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Abstract This paper analyzes, from Immanuel Wallerstein's Analysis of the World – System, an introduction, the emergence of the modern world – system, the permanence of the colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system from a decolonial approach. It examines how the center – periphery structure has determined the economic, political and epistemic dynamics at the global level. Through this approach we study how coloniality has influenced the construction of knowledge. It also analyzes the impact of this structure on the recognition of States and the negotiation of international treaties, showing how Western power has conditioned the legitimacy and autonomy of peripheral nations. It also addresses the persistence of the center-periphery logic in local relations, as well as in gender and racial inequality, highlighting the role of anti-systemic movements in the struggle against these structures. It concludes that, although colonial dynamics continue to operate through debt, extractivism and the imposition of political models, decolonial perspectives offer tools to make visible and resist them. Introduction This paper will analyze the dynamics of the current international system based on the work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System” by Immanuel Wallerstein. In it, Wallerstein (2005) argues that the modern capitalist world-system has structured the global order since the 16th century, consolidating a hierarchical division between the center and the periphery. This division has not only shaped economic and political dynamics but has also established patterns of domination and dependency that persist to this day. The colonial expansion of European powers not only guaranteed access to resources and markets but also legitimized a system of exploitation based on racism and the hierarchization of colonized peoples. The decolonial perspective of Walter Mignolo (2013) will be adopted, which posits that this is a political and epistemic project aimed at dismantling the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity. From this framework, the article will analyze how colonial logic continues to operate in the capitalist world-system through the economic and political subordination of the peripheries. It will also examine the impact of the colonial worldview on knowledge production during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as the reproduction of the center–periphery dynamic in the recognition of states during the 20th century and in the negotiation of international treaties during the 21st century. Likewise, it will address how this dynamic manifests not only internationally but also within local structures, perpetuating inequalities expressed in labor, gender, and racial relations today. This work seeks to provide a critical perspective on the persistence of colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system, emphasizing the need to rethink power structures from a decolonial perspective that makes visible and vindicates the subaltern voices that have been historically silenced. Development Colonial Logic in the Capitalist World-System In his work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System”, Wallerstein seeks to understand the structure and dynamics of the world-system, taking the 16th century as the starting point —a period when the conquests of the territories we now know as the Americas took place. The colonial period clearly illustrates the core–periphery dynamic (Wallerstein, 2005), as the Spanish, British, and Portuguese empires engaged in the extraction of resources from their colonies, while colonized peoples endured oppression and racism to which they would be condemned for centuries. This oppression brought significant benefits to the modern world-system, as it enabled massive capital accumulation — but exclusively in the core. This was because the colonial process built peripheral economies around the needs of the core, forcing them into subordination to the interests of the global market, generating dependency and underdevelopment. Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) argue that “[…] ethnicity was the inevitable cultural consequence of coloniality. It delineated the social boundaries corresponding to the division of labor” (p. 585). Due to the colonial period, the modern capitalist world-system laid its foundations and strengthened its market-based economic model through racism and hierarchization — circumstances that have legitimized the exploitation and domination of non-European peoples throughout history. Control over the resources of peripheral states by core states has endured to this day, along with the imposition of Western production and consumption models that perpetuate inequality. The colonial period’s greatest legacy remains systemic violence and subalternity. On this basis, it is important to analyze this work from a decolonial perspective. For Walter Mignolo (2013), “decoloniality is not a concept, but a practice and a political, epistemic, and ethical project aimed at disengaging from the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity” (p. 21). This perspective also draws on the notion of epistemic subalternity, which refers to the experiences and knowledge of colonized and subaltern peoples that are rendered invisible, devalued, or reduced to particular cases — without being considered an integral part of the world-system (Mora, 2008). Coloniality in the Construction of Knowledge At the end of the 18th century, the modern university emerged, dividing its studies into two faculties: sciences and humanities. In the 19th century, another division took place within the humanities, opening the space for the study of social sciences, which would later also be split — on one side, those leaning toward scientism, and on the other, toward the humanistic approach. This led to the creation of new disciplines: economics, political science, and sociology (Wallerstein, 2005). These new sciences built their worldview and knowledge construction from a Eurocentric and colonialist perspective, thus assigning labels to peoples different from their own. These new sciences categorized the study of the world’s peoples into three groups. First, civilized peoples — Western nations, considered as such because they believed their social and political organization systems were the most advanced. Second, the high civilizations — India, China, Persia, and the Arab world — classified in this way because they possessed writing, religion, language, and customs. They were regarded as civilized peoples but not modern, under the previously mentioned concept. This category gave rise to orientalist scholars, with a Eurocentric and exoticizing view. Finally, the so-called primitive peoples — those who, from the colonial perspective, lacked writing, religion, language, and customs. This perception of the “uncivilized other” was used to justify colonial processes in the periphery, which even today enable the reproduction of exploitative and racist practices. Segregation in the construction of knowledge, imbued with colonial and Eurocentric thought, is based on criticizing the behavior of these peoples and on what should be changed about them (Zapata, 2008). The Eurocentric conception asserts categorically that the modus vivendi of these peoples is not appropriate according to Western standards. Although this way of thinking has evolved over time, its essence remains the same and has led Western countries to grant themselves the power to change the way of life of these peoples through invasions, neocolonial processes, and violent interventions via military force or economic interference. The Center and the Periphery in the Recognition of States As previously mentioned, Europe established a correspondence between modernity and the West; this includes the institution of the nation-state as its derived product (Zapata, 2008). From the Eurocentric perspective, for civilizations to be considered nation-states, they must possess four characteristics: territory, population, government, and sovereignty. In Public International Law, sovereign states are the main subjects of international relations, and for a state to be recognized as such, it must be acknowledged by the majority of states that are part of the international system. The center–periphery concept operates both economically and politically, which can be observed when a new state seeks recognition from members of the international system. The recognition granted by a state from the center carries more weight than that from the periphery, since states in the center, with greater political and economic capacity, influence the decisions of their allies — both within the center and the periphery. This need for state recognition has been extremely beneficial for the modern capitalist world-system, as political and economic interdependence, along with the perpetuation of power in the countries of the center — particularly those belonging to the West — ensures that they act, whether in matters of state recognition, political agendas, or economic issues, entirely to their own advantage, disregarding the interests of “the other.” From a decolonial perspective, state recognition is a Western construct designed to maintain control over who meets the imposed criteria to belong to the Eurocentric international system. These criteria clearly do not align with the social organization of all non-Western civilizations but were conceived in such a way as to subordinate them to the needs of the world-system, which inevitably serves the interests of Western core states. This can be exemplified by the case of Taiwan. In 1971, the Kuomintang lost recognition from the government of mainland China, and starting in 1985, Taiwan’s government sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with states that already recognized it and to develop relations with those that did not, with the aim of obtaining their approval (Connelly, 2014). Despite the passage of time, recognition of Taiwan as a state by core countries seems inconvenient for them, likely due to the ongoing political dispute between Taiwan and China. As a result, only 14 peripheral states recognize it as such. Despite this, the Northeast Asian country maintains unofficial relations with 47 states and the European Union, for purely economic reasons. The Modern Capitalist World-System in International Treaties It is worth mentioning that the idea of the center–periphery permeates the negotiation of international agreements. As mentioned earlier, the so-called “primitive peoples” were civilizations that, from the Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, lacked writing, religion, languages, or customs. This idea persisted into the 20th century, as reflected in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which in Chapter II, Article 38, states that “the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: […] the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (UN, 1945). The Eurocentric conception of a civilized nation in the postwar period was based on the type of government existing in each state. Thus, countries without a democratic political system were not considered civilized nations. This conception forced nations not to determine their own system of government, but rather to adhere to the one imposed by the Western international system in order to be accepted, disregarding their customs and traditions. A more current example of the imposition of Eurocentric ideas on systems of government is the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Mexico in 2000. Ratification of the trade agreement was conditioned on what they called the “democratic clause.” The agreement was not ratified by the Italian government until July 3 of that year, when the presidential elections resulted in the victory of Vicente Fox (Villegas, 2001). On the same day, the European Commission’s spokesperson, Gunnar Wiegand, said in his press release: “A historic vote has taken place in Mexico. The Commission congratulates the Mexican people for exercising their democratic rights in such a mature and exemplary manner” (Caracol Radio, 2000). The spokesperson’s mention of the Mexican people’s maturity refers to the notion that, in the past, the exercise of democracy had not possessed this quality — an observation made from a paternalistic and Eurocentric perspective. Had the election results been different, Mexico could have faced the possibility of the European Union “imposing sanctions as a reaction to the verification of interruptions in democratic processes, which, in addition to affecting development, constitute a threat to international peace and security” (Cordero Galdós, 2002, p. 128). The criticism of the imposition of the “democratic clause” centers on the recurring practice of requiring peripheral states to adapt to the political ideologies and economic needs of the core. The Reproduction of the Center–Periphery Dynamic at the Local Level As mentioned in the development of this work, the effects of colonialism persist across all systems and subsystems through the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, the latter of which will be addressed later. This is manifested in global inequalities, the exploitation of natural resources in peripheral countries, and the persistence of racist and Eurocentric power structures. From Wallerstein’s perspective, the world-system is a historical structure which, although in constant transformation, reproduces power relations and inequalities over time through the domination of the core and the exploitation of the peripheries (Wallerstein, 2005). Thus, the world-system has evolved in several ways; one of these is the introduction of the term semi-periphery into the analysis. During the colonial period, there were only core and peripheral nations. Over the centuries, however, semi-peripheral states have emerged — nations that not only extract raw materials or engage in manufacturing but also have the capacity to produce cutting-edge technology (Wallerstein, 2005). This positions them in a more privileged place than peripheral countries in the international system. Yet, despite appearing to have overcome the systemic oppression that once kept them in the periphery, the colonial mindset within their institutions perpetuates their subordination to the core. Good examples of semi-peripheral states in Latin America are Mexico and Brazil. Both countries were victims of the exploitation and systemic violence of colonialism. This shaped the development of their societies and economies for centuries. Even after achieving independence and building productive and economic systems that placed them in the semi-periphery, their economic progress was built on a legacy of oppression and racism that continues to reproduce the abuses described. In this way, the concept of core and periphery permeates social and family subsystems. This can be observed in labor relations, where capitalists depend on the core–periphery or superior–subordinate relationship to sustain the production model. It is also evident in social relations, which Wallerstein refers to as anti-systemic movements. Society perpetuates the core–periphery principle by placing women and racialized communities in the periphery, while men — especially white men with power — occupy the core. Anti-systemic movements paved the way for the struggle against these inequalities, giving rise, for example, to feminist and Indigenous movements. These have led to the development of theoretical perspectives such as decolonial feminism, which adds analytical variables to the decolonial perspective. According to Yuderkys Espinosa, it emerges from “[…] a subaltern, non-hegemonic voice […] anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist. […] Its aim is to question and oppose an imperial and racist rationale” (Barroso, 2014, p. 2). Conclusions The modern capitalist world-system has managed to sustain and expand itself thanks to colonial structures that, far from disappearing with decolonization processes, have mutated and perpetuated dynamics of domination and dependence. As discussed, the core–periphery logic has been key to the organization of the international system, not only in economic terms but also in the construction of knowledge, the legitimization of states, the negotiation of international agreements, and the imposition of political and social models from Western hegemony. The colonial legacy remains in the structural subordination of peripheral economies to the interests of the core, the imposition of international norms that favor core countries, and the persistence of racialized and gender-based inequalities within peripheral states themselves. This scheme has not only ensured capital accumulation in the core but has also limited the self-determination of historically colonized peoples, while normalizing their exclusion from political, economic, and epistemic spheres. At the international level, neocolonialism operates through mechanisms such as external debt, unequal trade agreements, and political interference in the internal affairs of peripheral states. In addition, extractivism and territorial dispossession continue to reproduce colonial logics, affecting both peripheral countries and Indigenous communities as well as other historically marginalized groups. In this sense, the modern capitalist world-system not only perpetuates economic exploitation but also reinforces power structures based on racism, sexism, and subalternity. However, as decolonial perspectives point out, the coloniality of power is not an immutable phenomenon. This approach questions the structures of power and knowledge inherited from colonization, seeking to deconstruct Eurocentric discourses and make visible the voices and experiences of the subaltern. Anti-systemic movements have sought to challenge these structures, reclaiming the agency of subaltern peoples and promoting the construction of alternatives that confront the colonial matrix of power. Particularly, decolonial feminism has emerged as a key critique of the intersection between patriarchy and coloniality, showing how women — especially racialized women — have been relegated to the periphery of the system. Thus, analyzing the world-system from a decolonial perspective allows us not only to understand the continuity of structures of domination but also to recognize the spaces of resistance and contestation that emerge within it. In conclusion, the decolonial perspective enables us to rethink the modern world-system from a critical standpoint, recognizing structural inequalities and the need to transform the power dynamics that perpetuate the domination of the core over the periphery. Decolonialism makes it possible to redefine notions of progress, development, and modernity from a perspective free from colonial stereotypes and hierarchies, recognizing the diversity of knowledge and worldviews of Indigenous peoples. It seeks to decentralize power by rethinking and decolonizing power relations between the core and the periphery, between the state and local communities, aiming for a more equitable distribution of resources and benefits. 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Abstract The paper considers the question of location in the development and governance of artificial intelligence in Africa. The discussion draws from ideas on locational advantage and the mix of factors that affect inequalities in AI development and how this influences the ability that countries have to shape AI norms, cultures and governance. It analyses policy documents and internet databases to highlight Africa’s place in AI development, the continent’s governance approach and the symbiotic relationship that explains the influence of advanced countries and tech corporations in the AI landscape. Based on this, it proposes the concept of the ‘politics of locationality’ to extend our understanding of how the power resident in AI systems is associated with their primary situatedness and how this reality, in turn, (re)produces imbalances and unequal opportunities for Africa in AI development and governance. It concludes with implications for Africa’s contribution to global AI cultures, design and governance at this time of pressing need for well-balanced AI policies. KeywordsAI governance, culture, ethics, inequality, locational advantage, politics of locationality Introduction The race for supremacy in AI development and governance has gathered pace among leading countries such as the US, European nations and China (Bradford, 2023). Many of the largest AI companies and models trace their origins to these countries and benefit from massive investments in computing, data and skills (Moorosi, 2024). By contrast, African countries mainly boast of AI startup ecosystems coordinated by technology hubs such as Kenya’s ‘Silicon Savannah’ (Eke et al., 2023) and African journalists have had to grapple with tools like ChatGPT, given the relevance of generative AI for media production (Gondwe, 2023). Although many of these experiences show Africa’s creative potential in the AI sector, as well as its growing market for AI technologies and tools (Okolo et al., 2023), there remain complex historical, cultural, political, legal, economic, labour and data factors that the continent faces in its drive towards AI development and governance. This mix of factors is a subject that scholars have considered to varying degrees (Muldoon and Wu, 2023; Png, 2022). I build on this by examining the question of locationality within that mix and how locationality helps to explain aspects of the symbiotic relationship between countries and platforms in shaping AI design and governance principles within a global context. My discussion sits at the intersection of critical media studies (Ott and Mack, 2014), digital geopolitics (Wong, 2021) and AI studies (Crawford, 2021), seeking to demonstrate why AI, understood as a political tool for constructing knowledge and generating maps of meaning, should be situated. This focus on situatedness further ties into studies on economic geography and locational advantage (Dunning, 1998; Iammarino and McCann, 2013), which explain why multinationals such as AI companies are more likely to choose certain locations as headquarters and how these locations are better placed to acquire greater leverage and power. It relates to the understanding that the location where a technology company is headquartered has considerable influence to shape that company’s decisions (Sargsyan, 2016), presupposing that advanced AI development confers locational advantage on the place where this development is primarily domiciled, making it a locus of power in shaping global AI ethics, norms and governance. This presupposition is what I interrogate by asking: How do issues around the location of AI development explain the impact that African countries have to shape AI design, cultures and governance in light of inequalities between advanced nations and the majority world? This question is crucial as it indicates which countries are better positioned as key definers of AI at a time when the design, norms, ethics, principles and governance of the technology are being concretised. It also leads to my argument on what I call the ‘politics of locationality’ as a concept to advance our understanding of how the primary situatedness of leading AI companies in advanced locations (such as the Global North) reveals inequalities in AI development and governance in the majority world. In this paper, advanced locations refer to the US, Europe and China – following Bradford’s (2023) description of them as the three digital empires, having the capacity not only to define the digital ecosystem in line with their cultures and priorities, but also shape the digital values of other countries that fall under their influence. The discussion that follows flows through a review of the literature, my methodology and findings, culminating in my argument on the politics of locationality. Locationality and the mix of factors in AI development Across the AI landscape, ethical principles are vital because they guide AI development, design and governance (Tidjon and Khomh, 2022). In Africa, some of the ethical and cultural values that researchers contend should guide AI development include ubuntu (communal humaneness), humanism and indigenous knowledge (Nayebare, 2019; Mhlambi and Tiribelli, 2023). Not enough of this has been realised, however, given that AI technologies on the continent remain a largely Western import (Eke et al., 2023). Nonetheless, home-grown African AI systems have been on the rise, evident in the creation of technology centres such as Kenya’s ‘Silicon Savannah’, Ethiopia’s ‘Sheba Valley’ and Nigeria’s ‘Yabacon Valley’ (Eke et al., 2023). The centres serve as ecosystems that provide leverage for AI startups that are supported by communities such as Data Science Nigeria and Deep Learning Indaba (Nuwer, 2024). Okolo et al. (2023) found that there are at least 102 of these startups in Africa. But they face challenges ranging from limited infrastructure for energy and computing-intensive technology and lack of expertise (Nuwer, 2024). These challenges presuppose that AI development on the continent is likely to lag behind global advancements – with implications for the influence that the continent has as a place from which AI norms, ethics and governance are shaped. The US remains a dominant player in shaping AI ethics and governance. Chan et al. (2021), for instance, observe that the US is predominant in the AI development space, in line with its economic and cultural dominance and China follows closely behind, pointing to a US-China tech war in digital geopolitics (Wong, 2021). China, in particular, has exported AI facial recognition and smart city technologies to Africa, serving as the continent’s largest foreign ICT investor (Lin, 2024), with increasing access to African datasets (Okolo et al., 2023) – a worrying trend. Also, investments in AI still concentrate in countries like the US and China, with only 1% of global venture capital flows into Africa (Moorosi, 2024). This means profits from AI development are typically reinvested in the leading countries, creating further disparities between them and the majority world (Chan et al., 2021). Although major tech companies (e.g. Google and Microsoft) have invested in Africa by establishing AI labs in African countries, Chan et al. (2021) note that it is common for staff working in these labs to be based in advanced countries. These major AI companies have also diversified their locational presence by outsourcing some operations through an international division of labour across Africa. But they tend to do so in exploitative ways such as hiring low-wage data annotators, highlighting the continent’s locational disadvantage (Ludec et al., 2023). What this points to is the relation of labour and capital, which further underscores Muldoon and Wu’s (2023) description of the global AI supply chain as colonial, since it is actualised through an international division of digital labour that extracts value from labour in the majority world for the benefit of Western technological companies. It also reinforces hegemonic knowledge production through Western values and knowledge that marginalise non-Western alternatives (Muldoon and Wu, 2023). This hegemonic knowledge production leads to questions on the role of the human in the machine, since AI is not based on abstract models, but is embedded in human agency and cultural values (Natale and Guzman, 2022). Additionally, this hegemonic knowledge production not only ties into discourses on power in critical media studies (Ott and Mack, 2014), but also on the relevance of AI for creative and cultural work (Lee, 2022) – as seen in the use of ChatGPT, which, African journalists say, is built on a poor and non-representative African corpus and perpetuates stereotypes of the continent (Gondwe, 2023). What the foregoing, therefore, indicates are the mix of historical, technological, economic, labour and cultural factors that underpin AI development and deployment in Africa’s locational context, with implications for governance outcomes. AI governance and digital regulation in Africa In terms of governance, state actors in Africa have drawn up policy and legal instruments at local levels and are only just taking part in global multistakeholder conversations. Examples of these multistakeholder fora include the AI Governance Alliance of the World Economic Forum (2025), where three African countries (Rwanda, South Africa and Kenya) are represented and the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (2025), where Senegal is the only African country. It is unclear what influence African countries wield in multistakeholder bodies like these, but the indication is that inclusion is usually performative and exists for ‘virtue signalling and promotional purposes’ (Png, 2022: para. 17). At continental and regional levels, Plantinga et al. (2024) observe that African countries have increasingly turned towards AI strategies, but without considering how feasible these are to implement and their suitability to local contexts. There are also data localisation laws, which stipulate that data be stored and processed in the location where they are generated, with restrictions on data transfers across borders (Giovane et al., 2023). These laws, which point to the geographical relevance of data, have been introduced by at least 16 African countries, including Mauritius, Lesotho and Ivory Coast; they are also present in legal instruments on data protection, financial transactions, cybersecurity and telecommunications in several countries across the continent (CIPESA, 2022). Locationality is therefore the underlying principle in data localisation, underscoring the importance of data for AI control and governance. Sargsyan (2016: 2224), for instance, notes: ‘countries that host intermediaries’ data centres and offices have more opportunities to exercise influence over companies’ decisions and claim jurisdiction over data stored in their territory.’ What is crucial here is the presence of data centres which is vital for AI production, and African countries face challenges in relation to data, since the continent’s data centre landscape is nascent although growing (DCByte, 2023). When it comes to enforcement, only a few countries have been successful in imposing local laws and claiming jurisdiction over data stored in data centres, the most successful being the US (Sargsyan, 2016: 2231). This underscores the difficulties of AI policy implementation that African governments face, since, as CIPESA (2022) notes, there is barely any evidence that data localisation laws have been enforced in Africa. Where implementation has been more practicable is in the imposition of internet taxes on users in countries like Guinea, Benin, Uganda and Zimbabwe (Bergére, 2019). The infrastructure platforms through which governments enforce the taxes are local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and telecommunication providers (Bergére, 2019). The same process finds expression in the imposition of internet bans in Africa – enforcement targets usage disruption and is done through local ISPs (Parks and Thompson, 2020). African countries ordinarily enjoy a positive balance of power in comparison with local ISPs. Also, the fact that major tech and AI companies can be banned from operating or delivering services in any African country points to the power that the state has to impose controls as a means of last resort. Users can also deploy collective action against AI companies (Fratini and Musiani, 2024). All these highlight the diverse ways in which power and governance are contested at local levels but say little about the place that Africa holds in contributing to and shaping AI ethics, governance and worldviews in the global sense. If, as Sargsyan (2016) notes, the location where a technology company is headquartered has significant powers to influence the decisions of the technology company, then what does Africa’s record in AI development imply for its ability to shape AI design, ethics, cultures and governance? This question is what I aim to answer in interrogating the relevance of the politics of locationality for AI in Africa. Method To this end, I draw from a methodological approach informed by textual analysis of AI policy documents and critical analysis of internet databases containing the location associated with AI companies/models. For the AI policy documents, I focussed on three domains. The first domain concerned the AI policies of African countries, where I selected the AI Strategies of four countries: Mauritius (Mauritius AI Strategy, 2018), Egypt (Egypt AI Strategy, 2021), Rwanda (Rwandan National AI Policy, 2022) and Nigeria [draft] (Nigerian AI Strategy, 2024), representing South, North, East and West Africa respectively. I also reviewed the African Union’s (2024) AI Strategy. Mauritius, Egypt and Rwanda are particularly relevant because they are the first three countries to introduce AI strategies in Africa. I chose AI strategies because they comprise one of the major emphases for policymakers on the continent (Maslej et al., 2024). I analyse the strategies based on themes, which I developed after reviewing and coding the texts. The second domain included the AI policies of leading global players in AI: the US, EU and China. Here, my analysis aimed to ascertain whether these policies mandate AI firms to develop their technologies in line with principles and standards upheld by the leading countries. The third domain included the policies of some of the largest AI companies/models: OpenAI and Gemini (for the US), Darktrace (for the UK) and UBTECH and Qwen (for China). My aim was to examine whether these AI companies/models subject their policies and practices to the countries or places where they are headquartered. For the database searches, I accessed and reviewed the following to ascertain the location of AI companies globally: Datamation (see Jungco, 2024), AI Directory (2024) and the Companies Market Capitalisation (2024). I also drew from sources such as Epoch AI (2024), the Emerging Technology Observatory’s (2024) AI Country Activity Tracker and the AI Index Report (Maslej et al., 2024). Overall, my goal was to assess Africa’s place in AI development in comparison with the leading countries in AI before considering the leverage that locationality affords to nations when it comes to AI design, ethics and governance – the underlying premise for the politics of locationality. Locational advantage and AI development in Africa While acknowledging the mix of factors that comprise AI development, my findings focus on locationality by considering the number of AI companies headquartered in Africa and elsewhere. Here, I found that most AI companies are headquartered in advanced countries, with many of the largest AI companies being in the US. These are companies that have significant capitalisation as listed on the Companies Market Cap to scale globally and invest in AI infrastructure and models that fundamentally impact societies. Jungco’s (2024) review shows that the overwhelming majority (80%) of these companies are based in the US (81 out of 101 companies). The closest to this was the UK, which had eight companies out of 101. India and Canada had three each; China and Germany had two each; and Israel and Hong Kong had one each. The same is true for data compiled by AI Directory (2024) and the Companies Market Capitalisation (2024). I compiled the three listings (Jungco, 2024; AI Directory and the Companies Market Cap) and removed duplicates. The combined list comprised 234 of the largest AI companies (see Table 1), ranging from Apple valued at $3.3 trillion to FR8Tech valued at $2.1 million. The outcome shows that at 73%, the US is the undoubted leader. It is followed by India (5.98%), the UK (5.56%), China (2.99%) and Canada (2.56%). There is no African country on the list.   There is a similar outcome for data on notable AI models, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Alibaba’s Qwen and Meta’s Llama. Table 2 shows that, when isolating for AI models owned by organisations or entities that come from only one country, two-thirds (67.7%) of these notable AI models are traceable to the US. Again, no other country comes close; the closest countries are the UK, China, Canada and Germany. Maslej et al. (2024), in the AI Index, also show that foundation AI models, which are the basis for generative AI, are far more prevalent in the US. Again, there are no entries for Africa.   If Africa does not serve as a headquarter for the largest AI companies or models, what then can be said about AI startups? To answer this, I consulted the 2024 AI Country Activity Tracker, which presents data on the number of approved AI patents based on country locations, including patents for AI startups. The data, presented in Table 3, show that Africa is only ahead of the Middle East; even at this, Africa accounts for only 0.000006% or 157 of the 250,224 AI patents captured in the tracker. And only three African countries account for the continent’s figures: South Africa (139 patents), Morocco (17 patents) and Kenya (1 patent). Although this figure of 157 is slightly more than the 102 startups that Okolo et al. (2023) provided, the conclusions are similar: Africa has some way to go in making up for AI development in the future.   All these show that although Africa provides labour and data for AI companies globally and is poised to be a significant market as internet connectivity spreads (Access Partnership, 2024), it barely serves as a headquarter for AI companies, particularly the largest ones. This underscores Africa’s nascent standing in AI development and suggests that African countries will likely be constrained in their ability to shape wider AI ethics, cultures and governance. It perhaps explains why no African country has passed AI legislation into law (although some attempts are underway), with focus instead on AI task forces, national policies and strategies (Maslej et al., 2024). I turn next to the analysis of these strategies to examine the policy approach to AI development and governance in Africa. Analysing AI strategies in Africa My analysis of the AI strategies/policies of Mauritius, Egypt, Rwanda, Nigeria and the AU shows that they coalesce around four main themes: AI adoption for economic growth, AI partnership and collaboration, improving AI ethics and governance and strengthening local AI capacity. The focus on AI for economic growth is understandable, given that AI’s potential for economic transformation is a major attraction. This focus, which is present in all the strategies, highlights how AI can enhance economic development in various sectors (see in particular, the Mauritian Strategy). But more important, in the context of my discussion, are the inequalities in international cooperation and multistakeholder governance that the strategies point towards. To establish this, I refer to Pillar Two of the Nigerian AI Strategy, which underscores the need for partnership and collaboration among local and international stakeholders to leverage AI expertise and resources. The Rwandan AI Policy also recommends international partnerships and collaboration in AI development. But collaborations, especially with international private actors, highlight the need to evaluate where the major partners come from. These partners can collaborate with African countries and invest in AI, but they still operate primarily by rules set in their home countries, even if they also subscribe to laws in subsidiary countries (I establish this point in the next section). The exception would be collaboration within the continent, as can be found in the Egyptian and AU Strategies. The third theme, which focusses on ethics and governance, acknowledges the risks of AI and the need to mitigate them. It considers the importance of having AI principles such as fairness, transparency and accountability (see the Nigerian Strategy). The AU Strategy also mentions the need to guard against bias and risks to African values, indigenous knowledge and cultural heritage. This is connected to the AU’s Agenda 2063, which has a media and culture mandate to support inclusive and ethical AI through values such as ubuntu. But the plan to address these risks, for the most part, points to multistakeholder governance. The Egyptian Strategy, for instance, seeks to ‘actively contribute to global efforts and playing an active role in AI in different international fora’ (Section 5.1). Rwanda’s Policy also intends to ‘actively contribute to shaping responsible AI principles and practices in international platforms’ (Key Policy Recommendation 14). Likewise, the AU Strategy promotes a ‘multi-tiered governance approach’ (Section 2.4.1). They highlight a move towards greater inclusivity in international governance – hence the use of the word ‘actively’ in many of the strategies. My point, however, is that no matter how ‘actively’ African countries intend to influence AI cooperation, ethics and governance, there is a need to first reckon with Africa’s standing in AI development. Policymakers on the continent seem to have recognised this reality, and it is noticeable in their focus on strengthening local AI capacity. The AU Strategy, for instance, notes that Africa faces challenges around lack of computing platforms, limited data for training AI models and a scarce supply of AI skills, observing that, as of 2023, all the world’s supercomputers are located in only 30 countries. The Nigerian Strategy also recognises the need to build ‘affordable and localised infrastructure foundations and the compute capacity’ (Section 1.4.2) by making high-performance computing available. In Rwanda and Egypt, there is emphasis on AI training in schools. Evident here is a recognition that the continent lags behind in AI development, although it has a growing AI startup ecosystem and an unsaturated market for AI. It underscores the need to interrogate AI development, the locational advantages and disadvantages it represents and its links to governance inequalities. I argue that this should be a major consideration in Africa, based on what I describe as the politics of locationality. The politics of locationality Having established the foundational basis for my argument, I now define the politics of locationality as the way in which the power resident in Big Tech and AI systems is associated with their primary situatedness in places of advanced technological and AI development and how this underlying reality, in turn, (re)produces imbalances and unequal opportunities for AI development and governance faced by countries in the majority world, particularly Africa. The politics of locationality highlights the mix of advantages that countries such as the US, China and those in Europe where the largest AI companies are headquartered have. By contrast, African countries, despite advances that have been made in the AI startup ecosystem and state policy interventions, suffer from a range of disadvantages in locational, political, economic, cultural, data, labour and historical spheres. Addressing this mix of disadvantages is what the continent needs to become a location of influence from which the values, ethics and governance that circumscribe AI can be shaped. To expand on my argument, I refer to the AI policies of some of the largest companies and the guiding principles for AI that leading tech countries have drafted. Take OpenAI for instance. The OpenAI (2024) Terms of Use specify that dispute resolution between the company and users anywhere in the world would be coordinated by National Arbitration and Mediation, headquartered in New York. The law that governs the arbitration is the US Federal Arbitration Act. It adds that, ‘California law will govern these Terms’ and ‘claims arising out of or relating to these Terms will be brought exclusively in the federal or state courts of San Francisco, California’ (see Governing Law Section). This is not surprising, given that OpenAI is headquartered in San Francisco. Also, for Gemini (2024), owned by Google, the governing law of its User Agreement is the laws of New York, and the Agreement is seen as a ‘contract wholly entered into and wholly performed within the State of New York’ (see Governing Law Section). I found a similar pattern in the UK and China. In the UK, Darktrace (2024), an AI cybersecurity firm, notes that the governing law of its Master Services Agreement is the laws of England and Wales, except if the customer is located in the US, in which case the laws of California apply. In China, Section VII of the Terms of Use of UBTECH (2023), an AI robotics firm, states: ‘The establishment, effectiveness, performance, interpretation and dispute resolution of this [user] agreement are subject to the laws of the People’s Republic of China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan).’ The same goes for Alibaba’s Qwen (2023), which is covered by the Alibaba Cloud International Website Terms of Use, the governing law of which is that of Singapore, where Alibaba has its office in the Asia Pacific. Hence, I note that AI companies uphold the laws of the countries where they are headquartered, and they subject the governance of their technologies to these laws. AI companies have also come under sustained pressure to develop rules according to the values, ethics and standards of their host nations, thanks, in part, to the dictates of digital geopolitics and the competition for AI supremacy. The US, for instance, had the Biden Administration’s Executive Order on Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (US Executive Order, 2023), through which it sought to promote an AI market that emphasises US innovation and leadership on AI (Section 2(h)) and the need to encourage international partners to support the voluntary commitments of US AI companies (Section 11(a)(ii)). But these voluntary commitments are underpinned by the need for US leadership and ‘to ensure that artificial intelligence is aligned with values shared by all Americans’ (proposed National AI Commission Act (2023), Section 3(g)(1)). The Biden Executive Order was replaced in January 2025 by the Trump AI Executive Order, aptly named, ‘Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.’ All these underscore that a key intention of US policy is that the design of AI mirrors America’s geopolitical leadership, cultural norms, ethics and jurisprudence. A similar line of argument applies to Europe and China. In Europe, the first clause of the European Union (2024) AI Act says its purpose is to lay ‘a uniform legal framework’ for AI development and deployment ‘in accordance with Union values’ (Section 1) and it supports the ‘European human-centric approach to AI and being a global leader’ in AI development (Section 8). In China, there is the Generative AI Measures released in August 2023. The regulation includes a stipulation that generative AI technologies should not produce content that incite the ‘subversion of national sovereignty or the overturn of the socialist system’ (Henshall, 2023: para. 2). The same ethos is evident in China’s 2023 Management of Deep Synthesis of Internet information Services enacted by the Cyberspace Administration of China (2022). It mandates that in developing products such as AI, companies must abide by Chinese laws, correct political direction and value orientation. This was clearly evident in the January 2025 roll out of DeepSeek, a China-based AI assistant, which when asked about Tiananmen Square, refused to answer, saying it follows ‘ethical guidelines’ and added: ‘I respect the laws and cultural contexts in which I operate’ (author’s conversation with DeepSeek). It goes to show that expansive or restrictive design and deployment of AI technologies are subject to the value system prevalent in their originating countries. Hence, the politics of locationality sustains the different visions that leading tech countries have of AI in their battle for supremacy – visions that are not necessarily inclusive of African perspectives even though they find expression on the continent through pervasive deployment and usage. Conclusion In this paper, I have examined the importance of the location of AI companies and, by so doing, introduced the politics of locationality as a concept to extend our understanding and explain the standing that nations have in AI development and how this translates to the influence they wield in AI governance. My discussion showed that although Africa has a growing AI startup ecosystem, a burgeoning user market base and state influence in policymaking, the continent still faces a mix of disadvantages in historical, technological, political, legal, economic, labour and data spheres. This mix reveals the locational disadvantage that confronts Africa as a place from which AI ethics, cultures and governance can be shaped in the global sense. It relates to Hassan’s (2023) point on the ‘lack of African AI innovations that are rooted in the local context but [have] the potential to compete at the global scale’ (p. 1430). What I found was that AI companies that have global scale and presence are headquartered mainly in leading tech countries (the US, China and European nations) and have subjected themselves to the governing laws of these countries. Conversely, the laws and policies of leading tech countries mandate that these companies, among other things, embed the respective country’s ethos, values and cultures into AI systems. The link between AI systems and cultural values as outlined in this paper, therefore, points to the connection between media and cultural studies and AI. In particular, the paper highlights the importance of considering how AI is produced and shaped by cultural understandings, and how AI further projects, shapes and extends culture. It suggests the need for greater research emphasis on the connections between media, AI and culture, given that AI represents the intersection of human labour, machine learning, infrastructure (e.g. data centres), mineral resources (e.g. lithium), media inputs (vast troves of data: information, texts, pictures, videos, maps, and codes) and classification systems that all combine to transform AI models into mechanics of knowledge construction (Crawford, 2021). The outcome are mediated outputs (e.g. AI responses to prompts and automated decisions) – outputs that simultaneously represent and transform culture, even as they are shaped by it. Equally crucial and more important, in the context of this paper, is the need to consider the locationality of it all. By this I mean the globalised and complex interaction of locations in AI development and governance that potentially determines whose culture is elevated and whose culture is progressively silenced in a relationship defined by hegemony and inequality. Key to understanding this hegemony-inequality mix is the principle of locational advantage, which Iammarino and McCann (2013) describe as a two-way relationship between multinationals and their locational headquarters, noting that just as location is becoming increasingly vital for multinationals, so also are multinationals progressively more important for location (i.e. cities or countries). It underscores my argument on the politics of locationality, which shows that just as large AI firms need locations, such as the US or China, that have the right mix of advantages to serve as headquarters, so also do leading tech countries need and use these firms in setting the cultural and governance paradigm for AI technologies. This structural makeup reflects the imbalances in AI development, explaining why AI governance systems exist within institutional-heterogenous regimes that reproduce Global North dominance (Png, 2022). Addressing these imbalances is what African countries, supported by the AU, should focus on, and there are initial signs that African countries are starting to do this (as seen in the AI strategies). However, a bolder and more robust approach to AI development that is attuned to Africa’s unique sociopolitical context and economic evolution is needed to confront the imbalances tied to the politics of locationality. By so doing, Africa can be positioned to assume locational advantage, with important consequences for inclusive AI and the contribution of global majority countries to the cultures and values embedded in AI systems and the ethics and frameworks by which they are governed. AcknowledgmentsThe author extends appreciation to the editors and reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments, and also to the participants at the 2023 International Symposium on AI Cultures at the University of Turin for their feedback – all of which strengthened the article.Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Leverhulme Trust as part of an Early Career Fellowship. 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Abstract We examine the roles of Gold and Bitcoin as a hedge, a safe haven, and a diversifier against the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the Ukraine War. Using a rolling window estimation of the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-based regression, we present a novel approach to examine the time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier properties of Gold and Bitcoin for equities portfolios. This article uses daily returns of Gold, Bitcoin, S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. Our results show that Gold is a better safe haven than the two, while Bitcoin exhibits weak properties as safe haven. Bitcoin can, however, be used as a diversifier and hedge. This study offers policy suggestions to investors to diversify their holdings during uncertain times. Introduction Financial markets and the diversity of financial products have risen in both volume and value, creating financial risk and establishing the demand for a safe haven for investors. The global financial markets have faced several blows in recent years. From the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to the outbreak of the pandemic and uncertainty regarding economic policy measures of governments and central banks, the financial markets including equity markets around the world were faced with severe meltdowns. This similar behavior was observed in other markets including equity and commodity markets, resulting in overall uncertainty. In this scenario, the investors normally flock toward the safe-haven assets to protect their investment. In normal situations, investors seek to diversify or hedge their assets to protect their portfolios. However, the financial markets are negatively impacted when there are global uncertainties. Diversification and hedging methods fail to safeguard investors’ portfolios during instability because almost all sectors and assets are negatively affected (Hasan et al., 2021). As a result, investors typically look for safe-haven investments to safeguard their portfolios under extreme conditions (Ceylan, 2022). Baur and Lucey (2010) provide the following definitions of hedge, diversifier, and safe haven: Hedge: An asset that, on average, has no correlation or a negative correlation with another asset or portfolio. On average, a strict hedge has a (strictly) negative correlation with another asset or portfolio.Diversifier: An asset that, on average, has a positive correlation (but not perfect correlation) with another asset or portfolio. Safe haven: This is the asset that in times of market stress or volatility becomes uncorrelated or negatively associated with other assets or a portfolio. As was previously indicated, the significant market turbulence caused by a sharp decline in consumer spending, coupled with insufficient hedging opportunities, was a common feature of all markets during these times (Yousaf et al., 2022). Nakamoto (2008) suggested a remedy by introducing Bitcoin, a “digital currency,” as an alternative to traditional fiduciary currencies (Paule-Vianez et al., 2020). Bitcoin often described as “Digital Gold” has shown greater resilience during periods of crises and has highlighted the potential safe haven and hedging property against uncertainties (Mokni, 2021). According to Dyhrberg (2016), the GFC has eased the emergence of Bitcoin thereby strengthening its popularity. Bouri et al. (2017) in their study indicate that Bitcoin has been viewed as a shelter from global uncertainties caused by conventional banking and economic systems. Recent research has found that Bitcoin is a weak safe haven, particularly in periods of market uncertainty like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis (Conlon & McGee, 2020; Nagy & Benedek, 2021; Shahzad et al., 2019; Syuhada et al., 2022). In contrast to these findings, a study by Yan et al. (2022) indicates that it can function as a strong safe haven in favorable economic times and with low-risk aversion. Ustaoglu (2022) also supports the strong safe-haven characteristic of Bitcoin against most emerging stock market indices during the COVID-19 period. Umar et al. (2023) assert that Bitcoin and Gold are not reliable safe-havens. Singh et al. (2024) in their study reveal that Bitcoin is an effective hedge for investments in Nifty-50, Sensex, GBP–INR, and JPY–INR, at the same time a good diversifier for Gold. The study suggests that investors can incorporate Bitcoin in their portfolios as a good hedge against market volatility in equities and commodities markets. During the COVID-19 epidemic, Barbu et al. (2022) investigated if Ethereum and Bitcoin could serve as a short-term safe haven or diversifier against stock indices and bonds. The outcomes are consistent with the research conducted by Snene Manzli et al. (2024). Both act as hybrid roles for stock market returns, diversifiers for sustainable stock market indices, and safe havens for bond markets. Notably, Bhuiyan et al. (2023) found that Bitcoin provides relatively better diversification opportunities than Gold during times of crisis. To reduce risks, Bitcoin has demonstrated a strong potential to operate as a buffer against global uncertainty and may be a useful hedging tool in addition to Gold and similar assets (Baur & Lucey, 2010; Bouri et al., 2017; Capie et al., 2005; Dyhrberg, 2015). According to Huang et al. (2021), its independence from monetary policies and minimal association with conventional financial assets allow it to have a safe-haven quality. Bitcoins have a substantial speed advantage over other assets since they are traded at high and constant frequencies with no days when trading is closed (Selmi et al., 2018). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the average monthly volatility of Bitcoin is higher than that of Gold or a group of international currencies expressed in US dollars; nevertheless, the lowest monthly volatility of Bitcoin is lower than the maximum monthly volatility of Gold and other foreign currencies (Dwyer, 2015). Leverage effects are also evident in Bitcoin returns, which show lower volatilities in high return periods and higher volatilities in low return times (Bouri et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). According to recent research, Bitcoins can be used to hedge S&P 500 stocks, which increases the likelihood that institutional and retail investors will build secure portfolios (Okorie, 2020). Bitcoin demonstrates strong hedging capabilities and can complement Gold in minimizing specific market risks (Baur & Lucey, 2010). Its high-frequency and continuous trading further enrich the range of available hedging tools (Dyhrberg, 2016). Moreover, Bitcoin spot and futures markets exhibit similarities to traditional financial markets. In the post-COVID-19 period, Zhang et al. (2021) found that Bitcoin futures outperform Gold futures.Gold, silver, palladium, and platinum were among the most common precious metals utilized as safe-haven investments. Gold is one such asset that is used extensively (Salisu et al., 2021). Their study tested the safe-haven property of Gold against the downside risk of portfolios during the pandemic. Empirical results have also shown that Gold functions as a safe haven for only 15 trading days, meaning that holding Gold for longer than this period would result in losses to investors. This explains why investors buy Gold on days of negative returns and sell it when market prospects turn positive and volatility decreases (Baur & Lucey, 2010). In their study, Kumar et al. (2023) tried to analyse the trends in volume throughout futures contracts and investigate the connection between open interest, volume, and price for bullion and base metal futures in India. Liu et al. (2016) in their study found that there is no negative association between Gold and the US stock market during times of extremely low or high volatility. Because of this, it is not a strong safe haven for the US stock market (Hood & Malik, 2013). Post-COVID-19, studies have provided mixed evidence on the safe-haven properties of Gold (Bouri et al., 2020; Cheema et al., 2022; Ji et al., 2020). According to Kumar and Padakandla (2022), Gold continuously demonstrates safe-haven qualities for all markets, except the NSE, both in the short and long term. During the COVID-19 episode, Gold’s effectiveness as a hedge and safe-haven instrument has been impacted (Akhtaruzzaman et al., 2021). Al-Nassar (2024) conducted a study on the hedge effectiveness of Gold and found that it is a strong hedge in the long run. Bhattacharjee et al. (2023) in their paper examined the symmetrical and asymmetrical linkage between Gold price levels and the Indian stock market returns by employing linear autoregressive distributed lag and nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag models. The results exhibit that the Indian stock market returns and Gold prices are cointegrated. According to the most recent study by Kaczmarek et al. (2022), Gold has no potential as a safe haven, despite some studies on the COVID-19 pandemic showing contradictory results. The co-movements of Bitcoin and the Chinese stock market have also normalized as a result of this epidemic (Belhassine & Karamti, 2021). Widjaja and Havidz (2023) verified that Gold was a safe haven asset during the COVID-19 pandemic, confirming the Gold’s safe-haven characteristic. As previously pointed out, investors value safe-haven investments in times of risk. Investors panic at these times when asset prices fall and move from less liquid (risky) securities to more liquid (safe) ones, such as cash, Gold, and government bonds. An asset must be bought and sold rapidly, at a known price, and for a reasonably modest cost to be considered truly safe (Smales, 2019). Therefore, we need to properly re-examine the safe-haven qualities of Gold and Bitcoin due to the mixed evidences regarding their safe-haven qualities and the impact of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine on financial markets. This work contributes to and deviates from the body of existing literature in the following ways. We propose a novel approach in this work to evaluate an asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier characteristics. This research examines the safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities of Gold and Bitcoin against the equity indices; S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50. Through the use of rolling window estimation, we extend the methodology of Ratner and Chiu (2013) by estimating the aforementioned properties of the assets. Comparing rolling window estimation to other conventional techniques, the former will provide a more accurate representation of an asset’s time-varying feature. This study explores the conventional asset Gold’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. We use Bitcoin, an unconventional safe-haven asset, for comparison. Data and Methodology We use the daily returns of three major equity indices; S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. The equity indices were selected to represent three large and diverse markets namely the United States, France, and India in terms of geography and economic development. We assess safe-haven assets using the daily returns of Gold and Bitcoin over the same time. Equity data was collected from Yahoo Finance, Bitcoin data from coinmarketcap.com, and Gold data from the World Gold Council website. Engle (2002) developed the DCC (Dynamic Conditional Correlation)-GARCH model, which is frequently used to assess contagion amid pandemic uncertainty or crises. Time-varying variations in the conditional correlation of asset pairings can be captured using the DCC-GARCH model. Through employing this model, we can analyse the dynamic behavior of volatility spillovers. Engle’s (2002) DCC-GARCH model contains two phases; 1. Univariate GARCH model estimation2. Estimation of time-varying conditional correlation. For its explanation, mathematical characteristics, and theoretical development, see here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578] Results and Discussion The outcomes of the parameters under the DCC-GARCH model for each of the asset pairs selected for the investigation are shown in Table 1.   First, we look at the dynamical conditional correlation coefficient, ρ.The rho value is negative and insignificant for NSE 50/Gold, NSE 50 /BTC, S&P500/Gold, and S&P500/BTC indicating a negative and insignificant correlation between these asset pairs, showing Gold and Bitcoin as potential hedges and safe havens. The fact that ρ is negative and significant for CAC 40/Gold suggests that Gold can be a safe haven against CAC 40 swings. The asset pair CAC/BTC, on the other hand, has possible diversifier behavior with ρ being positive but statistically insignificant. Next, we examine the behavior of the DCC-GARCH parameters; α and β. We find that αDCC is statistically insignificant for all the asset pairs, while βDCC is statistically significant for all asset pairs. βDCC quantifies the persistence feature of the correlation and the extent of the impact of volatility spillover in a particular market’s volatility dynamics. A higher βDCC value implies that a major part of the volatility dynamics can be explained by the respective market’s own past volatility. For instance, the NSE 50/Gold’s βDCC value of 0.971 shows that there is a high degree of volatility spillover between these two assets, with about 97% of market volatility being explained by the assets’ own historical values and the remainder coming from spillover. Thus, we see that the volatility spillover is highly persistent (~0.8) for all the asset pairs except NSE 50/BTC. The results above show that the nature of the dynamic correlation between the stock markets, Bitcoin and Gold is largely negative, pointing toward the possibility of Gold and Bitcoin being hedge/safe haven. However, a detailed analysis is needed to confirm the same by employing rolling window analysis, and we present the results in the forthcoming section. We present the rolling window results for S&P500 first. We present the regression results for Gold in Figure 1 and Bitcoin in Figure 2   Figure 1. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Gold.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. In Figure 1, we examine the behavior of β0 (intercept term), β1, β2, and β3 (partial correlation coefficients). The intercept term β0 will give an idea about whether the asset is behaving as a diversifier or hedge. Here, the intercept term shows significance most of the time. However, during 2018, the intercept was negative and significant, showing that it could serve as a hedge during geopolitical tensions and volatilities in the global stock market. However, during the early stages of COVID-19, we show that the intercept is negative and showing statistical significance, suggesting that Gold could serve as a hedge during the initial shocks of the pandemic. These findings are contrary to the results in the study by Tarchella et al. (2024) where they found hold as a good diversifier. Later, we find the intercept to be positive and significant, indicating that Gold could act as a potential diversifier. But during the Russia-Ukraine War, Gold exhibited hedge ability again. Looking into the behavior of β1, which is the partial correlation coefficient for the tenth percentile of return distribution shows negative and insignificant during 2018. Later, it was again negative and significant during the initial phases of COVID-19, and then negative in the aftermath, indicating that Gold could act as a weak safe haven during the COVID-19 pandemic. Gold could serve as a strong safe haven for the SP500 against volatility in the markets brought on by the war in Ukraine, as we see the coefficient to be negative and large during this time. From β2 and β3, the partial correlation coefficients of the fifth and first percentile, respectively, show that Gold possesses weak safe haven properties during COVID-19 and strong safe haven behavior during the Ukraine crisis. Next, we examine the characteristics of Bitcoin as a hedge/diversifier/safe haven against the S&P500 returns. We present the results in Figure 2.   Figure 2. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Bitcoin.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. Like in the previous case, we begin by analysing the behavior of the intercept coefficient, which is β0. As mentioned earlier the intercept term will give a clear picture of the asset’s hedging and diversifier property. In the period 2018–2019, the intercept term is positive but insignificant. This could be due to the large volatility in Bitcoin price movements during the period. It continues to be minimal (but positive) and insignificant during 2019–2020, indicating toward weak diversification possibility. Post-COVID-19 period, the coefficient shows the significance and positive value, displaying the diversification potential. We see that the coefficient remains positive throughout the analysis, confirming Bitcoin’s potential as a diversifier. Looking into the behavior of β1 (the partial correlation coefficient at tenth percentile), it is positive but insignificant during 2018. The coefficient is having negative sign and showing statistical significance in 2019, suggesting that Bitcoin could be a good safe haven in that year. This year was characterized by a long list of corporate scandals, uncertainties around Brexit, and tensions in global trade. We can observe that throughout the COVID-19 period, the coefficient is showing negative sign and negligible during the March 2020 market meltdown, suggesting inadequate safe-haven qualities. However, Bitcoin will regain its safe-haven property in the coming periods, as the coefficient is negative and significant in the coming months. The coefficient is negative and shows statistical significance during the Ukrainian crisis, suggesting strong safe-haven property. Only during the Ukrainian crisis could Bitcoin serve as a safe haven, according to the behavior of β2, which displays the partial correlation coefficient at the fifth percentile. Bitcoin was a weak safe haven during COVID-19 and the Ukrainian crisis, according to β3, the partial correlation coefficient for the first percentile (coefficient negative and insignificant). According to the overall findings, Gold is a stronger safe haven against the S&P 500’s swings. This result is consistent with the previous studies of Triki and Maatoug (2021), Shakil et al. (2018), Będowska-Sójka and Kliber (2021), Drake (2022), and Ghazali et al. (2020), etc. The same analysis was conducted for the CAC 40 and the NSE 50; the full analysis can be found here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578]. However, it is important to highlight the respective results: In general, we may say that Gold has weak safe-haven properties considering CAC40. We can conclude that Bitcoin’s safe-haven qualities for CAC40 are weak. We can say that Gold showed weak safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis and good safe-haven characteristics for the NSE50 during COVID-19. We may say that Bitcoin exhibits weak safe haven, but strong hedging abilities to NSE50. Concluding Remarks In this study, we suggested a new method to evaluate an asset’s time-varying hedge, diversifier, and safe-haven characteristics. We propose a rolling window estimation of the DCC-based regression of Ratner and Chiu (2013). Based on this, we estimate the conventional asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying properties during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. For comparison purposes, we include Bitcoin, a nonconventional safe-haven asset. We evaluate Gold and Bitcoin’s safe haven, hedging, and diversifier properties to the S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 variations. We use a rolling window of length 60 to estimate the regression. From the results, we find that Gold can be considered as a better safe haven against the fluctuations of the S&P 500. In the case of CAC 40, Gold and Bitcoin have weak safe-haven properties. While Bitcoin demonstrated strong safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis, Gold exhibited strong safe-haven characteristics during COVID-19 for the NSE 50. Overall, the findings indicate that Gold is the better safe haven. This outcome is consistent with earlier research (Będowska-Sójka & Kliber, 2021; Drake, 2022; Ghazali et al., 2020; Shakil et al., 2018; Triki & Maatoug, 2021). When it comes to Bitcoin, its safe-haven feature is weak. Bitcoin, however, works well as a diversifier and hedge. Therefore, from a policy perspective, investing in safe-haven instruments is crucial to lower the risks associated with asset ownership. Policymakers aiming to enhance the stability of financial portfolios might encourage institutional investors and other market players to incorporate Gold into their asset allocations. Gold’s strong safe-haven qualities, proven across various market conditions, make it a reliable choice. Gold’s performance during crises like COVID-19 highlights its potential to mitigate systemic risks effectively. Further, Bitcoin could also play a complementary role as a hedge and diversifier, especially during periods of significant volatility such as the Ukraine crisis. While Bitcoin’s safe-haven characteristics are relatively weaker, its inclusion in a diversified portfolio offers notable value and hence it should not be overlooked. Further, policymakers may consider how crucial it is to monitor dynamic correlations and periodically rebalance portfolios to account for shifts in the safe haven and hedging characteristics of certain assets. Such measures could help reduce the risks of over-reliance on a single asset type and create more resilient portfolios that can better withstand global economic shocks. For future research, studies can be conducted on the estimation of the rolling window with different widths. This is important to understand how the safe-haven property changes across different holding periods. Further, more equity markets would be included to account for the differences in market capitalization and index constituents. This study can be extended by testing these properties for multi-asset portfolios as well. We intend to take up this study in these directions in the future. Data Availability StatementNot applicable.Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ReferencesAkhtaruzzaman M., Boubaker S., Lucey B. M., & Sensoy A. (2021). Is gold a hedge or a safe-haven asset in the COVID-19 crisis? Economic Modelling, 102, 105588. Crossref. Web of Science.Al-Nassar N. S. (2024). Can gold hedge against inflation in the UAE? A nonlinear ARDL analysis in the presence of structural breaks. PSU Research Review, 8(1), 151–166. Crossref.Barbu T. C., Boitan I. A., & Cepoi C. O. (2022). Are cryptocurrencies safe havens during the COVID-19 pandemic? A threshold regression perspective with pandemic-related benchmarks. Economics and Business Review, 8(2), 29–49. 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Note: some parts of the article have been excluded, if you want to go deep in the article please check  https://doi.org/10.1177/01445987251314504 for the complete version. Abstract Nuclear power plays a pivotal role in sustainable electricity generation and global net zero emissions, contributing significantly to this secure pathway. Nuclear power capacity is expected to double, escalating from 413 gigawatts (GW) in early 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 within the net zero emissions (NZE) paradigm. The global energy landscape is undergoing significant transformation as nations strive to transition to more sustainable energy systems. Amidst this shift, nuclear power has emerged as a crucial component in the pursuit of a sustainable energy transition. This study examines nuclear power's multifaceted role in shaping sustainable energy transition. It delves into nuclear energy's contributions toward decarbonization efforts, highlighting its capacity to provide low-carbon electricity and its potential role in mitigating climate change. Furthermore, the study explores the challenges and opportunities associated with integrating nuclear power into energy transition strategies, addressing issues such as safety, waste management, and public perception. In conclusion, the global nuclear power capacity is anticipated to reach approximately 530 GW by 2050, representing a substantial shortfall of 35% compared with the trajectory outlined in the NZE pathway. Under the NZE scenario, nuclear power demonstrates exceptional expansion, nearly doubling from 413 GW in early 2022 to 812 GW by 2050. Concurrently, the trajectory highlights a transformative shift in renewable energy investments, with annual expenditures surging from an average of US$325 billion during 2016–2020 to an impressive US$1.3 trillion between 2031 and 2035. These projections underscore the critical role of nuclear and renewable energy investments in achieving global sustainability and emission reduction goals. Introduction Global warming and greenhouse gas emissions pose some of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. The combustion of fossil fuels for electricity generation is a major contributor to these issues, releasing billions of tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere annually (Abbasi et al., 2020; Nassar et al., 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024a). In this context, nuclear energy emerges as a critical component of the solution. Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear power generates electricity with minimal greenhouse gas emissions, offering a reliable and scalable alternative to bridge the gap between energy demand and decarbonization goals. It operates independently of weather conditions, providing consistent energy output and complementing the intermittency of renewable sources like wind and solar (Rekik and El Alimi, 2024b, 2024c). Furthermore, advancements in nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors (SMRs) and generation IV reactors, have addressed historical concerns related to safety, waste management, and cost-effectiveness (Lau and Tsai, 2023). In 2022, global investment in low-emission fuels will maintain a robust growth trajectory, reaching a sum of US$13 billion. A significant portion of this investment was allocated toward liquid biofuels, totaling US$9.4 billion, and biogas, amounting to US$2.7 billion. It is important to emphasize that liquid biofuels constituted approximately 80% of the overall investment surge observed in 2022, with investments in biogas contributing 4% of the total. The residual portion of the investment was directed toward low-emission hydrogen production, which attained a sum of US$1.2 billion in 2022, representing an almost fourfold increase compared to the figures recorded in 2021 (Khaleel et al., 2024).Nuclear power is a pivotal component of low-carbon energy, which significantly contributes to the realization of a low-carbon economy and establishment of a green energy grid (Arvanitidis et al., 2023; El Hafdaoui et al., 2024; Fragkos et al., 2021). According to current data, 442 nuclear power reactors are operational worldwide, collectively generating 393 gigawatts (GW) of electricity, thereby furnishing a consistent and dependable source of low-carbon power (Mathew, 2022). Nuclear electricity constitutes approximately 11% of the total global electricity generation, representing a substantial portion of the global low-carbon electricity production (Alam et al., 2019). Recent advancements have enhanced the affordability and appeal of nuclear power as an alternative source of energy. These advancements encompass progress in large reactor technologies, the emergence of novel approaches such as advanced fuel utilization and SMRs, engineering breakthroughs facilitating the extension of operational lifespans for existing reactors, and innovations in materials science and improved waste management practices (Kröger et al., 2020; Zhan et al., 2021). Fast breeder reactor technology has transitioned into a commercial realm, offering benefits beyond electricity generation by enabling the production of surplus fuel and enhancing the efficiency of nuclear waste incineration, surpassing the capabilities of existing commercial reactor technologies (Lau and Tsai, 2023). Nuclear power plays a substantial role within a secure global trajectory toward achieving net zero emissions (NZE) (Addo et al., 2023; Dafnomilis et al., 2023). Nuclear power capacity experiences a twofold increase, progressing from 413 GW at the outset of 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 within the NZE paradigm. It is apparent that the annual additions to nuclear capacity peaked at 27 GW per year during the 2030s, surpassing the levels observed in the preceding decade. Despite these advancements, the global proportion of nuclear power within the overall electricity generation portfolio has experienced a marginal decline, settling at 8% (Murphy et al., 2023; Ruhnau et al., 2023). Emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) substantially dominate global growth, constituting over 90% of the aggregate, with China poised to ascend as a preeminent nuclear power producer prior to 2030. Concurrently, advanced economies collectively witness a 10% augmentation in nuclear power capacity as retirements are counterbalanced by the commissioning of new facilities, predominantly observed in nations such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada (Bórawski et al., 2024). Furthermore, annual global investment in nuclear power has experienced a notable escalation, soaring from US$30 billion throughout the 2010s to surpass US$100 billion by 2030, maintaining a robust trajectory above US$80 billion by 2050 (IEA, 2022). In 2022, global nuclear power capacity experienced a modest increase of approximately 1.5 GW, reflecting a marginal year-on-year growth of 0.3%. This expansion was primarily driven by new capacity additions that surpassed the retirement of an over 6 GW of existing capacity (Fernández-Arias et al., 2023; Mendelevitch et al., 2018). EMDEs accounted for approximately 60% of the new capacity additions, underscoring their increasing significance in the global nuclear energy landscape. Conversely, more than half of the retirements were observed in advanced economies, including Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Table 1 shows the nuclear power capacity by region in the NZE from 2018 to 2030.   In alignment with the Net Zero Scenario, it is imperative for the global nuclear capacity to undergo an expansion averaging approximately 15 GW per annum, constituting a growth rate slightly exceeding 3% annually, until 2030. This strategic augmentation is crucial for sustaining the contribution of the nuclear sector to electricity generation, maintaining its share at approximately 10% (Liu et al., 2023). Such an expansion necessitates concerted efforts in both advanced economies and EMDEs. Furthermore, prioritizing the extension of operational lifetimes of existing nuclear facilities within G7 member states would not only fortify the existing low-emission infrastructure, but also facilitate the integration of new nuclear capacity, thereby augmenting the overall nuclear energy portfolio. [...] The significant contribution of nuclear power to sustainable energy transitions is underscored by its multifaceted role in addressing the pressing challenges of climate change and energy security (Asif et al., 2024). As nations worldwide endeavor to shift toward greener energy systems, nuclear power has emerged as a critical pillar of the decarbonization journey. Its ability to provide low-carbon electricity, mitigate climate change impacts by 2050, and enhance energy security highlights its pivotal importance in the broader context of sustainable energy transitions (Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; NEA, 2015). Thus, to fully realize its potential, challenges such as safety, waste management, and public perception must be addressed effectively. By leveraging robust policy frameworks, technological advancements, and international collaboration, nuclear power is poised to play a vital role in shaping the future of sustainable energy transitions on a global scale. Furthermore, the dynamic landscape of nuclear power development is evident in the significant influence exerted by EMDEs, particularly China, which is expected to emerge as a leading nuclear power producer by 2030 (Fälth et al., 2021; Nkosi and Dikgang, 2021). Concurrently, advanced economies are witnessing notable expansions in nuclear power capacity driven by the commissioning of new facilities to offset retirements (Budnitz et al., 2018). This trend is further reinforced by a notable surge in annual global investment in nuclear power, underscoring the sustained commitment to nuclear energy's pivotal role in sustainable energy transitions in the foreseeable future (IEA, 2019). The primary objective of this article is to explore the strategic role of nuclear power in advancing global sustainability goals and achieving zero emissions. The objective is structured around the following key agendas: •Nuclear power: prominence and green electricity source•Nuclear's role in achieving net zero by 2050•Nuclear power's significance in power system adequacySpecific technologies for sustainability in nuclear energy production•Investment in nuclear power•Addressing policy implications This comprehensive analysis aims to provide actionable insights into harnessing nuclear power for sustainable electricity generation and its pivotal role in achieving global zero-emission targets. Data and methodology This article conducts an in-depth analysis of the role of nuclear power in achieving sustainable electricity generation and supporting NZE targets. The article also addresses the potential of nuclear energy as a prominent and environmentally favorable electricity source, examining nuclear power's contribution toward the net zero by 2050 goal, its critical importance in ensuring power system adequacy, investment imperatives, and the broader policy implications.  [...] Nuclear power: prominence and green electricity source In 2020, nuclear power will constitute approximately 10% of the global electricity generation portfolio. This proportion, which had previously stood at 18% during the late 1990s, has experienced a decline; nonetheless, nuclear energy retains its status as the second-largest provider of low-emission electricity, trailing only hydroelectricity, and serves as the primary source within advanced economies. Despite the substantial proliferation of wind and solar PV technologies, nuclear electricity production in 2020 surpassed the aggregate output of these renewable sources. As of 2021, the global cumulative installed nuclear capacity has reached 413 GW, with 270 GW of this total being installed in advanced economies (Guidi et al., 2023; Halkos and Zisiadou, 2023; Pan et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2022). Nuclear power generation during this period amounted to 2653 TWh, positioning it as the second largest source of electricity generation after hydropower, which generated 4275 TWh, as depicted in Figure 1.   In addition to its significant role in power generation, nuclear energy plays a crucial role in mitigating carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Since the 1970s, nuclear power has helped avoid the global release of approximately 66 gigatons (Gt) of CO2 globally, as shown in Figure 2.   Without the contribution of nuclear power, cumulative emissions from electricity generation would have increased by approximately 20%, whereas total energy-related emissions would have increased by 6% over this period (Wagner, 2021). Advanced economies accounted for more than 85% of these avoided emissions, with the European Union accounting for 20 Gt and the United States for 24 Gt, representing over 40% and 25% of total electricity generation emissions, respectively. In the absence of nuclear power, Japan would have experienced an estimated 25% increase in emissions from electricity generation, whereas Korea and Canada would have seen an increase of approximately 50%. Nuclear's role in achieving net zero by 2050 Nuclear energy has emerged as a pivotal low-emission technology within the trajectory toward achieving NZE (Pioro et al., 2019). In addition, it serves as a complementary force, bolstering the accelerated expansion of renewables, thereby facilitating the reduction of emissions from the global electricity sector to net zero by 2040 (Krūmiņš and Kļaviņš, 2023; Islam et al., 2024). Beyond its intrinsic contribution to fostering a low-emission electricity supply, nuclear power is significant as a dispatchable generating asset, fortifying supply security through its provision of system adequacy and flexibility. Furthermore, it is instrumental in furnishing heat for district heating networks and in selecting industrial facilities. Despite this, the prospective role of nuclear energy hinges significantly on the deliberations and determinations of policymakers and industry stakeholders concerning the pace of new reactor construction initiatives and the continued operational lifespan of existing nuclear facilities (Li et al., 2016; Li et al., 2015).In terms of the NZE trajectory, the global nuclear power capacity exhibits a remarkable surge, nearly doubling from 413 GW at the onset of 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 (Price et al., 2023; Utami et al., 2022). This augmentation primarily stems from the vigorous initiation of new construction endeavors, which effectively counterbalance the gradual decommissioning of numerous extant plants. Such an escalation constitutes a pronounced acceleration in comparison to the preceding three decades, characterized by a mere 15% increment in capacity, equivalent to approximately 60 GW (Haneklaus et al., 2023; Obekpa and Alola, 2023; Sadiq et al., 2023). Figure 3 demonstrates the nuclear power capacity within each country/region under the NZE by 2050 scenario.   The expected growth in nuclear power capacity far exceeds the path outlined by the current policies and legal frameworks. According to the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), the nuclear capacity is projected to reach approximately 530 GW by 2050, which is 35% lower than that of the NZE pathway (Espín et al., 2023; Nicolau et al., 2023; Nnabuife et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023). Without a significant shift from recent nuclear power development trends, achieving NZE would require a limited reliance on a smaller range of low-emission technologies. This could compromise energy security and lead to higher total investment costs, resulting in increased electricity prices for consumers. Table 2 shows the average annual capacity addition for global nuclear power in NZE from 1981 to 2030.   In 2022, the global deployment of new nuclear power capacity witnessed a notable upsurge, with 7.9 GW added, representing a substantial 40% increase compared to the preceding year (Ho et al., 2019). It is worth bearing in mind that China spearheaded this expansion by completing the construction of two reactors, maintaining its streak for consecutive years as the leading contributor to global nuclear power capacity augmentation. It is noteworthy that the projects were successfully completed in various other nations, including Finland, Korea, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, significant strides were made in the initiation of new construction endeavors, with the commencement of construction activities on five reactors in China, two reactors in Egypt, and one reactor in Turkey (Hickey et al., 2021). Nuclear power's significance in power system adequacy Nuclear power facilities have persistently underpinned the dependability of power systems, thereby bolstering the adequacy of the system. Across diverse national contexts, nuclear power plants have historically maintained operational readiness, manifesting availability rates consistently exceeding 90%, thereby demonstrating their reliability in power generation. Given that a substantial proportion of nuclear power capacity directly contributes to system adequacy metrics, its significance in fortifying system reliability and adequacy significantly outweighs its proportional contribution to the total power capacity (Orikpete and Ewim, 2024; Frilingou et al., 2023; Raj, 2023; Ragosa et al., 2024). The contribution of nuclear power to system adequacy is demonstrated by the consistent trajectory of its share within the aggregate dispatchable power capacity, hovering at around 8% between 2021 and 2050 within the NZE framework (IEA, 2022; OIES, 2024). Dispatchable electricity sources have historically constituted the primary mechanism for ensuring system adequacy, a trend that endures within the NZE paradigm, especially as electricity systems undergo evolution marked by an escalating reliance on variable solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy sources (Marzouk, 2024; Moon et al., 2024; Wisnubroto et al., 2023). It is indisputable that unabated fossil fuel resources predominantly dominate dispatchable capacity; however, their prominence clearly diminishes, declining by a quarter by 2030 within the NZE framework and experiencing a precipitous decline thereafter. Unabated coal-fired power, currently the most substantial dispatchable source, anticipates a decline exceeding 40% in operational capacity by 2030 and approaches a state of negligible contribution by the early 2040s. Conversely, the unabated natural gas-fired power capacity exhibits a sustained level of stability until 2030, primarily driven by the necessity to offset the diminishing role of coal; nonetheless, it subsequently undergoes a rapid descent throughout the 2030s. Oil, constituting a comparatively minor contributor, experiences rapid phasing out across most regions, except for remote locales, within the delineated scenario (Makarov et al., 2023; Ren et al., 2024). Figure 4 highlights the global capacity of dispatchable power categorized by category in the scenario of achieving NZE by 2050.   In this context, fossil fuels equipped with Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS) technology have emerged as notable contributors to bolstering system adequacy. Yet, nuclear power remains a steady contributor to the power system flexibility. In advanced economies, the proportion of hour-to-hour flexibility is projected to increase from approximately 2% to 5% by 2050. Similarly, in EMDEs, this ratio is anticipated to increase from 1% to 3% over the same temporal span (Jenkins et al., 2018). It is worth highlighting that in France, where nuclear power fulfills the lion's share of electricity generation requisites, flexibility has been ingrained within reactor designs (Ho et al., 2019). This feature enables certain plants to swiftly modulate their output to align with the fluctuating electricity supply and demand, operating in a load-following mode (Chen, 2024; Jin and Bae, 2023; Kanugrahan and Hakam, 2023). Although many nations have not habitually engaged nuclear power in such operational dynamics, a considerable number of reactors are capable of performing load-following operations with minimal or no requisite technical adaptations (Caciuffo et al., 2020). Figure 5 demonstrates the hour-to-hour power system flexibility based on the source and regional grouping in the NZE by the 2050 scenario.   Innovation holds promise in enhancing the flexibility of nuclear power. Advanced technological advancements, such as SMRs, can facilitate nuclear reactors to adjust their electricity output with greater ease, as illustrated in Figure 6 (Ho et al., 2019; Lee, 2024; Wisnubroto et al., 2023). Moreover, these technologies offer the prospect of enabling reactors to transition toward generating heat or producing hydrogen either independently or concurrently with electricity generation. Initiatives are underway to disseminate information to policymakers and planners regarding the potential cost advantages associated with enhancing nuclear power flexibility.  Figure 6 demonstrates the nuclear system augmented by wind turbines for trigeneration.   Investment in nuclear power The renaissance of nuclear power within the NZE trajectory necessitates a substantial surge in investment in the coming decades. This surge is envisaged to encompass the construction of new nuclear reactors and extension of operational lifespans for existing facilities. Within this scenario, annual global investment in nuclear power is poised to escalate to exceed US$100 billion during the initial half of the 2030s within the NZE framework, surpassing the threefold average investment level of US$30 billion recorded during the 2010s (IEA, 2022). Subsequently, investment levels are expected to gradually decline as the imperative for dispatchable low emissions generating capacity diminishes, tapering to approximately US$70 billion by the latter half of the 2040s (Kharitonov and Semenova, 2023; Zimmermann and Keles, 2023). Over the period spanning from 2021 to 2050, the allocation of investment toward nuclear power constitutes a fraction representing less than 10% of the aggregate investment dedicated to low-emission sources of electricity (IEA, 2022). By comparison, within this framework, the annual investment in renewable energy experiences a notable escalation, escalating from an average of US$325 billion during the interval from 2016 to 2020 to US$1.3 trillion during the period 2031–2035 (EEDP, 2023; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024d). It is worth noting that the latter consideration elucidates the rationale behind the disproportionate allocation of investment toward advanced economies in later decades. China, for instance, requires an annual expenditure averaging close to US$20 billion on nuclear infrastructure by 2050, representing a nearly twofold increase compared to the average observed during the 2010s (Aghahosseini et al., 2023; Vujić et al., 2012). Conversely, other EMDEs witness a tripling of investment, reaching approximately US$25 billion per year, on average. In contrast to advanced economies, the imperative for investment in these nations is more pronounced in the period leading up to 2035 (Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Khaleel et al., 2024). Thus, nuclear energy, despite its advantages as a low-carbon energy source, faces notable challenges. High capital costs and long deployment timelines, driven by complex construction and regulatory requirements, often hinder its adoption. The management of radioactive waste remains a costly and contentious issue, while safety concerns, shaped by historical incidents, continue to influence public perception. Additionally, reliance on uranium, with its geographically concentrated supply, raises geopolitical and environmental concerns. Nuclear power also competes with the rapidly advancing and cost-effective renewable energy sector, while decommissioning aging plants poses long-term financial and logistical burdens. Addressing these limitations through advanced technologies, public engagement, and international collaboration is crucial for enhancing nuclear energy's role in sustainable energy transitions. Technologies for sustainability in nuclear energy production The pursuit of sustainability in nuclear energy production has been supported by advancements in innovative technologies that enhance efficiency, safety, and environmental compatibility (Aktekin et al., 2024; Ali et al., 2024; Zheng et al., 2024; Khan et al., 2017). These technologies are crucial for positioning nuclear power as a key contributor to clean and sustainable energy transitions. Below are some of the most impactful technologies in this domain: Advanced nuclear reactors: Small modular reactors (SMRs): SMRs are compact, scalable, and safer than traditional large-scale reactors. Their modular design allows for deployment in remote locations, making them suitable for decentralized energy systems. Generation IV reactors: These reactors incorporate advanced cooling systems and fuel cycles to improve efficiency, safety, and waste reduction. Examples include sodium-cooled fast reactors and gas-cooled fast reactors. Thorium-based reactors: Thorium fuel cycle reactors use thorium-232 as an alternative to uranium, offering a more abundant and sustainable fuel source. Thorium reactors produce less nuclear waste and have a lower risk of proliferation. Fusion energy: Although still in the experimental stage, nuclear fusion promises to be a game-changing technology. Fusion produces minimal radioactive waste and harnesses abundant fuel sources like deuterium and tritium, making it a virtually limitless and clean energy solution. Molten salt reactors (MSRs): MSRs use liquid fuels or coolants, such as molten salts, which operate at lower pressures and higher temperatures. These reactors are inherently safer and have the capability to utilize a variety of fuel types, including spent nuclear fuel and thorium. Reactor safety enhancements: Passive safety systems: These systems enhance reactor safety by using natural forces like gravity, natural convection, or condensation to cool the reactor core without human intervention. Digital twin technologies: Digital simulations and monitoring of reactor systems allow for predictive maintenance and real-time safety management. Nuclear waste management technologies Fast reactors: These reactors can recycle spent fuel, reducing the volume and radioactivity of nuclear waste. Deep geological repositories: Advances in geotechnical engineering have improved the safety of long-term waste storage in deep geological formations. Hybrid nuclear-renewable systems: Combining nuclear power with renewable energy sources like wind and solar can optimize energy production and grid stability. Hybrid systems leverage the reliability of nuclear energy with the intermittency of renewables for a balanced, low-carbon energy mix. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning: AI and machine learning technologies are being deployed to enhance reactor performance, optimize fuel usage, and improve operational safety. Predictive analytics also play a critical role in maintenance and risk assessment. Fuel advancements: High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU): HALEU fuels enable reactors to operate more efficiently and reduce waste. Accident-tolerant fuels (ATFs): These are designed to withstand extreme conditions, reducing the likelihood of core damage during accidents. Integrated energy systems: Nuclear reactors are increasingly being used for purposes beyond electricity generation, such as hydrogen production, district heating, and desalination. The integration of digital technologies, including AI and machine learning, coupled with fuel advancements like HALEU and accident-tolerant fuels, highlights the continuous evolution of the nuclear sector. These innovations not only enhance efficiency and safety but also expand the applications of nuclear energy beyond electricity generation to include hydrogen production, desalination, and district heating. Despite these technological advancements, the sustainable deployment of nuclear energy requires robust policy frameworks, increased investments, and public acceptance. Addressing these challenges is critical to unlocking the full potential of nuclear power in achieving global energy security and NZE by 2050. [...] Discussion and policy implications Nuclear power presents a compelling case as a sustainable energy source owing to its several key advantages. Its high-energy density allows for substantial electricity generation from minimal fuel, enabling continuous operation, unlike intermittent renewables, such as solar and wind (Rekik and El Alimi, 2023a, 2023b), thus contributing significantly to grid stability (Cramer et al., 2023). Furthermore, nuclear power is a crucial tool for emissions reduction, boasting virtually no greenhouse gas emissions during operation. Although lifecycle emissions associated with fuel processing and plant construction exist, they remain comparable to or lower than those of renewables. Several studies have reported on the energy production capabilities of nuclear power and its contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions compared to other energy sources. A key aspect of these analyses is quantifying the potential contribution of nuclear power to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving net zero targets. However, direct comparison of reported data can be challenging due to variations in model assumptions, geographic scope, and time horizons.  [...] From another perspective, radioactive waste generation poses a significant challenge to nuclear power because of its long-term hazardous nature. This necessitates meticulous management and disposal strategies to mitigate potential social impacts. These impacts arise from perceived or actual risks to human health and the environment, fueling public anxiety and opposition to nuclear power, which is often expressed through protests and legal action (Kyne and Bolin, 2016; Nilsuwankosit, 2017; Ram Mohan and Namboodhiry, 2020). Additionally, communities near waste sites can experience stigmatization, resulting in decreased property values and social isolation. The persistent nature of radioactive waste also raises intergenerational equity issues, burdening future generations with its management (Deng et al., 2020; Mason-Renton and Luginaah, 2019). Thus, transparent communication and stakeholder engagement are crucial for building public trust and ensuring responsible radioactive waste management (Dungan et al., 2021; Sančanin and Penjišević, 2023). There are various radioactive waste disposal pathways, each with unique social and technical considerations. Deep geological disposal, an internationally favored method for high-level waste disposal, involves burying waste deep underground for long-term isolation. Interim storage provides a secure temporary holding until a permanent solution is obtained (Chapman, 1992; Grambow, 2022). Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel recovers reusable materials, reducing high-level waste but creating lower-level waste. Advanced reactor technologies aim to minimize waste and improve safety, potentially converting long-lived isotopes into shorter-lived isotopes (Dixon et al., 2020; Englert and Pistner, 2023). Choosing a disposal pathway requires careful evaluation of factors, such as waste type and volume, geology, feasibility, cost, and public acceptance, often leading to a combined approach. Ongoing community engagement and addressing concerns are essential to safe and responsible waste management. Effective management and disposal of this waste require advanced technological solutions, robust regulatory frameworks, and long-term planning to ensure safety and sustainability (Abdelsalam et al., 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024a), Moreover, its relatively small land footprint compared to other energy sources, especially solar and wind farms, minimizes the ecosystem impact and makes it a sustainable option in densely populated areas (Poinssot et al., 2016; Sadiq et al., 2022). Nuclear power also enhances energy security by reducing reliance on fossil fuels, which is particularly valuable in countries with limited domestic resources (Cramer et al., 2023; Ichord Jr., 2022). Additionally, nuclear power exhibits synergy with other clean technologies, providing a stable baseload complementing variable renewables and facilitating hydrogen production for diverse energy applications (Abdelsalam et al., 2024; El-Emam and Subki, 2021; Salam and Khan, 2018; Rekik, 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024e). Finally, ongoing advancements in reactor design, such as SMRs, promise enhanced safety, reduced costs, and greater deployment flexibility, further solidifying the role of nuclear power in decarbonizing the electricity sector (Aunedi et al., 2023). Supportive policies and international cooperation are essential for fully realizing the potential of nuclear energy. Streamlined licensing and regulatory frameworks are crucial for reducing deployment time and costs and ensuring that safety standards are met efficiently (Gungor and Sari, 2022; Jewell et al., 2019). Furthermore, incentivizing investments through financial tools such as tax credits and loan guarantees can attract private capital and create a level-playing field for nuclear power (Decker and Rauhut, 2021; Nian and Hari, 2017; Zimmermann and Keles, 2023). Addressing public perception through education and engagement is equally important for building trust and acceptance. Moreover, international cooperation is vital in several respects. The disposal of radioactive waste remains a complex issue, requiring careful long-term management and securing geological repositories to prevent environmental contamination owing to the long half-life of some isotopes. Furthermore, while modern reactors incorporate advanced safety features, the potential for accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima remains a concern because of the potential for widespread radiation release and long-term health consequences (Denning and Mubayi, 2016; Högberg, 2013; Wheatley et al., 2016). Moreover, the high initial costs associated with design, construction, and licensing present significant barriers to new nuclear projects, particularly in developing countries. In addition, the risk of nuclear proliferation, in which technology intended for peaceful energy production is diverted for weapons development, necessitates stringent international safeguards, as highlighted by following reference. Public perception also plays a crucial role because negative opinions and concerns about safety and waste disposal can create opposition to new projects. Finally, the decommissioning of nuclear plants at the end of their operational life is a complex and costly process that requires substantial resources and expertise to dismantle reactors and manage radioactive materials. [...] Conclusion The role of nuclear power in sustainable energy transition is multifaceted and significant. As nations worldwide strive to transition toward more environmentally friendly energy systems, nuclear power has emerged as a crucial component of the decarbonization journey. Its capacity to provide low-carbon electricity, mitigate climate change, and contribute to energy security underscores its importance in the broader context of sustainable energy transitions. Despite this, challenges such as safety, waste management, and public perception must be addressed to fully harness the potential of nuclear power to achieve sustainability goals. By leveraging policy frameworks, technological innovations, and international cooperation, nuclear power can play a vital role in shaping the future of sustainable energy transition on a global scale. In this context, EMDEs exert a substantial influence on global growth, collectively accounting for over 90% of the aggregate, with China positioned to emerge as the foremost nuclear power producer before 2030. Concurrently, advanced economies have witnessed a notable 10% increase in their nuclear power capacity. This augmentation is attributed to the commissioning of new facilities, which offset retirements, manifestly observed in nations such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Furthermore, there is a marked escalation in annual global investment in nuclear power, surging from US$30 billion throughout the 2010s to surpass US$100 billion by 2030. This upward trajectory is robustly sustained, remaining above US$80 billion by 2050. In conclusion, the remarkable decline in the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for solar PV and wind power over the past decade has positioned renewable energy as a cost-competitive and viable alternative to fossil fuels in many regions. The over 80% reduction in LCOE for utility-scale solar PV from 2010 to 2022 exemplifies the economic feasibility of renewables. Concurrently, the steady growth in renewable energy capacity, spearheaded by solar and wind energy, underscores their critical role in the global energy transition. With renewable electricity capacity surpassing 3300 GW in 2023 and accounting for over one-third of the global power mix, renewable energy is undeniably at the forefront of efforts to achieve a sustainable, low-carbon energy future. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ORCID iDSassi Rekik https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5224-4152Supplemental materialSupplemental material for this article is available online.ReferencesAbbasi K, Jiao Z, Shahbaz M, et al. (2020) Asymmetric impact of renewable and non-renewable energy on economic growth in Pakistan: New evidence from a nonlinear analysis. Energy Exploration & Exploitation 38(5): 1946–1967. Crossref. Web of Science.Abdelsalam E, Almomani F, Azzam A, et al. 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Abstract The international system is currently undergoing a process of reconfiguration that is having an impact on all areas of global development. In this process of reordering power relations, there is a tendency to move towards multipolarity, leaving behind the unipolar coalition established after the Second World War. In this context, several emerging powers are gaining increasing international power, which has led to changes in the hierarchy of power on the international geopolitical chessboard. Such is the case of the People's Republic of China, which has established itself not only as a power of great impact and relevance in the Asian region, but also in the entire international system. Namely, the management of the government and the Party in terms of innovation, industrialization, informatization, productivity, expansion and internationalization of its economic model, positions this country as the most dynamic center of the international economy. Evidencing that alternative models to the capitalist system are possible and viable, which strengthens the trend towards a systemic transition and multipolarity in the International System Introduction In the last two decades, a set of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and conflicts have become evident, with significant implications extending throughout the International System. As a result, we are currently experiencing a convulsion of the established order, giving way to a process of new global reconfigurations. In this context, several researchers and academics such as Jorge Casals, Leyde Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián Schulz, among others, have noted that these conditions have led to a crisis and hegemonic transition process, with a trend toward multipolarity in which the Asia-Pacific region is gaining increasing relevance. This article, titled "The International Reconfiguration’s Process Towards Multipolarity: The Role of China as an Emerging Power," is dedicated to analyzing the position of this country within the current international reconfiguration of power. Accordingly, the first section will systematize some essential guidelines to understand the current crisis and the decline of the hegemonic order established in the post-World War II period. The second section will address China's positioning amid the international reconfiguration of power. In this regard, it is important to note that China's rapid rise highlights how development management aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals can lead to a shift in the paradigm of international relations, as well as power reconfigurations that challenge the current balance of forces. Thus, it can be affirmed that China's rise constitutes a decisive element within the current trend toward multipolarity. DevelopmentNew International Order: Approaches to the Multipolar Reconfiguration of the International System The current international context is marked by a process of crisis. This crisis reflects the fact that the world order no longer aligns with the correlation of forces that gave rise to it during the post-World War II period. It is not a circumstantial crisis, but rather the interlinking of various interconnected crises that span across all sectors of life. That is to say, the effects of one crisis often become the causes of another, involving economic, political, social, cultural, ethical, moral, technological, commercial, and environmental components. In other words, it is a structural and systemic crisis—one that cannot be resolved unless a similarly systemic transformation occurs. To gain greater clarity, it is important to consider that the consolidation of the capitalist system brought about the process of globalization. This, in turn, introduced large-scale production and technological development capable of increasing output. This process, along with other characteristics of the system, has exponentially accelerated social inequalities between developed and developing countries. It has also led to strategic tensions over the control of resources, raw materials, and inputs, resulting in geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, the capitalist system has imposed an extremely high environmental cost, demonstrating that it is exceeding both its own limits and those of the planet. Specifically, in its constant pursuit of profit and maximization of gains, negative environmental impacts are not factored into cost-benefit analyses, leading to widespread environmental degradation. Among other harms caused by the system, we observe a decline in investment rates, an increase in public debt, loss of autonomy in monetary policy, rising unemployment levels, reductions in real wages, and growing inequality, among others. In short, capitalism has become an unsustainable system whose primary concern is profit generation—something that is currently entirely incompatible with environmental preservation and the responsible use of natural resources. Therefore, it can be affirmed that some of its most alarming effects include: vast amounts of currency without backing, increasingly concentrated in fewer hands; acceleration of capital concentration in the West; rising military expenditures; and environmental pollution and destruction (Casals, J., 2023). On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify that, for a particular state to be considered hegemonic, it must not only exert its influence predominantly within the system of international relations; its hegemonic role must also be linked to the founding and establishment of a universally accepted concept of world order. That is, the majority of other states must recognize it as such and identify with the model promoted by the hegemon. Therefore, it is not merely a matter of a hierarchical order among states, but rather the adoption of a dominant model of production that involves those states. As a result, certain mechanisms or general rules of conduct are established for the participating states. For this reason, a hegemonic crisis involving the dominant actor in the system of international relations leads to a crisis in the social, economic, political, and institutional structures upon which that actor’s dominance was built. In light of these elements, we currently observe a set of powers within the International System that are vying to establish a new distribution of power—one that moves away from the unipolar coalition led by the United States following World War II. From this perspective, Juan Sebastián Schulz asserts: “A hegemonic crisis occurs when the existing hegemonic state lacks either the means or the will to continue steering the interstate system in a direction broadly perceived as favorable—not only for its own power, but also for the collective power of the dominant groups within the system.” (Schulz, J. S., 2022) As a result, strategic alliances have been formed and new power groups have emerged that influence international relations.These blocs are precisely what the new polarity is forming around, increasingly reinforcing the trend toward multipolarity. This is a system in which hegemonic influence is not determined by a single power, but by two, three, or more. In this regard, Juan Sebastián Schulz further notes that a process of insubordination is becoming evident, particularly in the Western peripheries. As a consequence, several countries have begun to criticize the configuration of the contemporary world order, initiating efforts to organize and propose alternative models (Schulz, J. S., 2022). This reveals the emergence of a new kind of power hierarchy, generating a global order in which a diversity of forces and actors prevails. In this context, China has experienced rapid growth, thereby contributing to the trend toward multipolarity. While this does not imply that the United States will cease to be one of the central powers in the system of international relations—given its considerable global influence—it is evident that there is a noticeable decline in the dominance it held during the unipolar era that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This process of intersystemic transition unfolds in various phases. First, there is an observable economic transition marked by a shift in the center of gravity of the global economy toward emerging and developing economies. This shift is accompanied by a necessary technological transition, characterized by a new struggle—this time to lead the technological revolution. These changes, in turn, must be supported by a political transition. Currently, countries from the Global South have gained increasing prominence on the international stage [1]. From this foundation, a geopolitical transition is also underway, where the center of gravity and decision-making—once concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon West—is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, a cultural or civilizational transition is taking place, wherein the previously dominant value system is giving way to the rise of a new worldview. Based on this, the phases of the transition process can be outlined as follows: Existence of a stable order that brings together the majority of nation-states in the International System. - A crisis of legitimacy begins to affect the established global order. - A deconcentration and delegitimization of power emerges, impacting the hegemonic power. - An arms race and formation of alliances ensue in an attempt to preserve the hierarchical order by any means. This leads to a widespread crisis and the rise and emergence of new actors. - A necessary resolution of the international crisis. - Renewal of the system. (Schulz, J. S., 2022) In light of the above, it can be stated that a “new international order” is taking shape. Its manifestations are multifaceted, such as: - The rise of movements and associations of states that serve as alternatives to the neoliberal order. - Emerging powers like China and Russia are gaining strength in various sectors of the international geopolitical arena. - Russia's confrontation with NATO in the context of the conflict with Ukraine. - Sanctions imposed by the United States on various NATO and European Union countries have strengthened the BRICS nations. - The incorporation of new members into BRICS can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the economic and political dominance of the United States and the European Union. - The expansion of anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal integration mechanisms that promote South-South cooperation, such as the G-77 + China group. - The financial sanctions imposed by the West on Russia in the context of the Ukraine conflict have sparked a debate about the viability of the international monetary system and the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. - China and Russia conduct transactions in yuan and sell oil in this currency to Iran, Venezuela, and Gulf countries. China has increased its economic and political influence in the world, which can be seen as a challenge to U.S. hegemony. Its leadership within BRICS and its growing role in the global economy may be indicators of a shift in the balance of power. All these developments reflect a growing awareness within the International System of States regarding the importance of international cooperation to address global challenges such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and food security. They also serve as indicators that a transformation is underway in the way countries interact with each other, resulting in a shift in the economic, political, and strategic center of gravity. In this context, the United States has unleashed a global hybrid war as a desperate attempt to defend and maintain its hegemonic position, which once appeared unshakable in the postwar world. To this end, it has targeted China, as the latter represents its main threat in the economic and scientific-technological order. From this perspective, tensions between the United States and China have significantly deteriorated since the Republican administration of President Donald Trump. Beginning in 2017, his policy took on an aggressive stance toward China, manifesting through a trade war and economic attacks aimed at preserving U.S. global hegemony. This demonstrates that, in response to a process of decline already underway, nationalist and protectionist efforts intensified in the U.S., with policies targeting some of the emerging pillars of the crisis-ridden world order—China being a primary example. Under the administration of Joseph Biden, the focus shifted toward competition, emphasizing the commitment to protect U.S. sovereignty from potential Chinese threats. A significant shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan became evident with the approval of arms sales to Taiwan in August 2023, which escalated tensions in the region (Collective of Authors). Furthermore, in recent years, the United States has increasingly worked to generate geopolitical and geoeconomic motivations aimed at fostering tensions between China and Russia, potentially sparking conflict between the two. It has strengthened alliances with neighboring countries of these powers—most notably Taiwan and Ukraine—which has triggered concerns and tensions in both nations. A containment policy has also been deployed, including the imposition of trade barriers and tariffs on Chinese products; restricting Chinese companies’ access to U.S. technology and markets; and promoting the diversification of supply chains to reduce dependence on China. Nevertheless, the ongoing sanctions and restrictions have only served to reaffirm the shared survival interests of both powers, strengthening corporate ties and relations between them. These actions also reflect the growing concern among U.S. power groups over the decline of their hegemonic dominance. The Emergence of China and Its Role in the Transition Toward Multipolarity In a previous article titled "The Synergy Between Economy and Environment in China Through the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals," (‘La sinergia entre economía y medio ambiente en China mediante la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible’) the process of socioeconomic transformations experienced in the People's Republic of China over the past decade was discussed. These transformations have been primarily aimed at revitalizing the nation in preparation for its centenary in 2049. This strategy is rooted in aligning the Centenary Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set for 2030, under the leadership of the Communist Party and the momentum driven by President Xi Jinping. The results of this strategy have had an impact not only on the Asian Giant itself—now a decisive actor in the Asian region—but also on the international order as a whole. As a result, China has emerged as a powerful rising power, with promising prospects for further elevating its development standards. This is backed by sustained GDP growth, averaging between 6% and 8% annually, indicating a robust economy. In addition, China holds vast foreign exchange reserves, granting it economic stability and the capacity to withstand potential external shocks. It also invests heavily in modern infrastructure and cutting-edge sectors such as artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and renewable energy—all of which enhance its competitiveness and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainable growth (Lagarde, CH). Nonetheless, China has also had to confront significant challenges in its gradual and progressive approach to the desired development model. Among these is the environmental cost associated with its rapid economic growth. For instance, China still experiences high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, along with air, water, and soil pollution. In response, measures have been implemented such as the establishment of a national monitoring network and the replacement of coal heating systems in Beijing. Efforts have also been made to purify water resources polluted by industrial processes, and imports of solid waste have been reduced to help decontaminate soils affected by industrial and agricultural activities (González, R., 2023). In general, the development of renewable energy and a circular economy model is being promoted to enable a gradual transition toward a green economy, grounded in the concept of an ecological civilization. For this reason, China’s new era is committed to scientific and technological innovation as a means of driving economic growth that is both sustainable and capable of ensuring a higher quality of life for its population. This, in turn, leads gradually toward a new model of political leadership and economic management. In this regard, Jin Keyu, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), has stated that “trillions of dollars of investment are needed for the global green transition, and China is going to play an essential role in that transformation” (Feingold, S., 2024). Based on the aforementioned elements, various authors such as Dr. C. Charles Pennaforte, Dr. C. Juan Sebastián Schulz, Dr. C. Eduardo Regalado Florido, among others, have indicated that the millenary nation represents a threat to the hegemony held by the United States since World War II. Consequently, it is recognized that a process of hegemonic crisis and transition is currently underway, with the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the center of gravity of the global power, thereby contributing to the multipolar transformation of the International System. The authors of “Is China Changing the World?” argue that “market socialism with “Chinese characteristics” must gradually and more clearly diverge from capitalism if it is to embody a genuinely alternative path for all of humanity.” In pursuit of this goal, China bases its policy of peaceful coexistence on five fundamental principles:Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, regardless of a country's size, power, or wealth. Mutual non-aggression Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, acknowledging that each nation has the right to freely choose its own social system and path of development. Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence. (Herrera, R.; Long, Z.; and Andréani, T., 2023) The rise of China as a major international power under these principles has been consolidating since 2012 under the leadership of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC), gaining particular momentum from 2020 to the present. Thus, China has not only become the leading power within the Asian regional balance but has also expanded its presence across Europe, Africa, and Latin America—primarily through loans, investments, and multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa and the China-CELAC Forum in Latin America. In addition, China has positioned itself as a leader in several sectors, and it is projected that its economy may surpass that of the United States, increasing its Gross Domestic Product (Rodríguez, L., 2022). It has also undergone a process of opening up, energizing both its international trade and its overall foreign relations, all under the control of the Government and the Party. This, combined with its rise and development initiatives, has made China a focal point of interest for many countries within the International System seeking to jointly advance projects based on cooperation, the principle of shared advantage, and multilateralism. In this regard, the white paper "China and the World in the New Era," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2019, states: “The world is moving rapidly toward multipolarity, diverse models of modern development, and collaboration in global governance. It is now impossible for a single country or bloc of countries to dominate world affairs. Stability, peace, and development have become the common aspirations of the international community.” (People’s Republic of China, 2019. Quoted in Schulz, J. S., 2022) Undoubtedly, this rise has become a source of concern for U.S. power groups, which have increasingly applied geostrategic pressure. Notably, the United States has strengthened military alliances with India, Japan, and Australia in an effort to encircle China and attempt to control or obstruct its maritime routes—this also being a manifestation of the intensification of the imperialist arms race. Nonetheless, China has maintained its development strategy and, as part of it, has strengthened its diplomatic network and its relations with multiple countries across all world regions. For all these reasons, China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. Notably, it went from representing 4% of global GDP in 1960 to 16% in 2020—undeniable evidence of rapid economic growth. Moreover, it has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and also the leading importer, establishing itself as a major industrial power. In this regard, United Nations data reveal that China leads global industrial production, accounting for 30% of the total. This figure surpasses other industrial powers such as the United States (16%), Japan (7%), Germany (5.7%), and South Korea (3.2%) (Schulz, J. S., 2022). In addition, China has remained the world’s leading manufacturing power for approximately 15 consecutive years, according to statements from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology at the beginning of this year. This sector alone has contributed over 40% to overall growth. Likewise, in 2024, China experienced a significant increase in foreign investment, reflecting its interest in strengthening international cooperation for development. Efforts are also underway for urban renewal in 2024, with around 60,000 projects being implemented across various cities. These initiatives are primarily aimed at transforming underdeveloped neighborhoods and creating smarter urban areas (Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in the People's Republic of China, 2025). In this regard, the following graphs illustrate the value of China’s international trade during the 2016–2024 period, highlighting a strong presence of exports compared to imports. A second chart shows China's global export share, where it holds a dominant position.   Thus, China has risen as a center of power in the international system, with leadership not only in the economic domain but also in science and technology. At the same time, it has promoted a series of investments and a process of internationalizing its national currency. Accordingly, the Asian Giant offers an alternative model of development—one that is more comprehensive and sustainable—allowing it to propel the new phase of Chinese development. This phase aims not only to fulfill the dream of national rejuvenation but also to ensure the survival of its unique political, economic, and social model. Nevertheless, the significant challenges of sustaining growth cannot be overlooked. From this perspective, experts believe that new avenues of growth will be necessary for China to maintain the trajectory it has been experiencing. Specifically, the country must continue expanding its industrial sector while strengthening areas such as artificial intelligence, digital financial services, and green technologies (Feingold, S., 2024). It is also important to highlight the projected continuity and leadership of the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping identified as a key figure in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in China, in conjunction with the socioeconomic transformation strategy toward the 2049 centenary. This has been pursued through the defense of multilateralism, economic openness, and international integration and cooperation in support of global development. Conclusions In light of the above, a decline in U.S. hegemony can be observed, even though this process is not linear—nor is it certain whether any single power or coalition has come to occupy a hegemonic position. What is clear, however, is the existence of a trend toward multipolarity, driven by emerging powers and the strategic ties they are establishing. This is giving rise to a non-hegemonic reconfiguration of power blocs, which are building a multilateral and multipolar institutional framework. It can also be affirmed that China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. This has been supported by its growth strategy focused on industrialization, digitalization, innovation, productivity, expansion, and internationalization of its development model—while maintaining a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability. A range of key initiatives and development projects have been implemented to support the country's rise, consolidating its role in the multipolar reconfiguration of the International System. All of this has been essential in driving China’s new phase of development and contributing to the broader process of multipolar transformation. Undoubtedly, China’s rapid ascent represents a significant challenge to the International System, as it reflects a shift in international relations and a transformation in the distribution and hierarchy of global power. Notes [1] It is important to clarify that the so-called Global South should not be equated with the Third World, as the distinction between the First and Third Worlds is primarily based on economic and technological differences, which do not align with the current circumstances of the International System of States. In contrast, the term Global South emerges from a new geopolitical perspective that arose in the post–Cold War context, driven by the need to promote South-South cooperation. 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Abstract Climate change is considered to be one of the biggest problems acknowledged globally today. Therefore, the causes of climate change and solutions to this problem are frequently investigated. For this reason, the purpose of this study is to empirically examine whether the ‘Climate Change Performance Index’ (CCPI) is successful in increasing environmental investments for E-7 countries with the data for the period of 2008–2023. To achieve this aim, the Parks-Kmenta estimator was used as the econometric method in the study. The study findings provide strong evidence that increases in the climate change performance support environmental investments. High climate change performance directs governments and investors toward investing in this area; therefore, environmental investments tend to increase. The study also examined the effects of population growth, real GDP and inflation on environmental investments. Accordingly, it has been concluded that population growth and inflation negatively affect environmental investments, while GDP positively affects environmental investments. 1. Introduction There is a broad consensus that the main cause of climate change is human-based greenhouse gas emissions from non-renewable (i.e., fossil) fuels and improper land use. Accordingly, climate change may have serious negative consequences as well as significant macroeconomic outcomes. For example, an upward trend of temperatures, the rising sea levels, and extreme weather conditions can seriously disrupt the output and productivity (IMF, 2008a; Eyraud et al., 2013). Due to the global climate change, many countries today see environmental investments, especially renewable energy investments, as an important part of their growth strategies. Until recent years, the most important priority of many countries was an improvement in the economic growth figures. Still, the global climate change and the emergence of many related problems are now directing countries toward implementing policies which would be more sensitive to the environment and would ensure sustainable growth rather than just increase the growth figures. (Baştürk, 2024: 327). The orientation of various countries to these policies has led to an increase in environmental investments on a global scale. A relative rise of the share of environmental investments worldwide is not only a medium-term climate goal. It also brings many new concepts to the agenda, such as an increasing energy security, reduction of the negative impact of air pollution on health, and the possibility of finding new growth resources (Accenture, 2011; McKinsey, 2009; (OECD), 2011; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Eyraud et al., 2013). Today, environmental investments have a significant share in energy and electricity production. According to the World Energy Outlook (2023), investments in environmentally friendly energies have increased by approximately 40% since 2020. The effort to reduce emissions is the key reason for this increase, but it is not the only reason. Economic reasons are also quite strong in preferring environmental energy technologies. For example, energy security is also fundamentally important in the increase in environmental investments. Especially in fuel-importing countries, industrial plans and the necessity to spread clean (i.e., renewable) energy jobs throughout the country are important factors (IEA WEO, 2023).  In economic literature, environmental investments are generally represented by renewable energy investments. Accordingly, Figure 1 below presents global renewable energy electricity production for 2000–2020. According to the data obtained from IRENA (2024) and Figure 1, the total electricity production has increased by approximately 2.4% since 2011, with renewable energy sources contributing 6.1% to this rate, while non-renewable energy sources contributed 1.3%. In 2022 alone, renewable electricity grew by 7.2% compared to 2021. Solar and wind energy provided the largest growth in renewable electricity since 2010, which reached 11.7% of the global electricity mix in 2022.   Figure 2 below presents renewable energy investments by technology between 2013 and 2022. As shown in Figure 2, photovoltaic solar. and terrestrial wind categories are dominating, accounting for 46% and 32% of the global renewable energy investment, respectively, during 2013–2022.   Economic growth supported by environmental investments is impacted by the type and number of energy used to increase the national output. Thus, both the environmental friendliness of the energy used and the rise in energy efficiency is bound to reduce carbon emissions related to energy use and encourage economic growth (Hussain and Dogan, 2021). In this context, in order to minimize emissions and ensure sustainable economic growth, renewable energy sources should be used instead of fossil resources in energy use. Increasing environmental investments on a global scale, especially a boost in renewable energy investments, is seen as a more comprehensive solution to the current global growth-development and environmental degradation balance. In this context, as a result of the latest Conference of the Parties held in Paris, namely, COP21, it was envisaged to make an agreement covering the processes after 2020, which is accepted as the end year of the Kyoto Protocol. On December 12, 2015, the Paris Agreement was adopted unanimously by the countries that are parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kaya, 2020). As a result of the Paris Agreement and the reports delivered by the Intergovernmental Climate Change Panels, international efforts to adapt to the action to combat climate change and global warming have increased, and awareness has been raised in this area (Irfan et al., 2021; Feng et al., 2022; Anser et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2021; Huang et al., 2021; Fang, 2023). The rise in the demand for low-carbon energy sources in economies has been caused by environmental investments such as renewable energy investments. The countries that are party to the Paris Agreement, commit to the way to achieve efficient energy systems through the spread of renewable energy technologies throughout the country (Bashir et al., 2021; Fang, 2023). This study empirically examines the impact of the climate change performance on increasing environmental investments for E-7 countries. The climate change performance is expressed by the ‘Climate Change Performance Index’ (CCPI) developed by the German environmental and developmental organization Germanwatch. The index evaluates the climate protection performance of 63 developed and developing countries and the EU annually, and compares the data. Within this framework, CCPI seeks to increase clarity in international climate policies and practices, and enables a comparison of the progress achieved by various countries in their climate protection struggle. CCPI evaluates the performance of each country in four main categories: GHG Emissions (40% overall ranking), Renewable Energy (20%), Energy Use (20%), and Climate Policy (20%). In calculating this index, each category of GHG emissions, renewable energy, and energy use is measured by using four indicators. These are the Current Level, the Past Trend, the Current Level Well Below 2°C Compliance, and the Countries’ Well Below 2°C Compliance with the 2030 Target. The climate policy category is evaluated annually with a comprehensive survey in two ways: as the National Climate Policy and the International Climate Policy (https://ccpi.org/methodology/).  Figure 3 below shows the world map presenting the total results of the countries evaluated in CCPI 2025 and their overall performance, including the four main categories outlined above.   As it can be seen from Figure 3, no country appears strong enough to receive a ‘very high’ score across all categories. Moreover, although Denmark continues to be the highest-ranking country in the index, but it still does not perform well enough to receive a ‘very high’ score overall. On the other hand, India, Germany, the EU, and the G20 countries/regions will be among the highest-performing countries/regions in the 2024 index. When we look at Canada, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia, they are the worst-performing countries in the G20. On the other hand, it can be said that Türkiye, Poland, the USA, and Japan are the worst-performing countries in the overall ranking. The climate change performance index is an important criterion because it indicates whether the change and progress in combating climate change is occurring across all countries at an important level. The index is important in answering various questions for countries under discussion. These questions are expressed below:  • In which stage are the countries in the categories in which the index is calculated?• What policies should countries follow after seeing the stages in which they are in each category? • Which countries are setting an example by truly combating climate change? These questions also constitute the motivation for this study. The sample group for the study was selected as E-7 countries, which are called the Emerging Economies; this list consists of Türkiye, China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia. The reason for selecting these particular countries is that they are undergoing a rapid development and transformation process, and are also believed to be influential in the future with their increasing share in the world trade volume, huge populations, and advances in technology. Besides that, when the relevant literature has been examined, studies that empirically address the relative ranking of the climate change performance appear to be quite limited. In particular, there are almost no studies evaluating the climate change performance index for the sample group considered. Therefore, it is thought that this study will be of great importance in filling this gap in the literature. The following section of the study, which aims to empirically examine whether the climate change performance is effective in developing environmental investments in E-7 countries, includes national and international selected literature review on the subject. Then, the model of the study and the variables chosen in this model are introduced. Then, the findings obtained in the study are shared, and the study ends with discussion and policy proposal. 2. Literature Review 2.1. Studies on environmental investment  The excessive use of fossil-based energy sources, considered non-renewable and dirty energy, along with industrialization, constitutes a large part of carbon emissions and is regarded as the main reason of climate change. Thus, countries have turned to renewable energy investments with the objective to minimize the reaction of climate change and global warming, by introducing technologies which are considered more environmentally friendly and cleaner. Global energy investments are estimated to exceed 3 trillion US dollars by the end of 2024, and 2 trillion US dollars of this amount will go to clean and environmentally friendly energy base technologies and infrastructure. Investment in environmentally friendly energy has been gaining speed since 2020, and the total expense on renewable energy, networks, and storage now represents a higher figure than the total spending on oil, gas, and coal (IEA, 2024). When the energy economics literature is examined, since environmental investments are mostly represented by renewable energy investments, renewable energy investments studies and studies in related fields shall be discussed in this study section. One of the important studies in this field is the work of Eyraud et al. (2013). In the study, the authors analyzed the determinants of environmental and green (clean) investments for 35 developed and developing countries. Accordingly, they stated in the study that environmental investment has become the main driving force of the energy sector, and China has generally driven its rapid growth in recent years. In addition, in terms of the econometric results of the study, it has been found that environmental investments are supported by economic growth, a solid financial system suitable for lower interest rates, and higher fuel prices. Fang (2023) examined the relationship between investments in the renewable energy sector, the economic complexity index, green technological innovation, industrial structure growth, and carbon emissions in 32 provinces in China for the period of 2005–2019 by using the GMM method. Based on the study results, the economic complexity index causes an increase in China’s carbon dioxide levels. On the contrary, all of the following – the square of the economic complexity index, investments in clean energy, green technical innovation, and the industrial structure – were found to help decrease carbon dioxide emissions. Another important study in this field is the work of Masini and Menichetti (2013). The authors examined the non-financial sources of renewable energy investments in their study. Accordingly, the study results show that knowledge and confidence in technological competence positively impact renewable energy investments. In addition, trust in policy measures only impacts PV (Photovoltaic) and hydropower investments, whereas institutional pressure negatively impacts renewable energy investments. Finally, the study stated that experienced investors are more likely to fund innovations in renewable energy. One of the important studies on renewable energy investments is the work of Ozorhon et al. (2018). To support and facilitate the decision-making process in renewable energy investments, the authors determined the main criteria affecting investors’ decisions by reviewing the literature and examining sector-level practices. According to the findings, economic criteria, like policies and regulations, funds availability, and investment costs were the most important factors in the decision-making process for renewable energy investments. Xu et al. (2024) examined the relationship between the renewable energy investments and the renewable energy development with a threshold value analysis for China. According to the results, impact of the clean (renewable) energy investment on renewable energy development has a significant threshold value, and the general relation between them is a ‘V’ type non-linear relation. At this point, the study suggests that the state should keep spending in the segment of investments in clean energy, increase the financial proficiency, and ensure an efficient financial infrastructure for clean energy in China. 2.2. Studies on Climate Change and their Impact on Economic Variables  The widespread use of fossil-based energy sources, considered dirty energy, continues to create a negative externality in carbon emissions despite the globally implemented policies like the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (Rezai et al., 2021). The economic literature on climate change focuses particularly on the adverse effect of climate change on the economy. One of the important studies in this field is the study of Fan et al. (2019). In their study, the authors focused on the impact of climate change on the energy sector for 30 provinces in China and conducted their research with the help of a fixed-effect regression feedback model. As a result of the study, it was found that hot and low-temperature days positively affected the electricity demand. On the other hand, Singh et al. (2022) examined the effects of climate change on agricultural sustainability in India with data from 1990–2017. On the grounds of the study, it was found that India’s agricultural sector was negatively impacted by the climate change. In this regard, it is stated that India needs to take powerful climate policy action so that to reduce the adverse effect of the climate change and increase its sustainable agricultural development. One of the important studies in this field is the study of Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2013). This study investigated how the climate change affects the financial performance with a sample of 855 international companies operating in sectors with high greenhouse gas/ CO2 emissions from 2006–2009. The results reveal that the relationship between the environmental and financial performance is higher in times of economic crisis triggered by climate crisis. In other words, these results show that companies should continue investing in sustainable projects in order to achieve higher profits. Kahn et al. (2021) examined the long-term macroeconomic impact of the climate change by using a panel data set consisting of 174 countries between 1960 and 2014. According to the findings, the amount of output per capita is negatively affected by temperature changes, but no statistically significant effect is observed for changes in precipitation. In addition, according to the study’s results, the main effects of temperature shocks also vary across income groups. Alagidede et al. (2015) examined the effect of climate change on sustainable economic growth in the Sub-Saharan Africa region in their study. The study stated that the relationship between the real GDP and the climate change is not linear. In addition, Milliner and Dietz (2011) investigated the long-term economic consequences of the climate change. Accordingly, as the economy develops over time, and as progress is achieved, this situation will automatically be less affected by the adverse impact of the climate change. Structural changes made with economic development will make sectors more sensitive to the climate change, such as the agricultural sector, which would become stronger and less dependent. Dell et al. (2008) examined the effect of climate change on economic activity. The study’s main results are as follows: an increase of temperatures significantly decreases economic growth in low-income countries. Furthermore, increasing temperature does not affect economic growth in high-income countries. On the other hand, when examining the effects of climate change on the economy, the study of Zhou et al. (2023) is also fundamentally important. Zhou et al. (2023) examined the literature on the effects of climate change risks on the financial sector. In the studies examined, it is generally understood that natural disasters and climate change reduce bank stability, credit supply, stock and bond market returns, and foreign direct investment inflows. In their study for Sri Lanka, Abeysekara et al. (2023) created a study using the general equilibrium model ORANI-G-SL with the objective to investigate the economic impacts of the climate change on agricultural production. The study findings suggest that reductions in the production of many agricultural products will lead to increases in consumer prices for these agricultural commodities, resulting in a decrease in the overall household consumption. The projected decrease in crop production and increases in food prices will increase the potential for food insecurity Another important document in this field is the study by Caruso et al. (2024) examining the relationship between the climate change and human capital. The study findings reveal a two-way result regarding the effects of the climate change damages and the effects of climate change mitigation and adaptation on the human capital. Accordingly, the climate change has direct effects on health, nutrition and welfare, while changes in markets and damage to the infrastructure are expressed as indirect effects. In addition to these studies, the uncertainty of the climate change policies also exerts an impact on economic factors. Studies conducted in this context in recent years have also enriched the literature on the climate change. For example, Çelik and Özarslan Doğan (2024) examined the effects of uncertainty of the climate change policies on economic growth for the USA by using the ARDL bounds test. Their results confirmed the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between the climate policy uncertainty and economic growth in the USA. 3. Model Specification  This study empirically examines whether the climate change performance index successfully develops environmental investments in E-7 countries. For further details related to the mathematical model check https://doi.org/10.15388/Ekon.2025.104.2.6 4. Conclusion and Policy Implications  Today, many national and international initiatives are within the scope of combating global warming and climate change. In addition, many developed and developing countries are differentiating their growth and development policies with the objective to prevent these disasters. Although they vary from country to country, as well as from region to region, these policies mostly represent those policies which reduce carbon emissions and ensure energy efficiency. At this point, the key factor is renewable energy investments, which represent environmentally friendly investments. However, according to Abban and Hasan (2021), the amount of environmentally friendly investments is not the same in every country. This is because the determinants of environmentally friendly investments vary from country to country. While financial and economic factors are more encouraging in increasing these investments in some countries, international sanctions are the driving force in this regard in some other countries as well. This study aims to empirically examine whether CCPI is effective in the success of environmental investments in the E-7 countries in the period of 2008–2023 with the help of the Parks-Kmenta estimator. In this direction, the study’s dependent variable is environmental investments, represented by renewable energy investments. On the other hand, the climate change performance is represented by the ‘Climate Change Performance Index’ calculated by Germanwatch, which constitutes the main independent variable of the study. Other control variables considered in the study are the population growth, the real GDP per capita, and inflation. The study findings provide strong evidence that increases in the climate change performance support environmental investments. High-rate climate change performance drives governments and investors toward investing in this area; thus, environmental investments tend to increase. These results are consistent with the study results of Raza et al. (2021). As a result of their study, Raza et al. (2021) stated that the climate change performance is an important channel for the general environmental change, and that renewable energy has a very important role in this regard.  In addition, the study concludes that population growth and inflation negatively affect environmental investments. These results are consistent with Suhrab et al. (2023), but not with Yang et al. (2016). While Suhrab et al. (2023) obtained results regarding the negative effects of inflation on green investments, Yang et al. (2016) focused on the positive effect of population on renewable energy. Finally, the effect of the real GDP per capita on environmental investments has been found to be positive. These results are also consistent with Tudor and Sova (2021). The authors found that Real GDP encourages green investments. This study offers policymakers a number of policy recommendations. These are presented below. • One of the important factors affecting the climate change performance is the raising of awareness of the populations in these countries at this point, and providing them with the knowledge to demand clean energy. In this way, consumers, would demand environmental energy, and investors would invest more in this area. This is of great importance in increasing environmental investments. • The climate change performance also shows how transparent the energy policies implemented by countries are. Therefore, the more achievable and explanatory are the goals of policy makers in this regard, the more climate change performance will increase, which will strengthen environmental investments. • Moreover, the initial installation costs are the most important obstacles on the way toward developing environmental investments. At this point, the country needs to develop support mechanisms that would encourage investors to invest more. • Environmental investments, similar to other types of physical investments, are greatly affected by the country’s macroeconomic indicators. At this point, a stable and foresighted economic policy will encourage an increase in such investments. The countries in the sample group represent developing countries. Therefore, in many countries in this category, the savings rates within the country are insufficient to make investments. At this point, the financial system that will bring together those who supply funds and those who demand funds in the country; this system needs to be developed further. In addition, more extensive use of new and various financial instruments should be encouraged with the objective to collect the capital required for environmental investments. References Abban, A. R., & Hasan, M. Z. (2021). Revisiting the determinants of renewable energy investment-New evidence from political and government ideology. Energy Policy, 151, 112184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. enpol.2021.112184 (missing in the following “Access date:dd.mm.20yy”) Abeysekara, W. C. S. M., Siriwardana, M., & Meng, S. (2023). Economic consequences of climate change impacts on the agricultural sector of South Asia: A case study of Sri Lanka. 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Abstract: The Sahel is the most attractive strip of Africa for terrorist groups to establish themselves in. As a result of the fragility of the area and the limited resources to deal with armed gangs, more and more terrorist groups are emerging and coexisting in the area. This paper aims to briefly analyse the multiplicity of terrorist groups and the relationship between them, focusing essentially on one question: is the rise of Salafi attacks that make the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism caused by all terrorist groups acting together to achieve their aims, or is each acting independently? Keywords:Sahel - Terrorism - Jihadism - Terrorist groups - Cooperation - Competition. The Sahel: Africa’s Perfect Stage for Terrorists?  The Sahel is defined as the large strip that runs from west to east across Africa, between the Sahara Desert and the tropical zone of Sub-Saharan Africa1; in fact, Sahel derives from an Arabic word meaning ‘shore’, thus forming the southern shore of the great Sahara Desert. Although this area covers a dozen countries, due to the existence of a greater number of similarities between certain states in the area, reference is usually made to five specific countries when talking about the Sahel, specifically those that formed the G5 Sahel group between February 2014 and November 2023, with the aim of trying to find a joint and concerted solution to the instability in the area.  Indeed, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania share similarities given their historical and political past, to a greater extent than the rest of the Sahelian countries, and all of them are subject to strong instability. Within this general instability, it should be noted that in the case of the first three countries mentioned above, they share the so-called ‘triple border’, an area where 80% of the attacks recorded in the Sahel are concentrated2.  The countries have the common legacy of the mostly French colonisation process, sometimes, and more in the framework of current narratives, it is held responsible for having generated great instability in their political institutions and in the economy of the states3. And, faced with the challenge of having to develop democratic and stable political regimes, the reality is that these have mostly failed, especially in the countries that make up this triple frontier, which have been subject to multiple coups between 2020 and 2023, generating a powerful feeling of instability, especially towards the most vulnerable population4 who always suffer the consequences of political and social instability.  In addition, they are very poor countries; in the Human Development Index these countries are among the 10 poorest of those evaluated worldwide5, and to which must be added the negative effects of climate change, which has a direct impact on food insecurity, health problems and the quality of life of civilians6, and have a life expectancy of around 53 and 65 years.7 As these are countries with limited security along with an overflowing population growth, with the population doubling every twenty years, since 65% are under 25 years old sytems and bodies8 - since they are fed by the taxes collected - they are not very effective and security can only be provided in some parts of these countries, which leads to a growing feeling of distrust and frustration on the part of the population towards them and towards the government, so that the ‘social contract’, the obligation to respect the rules and laws of a state in exchange for receiving a series of services - the basic and primordial one being security - is not fulfilled in large parts of the Sahel. Faced with this situation, jihadist groups sometimes present themselves as an alternative capable of offering certain services to cover these needs neglected by governments9. In such complex and hopeless conditions, where the feeling of abandonment and the instinct for survival grow, being part of a terrorist group - or an organised crime group - is often seen by many young people as almost the only work alternative, often the only viable choice.10 .. or emigration. While the term ‘jihad’ generates debate and there is no clear consensus on its meaning and personal implication, in the literal sense it means “struggle” and for radicals it is used as ‘holy war’, which justifies terrorist attacks11, largely obviating the meaning of ‘inner struggle’ that any believer must sustain in the face of life's temptations in order to be a good believer. But, in the common wisdom, jihad comes to be understood as holy war. And with the intention of imposing a comprehensive vision of Islam, jihadists try to recruit and indoctrinate young Africans, offering them a sense of protection from other armed groups - in short, a sense of security - as well as a sense of identity and hope12, filling the vacuum that would otherwise be filled by a developed nation-state. Thus, jihadism is growing rampantly in the Sahel, where conditions are favourable for its development. Thus, in 2024, most of the global deaths related to terrorism occurred in the Sahel, an area where this figure has increased tenfold since 2015.13 Complexity of terrorist groups in the Sahel. In this scenario, which is very favourable to the emergence and growth of terrorist groups, there are multiple groups that continue to multiply their attacks qualitatively and quantitatively throughout the region, although it is feasible to point to the existence of ‘two large conglomerates of terrorist groups of jihadist aetiology’14. The two groups that dominate the geopolitical landscape in the Sahel are, on the one hand, ‘Jama'at Nusrat al islam wa ak Muslimeen’ (JNIM), an Al Qaeda affiliate - the Arabic transliteration of its initials would correspond to ‘Support Group for Islam and Muslims’ - and, on the other hand, the ‘Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’ (EIGS or ISIS), which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS)15. To these two branches belong various groups such as Ansar Eddine, which acts under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda, as well as Macina or Al-Mourabitoun. In fact, JNIM is composed of an alliance between four terrorist groups that follow Al-Qaeda's line. Among them, three of those mentioned above are part of these Sahara Brigades that are grouped under the name of JNIM16, and represented by the slogan: ‘One banner, one group, one emir’, which makes clear the idea of unity among them. And under the aegis of ISIS or EIGS (Islamic State), the largest active terrorist group is Boko Haram, although other active groups, such as Junud al-Khilafa, also follow the same line. What we understand by the oath of allegiance or loyalty comes from the practice of bay'ah and is one of the traditional procedures required to formalise terrorists' alliances with the respective organisations.17. This act of adherence to a group would be beneficial for both the one that lends allegiance and the one that receives it, being a way of projecting itself globally and going further in its expansion in the search for the constitution of a caliphate, while at the same time giving more power and a new status to the group that pledges allegiance. This procedure, which has been playing an increasingly significant role for the two Jihadist branches mentioned above, changed the terrorist landscape, given that until then they were only sympathetic to al-Qaeda, but several groups began to opt to join the Islamic State, a fact that reinforces the concept of the two dominant branches of global Jihadism. Al Qaeda was the first reference group to establish the Islamist terrorist phenomenon in the Sahel. In 2007, the first terrorist organisation in the geographical area of the Sahel was renamed Al Qaeda because of the power that this global denomination reflected18. Later, the Islamic State created the ‘Agency of Distinct Provinces’ in 2014, which allowed the group to plan an African strategy19. And this shift towards the Sahel coincides with the year of the fall of Mosul in Iraq, a city in which the Islamic State had proclaimed its caliphate three years earlier and which in 2014 had been liberated by an international coalition from Jihadist hegemony, drastically reducing the presence of members of the terrorist group. And the growth of these groups in this strip of Africa, in the Sahel, highlights both the vulnerabilities that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are trying to exploit to achieve their objectives and the fact that the loss of control of a territory does not mean the end of the Jihadist struggle.20, in search of alternative spaces.  Coexistence of Terrorist Groups in the Sahel: Allies for a Common Cause?  Thus, several terrorist groups coexist in the Sahel, all sharing the same Salafist ideology and the common goal of returning to the original Islamic community by establishing a caliphate21. One example is the 2018 campaign to isolate Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, which was coordinated by both major groups to gain control of that territory—demonstrating that, under certain circumstances, the two major groups can cooperate to achieve jihadist objectives22.  Analyzing the actions and attacks carried out by each group shows that each faction has more or less presence in specific areas, and in several of them, different Salafi groups coexist. In fact, in the so-called “tri-border area”—the region most affected by these attacks—the two main jihadist branches operate side by side23. However, according to findings by the International Observatory for the Study of Terrorism in February 2025, JNIM (an Al-Qaeda affiliate) was the sole perpetrator of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and the main actor behind those in Mali. In contrast, in Niger, it is the Islamic State that has caused the highest number of casualties24. And although JNIM has been active in the Sahel longer than ISGS, which is reflected in the wide area they operate in, ISGS is responsible for more victims due to the intensity of its attacks. Because these groups often overlap in the same localities and carry out separate and uncoordinated operations, it is clear that they mostly act independently, leaving behind evidence of distinct attacks. Even though it may seem logical to assume they would act jointly toward their shared goal, this is not usually the case.  The motivation for terrorist groups to form alliances can depend on international political-military pressure and the policies of local regimes.25 Additionally, personal relationships between leaders and members of these terrorist groups can significantly influence the connections between factions. These relationships, often complex, can be explained by the fact that many of the terrorist groups currently active in the Sahel were born out of internal tensions within larger factions, including differing views on how jihad should be carried out.26 Such tensions sometimes result in splinter groups—some maintaining ties, while others become rivals. One example is the close relationship between Amadou Koufa, founder of Macina (now part of JNIM), and Iyad ag Ghali, leader of Ansar Dine and head of JNIM. Similarly, in August 2018, the UN Group of Experts identified Abdallah Ag Albakaye, a Tuareg emir of JNIM, as coordinating actions between JNIM and ISGS in the Gao region of Mali.27  These coordinated actions were possible for a time when both Salafi groups carried out attacks together without competing or issuing dual claims of responsibility. These attacks were officially announced by only one of the groups, although later reports revealed that fighters from both branches were involved—for instance, the May 2019 ambush in Niger in which around 30 Nigerien soldiers were killed. Regarding this attack, a JNIM commander confirmed that the fighters were split between the two groups28.  Such fluid personal relationships gave rise to the so-called “Sahelian exception,” which referred to the unusually cordial relations between rival leaders and the absence of conflict between the two factions. But this is not always the case.  Competition for jihadist dominance in the Sahel?  While Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have come to show connections in certain attacks, the style and tone of each group differs. The controversies and disputes that can be observed between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are essentially two-fold: religious and political.  A phenomenon that was already occurring in previous years in parts of the Middle East, but is becoming increasingly common in the Sahel, is precisely this fragmentation and splintering of terrorist groups, which leads to clashes and disputes. In February 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for an explosive attack in Mali, which EIGS claimed a year later; identical claims of attacks in the same territories are coming to light between 2019 and 202029. But what is significant is what happened in Mali in 2020, when a clash between terrorist groups took place due to the crossing of Al Qaeda-dominated territory by terrorists under the aegis of the Islamic State, a clash that was made official in a letter from the ‘number two’ of the EIGS affiliate to the JNIM30.  Despite this, and despite this and other clashes, it was not until May 2020 that both JNIM and EIGS openly acknowledged the armed disputes between them, and did so in an ‘official’ manner, in the weekly Al Naba newsletter31, a publication of the ISIS jihadist gang, which specifically mentions clashes in the area of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali known as the triple frontier.  Later in 2022, the EIGS celebrated the addition of 11 new Al Qaeda members, news announced by the EIGS in a tone of supremacy and describing Al Qaeda fighters as sinners and infidels to God.32. And, on the part of the other groups, similar patterns are followed.  Therefore, it is feasible to point out that, on the one hand, tensions are generated due to clashes in the same territory and the desire to dominate it, and that despite having the same objective of imposing the caliphate, the motivation to control each region by a particular group is important, so much so as to fight against ‘apparent partners’, which reflects a clash over territorial ambitions.  On the other hand, there is also a certain religious and ideological fragmentation, a certain vision of Islam, which is what each group tries to impose, and this is of utmost importance, given that all this is framed in a ‘holy war’, so that the religious approach is a very important dimension in explaining these clashes. Both jihadist branches are based on the theory of takfirism, a doctrine that the Islamic State accuses al-Qaeda of not applying properly and vice versa33. As a result, both terrorist groups have blamed each other for deviating from the path of jihad; indeed, earlier this year the ISIS released a propaganda video mentioning JNIM as ‘impure’ for not applying Shariah34.  For this reason, and despite this common goal of creating an Islamic caliphate, since 2020 attacks between the two groups have not ceased and they have actively worked to increase the degree of territorial control exercised by each group, as a way of gaining supremacy in the region. Thus, in April 2020, JNIM had to withdraw from part of northern Burkina Faso due to pressure from the EIGS35, which is also gradually, and to a greater extent, taking root in the southern part of Niger, forcing JNIM to leave the area36.  Since then, there has been constant fighting between the groups in several regions of the Sahel, with the aim of consolidating and imposing themselves as the dominant reference point for jihad37… and those who suffer the results of this fighting end up being the civilians in these areas where government action is almost non-existent. Conclusion  The Sahel has become the epicentre of Islamic terrorism in which multiple terrorist groups from the two main branches coexist, as both JNIM and EIGS have been able to see the potential that this vast geographical area offers them due to the weakness of the region's states, especially in terms of security, to oppose these terrorist groups. And it is this vacuum that terrorist groups - and also organised crime groups - are trying to fill, presenting themselves as almost the only alternative life - apart from emigration - for many young people, which is why these groups are growing in power and degree of territorial control. While the common goal of all jihadist groups is to establish a caliphate, and despite the existence of a period of peaceful coexistence between the two main branches of jihadist terrorism, differences over both religious issues and simple power struggles are yet another source of conflict in this tortured part of Africa and the world. And, in addition to the chaos and suffering generated in the region, being the epicentre of global jihadism in a global world does not only have a regional impact. It has, and increasingly so, a global impact. References 1 MONTER, Jara “El mapa político del Sahel”, El Orden Mundial, 7 de febrero de 2025. https://elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/mapa-politico-sahel/  2 DEPARTAMENTO DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, “Terrorismo en el Sahel Occidental”, 16 de julio de 2021. https://www.dsn.gob.es/en/node/15446  3 ALLIANCE SAHEL, “Décryptage des causes et déterminants de la crise au Sahel: quels enjeux pour les partenaires au développement”, 12 de diciembre de 2023. https://www.alliance-sahel.org/seminaire-decryptage-causes-determinants-crise-sahel/#:~:text=La%20région%20du%20Sahel%20fait,augmentent%20la%20vulnérabilité%20des%20populations  4 FONDS MONÉTAIRE INTERNATIONAL, “La compléxité des défis au Sahel”, septiembre de 2024. https://www.imf.org/fr/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/09/the-sahels-intertwined-challenges-yabi   5 Datos de country economy (Human Development Index), 2024. https://countryeconomy.com/hdi/niger  6SÁNCHEZ HERRÁEZ Pedro, “Sahel: ¡tormenta perfecta de amplitud e intensidad creciente!!, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2021. https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2077188/Capítulo+8+Sahel+tormenta+perfecta+de+amplitud+e+intensidad+creciente.pdf/d4bc511b-75ef-6c12-aaeb-f9b51e72a765?t=1731579352666  7 SOLER David, “La esperanza de vida en África”, África Mundi, 26 de marzo de 2022. https://www.africamundi.es/p/la-esperanza-de-vida-en-africa  8 IFAD, “Afrontar los retos del desarrollo sostenible en el Sahel”. https://www.ifad.org/es/africa-occidental-y-central/sahel  9 BALLESTEROS MARTÍN Miguel Ángel, “Análisis geopolítico del Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, octubre de 2015. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5270491  10 SÁNCHES HERRÁEZ Pedro, “El Sahel: ¿también epicentro de la reconfiguración global?, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 18 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/el_sahel_tambien_epicentro_de_la_reconfiguracion_global  11 SANJUÁN MARTÍNEZ Casimiro, “El terrorismo yihadista. El yihadismo en el Sahel amenaza a Europa”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de noviembre de 2020. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2020/DIEEEO140_2020CASSAN_yihadSahel.pdf   12 DEPARTAMENTO DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, “El terrorismo en el Sahel”, 12 de mayo de 2021. https://www.dsn.gob.es/en/node/14943  13 OBSERVATORIO INTERNACIONAL DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE TERRORISMO, “Anuario del terrorismo yihadista 2024”. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/ES-ANUARIO-OIET-2024.pdf  14 MARTÍN SERRANO Lucas, “Daesh vs Al Qaeda. La lucha por la supremacía a las puertas de Europa”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 11 de julio de 2016. D https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5998290  15 FUENTE COBO Ignacio, “Radiografía de la amenaza yihadista en el Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel   16 ECSAHARAUI, “Estos son los grupos terroristas que operan en el Sahel”, 22 de septiembre de 2024. https://ecsaharaui.com/09/2024/estos-son-los-grupos-terroristas-que-operan-en-el-sahel/  17 IGUALADA Carlos y YAGÚE Javier, “El uso de la bay’ah por los principales grupos salafí-yihadistas”, OIET, 13 de octubre de 2021. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/actividades/el-uso-de-la-bayah-por-los-principales-grupos-salafi-yihadistas/  18 HERRERO Rubén y MACHÍN Nieva, “El eje Magreb-Sahel: La amenaza del terrorismo”, Revista UNISCI, octubre de 2015. https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-74789/UNISCIDP39-8RUBEN-NIEVA.pdf  19 ORIENTXXI, “Estado Islámico, diez años de expansión en el continente africano”, 24 de marzo de 2023. https://orientxxi.info/magazine/estado-islamico-diez-anos-de-expansion-en-el-continente-africano,6325   20 BBC NEWS MUNDO, “Caída de Mosul: cómo Estado Islámico se está transformando ante la pérdida de su territorio”, 10 de julio de 2017. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-40407044  21 THOMAS Dominique, “État islamique vs Al-Qaïda: autopsie d’une lutte fratricide”, Politique Étrangère, 2016. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2016-1?lang=fr&tab=sommaire  22 PÉREZ Carlota, “Al Qaeda y Daesh: rivales en Oriente Medio y aliados en el Sahel”, ATALAYAR, 29 de junio de 2018. https://www.atalayar.com/articulo/politica/al-qaeda-y-daesh-rivales-en-oriente-medio-y-aliados-en-el-sahel/20200224202755144652.html  23 BEAUDOUX Clara, “Qui sont les groupes islamistes qui opèrent en Afrique de l’Ouest?”, Fance Info, 20 de febrero de 2013. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/qui-sont-les-groupes-islamistes-qui-operent-en-afrique-de-l-ouest_1645959.html  24 AGUILERA Ana, “Actividad yihadista en el norte de África y el Sahel”, OIET, 26 de marzo de 2025. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/yihadismo-en-el-magreb-y-el-sahel-2025/actividad-yihadista-en-el-norte-de-africa-y-el-sahel-febrero-2025/   25 FUMAGALLI Giuseppe, “Terrorismo in Africa; le complicità dei regimi autoritari”, Instituto per gli studi di política internazionale, 5 de abril de 2016. https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/terrorismo-africa-le-complicita-dei-regimi-autoritari-14927  26 DE LEÓN COBO Beatriz, “La estrategia glocal de los grupos yihadistas del Sahel”, OIET, 15 de enero de 2021. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/actividades/la-estrategia-glocal-de-los-grupos-yihadistas-del-sahel/#_ftn5  27 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, “Letter dated 8 august from the Panel of Experts etablished pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali adressed to the President of the Security Council”, 8 de agosto de 2018, p.20.https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_581.pdf  28 ALJAZEERA, “ISIL claims attack on Niger soldiers as death toll rises to 28”, 16 de mayo de 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/16/isil-claims-attack-on-niger-soldiers-as-death-toll-rises-to-28   29 POST X, Menastream, “#Burkina faso: #JNIM claimed Thursday’s atttack against the police station in Manila…”, 27 de enero de 2019. https://x.com/MENASTREAM/status/1089648251291254784  30 EL IMPARCIAL, “Al Qaeda y Daesh se enfrenan en un conflicto armado inédito en el Sahel”, miércoles 9 de abril de 2025. https://www.elimparcial.es/noticia/212597/mundo/al-qaeda-y-daesh-se-enfrenan-en-un-conflicto-armado-indito-en-el-sahel.html  31 NSAIVIA Héni y WEISS Caleb, “The end of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the Global Conlict between the Islamic State and al-Qaìda finally came to West Africa”, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Julio de 2020. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-end-of-the-sahelian-anomaly-how-the-global-conflict-between-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida-finally-came-to-west-africa/  32 OBSERVATORIO DE AL AZHAR, “Daesh celebra la incorporación de 11 miembros de Al Qaeda… una muestra más de las diferencias entre ambas organizaciones terroristas”, miércoles 3 de agosto de 2022. https://www.azhar.eg/observer-es/details/ArtMID/1201/ArticleID/63847/Daesh-celebra-la-incorporaci243n-de-11-miembros-de-Al-Qaeda…-una-muestra-m225s-de-las-diferencias-entre-ambas-organizaciones-terroristas  33 THOMAS Dominique, “État islamique vs Al-Qaïda: autopsie d’une lutte fratricide”, Politique Étrangère, 2016. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2016-1-page-95?lang=fr  34 AGUILERA Ana, “Actividad yihadista en el norte de África y el Sahel, febrero 2025”, OIET, 26 de marzo de 2025. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/yihadismo-en-el-magreb-y-el-sahel-2025/actividad-yihadista-en-el-norte-de-africa-y-el-sahel-febrero-2025/  35 SUMMERS Marta, “Enfrentamientos entre JNIM y EIGS. Cambios en el equilibrio terrorista del Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 6 de julio de 2020. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2020/DIEEEO98_2020MARSUM_Sahel.pdf  36 MARSTON Barry, “Analysis: High jihadist activity in Africa’s Sahel continues”, BBC, 9 de noviembre de 2023. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c204qwhm   37 FUENTE COBO Ignacio, “Radiografía de la amenaza yihadista en el Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel  

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The collision of climate impacts with forced displacement and conflict renders efforts to promote peace and development particularly challenging. Most of the academic literature to date has focused on exploring and predicting causal links between climate change, conflict, and forced displacement. Much less attention has been paid to the need to inform actual policy interventions and responses, particularly to support climate-resilient development. Here, we address this gap and develop a decision framework to inform long-term climate responses in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. Building upon previous World Bank policy reports and the authors’ professional experience, we suggest that a focus on decision pathways can help inform a long-term, development response to conflict, forced displacement, and climate challenges. Pathways capture the sequence of interventions that are required to reduce climate risks in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. They also offer an opportunity for aligning climate change adaptation interventions, such as water storage or flood embankments, with peacebuilding and stabilization initiatives. Case studies from Lebanon and South Sudan are discussed to illustrate the pathways approach to climate adaptation in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. 1. Introduction Research and policy analysis on climate change, migration, and conflict have expanded significantly in recent years (Swain et al., 2023; Von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021). Attention has been mostly devoted to answering questions of causality, trying to unpack the complex causal linkages between these issues (e.g., Abel et al., 2019), and viewing climate as a “driver” of security risks. While research on causality has yielded important insights into some of the potential channels through which climate change might affect human mobility and conflict, it has also been criticized for its lack of nuance and context sensitivity (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016). Moreover, it has led to some statements about conflict–climate relationships, especially in the context of the Syrian civil war, that largely fail to account for broader political economy considerations and are, as such, unhelpful from a policy perspective and unwarranted from a scientific perspective (Daoudy, 2020; de Châtel, 2014; Fröhlich, 2016). Here, we argue that rather than attempting to quantify and model causal linkages between climate, migration, and conflict, research should focus more on questions of policy and intervention design. This will address urgent needs to anticipate people’s movements and to find lasting solutions to displacement caused by conflict- and climate-related factors (African Union and International Organisation for Migration, 2024). A focus on solutions and policy design will also support governments in conflict-affected areas in adopting a position on climate security and in prioritizing scarce development resources to address climate security risks (International Crisis Group, 2025). A focus on policy and intervention design requires understanding two sets of interactions. First, the impacts of climate risks—encompassing hazard, exposure, and vulnerability—on efforts to address protracted conflict and migration. For example, there is little knowledge of the drought and flood hazards faced by forcibly displaced populations living in refugee camps under high-end climate change scenarios, or of the effects that short-term humanitarian responses to flood hazards might have on exacerbating long-term flood exposure in conflict-affected areas. Second, the impacts of efforts to advance climate change adaptation or mitigation on forced displacement and conflict risks. For example, there is little knowledge of the potential conflict and forced displacement risks arising from investments in climate infrastructure (e.g., flood embankments, irrigation) in certain contexts. This perspective focuses on these interactions and presents a decision framework for evaluating options to address forced displacement and conflict challenges while not exacerbating the climate risks faced by populations. The perspective specifically focuses on the role of water development interventions in influencing interactions between forced displacement responses and climate risks. Forced displacement is interpreted as situations where individuals or communities leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence, persecution, and human rights violations. 2. Promoting climate-resilient development in situations of protracted forced displacement2.1. Decision points and path dependencies shape success in development responses When responding to protracted forced displacement situations, policymakers will likely face trade-offs between short-term uncoordinated measures to respond to immediate risks (e.g., lack of drinking water supplies, temporary flood embankments) and long-term measures needed to address structural issues (e.g., provision of sustainable water services, land-use zoning to reduce flood exposure) (Borgomeo et al. 2021). These trade-offs are time-specific, meaning that they can create path dependencies and lock-in, thus influencing countries’ ability to achieve stability and climate-resilient development over the long term. Hence, at different stages of a protracted forced displacement crisis, policymakers need to be cognizant that their efforts can undermine or support long-term policy objectives such as climate resilience and peace. Building upon Borgomeo et al. (2021), we propose a framework (Figure 1) that identifies three decision points at which specific trade-offs shape future development and climate resilience paths: • Prevention and pre-crisis coordination and planning• Responding to protracted forced displacement• Preparing for recovery and return  Figure 1. Decision points and impact of climate and water-related events at various stages of conflict and forced displacement cycle. Adapted from Lund (1996). The framework adapts Lund’s peace and conflict cycle (Lund, 1996) to the specific case of climate change, conflict, and forced displacement responses. The bell-shaped curve in Figure 1 is a stylized representation of the potential course of a complex forced displacement and conflict crisis, with the vertical axis representing the intensity of the crisis, and the horizontal axis representing time. Different conflict and forced displacement crises will follow different curves: responses can prevent or reduce the risks of the crisis escalating further. Moreover, climate-related events might make addressing the crisis more challenging, exacerbating risks of armed violence, or perpetuating forced displacement cycles. At each of the decision points in Figure 1, policymakers need to explore trade-offs between addressing short-term needs and achieving longer-term development. Policymakers confront a series of choices through time; their choices will determine a “pathway” and the type of outcomes they can achieve. Figure 2 shows three examples of pathways that emerge (from left to right) depending on choices made at each of the three decision points. While timing and responses will be context-specific, these decision points are likely to arise in any protracted forced displacement situation, making the framework shown in Figures 1 and 2 generally applicable in different contexts.  Figure 2. Decision points shape three example pathways to respond to climate change, forced displacement, and conflict challenges. Prevention and pre-crisis coordination and planning At Decision point 1, in a situation where the crisis has not yet materialized, building preparedness through coordination between development, humanitarian, and security actors is essential. Development actors have access to ministries and service providers and should ensure that these public sector entities that are tasked with providing climate-related information (e.g., hydrometeorological services), managing water, and delivering services establish functional links with humanitarian and security actors (World Bank, ICRC and UNICEF 2021). Development actors should promote and support data collection and information-sharing protocols to build a common understanding across parties involved in climate-related sectors in fragile contexts. For example, a joint understanding of water resource availability and safe deployable outputs (i.e., the quantity of water that can be consumed without compromising it through depletion or salinization) and of water governance structures can ensure that humanitarian actors have a better understanding of when and where water resources might be compromised or depleted during a crisis. This joint understanding also involves mapping critical interconnected infrastructure systems, notably energy, digital, and water infrastructure, and ensuring that there are no single points of failure that—if targeted—can bring down the entire system (Weinthal and Sowers, 2020). Similarly, joint understanding should be developed in the area of flood and drought hazards, to prevent any potential crisis responses from further exacerbating exposure to climate impacts, for example, by locating refugee camps in flood-prone areas. Response to protracted forced displacement During a protracted forced displacement crisis, policymakers face significant trade-offs between short-term responses to meet immediate needs and long-term measures that address underlying sector weaknesses (Figure 2, decision point 2). Overreliance on temporary solutions provided by humanitarian actors and private sector providers can undermine long-term institutional ability to provide sector oversight, understand climate risks, and deliver services. Moreover, it might paradoxically exacerbate vulnerability and exposure to climate hazards leading to lock-in, where temporary responses perpetuate, delay, or prevent a transition to more sustainable and long-term adaptation to climate shocks (Pathway 1 in Figure 2). Two examples help elucidate the type of trade-offs that might emerge at decision point 2. In the case of water service delivery, private water vendors might be interested in maintaining control of water distribution even after the crisis ends, complicating the transition to a sustainable and affordable water delivery model. They might also avoid protecting water sources from pollution and overexploitation or promote the drilling of new wells, contributing to an uncontrolled expansion of unlicensed users and exacerbating vulnerability to droughts under climate change. This pathway has been observed in Yemen, for example, where most urban residents are supplied by privately operated tanker trucks, with ensuing issues for affordability, public health, sustainability of water use, and long-term resilience to drought (Abu-Lohom et al. 2018). In the case of flood risk management for forcibly displaced communities, short-term responses can have profound implications for future climate resilience and vulnerability. Forcibly displaced communities often relocate to marginal lands exposed to water-related hazards, such as landslides and floods. This pattern has been observed in several contexts, such as Colombia (Few et al., 2021), Sierra Leone (Gbanie et al., 2018), and South Sudan (Borgomeo et al., 2023). Once the forced displacement crisis and conflict end, these communities are likely to experience heightened climate impacts because they settle in areas highly exposed to floods and landslides. These communities might also receive inequitable benefits from recovery efforts, as settlements on marginal lands are often considered illegal and therefore not serviced by infrastructure. In turn, this might make historical grievances resurge, heightening the risk of relapse into conflict and hindering efforts to build government legitimacy and trust. Although sustainability of use, resource protection, and land use planning might not seem like priorities in the short term, they are key tenets of a development approach to the forced displacement crisis at decision point 2. Often, short-term responses, such as drilling a well, can have long-term impacts on the sustainability of both short- and long-term interventions by inevitably depleting or contaminating water resources. Similarly, short-term responses to settlement issues can also aggravate exposure to climate impacts. A development approach focused on addressing urgent needs while responding to structural challenges is better able to achieve long-term climate resilience and stability outcomes. In the context of water service delivery, this approach entails rationalizing the use of existing water resources and prioritizing demand-side solutions (e.g., reducing water use) to avoid placing additional pressures on already strained supplies (Borgomeo et al. 2021). In the context of flood risk management, this entails using integrated gray and green solutions to respond to flood risks and adopting floodplain zoning strategies. A longer-term approach might also combine short-term humanitarian actions with interventions that support the business continuity of water service providers and water resource management agencies with one-off capital injections or specific staff support programs to prevent brain drain. Although a development approach helps to address water sector issues in host countries, it might be challenging to adopt in practice. In already politically fragile and financially stretched contexts, governments might not be willing or able to provide water services or protection to forcibly displaced communities. In turn, this leaves humanitarian actors or unregulated private vendors to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations. However, these short-term responses might be counterproductive in the long run because they might create patterns of inclusion and exclusion between host communities and forcibly displaced populations, making integration and cohesion harder to achieve (Pathway 2 in Figure 2). When host communities perceive that forcibly displaced populations are receiving better services through humanitarian actors, this can fuel grievances against the forcibly displaced populations and the state. While temporary solutions might offer a relatively easier way to respond to forced displacement, they can also lead to lock-in and foreclose alternatives in the long term for host countries. The different responses to the Syrian refugee crisis observed in Jordan, Lebanon, and Türkiye demonstrate this problem: the water security of forcibly displaced populations and their host communities varies significantly depending on host countries’ willingness and ability to adopt a long-term development approach to the crisis rather than short-term temporary solutions. Preparation for recovery and return A third decision point relates to a post-conflict situation of recovery, peacebuilding, and potential return of the forcibly displaced. At this point, water- and climate-related interventions need to be integrated within broader plans for reconciliation and for extending basic services to camps and informal settlements, rehabilitating infrastructure, and expanding the capacity of existing urban water systems to respond to higher demand (Pathway 3 in Figure 2). For example, a higher presence of refugees in urban areas can increase water demands, highlighting the need to upgrade and in some cases increase the capacity of existing supply and sanitation infrastructure. This demand growth is different from normal surges in demand for water services, which are typically short-lived increases in demand in response to weather conditions or public health measures (e.g., COVID-19 lockdowns). In contrast to these demand surges, forced displacement causes long-lasting increases in service demand, thus requiring a master plan and long-term response. For water utilities and service providers, restoring and expanding services will be an opportunity to improve service quality for their constituents and customers while avoiding the promotion of exclusionary practices that benefit factional interests and that can contribute to fragility (Sadoff et al 2017). A development approach to recovery and return should also consider a regional perspective. Following a protracted forced displacement crisis, new economic realities and incentives might arise. In some situations, the forcibly displaced populations might not intend to go back to their place of origin (as reported by some Syrian refugees) (IPA, 2020). In this case, it might make more economic sense for development actors to prioritize the use of scarce financial resources to support the expansion of water infrastructure in the host country rather than to rebuild infrastructure in the place of origin. A regional perspective also helps to identify opportunities to share benefits from transboundary waters and identify regionally beneficial approaches to water management. 3. Insights from balancing and sequencing development interventions to respond to climate, conflict, and forced displacement challengesLebanon: addressing the needs of the forcibly displaced and their host communities in situations of crisis At the height of the Syrian crisis in 2014, the Lebanese authorities estimated that around 1.5 million Syrian refugees had entered Lebanon, causing the country’s population to increase by almost 25% (World Bank 2018). Lebanon chose not to establish refugee camps, and the majority of the Syrians settled amid Lebanese communities in urban and rural areas. The sudden increase in demand for services placed significant pressure upon already limited and poorly performing infrastructure. In 2014, the Ministry of Environment estimated that domestic water demand had increased by 43 million m3 to 70 million m3 a year, which corresponds to an increase in overall national water demand of between 8% and 12% (Ministry of Environment of Lebanon 2014). This crisis took place against a backdrop of growing water-related hazards including increasing drought hazards because of climate change, and also chronic water scarcity caused by decades of underinvestment in water systems and soaring water demands (World Bank 2017). Faced with this situation of crisis (decision point 2 above), the Republic of Lebanon, with support from the World Bank, adopted a long-term response strategy that intervened in host communities in a way that benefited both hosts and refugees. Rather than creating a parallel system of assistance only for the forcibly displaced, the Lebanon Municipal Services Emergency Project targeted both the host community and Syrian refugees through infrastructure and social interventions (World Bank 2018). Community social interventions were urgent and indispensable to complement water and energy service delivery as well as to support the long-term objective of enhancing social cohesion and living conditions. Based on consultations, communities prioritized 12 social interventions around five themes—environmental awareness, employment training, skills training, health, and social cohesion—for both Lebanese and Syrians, with a focus on women, youth, and children (World Bank 2018). Infrastructure interventions addressed urgent community priorities which were also identified through community consultations involving both forcibly displaced and host communities. This included installing solar pumps to improve the reliability of water supplies and improve the ability to meet growing water demand. This had the additional advantage of reducing electricity costs for the financially weak water utility. South Sudan: water as an enabler of durable solutions for the forcibly displaced South Sudan is the main source of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa and hosts one of the world’s largest internally displaced populations (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2025). The country presents a multilayered mix of IDPs, asylum seekers, refugees, returnees, stateless persons, and persons at risk of statelessness. South Sudan is also among the most vulnerable countries to climate change, ranking as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards such as floods and droughts in the world, according to the 2024 INFORM Risk Index. Forced displacement was traditionally associated with armed conflict, but in recent years water-related disasters, notably floods, have triggered large-scale internal and cross-border displacement (UNHCR, 2021). These sobering statistics position South Sudan as one of the global hotspots where urgent responses at the nexus of climate change, forced displacement, and conflict are needed. At the time of writing, South Sudan confronts a situation of relative stability and an urgent need to address the needs of IDPs and returnees (decision point 3). Since 2018, the country has faced unprecedented floods, which have contributed to protracted cycles of displacement. These floods are directly linked to rainfall patterns in the African Great Lakes region, where the Bahr el Jebel (White Nile) originates, and in the Ethiopian Highlands. Because of South Sudan’s very flat landscape and impermeable soils, flooding persists for a long time, posing long-term challenges for climate adaptation. The country also faces a water supply and sanitation crisis, with about 60% of the population using unimproved sources at risk from contamination (Borgomeo et al., 2023). Decision-makers face stark trade-offs between temporary fixes and long-term, durable solutions that lay the foundation for sustainable service delivery and flood risk management over the long term. In the context of South Sudan, the provision of water services is an area where the Government has identified the importance of transitioning towards long-term solutions instead of just relying on temporary humanitarian actions. This provides an example of how responses to decision point 3 can help countries gradually improve climate resilience and water security while addressing the urgent needs of the forcibly displaced. The provision of clean drinking water in areas of return or local integration is one of the Six Priority Areas under the South Sudan 2021 Durable Solutions Strategy, highlighting that water availability is a governing factor in the government’s response to forced displacement. The strategy recognizes that without access to water supply and sanitation services, local integration processes, voluntary returns, and relocations cannot materialize. Durable solutions are achieved when individuals no longer have specific assistance or protection needs linked to displacement and represent the closure of the displacement cycle. The Government of South Sudan and a range of humanitarian partners developed a WASH Transition Strategy for Former Protection of Civilian (PoC) Sites, to ensure that the responsibility for maintaining and operating WASH facilities is progressively transferred to local populations and the responsible local authorities. The WASH Transition Strategy for Former PoC Sites, through the WASH exPoC Task Force, is contributing to building the capacity of the responsible local authorities who should become responsible and accountable for ensuring regular services to eventually promote suitable solutions for IDPs by creating service conditions conducive to durable solutions (returns and local integration) (WASH Cluster South Sudan, 2021). In several locations, multisectoral plans are being developed at the site level, including transition plans for security, services, and community engagement (WASH Cluster South Sudan, 2022). The challenge of providing durable solutions to forced displacement in South Sudan is extremely complex: because the security conditions in multiple parts of the country remain fragile and the impacts of climate change are increasing. The country’s efforts to advance durable solutions in terms of water services show that it is indeed possible to take a long-term view of forced displacement as one that is complementary to humanitarian efforts; focuses on medium-term socioeconomic aspects; is government-led and places particular attention on institutions and policies. While water service delivery has been included in the Government’s durable solutions plan, the issue of flood risks under climate change remains largely unaddressed, posing significant challenges to break the forced displacement cycle and build climate resilience in the country. The scale of the flood challenge and the risk of regional spillovers call for more regional and international attention to climate security risks in South Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2025). Research and policy should focus on identifying opportunities to link climate adaptation interventions to broader reconciliation and stabilization efforts at local and national levels. 4. Discussion and conclusions This perspective focuses on the design of interventions to respond to complex challenges at the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict. It suggests that sequencing and trade-offs need to be considered when implementing humanitarian interventions, to avoid perpetuating existing vulnerabilities or delaying opportunities to pursue climate-resilient development. This perspective also highlights that development and humanitarian actors should work more closely together to align perspectives and create a level of readiness for when a crisis occurs. The perspective identifies three specific decision points that can help focus planning and interactions among the different stakeholders from the humanitarian, security, and development sectors involved in crisis response. Frameworks based on pathways and decision points, such as the one presented here, have been found valuable in guiding decision-making and design of interventions in the field of water security (Garrick and Hall, 2014) and climate adaptation under uncertainty (Haasnoot et al., 2024). However, their application for intervention design and implementation at the humanitarian-development nexus is limited and likely to be affected by stakeholder cultures and objectives. Moreover, a focus on decision points and pathways requires capabilities to conduct monitoring and options identification and assessment which are often absent in contexts characterized by fragility and conflict. Moving forward, research should focus on developing models and frameworks that can help design and monitor effective policy responses at the climate change, migration, and conflict nexus. First, research should attempt to develop typologies of climate adaptation and water interventions to address conflict and forced migration challenges, including an assessment of their potential to increase risks of conflict and violence (see Gilmore and Buhaug, 2021 for an example in relation to climate mitigation policies). Typologies will help design interventions and compare experiences across different geographies and settings. Second, research should focus less on ex-post analysis or future predictions and concentrate more on careful monitoring and evaluation of ongoing climate change adaptation and conflict-resolution and peacebuilding interventions. This will help inform the early stages of policy implementation (including options assessment and monitoring strategies mentioned above), support learning, and help with early identification of risks of relapse into conflict. Finally, analysts have highlighted several challenges related to access to climate finance in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement (Cao et al., 2021; Meijer and Ahmad 2024). Research should examine opportunities for climate finance to support the transition from humanitarian to long-term development approaches in a context characterized by fragility and conflict. This includes creating frameworks to evaluate project contributions to financiers’ objectives, as well as improved evidence on the need for urgent climate adaptation among conflict and forcibly displaced communities worldwide. Acknowledgments Findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent, or of the Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership. Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article is partly derived from Chapter 4 of the World Bank report Ebb and Flow, Volume 2: Water in the Shadow of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Spread of Instability from the Sahel Directly Threatens West African Countries, Especially the Gulf of Guinea States (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo) — recently, there have been more attacks by jihadist fighters in these areas. If these attacks become more successful, it could seriously hurt the global economy, especially the economy of the European Union. Events in spring 2025 show that the jihadist movement is growing in this region, which causes big problems for safety and the economy.Gulf of Guinea Countries Under Attack by Jihadists Before, jihadists attacked only the northern parts of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo — near the borders with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. But on April 24, 2025, they destroyed and captured an army vehicle in the center of Benin, far from the northern border. This showed they can now strike deep inside the country, not just near the border where most of the army is based. It seems this was done to force the army to move some soldiers away from the north, making it weaker there. This could mean that fighting is spreading into areas that used to be safe. A video of the attack was shared by a group linked to the Wagner Group that works in Africa. An even more worrying event happened on May 12. Jihadists attacked a gold mine in Mali, near the town of Narena on the border with Guinea. During the attack, they kidnapped Chinese workers. It’s important to note that the distance between this place and the attack in Benin is about 1,700 kilometers. This shows how far the violence is spreading across Africa. The situation is especially bad in Benin. Its army has been hit very hard in recent years. On April 17, 2025, jihadists destroyed two army posts in the north. The army said 54 soldiers were killed (the attackers said it was 70). Earlier, on January 8, 2025, radical Islamists killed 28 soldiers. In total, over 300 Beninese soldiers have been killed by jihadists between 2019 and 2025. The current year — 2025 — is already the worst so far, with 157 soldiers killed by May. A similar situation is happening in countries next to Benin. For example, in Togo, between 2022 and 2024, at least 37 soldiers and civilians were killed during major group attacks (with 29 of them in 2024 alone). Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) is also suffering from jihadist attacks. Back in 2016, at least 15 people were killed in one attack, including three elite special forces soldiers. Later, during a series of attacks by radical Islamists in 2021–2022, at least 15 more Ivorian soldiers were killed. And this does not include small attacks carried out by these groups. Reasons for Escalation West African countries became a new target for jihadist attacks for several reasons. Of course, the situation in neighboring Nigeria, where the jihadist group Boko Haram operates (recognized as terrorist and banned in Russia), plays a destabilizing role. Part of this group joined the Islamic State (also banned in Russia). Its appearance helped create instability in the southern Sahel, and a similar process happened in the north after Muammar Gaddafi was removed from power in Libya in 2011. Radical Islamists who took over big parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger want to spread their control even more. These are jihadist “katibas” (Arabic for “unit”), acting under the name of JNIM (an Al-Qaeda branch in the Sahel, banned in Russia) and IS Sahel (Islamic State in the Sahel, banned in Russia). They want to build on their success in fighting French influence in Africa, get rid of it in other countries too — like Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire — and bring in Islamic rule and sharia law to new areas. This is their “mission,” as they see it. It seems that they will try to do this in the medium term. For now, their main goal appears to be bringing down the weak governments in Sahel countries. Even though the situation in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is still very bad, and the governments there mostly control only big cities, the jihadists have not yet succeeded in removing these military regimes. One of the reasons for this is the presence of Russian forces in the region, both state-run (“African Corps”) and semi-private (“Wagner Group”). Without removing these governments, it is too risky for jihadists to start big operations to take over other countries. But it is possible that, after facing Russian military experts — who have made the armies of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger stronger — the jihadists are now trying to focus on West African countries where they are not yet present. It may also be that the goal of jihadist attacks in West Africa is to put pressure on their enemies in the Sahel from the northern areas of the coastal countries in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, by setting up in northern Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, the jihadists can create safe zones for operations in southern Burkina Faso and Niger, and also threaten the capital of Niger, Niamey. They also place supply camps and families in local forests so that government forces in the Sahel don’t capture them. And finally, they use Gulf of Guinea countries as transit zones to get the things they need. For instance, they smuggle fuel from Nigeria for their vehicles — cars and motorbikes (their “mechanized cavalry”). They pay for this with illegally mined gold and livestock from the Sahel and West Africa. Ghana plays a special role in these operations. It is the only country in the Gulf of Guinea that borders the Sahel but has not yet experienced bloody jihadist attacks. Its geographic location is very important for the logistics of radical Islamists, and the local terrain helps their activities. For example, in northern Benin and Togo there are nature reserves and national parks stretching for hundreds of kilometers — W and Pendjari Parks in Benin, Comoe Park in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Oti-Keran Mandouri complex in Togo. These are rough, hard-to-reach areas with thick forests and poor road networks. Because of this it’s hard for the slow and heavy security forces of local governments to act in these places. But for small, lightly armed jihadist groups, it is much easier to move around and complete their missions. Security Forces Are Not Ready to Fight Jihadists Among the reasons why West African countries cannot succeed in the fight against radical Islamists is the "physical" weakness (as in the case of Togo and Benin) of their state security forces, and their general unpreparedness for conducting quick anti-guerrilla operations. For example, even after being enlarged due to the current crisis, their armies do not exceed 12,300 troops each, including naval forces (which have not really been involved in this fight). This is clearly not enough to effectively control their northern borders with Burkina Faso and Niger, which together stretch more than 700 km. The technical equipment of the armies of Benin and Togo is also poor because of a lack of transport, aircraft (especially drones), and modern gear in general (for example, some armored vehicles are still from the 1950s). The army of Côte d’Ivoire is much stronger. By the end of 2024, it had 22,000 soldiers, including the navy, and more than 5,000 irregular fighters. But even this is not enough to effectively guard its difficult border with Mali and Burkina Faso, which is 1,183 km long and has rough terrain. In such conditions, it is hard to expect a turning point in the fighting. Lack of Loyalty from the Local Population The establishment of jihadist control over the northern areas of Gulf of Guinea countries is also prevented by the low loyalty of the local population. Understanding that without at least some level of support (even if forced and limited) from locals, jihadists from the Sahel would not be able to act so effectively, the security forces of the region often carry out repressions against local people. This clearly does not increase their loyalty to the authorities and creates new problems for the future. These people can seriously harm the military, even if acting passively — for example, by helping jihadists as guides, scouts, or informants. This especially concerns the nomadic herders from the Fulani (or Fula) ethnic group, who are known to form the main part of jihadist groups in the Sahel countries. Many Fulani people also live in West and Central Africa. The high involvement of the Fulani and some other groups in jihadism often comes from their dissatisfaction with their situation. They often feel left out when it comes to getting resources, positions in government, and so on. When they express their dissatisfaction, it is often ignored at best, or met with repression at worst. The dissatisfaction of people in other West African countries with their own governments and the general situation comes from many factors. One of them is the strong and sometimes very fast population growth since the countries gained independence. At the same time, the amount of resources per person, like water and fertile land, has gone down. This has naturally led to more conflicts. Just like in the Sahel, conflicts over water and land between herders, farmers, hunters, and fishermen have gotten worse in West Africa. In the Gulf of Guinea countries, this happened at the same time as the government’s efforts to protect unique nature parks, which were declared reserves, but later became jihadist strongholds. As a result, farming and herding in these areas was greatly limited, and often completely banned, which hit the local economy hard. At the same time, people believe that the governments invested very little in the development of remote northern regions, especially in infrastructure. However, the presence of almost untouched parts of nature, far from cities, did lead to some tourism development (before the jihadists arrived). Because of this, some people who could not succeed as farmers or herders found jobs in tourism. The rebels used local dissatisfaction to their advantage. When they arrived, they removed the government bans on local economic activities (except cutting down the forests that hide their fighters), including hunting rare protected animals. Many local people saw this as a good thing. Prospects for the Fight Faced directly with the threat of Sahelization, the governments of the region are trying to urgently stabilize the situation. For example, the Beninese army (and other security forces) was increased by one and a half times — if at the beginning of the jihadist attacks it had 8,000 soldiers, now it has 12,300. The governments of the Gulf of Guinea countries also turned for help to their former security partners — France and the United States, who started sending modern weapons. But new weapons alone cannot change the situation — not even the use of drones, which are supposed to help better observe the terrain and find jihadist bases. The forests in the conflict zones are so thick that even modern UAVs sometimes cannot spot the enemy, even with poor camouflage. The authorities of Benin and Côte d’Ivoire have started developing border areas and creating jobs for young people, to make it harder for jihadists to recruit them. The Beninese government is also considering helping herders switch from a nomadic way of life to more efficient and less environmentally damaging farming. This idea might work in the long term, but it will need huge resources and could anger herders, who find it very hard to change their traditional lifestyle. Togo, which is poorer, cannot keep up with Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. Its government is mainly just running information campaigns and talking about the dangers of jihadism. So, the measures to stop jihadist expansion in these countries are not well coordinated. There is also a lack of cooperation in the fight itself. For example, Islamist radicals have escaped many times into neighboring Sahel countries, and this happened because there was no agreement that would let the security forces of one country pursue enemies into another. It is important to note that back in 2017, seeing the growing threat from jihadists, the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea countries signed the “Accra Initiative”, which became an anti-jihadist alliance. But soon after that, coups hit the region, removing pro-French governments in the Sahel countries, while in the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea (except for Guinea itself), pro-Paris governments stayed in power. This damaged relations between the Sahel countries and the West African countries that remained loyal to France. Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, still somewhat supported by France, joined the blockade of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and even considered military intervention. The military governments of the Sahel, in turn, began to actively cooperate with Russia. Since then, there has been no coordination between the former allies in the fight against jihadism. And until this conflict is resolved, it is hard to expect any effective cross-border fight against jihadists. Therefore, even in the short term, the situation in the region will likely get worse — because the Sahel’s population keeps growing rapidly, and as they move south into West African countries, competition for limited resources will keep increasing. How the Escalating Struggle Shapes the Global Landscape and Russia’s RoleDespite the destabilizing effect of “Sahelization” and the spread of jihadism into the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, there are some opportunities for Russia. For example, it is possible that the people of West African countries, just like those in the Sahel, will lose trust in France — especially if Paris fails to stop the jihadist advance. As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility of anti-French coups in Gulf of Guinea countries. Russia could use this to further weaken the West, and France in particular, during the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Other countries will also try to fill the growing political vacuum in the region. The United States is already doing this, by giving military and technical help to these countries and clearly trying to push out French influence. In the worst-case scenario (if the governments of the coastal West African countries collapse), jihadists could reach the major shipping routes of the Gulf of Guinea. Since important global trade routes pass through this area, this would be a direct threat to international trade, especially for the European Union. However, for now, this seems possible only if the entire state system built in Africa after the end of colonial rule completely falls apart. A much more serious danger may come from jihadists reaching the border with Guinea, or pushing further south into coastal West African countries. In the first case, the threat affects the world economy, because Guinea supplies 20% of the world’s bauxite — the raw material used to make aluminum. Guinea also has rich deposits of iron ore and other minerals. It's important to note that not only the West, but also China depends on these supplies. Russian companies also work in Guinea. That’s why many outside powers (like the USA, Turkey, UAE, Qatar, and others) may be tempted to use Sahel rebel groups to try to change who controls the market in Guinea. Many people in Guinea are unhappy with how the wealth is shared, and most of the population lives below the poverty line. A large part of the population (about one-third of the 14 million people) are again the Fulani, the same active group that often forms the base of rebel movements. Some of them might join the fighters if there is an invasion of Guinea from Mali. As for the attempt to move jihadist activity into central Benin, this is very bad news for the European Union, which hopes to get cheap pipeline gas if the planned “Atlantic” gas pipeline from Nigeria to Morocco is built. So, if jihadists become more active in coastal Gulf countries, it could scare away investors from this expensive project. At the same time, Russia might use the situation to its own advantage.

Another war appears imminent in Tigray; this time the conflict threatens to engulf the region. Eritrea appears ready to join the fighting . Despite the heavy toll of the 2020–2022 war, both the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government have resumed belligerent rhetoric. If fighting resumes, the underlying causes are the TPLF’s pursuit of secession, Abiy Ahmed’s authoritarian rule, and his territorial ambitions. The TPLF has pursued independence since its formation in 1975  by advocating the right to self-determination; it has promoted a narrative rooted in historical exceptionalism and the right to self-determination. That vision matured into a program of statehood during the years the TPLF controlled the Ethiopian government. Between 1991 and 2018, it used state power to lay the political, economic, and military groundwork for secession. Ethnic federalism, introduced under the rhetoric of self-rule, eroded national cohesion. A constitutional clause granted regional states the right to secede unilaterally. Ethiopian nationalism was deliberately undermined; ethnic nationalism was systematically promoted. Ethnic regions were later militarized through the creation of special forces that operated beyond constitutional limits, ostensibly for regional security. Tigray assembled the most powerful of these units—well-armed, well-trained, and well-structured, designed as a paramilitary force prepared to enforce constitutional claims to territory ). These units appear intended to serve as the armies of the independent states they envisioned. In parallel to this build-up, heavy military equipment vital to national defense was transferred to Tigray under the pretext of countering threats from Eritrea. The TPLF later used its special forces and this hardware to wage war against the Ethiopian state. Unrestrained by legal, political, or institutional checks, the TPLF exercised full control over the Ethiopian state. It used that power to extract the country’s natural resources, seize physical assets, and divert financial capital. Under the guise of implementing market reforms recommended by the IMF and World Bank, it transferred state-owned enterprises to firms under its command. The TPLF used the state’s economic apparatus and its control over the private sector to advance its long-term goal of Tigrayan independence. As the TPLF moved toward secession, Ethiopia stood primed for fragmentation, by its constitution, by its leaders, and by its institutions. When a popular revolt removed the TPLF-led government in 2018, the leadership retreated to Mekelle and intensified its campaign for independence. The TPLF escalated its confrontation with the federal government through a series of provocative actions: holding regional elections in September 2020 in defiance of federal authority, expelling federal military officers from Tigray, obstructing troop movements and logistics, and organizing large-scale military parades to project force. Each move appears calculated to provoke a military confrontation with the central government. Convinced that the moment had arrived, the TPLF launched a coordinated assault on the Northern Command on November 4, 2020, as a decisive step toward secession. After two years of devastating war, it failed to achieve its long-term objective. On November 2, 2022, it accepted a cessation of hostilities under the terms of the Pretoria Agreement. Support for secession has increased, fueled by the federal government’s conduct during the war, particularly its decision to invite the Eritrean army into Tigray (Reuters). The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, once a bastion of unity, has splintered. Tigrayan clergy formed a separate synod and severed all ties with the central hierarchy. In the diaspora, former advocates of unity champion independence. Among educated Tigrayans, disillusionment runs deep. Many interpreted the nationwide support for the federal war effort, mostly due to the TPLF’s authoritarianism, as a broader denunciation of Tigrayan identity. For this group, the war was not a political confrontation, but a genocidal campaign. That belief has hardened into a dominant narrative: that civilian deaths were not accidental byproducts of conflict, but deliberate acts of extermination. A rival project of state-building has emerged at the federal level, based on irredentism rather than ethnic autonomy. Abiy Ahmed, an authoritarian ruler backed by a narrow Oromo elite, has declared his intention to govern a unitary state stretching from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. He has repeatedly insisted that Ethiopia must secure a seaport, peacefully or by military force. Despite having no coastline, his government established a navy with France’s assistance; he signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to build a naval base—later cancelled—and has advanced a plan for an economic union encompassing Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia.Federal authorities have also provided weapons to factional leaders in Puntland and Jubaland to undermine the Somali government). While economic integration offers benefits, Abiy’s strategy to annex or dominate neighbouring states risks regional instability, diplomatic estrangement, and military confrontation. A government committed to external expansion is unlikely to tolerate internal disintegration. Tigrayan secessionism and Abiy’s expansionism stand as twin causes of the impending war. The immediate triggers of renewed war have already surfaced. Abiy Ahmed can invoke a legal casus belli against Eritrea, which continues to occupy Ethiopian territory despite repeated demands from Western governments and multilateral organizations). Eritrea, in turn, could claim self-defence. The TPLF could justify a war by claiming that the federal government has failed to fully implement the Pretoria Agreement. Both sides blame each other for the collapse of the agreement and have resumed hostile rhetoric and provocative actions. The TPLF, ignoring the Pretoria Agreement, has declared that it does not require federal permission to engage with Eritrea). Its leaders have publicly affirmed sovereignty, consistent with the constitutional framework. An Eritrean official has offered explicit support for Tigrayan independence; this has introduced an unpredictable external variable into an already volatile situation). On the federal side, the government has revoked the TPLF’s legal status as a political party, eliminating what remained of the formal political channel). At the same time, Abiy launched a European tour on May 22, likely to secure diplomatic backing for a new campaign). The symmetry with the prelude to the first war is striking: escalating rhetoric, foreign lobbying, and mutual delegitimization. What unfolds is not a fresh crisis but the second act of a war poorly resolved. The TPLF has fractured under the weight of the war it helped to unleash. An internal power struggle—driven by disputes over military conduct, political legitimacy, and personal ambition—split the organization in August 2024 into two factions: one led by Debretsion Gebremichael, the chair; the other by Getachew Reda, the vice chair. Each accuses the other of betraying the people of Tigray). The TPLF fighters are also divided. A large faction supports the Debretsion group, while Getachew’s faction has secured the backing of armed groups in southern Tigray, reportedly trained by the Ethiopian government in the Afar region). These forces have pledged to defend the administrative structure he established. The likelihood of intra-Tigrayan armed conflict is high. Tensions have escalated further as Getachew has leveled serious criminal accusations against the TPLF’s military command. In interviews aired on government television on May 13 and 14, he alleged that senior generals committed war crimes, operated illegal gold mines, embezzled state funds, trafficked humans, smuggled arms, and stripped steel from public infrastructure for sale—even as the war was taking place ). The accused commanders have denied all charges and denounced him as a traitor aligned with the federal government. He further reported that the number of registered TPLF fighters DDR had been inflated and that commanders had embezzled funds intended for their salaries. He accused the same officers of plotting to assassinate him. These are not casual allegations—they come from a man who served as deputy chair of the party, member of the executive, member of its wartime command, spokesperson during the conflict, head of the Pretoria delegation, and former regional president. According to Getachew, the TPLF’s military leadership has a vested interest in restarting the war to avoid accountability. He argues that peace would expose their crimes, while renewed conflict offers protection. As evidence, he cites the leak of secret peace talks in Djibouti between the TPLF and the federal government by one of the implicated generals. The federal government, upon learning of the leak, ended the negotiations. In another case, he claims that when the federal government attempted resettlement of Tigrayans in contested areas, the TPLF commanders demanded that fighters accompany the returnees; the government refused. Getachew alleges the generals are using displaced civilians as “hostages” to obstruct reconciliation. He claims to hold documentary evidence supporting these accusations. While he describes the TPLF as a “criminal enterprise,” he occasionally softens the charge, placing blame on a few bad actors. This contradiction raises a crucial question: if an organization protects offenders and functions as a criminal network, can it still claim political legitimacy? The conflict between the TPLF and the federal government has persisted, but alliances have shifted dramatically. During the first Tigray war, a coalition of federal troops, Eritrean forces, Amhara special forces, and the Fano militia fought the TPLF. That coalition has disintegrated. In April 2023, the federal government disbanded the Amhara special forces while retaining similar units in other regions). It then launched a military campaign to disarm the Fano, provoking armed resistance across the Amhara region. The government has struggled to suppress the rebellion and has lost control of large areas. It accuses the TPLF of aiding the Fano. At the same time, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have unraveled. Abiy Ahmed’s declaration that Ethiopia would obtain a seaport—by negotiation or by force—has pushed the two states into hostility). In a startling reversal, the TPLF has begun to align with Eritrea, its former enemy. Reports suggest the Debretsion faction has initiated cooperation with Eritrean officials, despite Eritrea’s continued occupation of territories claimed by Tigray). Getachew alleges that senior TPLF commanders have coordinated military planning with Eritrean authorities. Gebru Asrat, the former Tigray regional president, has made similar claims). Eritrea appears prepared to re-enter the war, this time as a TPLF ally. One Eritrean official has gone further and has expressed support for Tigrayan independence, as stated earlier. But given their history of mutual hostility, unresolved border disputes, and clashing ambitions, the alliance remains fragile. It may serve tactical needs, but it is unlikely to survive strategic realities. Strategic miscalculation is a crucial risk in this war, as it was in the previous one. During the first Tigray war, both the federal government and the TPLF overestimated their military capacity and underestimated their opponent’s. The war yielded no victory. Instead, both sides accepted a cessation of hostilities after enduring political crisis, economic hardship, and human catastrophe. The result crippled both actors. Despite renewed threats, confrontational posturing, and aggressive rhetoric, neither side appears ready for war. In Tigray, the public is exhausted. People demand peace, basic services, the return of the displaced, and the restoration of infrastructure. The struggle for basic needs outweighs the desire to engage in another war. While support for independence remains high, many Tigrayans question whether the embattled TPLF can govern a region, let alone a future state. Among Tigrayans, the yearning for peace far exceeds the willingness to fight another war. The Eritrean government, although it commands a disciplined army, lacks the diplomatic support and military capabilities to confront a stronger adversary. Its economic base is fragile; its population is small, overburdened by years of forced conscription, and exhausted by endless mobilization. Eritrea’s international isolation—worsened by sanctions, strained relations with neighbors, and a dismal human rights record—undermines its capacity to secure foreign military or financial assistance. These constraints—weak economy, fragile population base, diplomatic isolation, and limited military resources—reduce Eritrea’s capacity to sustain a protracted war The Ethiopian state faces even greater problems. Armed insurgencies continue in Amhara and Oromia, the country’s two most populous regions. Federal forces have failed to suppress either movement and have lost control over extensive territory. Across the country, support for the government has collapsed. A nationwide strike by healthcare workers—triggered by surging inflation—signals broader unrest). Legitimacy has eroded; institutions have decayed; crises have multiplied. The military—commanded by officers appointed for ethnic loyalty rather than professional competence, crippled by systemic corruption, and plagued by operational incapacity—is unfit for war. These deficiencies became evident when the army suffered a series of humiliating defeats in the last war against the TPLF. External actors can influence both the likelihood and the outcome of a renewed conflict. In the previous war, the United States played a moderating role, driven by its own strategic interests in Ethiopia, the Horn, and the Red Sea. The Biden administration helped contain escalation by the Ethiopian government and dissuaded the TPLF from pursuing independence. It appointed Special Envoy Mike Hammer, whose diplomacy helped secure the Pretoria Agreement). Under President Trump, U.S. policy shifted toward disengagement. That shift may have persuaded the Ethiopian government that war carries no consequences and emboldened the TPLF to pursue secession. Regional powers also have the capacity to influence whether the war erupts and how it unfolds. Egypt, a traditional adversary of Ethiopia and locked in dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, has aligned with Eritrea and had supported the TPLF in the past. Saudi Arabia continues to back the Eritrean regime). The United Arab Emirates has supplied Ethiopia with drones and weapons). Turkey has armed Ethiopia with drones as well, but backs Somalia over Abiy’s memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the breakaway state of Somalia, later cancelled ). Whether another war erupts will depend in part on how these regional powers calculate their interests and the extent to which they are willing to intervene to secure them. Under present conditions, neither side appears capable of waging war. The TPLF—isolated abroad, fractured within, stripped of territory, crippled by corruption, and bereft of popular support—lacks the means to mount a new campaign. The federal government, weakened by internal fragmentation, collapsing legitimacy, and mounting public dissent, cannot sustain another conflict. Rhetoric has escalated, but capacity has not. The Eritrean government commands a well-trained army but lacks the diplomatic support, economic strength, and military capacity to fight a stronger adversary. Its international isolation, small population, and limited resources leave it vulnerable. Eritreans may defend sovereignty but show little enthusiasm for another costly war. Eritrea’s shifting loyalties, Abiy Ahmed’s expansionist ambitions, the Tigrayan elite’s secessionist agenda, the TPLF’s record of miscalculation, and foreign interference have created a volatile situation. Any of these variables could reignite the conflict, dismantle either state, and destabilize the entire region. Even in the absence of strategic advantage, wars can erupt because of misjudgments, personal ambition, or elite rivalries. Peace in the Horn is no local concern; it is a global imperative essential to regional order, international security, and the prevention of another humanitarian catastrophe.