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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a week away from the inauguration of Donald J. Trump as the 47th President of the United States of America, not only strategic allies and trading partners but also multilateral organisations and the UN system are bracing themselves for the certainty of unpredictability.  However, taking into consideration President Trump’s first term in office, his announcements on the campaign trail, his own personality, the nomination of personnel for positions of high relevance for the international system as well as the impact of the Republican trifecta and diminished checks and balances, a substantial re-positioning of the US within the international system can be expected.   The impact of the first Trump Administration Since the UN’s founding in 1945, the relationship between the US and the United Nations can at best be described as contradictory, which is largely the result of constant tensions between domestic considerations and foreign policy goals. As the leading advocate for a successor institution to the League of Nations, the US fundamentally shaped the objectives and values of the United Nations. This support, which had been driven by national interests, started to wane in the mid-70s when enlarged membership and the creation of the G77, a group of 77 developing countries, reduced US influence.  Although the US was a leading actor in the UN’s establishment, the UN has become a secondary platform of international cooperation. Various US administrations have engaged substantially with the UN system when it served national interests. However, domestic power constellations have frequently impeded any substantial engagement that has gone beyond financial contributions.1  However, Trump’s “America First” ideology stood out from his predecessors’ policies, and particularly conservative ones, in its obstructive approach to the United Nations and disdain towards institutions such as NATO, thus rebuking the closest allies of the US. Indifference and discord towards the United Nations not only damaged the institution but also the reputation of the US. President Trump’s unilateral “America First” policy and abject disregard for multilateral institutions damaged US legitimacy as a global leader and weakened the UN. Under Trump, the transactional nature of US engagement with the UN became obvious. As long as US interests were served, constructive engagement was applied.  US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley even managed to gain the support of China and Russia on a Security Council Resolution (SC/RES/2397) that would impose harsh sanctions on North Korea (DPRK).2 However, in other areas the dominance of national interests guided US policies at the UN during the Trump administration. In showing its unconditional support for Israel, the Trump administration cut all of the US’s funding from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and further reduced its potential role as mediator in the Middle East Peace Process.3 After accusing the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) of supporting coercive abortions and involuntary sterilisations in China without proof, the Trump administration cut all core funding for UNFPA and jeopardised many family planning programmes in developing countries.4 In the Security Council, the US position at times even aligned with Russia’s or China’s policy – particularly when other UNSC members tried to raise the nexus of climate change and security. This, as well as the US positions on the rights of victims of sexual violence in war and their reproductive health, further enhanced tensions with traditional Western allies. In addition, Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Climate Accords, the JCPOA5, the INF treaty6, and boycotted the UN Migration Pact7 negotiations.  However, the most obstructive political manoeuvres under President Trump have certainly been the scapegoating of the WHO and the labelling of the organisation as a Chinese puppet during the COVID-19 crisis, the suspension of funding for WHO, and the subsequent withdrawal from the UN body at the height of the pandemic. By doing so, the US squandered its reputation as a reliable partner and blocked any declaration by the UNSC on the pandemic for months.  Equally harmful was the US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights (HR) Council in 2018. Not only did the US abandon a platform for denouncing human rights violations worldwide, but its departure also allowed China to disseminate its own human rights narrative. Although autocratic regimes are regularly elected to the Council and use the opportunity to ensure their own HR violations are not addressed, the US withdrawal created a vacuum and took away a powerful ally for like-minded states, particularly the European Union (EU). In the HR Council, we see an increasingly assertive China, which previously only tried to shield its domestic situation from scrutiny, but which has now come up with its own interpretation of collective, developmental rights versus individual human rights. Swift action and a prepared agenda During his first term President Trump only slowly appointed key positions in foreign relations. It took him two years to appoint an Ambassador to Geneva, for example. His ambition to fundamentally cut financial support to the UN system found its limits in Congress. The US remained the world’s largest donor of development and humanitarian assistance. Even within in the Republican party and in conservative circles, particularly in the religious and evangelical constituencies the opinion prevailed that official development assistance still served the interests of the American people.  In January 2025, the situation is different. One of the first nominations of Donald Trump after his re-election in November has been Marco Rubio, as Secretary of State, and he appointed Republican Representative Elise Stefanik as his Ambassador to the United Nations in New York.  Senator Rubio has been known so far as a supporter of US global engagement as when it serves American economic interests and national security. He is hard on China and aims for more transparency and accountability in the aid sector. He supported the fight against Malaria and other preventable and treatable diseases in the past. Although a sigh of relief went through the development community when his name was circulated, it cannot be taken for granted that he will defend their interests against the MAGA dynamics in the party and administration. As with all Trump appointments, and considering experiences from the past, the question will always be how much autonomy can they preserve, and for how long will they endure in the system?8  Although Donald Trump distanced himself during the campaign from Project 2025, a blueprint for an incoming conservative administration by the Heritage Foundation, it is to be expected that those he has so far selected not only share the views on the multilateral order but also the criticism and preconceptions brought up against the institutions.  The frontline of Trump’s anticipated crusade against multilateral organizations might this time also include those who have been spared so far: World Bank, IMF, as well as the OECD. 9 In the case of others, he might continue where the end of his first term prevented further action or the Biden administration reversed the steps he had taken. Human Rights Council The latter has been the case of the Human Rights Council. In 2018 the Trump administration had been withdrawing from the Council arguing that it had become an “exercise in shameless hypocrisy – with many of the world’s worst human rights abuses going ignored, and some of the world’s most serious offenders sitting on the council itself.”10  In October 2021, the US got reelected to the Human Rights Council. In the context of its staunch support for Ukraine, the US became the driving force behind a Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine as well as on the creation of the Special Rapporteur on Russia. However, when its reelection came up again in October 2024, the Biden administration deliberately decided not to stand as a candidate. Although some observers argue that this decision has been taken in order to avoid a backlash from a majority of UN Member States who see the unwavering US position on the collateral implications for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights by Israel’s fight against Hamas and Hizbollah as a paramount example of double-standards. One could also argue that not being a sitting Member of the Human Rights Council at a time when the likelihood of another withdrawal is not too far away, reduces the reputational damage for the organization as well as for the standing of the US in the International System.  US Ambassadors to the United Nations in New York are generally Cabinet Members, thus directly involved in shaping policies. With Elise Stefanik, Trump has not only appointed a staunch supporter of Israel who has accused the UN of being “a den of antisemitism”11 but also a reliable anti-abortion proponent. Her positioning in New York will certainly influence dynamics in Geneva as well. And if Project 2025 is becoming the playbook that everybody expects it to be, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the US is a signatory might not remain the uncontested reference point anymore.  The U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights created during the first Trump administration by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, produced a report which is projected by Project 2025 as an important guidepost for bilateral and multilateral engagements on human rights.12 The report sets out to define which rights are ‘unalienable,’ elevating religious liberty and the right to private property, while dismissing rights the report calls “divisive social and political controversies,” including sexual and reproductive rights, LGBTI rights, and the right to non-discrimination.13  The intention of Project 2025 is not only to reevaluate all multilateral engagements by the US in the light of the work of the Commission on Unalienable Human Rights, but also to forge a consensus among like-minded countries in support of human life, women’s health, support of the family as the basic unit of human society, and defense of national sovereignty. In 2020, the Trump administration sponsored in the UN General Assembly the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and the Protection of the Family (A/75/626) for which it gained the support of 34 Member States, including those whose human rights and women rights track records are anything but clean: e.g. Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Pakistan.14  Taking into consideration initiatives like the Geneva Consensus, the in-coming Trump administration could besides of complete withdrawal also undermine Human Rights standards by introducing almost in a similar way as China is doing, new narratives. In this endeavour, the US could even find support amongst states who are normally staunch US critics but who will seize the moment and opportunity to dismantle the liberal rules-based order that they perceive as Western dominated anyway. World Trade Organisation (WTO) To avoid another blockage in the appointment of a WTO Director General in 2025 by the US, WTO members brought forward the re-election process of incumbent Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala by two months. President Trump had already in 2020 blocked her appointment, leaving the organisation without leadership for almost seven months.  From an “America first” perspective, “America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institutionally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO.”15 Thus, Project 2025 recommends to reform the WTO or to build a successor organisation and limiting its membership to liberal democracies. The main red-flag for the US at WTO certainly is the developing-country status of China in the WTO and the alleged infringements on US sovereignty – albeit ignoring the veto right the US has as the WTO is a consensus-based organisation.  However, and although Trump’s announced tariffs applied on friends and foes will be disruptive for the international trade system, one must highlight that also during the Biden administration, the US has not been a WTO member easy to engage. This held particularly true for the reform of the appellate body of the dispute settlement mechanism whose appointment process remains dysfunctional since the Obama administration. For the in-coming administration, trade is considered also as a tool for development. In this regard it does not differ too much from the reforms out-going USAID Administrator, Samantha Power, had tried to initiate.16 And it could be an area where WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who is seen as particularly focused on the development aspects of trade, and the Trump administration could perhaps find a common ground. Humanitarian and development assistance Humanitarian assistance that already faces substantial funding gaps will certainly face new vulnerabilities with the in-coming Trump administration. Despite substantial reductions which already kicked in in 2022, the US remains the largest donor for UN agencies such as the World Food Programme (2023: 36.53% of total WFP came from US); UNHCR (2023: 38.93%); and OCHA (2023: 19.9%). Although humanitarian aid and particularly funding for food security (WFP was run by the Trump ally, David Beasley) was not contentious during Trump’s first administration, this might change. According to Max Primorac who had been Deputy Administrator of USAID during Trump’s first term, and is the author of the Project 2025 chapter on the Agency for International Development, “’emergency’ aid distorts humanitarian responses, worsens corruption in the countries we support, and exacerbates the misery of those we intend to help.[...] humanitarian aid is sustaining war economies, creating financial incentives for warring parties to continue fighting, discouraging governments from reforming, and propping up malign regimes. Nefarious actors reap billions of dollars in profits from diversions of our humanitarian assistance, but so do international organizations.”17 While criticizing the overheads international agencies have to charge in order to deliver aid in emergency situations, Trump affiliated development experts highly advocate for localisation – albeit in a slightly different fashion as progressive voices would do. The quest of the latter for enhanced equity, inclusion, and ownership of local organizations from project design to implementation remains disregarded while a case is built for aid delivery by faith-based organisations. Although enhancing the inclusion of local organizations for the right reasons is laudable, it certainly will not diminish the need for strong oversight and staff capacities on donor level. One reason why multilateral and international organisations are often used as a type of “middlemen” in aid delivery relates to the lean project management structures in Foreign and Development Ministries these days and the need for accountability mechanisms where taxpayers’ money is spent.  Drawing on the visions presented by Project 2025, development assistance under the in-coming Trump administration will have a strong focus on countering Chinese influence and will align foreign and developmental with anti-abortion policies. What is labelled as “Protecting life in Foreign Assistance”18 will inter alia reintroduce the “global gag rule” which prohibits US funding to organisations abroad that provide abortion services or information. Trump had already in his first term expanded the interpretation of it to the “Protecting Life in Global Health Policy”, and it is expected that he will include now humanitarian and development assistance as well – making it extremely difficult to assess what is included under these new rules and what not.19 In this context it is almost a given that Trump will cut again all funding for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) as its reproductive health services worldwide are a red-flag.20 Although UNFPA has gotten used to budget cuts by conservative US governments over the years, loosing 11% of its budget (2023) would not be easy to compensate for. World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNAIDS During the Covid-19 pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) became a prime target for President Trump who inter alia accused the organisation of being too close to China and its handling of the early stages of the outbreak.21 He initiated a process to withdraw the US from it – a move that has been immediately reversed by his successor President Biden. Also for WHO, the US is currently the largest donor of assessed and voluntary contributions totalling 15.59% (2023).22 But with the negotiations of the Pandemic Treaty still underway, and the possibility for states to challenge the finalised amendments of the International Health Regulations until July 2025, it is much more at stake for WHO than just the financial implications of a disruptive relationship with the next Trump administration. With the nomination of Robert Francis Kennedy (RFK) Jr as the new Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the global health community is on high alert. On his campaign trail for president, RFK Jr. had already proclaimed to stop the pandemic treaty, as has done President elect Trump. In addition, RFK Jr has linked vaccines to autism, called the Covid-19 vaccines deadly, supports anti-vaccine organisations, and even questioned the proven fact that HIV causes AIDS.23 When 77 Nobel Laureates urged the US Senate in December 2024 to reject the nomination of RFK Jr.24, WHO Director General Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus called for a “wait and see” attitude. He and his team are looking for areas where it might be possible to engage the Trump administration and its new HHS secretary. One area could be the epidemic of non-communicable diseases faced by Americans and which is often cited by RFK Jr. who advocates for enhanced prevention by healthier diets, environments and an active lifestyle.25  Health security has in the past always been a matter of common concern, and parties were able to work across the aisle. However, polarisation has also become a characteristic feature here. With a trifecta in place, the majority of Republicans in the House as well as in the Senate could become an issue of survival for programs such as PEPFAR. Already this year, PEPFAR, the US global flagship initiative in the fight against HIV/AIDS that had been established under Republican President George W. Bush in 2003, failed to secure bipartisan support for a full, five-year legislative reauthorization. After conservative groups had launched a campaign accusing without evidence the Biden administration to use PEPFAR money for abortions, the program only secured a temporary one-year reauthorization until March 2025.26 PEPFAR funding (6.5 billion USD in 2024) is comprised of U.S. bilateral funding and U.S. contributions to multilateral organizations addressing HIV, primarily the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund: 1.65 billion USD from PEPFAR) and UNAIDS. Particularly the latter would be severely impacted if funding would get further reduced. In 2024 UNAIDS received 50 million USD from PEPFAR27 making the US its largest donor. Personality, Ideology and Money – a toxic cocktail For most UN Agencies, Funds and Programs the US is the largest contributor in assessed and voluntary contributions. 22% of the UN budget are financed by assessed US contributions. With voluntary contributions counted in, this figure amounted in 2023 to 27.9%.28 Thus, the UN leadership is bracing itself for the worst-case scenarios. However, scraping the bottom of the barrel at times when other donors are equally becoming reluctant in financing multilateral and developmental programs, is only sustainable in the short term. In addition, the much-lamented growing influence of autocratic states such as China will only grow further when the US is creating once again a vacuum that will be filled with pleasure by its adversaries. During the first Trump administration’s withdrawal from multilateralism, the EU and EU Member States were stepping up their engagement and managed in many cases to fill the void.  To preserve a rules-based multilateral order, European governments need to be prepared not only to contribute to the empty coffers of UN institutions but also to take on a leadership role and to forge new alliances with states who are still sharing the same values. In the future, Russia will not remain the only disruptor on the multilateral parquet and China will not be the only country trying to create new narratives around human rights. By disengaging from multilateral arrangements and disregarding established collective norms, the next Trump Presidency will certainly have a negative impact on the social fabric of international cooperation.  But this should not come to us as a surprise. Multilateralism needs as a minimum requirement moral commitment to the established principles of collective decision-making, including the precondition of pacta sunt servanda. Multilateralism strives for inclusive decision-making and equality amongst those sitting around the table. Multilateralism lives on tolerance for the point-of-view of others, and the acceptance of compromises for the sake of mutual benefits. In the transactional, zero-sum world of Donald Trump neither compromise, reciprocity nor empathy are part of the vocabulary. “America First” reflects his personality and illustrates a perceived incompatibility between US national interests and multilateral engagement.29  To keep up a rules-based international order in a geo-political era of manifold crisis, like-minded states and above all Europeans have to step up their action to preserve what they treasure. Despite all the headwinds coming out of Washington, DC starting January 20th, multilateralism is not doomed to fail without US engagement. Power relations will certainly change but it must be Europe’s core interest to safeguard its influence in shaping the global order. References 1 Ostheimer, Andrea E.: The United Nations and Global Multilateral Organisations as a Playground for American-Chinese Rivalry, in: New Realities of Multilateralism, Panorama 2022, pp. 7-26.[ Panorama 2022_01_Multilateralism_cover_v3_crop.indd https://www.kas.de/documents/288143/21303801/Panorama+2022+New+Realities+of+Multilateralism.pdf/d2ed886c-83fa-6423-90b8-eeaa48ef8620?version=1.0&t=1668409843028 ].  2 Runde, Daniel F.: Competing and Winning in the Multilateral System. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 2020, p 4. [ https://www.csis.org/analysis/competing-andwinning-multilateral-system-us-leadership-united-nations ]. 3 Amr, Hady. 7 September 2018. Brookings. [ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from chaos/2018/09/07/in-one-move-trump-eliminated-us-funding-for-unrwa-and-the-us-role-as-mideast-peacemaker/ ].  4 Morello, Carl. 4 April 2017. The Washington Post. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/trump-administration-to-eliminate-its-funding-for-un-population-fundover-abortion/2017/04/04/d8014bc0-1936-11e7-bcc2-7d1a0973e7b2_story.html]. 5 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) had been an accord that restricted the Iranian nuclear program to mere peaceful usage.  6 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had limited the type of weapons systems the signatories, US and Russia could pursue.  7 The Global Compact for Safe, https://www.iom.int/resources/global-compact-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration/res/73/195 Orderly and Regular Migration is the first intergovernmental agreement covering all dimensions of international migration. It is a non-legally binding, cooperative framework that upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law. 8 Saldinger, Adva; Igoe, Michael: “We can work with him: Aid advocates react to Trump’s Rubio pick”, 14 November 2024, [‘We can work with him’: Aid advocates react to Trump’s Rubio pick | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/we-can-work-with-him-aid-advocates-react-to-trump-s-rubio-pick-108752 ]  9 Klingebiel, Stephan; Baumann, Max-Otto: Trump 2.0. in time of political upheaval? Implications of a possible second presidency for international politics and Europe, IDOS Policy Brief, No 24/2024, [https://doi.org/10.23661/ipb24.2024]. 10 Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, 19 June 2028 [Remarks on the UN Human Rights Council - U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/06/21/remarks-on-the-un-human-rights-council/ ]  11 Elise Stefanik cited in King, Ryan; Spector, David, New York Post, 20 November 2024, [ICYMI: New York Post: Elise Stefanik vows to take on ‘den of antisemitism’ and ‘apologist for Iran’ at the UN | Press Releases | Congresswoman Elise Stefanik https://stefanik.house.gov/2024/11/icymi-new-york-post-elise-stefanik-vows-to-take-on-den-of-antisemitism-and-apologist-for-iran-at-the-un ].  12 2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf  13 Commission on Unalienable Rights | https://bidenhumanrightspriorities.amnestyusa.org/commission-on-unalienable-rights/  14 n2034430.pdf https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n20/344/30/pdf/n2034430.pdf  15 Navarro, Peter: The case for fair trade, Project 2025, [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-26.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-26.pdf ] 16 90% of USAID funding from US Congress is earmarked and dedicated to basic sectors such as health care, education and agriculture. At the start of the Biden administration only 5% of USAID’s budget went into economic growth programs. Miolene, Elissa: How economic growth became a forgotten priority at USAID, 10 December 2024, [How economic growth became a forgotten priority at USAID | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/how-economic-growth-became-a-forgotten-priority-at-usaid-108911#:~:text=At%20the%20start%20of%20the,lack%20of%20focus%20surprised%20her. ]  17 Primorac, Max: The Agency for International Development, Project 2025 [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf ].  18 [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf ] 19 Igoe, Michael: What we do and don’t know about Trump’s US aid plans, 15 November 2024, [What we do and don't know about Trump's US aid plans | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/what-we-do-and-don-t-know-about-trump-s-us-aid-plans-108719 ]  20 Lynch, Colum: Will Trump gut UN family planning funds….again?, 31 October 2024, [Will Trump gut UN family planning funds ... again? | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/will-trump-gut-un-family-planning-funds-again-108655 ] 21 Coronavirus: what are President Trump’s charges against WHO?, BBC Fact Check, 8 July 2020, Coronavirus: What are President Trump's charges against the WHO? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52294623   22 WHO | Programme Budget Web Portal https://open.who.int/2022-23/contributors/top25  23 Lei Ravelo, Jenny: Will RFK Jr. ‘go wild’ on global health?, 4 December 2024, [Will RFK Jr. ‘go wild’ on global health? | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/will-rfk-jr-go-wild-on-global-health-108837 ]. 24 Nobel laureates oppose RFK Jr.'s confirmation to HHS https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/5031298-nobel-laureates-oppose-rfk-jr/  25 Fletcher, Elaine Ruth: ‘Give them some space’: WHO Director General on Trump Nomination of RFK Jr as US Health Secretary, 11 December 2024, [‘Give Them Some Space’: WHO Director General On Trump Nomination Of RFK Jr As US Health Secretary - Health Policy Watch https://healthpolicy-watch.news/give-them-some-space-who-director-general-comments-on-trump-nomination-of-rfk-jr-as-us-health-secretary/ ]  26 Igoe, Michael: PEPFAR chief warns waning political will could hurt AIDS fight, 22 July 2024, [PEPFAR chief warns waning political will could hurt AIDS fight | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/pepfar-chief-warns-waning-political-will-could-hurt-aids-fight-107022 ] 27 The U.S. Government and the World Health Organization | KFF https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-and-the-world-health-organization/#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20in%20the%20previous%20budget%20period%20(2022%2D2023,totaled%20%2428.1%20million%20(0.4%25).  28 Revenue by Government donor | United Nations – CEB https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-government-donor  29 Loewener, Franca/Cook, Justin D.: Trump re-elected. How the Trump Doctrine reshapes US multilateral engagement and global influence. 12.11.2024 [Publication - OI] https://observatoire-multilateralisme.fr/publications/trump-reelected-how-the-trump-doctrine-reshapes-us-multilateral-engagement-and-global-influence/  The text of this work is licensed under the terms of by "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike same conditions 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The countries of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States continue to strengthen their sovereignty and their alignment with Pan-African values and a multipolar world. This development has deeply unsettled Western regimes and their agents on the African continent. The growing integration of the member states of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States (Alliance-Confédération des Etats du Sahel, AES) – namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – has reached a new level. The regional Pan-African organisation now has its own logo and motto. The motto is particularly symbolic: One Territory, One People, One Destiny. Today, Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey are not only reviving the dreams of the forefathers of Pan-African values but are also bringing to life the aspirations of great African leaders and millions of African citizens. In doing so, they are giving additional momentum to these projects. Naturally, this does not sit well with the puppets and subcontractors of the Western planetary minority on the continent, nor with their masters. The AES Project: A Nightmare for the West When the Alliance of Sahel States was established – now formalised as a confederation of three nations within the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) – the interests of the Western planetary minority suffered a significant blow, not only in the Sahel but across the African continent. This shift was reflected in the neighbouring state of Chad’s decision to demand the withdrawal of the French military contingent. At the same time, public sentiment in several African nations has increasingly called for the removal of the remnants of Western neocolonialism from their lands. But the setbacks for French and Western interests did not end there. Senegal, whose authorities have yet to fully determine their strategic direction in foreign policy, also announced the conclusion of French military presence on its soil. Most ironically, even in Côte d’Ivoire – where one of the last openly pro-Western regimes in Africa remains in power – statements have been made suggesting that French troops will eventually leave the country. However, in Côte d’Ivoire, this move appears more like a tactical manoeuvre aimed at temporarily appeasing the widespread anti-French and anti-Western sentiment among a large segment of the population. Meanwhile, in the same Côte d’Ivoire, the military presence of the leader of the Western bloc – the Washington regime – continues to expand. Nevertheless, in all these processes, there is no doubt today that the AES countries, allies of Russia and the multipolar world, have played and will continue to play a key role. They enjoy the support of millions, not only among the citizens of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger but also across many other countries in the region and Africa as a whole. Notably, in addition to the military and economic alliance of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States, the union is becoming significantly stronger in the media and information space. Recently, the communication ministers of the three countries approved the creation of a joint union internet television platform, as well as a shared television channel and radio station. This is a highly strategic decision that will enable maximum outreach, covering urban populations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and neighbouring states, as well as the African diaspora living abroad. Crucially, it also aims to reach residents of remote rural regions, where radio often remains the most effective means of accessing information. The plan has been thoroughly thought out, leaving no detail overlooked. Importantly, the AES countries are also taking effective measures to counter Western propaganda. It is no coincidence that amidst these developments, anxiety is growing not only among Western powers – unable to dismantle the genuinely Pan-African AES alliance – but also within regional structures such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), where pro-Western interests remain strong. It is worth recalling that the AES member states announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS at the beginning of last year. However, ECOWAS has been reluctant to lose such significant members and is actively trying to persuade them to reconsider their decision. AES as a Reliable Ally of a Multipolar World Order Regional structures like ECOWAS, where Western influence still wields significant power, are acutely aware that African public opinion is largely not in their favour. The continued rise of AES could logically lead to a scenario where former ECOWAS members seek membership in AES. Consequently, this may eventually result in the dissolution of organisations like ECOWAS. In this context, those in Africa who still serve the neocolonial interests of the Western planetary minority understand their fate well. They recognise that there will be no place for them in the new African realities of a multipolar world. However, this does not mean that supporters of the multipolar world order can afford to become complacent. Quite the contrary. Given the radically revanchist sentiments of Western-NATO regimes, which are losing not only geopolitical influence in Africa but also their near-cost-free access to Africa’s strategic resources, and considering the growing unease among Western puppets and subcontractors on the continent who fear being left without a role, it is essential to remain fully prepared to counter any new attempts at Western destabilisation. Supporters of the multipolar world must continue their advance. Today, the position of Pan-African and multipolar world advocates in Africa is stronger than ever. This is partly due to the presence of patriotic leaders – in the case of AES, military officers guided by the hopes and expectations of their citizens. It is also bolstered by strategic support from Russia and China, leading forces of the multipolar world order. Moreover, the mass mobilisation of civil society and African youth plays a critical role – a force against which Soros-linked and other Western agents of chaos remain utterly powerless.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The meeting held on 6 December in Auckland, the second session of the “2+2 Format” established earlier this year, involving the foreign and defence ministers of both Australia and New Zealand, marked an important milestone in the rapidly advancing development of all aspects of bilateral relations. The Foreign Policy of New Zealand’s Conservative Government This process has become particularly evident since the conservative National Party government assumed power in New Zealand at the beginning of 2023. A few clarifications are warranted in this context. Firstly, the current government, led by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and representing the NPNZ (New Zealand National Party), officially took office in January 2023. However, it initially functioned as a caretaker government, succeeding the Labour administration under Jacinda Ardern, who had resigned prematurely. This interim status lasted until November 2023, when it shed the “caretaker” label following the general election held the previous month. It is worth noting that the NPNZ-led coalition’s victory was far from decisive, necessitating complex negotiations with a minor party to retain power. Secondly, it would be inaccurate to suggest that New Zealand entirely disregarded the foreign policy concerns of other Anglophone nations in past decades, including under Labour governments. For instance, Wellington has consistently remained a member of the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence-sharing cooperative among five Anglo-Saxon countries. However, until the conservative government came to power, New Zealand appeared to make every effort to ensure that the significant deterioration in international relations, which began at the end of the previous decade, had no adverse effect on its relations with China. Nevertheless, the global restructuring process initiated in the second half of 2019 (notably marked by the Skripal affair) inevitably impacted New Zealand, particularly given its location in the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the focal point of the current phase of the “Great Game”. Bilateral Engagements in Relations with Australia New Zealand’s involvement in the aforementioned global restructuring is primarily occurring within the surrounding region of the vast Indo-Pacific area. Naturally, the country’s leadership has prioritised its relations with Australia, its closest partner in every respect. Within two months of shedding its “caretaker” status, New Zealand’s government, alongside its Australian counterparts, inaugurated the “2+2 Format” platform for foreign and defence ministers. The first session of this format took place on 1 February of this year in Melbourne. The mere existence of such a platform underscores the particularly close and trusting relationship between the two nations. However, the intention for closer bilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues was signalled six months earlier, during the first session of a separate “2+2 Format” involving finance and environment ministers, held in Wellington on 8 June 2023. This platform was subsequently convened for the second time on 30 July 2024 in Brisbane, Australia. Both sessions concluded with a “Joint Statement”. From the perspective of the evolving Indo-Pacific situation, special attention should be given to the second session of the defence and foreign policy “2+2 Format”, held on 6 December in Auckland. The key points of the document adopted at the session can be reviewed here. Notably, the title of the first chapter, “The Australia-New Zealand Alliance”, stands out. This chapter opens with an acknowledgment of the “natural, neighbourly, and formalised” bond between the two nations. The final element of this statement is confirmed by a significant reference to the ANZUS trilateral military-political treaty (involving the United States), which was adopted back in 1951, during the height of the Cold War. It is worth noting that until the signing of the document under discussion in Auckland, the very existence of ANZUS was likely remembered by few. This is not surprising, as for decades, international treaty reference guides consistently noted that, although ANZUS had not been formally dissolved, the United States and New Zealand had long ceased to maintain an alliance in practice. This situation stems from New Zealand’s 1984 declaration as a nuclear-free country, which resulted in the closure of its ports to American vessels with nuclear propulsion systems, even if they did not necessarily carry nuclear weapons at the time. By contrast, Japan, despite a similar “three non-nuclear principles” policy, has never taken such a step. Following the 1984 decision, which effectively marked the withdrawal of one participant from this tripartite alliance, the remaining two members restructured it to suit new conditions. However, with the end of the Cold War, even its bilateral format barely showed signs of activity. This continued until the latter half of the previous decade, a period when the world seemingly turned upside down. During this time, the Australian government, led by the conservative coalition under Scott Morrison, adopted a policy of sharply intensifying military-political ties with allies. This course has been largely upheld by the current Labour government under Anthony Albanese, which has also accelerated the development of comprehensive relations with its new ally, Japan. Canberra is also closely monitoring another key regional player: India. In summary, a particularly noteworthy development occurred on 6 December of this year in Auckland, New Zealand, when viewed from the perspective of assessing the evolving situation in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). New Zealand Increases Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region The meeting held on that day fits into the broader trend of New Zealand’s comprehensive engagement in the region, following Australia’s example. Indeed, the main aspects of this trend are mentioned in the final document adopted in Auckland. During his visit to Australia in August of this year, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced his country’s intention to join the AUKUS pact (Australia-United Kingdom-United States), specifically its “Pillar II,” which focuses on the development of cutting-edge military technologies. The “Pillar I” of AUKUS, by contrast, deals with the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Japan and the Republic of Korea are also potential candidates to join AUKUS Pillar II. However, due to internal turmoil in South Korea, Japan currently remains the more likely candidate. Incidentally, in June of this year, Christopher Luxon made a three-day visit to Japan. A government communiqué regarding the trip and his discussions with then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted the shared intention to develop various aspects of bilateral relations. This clearly signals a shift in New Zealand’s trajectory away from the popular (and to some extent accurate) stereotype of the country as a sleepy geopolitical backwater that also enjoys economic prosperity. This image has seemingly been satisfactory for New Zealanders until now. However, the geopolitical storms raging worldwide have inevitably reached even this distant nation. As New Zealand becomes increasingly involved in global disputes, it faces the prospect of previously unfamiliar challenges arriving on its shores. Finally, it is essential to note that the above developments weigh heavily on the negative side of the scale when assessing the current situation in the IPR. This does not mean, however, that there are no positive counterweights, albeit fewer in number. These positive elements suggest that the main players (at least for now) maintain control over the unfolding dynamics in the region. This is no small achievement in a world order that appears to be in upheaval.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Western missteps in Africa are creating an opening for Russia to deepen its influence. Recent protests against International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed austerity measures have rocked several African states. Kenya, a long-time partner of the United States and a key contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti, experienced violent clashes between government security forces and anti-austerity protestors over tax hikes in a controversial finance bill. Simultaneously, many protesters saw Kenyan engagement in Haiti as footing the bill for American security interests while ordinary Kenyans struggled to make ends meet. Soon after, similar protests against IMF measures spread to Nigeria. Analysts and locals are concerned that spreading protests may threaten stability across Africa. Citizens of other countries continue to voice their displeasure with the political and economic status quo through protest (in Mozambique) and at the ballot box (in Botswana). IMF loans come with significant stipulations, including reforms to financial systems and governance. Critics of these conditions frequently malign the IMF as a violator of sovereignty. Changes to economic and governing models, combined with high debts and economic stress, increase the costs of everyday products and diminish purchasing power across the continent. To many ordinary citizens, the West is benefiting from the fruit of African resources while hindering Africans’ access to the global economy. Publics in these countries demand alternatives to IMF funding, protesting governments to oppose IMF-imposed austerity. Youth, an increasingly important demographic, are especially active. Many of these young people are college-educated but fail to secure adequately paid employment in skilled industries. The informal economy is growing but increasingly separated from formal and international economies. IMF austerity measures are driving the continent to economic crisis and protest that may have lasting effects anathema to US foreign policy and the liberal international order. Some already see China as a viable alternative, although public opinion of Chinese influence is mixed. Elsewhere, faded Cold War memories make Russia a relatively unknown economic and political alternative. So, while recent Western actions in Africa have put long term relationships at risk, Russia is slowly increasing its influence on the continent. In fact, the Kremlin has already taken action and is engaged in the politics surrounding the various debt crises in African nations. African countries owe debts to multiple international actors, including Russia. However, Moscow has forgiven debts owed by many of these countries, coupling debt relief with additional economic benefits, including an influx of grains and energy resources. It has also deepened defense cooperation with several African countries. This cooperation often includes contracts for weapons sales and the deployment of irregular military units, including the Wagner Group. Diplomatic actions such as the above have led some protestors to see Russia as a viable alternative to IMF funding and partnerships with the US and Europe. In a visual representation of this phenomenon, protestors have been seen waving Russian flags at mass gatherings across Africa. Russia appears to receive the greatest support in the Sahel, where governments have failed to curb political instability and deliver on economic development promises. Publics in the region were already angry with the continued postcolonial military presence of France, and Russia took advantage. Mass publics are not the only actors seeking alternatives, ruling elites also see Russia as an attractive partner. Russian defense cooperation and the presence of irregular forces bolster these regimes in the face of increasing civilian protests over poor governance or human rights. Still, Russia has not yet made the gains it could. The war in Ukraine is hurting Africans and contributing to economic stress as global grain prices have skyrocketed. Some perceive Russia as exacerbating the problems of failed governance through its use of Wagner Group formations to back corrupt officials, protect corporate interests, and bolster unpopular governments. Russian interest in the region is also less significant than in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or the Arctic, where Russia has more proximate strategic, economic, and political goals. Rather than rushing in, Russia’s economic presence in Africa is slowly advancing Moscow’s goals on the international stage. When Russia sought to undermine financial, technological, and energy sanctions from the West as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, it turned to Africa to find new consumers for food products, energy, and arms. Already, in the wake of the invasion, only half of the continent voted to condemn Russia. Such voting patterns at the UN indicate greater support for Russia in Africa than in other regions around the world, even if distrust of Russia remains high in some parts of the continent. Forecasted crises could increase Russian influence on the continent as well. Shocks generated by the African debt crisis could become a proximate cause for geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts. Rapid demographic changes and disastrous climate events (e.g., droughts and floods) exacerbate existing economic and migratory challenges. Since the tentacles of Russian economic and security influence, as well as misinformation, are already present in Africa, such future crises could pull multiple African states further into Russian orbit, and away from Western countries and institutions. Further alignment of African states with Russia would have several drawbacks. Russia would discourage democratization and use security assistance to bolster dictators across the continent. Environmentally sustainable development is also likely to be hampered. Russia may increase the extraction of natural resources in environmentally damaging ways. Additionally, Russian energy exports will be oil and gas, eroding the already significant investment and progress in green energy development many African political economies have made. As Western missteps create openings for Russia to gain a foothold in Africa, they also set the stage for other global powers to capitalize on the vacuum. Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa also contributed to debt burdens, but unlike Western approaches tied to IMF austerity measures, China is recalibrating its strategy. By shifting to smaller projects with lower debt exposure and promoting green energy development overseas, China positions itself as a more appealing partner. This strategy not only bolsters China’s domestic solar and EV industries but also enhances its soft power by responding to local economic needs. Moreover, as Western policy blunders alienate African publics and governments, both Russia’s and China’s influence may grow. Russia’s gains in the region could indirectly strengthen China’s position by fostering broader skepticism of Western-led systems, aligning African leaders more closely with Beijing’s geopolitical goals, including its stance on Taiwan. Africa is a burgeoning continent. One in four humans will be African by 2050. If the US and Europe pass on opportunities to engage with a continent of emerging green development powers and an increasingly educated demographic bulge, Western policies will undermine their own power and influence in the international order. Russia’s quiet increase in trade and security assistance offers an established alternative. Meaning ultimately, both Russia and China, may play the long game, gaining incremental support from a region of one billion people at a time. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has claimed that he could end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of taking office. He now calls for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and the beginning of negotiations. However, history shows that what cannot be achieved on the battlefield is unlikely to be obtained at the negotiating table. Immediate ceasefire of the Ukraine war could be a double-edged sword for the United States under the current circumstances. Russia occupies significant Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and parts of Zaporizhzhia, amounting to approximately 18% of Ukraine’s territory. Ukraine has made incursions into the Russian regions of Belgorod and Bryansk, only amounting to less than 1% of Russia’s total territory. How can both sides achieve their goals at the negotiating table?  Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg suggests ending the war by halting weapon supplies to Ukraine if it refuses to engage in peace talks — and increasing weapon deliveries to Ukraine if Russia fails to do the same. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire deal with Russia, proposing that the status of occupied territories could be addressed diplomatically at a later stage. This reflects Ukraine’s constrained position under various pressures. Russia is open to a peace talk but is unlikely to make a huge compromise with Ukraine. Despite NATO’s extensive support, sufficient military resources such as ammunition and air defense systems have not been provided to enable Ukraine to effectively counter Russian advances and produce decisive outcomes in strategic offensives due to unclear strategic objectives and effective implementation measures.   Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies have not crippled the Russian economy as intended; instead, the Russian economy grew by 3.1% in the third quarter of 2024, and its national debt remains at 14.6% of GDP—approximately the same level as when the war began in 2022.  In 2023, Russia spent $160 billion on military needs, accounting for about 40% of its budget. For 2025, Russia has already allocated 13.5 trillion rubles (over $145 billion) for national defense, representing 32.5% of the budget. With support from North Korea, Iran, China, and other countries, Russia is likely to sustain its efforts on Ukrainian soil. In contrast, Ukraine is unlikely to achieve a decisive victory in the short term. If its allies continue with the current strategy while reducing financial aid, Ukraine risks depleting its resources and prolonging the conflict into an unpredictable stalemate, potentially leaving it at a disadvantage during negotiations. Without doubt, an immediate ceasefire could help stop further casualties and bring some much-needed relief to the people affected by the conflict. It can also ease the immediate burden of supporting Ukraine militarily and financially, freeing resources for domestic priorities and addressing other international challenges, particularly countering China’s challenges. However, an immediate ceasefire according to the current battlefield map could also benefit U.S. rivals—authoritarian regimes. First, it would solidify Russia’s control over occupied territories, allowing Moscow to claim a partial victory and bolster domestic support. Such an outcome rewards territorial aggression and undermines international norms. Second, it could weaken the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, signaling to adversaries that aggression can succeed if sustained long enough. European allies might interpret a ceasefire as a sign of wavering U.S. resolve, leading to fractures within NATO and weakening transatlantic unity. Allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, may question the reliability of U.S. security commitments in the region. Third, China has been closely watching the West’s response to the Ukraine crisis, focusing on the cohesion of alliances, the impact of sanctions, and the dynamics of military support. An immediate freeze of the war would demonstrate limited Western resolve and suggest that territorial aggression can yield lasting gains. This reinforces Beijing’s belief that the international community would hesitate to intervene militarily in Taiwan and encourages China to change the status quo over the Taiwan Strait, believing it can manage economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. Fourth, an immediate ceasefire does not guarantee long-term peace. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement leaves underlying issues unaddressed, and it merely postpones hostilities, making the prospect of sustainable peace elusive. Historically, frozen conflicts like those in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Moldova’s Transnistria have fostered prolonged instability, enabling aggressors to consolidate control over occupied territories and exert leverage over affected states. The lesson from Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea demonstrates that tolerating an aggressor only encourages further expansion of their ambitions. Instead of an immediate ceasefire agreement, it is necessary to further support Ukraine in reclaiming its territory by changing the current strategy before reaching any cease-fire deal. Historical patterns show that successful territorial recaptures often require asserting military strength before engaging in peace talks. A cease-fire without the necessary restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty risks legitimizing Russia’s invasion. A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could not only enhance Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations but also serve as a powerful deterrent against future territorial ambitions by other authoritarian regimes globally. The United States will not compromise American national interests when mediating a cease-fire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. However, it will be an extremely challenging task for any American president to broker a peace deal at this time because a deal should uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and internationally recognized borders, align with U.S. support for a rules-based international order, and ensure a balance between both parties instead of rewarding Russian aggression. It should strengthen U.S.-European relations rather than undermine allied unity, adhere to longstanding U.S. foreign policy principles rather than prioritize political gains, and enhance the U.S.’s reputation as a reliable global leader. Otherwise, immediately freezing the war could potentially harm U.S. national interests in the long term and directly encourage the ambitions of aggressors worldwide. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. 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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now? One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad. But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers. What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham? Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad. The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world. In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.” The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.” This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid. Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria. Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success? Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia. Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria. The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war. It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold. This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics. Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally. How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria? To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations. Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement. This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services. Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups. Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses. In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government. This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups. In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs. Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests. Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off. What does the US think of the group and al-Golani? The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions. Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani. However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list. What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader? First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad. But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies. First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large. This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws. Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups. Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity. Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country. However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support. Sections of this article were first published in an article for The Conversation on Dec. 2, 2024.