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Director-General, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Dear Friends, Young and Old, This week, as we have gathered here at the World Food Forum in the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations in Rome to discuss the necessary transformation of our agri-food systems, we must not only be conscious of targets missed or imperfectly achieved, but of the need for courage, and to generate new capacity to move to new models of better connection between economy, social protection, social justice and ecology. We are confronted with a climate and biodiversity emergency that cannot be handled by the tools that produced it or by the architecture of how we made decisions before. We are called upon to, once and for all, tackle with alternatives and sustained effort and innovation, the vicious circle of global poverty and inequality, global hunger, debt and climate change, our interacting crises. That is the context in which sustainable food systems must be achieved. I ask you all gathered today to respond in the most meaningful way within your capacity, within your generation, in a way that includes all generations, to the challenge set out by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in his recent statements: This is how the Secretary-General put it: “The Sustainable Development Goals aren’t just a list of goals. They carry the hopes, dreams, rights and expectations of people everywhere. In our world of plenty, hunger is a shocking stain on humanity and an epic human rights violation. It is an indictment of every one of us that millions of people are starving in this day and age.” It can be put right but we must change and there is work involved in upskilling in such a way that we can not only identify and critique assumptions of failing models but be able to put the alternative models in place. We have had so many broken promises. Only 15 percent of some 140 specific targets to achieve the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals are on track to be achieved. Many targets are going in the wrong direction at the present rate, and not a single one is expected to be achieved in the next seven years. However, we have some reasons to be hopeful. When I look around this room today, I see so many engaged and committed people, including young people who have the enthusiasm, energy and creativity needed to tackle the serious structural causes of food insecurity and global hunger. But it is important to acknowledge that young people are not alone in seeking authenticity of words delivered into actions that have an ethical outcome. There are those who have spent their lives seeking a fairer world, one in which hunger would be eliminated – as it can be. We must recognise their efforts. We must work together to harness this collective energy and creativity into strong movements that will deliver, finally, a food-secure world for all. This will require, I suggest, moving to a new culture of sharing information, experiences, insights. As the cuts have taken effect, we must take the opportunity of developing a view, post-silo culture, of sharing insights, and I see FAO as uniquely positioned for this. As Glenn Denning, Peter Timmer and other food experts have stated, achieving food security is not an easy task given how food hunger is “deeply entwined with the organisation of economic activities and their regulation through public policies”, given, too, how governments and markets must work together, how the private, public and third sectors must work together. All of our efforts must have the character of inclusivity. Each of us as global citizens has a responsibility to respond. To ignore it would be a dereliction of our duty of care to our shared planet and its life-forms including our fellow humans and future generations. The Secretary-General’s pleas in relation to the consequences of climate change are given a further terrible reality in the increased and spreading threat of hunger, a food insecurity which is directly affected by the impact of climate change. For example, figures published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations show that 26.2 percent of Africa’s population experienced severe food insecurity in 2021, with 9.8 percent of the total global population suffering from undernourishment the same year. It is time for us all, as leaders and global citizens, to take stock of how words are leading to actions, to increase the urgency of our response to what is a grave existential threat and to achieve change. It is clear, as the Secretary-General’s powerful statement shows, that we need to begin the work of reform in our international institutional architecture, such as UN reform at the highest level, including the Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions, if we are to achieve what the Secretary-General has suggested is the challenge to “turn a year of burning heat into a year of burning ambition”. Let us commit then to sharing purposes, projects, resources, seeking a new culture for sustenance solutions. Those of us who have spent much of our lives advocating UN reform believe that its best prospects are in the growing acknowledgement of the importance of the vulnerabilities and frustrated capacity of the largest and growing populations of the world being represented, not only nominally but effectively, through a reform that includes reform of the Bretton-Woods Institutions. As Secretary-General Guterres has said on a number of occasions, it is time to reform what are 1945 institutions, including the Security Council and Bretton Woods, in order to align with the “realities of today’s world”. We have to acknowledge too that the development models of the 1950s and 1960s were part of the assumptions that brought us to the crises through which we are living. New models are needed and the good news is that a new epistemology, our way of looking at the world, of sufficiency and sustainability, is emerging. We are seeing good work already occurring. Good development scholarship is available to us. I reference, for example Pádraig Carmody’s recent book, Development Theory and Practice in a Changing World. Such work builds important bridges from the intellectual work that is so badly needed and is welcome at the centre of our discourse on all aspects of interacting crises, including global hunger, and the need to link economy, ecology and a global ethics. What we must launch now is a globalisation from below. Replacing the globalisation from above that has given us a burning planet and threatened democracy itself, with a globalisation from below of the fullest participation, we can establish and indeed extend democracy, offering accountability and transparency of our work together. Writers such as Pádraig Carmody are not alone in suggesting that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals provides the opportunity for moving past the worst contradictions of failed models and dangerous undeclared assumptions. The demise of hegemonic development theory and practice may be a result of several factors, such as the rise of ultra-nationalism around the world, the increasing importance of securitisation where the most powerful insulate their lives from the actions of the excluded, and the existential threat posed by the climate crisis. Such research adds to the growing body of development literature that argues for a pro-active, structural-focused, tailored approach to development. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative of the FAO, details of which were discussed at this week’s parallel session, is a most welcome initiative, one that aims to raise incomes, improve the nutritional status and well-being of poor and vulnerable populations, and strengthen resilience to climate change. It heralds a belated recognition too of the insufficiency of a reactive emergency response to famine and hunger crises. It suggests a move towards one that tackles the underlying structural causes of hunger. Young people will need patience and to dig sufficiently deep to achieve these necessary changes. They are right in seeking to be partners, so much more than being allowed as attendees. Hand-in-Hand recognises the importance of tailor-made interventions to food security, using the best available evidence in the form of spatial data, validated on the ground through local diagnostics and policy processes, to target the most food insecure, the most hungry, the poorest. It recognises that context-specific employment and labour market policies are part of the sustainability challenge. I believe that evidence from below is crucial to achieving globalisation from below and that it can be achieved by a reintroduction of new re-casted anthropology guided by, among others, the new African scholars now available, whose work is empirical and peer-tested, can be invaluable in giving transparency on projects and investments – a strategy for fact-gathering for empowerment of rural people so like the 1955 fact-gathering with rural people of the FAO – first published in 1955 and used by me in 1969! Young people must be about upskilling to be able to critique all of the assumptions guiding the policies on to their lives. A key objective for us now must be to strengthen institutional capacity on the ground, not only at the strategic level, but also fundamentally, so that the public, farmers, and other stakeholders’ institutions are enabled to participate in territories-based agri-food systems. Such a move is fundamental to a successful food security strategy. Our institutional architecture and the multilateral bodies within it, must be made fit for purpose if we are to tackle effectively and meaningfully our contemporary food insecurity crisis which is worsening according to the 2023 Global Report on Food Crises, with 258 million people across 58 countries suffering acute food insecurity. Perhaps most crucially, we must acknowledge, as United Nations Programmes such as the Hand-in-Hand Initiative does, the critical importance of partnership and collaboration in addressing global hunger. We must do everything we can to ensure cross-sectoral co-ordination, foster coherent development actions, under a common, shared vision. We must end all wasteful competitive silo behaviours, create a culture of openness and co-operation. The FAO is well positioned to lead on this with its new invigorated partnerships with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Co-operation in the development and implementation of new models will be key to the achieving of any targets that seek to be sustainable and inclusive. For example, I suggest it will achieve best results if funders, such as the African Development Bank, are enabled and funded to work closely with research institutes, both at the national and international level, but particularly take account of field studies conducted over time at local level in the new anthropology so as to ensure that findings from the latest research feed into the design and implementation of any financial supports and investments. By providing a platform, a shared interactive transparent space for national authorities and producers, national and global businesses, multilateral development banks and donors to discuss and advance ways and means to finance the supported national food programmes, initiatives such as Hand-in-Hand are proving to be an effective flagship programme of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Co-operation must work both ways. For example, the parts of the so-called ‘developed’ world suffering from problems of high levels of obesity and food wastage must learn from the deep knowledge and wisdom existing in the most populated continents, as well as the science, which points to a new ecological revolution, one in which agroecology – the bringing of ecological principles to develop new management approaches in agroecosystems – can play a fundamental role, especially for the poorest of our global citizens. We have seen the destructive impact of colonial models of agronomy promoting an over-reliance on a small number of commodity crops, herders incentivised to become less mobile and store less grain in order to maximise commodity crop production, and increasing imports in conditions of near monopoly of seeds, pesticides and fertilisers. This had the deadly effect of opening up farmers not only to the full force of extended droughts, the ravages of variable climate conditions, and a reliance on non-indigenous inputs, but also to global spaces where they have insufficient influence. We must retreat from these dysfunctional food systems model, with their related dependencies, with urgency and embrace models of sufficiency and effective local markets and see the value of making our way too that includes agro-ecological models that promote food security and development opportunities for the poorest people on our fragile planet. Adaptation and responding to the already changing climate is crucial for all of us, and especially in the most food-insecure nations. We must restore degraded ecosystems, introduce drought-resistant crops, ensure accessible digital services for smallholder farms, while creating new, sustainable green jobs for young people so that we may forge a smart, sustainable, climate-resilient development path for the continent. This week we have to acknowledge the many challenges we face including, inter alia, the energy, climate and biodiversity crises, war and conflict which exacerbate food insecurity, ensuring enabling policy environments, and reaching the long-term goal of sustainable food system transformation. Any agri-food initiative, be it for Africa, the Middle-East, Central or South America, or other food-insecure regions, must place inclusivity at its core. Specifically, more vulnerable, smallholder farmers must be targeted for inclusion as programme beneficiaries, not just large-scale, industrial level farmers and ever-expanding commercial plantations. Research has shown that irresponsible agri-business deals are sometimes falsely legitimated by the promotion of alleged achievement of Sustainable Development Goal Number 2 at any cost, without care as to consequence, ignoring the reality that smallholders need enabling policies to enhance their role in food production; that food insecurity is linked to rights, processes, and unequal access to land resources; and that dispossession disproportionately affects women farmers. On this latter issue of gender, achieving zero hunger requires gender-inclusive land and labour policies. Actions must prioritise the inclusion of women and girls who are more food insecure than men in every region of the world. Women must have a right to land recognised and enshrined. The gender gap in food security has grown exponentially in recent years, and will only deteriorate further in the absence of targeted intervention. Women are obviously the most impacted victims of the food crisis, thus they must be a part of the solution. Women produce up to 80 percent of foodstuffs. Empowering women farmers can thus serve as a transformative tool for food security. However, female farmers have, research tell us, limited access to physical inputs, such as seeds and fertiliser, to markets, to storage facilities and this must be addressed. Climate change, and our response to it, addressing global hunger and global poverty, exposing and breaking dependency is a core theme of my Presidency. It is the most pressing existential crisis that our vulnerable planet and its global citizens face. Throughout the world, young people and the youth sector have been at the vanguard of efforts to tackle climate change. Young people have demonstrated, time and again, how well-informed and acutely aware they are of the threat that climate change poses, as well as its uneven and unequal impacts. May I suggest to all of you that, as young innovators and future leaders in your respective fields, you will be at your best, achieve the greatest fulfilment for yourself and others, when you locate your contribution within a commitment to be concerned and contributing global citizens. Take time to ask how is my energy in the tasks of hand and brain being delivered and for whose benefit. May I suggest, too, that you will be remembered and appreciated all the more if you work to ensure that the results of science, technology are shared and that all human endeavours are allowed to flow across borders for the human benefit of all and with a commitment to ecological responsibility and inclusivity. Offer your efforts where they can have the best effect for all. Locate yourselves in the heart of the populated world, as Nobel Laureate William Campbell did with his research on river blindness. Changing our food systems is, however, let us not forget, an intergenerational challenge that requires an inter-generational approach. We must now empower youth to be in the driver’s seat to build a new, better, transparent model of food security in a variety of different settings. Let us endeavour, together, in our diverse world, to seek to build a co-operative, caring and non-exploitative global civilisation free from hunger, a shared planet, a global family at peace with nature and neighbours, resilient to the climate change that is already occurring, one based on foundations of respect for each nation’s own institutions, traditions, experiences and wisdoms, founded on a recognition of the transcendent solidarity that might bind us together as humans, and reveal a recognition of the responsibility we share for our vulnerable planet and the fundamental dignity of all those who dwell on it. Thank you. Beir beannacht.

The apparent assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin in the crash of his private jet between Moscow and St. Petersburg represents an inflection point in Russian-African relations. Prigozhin, as leader of the notorious Wagner Group, had been the point man for Russia in Africa since Wagner first began operations on the continent in 2017. More than a single entity, the Wagner Group is an amalgamation of shell companies deploying paramilitary forces, disinformation and political interference in Ukraine, Syria and Africa. Its leaders have been sanctioned by 30 countries for the group’s destabilising activities.  Prigozhin was believed to be living on borrowed time after he led a short-lived insurrection – part of a power struggle with the Russian military leadership – in June. While he quickly backed down, the action embarrassed Russian president Vladimir Putin and triggered chatter that Putin’s perceived weakness would embolden other challengers to his authority. Prigozhin advanced Russian influence in Africa by propping up politically isolated and unpopular authoritarian leaders. As a result of Wagner’s support, these leaders were beholden to Russian interests. Wagner’s backing took a variety of irregular forms, like paramilitary forces, disinformation campaigns, election interference, intimidation of political opponents, and arms for resources deals. Prigozhin referred to this interlocking set of influence operations as “The Orchestra”, which he conducted. Wagner deployed forces to Libya, the entral African Republic, Mali and Sudan. It has also been interfering in domestic politics and information narratives in some two dozen African countries. I research the role of governance in advancing security and development as well as the influence of external actors in Africa, including Russia. Democratic transitions and institutions of democratic accountability are among my interests. The breadth of Russian political interference in Africa points to Russia’s strategic objectives for the continent. It aims to secure a foothold in North Africa and the Red Sea, undermine western influence, normalise authoritarianism and displace the UN-based international system. None of these objectives are about making Africa more prosperous or stable. Rather, the continent is primarily a theatre to advance Russia’s geostrategic interests. Attempting to maintain the lucrative and influential operations of the Wagner Group in Africa after Prigozhin’s death will make it hard for Russia to deny that it uses irregular and illegal actions to extend its influence. Maintaining Wagner without Prigozhin The Wagner model has seen Russian influence expand rapidly in Africa. That’s despite Russia investing very little on the continent. Most of Wagner’s costs have been covered through cash and mineral concessions provided by host regimes. By some accounts revenues from mining operations in the Central African Republic and Sudan generate billions. It is no surprise that Russia would want to keep the Wagner enterprise going. Tellingly, on the day of Prigozhin’s plane crash, deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was in Libya to reassure warlord Khalifa Haftar of Russia’s ongoing support. Yevkurov later visited the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso to deliver the same message. The question will be whether the Russian military has the capacity. Russia needs soldiers in Ukraine. So, it may not have experienced fighters to spare in Africa. It is also an open question whether Wagner troops will agree to sign contracts with the Russian defence ministry, given the way their leader was dispatched. The Russian government would also need to recreate the multidimensional dealings that made Wagner’s operations effective in shoring up client regimes. For years, Russia has promoted hybrid warfare – the fusion of conventional and subversive tools. Synchronising this across multiple African contexts will require greater dexterity than the Russian security bureaucracy is likely capable of, however. Finally, Russia has benefited from the plausible deniability that Wagner has provided while doing Putin’s bidding. In every context in which Wagner forces have been deployed, they have been credibly accused of human rights abuses including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings. In Mali, Wagner is linked to more than 320 incidents of human rights abuses and hundreds of civilian deaths. Wagner has also been accused of driving away local communities where it has secured mining concessions, effectively annexing African territory. By directly taking over the mantle of Wagner operations in Africa, the Russian government can no longer claim ignorance or impotence to do anything about these unlawful and destabilising actions. Russia has largely escaped serious reputational costs for Wagner’s thuggish activities in Africa. But this will change when it owns the repressive tactics Wagner has deployed. Reassessments in Africa What of Wagner’s African clients? Leaders of these regimes have come to power through extraconstitutional means. They restrict opposition voices and media. They are isolated internationally. Simply put, they cannot survive without Moscow’s support. So, we should not expect a change in receptivity from the military juntas in Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, the co-opted leadership in the Central African Republic, or the Libyan warlord, Haftar. What will be telling is the reaction from other governments on the continent. Some will continue to see value in flirting with Russia as a way of hedging against international criticism. Russia’s reach in Africa may be exceeding its grasp, however. There is a growing awakening on the continent of how little Russia actually brings to Africa in terms of investment, trade, jobs creation or security. Its deployment of mercenaries, disinformation, political interference and arms for resources deals mean it actually amplifies instability on the continent. The symbolism of this was vividly brought home in the days before the Russia-Africa Summit at the end of July. Russia pulled out of the Black Sea grain deal that had enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to get from Ukraine to Africa and other parts of the world. The deal had eased supply chain restrictions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not only did Russia scuttle the deal: it bombed the Ukrainian ports that were exporting the grain, wasting 180,000 tonnes in the process. The contempt Putin showed for African interests by this action was hard to ignore. This disregard, coupled with recognition that Russia offers relatively little to Africa, contributed to only 17 African heads of state attending the St. Petersburg summit. By comparison 43 African heads of state attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019. The way that Prigozhin was eliminated must also give African leaders pause. Putin speaks often of his desire to create a new international order. Russia’s lawlessness at home and abroad is bringing into sharp focus what his world order would look like. And that’s not a vision many African leaders share.

AbstractPurpose: The main objective was to review literature on the Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action with emphasis on how to solve Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia.  Methodology: The author reviewed credible secondary data of HDP case studies online as part of a systemic Critical review design. Only official organizational documents from the UN and its bodies, peer-reviewed published research, books, and mass-media outputs related to HDP nexus were admissible to guarantee validity of results and conclusion applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia.Results: Reviewed scoped evidence based on themes concluded that humanitarian -development peace nexus is intended to bridge collaborations among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. These collaborations are not limited only to funding and financial drivers, strategies such as resilience agenda pathways for societies, destabilizing the effects of environmental stress, etc. Tackling protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia ultimately leads to sustaining the peace humanitarian, development, and peace interventions agenda (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018). Conclusion: The paper concluded that Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action had an impact on Protracted Environmental Conflicts in Somalia. Unique Contribution to Theory: The paper contributes to the existing literature by reviewing the HDP nexus in action, specifically on how it can solve protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia. It highlights the collaboration among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem and the strategies that can be used to tackle environmental stress.Unique Contribution to Policy: The paper emphasizes the importance of the HDP nexus in sustaining peace interventions in conflict-affected areas like Somalia. It provides insights on how collaborations and strategies can be used to address protracted environmental conflicts in the country. Unique Contribution to Practice: The paper offers a systematic critical review design that can be used by humanitarian practitioners and stakeholders to evaluate the effectiveness of HDP nexus programs in addressing protracted environmental conflicts. It highlights the importance of using credible secondary data sources and collaboration among development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. Overall, the paper highlights the importance of the HDP nexus in addressing protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia and provides insights on how it can be operationalized in practice. The findings can inform the design and implementation of contextually appropriate and effective HDP nexus programs in conflict-affected areas. Keywords: Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus, Protracted Environmental Conflicts   1.0 Introduction Protracted Environmental Conflicts  , collaborative evidence (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018; Oxfam, 2019) warns of the dynamic complexity of solving environmental problems based on their polarity (based on the fact that there is conflict and disconnect between home based strategies and generic strategies), and protracted nature of environmental conflicts (ICARDA, 2020) .Protracted in sense of  breadth of  variability  of environmental conflicts such as concerns on climate change, global warming desertification and ecology risks impact on quality of life compounded by the fact that these risks have not been solved for a long time despite their risk profiles.  Swiss Re Institute (2021) ties the protracted nature of environmental conflicts to economic, social, cultural, and peace outcomes to humanity that pose an antagonistic end result to humanitarian goals if the vagaries of nature are not professionally managed. This is in agreement with Hinga (2018) looks at the impeccable challenges of protracted environmental and their outcomes on societies and individuals specially to WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene).  The available evidence views of, impeccable and protracted ‘challenges is more akin to of ‘stakeholders need to realize that environmental problems in Somalia and elsewhere are recurring unless the stakeholders change methodology. Consequently, in this paper, the author argues that as environmental conflicts in Somalia conflicts grow increasingly protracted, climate-related shocks more intense, ecological conflicts pitting nature and man more execrated, the vulnerability cycle of fragility, vulnerability and the exacerbation of conflict becomes more established in Somalia (Oxfam, 2019).In this regard, Abel et al (2021) commends  that a framework that integrates a coherent humanitarian, development and peace interventions is needed to tackle protracted environmental conflicts in the globe and elsewhere. This paper will be thus anchored in the humanitarian -development peace nexus theory.  1.1 Problem  The key environmental challenges in Somalia are land deforestation, land degradation, aridity, desertification, pastoral conflicts, water unsustainability, climate change among others, climate change among others. Protracted environmental pressures have been associated with economic, political, social and cultural problems thus downgrading human resilience and ecological sustenance in the region (unisdr,2021). Consequently, it also appears that although evidence relating to climate, environmental risks exists, a disjointed perception exists especially viewed from the success and operationalization of international humanitarian programmes discourse. One of the common misconceptions to the misapplication of humanitarian -development peace rests on the assumption that environmental resilience competes against humanitarian security. These two problems surrounding humanitarian– development– peace nexus and environmental acuity in Somalia builds the problem to be addressed in this paper (Oxfam, 2019). 1.2 Objectives  An overview of Role of the Humanitarian – Development – Peace Nexus evidence in Tackling Protracted Environmental Conflicts theory and literature forms study purpose. Review Role of HDP Nexus Evidence in Theory and PracticeConfigure Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia1.3 Research QuestionsWhat are the elements of HDP nexus in context of Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in SomaliaWhat is the Role of HDP Nexus Evidence in Theory and Practice Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in SomaliaWhich Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action strategies is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia 1.4 Value of research  This paper aims at improved interlinking of the various instruments within the HPD. The interlinking of humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation had already started to be implemented in the 1990s through the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approach. What is particularly new in terms of the triple nexus concept is the inclusion of the peace dimension. Humanitarians as well as development and peace actors are called upon to better coordinate their work in order to more effectively promote the transformation of crises and conflicts into sustainable peace. In the past, different mandates, approaches and funding logic as well as a lack of cooperation mechanisms among the stakeholders have led to the poor integration of interventions and often compromised efficiency and effectiveness as a result (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018; Oxfam, 2019). This paper gives new insights on challenges: a broad strategy, lack of incentives and a poor mutual understanding of the HPD nexus. Despite the awareness of the relevance of the concept and initial successes, implementation still poses major challenges for the stakeholders involved. Effective and efficient cooperation beyond institutional borders requires an adjustment to internal structures, processes and procedures that have often evolved over decades. Within the institutions and the nexus system, there is also a lack of incentive structures to encourage cooperation. Furthermore, there is no in-depth understanding of the work and functioning of the other stakeholder groups. Last but not least, there is a lack of joint analysis and scenario planning to define the focus of coherent programmes that map all aspects of the HDP nexus. Despite OECD DAC recommendations, the rather broad concept leaves plenty of room for interpretation and leads to the various actors having a different understanding of how the actual implementation of the HDP nexus is to take place (Oxfam,201; Medinilla, Shiferaw and Veron, 2019; Abel et al. 20; Hinga, 2018). 1.5 Justification for Study  On the Possible solutions listed below: greater coordination, more changes of perspective and dedicated cooperation at all levels as follows are expected in Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus, Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018)).Leadership and governance: The HPD nexus should demonstrate commitment to accountability through feedback and openness integrated into environmental programs, monitoring and evaluation, staffing, stakeholder engagements, reporting etc.Transparency: provision of timely information on procedures structures and processes enabling informed decision makingFeedback: Actively engage affected populations to develop resilient policy and practice programming that customizes and responds to protection issues (environment.)Participation: Encourage community partnered participation models Design, Monitoring and Evaluation: Design, monitor and evaluate community conscious programs that are environment sensitive2.0 Critical review of Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action Critical review of Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action: Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia scopes literature based on following keywords is effected (Kroll,Warchold. and Pradhan,2019). These keywords encompass Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus, Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia as suggested by agents of humanitarian-development– peace nexus. These keywords capture the dynamism in the HDP landscape fueled by technology, globalization/commercialization, increased risks (financial/operational/ morbidity/mortality) , and evidence   points to sustained disruption in the otherwise unstable   environmental sector. A summary of HDP models is ascertained because these models converge HDP inputs ;( stakeholders), outputs;(participants and procedures) aimed at delivering short/long term outcomes (quality / cost efficient/ sustainable HPD) to society. Success of HDP projects/programs/health performance is a critical subject Moreso to the Somali government/ policy makers/practitioners /public (Sharma et al., 2019). Contextual keywords summarized included i.e.,’ humanitarian-development– peace nexus, r barriers of   the operationalization of the HDP, success factors to the operationalization of HDP, benefits of HDP – nexus efforts in tackling recurring environmental conflicts in Somalia, recommended a humanitarian-development– peace – nexus model in tackling desertification in Somalia. This sets the groundwork for the theoretical development, methodology Analysis and findings of the subsequent research content (Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). The HDP theoretical precepts of this proposal aim to guide the integration of interlinkages in protracted issues of the humanitarian-development– peace nexus viewed through the lens of environmental sustenance, diminishing the adverse effects of environmental conflicts. Specifically, the humanitarian-development peace nexus intends to bridge collaborations among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. These collaborations are not limited only to funding and financial drivers, strategies such as resilience agenda pathways for societies, destabilizing the effects of environmental stress, etc. Tackling protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia ultimately sustains the peace HDP interventions agenda (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018). Peace as a central component of HDP nexus has been championed from 2016. On the forefront is the UN who have placed peace as the banner of its operations. The UN argues that without peace, social developmental goals in public and private circumstances cannot exist. Peace is a human right that supports sustenance of any society, economy or political organization. (Webster and Paton, 2016). Based on this information, the HDP as a policy document cannot be ignored as a guiding document on the success of HDP. Kabia (2016) notes that achieving the optimal combination of humanitarian, development, and peace approaches, and integrating them, is crucial. A nexus approach should never be used as an excuse not to provide humanitarian aid promptly or to reduce development assistance. Many multi-mandated organizations, transforming the aid system, have become accustomed to recognizing and responding to these altering settings.  Khafagy's (2020) case study explores the nexus between FBOS's humanitarian and religious motives. To achieve this, the author argued that Humanitarian actions are socially constructed to the accountability of affected populations of a particular society in that populations' inherited socioeconomic and political aspects (traditions) are integrated into outcomes. The dissertation applies to this HDP nexus in Somalia because the HDP nexus will refer to employing power (resources and decision capabilities) by humanitarian stakeholders anchored with effective and meaningful programming that recognizes the social, cultural, and political independence of the Somali people. It is the protection function envisioned by the UNHCR whereby commitment to protecting human dignity is cherished. Barnett and Stein's (2012) case study of systematic reviews of why HDP fails is an allusion to the secularization of humanitarian outcomes as the process by which daily routines are delinked from a supernatural direction to a more humanistic attribution, thus challenging its roots of spiritual standing. The book is an apparent break from the religious philosophy of the humanitarian paradigm that has dominated the world.  In their premise, the book author's point to arising of the secular humanitarian approach, which justifies the need to have efficient systems of humanitarian delivery that are based beyond sacred roles DEMAC report (2021) arises from a five-year systematic review of the evidence of Diaspora Humanitarian response In Somalia. The report aimed to provide an integrated humanitarian ecosystem by evaluating the smallest peripheral interlocks of the Diaspora humanitarian stakeholders. They process different Humanitarian approaches, identifying gaps and recommending novelties for cross-fertilization of HDP, thus improving humanitarian outcomes. The report is very suitable in that DEMAC has piloted structures linking diaspora and institutional humanitarian players specifically in Somalia and, as such, provides quality first-hand information on this topic.3.0 Methodology The aim of this study, objectives, scope, hypothesis, data type,  converging in different data collection methods, diversified outcomes of the study, bias as well freedom of the researcher, among other factors, defined this study methodology problem in the sense that this study touched on various multidisciplinary settings that were incongruent, research was conducted in complex situational environments on top of research falling under contemporary social investigation which is not succinctly developed (Timans et al. 2019).An elaborate and concise elaboration of the research methodology problem that the researcher must be aware of is exhibited below;Validating the null hypothesis: The Role of the (HDP) Nexus evidence in Tackling Protracted Environmental Conflicts in Somalia based on the assumption that the HDP model is more resilient in mitigating HDP challenges is unknown (Ashley, 2018). The HDP model was chosen as the theoretical grounding for this dissertation because it argues that delivering a HDP('triple') nexus approach surpasses the Framework for Resilient Development and the One Programme Approach in that these two Frameworks leave out the structural elements of peace components. A significant benefit of HDP is that it will entail reconsidering funding channels, operations, required knowledge and thought on how to set criteria and define success in addressing environmental concerns. The HDP, in particular, is more purposeful and persistent in incorporating conflict sensitivity and improving local peace-making capacities. Problem: protracted issues in Somalia persist due to the lack of a feasible HDP environmental model relying on partnerships, promoting human resource’s function optimization, technology adoption, and use of local structure and strategy, among other novel concepts (Oxfam, 2019) Contextualizing the expected HDP model from theory to practice: systematically assembling HDP factors based on reviewing HDP evidence and identifying barriers and success factors is a tall order (Ashley, 2018). The latest document on HPD status released in 2021 i.e., the Somali humanitarian response plan, gives the newest revelation of the humanitarian situation in Somalia. The paper is a result of consolidation by OCHA on behalf of the humanitarian country team and partners. The dissertation provides a comprehensive understanding of the humanitarian crisis, challenges, and recommended strategies, for easing the Somalia humanitarian response plan (UNOCHA.ORG/,2022). 4.0 Discussion Summary  4.1 Discussion of relevant themes based on keywords  This paper used a positivist and pragmatic research philosophy to achieve its primary and secondary goals. Hence, both philosophies ensured that the research philosophy used was factual and that the choice of research philosophy was a function of this discourse research problem (Rowley, 2014). This also informed the study's design framework, methodology, and analytical ability., while qualitative would guide the formulation of the active part of the model (Fischer and Miller, 2017). 4.2 Summary  Role of HDP Nexus Evidence in Theory and PracticeTheory The first objective was Review literature on humanitarian-development–peace. The author reviewed credible secondary data of HDP case studies online. Only official organizational documents from the UN and its bodies, peer-reviewed published research, books, and mass-media outputs related to HDP nexus were admissible. Review scoping concluded that humanitarian -development peace nexus is intended to bridge collaborations among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. These collaborations are not limited only to funding and financial drivers, strategies such as resilience agenda pathways for societies, destabilizing the effects of environmental stress, etc. Tackling protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia ultimately leads to sustaining the peace humanitarian, development, and peace interventions agenda (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018). Summary of tabulated results on respondents of the interview guide by selected sources   showed that stakeholders of HDP consisted of both genders, working in different capacities and roles under separate entities over various clusters of operations. This is affirmative to Medinilla et al. (2019), who argue that the HDP nexus intersects different inputs, outputs, and outcomes moderated by a risky environment. Empirical results on Familiarity and Experience with HDP Nexus show despite many respondents knowing HDP, experience, and uptake were low. This agrees with various studies showing that HDP nexus has not been adopted due to many challenges Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). Case studies: Practice The HDP nexus theoretical precepts of this case studies are aimed at guiding the integration of interlinkages in protracted issues of the humanitarian-development– peace nexus viewed through the lens of environmental sustenance, diminishing the adverse effects of the ecological conflicts in Somalia ( Osa and Hanatani, 2018). Global case studies in volatile areas such as Nigeria, Yemen, Nigeria, and Somalia show that HDP seems to be moving beyond analysis and planning to practical, programmatic action with shared objectives. HDP success is not tied to Government desire, resources, or availability of resources to foster HDP outcomes. HDP success is evident in Ethiopia, Jordan, and Indonesia, whereby the government spearheads the implementation using state systems. HDP success is apparent in Chad and Somalia, whereby the government allows collaborations among various stakeholders. High volatility has required actors to hold the joint program in the face of the failure of the traditional peace system in areas such as Somalia, CAR, and S.Sudan. In Nigeria, governments have called for a strategy that capitalizes on a more immediate humanitarian response, thus building benefits for local communities (Hernaiz, 2020; Medinilla, Shiferaw and Veron,2019; Abel et al., 2021; Hinga, 2018). 4.3 Recommendations Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action strategy that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia Humanitarian-Development–Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia can be improved by interlinking of the various instruments within the HPD.For instance, The inclusion of the peace dimension is a very novel addition to the triple nexus notion. Humanitarians, as well as development and peace-building players, are being urged to better coordinate their efforts in order to facilitate the transformation of crises and conflicts into long-term peace. Different mandates, methodologies, and financial logic, as well as a lack of cooperation channels across stakeholders, have in the past resulted in inadequate intervention integration and, as a result, often undermined efficiency and effectiveness (Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). A broad approach, a lack of incentives, and a lack of mutual understanding are among the challenges facing Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia. Despite widespread recognition of the concept's importance and early successes, implementation remains a substantial issue for the players involved. Cooperation across institutional boundaries that is effective and efficient necessitates changes to internal structures, processes, and procedures that have typically evolved over decades. There are also no incentive systems to foster cooperation between the institutions and the nexus system. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive awareness of the other stakeholder groups' work and operations. Finally, there is a dearth of combined analysis and scenario planning to determine the emphasis of coherent programs that map all components of the HDP nexus( Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). On the Possible solutions of Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia: greater coordination, more changes of perspective and dedicated cooperation at all levels as follows;Leadership and governance: The HPD nexus should demonstrate commitment to accountability through feedback and openness integrated into environmental programs, monitoring and evaluation, staffing, stakeholder engagements, reporting etc. Transparency: provision of timely information on procedures, structures and processes enabling informed decision-making feedback actively to engage affected populations to develop resilient policy and practice programming that customizes and responds to protection issues (environment)(Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017;). Operationalization of HDP nexus opportunities leads to Allocatable benefits measurable by both quantitative and qualitative indicators. The study findings revealed that Benefits of HDP – Nexus  In Somalia could be auctioned by  impact evaluation of   ; No of refugee families with housing, no of people accessing Health services, no of people above the poverty   line, funding gap in dollars,no of IDPS formerly with no land rights returning to properties with secure land tenure, no of refugees able to access clean water, sanitation and hygiene, no of livelihoods support programs including women’s and youth empowerment; no of Solved tribal/clan conflicts (Weishaupt, 2020). Timko et al (2018) is of the opinion that Human security aims to build local solutions to local problems based on the argument that recurrent environmental crises are intertwined and adversely affect individual social and well-being. Human Security complements humanitarian efforts by recognizing that long-term solutions considering local capacities and resources are a prerequisite for achieving sustainable results and preventing crises from recurring (UNTFHS,2016). 4.4 Conclusions The paper concluded that Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action had an impact on Protracted Environmental Conflicts in Somalia. The HDP nexus theoretical precepts are aimed at guiding the integration of interlinkages that solves protracted issues of the humanitarian-development– peace nexus in Somalia viewed through the lens of environmental sustenance, diminishing the adverse effects of the ecological conflicts.

The changing global order has created an enabling environment for the recent spike of takeovers in Africa’s ‘coup belt’ – with Russia and newly assertive middle powers offering themselves as partners to putschists  Coups d’états have returned to Africa. In the 1990s and 2000s, the number of forced takeovers of power on the continent fell; but the figure began to creep back up around 15 years ago. This deterioration has come to particular prominence with the emergence of a ‘coup belt’ spanning from Sudan to Niger (and mostly recently Gabon), where eight coups have taken place in the last three years.   The drivers behind coups range from state fragility to weak economic development. But such factors were also a constant in the decades immediately after the end of the cold war – when Africa experienced fewer coups.  The overlooked factor is the weakening of global order and the coup-enabling international environment it has created. Policymakers should consider, in particular, the role that activist ‘middle powers’ and Russia are now playing in taking advantage of an increasingly lawless international setting. US retrenchment, selective AU enforcement As the United States retrenches to pursue its strategic competition with China, its capacity to invest seriously in both strategic imperatives and values-led foreign policy objectives is coming under strain. With the essential taking precedence over the good, upholding democracy in Africa has slipped down the list of America’s strategic priorities.  Africa’s own system for deterring takeovers has also weakened considerably. The African Union’s  enforcement of its coup-prohibiting rules grew increasingly inconsistent during the same period, during which time it began to enforce only selectively, due to the whims of powerful AU member states. This started with the coup in Mauritania in 2008, and was followed by President Sisi’s post-coup election in Egypt, and more recently by coups in Chad and Sudan. The interregnum and the rise of the middle powers To paraphrase Gramsci, the international rules-based order has not yet died so the new order cannot be born. The world thus finds itself in an interregnum in which the rules-based order is fraying but where the next iteration of global order is yet to emerge.  Aware that the world around them is changing, African leaders worry that a new version of cold war is developing, and that they are at risk of being forced to choose a side – America or China. But a cold war-style scenario is not a given, which means African leaders may be preparing for the wrong thing. This risks obscuring a major challenge created by the interregnum: the rise of assertive middle powers.    With global order in flux, middle powers seek to maximise their sovereignty and expand their influence. For middle powers in the Gulf, to Egypt and Turkey, those twin ambitions translate into treating the Horn of Africa as their near abroad. Russia surges into the coup belt sharing the same middle power motivations, but it differs on one count: desire to undermine the West. The opportunity generated by coups determines where Russia chooses to engage. But pursuing its rivalry with the West provides a second motive for Russia’s focus on the western half of the coup belt: it works to push back the strongest European influence, namely France’s presence in francophone Sahel states.  Naturally, Russia’s and middle powers’ engagement in Africa pre-dates the interregnum, but the opportunity presented by the evolving global order supercharges their interventions. Russia and middle powers exploit US retrenchment and eroding AU norms by offering themselves as partners to putschists. Seeing the opportunity to gain influence in power-grabs, they move in and back their preferred horse. These include the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey throughout the Horn of Africa, where Turkey is more focused on Somalia; the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are more focused on Sudan. In the Sahel, Turkey is tentatively exploring economic and security cooperation in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Russia plays a role across the Horn of Africa and Sahel sections of the coup belt; its deepest footprint is in Mali and Burkina Faso. All active middle powers are eyeing the prize of Libya as part of the strategic rationale for getting involved in its bordering countries.  With increasing numbers of autocratic political entrepreneurs in the coup belt bidding for power, the opportunities for engagement multiply. Middle powers – and Russia, to a lesser degree – place serious political and financial capital behind their engagement as well as no-questions-asked security support. This creates outsize impact compared to the mid-level Western official engagement and more conditional provision of financial and security support. Even though they wield greater firepower, the abilities of middle powers’ diplomatic and security institutions have yet to catch up with the demands placed on them by their political masters’ robust will to act. The impact can be of the bull in the china shop variety.  Russia and middle powers create an enabling environment for Africa’s autocrats by making their international and African-regional isolation impossible. The previous, unipolar period allowed the US, with European flanking, all behind an African lead (generally the AU), to deploy carrots and sticks while corralling other external powers. But middle powers’ assertive go-it-alone policies hamper the formation of a critical mass of international support to disincentivise rule-breaking.  How to navigate this new landscape African leaders grasp that changing global order is creating greater interest in Africa. They encourage new partners as a welcome means of diversification beyond the former confined choice of the US, old colonial powers such as France and Britain, or China. But the impact of Russian and middle power engagement in the coup belt demonstrates the pitfalls of such diversification. Rather than creating an additionality of options for Africa’s benefit, Russian and middle power engagement strengthens African autocrats and feeds state destabilisation.  There will be no return to the unipolar US-led order; no American linchpin to hold together the rules-based order against coups in Africa. Even if the US were to reallocate political capital to this end, the interregnum phase has already created shifts in global order of a magnitude that makes assertive middle powers and Russia near impossible to contain.  Nor can muscular engagement by France in its former colonies – the Sahel swathe of the coup belt – fill the US leadership gap. As much as France struggles to retain its primus inter pares role among European powers in the Sahel, the fever-pitch of anti-French sentiment in its former Sahel colonies constrains its efficacy.  When encouraging all-comers to support development in their countries, African leaders may have lingered too little on the drawbacks of Russia’s and middle powers’ engagement. If their fear was of Africa’s instrumentalisation by China and the US, then Russia and middle powers are not creating greater African agency. As it stands, they simply add to the number of actors instrumentalising Africa. That is the true wake-up call sounded by the Niger coup.

While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts. This analysis was first published in the Global Observatory, 30 August 2023. When Jim O’Neill coined the BRIC acronym in 2001, the point he was trying to convey was that the global economic system needed to incorporate the world’s largest emerging economies. His advice fell on deaf ears and in 2009, Brazil, China, India and Russia decided to take matters into their own hands and formed the BRIC grouping. South Africa joined the group in 2010 to form the BRICS. This July, the group held its 15th summit in South Africa, where they decided to add six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. More are likely to join in the future, including countries like Indonesia and Nigeria.  What these countries have in common is a frustration, if not a grievance, about being side-lined to the periphery of the world economy. Together, the BRICS represent approximately 40% of the world’s population. The combined size of their economies are approaching approximately 30% of the world’s GDP, which puts them roughly on par with combined size of the economies of the G7 countries, depending on whether size is measured in GDP or PPP.  More importantly, in the next few decades, the combined size of the BRICS economies will surpass that of the G7. Despite this growing parity, all the members of the BRICS, with the exception of Russia, self-identifies as being part of the Global South, i.e., they feel excluded from a global system dominated by the Global North. Their stated aim is to work towards a future system of global governance where they will have equal political and economic say in global institutions, and where no one state will dominate others. In pursuit of this aim, BRICS countries have established their own development bank, set up their own contingency reserve arrangement, are developing their own payment system, and have started to trade with each other in their own currencies.  The BRICS want to free their economies from the dollar-based international financial system. They feel exposed to United States interest rates that can have a negative effect on their economies, for no domestic reasons. The dollar-based financial system also provides the US with significant advantages in the global economy, which the BRICS see as unfair. They also feel a dollar-based financial system gives the US hegemonic influence in global affairs, through for example, exerting US jurisdiction on all dollar-based trade or investments that flow through US banks or financial institutions.  While the BRICS countries have these clear shared macro-economic interests, many of the members also have competing interests in other domains. China and India are geopolitical rivals in South Asia. Egypt and Ethiopia are at loggerheads over the Nile. Brazil, India, South Africa and the newly-added Argentina are democracies, while other countries in the group are governed by a diverse set of autocratic regimes, which could set up an irreconcilable clash of values on some issues. Many of the members of the BRICS also have close ties to the United States and Europe, including Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in a televised statement to the nation on the eve of hosting the BRICS summit in South Africa, explained that South Africa remains non-aligned, and he announced that in 2023 the country will also host a major United States-Africa trade meeting and an EU-South Africa summit. South Africa will also host the G20 in 2025, the first in Africa. For many countries, membership of the BRICS does thus not necessarily imply aligning themselves with one global alliance versus another, but rather cooperation in a group around a series of shared interests.  Where does this place the BRICS on the Russian war in Ukraine? The BRICS summit in Johannesburg steered clear of taking a position on the war, other than welcoming mediation aimed at resolving it through dialogue and diplomacy. Some BRICS members like Iran are clearly supporting Russia, while most others have stopped short of either supporting or condemning Russia. For many such as Egypt, the war has adversely affected their economy. Two of the BRICS members, Egypt and South Africa, are part of an African initiative to seek a mediated end to the conflict, which is perhaps the first African initiative to mediate an international conflict. Overall, however, the BRICS have their eyes on the medium- to long-term transformation of the global macro-economic and financial system, and countries like China are probably frustrated that the Russian war in Ukraine has drawn attention away from this larger objective.  Are the BRICS and the West headed for a new cold war? The shift in the center of gravity of the global economy to the East is an unstoppable fact driven by demographics and economic factors like the cost of production. At the same time, Europe and the United States will remain major economic players. In tandem with these changes in the global economy, it is clear that the global political order will become more multipolar, with China, Europe, India, and the United States representing some of the major centers of influence.  In an August 27 article, Jim O’Neil argues that the influence of the BRICS will be determined by their effectiveness, not their size. An expanding BRICS will most likely succeed in helping its members to break free from a dollar-based international financial system, but that will take several decades of incremental change before it reaches a tipping point. Whether that is a good or bad thing depends on the degree to which your economy is tied to the United States. Many of the BRICS countries, including China, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa all have economies whose prosperity are closely tied to the Unites States. They will thus have an interest in a slow, stable freeing up of the international financial system, and this should give everyone that is prudent time to adapt.  The same logic also applies to changes in global governance architecture. Apart from Russia, all the other BRICS countries have an interest in making sure that changes in the global order are managed at a slow steady pace that does not generate instability. All the BRICS countries, apart from Russia, are also strong supporters of multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center. Many Western countries and BRICS members may thus have more shared interests than the doomsday headlines suggest. While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts.

Now with 11 members, BRICS’ decision-making by consensus will be that much more difficultOnce upon a time, the BRICS were nothing but a slogan devised by Goldman Sachs’ economists to describe four emerging market economies to which South Africa was later added. But more than a decade later, the grouping, now with an investment bank—New Development Bank—of its own is besieged by dozens of countries of the Global South for membership.The Johannesburg summit of BRICS has drawn unusual interest around the world. There was a time when it barely merited a mention in the western press, but now it has been the subject of major stories, in which some saw BRICS as brittle whiel others thought it was  seeking to challenge the G7 and the western world through a process of enlargement. While the BRICS puts itself forward as a unified face of the emerging economic powers, the reality is that within the organisation—which  is neither a trade nor military bloc—there is considerable jostling between two Asian powers who are developing a global imprint—India and China.BRICS expansion announced in JohannesburgOne of the issues where this jostling played out in was the BRICS expansion process. Reportedly, 40 countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, though some 22 nations had formally expressed interest in joining the bloc. With the latest expansion, Iran, Egypt, Argentina, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and UAE have been offered membership effective 1 January 2024. That there was a bit of lobbying is evident from the fact that  last week, President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran spoke on the phone with Prime Minister Modi. According to the official spokesman, they talked about “regional and bilateral matters” as well as issues like the expansion of BRICS. The two leaders later met in Johannesburg as well.There was some doubt at the beginning of the summit as to whether expansion would actually be announced. This was because of the intense negotiations over the names of the proposed members.Earlier this month, an Indian official spokesman had clarified that India believed that BRICS expansion should take place through “full consultation and consensus” among members of the bloc. In his speech at the summit, the Prime Minister made it clear that “India fully supports the expansion of the BRICS membership. And welcomes moving forward with consensus in this.” On Thursday, too, there were reports that there were “eleventh hour negotiations” over the potential new members. Reuters claimed that an agreement had meant to be adopted on Wednesday, but it was delayed by India’s introduction of new criteria for membership. On Tuesday President Lula of Brazil had made it clear that his country was did not want to be any kind of “a counterpoint to G7, G20 or the United States. We just want to organise ourselves.”In an organisation that acts through consensus, getting in is difficult, but global politics is about give and take and a certain degree of persuasion and arm twisting does go on. So does the notion of giving a push to countries who you see eye to eye with and blocking countries that you don’t. Sometimes the negotiation involves two powerful players splitting the difference and negotiating the entry of countries in such a way that a balance of sorts is maintained. This is the way India became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation dominated by China. India’s case was pushed by Russia to balance China, and Beijing finally agreed to have India, if Pakistan, its “iron” friend, could become a member at the same time.Another element in such organisations is that countries seek membership not just to further their interests but to block the ambitions of others. In this way, China sought and became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) arrangement and once in there, it has used its vote to block efforts by the United States (US) to shape APEC into an Asia Pacific Economic Community in the manner of the European Economic Community that finally gave rise to the European Union.India has been reportedly joined by Brazil in resisting the haste and suggesting that new members may first be given the status of observers. The Indian position has been that while it was all for expansion, there was need to develop and standardise mechanisms to consider the applications and move on them.As of now, BRICS is more of a symbol than a unified and purposive entity. True, it has members like China and India who wield substantial power in their respective regions, but the entity itself hardly functions as an economic bloc of any kind. It does have the New Development Bank headquartered in Shanghai, which, in 2021, sharply stepped up its disbursements to US$7.6 billion, with its total disbursements being of the order of US$32 billion for infrastructure and sustainable development in four continents . The initial subscribed capital of the bank is equally distributed among the BRICS members.China’s role in and vision for BRICSBeijing, no doubt views BRICS as a means of offsetting US global power. In a page 2 commentary in the People’s Daily by someone with the nom de plume  “Huanyu Ping,” said that currently the world governance system was “at a historical turning point”. The growth of the emerging market and developing countries has enhanced their influence. But the western-dominated global order was a “stumbling block to world economic development and social progress.” The multilateralist BRICS was therefore providing a model for decisions to be made on the basis of equality and consensus, as testified by the share-holding of the New Development Bank. They also actively promoted reform of the global governance system and upheld the validity of multilateral and multipolar solutions.There should be no doubt about the weightage China has within BRICS. It has a GDP more than twice the size of the other members combined. Its economy may have slowed down but it is still growing, with IMF predicting a 5.2 per cent growth as against 5.9 for India. The others are growing at less than 1 per cent.  It has played a significant role in getting together two of the new incoming members, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 2022, China was the largest trading partner of South Africa, India and Brazil.There should be little doubt that China sees Africa as a battleground in the global struggle against the US. In a meeting with President Cyril Ramaphosa on Tuesday, President Xi spoke of the urgent need for China to promote cooperation with Africa because of “changes and chaos” in the world, an indirect allusion to the US. He took up the theme in the Business Forum meeting that he did not attend, but where his speech was read out: “Right now, changes in the world, in our times, and in history are unfolding in ways like never before, bringing human society to a critical juncture.”China may swear by multilateralism, but it is not really comfortable with it. What it is seeking to do is to shape institutions like BRICS in its own image for countering its principal rival, the United States of America. In this, it is unlikely to get Indian support, so what it is trying to do is to pack its membership with countries where it has already made significant investments through its Belt & Road Initiative. Such countries would be inclined to follow its global agenda, which is now manifesting itself as the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and the Global Civilisation Initiative.The Chinese aim, according to James Kynge in the Financial Times is two-fold. The first is to ensure that large parts of the world remain open to Chinese investment and trade in an environment where western attitudes are increasingly hardening. And the second is to have a bloc of votes in multilateral forums like the United Nations (UN) to project Chinese influence.In the turbulent world, China’s path is not an easy one. Its economy is slowing down and its global security calculations have been roiled by the Russian adventure in Ukraine. Further, in promoting the Global South it runs up against India which has its own ambitions, as well as the backing of the west. Even while promoting the UN and its institutions, China is not interested in any serious reform there because that could result in a bigger role for its adversaries like Japan and India.Done increases with the expansion of its membership. Now, with 11 members, things will be that much more difficult. The BRICS countries have economies and geopolitical profiles that are hugely divergent, and which makes consensus-based decision-making hugely difficult.

War and conflict in Sudan have forced more than 4.5 million people to flee. Many of those fleeing from the war are themselves refugees, who originally came to Sudan to escape crises in their home countries. Eritreans are among the largest and longest living groups of refugees in Sudan. Many cannot return home, leaving them in a limbo.  Sudan as a transit hub and a new home The majority of migration studies in the Greater Horn of Africa point to Sudan as the main crossing point for migrants from the region. Migrants from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia that are crossing the Sudanese border remain in Sudan for a while and then migrate to Europe, Gulf countries, and Israel. Khartoum is considered as the main transit hub for migrants from the Horn, including Sudanese migrants hoping to make their way to Europe. Thousands of the Eritreans, however, have not only seen Sudan as a transit but as a new home. There are an estimated 134,000 Eritrean refugees and asylum-seekers in Sudan. Some of them arrived as early as the 1960s and have since remained. Most of them live in the camps in Eastern Sudan bordering their country of origin, around 100,000 in Kassala state and 14,000 in Gedaref state, while some of them live in towns, among them around 10,000 in Khartoum state. No longer a safe haven Before the war erupted in Khartoum, many Eritreans had sought permanent refuge in the city, or using it as a pit stop on the journey onward through Libya with hopes of reaching European countries, risking their lives crossing rivers, deserts, and finally the Mediterranean Sea. These young Eritreans, both men and women, had escaped from forced conscription into the Eritrean army. They ran away from an extremely repressive state described as Africa’s equivalent to North Korea, or sought alternatives from a future without economic prospects. Many of them worked in Khartoum’s hospitality or informal business sectors, and have been victims of harassment and arbitrary detention by Sudanese security, aiming at cracking down on irregular migration. When the war broke out, they were among the civilians caught in the crossfire between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with an immediate need for protection and humanitarian assistance. Returning to Eritrea could seem like one of the most obvious ways out of the dire situation. But for many Eritreans, returning to their country of origin is not an option. Going back home would imply no protection from severe human rights violations by the Eritrean regime,  such as arbitrarily detentions, forced disappearances, secret prisons, and collective punishment of relatives of those who ran away from military service. Eritreans interviewed by Adam Babekir in Gedaref all state that they would not go back. A 28-year-old Eritrean woman, who was born in Sudan, expressed: Due to this war in Khartoum, some of my friends fled to other Sudanese towns like Kassala or Wad Medani, and those who have enough money to South Sudan. Most of the refugees are not willing to return to Eritrea because I have heard from a friend of mine from Eritrea that the situation is very bad there. So I will stay here till peace is restored in Khartoum. This is my hope and dream. Precarity in Eastern Sudan According to the Commission of Refugees (COR)’ local office in Gedaref town more than 4000 refugees (Ethiopian and Eritrean) arrived there after fleeing the fighting in Khartoum. Some Eritrean refugees have temporarily settled in the Um Gulja closed camp at Amna Aregawi Church while others are staying in Gedaref town benefiting from their relatives’ network. The refugee camps in Sudan are run by the COR and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) collectively. COR is facing capacity constraints due to the evacuation of UN staff and other humanitarian actors from Khartoum and elsewhere. The evacuation of some UN staff, and NGO employees in addition to the influx of refugees into other states resulted in a heavier work oad and resulted in capacity constraints for COR, and the UNHCR has proposed to relocate the refugees to other camps in Kassala and Gedaref states. The majority of Eritrean refugees who has arrived in the Um Gulja camp are women and children who need essential services such as food, water, sanitation and protection. But there is no service provider or referral pathway for them even though they are in dire need of physical support. The Um Gulia closed camp in Gedaref is infamous for lacking provision of basic services. However, the only alternative camp for Eritrean refugees is El Shagarab camp, Kassala State, Eastern Sudan. A 25 -year-old Eritrean women who was born in Khartoum said: Conditions are very bad here in Gedaref. No one helps us to get medicine, food, and cover basic needs. Even my sister's husband, who lives in Germany, has difficulties sending money to us due to closed cash transfer agencies. To me, returning to Eritrea is an impossible option, so I am thinking about travelling to Egypt. Yet, the vast majority of of the Eritrean refugees are reluctant to be relocated from their current location to the Shagarab camp. The Shagarab camp is remotely located, far away from any nearby town. Therefore this option severely limits the freedom of movement for the refugees. The camp also lacks many facilities that are available to the refugees in Gedaref. Many of the refugees are also hopeful that the UN will work for a third country resettlement solution, eventually enabling them to go to Europe or Canada, and have appealed to the UNHCR to act accordingly. A 27 -year-old Eritrean women born in Khartoum confirmed that ‘COR and UNHCR have proposed for us to stay in refugee camps in Kassala state, but we have requested the UNHCR to take us to a third country, as there is no future for us in Sudan.’ She added that if she suffers more than this, and if the war in Sudan does not come to an end she is considering travelling to Europe via Libya. Her preferred destination is Europe, as she expects Western communities to respect women and their rights: ‘We are very strong women with promising potential in our countries, but our societies do not empower women.’ An immediate need for protection The protection of civilians, including both citizens and refugees, can only materialize through the cessation of hostilities, an opening of safe passage to humanitarian aid, and engagement in  comprehensive dialogue between all parties. For this to happen, international bodies such as the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the UN and the TROIKA countries consisting of Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States must continue to exert pressure, and provide technical help if negotiations materialize. Locally, in Eastern Sudan, COR must work with the UNHCR and all relevant stakeholders to provide safe passage out of conflict areas such as Khartoum to other parts of Sudan and must provide effective services to the Eritrean refugees who wish to stay in the country.

A few years ago, the BRICS grouping – Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa – had lost salience because three of its members were in severe economic difficulty. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are primarily natural resource exporters and were badly affected by the global commodity price bust of 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has now given BRICS a new geopolitical salience as the members and their respective allies respond to events. In the emerging world order there is also now increased demand to join BRICS, in part as a countervailing power to “the west”. Argentina, Saudi Arabia and lately, Ethiopia, have expressed strong interest in becoming members. I have researched the political economy of globalisation in Africa over the last 30 years. I have specifically examined the scramble for Africa by the US and China, South Africa’s involvement in BRICS, the nature of BRICS engagement with Africa and market and resource access by BRICS in southern Africa. It would be a major coup for Ethiopia if it were able to join the grouping as it would raise its global profile, allow it to interact and coordinate more closely with some of the major world powers and move the discourse beyond the recent civil war there, potentially enabling it to attract more investment. Opportunities Ethiopia has cited its key role in founding the African Union and other institutions, along with its national interest as grounds for seeking BRICS membership. In my opinion, there are five key reasons why Ethiopia would want to join the grouping. Deteriorating relations with western powers: Ethiopia has historically depended on substantial western support through aid and security cooperation. But its relations with the west have soured as a result of the civil war, in which human rights violations were reported. Joining BRICS would make the country more geostrategically important, perhaps encouraging western powers to downplay human rights concerns, as they have in the past in the interests of “realpolitik”. Alternative growth frontier: Ethiopia remains one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, at over 5% a year. It has developed strong economic ties with China in recent decades. Similarly, Indian companies have been acquiring land in Ethiopia. China and India are now Africa’s two largest single trading partners (not counting the European Union as a single entity). Joining BRICS would signal openness and lead to greater cooperation through platforms like the business council and forum. It could also add impetus to the “resurgent Ethiopia” narrative, an image the authorities are keen to promote to attract investments. Negotiations over finance: The Ethiopian government is negotiating a financial package with the International Monetary Fund. Joining BRICS might give it greater leverage. Western powers, which largely control the IMF, might be more wary of alienating Ethiopia in BRICS and driving it further “into the arms” of China. The creation of a new BRICS currency, to challenge US dollar hegemony, is on the agenda and its existing Contingency Reserve Arrangement already partly competes with the IMF. Non-interference policy: BRICS powers rhetorically largely subscribe to non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other states, with the qualification that President Lula de Silva of Brazil talked about “non-indifference” to human rights when he was previously in power and Russia has violated the principle through invasions and election interference, amongst others. Ethiopia may be interested in the political cover that joining BRICS would provide. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has received political cover from China, and some would argue from South Africa. The Ethiopian government may be keen to avoid human rights governance conditions attached to new loans, aid or debt relief from the west. A prime minister seeking new friends: BRICS membership would help restore the tarnished image of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who is a Nobel peace prize recipient. Ahmed was heavily criticised as a war-monger during the civil war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Joining the BRICS club would show that his government is still politically acceptable to some major world powers. The risks There would of course be risks in Ethiopia joining the BRICS. Western powers might perceive it as drifting into the alternative geopolitical bloc or alignment, which could reduce aid and investment from them. But this could also have advantages for Ethiopia’s relations with the west by making the country more geo-strategically important. Based on past experience, Ethiopia would be an unlikely addition to the grouping. The last and only country to be admitted after the group’s founding was South Africa in 2010. Other countries have applied and have not been admitted. BRICS now operates in what is sometimes described as a BRICS-plus format with countries such as Egypt already members of its development bank and all African leaders invited to the up-coming BRICS’ summit in South Africa. Ethiopia’s economy, estimated at around US$126.78 billion in 2022, is less than half the size of South Africa’s US$405.87 billion. South Africa is by far the smallest economy in the BRICS. But in some ways Ethiopia might be seen as a more representative African country in BRICS than South Africa. Ethiopia hosts the African Union headquarters and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Its capital, Addis Ababa, is sometimes described as the continent’s diplomatic capital. The outcome of Ethiopia’s application will likely be known after the next summit in August.

Programme Director, Mama Graça Machel,  Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture, Mr. Zizi Kodwa Deputy Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture, Ms. Nocawe Mafu, Premier of the Eastern Cape, Mr. Lubabalo Oscar Mabuyane,  Your Majesties Kings and Queens, Other traditional leaders present, MEC for Sports, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Ms. Nonceba Kontsiwe, Executive Mayor of the OR Tambo District Municipality, Cllr. Mesuli Ngqondwana, Executive Mayor of the King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality, Cllr. Nyaniso Nelani, Chief Executive Officer of the Nelson Mandela Museum, Dr. Vuyani Booi, Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Fellow South Africans. Molweni. Sanibonani. Dumelang, Goeie more, Kgotsong, Lotjhani, Ndi matsheloni, Nhlekanhi. Good Morning. I greet you all wherever you may be on this Nelson Mandela Day. To be here, eQunu where Tata grew up and that is his final resting place, is a great honour. Qunu had a special place in Madiba’s heart.  This was where he spent his boyhood being cared for by his family, tending cattle and listening to the stories of the elders about the bravery of his people.  It has been said that the two most important days in your life are the day you are born - and the day you find out why. It was here in Qunu that the first seeds of his political consciousness were planted, where Madiba’s imagination was first stirred, and where his great mind began to be shaped. Madiba later said of this place that:  “It was there in the hills and valleys of Qunu, in the rolling hills of KwaDlangezwa, in the Genadendal settlement, and long the Gariep, the Lekoa and the Luvuvhu rivers, that we first understood that we are not free.”  In Long Walk to Freedom, he wrote that as he listened to the stories of the elders, he hoped to someday have the opportunity to serve his people, and to make his own humble contribution to the struggle for freedom. Madiba’s was no humble contribution. He led our nation to freedom, and even today, many years since his passing, his legacy lives on.  There are many monuments paying tribute to Madiba across South Africa, across Africa and in many parts of the world, from Palestine to the United Kingdom, Seychelles, Senegal, Cuba, the US, Brazil, China, France, and many other places. But for us to be able to honour the father of our nation at this place that meant so much to him is something we have been working towards for some time. Since 2021 the Eastern Cape Provincial Heritage Resource Agency, the Mandela family, the Nelson Mandela Museum and the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture have been driving this process – a process that included public consultation. As human beings we are the sum of many parts, and Madiba was no different.  Our upbringing, our culture, and many other factors shape our lived experiences.  The statue we unveiled earlier today in Mthatha depicts Madiba in the role for which he was most well-known, that of a statesman. The statue here in Qunu depicts him in the attire of his Xhosa-Tembu culture, reminding us of the traditional values he lived by and that shaped his consciousness. It is our hope that this homage to Madiba in his final resting place will serve as an inspiration especially to the young people in the community.  It is to remind you that the seeds of greatness lie dormant within each one of us, and that it is up to us to make them germinate and bloom. It is to remind you that being born in a rural area, or having humble beginnings, is no obstacle to achieving greatness, and to fulfilling your destiny. It is to remind us of all our duty to do what we can to make the world a better place. Monuments, statues, and museums have a key role to play in the political and cultural life of any country. They are a means of giving recognition to those who suffered hardship, repression, exile, or death in pursuit of universal ideals such as human freedom.  Monuments such as this one are the struggle of memory against forgetting. These statues of Madiba are beacons of hope to individuals and communities that are still suffering from the evils of marginalisation, and the scourges of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment.  This statue should serve as reminder to those of us elected to serve the South African people that we must redouble our efforts to build a better South Africa that leaves no-one behind.  To quote Madiba’s own words, as long as poverty, injustice and gross inequality still exist in our world, none of us can truly rest. I would like to thank you, Mama Graça Machel, and members of the family for agreeing to collaborate with the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture on this project.  Earlier today in Mthatha a library was handed over to the Zingisa Comprehensive School. I am told that the library project was sparked by a letter written to the authorities by a learner at the school requesting assistance, and I want to thank the provincial government for acceding to this request. I call upon the people of Qunu to protect and look after these sites of memorialization and commemoration. I have no doubt they have the potential to attract tourists which will in turn support business and job creation. Every Nelson Mandela Day we are called upon to dedicate 67 minutes to performing acts of goodwill towards others as part of making our world a better place. If you have not yet done so, I encourage each South African to do their bit of good today, wherever they may be. Madiba built bridges of peace, and mobilised people of the world to fight against social injustice and oppression.  Let us strive to emulate his example, today and every day. I wish you all a Happy Nelson Mandela Day. I thank you.

Among the challenges faced by African-led peacekeeping missions, loss of materiel to adversaries is a significant – and underappreciated – risk. More must be done to ensure that weapons and ammunition are appropriately managed. Last year, the East African Community and the Accra Initiative became the 14th and 15th African regional organisations to authorise peacekeeping operations, respectively (see Table below). Both missions are certain to encounter resistance among non-state armed groups active in their proposed areas of operation. Indeed, rebels from Congo’s March 23 Movement have already attacked Burundian troops serving in the East African Community Regional Force. Such groups secure considerable quantities of lethal materiel from uniformed personnel – both peacekeepers as well as national security forces serving within or near these missions’ areas of operation. Much can be done to reduce such diversion. Enhancing the effectiveness of African-led peacekeeping operations is especially important and worthy of support, as these organisations will remain significant actors in promoting peace and security for the foreseeable future. Without minimising the shortcomings and challenges many such missions have faced, numerous deployments have helped promote human security and ushered in beneficial political change. These objectives have been achieved often at considerable cost and sacrifice for the troop-contributing countries. Moreover, regardless of their track record, the UN Security Council is not likely to ‘re-hat’ these missions as readily as it has in the past. The security threats facing these missions, however, are quite grave. The African Union (AU)-led peacekeeping operations in Somalia, for example, have come under repeated attack from al-Shabaab, losing men and women in uniform as well as considerable lethal materiel as a result. Between June 2015 and January 2016, the armed group overran three forward operating bases (military camps that house formed units of more than 100 uniformed personnel, together with associated lethal equipment to allow them to be self-sufficient, often for extended periods of time) of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In May 2022, al-Shabaab again overran such a base belonging to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which had succeeded AMISOM the previous month. AU missions in Somalia have likely lost millions of rounds of ammunition, thousands of firearms and many hundreds of crew-served light weapons (such as heavy machine guns and mortars) to their adversary. Material that armed groups have secured from African-led peacekeeping operations also includes heavy weapons systems. The Islamic State’s West Africa Province and the al-Qa’ida-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims have looted the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), as well as that of the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (FC-G5S). Items seized include main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled as well as towed multiple-launch rocket systems and artillery. The UN, which has undertaken peacekeeping operations for over 70 years, has also experienced challenges in securing lethal materiel during its missions. Eight months after the Justice and Equality Movement attacked and overran an AU Mission in Sudan base, the successor UN–AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur lost 600,000 rounds of ammunition when a convoy transporting contingent-owned equipment was seized. That said, the UN has numerous well-established checks and balances in place to keep tabs on arms and ammunition deployed in its missions. For example, it has quarterly on-site checks of materiel, well-resourced investigations into incidents when diversion has occurred, and reimbursement mechanisms to encourage transparency and accountability. African regional organisations lack equivalent administrative practices and procedures. Where such checks and balances do exist to manage lethal materiel in African-led peacekeeping operations, they are not fully utilised. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a case in point. It has a convention that entered into force more than 10 years ago, which calls on its 15 member states to record and report materiel that is taken into a peacekeeping operation, resupplied, destroyed or taken back when the operation withdraws. This is to be done whether the mission is undertaken by ECOWAS, the UN or some other entity. These stipulations – on paper – represent a global best practice. Were they to be followed, ECOWAS could quickly determine what materiel was used or lost after deployment and make appropriate enquiries. Details concerning implementation are not made public, but it is understood that member states’ adherence to their commitments is limited, despite their being legally binding. This disconnect between expectation and reality is especially important to address because so many ECOWAS member states participate in peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS currently fields two missions: one in the Gambia and another in Guinea-Bissau. Both of these are relatively small and also relatively peaceful (although in January 2022 the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance attacked Senegalese troops serving in the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia and disarmed them). More important for oversight purposes are the FC-G5S, the MNJTF and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which operate in much less permissive environments in which peacekeepers routinely come under attack. Also of note is a recent policy the AU has adopted to promote management of recovered lethal materiel in peacekeeping operations it authorises or mandates. When organisations undertake formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, these initiatives usually include funding for storehouses and procedures for recordkeeping. But many such undertakings recover materiel outside of DDR through cordon-and-search activities or clashes with negative forces. Oversight and resources have been lacking, and the new policies are meant to improve on previous practice. This would include ATMIS, the FC-G5S, the MNJTF and the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique. Progress is slow-going. A challenge African-led operations have is that the secretariats overseeing their implementation are not adequately staffed. This is not a criticism of officials’ work ethic or expertise, but rather a comment on the mismatch between mandates and resources. There are too few staff in relation to the work needed. The longstanding recruitment freeze at ECOWAS has recently been lifted, which ought to bring some relief. The AU remains woefully understaffed, however, which is not likely to change in the short term. Recognising these challenges and opportunities is an important first step. More appropriate staffing alone is not going to solve the problem, and yet it is essential to ensuring that existing checks and balances are promoted and used. Member states and external donors must be made aware of the frameworks and policies available and incorporate them in their discourse and priorities. And the counterterrorism, development and security sector governance communities, among others, must acknowledge their important role in enhancing weapons and ammunition management in peacekeeping operations, and in helping to generate appropriate resources and set the agenda. The deployment of peacekeepers must not add fuel to the fires they are trying to extinguish.