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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The outcome of the G20 leaders' summit held in Rio de Janeiro undoubtedly marks a series of victories for Brazilian foreign policy and also for the international community if we understand what is considered a success in terms of global governance. Firstly, the G20 summit declaration is a major achievement for Brazilian diplomacy, as it brings together twenty countries around agendas that not all of them support (such as human rights). Reaching this consensus required a year of intense negotiations to reach the final result. Brazil obtained support on the main themes it proposed: hunger and poverty, always off the radar of rich countries; sustainability; the bioeconomy , reaching the first multilateral treaty on the subject. Another consensus was the taxation of the super-rich , an issue that touches on the issues of inequality between countries and tax havens. Reaching the support of the G20 members around these proposals represented the reconstruction of the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy, which had been mocked during the Bolsonaro government, and crowned Brazil's return as a relevant country in the international community after years of self-inflicted isolation. Two other points that went unnoticed by some analyses is that the G20 summit allowed dialogue with Venezuela to return to normal, avoiding enormous damage to the Brazilian government and preserving good relations with the tumultuous neighboring country. And what can we say about the turbulent presence of the newest representative of the Latin American extreme right, Argentine President Javier Milei, who until the last moment tried to undo the consensus reached and was skillfully circumvented by Brazilian diplomacy? Returning to the proposals made by the presidency and supported by the other members of the group, are they “more of the same”, “undefined”, that do not change at the international level, as some analysts and part of the press said yesterday? Understanding the nature of international forums such as the G20 may answer this question. Outlined in 1999 and formalized in 2008, the G20 was created to bring together finance ministers and central bank governors from the twenty largest economies on the planet to discuss the financial crises of those periods. The crises of the 1990s, in particular, brought a new factor: it was the first time that economic problems in developing countries affected the central economies. It was therefore necessary to expand the discussions beyond the restricted Group of Seven (G7), a group of rich countries created in 1975, and to bring emerging economies to the negotiating table. Over the years, the G20 began to discuss other topics besides finance, and today sustainability is at the center of the work. The G20 emerged as an informal group with a flexible structure, dependent on a rotating presidency among its members to organize summits and working groups. In addition, it does not have a constitutive treaty and does not have the capacity to impose standards. When reading this brief description, most people wonder why a forum of this kind should exist if it “serves no purpose.” But informality and flexibility are a demand of the member countries that voluntarily chose to participate. These are the characteristics that allow ministers and other representatives of countries with divergent interests, such as the United States and Russia, to discuss issues that affect humanity, such as the eradication of hunger or climate change, for almost a year. The concrete actions that we so desperately need will depend on the efforts of each country and the corresponding pressure from their civil societies. The commitments exist, and now it is necessary to demand their implementation. Imagining a world without any kind of coordination is difficult because we have lived under the weak governance of the United Nations (UN) since the end of the Second World War, which, by the way, will be 80 years old in 2025. The memories of an international system under constant threat of global wars and in which common problems were not even discussed are a pale memory and, perhaps for this reason, so many people disdain the advances of international forums such as the G20. There are political forces today that oppose these alliances and the minimum level of global governance that we have managed to achieve, as Milei’s criticisms in his speech at the leaders’ meeting made clear. In line with the thinking of other far-right politicians, the Argentine president called global governance a “corset” that suffocates countries that think differently. It is contradictory that international regimes are criticized for restricting the freedom of States while at the same time being accused of being weak and ineffective, which demonstrates empty criticisms that serve only to encourage their supporters against imaginary enemies. Leaders like Donald Trump and Miley defend the “every man for himself” rule in international relations. This idea is gaining more and more followers among the people, a situation that makes declarations like the one by the G20, which defends basic principles of human rights and sustainability, an important manifesto for those who still defend an international order based on rules and cooperation. The Brazilian presidency has achieved important achievements for our foreign policy and also for the international order that it seeks to preserve.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract: Japan is going through a difficult domestic political period that coincides with the demands of the enormous geopolitical challenges posed by the threat posed by the increased assertiveness of China and Russia in the region, coupled with the risk of North Korea's nuclear programme. Uncertainty over the immediate future of the security relationship with the United States, which was tightened under former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, also leads Japan to a dilemma regarding its own deterrence capabilities, as reliance on such an alliance may become another risk factor in the event that the United States reformulates it. Therefore, the search for Japan's own strategic autonomy is becoming increasingly important, firstly by accelerating remilitarisation that includes possibilities beyond strict self-defence and, as a second pillar, by seeking to create a mutual security organisation with other countries in the region to act as a deterrent to China, Russia and North Korea, bringing together the various bilateral and multinational treaties to which Japan is a party. Introduction The 27 October elections have left Japan in a complicated political situation. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won and remains the most represented party in the Diet, with 191 seats, but together with its current partner, the Komeito, the governing coalition fell far short of the 233 needed for a majority. Nevertheless, the current prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, can continue to hold office and the punishment of the LDP seems to be read in a domestic context and not because of dissent over security and the country's external projection. Japan's stability is key to the region, so it seems unlikely that any government that is formed will affect the main lines of defence policy, as the concern remains an increasingly assertive China and the attitude of other actors such as Russia and North Korea. The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party won 148 seats, 52 more than in the last election, but if we look at its election manifesto, on foreign policy it opts to align itself with the strategic concept of a secure and open Indo-Pacific, while on defence the question is whether to continue to rely on the alliance with the US, which has approximately 50,000 troops in the country, or whether Japan should be able to have sufficient deterrent capabilities of its own .1 On 1 October, Shigeru Ishiba took over as prime minister from his party colleague and prime minister from 2021, Fumio Kishida, worn down by several corruption cases. On October 4, Ishiba announced some of his foreign policy priorities: the design of a mutual security organisation, an "Asian NATO" with several Indo-Pacific countries and greater reciprocity in the alliance with the United States, although this does not mean a questioning of this. 2 All this in a regional context where Japan's perception of its security being threatened was growing, given that a few days earlier a Chinese aircraft carrier had passed through the waters between the Japanese islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, coming within 24 miles of Japanese territory. For decades, Japan has been perhaps the main Pacific ally of its former World War II enemy, the United States, and this, coupled with its own geopolitical position, translates into remilitarisation, a dynamic of confrontation with China and the search for allies beyond the US, both in the region itself and further afield, in Europe, for example. With Ishida it seems that there will be some continuity with Kishida's policy, although both belong to the same party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been governing Japan for a decade, although their sensibilities and political paths are different, while some unknowns remain in the immediate future, such as China's own position with the increasingly belligerent discourse from Japan or the future of the close alliance with the United States depending on the tenant in the White House from next year, after the elections on 1 November: continuity or rupture if the United States demands a change in Japan's defence policy, pushing it towards greater spending and thus increasing strategic autonomy? Japan's socio-economic and political turbulence Sigheru Ishiba was appointed prime minister due to corruption cases in the Fushida government, including some dealings in various contracts within the defence industry. Since 2017, laws have been tightened to prosecute bribery of officials, which has an impact on the awarding of contracts and tenders for public works. Since 2021, the year of his appointment as prime minister, Fumio Kishida's career has been punctuated by various scandals, starting with the scenario surrounding the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the summer of 2022, which brought to light the party's links to the controversial religious organisation of the Unification Church, also known as the Moon Sect, to which his assassin belonged. As early as 2023, the case of the blackmailing of senior party officials, including Kishida himself, caused his popular approval rating to fall to less than 15 percent, and after sacking senior officials and ministers, he decided last August to step down and make way for another candidate, who would end up being Ishiba .3 Sigheru Ishiba is a veteran politician known for his loquacity who has been ostracised within the LDP for his criticism of its leaders, for example in 2014 against Shinzo Abe for his reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that prohibited the country from rearming. After several unsuccessful attempts to lead the LDP, Ishiba was a minor parliamentarian, but what was crucial in his rise to prime minister was that he embodied the image of a fighter against corruption, which is also considered a burden in Japan's current complex economic situation. Although it is the fourth largest economic power, in 2023 Germany overtook Japan as the world's third largest economy and also has a trade deficit of around 2 billion euros, as the country is totally dependent on resources such as oil and gas, suffering from rising prices and obstacles in supply chains in the Indo-Pacific, for example, with the Houthi threat in the Red Sea 4.  Another sensitive issue is demographics. Japan has an ageing society, where 30% of its 125 million inhabitants are over 65, the highest rate in the world, while the birth rate is very low, with an average of 1.3 children per woman, according to World Bank figures 5 . This has consequences such as a shrinking domestic market, as older people are reluctant to put their savings at stake, plus the danger of not being able to meet labour needs in some sectors, including defence needs, precisely at a time when there is a desire to increase manpower. Technology and robotisation have been alleviating this situation of the need for demographic renewal, but doubts lurk in the very near future, especially in one of the countries with the most restrictive immigration legislation in the world. Redoubling security threats: China, Russia and North Korea  Japan's historic territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea and with Russia over the Kuril/Chishima Islands have been compounded by a heightened threat perception of these two formidable giants, while North Korean ballistic missile tests have added to the escalating tension. As the 2024 Defence White Paper has made clear, Japan's approximately 16,000 kilometres of coastline along its four main islands, which means that no point in the country is more than 150 kilometres from the sea, means that Japanese military doctrine regards its defences as definitive battle sites. Moreover, the straits separating these islands greatly restrict a rapid transfer of forces, and this is compounded by the mountainous barriers that similarly prevent rapid deployment of troops. 6  The paper notes that China is modernising and expanding its military by leaps and bounds, while Russian manoeuvres in the Kuriles have involved not only naval exercises but also the deployment of coastal missile and air defence systems. On 18 September, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning passed through the waters between the islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, the first ship of its kind, while it is common for fighter jets and other vessels to invade Japanese airspace or territorial waters 7. Similarly, an anti-Japanese sentiment is beginning to emerge in China that is rooted in cultural and historical elements and embedded in the diplomatic sphere. In addition to Beijing's reminders that both exports and imports between the two countries are key to their respective economies, and that any ban or stricter regulation could alter them, there are also Chinese diplomatic protests over issues such as the sending of a Japanese warship to the Taiwan Strait on 25 September, an unprecedented action, albeit in the framework of collaboration with other countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which took part in joint manoeuvres in the area, dubbed "freedom of navigation exercises"8.  Finally, several Japanese companies based in China are willing to relocate their staff after xenophobic attacks, including the fatal stabbing of a child in Shenzhen on 18 September 9. On social media, many posts from China claim that Japanese schools create spies and label them as "new colonies" in reference to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1932-1945. In these China-Japan frictions, destabilising actions are also observed within the so-called grey zone. A report has identified a disinformation network in China that promotes a supposed independence movement in Okinawa, where there are also calls for an end to the US presence on the island, which is home to more than 25,000 troops in the largest base on Japanese territory.  Violations of Japanese air or maritime sovereignty have also recently come from Russia. On 23 September, a serious incident occurred when a Russian military aircraft violated Japanese airspace north of Rebun Island in Hokkaido Prefecture and was intercepted by a Japanese aircraft, which threw flares that hit its fuselage 10. It is also noteworthy that since the summer of 2019 and on an annual basis, a joint fleet of Chinese and Russian warships have been carrying out joint manoeuvres in the space between the seas of Japan and Okhotsk, while Russia has also announced the installation of new missile platforms in the Kuriles, which is seen as an increased threat to Japan.11  For its part, North Korea and its ballistic missile tests continue to be a risk for Japan, as it seems to have become one of the main targets of such tests, given that these projectiles tend to land in Japanese sovereign waters. Recently, Prime Minister Ishiba has pushed the diplomatic option by proposing to the regime in Pyongyang to set up liaison offices in both countries to settle any disputes, including the fate of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. This proposal includes an end to missile testing in exchange for Japanese investment in North Korean projects, another sign that Tokyo is beginning to seek its own solutions to problems previously settled within the broad framework of the alliance with the United States.12  Rethinking the alliance with the United States?  It should be remembered that all of Japan's military activity and capabilities are strictly limited to a defensive character, restricting the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' overseas deployments and mission to humanitarian cover. However, the dependence on the United States in this foreign projection is quite evident and goes beyond legal limitations. Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution regulates the use of force in Japan to self-defence. Prior to the reforms during Shinzo Abe's term in office (2012-2020), the 1951 Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is still in force, even with revisions, allows in Articles V and VI for a US presence on Japanese territory, which covers the 50,000 US military personnel stationed at bases throughout the country, especially on the island of Okinawa, up to a maximum of 100,000. 13 But guidelines signed in 1978, also in force, stipulated the possibility of Japanese participation in foreign military operations if vital sea lanes for the country were under attack, such as protection for ships under the US flag of war or carrying Japanese nationals, as well as direct assistance to the US in the event of an attack on its mainland, for example by intercepting missiles overflying Japan. 14 When Abe was prime minister in 2015, the Diet passed two bills, the first allowing Japanese forces to operate abroad for humanitarian reasons or in the case of situations that "threaten Japan's existence", and the second removing restrictions that prevented action in collective self-defence, i.e. it can use its armed forces to defend an ally under attack and no longer just the United States. This opened the door for Japan to join military alliances. Two years later, in 2017, it became a founding member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), although this alliance between the United States, India, Australia and Japan is not, stricto sensu, a coalition with military powers, this same year they agreed to greater involvement in this regard with joint maritime patrols in the waters of the Indo-Pacific from 2025. 15 Some media refer to QUAD as a germ of "NATO in the Indo-Pacific".  With regard to NATO itself, Kishida participated as an observer in the meeting of the heads of state of the member states in Madrid in June 2022, the first Japanese leader to do so in history. Recall that, in the strategic concept agreed during that meeting, China already appeared as a systemic threat in the concept, an issue of vital strategic importance to Japan. Kishida also attended the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, and was the first Japanese leader in history to deliver a speech from a non-coalition partner country: "We welcome the increased interest and engagement in the IndoPacific by our Euro-Atlantic partners"16. Japan is part of the AP4, the NATO AsiaPacific Partners, i.e. NATO's four Indo-Pacific partners along with South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.  In December 2022, the Kishida government updated three important defence documents, the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy and the Defence Strengthening Programme, which ultimately authorised the government, for example, to acquire long-range missile platforms in a controversial decision, as it contradicts the premise of not acquiring offensive weapons. It was justified by Japan's new strategic concept of deterrence and anticipatory defence in the earlier "Three Pillars of Defence" documents, which include improving its security architecture with new equipment such as these missiles, strengthening the alliance with the United States and increasing cooperation with international partners. 17 The so-called 'Spirit of Camp David' 18 , the meeting at President Biden's summer residence in August 2023 between President Biden, Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, further integrated Japan into the US defence architecture in the Pacific, adding a key player to the alliance in South Korea, with whom Japan had hitherto had a complicated relationship stemming from a traumatic common history, and the germ of a trilateral military alliance was even raised, effectively including the possible transfer of certain deterrent technology vis-à-vis China, Russia and North Korea, such as nuclear weapons, something that had already come up at the G7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023, no less, although Kishida flatly denied this possibility. However, in 2017 it was the then Diet deputy and now prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, who raised this possibility as a real option for Japan, although the then defence minister immediately rejected it 19. Now Ishiba and part of the Japanese political spectrum seem to advocate a certain distancing from dependence on the US, without disavowing bilateral agreements, but advocating initiatives such as having Japanese forces on US soil, the joint use of military bases in Okinawa, and making Japan's defence less dependent on US policy for the region.  When in doubt, open the fan and increase the force.  Last January, Kishida and his foreign and defence ministers travelled to Washington to meet with their US counterparts. There, a new step in Japan's strategic thinking was revealed when it was announced that Japan intends to increase defence spending by almost 60 per cent over five years, abandoning the 1 per cent of GDP budget cap. Beyond a reading in terms of sustaining the alliance with the United States, the fact is that we are witnessing a revision of the country's defence strategy unprecedented since World War II: doubling defence spending means giving Japan its own autonomy in this area, without depending on third parties and with the agreement of the United States 20.  Japan perceives that the US will remain the global power for the foreseeable future, but may become less so in the medium to distant future, posing a threat to Japan's defence credibility, especially in the face of Chinese assertiveness in the adjacent seas. To counter this risk, one avenue could be a security alliance with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, India or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. In fact, there are already some bilateral agreements that allow Japanese warships to call at various ports, carry out joint manoeuvres or increase the capacity of maritime agencies to improve patrolling, with Japan supplying patrol boats, coastguard vessels and aircraft 21. However, these security agreements are not only encouraged with Indo-Pacific states, but also with more distant actors with many interests in the region, such as the Europeans, where defence exchanges, joint exercises and contracts in the Japanese defence industry are also increasingly common, either bilaterally with countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Spain, or through recent agreements with the European Union 22.  On security issues, Ishiba has also raised the need to create a mutual defence organisation for the Pacific area that would be similar to NATO for the Atlantic, with both sharing a reference to China as a systemic rival. Thus, there is speculation about a new Basic Law on Japan's Security Policy that would authorise participation in a multinational military alliance. The way forward could be to bring together existing alliances such as the bilateral Japan-US alliance, others such as those already mentioned with South Korea and the US, as well as multinational alliances such as ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US Security Treaty), AUKUS (a partnership between Australia, the UK and the US) and above all QUAD, which would have a principle of "collective self-defence" and expand the number of its partners.23  The narrative gaining traction in Japan is that only such a defensive alliance can deter China, Russia or North Korea from future war moves in the region. Clearly, such a proposal would involve an in-depth debate ranging from the position of a crucial power that would be the key to the success or failure of such an alliance, such as India, to the status and position of Taiwan, to the sharing of units, equipment and technology, such as nuclear, as well as the projection of the US partnership itself, On the contrary, it would be an essential part of this new organisation, from the Japanese point of view, a definitive element of deterrence, but in balance and on an equal footing with the rest of the partners, such as Japan itself. 24 Further evidence of this new Japanese perception is the acquisition of deterrence capabilities of its own, within a range of sophisticated military equipment such as longrange counter-attack missiles, designed in principle to repel a perceived adversary's attack from a distance. The country appears to be preparing not only to defend itself at home, but to anticipate its defence abroad. Other key changes in this regard include the creation of a permanent joint operational headquarters for the Self-Defence Forces, the transfer of authority over Japan's Coast Guard to the Ministry of Defence in the event of conflict, the strengthening of cyber defence and a new commitment to increase intelligence capabilities, vital for a hypothetical confrontation with China or Russia in the grey zone. 25  Conclusions: another uncertain future comes from the United States.  The key to Japan's 'Pacific NATO' project also reflects another uncertainty, that of the immediate future of US foreign policy towards the region. After the good feeling with the Biden Administration, there is some uncertainty and unease in Japan if Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, and a term has become popular, "MoshiTora", something akin to "What if Donald Trump wins?" ("Tora" is the beginning of Trump's name translated in Japanese as "Torampu") 26 . This could mean changes in relations between the two countries on the economy - what about tariffs - and security, as well as bilateral defence treaties. During 2017-2021, the Trump administration questioned the value of some of these treaties, especially the costs to the US treasury, insisting that NATO countries and others, such as South Korea and Japan, should pay for them and threatening to withdraw US forces. In Japan in particular, then Prime Minister Abe tried to maintain the status quo despite some of Trump's rudeness and arrogant treatment of the country. Indeed, Trump's time in office can be seen as Japan's discovery of the risks of gambling everything on the US alliance and the beginning of a discourse, like Ishida's, advocating greater autonomy in security and defence 27. However, on the campaign trail, Trump himself has hinted that he will pursue a policy of close alliance with Japan and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, with China in his sights. 28 Also at stake in the US presidential election is the future of US financial and military assistance to Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia. In line with the previous point and reducing spending in scenarios considered onerous and not vital to US security, a withdrawal of such assistance to Ukraine could be interpreted globally as an indication of what might happen in other areas such as the Indo-Pacific, where Japan could be in a dangerous situation if there were a partial or total US withdrawal, as it would coincide with the process of remilitarisation, without clear regional security alliances and with the certain possibility that both China and Russia would redouble their threats to the country. There are two issues close to Japan that may discern which path the new US administration will take in the region. The first is North Korea, since it should be remembered that in 2019 Trump pushed for talks with Kim Jong-Un to reach an agreement on controlling and curbing the Asian country's nuclear capabilities, although in the end no agreement was reached. The truth is that he did so without including Japan in the negotiations, when it is the main country in the region affected by this threat and North Korean ballistic tests. Secondly, the situation in neighbouring Taiwan. If the United States were to relax its hitherto resolute support for the island in the face of alleged Chinese aggression, how could this be interpreted by Japan, especially when it is committed to this vision? A certain consensus seems to be flourishing in the country at the strategic level: to achieve full security autonomy that demonstrates its own deterrence capabilities. This seems to be the way forward in the short and medium term.  [1] "Contribution to global peace and prosperity", The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan. Basic Policies. Available at: Basic Policies - The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (cdp-japan.jp) (accessed 29/10/2024). [2] WARD, Robert. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In Rio de Janeiro, world leaders are gathering for a historic summit. The G20, the symbol of global governance, is at a crossroads. The planet is waiting. The climate, economic and geopolitical challenges are urgent.Since yesterday, at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, under the strategic engagement of Russia, Foreign MinisterSergey Lavrov, guided by the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, has been playing a key role in discussions on combating inequality, hunger and poverty, as well as reforming global institutions. Together with the BRICS Alliance, innovative initiatives are being put forward to strengthen economic cooperation and global stability, including sustainable development projects and strategic trade agreements. This Summit is proving to be a crucial platform for addressing pressing global challenges such as security and climate change, while potentially influencing global governance and international relations in the years to come.Geopolitical context of the summit, the madness of the Biden administrationAs the G20 group meets in Rio de Janeiro to reconcile the positions of the balance of power in the global chessboard, the recent antithetical decisions of the United States, held on the very eve of the summit and supported by France and Great Britain, are once again dispersing the positions to be reconciled. The Western minority, accustomed to living off the labor of the planetary majority, is lamentably trying to redefine the dynamics of the international community in its favor, by authorizing deep strikes on Russian territory. This approach, adopted by the Biden administration, reflects both madness and a vision of resistance in the face of the potential defeat of Ukraine and NATO allies against Russia, while seeking a reaction that could exacerbate global tensions. This audacious geopolitical calculation, perceived as a last-ditch attempt to consolidate Ukrainian positions before a potential change in American leadership, marks a turning point towards a dangerous escalation of hostilities. It can also be compared to a very big step taken towards the start of the Third World War.The 2024 G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro is therefore taking place in a complex geopolitical context, marked by key global issues. International conflicts, exacerbated in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, and tensions over the role of the United States, France, Great Britain and the collective West are at the heart of discussions on global security. While António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) urges the G20 to adopt actions aligned with the UN Charter – although Western ambitions of domination are being challenged by the rise of the BRICS Alliance – the Western minority continues to pour oil on the embers precisely to satisfy its ambitions of eternal domination.The climate crisis, meanwhile, is forcing more ambitious policies, as the G20, responsible for 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions, must revise its commitment to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Also, growing economic inequality and the need for reforms to a perceived unfair international financial system underscore the urgency of changing the global financial architecture. Despite the political challenges, the summit embodies a push towards stronger multipolarism, with key players such as Sergei Lavrov, Xi Jinping, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, etc., advocating for international cooperation. The political transition in the United States, with the imminent departure of Joe Biden and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, adds uncertainty, potentially impacting global cooperation and sustainability efforts. This nineteenth summit of the Group of Twenty powers (G20) is crucial to encouraging collective action in the face of complex challenges related to security, climate, the economy and international cooperation.Russia’s engagement in the world chessboardRussia’s participation in this Rio de Janeiro Summit is of major strategic importance. Led by Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and mandated by the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian delegation demonstrates the country’s strong commitment to global discussions. Russia aims to take a leading position in addressing global challenges such as combating inequality, hunger and poverty, and reforming international institutions. Mr. Sergey Lavrov’s interventions at the plenary sessions are essential, while his bilateral talks with other world leaders could lead to decisive agreements, strengthening international relations. Capitalizing on its long history of global engagement, Russia is ideally placed to influence these crucial debates for the future of the planet.Positive initiatives of the BRICS Alliance in global dynamicsThe BRICS, originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and expanded over time to BRICS+ – represent an undeniable emerging force in global economic cooperation, as demonstrated by their landmark initiatives at the Rio Summit yesterday. By establishing the New Development Bank, these nations are demonstrating their commitment to financing joint infrastructure projects, strengthening their synergy and displaying a clear desire for de-dollarization. The significant progress made in social security also demonstrates their determination to improve social protection on a large scale. Looking ahead, the BRICS countries are committed to driving reform of international financial institutions, placing their economic weight at the heart of global decisions, while working towards sustainable development and the fight against climate change. Speeches by representatives such as Mr. Sergei Lavrov at the summit captured attention, underscoring the BRICS’ determination to impact global governance and promote a more equitable and sustainable economic future.The impact of the summit on global governanceAs mentioned above, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, represents a crucial opportunity to transform global governance and have a lasting impact on the future of the planet and international relations. Since yesterday, this strategic meeting has been addressing major issues such as the reform of international institutions, requested in particular by the member countries of the BRICS Alliance, the proactive fight against climate change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and international security requiring enhanced cooperation in the face of current geopolitical tensions. Through decisive decisions, the summit could establish a new multipolar world order and decide on the choice between cooperation and global confrontation. The challenge lies in reconciling national and global interests, strengthening trust between international partners, and finding innovative solutions to address the complex challenges of our era. The G20 Summit in Rio thus offers a unique platform for leaders to demonstrate their leadership and vision, thereby shaping a multipolar and sustainable future for future generations.It can be said that the 2024 edition of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro marks a turning point where world leaders are called upon to choose: cooperation or confrontation, progress or stagnation. The future of the planet is now in their hands. Today’s decisions, contained in the Summit Declaration, will shape the world of tomorrow. History will judge.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sea of Cooperation: New Opportunities for the Development of China — ASEAN RelationsSoutheast Asia (SEA) is gaining increasing importance with the changing global order. The region is once again experiencing a period of competition between the “great powers”. During the Cold War some countries managed to stay out of the Soviet-American confrontation, but today, integration into economic, technological, and humanitarian exchanges forces members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to reshape their foreign policy in line with the prioritization of partnerships with various centers of power. SEA has significant economic growth potential, making cooperation beneficial and conflicts costly. Despite the tempting logic of harsh realism in contemporary geopolitical conditions, there remains space in this region for the traditions of idealism and complex interdependence as prerequisites for peaceful coexistence.When Profit Matters More than ClaimsThe ASEAN Summit-2024, held in October in Vientiane, clearly became a platform for a multidimensional dialogue between the “Great East Asian” countries, including India. Almost all participants tried to avoid raising contentious issues; in particular, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, emphasized Japan’s investments in Southeast Asian countries and avoided discussions about the possibility of forming an “Asian NATO”. Similar ideas about freedom from confrontations and unilateral attempts to change the balance of power were expressed by the President of South Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol. Narendra Modi focused on enhancing multilateral cooperation between Asian states in the fields of information technology, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure modernization, which would help accelerate the recovery of production and distribution chains after the COVID-19 pandemic. Chairman of the State Council of China, Li Keqiang, firmly pointed to “external forces” as the main culprits of disrupting regional order.According to him, China is ready to work with each ASEAN country in the interest of establishing a common market and achieving sustainable development. The Prime Minister stated that China and Southeast Asian countries are opening up to each other, and this process inevitably contributes to mutual prosperity, which will have a positive impact on the entire world. Notably, in 2023, the trade turnover between China and ASEAN countries exceeded 900 billion USD for the second consecutive year, and has nearly doubled over the past 10 years. The greatest activity is observed in developing relations with Vietnam and Malaysia, which together account for 230 and 191 billion USD, respectively. This means that today, Southeast Asian countries are collectively a more important partner for Beijing (in terms of volume) than the United States or the European Union.It is not surprising that at the events within the framework of the ASEAN Summit, including numerous bilateral meetings, the focus was on mutually beneficial cooperation, including issues related to further removing barriers and optimizing transport routes. Li Keqiang's statement at the 27th China-ASEAN Summit regarding the update of the Free Trade Agreement with the Association highlights the clear dominance of the economic component of cooperation over security issues, ideological differences, and other disagreements. Of course, there are opinions that Laos, in its capacity as chair, deliberately separated political issues from economic ones, but what is wrong with that?Only Philippine President F. Marcos Jr. was left alone, accusing the Chinese Coast Guard of reckless and unjustified pressure in the «exclusive economic zone». This is despite the fact that in July, an agreement was reached allowing the Philippines to deliver supplies to the “Sierra Madre” ship, which had been intentionally grounded 10 years ago at the Ayungin Shoal as a forward post for a Marine Corps unit.Professionally and SafelyToday, the South China Sea (SCS) is home to some of the busiest maritime communication routes. At least 500,000 vessels pass through the region each year, accounting for approximately 40% of global cargo traffic, and more than a million civilian flights cross the airspace above the sea annually. This high intensity of exchanges increases the importance of ensuring the safety of transport amidst unresolved disputes over the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, the ownership of parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the escalation of US-China geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Formally, the multilateral dispute over the islands and maritime areas between ASEAN member states and China remains unresolved.In September, the Beijing-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative published a report on the situation in the region. The authors of the document note that in recent years, the United States has pursued an offensive strategy to contain China, primarily using the “instability factor” in the South China Sea to escalate the multilateral dispute and fuel anti-China sentiments. Washington has also encouraged territorial claims by ASEAN countries against China, based on its own interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the concept of a “rules-based order”. So far, these flare-ups of claims against Beijing, which are sometimes accompanied by incidents between coast guard vessels, have not resulted in significant disruptions to freedom of navigation and air traffic. Moreover, China notes that the majority of the contacts have been “professional and safe”. Undoubtedly, in the event of increased tensions—such as more active actions by the air force, navy, and coast guards of various countries toward Chinese aircraft and vessels—logistical routes would need to be reorganized, which could lead to significant losses not only for China but for the entire regional economy. However, despite attempts by the US and its allies to assign special geopolitical significance to the situation in Southeast Asia, the situation remains manageable. As a result, Beijing still believes that peaceful resolution is possible.China Daily cites the opinion of specialists from the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), who believe that, in terms of ensuring the stability of international trade flows, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not under threat. However, in the military dimension, instability is growing, primarily due to excessive US interference.[1] The Institute argues that American activities, which involve sending military ships and aircraft to demonstrate power, only provoke disputes over sovereignty and borders. Such actions create a dangerous misconception among the leadership of several countries that Washington will intervene if necessary to contain China's expansion, thus assisting in resolving the dispute through pressure. The demonization and constant condemnation of China have already negatively affected bilateral relations with the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which requires significant diplomatic efforts from the Chinese leadership to normalize relations.Military activity is noticeably increasing in Southeast Asia, involving both regional and non-regional states. In addition to the United States, countries such as Japan, Australia, and European NATO members — Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands — are also becoming involved. In total, the US Navy conducts over 1,600 ship hours annually in the region, with at least 3,000 additional ship hours contributed by auxiliary forces. In the airspace above the South China Sea, approximately 30,000 sorties by combat aircraft and helicopters were recorded in 2023, a third of which involved non-regional states, with no fewer than 7,800 sorties conducted by the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.At CIIS, it is believed that through military actions, Washington is “inflating” its own importance in ensuring freedom of navigation, despite the fact that the US has no merit in this — China itself does not hinder shipping and views patrol and training missions from other countries with understanding. However, joint coast guard exercises between the two most outspoken opponents of China's activities in the South China Sea (the Philippines and Vietnam), as well as “ASEAN-wide” naval maneuvers, initiated by Indonesia, have attracted the attention of the PLA command. The main troublemaker in the region, according to Beijing, is the United States, which effectively ignores the “rules” it established for the safe passage of ships, vessels, and aircraft, constantly maintaining a military presence in the region where the greatest threat actually comes from US military forces. These actions are seen as an attempt to maintain hegemony in the face of “strategic retreat” and to push regional countries away from expanding cooperation with China by artificially creating an unsettled atmosphere and undermining multilateral confidence-building measures.The Chinese leadership's course of separating trade, economic, and investment cooperation from territorial disputes is generally understood by Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore, which claim parts of the Spratly Islands. However, it has also become a target for criticism from radical circles in these countries, clearly incited by Washington. As negotiations have shown, China and Southeast Asian countries are capable of independently developing mutually acceptable rules of action in the South China Sea, based on international law principles and taking into account each other's interests and concerns. The main idea is to establish direct dialogue in any disputed situation, maintain a constant consultation mechanism, preserve constructive negotiations, and adhere to the principle of peaceful resolution.ASEAN countries clearly do not want confrontation with Beijing, but they are in urgent need of a reliable system for peacefully managing any activities in the waters and on the continental shelf, which still needs to be developed together, ensuring guarantees of unhindered access for exploitation. Peace and cooperation in the South China Sea are inseparable, and collective responsibility for security will invariably contribute to the development of multidimensional ties, further increase trade volume, and lead to the emergence of the Sea of Cooperation on the world map.Reference1. Jiang, Chenglong. South China Sea disputes still ‘manageable’. China Daily. September 28-29, 2024. P. 2.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russian President Vladimir Putin last week hosted the BRICS summit, where Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia became official partner members – the first step toward full membership.  Putin had two main goals at the summit, where he tried to build up more international support for Russia against the backdrop of its invasion of Ukraine. First, he wanted to convey that Moscow is far from isolated on the world stage despite being targeted by United States-led sanctions, and that some of the largest economies don’t see the war in Ukraine as an impediment to closer ties with Russia.  Second, Putin was trying to build up consensus to create an alternative to the U.S. dollar-led trading order, which has made Russia and a host of other countries, including Iran, vulnerable to sanctions from the West. Putin made considerable progress on the first goal, but far less with the second one.  The four Southeast Asian states help explain why this is the case. Multipolar? Although Russia’s trampling of international law and use of military force to change borders sets a dangerous precedent for the countries of Southeast Asia, most states in the region see Russia as the path to a multipolar global order. And for Southeast Asian states that are always trapped in an increasingly zero-sum competition between Washington and Beijing, Moscow presents itself as a guardian of multipolarity. To them, it is a model for standing up to the West, or at least charting a more independent foreign policy.  For countries, whose foreign policy is largely transactional, pursuing ties with Russia increasingly makes sense.  Indonesia – arguably, the country in the region that is most protective of its sovereignty – has repeatedly voted against Russia at the United Nations, but barely spoken of Russia’s invasion.  Former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo hosted foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and met with Putin. But his Russia policy was extremely unprincipled and transactional. Russia has now supplanted Ukraine as Indonesia’s largest source for wheat imports. The country also is a major importer of oil from Russia, which has an internationally imposed price cap and sells below market rates. Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s new president, is set to continue this policy. Before his inauguration, he met with Putin and Prabowo’s foreign minister, Sugiono, made clear at the BRICS summit that Indonesia was seeking full membership in the grouping founded by Brazil, Russia, India and China. While Jokowi cared little about foreign policy, Prabowo seeks to assert Indonesia on the world stage with a much more active international policy and clout commensurate with its economic size. Russia is key to realizing this ambition. While Malaysia voted against Russia in two U.N. votes, its policy now is shaped by the conflict in Gaza, and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s seething anger towards the United States for its support of Israel.  Foreign corporations have recently pledged over U.S. $6 billion in investment to Malaysia’s semiconductor industry, one of the world’s largest.  Malaysia has angered Washington by repeatedly offering to sell semiconductors to sanctioned countries, including Russia and Iran. Anwar bristles at the unilateral imposition of U.S. sanctions on what he deems is a sovereign right to conduct foreign trade. Anwar views BRICS as not only a hedge against Western sanctions, but also as an alternative source of capital. Vietnam’s relations with Russia are long-standing and deep, and should be seen as part of its studiously neutral “bamboo diplomacy.” Vietnam voted with Russia in two U.N. votes, and abstained in a third. In July, Hanoi hosted Putin for a brief state visit.  Russia remains essential to Vietnamese security. Roughly 80% of its existing arsenal is Russian-made. While Vietnam seeks to diversify its supply chain, that will be difficult to do quickly.  The People’s Army leadership is close to Moscow. Its military is familiar with Russian equipment and produces many spare parts. Russia also allows licensed production of key weapon systems. In 2023, Moscow and Hanoi concluded an agreement to use proceeds from a Vietnamese investment in Siberian oil to fund the next generation of weapons. This alternative payment system was established to evade U.S. dollar transactions and thus Washington’s ability to impose sanctions. Thailand’s motivation in becoming a BRICS partner state has more to do with geopolitics than anything else.  A U.S. treaty ally, Thailand has been angered by Washington’s repeated imposition of sanctions as a result of military intervention in politics, including coups in 2006 and 2014.  China tried to fill that vacuum by maintaining close ties to the military leadership and increasing arms sales. Thailand feels caught between a rock and a hard place.  De-dollarization doubts Putin’s second goal, of de-dollarization, was far more divisive at the BRICS summit.  Luckily for the four Southeast Asian states, which depend so much on trade with the United States and which have no interest in creating a dollar alternative, they had India to hide behind.  Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar firmly rejected Moscow’s de-dollarization agenda and made clear that India would continue to settle the majority of its trade in U.S. dollars. That was all the cover the Southeast Asian states needed. In sum, Jakarta, Putrajaya, Hanoi, and Bangkok are not seeking to upend the U.S.-led liberal international order through BRICS. They describe the grouping not as an “either-or” but an “and.”  A distant war For Southeast Asia, the war in Europe is far away. And the countries remain in deep denial about the international legal precedent being set or what Russian success in achieving its war aims would mean for global security. But Putin’s confidence presupposes the economic realities. While Russia has seemingly defied international sanctions and there’s still positive economic growth, expected to be 3.6% for 2024, this is now a war economy. Foreign investment has fled and is unlikely to return. More than 600,000 of Russia’s educated urban middle-class has emigrated in a massive brain drain.  Domestic production, meanwhile, is geared solely to support the war effort. Interest rates are now 21% to help counter the 13.4% inflation rate.  With an estimated 1,000 battlefield losses a day, and over 70,000 new hires in Russia’s primary defense contractor, Rostec, the labor market is tight. The IMF is predicting the Russian economy to finally feel the weight of prolonged sanctions and the war economy with GDP expected to fall to 1.3% and 1.2% in 2025 and 2026, respectively.  And even Moscow’s arms exports to Southeast Asia – one of its primary instruments of statecraft – are in doubt, as domestic demand surges. Between 2022-2024, Moscow’s arms exports fell by 60%, compared to the previous three-year period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  While Moscow sees the BRICS as the key to a multipolar world that would erode the dominant position of the United States, his moves to weaken the dollar’s grip is too confrontational for many of the new partner states. Putin’s own bravado may be undermined by Russia’s isolated wartime economy and inability to be the security partner of choice for many developing states. Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском No mother wants to say goodbye to their child. However, with the looming threat of an attack from China, this fear threatens to become a reality for many Taiwanese mothers. There has been widespread speculation that People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping (習近平) has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to invade the island by 2027. Amid such predictions, Taiwan has completed numerous actions to increase its capabilities to resist a Chinese attack. Arguably, the island’s most notable single measure—and the most politically controversial—has been the extension of conscripted service for young men from four months to one year of training and military duty. [1]   Current Party Stances  When then-President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) announced the extension of conscripted service in December 2022, public opinion was divided regarding the presidential decision. In the January 2024 presidential election, the three contenders differed on their proposed policies for housing and economic issues, as well as relations with China, but all three—Lai Ching-te (賴清德) of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜) of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), and Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, (台民黨)—supported expanding conscripted military service. According to Dr. Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), acting deputy chief executive of the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, 國防安全研究院), a government funded think-tank in Taipei, the rare agreement reached by the three men reflects how the issue involves national security interests that transcend party politics.  In Taiwan, the conscription age is 18; however, deferments for higher education are very common. All males must serve in the military by age 36, when they can retire from the reserves. Conscription length has varied throughout administrations. It used to last between two and three years, until being shortened to one year in 2008. This was further cut to four months in 2012 under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who came to power in 2008 and followed a policy of pursuing warmer ties with China. In the years that followed, Taiwan’s conscripted service system has been widely criticized by commentators both inside Taiwan and abroad as ineffective in providing for Taiwan’s defense, leading the Tsai Administration to implement the one-year program.  Public Opinion and the Impacts of Conscription  Former conscripts have frequently expressed disappointment with their training and equipment. In a study conducted in September 2023, participants regarded military service as “useless” and a “waste of time.” Citing as evidence the lack of equipment and the long permitted periods of leisure time, past participants have complained about the military training camps. One participant who trained in the Taiwanese military between 2023 and 2024 stated that “I just sat under the AC with my phone, they [military personnel] didn’t train us with any specific weapons because they said to not waste bullets, so my friends and I just sat on a field most of the time.” The researchers similarly conducted an interview with Jack Huang, a 30 year old male who completed his four months of service over two semester breaks in university. According to this news report, Huang “felt [that] his shooting practice was outdated, like a holdover from the 1950s, and did not see how it would help him in modern warfare.”   These examples support what Dr. Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a research fellow and director of INDSR has found: namely, that psychological defense and troop morale are the top concerns regarding Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. If troop morale and confidence are down, how is a sovereign island supposed to maintain its basic defense capacity against China?   Polling data and public sentiment reflect a mix of opinions regarding the conscription extension. According to a survey by the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學), 58 percent of Taiwanese citizens support the extension of conscription to one year, viewing it as a necessary measure for national defense. However, 35 percent oppose the extension, citing particular concerns about its impact on young mens’ educational and career prospects. This division in opinion is evident across different demographics, with younger generations expressing more resistance to the policy compared to older generations.  There is indeed research that points to a one year conscription policy as being an impediment to educational and job prospects. In 2015, The IZA Journal of Labor Economics published a study on the long-term effects of peace-time military conscription on educational attainment and earnings in the Netherlands. Researchers found that compulsory military service decreased the proportion of Dutch university graduates by 1.5 percentage points (from a baseline of 12.3 per cent). Furthermore, the study found that being a conscript diminished the likelihood of earning a university degree by about four percentage points. The impact of military service on wages is also detrimental and long-term. The research concluded that “approximately 18 years after military service, we still find a negative effect of 3 to 4 per cent.” This quantifies some of the negative economic impacts of prolonged military conscription.   Flexibility in Service and Better Compensation for Conscripted Soldiers  Amid public reservations about the new policy, Taiwan’s government has implemented measures aimed to provide benefits after conscription. These include considering service time when calculating future benefits, and providing “flexible” educational options to facilitate the move into the economy for all conscripts. The Taipei Times reported in June 2023 that the Ministry of Education (教育部) has implemented a “3+1” program in which conscripts can complete college in three years and military duty in one year, allowing them to graduate alongside those who do not have to serve. To do this, institutions must raise the limit on the amount of credits that draftee students may obtain each semester. They should also provide summer courses and allow drafted individuals to attend classes at other universities. However, some have criticized the program: for example, KMT members of the legislature have stated that it would jeopardize students’ educational rights, and that conscripts would be “burning the candle at both ends” by balancing studies and conscription.  Conscription programs have also traditionally been known for the very low levels of pay given to junior conscripts—another point that has made the service period unpopular. The return to one-year service is part of a package of conscription reforms that includes increased pay for conscripted soldiers, in which the monthly compensation for a private will increase from NTD $6,510 to NTD $26,307 (USD $203 to USD $850)—still not a huge sum, but a four-fold increase over the standard pay level of the past.  Personal Interviews with Taiwanese Americans Affected by the Conscription Policy   Another issue of concern regarding conscription may be identified in the current attitudes of future Taiwanese-Americans conscripts residing in Taiwan. To investigate the trend, the author conducted a limited study in Taiwan in May 2024, in which interviews were conducted with five teen participants who have to serve upon turning 18. [2] In the interviews, the participants were asked about their views towards the policy. For the first subject pool, four of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, 4, and 5) stated that period of the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future career plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 3 stated in his interview, “Especially because the job market is so tight right now… Having to serve would make getting a job harder. I know I’m supposed to be mad at China, but I’m mad at Taiwan.”   This correlates to the fluctuation of public confidence in Taiwan’s military, according to data found by NCCU’s Election Study Center. In September of 2021, about 58 percent of respondents were confident or very confident in the military’s ability to defend Taiwan. However, confidence dropped to 54 percent in March 2022 and to 43 percent in March 2023—possibly due in part to negative news and cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare and negative news covers many areas: ranging from naval exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan and military aviation flights that steadily advance closer to Taiwan’s airspace, to bans of Taiwanese agricultural products, and the use of fringe political parties employed to spread pro-CCP (and anti-American) narratives.  Another theme commonly cited as a reason for their decreased level of patriotism was the effect of military service on plans for higher education. Three out of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, and 4) stated that the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future education plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 1 stated in his interview, “I’m just trying to live my life and go off to college abroad and never have to think about this problem or Taiwan ever again.” The frustration expressed corresponds to a decrease in patriotic connection: as Teen 4 stated in his interview, “I don’t like it. It inconveniences me and my plans for college. Plus, Taiwan doesn’t have anything to offer to my education.”   In a second subject pool, four parent participants (Parents 2, 3, 4, and 5) stated that the prolonged military service for boys born after 2005 caused concerns regarding future career plans. Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s employment opportunities, and cause them to lose valuable work experience. For example, Parent 2 stated in their interview, “We have to think about what the youth needs. A one-year training with weapons they will never be able to use or use well in their entire life is useless and bad for job prospects. I am disappointed in Taiwan and perhaps even a bit ashamed of my country.”    Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s educational development and cause them to lose valuable academic learning. This connects to March 2023 research in the publication Voice Tank, which found that “respondents’ confidence had dropped, for the first time below 50 percent (to 43 percent), and the proportion of those not confident exceeded that of those confident. While such a drop could be attributed to various factors and may only be temporary, we think it may be a result of cognitive warfare and negative news coverage of the ROC armed forces.” [3] This links to Parent 4’s questioning of Taiwan, asking, “What is wrong with Taiwan? Don’t they understand our future generation needs to study abroad for a better chance?” Parent 4 believes that the government is directly hindering her son’s academic development and future by implementing the policy, a reason for her declining level of patriotism.  Conclusion  The prolonged military conscription for males born after 2005 has caused clashing public opinions—and a decline in patriotic sentiment for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling DPP must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat. It becomes imperative for the ruling party to acknowledge that while conscription may appear on the surface to be cost-effective, simple budgetary accounting does not consider the potentially high opportunity cost that young people face when forced to serve, leading to long-term earnings losses and educational disruptions. These factors combine to reduce national income and economic growth. Additionally, for Taiwanese Americans and expatriates, conscription does little to foster unity; instead, it risks further weakening the relationship between overseas citizens and the state, whose voices still influence Taiwan’s future.  The main point: The prolonged military conscription for boys born after 2005 has caused public controversy and a decline in patriotism for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat.  References  [1] For previous discussions of the issues surrounding the extension of service to one year, see: John Dotson, “Taiwan’s ‘Military Force Restructuring Plan’ and the Extension of Conscripted Military Service,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 8, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/02/taiwan-military-force-restructuring-plan-and-the-extension-of-conscripted-military-service/; and John Dotson, “Taiwan Initiates Its New One-Year Military Conscription Program,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 7, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/02/taiwan-initiates-its-new-one-year-military-conscription-program/.  [2] The research was conducted for a duration of one year, under the supervision of Dr. Irish Farley. The study utilized a two-part, mixed methods approach that surveyed boys between of 14 and 17 living in Taiwan who are eligible for military conscription upon turning of age; followed by small group interviews with the teen participants, and parents of boys aged 14 through 17 living in Taiwan.  [3] For example, a report in Nihon Keizai Shimbun in February 2023 claimed that 90 percent of retired Taiwanese spies have worked with China. In early March, soldiers stationed in Kinmen defected to Xiamen, which led to the circulation of negative news about Taiwan’s military. See: Lee, Kuan-chen, Christina Chen, and Ying-Hsuan Chen. 2024. “Core Public Attitudes toward Defense and Security in Taiwan.” Taiwan Politics, January 2024, https://doi.org/10.58570/WRON8266. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ushering in a multipolar order requires a streamlined and coherent political agenda – not unfocused expansion.  The 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, concluded last week with the usual grand declaration of the group’s commitments, concerns and aspirations.  Many media headlines, particularly in Western countries, focused on how the summit and BRICS generally, symbolised Moscow’s ability to circumvent the fallout of sanctions by turning to the global south. In this way, BRICS is indirectly viewed as a threat to Western efforts to isolate Russia, weaken its power projection capabilities, and end its invasion of Ukraine.  Western governments and analysts often struggle to frame BRICS’s evolution beyond a binary, zero-sum narrative in which the group is a key geopolitical challenge to the Western-dominated international order. This interpretation places the forces of democracy and liberal political values in one camp and authoritarian governments in another, with certain developing countries caught in the middle, trying to play one side off the other for their own benefit.  There is some merit to these kinds of headlines. Russia and China are primarily major status-quo powers. Both have been permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members since its establishment. Moscow was the ‘other pole’ in the international order for most of the 20th century, a position Beijing is working towards. And the foreign policy goals of both place them in confrontation with the United States and its Western allies.  BRICS may be on a path towards unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  So, are these two countries in a position to champion the global south’s cause, and why haven’t more representative bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement played a more prominent role?  The preoccupation with Russia and China detracts from BRICS’s broader, underlying geopolitical project – the need for global south countries to reform and shape the international order’s future direction on their own terms.  These include greater representation and agency in global policy- and decision-making bodies and facilitating greater freedom to trade, invest and borrow money outside the Western-dominated financial system. They also include a more just and equitable global power balance that reflects modern realities.  In pursuing these aims, BRICS countries have made steady progress on developing a shared strategic agenda for increased cooperation across various policy domains.  The Kazan summit’s 32-page outcomes declaration covers almost everything from reforming the UNSC and Bretton Woods institutions to climate change, biodiversity and conservation. It also covers challenges from global crises, conflicts and terrorism and a suite of economic development, health, education, science and cultural exchange-related issues.  A group of democracies, autocracies and theocracies speaking with one voice on human rights and democracy is absurd.  The group’s ballooning cooperation agenda may indicate progress. But it could also signify the limits of its diverse members’ ability to agree on ‘hard’ political and security matters central to the core business of reforming the international order.  The expansion of BRICS’ substantive agenda and its membership dilutes its primary purpose and reinforces the binary, zero-sum Western narrative its members constantly try to shed.  Tangible, albeit gradual, progress on establishing intra-BRICS institutions and processes such as the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the cross-border payment system and its independent reinsurance capacity suggest that BRICS’ clout and credibility are growing.  These initiatives could enable members to pursue their international economic objectives without the constraints and transactional costs associated with traditional financial bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Ideally, this would improve their relative positions of global power and influence, and help deliver a more multipolar international order.  In contrast, deepening cooperation on big cat conservation, while important, doesn’t serve that purpose. Nor does facilitating youth exchanges on sports and healthy lifestyles or championing a BRICS alliance for folk dance. Including these kinds of initiatives in BRICS’ growing agenda detracts from its core objectives.  A streamlined agenda would divert attention from the contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring of BRICS’ members.  More worryingly, this suggests that BRICS’ diverse constellation of member states is pursuing the path of least resistance – expanding their cooperation in every direction, hoping something eventually sticks.  Instead of doubling down on hard strategic questions about a shared conception of multipolarity, and the steps necessary to reform global governance and security institutions, BRICS seems to be heading for greater expansion and formalisation. And with that come the risks, challenges and institutional dependencies that have led to the stagnation and ineffectiveness plaguing more established international organisations in recent years.  Perhaps the group’s core members recognise that they have very different ideas of what constitutes multipolarity. Russia (and China to an extent) envisage much more than global institutional reforms, focusing instead on reimagining international norms and core principles.  These differences are also reflected in BRICS’ expanding membership. It seems Russian and Chinese enthusiasm has been curbed by other founding members, who prefer a ‘partner country’ model for future growth. This contrasts with the full membership offers to Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2023. (Argentina’s new political administration declined, and the Saudis have remained non-committal.)    Most worrying, however, is BRICS’ preoccupation with promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no doubt that these terms are increasingly politicised and rife with double standards – among developing nations with mixed political systems and traditionally liberal, Western democracies. However, for BRICS to meaningfully champion normative values, its members must at least attempt to commit to common political governance systems in their own countries.  Having a group of partner nations composed of progressive constitutional democracies and closed repressive autocracies and theocracies attempting to speak with one voice on promoting human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms is absurd. It reeks of empty political rhetoric at best, and Orwellian double-speak at worst.  This again dilutes BRICS’ key messages, undermines its important core business, and detracts from the significant progress being made towards a common strategic agenda.  BRICS primary goal moving forward should be to trim the fat.  A streamlined annual working agenda would divert attention away from its individual member states' contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring. With a focus on addressing the international system’s failures, institutional reform and greater representation for global south countries in policy- and decision-making bodies could be prioritised.  This seems unlikely though, if this year’s summit is anything to go by. By following the path of least resistance, BRICS may be setting itself on a course towards increasing and unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  Only time will tell if certain members are willing to be more assertive and correct course before they are too far down a path impossible to pivot away from. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The problem of piracy has cast a shadow over the maritime areas of Southeast Asia for many centuries. The waters of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which hold tremendous economic significance for international trade, are particularly susceptible to pirate attacks. In the 2000s, ASEAN countries launched a comprehensive regional campaign to institutionalize measures for collective action against maritime piracy, and these measures proved to be effective. However, excessive concerns about intrusions into their sovereignty have led the Association's member states to "dilute" their efforts, resulting in a lack of true unity. This situation could result not only in losses for international trade but also in the loss of lives of ship crews.  Introduction to the History of Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia  Despite the long and dark history of the ugly and inhumane activities of the "hostis humani generis" [1], the romanticized image of pirates continues to captivate the public's imagination, thanks to numerous literary and cinematic works. In these portrayals, pirates appear as free-spirited men and women, living outside the reach of legal and state institutions, driven by daring adventures. However, it is not only European privateers, Somali groups, and the inhabitants of Morocco's "pirate" Republic of Salé who have left their grim mark on the history of maritime trade routes. For many centuries, pirates in Southeast Asia have attacked trading vessels passing through the Straits of Malacca. As early as the 13th century, the Chinese traveler Zhao Rukuo described how the powerful maritime kingdom of Srivijaya controlled regional waters [2], sending boats to attack ships that did not dock at its ports. Trading hubs in Malacca, Johor, and the Riau Archipelago flourished under the rule of Muslim sultanates, with the support of the Orang Laut community — “the sea people” — whose culture was inextricably linked to maritime activities [3]. It is no coincidence that in 1856, the Scotsman John Crawfurd, considered a leading British authority on Malay history and culture, noted that many Malay rulers viewed piracy as an "honest and regular source of their income" [4].  The Economic Significance of Maritime Waters in Southeast Asia  However, in the 21st century, maritime piracy remains one of the most pressing issues for Southeast Asian countries. According to data from the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center, from 1992 to 2006, Southeast Asia was the most "pirate-infested" region in the world. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the waters of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which are most susceptible to pirate attacks, are crucial for trade in the Asia-Pacific region. These straits also serve as "superhighways" of global shipping, with over 120,000 vessels passing through them annually. In 2000, 39% of Japan's foreign trade (equivalent to $260 billion) and 27% of China's foreign trade ($65.6 billion) were conducted through Southeast Asia's maritime routes [5]. Annually, the Malacca Strait facilitates trade valued at $3.5 trillion, accounting for two-thirds of China's maritime trade and 40% of Japan's maritime trade.  Despite significant improvements in the security of Southeast Asia's maritime routes over the past 20 years, thanks to the joint efforts of ASEAN countries and their partners, as well as the development of the shipping industry, the threat of maritime piracy remains a pressing issue. In this context, it is crucial to examine the existing initiatives aimed at combating maritime piracy in the region.  Overview of Projects, Agreements, and Initiatives  In 1999, at the ASEAN+3 Ministers' Conference under the concept of "Maintaining Peace in the World Ocean" Japan proposed an initiative to establish a permanent regional naval force based on national contingents. However, the project did not receive the necessary support. Five years later, in 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was signed, leading to the establishment of an Information Sharing Center to facilitate cooperation between stakeholders and coastal states in combating maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. These events marked the beginning of a new era of multilateral cooperation.  The activities of the Information Sharing Center (ISC) have been crucial in building operational links between member countries of the Agreement and coordination centers, enabling information exchange, incident reporting, and rapid response to threats. A key role in maintaining security in the region is played by the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, known as "INDOMALPHI" signed in 2017. Under this agreement, maritime security is ensured through coordinated surface patrols, combined aerial maritime patrols, and the operation of an Intelligence Exchange Group. These efforts collectively enhance regional capabilities to respond to piracy and strengthen the overall security of Southeast Asia's maritime routes.  Coordination efforts among Southeast Asian countries also take place through naval cooperation. For instance, the Singapore Navy works closely with Malaysian and Indonesian regional naval forces to combat maritime piracy through the Information Fusion Centre (IFC). The navies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam also actively participate in multilateral exercises conducted annually by the United States Navy. A key objective of these exercises is to strengthen regional measures against the threats of maritime terrorism and piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, as well as in the South China Sea.  As a result of these efforts, the number of ship hijackings for ransom significantly decreased between 2007 and 2022. Representatives of Indonesia's Ministry of Defense noted that in the first six months of 2023, not a single incident of ship hijacking was recorded, whereas, in 2017, 99 cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea were reported in the patrol zone. Experts also highlight the potential benefits of Japan and India joining the "INDOMALPHI" initiative, which could further enhance regional security efforts against piracy.  Challenges to Regional Unity in Combating Maritime Piracy  Despite significant successes in consolidating the efforts of Southeast Asian countries in combating maritime piracy, there are still “gaps” in the “united front” of interested ASEAN countries that hinder individual and collective initiatives. Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia have not ratified the 2004 Agreement and are not de jure participants in the Information Exchange Centre, although they participate in some events under its auspices. The Centre itself receives information on cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea from the coordination centers of the participating countries, which inevitably entails a time lag that may prove critical in the event of a threat to a ship and its crew. It is noted that an appropriate clarification of the mechanism of its work would be the obligation of ships to send information directly to the Centre, which would immediately transmit it to the relevant operational units of the participating countries responsible for deploying patrol vessels on site.  The Downside of the "ASEAN Way"  The Russian researchers note that while ASEAN is discussing the possibility of creating a unified navy to combat piracy, the approaches of the "ten" countries to the problem differ [7]. It is the absence of full-scale consolidated institutions that significantly undermines the successes already achieved and may provoke an escalation of the problem after the "lull" of 2000-2022. ASEAN's traditional rigid orientation towards the rejection of any supranational institutions and concern about maintaining national sovereignty may play a "dirty joke" on the Association's states, since the existence of multiple regional initiatives duplicating each other's functions and goals, as well as the fact that the Information Exchange Center does not have a real operational status, slow down progress. Finally, it should be borne in mind that at stake in this case is not only the stability of international economic turnover along the maritime trade routes of Southeast Asia, but also the lives and safety of ship crews, fishermen and sailors, whose professions are already associated with risk.  References  1. "Enemies of the Human Race" - author's note.  2. See in particular: Berezin E.O. History of Thailand M. 1973. 320 pages. p. 35.   3. There are conflicting views regarding the true role of the Orang Laut in maritime piracy. While some researchers portray their culture as inherently linked to piracy in the conventional sense, others argue that the "sea people" were driven to piracy due to the actions of British colonial authorities who controlled the port of Singapore. See on this: Barnard T.P. Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and Their Decline in History // Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. 80. No. 2. 2007. P. 33-49.  4. Amirell S.E. Pirates of Empire. Colonisation and Maritime Violence in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. 2019. 266 pp. P. 37.  5. Frécon E. The Resurgence of Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia. Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine. 2008. 131 pp. P. 72-73.  6. Paramonov O.G. "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Regional Perspective." // International Analytics. No. 1-2 (27-28), 2019, pp. 74-81, p. 77.  7. Paramonov O.G. "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Regional Perspective," p. 78.