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While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts.This analysis was first published in the Global Observatory, 30 August 2023.When Jim O’Neill coined the BRIC acronym in 2001, the point he was trying to convey was that the global economic system needed to incorporate the world’s largest emerging economies. His advice fell on deaf ears and in 2009, Brazil, China, India and Russia decided to take matters into their own hands and formed the BRIC grouping. South Africa joined the group in 2010 to form the BRICS. This July, the group held its 15th summit in South Africa, where they decided to add six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. More are likely to join in the future, including countries like Indonesia and Nigeria. What these countries have in common is a frustration, if not a grievance, about being side-lined to the periphery of the world economy. Together, the BRICS represent approximately 40% of the world’s population. The combined size of their economies are approaching approximately 30% of the world’s GDP, which puts them roughly on par with combined size of the economies of the G7 countries, depending on whether size is measured in GDP or PPP.  More importantly, in the next few decades, the combined size of the BRICS economies will surpass that of the G7. Despite this growing parity, all the members of the BRICS, with the exception of Russia, self-identifies as being part of the Global South, i.e., they feel excluded from a global system dominated by the Global North. Their stated aim is to work towards a future system of global governance where they will have equal political and economic say in global institutions, and where no one state will dominate others. In pursuit of this aim, BRICS countries have established their own development bank, set up their own contingency reserve arrangement, are developing their own payment system, and have started to trade with each other in their own currencies. The BRICS want to free their economies from the dollar-based international financial system. They feel exposed to United States interest rates that can have a negative effect on their economies, for no domestic reasons. The dollar-based financial system also provides the US with significant advantages in the global economy, which the BRICS see as unfair. They also feel a dollar-based financial system gives the US hegemonic influence in global affairs, through for example, exerting US jurisdiction on all dollar-based trade or investments that flow through US banks or financial institutions. While the BRICS countries have these clear shared macro-economic interests, many of the members also have competing interests in other domains. China and India are geopolitical rivals in South Asia. Egypt and Ethiopia are at loggerheads over the Nile. Brazil, India, South Africa and the newly-added Argentina are democracies, while other countries in the group are governed by a diverse set of autocratic regimes, which could set up an irreconcilable clash of values on some issues. Many of the members of the BRICS also have close ties to the United States and Europe, including Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in a televised statement to the nation on the eve of hosting the BRICS summit in South Africa, explained that South Africa remains non-aligned, and he announced that in 2023 the country will also host a major United States-Africa trade meeting and an EU-South Africa summit. South Africa will also host the G20 in 2025, the first in Africa. For many countries, membership of the BRICS does thus not necessarily imply aligning themselves with one global alliance versus another, but rather cooperation in a group around a series of shared interests. Where does this place the BRICS on the Russian war in Ukraine? The BRICS summit in Johannesburg steered clear of taking a position on the war, other than welcoming mediation aimed at resolving it through dialogue and diplomacy. Some BRICS members like Iran are clearly supporting Russia, while most others have stopped short of either supporting or condemning Russia. For many such as Egypt, the war has adversely affected their economy. Two of the BRICS members, Egypt and South Africa, are part of an African initiative to seek a mediated end to the conflict, which is perhaps the first African initiative to mediate an international conflict. Overall, however, the BRICS have their eyes on the medium- to long-term transformation of the global macro-economic and financial system, and countries like China are probably frustrated that the Russian war in Ukraine has drawn attention away from this larger objective. Are the BRICS and the West headed for a new cold war? The shift in the center of gravity of the global economy to the East is an unstoppable fact driven by demographics and economic factors like the cost of production. At the same time, Europe and the United States will remain major economic players. In tandem with these changes in the global economy, it is clear that the global political order will become more multipolar, with China, Europe, India, and the United States representing some of the major centers of influence. In an August 27 article, Jim O’Neil argues that the influence of the BRICS will be determined by their effectiveness, not their size. An expanding BRICS will most likely succeed in helping its members to break free from a dollar-based international financial system, but that will take several decades of incremental change before it reaches a tipping point. Whether that is a good or bad thing depends on the degree to which your economy is tied to the United States. Many of the BRICS countries, including China, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa all have economies whose prosperity are closely tied to the Unites States. They will thus have an interest in a slow, stable freeing up of the international financial system, and this should give everyone that is prudent time to adapt. The same logic also applies to changes in global governance architecture. Apart from Russia, all the other BRICS countries have an interest in making sure that changes in the global order are managed at a slow steady pace that does not generate instability. All the BRICS countries, apart from Russia, are also strong supporters of multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center. Many Western countries and BRICS members may thus have more shared interests than the doomsday headlines suggest. While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts.

A few years ago, the BRICS grouping – Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa – had lost salience because three of its members were in severe economic difficulty. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are primarily natural resource exporters and were badly affected by the global commodity price bust of 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has now given BRICS a new geopolitical salience as the members and their respective allies respond to events. In the emerging world order there is also now increased demand to join BRICS, in part as a countervailing power to “the west”. Argentina, Saudi Arabia and lately, Ethiopia, have expressed strong interest in becoming members. I have researched the political economy of globalisation in Africa over the last 30 years. I have specifically examined the scramble for Africa by the US and China, South Africa’s involvement in BRICS, the nature of BRICS engagement with Africa and market and resource access by BRICS in southern Africa. It would be a major coup for Ethiopia if it were able to join the grouping as it would raise its global profile, allow it to interact and coordinate more closely with some of the major world powers and move the discourse beyond the recent civil war there, potentially enabling it to attract more investment. Opportunities Ethiopia has cited its key role in founding the African Union and other institutions, along with its national interest as grounds for seeking BRICS membership. In my opinion, there are five key reasons why Ethiopia would want to join the grouping. Deteriorating relations with western powers: Ethiopia has historically depended on substantial western support through aid and security cooperation. But its relations with the west have soured as a result of the civil war, in which human rights violations were reported. Joining BRICS would make the country more geostrategically important, perhaps encouraging western powers to downplay human rights concerns, as they have in the past in the interests of “realpolitik”. Alternative growth frontier: Ethiopia remains one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, at over 5% a year. It has developed strong economic ties with China in recent decades. Similarly, Indian companies have been acquiring land in Ethiopia. China and India are now Africa’s two largest single trading partners (not counting the European Union as a single entity). Joining BRICS would signal openness and lead to greater cooperation through platforms like the business council and forum. It could also add impetus to the “resurgent Ethiopia” narrative, an image the authorities are keen to promote to attract investments. Negotiations over finance: The Ethiopian government is negotiating a financial package with the International Monetary Fund. Joining BRICS might give it greater leverage. Western powers, which largely control the IMF, might be more wary of alienating Ethiopia in BRICS and driving it further “into the arms” of China. The creation of a new BRICS currency, to challenge US dollar hegemony, is on the agenda and its existing Contingency Reserve Arrangement already partly competes with the IMF. Non-interference policy: BRICS powers rhetorically largely subscribe to non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other states, with the qualification that President Lula de Silva of Brazil talked about “non-indifference” to human rights when he was previously in power and Russia has violated the principle through invasions and election interference, amongst others. Ethiopia may be interested in the political cover that joining BRICS would provide. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has received political cover from China, and some would argue from South Africa. The Ethiopian government may be keen to avoid human rights governance conditions attached to new loans, aid or debt relief from the west. A prime minister seeking new friends: BRICS membership would help restore the tarnished image of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who is a Nobel peace prize recipient. Ahmed was heavily criticised as a war-monger during the civil war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Joining the BRICS club would show that his government is still politically acceptable to some major world powers. The risks There would of course be risks in Ethiopia joining the BRICS. Western powers might perceive it as drifting into the alternative geopolitical bloc or alignment, which could reduce aid and investment from them. But this could also have advantages for Ethiopia’s relations with the west by making the country more geo-strategically important. Based on past experience, Ethiopia would be an unlikely addition to the grouping. The last and only country to be admitted after the group’s founding was South Africa in 2010. Other countries have applied and have not been admitted. BRICS now operates in what is sometimes described as a BRICS-plus format with countries such as Egypt already members of its development bank and all African leaders invited to the up-coming BRICS’ summit in South Africa. Ethiopia’s economy, estimated at around US$126.78 billion in 2022, is less than half the size of South Africa’s US$405.87 billion. South Africa is by far the smallest economy in the BRICS. But in some ways Ethiopia might be seen as a more representative African country in BRICS than South Africa. Ethiopia hosts the African Union headquarters and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Its capital, Addis Ababa, is sometimes described as the continent’s diplomatic capital. The outcome of Ethiopia’s application will likely be known after the next summit in August.

More than a generous immigration policy, Africa desperately needs help holding on to its precious human capital. For some time now, it’s been customary to frame the debate on global North–South migration in terms of its economic benefits to destination Western countries. The question, for example, of whether an influx of “low-skilled” immigrants is potentially inimical to the welfare of their counterparts in destination countries derives from this framing. If entertained at all, the reasons why immigrants flee hearth and home, often in the most perilous of circumstances, are a secondary consideration. The same neglect of the situation in ‘sending countries’ (in reality, there is no such thing) can be seen in discussion of high-skilled immigration, generally accepted as a win-win for both immigrants and destination countries. Western policy on immigration appears to encapsulate this incongruity. Under pressure from sundry pro-immigrant groups, many western countries have embraced a policy approach aimed at making legal immigration less onerous and more humane. At the same time, the need for high-skilled manpower to fill gaps in various sectors of the Western economy—health and education immediately come to mind—has prompted a raft of programs and initiatives geared towards attracting and keeping talented individuals from various parts of the world. True, the overall picture remains mixed, with immigration being a continued source of rancor within western civil societies. Nevertheless, Fortress Euro-America of the closing decades of the twentieth century has yielded to a more liberal immigration regime. From a Western perspective, Africa has been one of the prime "beneficiaries" of this new dispensation. As African states have struggled with infrastructural decay, poverty, and corruption, highly skilled Africans have sought fresh starts in various parts of the Western Hemisphere. The statistics do not make for easy reading. According to the African Union (AU), an average of seventy thousand skilled professionals exit Africa annually. In the decade spanning 2008 to 2018, the proportion of doctors trained in Africa working in hospitals across the United States grew by 27 percent. In the U.S. healthcare sector, 24 percent of registered nurses, 20 percent of nursing assistants, and 16 percent of personal care aides hail from Africa. As of 2018, more than 5,250 Nigerian medical doctors were employed in the British National Health Service (NHS). While the whole of Africa has an estimated 4.5 doctors per 10,000 residents, the United Kingdom and the United States respectively have 2.9 and 2.6 doctors per 1,000 residents. As of 2015, 86 percent of African-educated physicians working in the United States were trained in just four African countries—Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa.   According to the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), “only forty thousand of the over eighty thousand medical doctors registered with the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria practice at home.” As of 2019, “five thousand of the registered thirty thousand pharmacists in Nigeria had travelled out of the country.” The annual cost to the African region of the flight of medical personnel is approximately 2 billion dollars.  From an African standpoint, the view from the education sector is no less dispiriting. In December 2020, the number of university students from Sub-Saharan Africa studying outside their homeland stood at just a little over four hundred thousand. According to a Campus France survey, “about 5 percent of the 8.1 million tertiary students on the continent have crossed a border, as compared to the global average of 2.4 percent.” There are currently more than seventy thousand Nigerian students studying outside the country. In the United States, the population of Nigerian students pursuing college education has gone up by 93 percent over the past decade. From Cairo to Cape Town, the triggering factors appear to be the same, and are not necessarily limited to problems in the education sector. According to the 2022 Africa Youth Survey, “Economic strife, insecurity, corruption, political intolerance, unreliable internet, and poor education systems are behind the desire of many African youth to relocate to Europe or the United States.”    While 52 percent of 4,500 Africans aged 18-24 surveyed recently by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) “are likely to consider emigrating in the next few years,” numbers alone do not do justice to the level of despair of many of the region’s youth at its gloomy prospects, or the sinking feeling among young people that they must get out if they ever hope to achieve something meaningful with their lives. The currency of the slang “Japa” (translation, “leave with no plan of ever coming back”) among Nigeria’s disenchanted youth is telling.    It is right and proper that pro-immigration groups across the West sympathize with the plight of African immigrants who, it should be remembered, cannot be blamed for wanting to get away from a predicament they had no hand in creating. Nevertheless, more than rote concern is needed to ensure that important questions around quality of governance and political accountability in Africa are placed front and center. That this has not been the case counts as one of the major failings of Western migration discourse. Other than insisting on the proper treatment of immigrants and calling attention to the human rights situation in countries of origin (something witnessed most recently in the reaction to the UK-Rwanda asylum deal) there seems to be little curiosity about longstanding political and economic determinants of emigration. If pro-immigration groups are genuinely interested in African development, as the majority unquestionably are, they must face up to the uncomfortable paradox that an unquestioning defense of continued emigration from Africa (coupled with a dogged opposition to repatriation) is effectively a vote for the region’s continued underdevelopment, since the status quo amounts to little more than an evacuation of African talent to the West. To be effective, Western pro-immigrant groups must synergize with local civil society groups across Africa working to hold the continent’s many corrupt leaders to account. The logic is simple: the more accountable African leaders are, the more robust civil society becomes, and the greater the incentive for young people to remain. This is not an argument against immigration. It is, on the one hand, acknowledging the obvious truth that the loss of energetic and driven young people leaves Africa denuded. On the other hand, one is merely amplifying a frustration that civil society groups across the continent have consistently expressed. Nor, just to be clear, is this a case of blaming the West for Africa’s problems or asking that Western countries step in as the region’s long-awaited saviors. If any blame is to be assigned, it is to African leaders for their scandalous mismanagement of the continent’s abundant resources. Nigeria, and increasingly South Africa, are prime examples of this culture of waste and political predation. Beyond playing the blame game, the aim is to underscore the point that migration has an unintended deleterious effect that pro-immigrant advocates can no longer afford to overlook.    Affirming immigrant rights and campaigning against immigrant repatriation is noble. Working in concert with Africa-based actors and institutions to help the continent keep hold of its precious human capital should be the goal.   

Mauritius and Seychelles are two small island states in the southwestern Indian Ocean.  They are both former British colonies and have been members of the British Commonwealth since independence. Both are among the most prosperous African countries, blessed with stable democratic governments, high levels of public safety, a year-round warm climate and uncommon natural beauty. They boast the highest rankings in the United Nation’s Human Development Index among Sub-Saharan African countries by far (Mauritius 63rd, Seychelles 72nd — out of the 191 total countries ranked — the next highest, South Africa, is 109th).  Sources: International Monetary Fund, 2022. The seemingly precarious geographic status of small island states also comes with a major advantage: they enjoy Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) many times larger than their land mass. In fact, the EEZs of these two states are so large that, even though they are more than a thousand miles away from one another, there is an almost 153,000-square mile overlap between them which they manage jointly and without dispute. Needless to say, while such large EEZs are virtually impossible for small island states to effectively control, they also hold the promise of unexplored riches in and under the sea. Small island states by definition are vulnerable and must pursue activist foreign policies, participate in a range of regional and global international organizations, and seek allies wherever they can. Traditionally, given that the largest ethnic group is descended from indentured servants from India, Mauritius has had particularly close ties with New Delhi. But Mauritian political elites have been quite successful in harnessing the emerging rivalry between India and China in the southern Indian Ocean region, obtaining investments in a wide range on industrial, commercial, and infrastructural projects. During the Cold War, Seychelles — like Mauritius, officially a member of the non-aligned movement — was in effect firmly in the socialist camp, though it hosted a US tracking and spying station in the mountains above the capital, Victoria, while the Soviet navy’s ships were frequently moored in its harbor. Both countries have cultivated relationships with Gulf monarchies and have handsomely benefited from them. Mutually Supportive Political TiesSoon after independence Mauritius and Seychelles established diplomatic relations with most Gulf monarchies. These links have continued unabated since then and have grown closer. Obviously, this is a largely unbalanced relationship as for the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) the nexus with two small island states is not a priority. For Mauritius and Seychelles, however, links to the wealthy Arab monarchies — particularly to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia — are far more important and have been carefully cultivated.  Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have decades-long traditions of providing support in a variety of ways to the two island nations.  Numerous bilateral agreements have been concluded between them from establishing university scholarships to cooperating in security operations.  Collaboration in anti-piracy activities, especially critical during the first two decades of this century — when it was the most significant external security threat facing these countries — has been an important dimension of maritime diplomacy between the Mauritius and Seychelles and the GCC states. The Emirates extended a $15 million grant to rebuild the Seychelles Coast Guard and donated five boats to help patrol its shorelines. Oman, given its own long Indian Ocean coast, had also held talks with Mauritius and Seychelles on piracy issues. Kuwait has provided assistance to the Seychelles through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development since 1985, helping to develop a number of off-shore fishing and infrastructure projects as well as financing a primary school in Victoria. In April 2022 the Seychelles signed an agreement with the Emirates to modernize and transform its public service. The three-year project will help develop and improve government activities and practices, interaction with the public, and generally enhance the effectiveness of Seychelles’ public administration. Seychelles’ finance minister Naadir Hassan said that embracing the results-based management framework and digitalization of public service would be spur a major improvement in increasing the delivery of high-quality public services. The UAE has also strengthened several of Seychelle’s community project initiatives. For instance, it has financially supported the construction of public housing units. Moreover, the Emiratis have contributed to the wind turbine farm emerging on Ile du Port, just outside of the capital, Victoria. These ventures have been made possible by grants provided by the Abu Dhabi government and administered by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. The Emirates also donated 40 buses for the Seychelles public transport authority.  Behind much of this aid to Seychelles was Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (1948-2022), the second president of the UAE and the ruler of Abu Dhabi (2004-2022). His interest in the Seychelles was not entirely altruistic. Starting in 1994 he bought up nearly 100 acres of the island where he built a palace in 2005. The construction of the mountain-top castle was highly controversial owing to the massive environmental damage it caused though Khalifa made reparations and compensated the affected 360 households. Unlike Seychelles, Mauritius has been a multiparty-democracy from independence. It, too, has significantly benefited from its links to GCC states and, in turn, has supported them according to its limited capabilities. When, in 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt isolated Qatar for its allegedly different approaches to foreign relations and international terrorism, Mauritius was one of the nine Arab countries that severed relations with Doha in June 2017. After all, political elites in Port Louis had to be pragmatic and realize that they had more to lose if they withheld support from their primary beneficiaries of the region (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) than sticking with Qatar. Still, in a remarkable example of political brinkmanship just a few months later, in October 2017, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Mauritius met with Qatar’s non-resident ambassador in Port Louis, “discussing bilateral relations” and “ways to boost and develop them.” Presumably the commercial benefits of connections with Qatar outweighed the advantages of being one of the states that supported isolating Doha. Small island states, after all, must be exceedingly pragmatic. Mauritian political elites and underprivileged societal groups have also been the beneficiaries of Riyadh’s largesse. Unlike Seychelles 1,100 miles to the north, Mauritius is hit by devastating cyclones with troubling regularity. Port Louis’s GCC allies have just as regularly extended donations, aid, and grants to support rebuilding efforts. For instance, in May 2019 the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center announced a donation of $10 million to provide humanitarian assistance. The grant funded projects to build shelter, assist the food and health sectors, and to assist with rapid intervention. The Saudi Fund for Development contributed low-interest loans and grants for the establishment of a teaching hospital, a multi-sports complex, and social housing sector projects. Riyadh also airlifted 50 tons of dates to lighten the suffering during the crisis. Expanding relations between the two countries gained further momentum with the 2018 opening of a Consulate General of Saudi Arabia in Mauritius and a Mauritian Consulate in Jeddah — partly financed by the Saudis — soon after. Growing Trade and Cultural RelationsUndoubtedly the largest segment of the commercial relationship between Mauritius and the Seychelles and the GCC is tourism. From the busiest airports of the Gulf kingdoms — Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai — the islands are a 4-6-hour flight away and offer a comparatively mild yet warm climate, pristine beaches, well-developed infrastructure, and many exclusive resorts.  The diminution of Chinese visitors to Mauritius and Seychelles served to redouble the efforts of these countries to turn toward the GCC, especially its most populous nation, Saudi Arabia. The Mauritius Tourism Promotion Authority (MTPA) has devised campaigns to position the Mauritian islands as “a destination choice” for Saudi travel agents. Unsurprisingly, the COVID pandemic which brought international travel to a near standstill, was a particularly challenging time for the two island countries. Mauritius put in place a robust vaccination strategy and safety protocol that proved to be quite effective in protecting its population but shut down its tourism sector. To cushion the blow and help make-up for the lost revenue, the UAE provided financial assistance to both countries. Since early 2022 tourism from the Gulf has increased partly in response to the islands’ marketing campaigns. In May, Saudi Arabia and the Seychelles signed a Memorandum of Understanding to boost tourism, create job opportunities, and promote sustainable development. Direct flights to the Seychelles by Flynas, a Saudi airline, began in July. Air Seychelles and Air Mauritius became beneficiaries of the rapprochement between some of the Gulf monarchies and Israel as they received overflight rights from Saudi Arabia’s government for their flights to and from Tel Aviv. This has been a boon to both airlines as Israel has been a leading market for them and overflight rights allows them to save fuel and add passengers to their flights. The MTPA’s new marketing campaign, “Explore the Unexplored Mauritius,” was aimed specifically at GCC countries. Mauritius recorded 470,640 arrivals in the first half of 2022, far above 2021 numbers but still 40 percent below 2019 figures. Tourism is not the only source of the commerce between the island states and the Gulf. As a growing number of Gulf nationals — especially Emiratis — have purchased holiday homes in Seychelles and Mauritius, GCC corporations also increased their investments not just in hotels but also in the banking and construction sectors. Mauritius also is home to a growing knowledge economy, with several small but ambitious technology companies and consulting firms entering the GCC market. For instance, Abler, a Mauritius-based independent compliance consulting firm — its expertise lies mainly in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing to navigate international regulatory challenges — recently launched operations in the UAE. Saudi Arabia is keen to expand its own tourism sector, and Saudi companies have recently hired Mauritian travel consultants with widely recognized expertise. The Tourism College of Oman and the Seychelles Tourism Academy are also planning exchanges. More generally, Oman — which has established bilateral relations with Seychelles in 1983 — has in recent years become interested in investment opportunities in the Seychelles as well as establishing direct flights to the island from Muscat for its national carrier, Oman Air. Finally, the Muslim community in Mauritius — Islam is the third largest religion after Hinduism and Christianity — has cultivated close ties with their brethren in the GCC, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Islamic revivalism has played a significant role in the formation and articulation of ethnic and religious identity and, in turn, lent focus to the political opposition activities among the minority Muslims. In 2000 Riyadh financed the construction of an Islamic Cultural Center in Port Louis that has become the focal point of Muslim life on the island. The Kingdom has also provided assistance to Mauritian pilgrims for Haj. Saudi Arabia’s uninterrupted political and commercial engagement in Mauritius has been a boon for its coreligionists on the island. ConclusionThe relationship between Mauritius and Seychelles and the Gulf kingdoms have lasted since independence and have been free of disputes and controversies. The island states have provided political support for the Arab kingdoms in international organizations and forums as well as commercial opportunities for the GCC member countries. The two small island states have been fortunate for the aid, investments, and multifaceted patronage they have received from the Gulf. These mutually advantageous ties are likely to further develop and proliferate in the foreseeable future. GCC states must diversify their economies and need stable and friendly countries receptive to their investments. (Mauritius happens to be by far the top African state both in terms of persistence of democracy as well as in terms of ease of doing business.) It appears that only unforeseeable calamities like the recent pandemic or a similarly improbable politico-economic crisis or collapse in either side of the equation might cloud these horizons.