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2024 looks set to be an even more perilous year than 2023 on the Korean Peninsula as nuclear threat and counter threat have escalated even further since the beginning of January. On New Year’s Day, South Korea’s defence ministry repeated previous threats to destroy the North Korean “regime” if it uses nuclear weapons. This was a response to North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un’s speech the day before in which he told his military to prepare for possible war. Since then, Kim has said he has given up on the idea of peaceful reunification with South Korea designating it a hostile state and again warned of possible war. In the past week alone, Kim has called for a change in the constitution to designate Seoul as Pyongyang’s “primary foe” and a confidence building military agreement with the South agreed in 2018 has started to fall apart as the South Korean armed forces resumed frontline aerial surveillance in the wake of North Korean artillery exercises near a South Korean island on the maritime border between the two states. The expected change in the constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea’s official name) follows an amendment last year that enshrined nuclear weapons in it. This week has also seen the North testing what it says is a solid-fuelled hypersonic missile and an underwater nuclear drone in response to what some observers say is the largest ever joint naval exercise between South Korea, the United States and Japan. Analysts believe Pyongyang is developing both so-called strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in order to deter the US which is committed to use nuclear weapons in South Korea’s defence. North Korea has been testing more and more advanced ballistic missiles and warheads, some with the range to reach the US and has also said it is developing ship-launched cruise missiles, while the Americans have been mounting repeated shows of force including military exercises using nuclear-capable aircraft and the visit of a nuclear-armed submarine to South Korea. Last year, the US and South Korea agreed to increase their cooperation on the planning for the use of nuclear weapons following earlier statements by South Korean President, Yoon Suk Yeol, that suggested Seoul might develop its own nuclear weapons. Yoon has since cooled talk of acquiring nuclear weapons, but the debate continues in policy circles. Another escalatory move has been increasing military cooperation between the US, South Korea, and Japan, which also endorses the use of American nuclear weapons in its defence. In the light of this, some analysts see the Korean Peninsula as the most dangerous nuclear flashpoint in a world that currently has no shortage of conflict involving nuclear-armed states in Ukraine and Gaza. Alicia Sanders-Zakre, ICAN’s Policy and Research Coordinator, called for restraint on all sides: “Inflammatory nuclear rhetoric and threats, accompanied by military exercises and weapons tests, ramp up tensions and bring us closer to the brink of catastrophe. All nuclear-armed states, including North Korea and the US, as well as those allied on nuclear policies, such as Japan and South Korea, need to take urgent steps to de-escalate tensions and to break free from the dangerous doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a crucial step to delegitimise nuclear deterrence and eliminate nuclear weapons.” North Korea uses the same justification for its actions as the US, and the other declared nuclear-armed states. Just like Washington, Pyongyang says it is committed to disarmament, but argues the security threats it faces mean it needs nuclear weapons to deter its enemies. The doctrine of deterrence is based on the threat to use nuclear weapons with all the catastrophic consequences that would entail for the whole world. As the states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) declared at their recent meeting in New York: “the renewed advocacy, insistence on and attempts to justify nuclear deterrence as a legitimate security doctrine gives false credence to the value of nuclear weapons for national security and dangerously increases the risk of horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.” The TPNW is growing in strength and has just welcomed its 70th state party while a further 27 countries are signatories. These states recognise that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is a global imperative and they are showing responsible leadership by championing the treaty as the best way to end the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons.

The EU should try to attract more business from Taiwan, though Taiwan’s January 2024 election hasn’t made the job easier Taiwan’s economy has transformed since 2016 under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In particular, the Taiwanese economy has diversified away from mainland China, while reliance on semiconductors is now even more acute than eight years ago. In elections in January, the DPP won the presidency for a third term but lost overall control of Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan. In contrast to the previous two terms, the DPP therefore needs to agree policy, including economic policy, with other parties. this could signal a softer approach in relation to the continuation of diversification away from the mainland. Ongoing diversification Mainland China remains Taiwan’s biggest export and investment destination, despite the share of Taiwan’s exports that go to China reducing from 40 percent on average between 2016 and 2019 to 35 percent in 2023 (Figure 1). This has happened even though Taiwan signed a free trade agreement with mainland China in 2010 – the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – which at the time led to an increase in Taiwanese exports to the mainland. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 also triggered a sharp increase as the rest of the world entered a deep recession, but the trend has not lasted. Since 2021, the share of Taiwanese exports going to the mainland has dropped significantly, influenced by US export controls on high-end semiconductors, with a clear knock-on effect on Taiwanese exporters.   Taiwanese FDI into mainland China has also shrunk rapidly, from 65 percent of total Taiwanese FDI on average from 2008-2016 to 34 percent on average from 2017-2023 (Figure 2). The difference between these periods is that in the former, Taiwan was governed by the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party), which favours closer relations with the mainland, while in the latter period the DPP was in charge. There are both geopolitical and economic reasons for mainland China’s falling share of Taiwanese FDI. First, the ECFA trade and investment agreement, reached under the first term of KMT President Ma Ying-jeou, was not extended when a new round of negotiations started in 2012, to include technological cooperation, finance and people-to-people exchanges. A broader economic agreement between Taiwan and the mainland, mostly focusing on services – the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) – fell victim to lack of consensus among Taiwan’s main political parties, increased tensions in the Taiwan Straits and student protests in Taiwan (the so-called Sunflower movement) in 2014.1 Second, with the DPP victory in 2016, the new Southbound Policy 2 was launched, offering incentives for Taiwanese companies investing in 18 Asian countries, including ASEAN 3, India and other South Asian and Australasian nations. In addition, rising labour costs in mainland China, the ongoing trade war between the US and China, an increased regulatory burden in the mainland and political tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait also pushed Taiwanese businesses to look elsewhere to invest. -    The new political reality and geographical diversification While the election-winning DPP wants to see further diversification away from the mainland, the more pro-China party, the KMT, wants reinforced economic relations with China.4 Because of the now-hung parliament, the DPP will need to take some of the KMT’s wishes into account it wants pass new rules, including those related to geographical diversification. Beyond the two parties’ preferences, two other important issues also need to be factored in. First, geographical diversification requires open markets but Taiwan is increasingly unable to open any market through trade or investment deals. Taiwan has spent the last eight years negotiating bilateral deals with its closest allies, Japan and the US, but the DPP administration has not even been able to complete these. Incoming President Lai has said that Taiwan should continue to push to be part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which it applied in September 2021, but the reality is that Taiwan’s application has little hope of success. China officially applied to be a member of the CPTTP only a couple of days before Taiwan. Since then, the United Kingdom has become a member of CPTTP, but the negotiation processes with Taiwan and mainland China have not started. Australian’s prime minister, Anthony Albanese, has expressed severe doubts about Taiwan’s ability to become member of CPTTP because of lack of international recognition of it as a nation-state.5 Second, while the DPP is likely to continue to offer more fiscal incentives to promote diversification in Southeast Asia and India (under the Southbound Policy), the fastest-growing destination for both exports and foreign direct investment from Taiwan is the United States, followed by Japan. This can be explained by the ongoing artificial intelligence revolution, which needs semiconductors, and the decisions of some key Taiwanese chip companies (especially TSCM) to open factories overseas for chip production, with the US and Japan as the most important destinations. In other words, the DPP’s push for geographical diversification might not be the main reason why diversification has happened; rather, it has been driven by market forces and business opportunities. This also means that the KMT push to maintain – if not deepen – economic ties with mainland China might not succeed unless China’s currently underwhelming economic performance turns around. Implications for the European Union So far, the EU has benefitted little from Taiwan’s trade and investment diversification, at least when compared to the US and the rest of Asia. The EU’s export share into Taiwan has remained practically stagnant (while the US has doubled its share), notwithstanding a large increase in exports from the Netherlands for a single item – ASML’s lithography machines for chip production. The EU lacks a trade or investment deal with Taiwan, but so do some of Taiwan’s other trading partners, including the US. Considering that the EU is the largest foreign direct investor in Taiwan, the question arises of whether the EU should do more to foster more bilateral economic relations. The gains could be substantial, especially from inbound FDI as Taiwanese investment focuses on high-end manufacturing. There has been some movement. A €5 billion investment in France by a Taiwanese company (ProLogium) was announced in May 2023 to build a battery factory 6 . TSMC announced in August 2023 a €4.5 billion investment in a semiconductor factory in Germany 7 . But for the EU to catch up with Japan and the US as a recipient of outbound FDI from Taiwan, the result of Taiwan’s elections could be an obstacle. This is because the DPP will have less control of the economic agenda because it does not control the Legislative Yuan. The close-to-impossible negotiation of a trade and investment deal between the EU and Taiwan – as shown by Taiwan’s difficulties in relation to Japan, the US and the CPTTP – does not point to any improvement in the institutional framework for economic relations to improve. The question, then, is what can the EU offer to attract high-end foreign direct investment from Taiwan? Subsidies to attract semiconductor factories cannot be the only answer, given the very large amounts needed and the pressure such subsidies put on EU member states’ already stretched finances (Legarda and Vasselier, 2023). Working with business associations and chambers should be a key driving force to improve business relations between Taiwan and the EU, especially considering that the EU is the largest foreign foreign direct investor in Taiwan, while Taiwanese companies have been absent from the EU single market until recently. Overall, the US and the rest of Asia have been the main winners from Taiwan’s rapid diversification of its economy away from mainland China. The EU, which is lagging, should work to enhance its economic exchanges with Taiwan. Hopefully the January 2024 election results will facilitate this. Most importantly, the EU should aim to attract more high-tech FDI from Taiwan. Unfortunately, a better institutional framework through a trade/investment deal seems highly unlikely, for geopolitical reasons. This puts all the burden on chambers of commerce and other forums to improve business relations. References 1- The Sunflower Movement was a student-led protest that occuped Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan to put pressure on the KMT government against signing a second cooperation deal with mainland China. See Ho (2018). 2- See the New Southbound Policy portal at https://nspp.mofa.gov.tw/nsppe/. 3- Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 4- Alicia García-Herrero, ‘Taiwan’s future economic direction hinges on the election outcome’, First glance, 12 January 2024, Bruegel https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/taiwans-future-economic-direction-… 5- Claudia Long and Stephen Dziedzic, ‘Albanese says Australia is unlikely to support Taiwan 6- France24, ‘Taiwanese battery maker Prologium to invest €5 billion in French factory’, 12 May 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230512-taiwanese-battery-maker-pro…. 7- DW, ‘Taiwan’s TSMC to build semiconductor factory in Germany’, 8 August 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/taiwans-tsmc-to-build-semiconductor-factory-in-ge…. Ho, M.-S. (2018) ‘The Activist Legacy of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 August, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/02/activist-legacy-of-taiwan-s-sunflower-movement-pub-76966 Legarda, H. and A. Vasselier (2023) ‘Navigating Taiwan relations in 2024: Practical considerations for European policy makers’, China Horizons, 21 December, available at https://chinahorizons.eu/our-research/policy-briefs/278-navigating-taiwan-relations-in-2024-practical-considerations-for-european-policy-makers

SUMMARY The Korean Peninsula seems always to be on the knife edge of calamity. North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal, its more threatening language, and the potential for more provocative and aggressive actions are a volatile combination. Overreacting to Pyongyang’s inflammatory threatening language is dangerous, but so is dismissing potential signals of a resumption of deadly tactical attacks. Indications are that this year will be even busier for Korea watchers who long ago learned to keep both a pot of coffee and a bottle of scotch nearby to deal with the inevitable crises. KEY TAKEAWAYS 1. North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal, its more threatening language, and the potential for more provocative and aggressive actions are a volatile combination. 2. Overreacting to Pyongyang’s inflammatory threatening language is dangerous, but so is dismissing potential signals of a resumption of deadly tactical attacks. 3. Reducing the potential for invasion while increasing transparency with respect to military forces can reduce the potential for miscalculation and a military clash. It appears that 2024 is going to be a year for greater North Korean provocations, heightened tensions, and increased potential for tactical military clashes along the inter-Korean border. Pyongyang’s rhetoric and military posture have become more threatening, and the regime recently abandoned a military tension-reduction agreement with Seoul. That said, Pyongyang is unlikely to start a major war with South Korea and the United States deliberately. In other words, put your helmets on, but there’s no need to get under the desk just yet. More Bombastic and Threatening Rhetoric During major speeches in December 2023 and January, North Korean “Supreme Leader” Kim Jong-un described the Korean Peninsula as being “on the brink of a nuclear war” and called on his military to accelerate preparations for “a great event to suppress the whole territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces including nuclear forces.”1 Kim warned that North Korea “does not want war, but we also have no intention of avoiding it” and that a “physical clash can be caused and escalated even by a slight accidental factor in the area along the Military Demarcation Line.”2 Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s powerful sister, declared similarly that “the safety catch of [the] trigger of the Korean People's Army (KPA) had already been slipped” and that Pyongyang “will launch an immediate military strike if the enemy makes even a slight provocation.”3 Kim Jong-un also abandoned decades of North Korean policy seeking reconciliation and reunification with South Korea, instead describing inter-Korean relations as now being between “two hostile and belligerent states.”4 This declaration is particularly noteworthy because Kim is implicitly criticizing the unification policy of both his grandfather Kim Il-sung and his father Kim Jong-il. Such blasphemous remarks coming from anyone else would have immediate and dire consequences. To emphasize the new policy, Kim disbanded all government agencies devoted to relations with South Korea and demolished the massive monument to Korean unification that had been commissioned by his father Kim Jong-il, describing it as an “eyesore.”5 North Korea backed up its diatribes with artillery fire along the naval boundary off the west coast of the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang fired a total of 350 shells during three consecutive days in early January, and South Korea responded by firing 400 artillery rounds. While all shells remained on each country’s side of the disputed Northern Limit Line that delineates the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas, they did land in the former buffer zone created by the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement. That bilateral risk-reduction accord had proscribed artillery fire and military drills near the border area. Pyongyang’s nullification of the agreement in November 2023 will return armed North and South Korean troops back to closer contact. Seoul announced that it would resume army, navy, and Marine Corps live-fire artillery drills and regiment-level field maneuvers within five kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).6 North Korea’s belligerent declarations, along with escalating provocations, may be intended to influence both the April 10 South Korean National Assembly election and the November U.S. presidential election. However, such actions would more likely affirm pre-existing progressive and conservative views rather than they would to induce any voters to change sides. Inexorably Growing Military Threat North Korea has been on a multi-year binge of testing and deploying improved nuclear-capable systems that can target South Korea, Japan, and the continental United States. Most recently, Pyongyang successfully launched a solid-fueled ICBM, a solid-fueled intermediate-range missile with a hypersonic maneuverable warhead, its first military reconnaissance satellite, submarine-launched cruise missiles, and an underwater nuclear-capable drone. Knowing that he is backed in the U.N. Security Council by China and Russia could embolden Kim Jong-un to pursue even more provocative behavior. In the past, Beijing and Moscow were willing to impose U.N. resolutions and sanctions after North Korean ICBM and nuclear tests, but both countries now block new international actions in response to Pyongyang’s repeated violations of previous U.N. resolutions. North Korea could conduct its long-awaited seventh nuclear test—either of a new generation of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons or of Kim’s promised “super large” weapon. In its last nuclear test in 2017, Pyongyang exploded a hydrogen bomb at least 10 times as powerful as the 1945 atomic weapons used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The regime could also launch an ICBM over Japan and demonstrate multiple-warhead or re-entry vehicle capabilities. To date, all ICBM launches have been on a nearly vertical lofted trajectory to avoid flying over other countries. North Korean provocations are expected to increase in the run-up to the annual U.S.–South Korean large-scale military exercises in March. Trilateral Axis of Authoritarianism Pyongyang’s recently strengthened relationship with Moscow is another cause for concern. In return for shipping over a million artillery shells and rockets to Russia for Moscow to use in its attacks on Ukraine, North Korea is likely to receive some military technology. While some experts believe that this could include nuclear warhead, re-entry vehicle, or ICBM technology, Moscow is less likely to provide those “crown jewels” than it is to provide lower-level conventional weapon technology. However, any Russian assistance to improve North Korean weapons is worrisome to the U.S. and its allies. Both China and North Korea responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by increasing their economic and military support to Moscow. There is growing apprehension of the risk of horizontal escalation in which Beijing or Pyongyang could take advantage of the global focus on crises in Ukraine and the Middle East to initiate their own coercive or military actions against Taiwan or South Korea. Clashes but Not War Some experts speculate that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is the most dangerous it has been since the 1950 North Korean invasion of the south and that Kim Jong-un has already made the strategic decision to go to war.7 However, despite its menacing posturing, Pyongyang would not have sent massive amounts of artillery shells and rockets as well as dozens of its new KN-23 missiles to Russia if it were contemplating starting a war with South Korea. Nor has any buildup of North Korea military forces along the inter-Korean border been detected. More probable is another tactical-level military clash along the DMZ or maritime Northern Limit Line. South Korean officials privately comment that they cannot rule out another deadly North Korean attack such as the 2010 sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which cumulatively killed 50 South Koreans. Danger of Stumbling Into Major Conflict Both Koreas have been more vocal in their vows to strike preemptively if they perceive—or misperceive—the other side as preparing for an attack. In 2022, North Korea revised its nuclear law and disturbingly lowered the threshold for its use of nuclear weapons. The regime is developing smaller tactical nuclear warheads for deployment to forward-based units, and their proximity to allied forces across the DMZ could lead to a “use it or lose it” strategy for its vulnerable nuclear arsenal during the early stages of a conflict. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has shown a greater willingness to respond firmly to North Korean threats than his predecessor did. He directed enhancement of South Korea’s preemptive attack capabilities and declared, “Should North Korea make a provocation, we will punish it many times over.”8 He told his military to “immediately respond and retaliate before reporting to [higher authorities and] sternly and swiftly smash the enemy’s intentions to stage provocations on the spot.”9 The danger of miscalculated military action is real, even at a tactical level. In 2015, Seoul announced that North Korea had fired 13 artillery shells into South Korea and it had responded with 39 shells into the North. However, a subsequent investigation by United Nations Command revealed that there had been no North Korean military attack. Instead, South Korean counter-battery radar had misinterpreted a nearby lightning storm as inbound artillery fire. Luckily, North Korea did not respond to the unprovoked South Korean action. What Washington Should Do Washington must walk a fine line between maintaining a strong military posture to deter and if necessary respond to North Korean military actions while also minimizing the risk of inadvertent escalation into a strategic war. With this in mind, the U.S. should: • Enhance trilateral security cooperation. The U.S., along with South Korea and Japan, should continue ongoing efforts to increase coordination among their three militaries. South Korean President Yoon acknowledged the importance of Tokyo’s role in a Korean contingency, including the seven U.N. Command bases in Japan. During their August 2023 Camp David summit, the three leaders pledged even more extensive trilateral military exercises, real-time exchange of information on North Korean missile launches, and increased cooperation on ballistic missile defense. The leaders’ commitment to consult and coordinate responses to common security threats was a major step forward in trilateral military cooperation but stopped far short of formal alliance. The three countries should continue and expand the scope of the trilateral combined military exercises that resumed in 2022 after a four-year hiatus. The wide-ranging exercises reversed the degradation in allied deterrence and defense capabilities as did the resumption of U.S. rotational deployment of strategic nuclear-capable assets to the Korean theater of operations. • Ensure that military exercises are strong but constrained in location. The U.S. and its allies should be aware that any large-scale unannounced combined military operations close to North Korea’s borders run the risk of being misinterpreted by Pyongyang as preparations for an allied attack. Therefore, while maintaining high levels of military training, the exercises should be announced beforehand and not conducted close to North Korean forces along the DMZ. Washington should also counsel Seoul against highly escalatory responses to North Korean actions. However, appearing too heavy-handed in trying to curtail a South Korean response to a tactical-level attack risks undermining ongoing U.S. efforts to reassure Seoul of America’s commitment to its defense. After both 2010 North Korean attacks, South Korean officials privately complained that the U.S. had “sat on its ally” and prevented a South Korean retaliation. More recently, North Korea’s growing ability to hit the American homeland with nuclear weapons caused South Koreans to doubt the viability of the U.S. as an ally and led to greater domestic advocacy for an indigenous nuclear weapon program. • Push for risk-reduction talks. There seems to be little potential for a diplomatic off-ramp on the road to crisis with North Korea. Since late 2019, the regime has rejected all U.S. and South Korean entreaties for dialogue on any topic, including provision of humanitarian aid. Nor does Pyongyang’s cancelling the inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement bode well for negotiations. However, the proximity of several militaries to each other, rising suspicions, and mutual threats of preemptive attacks are a recipe for disaster. Washington and Seoul should call on Pyongyang to discuss potential risk-reduction and military confidence-building measures similar to those in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the accompanying Vienna Document of Confidence and Security Building Measures. Reducing the potential for either side to conduct a sudden-start invasion while increasing transparency with respect to military forces can lower tensions by reducing the potential for miscalculation leading to a military clash. Conclusion The Korean Peninsula seems always to be on the knife edge of calamity, but North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal, its more threatening language, and the potential for more provocative and aggressive actions are a volatile combination. Overreacting to Pyongyang’s inflammatory threatening language is dangerous, but so is dismissing potential signals of a resumption of deadly tactical attacks. Indications are that this year will be even busier for Korea watchers who long ago learned to keep both a pot of coffee and a bottle of scotch nearby to deal with the inevitable crises.   References: 1- Korea Central News Agency, “Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee,” KCNA Watch, December 31, 2023, (accessed February 5, 2024). https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1704027054-512008976/report-on-9th-enlarged-plenum-of-8th-wpk-central-committee/ 2- Ibid. and Brad Lendon and Gawon Bae, “North Korea’s Kim Vows to Dismantle Father’s Unification Arch as He Declares South Korea ‘Principal Enemy,’” CNN, January 16, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed February 5, 2024). 3- Reuters, “North Korea Vows Military Strike If Any Provocation, Fires Artillery Rounds,” January 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-yo-jong-vows-immediate-response-provocation-kcna-2024-01-07/ (accessed February 5, 2024). 4- Korea Central News Agency, “Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee.” 5- Lendon and Bae, “North Korea’s Kim Vows to Dismantle Father’s Unification Arch as He Declares South Korea ‘Principal Enemy.’” 6- Chae Yun-hwan, “Military Set to Resume Drills Halted Under 2018 Inter-Korean Accord Buffer Zones,” Yonhap News Agency, January 9, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240109007400315#:~:text=SEOUL%2C%20Jan.,artillery%20firing%2C%20officials%20said%20Tuesday (accessed February 5, 2024). 7- Robert L. Carlin and Siegfried S. Hecker, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?” Henry L. Stimson Center, 38 North, January 11, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/01/is-kim-jong-un-preparing-for-war / (accessed February 5, 2024). 8- Sarah Kim, “After North Declares ‘Hostile’ Relations, Yoon Vows to ‘Punish’ Regime in Case of a Provocation,” Korea Joongang Daily, updated January 18, 2024, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-16/national/northKorea/Yoon-vows-to-punish-North-Korea-many-times-over-in-case-of-a-provocation-/1959411?detailWord= (accessed February 5, 2024). 9- Hyung-Jin Kim, “North Korea’s Kim Vows to Bolster War Readiness to Repel US-Led Confrontations,” Associated Press, updated December 28, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-kim-party-meeting-missiles-27803fcfbfa9cb2a89d6fb5e824e9c0c (accessed February 5, 2024).

In an ideal world, Taiwan's national elections would have nothing to do with China or the United States, let alone the relationship between these two countries. However, the victory of Lai Ching-te, hitherto the vice-chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, a candidate who enjoys no sympathy from Beijing, has implications for China-Taiwan and China-US relations. In any case, the DPP's victory has not guaranteed it an absolute majority - in a chamber composed of 113 seats, the vote for the DPP fell from 61 to 51 (because of the poor economic situation) - and it will be forced to negotiate a coalition government. Taiwan's national elections are a matter of world order mainly because one of Xi Jinping's policy priorities is the "historical inevitability" of "unification" between China and Taiwan. If Xi fulfills his ambition, changing the borders and territorial integrity of a country through military force, it would be a flagrant violation of the international liberal order. Given U.S. President Joe Biden's promise - that Washington would defend Taiwan if invaded by China - "reunification" would provoke a war between the two powers, between revisionist and authoritarian China and the United States, the country that has created, sustained and led the international order after World War II. While Western politicians and analysts argue that China, as a revisionist power, increasingly poses a threat to the stability of the region and the international liberal order, for Taiwan it is an existential issue. The successful consolidation of Taiwan's democracy in recent decades has intensified the growth of a distinct Taiwanese identity. As the political systems of China and Taiwan continue to diverge, there is little support on the island for "unification." Taiwan is increasingly anchored to the West and its population is broadly in favor of strengthening relations with liberal democracies, especially Japan, the United States and Europe. From the beginning of the campaign, all three candidates - DPP's Lai, Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), which increased its number of legislators from 38 to 52, and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), which has won 8 seats - expressed that the priority of their foreign and domestic policies would be to preserve Taiwan's de facto independence and peace with China. However, their strategies to achieve this are divergent. The strategy of Lai, the candidate who won the election, is to strengthen political, military and economic ties with the United States and its allies; while Hou and Ko intended to restart the dialogue with Beijing, which China interrupted after the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 (William Lai's predecessor, who served two presidential terms at the helm of the country). The new government, possibly a coalition between the DPP and KMT, will be rocked by debates over increased Defense spending. KMT politicians disagree with the DPP on the details of military strategy and what weapons to procure from the United States. In 2022, Washington and Taipei launched an ambitious trade initiative as well as security cooperation. Thus, Washington increased the number of troops deployed in Taiwan to train its military and expanded the training of Taiwanese soldiers in the United States. The new president faces economic problems that have undermined the popularity of the ruling DPP. But undoubtedly his biggest problem is relations with China. Strengthening Taiwan's defenses and minimizing Beijing's provocations-which are likely to increase in the form of military maneuvers and economic pressures-will remain the DPP's policy priorities in Taiwan. However, it does not seem clear that the DPP has a clear strategy for dealing with Xi Jinping's possible decisions. Xi is unlikely to conclude that he can tolerate Taiwan's trajectory. Lai's victory has deeply irritated the Chinese Communist Party. The election results can be read in the key of a referendum on Taiwan-China relations. Beijing has lost it to the United States. Peaceful "unification" is becoming less and less viable. Rather, there are signs that the Chinese Communist Party perceives that the trend in Taipei-Beijing relations is not moving in Beijing's favor. As a result, Xi may take the decision to act to achieve unification. Xi has stated that the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on to future generations and that achieving unification is the essence of the country's rejuvenation. "Historical inevitability" may turn into practical decision - use of military force - given China's unsatisfactory economic situation. Xi may try to make unification an important part of his political legacy. The outcome of the Taiwan election will not influence Xi Jinping's decisions. The results confirm a status quo in Taiwanese politics - the continuity of the DPP government - but it means increased pre-war tensions between Taiwan and China, as well as between China and the United States.

It is also possible that, in the face of the uncertainty that this 2024 will bring, there may be no other alternative than to tolerate the tense wait that each of these elections entails. But even if this attitude is adopted, we must remember the lessons that history provides us in a context like the current one. During a conversation with foreign academics, one of them joked that, in 2024, we should at best content ourselves with having a quieter year than the previous one. Most agreed on the perplexity of entering a new year while still processing much of what happened in 2023. One of them recalled the assault on the Congress and the Supreme Court in Brazil, or the democratic regressions seemingly consolidating in India, Turkey, or Hungary. Another lamented that the terrorist attack in Israel and the brutal occupation of Gaza had diverted attention from the occupation in Ukraine and obscured the growing tension in the Balkans, the Red Sea, or the Taiwan Strait. Throughout this conversation, the common thread is the same: many events in 2023 reflect a world that has become extremely unpredictable. From this perspective, however, 2024 hardly presents itself as auspicious. By chance, in different electoral calendars, nearly half of the world's population will go to the polls in every corner of the planet, with geopolitical and democratic consequences difficult to anticipate. During 2024, there will be general elections in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Mexico, South Africa, Taiwan, Indonesia, Pakistan, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Rwanda, Mozambique, Uruguay, Namibia, North Macedonia, or Romania. In addition to this, there will be presidential elections in Russia, Venezuela, Finland, Azerbaijan, Iceland, Croatia, Algeria, or Slovakia. There will also be parliamentary elections in Portugal, South Korea, Iran, Bangladesh, Belgium, Austria, Mongolia, Botswana, Georgia, or Lithuania. There will also be regional or municipal elections in Australia, Germany, Canada, Turkey, Spain, Poland, Brazil, Chile, or Bosnia and Herzegovina. This combination represents an unprecedented electoral scenario since the introduction of universal suffrage in the late 18th century. This intricate electoral puzzle will undoubtedly have direct consequences on almost all ongoing or developing geopolitical conflicts. For example, this Saturday, presidential elections will take place in Taiwan, in which one of the three candidates in dispute advocates for a more favorable position towards reunification with China, and another has downplayed the importance of this conflict to focus on public policy issues. It is no coincidence, then, that in his New Year's speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced reunification with the island as inevitable, marking an escalation in the rhetoric used to address the issue compared to the same speech the previous year. Also in Asia, the border conflict between India and Pakistan could take a new turn after the escalation of violence in 2021 and 2022, as a result of the general elections both countries will have between February and May. From India, only a consolidation in its nationalist rhetoric can be anticipated, while from Pakistan, it is difficult to know what to expect, given the deep political crisis the country has been experiencing for almost two years and the political dynamics generated by the humanitarian crisis on its border with Afghanistan. Against all odds, the war in Israel and Palestine has not yet escalated into a regional armed conflict. However, the situation in the Middle East rests on a precarious balance whose pieces could be rearranged in the coming months. Even if Benjamin Netanyahu's government resists the pressure to call general elections, Israel's geopolitical position is likely to be weakened by the almost certain Labour shift in the UK government, a result of the division this conflict generates within the British left. Conversely, a Republican victory in the US elections in November would be a relief for Netanyahu, given the deference with which this party usually approaches the more problematic actions of the Israeli government. The importance of this support should hardly be underestimated, given Israel's increasing marginalization within the international community. This is evident not only in the adverse votes it has faced in the United Nations General Assembly but also in the genocide accusation that South Africa has filed against it before the International Court of Justice. This latter country is also heading for general elections in 2024 after a presidential term characterized by corruption scandals and, for the first time since the end of apartheid, could result in a change in parliamentary majorities that ends the political hegemony of Mandela's party. Finally, there are no major expectations of change in the parliamentary elections of a theocratic autocracy like Iran, even after suffering one of the worst terrorist attacks since the 1979 revolution and undergoing a deep economic crisis that has persisted for years. But attention must be paid to the election of the Assembly of Experts in March, as the resulting balances in it could impact the eventual appointment of the successor to an increasingly elderly Ayatollah Khamenei, with the regional ramifications that this may entail. Calls are growing in Ukraine for President Volodymyr Zelensky to call elections during this year, due to the widespread criticism his handling of the conflict has received. But even discounting this uncertainty, the country will have to face multiple external electoral variables that could compromise its position. For now, in the middle of the year, the election of five out of ten non-permanent positions on the United Nations Security Council will take place. More importantly, a possible Republican victory in the US presidential and parliamentary elections could severely weaken the Ukrainian military position, as indicated by recent debates in the House of Representatives and the Senate. While Vladimir Putin's position within Russia is weaker than before the invasion in 2022 (especially after the failed Wagner Group rebellion last June), everything suggests that the president will be re-elected for a fourth term in March. This geopolitical equation must also consider the election of the European Parliament, in which some predict unprecedented victories for the far right, which, if materialized, would also impact the composition of the European Commission. At the same time, there will be a renewal of the European Council, whose composition could also undergo changes due to new political balances in national governments. It should not be ruled out that Ursula von der Leyen could fail to be re-elected for a new term, despite her recent promise to prioritize aid to Ukraine. However, the advance of the far right may not entail significant changes in the European position toward this conflict. As a recent study suggests, the Russian invasion has marked a shift in sympathy that some populist or far-right parties previously expressed toward the Putin regime, which has now become a toxic association they deliberately seek to avoid. The geopolitical importance of the war in Ukraine, finally, has overshadowed other conflicts that are even brewing on European territory itself. Notably, the growing tension between Serbia and Kosovo - in which the former has threatened military interventions - has multiplied fears of the resurgence of a conflict that between 1998 and 1999 caused an estimated twelve thousand deaths and more than a million displaced. It is in this scenario that general elections will take place in Croatia and North Macedonia, as well as municipal elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina. All this also happens in a year that will be a critical juncture for global democratic development. As all available indicators suggest, the last two decades have witnessed a decline in democracy worldwide. Last year is indicative of this trajectory: in Africa alone, seven coups d'état occurred. And while many of these events also demonstrate the surprising democratic resilience of many countries, it is undeniable that 2024 could be a turning point for liberal democracy. Many of the main democracies show severe democratic erosions. Elections in India - which some question whether it can still be considered a democracy - could end up consolidating a competitive autocracy in that country, as everything indicates that Narendra Modi will remain as prime minister. In Mexico, polls anticipate that in June, the presidential candidate of the ruling coalition will be elected, suggesting that the state dismantling advanced by President López Obrador and his attacks on key institutional checks will continue. Moreover, the eventual election of Donald Trump - if not disqualified by the Supreme Court from running again as a candidate - would pose a serious threat to American democracy, as predicted by the contempt he repeatedly showed as president towards constitutional forms. Just remember his reaction to the Capitol assault or his efforts to subvert the electoral result in 2021. And it is needless to point out that his return to the White House would make any geopolitical balance as unstable as his temperament. There may be those who criticize the excessive pessimism of the outlined horizon. They may use the example of Poland, whose parliamentary election last October offered some optimism in the face of the democratic erosion that the country had experienced over the previous eight years. But even in this case, the path ahead for the Polish government to reverse this illiberal trajectory is long, and it will face multiple challenges. Perhaps the greatest of them in the short term is the municipal election in April, which populist parties could win. The same could be said of Brazil, which, after denying re-election to President Jair Bolsonaro, will return to the polls for the municipal elections in São Paulo. It is also possible that, in the face of the uncertainty that this 2024 will bring, there may be no other alternative than to tolerate the tense wait that each of these elections entails. But even if this attitude is adopted, we must remember the lessons that history provides us in a context like the current one. After all, we must not forget that in August 1914, the world's major powers believed that, in a context of great geopolitical instability, they would be perfectly capable of anticipating the reactions of their adversaries in case conflicts escalated.

Only days after Cambodia’s recently elected national assembly endorsed Hun Manet as the country’s new prime minister, the young leader revealed his vision for the next 25 years of economic growth and prosperity. Cambodia is aspiring to become a high-income country by 2050. To make this happen, Manet released his Pentagonal Strategy, centring on the five objectives of sustained economic growth, more and better employment, human capital development, diversification of the economy and increased competitiveness. For those who have been advocating sweeping reforms to Cambodia’s economy, the new strategic objectives comprise all the right catchwords. But it remains uncertain whether the ambitious new strategy will help Cambodia reach its targets. Despite GDP forecasts for 2023 not living up to expectations, the Cambodian government forecasts 6.6 per cent GDP growth in 2024. The Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund downgraded their 2023 economic growth projections to 5.3 per cent, down from 5.8 per cent in April 2023, while the World Bank projects 5.4 per cent growth, down from 5.5 per cent in May 2023. The minor adjustments were made in response to global geopolitical tensions and a worldwide economic slowdown, as well as the country’s structural issues, which include limited productivity and competitiveness, a lack of economic diversification and dependence on a small number of external markets. The government’s optimistic growth projection for 2024 is based on the anticipated revival of key sectors including garment manufacturing. Cambodia’s garment sector showed continuing decline throughout 2023 but is expected to surge by around 8 per cent in 2024. For Manet’s pentagonal ambitions to become a reality, Cambodia must diversify its product range, upgrade its production capacity and productivity and process resources at home instead of exporting them. The garment sector is not conducive to such transformations. The sector is already on life support — a tax break is in place for garment factories until the end of 2025 — but a continued reliance on garment manufacturing also exacerbates Cambodia’s economic vulnerability. Primarily a cut, make and trim industry employing low-skilled labour, garment manufacturing relies on the import of raw materials sourced from other Asian countries, predominantly China. It exports to the major economies where Cambodian products enjoy increasingly precarious preferential treatment under the European Union’s Everything But Arms scheme. To move Cambodia beyond being a cheap labour hub, the Pentagonal Strategy outlines a comprehensive makeover of three sectors identified as the engines of future economic growth — agriculture, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and tourism. With nearly 70 per cent of Cambodian households depending directly on agriculture, an overhaul of this sector is long overdue. The new strategic objectives bolster agribusiness to better serve Cambodia’s export markets. The turn to ‘smart farming’ advances local processing of Cambodian crops and high-value products instead of high-volume cash crops. Loans have also been made available for agribusiness and are being directed to ‘economic poles’ spread across the country. The transformation of over 500,000 MSMEs in Cambodia is a core agenda under the new strategic plan. MSMEs closely entwined with agribusiness and digitisation will have access to a new loan scheme established in partnership with the private sector and Wing Bank. Efforts will also be made to integrate the informal sector into the formal economy under the National Strategy for Informal Development 2023–2028, encouraging informal businesses to register and receive benefits such as penalty waivers, tax incentives and skills training. Tourism, heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, is forecasted to bolster GDP as international arrivals, particularly from China, begin to surge. Foreign tourists are returning to Cambodia, with 4.4 million arriving in the first 10 months of 2023. But the rising numbers have not generated the desired income, as most of the arrivals are low-spending visitors from neighbouring countries. Crowds from China are not as anticipated despite major efforts including the new Siem Reap airport operating direct flights to and from a variety of Chinese destinations, the reintroduction of Chinese package tours and the launch of the China Ready program. Efforts to diversify the tourism sector are ongoing, with India and Indonesia identified as likely markets for outbound tourism. The Ministry of Tourism is also implementing a new tourism strategy and action plan with a focus on cultural heritage, coastal and eco-tourism. As the new government pushes economic reforms with vigour, old habits die hard. International attention was recently drawn to a new investigation by Amnesty International into the 2022 evictions of 10,000 families making a living on the premises of the Angkor Archaeological Park. The Angkor Archaeological Park, Cambodia’s biggest tourist attraction and a UNESCO World Heritage site, is pivotal to the new tourism action plan. While the Cambodian government claims these families were squatters causing overdevelopment at the complex, the report revealed that the evicted families were relocated to a remote site lacking infrastructure, jeopardising their livelihoods. Similarly, the voluntary registration of informal businesses under the new development strategy was temporarily suspended due to pushback from small business owners concerned about the regulatory burden imposed by the measure. The economic reforms outlined in the Pentagonal Strategy are long overdue and will have beneficial impacts on Cambodia’s socioeconomic development. But as Cambodia’s new leadership pursues growth, it should consider that even well-intentioned interventions can have detrimental bearings on people’s livelihoods and may be reminiscent of past injustices suffered at the hands of authorities. This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2023 in review and the year ahead.

Comrade Choe Son-hui, I am very glad to welcome you and all your delegation members to Moscow in the first days of 2024. I would like to once again congratulate you and our Korean friends on the holidays we have celebrated recently and wish you all the best and every success in the new year. The timing of this meeting provides us with a perfect opportunity to conduct a preliminary review of our efforts to carry out the agreements resulting from the summit between President of Russia Vladimir Putin and Chairman of State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Kim Jong-un at the Vostochny Space Launch Centre in September 2023. We are proactively working on these matters. I have warm memories of my visit to Pyongyang in October 2023 and the hospitality you extended to our delegation. The 10th meeting of the Russian-Korean Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in November 2023 was another important event. There were also other bilateral exchanges at the agency, ministry, and regional levels. We appreciate the fact that DPRK’s Minister of Physical Culture and Sport, Kim Il-guk, took part in the Russia – A Sports Nation international forum in Perm in October 2023, while DPRK’s Minister of Culture Sung Jong-gyu proactively contributed to the 9th St Petersburg International Cultural Forum in November 2023. The visit by a delegation from the Primorye Territory to Pyongyang, led by Governor Oleg Kozhemyako, in December 2023 was also very useful. These contacts mark the beginning of an intensive and demanding, but also fruitful and rewarding, work to expand our relations across the board. We are preparing several other important events, including on cultural and humanitarian matters. I can mention the upcoming performance by Mariinsky Theatre’s Primorye branch in Pyongyang, as well as the participation of Russian performing groups in the annual April Spring festival. Today, we will have a detailed discussion on topical bilateral matters, including ways to further enhance our practical cooperation. As for the international agenda, we are looking forward to continuing our trust-based dialogue on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Russia reaffirms its principled position on the need to find comprehensive and fair solutions to the existing problems. We have always advocated for talks without preconditions as a path to achieving lasting peace and stability across Northeast Asia. Russia has independently submitted proposals to this effect, as well as together with the PRC, to the UN Security Council. These proposals are currently on the negotiating table. We must recognise that the policy pursued by the United States and its regional satellites to create security threats for the DPRK does nothing to promote any positive advancements. We will continue to call for the rejection of any steps that lead to escalation and heightening tensions. We are working together within a broader geography on security matters in the Asia-Pacific region, where we must uphold universal mechanisms rooted in ASEAN proposals and which have been effectively operating for many decades. However, attempts by the United States and its allies to create closed, bloc-based formats and to expand NATO infrastructure to this region undermine these mechanisms and erode their effectiveness. We have been working closely and very successfully with Pyongyang within the United Nations and at other multilateral organisations. Russia has always supported the DPRK within the UN and appreciates the fact that you have treated Russia in the same manner, including on matters related to the ongoing special military operation in Ukraine. We have a packed agenda, and I am certain that today’s talks will enable us to advance towards delivering on the agreements between our leaders resulting from the September 2023 summit.

Successful North and South Korean satellite launches underscore both countries’ ambitions to possess an independent space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability to support their respective deterrence postures. Paradoxically, better ISR capabilities may also improve stability on the Korean Peninsula. Within two weeks, North and South Korea have each successfully launched their first military geospatial imaging satellites. Although the information-gathering capabilities of North Korea’s satellite are probably inferior to South Korea’s, Pyongyang will likely improve this over time, possibly with Russian assistance. Space-based systems will increase Pyongyang and Seoul’s capability to hold each other’s territory at risk, but paradoxically may also improve stability. Targeting tactics Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems play an important role in the so-called ‘kill-chain’ through which militaries detect, track and engage targets with precision-strike systems. Pyongyang and Seoul possess large arsenals of precision-guided ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles, but their respective ISR capabilities to inform targeting decisions are less mature by comparison. North Korea has developed several types of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) for ISR purposes, but sensor, endurance and communications constraints limit their utility, and they are vulnerable to South Korean and United States air defences. South Korea has more advanced ISR capabilities, but it has historically relied on United States space-based assets for its geospatial imagery needs.    North Korea said that it developed a space-based ISR capability to provide its armed forces with ‘real-time information’ to improve its ‘war deterrent’. Following the successful launch of the Malligyong-1 satellite on 21 November, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said that it provided North Korea with ‘eyes’ to complement its ‘fist’. To underline this point, North Korean state media claimed the satellite imaged Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and other ‘ major targets in the enemy region’ that North Korea could target in a conflict, without releasing imagery. Similarly, South Korea said that it is developing its space-based ISR capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of its so-called 3K deterrence architecture. It envisages South Korean forces detecting and targeting North Korean missile launchers and command-and-control in the event of an imminent or unforeseen North Korean missile launch. Both countries have made clear their recent launches are merely a first step to building out a space-based ISR layer. North Korea has said that it will launch an unspecified number of satellites in the future. Seoul plans to follow the 1 December launch of a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket with the deployment of four synthetic-aperture radar satellites by 2025, giving it an all-weather capability. Launch implications Although North Korea’s launch is an achievement for Pyongyang after earlier launch failures, the satellite’s likely poor image quality might provide limited initial returns. After a prior North Korean launch of a military-satellite similar to the Malligyong-1 failed, South Korean and US investigators judged, based on recovered parts, that the payload had ‘no military use’, suggesting its sensors and communication equipment were of poor quality. Even so, the successful launch on 21 November provides Pyongyang with an independent capability that will likely mature through domestic refinement, illicit acquisitions and potentially foreign assistance. South Korea claims that Russia provided unspecified input on the Chollima-1 satellite-launch vehicle (SLV) following two failed launch attempts earlier this year. Russian President Vladimir Putin also apparently pledged to provide support for North Korea’s space programme during a September meeting with Kim at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, possibly as repayment for much-needed ammunition to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Because SLVs incorporate dual-use components and technologies that can also be used in ballistic missiles, Pyongyang’s satellite launch was condemned by France, the United Kingdom and the US as destabilising and a violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to North Korea’s sanctioned ballistic missile programme. The Chollima-1 SLV’s first-stage rocket motor, for instance, is derived from the Soviet-designed RD-250 engine that has powered several different North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17. An advancement in North Korea’s SLV capabilities will undoubtedly have some benefits for its ballistic missile programme. Although Pyongyang regularly tests ballistic missiles, it is unlikely to have used this launch to disguise testing military capabilities related to its missile programme. South Korea’s military space programme also has received some external assistance. The country launched its satellite on a SpaceX Falcon 9 SLV from the US government’s Vandenberg Space Force Base. Future satellite launches might continue to use US technology alongside South Korea’s burgeoning SLV capability. Supporting stability Perhaps paradoxically, Pyongyang and Seoul’s new space-based ISR capabilities may have some unexpected stability benefits by reducing mutual fears of pre-emption. In a crisis, a lack of information may exacerbate pre-emption fears and could trigger escalation. South Korea’s deterrence doctrine is based on Seoul’s fear that North Korea may pre-emptively use conventional or nuclear weapons against it. North Korea is arguably concerned about South Korea’s analogous precision-strike capabilities, evidenced by recent changes to its nuclear doctrine to delegate launch authority if Kim were killed. Although space-based ISR will allow North and South Korea to target each other more effectively in a conflict, their new capabilities might also be useful in a crisis by providing Pyongyang and Seoul with greater situational awareness that could reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Why is Pyongyang ringing in the new year with warmongering? North Korea’s official newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, is predicting a year of living dangerously, marked by the “highest risk of confrontation.” Addressing an end-of-year party plenum, Kim Jong Un cautioned that “war can break out at any time.” He added, however, that foreign military confrontation would be met by “a deadly blow to thoroughly annihilate” the enemy and subjugate “the whole territory of South Korea.”  Kim’s dire forecast is a matter of concern, but not because deterrence is likely to fail. The North Korean leader wants others to fear the prospect of war, which is why he (once again) threatened that the Korean peninsula is “on the precipice of nuclear war.” But Kim wants to sharpen his “treasured sword,” not fall on it.  North Korea may be viewed as preternaturally bellicose, but menacing discourse is not harmless prattle. The sharp rhetoric emanating from the Kim regime masks serious internal and external goals that impinge on vital U.S. national interests and regional security. For starters, Kim needs to justify his fixation on military spending. Clearly, three military parades, 44 missiles, and 64 flights a year are difficult to sustain. The notion that U.S. and allied military exercises are making the thought of war on the peninsula “realistic” is propaganda. Even so, Kim’s pledge to launch three more military spy satellites in the coming months is realistic, if also suggestive of one of the concrete benefits of adopting Russia as North Korea’s primary defense partner. North Korea’s anemic economy cannot support additional military spending. The ambitious five-year defense modernization plan Kim unveiled three years ago is perpetuating the country’s impoverishment. Pyongyang’s boast of a 40% increase in the country’s gross domestic product last year masks a fragile and sanctioned economy, overly dependent on China, which accounts for 90% of North Korean exports. While North Korean exports to China rebounded to about $300 million in 2023, a shocking 57% of that total came from exports of wigs, false beards, eyebrows and eyelashes. A weak and vulnerable economy is precisely why the North Korean regime places a higher priority on cyber theft than it does on legal trade. When you can raise more than $2 billion from hacking, who needs to maintain so many foreign diplomatic outposts in Africa? So, U.S. and South Korean authorities must step up their game if they are to prevent cyber heists like the one on Orbit Chain on New Year’s Eve that probably netted North Koreans $81.5 million in cryptocurrency.  Kim Jong Un also is relying on cooperation with like-minded partners to compensate for his diplomatic failures with South Korea and the United States. Having strengthened ties with Russia by providing additional ammunition for Moscow’s war of aggression — and North Korean mortar and rocket shells are increasingly visible on the Ukrainian battlefield — Kim is in a position to leverage relations with Beijing.  China’s Xi Jinping, locked in a fierce competition with the United States, appears eager to lend an extra hand to help North Korea. Xi’s New Year’s Day greeting to Kim said that “the new situation in the new era” further underscores the need to take “a strategic and long-term perspective” on China-North Korea relations. North Korea’s diplomatic outreach to Russia and China not only is a counterpoise to growing trilateral relations among the United States, Japan and South Korea but also a useful means of undermining Seoul as it begins a two-year stint as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council.  Setting a belligerent tone to commence the year is also Pyongyang’s way of trying to subvert South Korea’s democratic government. There was no subtlety in labeling South Korea “a hemiplegic malformation and colonial subordinate state.” Furthermore, as South Koreans mark the centennial of the birth of former president Kim Dae-jung, the Kim regime might be engaging in wishful thinking that progressives will rise in protest against the conservative administration of Yoon Suk-yeol. Politics is as polarized as ever and South Korean police are reinforcing security after the stabbing of the leader of the main opposition political party and an online threat to kill the head of the ruling People Power Party. But Kim Jong Un must have an even greater fear of losing his totalitarian power than is suggested by state-controlled media. Burnishing Kim’s credentials as a benevolent father figure and feigning more democratic elections shows a need to appeal to popular support. Even more telling was the Jan. 1 airing on North Korea’s KCTV of the movie A Day and A Night, which highlights the real story of how a nurse uncovered a counter-revolutionary plot to overthrow the Kim Il Sung government. The point of the Pyongyang-produced movie is to ensure North Korean people are sufficiently motivated to protect their leader.  Finally, threatening conflict is a cost-effective way for the Kim regime to amplify America’s trending theme of dread about the fate of American democracy. The West has a rich supply of smart pessimists who regularly churn out frightening warnings. No doubt Kim also would like for us to unburden ourselves by accommodating a nuclear North Korea and removing U.S. troops from the peninsula.  Oh, to recall the “beautiful letters” that Kim Jong Un penned to then-President Donald Trump after their brief flirtation with peace in the summer of 2018. 

Thailand would need to implement essential refugee policies that align with international standards to deal with the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Thailand lies at a critical intersection in Southeast Asia, where the vibrant tapestry of cultures meets the complex weave of geopolitics. As the nation grapples with the escalating number of Myanmar refugees, it's not merely facing a geopolitical conundrum but a humanitarian crisis which demands global attention. Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin is actively advocating for Thailand to play a central role in engaging with the Myanmar military regime to address the two-year civil war. While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection. This exodus, in turn, necessitates the provision of essential services to address their needs. PM Srettha's recent statement indicates a shift in Thailand's approach from the previous government's stance, which largely supported the Junta, to a more humanitarian-focused role. However, the current government's engagement remains limited to the Junta, highlighting the need for broader connections with other groups.Roots of displacementThe Kayin State, formerly the Karen State, has witnessed a history of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Junta, particularly against the Karen ethnic minority seeking greater autonomy. Well-documented instances of systematic violence, including rape, torture, and forced labour, explicitly targeting Karenni women and girls, showcase the severity of the situation. The military's use of both women and men as human shields violates international humanitarian law. The coup has exacerbated the crisis and made these people easy targets of violence. There are restrictions on travel and a shortage of essential resources in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar. Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces. Consequently, a growing number of individuals, including men, women, and children, are seeking refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border to escape the worsening conditions.Attending the displacedBangkok's historical role as a haven for displaced people, mainly from Myanmar, is evident. Since the mid-1980s, the nation has provided shelter to approximately 90,801 displaced people from Myanmar across nine camps. However, following the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, an additional 45,025 displaced people sought refuge. Thailand's humanitarian efforts include providing temporary shelters, a few core relief items, food, and medical assistance. Despite allowing these new arrivals to stay in temporary shelters near the border, the Thai government has sporadically pushed them back. Notably, these recently displaced populations are not allowed to enter established refugee camps, and Thai officials impose stringent restrictions on their movement. In July 2023, around 9,000 hapless people sought safety in Thailand's Mae Hong Son district due to frequent airstrikes in Karenni State. Initially, Thai authorities permitted them to stay in temporary shelters, however, on 21 October, they were asked to return to Myanmar within two weeks. Consequently, the shelters were vacated as people walked back across the border into Karenni State, a journey taking four to five days. Many resettled in Doh Noh Ku, a settlement for internally displaced people at the Thai-Myanmar border. Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. Subsequently, opposition forces elsewhere in Myanmar launched attacks against the military, prompting retaliatory airstrikes, including in Karenni State. By 27 November, over 2,387 Myanmar individuals had fled again, crossing back into the Mae Hong Son district. The Thai Foreign Minister's announcement on 3 December to construct shelters for displaced people underscores a recognition of the escalating violence and the potential for more people to seek refuge. On 8 December, Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed that Myanmar officials had reached an agreement to establish a task force to enhance humanitarian aid for those displaced within Myanmar due to the ongoing conflict. Despite good intentions, concerns arise about the effective distribution of assistance to all affected regions, considering the track record of the Junta.PredicamentsThailand's response to the crisis is challenging. The delicate balance between engaging with the Myanmar military regime and advocating for humanitarian provisions poses a diplomatic dilemma. The strain on resources and infrastructure due to the growing refugee population is a significant concern. The need for sustained efforts, both domestically and through international collaboration, is crucial to address the humanitarian crisis effectively. Thailand's response is constrained by its non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol. However, in 2018, Thailand voted in favour of the Global Compact on Refugees, and subsequently, the National Screening Mechanism (NSM) was established in 2019. The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee. Despite delays in application due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2023, Thailand's Cabinet approved a regulation outlining the procedure and eligibility criteria for individuals seeking NSM status, which officially came into effect on September 2023. Additionally, the rollout of the NSM will occur incrementally as the Thai government, with technical assistance and advocacy from UNHCR, continues to develop the comprehensive set of procedural standards and policies needed for its implementation. However, concerns exist regarding the NSM's effectiveness and legal subordination to the Immigration Act. While Clause 15 of the NSM regulation delays the deportation of individuals asserting protected-person status, it fails to shield them from arrest, detention, or prosecution based on their immigration status. Additionally, as the NSM is legally subordinate to the Immigration Act, the predominant experience for refugees seeking protection under the NSM in Thailand would involve initial encounters with arrest, detention, and prosecution. There also remains apprehension that the NSM excludes migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos under its provision from receiving adequate protection in Thailand.Actions requiredTo address the challenges, the Thai government should utilise the power granted by Section 17 of the Immigration Act to exempt NSM applicants from arrest, detention, or prosecution. Explicit provisions for determining protected status under NSM need to be established. Exempting refugees from arrest, detention, and prosecution under the Immigration Act, as emphasised in an open letter by eight organisations on 12 December, will signal Thailand's commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees. Urgent action from Thai authorities is imperative to enhance efforts in granting appropriate status and protection to those fleeing persecution, aligning with international standards. The escalating Myanmar refugee crisis necessitates a comprehensive and swift response from Thai authorities. While challenges persist, Thailand can set an example in the region by implementing essential refugee policies. Addressing humanitarian concerns, engaging in regional cooperation, and enacting necessary policy reforms are imperative for Thailand to effectively manage the evolving crisis and provide sustainable solutions for refugees and displaced persons.