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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On September 24, 2024, speaking from the gargantuan Kazan International Exhibition Centre during the BRICS Summit in Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphatically extolled the “collective rise of the Global South [as] a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world.” While celebrating “Global South countries marching together toward modernization [as] monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” the Chinese leader hastened to add that China was not quite a part of but at the Global South’s “forefront”; that “will always keep the Global South in [their] heart, and maintain [their]roots in the Global South. As emerging powers in the BRICS+ grouping thronged Kazan in a clear sign to the West that they would not unwittingly entrench Vladimir Putin’s full-scale diplomatic isolation, China’s message was clear: as a great power, they would not ignore or undermine the interests of the Global South.  The rise of the Global South as a central voice in world politics concurs with the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a diplomatic field. This is not a coincidence, as they are both intimately related to broader changes in the international order, away from a US-led liberal international order, toward a post-liberal one, whose contours are still being defined, but where informal groupings, such as the BRICS+ play a key role. One could even argue that it is this transition to a new order that has pushed states to engage diplomatically on issues around cyberspace. What was once the purview of the Global North, and particularly the US, is now a contested domain of international activity. In this text we explore how the Global South has entered this contestation, and how it articulates its ever-growing presence in shaping the agenda of this domain. However, as cyber diplomacy is mainstreamed across the Global South, it is unclear whether it will continue to be a relevant collective force in forging the rules and norms that govern cyberspace, or whether the tendency will be for each country to trace their own path in service of their independent national interests. The evolution of cyber diplomacy in a post-liberal world Cyber diplomacy is very recent. One could argue that its practice only really started in the late 1990s, with Russia’s proposal of an international treaty to ban electronic and information weapons. Cyber diplomacy, as “the use of diplomatic resources and the performance of diplomatic functions to secure national interests with regard to the cyberspace” (or more simply, to the “the application of diplomacy to cyberspace”  is even more recent, with the first few writings on the topic emerging only in the last 15 years.   To be sure, the internet was born at the zenith of the US-led liberal international order and was viewed as an ideal tool to promote based on liberalism, free trade and information exchange with limited government intervention and democratic ideals. Cyber libertarians extolled the virtues of an independent cyberspace, free from state control and western governments, particularly the US, did not disagree. They viewed the internet as the perfect tool for promoting US global power and maintaining liberal hegemony -“ruling the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas.” The internet was ensconced in the relatively uncontested unipolar geopolitical moment. As the pipe dreams of a liberal cyberspace began to unravel with China and Russia pushing for an alternate state-centric vision of cyberspace, cyber diplomacy began to emerge both as a “response to and continuing factor in the continuing battle in and over cyberspace.” Explicitly, we can pin down its origin to two factors. First, is the perception that cyberspace was becoming an increasingly intertwined with geopolitics and geo-economics, with states starting to better understand its threats, but also its opportunities. Moonlight Maze, the 2007 attacks against Estonia or even Stuxnet were all cases that helped focus the mind of policymakers around the world. Second, the broader context of underlying changes in the international order necessitated cyber diplomacy as a bridge-building activity both to mitigate great power rivalry and to preserve the stability of cyberspace and the digital economy. Private companies, till then the beneficiaries of an open and de-regulated internet, also had to step in to ensure that their own interests and profit motives were safeguarded. These two intertwined factors dominated the discussions around cyber diplomacy for most of the 2000s. Initially, the predominant focus was arms control, reflected in the composition of the first few Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) iterations, the forum created by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to discuss the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in international security. And although experts appointed by countries from the Global South were present since the first meeting in July 2004 the debate was very much framed as a discussion among great powers. As discussions progressed, and the GGE became a process in itself, some states outside the permanent members’ group started to engage more actively. This also coincided with the progressive creation of cyber diplomacy posts and offices in foreign ministries around the world. The field was becoming more professional, as more states started to realise that these were discussions that mattered beyond the restrictive group of power politics. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, or Kenya started to push for the discussion of issues that affected a larger group of states, with a particular focus on cyber capacity building not just at the UN-GGE but also at other multilateral and multi-stakeholder processes and conferences including the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN First Committee (after an acrimonious diplomatic process) had an important effect in the diversification and democratisation of the discussions, as these were now open to the whole UN membership, and non-state actors were given the opportunity to observe and participate in these sessions. Further, in 2022, the UN set up an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a cybercrime convention (adopted by consensus by UNGA members in December 2024) that also enabled all UN members to participate in the negotiations. The opening up of these processes exposed many states, particularly in the Global South, to the field, and it forced them to actively engage in discussions that until recently were seen as the dominion of great powers. The African Group and the G77 were now able to actively participate in the discussions, with frequent statements and contributions. Conceptualising the Global South in cyber diplomacy As cyber diplomacy progressed, policy-maker and academics alike understood global cyber governance to be divided along three main blocs of states. The status quo defenders were led by the US and (mostly Western) like-minded states, focused on the promotion of liberal values and non-binding norms shaped by a multi-stakeholder approach and adherence to existing tenets of international law but resisted significant changes in the governance of cyberspace. A revisionist group, led by Russia and China, advocated for a new binding international treaty and multilateral governance with the objective of guaranteeing security and order rather than necessarily promoting liberal values. Given this impasse, the role and influence of a group of states termed ‘swing states’ or ‘digital deciders’ has been recognized as critical to determining the future of cyberspace, most prominently in a detailed 2018 report by the Washington DC-based think-tank New America . This grouping that largely includes emerging powers from the Global South including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, are understood as countries that are yet to “gravitate towards either end of the spectrum, some undecided and others seeking a third path.” Given these groupings, it is worth considering how the Global South fits in with present conceptualisations of cyber diplomacy, or whether it is a grouping at all. The term ‘Global South’ has come in for some criticism given the heterogeneity of countries it describes and its geographical inaccuracy (many Global South countries are not quite in the geographical South.) To be fair, the term never aspired for terminological accuracy and was instead coined to conceptually represent a group of countries during the Vietnam dissatisfied with the political and economic exploitation from the Global North. In that regard, Global South is a “mood,” a metaphor for developing countries aiming to find their way in an increasingly contested world. The war in Ukraine only augmented these fissures as the West were confounded by the Global South’s refusal to take a stand against brazen Russian aggression in Europe. The developing world saw it differently though: in an international order long-built on racism and inequality, expecting these countries to take a stand in their “petty squabbles” while they had also carried out “similarly violent, unjust, and undemocratic interventions—from Vietnam to Iraq” was a bridge too far. The Ukraine war helped clarify the combination of behaviours that countries within the Global South exhibit to attain this strategic goal: ideological agnosticism or neutrality; selective engagement with norms and rules; and finally, multi-pronged bilateral and minilateral groupings, with equidistance from the major powers. These three approaches helped illuminate the multiple different forms of agency that each developing country exercises vis-à-vis the international order based on their own interests and quest for strategic autonomy. However, what became evident as Russians bombs started to fall on the street of Kyiv, was already visible in these states’ interactions in cyber diplomacy. First, much of the Global South has refused to take an explicit stand on the controversial fissures that the leading powers have spent much of their time debating, including whether cyberspace governance should be state-centric or driven by new rules or existing international law.  Throughout the negotiating processes at the UN OEWG and AHC, as Russia and China clashed with the United States and its allies on the text of several controversial proposals, most developing countries took an agnostic approach, neither explicitly endorsing or opposing any of these potential treaty provisions. (There are naturally some exceptions: an analysis of voting patterns suggests that Iran and North Korea have firmly pegged themselves to the Russian and Chinese side of the aisle whereas some smaller developing countries have gravitated towards the US side of the aisle.) Second, there has been selective engagement when security or developmental interests are directly impacted. For example, in its joint submission to the UN’s Global Digital Compact (GDC), the G77+China asserted the need for equitable cross-border data flows that maximize development gains. The GDC is the UN’s first comprehensive framework for global digital cooperation. Long concerned about the misuse of the multi-stakeholder model by private actors for profit at the expense of developmental interests, the G77 also highlighted the need for “multilateral and transparent approaches to digital governance to facilitate a more just, equitable and effective governance system.” Finally, countries in  the Global South have entered into multiple technology partnerships across political and ideological divides. US efforts at restricting the encroachment of Chinese hardware providers like Huawei and ZTE into the core technological periphery of several Global South countries using allegations of surveillance were sometimes rebuked, given the Five Eyes’ proclivity and reputation for also conducting similar surveillance, including on top officials. By being agnostic on controversial ideological issues, countries in the Global South have been able to maintain ties with great powers on all sides of the political spectrum and foster pragmatic technological partnerships. Will the Global South rise? The Global South’s rise as a potent force in cyber diplomacy will, however, depend on three factors. Can it maintain ideological consistency on developmental and rights concerns, including on how the internet is governed at home? Can they continue to work with multiple partners without succumbing to pressure either from Washington or Beijing? Will emerging powers in the Global South (like India, Brazil and Indonesia) bat for the interests of the larger developing world, rather than simply orchestrating global governance to service their own interests or that of the regime in power? Given that cyber diplomacy emerged and developed as the playground of great powers, analysing it through the perspective of the Global South enables us to focus on cyber governance as an issue that goes beyond (cyber)security concerns – including economic development and identity (cutting across issues of race, gender, and colonialism) – and to see the world from a perspective that goes beyond the dynamics of great power competition. Analytically, it is useful to understand how these states position themselves and justify their actions on behalf of the whole. When looking inside the box, we see some collective movement but also a desire on part of the great powers, including China to incentivise the developing world to see the world as they do. The Global South remains relevant as a construct that captures the mood of the developing world on the geopolitics of technology of cyber issues. Its “great strength” will emerge not from swinging between Washington and Beijing or being orchestrated through New Delhi or Brasilia. It will instead come through standing their ground, in service of their own security and developmental interests in cyberspace. And as they progress, it remains to be seen whether the “Global South” retains its relevance as an analytical construct or whether it will give way to other denominations that better capture the developing world’s nuances and differences vis-à-vis the international cyber order. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Serbia’s future hinges on how it navigates its competing loyalties. Its path forward depends on whether it chooses to lean into its nostalgic ties or align more closely with its economic interests. A romanticised view of Russia, particularly its cultural heartlands, is common among Serbs with no firsthand experience of Soviet rule. Serbia, as part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, occupied a unique position in the post-World War II geopolitical order. Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia decisively rejected Soviet dominance in 1948, leading to its expulsion from the Cominform. This was a bold move, famously marked by Tito’s defiant “nyet” to Stalin. Following this split, Yugoslavia pursued a non-aligned foreign policy, establishing the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) alongside other decolonising nations. This allowed it to maintain a delicate balance between the East and the West. State-sponsored construction companies were active in Asia and Africa, while guest workers were exported to Western Europe to bolster the domestic economy. Serbia, as a successor state, maintains engagement with the NAM to this day, continuing its long-standing tradition of non-alignment. A dual pillar of sentiment and strategy Serbia’s current diplomatic relationship with Russia reflects a mixture of historical sentiment and pragmatic strategy. The bond is sustained through Orthodox Christian faith, Slavic linguistic familiarity, and a shared narrative of past solidarity. These factors bolster Russia’s influence in Serbia, most visibly through extensive media penetration and strong political support for Serbia’s territorial integrity, especially concerning Kosovo. One of Russia’s most powerful diplomatic tools remains its veto power in the United Nations Security Council. Moscow has consistently used this privilege to block Kosovo’s accession to international institutions, a gesture widely appreciated in Serbia. This support reinforces Russia’s image as a loyal ally among much of the Serbian public. Meanwhile, Russia has secured a prominent role in Serbia’s economic landscape. Bilateral trade between the two nations is estimated at US$3 billion annually. Gazprom owns a majority stake in Serbia’s oil and gas company, NIS, and Serbia remains tied into Russia’s TurkStream gas pipeline. As of May 2025, Serbia extended its gas import contract with Russia until the end of September, locking in prices and guaranteeing supply ahead of winter. Additionally, the Russian tech company Yandex has relocated a significant portion of its operations to Serbia. The firm employs thousands of local staff in transportation, delivery, and IT services. Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, over 300,000 Russian nationals and approximately 20,000 Ukrainians are estimated to have settled in Serbia fleeing war, with many employed in these sectors and obtaining Serbian residency. This follows a historical pattern; for instance, more than 1,500 prominent Russian families sought refuge in Serbia after the Russian Civil War (1917–1918). Many Serbs still travel to Russia, including for business, holiday, or professional exchanges. While Western pop culture dominates in Serbia, many Russian artists still perform there regularly, especially in classical arts. Pragmatic neutrality President Aleksandar Vučić has carefully walked the tightrope of maintaining Serbia’s candidacy for European Union membership while resisting pressure to join Western sanctions against Russia. This diplomatic balancing act reflects both domestic political realities and a long-standing foreign policy of strategic neutrality. In early May 2025, Vučić attended Russia’s Victory Day parade alongside President Vladimir Putin. While EU officials strongly criticised his decision, Vučić defended his actions as a matter of honouring “traditional friendships.” He reiterated Serbia’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity yet refrained from imposing sanctions on Moscow. This ambiguous stance continues to frustrate Western diplomats, who see Serbia as needing to “choose a side.” However, choosing a side would be contrary to the Serbian government’s worldview of needing to remain strategically neutral, which is a tradition in Serbia’s foreign policy dating back to the 13th century. However, some Russian officials have recently questioned Serbia’s neutrality as reports emerged about Serbian defence companies exporting weapons to Ukraine through third party companies located in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria. Serbia’s official refusal to impose sanctions against Russia has preserved its access to Russian markets, energy, and political backing. However, it also risks alienating its most significant trading partners. In 2024, Serbia exported goods worth US$959.1 million to Russia—just three percent of its total exports. In comparison, exports to the European Union totalled US$19.3 billion, accounting for over 60 percent of total trade. Imports reflect a similar pattern, with only 3.3 percent coming from Russia compared to 56.3 percent from the EU. This stark contrast suggests that while Russia may provide strategic and emotional support, Serbia’s economic lifeline lies firmly in the West. The energy factor Energy remains the linchpin in Russia-Serbia relations. Serbia is heavily dependent on Russian gas, with existing contracts offering favourable terms that are hard to replicate elsewhere. Although Serbia is making efforts to diversify its energy mix—including exploring Azerbaijani gas, LNG imports via Greece and Croatia, and domestic renewables—these transitions take time. A new strategic plan for wind and solar development is underway, and Serbia is also preparing to auction renewable energy projects. In parallel, the EU and Serbia signed a strategic raw materials partnership in July 2024, targeting Serbia’s lithium reserves. These are critical to the EU’s push to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains. Yet, public protests against lithium mining in Serbia have stalled the project, revealing the complex interplay between geopolitics and local opposition. Serbia’s role in a shifting world Despite being a small country, Serbia plays an outsized role in the geopolitics of Southeast Europe. With the war in Ukraine dragging on and Moscow becoming increasingly isolated, Serbia remains a key outpost for Russian diplomacy and influence in Europe. At the same time, the country is also investing in deeper partnerships with China, which is fast becoming a major investor in Serbian infrastructure, technology, and mining. While Serbia’s historical and cultural ties with Russia are enduring, they are not immutable. The Serbian public is increasingly aware of the limitations of relying solely on Moscow for diplomatic and economic support. Younger generations are more outward-looking and inclined toward European integration. This generational shift, combined with economic imperatives, could eventually reshape Serbia’s foreign policy priorities. Serbia between a rock and a hard place Serbia’s future hinges on how it navigates its competing loyalties. Russia remains a potent symbol of shared heritage and a geopolitical partner on issues like Kosovo. But economically and institutionally, Serbia is deeply embedded in European systems. Its path forward depends on whether it chooses to lean into its nostalgic ties or align more closely with its economic interests. In today’s multipolar world, Serbia is attempting to preserve its tradition of non-alignment while adapting to a new era of global fragmentation. Whether it succeeds in maintaining this delicate balance, or is ultimately forced to choose, will have profound implications not only for its own trajectory but for the entire Western Balkans. The romanticism of Russia still appeals to many Serbs and people from the Balkans generally, especially older, Yugo-nostalgic generations. Yet the reality of economic interdependence with the West and the shifting sands of global diplomacy may compel Belgrade to make harder decisions in the years to come. Romance or pragmatism? It is always a mix of both in Serbia’s case. Dr Nina Markovic Khaze (PhD Pol. Sc., ANU) is a sessional academic at Macquarie University, political analyst for SBS radio and Director of Communications at Solve Law, Manly. She was previously Vice-President of the AIIA’s ACT Branch, and senior parliamentary researcher for Europe and Middle East. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract Why is it that cross-strait tension has been at its highest since the missile crisis of 1996? Why is the USA–Taiwan–China relations so contentious since 2016? This article argues that one oft-neglected factor—nationalism and identity politics—needs to be considered as a contributing factor to the heightened tension in this triangular relationship. In all three states, audience costs have significantly increased as domestic leaders and elites appeal to populist and nationalistic positions and rhetoric. Though studies of foreign policy often claim that ‘politics stop at the water’s edge,’ populist and nationalist rhetoric in the domestic politics almost always spill over to the international arena. The convergence of Trump’s America First and the US’ obsession with its global primacy underpins and drives America’s approach to its strategic competition with China. China’s continual reference to the hundred years of humiliation in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century and Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ are ethnonationalist appeals that drives China’s fight for its ‘rightful place’ in the global pecking order. Taiwan’s deepening national identity and sociopolitical de-Sinicisation while contributing the development of a separate nation-state is a direct clash to the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) claim of Taiwan as part of its one-China principle. This article will trace and examine the role of domestic nationalism and how it has contributed to make the Taiwan Straits a ‘hotspot’ in global geopolitics and geoeconomics. Introduction The introduction of the phrase ‘Taiwan Contingency’ to the global lexicon in 2020 served to highlight how the temperature of cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan had become a key barometer that the global community was paying attention to (Taylor, 2020). It is also not a coincidence that the increasing attention paid to the Taiwan Strait comes at a time when the USA–China relationship has devolved into great power strategic competition; the Pentagon had long used the term ‘Taiwan Contingency’ in its annual assessment reports on the US military’s ability to implement the Taiwan Relations Act, going as far back as the report from the year 2000, but it was only when USA–China relations worsened and cross-strait tensions created a worry about a flashpoint that the term became widely used (Department of Defense, 2000; Wuthnow, 2020). Much has been said about the increasing tension in cross-strait relations being a result of the overarching competition between the USA and China to define their positions vis-a-viz each other in the global hierarchy. These increasing tensions have often been attributed to the inherent rivalry between an ascending power and a declining one, most notably by Graham Allison in his book Destined for War (Hanania, 2021). The idea of the Thucydides Trap as floated by Allison has become the dominant narrative in the discourse surrounding the USA–China competition and has also contributed to an arguably narrow analysis of the strategic competition. Influenced by the analysis of the Thucydides Trap, China’s actions have been cast separately as being driven by security concerns and imperial aggression, feeding into the narrative of a power struggle in the international arena between the reigning superpower and a surging new power with desires to fulfil its civilisational creed (Mazza, 2024; Peters et al., 2022; Sobolik, 2024). This view seeks to portray China as a disrupting force that seeks to upend the status quo in the international system and thereby overturn the current rules-based international order, while casting the USA as a defender standing up against Chinese aggression, and has led to the USA–China strategic competition also being referred to a ‘new Cold War’ (Brands & Gaddis, 2021; Mazza, 2024). The rising tension in the Taiwan Strait has thus been seen as serving as a frontline to this ‘new Cold War’, and that the three-party relationship between the USA, China and Taiwan serves as some litmus test of American ability to contain a rising China (Lee, 2024). In fact, China hawks in the US and Taiwanese officials have often made use of this ‘new Cold War’ setting to frame the USA–China strategic competition as a competition between autocracies and democracies, and that Taiwan’s democracy makes it worth protecting (Hung, 2022; Lee, 2024). The Taiwanese government has consistently focused on a need to build an alliance of democracies that will support the island against Chinese aggression, highlighting shared values and like-minded partners in their discourse (Ripley, 2024). Yet, a broader analysis shows how framing the rising tension in the Taiwan Strait was a by-product of the greater geopolitical struggle between the USA and China in this ‘new Cold War’ ignores other possible factors. Most notably, the impact of nationalism and identity politics on the domestic sphere needs to be considered as a contributing factor to the heightened tension in this triangular relationship. While there has been increasing attention on nationalism as a characteristic of the international system since the time that scholars like Holsti (1980) brought up the need to emphasise the ‘prominence of nationalist behaviour’ in international relations (IRs) theory, the contemporary analysis of the Taiwan Strait issue shows that most still ignore the impact of domestic pressures on foreign policy choice by the three parties in this relationship; audience costs have significantly increase as domestic leaders and elites appeal to populist and nationalistic positions and rhetoric, and these populist and nationalist rhetoric in the domestic politics almost always spill over to the international arena (p. 25). In the United States, we have the convergence of Trump’s America First ideology and the US’ obsession with its global primacy that underpins and drives America’s approach to its strategic competition with China. While in China, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) continual reference to the hundred years of humiliation in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century and Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ are ethnonationalist appeals that are used to reinforce the Party’s right to guide China to fight for its ‘rightful place’ in the global pecking order. On the island, Taiwan’s deepening national identity and sociopolitical de-Sinicisation while contributing the development of a separate nation-state create a direct clash to the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) claim of Taiwan as part of its one-China principle. This article thus seeks to trace and examine the role of domestic nationalism and how it has contributed to make the Taiwan Strait a ‘hotspot’ in global geopolitics and geoeconomics. This is done by first analysing the literature on nationalism and its role in IRs, following which, the sections examine the unique nationalisms of the United States, China and Taiwan and their role in increasing audience costs for the political elite, which will allow us to analyse how this clash of nationalism contributes to the Taiwan Strait becoming the global ‘hotspot’ that it is. Understanding Nationalism in International Relations As previously mentioned, the literature on IRs theory mainly focuses ‘on models of international interaction based on rational action and material structural factors, and exogenising the formation of preferences and the actors’ identities’ (D’Anieri, 1997, p. 2). Even theorists who have engaged with nationalism in international relations have admitted that ‘the relationship between the two has never been an especially easy one’ (Cox, 2019, p. 249). Yet nationalism is arguably central to the practice of IRs, given how nationalism is a key factor that makes it possible to conceive of states as coherent agents, as it creates the distinctiveness that allows a nation-state to define itself in its interactions with another (Kowert, 2012; Waltz, 1959). It is almost impossible to ignore the role of nationalism given the presumed equivalence of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in IRs theories, and how nationalism is embedded in the conceptualisation of sovereignty, which serves as a fundamental factor in the interactions between states (Heiskanen, 2019, 2021). This is especially so given how the era of globalisation has come to an end, giving rise to a period of IRs that is characterised by securitisation and the preponderance of terms like ‘national security’ and ‘national interest’ (Heiskanen, 2019; Posen, 2022). In this contemporary age, there is a heightened awareness of the need to express and protect a state’s sovereignty in its international interactions, which therefore paves the way for nationalism to be the ‘centripetal force’ in driving interactions between nation-states (Kovács, 2022; Waltz, 1959, pp. 177–178). Nationalism can play such a role in defining interactions between nation-states because nationalism at its core is the conceptualisation of the identity of the polity. Modern nationalism in that sense is the expression of the principle that ‘nation = state = people’, with the purpose of binding the people to the state under one ‘imagined community’ to justify the existence of the nation-state as a construct (Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 19). The nationalism that defines the nation-state is neither natural nor inevitable, but rather a by-product of a nation-building effort to craft an identity that will allow the state to distinguish and therefore differentiate itself in a world of nation-states (Connor, 1990; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986). This creates the peculiarity of nationalism in which they are essentially all the same, yet at the same time, individually unique by necessity. It is thus the interaction between the individual uniqueness while having the same broad goals that lead to nationalism influencing the interactions of nation-states in the international arena; arguably, it is not just the strength of nationalism that is important but also the content of the national identity that helps dictate the interaction between the states (D’Anieri, 1997). The creation and the make-up of nationalisms and national identities are thus of interests for this article’s analysis of the triangular relationship between United States, China and Taiwan. The literature on nationalism and national identity gives us a breakdown on the creation of nationalism. As a relatively modern phenomenon, the rise of nationalisms around the world is a direct result of the socioeconomic upheaval that marked the progress of modernity (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). The advent of industrialisation saw the collapse of the previous social structure that separated the agrarian, merchant classes and the nobility, and necessitated the development of a new identity that would bind diverse groups of people together under the banner of a nation-state. In that regard, the creation of nationalism was necessarily top-down, often driven by the needs of the new political elite who now exercised power in these emerging modern nation-states and formed through nationwide tools such as a national language and the national education system (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). The content of the national identity though could not simply be created out of thin air where the general form of nationalisms is the same and built on a structure of common identity and a sense of belonging to a community, the content of nationalisms needed to be specific to the groups of people living in the nation-state to produce the necessary uniqueness that would engender the desired outcome. As such, nationalisms and national identities were built on the pre-existing myths and histories of the people that inhabited the land or were present at the founding of the nation-state (Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997; Smith, 1986). This results in various contents of the nationalism that are part ethnic but also part mythological. The next section will examine the contents of the national identities of the United States, China and Taiwan in relation to this. American Exceptionalism: America the Great Like all nationalisms, American nationalism aims to ‘legitimise, mobilise and integrate the nation, thereby promoting the unity of the national people, and demanding a sovereign state for this nation’ (Trautsch, 2016, p. 291). Yet unlike European nationalism which had existing histories to build upon, American nationalism was ‘a model of nationhood that did not rest on historic claims to antiquity nor on any sense of distinctive peoplehood’, its foundations being very much rooted on mythologising the pilgrims’ journey across the Atlantic on the Mayflower and the nation’s beginnings as a settler nation (Doyle, 2009, p. 79). The pilgrims’ journey on the Mayflower marked the separation between the ‘Old World’ and the ‘New World’, providing dividing line that forms the basis for the conceptualisation of America as unique. While American nationalism does identify its roots with the colonial migration from Europe, the beginnings of this nationalism are tied specifically to the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence (Doyle, 2009). The War of Independence marked a coalescing of consciousness in the 13 colonies that birthed a new nation, and gave even more credence to the distinction between Europe and the ‘Old World’, and the new American nation in the ‘New World’ (Commager, 1959; Doyle, 2009). This distinction was helped by the colonies’ history as an asylum for religious dissenters, impoverished servants and assorted refugees from Europe, allowing the colonies to divest itself of its British heritage (Doyle, 2009). Yet, certain aspects of British culture did influence the founding fathers of America in the conception of the American nation. While rebelling against their colonial masters, the founding fathers framed their independence as based on the British belief in the institutions of law, liberty and representative government mixed with a healthy dose of religiosity, which, given the lack of a feudal tradition and existing aristocracy, allowed for the creation of a national consciousness that celebrated equality without the necessary social revolution that marked the ‘Old World’ (Lieven, 2012). This allowed for the image of America as a newfound promise land, further playing into the distinction between the old and new, and as scholars from Tocqueville on have noted, birthed the idea of the exceptionalism of the American nation, the ‘shining city on the hill’ (Lieven, 2012). The subsequent expansion of the USA westward that saw the eventual formation of the geographical borders of modern America helped to further this sense of exceptionalism. As the expansion evolved from purchasing land to conflict with both the Native Americans and the Spanish colonial forces, American exceptionalism took on a sense of preordination (Doyle, 2009; Trautsch, 2016). Between the Revolution and the Civil War, American nationalists who recognised the need for strengthening the national consciousness began the enterprise by focusing on the fundamental idea that ‘Americans had a historic mission and that their bond of nationhood lay in their common destiny’; this required the positioning of America’s future place in the history of the world as one that was naturally glorious (Doyle, 2009, p. 86; Trautsch, 2016). To that end, the nationalists pushed the narrative of America’s ‘manifest destiny’, an unstoppable rise for the ‘freest, the happiest, and soon to be the greatest and most powerful country in the world’ (Doyle, 2009, p. 88). The successful expansion and victories in conflict that eventuated in the American nation covering the breadth of continental North America firmly entrenched this sense of preordained greatness for the nation. American nationalism had come to encompass both the civic values of liberty and respect for institutions, and the dreams of imperial grandeur that marked them for greatness; America was free and therefore exceptional, just as America was victorious and therefore exceptional. American exceptionalism, therefore, made the nation’s ascension to the top of the global hierarchy post-1945 easy. To the American nation, having believed in their destined greatness, a seat at the table presiding over global affairs was only to be expected. American nationalism had led the nation to believe in its destiny, and it saw itself as having been chosen, or even, anointed to lead (Lieven, 2012). Such exceptionalism naturally influences modern American foreign policy, as Kristol (1983) points out: Patriotism springs from love of the nation’s past; nationalism arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive greatness…The goals of American foreign policy must go well beyond a narrow, too literal definition of ‘national security.’ It is the national interest of a world power, as this is defined by a sense of national destiny. (p. xiii) American nationalism shapes the way the USA views its interactions with the world, starting with its presumption of its deserved position at the top of the global hierarchy. The mythologising of its ‘historic mission’ and ‘manifest destiny’ helped to create the paradigm that the United States is the natural leader of the world, and its national interests include the protection of its position as the leader of the world. This creates a knock-on effect in its interactions with other states; if the United States is the natural leader, then others must listen and be led, and as the leader, challenges to its primacy cannot be tolerated. However, such conceptualisation brings it into a clash with the rising nationalism of China. Chinese Ethnonationalism: The China Dream Unlike American nationalism, modern Chinese nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon. In fact, the conceptualisation of a Chinese nation did not come about until the nineteenth century, as the Chinese tried to ‘create a modern identity to cope with conditions created by China’s confrontation with the Western world’, forcing the Chinese ‘to deal with foreign concepts, including that of nation, state, sovereignty, citizenship and race’ (Wu, 1991, p. 159). Furthermore, where American nationalism was centred upon its existence as a settler nation, Chinese nationalism could rest on both historic claims to antiquity and a sense of distinctive peoplehood, as Smith (1986) would have identified it, the roots of Chinese nationalism were definitely ethnosymbolic. The 1911 Revolution that saw the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and Imperial China marked the beginnings of modern Chinese nationalism (Townsend, 1992). Where previously the conceptualisation of Chinese identity was grounded in a rich cultural heritage of stories about the ‘abstract idea of the ‘Great Tradition’ of Chinese civilisation’, the encroachment of Western colonial forces in China led to rising discontentment amongst the Chinese public and the rise of intellectual writings about a modern form of Chinese identity which combined Chinese tradition and Western nationalism (Townsend, 1992; Wang, 1988, p. 2; Zheng, 2012). Dr Sun Yat-Sen, who is acknowledged as the father of the modern nation, pushed for the creation of a consciousness of nationhood in his Three Principles of the People, advocating for the creation of modern Chinese nationalism that was centred upon the Chinese people as a unified group, which he categorised as the Chinese ethnic community, ÖлªÃñ×å zhonghuaminzu (Fitzgerald, 2016; Tan & Chen, 2013; Wang, 1988; Wells, 2001). The end of the 1911 Revolution saw the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) with Dr. Sun as the first president (Zheng, 2012). This marked the transition of China from imperial to statehood and saw the coalescing of the consciousness of Chinese nationhood. The ethnosymbolic roots of Chinese nationalism permeated this consciousness, even the name of the Republic, ÖлªÃñ¹ú zhonghuaminguo, emphasised the belonging of the state to the Chinese ethnic nation as the first three characters of the name represent the ethnic Chinese nation. So, Chinese nationalism can be said to also equate to Chinese ethnonationalism, and as a nationalism that rested on the rich history of the Chinese people and the abstract conceptualisation of the following the tradition of great Chinese civilisations, Chinese nationalism is also beholden to a lot of nostalgia. Where Dr Sun and his fellow intellectuals pushed the creation of Chinese nationalism by appealing to the cultural heritage of Chinese civilisation, they combined this with modern western nationalist ideology that focused on a struggle for sovereignty, in this case against the Western imperial powers and the Qing rulers. As such, this nostalgia is driven by the experiences of the Chinese people during the perceived ‘century of humiliation’ °ÙÄê¹ú³Ü bainianguochi starting from the Opium War till 1945, where China struggled for self-determination only to be invaded by the Japanese prior to the Second World War (Fitzgerald, 2016; Townsend, 1992; Zheng, 2012). China, as the empire-turned-nation and heir to the great tradition of Chinese imperial civilisation, was successively beaten and this was seen as a deep shame to the Chinese people who under successively foreign oppressors, including the Manchus of the Qing Dynasty, longed for freedom and a return to glory for the Chinese nation. As such, when Mao announced the founding of the PRC in 1949, the legitimacy of the CCP in ruling the nation was built on Chinese nationalism and the part that the party played in defeating the Japanese. The CCP’s victory in the civil war was arguably also because they presented themselves as even more nationalist than the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) that they chased out of the mainland (Gries, 2020). This close connection between the party’s legitimacy and Chinese nationalism has seen the CCP often fall back on nationalistic propaganda to shore up its position of power, most notably after the events of Tiananmen Square (Gries, 2020). With his ascension to the presidency, Xi Jinping has continued the use of Chinese nationalism to firm up the party’s hold on power, having often referred to China’s rise as the country’s national destiny, referencing the country’s glorious past and harping on the ‘century of humiliation’ that denied China its place among the world’s powers (Tan, 2023). In this current form of Chinese ethnonationalism, Xi’s slogan of ‘national rejuvenation’ helps to reinforce the concept that China, once great but humiliated by the predations of Western colonisers, is now reclaiming its previous majesty to fulfil the ‘China Dream’ (Tan, 2023). This creates the sense that China must stand up to Western powers due to their rightful placed in the world while it must also continue to address the humiliations of the past, of which Taiwan serves as a reminder of, and this creates the setting for competition with the United States and rising tensions with Taiwan. Taiwanese Nationalism: De-sinicised and Independent The case of Taiwanese nationalism is an interesting one. Of the three nationalisms examined in this article, Taiwanese nationalism is the youngest one, having come into existence only in recently. Furthermore, unlike the United States and China, there is no continuity and coherence between the nation and the state in Taiwan. The state governing and exerting authority over Taiwan’s population embodies and merges two distinct political visions, each tied to a separate national identity: Chinese and Taiwanese, as the ROC is ‘a product of Chinese history and Chinese nationalism’, having been imposed onto the island when the KMT lost the civil war and fled the mainland (Clark & Tan, 2012; Lepesant, 2018, p. 65). In fact, while the KMT exercised marital rule over the island under the regimes of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, the party tried constantly to impose an essentialist Chinese nationalism that clashed with the memories and experience of most of the island’s population, especially those who were raised under Japanese rule (Lepesant, 2018). This directly restricted the development of a national consciousness that centred on Taiwanese-ness, which explains the relatively late creation of Taiwanese nationalism. While overseas Taiwanese who were exiled by the KMT had started to display ideologies that was a semblance of Taiwanese nationalism, it was not until the 1980s and the gradual democratisation of the island that this nationalism began to take root (Chiou, 2003; Clark & Tan, 2012; Wakabayashi, 2006; Wu, 2004). With the increasing calls for political liberalisation in the 1980s, Chiang Ching-kuo began the initial process of Taiwanisation, allowing for the appointments of Taiwanese who were ±¾Ê¡ÈË benshengren (Han-Chinese who were on the island before the 1949 migration) to political positions even in his own administration (Cabestan, 2005). This kickstarted the process of nation-building, which only moved into a higher gear with the democratisation of the island in the early 1990s as there developed a political imperative to create an identity that could unify the people on the island (Wakabayashi, 2006). Lee Teng-hui, as the president of Taiwan who oversaw the democratisation process, put his support behind the Taiwanisation movement, supporting the development of a nation-building programme that would spur the adoption of Taiwanese nationalism, against the wishes of the KMT old guard. Lee’s action in building up Taiwanese nationalism is best seen in his propagation of the idea of a ‘new Taiwanese’ national identity in his speech to the National Assembly and more concretely, the change in name for the ROC to the ROC on Taiwan (Chiou, 2003; Jacobs, 2007; Wakabayashi, 2006). As such, the content of Taiwanese nationalism cannot be separated from the complex history of the island. The roots of Taiwanese nationalism are traced to the imperial expansion of Japan in the late 1800s, while previously the island had some contact with various Chinese dynasties and a brief colonial period by the Dutch, the Qing had neglected the island which meant that Japanese colonialisation marked the modernisation of the island (Cabestan, 2005; Wakabayashi, 2006). Japanese colonial rule also sparked the development of a pan-Taiwanese identity rooted in a struggle for independence, and distinctly anti-colonial and anti-Japanese (Brown, 2004). This pan-Taiwanese identity covered all the residents of the island who were not Japanese and therefore was not just restricted to the ethnic Han Chinese. With democratisation and the push for the ‘new Taiwanese’ national identity under Lee, this pan-Taiwanese identity was used as the foundation to build a new national identity. However, this also meant that the aspects of this identity that focused on independence were subsumed into the new Taiwanese nationalism, which was further enhanced by the experiences of the Taiwanese people under KMT rule (Wakabayashi, 2006). For Taiwan, both Japanese colonial rule and the experience of the civil war of post-1945 China became the existence of the ‘others’ to the development of the Taiwanese sense of self (Wakabayashi, 2006). This therefore meant that Taiwanese nationalism was first and foremost a nationalism for an independent Taiwan. In 2000, with the election of Chen Shui-bian from the then opposition Democratic Peoples’ Party (DPP) to the presidency, Taiwanese nationalism took another step in its evolution. No longer was Taiwanese nationalism simply about the independent sovereignty of the island whilst maintaining the cultural affinity for the Chinese tradition as espoused by Lee, but now there was a clear de-Sinicised aspect to Taiwanese nationalism and national identity (Hughes, 2013; Wakabayashi, 2006). This was driven by the policies of the Chen administration which included initiatives to rectify Taiwan’s name, changes to institutions designed to promote unification with mainland China, attempts to change the ROC Constitution and most importantly, the re-orientation of the education curriculum to focus more on Taiwan and less on the mainland. This resulted in the evolution of Taiwanese national identity towards one that increasingly sidelined the culturally ethnic Chinese component, instead insisting a cultural makeup that was simultaneously Han Chinese, Japanese and Aboriginal Taiwanese (Brown, 2004; Hughes, 2013; Wu, 2004). Yet such a nationalism brings along issues given the precarious relationship between the island and its cross-strait neighbour. The Clash of Nationalisms This article aimed to examine the role that nationalism played in the rising tensions in the United States, China and Taiwan triangular relationship. The idea that nationalisms can be antagonistic to each other and lead to conflict is not entirely new, despite the lack of IR theories that appropriately accommodate for the impact of nationalism. Samuel Huntington (1996) in his book, Clash of Civilizations, argues that future global conflicts will be driven not by ideological or economic differences but by cultural and civilisational divisions due to the increasing interaction between civilisations as a result of globalisation. Huntington (1996) predicted that a rising and assertive East Asia, on the back of rapid economic development, would increasingly come into conflict with Western civilisation led by the United States, in part due to a difference in cultural values and geopolitical goals. Where some would argue that Huntington’s claims were oversimplified and may broadly reinforce cleavages, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror, his basic premise provides an interesting starting point to examining the impact of nationalism on the USA–China–Taiwan relationship. While Huntington viewed the incoming conflict as drawn along civilisational lines, assuming that cultural similarities and affinities would be sufficient to create groupings of nation-states around the world that would come into conflict with each other, recent events have proven otherwise. In fact, cases like Donald Trump’s threat to put a 25% tariff on Canadian imports when he assumes the presidency in January 2025 serve as a reminder that nationalism can easily overpower any sense of cultural affinity, even between nations as closely connected and allied as the United States and Canada (Hale, 2024). The advent of modernity brought about the rise of nationalism in the nation-state, and in the bid to give the nation-state’s existence legitimacy, each nationalism was propagated as individually unique. And as such, while cultural civilisations may not be a cleavage that thoroughly defines the world today, nationalism seems to be one that could fit into Huntington’s theory instead. Given the unique nationalisms of the United States, China and Taiwan covered in the sections above, it also appears that what is happening in this triangular relationship is a conflict arising from diametrically opposed nationalisms, a ‘clash of nationalisms’ if you will. Figure 1 summarises the interactions between the nationalisms of the United States, China and Taiwan.  Figure 1. Interaction Between Nationalisms. The United States having built a national identity that centred on a higher calling to being a model nation and leader of the world sees its position at the top of the global hierarchy as sacrosanct. The reason why the concept of the ‘Thucydides trap’ has gained so much attention is because there is an inherent acknowledgement that no matter the ills that may plague the United States, it is unwilling to see the global primacy it has established after the end of the Cold War being challenged (Mazza, 2024). However, China’s ascendency on the back of its rapid economic growth and the fact that it managed to emerge from the 2007–8 Great Financial Crisis relatively unscathed has given life to the belief in the PRC that their anointed time has finally come. Driven by Xi’s desire to push Chinese ethnonationalism as a foundation for the PRC’s assertiveness in the international arena, the world is now witnessing a China that seeks to act like a great power, including a demand for regional hegemony (Mazza, 2024). Yet regional hegemony for the PRC set it in direct conflict with the United States as regional hegemony in East Asia would mean the United States having to pull back on its global primacy and cede control over the region where it has key allies like Japan and South Korea. And this is exacerbated by the anti-West element of Chinese ethnonationalism that holds the West, with the United States being symbolic of it, responsible for the century of humiliation and the country not being the rightful great power it should have long been. As the saying goes, one mountain cannot contain two tigers, the nationalisms of both the United States and the PRC are dependent on the countries fulfilling their self-perceived destiny of greatness which naturally puts them into conflict with each other and is reflected in Figure 1. Similarly, Figure 1 also shows how the nationalisms of China and Taiwan are in conflict. As mentioned above, Chinese ethnonationalism and the ‘China Dream’ are also about washing away the shame from the century of humiliation. Part of this humiliation stems from the losses to the Japanese in the two Sino-Japanese wars, of which the loss of the island of Taiwan serves as a reminder of and it is for this reason that Xi has made clear that reunification between Taiwan and the mainland is a core part of his ‘national rejuvenation’ (Sobolik, 2024). Yet, in Taiwan, the evolution and rise of Taiwanese nationalism have led to a strong Taiwanese national identity that rejects its relationship with the Chinese mainland; increasingly Taiwanese are rejecting the Beijing-led discourse of a common identity between them and the mainland Chinese, and polling shows an increasing majority of Taiwanese no longer identify as Chinese (Fifield, 2019; Wang, 2023). This sets up the two nations in a path for conflict, a worse-case scenario that experts are predicting gets ever closer, as Taiwanese independence is a redline for China that cannot be crossed, but any form of reunification for the island is incompatible with their unique and independent national identity (Kuo, 2022; Wu, 2004). On the flip side, the relationship between American nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism is somewhat complementary, as shown in Figure 1. In examining American nationalism above, we pointed out how much of American nationalism is driven by American primacy in the form of American exceptionalism. This exceptionalism has been shown to have a messianic fervour, with Badri (2024) arguing that this has led to America’s interventionist foreign policy since 1991. Yet this messianic fervour makes American nationalism the perfect complement for Taiwanese nationalism. As Taiwanese nationalism tends towards de-sinicisation and independence, it has also gone through pains to emphasise its democratisation as a key characteristic of its nationalism. This results in America becoming a natural support pillar for the objectives of Taiwanese nationalism, while America’s messianic tendencies lead it to want to support Taiwanese democracy. As a result, American and Taiwanese nationalism become complementary existences. However, that the nationalisms are in conflict do not necessarily explain the existence of the triangular relationship that has seen the Taiwan Strait become the geopolitical ‘hotspot’ that it is. In order to do so, it is important to remember that nationalism is a double-edged sword when used by governments (Gries, 2020; Tan, 2023). Since 2016, we have seen the respective governments in all three countries increasingly turn to nationalism to further their own agendas (Kuo, 2022; Restad, 2020). Trump won his first presidential victory on the back of his ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan, which implied that the greatness of the American nation had been allowed to wane by his political predecessor. In doing so, Trump had unleashed a torrent of populism built upon conservative American nationalism that centred upon how powerful and great the country was perceived at the end of the Cold War and the longing for a return to those days (Renshon, 2021). In China, Xi, as previously mentioned, turned to the concept of the ‘China Dream’ in his bid to secure the legitimacy of the CCP and his hold over power. In his elaboration, it was the preeminent task of the CCP to restore the past glory of the nation and thereby, turn the dream of a great power nation into a reality, which would aid in making life better for the Chinese people (Bhattacharya, 2019). The rise of Chinese ethnonationalism has been successful in legitimising the position of the CCP in the wake of the political turmoil of the early 2010s and increasingly we have seen assertive Chinese expressions of this ethnonationalism, be it in its ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy or cases of Chinese international students in university campuses in places like Australia, United States and the United Kingdom who openly challenge their lecturers and peers who comment on issues like Taiwan and Hong Kong (Tan, 2023). While in Taiwan, the DPP under Tsai Ing-wen latched on to the anti-Chinese sentiment of the 2014 Sunflower Movement and harnessed Taiwanese nationalism and desire to exist as a sovereign people to win the 2016 presidential election from the KMT (Chen & Zheng, 2022; Clark et al., 2020). Since then, the DPP has increasingly relied on Taiwanese nationalism to secure itself electoral victories, as it provides a clear delineation on the Taiwanese/Chinese cleavage between itself and the opposition KMT, while also allowing the government to create a narrative that differentiates Taiwan from the mainland, and therefore rouse support for its cause for international recognition (Lee, 2024). In each of these countries, we have seen political leaders turning to nationalism for their own domestic agendas. However, using nationalism in such manner also means that there is a significant consequence when the desires and dreams of the nationalism cannot be fulfilled, especially for regimes that have built their legitimacy on said nationalisms. To that end, the escalation of tension in the Taiwan Strait becomes understandable. Taiwanese nationalism has led to Tsai and the DPP to insist on Taiwanese sovereignty, even without the need for actual independence, but this has crossed the CCP’s red line and Chinese ethnonationalism necessitates a reaction in the form of increased military activity. The United States, having been bound to support Taiwan due to the Taiwan Relations Act, and in part to reassert its global hegemon status, thus sees it as imperative that it continue to be involved in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, either through freedom of navigation movements or selling of arms. As each side escalates their foreign policy response to the Taiwan Strait issue, audience costs for the political leaders also increase. Having unleashed the forces of nationalism, any semblance that the political leader is contemplating backing down would have serious implications on the stability of the domestic regime. This is even more so given the looming economic challenges in each of the three nations. Conclusion Therefore, the triangular relationship between the United States, China and Taiwan is not merely a product of power struggles or ideological conflicts but a ‘clash of nationalisms’. The interplay of unique national identities, reinforced by domestic pressures, has intensified the geopolitical stakes in the Taiwan Strait, transforming it into a critical hotspot in global politics. In understanding this, we can therefore see how nationalism is in fact an important factor that influences the interactions of states in IRs theories. Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.Cite: Tan, O., & Tan, A. C. (2025). 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the international political economy of Korea and its effects due to geopolitical tension between China and the USA. Design/methodology/approach Economic war between China and the USA has prolonged longer than expected. Aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, reforming the supply chain has been the centre of economic tension between China and the USA. Quite recently, with the rapid expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms, distribution channels come upon a new economic tension between the two. And now is the time to pivot its pattern of conflict from competition into cooperation. In this end, economic diplomacy could be a useful means to give a signal of cooperation. From the view of economic diplomacy, this paper tries to analyse the projected transition of economic war between China and the USA with its implication on the trade policy of Korea. Findings As an implementation of economic diplomacy, China suggested the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing trade logistics among related countries to gain competitiveness. In 2023, the Biden administration suggested the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor as a counter to BRI, which will be a threshold for changing trade policy from economic war into economic diplomacy. As a result, it is expected China and the USA will expand their economic diplomacy in a way to promote economic cooperation among allied states, while the distribution channel war would continue to accelerate the economic tension between China and the USA. Korea has to prepare for and provide measures handling this geopolitical location in its trade policy or economic diplomacy. Originality/value This research contributes to the awareness and understanding of trade environments from the perspective of economic diplomacy. 1. Introduction The advent of globalisation has led to widespread economic integration, creating global production networks and markets. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a significant setback to this trend. In the wake of COVID-19, an economic war has arisen between China and the USA, centred on the restructuring of global supply chains following widespread disruptions. International political economy (IPE) examines the power dynamics between states and the structures of influence within regional economies. Consequently, economic diplomacy has gained unprecedented attention. Economic diplomacy focuses on government actions regarding international economic issues, distinct from political diplomacy through its market-oriented approach in foreign policy. Putnam (1988) categorises economic diplomacy into two levels: unilateralism and bilateralism. Unilateral economic diplomacy (or unilateralism) often relies on hard power, involving decisions on trade liberalisation or market protection without negotiation. Bilateral economic diplomacy (or bilateralism) or multilateral economic diplomacy (or multilateralism), by contrast, involves negotiation among trade partners, resulting in agreements such as regional or global free trade agreements (FTAs). A vast range of state or non-state actors engage in economic diplomacy, navigating the complex interplay between international and domestic factors. Defining economic diplomacy is extremely challenging, but one useful definition is “the broad concept of economic statecraft, where economic measures are taken in the pursuit of political goals, including punitive actions such as sanctions” (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008).  Figure 1 Recent trend of economic diplomacy To exert influence internationally, ministers and heads of government strive to demonstrate their capacity for national security through two primary approaches, as shown in Figure 1 (above): economic war (or competition) and economic diplomacy (or international cooperation). In the context of global supply chain restructuring, the economic conflict between China and the USA has intensified, marked by threats of supply chain disruptions. This has led to emerging strategies aimed at “crowding out” the USA from global supply chains (去美戰略) or excluding China through alliances such as the Allied Supply Chain and Chip 4. While economic war is inherently “temporary” due to its painstaking nature, economic diplomacy or international cooperation offer a more “long-term” approach because it is gains-taking. This paper analyses the factors contributing to the prolonged nature of this economic war and explores potential outcomes of the supply chain tensions between China and the USA from the perspectives of IPE or geo-economics. In conclusion, it highlights the importance of preparing for trade policy adjustments and strategic economic diplomacy. 2. International trade war and strategic items2.1 Supply chain The supply chain encompasses a network of interconnected suppliers involved in each stage of production, from raw materials and components to the finished goods or services. This network can include vendors, warehouses, retailers, freight stations and distribution centres. Effective supply chain management is a “crucial process because an optimised supply chain results in lower costs and a more efficient production cycle” [1]. Within the supply chain, a leading company typically holds governance power, enabling it to coordinate scheduling and exercise control across the interconnected suppliers, resulting in reduced costs and shorter production times (Gereffi et al., 2005) [2]. Since the 2000s, forward and backward integration have been key strategies for managing time, cost and uncertainty in supply chains. For example, Toyota’s Just-In-Time (JIT) system demonstrated the efficiency of locally concentrated supply chains until disruptions from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and the Thailand flood. Following supply chain shutdowns in 2020, many businesses shifted from local to global supply chains, utilising advancements of the information technology (IT) and transportation technologies to geographically diversify operations. As the need for a systematically functioning global supply chain has grown, a leading nation, much like a leading company, often assumes governance power in international trade and investment, as illustrated in Figure 2 (below), by aligning with the leadership of a dominant market competitiveness, which makes this leadership valuable.  Figure 2 Supply chain The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to the global supply chain, causing sudden lockdowns that led to widespread supply chain disruptions. To mitigate the risks of future global disruptions, supply chains have begun restructuring to operate on a more regionally segmented basis. In this shift toward regional supply chains, China and the USA are at the centre, drawing allied countries within their spheres of influence. This alignment helps explain why the economic war between China and the USA has lasted longer than anticipated. 2.2 Strategic items China has restricted exports of two rare metals, gallium and germanium, which are critical to semiconductor production. Kraljic (1983) highlighted the importance of managing “strategic items” within the framework of supply chain management, as shown in Figure 3. Kraljic emphasises the need to strengthen and diversify critical items. The Kraljic matrix provides a valuable tool for identifying essential items that require focused management within the supply chain.  Figure 3 Kraljic matrix Kraljic identified the importance of managing “bottleneck items” in strategic supply chain management – items that present high supply risk but have relatively low business value. Due to the potential costs associated with non-delivery or compromised quality of strategic items, these must be closely monitored and controlled. From a risk management perspective, establishing medium-term business relationships and collaboration with suppliers is essential. For example, South Korea imports over 90% of its urea for agricultural and industrial purposes from China [3]. Heavily dependent on China for urea supplies due to pricing factors, Korea faced challenges when China imposed export controls on urea, underscoring Korea’s vulnerability within China’s sphere of influence. The European Union (EU) also faces challenges with critical raw materials (CRMs). China remains the EU’s sole supplier of processed rare earth elements, while Chile supplies 79% of its lithium. In response, the EU introduced the CRM Act (CRMA) to support projects aimed at increasing “the EU’s capacity to extract, process, and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify supplies from the third countries” [4]. 2.3 Resilient supply chain alliance In contrast to China’s approach of leveraging supply disruptions to strengthen its influence, the Biden administration in the USA has adopted a cooperative approach focused on building resilient supply chains (Pillar 2) through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which includes 14 member countries [5]. The need for resilient supply chains has been further underscored by the Russia–Ukraine crisis. The IPEF aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities by fostering global efforts to reduce risks associated with concentrated, fragile supply chains [6].  Figure 4 Resilient supply chain alliance In Figure 4, the EU Commission presented the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) in September 2022, a crisis governance framework designed to ensure the availability of essential goods and services during future emergencies. The SMEI operates on three levels: contingency planning, vigilance and emergency. The contingency planning phase focuses on collaboration among member states to mitigate supply chain disruption and monitor incidents. The vigilance phase can be activated when a significant disruption is anticipated, enabling specific measures such as mapping and monitoring supply chains and production capacities. Finally, the emergency phase is activated in cases of severe disruption to the functioning of the single market [7]. Establishing a resilient supply chain through international cooperation may be appealing, yet the reality often falls short of the ambition. In South Korea, the IPEF took effect on 17 April 2024, after an extended negotiation process, marking the first multilateral agreement on supply chains. As a result, during non-crisis periods, the 14 member countries will collaborate to strengthen international trade, investment and trade logistics. In times of crisis, member countries will activate a “crisis response network”. Conversely, opportunities for negotiation with China, South Korea’s largest trading partner, are essential for building supply chain resilience [8]. China has pursued an industrial policy focused on enhancing its supply chain management capabilities. In the semiconductor sector, the decoupling between China and the USA has become increasingly evident. Contrary to expectations, China has adopted a policy of internalising its supply chains, returning to the integration strategies of the 2000s rather than furthering globalisation. A promising opportunity for transformation between the two countries has emerged recently. Since 2015, China and South Korea have maintained bilateral FTA, and with the second phase of FTA negotiations currently underway, there is an opportunity to strengthen trade and investment ties, fostering positive progress through international cooperation. 2.4 China manufacturing exodus During the COVID-19 pandemic, China imposed sudden lockdowns without prior notice or preparation, halting production and logistics cycles. This “zero COVID” policy may have triggered a shift towards “de-risking” China from supply chain disruptions. Although China still offers significant advantages as “the factory of the world,” with vast market potential, prolonged trade tensions with the USA, intensified during the Trump administration, have prompted global manufacturers with substantial USA market bases to relocate operations amid rising geopolitical uncertainties. For example, Nike and Adidas have shifted much of their footwear manufacturing to Vietnam, Apple has begun iPhone production at a Foxconn in Chennai, India, and AstraZeneca has contracted production with India’s Serum Institute. In the pre-globalised era, defining the Rule of Origin (ROO) was straightforward, as a product’s components were usually manufactured and assembled within a single country. However, with the complexity of global supply chains, particularly since 2012, determining ROO has become a time-consuming and subjective process. ROO are classified as either non-preferential or preferential. The USA applies non-preferential ROO to restrict imports from countries like Cuba, Iran and North Korea, while offering trade preference programmes for others. Preferential ROO are used to determine duty-free eligibility for imports from approved countries [9], whereas non-preferential ROO play a crucial role in “country of origin labelling, government procurement, enforcement of trade remedy actions, compilation of trade statistics, supply chain security issues.” [10] China manufacturing exodus may negatively impact capital inflows into Hong Kong, traditionally seen as the Gateway to China. In 2023, Hong Kong’s initial public offering volume fell to a 20-year low of $5.9bn [11]. While China-oriented business remains in Hong Kong, which returns fully to Chinese control in 2047, non-China-oriented businesses have migrated to Singapore. As the certainty of contract and ownership rights forms the foundation of capitalism, this capital flight from Hong Kong is likely to persist. 3. Trade logistics and economic corridors Globalisation has allowed supply chains to leverage interdependence and interconnectedness, maximising efficiency. However, while these efficiencies have been beneficial, they have also created a fertile ground for friction between trade partners due to a “survival of the fittest” mindset and the principle of “winner takes all.” This interdependence has also highlighted vulnerabilities; the global supply chain struggled to manage the disruptions caused by COVID-19, prompting a shift towards regional integration initiatives, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. As the global economy seeks stability, collaboration over competition has become increasingly essential, with economic diplomacy emerging as a priority. The prolonged economic war between China and the USA arguably needs to shift towards economic diplomacy. The global supply chain is restructuring into regional supply chains, building resilience by operating in regional segments that can withstand crises. Michael Porter introduced the concept of value chain as “a set of activities that a firm performs to deliver a valuable product or service to the market.” [12] Complex finished goods often depend on global value chains, traversing multiple countries. As shown in Figure 5, the value chain consists of supply chain and trade channel components. While the focus has traditionally been on which country holds lead status within a regional supply chain, the emphasis is now shifting to how these regional segments can be interconnected and relayed. In this context, the supply chain competition may evolve into a “channel war” in international trade, where trade logistics will centre on the internal flow of goods, standardising channel processes and establishing authority over these channels.  Figure 5 Supply chain v. trade channel 3.1 Trade logistics It is natural for governments to seek environments that enhance competitiveness within in their countries. In terms of trade, effective trade logistics are essential for maintaining competitive advantage. As a prerequisite, a strong IT management infrastructure is indispensable. As shown in Figure 6, trade logistics encompass the internal flow of goods to market, integrating physical infrastructure with operating software – such as transport hubs, warehouses, highways, ports, terminals, trains and shipping vessels. Key areas of conflict in trade logistics involve the standardisation of channel processes and determining who holds governance over operation of these logistics systems. This is equally relevant within the digital economy. Recently, Chinese e-commerce – often referred to as C-commerce – has aggressively sought to gain control over digital distribution channels, interconnected delivery networks and trade logistics via digital platforms. Chinese platforms such as Taobao, Temu and AliExpress are actively working to increase their monthly active users (MAUs), positing themselves as counterweights to USA-based platforms such as Amazon and eBay in digital trade [13].  Figure 6 Trade logistics When the agenda of establishing international trade logistics is introduced to relevant trade members across various countries, initial progress and effective responses are often achieved. However, efforts soon encounter obstacles related to standardising logistics processes and establishing operational governance. Greater reliance on international institutions could help resolve these issues (Bayne, 2017). Yet governments frequently prioritise domestic interests, and after prolonged negotiations, the risk of international agreements failing increases. Amid the economic war between China and the USA, China launched a trade logistics initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt One Road, in 2013. Often referred to as the New Silk Road, the BRI aims to establish economic corridors for trade logistics. The World Bank estimates that the BRI could boost trade flows by 4.1% and reduce trade costs by 1.1% [14]. In response, the Biden administration proposed the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in September 2023 to strengthen transport and communication links between Europe and Asia as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. IMEC has been well received by participating countries, with expectations of fostering economic growth, enhancing connectivity and potentially rebalancing trade and economic relations between the EU and China [15]. Both BRI and IMEC are ambitious projects aimed at boosting international trade through substantial investments in trade logistics infrastructure. Each seeks to assert governance over international trade channels, signalling that the supply chain war may soon evolve into a trade channel war between China and the USA. 3.2 Economic corridors Economic corridors are transport networks designed to support and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and information. These corridors often include integrated infrastructure, such as highways, railways and ports, linking cities or even countries (Octaviano and Trishia, 2014). They are typically established to connect manufacturing hubs, high-supply and high-demand areas, and producers of value-added goods. Economic corridors comprise both hard infrastructure – such as trade facilities – and soft infrastructure, including trade facilitation and capacity-building measures. The Asian Development Bank introduced the term “economic corridor” in 1998 to describe networks connecting various economic agents within a region [16]. Economic corridors are integrated trade logistics networks, providing essential infrastructure for connecting regional segments of supply chains. As supply chains increasingly operate in regional “chunks,” linking these segments becomes ever more important. Economic corridors typically include a network of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, terminals and ports. Initiatives like the BRI and IMEC use economic corridors as instruments of economic diplomacy, shifting strategies from hard power to soft power, as shown in Figure 7. Because less-developed or developing countries often lack sufficient funding to invest in trade logistics, they tend to welcome these initiatives from developed countries, which offer international collaboration and support. However, these initiatives usually come with the condition that participating countries must accept standardised trade processes and governance led by the sponsoring developed country.  Figure 7 Economic corridor initiatives as economic diplomacy To succeed, economic corridors must meet three key conditions [17]. First, government intervention is essential, as economic corridor initiatives primarily involve public infrastructure investments beyond the scope of the private sector. In realising these projects, governments must reconcile three tensions to ensure their policies are mutually supportive: tensions between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures and between governments and other stakeholders. Second, intermediate outcomes should be measured and demonstrated as results of economic corridors, allowing participants to experience tangible benefits throughout these longer-term projects. Finally, economic corridors should deliver broader benefits. Participants need incentives to utilise the infrastructure sustainably. These benefits may extend beyond economic welfare, such as wages and income, to include social inclusion, equity and environmental gains, which support the long-term viability of the infrastructure. 4. BRI vs IMEC4.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - Silk Road The BRI can be a modern-day realisation of the Silk Road concept, connecting Europe as a market base with China as a production base. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, which connected trade routes across Eurasia, the BRI poses potential challenges due to its extensive connectivity. Firstly, there are social and environmental externalities, such as increased congestion and accidents from concentrating traffic flows through limited links and nodes within trade networks. Secondly, while the connectivity may benefit the production and market bases at either end, regions situated between these hubs, through which highways and railways pass, may gain minimal advantage. Thirdly, there is often a mismatch between where costs and benefits are realised. Transit regions that facilitate network traffic often see fewer direct benefits compared to high-density nodes within the network. 4.2 India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) - The Spice Road The ancient Spice Roads once connected the Middle East and Northeast Africa with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods such as cinnamon, ginger, pepper and cassia, which, like silk, served as a form of currency. The IMEC proposes a modern route from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Greece. Since its announcement in September 2023, some regional experts have expressed reservations about its feasibility, particularly regarding the connection between the Middle East and Israel. The project has faced delays due to the Israel–Hamas war. Despite these challenges, IMEC holds potential to drive economic growth and strengthen connectivity, especially as countries like Vietnam and India emerge as alternative manufacturing bases for companies relocating from China. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, IMEC is not viewed as a challenge to China but rather as an opportunity to diversify their economies and solidify their roles within the Middle East region [18]. 5. Conclusion A new trade war between China and the USA has begun, with the Biden Administration’s introduction of IMEC as a counter to China’s BRI. This shift could soon transform the nature of economic war from a focus on supply chains to one on trade channels. The China manufacturing exodus was further accelerated by supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the economic tensions between China and the USA, the restructuring of global supply chains into regional networks has made significant progress. With China maintaining its stance on export controls for strategic items, South Korea must prepare for resilient supply chain management. In relation to China–Korea FTA, which is currently undergoing its second phase of negotiation, South Korea should seek clarity on the transparency of China’s strategic item controls. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) plays a key role in monitoring the quality of inbound investments; similarly, South Korea is experiencing increased inbound investment due to the manufacturing shift from China and should apply similar standards to evaluate investment quality. This emerging economic war between China and the USA is now marked by the competing initiatives of the BRI and IMEC. The BRI can be viewed as a modern Silk Road, linking China with Europe, while the IMEC seeks to establish a trade logistics corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Greece. The South Korean Government should take proactive steps to prepare for the evolving dynamics of the trade war between China and the USA. CitationOh, J.S. (2025), "International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-11. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-06-2024-0031  Notes 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp2. According to Gary Gereffi et al, 5 governance types of a lead company could be categorised as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.3. Korea imports urea from 12 countries including Qatar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in addition to China.4. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en5. IPEF was launched on May 23,2022 at Tokyo. 14 member countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA. 4 Pillar of IPEF are Trade (Pillar 1), Supply Chain (Pillar 2),Clean Economy (Pillar 3) and Fair Economy (Pillar 4).6. Critics say “lack of substantive actions and binding commitments, instead focusing on process-driven framework building.” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/its-time-ipef-countries-take-action-supply-chain-resilience7. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_54438. As of 2023, the first-largest trade partner of Korea is China (Trade volume of $267.66bn), the second is the US ($186.96bn) and the third is Vietnam ($79.43bn)9. As preferential ROO contain the labour value content requirement in the USMCA, it could increase compliance costs for importers. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3452410. USITC(1996), Country of Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations and Practices, USITC Publication 2975, July, pp. 2–411. https://www.barrons.com/articles/hong-kong-financial-center-china-46ba5d3612. Porter identifies a value chain broken in five primary activities: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and post-sale services. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/concepts_approaches_in_gvc_research_final_april_18.pdf13. MAU is a metric commonly used to identify the number of unique users who engage with apps and website. MAU is an important measurement to the level of platform competitiveness in the digital trade logistics or e-commerce industry.14. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/12/china-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-global-chemical-industry.html15. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2023/10/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-us-businesses16. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which first used the term in 1998, defines economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets. http://research.bworldonline.com/popular-economics/story.php?id=350&title=Economic-corridors-boost-markets,-living-conditions17. Legovini et al. (2020) comments traditional cross border agreements of transport investment focuses only on a narrow set of direct benefits and cost. However, economic corridors can entail much wider economic benefits and costs such as trade and economic activity, structural change, poverty reduction, pollution and deforestation.18. Arab Centre Washington D.C. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/ References Bayne, N. (2017), Challenge and Response in the New Economic Diplomacy, 4th ed., The New Economic Diplomacy, Routledge, London, p. 19.Blanchard, J.M.F. and Ripsman, N.M. (2008), “A political theory of economic statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 371-398, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The governance of value chain”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 78-104, doi: 10.1080/09692290500049805.Kraljic, P. (1983), “Purchasing must be supply management”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 61 No. 5, September.Legovini, A., Duhaut, A. and Bougna, T. (2020), “Economic corridors-transforming the growth potential of transport investments”, p. 10.Octaviano, B.Y. and Trishia, P. (2014), Economic Corridors Boost Markets, Living Conditions, Business World Research, Islamabad, October.United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1996), “Country of origin marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices”, USITC Publication, Vol. 2975, July, pp. 2-4.Further readingPorter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press.Putman, R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics; the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 427-600.USITC (2019), “Global value chain analysis: concepts and approaches”, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, April, pp. 1-29.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract Observers have noted that Washington’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ aims not only to deter China from attacking Taiwan but also to keep Taipei from taking actions that may be deemed provocative by Beijing leaders. Remarks and actions taken by former United States President Joseph Biden seem to place America’s long-held ambiguous policy in doubt. It has been argued that a clear security commitment from Washington is likely to bolster Taiwan citizens’ unrealistic expectations of America’s defence support and their calls for independence, which will certainly invite Beijing’s violent responses. Employing the theory of deterrence and survey data collected in Taiwan during the past 20 years, this article examines this argument. The analysis shows that the policy of strategy ambiguity remains crucial for the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. As China has increasingly turned itself to become a revisionist, Washington’s policy requires a recalibration, and the adjustment does not have to be a binary choice between ambiguity and clarity. Donald Trump’s return to the White House with his transactional approach to international affairs makes US policy towards the Taiwan issue less predictable, potentially leading to a volatile Taiwan Strait during his second term. Introduction One of the key aspects of US policy towards Taiwan since 1979 has been its ambiguous posture. With an objective of maintaining cross-strait peace and stability, Washington’s policy is based on its version of the ‘one-China’ policy, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the three United States–China communiques and ‘Six Assurances’ (Congressional Research Service, 2024). Under this framework, Washington acknowledges that there is only one China and maintains an unofficial relationship with Taipei. The United States supports Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character and will ‘resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’ (TRA, Section 2(6)) but it does not clarify what would trigger an American military response. The deliberate uncertainty about whether the United States would intervene in cross-strait conflicts distinctively characterises Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity. Former United States President Joseph Biden’s repeated security pledges to Taiwan since taking office in 2021 seem to place this policy in doubt. Biden’s response to a reporter of CBS 60-Minutes was unequivocal. When being asked, ‘So unlike Ukraine, to be clear, sir, US forces—US men and women—would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion?’ Without hesitation, Biden replied, ‘Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack’ (Pelley, 2022). Although White House officials later repeatedly indicated that America’s policy towards Taiwan had not changed, Biden’s remarks generated a new round of discussion (e.g., Benson, 2022; Christensen et al., 2022) since this was the fourth time that the President made such a pledge.1 Critics point out that Washington’s deliberate ambiguity about America’s military intervention is not merely designed to deter China from attacking Taiwan. By intentionally being vague on its defence commitment, the policy also intends to keep Taipei from taking actions that may be deemed provocative by Beijing leaders (Bush, 2006). Survey data have consistently shown that few on the island are willing to be ruled by the Chinese Communist government and the majority would opt for independence if a war with China can be avoided (Hsieh & Niou, 2005; Wang, 2017). An unconditional security guarantee from Washington is likely to bolster Taiwan citizens’ unrealistic expectations of America’s defence support and their calls for independence. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the popularly elected Taipei government could take aggressive actions under public pressure, which will certainly invite Beijing’s military attacks and drag the United States into an unwanted war with China. Employing the theory of deterrence and survey data collected in Taiwan during the past 20 years, this article attempts to examine this logic with the following research questions: What is the logic behind Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity? Why is there a call for clarity in the first place? And, what are the concerns about a policy of clarity? What would Donald Trump’s second term as the President of the United States mean for Washington’s policy on Taiwan? The Functioning of Strategic Ambiguity Fierce fighting broke out between troops led by the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the Chinese mainland at the end of the Second World War. Under the weight of corruption, the KMT government suffered a disastrous military defeat and retreated to the island of Taiwan. As geopolitical tension mounted, Washington signed a mutual defence treaty with Taipei to contain the expansion of Communism. Several major battles were fought in the 1950s and 1960s across the Taiwan Strait. With America’s assistance, Taipei thwarted Communist military attacks on offshore islands held by Taiwan. The 1970s saw a shift in China’s strategy away from a reliance on the ‘military liberation’ of the island to a wave of ‘peaceful initiatives’ for China’s unification. However, Chinese leaders continue to regard Taiwan as a renegade province and have refused to recognise it as an equal and legitimate negotiating partner. Attempting to coerce Taipei into acceptance of the unification formula known as ‘one country, two systems’, Beijing has repeatedly warned that it would use ‘any means it deems necessary, including military ones’ (State Council of the PRC, 1993). Taipei’s loss of United Nations (UN) membership in 1971 and the normalisation of relations between China and the United States in 1972 signified Beijing’s decisive diplomatic victory. China’s growing importance in international affairs has led many countries, including the United States, to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan. After the United States and China established official ties in 1979, Washington has maintained an ‘unofficial’ relationship with Taipei. With an aim to maintain cross-strait peace and stability, the policy of strategic ambiguity was gradually articulated in the subsequent years and has become America’s key policy towards the Taiwan issue. In essence, strategic ambiguity is a policy of deterrence aiming to prevent a target state from taking unwanted actions. The deterrent effect is accomplished by the deterring state’s threat of taking actions that will potentially deny the target state’s expected gains or punish it to the extent that the costs of the unwanted acts exceed the gains it hopes to acquire. In order to be effective, the deterring state needs to show that it (a) possesses sufficient retaliatory capability to deny the fruits of unwanted actions; and (b) has the resolve to use the force so that the target state is persuaded that the threats are credible (Chan, 2003; Christensen, 2002; Wang, 2010). As the world’s only superpower, few countries can withstand the weight of American power if it were deployed against them. Washington has also demonstrated that it has the resolve to use force, as the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis has shown. Triggered by Beijing’s military exercises and missile tests aiming to intimidate Taiwan voters on the eve of the island country’s first popular presidential election, the Clinton administration responded by dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan. Although some may question Washington’s resolve due to the perceived decline of American power, wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan still serve as reminders of its resolve of deploying military might. Previous literature has demonstrated that credible threat is not sufficient to deter unwanted behaviour, as an effective deterrence also needs convincing assurance (Christensen, 2002; Christensen et al., 2022; Schelling, 1966). The target state will have little incentive to comply with the deterring state’s demand if it believes that it will ultimately lose its principal values. This is why various United States administrations have repeatedly assured Chinese leaders that Washington does not support Taiwan independence lest Beijing use force to realise its cause of unification for fear of Taiwan’s permanent separation from China. The flip side of this logic is to remind Taipei that America’s security commitment is not without conditions. The goal is to discourage Taiwan from taking aggressive actions towards independence, which will certainly provoke military attacks from China. Thus, the potential of taking actions to impose costs that outweigh the benefits of an unwanted action is a form of deterrence. The prospect of inaction can also exert a deterrent effect as it can raise the expected cost of unwanted acts of the target state. Washington’s ambiguous posture is said to have the effect of ‘dual deterrence’ (Bush, 2006). On the one hand, it deters Beijing from using military force against Taiwan since Chinese leaders are unsure if Washington would be involved militarily. On the other hand, it dissuades Taipei from pursuing de jure independence so that cross-strait military conflicts can be avoided. Through a web of incentives and disincentives, Washington’s strategic ambiguity has been praised as one of the most successful foreign policies as it has maintained cross-strait peace and stability for several decades. Why the Call for Clarity? If Washington’s policy has been effective, why are there calls for change? The answer lies in China’s revisionist behaviours, which have become increasingly assertive and aggressive. Indeed, deterrence diplomacy is effective only when targeted actors are conditional revisionists. Christensen (2002) provides a useful typology of different political actors for analysis. Countries like Japan, France and the United Kingdom (UK) are ‘unprovokable friends’ of the United States. They may be annoyed with Washington’s policies from time to time, like France’s fury over a submarine deal after Australia cancelling a multi-billion-dollar order with a French company and turning to the United States and the UK for a new contract (Sanger, 2021). The governments of these countries have no intention to challenge America’s fundamental national interests. Nor does Washington see them as potential threats. While deterrence diplomacy is not needed for unprovokable friends, there are also ‘undeterrable ideologues’ to whom the threat of deterrence is futile. Political actors like Hitler’s Germany and Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network are determined to pursue their political objectives and simply cannot be dissuaded. In addition to unprovokable friends and undeterrable ideologues, there is a third type of political actor—‘conditional revisionists’. They are willing to exploit opponents’ weaknesses in order to change the status quo but would refrain from taking action unless opportunities arise. Because the deterring state can hold the target state’s prized possessions hostage while at the same time provide convincing assurance, the latter has the incentive to comply with the former’s demands. This logic underlies the success of strategic ambiguity because, for much of the time since 1979, China did not possess the capabilities to directly or indirectly coerce Taiwan or challenge America’s deterrence policy. The world has witnessed a different China since the end of the twentieth century as the country has experienced rapid economic expansion. Figure 1 shows that China’s annual GDP growth rates between 1981 and 2023 generally ranged from 7.5% to 10%. With its enormous economic resources, Beijing has launched an effort to modernise its military. During the 20-year period between 1989 and 2010, as Figure 2 demonstrates, China’s military expenditures as a percentage of government spending were between 7% and 17%, far exceeding those of Japan, France and the UK. In addition to acquiring new weapon systems, the People’s Liberation Army has also developed anti-access area denial capabilities, raising concerns among American officials (Maizland, 2020; Olay, 2024). Such capabilities aim to neutralise the United States and its allies’ ability to project power in the Western Pacific region, including in the area close to Taiwan. Beijing, in recent years, has aggressively expanded its military presence in the South China Sea (Centre for Preventive Action, 2022), engaged in border disputes with India, and constructed military outposts in Bhutan (Barnett, 2021). China has also built numerous ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang, engaged in ‘serious’ human rights violations against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the region (UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2022) and imposed repressive responses to the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong (Wang, 2023). With Beijing’s continuing alignment with Moscow after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leaders have shown to the world that they are willing to defy international opinions and forcefully assert their growing power inside and beyond China’s boundaries.  Figure 1. China’s GDP Growth Rate: 1961–2023.Source: World Bank Group (various years-a).  Figure 2. Military Expenditure by Country as a Percentage of Government Spending: 1989–2023.Source: SIPRI (various years). In this context, aggregated national power has increasingly shifted to Beijing’s favour over the past decades. Figures 3 and 4 juxtapose Taiwan’s and China’s gross domestic product and total military expenditures since the late 1980s. Prior to 2000, as Figure 3 shows, China’s annual GDPs were only two to four times larger than Taiwan’s, but the ratio has expanded to more than 10 times since 2008. By 2010, China overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest economy, far exceeding Taiwan’s economic productivity. Meanwhile, China’s military spending has been 10–20 times that of Taiwan’s since 2009, as Figure 4 demonstrates. After Chinese leaders invalidated their promises of a ‘high-degree of autonomy’ to Hong Kong under the unification plan, observers believe Taiwan is their next target (Lopez, 2022). Since Tsai Ing-wen of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected Taiwan’s president in 2016, Beijing has furthered its effort of isolating Taipei internationally and escalated its belligerent behaviours by repeatedly dispatching naval vessels and warplanes circulating the island and violating its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ; refer to Ministry of National Defence R.O.C., various years). In recent years, Chinese leaders further heightened their military pressure by repeatedly launched live-fire drills in water close to Taiwan, frequently with a record number of military aircraft and naval vessels (Ng & Wingfield-Hayes, 2024). China’s rapid technological advancement also allows it to infiltrate Taiwan’s IT infrastructure (Lonergan & Mueller, 2022). These developments have led to a warning from United States Navy Admiral John Aquilino in 2021 that China could be prepared to take Taiwan by force by 2027 (Lendon, 2021).  Figure 3. Ratio of China and Taiwan Gross Domestic Productivity: 1991–2023.Source: World Bank Group (various years-b) and National Statistics, R.O.C. (Taiwan) (various years).  Figure 4. Ratio of China and Taiwan Military Expenditures: 1989–2023.Source: SIPRI (various years). Observers, therefore, have noted that China is no longer a conditional revisionist but has turned into a revisionist that has the ability and intention to change the status quo. Some in the United States argue that ambiguity is unlikely to deter an increasingly assertive and threatening China towards Taiwan. Instead, they maintain, ‘[t]he time has come for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that the United States would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan’ (Haass & Sacks, 2020). This is a view that the Biden administration also holds. Characterising China as a revisionist with both the intent and the ability ‘to reshape the international order’, the Biden administration acknowledged that China is the greatest challenger to the United States and its allies (White House, 2022, p. 23). Because ‘we cannot rely on Beijing to change its trajectory’, it is upon Washington to ‘shape the strategic environment around Beijing’ (Blinken, 2022). Thus, supporting Taiwan and strengthening its defence capabilities are crucial for America’s response to China’s growing coercion. Observers also point out that Washington’s ambiguous posture, while aiming to discourage unwanted actions of targeted states, may lead to miscalculation and risky behaviours. Leaders in both Beijing and Taipei have ‘obvious incentives to misrepresent their true perceptions concerning United States resolve’ (Kastner, 2006, p. 662). The tendency is particularly strong for Chinese leaders as the equation that previously made ambiguity a feasible policy has changed. Rather than maintain stability, it is argued, ambiguity may contribute to cross-strait instability and drag the United States into an unwanted conflict with China. In addition, no response to a Chinese military invasion of a democratic Taiwan would damage Washington’s reputation as the guardian of democracy and create the perception that the United States is not a reliable partner (Schmitt and Mazza, 2020). If American allies in the region conclude that Washington can no longer be counted on, they would be likely to accommodate Beijing’s demands as a result. Alternatively, some in the region may band together to balance a rising China, leading to tension and instability in one of the most dynamic areas of international commerce. Both would threaten America’s interests in the region and hurt Washington’s global leadership. Beijing’s forceful takeover of Taiwan would mean that China could then project its naval power beyond the first island chain, directly threatening the maritime security of the United States and its allies. Taiwan’s autonomy has also become a vital geopolitical interest and a national security issue for the United States due to the island’s dominant role in the semiconductor manufacturing market. It is estimated that the United States and other countries would lose access to 85% of all leading-edge microprocessors if China were to invade Taiwan tomorrow (Fadel, 2022). Beijing’s threatening military exercises, after United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei and the inauguration of pro-independence Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s president, further underscore the need of revising the policy of strategic ambiguity. There have been a number of developments in the first Trump administration reflecting the growing sentiment that Beijing’s revisionist behaviour needs a robust and unambiguous response, including an unambiguous support for Taiwan. These included dispatching cabinet-level officials and military officers to Taipei and selling a large quantity of advanced weapons to Taiwan. The United States Congress also passed the Taiwan Travel Act of 2018 and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) of 2020. The former permits high-level United States officials to travel to Taipei and meet their Taiwanese counterparts, while the latter aims to assist Taiwan in maintaining existing diplomatic relations. After Biden took office in 2021, his administration has further pursued a coherent and comprehensive approach for ‘broadening and deepening’ United States–Taiwan relations. It includes inviting Taiwan’s de factor ambassador to the United States as an official guest to the presidential inauguration (Blanchard, 2021), dispatching a delegation to Taipei sending a ‘personal signal’ of support from the President (Brunnstrom & Martina, 2021), providing large packages of arms sales (Chung et al., 2024), strengthening bilateral economic ties, and re-confirming Taiwan’s status as a major non-NATO ally (US Government Publishing Office, 2022). All of these efforts aim to advance the island country’s security, prosperity and respect in the international community. The Biden administration’s efforts to internationalise the Taiwan issue have been further noted. Wording like ‘the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’ was mentioned at the United States–Japan (White House, 2021b), United States–Korea (White House, 2021a), Japan–Australia (Prime Minister of Australia, 2022) and G7 summits (European Council, 2021). For the first time, the issue of Taiwan’s security has been included in the communique of so many major powers’ summit meetings, which shows the Biden administration’s effort of building an international coalition to constrain a threatening China that will benefit Taiwan. In this context, Biden has repeatedly vowed to defend Taiwan, indicating that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese invasion, prompting many to speculate if Washington has changed its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. Issues with Clarity Critics point out that a policy of strategic clarity involves risks. Chief among those is a clear security pledge like the one given by Biden, which is likely to bolster Taiwan citizens’ unrealistic expectation of America’s defence support, which will then motivate the public’s calls for independence. Under public pressure, the popularly elected Taipei government could take aggressive actions and will provoke a violent reaction from Beijing. Meanwhile, the public’s overconfidence does not match America’s military actions that would support an ally or a friend (Benson, 2022). The Biden administration’s decision to provide Ukraine with security assistance but refrain from putting American boots on the ground clearly demonstrates Washington’s reluctance to undertake direct military intervention in overseas conflicts. Taiwan citizens’ impracticable confidence in the United States’ defence commitment may destabilise the cross-strait relationship and bring harm to the island country. Thus, some pundits consider Biden’s move towards a policy of clarity ‘reckless’ (e.g., Beinart, 2021). The above concern is a valid one. Figure 5 presents the trend of public preferences on Taiwan’s international status during the past two decades. The top two dashed lines show that roughly 15%–35% of Taiwanese citizens prefer the status quo indefinitely, and about one-third of them are ‘undetermined’ regarding the island’s future status in the international community. The middle two solid lines show that there is a small but increasing proportion of respondents prefer to keep the status quo now but move towards independence in the future, and that proportion has increased quite dramatically since 2018. An even smaller and declining proportion of them favour unification as a final goal. The bottom two dashed lines indicate that less than 10% of the island’s residents want to pursue immediate unification or independence. Taken together, the figure demonstrates that very few on the island want to be ruled by the Chinese Communist government as it is now. The vast majority of them want to maintain the status quo and prefer either a ‘kinder, gentler’ version of de facto independence, that is, maintaining status quo forever, or a permanent separation from China in the future.  Figure 5. Taiwan Citizens’ Position on Independence and Unification: 1994–2024.Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (January 13, 2025). While Taiwan’s citizens prefer to preserve their democratic way of life, they understand the pursuit of independence will encounter violent reaction from China. Figure 6 shows that the majority of the public express a preference for de jure independence if cross-strait conflicts could be averted, but support for independence declines substantially if they believe that Beijing would launch an attack on Taiwan.2 Figure 7 also shows that 50%–60% of island citizens consistently believe that the United States will come to Taiwan’s defence if China launches an attack. The level of confidence is particularly high among supporters of the ruling DPP, which has a plank of pursuing Taiwan’s de jure independence. The above figures reveal that the public’s preferences over the island’s future relations with China are consistently conditioned by perceived risks. That is, they will refrain from declaring Taiwan’s independence if it involves such high risks as warring with China. The conditionality of Taiwanese citizens’ preferences indicates that, collectively, they are conditional revisionists; that is, they would refrain from taking actions unless opportunities arise. In addition, the public is highly confident that the United States will come to Taiwan’s aid if there is a cross-strait military conflict. Thus, strategic clarity is likely to further bolster Taiwan citizens’ unrealistic expectation of Washington’s security commitment as well as their support for policies that may be deemed provocative by Beijing leaders.  Figure 6. Support Independence With/Without War With China, 2003–2024.Source: Program in Asian Security Studies (Various years).  Figure 7. Taiwan Citizens’ Confidence in United States Security Commitment: 2003–2020.Source: Program in Asian Security Studies (Various years). The above findings appear to validate the concerns of proponents of strategic ambiguity, but a recent study with panel data collected on the island may alleviate such a concern (Wang & Cheng, 2023). Contrary to our expectations, Taiwanese citizens’ confidence in Washington’s security commitment has not increased but, in fact, decreased after Biden’s security pledges. The decline in confidence was mainly due to the pro-independence respondents’ shifting views. As noted, supporters of Taiwan independence historically have a higher level of confidence in America’s security commitment, which is cognitively consistent with their determination of pursuing the island country’s permanent separation from China. The war in Ukraine may be an awakening call for them as it demonstrates the Western hesitancy to undertake direct military intervention in overseas conflicts. The United States can have similar avoidance in a situation involving Taiwan. Despite Biden’s verbal assurance, actions speak louder than words. Pro-independence citizens’ shifting attitudes thus explain the declining confidence in Washington’s security commitment, which can also soften their calls for aggressive actions towards independence. Because panel analysis has long been considered one of the best ways of examining persistence and change of individuals’ attitudes, the results of the study are worth noting. Another identified pitfall of strategic clarity is that it signals what one ‘is prepared to take a risk for’ and ‘what one would ignore’ (Chang-Liao & Fang, 2021, p. 51). Given the heavy costs and uncertain outcomes, Chinese leaders are likely to avoid launching direct military attacks on Taiwan. Instead, they have employed and may continue to employ such ‘grey zone’ tactics as imposing economic sanctions on Taiwanese products, attacking the island’s information technology infrastructure, violating the island’s ADIZ and conducting military exercises for a de facto blockade. Without embarking on a conventional invasion of Taiwan that a policy of clarity intends to deter, these ‘low-intensity’ tactics can nonetheless have the effect of exhausting Taipei’s resources and eroding its resolve. Rather than discouraging Beijing’s aggressive and threatening behaviours, strategic clarity could undercut the effect of Washington’s deterrence policy. Such a criticism is also a legitimate concern, but it ignores the fact that Beijing embarked on grey zone approaches against Taiwan long before recent calls for clarity. This means that without setting a clear threshold for intervention has not stopped Chinese leaders from taking low-intensity provocations. China’s increasing clout and the perceived decline of America’s relative power seem to be the underlying factors to Beijing’s aggressive behaviour. Chinese leaders are apparently counting on Washington being ‘reactive and risk-averse’ (Sussex & Moloney, 2021). It will be incumbent on the United States to show its determination to confront China with coordinated responses. America’s policy of strategic ambiguity, therefore, remains crucial for cross-strait peace and stability, but it needs to be recalibrated. As China increasingly turns out to be a revisionist power, it is necessary for Washington to adjust its ambiguous posture in order to counter Beijing’s increasingly belligerent behaviour. The recalibration does not have to be a binary choice between ambiguity and clarity. Both policies can be treated as two ends of a continuum and can be adjusted accordingly. Given Beijing’s intense pressure campaign, Washington can step up its commitment to help Taiwan to defend itself for protecting democracy and America’s national interests. These measures include the development of a ‘porcupine’ defence strategy by enhancing Taipei’s asymmetric warfare capability, building military stockpile and forming an effective civil defence. Washington can also expand Taiwan’s integration with the international community lest Beijing employ its grey zone tactics to further isolate Taipei and deepen the island’s economic vulnerability. Ultimately, a successful deterrence policy will also depend on Washington’s convincing assurance that it would not support Taiwan’s pursuit of independence. Chinese leaders have a deep suspicion that the United States has a covert attempt to undermine China’s unification with Taiwan. America’s recalibration of its policy of strategic ambiguity is likely to be interpreted as a confirmation of their suspicion. If Beijing leaders believe that America’s policy will lead to Taiwan’s permanent separation from China, they are unlikely to submit to Washington’s demands. Trump 2.0 Donald Trump’s 2025 return to the White House for a second term as the president of the United States has added uncertainty to the policy of strategic ambiguity. Observers have noted that Trump is sceptical of the value of friends and allies as well as the benefits of international partnerships and alliances (Bush & Haas, 2024). Under the slogan of ‘America First’, he removed the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Lobosco, 2018), the Paris Climate Accord (White House, 2017, 2025a), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (Pompeo, 2019) and the UN Human Rights Council (White House, 2025b) and has mandated a comprehensive review of all international organisations to determine if the United States should withdraw its membership from or end its support for these organisations (White House, 2025b). He repeatedly admonished members of NATO, South Korea and Japan for not paying enough for United States protection (Reuters, 2024). His contempt for alliances and security partnerships has upended decades of American international engagement. In this context, two developments have direct implications for Taiwan. First, Trump has expressively suggested that the United States acquire Greenland (Erlanger & Smialek, 2025), take control of the Panama Canal (New York Times, 2025), and annex Canada as the 51st state of the United States (Colvin, 2025). His ambition for territory expansion has alarmed the world community3 and undermines an international principle that borders should not be changed through force or coercion. Trump’s threat regarding Greenland, the Panama Canal and Canada could potentially embolden Chinese leaders to consider taking Taiwan by force (Sacks, 2025). Second, unlike Biden’s emphasis on the defence of democratic values in his support for American allies, Trump has taken a transactional approach to international affairs. His dealing with the Russo–Ukrainian conflict is a case in point. The Trump administration has placed heavy pressure on the Ukrainian government to sign over a huge portion of its mineral wealth to the United States in exchange for helping the country to defend itself (Taub, 2025). Some speculate that Trump’s alignment with Russia represents a strategy of ‘reverse Kissinger’ aiming to counter China’s rise (Editorial Board, 2025). Though such a strategy may potentially benefit Taiwan, many on the island are nevertheless alarmed by the Trump administration’s approach to the conflict, questioning if they can continue to count on American support (Buckley & Chien, 2025). Because Trump has expressed his desire to negotiate a broad economic deal with Beijing (Swanson, 2025), the Chinese government may offer concessions on a trade deal in exchange for Washington’s positions on Taiwan without Taipei’s involvement. Indeed, Trump has expressed scepticism about Taiwan’s value compared to China (Llorente, 2024). He previously also questioned America’s ability to defend the island country (Bolton, 2020). Even though the State Department recently removed the long-standing phrase that ‘[w]e do not support Taiwan independence’ from its Taiwan factsheet (US Department of State, 2021), leading some to speculate if it represents a strategic shift (Tao, 2025), Trump’s dubious attitude about the island country was fully displayed in a previous interview. Speaking in a transactional tone, Trump argued that ‘Taiwan should pay us for defence’ because ‘we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything’. He also complained that Taiwan had taken ‘almost 100%’ of the chip industry from the United States (Kharpal, 2024). In response to Trump’s inimical demands, by displaying Taiwan’s tangible value to the United States, the Taipei government has pledged to increase its defence spending to 3% of Taiwan’s gross domestic product (Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan], 2025). The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)—the world’s largest chip manufacturer that produces the most advanced semiconductors—also announced plans to invest an additional $100 billion to expand its operations in the United States (Tang & Price, 2025).4 While the investment announcement was viewed favourably by Trump (Chung & Lee, 2025), it may be interpreted by Chinese leaders as a lack of resolve on the part of his administration due to Trump’s scepticism and versatile mindset. Given that credible threat is key to deterrence policy, the future and effectiveness of strategic ambiguity in Trump’s second term will be uncertain.ConclusionThe Taiwan Strait has been described as ‘the most dangerous place on Earth’ (Economist, 2021). A military conflict between China and Taiwan will have significant consequences. In addition to causing damage and human suffering on both sides, such a conflict could escalate into a direct confrontation involving two nuclear powers, threaten regional stability in East Asia, and undermine the prosperity of one of the most dynamic regions in the global economy. Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity has been effective in maintaining cross-strait peace and stability for several decades, but a recalibration is necessary due to an increasingly powerful and assertive China. Instead of changing to a policy of strategic clarity, the United States can adjust its ambiguous posture through strengthening Taiwan’s defence capabilities and advancing its international integration. By assuring that Washington seeks regional peace and stability, not Taiwan’s independence, the effects of the deterrence policy can be maintained, and risks of cross-strait military conflicts can be minimised. Trump’s return to the White House nevertheless has disrupted America’s traditional foreign policy of promoting freedom and democracy. Although he has not clarified the administration’s position on America’s support for Taiwan, his transactional approach suggests that he might use the cross-strait relationship as leverage over Beijing. Washington’s policy towards Taiwan is expected to be less predictable, potentially leading to a volatile Taiwan Strait during Trump’s second term. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.Footnotes1. Biden previously provided such an assurance in May of 2022 (Kanno-Youngs & Baker, 2022), October of 2021 (Hunnicutt, 2021) and August of 2021 (ABC News, 2021). 2. The attempts to explore the conditionality of Taiwanese residents’ policy preferences include Hsieh and Niou (2005), Niou (2004) and Wu (1993, 1996). 3. There have been strong public reactions in Canada to Trump’s threats to make Canada the 51st state of the United States. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском This paper was earlier published as Issue & Policy Briefs on May, 16th 2025 on the Website of The Institute for Security & Developement Policy. The April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack marks a significant moment in South Asia’s evolving security matrix. While the India–Pakistan binary continues to dominate discourse, China’s ambiguous posture following India’s Operation Sindoor warrants deeper scrutiny. This issue brief assesses Beijing’s silence, the implications for China-India ties, and China’s alignment with Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Drawing on past crises like Pulwama, Balakot, and Uri, it interrogates China’s selective neutrality, its shielding of Pakistan, and the erosion of its credibility as a regional stabilizer. By weaving in Chinese media narratives and official statements, the analysis critically evaluates whether Beijing is prepared—or even interested—in playing a constructive role in South Asian stability. The brief concludes that unless India recalibrates its strategic assumptions and narrative posture, China will continue to manipulate the region’s instability through plausible deniability and transactional diplomacy. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025,1 which killed 25 Indians and 1 Nepali and injured dozens more, is the latest chapter in South Asia’s long-running saga of cross-border militancy. Yet it would be a mistake to frame it solely within the India–Pakistan binary. As India launched Operation Sindoor in response— targeting terrorist infrastructure across the Line of Control (LoC)—the silence and subsequent posture of China signaled deeper tremors in the broader regional architecture. Kashmir has long served as a crucible of IndiaPakistan hostility, but the Pahalgam attack— attributed to the Pakistan-backed group The Resistance Front (TRF),2 which is a front for the UN-proscribed Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba—has unfolded in a regional context far more complex than previous crises. India’s swift military response via Operation Sindoor, while reminiscent of the 2019 Balakot precedent, came in a more layered geopolitical moment, where any Indian action reverberates beyond Islamabad to Beijing. Despite issuing a generic statement of terming India’s Operation Sindoor “regrettable,”3 Beijing offered no commentary on the Pakistan-backed terror attack itself. By sidestepping the central provocation—the targeting of Indian civilians by a known Pakistani terror outfit—China has raised fundamental questions about the strategic calculus guiding its relations with both Islamabad and New Delhi.  New Delhi’s official narrative continued to underscore its commitment post Operation Sindoor to “commitment to non-escalation, provided it is respected by the Pakistan military”.4 However, during May 8-9, Pakistan responded with a drone offensive targeting Indian military sites,5 prompting countermeasures. By May 10, Pakistan had a name for its retaliatory escalation: Operation Bunyan Marsoos,6 which came to an abrupt halt when a ceasefire was agreed upon between India and Pakistan later in the day.7 Despite ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the announcement, the agreement seems to be holding currently.  Yet what stood out amid this tit-for-tat dynamic was China’s conspicuous silence and strategic responses. Post Pakistan’s escalation on May 9, the topic of India-Pakistan conflict was completely absent from the pre-approved questions of the regular press briefing by the Chinese Ministry.8 Even in response to the news of the ceasefire, China’s statement has been guarded, stating it hopes India and Pakistan will “consolidate and extend” the same.9 As China distances itself from India’s narrative but attempts to show semblances of neutrality, it raises doubts over the credibility of Sino-Indian normalization. While the two countries may engage in tactical military disengagements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Pahalgam episode demonstrates that deep strategic distrust remains. India’s engagement with counterterrorism in the region has often required it to navigate a diplomatic minefield, particularly when the international community does not uniformly support its security concerns. The post-Balakot moment saw similar divisions, with China refusing to back India’s actions at multilateral fora while amplifying Pakistan’s grievances. Such flashpoints, unpacked later in this brief, underscore a consistent Chinese pattern—a trend that has deepened in the aftermath of Pahalgam. What differentiates this latest incident, however, is the broader geopolitical backdrop.  The Pahalgam incident hence emerges as a compelling prism through which to examine the strategic entanglements involving China in South Asian geopolitics. China’s posture following Operation Sindoor calls to question its regional credibility10 and the future of the still recovering India-China bilateral post the 2020 Galwan clash. In essence, the Pahalgam incident is a microcosm through which to assess whether Beijing is capable of playing a stabilizing role in South Asia or if it remains tethered to old geopolitical loyalties that undermine its normative credibility.11 China’s Calculated Ambiguity and Strategic Hedging  At first glance, China’s reaction to the Pahalgam attack appeared predictably neutral,12 reiterating a standard line against terrorism in all forms albeit without naming Pakistan-based groups, which then evolved into calling for an “impartial probe” into the attack.13 Beijing’s ambiguous position is hardly new. It has long shielded Pakistan from international pressure on terrorism-related matters. In 2023, for instance, China blocked a UN Security Council listing of Sajid Mir—a Lashkar-e-Taiba commander with ties to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.14 Such acts are not isolated; they are part of a broader calculus in which Pakistan is Beijing’s irreplaceable partner in South Asia. This alignment is driven by both geopolitical and geo-economic considerations. Pakistan is China’s all-weather partner (全天候伙伴关系 or quántiānhòu huǒbàn guānxì),15 crucial not just for counterbalancing India but also for securing the western front of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is a flagship component of BRI and runs through an unstable Gilgit-Baltistan and, despite India’s vehement opposition, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Stability in these zones is key to China’s western frontier strategy, giving it a vested interest in maintaining the status quo—even if that includes cross-border terrorism targeting India.  Further compounding the issue is the unspoken quid pro quo between Beijing and Islamabad: Pakistan remains silent on China’s domestic repression of Uyghurs,16 while China refrains from condemning Pakistani-linked Islamist militant groups. This transactional compact allows both states to shield each other on their respective internal and external security issues, forming a mutually reinforcing axis of silence.  In times of crisis, this axis manifests through diplomatic choreography. For example, during the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020, Pakistan was among the few countries to openly17 support China’s position, even as the rest of the world urged de-escalation.18 Conversely, during moments of India-Pakistan tension, Beijing reliably leans toward a neutral but structurally pro-Pakistan position. During the 2016 Uri attack, Beijing maintained a studied silence while subtly encouraging bilateral restraint. In 2019, when India moved to revoke Article 370 granting Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, China supported Pakistan’s “legitimate rights and interests” in Kashmir.19  Furthermore, post the 2019 Pulwama attack, China refused to list Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief as a global terrorist under UNSC Resolution 1267.20 This narrative strategy appears to serve a dual function: first, to construct a regional imaginary in which India is framed as a destabilizing actor across multiple contested peripheries; and second, to subtly align with Pakistan’s security perceptions without overt endorsement as seen during Balakot as well with Chinese state media closely relaying Pakistan’s perspectives.21 Such framing enables Beijing to reinforce an adversarial posture vis-à-vis India while maintaining formal neutrality. More critically, it delegitimizes India’s counterterrorism imperatives by projecting them as part of a broader pattern of assertiveness rather than as legitimate responses to asymmetric threats. The aftermath of Pahalgam has reinforced this pattern. Structural Limits of Sino-Indian Normalization –and the idea of China as a stabilizer Although India and China have made some progress in military disengagement following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash and the October 2024 border agreement, the Pahalgam episode reveals the limitations of this tactical thaw. China’s refusal to acknowledge Pakistani provocations— or even address the cross-border violence in its Operation Sindoor press briefings—shows that Beijing’s strategic alignment with Pakistan remains intact. This persistent ambiguity damages the credibility of any “reset” in India-China relations. It also underscores a recurring pattern in Chinese state discourse, where India’s actions across both the LoC and Line of Actual Control (LAC) are presented as signs of regional destabilization.22 The result is a rhetorical sleight of hand: India’s counterterrorism efforts are rebranded as adventurism, while China claims neutrality.  India for its part has walked a delicate line on China’s own internal security policies.23 India’s cautious approach is also seen on the Uyghur issue, where it has stopped short of criticizing China. India’s intent is to prevent further escalation with China, particularly amid the tensions along the Himalayan border.24 Ironically, this caution has earned India neither Chinese neutrality on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism nor any softening of China’s positions on Kashmir. India must prepare for the possibility of a more overt China-Pakistan strategic alignment in the Himalayan theatre—as seen briefly with the short-lived Himalayan Quad.25 A major point of pride in Chinese social media and state-media news circulating currently is the alleged downing of Indian aircrafts, “three Rafale f ighter jets, one MIG-29 fighter aircraft, one Su30 fighter jet, and one Heron drone”26 by the Pakistani air force. India has not confirmed these losses. China has emerged as Pakistan’s principal defense partner, supplying approximately 81 percent of its arms imports between 2020 and 2024.27 This strategic partnership was evident during the recent military exchanges with India, where Pakistan deployed Chinese-made J-10C f ighter jets and PL-15 air-to-air missiles.28 The J-10C, a 4.5-generation aircraft equipped with advanced avionics and radar systems, played a pivotal role in Pakistan’s aerial defense, which the Chinese social media is celebrating in disc. China’s support extends to artillery systems, such as the SH-15 155mm truck-mounted howitzer, and advanced radar installations along the LoC.29 China’s participation in February 2025 in Pakistan’s multinational naval exercise AMAN further consolidates the partnership’s expansion into the Indian Ocean.30 This deepening military collaboration underscores China’s commitment to bolstering Pakistan’s defense capabilities, thereby influencing the strategic balance in South Asia. Concurrently, on May 9, as Pakistan responded to Operation Sindoor,31 China conducted a live-fire military exercise in Tibet involving truck-mounted artillery and long-range rockets. Although conducted within Chinese territory, the exercise’s temporal proximity to the crisis raised red flags within Indian security circles. Of particular concern was increased PLA logistical activity along the G219 highway—an artery critical for mobilization across Tibet and Xinjiang. Such maneuvers are not incidental; rather, they reflect deliberate strategic signaling. Given the history of the China-India border standoff from April 2020 to October 2024, this latest development underscores Beijing’s continued use of military exercises as coercive diplomacy (胁迫性外交 xiébò xìng wàijiāo). The drill’s timing suggests that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not merely observing the India-Pakistan escalation, but actively inserting pressure on India’s northern front to exploit its two-front dilemma. At the same time, China’s approach to international order is selective. It supports rules when they are advantageous and obstructs them when they threaten. This raises an important question for policymakers: can Beijing ever be a partner in building a rule-based regional order when its strategic habits are so conditional? The Pahalgam silence is not simply an oversight; it reflects a broader unwillingness by China to apply consistent normative standards when its interests are at stake. India, therefore, faces not just a tactical silence, but a strategic contradiction—one that complicates regional security architecture. This difference also further highlights China’s inability to be a stabilizing regional actor or mediator—a niche it is building for itself in West Asia—in South Asia owing to its national interest driven biased approach to regional conflicts.32 China increasingly brands itself as a mediator in global hotspots—from IranSaudi rapprochement to ceasefire proposals in Ukraine. Yet in South Asia, this “stabilizer” identity appears performative. Its refusal to challenge Pakistan undercuts its credibility as a neutral actor. The narrative of “community of shared future” (人类命运共同体 rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) rings hollow when Beijing prioritizes geopolitical returns over regional peace. In this regard, it is also critical to note that India’s claim to great power status hinges not only on its material capabilities but also on its willingness to shape global norms on terrorism. To do so, a post-Pahalgam India may need to deepen its engagement with global norm entrepreneurs—from middle powers in Europe and Asia to civil society actors and multilateral institutions. Additionally, it must better leverage its leadership in forums like the G20 and BRICS to reframe regional security debates. If China wishes to be seen as a responsible stakeholder, it must be challenged to behave like one. In forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which have been focused on regional non-traditional security, China’s bias becomes more evident—obstructing Indian efforts to spotlight Pakistan’s terror links33 while promoting counterterrorism cooperation that suits its agenda.34 The SCO’s regional antiterrorism structure (RATS) has increasingly focused on threats aligned with Beijing’s internal definitions, particularly extremism related to Xinjiang, while sidelining India’s concerns about transnational Islamist militancy based in Pakistan.  However, Beijing’s notion of “Asia for Asians” appears hypocritical when it shelters Pakistan but obstructs regional counterterrorism consensus—especially in RATS under the SCO umbrella. Beyond multilateral diplomacy, China’s reluctance to endorse Indian perspectives has extended to informal channels. While India and Pakistan engage in kinetic and symbolic war over territory and identity, China operates in the background as both facilitator and firewall for Pakistan. Backchannel discussions have repeatedly seen Chinese interlocutors urge restraint on both India and Pakistan—without distinguishing between a state defending its civilians and one enabling non-state actors. This false equivalence erodes India’s trust and limits the scope for genuine regional cooperation. From Response to Strategy:  How Should India Read into Beijing’s Silence? India’s recent history is littered with crises where tactical victories often came at the cost of longterm ambiguity. In the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, for instance, India successfully reestablished control over its territory but failed to push for international accountability on Pakistan.35 Similarly, the 2017 Doklam standoff with China ended with a disengagement, but left the broader strategic questions unresolved. Even the 2020 Galwan clashes, despite their tragic costs, did not lead to sustained support or narrative building. What unites these episodes is a recurring pattern: India seeks resolution through calibrated responses while both adversaries exploit the absence of sustained international pressure. The Pahalgam attack threatens to repeat that pattern unless India broadens the strategic scope of its response—not merely in military terms but in diplomatic signaling, normative positioning, and alliance formation. India’s challenge is not just the asymmetry of violence with Pakistan—it is the asymmetry of narrative and support in multilateral spaces. Despite India’s restraint on Chinese internal matters, such as its silence on Xinjiang in UN forums, China has shown no reciprocal flexibility on Kashmir or Pakistan-based terrorism. This lack of strategic reciprocity is widening the gap between tactical cooperation and strategic mistrust. It also casts doubt on China’s repeated offers to play the role of a regional stabilizer. Beijing is unlikely to act as an honest broker in India-Pakistan disputes because it is structurally invested in Pakistan’s strategic and territorial claims, especially those in Kashmir. Moreover, the geo-economic dimension complicates the landscape further. China’s massive infrastructure projects through Pakistan-administered territories give it a direct stake in the political and security status quo in Kashmir. Any Indian attempt to assert sovereignty over the entire region threatens not just Pakistan’s territorial claims but China’s physical investments. It is for this reason that Chinese diplomats have avoided endorsing even moderate Indian positions on Kashmir. Even in backchannel diplomacy, Chinese officials urge restraint from both sides but refrain from applying pressure on Pakistan to dismantle terrorist networks—a selective neutrality that undermines India’s trust in Beijing’s intentions. Going forward, Indian policymakers may consider more assertive linkages between China’s Kashmir positions and India’s stance on Tibet and Xinjiang. While such rhetorical escalation risks deepening the rift, it may serve as a deterrent to Beijing’s selective neutrality. More broadly, India must prepare for a strategic environment in which a China–Pakistan alignment in the Himalayas becomes less tactical and more entrenched. If China continues to describe Jammu & Kashmir as “disputed territory,” Indian policymakers may feel justified in elevating the discourse on Chinese internal colonialism in places like Tibet and Xinjiang.36 While such a shift would risk further alienation, it could also serve as a deterrent against China’s one-sided narratives in multilateral spaces. Forecasting China’s future position on Jammu and Kashmir suggests continuity rather than change. As long as CPEC remains central to China’s regional vision, Beijing will oppose any Indian attempt to alter the territorial status quo in ways that threaten Pakistan’s legal or strategic control over its administered areas. Even if the Pahalgam incident spurs limited backchannel diplomacy, it is unlikely to alter China’s fundamental incentives in the region. The question, then, is whether the Pahalgam attack has merely revealed existing patterns in China’s South Asia policy or whether it marks a turning point. In one sense, it reaffirms an uncomfortable reality: Beijing’s anti-terrorism policy is primarily inward-looking and defined by the logic of state sovereignty, not regional peacebuilding. Terrorism that originates in Xinjiang is treated as an existential threat to the Chinese state, meriting mass surveillance, reeducation camps, and transnational intelligence cooperation. But terrorism that originates in Pakistan and targets India is diplomatically bracketed, treated as either a bilateral problem between New Delhi and Islamabad or, more insidiously, as a counterweight to Indian assertiveness. In the wake of Pahalgam, Indian policymakers face a difficult but necessary recalibration. While India has long pursued strategic autonomy, this doctrine cannot translate into strategic silence in the face of double standards. New Delhi must continue to assert its case in global forums— not only in terms of territorial integrity but also normative consistency. A longer-term Indian strategy may also involve diversifying its diplomatic partnerships in ways that offset Chinese influence. This includes expanding cooperation with regional and extra-regional actors who share India’s concerns about crossborder terrorism and authoritarian influence in multilateral institutions. The elevation of minilateral forums such as the Quad and closer coordination with Europe and Southeast Asian partners could enable India to construct new coalitions that constrain Chinese room for maneuverability as Beijing’s current incentives give it little reason to alter course. As long as CPEC remains a geostrategic and economic priority, and Pakistan serves as both a buffer and a partner, China will continue to downplay Islamabad’s transgressions. Any backchannel diplomacy following Pahalgam is unlikely to produce meaningful rebalancing unless India reshapes the cost-benefit calculations driving China’s current Sout​h Asia posture. The Pahalgam terrorist attack is not merely an India-Pakistan crisis. It is a regional flashpoint that pulls China out of the shadows and into the foreground of South Asian security dynamics. Beijing’s silence—strategic, deliberate, and revealing—shows that China is not yet ready to play the role of a stabilizing power in the region. Instead, it continues to hedge its bets, uphold transactional alliances, and avoid normative positions on terrorism that might alienate Pakistan. For India, the path forward involves more than military preparedness. It demands a recalibration of strategic assumptions about China’s role in regional crises. The Pahalgam attack may not shift China’s behavior immediately, but it sharpens the contours of a regional order where Beijing is less bystander and more stakeholder— one whose interests often run counter to India’s pursuit of stability and security. In this landscape, India must think beyond Pakistan and confront the deeper structural dynamics of the Pakistan-China bonhomie. About ISDP  The Institute for Security and Development Policy is a Stockholm-based independent and non-profit research and policy institute. The Institute is dedicated to expanding understanding of international affairs, particularly the interrelationship between the issue areas of conflict, security and development. The Institute’s primary areas of geographic focus are Asia and Europe’s neighborhood. Endnotes  1. Esha Mitra, Mukhtar Ahmad, Aishwarya S Iyer, Kara Fox and Jessie Yeung, “Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot,” CNN, April 23, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/22/asia/gunmen-open-firejammu-kashmir-intl. 2. “Statement by Foreign Secretary: OPERATION SINDOOR,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 7, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39473; see also, M. Sudhir Selvaraj, “A Primer on The Resistance Front, the Group Behind the Pahalgam Attack,” The Diplomat, April 30, 2025, https://thediplomat. com/2025/04/a-primer-on-the-resistance-front-the-group-behind-the-pahalgam-attack/. 3. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Ongoing Situation Between India and Pakistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, May 7, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202505/ t20250507_11616523.html. 4. “Transcript of Special briefing on OPERATION SINDOOR (May 08, 2025),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 8, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/39479/Transcript_of_Special_ briefing_on_OPERATION_SINDOOR_May_08_2025. 5. “Special briefing on Operation Sindoor (May 09, 2025),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 9, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSEo4RpICoY&t=491s. 6. Abid Hussain, “Pakistan launches Operation Bunyan Marsoos: What we know so far,” Al Jazeera, May 10, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/10/pakistan-launches-operation-bunyan-marsoos-what-we-know-so-far. 7. “India-Pakistan ceasefire updates: Pakistan violates ceasefire understanding along Jammu border,” The Hindu, May 11, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/operation-sindoor-pahalgam-attack-india-pakistan-live-updatesmay-10-2025/article69559875.ece. 8. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on May 9, 2025,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, May 9, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202505/t20250509_11618305. html. 9. “China calls on India, Pakistan to consolidate ceasefire momentum: FM spokesperson,” Xinhuanet, May 12, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20250512/3024d6c69d154eb7ac23968925bdca2b/c.html. 10. Eerishika Pankaj and Omkar Bhole, “China’s Thinking on Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor: Impact on its Regional Credibility,” Organisation for Research on China and Asia, May 7, 2025, https://orcasia.org/article/1165/chinasthinking-on-pahalgam-and-operation-sindoor. 11. Hayley Wong and Seong Hyeon Choi, “Why China may find it hard to play peacemaker in India-Pakistan conflict,” South China Morning Post, May 8, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3309452/why-chinamay-find-it-hard-play-peacemaker-india-pakistan-conflict. 12. “China condemns Pahalgam terror attack that resulted in multiple casualties: FM,” Global Times, April 23, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202504/1332699.shtml. 13. Suhasini Haidar, “China calls for ‘impartial probe’ into Pahalgam,” The Hindu, April 28, 2025, https://www.thehindu. com/news/international/china-calls-for-swift-and-fair-investigation-into-pahalgam-terror-attack/article69499929.ece. 14. PTI, “India slams China at UN for blocking move to designate 26/11 accused Sajid Mir as ‘global terrorist’,” The Hindu, June 21, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slams-china-at-un-for-blocking-move-todesignate-2611-accused-sajid-mir-as-global-terrorist/article66993043.ece. 15. “中华人民共和国和巴基斯坦伊斯兰共和国联合声明（全文）,” FMPRC, February 6, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/202502/t20250206_11550130.shtml; see also, “Wang Yi: Develop China-Pakistan All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership with “Four Commitments”,”Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, May 15, 2024, in.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/202405/t20240516_11305420.htm. 16. Ben Westcott, “Pakistan PM Imran Khan refuses to condemn China’s Xinjiang crackdown,” CNN, June 22, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/22/asia/imran-khan-xinjiang-axios-intl-hnk. 17. “Interview: ‘India wants to quell domestic dissent after China clash by diverting attention’,” Dawn, June 26, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1565331.18. Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “What Does the China-India Standoff in Ladakh Mean for Pakistan?” The Diplomat, June 24, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-does-the-china-india-standoff-in-ladakh-mean-for-pakistan/. 19. Keegan Elmer, “China says it will support Pakistan ‘upholding its rights’ in Kashmir row with India,” South China Morning Post, August 10, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3022254/china-says-it-willsupport-pakistan-upholding-its-rights. 20. “Pulwama attack: What about Wuhan spirit, Shashi Tharoor condemns China’s protection to Jaish-e-Mohammad,” India Today, February 15, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pulwama-attack-wuhan-spirit-shashi-tharoorcondemns-china-protection-jaish-e-mohammad-1456963-2019-02-15. 21. “Pakistan condemns India’s ‘blatant aggression,’ says it brings ‘two nuclear-armed states closer to major conflict’,” Global Times, May 7, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1333486.shtml#:~:text=,said%20the%20 statement; Xinhua, “Pakistan army says Indian aircraft cross LoC,” China Daily, February 26, 2019, https://www. chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/26/WS5c74eebba3106c65c34eb81d.html#:~:text=,minister%20told%20the%20state%20 TV. 22. “India can change course for the better with China,” Global Times, July 8, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ content/1193819.shtml#:~:text=India%27s%20relations%20with%20many%20of,even%20adventurous%2C%20 recent%20foreign%20strategies. 23. “Human rights must be respected: India after Xinjiang vote,” The Times of India, October 8, 2022, https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/human-rights-must-be-respected-india-after-skipping-xinjiang-vote/articleshow/94713915.cms. 24. “Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute,” International Crisis Group, November 14, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india-china/334-thin-ice-himalayas-handling-india-china-borderdispute; Arkoprabho Hazra, “Why Is India Silent on China’s Human Rights Record at the UN?” The Diplomat, October 27, 2020,  https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/why-is-india-silent-on-chinas-human-rights-record-at-the-un/; see also  Raj Verma, “Domestic Political Drivers and Chinese Diplomacy: Xinjiang and Counter-Terrorism in South Asia,” Asian Perspective 44, no. 4 (2020), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/766324. 25. Jagannath Panda, “The Trans-Himalayan ‘Quad,’ Beijing’s Territorialism, and India,” China Brief 20 (20), November 12, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/the-trans-himalayan-quad-beijings-territorialism-and-india/. 26. Feng Fan, “Pakistani PM vows to avenge ‘our innocent martyrs’; India FM warns any attacks will be met with ‘firm response’: media,” Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1333630.shtml. 27. Hayley Wong, “China supplied 81% of Pakistan’s arms imports in the past 5 years, SIPRI says,” South China Morning Post, March 16, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3302515/china-supplied-81-pakistans-armsimports-past-5-years-sipri-says. 28. Seong Hyeon Choi, “Kashmir conflict: the Chinese warplanes and weapons used by Pakistan,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3310172/kashmir-conflict-chinese-warplanesand-weapons-used-pakistan. 29. “Pakistan Deploys Chinese SH-15 Howitzers Along India Border: New Long-Range Artillery Threat Emerges,” Video, Defence Security Asia, April 30, 2025, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/pakistan-deploys-chinese-sh-15-howitzersalong-india-border-new-long-range-artillery-threat-emerges/. 30. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy to join multinational drill in Pakistan, eye maritime security boost,” Global Times, February 6, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1327941.shtml. 31. Ajay Banerjee, “China holds military drills in areas adjoining Ladakh,” The Tribune, May 9, 2025, https://www. tribuneindia.com/news/india/china-holds-military-drills-in-areas-adjoining-ladakh/. 32. Tushar Shetty, “The Dragon-Elephant Dance: China and India’s Battle for South Asia,” The Diplomat, April 22, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/the-dragon-elephant-dance-china-and-indias-battle-for-south-asia/. 33. “India delivers strong message to Pakistan at SCO; Jaishankar condemns terrorism,” The Economic Times, October 17, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-delivers-strong-message-to-pakistan-at-sco-jaishankarcondemns-terrorism/articleshow/114274767.cms?from=mdr. 34. Linda Maduz, “Flexibility by design: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the future of Eurasian cooperation,” Center for Security Studies, May 2018, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/Maduz-080618-ShanghaiCooperation.pdf; see also  Gunjan Singh, “Terrorism casts its shadow over SCO meet, China-Pakistan ties,” Deccan Herald, October 14, 2024, https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/terrorism-castsits-shadow-over-sco-meet-china-pakistan-ties-3231147. 35. Pravin Sawhney, “Bottomline - Kargil Legacy,” Force, https://forceindia.net/bottomline/kargil-legacy/. 36. “Kashmir issue proves India unqualified for UN Security Council seat,” Global Times, September 8, 2019, https://www. globaltimes.cn/content/1161229.shtml.

Abstract The EU-India–Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, relaunched in 2022 after a nine-year hiatus, represent a significant step towards deepening economic and geopolitical ties between the European Union (EU) and India. The agreement, with its potential to eliminate tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and enhance market access, particularly in services such as telecommunications, could substantially increase trade volume between the two entities, offering promising economic prospects. By creating a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, the FTA offers significant economic opportunities in sectors such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment. More importantly, it serves as a geopolitical tool aligned with the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, aiming to strengthen partnerships with like-minded democracies and potentially counterbalance China’s increasing influence, reassuring them about its geopolitical implications. Therefore, this study examines the potential economic and geopolitical opportunities and challenges associated with the EU-India FTA. It concludes that, perhaps unsurprisingly, much depends on the foreign and security policies of great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. Key Words: EU, India, Free Trade Area, Geopolitics Introduction Negotiations regarding the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were initially launched in 2007. The talks were suspended in 2013 due to a gap in ambition and resumed after a nine-year pause with a formal relaunch on June 17, 2022, announced by Union Minister Piyush Goyal and European Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis in Brussels.[i] This relaunch also included separate negotiations for an Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) and an Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs), reflecting a broader agenda to enhance bilateral economic relations. The EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting for €124 billion in goods trade by 2023 (12.2% of the total Indian trade). India is the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, representing 2.2% of the total trade in goods. Trade in services reached €59.7 billion in 2023, nearly double the 2020 level, with a significant portion being digital services, highlighting the growing economic interdependence.[ii]       *Data acquired from the European Commission at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en Negotiation Rounds and Progress Since the relaunch, ten rounds of negotiations have been conducted, with the following timeline detailing key developments:   ·         Acquired through Grok. Prompt: What is the latest on the EU – India FTA Negotiations? At: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1922705918707265888 (14 May 2025) What is so important regarding FTAs? Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have become the cornerstone of international trade policy by reshaping global economic landscapes and geopolitical dynamics. These agreements aim to reduce trade barriers and foster economic cooperation among member states; however, their implications extend far beyond mere economic exchanges. Economic Consequences of Free Trade Areas One of the primary economic consequences of FTAs is the creation of new trade opportunities among the member states. By reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, FTAs encourage specialisation and efficiency and increase trade volumes. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is expected to boost intra-African trade by creating a single market for goods and services that can unlock regional value chains and enhance economic integration.[i]  Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has expanded trade between Indonesia and China, although the benefits may be asymmetric, with Indonesia's imports growing faster than exports.[ii] However, FTAs can also lead to trade diversion, in which member states import goods at the expense of non-member countries. This phenomenon can harm non-members by reducing market access and undermining global trade liberalisation efforts.[iii] For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which never entered into force,[iv] and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which shared the same fate, were criticised for potentially marginalising non-member states and creating a fragmented global trade system.[v] FTAs often attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by creating more integrated markets. For instance, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has stimulated FDI inflows into member states such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, contributing to GDP growth.[vi] Similarly, establishing Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in China has promoted financial employment and industrial upgrading, particularly in the middle and western regions, balancing regional development.[vii] However, the benefits of FTAs are not always distributed evenly. Some studies suggest that while FTAs may boost economic growth for member states, non-members may experience adverse impacts such as reduced trade volumes and deteriorating terms of trade.[viii] Geopolitical Consequences of Free Trade Areas FTAs often serve as tools for geopolitical influence, allowing powerful states to shape their global economic order. For example, the TTIP and TPP were partly designed to counterbalance China's rising economic influence and establish new trade standards.[ix] Similarly, the RCEP has reinforced China's economic leadership in Asia, while the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) has allowed the United States to maintain its influence in North America.[x] For smaller countries like Vietnam, FTAs can enhance international recognition and strategic balancing between major powers, contribute to regional integration and stability, influence internal political legitimacy and power dynamics, and provide tools to manage geopolitical risks and external shocks. FTAs, especially New Generation Free Trade Agreements (NGFTAs) such as the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), act as economic instruments and geopolitical tools that shape Vietnam's global and regional order position.[xi] The geopolitical implications of FTAs are evident in their impact on international trade governance. The proliferation of mega-regional trade agreements has challenged the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO), creating a fragmented trade landscape.[xii] This shift has raised concerns about the marginalisation of developing countries and the erosion of global trade rules. FTAs can also mitigate interstate conflict by increasing war costs. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) catalyses regional peace, fostering economic interdependence and reducing the likelihood of conflict.[xiii] Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has strengthened economic ties between Indonesia and China, reducing potential geopolitical tensions in the region.[xiv] FTAs are not always effective in preventing conflict. In some cases, they may exacerbate tensions by creating unequal benefits or excluding certain states. For example, the TPP and TTIP have been criticised for their exclusionary nature, which may have contributed to trade tensions between member and non-member states.[xv] FTAs often serve as building blocks for broader regional integrations. For instance, the EU began a series of FTAs and customs unions before evolving into a deeply integrated economic and political bloc. Similarly, AfCFTA is part of a broader vision for African economic integration, aiming to create a single market and customs union. The proliferation of FTAs has also raised concerns regarding the future of multilateralism. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations has stalled, and the rise of mega-regional trade agreements has further fragmented the global trade system.[xvi] This has led to calls for a more inclusive and equitable approach to trade governance that ensures that developing countries are not left behind.Free trade has profound economic and geopolitical consequences. It shapes global trade patterns, influences regional stability, and affects the distribution of wealth and power. Although FTAs offer significant economic growth and integration opportunities, they also pose inequality, exclusion, and sustainability challenges. EU – India FTA Opportunities Economic The potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and India presents significant economic opportunities for the EU driven by eliminating trade barriers, increased market access, and deeper economic integration. First, the services sector is a critical area where the EU can benefit significantly from an FTA with India. The EU's services exports to India could more than double, while India's services exports to the EU would increase by approximately 50%.[xvii] This growth is attributed to reduced trade barriers and the liberalisation of sectors such as telecommunications, which has been identified as a key area for reform. Arguably, half of the predicted export expansion is driven by reforms to domestic regulations, particularly in the telecommunications sector, which could further enhance the EU's competitive position in the Indian market. The FTA is expected to eliminate tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers, creating a more level-playing field for the EU businesses in India. The FTA of EU-Indian trade could approximately double, particularly in business services.[xviii] This liberalisation would increase trade volumes and lead to structural changes in both economies, with the EU potentially gaining a competitive advantage in high-value-added sectors. The FTA would create a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, enabling the EU and India to reap the benefits of economies of scale. This integration would be particularly beneficial for manufactured goods, such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment, where intra-industry trade could lead to efficiency gains and cost reductions. These economies of scale could also give the EU a competitive edge in global markets, helping to stimulate economic growth and job creation.[xix] Geopolitics and security The EU–India FTA is an economic arrangement and a geopolitical tool that aligns with the EU's broader objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU's geopolitical position and security interests are central to understanding the opportunities and challenges presented by the FTA. The EU's engagement with India through the FTA is deeply rooted in its Indo-Pacific strategy, formally launched in 2021. This reflects the EU's ambition to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, an area increasingly characterised by multipolar competition, particularly between the United States and China. The EU's strategy is driven by recognising that the Indo-Pacific is the "pivotal region" of the 21st century, and its economic and security dynamics will shape global governance.[xx] While the EU's new strategy does not take a confrontational stance towards China, it reflects increased concerns about Beijing’s growing assertiveness and the implications of the US-China rivalry for Europe. The strategy advocates for a multifaceted engagement with China, encouraging cooperation and protecting EU interests and values. An FTA with India is a key component of the EU’s strategy. India's growing economic and political influence in the Indo-Pacific region makes it a critical partner for the EU. The EU views India as a like-minded democracy that shares concerns about China's assertiveness and the need for a rule-based international order. This alignment creates a unique opportunity for the EU to deepen its strategic partnership with India by leveraging economic cooperation to strengthen geopolitics.[xxi] The EU's engagement with India is part of its broader effort to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU and India share concerns regarding maritime security, cybersecurity, and the challenges posed by China's growing influence in the region. The FTA can serve as a foundation for deeper collaboration on security issues such as counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and disaster management.[xxii] The EU's security strategy in the Indo-Pacific also emphasises the importance of upholding a rule-based international order. An FTA with India can help promote this objective by reinforcing shared norms and standards in trade, investment, and intellectual property rights. This alignment is critical in China's increasing assertiveness and need for like-minded partners to counterbalance its influence.[xxiii] The EU's approach to an FTA is also shaped by its identity as a normative power. The EU has historically sought to promote its values, such as human rights, environmental sustainability, and social justice, through trade agreements. The FTA with India allows for advancing these values by incorporating labour rights, environmental protection, and sustainable development clauses.[xxiv] However, its geopolitical and economic realities constrain the EU’s ability to promote its normative agenda. The EU must be pragmatic and balance its value-based approach with the need to secure concessions on market access and other economic interests. This tension is evident in EU trade policy, where strategic and economic interests often precede normative objectives.[xxv] EU – India FTA Challenges Existing literature on the challenges the EU–India FTA poses is sparse. Generally, scholars admit that FTA, especially those negotiated by the EU, can face varying degrees of politicisation and contestation from civil society, as seen with TTIP and CETA.[xxvi] This finding suggests the potential for public opposition to new FTAs. In addition, the EU often pursues ambitious agreements beyond tariff reductions, including behind-the-border measures and regulatory cooperation.[xxvii] While FTAs aim to boost trade, their impact can be uneven. Some agreements have failed to entirely realise the expected benefits of trade and investment flows.[xxviii] There are also concerns that FTAs may reduce policy space for developing country partners to pursue alternative development strategies.[xxix] Economic However, several economic challenges regarding the EU-India negotiated FTA can be easily identified. To begin, the talks were stuck for nearly two decades, mainly because the EU and India had different goals. The EU wants deeper integration, including investment and competition policies, whereas India prefers a more limited agreement. This has led to repeated delays, and little progress has been made. Specifically, market access has been a point of contention, especially in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and automobiles. India imposes high tariffs on EU cars (60-100%) compared to the EU's 6.5% on Indian cars, and it protects its agricultural sector, making it difficult for EU farmers to enter the market. The EU also wanted India to open up services such as accountancy and legal work, but India resisted due to fears of competition.[xxx] The EU has strict rules, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and sustainability directives, which India sees as overregulatory and burdensome. This creates friction, as India worries these rules could act as trade barriers. There are also issues with intellectual property rights, where the EU wants stronger protection, but India resists keeping generic drugs affordable.[xxxi] Finally, the EU has invested heavily in India, around €100 billion by 2020, but India's decision to end bilateral investment treaties in 2016 and stalled talks on investment protection since 2023 creates uncertainty. There is also a trust deficit, with India fearing EU regulatory overreach and the EU worrying about compliance.[xxxii] Geopolitics and security As mentioned above, the EU's engagement with India is part of its broader strategy to deepen ties with the Indo-Pacific region. This strategy is driven by the need to counterbalance rising powers like China and enhance its global influence. The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway Initiative reflect this ambition, emphasising the importance of strategic partnerships with like-minded actors such as India.[xxxiii] China's growing economic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific region poses a significant challenge for the EU and India. The EU has expressed concerns about China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is seen as a tool for expanding Chinese influence.[xxxiv] The EU and India share a common interest in promoting rules-based international order and countering China's increasing dominance. This alignment has been a key driver of their strategic partnership, with both sides seeking to enhance trade, technology, and security cooperation.[xxxv] The Russia-Ukraine war has further complicated the geopolitical landscape, with significant implications for EU-India relations. While the EU has strongly supported Ukraine, India has maintained a more neutral stance by prioritising its strategic partnership with Russia.[xxxvi] This divergence in approach has created tensions, particularly in terms of energy security and sanctions, which could impact FTA negotiations. The EU and India face various traditional security challenges that affect their strategic partnerships and FTA negotiations. China's military modernisation and assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region have heightened security concerns for the EU and India. The EU has expressed support for India's role in maintaining regional stability, particularly in China's actions in the South China Sea and along the India-China border.[xxxvii] The EU and India are also concerned about regional instability, including Myanmar and the Korean Peninsula. These issues underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation between the two partners.[xxxviii] As for non-traditional security challenges, climate change and energy security are key areas of cooperation between the EU and India. The EU has emphasised the importance of transitioning to renewable energy sources, while India has sought to balance its energy needs with environmental concerns.[xxxix] In addition, the increasing importance of digital technologies has highlighted the need for cooperation in cybersecurity and data protection areas. The EU and India are interested in collaborating with digital infrastructure and innovation.[xl] Conclusion According to the European Parliament, “India was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1962. With the formal establishment of the EU in 1993, India signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1994, which opened the door to broader political interaction between the two. […] The relationship was upgraded to a 'Strategic Partnership' during The Hague's 5th India-EU Summit in 2004. From 1980 to 2005, EU-India trade grew from €4.4 billion to €40 billion. The EU was India's largest trading partner at the time, accounting for 22.4% of Indian exports and 20.8% of imports”.[xli] Despite these incentives, India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[xlii] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[xliii] Finally, although the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper and more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[xliv] Time will typically show how much the FTA between the EU and India will facilitate closer security and geopolitical links. Much depends on great powers' foreign and security policies, such as the US, China, and Russia. Their intricate games make the geopolitical chessboard fascinating, if not difficult to predict. REFERENCES  [1] EU and India kick-start ambitious trade agenda. (2022, June 17). Directorate-General for Trade and Economics. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-india-kick-start-ambitious-trade-agenda-2022-06-17_en[2] EU trade relations with India. Facts, figures and latest developments. (n.d.). European Commission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en[3] Joseph, J. E. (2024). Critical factors to consider in the trade–security nexus of the African Continental Free Trade Area: A catalyst for establishing peace. African Security Review https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2303459[4] Kurniawan, K. (2011). The Economic, Environmental, and Geopolitical Impacts of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) on Indonesia. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349858225_THE_IMPACT_OF_ASEAN-CHINA_FREE_TRADE_AREA_ACFTA_AGREEMENT_ON_INDONESIA'S_MAJOR_PLANTATION_EXPORT_COMMODITIES[5] Pasara, M. T., & Dunga, S. H. (2023). Impact of Regional Trade Agreements on Economic Growth: An Econometric Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_6[6] Following the U.S. withdrawal, the remaining 11 nations (without the U.S.) negotiated a revised agreement called the CPTPP, which is now in force.[7] Tellis, A. J. (2014). The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP. Adelphi Series. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.1019720[8] Zhang, Q., & Wang, Q. (2024). Impact assessment of multilateral trade agreements on regional economic growth based on quantitative model optimization. Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences. https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-2831[9] Chen, Y., & Wu, S. (2024). Can the Founding of Free Trade Zones Lead to Financial Employment Boom? --Based on Multi-period Double-difference model. Highlights in Business, Economics and Management. https://doi.org/10.54097/tfrq5c45[10] Zhang, Q., & Wang, Q. (2024). Impact assessment of multilateral trade agreements on regional economic growth based on quantitative model optimization. Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences. https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-2831[11] Tellis, A. J. (2014). The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP. Adelphi Series. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.1019720[12] Zhang, Q., & Wang, Q. (2024). Impact assessment of multilateral trade agreements on regional economic growth based on quantitative model optimization. Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences. https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-2831[13] Boguszewski, M. (2022). Political economy of domestic influences of free trade agreements: A case study of the agricultural sector in Vietnam (Doctoral dissertation, The Education University of Hong Kong).[14] Palit, A. (2017). Mega-regional trade agreements and non-participating developing countries: Differential impacts, challenges and policy options: Competition and Change. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529417729324[15] Joseph, J. E. (2024). Critical factors to consider in the trade–security nexus of the African Continental Free Trade Area: A catalyst for establishing peace. African Security Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2303459[16] Kurniawan, K. (2011). The Economic, Environmental, and Geopolitical Impacts of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) on Indonesia.[17] Tellis, A. J. (2014). The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP. Adelphi Series. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.1019720[18] Palit, A. (2017). Mega-regional trade agreements and non-participating developing countries: Differential impacts, challenges and policy options: Competition and Change. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529417729324[19] Nordås, H. K. (2023). Services in the India-EU free trade agreement. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inteco.2023.100460[20] Felbermayr, G., Mitra, D., Aichele, R., & Gröschl, J. K. (2017). Europe and India: Relaunching a Troubled Trade Relationship. Research Papers in Economics.[21] Khorana, S., Perdikis, N., & Kerr, W. A. (2015). Global economies of scale in the EU-India trade agreement: are they the key to a return to economic growth? Asia Europe Journal, 13(1), 41–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/S10308-014-0404-8[22] Carteny, A., & Tosti Di Stefano, E. (2024). The EU and the Indo-Pacific: The path towards a comprehensive strategy. In The European Union in the Asia-Pacific: Rethinking Europe’s strategies and policies (pp. 406–428). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003336143-25[23] Kaura, V., & Singh, P. (2022). European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Policy Implications For India. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 68(4), 542–555. https://doi.org/10.1177/00195561221098175[24] Grgić, G. (2023). Ambition, meet reality: The European Union’s actorness in the Indo-Pacific. International Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231191275[25] Pugliese, G. (2024). The European Union and an “Indo-Pacific” Alignment. Asia-Pacific Review, 31(1), 17–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2024.2334182[26] Christou, A., & Damro, C. (2024). Frames and Issue Linkage: EU Trade Policy in the Geoeconomic Turn. Journal of Common Market Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13598[27] Leeg, T. (2014). Normative Power Europe? The European Union in the Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement with India. European Foreign Affairs Review, 19(3), 335–355. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4834907[28] De Bièvre, D., & Poletti, A. (2020). Towards Explaining Varying Degrees of Politicization of EU Trade Agreement Negotiations. Politics and Governance, 8(1), 243–253. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2686[29] Lakatos, C., & Nilsson, L. (2016). The EU-Korea FTA: anticipation, trade policy uncertainty and impact. Review of World Economics, 153(1), 179–198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-016-0261-1[30] Mazyrin, V. M. (2025). The EAEU – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Expectations and Reality. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, 17(3), 128–148. https://doi.org/10.31249/kgt/2024.03.07[31] Hurt, S. R. (2012). The EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations: ‘locking in’ the neoliberal development model in southern Africa? Third World Quarterly, 33(3), 495–510. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.657486[32] Khorana, S. (n.d.). The FTA: a strategic call for the EU and India? European Council on Foreign Relations, India’s Foreign Policy. https://ecfr.eu/special/what_does_india_think/analysis/the_fta_a_strategic_call_for_the_eu_and_india[33] Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. (n.d.). European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union. https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en[34] Mishra, A. R. (2015). India cancels EU trade talks over pharma ban. Mint. https://www.livemint.com/Politics/JtJwcwhXDZz4c01D9DGk5I/Govt-cancels-trade-negotiatorlevel-meet-with-EU.html[35] Reiterer, M. (2023). The Indo-Pacific taking centre-stage for the EU’s security policy. EuZ – Zeitschrift Für Europarecht. https://doi.org/10.36862/eiz-euz022[36] Singh, M. (2021). India, Europe and Connectivity: From Shared Views on BRI to Mutual Cooperation? (pp. 133–159). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4608-6_6[37] Kugiel, P. (2021). From Destroyer to Preserver? The Evolution of India’s Position Towards the Liberal International Order and Its Significance for the EU–India Strategic Partnership (pp. 253–273). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_12[38] Dominguez, R., & Sverdrup-Thygeson, B. (2021). The Role of External Powers in EU–Asia Security Relations (pp. 415–435). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69966-6_19[39] Reiterer, M. (2023). The Indo-Pacific taking centre-stage for the EU’s security policy. EuZ – Zeitschrift Für Europarecht. https://doi.org/10.36862/eiz-euz022[40] Kirchner, E. J. (2022). EU Security Alignments with the Asia-Pacific. Asian Affairs, 53(3), 542–560. https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2022.2082165[41] Singh, M. (2021). Multilateralism in a Changing Global Order: Prospects for India–EU Cooperation (pp. 275–290). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_13[42] Aspengren, H. C., & Nordenstam, A. (2021). What Strategies Can Do for Strategic Partnerships: Lessons from the EU’s Strategy on India (pp. 67–85). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_4[43] Delivorias, A., & Mácsai, G. (2024). EU-India free trade agreement. In BRIEFING International Agreements in Progress. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/757588/EPRS_BRI(2024)757588_EN.pdf  [44] Sinha, Aseema, and Jon P. Dorschner. 2009. “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?” Polity 42 (1): 74. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19.[45] Chandrasekar, Anunita. 2025. “It’s Time to Upgrade the EU-India Relationship.” https://www.cer.eu/insights/its-time-upgrade-eu-india-relationship.[46] Gare, Frédéric and Reuter Manisha. “Here be dragons: India-China relations and their consequences for Europe”. 25 May 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/here-be-dragons-india-china-relations-and-their-consequences-for-europe/

International efforts, such as the Paris Agreement, aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But experts say countries aren’t doing enough to limit dangerous global warming. Summary Countries have debated how to combat climate change since the early 1990s. These negotiations have produced several important accords, including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Governments generally agree on the science behind climate change but have diverged on who is most responsible, how to track emissions-reduction goals, and whether to compensate harder-hit countries. The findings of the first global stocktake, discussed at the 2023 UN Climate Summit in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), concluded that governments need to do more to prevent the global average temperature from rising by 1.5°C. Introduction Over the last several decades, governments have collectively pledged to slow global warming. But despite intensified diplomacy, the world is already facing the consequences of climate change, and they are expected to get worse. Through the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere keeps rising, heating the Earth at an alarming rate. Scientists warn that if this warming continues unabated, it could bring environmental catastrophe to much of the world, including staggering sea-level rise, devastating wildfires, record-breaking droughts and floods, and widespread species loss. Since negotiating the Paris accord in 2015, many of the 195 countries that are party to the agreement have strengthened their climate commitments—to include pledges on curbing emissions and supporting countries in adapting to the effects of extreme weather—during the annual UN climate conferences known as the Conference of the Parties (COP). While experts note that clear progress has been made towards the clean energy transition, cutting current emissions has proven challenging for the world’s top emitters. The United States, for instance, could be poised to ramp up fossil fuel production linked to global warming under the Donald Trump administration, which has previously minimized the effects of climate change and has withdrawn twice from the Paris Agreement. What are the most important international agreements on climate change? Montreal Protocol, 1987. Though not intended to tackle climate change, the Montreal Protocol [PDF] was a historic environmental accord that became a model for future diplomacy on the issue. Every country in the world eventually ratified the treaty, which required them to stop producing substances that damage the ozone layer, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The protocol has succeeded in eliminating nearly 99 percent of these ozone-depleting substances. In 2016, parties agreed via the Kigali Amendment to also reduce their production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), powerful greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992. Ratified by 197 countries, including the United States, the landmark accord [PDF] was the first global treaty to explicitly address climate change. It established an annual forum, known as the Conference of the Parties, or COP, for international discussions aimed at stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These meetings produced the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Kyoto Protocol, 2005. The Kyoto Protocol [PDF], adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005, was the first legally binding climate treaty. It required developed countries to reduce emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels, and established a system to monitor countries’ progress. But the treaty did not compel developing countries, including major carbon emitters China and India, to take action. The United States signed the agreement in 1998 but never ratified it and later withdrew its signature.  Paris Agreement, 2015. The most significant global climate agreement to date, the Paris Agreement requires all countries to set emissions-reduction pledges. Governments set targets, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with the goals of preventing the global average temperature from rising 2°C (3.6°F) above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to keep it below 1.5°C (2.7°F). It also aims to reach global net-zero emissions, where the amount of greenhouse gases emitted equals the amount removed from the atmosphere, in the second half of the century. (This is also known as being climate neutral or carbon neutral.) The United States, the world’s second-largest emitter, is the only country to withdraw from the agreement, a move President Donald Trump made during his first administration in 2017. While former President Joe Biden reentered the agreement during his first day in office, Trump again withdrew the United States on the first day of his second administration in 2025. Three other countries have not formally approved the agreement: Iran, Libya, and Yemen. Is there a consensus on the science of climate change? Yes, there is a broad consensus among the scientific community, though some deny that climate change is a problem, including politicians in the United States. When negotiating teams meet for international climate talks, there is “less skepticism about the science and more disagreement about how to set priorities,” says David Victor, an international relations professor at the University of California, San Diego. The basic science is that:• the Earth’s average temperature is rising at an unprecedented rate; • human activities, namely the use of fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—are the primary drivers of this rapid warming and climate change; and,• continued warming is expected to have harmful effects worldwide. Data taken from ice cores shows that the Earth’s average temperature is rising more now than it has in eight hundred thousand years. Scientists say this is largely a result of human activities over the last 150 years, such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation. These activities have dramatically increased the amount of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere, causing the planet to warm. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN body established in 1988, regularly assesses the latest climate science and produces consensus-based reports for countries. Why are countries aiming to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C? Scientists have warned for years of catastrophic environmental consequences if global temperature continues to rise at the current pace. The Earth’s average temperature has already increased approximately 1.1°C above preindustrial levels, according to a 2023 assessment by the IPCC. The report, drafted by more than two hundred scientists from over sixty countries, predicts that the world will reach or exceed 1.5°C of warming within the next two decades even if nations drastically cut emissions immediately. (Several estimates report that global warming already surpassed that threshold in 2024.) An earlier, more comprehensive IPCC report summarized the severe effects expected to occur when the global temperature warms by 1.5°C: Heat waves. Many regions will suffer more hot days, with about 14 percent of people worldwide being exposed to periods of severe heat at least once every five years. Droughts and floods. Regions will be more susceptible to droughts and floods, making farming more difficult, lowering crop yields, and causing food shortages.  Rising seas. Tens of millions of people live in coastal regions that will be submerged in the coming decades. Small island nations are particularly vulnerable. Ocean changes. Up to 90 percent of coral reefs will be wiped out, and oceans will become more acidic. The world’s fisheries will become far less productive. Arctic ice thaws. At least once a century, the Arctic will experience a summer with no sea ice, which has not happened in at least two thousand years. Forty percent of the Arctic’s permafrost will thaw by the end of the century.  Species loss. More insects, plants, and vertebrates will be at risk of extinction.  The consequences will be far worse if the 2°C threshold is reached, scientists say. “We’re headed toward disaster if we can’t get our warming in check and we need to do this very quickly,” says Alice C. Hill, CFR senior fellow for energy and the environment. Which countries are responsible for climate change? The answer depends on who you ask and how you measure emissions. Ever since the first climate talks in the 1990s, officials have debated which countries—developed or developing—are more to blame for climate change and should therefore curb their emissions. Developing countries argue that developed countries have emitted more greenhouse gases over time. They say these developed countries should now carry more of the burden because they were able to grow their economies without restraint. Indeed, the United States has emitted the most of all time, followed by the European Union (EU).   However, China and India are now among the world’s top annual emitters, along with the United States. Developed countries have argued that those countries must do more now to address climate change.   In the context of this debate, major climate agreements have evolved in how they pursue emissions reductions. The Kyoto Protocol required only developed countries to reduce emissions, while the Paris Agreement recognized that climate change is a shared problem and called on all countries to set emissions targets. What progress have countries made since the Paris Agreement? Every five years, countries are supposed to assess their progress toward implementing the agreement through a process known as the global stocktake. The first of these reports, released in September 2023, warned governments that “the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.” That said, countries have made some breakthroughs during the annual UN climate summits, such as the landmark commitment to establish the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The fund aims to address the inequality of climate change by providing financial assistance to poorer countries, which are often least responsible for global emissions yet most vulnerable to climate disasters. At COP28, countries decided that the fund will be initially housed at the World Bank, with several wealthy countries, such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and EU members, initially pledging around $430 million combined. At COP29, developed countries committed to triple their finance commitments to developing countries, totalling $300 billion annually by 2035. Recently, there have been global efforts to cut methane emissions, which account for more than half of human-made warming today because of their higher potency and heat trapping ability within the first few decades of release. The United States and EU introduced a Global Methane Pledge at COP26, which aims to slash 30 percent of methane emissions levels between 2020 and 2030. At COP28, oil companies announced they would cut their methane emissions from wells and drilling by more than 80 percent by the end of the decade. However, pledges to phase out fossil fuels were not renewed the following year at COP29. Are the commitments made under the Paris Agreement enough? Most experts say that countries’ pledges are not ambitious enough and will not be enacted quickly enough to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. The policies of Paris signatories as of late 2022 could result in a 2.7°C (4.9°F) rise by 2100, according to the Climate Action Tracker compiled by Germany-based nonprofits Climate Analytics and the NewClimate Institute. “The Paris Agreement is not enough. Even at the time of negotiation, it was recognized as not being enough,” says CFR’s Hill. “It was only a first step, and the expectation was that as time went on, countries would return with greater ambition to cut their emissions.” Since 2015, dozens of countries—including the top emitters—have submitted stronger pledges. For example, President Biden announced in 2021 that the United States will aim to cut emissions by 50 to 52 percent compared to 2005 levels by 2030, doubling former President Barack Obama’s commitment. The following year, the U.S. Congress approved legislation that could get the country close to reaching that goal. Meanwhile, the EU pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030, and China said it aims to reach peak emissions before 2030. But the world’s average temperature will still rise more than 2°C (3.6°F) by 2100 even if countries fully implement their pledges for 2030 and beyond. If the more than one hundred countries that have set or are considering net-zero targets follow through, warming could be limited to 1.8˚C (3.2°F), according to the Climate Action Tracker.   What are the alternatives to the Paris Agreement? Some experts foresee the most meaningful climate action happening in other forums. Yale University economist William Nordhaus says that purely voluntary international accords like the Paris Agreement promote free-riding and are destined to fail. The best way to cut global emissions, he says, would be to have governments negotiate a universal carbon price rather than focus on country emissions limits. Others propose new agreements [PDF] that apply to specific emissions or sectors to complement the Paris Agreement.  In recent years, climate diplomacy has occurred increasingly through minilateral groupings. The Group of Twenty (G20), representing countries that are responsible for 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas pollution, has pledged to stop financing new coal-fired power plants abroad and agreed to triple renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade. However, G20 governments have thus far failed to set a deadline to phase out fossil fuels. In 2022, countries in the International Civil Aviation Organization set a goal of achieving net-zero emissions for commercial aviation by 2050. Meanwhile, cities around the world have made their own pledges. In the United States, more than six hundred local governments [PDF] have detailed climate action plans that include emissions-reduction targets. Industry is also a large source of carbon pollution, and many firms have said they will try to reduce their emissions or become carbon neutral or carbon negative, meaning they would remove more carbon from the atmosphere than they release. The Science Based Targets initiative, a UK-based company considered the “gold standard” in validating corporate net-zero plans, says it has certified the plans of  over three thousand firms, and aims to more than triple this total by 2025. Still, analysts say that many challenges remain, including questions over the accounting methods and a lack of transparency in supply chains. Recommended Resources This timeline tracks UN climate talks since 1992. CFR Education’s latest resources explain everything to know about climate change.  The Climate Action Tracker assesses countries’ updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement. CFR Senior Fellow Varun Sivaram discusses how the 2025 U.S. wildfires demonstrate the need to rethink climate diplomacy and adopt a pragmatic response to falling short of global climate goals. In this series on climate change and instability by the Center for Preventive Action, CFR Senior Fellow Michelle Gavin looks at the consequences for the Horn of Africa and the National Defense University’s Paul J. Angelo for Central America. This backgrounder by Clara Fong unpacks the global push for climate financing.

The Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum does not mark the end of a stage, but the beginning of a new phase in the Sino-Latin American relationship. Since its inception in 2014, the China–CELAC Forum (FCC) has gone through three key stages that outline its evolution. The first ministerial meeting, held in Beijing in 2015, laid the normative foundation for the mechanism, establishing its intergovernmental and voluntary nature. The second, held in Santiago, Chile, in 2018, consolidated priority areas of cooperation and linked the Forum to the Belt and Road Initiative. The third, held virtually in 2021, updated the agenda in a pandemic context, incorporating new topics such as health, digitalization, and sustainability. After a period of relative inertia, the Fourth Ministerial Meeting—held on May 13, 2025, in Beijing—represented a turning point both in ambition and strategic scope. It is essential to remember that the Ministerial Meeting constitutes the highest level of deliberation within the mechanism, bringing together the foreign ministers of China and Latin American countries. In this edition, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi presided over the sessions, emphasizing that, as developing countries and members of the Global South, China and Latin America must coordinate efforts to defend their legitimate rights and interests. As a result of the meeting, two key documents were adopted: the Beijing Declaration and the Joint Action Plan 2025–2027, approved by all 33 participating countries—with the exception of Argentina, which chose not to endorse the documents. Although the FCC is primarily ministerial in design, it occasionally takes on a broader political dimension, with the participation of heads of state and government. Such was the case this time, as the intervention of President Xi Jinping—host and central figure of the meeting—gave the forum a strategic tone and outlined its future roadmap. In the face of global challenges such as unilateralism, trade wars, and the climate crisis, Xi proposed a cooperation architecture based on five strategic programs combining political, economic, social, cultural, and security objectives. First, the Solidarity Program reflects the political dimension. In this regard, Xi Jinping stated that “China is ready to continue supporting each other with LAC [Latin America and the Caribbean] on matters concerning our respective core interests and major concerns.” This stance contrasts with more restrictive approaches promoted by the United States, such as during the IX Summit of the Americas (2022), where Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua were excluded. Moreover, the Beijing gathering fits into an active diplomatic sequence that includes the G20 summit in Rio (November 2024), APEC in Lima (November 2024), and the upcoming BRICS summit in July 2025, also in Rio. Far from being symbolic gestures, the frequency of these encounters reveals a convergent strategy of global engagement on China’s part, based on sustained regional alliances. Second, the Development Program encompasses the economic dimension. This pillar aims to promote cooperation in growth, investment, and productive transformation, expanding into strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy. Xi announced a credit line of 66 billion yuan to support regional development, which constitutes not only a financial contribution but also a clear sign of confidence in Latin America amid trade fragmentation and the reconfiguration of global value chains. Third, the Civilizations Program expresses the cultural dimension in the cooperation agreements. Beijing promotes intercivilizational dialogue grounded in equality, mutual learning, and inclusion. This translates into initiatives such as Latin American Art Seasons in China, joint heritage conservation projects, and comparative studies on ancient civilizations. In a region historically influenced by American cultural ideology, this strategy seeks to diversify symbolic references, strengthen Chinese soft power, and project a more respectful and relatable image in Latin America. Fourth, the Peace Program underscores the increasingly relevant security dimension. This pillar marks a qualitative evolution in China’s outreach to the region, as it addresses non-traditional security issues from a cooperative standpoint. Based on support for the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace (CELAC, 2014), China proposes to strengthen collaboration in areas such as cybersecurity, counterterrorism, corruption, drug trafficking, and organized crime. This approach reinforces the principles of non-interference and peaceful resolution, aligning with the concrete needs of Latin American states. Fifth, the People-to-People Program expresses the social dimension. This component consolidates the social connection between China and Latin America through scholarships, technical training, Chinese-language teacher education, and community projects. The inclusion of tourism as a focal point—alongside the upcoming implementation of a visa waiver policy for five Latin American countries—highlights the intention to promote direct exchange between populations. The five programs outlined by Xi Jinping—solidarity (political), development (economic), civilizations (cultural), peace (security), and people (social)—constitute a comprehensive framework that positions China as a multidimensional partner for Latin America. This strategic vision is grounded in an already robust economic relationship: in 2024, bilateral trade surpassed $500 billion, reaching the goal set a decade ago. In this context, the third edition of the White Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to be published soon, a document that will complement the commitments made in the final declaration and the Action Plan adopted in Beijing. Thus, the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum does not mark the end of a phase, but the beginning of a new chapter in Sino–Latin American relations. The scope and quality of this phase will depend on the ability of Latin American actors to engage strategically and proactively with China’s proposal. The opportunity is there. *This article was originally published on the REDCAEM website.

China relies heavily on Malaysia as a bridge for cooperation, dialogue, and coordination with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and China in confronting the economic and political challenges imposed by the United States on China and many countries around the world after President “Trump” increased US tariffs on China. To this end, China seeks to coordinate with Malaysia during its presidency of the (ASEAN Summit) this year 2025, and its concurrent presidency of the (ASEAN-GCC Cooperation Summit), a situation China is keen to capitalize on through its distinguished partnership with Malaysia. In addition, Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Malaysia in mid-April 2025, during which they issued a joint statement on support for Gaza and the Palestinian cause in the face of Israeli violations.  Malaysia's meetings and its current hosting of the (ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN-GCC Cooperation Summit) come after important trade talks between the United States and China in Switzerland in May 2025, the same month as the ASEAN and ASEAN-GCC Cooperation Summits with China. The ASEAN-GCC Summit may be a real opportunity to lay the foundation for deeper negotiations between the world's two largest economies after a period of escalation in the trade war between the two sides.  Given the importance of the ASEAN region to Southeast Asia, which represents China's vital backyard, it is at the heart of the strategy for managing major events between Washington and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, Washington and Beijing signed a strategic partnership agreement with ASEAN, given its critical importance to both countries.  Former US President Joe Biden signed a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), describing it as a decisive step toward addressing the biggest issues of our time. Meanwhile, Beijing emphasized strengthening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement it signed with ASEAN in 2021, with China keen to jointly build the world's largest free trade area.  The most prominent complex global issues on the agenda of ASEAN countries, China, Malaysia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in their confrontation with Washington and Russia include (the war in Ukraine, climate change, regional tensions around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, North Korea's missile launches, the recent Gaza war, and US tariffs), among others.To this end, China officially confirmed Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Malaysia in late May 2025 to attend a summit coordinated by China with a newly formed group of Southeast Asian and Arab countries, through which Beijing hopes to garner support in the face of Washington's tariffs. China also launched a campaign to mend relations with the European Union, Japan, and South Korea, after US President Donald Trump imposed a series of tariffs on numerous countries on April 2, 2025, before abruptly suspending them for dozens of countries except China.  Chinese Premier “Li Keqiang” will also be in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to attend the (ASEAN-GCC-China Summit) on May 27, 2025, which will be held one day after the ASEAN Summit scheduled for May 26, 2025. China has not publicly confirmed the names and number of Chinese officials who will comprise the Chinese delegation it will send to Malaysia before the summits in Malaysia.  From my analytical perspective, this may stem from China's fear that the United States and its ASEAN allies will exert pressure on those Chinese figures who will participate in the (ASEAN-GCC Summit) in particular.  In my view, Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Malaysia in mid-April 2025 is linked to the role Malaysia will play, along with its ally China, in confronting US protectionist policies. This follows President Xi Jinping's visit to three Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia) to win them over to China's side in its trade war with the United States. To this end, China is seeking to win Malaysia over, particularly at this time, as Beijing intensifies its current efforts to secure partnerships to protect its economy from the escalating trade war with the United States. While the three countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia) will benefit from Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit in mid-April 2025 to diversify their Chinese supply chains, it also places them in a challenging position with the US, and in the crosshairs of US President Trump as he seeks to restrict the reshipment of Chinese goods to its regional neighbors and then transport them through them to the world.  In anticipation of all stages of US escalation against China, Chinese President “Xi Jinping” convened and chaired the Central Working Conference on Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries in early May 2025. This conference highlighted China's increasing focus on strengthening regional relations, particularly with its neighbors, most notably Malaysia and its ASEAN partners.  On the other hand, there is competition between the United States, China, and Europe to enhance economic presence at the joint summit between the Malaysia-led ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The GCC countries are in fierce competition with the United States, Russia, China, and Europe to strengthen their economic presence in the vibrant ASEAN, which holds promising opportunities in multiple fields for the Gulf community. The ASEAN summit with the Gulf states and China represents an important milestone that reflects the growing interest of the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in strengthening relations with the ASEAN countries and China, in the face of economic and geopolitical challenges that require deeper coordination and more flexible cooperation. This is especially true given the unbalanced nature of Trump's personality, from the perspective of the Gulf states, even his closest allies. Many GCC leaders fear a sudden Trump coup against his closest allies, which is one of the reasons for the Gulf's move towards rapprochement with the ASEAN and China, led by Malaysia. The geopolitical transformations and escalating international competition between China and the United States over the Asian region and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in East and Southeast Asia, on the part of Russia, Europe, the United States, and China, have highlighted the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to strengthen their economic and political presence in this vital region through strategic partnerships that transcend traditional considerations and are based on mutual interests and commonalities. ASEAN countries represent emerging economies that hold promising opportunities in multiple fields for China and the Gulf countries, such as energy and infrastructure. This is why all GCC countries are currently investing in it. Furthermore, there are important commonalities, including that these countries, like the Gulf states, are also seeking to distance themselves from geopolitical polarization in their regional environment, especially after the recent Gaza war. The GCC countries are currently unwilling to enter into economic alliances against other parties. This provides common ground for fruitful cooperation between all, led and coordinated by Malaysia as a bridge for communication, dialogue, and coordination between the GCC countries, primarily with China.  There is also a mutual desire to strengthen Sino-Gulf relations with ASEAN countries through Malaysia at various levels, including cultural cooperation, based on a shared history spanning hundreds of years, particularly through the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which represents numerous cultural and civilizational aspects, in addition to its economic, commercial, and investment importance for all.  The secret to ASEAN's success and the encouragement of GCC countries to cooperate and coordinate with it and with China through Malaysia is its focus on economic objectives, transcending ideology and non-interference in the internal politics and affairs of other countries, while giving priority to development and investment. The new and vital area of coordination between ASEAN, China, Malaysia, and the GCC countries is the Maritime Cooperation Mechanism, recognizing the importance of oceans and seas as a key factor in driving growth.  Therefore, there is a working agenda for a framework for maritime cooperation among all concerned countries, to ensure the security of maritime and logistical straits, achieve the principles of maritime safety and security, and ensure freedom of navigation and air traffic without obstacles that limit the movement of legitimate maritime trade. It also promotes peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the principles of universally recognized international law.   The Gulf's move toward cooperation with ASEAN countries and China, through Malaysia's coordination of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit with ASEAN and China, has several fundamental reasons. These include the United States' imposition of tariffs on several countries, including the GCC itself, at varying rates. This will impact their exports to the US market. This move will inevitably push them to seek alternative markets, enhancing opportunities for cooperation between ASEAN and China, led by Malaysia, with the Gulf countries. This comes amid Chinese efforts to leverage these changes to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Americans. Perhaps the positive thing is that Washington announced the suspension of these tariffs on China for 90 days, but I most likely expect it to impose other tariffs on China and the Gulf countries and set other conditions. This will make economic relations between the GCC countries, ASEAN, and China vis-à-vis Washington more tense in the short and long term, as their exports to the US will inevitably be affected in the near future. Therefore, we note that these common challenges facing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), ASEAN, China, and Malaysia together in the face of these American pressures, even after Trump's visit to the three Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE) in the same month as the (ASEAN-China-GCC summit) in Malaysia in May 2025, open the door to new economic dialogues between all parties and help form regional blocs between ASEAN, China, Malaysia, and the GCC countries. There is clear enthusiasm from all parties to make this happen on the ground. Suffice it to mention the keenness of the concerned parties to hold real summits at the level of heads of state, in addition to ongoing ministerial and technical meetings. This reflects the existence of a genuine political will that seeks to translate all these aspirations into practical partnerships on the ground.  In this context, China, ASEAN, and Malaysia welcomed Saudi Arabia's bid to host Expo 2030 in Riyadh, highlighting the importance of organizing regional and international exhibitions to revitalize economic and cultural exchanges between the Gulf and ASEAN regions, including Southeast Asian countries, China, and Malaysia. They also emphasized the importance of conducting consultations to explore cooperation on implementing the “ASEAN Integration Initiative Action Plan” (2021-2025) and integration programs in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with China and Malaysia. This is what the ASEAN-GCC Joint Summit with China and Malaysia seeks to explore and achieve.  The ASEAN-GCC-China Joint Summit, led by Malaysia, is expected to discuss the Joint Action Plan until 2028 and enhance cooperation between the two organizations, particularly political, economic, security, and cultural aspects, as well as investment, tourism, agriculture, halal products, education, and training.  Coordination between these parties, through Malaysia's presidency of the current ASEAN-GCC summit with China, is focused on key economic partnership priorities, namely enhancing regional market integration and integrating them through cooperative partnerships among all, while strengthening the multilateral trading system. This summit also aims to strengthen existing relations between the Gulf states, ASEAN, and China, given the current circumstances, regional conditions, and rapid international changes. The summit will also enhance the dynamics of relations between ASEAN, the GCC, China, and Malaysia, by discussing the path forward and strengthening cooperation across a number of existing areas of cooperation, including combating international crimes and terrorism. It is also an opportunity to identify new areas of cooperation in security, politics, economics, and cultural pillars. The most important aspect, from my perspective, is that the currently emerging multipolar international order requires middle powers such as the Gulf states, ASEAN, China, and Malaysia to stick together and reach a joint dialogue to support multilateral relations, particularly political aspects, and to coordinate their common positions, especially after the recent Gaza war and the American pressures that have become openly exerted on everyone. In general, the relationship between the Gulf and ASEAN sides, along with China and Malaysia, is considered primarily economically important for all, but it has also evolved due to circumstances in the political dimension. ASEAN countries enjoy a reputation for great neutrality and flexibility regarding international positions, with a greater focus on the economic dimension, while Gulf leaders are placing greater importance on developmental aspects alongside the economy.