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Abstract  This paper looks at the development of Chinese exports to Central Asian countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The analysis, which relies on export data from China to Asian countries at a general product level, shows that China’s exports to Central Asia have significantly increased since the start of the war. In particular, exports to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have increased significantly. The analysis focuses on exports in Harmonized System (HS) categories 84, 85, 87, and 90. Many of the products sanctioned by the West in trade with Russia belong to these categories, but the categories also include many non-sanctioned products. Although the value of China’s exports to Central Asia is still smaller than direct trade with Russia, China’s exports – especially to Kyrgyzstan – have seen dramatic increases in the HS 84, 85, 87, and 90 categories. Along with the export growth from China to Central Asia, exports in these categories from Central Asia to Russia have also increased significantly.  Keywords: China, Central Asia, Russia, exports 1. Introduction  This policy brief sheds light on the development of Chinese exports to Central Asia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. The analysis, which focuses on China’s dollar-denominated exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan between 2018 and 2023, is based on the monthly and yearly customs data on goods exports from CEIC, China Customs Administration, Kazakhstan Bureau of National Statistics, and UN Comtrade. The analysis considers exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in some key product categories in the same time frame. Data on Chinese exports to Russia and the rest of the world (excluding Russia and Central Asian countries) help broaden the analysis.  The European Union, the United States, as well as a number of other countries, imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The sanctions packages targeted trade, investment, and cooperation with Russia, including sanctions on exports and imports of goods and services. While China has yet to impose sanctions on Russia, Chinese companies increasingly face the threat of secondary sanctions.  There is evidence that trade sanctions imposed against Russia have been circumvented by redirecting trade through Russia's neighboring countries (e.g. Chupilkin et al., 2023) and that China exports to Russia dual-use goods exploited by the Russian military (Kluge, 2024). This analysis shows that Chinese exports to Central Asia increased significantly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The soaring trade with Kyrgyzstan, a relatively tiny economy, is particularly notable. Chinese exports to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also rose sharply. Exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in selected key export categories increased in 2022, with Kazakhstan’s exports growing significantly, making it the largest exporter to Russia among Central Asian countries.  The paper analyzes the export of China to Central Asia by examining Harmonized System (HS) categories 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical equipment), 87 (Vehicles), and 90 (Optical and medical instruments). Categories 88 (Aircraft) and 89 (Ships) were omitted from the analysis since their export volumes were irregular and the data are inconsistent. These categories are important since many of the sanctions goods belong to these broad categories and often involve sophisticated technologies essential to Russian military efforts. Additionally, China is a major technology producing country and Russia’s main supplier of sanctioned technology products (Simola, 2024). Not all products in these categories are subject to sanctions and instead the analysis here only provides a broad view of the development of categories with sanctioned products.  The three-part analysis in this brief begins with a discussion of the development of Chinese exports to Central Asian countries at a general level. We then consider Chinese exports to Central Asia in HS categories 84, 85, 87 and 90, and conclude with an overview of Central Asia country exports to Russia in the same HS categories.  2. Chinese trade relations with Central Asia  From a trade perspective, China dominates trade relations with Central Asian countries. Most Central Asian countries run trade deficits with China. While Central Asian countries are geographically proximate with China (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan share borders with China), total exports to these countries have traditionally represented a small slice of China’s total exports. In 2018, for example, Kazakhstan accounted for around 0.5 % of China’s total exports, and the shares of China’s exports to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were between 0.01 % and 0.2 %. China’s exports to Russia in 2018 were around 2 % that year. In 2023, however, exports to Kazakhstan had grown to 0.7 % of China’s total exports, and exports to other Central Asian economies were between 0.03 % and 0.6 %. The share of exports to Kyrgyzstan grew from 0.2 % to 0.6 % in terms of China’s total exports. In comparison, Chinese exports to Russia in 2023 represented 3 % of China’s total exports. In terms of annual growth, Kyrgyzstan on-year increase between stands out, with Chinese exports (measured in dollars) growing by 150 % in 2021 and 110 % in 2022.  The countries in the region are not a homogeneous group. Their economies differ in size and trade patterns. Measured by GDP, Kazakhstan was the largest regional economy in 2023, with a GDP of $260 billion. The second largest was Uzbekistan ($90 billion), followed by Turkmenistan ($59 billion), Kyrgyzstan ($14 billion), and Tajikistan ($12 billion) (World Bank, 2024). China’s top export destination in 2023 was Kazakhstan ($25 billion) and Kyrgyzstan ($20 billion). Turkmenistan had the least exports ($1 billion).  In addition to Russia’s war of aggression, new trade routes and warm bilateral relations may have played a role in Chinese exports to Central Asia. New trade routes have opened under the Belt & Road Initiative, and Xi Jinping’s relations with the leaders of Central Asian countries have been generally friendly.  China has been particularly active in Kyrgyzstan, where it has helped to build several transport infrastructure projects to improve transport connections within the country and the region. Especially in mountainous areas, new transport routes and improved logistics connections could have a major impact on trade volumes. Kyrgyzstan also changed presidents in 2021 following snap elections to quell a wave of protest. Kyrgyzstan’s newly elected president, Sadyr Zhaparov, emphasizes China’s importance as Kyrgyzstan’s trading partner and investor, and has called for closer relations with China.  A new trade route from China to Kazakhstan was opened in the summer of 2023 during the China-Central Asia Summit. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Kazakhstan in 2022, the leaders announced to deepen bilateral relations.  Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have established friendly relations with Xi and China. With regard to vehicle exports, it is worth noting that the re-export of cars through the Eurasian Economic Union to Russia previously received tax relief, a policy that ended this year. 3. An overview of  Chinese exports to Central Asia Between 2018 and 2023, China primarily exported textile and wood-related products, as well as machinery, electronics, and vehicles to Central Asia (Figure 1). Compared to China’s overall export structure to the world (Figure 2), the share of textile and wood products in China’s exports to Central Asia is significantly higher. In contrast, approximately 50 % of China’s global exports consist of machinery, electronics, and vehicles, whereas these categories account for about 30–40 % of China’s exports to Central Asia.   In dollar terms, Chinese exports to Central Asia grew by 170 % from 2018 to 2023. This growth parallels China's export growth to Russia, which increased by 130 % over the same period. For comparison, Chinese exports to the rest of the world grew by around 40 % in that period. The largest export growth was seen in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (Figure 3), with exports to Kyrgyzstan experiencing an explosive increase at the beginning of 2021. While more moderate, export growth to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also took off in the first half of 2022. Chinese exports to Kazakhstan, which were valued at $11 billion in 2018, surged to $25 billion in 2023. Chinese exports to Uzbekistan tripled from $4 billion in 2018 to $12 billion in 2023. Chinese exports more than tripled to Kyrgyzstan during the period from $6 billion in 2018 to $20 billion in 2023. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan are significant given the country’s modest GDP. Growth in Chinese exports to Russia mirrors the growth in exports to Central Asia (Figure 3). In dollar terms, however, China's exports to Russia are about double to those of China’s total exports to Central Asia.   The largest export categories to Central Asia in China’s 2023 export structure were footwear, textiles, and clothes ($20 billion); machinery and vehicles ($11 billion); electronics ($3 billion); and iron and steel ($2 billion). Exports of iron and steel to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan were minimal, but significant for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with growth starting in early 2023.  Chinese exports of footwear, textiles and clothes to Kyrgyzstan (and exports generally) began took off in early of 2021 (Figure 4). Kazakhstan’s export growth in the same category started after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Exports of machinery and vehicles to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Figure 4) skyrocketed in 2023. Chinese exports of iron and steel to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also soared in 2023 (Figure 5). In the export of electronics, Uzbekistan stands out as exports from China more than doubled in 2023 from 2022 levels (Figure 5). Electronics exports to Kyrgyzstan started increase in early 2021 (Figure 5).     When examining annual changes in these export categories, the dollar-based annual growth of Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan clearly stands out from other Central Asian countries across all export categories (see Figures 6 and 7). The annual growth to Kyrgyzstan began to increase in early 2021 and remains high throughout 2022. For instance, Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in electronics and in footwear, textiles and clothes peaked around 300 % in early 2022. Chinese exports to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are significantly smaller in dollar terms than for other Central Asian countries, so they do not stand out in earlier figures. However, annual growth patterns show that China’s annual export growth to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan also rose in 2022.     This section examines Chinese exports to Central Asian countries in the HS categories 84 “Machinery,”1 85 “Electrical equipment,”2 87 “Vehicles”,3 and 90 “Optical and medical instruments.”4 HS categories 88 “Aircraft”5 and 89 “Ships”6 were omitted from the analysis since the export volumes were irregular and inconsistent. The data used in the analysis is the sum of HS8-level customs data for the respective category, so values may slightly differ from the actual HS2-level values.  China’s dollar-denominated exports in machinery (HS 84) increased in 2022 and 2023 from the pre-invasions period (Figure 8). Growth in exports is already apparent in 2022 for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, while the rise in Uzbekistan begins in 2023. Exports of machinery to Russia started to increase in 2021, with higher growth in 2022 and 2023 (Figure 9). China’s exports to the rest of the world in the same category rose through 2021, and decreased from 2022 to 2023 (Figure 9).   For electrical equipment (HS 85), China’s exports increased significantly compared to the period before the war, especially to Kyrgyzstan, where exports surged in 2022 and continued to grow in 2023 (Figure 10). China’s exports to Uzbekistan also surged in 2023. Exports to Kazakhstan decreased from 2021 to 2022, but grew in 2023, slightly surpassing the 2021 level. When examining Chinese exports to Russia, dollar-denominated changes follow a similar trend (Figure 11). During the same period, China’s exports to the rest of the world increased from 2021 to 2022 and decreased in 2023, a trend similar to that of machinery (Figure 11).   In the export of vehicles (HS 87), China’s exports to Central Asia followed a similar trend in exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, i.e. initial growth in 2022 and strong growth in 2023 (Figure 12). Chinese exports to Russia also surged in 2023 (Figure 13). In the vehicle category, Chinese exports to the rest of the world grew steadily in 2021, 2022, and 2023 (Figure 13).   For optical and medical instruments (HS 90), China’s exports to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan increased significantly in 2022, and grew further  in 2023, albeit at a more moderate pace (Figure 14). China’s exports to Uzbekistan increased post-invasion in 2022 and 2023, although export levels were similar to 2019 and 2020. Exports to Turkmenistan grew by 260 % in 2022 from the previous year, although this is less noticeable in the figures due to the smaller dollar value amounts related to other Central Asian countries. China’s exports of optical and medical instruments to Russia grew steadily, with a sharper increase beginning in 2022 (Figure 15). However, China’s exports to the rest of the world in this category decreased from 2021 to 2022 (Figure 15).   In summary, China’s dollar-denominated exports to Central Asia increased significantly over the past couple of years, particularly those to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Reflecting the general trend of China’s exports to Central Asian countries, the highest dollar amounts for Chinese exports involved products to Kazakhstan across all analyzed harmonized system categories. The most significant dollar-denominated export growth was observed for Kyrgyzstan: the annual growth rate of China’s exports in electrical equipment in 2022 approaches 400 %, and for vehicles nearly 500 % in 2022 and about 300 % in 2023. Additionally, in optical and medical instruments, China’s 2022 exports grew by nearly 300 % to Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan from the previous year. When comparing China’s exports to Central Asia with its exports to Russia, it is evident that the dollar value of China’s exports to Russia is higher than to Central Asian countries, and the dollar value changes in exports are also more significant. For instance, in 2023, China’s exports of machinery to Russia amounted to $24 billion, while exports to the entire Central Asia region were approximately $7 billion. In the electrical equipment category, China’s exports to Russia were $13 billion compared to $5 billion to Central Asia. In the vehicles category, exports to Russia were $18 billion, while exports to Central Asia were $8 billion. On the other hand, the annual growth rates of individual Central Asian countries are higher in percentage terms compared to Russia. For example, as illustrated in Figure 12, China’s exports to Kyrgyzstan grew from $41 million in 2021 to $1.5 billion in 2022, while China’s exports to Russia increased from $1.2 billion dollars to $1.8 billion in the same period. The annual growth rates for Russia do not exhibit similar spikes, nor do they significantly exceed the growth rates for any Central Asian country in any category. 5. Central Asian exports to Russia in HS categories 84, 85, 87 and 90 In the HS categories 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical equipment), 87 (Vehicles), and 90 (Optical and medical instruments), exports from Central Asian countries to Russia exhibited significant growth in 2022 (Figures 16 and 17), with continued expansion in 2023 (with the exception of Kazakhstan in vehicles and parts). In total, exports from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) in these categories grew in 2022 by 600 % from the previous year. Notably, Kazakhstan was the biggest export in dollar terms. Its exports to Russia surged across all categories in 2022, with on-year growth rates for machinery, electrical equipment and sound devices, and optical and medical instruments ranging between 400 % and 600 %. In addition to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan recorded substantial increases in exports in 2022, particularly in the machinery and electrical equipment categories. Kyrgyzstan’s exports machinery increased from $2 million in 2021 to $49 million in 2022, a jump of about 2,500 %. However, when comparing the Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in electrical equipment, the dollar value in exports to Russia seems considerably smaller. Thus, no direct conclusion should be drawn from the fact that higher quantities of electronics pass through Kyrgyzstan to Russia. Although not depicted in the graph, it is important to highlight Turkmenistan’s growth in the export of electrical equipment in 2023 when it grew from $2,075 (2022) to $3 million in 2023, onyear growth of approximately 200,000 %. Similarly, Uzbekistan’s annual growth in exports of optical and medical instruments was around 40,000 % in 2022. As to vehicles and parts, Kyrgyzstan’s export growth commenced already in 2021. In the optical and medical instruments category, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan experienced notable export growth, particularly in 2023. At the HS category levels of 84, 85, 87 and 90, data for Tajikistan’s exports to Russia were unavailable.     6. Conclusion Chinese exports to Central Asia have significantly increased since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with concurrent growth China’s exports to Russia. Notably, there was a substantial surge in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan prior to invasion. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan, which has a modest GDP, saw the largest dollar-value increase from 2021 to 2023 in the categories of footwear, textiles, and clothes, as well as machinery and vehicles starting in 2022. The annual growth rates in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan show clear increases in the major export categories in 2022.  In dollar terms, Chinese exports to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also rose significantly from 2018 to 2023. For Uzbekistan, the largest growth in China's exports began in 2021 in electronics. Exports to Kazakhstan grew the most in 2022–2023 in the categories of footwear, textiles, and clothes, and machinery and vehicles.  The trade categories with notable growth in Chinese exports to Central Asian countries were machinery (HS 84), electrical equipment (HS 85), vehicles (HS 87), and optical and medical instruments (HS 90). Generally, the steepest rise in Chinese exports to Central Asia occurred in the vehicles category, with significant increases in exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 2022 continuing to a sharp rise in 2023. The trend for Chinese vehicle exports to Russia is similar. It is worth noting that Chinese vehicle exports to the rest of the world also accelerated after 2020. Additionally, there was substantial growth in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in the electrical equipment category in 2022 and 2023. In these categories, Chinese exports to Russia are significantly higher in dollar terms that exports to Central Asia. However, the annual growth rates in between 2018 and 2023 of Chinses exports to individual Central Asian countries have generally seen larger increases in percentage terms than those for Russia.  Exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in the selected key export categories increased significantly across all examined categories in 2022. Among Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan was the largest exporter to Russia in dollar terms from 2018 to 2023, with sharp growth in 2022 in all four categories examined in this paper. Additionally, the exports of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia grew significantly in 2022, particularly in the categories of machinery, and electrical equipment. The most notable annual growth in exports was posted by Turkmenistan – an increase from $2,075 in 2022 to $3 million in 2023, a 200,000 % increase in electrical equipment exports from the previous year. References Chupilkin, Maxim and Javorcik, Beata and Plekhanov, Alexander. (2023). The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows Into Russia Through the Caucasus and Central Asia. EBRD Working Paper No. 276, Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4368618 or https://ssrn.com/abstract=4368618 Kluge, Janis. (2024). Russia-China economic relations: Moscow’s road to economic dependence, SWP Research Paper, No. 6/2024, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, https://doi.org/10.18449/2024RP06 Simola, H. (2024). Recent trends in Russia’s import substitution of technology products. BOFIT Policy Brief 5/2024, June 2024.  World Bank, 2024, read 14.8.2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/brief/central-asia 1 Harmonized System code 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof.  2 Harmonized System code 85: Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles.  3 Harmonized System code 87: Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof.  4 Harmonized System code 90: Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof. 5 Harmonized System code 88: Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof.  6 Harmonized System code 89: Ships, boats, and floating structures.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The AIFTA and CECA have increased India-ASEAN trade, but recent talks aim to address trade imbalances and adjust tariffs for improved Indian export access. India's Act East Policy, initiated in the early 1990s (previously Look East Policy), is a cornerstone of India's foreign policy to strengthen economic, strategic, and cultural ties with the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) play a central role in this strategy. India's approach to trade policies, particularly in FTAs with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), reflects a complex balancing act between protecting domestic industries and fostering international trade partnerships. The India-ASEAN Free Trade Area (AIFTA), established in 2009, aimed to enhance economic cooperation by offering tariff concessions on goods traded between India and ASEAN countries. However, recent talks have focused on revising tariff structures to address disparities and improve trade flows, highlighting India's commitment to deepening economic engagement with ASEAN for mutual benefits and regional integration. To be sure, ASEAN remains a crucial trading partner for India, accounting for 11 percent of its global trade, with bilateral trade reaching US$ 122.67 billion during 2023-24. The India-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) comprises three key agreements covering Goods, Services, and Investment. India’s trade with ASEAN experienced astounding growth after signing the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA). However, the trade disproportionately benefits the ASEAN region. Between FY 2009 and FY 2023, imports from ASEAN to India grew by 234.4 percent while exports from India rose only by 130.4 percent, expanding India’s trade deficit from US$ 7.5 billion annually when the agreement was enacted in 2011 to approximately US$ 44 billion in 2023.    The potential adjustment of tariffs is influenced by the need to protect burgeoning sectors within India's economy, aligning with the government's “Make in India” initiative to transform India into a global manufacturing hub. For instance, raising tariffs on mobile phone parts and automobile components could incentivise domestic production and reduce import dependency. In the goods trade category, India eliminated import duties on approximately 74 percent of tariff lines and reduced duties on an additional 14 percent of tariff lines—highlighting one consolidated offer to ASEAN. At the same time, each ASEAN member made separate offers to India. This asymmetry in negotiation power also hinders India’s flexibility in protecting vulnerable domestic industries from competitive ASEAN imports.  ASEAN economies are inherently export-oriented with flourishing manufacturing bases. In contrast, India’s economy is significantly service- and agriculture-oriented, and it has not fully capitalised on the FTA, resulting in higher penetration of ASEAN countries into the Indian market. Indian exports have struggled to gain similar traction in ASEAN countries. Moreover, the inverted duty structure on certain items, like ferroalloys, aluminium, copper pipes and tubes, textile staple fibres, and several chemical preparations, puts Indian industries at a disadvantage.  To boost local manufacturing, India has implemented specific measures such as Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, higher import tariffs, and import monitoring, but several trade agreements negotiated earlier are seen as impediments. Domestic firms in India, particularly in the electronics and automotive sectors, have pressured the government to raise import tariffs to protect local industries, rooted in the desire to safeguard domestic manufacturers from cheaper imports and promote self-reliance and technological advancements. The implications of such tariff hikes extend beyond immediate economic protection. By fostering a robust industrial base, India can create jobs, stimulate economic growth, and enhance technological innovation. However, it is crucial to implement these measures in a way that does not significantly disrupt trade relations in the region. India-ASEAN trade talks  The 5th meeting of the AITIGA Joint Committee at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, in July 2024 marked a significant step forward in strengthening economic cooperation between India and ASEAN where all eight sub-committees focused on market access, rules of origin, standards, sanitary measures, and trade facilitation. India will host the next round of negotiations to review the AITIGA in November 2024 to address the pending concerns involving the reciprocity of trade benefits between India and ASEAN. One of the primary concerns is the trade imbalance between India and its FTA partners. To address this imbalance, India seeks greater market access for its goods, particularly in the automotive and agricultural sectors. For instance, India aims to enhance exports of automobiles and agricultural products to ASEAN countries, aligning with its strategic economic goals despite challenges. Reducing non-tariff barriers is another critical issue. Non-tariff barriers, such as stringent customs procedures and regulatory hurdles, impede smooth trade flows and increase business costs. Simplifying these procedures and ensuring compliance with international standards can facilitate more accessible trade between India and its FTA partners. For example, streamlining customs procedures for agricultural exports can help Indian farmers access new markets in ASEAN countries. The ASEAN bloc has already expressed concerns about India’s Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 (CAROTAR 2020), which they believe hinder their exports. Indian negotiators also push for tariff cuts in various sectors, including chemicals, metals, textiles, and gems, while addressing non-tariff barriers imposed by ASEAN, such as strict food certification requirements. The outcome of these negotiations will be pivotal in reshaping India-ASEAN trade dynamics. Revising the sensitive and exclusion lists to ensure fair trade practices while protecting vulnerable domestic industries will also be a crucial point of negotiation. This revision can help balance the interests of domestic manufacturers with the need to adhere to international trade commitments. Enhancing the transparency and predictability of trade practices, including establishing consistent and transparent trade policies, will be essential to foster a more robust trade relationship. Finally, by engaging with ASEAN through comprehensive trade agreements like AIFTA and CECA, India aims to boost economic cooperation and solidify its geopolitical influence in the region. India’s efforts to balance protectionism with regional integration reflect its broader economic strategy. For example, the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-Reliant India) initiative emphasises self-reliance and domestic manufacturing while seeking to integrate India into the global economy by enhancing its trade relationships. This strategy can ensure that India remains competitive in the global economy.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The concept of a multipolar (or polycentric) world order [1] was first coined by Academician Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 [Primakov 1996]. Like everything new, it was not immediately accepted, but ultimately became a significant contribution to both domestic and world theory of international relations, offering a compelling alternative to Western approaches, particularly the one proposed in Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations [Huntington 1993]. It informed the idea of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and India, implemented by Primakov and later embodied in the BRICS group. By now, the idea of multipolarity has been recognized in global political science, has entered the conceptual framework and the language of international diplomacy and is used in Russia’s doctrinal documents. In 2015, we proposed the scenario of a new bipolarity [2] as one of the possible trajectories for global development. Today, many scholars, both Chinese and American, [3] suggest that China-centric and U.S.-centric poles are emerging. This article discusses the “multipolarity — new bipolarity” dichotomy. Long Global Macro-Transformations World history shows that a new world order typically emerges after the end of a major war (see Table 1). Table 1. International system (world order)    Source: systematized by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS Europe was usually the “kitchen” where the world order was cooked. Take the last 200 years. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe emerged and lasted for 100 years. The century-long stability of that system could be explained by the homogeneity of the political organization of its guarantor states. All members of the Concert of Europe were monarchies. World War I produced the Versailles system, which lasted only 20 years. One of the reasons for its short life was the exclusion of the Soviet Union, Germany and China. The Yalta-Potsdam system was formed by the victors in World War II. Its guarantors were the “Big Three” powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the UK—along with France and China. The three defeated powers—Germany, Japan and Italy—were discriminated and disenfranchised. This system existed for 45 years and was initially thought to be polycentric, but quickly degenerated into a bipolar order, and the Cold War commenced. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the system became unipolar, dominated by the West, primarily the U.S. It disregarded Russia’s interests and, from 2018 onward, began discriminating against China as well. February 2022 can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s demise. However, today’s predictions suggest it will take at least 10 years before the new post-unipolar system becomes stable. The economic center of gravity is a spatial indicator of the economic strength of states, borrowed from physics. To put it simply, this is a geographical point of equilibrium for GDP, trade and investment flows of different countries. Figure 1 shows a map of how the world’s economic center of gravity shifted for over a thousand years. It appeared in Central Asia, on the territory of the Ghaznavid Empire (modern-day Afghanistan). The center then migrated northwest, while the devastation in post-war Europe forcefully pushed it (within just 10 years) to the West, toward Greenland. Then it turned east again. The sharpest shift, to the southeast, occurred in 2000–2010 and is associated with the rise of China. The economic center of gravity has almost returned to the same meridian but remained more than 2,000 km north of the starting point, which indicates a return to the millennial balance of economic power between the West and the East. Figure 1. “Journey” of the three-dimensional economic center of gravity    Source: Dobbs R., Remes J., Manyika J. et al. Urban world: Cities and the rise of the consuming class. McKinsey Global Institute, 2012. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/urbanization/urban-world-cities-and-the-rise-of-the-consuming-class. Statistic calculations by IMEMO RAS for 60 years of peace (1960–2021) indicate the stability of the center’s latitudinal (horizontal) position. This suggests a relatively consistent proportion of GDP production by the countries in the Global South and Global North, under the economic leadership of the Northern Hemisphere. The shift to the East has also been clearly confirmed. According to our projections up to 2050, the future position of the globe’s center of economic activity will lie on the border of India and China. This method of analysis reveals a high level of inertia in time and geographic monotonicity of changes in the balance of economic power of states. It also shows that wars can drastically disrupt the natural course of events. The center of gravity method can also be applied to the arsenals of strategic and tactical weapons (see Figure 2). For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had a huge advantage, but then there was a clear pivot to the northeast—the creation of superior nuclear capabilities in the Soviet Union. With the onset of arms control in 1993, a reversing loop emerged, heading southwest. This was followed by a curve to the east with an implied southward inclination, which reflects the growing nuclear stockpiles of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the rapid buildup of strategic and tactical nuclear forces in China. The military center of gravity follows its economic peer with a lag of 20 years, reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of Asian powers. These interpretations also clearly demonstrate the end of unipolarity and point to the rise of multipolarity. Figure 2. Movement of the nuclear center of gravity Source: calculations by K.V. Bogdanov, Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. Technology. Politicians tend to be techno-optimists. Barack Obama predicted that 3D printing would transform the entire world. [4] George W. Bush promised that decoding the human genome would revolutionize medicine. [5] All false starts. Economists traditionally measure the rate of technological progress (TP) using the total factor productivity (TFP) index. To put it simply, this is the part of economic growth driven not by an increase in inputs—labor and capital—but rather by improvements in the efficiency of their use. Technological progress means not only the generation of new scientific and technological ideas but also their mass replication. Without economic validation of the impact of wide dissemination of innovations, scientific or technological achievements remain in history as brilliant breakthroughs with only local economic effects, giving rise to journalistic generalizations at best, such as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” or “the sixth techno-economic paradigm.” Statistical metrics rely on data of technologically advanced nations, while catching-up countries have room for growth by approaching the TP frontier, i.e. adopting and improving existing ideas and technologies. Technological leaders spend more resources pushing the TP frontier, while those catching up can accelerate at lower costs, effectively staying in the “wind shadow” of the leaders. The TFP index growth rate has been steadily declining in developed countries for many years, but this has been especially conspicuous since the mid-2000s. Today, the growth is below 1.5% and even 1% per year (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Average annual growth of total factor productivity, % Source: calculations by IMEMO RAS based on the data from the International Productivity Monitor. No. 38, Spring 2020. http://www.csls.ca/ipm/ipm38.asp#:~:text=Martin%20Neil%20Baily%2C%20Barry%20P.%20Bosworth%20and %20Siddhi%20Doshi%0ALessons%20from%20Productivity%20Comparisons%20 of%20Germany%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States%C2%A0; Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth. World Bank Group, and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. China. 2019. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1335-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/833871568732137448/pdf/Innovative-China-New-Drivers-of-Growth.pdf. A similar pattern of dramatic TFP deceleration was observed in China. The consensus interpretation of these figures is that the main effects of the Third Industrial (i.e., computer) Revolution have largely been exhausted, and no new general-purpose breakthrough technologies (such as electricity, internal combustion engines, or computers and mobile communications) have emerged. However, it seems that the intellectualization of technologies and approaches to project management, as well as informatization, simply do not fit into the traditional factor-based view of progress that was established many years ago. The scale of knowledge is growing, new professions are springing up, the role of emotional intelligence and cognitive functions is increasing. All this dramatically changes the structure of capital assets (see Figure 4). From the beginning of the 21st century and until the 2008 crisis (2000–2007), equipment accounted for over 50% of the increase in capital’s contribution (investment) to output growth, whereas in 2019–2021, almost 63% of this increase was attributable to intellectual property assets. This result of our research suggests a refocusing of technological progress from final products to intellectual technologies, enabling the production of a range of innovative goods and services tailored to highly segmented demand. Figure 4. Transformation of the capital structure in the U.S. private sector Source: Total Factor Productivity for Major Industries—2022. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prod3_03232023.htm. There are now hopes that the pace of technological progress may accelerate due to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, which will spark a new industrial revolution. An indirect sign of its imminence is the sharp rise in the rate of business births and deaths in the U.S. economy in 2020–2022. [6] The spillover of labor from companies that are losing efficiency to corporations with increasing market shares has also accelerated. These are some sort of leading indicators that suggest the structural results of TP are approaching. Similar developments occurred 30 years ago, on the cusp of the computer revolution. The above-mentioned intellectualization of fi ed capital, where trusted AI will be applied, adds credibility to these hopes. In addition, AI is one of the critical areas of technological sovereignty. It is no coincidence that Vladimir Putin described AI as “crosscutting, universal and essentially revolutionary technology.” [7] The Russian President announced the preparation of a new edition of the National AI Development Strategy and a respective decree. I believe that this prioritization is justified. China’s experience in the semiconductor race is a good model to be emulated (see Figure 5). Its distinguishing feature is the focus on companies as drivers of development, with massive, cumulatively growing state support. Figure 5. Focusing on China’s priorities (nanometer chip race) Source: Systematized by I.V. Danilin, IMEMO RAS The U.S. strategy of curbing technological development of Russia (in all areas) and China (in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and electric cars) leads to stiff competition in high technology, which is fraught with fragmentation, diversification of technical standards, legal norms and rules. And this is another argument in favor of a new bipolarity. Demographic processes. According to UN projections, by the middle of the 21st century, Russia will drop from its current 9th place to 14th in terms of population, while remaining the most populous country in Europe. [8] A more significant problem for Russia is population aging. The proportion of elderly people, who are typically not part of the labor force, is increasing. Japan, Spain and Italy are leading this process today, but neither China nor India will be spared. Nigeria appears to be the only major country where population and the share of young people will continue to grow until the end of the 21st century. As of December 2023, one in 10 people worldwide was aged 65 or over, with health spending taking up 10% of global GDP. [9] In this context, the importance of medical technologies cannot be overstated, as they can extend not only people’s life expectancy but also the duration of their healthy and socially active life, thereby easing labor market pressures. Needs always steer technological progress toward overcoming economic growth constraints tied to the scarcest resource in any given historical period. A serious risk associated with the problem of aging is a slowdown in innovation, since it is people under 40—the age group that will shrink throughout the 21st century—who are the primary drivers and consumers of innovation. So far, this risk has been mitigated by the large youth cohorts in China and India. This is why these two nations are experiencing almost exponential growth in patenting, massive reengineering and, consequently, in middle-class numbers. Demographics give India an edge until around 2060, which is already evident in the growth rates of Indian economy. Combined with the influx of hi-tech investments and the contribution of the Indian diaspora, India has good prospects, making its position crucial to the future architecture of the world order, regardless of how it evolves. The U.S. understands this and has been figuratively “clinging” to this nation for the past 20 years. I believe that the Russian Academy of Sciences should significantly bolster scientific and educational ties with India and its dynamically developing neighbors in Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. The anticipated tension in the global market of new generations of innovators aggravates inter-country competition for this scarcest resource. I think that the international reputation of the Russian Academy of Sciences is a powerful tool to attract and retain young people and foster their creative motivation. We should reassert this as we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. Ideology. Dirigisme [10], or statism, is the main trend in both economic theory and economic policy of the West. A pivot to a more state-controlled economy began with the disappointing outcomes of the Washington Consensus, which aimed to guide post-socialist countries from planned to market economies. The 2008–2009 financial crisis cemented the trend toward statism, and the COVID-19 pandemic elevated it to unprecedented proportions. In the U.S., Democrats are among the most vocal proponents of greater government intervention in all spheres of life, but they are not alone. Republicans are also actively advocating industrial policy, repudiation of free trade, as well as strict control over Big Tech, among other measures. The popularity of the so-called cultural Marxism is on the rise. [11] Its origins go back to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (H. Marcuse, E. Fromm and others). These ideas are moving from the realm of ideological and theoretical confrontations into political activism. For example, the leaders of the BLM movement publicly self-identify as “trained Marxist organizers.” The essence of the strategy inspired by “cultural Marxism” is the rejection of direct political struggle on the barricades, since the proletariat has been “bought off by the bourgeoisie and is no longer capable of anything,” and the ranks of the classic proletariat are rapidly thinning. The direction of social change is set, on the one hand, by intellectuals with personal power and, on the other hand, by marginalized groups seeking to assert their “right to identity.” The strategy of activists who form this paradoxical combination of intellectuals and marginalized individuals is the creeping takeover of the main institutions of power and society by planting “correct” ideas in the mass consciousness. In the U.S., the fighters for political correctness have already hijaked the school system, university campuses, major media outlets and the entertainment industry (Hollywood). Civil servants are forced to take courses in critical race theory, which postulates not only the socially constructed nature of race and the recognition of systemic racism [Delgado, Stefancic 2017: 45] but also a sense of guilt in one part of society toward another. This, in turn, allegedly requires addressing moral and material injustices by organizing public life in line with such an ideology. Similar concepts are being pushed into public discourse as well. It is already dominated by the ideas of radical feminism, cancel culture, anti-systemic racism and postcolonialism, the fight against global warming and the green agenda, which claims to be universal and non-negotiable. As a result, the energy transition is motivated more by ideology than by the comparative market efficiency of energy supplies. Different environmental-political discourses—eco-nationalism, eco-imperialism and green growth—are competing in shaping the green agenda, eroding the attractiveness of the dominant sustainable development model. Another universal weapon in fighting any dissent is political correctness. Large corporations, government agencies and universities are developing and implementing strategies to promote DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) principles, which are nothing but tools of ideological control over employees. Universities are required to fi reports on their compliance with such principles and efforts to promote them, which causes mounting criticism as they violate academic freedom and cultivate ideological conformity. [12] However, ideological censorship has already taken deep root in various spheres of public life, and questioning its compatibility with democracy is deemed politically incorrect. Revising cultural norms has become a cultural norm in and of itself, deepening divisions in modern polarized societies, primarily in the U.S., but also in Old Europe [Semenenko 2023: 27-35]. Another curious phenomenon is associated with the new agenda. In the 20th century, the left championed progress, advocating faster economic growth, rapid technological advancement and better social welfare. Now the ideas of zero or even negative growth and post-growth are popular among them. [Buchs, Koch 2017: 218]. Such ideological narratives exacerbate the question of how to treat the poor countries of the South, but also their own poor: the welfare state for all no longer fit into this agenda. On the contrary, it becomes a selective tool of backing the “right” minorities. This creates a breeding ground for stronger positions of populist forces. Such contradictory internal political processes distort public consciousness as well as domestic and foreign policy decision-making. The new elites are extremely ideologized. The U.S. political system is becoming less effective at regulating the economy. Two rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, have downgraded the U.S. credit rating to AA+ from the top mark of AAA. In November 2023, Moody’s lowered its outlook on the U.S. credit rating to “negative” from “stable.” All three agencies agree on the main reason for the downgrade: the growing dysfunctionality of the political system. In foreign policy, the U.S. has withdrawn from 16 major international treaties and agreements on arms control, global trade, climate and the Arctic since the beginning of the century [Dynkin 2020]. In other words, the unipolar world order with its unbridled appetite for expansion has brought the world into a zone of extra-high risks. And the paradigms that are dominant in the West have proven incompatible with either Russian or Chinese value-oriented political projects. Therefore, the ideological sphere will inevitably see increased confrontation, marking another step toward bipolarity. IMEMO RAS researchers have repeatedly warned about the West’s miscalculated strategic hopes: 1) that Russia would face an economic catastrophe because of an unprecedented sanctions war in modern history; 2) that the unipolar world order would remain unchallenged; 3) that a global blockade of Russia’s export-oriented economy would be feasible. And we were not the only ones who made these warnings. In response, we only heard propagandistic clichés like “a gas station masquerading as a country,” “a regional power” and “Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters”. This kind of “expertise” led the Washington establishment to believe that Russia is a “declining power” whose strategic interests could be safely neglected. This “strategic lunacy” is a consequence of a universalist mindset—a product of the West’s political experience and culture, which tends to elevate Anglo-Saxon and European historical tradition to absolutes—and of a failure to understand the shifts in the balance of power in the 21st century. Today, Russia is the world’s fourth-largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), while the top fi e global economic powers include three BRICS nations and none from the blooming “garden” of Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief who has recently been fired. Now a new narrative has been launched into the propaganda orbit: “Russia is about to attack Eastern Europe.” The logical gap between the image of a declining power and that of an “aggressive bear” is conveniently ignored. This primitive, one-dimensional perception of complex non-linear processes can only lead to disappointment—just as it did when the West lulled itself into believing that Chinese reforms would eventually lead to political pluralism. As a result, the West has an inexhaustible stream of surprises. It appears that their experts are increasingly out of touch with Russian (and any other non-Western) realities. Figuratively speaking, they are staring into a distorting rearview mirror constructed by their own rhetoric and propaganda. But the main real surprise was the fantastic resilience of the Russian economy. I dare say that no other economy in the world, not even China’s, could withstand such aggressive pressure. The high resistance of the Russian economy to external shocks can be explained by three fundamental reasons. First, it is the result of difficult, sometimes agonizing institutional and structural reforms. These efforts have ultimately produced a self-sufficient, adaptive and highly diversified market economy. Second, the crisis of 2022 was the fifth (!) in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The government, federal regulators and the Bank of Russia have accumulated hard-earned professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical strategies. The same can be said about business. Our economic entities have demonstrated time and again that there are always more effective solutions than there are problems. Finally, the West miscalculated its ability to isolate our economy. The dual containment of Russia and China, in fact, only strengthens ties between the BRICS member states. Transformations of the 2020s. The first half of the 2020s has fi y buried what was once known as “European security.” It is impossible to glue this “broken cup” back together without Russia. The unwillingness of the Ukrainian side and the West to stop the armed conflict at its very beginning, the dangerous escalation, NATO’s constant violation of its own “red lines” and the accession of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Alliance are all symptoms of the European security system transforming into a transatlantic one. Meanwhile, the Eurasian security system is taking shape. The outcomes of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China hint that the “political East” is starting to form, if not as an alternative to the long-standing “political West,” then at least as an equal partner. Without considering its interests, any debate about “rules-based” global security will be mere fantasy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Moscow after his recent reelection is in the same vein. Of course, geography cannot be changed, and Russia has been and will remain a European power. However, it is also the geographic center of Eurasia, providing the infrastructure backbone for the Eurasian partnership—from the Northern Sea Route and up to the Trans-Siberian Railway, Baikal–Amur Mainline, Trans-Asian Highway and cross-continental pipelines. The “post-Ukrainian” world seems to be moving toward a new, indivisible Eurasian security architecture, relying on existing institutions: the Union State, CSTO, EAEU, CIS, BRICS, SCO and ASEAN. Minsk has put forward an initiative to develop a Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity—a strategic vision for a new system of international relations to replace the “rules-based” world order. An important event of 2024 in this context is the expansion of the BRICS club (see Figure 6). Its combined economic power could potentially reach $67 trillion, surpassing the total GDP of the G7 countries. Figure 6. Economic potential of BRICS countries Source: calculations by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the IMF, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Steel Association, Energy Transition Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2023, International Energy Agency. And there are still 28 more countries on the “waiting list”. In several important markets such as metals, automotive industry, oil and mineral fertilizers, BRICS already matches or exceeds the potential of the G7 nations. Russia, which took over the BRICS rotating presidency in 2024, faces the task of energizing the harmonized economic and technological policies of the members. This approach is the institutional cornerstone of the future polycentric world. What will the coming world order look like? It is difficult to say which of the two trends—bipolarity or polycentrism—will prevail in the end. It is more likely that they will coexist: for example, rigid bipolarity in the Global North and polycentrism in the Global South. Signs of military, economic and technological bipolarity are already visible in the North. Interestingly, New Delhi tends to categorize China as a country of the North [Jaishankar 2020: 240]. This viewpoint has substance, as China is far ahead of other countries of the Global South in terms of GDP per capita ($12,541). For comparison, India’s GDP per capita is $2,612. [13] The decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies has not affected trade flows yet, but only technology and investment. In 2023, China saw a reversal of foreign direct investment inflows, with funds previously invested being withdrawn. Negative trends took hold, and the outflow approached negative $1.5 trillion (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific macro-region is gaining greater internal dynamics, unlike Europe or North America. Figure 7. U.S.–China Economic Decoupling Source: UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/; State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/. Meanwhile, the trend toward political polycentricity persists. For example, New Delhi and Ankara were initially poles apart on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. This is also the dawning of post-unipolarity, where the new centers of power are increasingly guided by their own interests in decision-making rather than by any “rules” or advice from Washington, Beijing or Moscow. It would be unrealistic to expect that the future world order will be free of conflict. The world will retain its diversity, with different potentials of countries and their competition. It is crucial that, despite their differences, the interests of larger and smaller nations are respected, and problems are solved through constructive dialogue. Russia was the first to challenge the notorious unipolar world order. Today we can state that most countries in the Global South have responded to this challenge and refused to subscribe to the Western interpretation of the conflict in Ukraine . The future world order is taking shape right before our eyes. I am sure that a multipolar world is preferable for Russia as a developed, self-sufficient and sovereign nation. But this world also requires a new system of global governance, development and strengthening of its institutions, such as BRICS, G20, SCO and EAEU. For instance, the EAEU member states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) are faring much better than the five other post-Soviet countries. In 2022, GDP per capita in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union was 3.5 times higher than the average for the fi e other CIS states that are not part of the EAEU (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) (see Figure 8). Our strategy in these organizations requires a solid approach and “stereoscopic” vision from socio-economic, scientific, technological and political perspectives. Here, the Russian Academy of Sciences should play a major role as a leader of scientific and expert community. Figure 8. Economic trends of EAEU and CIS countries Source: EEC. https://eec.eaeunion.org/?ysclid=lr7rtdg7np631919243; IMF. https://www.imf.org/; World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/.  Conclusion In conclusion, there are compelling arguments both for multipolarity and for a new bipolarity. Leading U.S. experts are asking similar questions: “What order will replace the crumbling US-led system is far from certain. Will China push aside the United States as the global hegemon to lead a world according to rules written in Chinese characters? Will the world become bipolar, divided between two more or less rigidly defined blocs led by the United States and China? Will a genuinely multipolar world emerge based on several states or coalitions of more or less equal strength?” [Graham 2023: 272]. These questions are yet to be answered, and definitive conclusions in this case are premature. Given this high uncertainty, one should be prepared for any scenario. The essential prerequisite for such readiness is Russia’s strategic autonomy based on military-strategic parity with the U.S. The fundamental question to which the author has no answer today is: how likely is the emergence of a new world order without a major war? In 2024, presidential or parliamentary elections will take place (or have already taken place) in 50 countries, which account for more than 45% of the world’s GDP and population. Perhaps their results will clarify our vision of the near future. Dynkin A.A. (2024). World order transformation: economy, ideology, technology. Polis. Political Studies, 5, 8-23. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.05.02 This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”. The author expresses gratitude to his colleagues at IMEMO RAS R.I. Kapelyushnikov, V.D. Milovidov, I.S. Semenenko, I.V. Danilin, S.V. Zhukov, K.V. Bogdanov, A.P. Guchanova for consultations and assistance in preparing this article. References Büchs, M., & Koch, M. (2017). Critiques of growth. In M. Büchs, & M. Koch. Postgrowth and Wellbeing: Challenges to Sustainable Welfare (pp. 39-56). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-59903-8_4 Delgado, R.,& Stefancic, J. (2017). Critical race theory. Anintroduction. New York: New York University Press. Graham, T. (2023). Getting Russia right. UK: Polity Books. Huntington, S.P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India way: strategies for an uncertain world. New Delhi; New York: Harper Collins Publishers India. Kupchan, C. (2021). Bipolarity is back: why it matters. The Washington Quarterly, 44(4), 123-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457 Yan Xuetong. (2016). Political leadership and power redistribution. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow002 Dynkin, A.A. (2020). International turbulence and Russia. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 90(2), 127-137. https://doi.org/10.1134/S101933162002001X. Primakov, E.M. (1996). Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya nakanune XXI veka: problemy, perspektivy [International Relations on the eve of 21st century: problems, prospects]. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, 10, 3-13. (In Russ.) 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The world order or international system is a stable set of institutions and norms of military-political and economic relations, which is institutionalized and legitimate in the international legal sense. The world order remains stable during the active life of at least one generation—a universal measure of social time. However, in the wake of geopolitical macro-crises, illegitimate systems emerge, forcibly imposed by the winner. This was the case with the unipolar world order. 2. Dynkin A., Burrows M. Here’s the Playbook for Getting U.S.–Russian Cooperation Back on Track. The National Interest. 07.12.2015. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-the-playbook-getting-us-russian-cooperation-back-track-14527. 3. For example, see: [Yan Xuetong 2016; Kupchan 2021]. 4. Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address. The White House. President Barack Obama. 12.02.2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address. 5. President Bush Calls on Senate to Back Human Cloning Ban. Remarks by the President on Human Cloning Legislation. The East Room. The White House. President George W. Bush. 10.04.2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020410-4.html. 6. Private sector establishments birth and death, seasonally adjusted. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 25.10.2023. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.t08.htm. 7. Artificial Intelligence Journey 2023 conference. President of Russia. Official website. 24.11.2023. http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/72811. 8. World Population Prospects 2024, Online Edition. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/MostUsed/. 9. Global Health Expenditure database. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/nha/database. 10. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment; a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action The world is looking at a potential geopolitical and environmental point of conflict, which will affect every country in more ways than one. This dispute stems from a search for critical minerals in the deep sea. Critical minerals are considered the building blocks of contemporary technology. To say that they are crucial to the economic and national security of every country would be an understatement. Due to the inherited complexities of mining and attaining critical minerals from challenging geographies, the hunt for them has intensified. Beyond land, many countries are now looking at space as an alternative. Finding and commercially harnessing minerals from celestial bodies like the Moon and asteroids, however, is still a challenge. Therefore, the search for critical minerals in the deep sea has now entered a new phase of competition, where countries are no longer waiting but are actively engaged in the process of deep-sea mining. In this race, while some countries such as China, India, and South Korea (see Table 1) are preparing to grab the opportunity and are trying to build capacities and capabilities, others have raised the environmental and ecological impacts of deep-sea mining. Against this background, it is crucial to identify the key players in this race and understand the accompanying international legal nuances. Table 1: Exploration Contracts issued by the International Seabed Authority (ISA)   Source: ISA. What’s the rush? The urgency of the critical mineral problem is exacerbated by two factors: Fast-depleting reserves of critical minerals for human use and their rising demand. Behind this sudden rush are two important reasons: Firstly, the focus on clean and renewable energy, which is crucial in driving the green energy transition, and secondly, the increasing consumption of high-technology products, which depends on the heavy use of critical minerals. As an illustration, consider its application in high-tech items of various sizes, such as smartphones, electric car magnets, and intricate machinery like F35 stealth aircraft. A F35 aircraft, for example, needs 920 pounds of rare earth elements, demonstrating the significance of these minerals for any nation. Although deep-sea mining is not an exclusively Indo-Pacific phenomenon, competition is most felt in this region due to the high stakes involved. The major actors involved in this race are China, India, South Korea, and even non-state actors, such as private companies such as the Metals Company (TMC, a Canada-based company, which have considerable stakes in the space. International Seabed Authority: China and influence politics Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was constituted with the mandate to ‘organise and control all mineral resources-related activities’ and guarantee ‘effective protection of the marine environment’ on the seabed of international waters, which are a global commons. ISA is constituted by the Assembly, Council, and Secretariat. ISA’s key advisory body, the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), should help the authority frame the rules, regulations and procedures (RRPs) to govern mining activities on the international seabed. While the conversation on setting a legal framework for undersea mining has been in process since 2016, ISA has garnered increasing international attention due to the triggering of the ‘two-year rule’ by the island nation of Nauru back in 2021. As per UNCLOS, if the Council of ISA fails to adopt the relevant RRPs within two years of receiving the application for approval of a plan of work for exploitation, the council will have to consider and approve such plan ‘based on the provisions of the Convention and any rules, regulations and procedures that the Council may have adopted provisionally, or based on the norms contained in the Convention and the terms and principles contained in this Annex as well as the principle of non-discrimination among contractors.’ Since this incident, negotiations have naturally picked up, with China playing the leading role in shaping the deep sea mining code, as it wants to influence and is eager to push forward the negotiations in its infancy phase. In the 2023 ISA Council’s July meeting, China blocked the motion introduced by France, Chile, and Costa Rica to discuss a moratorium on deep sea mining. The absence of the United States (US) from the ISA elevates Beijing's role to a prominent position. This discussion will likely have severe implications for the future of the high seas, which cover 60 percent of the world’s oceans. At the ISA’s Council meeting in July 2023, China and other states like Nauru, Japan, Australia, India, Norway, and Russia supported deep-sea mining against a group of 20 countries that opposed it due to lack of scientific evidence and are pushing to put a moratorium in place. France was the exception, calling for a total ban on deep-sea mining. Apart from nation states, many international Multinational Corporations (MNCs) like Google, Samsung, BMW, Volvo Group, and Tesla have also joined the call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining. This call includes 804 marine science and policy experts from 44 countries recommending a ‘pause until sufficient and robust scientific information’ is obtained. The call for a moratorium has increased since the discovery of “dark oxygen” on the seafloor. Even the European Union has adopted a resolution to support a moratorium in response to Norway’s decision to initiate deep-sea mining in the Arctic . Stuck in a limbo As commercial deep-sea mining comes closer than ever to being a reality, it is critical to analyse and take stock of the complex interplay of geopolitical, environmental, and legal challenges that will define the future of international relations and environmental stewardship. As nations such as China, Norway, South Korea, and even India accelerate their efforts to exploit these untapped resources, the world faces a crucial decision: To prioritise immediate economic and technological gains or the fragile ecosystems of the deep ocean. China's geopolitical and strategic goals and its growing influence on international organisations, including the ISA, must be kept in mind while taking a call when the stakes are undeniably high, not just for the Indo-Pacific but for the entire planet. The moratorium is also being proposed as per the established precautionary approach. This approach is a broad legal and philosophical principle that suggests a pause and reassessment in case of a human innovation/activity that could potentially result in harm given the lack of scientific knowledge. In light of the pressing concerns raised by scientists, environmentalists, and several nations, a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action. While some have argued that such a precautionary pause would not be in accordance with UNCLOS, including the current Secretary General of ISA, it would be an obligation under the constitution of the oceans. In an advisory opinion, the International Tribunal on Law of Sea (ITLOS) has confirmed a trend of precautionary approach becoming a part of customary international law and stated that it is a ‘binding obligation’ on both states and the ISA. This approach is enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. An example of such a moratorium under international law is the International Whaling Convention, which was adopted based on the precautionary approach and has been largely followed for the past 35 years. As the global community navigates this uncharted territory, it must ensure that the pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment that sustains us all. The choices made today will have far-reaching consequences, shaping the geopolitical landscape and determining whether the international community can unite in the face of shared challenges or whether the race for resources will lead to further fragmentation and conflict.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Picture: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ China now has strategic partnerships with 53 of the 54 African countries; investments range from industry to agriculture After holding bilateral meetings with 25 African heads of state in less than a week, China's President Xi Jinping announced on Thursday (5) the project to implement ten partnership actions with the continent that will be financed by the Chinese government to the value of 360 billion yuan (US$ 51,4 billion). According to the Chinese president, the projects should affect various areas of infrastructure and the transfers should be carried out by 2027. He has been meeting with presidents of African countries in Beijing since Monday (2), before and during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, in English), which began on Wednesday (4) and runs until Friday (6). In the current edition, China has decided to sign strategic partnerships with all the African countries with which it has diplomatic relations – or 53 of 54. Raising the level of partnerships is a growing practice in Chinese foreign policy to strengthen ties with countries, mainly in the so-called Global South. The total investment will be divided into a credit line of 210 billion yuan (around US$ 29,8 billion), 80 billion yuan (US$ 11,3 billion) in assistance, and 70 billion yuan (US$ 9,9 billion) of investment by Chinese companies in Africa. Regarding health cooperation, it was planned for the joint creation of an alliance of hospitals and medical centers. China has promised to send 2,000 health workers to the continent and launch 20 programs for health facilities and malaria treatment. According to the WHO, in 2022 Africa had 94% of the world's malaria cases (233 million) and 95% of the deaths caused by the disease (580,000). In agriculture and food, China will provide African countries with 1 billion yuan (around US$ 142,1 million) for emergency food assistance, the construction of standardized agricultural “demonstration areas” of more than 6,600 hectares, the sending of 500 agricultural experts and the creation of a “China-Africa agricultural scientific and technological innovation alliance.” In this sector, the Chinese president said that “two-way investments will be encouraged for new businesses of Chinese and African companies”, to help them gain added value and create at least 1 million local jobs. Common security is the tenth area of cooperation announced. Xi said China will offer 1 billion yuan to train 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police officers, “and invite 500 young [African] military officers to visit China”. It also announced the creation of a digital technology cooperation center to start 20 digital projects and 30 infrastructure connectivity projects in Africa. This week, the presidents and heads of state of Libya, Mali, Comoros, Togo, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Chad, Malawi and Mauritania signed an agreement to upgrade diplomatic relations with China to the level of strategic partnership. Other countries, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, have adopted what is known as comprehensive strategic partnerships. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa signed a “new era comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” with the Asian giant, which is now the highest relationship with China among African countries. In addition, two documents were signed, the “Beijing Declaration on Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era” and the “Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)” of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The long name of this Beijing Declaration is part of the country’s diplomatic terminology and is the highest used for a partnership with an entire region. Right to modernization On Thursday (5), Wang Yi, China's foreign minister held a press conference with his counterpart from Senegal, Yassine Fall, and from the Republic of Congo, Jean-Claude Gakosso, to comment on the partnership, results and prospects. Wang Yi emphasized the need to build multilateralism with Africa. “We must always listen to Africa's voice [...] without being condescending.” The Beijing document argues that Africans “are qualified to serve as heads of international organizations and institutions.” African countries, in return, highlighted in the document their appreciation that China was the first country to support the African Union's entry into the G20. China welcomes the fact that more African countries are joining the BRICS, since in addition to South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia joined the group last year. At the press conference, Wang Yi also called for China and Africa to face together challenges such as “small gardens and high fences”, about the U.S. strategy of protectionism against China. Referring to cooperation with the continent, Wang Yi said the country does not want to “play geographical games, or confront blocs”. “We want to reach a consensus in the international community [...] everyone has the right to modernization.” For his part, Yassine Fall emphasized China's commitment to increasing the supply of exports from African countries to China, the elimination of customs barriers for the least developed countries – which include 33 African countries – and financial support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Translated from Portuguese to English by: Ana Paula Rocha

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском China's geopolitics and Russia's concessions While the Western media continues to speculate about China's role in the Russian war of aggression, Beijing is seeking to maximize its benefits: from China's point of view, the aim is to exploit Moscow's dependence on the People's Republic and expand cooperation in its own interests - and not just in economic terms. In geopolitical terms, this relates in particular to China's access to the Sea of Japan, but Beijing's plans extend as far as the Arctic. A paragraph from a joint statement by Presidents Xi and Putin, which at first glance seems inconspicuous, could have far-reaching geopolitical implications and become a serious security policy challenge for Japan and South Korea. New balance of power opens up room for maneuver for Beijing The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced a premiere of a special kind on July 24: for the first time, fighter jets from the USA and Canada had to take off over the Bering Sea as two Chinese H-6K bombers approached the coast of Alaska. These were accompanied by two Russian Tupolev Tu-95MSs.[i] Just a few days earlier, Russia and China had held a joint naval and air force exercise called "Joint Sea-2024" near the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. But while these joint military exercises attracted media attention, Beijing and Moscow are creating facts in the background that could have far-reaching consequences for the security architecture in the Sea of Japan and around the Korean peninsula: Russia's ruler Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping recently published a joint declaration on deepening their strategic partnership.[ii] The background to the paper was the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, or the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, 75 years ago. It contains the following resolution: "Russia and China wish to conduct a constructive dialog with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the navigation of Chinese ships across the lower reaches of the Tumen River." What seems inconspicuous could, from Seoul and Tokyo's perspective, change the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China to their own disadvantage and have a decisive impact on the sensitive security architecture in the region. The Tumen River: will China's maritime impasse disappear? The 521-kilometre-long Tumen River forms the border between China and North Korea and becomes the border river between North Korea and Russia downstream before flowing into the Sea of Japan. At present, Chinese ships can only navigate the river freely as far as the village of Fangchuan at the eastern end of the inland province of Jilin. Permission from both Russia and North Korea is required for the remaining 15 kilometers to the Sea of Japan. A Soviet-era "Friendship Bridge" less than ten meters high also blocks the passage of larger ships. Historically, China held the area until the Russian Empire gained control in the 1860s. China has repeatedly called on Russia and North Korea to permanently allow Chinese ships to navigate the river to the Sea of Japan and has proposed the creation of a special economic zone along its banks. China's goal is clear: Beijing is keen to gain access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River. Japan and South Korea: concerns about geopolitical implications There is concern in Japan that the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China could shift to Japan's disadvantage: In an interview with the daily newspaper Nikkei Asia, Chisako Masuo, professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyushu University, warns that in the future, Chinese coast guard patrol vessels could enter the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River alongside larger ships. "This could force the Japanese navy to withdraw its coast guard vessels from the Senkaku Islands, which would weaken surveillance in the East China Sea."[iii] Japan and China are in dispute over the Senkaku Islands. Japan controls them, China calls them Diaoyu and claims them for itself. Recently, the presence of Chinese ships in the waters around the islands has increased again. "There are likely to be similar concerns in South Korea. Chinese ships could now reach the Korean peninsula from both sides. In addition, both Japan and South Korea are close allies of the USA. A deterioration in the security situation - even if it is only perceived - would therefore also have an impact on the plans of the US armed forces," analyses journalist Michael Radunski, who reported from Beijing as a correspondent for several years[iv]. The Sea of Japan: Gateway to the Arctic Beijing is pursuing a much broader goal beyond access to the Sea of Japan: access to the Arctic. In a paper published on May 13, 2024, researchers from northern China's Dalian Maritime University argue that access to the Sea of Japan could strengthen China's position in the Arctic and significantly advance Beijing's vision of a "Polar Silk Road."[v] If the Arctic is indeed largely ice-free by mid-century, new and shortened sea routes would open up for Chinese shipping. "With the Polar Silk Road, China is also embedding the Arctic region in the so-called New Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative), a large-scale Chinese project to expand an intercontinental infrastructure and trade network. The potential shipping routes of the "Polar Silk Road" run west of Greenland along the Canadian coast (Northwest Passage), from Scandinavia along the Siberian coast of Russia (Northeast Passage) and centrally between Spitsbergen and Greenland (Transpolar Route) into the Bering Strait," states David Merkle, China expert at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in a comprehensive analysis of Chinese policy in the northern polar region. [vi] Currently, a significant proportion of Chinese trade has to pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia. A blockade of this strait, which is only around 50 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, would pose a serious threat to China's energy security. In addition, an ice-free Arctic would shorten the existing sea routes from Asia to Europe by around 8,000 kilometers and to North America by around 4,500 kilometers. Overcomeable challenges or deliberate uncertainty? Russia and North Korea have so far been extremely sceptical of China's plans. Moscow fears that China's influence in North-East Asia could increase. Meanwhile, North Korea also has a lot at stake: until now, all Chinese goods have crossed the Tumen River via a bridge and been transported overland to the port of Rajin. "Therefore, the idea of allowing China to ship directly to the Pacific via the Tumen River would make this port redundant. North Korea would lose a lot of revenue as a result," states Melik Kaylan from the business magazine Forbes.[vii] He points out that massive dredging and widening would be required to make the Tumen navigable for large ships. In his view, the idea of restoring Chinese access seems like a fantasy, "an improbable one". So why did Putin and Xi bring up this idea? His explanation: "The coastal strip was ceded to Russia by the Qing dynasty in the 19th century and the People's Republic of China has been demanding it back for decades. Putin is running out of incentives he can offer Beijing to support his war in Ukraine. Such an offer goes down well with the Chinese public - but triggers anger in Moscow among supporters of the Putin regime, who are filled with Great Russian fanaticism. (...) But Putin is making a certain point: if Beijing gains direct access to the Sea of Japan, the strategic equation will change radically. Currently, the Chinese navy has to sail around the entire Korean peninsula to get to this area. Suddenly, Beijing could directly threaten Japan (and various disputed islands)."[viii] Consequently, the burden on the US and its allies to expand maritime projection, protection, readiness and resources would increase dramatically. So is it all just a PR stunt designed to create uncertainty among the US and its allies - and also generate applause among the Chinese public? This theory is contradicted by the fact that there are hardly any reports in the state media of the People's Republic that address the issue. Furthermore, there is increasing movement in the matter: Chinese online portals have reported that Putin agreed further resolutions at his meeting with North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un in mid-June. Accordingly, North Korea and Russia are said to have already signed a bilateral agreement on the construction of a new bridge over the Tumen River. "It can be seen that cooperation between Russia and China is becoming ever closer in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and increasing Western sanctions. The redesign of this bridge is not only an infrastructure project, but also a symbol of strategic cooperation between the two countries [Russia and China] and heralds a new era of economic cooperation," judges Yi Dan Qing Cheng, who writes under a pseudonym and is one of the few commentators from China to have dealt with the issue in a journalistic capacity.[ix] Outlook There is no question that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has changed the balance of power and relations between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang in June. Putin traveled to North Korea for the first time in a quarter of a century to personally deepen relations between the two states. Meanwhile, Russia is dependent on Chinese goods: in 2023, goods worth a record value of more than 240 billion US dollars were traded between Russia and China, an increase of 26.3 percent compared to the previous year. These shifts in Russia's power and dependencies open up new opportunities for the People's Republic, including geopolitically. If the project to provide Chinese access to the Sea of Japan is successfully pursued, China could develop the Tumen Delta as a secondary shipyard for its naval and patrol vessels and position them strategically close to Japan's international maritime borders. The region appears to be preparing for growing tensions: The foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the USA announced in Tokyo at the end of July that they would be expanding their cooperation within the framework of the so-called Quad. Specifically, this involves the area of cyber security - but also maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. References [i] Siehe ausführlicher: Zwerger, Patrick 2024: Uralt-Bomber aus Russland und China treffen auf US-Jets, abrufbar unter: https://www.flugrevue.de/militaer/tupolew-tu-95ms-und-harbin-h-6-uralt-bomber-aus-russland-und-china-vor-alaskas-kueste/, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [ii] Außenministerium der Volksrepublik China 2024: Gemeinsame Erklärung der Volksrepublik China und der Russischen Föderation zur Vertiefung der umfassenden strategischen Kooperationspartnerschaft im neuen Zeitalter anlässlich des 75. Jahrestages der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern, abrufbar unter: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iii] Tajima, Yukio 2024: China eyes Sea of Japan access via Russia-North Korea border river, Nikkei Asia, abrufbar unter: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-eyes-Sea-of-Japan-access-via-Russia-North-Korea-border-river, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iv] Radunski, Michael 2024: Chinesisch-russische Partnerschaft: Wie Peking sich Zugang zum Japanischen Meer verschaffen will, China.Table, 28.06.2024. [v] Chang, Yen-Chiang, Xingyi Duan, Xu (John) Zhang & Ling Yan 2024: On China’s Navigation Rights and Interests in the Tumen River and the Japanese Sea, abrufbar unter: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08920753.2024.2347817?src=exp-la, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vi] Merkle, David 2023: Der selbsternannte Fast-Arktisstaat: Chinas Politik in der nördlichen Polarregion, in: Auslandsinformationen, abrufbar unter: https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/der-selbsternannte-fast-arktisstaat, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vii] Kaylan, Melik 2024: Russia Offers China A River To The Sea In The Pacific, abrufbar unter: https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2024/06/25/russia-offers-china-a-river-to-the-sea-in-the-pacific/, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024. [viii] Ebd. [ix] Yi Dan Qing Cheng 2024: Was er unserem Land versprochen hat, hat Putin eingehalten. Die Umgestaltung der Tumen-Brücke hat die Sorgen der chinesischen Seite gemildert, abrufbar unter: https://www.163.com/dy/article/J6JBCD8K0552P34A.html, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In recent years, Malaysia has emerged as a strategic economic hub in Southeast Asia. In recent years, Malaysia has become a key node in the global production chains of electronic components, especially in the semiconductor sector. The nation can also rely on abundant natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, of which it is an important exporter. Along with other Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, Malaysia presents itself as an attractive destination for foreign investors looking to relocate their manufacturing plants. The trend towards de-risking, in the context of the geoeconomic competition between China and the United States, sees multinationals and governments committed to diversifying their supply chains and strengthening domestic production to minimize dependence on Beijing. Malaysia is a dynamic and complex country. Its society is composed of numerous ethnic groups whose diversity sometimes makes it more difficult for the government to satisfy their different interests. This social complexity is also reflected in the intricate state system, which combines a monarchical aspect with a federal system, where citizens elect their representatives at both the state and federal levels. Despite the multiparty system, for over six decades, Malaysia was governed by a single party, the United Malays National Organization (Umno), which dominated the political landscape [1]. However, this continuity was interrupted in 2018, with four different governments taking turns in power due to corruption scandals and internal political struggles: an unprecedented upheaval in Malaysian history, which from independence in 1957 until then had only seen six prime ministers. The establishment of a new administration in November 2022, under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, has not brought the hoped-for stability, and tensions remain in the country, risking the exacerbation of internal divisions and undermining the confidence not only of citizens but also of foreign investors. The Malaysian political system between complexity and unusual instability Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy, where power is distributed among the monarchy, the federal government led by the prime minister, and the central bicameral parliament, as well as the state governing bodies. The political landscape of the country is characterized by strong multiparty politics, meaning that coalitions rather than a single majority party tend to govern, leading in recent times to the formation of fragile alliances and frequent shifts in alignments among parliamentary groups. Malaysia is composed of thirteen states, nine of which are kingdoms led by a sovereign (or sultan), and three federal territories. Each state has its own constitution, an executive council, and a legislative assembly elected by the citizens. The nine sultans, gathered in the Conference of Rulers, every five years appoint the head of state of Malaysia, or Yang di-Pertuan Agong [2]. The core of the country's democratic life is the central Parliament, composed of 70 members of the Senate (26 members elected by the state assemblies and 44 appointed by the head of state, also on the advice of the prime minister) and 222 members of the House of Representatives (elected every five years during the general elections) [3]. Another element of complexity in the country's structure is the dual legal system: a state system, which has jurisdiction over the entire population, and a Sharia-based system for the Muslim community. In fact, Islam is the state religion, and the majority ethnic group of Malays (also known by the English term ‘Malays’) is constitutionally Muslim; therefore, about two-thirds of the population are subject to Sharia. The Islamic authority has jurisdiction over the Muslim population on religious issues, matters of morality, and family affairs [4]. Despite the complexity of its political system, Malaysia, as mentioned, had a stable government from 1957 to 2018 under the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, composed of parties representing ethnic groups and conservatives such as Umno, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). However, in 2018, the BN was defeated by the multi-ethnic opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH), which brings together more progressive and liberal parties [5]. The downfall of the BN government was partly due to an internationally resonant corruption and financial fraud scandal related to the sovereign wealth fund 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), involving key figures of the ruling coalition, including then Prime Minister Najib Razak [6]. After Pakatan Harapan's victory in 2018, Mahathir Mohamad, who had previously served as Prime Minister with Umno from 1981 to 2003, returned to office. However, internal conflicts and changes in parliamentary alliances within PH led Mahathir to resign [7]. He was succeeded by Muhyiddin Yassin, one of the parliamentarians who had defected from the PH, leading the newly formed coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN). However, Muhyiddin also lost the majority after 17 months, handing over the reins to seasoned politician Ismail Sabri Yaakob of Umno in August 2021 [8]. Ismail Sabri, leading a government with a fragile majority, was compelled to call for early elections driven internally by his party's push and with the aim of securing a stronger mandate [9]. The succession of these governments through internal political maneuvers in parliament has further eroded public trust in the political class, already damaged by corruption scandals. Moreover, the timing of the political system crisis did not favor government officials, who also had to simultaneously manage the pandemic period and the disastrous economic and social consequences that ensued. In this climate of dissatisfaction and growing political polarization, the 2022 elections resulted in Malaysia's first ‘hung parliament’, where no party managed to secure enough seats to govern outright. The Pakatan Harapan, Anwar's coalition, secured 82 seats out of 222, surpassing the PN – which includes the nationalist Malaysian United Indigenous Party (PPBM) and the conservative Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) – which garnered 74 seats [10]. Meanwhile, the BN managed only 30 seats, demonstrating Umno's struggle to rebuild its image after corruption scandals [11]. The Islamic-inspired PAS, however, won the most seats as a single party, with 41. After lengthy negotiations, the head of state tasked PH with forming a unity government, with cooperation from Umno. Anwar, a key opposition figure for decades, succeeded in obtaining the position of prime minister [12]. Since November 2022, Anwar has been leading the country, but political uncertainties have not ceased with the establishment of his government. Anwar is not seen as a leader capable of forcefully imposing his political line, due to the breadth of his coalition which relies on coexistence and compromise among different political factions within the majority, threatening the government's stability. The need to find broad consensus within his coalition has so far prevented Anwar from implementing significant reforms in the country, especially those that could affect the protections guaranteed to the Malay majority. Umno, with which he governs, despite losing some support from the Malaysian electorate in the recent elections, has historically represented the interests of this segment of the population and does not seem inclined to support Anwar's more liberal and inclusive policies [13]. Furthermore, Muhyiddin's PN coalition, and particularly the PAS party, are proving to be formidable opponents for Anwar's unity government, confirming the positive trend of the 2022 elections. This was evident in the recent state elections where PAS reaffirmed its government in three Malaysian states [14]. A more polarized society: socioeconomic tensions intensify. Disillusionment towards traditional political parties has accentuated political, ethnic, and religious fractures in Malaysia, which have long undermined social cohesion and contributed to the persistence of economic inequalities in the country. One of the major challenges for the government is to mitigate economic disparities among ethnicities and promote social harmony in a country where bumiputera or bumiputra (indigenous populations, including the Malay majority, comprising over two-thirds of the total population), Chinese ethnicity (approximately 20%), and Indian ethnicity (around 6%) coexist [15]. Economic differences between indigenous populations and foreign-origin citizens became more pronounced after independence: during this period, the most prosperous economic activities were predominantly controlled by the Chinese community, which was also gaining increasing political prominence. This led to heightened tensions with Malays, culminating in ethnic riots on the streets of Kuala Lumpur in 1969 [16]. To address these disparities, the government has instituted a regime of preferential policies to promote the prosperity and economic empowerment of bumiputera, which have expanded and evolved over the years. For instance, the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971 introduced quotas for ethnic representation in public institutions and universities, along with increased support for bumiputera businesses [17]. While these policies have improved the social conditions and historical economic disparities of bumiputera, the regime of ethnic-based affirmative action has also led to economic inefficiencies and social tensions, fostering patronage and clientelism practices by parties seeking political support from the broader Malay population [18]. Another factor of increasing division in the country is the tension between the Muslim majority and religious minorities (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu) [19]. For instance, the strict implementation of Sharia law has often clashed with civil laws, creating tensions among different religious communities. In recent years, there has also been a rise in religious conservatism at the social level, manifested in the strong electoral performance of PAS, a party that advocates for Malay interests and promotes further Islamization of society, absorbing much of Umno's electorate [20]. To counter this phenomenon of Islamic conservatism, known as the "green wave" [21], Anwar's PH politicians leverage the fear that a more Islamized society may erode civil liberties, resonating particularly among more liberal or non-Malay segments of the population. Conversely, the PN seeks support by accusing Anwar and PH of aiming to limit rights and the preferential system that protects Malays [22]. As a consequence of these socio-economic tensions, Malaysian politics has become increasingly fragmented and polarized, with voting reflecting a radicalization of ethnic and religious identities. Balancing the promotion of socio-economic equity among the country's diverse ethnic groups on one hand and building a more competitive and inclusive social fabric on the other, remains a crucial challenge for Malaysia. The country continues to seek policies that effectively address the needs of all citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion. Challenges to Malaysia’s economic development While Malaysia's political and social situation remains uncertain, the country's economic prospects appear more promising, albeit with some challenges. Thanks to targeted industrial development policies and facilitation of foreign investment, the country has transitioned in a few decades from an agriculture-based economy to an industrialized economy. Particularly, the services sector drives the country's economic growth, accounting for approximately 50% of Malaysia's GDP in 2022, followed by the manufacturing sector at about 23% [23]. The mining sector is also pivotal to the country's economy, alongside the extraction of oil and natural gas. Malaysia is rich in commodities such as tin, bauxite, and copper, which help diversify the Malaysian economy. However, oil and natural gas remain among the most valuable natural resources for Kuala Lumpur, enabling Malaysia to be nearly self-sufficient in energy production. Petronas (Petroliam Nasional Berhad), Malaysia's national oil company, is one of the largest players globally in the energy and oil sectors. As a state-owned entity, Petronas significantly contributes to Malaysia's fiscal revenues, in addition to providing employment and training to the population [24]. In this regard, given the centrality of gas and oil in the country's energy mix, one of the challenges Malaysia will face in the coming decades is transitioning towards renewable energy sources [25]. To advance the country's development, the government is outlining measures to transform Malaysia into a leading production hub, while also fostering growth in the domestic industrial ecosystem. This direction is reflected in the New Industrial Master Plan (NIMP) 2030 introduced in September 2023, which aims to boost the nation's manufacturing sector, targeting an annual GDP growth of 6.5% in this sector. Specifically, Kuala Lumpur is focusing on technology with a specific emphasis on the semiconductor sector. As early as the 1970s, Malaysia was an important hub for semiconductor production, but in the subsequent decades, other players such as Samsung from Korea and TSMC from Taiwan took over the sector. However, the recent geopolitical competition between China and the United States has once again made Malaysia an attractive destination for microchip multinationals, with significant investments revitalizing the sector in the country. Currently, Malaysia holds a significant position in the final stages of microchip production — namely ‘packaging’, assembly, and ‘testing’ — with a 13% share of the global market. Recently, several leading companies in the industry have announced new investments in the country [26]. For instance, Intel has announced $7 billion investments in facilities for microchip packaging and testing, while the U.S. giant Nvidia is planning to invest over $4 billion in collaboration with Malaysian company YTL Power International to create infrastructure for artificial intelligence and ‘supercomputing’ [27]. Additionally, the government has announced the ambitious construction of one of the largest ‘integrated circuit design parks’ in Southeast Asia, aiming to transform the country from a critical hub in the final stages of the value chain to a powerhouse in semiconductor design as well [28]. However, competition with other Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, requires Malaysia to continue investing to attract capital and strengthen the national industrial ecosystem. To this end, on May 28, 2024, Anwar announced the National Semiconductor Strategy, which plans to mobilize approximately $5.3 billion in fiscal support over the next ten years to drive sector growth. Kuala Lumpur aims to mobilize domestic and foreign investments totaling over $100 billion under the new strategy. The government also aims to train more than 60,000 highly skilled engineers to help the country become a leader in the semiconductor supply chain [29]. However, there are additional critical factors for the development of Malaysia's economy, such as its dependence on exports and the presence of multinational corporations and foreign capital, which make the economy vulnerable to external factors. Global demand and fluctuations in international markets can significantly influence Malaysia's economy, as evidenced by the slowdown in GDP growth from 8.7% in 2022 to 3.7% in 2023, primarily due to weaker external demand and a decline in commodity prices. Exports, crucial for the country's economy, declined by 7.8% in 2023, with contractions also seen in Malaysia's key export sectors such as palm oil, petroleum, and electrical and electronic products. The reduced demand for Malaysian products is also attributed to economic uncertainties in major trading partners such as the United States and China – the former dealing with uncertain monetary policy and the latter seeking new stimuli for economic growth while addressing the real estate sector crisis [30]. Malaysia must also be cautious not to overly rely on the presence of foreign companies to drive its economic development. So far, Malaysia, along with other Southeast Asian neighbors like Vietnam and Indonesia, has been among the beneficiaries in the geo-economic competition between China and the United States. Many multinational corporations, especially in the tech sector, have set up manufacturing facilities or initiated partnerships in Malaysia. However, the resurgence of current conflicts and geopolitical tensions could lead to fragmentations along value chains and further relocations. In an increasingly polarized international system, excessively relying on economic development from the presence of foreign firms could become a risky choice. Despite these challenges, the Malaysian economy has benefited from foreign investments and domestic consumption, supported by government subsidies and price controls to contain inflation [31]. Economic growth for 2024 is projected at 4.5%, driven by increasing domestic demand and higher export demand [32].   Conclusion In recent years, Malaysia has emerged as a strategic economic center in Southeast Asia: the country has attracted investors due to its expanding manufacturing sector and has shown remarkable adaptability, becoming a key player in global production chains-especially in the semiconductor sector. To minimize uncertainties related to current global geoeconomic tensions, the country should continue to focus on a more robust and self-sustaining domestic industrial ecosystem. In addition, recent political instability, characterized by frequent changes of government and growing ethnic and religious tensions, is likely to undermine the confidence of investors and the population.  In sum, Malaysia's success will also depend on its ability to balance economic growth with social cohesion, while addressing challenges arising from economic disparities, ethnic tensions, and economic dependence on foreign markets. The performance of inbound foreign direct investment (Ide) in Malaysia.   [1] M.M.N. Nadzri, “The 14th General Election, the Fall of Barisan Nasional, and Political Development in Malaysia, 1957-2018”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 37, n. 3, dicembre 2018, pp. 139-71. [2] ”List of The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong”, The Government of Malaysia’s Official Portal. [3] “Introduction”, Portal Rasmi Parlimen Malaysia – Pengenalan, 10 dicembre 2019. [4] Malaysia 1957 (Rev. 2007) Constitution, Constitute. [5] R.C. Paddock, “Malaysia Opposition, Led by 92-Year-Old, Wins Upset Victory”, The New York Times, 9 maggio 2018; “MalaysiaGE: full results”, The Straits Times, maggio 2018. [6] “Explainer: Malaysia’s ex-PRIMO MINISTRO Najib and the Multi-billion Dollar 1MDB Scandal”, Reuters, 23 agosto 2023; “Goldman Sachs and the 1MDB Scandal”, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 14 maggio 2019; S. Adam, L. Arnold e Y. Ho, “The Story of Malaysia’s 1MDB, the Scandal That Shook the World of Finance”, Bloomberg, 24 maggio 2018. [7] S. Lemière, “The Never-ending Political Game of Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad”, Brookings, 30 ottobre 2020 [8] “The Rise and Fall of Malaysia’s Muhyiddin Yassin”, Reuters, 16 agosto 2021; Y.N. Lee, “Malaysia’s New Prime Minister Has Been Sworn in – but Some Say the Political Crisis Is ‘far From Over’”, CNBC, 3 marzo 2020. [9] A. Ananthalakshmi, R. Latiff e M.M. Chu, “Malaysian PM calls for early polls as ruling party seeks to rise above graft cases”, Reuters, 10 ottobre 2022. [10] A. Ananthalakshmi, R. Latiff e M.M. Chu, “Malaysia Faces Hung Parliament in Tight Election Race”, Reuters, 19 novembre 2022. [11] K. Ganapathy, “‘End of an Era’ for Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional, After Corruption Issues Hurt Candidates at GE15: Analysts”, Channel News Asia, 21 novembre 2022. [12] “Anwar Ibrahim: The Man Who Fulfilled His Goal to Lead Malaysia”, BBC News, 24 novembre 2022. [13] F. Hutchinson, “Malaysian Unity Government’s Power Was Retained but Constrained in 2023”, East Asia Forum, 28 gennaio 2024. [14] R.S. Bedi, “Analysis: Strong State Poll Performance by Perikatan Nasional Boosts Stock for Some PAS Leaders, but Obstacles Lie Ahead”, Channel News Asia, 16 agosto 2023. [15] Bumiputera Statistics 2022, Department of Statistics Malaysia Official Portal. [16] “Malaysia: Majority Supremacy and Ethnic Tensions”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1 agosto 2012; N. Bowie, “Fifty Years on, Fateful Race Riots Still Haunt Malaysia”, Asia Times, 29 maggio 2019; “Ethic Tensions Boil Over in Malaysia’s 13 May 1969 Incident”, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. [17] K.S. Jomo, Malaysia’s New Economic Policy and ‘National Unity’, Londra, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 182-214; H. Lee. “Malaysia’s New Economic Policy: Fifty Years of Polarization and Impasse”, Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 11, n. 2, Agosto 2022; M.A. Khalid e L. Yang, “Income Inequality Among Different Ethnic Groups: The Case of Malaysia”, LSE Business Review, 11 settembre 2019; “2021/36 ‘Malaysia’s New Economic Policy and the 30% Bumiputera Equity Target: Time for a Revisit and a Reset’ by Lee Hwok Aun”,ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 25 marzo 2021. [18] H.A. Lee. “Perpetual Policy and Its Limited Future as Reforms Stall”, New Mandala, 17 aprile 2018. [19] M. Mohamad e I. Suffian “Malaysia’s 15th General Election: Ethnicity Remains the Key Factor in Voter Preferences”, FULCRUM, 4 aprile 2023. [20] “Buddhism, Islam and Religious Pluralism in South and Southeast Asia”, Pew Research Center, 12 settembre 2023. [21] K. Ostwald e S. Oliver, “Continuity and Change: The Limits of Malaysia’s Green Wave From a Four Arenas Perspective”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 27 ottobre 2023; O.K. Ming. “Debunking the Myths of Malaysia’s ‘Green Wave’ in GE15”, Channel News Asia, 28 giugno 2023. [22] D.A. Paulo, “Malaysia’s ‘Green Wave’: A Threat to the Country’s Politics and Religious Restraint?”, Channel News Asia, 10 giugno 2023. [23] “Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) – Malaysia”, The World Bank Open Data, “Services, value added (% of GDP) – Malaysia”, The World Bank Open Data. [24] “Petronas’ Role in the Larger Economy”, The Malaysian Reserve, 30 agosto 2019; “Petronas Payout to Malaysia Govt Seen Higher at 55-59 Bln Rgt This Year”, Reuters, 22 luglio 2022. [25] G. Musaeva, “Greening Pains: Can Petronas Make the Leap to Renewables?”, The Diplomat, 15 settembre 2022. [26] T. Cheng e L. Li, “Malaysia Aims for Chip Comeback as Intel, Infineon and More Pile In”, Nikkei Asia, 28 settembre 2023. [27] R. Latiff e F. Potkin, “Nvidia to Partner Malaysia’s YTL Power in $4.3 bln AI Development Project”, Reuters, 8 dicembre 2023. [28] “Malaysia Plans Southeast Asia’s Largest Integrated Circuit Design Park”, Reuters, 22 aprile 2024. [29] N. Goh, “Malaysia to train 60,000 engineers in bid to become chip hub”, Nikkei Asia, 28 maggio 2024; D. Azhar, “Malaysia targets over $100 bln in semiconductor industry investment”, Reuters, 28 maggio 2024. [30] Asian Development Outlook April 2024: Malaysia”, Asian Development Bank, aprile 2024, pp. 218-24. [31] Ibid. [32] Ibid.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract This study investigates the academic discourse surrounding China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a multifaceted geopolitical project championed by the central government. Through a critical examination of BRI-related literature, primarily in political science and international relations published between 2015 and 2023, the analysis highlights a burgeoning field marked by both growing depth and intensifying critique. It further contends that despite a rise in scholarship, BRI's smaller players and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) call for further investigation. This nuanced approach fosters a comprehensive understanding of BRI's complexities and its evolving global impact. Keywords China- Maritime Silk Road Initiative- Silk Road Economic Belt- Belt and Road Initiative 1. Introduction Following the 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the ambitious undertaking has garnered significant attention from observers for its vast scope and projected economic and political implications.1 The BRI's potential impact on the global order, its member states, diverse regions, and all involved actors has raised a multitude of concerns. A huge body of literature on (BRI) aligns with China’s positive view of the initiative.2 However, a comprehensive review showed that previous research had limitations in scope and depth. Notably, repetitive investigations into established topics and examinations of prior inquiries are prevalent, which hinders the production of novel insights. Furthermore, the trend towards proliferation of topic areas, instead of deeper analysis within existing themes, impedes scholarly advancement. Additionally, many studies assign marginal roles to (BRI), disproportionately focusing on China's perspective. This results in imbalanced literature on China's initiative in terms of quality and nuanced interpretation. From the above mentioned, this study focuses on a key question that revolves around, what are the gaps and limitations in current understanding in BRI’s literatures in the study time period (2015-2023), and what are the challenges and opportunities for the initiative’s researchers and scholars? As focusing on these gaps serves as a catalyst towards more understanding of the dimensions of the initiative, and then contributes to providing a clearer vision for policy decision makers and scholars interested in the initiative. Given these deficiencies, this study aims to critically examine the existing (BRI) literature, drawing upon a diverse selection of academic research, primarily within international relations and political science, published between 2015 and 2023. More significantly, this overview would outline a framework for refining and renewing the discourse surrounding the initiative. This article aims for a deeper understanding of the participants, their plans and future developments. Research should move beyond broad overviews and engage in analyses of the Mari-time Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), focusing on specific regions and project development trajectories. This necessitates rigorous analyses and interpretations of data to lay forward local experiences and diverse future aspirations of (BRI) participants. Secondly, a closer examination of (MSRI) and (SREB) application is imperative. This entails meticulously evaluating the financial performance and sociopolitical implications of completed projects, with particular attention to both economic benefits and potential challenges like debt burdens. Furthermore, a thorough analysis of internal and external policy ramifications for participating countries is crucial, exploring how (BRI) projects align with or challenge existing national and regional frameworks. Thirdly, while existing studies have shed light on Chinese foreign policy through (BRI), further inquiries should expand beyond this singular perspective. Independent research conducted by scholars based in (BRI) recipient countries can offer invaluable insights into local needs, priorities, and concerns. Additionally, comparative studies across diverse regions can illustrate region-specific challenges and successes, enriching our understanding of participant experiences. Finally, it is essential to move beyond China-centric narratives and actively incorporate the perspectives of participating nations within BRI research, which necessitates prioritizing analyses that critically examine the role of Chinese soft power, encompassing cultural exchanges, media engagement, and educational initiatives, and their impact on shaping perceptions and fostering cooperation within the initiative. 2. China’s Initiative at Crossroads Since China's 2013 announcement of the (BRI), its purpose has sparked diverse interpretations among researchers, with ongoing debate focusing on the balance between economic and political motivations.3 While some researchers interpret (BRI) primarily as a domestic economic strategy aimed at market expansion, securing energy sources, and creating investment opportunities for Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs),4 others view it as a manifestation of China's global ambition to achieve dominance in the Eurasian region, and global order.5 A third group of scholars further argue that the BRI is a strategic tool for China to improve its diplomatic relationships with participating countries across Asia, Africa, and Europe. They suggest that by promoting economic cooperation and infrastructure development, the (BRI) can foster regional stability and reduce potential conflict.6 A fourth group of (BRI) studies focuses on the Chinese economy's structural vulnerabilities, arguing that they pose long-term risks to both economic growth and political stability. These vulnerabilities include rampant surplus industrial capacity, which threatens job security and social cohesion; overreliance on land-based energy import routes, potentially exposing China to geopolitical disruptions; and the economic stagnation of western regions, exacerbating regional disparities and social tensions. These studies further examine the extent to which the (BRI) can exacerbate or alleviate these challenges, particularly considering China's heavy reliance on investment, exports, and state-owned enterprises as economic drivers.7 Another area of research focuses on the evolving scope of international dispute resolution mechanisms within the (BRI) framework for projects between China and African countries. This study analyzes the strength and transparency of these new entities, considering factors like legal expertise, judicial independence, and efficient dispute resolution procedures. The study aims to contribute to a better understanding of how disputes relating to China-Africa cooperation will be addressed in the future.8 Adding to the complexity of understanding the BRI's aims, some studies analyze its role as a tool for China's soft power projection,9 They highlight how the initiative's focus on cultural exchange, infrastructure development, and media engagement fosters positive international perceptions of China and enhances its global influence. Others suggest that the (BRI) serves domestic political purposes, potentially serving as a means for Xi Jinping to solidify his leadership within the Chinese Communist Party and strengthen his legitimacy on the international stage.10 This diversity of interpretations underscores the complexity of the BRI's objectives, likely driven by a multitude of motives within China's vast political and economic system. While China emphasizes the collaborative nature of the initiative, portraying it as a 'symphony,' concerns remain about how individual participant interests align with China's own ambitions. Further research is crucial to understand how the BRI's complex motivations translate into tangible outcomes for all involved parties.11 Several studies assess the BRI's impact on both benefits and challenges by examining its relationship with past Chinese development initiatives.12 They argue that the (BRI) draws upon earlier programs like the southern and western campaigns, benefiting from existing infrastructure and communication networks in Central and South Asia. Given the multitude of perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative's objectives and potential consequences, a question arises: do existing research efforts sufficiently cater to the needs and concerns of participating countries? While studies provide valuable insights into aspects like soft power dynamics and geopolitical implications, a crucial factor often remains in the shadows - funding. Despite the BRI's reliance on vast financial resources, research rarely dives into the effectiveness of funding mechanisms, or their potential impact on participants' debt burdens and economic sustainability. To truly gauge the BRI's long-term success and ensure equitable benefits for all involved, future research must prioritize a deeper understanding of its financial dynamics and their consequences for diverse stakeholders. Despite the vast sums promised to the (BRI), a veil of ambiguity hangs over its true financial picture. While platforms like the (MSRI) and (SREB) lack explicit upper limits for project funding, details regarding specific project budgets remain shrouded in secrecy. This loose terminology surrounding "costs," "loans," and "investments" further obscures the potential debt burdens faced by participating countries. Although numerous financial entities, including banks like China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed willingness to participate, specific committed amounts remain elusive. This lack of transparency raises concerns about potential overestimations of the BRI's overall funding capacity and hinders a clear understanding of how financial resources are actually channeled into projects. Future research must prioritize unraveling this tangled web of finances to assess the BRI's true economic feasibility and its implications for all stakeholders involved. The financial picture of the (BRI) remains obscure despite estimations ranging from $400 billion to $8 trillion. This ambiguity stems partly from the lack of publicly disclosed budgetary allocations for specific projects under platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB).13 Further compounding the opaqueness is the loose terminology used by observers, who often conflate "costs," "loans," and "investments" without adequately differentiating their financial implications. Though numerous financial entities, including banks like the China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed interest in BRI projects, concrete commitments regarding specific funding amounts remain elusive.14 This lack of transparency impedes a clear understanding of the initiative's true financial capacity and raises concerns about potential overestimations of total funding. Unraveling this tangled web of financial ambiguity is crucial for future research to assess the BRI's economic feasibility and its implications for participating countries.15 Despite the increasing number of countries engaged in (BRI), its participant roster remains shrouded in a cloud of ambiguity. However, with the initiative's rapid expansion, accurately delineating participants has become increasingly complex. While some prominent nations like the United States, India, and Japan remain firmly outside the initiative, others, including Vietnam,16 Ethiopia,17 Myanmar, Nepal,18 Latin America,19 Africa,20 and numerous numbers of countries nearly 140 in the BRI,21 play significant roles. Estimates suggest the total number of BRI participants now approaches 140. This lack of readily accessible and transparent participant data poses a significant challenge for research and analysis. Accurately understanding the BRI's geographic scope, assessing its economic impact on diverse participants, and predicting its long-term geopolitical implications hinge upon a clear and comprehensive understanding of who stands as part of the initiative. Despite the multitude of studies analyzing (BRI), much remains opaque regarding the distinction between its "connectivity" and "non-connectivity" projects. This is surprising given the initiative's emphasis on hard infrastructure development, encompassing projects like railways, highways, bridges, airports, and seaports.22 However, beyond these tangible linkages lies a spectrum of critical "non-connectivity" projects vital for economic development. These include initiatives addressing areas such as bolstering economic growth, fostering diverse investment opportunities, facilitating mining development, establishing special economic zones, and even deploying satellite monitoring stations. Failing to delve into both connectivity and non-connectivity domains hinders a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's economic impact and broader geopolitical implications. Only by recognizing the intertwined roles of these project types can we fully grasp the initiative's complex landscape and its potential consequences for participating countries.23 While (BRI) draws extensive attention for its transformative hard infrastructure projects like railways, highways, and bridges, its success hinges on an equally crucial yet less visible layer: soft infrastructure. Bilateral investment treaties,24 and free trade agreements form the backbone of this soft infrastructure, establishing clear legal and regulatory frameworks that underpin cross-border investments, trade liberalization, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Recognizing the vital role of this soft infrastructure, alongside the hard connectivity projects, is essential for comprehending the BRI's full scope and assessing its potential impact on participating countries.25 To overcome the limitations identified, future research on (BRI) should shift its focus from broad analyses of the initiative as a whole to delving deeper into specific platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB). These platforms often lack transparency regarding project details, including participants, features, costs, and funding mechanisms. By conducting focused studies on these platforms, researchers can contribute substantially to demystifying the BRI's financial picture and identifying its true participants. 3. Problems Arising in Edited Volumes This section identifies limitations in existing edited volumes on (BRI) and proposes potential solutions, acknowledging varying degrees of implement ability. Remarkably, current volumes often prioritize specific aspects of the BRI, such as its geographical scope, key drivers, diverse stakeholder involvement (including private and public actors), and the participation of subnational and international organizations. However, this fragmented approach overlooks the initiative's broader implications for global governance, power dynamics, international trade flows, transportation infrastructure (including high-speed networks), social movements, and government accountability. Therefore, future edited volumes on the BRI require a more holistic analytical framework that transcends individual thematic strands and comprehensively examines the initiative's multifaceted impact across these interconnected dimensions.26 Another critical concern with a subset of edited volumes on (BRI) lies in the editors' failure to ensure consistent thematic engagement across chapters. This often leads to a lack of focus on empirical analysis, with some chapters delving into specific case studies or data-driven investigations, while others remain mired in theoretical discussions or abstract conceptualizations. This inconsistency undermines the potential for cross-fertilization between chapters and hinders the volume's ability to offer a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's multifaceted realities.27 The thematic inconsistencies between chapters in many edited volumes on (BRI) hinder the development of a comprehensive understanding of the initiative. To enhance the value of their work, (BRI) editors should prioritize thematic coherence and avoid redundancy by curating chapters that offer diverse perspectives and delve deeper into specific aspects of the initiative, rather than presenting overlapping analyses. Several edited volumes on (BRI) suffer from critical lacunae. A significant number lack robust introduction or conclusion, impeding the synthesis of key findings and the formulation of future research directions.28 While individual chapters may possess abstracts, these often fail to engage with overarching thematic threads, identify areas of divergence within the volume, or propose new avenues for inquiry. This fragmentation hinders the volumes' capacity to foster a holistic understanding of the BRI. Furthermore, some edited volumes suffer from outdated data, often relying on information presented at workshops or conferences years prior.29 This presents readers with potentially stale facts and hinders informed analysis. Additionally, a lack of consensus among contributors regarding key terms like "economic growth" and "global governance" can fragment the discussion. With varying definitions, contributors essentially discuss the (BRI) through different lenses, limiting the potential for cohesive analysis and knowledge accumulation. Building upon the identified weaknesses in edited volumes on the (BRI), this study has highlighted several challenges facing BRI research. However, it also offers invaluable groundwork and potential solutions for overcoming these limitations, paving the way for more robust and comprehensive future scholarship in this critical area. 4. BRI’s Operational Problems Operational challenges within (MSRI) and (SREB) projects necessitate a deeper understanding of the dynamic interplay between several factors. This includes the relationship between on-the-ground project realities and the expectations outlined in relevant treaties, as well as the internal and external political and economic forces that can facilitate or hinder project modifications. Such knowledge is crucial for informing sound decision-making. Furthermore, a granular understanding of these critical factors within specific states and regions holds the potential to significantly enhance research on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a whole. While a plethora of studies and analyses on (BRI) exist, many suffer from limitations that impede our understanding of (MSRI) and (SREB) projects. A significant portion focuses on a narrow range of cases, repeatedly analyzing the same treaties or memorandums of understanding. This repetitive approach overlooks the diverse factors and dynamics impacting (MSRI) and (SREB) development. Additionally, an overemphasis on specific, well-documented aspects like high-speed railways in certain Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, Laos, and Pakistan, obscures the broader picture of project complexities and variations across the BRI's vast geographical scope. To enhance the analysis of project execution within (MSRI) and (SREB), four key areas warrant further investigation. Firstly, robust, comprehensive data on project development is crucial. Analyzing actual progress before drawing conclusions about (MSRI/SREB) nature will yield more reliable and nuanced insights. Secondly, researchers must scrutinize the factors with the highest impact on project development. Identifying these critical drivers will enable a deeper understanding of project outcomes and trajectories. Thirdly, examining the dynamic interplay between initial expectations and evolving ground realities is vital. Unveiling the reasons for deviations from expected outcomes, whether positive or negative, will provide valuable knowledge for project management and adaptation. Finally, researchers should delve into the complex interplay between funding mechanisms, project requirements, and associated costs. Untangling these financial relationships is essential for assessing project feasibility and optimizing resource allocation.30 Finally, a comprehensive analysis of project execution necessitates thorough examination of the diverse actors involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This includes scrutinizing their domestic political landscapes, individual characteristics, and contextual operating environments. Understanding these multifaceted influences helps illuminate the motivations, capabilities, and potential limitations of various stakeholders, thereby enabling researchers to more accurately predict their behavior and its impact on project outcomes.31 5. Statement of the Problem It is crucial to examine the multifaceted factors directly or indirectly affecting (MSRI) and (SREB) project execution. This includes a nuanced understanding of the initiative's benefits and costs across various scales: universal, regional, sub-regional, national, and subnational. These benefits encompass a wide range of aspects, including economic development, trade growth, infrastructure improvement, industrial development, productivity enhancements, technology and experience transfer, energy availability and production development, job creation, poverty alleviation, transportation cost and time reduction, and regional economic integration. Investigating the distribution and realization of these benefits, alongside the associated costs, is essential for assessing the overall impact and sustainability of projects.32 While existing research delves into various economic aspects of (BRI), crucial areas warrant further attention. Concerns surrounding heightened domestic trade competition, potential de-industrialization, rising trade deficits, and FDI displacement require deeper investigation. Similarly, political issues related to potential sovereignty concerns and BRI's impact on domestic and foreign policy deserve thorough analysis. Finally, social issues like environmental degradation, pollution, and potential social disintegration demand urgent attention from researchers beyond economics.33 Beyond economists, development specialists, and trade and infrastructure experts, scholars in political science, international relations, and related fields must actively engage with these critical (BRI) dimensions. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of the initiative's impacts necessitates a concerted effort across diverse disciplines to ensure a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's potential consequences. Comprehensive data on the costs and benefits of (BRI) projects serves as a critical tool for enhanced decision-making. Several studies investigating (BRI) rely on broad-stroke statistical analyses and projected benefits without sufficient project-specific detail.34 This approach suffers from several limitations. Firstly, while (BRI) projects unfold over extended periods, these studies often base their conclusions on data from limited timeframes and utilize short-term analytical frameworks. This can paint an incomplete picture and lead to inaccurate predictions. Secondly, these studies often make optimistic assumptions about the guaranteed success, sustainability, and completion of all BRI projects. This overlooks potential challenges and complexities, hindering a balanced and nuanced understanding of the initiative's true potential and pitfalls. A common weakness is overlooking the ground realities of project implementation. While acknowledging potential tensions and rivalries among participating countries,35 these studies often fail to delve deeper into their impacts on project outcomes. Similarly, qualitative research on BRI benefits tends to provide fragmented views. While highlighting positive aspects like training, connectivity, technology transfer, and industrialization, these studies rarely conduct comprehensive analyses or compare benefit distribution across different parties. Additionally, the focus on specific sectors, regions, or countries in a limited number of studies,36 restricts our understanding of the initiative's broader implications. Furthermore, scarce research investigates the total costs of BRI projects in specific regions or their potential negative impacts, such as exacerbating trade deficits, hindering industrialization, or closing certain sectors. While some studies acknowledge the potential boost to China's global reputation and public approval in participating countries, this aspect needs further exploration.37 Likewise, existing research highlighting problems within (BRI) partner countries deserves deeper and more nuanced investigation.38 Elevating the quality of (BRI) research necessitates prioritizing three key areas. Firstly, rigorous studies exploring the proof of identity of (MSRI) and (SREB) are crucial. Secondly, quantitative research on (BRI) projects demands a shift towards realism. Moving beyond the ambitions and aspirations enshrined in official narratives, researchers must utilize robust data and meticulous analysis to assess project costs, benefits, and potential risks. Thirdly, both quantitative and qualitative research should dedicate greater focus to the distribution of (BRI) benefits. Lastly, it is important to focus on projects that affect the environment and society, represented by hydroelectric projects that are required to implement the BRI’s projects. In addition to the energy extraction projects, mining operations and power generation. Thus, it is important for both Finally, a critical research gap lies in analyzing the environmental and social impacts of infrastructure projects associated with the (BRI). This includes, but is not limited to, hydropower dams, energy extraction ventures, mining operations, and power generation facilities. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers must devote attention to assessing the environmental consequences of these projects, such as potential biodiversity loss, pollution, and resource depletion, evaluating their social impacts, including community displacement, cultural disruption, and potential violations of labor rights, and investigating the effectiveness of mitigation measures implemented to address these concerns. 6. Political Influence This section delves into the political ramifications of (BRI) projects for participating countries. It specifically examines the extent to which both internal and external Chinese policies influence the foreign policy characteristics of BRI partners. This includes analyzing the impact on: a) domestic foreign policy features, such as priorities, alliances, and voting alignments; and b) international positions, particularly voting behavior on China-related issues in international forums like the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While several studies have explored Beijing's foreign policy influence within the BRI framework, focusing on specific countries like Cambodia, Ethiopia, Greece, and Sri Lanka,39 a comprehensive understanding necessitates systematic comparative analysis across diverse (BRI) partners, in-depth investigation of both internal and external policy dynamics, and consideration of alternative explanations for shifts in foreign policy beyond solely attributing them to Chinese influence. Such a nuanced approach will ensure a deeper and more accurate understanding of the complex interplay between (BRI) projects, national interests, and the evolving foreign policy landscapes of participating countries. This section further explores the potential spillover effects of Beijing's domestic policies onto participating (BRI) countries. While some studies suggest that the attractiveness of (BRI) projects incentivizes compliance with Chinese regulations, this hypothesis requires closer scrutiny. More research is needed to systematically analyze the specific content and implementation of relevant Chinese policies and their potential impact on partner countries, investigate the mechanisms through which such influence might occur, beyond mere project incentives, and consider alternative explanations for policy changes in (BRI) partner states, such as domestic drivers, regional pressures, or global influences. By moving beyond simplistic assumptions and conducting rigorous empirical research, we can gain a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between internal Chinese policies, (BRI) projects, and the evolving legal and regulatory landscapes of participating countries. The interplay between economic incentives and the political behavior of countries holds substantial research potential. Several studies have highlighted a correlation between economic and commercial relationships and the behavior of actors within those relationships. This link often involves a nuanced interplay of both positive and negative incentives, suggesting that economic factors can influence political decisions and actions in complex ways. Further research in this area should delve deeper into the specific mechanisms through which economic incentives translate into political behavior, the conditions under which these incentives have the strongest impact, and the potential unintended consequences of using economic levers to influence political outcomes.40 While political and economic factors are critical considerations for policymakers, it is crucial to avoid oversimplification. Assuming a direct and uniform impact of economic and political costs and benefits arising from bilateral relations between (BRI) partners and China on project-level outcomes would be inaccurate. As previously discussed, believing that all (BRI) projects will be flawlessly executed, yield solely positive outcomes, and universally benefit all participants is unrealistic. A nuanced understanding requires distinguishing between bilateral and project-level dynamics based on an interplay of economic and political factors which may differ significantly in individual (BRI) projects compared to broader bilateral contexts. Then, acknowledging project heterogeneity as (BRI) projects encompass diverse goals, scales, and contexts, necessitating an analysis that recognizes their potential for varying degrees of success and varying impacts on different stakeholders. Finally, accounting for unforeseen challenges as project implementation can be affected by unforeseen complexities, political shifts, and external factors beyond purely economic and political considerations. Therefore, policymakers should adopt a comprehensive perspective that goes beyond simple cost-benefit calculations and considers the interplay of diverse factors across different levels of analysis.41 Numerous studies highlight the fallacy of assuming uniformity in (BRI) projects' outcomes and universally positive net benefits. This critique stems from the understanding that economic relationships involve a complex interplay of positive and negative incentives, with clear linkages between economic stimuli and political behavior. Therefore, emphasizing the influence of political factors alongside economic ones becomes crucial. While pro-China sentiments and economic incentives often act as prominent motivators for countries to join (BRI), deeper analysis reveals that political factors frequently play a more primary role. Internal political motives can be particularly influential. Next, foreign policy objectives as joining the BRI can help countries secure allies, gain international leverage, or advance specific diplomatic goals. Finally, domestic policy priorities as (BRI) projects can be leveraged to address internal challenges like infrastructure deficiencies, economic underdevelopment, or resource scarcity. It is crucial to recognize that these political motives can interact with, and even supersede, economic interests in driving a country's decision to join the (BRI). Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of (BRI) participation necessitates going beyond simplistic cost-benefit calculations and carefully considering the complex interplay of internal and external political factors.42 Moving beyond participation alone, research needs to delve deeper into the implementation and impacts of (BRI) projects within partner countries. This entails addressing crucial questions such as project completion and success, political and economic costs and benefits and unforeseen consequences. Understanding BRI’s success necessitates analyzing the role of third-party actors. While existing research often focuses on bilateral dynamics between China and (BRI) partner countries, neglecting third parties introduces blind spots. A critical research gap exists in understanding (BRI) ramifications for China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). While existing studies often delve into specific aspects like hardware acquisition or naval base plans, a more comprehensive understanding necessitates examining the initiative's broader impact on the PLA's military posture and engagement. This entails investigating, firstly, the potential alterations to the PLA's strategic capabilities, its strategic resources, logistical networks, or potential overseas deployment points. Secondly, research should illuminate the initiative's effects on China's strategic priorities. Thirdly, it is crucial to analyze the BRI's influence on inter-ministerial dynamics within China.43 Research on (BRI) requires careful consideration of China's internal institutional landscape. While existing studies often focus on external factors or aggregate dynamics, a critical gap lies in understanding the role of Chinese institutions in shaping and implementing the initiative. This necessitates investigation into both formal and informal structures.44 7. Understanding BRI from Different Lenses While existing research on (BRI) encompasses wide-ranging analyses, shifting the focus towards implementation, impact, and other enriching areas holds significant potential for advancing understanding of the initiative's outcomes. Examining the practical realities of project execution, assessing its tangible and intangible effects, and exploring complementary avenues can significantly improve the BRI's overall contribution. Future research on (BRI) should prioritize several understudied yet crucial areas. These include the role of non-state actors, the interplay with Chinese foreign policy, the efficacy of soft power, the impact on global governance and regional and infrastructural variations. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research, particularly understanding the diverse actors shaping its dynamics. Existing studies often focus solely on state-level interactions, neglecting the significant roles played by internal actors like Chinese ministries, think tanks, and subnational entities, as well as external actors like Chinese multinational companies and non-BRI regions. Such a comprehensive lens is crucial for appreciating the multifaceted dimensions of the initiative and the factors influencing its trajectory.45 While numerous studies dissect Chinese foreign policy, with detailed analyses of its key players, driving forces like ideology, culture, nationalism, internal factions, the military, and public opinion, a crucial research gap exists around (BRI). This lacuna lies in overlooking the internal and external actors who significantly shape the initiative's dynamics. Understanding the roles of Chinese internal actors, and non-BRI regions is essential for grasping the BRI's multifaceted dimensions and navigating its trajectory.46 The BRI's potential impact on Chinese soft power merits nuanced inquiry beyond simplistic assumptions. While the initiative positions China as a prominent economic sponsor, superpower, or development actor, its influence on international perceptions is likely multifaceted and context-dependent. Analyzing the soft power implications should move beyond mere project scale and "get-things-done" narratives. Crucial research avenues include deconstructing and activating soft power. By adopting this nuanced approach, research can move beyond simplistic claims about enhanced Chinese prestige and instead provide a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's complex soft power dynamics. This can inform more effective strategies for both China and partner countries in navigating the potential opportunities and challenges associated with the initiative's global engagement.47 A significant deficit within (BRI) research lies in its limited engagement with the issue of global governance. While existing studies often explore the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), their focus frequently remains narrowly confined to its creation, primary function as a (BRI) funding institution, and potential to challenge the established global economic order. This restricted lens obscures the broader ramifications of the BRI for global governance structures, norms, and practices.48 However, studies lack a deeper understanding of the BRI's interaction with and potential impact on global governance structures, norms, and practices. This includes international law and standards in various fields relevant to the initiative, such as trade, finance, environment, and development. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research: an overreliance on China-centric perspectives. While understandable given China's ownership and primary funding role, this viewpoint often leads to superficial analyses that neglect deeper examination of the initiative's multifaceted objectives. This results in a profusion of research that, despite focusing on the BRI, fails to adequately unpack its core aims and motivations.49 Beyond a solely China-centric lens, research on the (BRI) must delve deeper into regional variations, local-level impacts, and the complex interplay of international political and economic forces driving participation. Prioritizing the viewpoints of (BRI) partner countries is crucial for a more comprehensive understanding than can be achieved solely through analysis of Chinese perspectives. 8. Conclusion This study critically engages with the (BRI) research landscape with two guiding objectives. First, it systematically appraises existing scholarship, identifying gaps and limitations in current understanding. Second, it seeks to shape future (BRI) research by proposing avenues for more impactful and fruitful investigations. Through a comprehensive review of (BRI) related topics and analyses, the study reveals key shortcomings in current research including overreliance on China-centric perspectives, neglecting diverse viewpoints and local-level impacts. Surface analyses of (BRI) objectives and motivations, often overlooking complex political and economic driving forces. Inadequate exploration of implementation challenges and project outcomes across various regions and sectors. Limited engagement with translation issues, hindering accurate understanding of (BRI) dynamics in non-Western contexts. To address these limitations, the study proposes specific interventions for future research including prioritizing diverse perspectives of (BRI) partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, conducting in-depth case studies and comparative analyses through investigating implementation intricacies and project impacts across different contexts and leveraging translation as a research tool via employing multilingual approaches to gain deeper insights and overcome cultural biases. By actively addressing these critical gaps and adopting more nuanced research strategies, this study aims to significantly enhance the field of (BRI) scholarship and guide future investigations towards a more comprehensive and impactful understanding of this complex global initiative. This study's critical engagement with (BRI) scholarship holds profound implications for policymakers. By unveiling significant limitations in existing research, it demonstrates that overreliance on specific perspectives, superficial analyses of objectives, and inadequate exploration of implementation and impacts can mislead judgments. Decision-makers and policy analysts must therefore exercise caution when navigating the BRI research landscape. To avoid misinterpreting progress, political and economic ramifications, domestic/foreign influences, and broader implications, they should prioritize access to high-quality studies that address the identified shortcomings, critically evaluate all research: consider methodological rigor, bias, and the limitations outlined in this study and seek diverse perspectives: consider research beyond dominant viewpoints to gain a more comprehensive understanding. These steps are crucial for ensuring sound policy decisions informed by reliable and nuanced BRI scholarship. Similar caution applies to entrepreneurs engaging with BRI projects. Basing business, investment, and operational choices solely on analyses prone to the identified drawbacks can be reckless. They should either utilize analyses conducted with rigorous methodologies and awareness of existing research limitations or fully acknowledge the limitations of available research and factor them into their decision-making. By adopting these measures, entrepreneurs can mitigate potential risks and navigate BRI opportunities with greater prudence. For researchers and scholars, this study presents both challenges and opportunities. While the identified gaps indicate the need for considerable future research efforts, they also unlock exciting avenues for investigation. Scholars can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the BRI by conducting in-depth case studies that explore implementation intricacies and project impacts across diverse contexts, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, unpacking the interplay of domestic, regional, and global factors, prioritizing diverse perspectives, incorporating voices of partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars and addressing the limitations unveiled in this study is imperative for all stakeholders. Through rigorous and comprehensive research, we can navigate the complexities of the BRI with greater informedness and foresight, ultimately leading to more effective policymaking, informed entrepreneurial decisions, and a deeper scholarly understanding of this global initiative. Despite its continued, albeit bumpy, trajectory, the (BRI) faces growing research challenges that mirror its own complexities. A burgeoning volume of publications, propelled by an expanding pool of publishers, editors, and scholars, often overlooks methodological rigor and critical depth. Consequently, the full potential of BRI research remains unrealized. To unlock its true value, a shift towards more focused and nuanced investigations is imperative. This necessitates bolstering the infrastructure underpinning social science analysis through deeper engagement with diverse perspectives to incorporate voices from partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars beyond dominant viewpoints. Next, strengthened data collection and analysis which could employ rigorous methodologies and ensuring comprehensive project-level data across various regions. Additionally, enhanced communication and collaboration to foster interdisciplinary dialogue and knowledge sharing among analysts studying different BRI facets. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском MAY 2024.- Speaking about the spectacular growth of China's GDP, someone might argue that GDP is not the only indicator to observe in a country's improvement, and that is true. What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) has surpassed the latter in life expectancy of its inhabitants? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity), has a much lower poverty rate than the United States? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What are human rights for the West? The most evident thing is that human rights for the West are a media weapon to attack China. Every time Western media mention China, they inevitably, as a self-imposed style guide, have to vilify China for its lack of human rights. “Tell me what you boast of, and I will tell you what you lack.” For the West, human rights focus on defending Western "Democracy" against what they term Chinese “Autocracy." If we look at this Western-style "Democracy," we see that it is characterized (primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries and to a lesser extent in other Western countries) by the alternation in government between two political parties that uphold the same political system. The exclusive dominance of these two parties over the state is built upon the absolute repression of organizations opposed to the system. This repression is executed through various means: Firstly, elections are designed on a marketing basis that requires mobilizing large sums of money to have any chance; secondly, the media, which shapes the population's thinking, is controlled by the same business groups that control the two parties; and thirdly, when any political force emerges with fresh air in this neoliberal jungle, the entire legal and illegal machinery of the state is unleashed upon it until it is annihilated. A system that has been working for two centuries now and has allowed the American empire to rise. The West fills its mouth with the word "Democracy" to cover up all its democratic shortcomings and deficiencies. A "Representative Democracy" based on elections every four or five years where the parties of the neoliberal system always "win" because other parties are prevented from having the necessary means to have any chance. And it uses this supposed legitimacy it claims due to its presumption of democracy to deny human rights to its citizens. (Of course, while the human rights of its citizens are denied, the human rights of citizens in the rest of the world are directly massacred. In addition to the hundreds of interventions in numerous countries, in Latin America and other continents, to manipulate and change their governments in favor of American interests, in just the current century, the United States has waged war with its military against the following countries or regions: Afghanistan -2001/2021-, Iraq -2003/2011-, Somalia -2007/2021-, Indian Ocean -2009/2016-, Libya -2011-, Uganda -2011/2017-, Iraq -2014/present-, Syria -2014/present-, Libya -2015/2020-, Mozambique -2021/present-, and Yemen -2023/present-.) The Political System of China Firstly, and it seems unlike the West, human rights in China consist of 30 rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations), and not just neoliberal democracy. Let's start with "Democracy." In China, there are nine political parties with parliamentary representation, and all of them support the existing participatory democracy in the country: Ø Communist Party of China Ø Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang Ø China Democratic League Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø China National Democratic Construction Association Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party Ø China Zhigong Party Ø Jiusan Society Ø Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League The political membership of Chinese citizens in these parties is much higher than in the West, and the majority far exceeds one hundred thousand members. If we look at Article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which focuses on the Right to participate in public affairs, we see that it establishes that: 1. "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives." 2. "Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in their country." 3. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." China's participatory democracy is based on People's Congresses, which currently have 2.77 million elected deputies. There are five levels of People's Congresses: municipality, county, city, province, and national. In last June elections, 921 million voters participated in municipal elections, representing 86.49% of registered voters, and 623 million voters participated in county elections, representing 85.63% of registered voters. The upper three levels of deputies (city, province, and national) are elected by deputies from the lower level. If we look at the XIV National People's Congress (NPC), it consists of 2,977 deputies. Some important characteristics to highlight about the composition of these deputies are as follows: Ø Ethnic minorities: There are 55 ethnic minorities in China represented by a total of 442 deputies. Ø Women: Their representation remains low. There are 790 female deputies, representing only 26.54% of the total NPC. Ø Workers and farmers: With 497 deputies, their participation reaches 16.69% of the total deputies. Ø Communist Party of China: There are 969 deputies, accounting for 32.55% of the total deputies. We can conclude that the North American political system is designed to perpetuate the neoliberal democracy upon which it is based. Similarly, the Chinese political system is designed to perpetuate Chinese socialist democracy. Both systems formally meet the three requirements of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From the perspective of effectiveness, it seems that the neoliberal system, on one hand, in the current crisis situation, is generating a level of confrontation between the two parties that alternate in power (Republicans and Democrats in the United States, Socialists and Populars in Spain) that is hindering the government's work and muddying the political situation with the goal of obtaining power above any principle. On the other hand, the electoral marketing style on which it is based enhances government actions on short-term needs at the expense of medium and long-term plans, which cease to be an electoral priority. Looking towards China, the Chinese political system centered on grassroots People's Assemblies has two important advantages: on one hand, electoral confrontation does not occur between two national machineries geared to compete and win, but between grassroots individuals known to and neighbors of the voters who will elect them, where the individual holds greater value than the party itself. On the other hand, this system based on individuals allows for their selection based on their capabilities and promotes the rise to power of the most qualified. This phenomenon has been referred to as "Meritocracy" or the government of the best, and China today represents the clearest depiction of this meritocratic system. The other 29 articles of the Human Rights Declaration Without going deep into each of the Human Rights due to space constraints, let's focus on those that are driving the quality of life of Chinese citizens. In general, the United States uses human rights as a political tool for interference in the internal affairs of other countries, to influence and overthrow governments in its strategy of global domination. The State Department periodically publishes reports that are disseminated by Western media. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador expressed a few days ago regarding the latest U.S. report that "The State Department is talking about the human rights situation in Mexico being gray. The only thing is to ask [the agency] to review its recommendations because they violate the sovereignty of peoples. They are no-one to extend letters of good conduct to independent and sovereign countries and peoples." In relation to this latest report, many voices have risen up to rebuke the United States and assert that it lacks the capacity, or even the moral high ground, to criticize what happens in other countries regarding human rights. They point to everything happening with Julian Assange, the brutal repression of students in the United States, or the military support for the genocide of Palestinians, to express that this country cannot speak about human rights because it lacks moral authority. The right to equality and non-discrimination. Articles 1 and 2 are about the right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination. If we use their representation in the highest legislative body of each country for various minority groups to compare their level of discrimination, the result is as follows:   While ethnic minorities in China are overrepresented in the highest legislative body, in the United States, Latinos and African Americans together are discriminated against compared to non-Latino white individuals in the House of Representatives. The situation of women in both countries in their legislative bodies is discriminatory and at a similar level. In China, only 26.5% of deputies in the National People's Congress are women, and in the United States, only 28% of congresswomen in the House of Representatives are women. The respect for ethnic minorities and their national integration in China is notable. The most evident case is the Uyghur minority settled in the Xinjiang region, which is of Muslim origin and for which the United States has been financing all kind of Islamist terrorist groups to destabilize China without any success and launching worldwide discrediting campaigns. The Right to the Satisfaction of Economic, Social, and Cultural Needs According to Article 22, every person has the right to the satisfaction of these needs. China's progress in poverty alleviation, as seen in the previous graph, is spectacular. It shows how, starting from extremely high poverty levels (over 50% in the year 2000), China outpaces the United States from 2014 until its elimination. Meanwhile, no progress is observed in the United States over the last 50 years. Never before so many people have exited poverty in such a short time in human history. This result is the consequence from the different objectives of both societies; while in the United States the focus is on maximizing the benefits of the capitalist system, in China, the focus is on meeting the social needs of the entire population. The Right to Social Security in the Event of Illness, Disability, Widowhood, Old Age, or Other Circumstances Beyond One's Control Article 25 speaks of this right. We have already shown above the evolution of life expectancy in the United States and China, which is the best indicator of the satisfaction of this right. China's advantage in healthcare and social services does not come from higher healthcare spending by this country. On the contrary, the United States is the world's largest spender on healthcare in terms of percentage of GDP, but this expenditure is not distributed evenly and solidarily among all its citizens. Nearly 30 million people in the United States lack health insurance and have had no insurance at all throughout 2022, and worse, they have also lacked the financial means to meet their healthcare needs, which in the United States are all paid for. The U.S. Census does not provide information on how many, in addition to these 30 million, have only had access to health insurance at some point during the year. The Right to Education Article 26: Everyone has the right to education. Let's see how the United States and China spend their budgets:   China has opted for the widespread and open generalization of education. For example, it has been sending nearly 400,000 students each year to American universities until Biden began to prevent their access, and another 300,000 students to other countries worldwide. The gross enrollment ratio in higher education in China reached 59.6% in 2022. Today, Chinese universities host most students worldwide enrolled in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. As a conclusión China draws its strength from human rights to drive its economy and progress. We find a country where the population shares the benefits of progress in solidarity, expanding social security, healthcare, and education nationwide. This has created the world’s most skilled workforce, setting annual records in patents, surpassing both the United States and all combined university systems of European Union countries in graduate students, with 11.6 million new graduates in the last academic year. And it's not just the labor force that the standard of living, healthcare, or education generate in a country; it's also the personal satisfaction of citizens with the respect of all their rights. The French company Ipsos is responsible for conducting worldwide studies on the level of happiness in different countries and has been pointing out China as the happiest country in the world. There is no doubt that Chinese society is a satisfied one. A satisfaction that hints at the pride of belonging to a country that has carried out the largest and fastest economic and social revolution in history.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском We can talk about selective tariffs - but not about protective tariffs - Concerns about the effects of economic dependencies are increasingly overshadowing the benefits of open global trade. - In the current geopolitically charged situation, there may be situations in which trade policy dependencies - for example in the case of rare earths - can be mitigated by state intervention. - In such cases, selective tariffs are the best choice. Subsidies to build up own production capacities are significantly less efficient, more expensive and undermine the market principle. - Protective tariffs for industries whose products are sufficiently available on the global market, such as the automotive and steel industries, should be rejected. - The fundamental goal should be the preservation of rule-based world trade in accordance with WTO rules. Any kind of state intervention must be justified on the basis of solid data. Background During Chinese party leader Xi Jinping's visit to Europe in May, there was once again a lot of talk about economic dependencies. They are seen as a threat to the "economic security" of Germany and Europe. What often seems to fade into the background is that the arguments for a global division of labor remain valid: it enables general prosperity precisely because certain countries and regions concentrate on the production of individual goods and consequently do not produce others themselves. On the other hand, it is also true that the economic damage more than compensates for these advantages if a state such as China uses economic dependencies as political leverage and, in the worst case, stops supplying goods for which it has a monopoly. In principle, China has achieved such a monopoly for refined rare earths and some other smelted metals.1 However, this clearly does not apply to electric cars, steel or solar cells. The reason for such quasi-monopolies is simple: Chinese companies export the products in question so cheaply that production elsewhere in the world is not worthwhile. If this were solely due to the fact that Chinese companies produce better, the only correct response would be to roll up our sleeves and become better ourselves. In the case of rare earths from China, however, the advantage of Chinese manufacturers is largely due to direct and indirect subsidies. In such an environment, in which Chinese producers have massive cost advantages due to politically granted benefits, it is not worthwhile for private companies outside China to build up their own capacities for the production of rare earths, for example. Even if prices were to rise and economic production were possible, this would not be rational; state-supported Chinese companies can easily survive periods of low prices. The usual market mechanism, whereby companies with the most competitive solutions survive, does not apply here. Even technologically superior production methods do not prevail due to Chinese subsidies. Possible reactions The best economic solution is undoubtedly for the state not to react at all and to see the availability of very cheap products that are available for domestic consumption or for further processing as an advantage. The fact that the products in question have been made cheaper by Chinese taxpayers' money can be gratefully accepted. It would be a genuine and courageous system competition not to respond with the same instruments, but to maintain a market economy system and thus exploit the weaknesses of the counter-design. Shaping the economic framework conditions politically in such a way that innovations that provide alternatives to the use of the raw materials in question can be developed more easily would be a reaction that is still justifiable within the framework of the social market economy. This would be, for example, favorable recycling processes. In most cases, such innovations are possible. However, their introduction and application is significantly more expensive than importing standard products from China. If dependence on China is really not justifiable in individual cases,2 there are two possibilities for state intervention in the form of subsidies or tariffs, which may be justifiable in rare individual cases, but are not provided for within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Important indicators for the assessment of dependencies are, for example, the lack of substitutability of the imported good, the degree of concentration of supply in a country and the relevance of the good in question for the domestic economy. However, state intervention to protect domestic production sites, such as is being discussed for electric cars or steel, appears to be explicitly unjustifiable. There is a sufficiently diversified supply of such products on the global market and there is no dependency on just one country. Economic effects of tariffs and subsidies Tariffs and subsidies both aim to compensate for the price difference to cheaper foreign competitors. Tariffs make imports more expensive, while subsidies make domestic production cheaper through state subsidies. Both have a negative welfare effect, but the correlation is more harmful in the case of subsidies. Figure 1 uses a schematic example, which is not based on empirical data, to illustrate the effect if the costs of producing rare earths in Germany were reduced to the level of the import price from China (country 1) through subsidies.   With the subsidies, it is now economically viable for the subsidized companies to produce the rare earths from ore in Germany. The actually cheaper ways of importing rare earths from alternative countries or using other technical solutions remain more expensive and would hardly be used. The goal of reducing dependencies would therefore be achieved in a very expensive way. Large sums of taxpayers' money would be spent on this. In this example, the most expensive possible route is discussed in order to clearly demonstrate the negative consequences. In reality, however, it is very unlikely that the cheapest route in economic terms will be subsidized. This is because there are always many different providers and technical solutions, which means that all the options are often not even known or can only develop in the long term. It is therefore very unlikely that the optimal subsidy recipients will be selected. A benefit is created for a specific, relatively arbitrarily selected application, but not for others. The effectiveness of the market is thus distorted and the competitiveness of the location decreases as a result. As the subsidies compensate for a competitive disadvantage, it is unlikely that high additional tax revenues will be generated. The funds spent are no longer available for other state investments. The result is a loss of welfare on this scale. Only the subsidized companies benefit from this. The price at which rare earths can be purchased in Germany does not change. It is also possible to subsidize production abroad in order to reduce dependence on one country. Such models are being attempted via "raw material partnerships", for example. Such an approach can be significantly cheaper than subsidizing domestic production. In the example (Figure 1), only the significantly lower import price from country 2 would have to be subsidized. However, the other disadvantages of subsidies listed above also apply in this case. In particular, it is even more difficult to obtain all the necessary information for projects abroad and therefore even less likely to choose the most cost-effective option. The targeted tariffs discussed here are intended to respond to dependencies on supplies from a specific country. They are therefore only imposed on imports from this country. Other imports are not affected. To stay with the example, the importer pays a surcharge on the imported rare earths. This makes his product, for which he processes rare earths, more expensive domestically. Manufacturers abroad who are not affected by the duty become more competitive in comparison.    If the tariff rate were set in the same way as above so that the competitive disadvantage for the most expensive option - metal processing in Germany - is compensated for in terms of price, the tariff rate on imports from China would be very high. However, consumers of rare earths in Germany would still have access to the significantly cheaper other options. Metal processing in Germany would therefore remain unprofitable, while imports - now no longer from China, but from country 2 - would continue to be significantly cheaper. However, the price difference to the cheapest processing variant in Germany, in the example (Figure 2) recycling, would no longer be so great, so that this variant would be easier to make economically viable by scaling up or using innovative technical solutions. In reality, the introduction of customs duties would not divert all procurement to a single country; there is no capacity for this anywhere. The result would be a mix of different suppliers, which would make it more worthwhile to drive innovation in Germany. Changes in the price structure between the different providers and processes over time can be tracked by customers in this model - the best process (or the second best, if the best is used in China) then prevails on the market. The welfare loss here arises from the fact that consumption or further processing of the imported products becomes more expensive by at least the difference to the second cheapest source of supply. However, the volume of the welfare loss is significantly lower than in the case of subsidies. It can be argued that tariffs make the prices of downstream products in the supply chain more expensive, whereas subsidies do not. While this is true, it overlooks the fact that the much larger group of companies and consumers who are not directly affected do not suffer any direct additional costs in the case of tariffs, but bear the costs of subsidies through their taxes. Political effects of tariffs and subsidies In terms of their political and structural consequences, subsidies are more harmful than targeted tariffs. This is simply due to the procedure at the end of which individual companies receive a subsidy decision. An "objective" allocation is hardly possible here. On the contrary: the procedure is susceptible to personal relationships, political influence and direct corruption. Furthermore, subsidies that are only granted in one country of the European Union jeopardize the integrity of the European Single Market. Similar problems can arise with customs duties. This happens when they are used to protect certain domestic industries. In the case of targeted, selective tariffs, which are based on clearly defined, objective categories, such as the degree of dependence on a product from a country, there is little scope for political influence once the criteria have been established. Tariffs cannot harm the European single market either, as they can only be imposed at European level anyway. WTO conformity The reduction of tariffs and subsidies within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the predecessor agreement GATT are a central reason for the reduction of global poverty in recent decades and one of the cornerstones of Germany's prosperity. It is therefore self-evident that tariffs and subsidies not only contradict the idea of the WTO. They also contradict its two basic principles: Subsidies for domestic production contradict the non-discrimination principle3, tariffs against individual countries violate the Most Favorite Nation Clause4. There are exceptions for both in the WTO rules. For example, WTO members must notify subsidies so that they can be examined and other countries can object to them if necessary. In principle, subsidies are only intended - and within a narrow framework - for developing countries, which still includes China. However, the notification of subsidies to the WTO hardly works any more. For example, 64 countries (around a third of members) have not even notified their subsidies for 20175. Nevertheless, some of China's subsidies may indeed be legal according to the letter of the WTO rules. But they are certainly not legitimate, as the aim of the WTO is to liberalize world trade and not to cement the opposite. And even if subsidies are known, the WTO cannot take legally binding action against them due to the dispute settlement mechanism blocked by the USA. Consequently, the USA has not reacted to the unresolved problem of China's subsidies within the WTO framework. Although tariffs have been imposed on some Chinese imports, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a huge subsidy program. If the dispute settlement mechanism were to work, the IRA would almost certainly have to be declared WTO-incompatible. However, as this path is blocked, many countries and regions of the world - including Germany and the EU at the forefront - are reacting with their own openly WTO-incompatible subsidy programs. The current subsidy race is constantly creating new reasons to impose subsidies in response to the subsidies of others. This will further damage the multilateral trading system, which has been very successful for Germany in particular. Targeted tariffs, on the other hand, which can be used to eliminate competitive disadvantages caused by subsidies and which are therefore only levied on goods from the subsidizing country, are in principle in line with the basic idea of the WTO. This is because it balances out a distortion of the world market created by subsidies. Therefore, tariffs are generally permitted as a reaction to dumping and subsidies6. A reaction to subsidies via tariffs within the strict WTO framework is currently hardly possible for the reasons mentioned above. In this situation, it should be actively communicated that in an unsatisfactory legal situation, the path of the least evil will be taken with tariffs. At the same time, serious efforts should be made to reform the WTO. Conclusion The argument: "We want to have the production of certain things in Germany because we believe that we would no longer be supplied with them in crisis situations" is not an economic argument. Production for strategic reasons is always a financially subsidized business. Because if there was money to be made, the private sector would do it. Politically, this line of argument is perfectly legitimate - as is the attempt to steer the economy directly in a politically acceptable direction through subsidies. However, this has nothing to do with a social market economy, but rather the opposite. However, if Germany and Europe are to remain committed to the social market economy and open multilateral trade, the only economically sensible response to problematic dependencies from abroad (if one has to respond at all) is to impose targeted, selective tariffs - but certainly not protective tariffs for domestic production sites. The German government should work within the EU to set a clear framework for this and at the same time work on a reform at WTO level to finally reduce the rampant subsidies. Because these - and not tariffs - are currently the biggest threat to the open global trading system that is so important to us. References 1 Vgl. etwa die Darstellung der Abhängigkeiten von für die Energiewende nötigen Metallen in Cernicky (2022): https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/16166715/Energiewende+und+Protektionismus+-+Wie+gehen+wir+pragmatisch+mit+China+um.pdf/442ba770-d504-43cc-25f1-eaf7d970dfc1, genaue Zahlen vgl. etwa die Auflistung des BDI: https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/analyse-bestehender-abhaengigkeiten-und-handlungsempfehlungen/ 2 Zum Versuch einer entsprechenden Bewertung vgl. etwa die von der KAS und dem Ifo-Institut durchgeführte Studie zu Abhängigkeiten in Lieferketten, Flach et al (2021): https://www.kas.de/de/analysen-und-argumente/detail/-/content/globale-wertschoepfungsketten 3 Art. III GATT 4 Art. I GATT/ WTO 5 WTO | 2023 News items - Members reiterate concerns on lack of transparency with subsidy notifications: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/scm_02may23_e.htm 6 GATT Art VI, Dumping und Ausgleichzölle Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2024, Berlin Design: yellow too, Pasiek Horntrich GbR Produced with the financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany. This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or election campaigners or helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de).