Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Donald Trump declared his Alaska summit with Vladimir Putin a success, despite contrasting evidence suggesting otherwise. On Truth Social, he said a peace agreement over Ukraine, not a mere ceasefire, was the right path, claims he echoed during follow-up talks in Washington with Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders. “Potentially, millions of people’s lives will be saved,” Trump said. That optimism looks misplaced. For Putin, Ukraine is not merely a bargaining chip but a territory he views as part of a Russian “civilization-state.” When he meets with Western leaders, he is not negotiating over land; he frames the war as a defense of Russian civilization and its values. As a result, Putin cannot easily “make a deal” involving land swaps to end the conflict.  Russia’s civilisational project  In addition to civilisational rhetoric, other factors contribute to Putin’s intransigence. Strategic concerns about NATO, fears for regime security, and the material importance of Crimea and the Black Sea all shape Moscow’s stance. Yet the language of civilisation turns these into matters of identity and survival. It fuses practical interests with existential claims, making retreat even harder. Even if compromises were possible on security or economics, the civilisational frame casts them as betrayals of Russia’s destiny.  Some American policymakers have tended to read Russia as a state with interests that can be traded. However, Putin accounts for Russia not simply as a nation-state, but as a civilization rooted in Orthodoxy, empire, and the memory of Soviet power. Viewed through this prism, Ukraine is not a foreign neighbour, but an inseparable part of Russian history and identity, which must be defended against Western encroachment.  In his 2021 essay On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people,” and that Ukraine is “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” Whatever his private convictions, the function of this language is clear. It justifies annexation and occupation, and it raises the political cost of retreat by treating territorial issues as matters of civilisational survival.   Putin himself insists that “the West” does not understand that “the Ukraine crisis is not a territorial conflict … and not an attempt to establish regional geopolitical balance.” Instead, he says, it is rooted in “the principles underlying the new international order” he is building. Peace, in this new order, is possible only “when everyone feels safe and secure, understands that their opinions are respected” and when “no one can unilaterally force …others to live or behave as a hegemon pleases even when it contradicts the sovereignty …traditions, or customs of peoples and countries.”    This framing lets the Kremlin portray the West as the aggressor imposing alien norms on unwilling Ukrainians. Russia, by contrast, is said to be fighting for itself on behalf of all nations who wish to see western hegemony end and the birth of a new multipolar world. Moreover, it portrays Ukraine’s status as a civilisational question tied to identity and resistance to Western liberal norms. As a result, only a settlement that Putin present domestically as recognition of Russia’s civilisational standing is acceptable, which complicates compromise beyond what standard diplomatic formulas suggest.  Challenges to Trump’s pursuit of peace  Trump has made no secret of his desire to be remembered as a peacemaker. However, he also admires strong leaders and has shown sympathy for post-liberal arguments that liberal democracy is exhausted. These affinities bring him closer, at least rhetorically, to elements of Putin’s stance.  Admiration and aspiration alone are insufficient in bridging the gap between Putin and Trump’s positions on Ukraine’s independence. Putin frames the conflict as existential, defending Russian civilisation against Western encroachment. This  makes compromise especially difficult. If the war is understood in these terms, how can Moscow return occupied territories without undermining its own civilisational claim? How can it accept a Ukraine that leans towards the European Union, or tolerate an American presence on its soil?  Trump may want peace, but Putin has tied his legitimacy to a narrative that resists it. Unless that framing is abandoned, or radically reinterpreted, any settlement will remain elusive.  A wider trend  “Russia’s approach is part of a wider pattern in which civilisational claims have become central to how leaders justify power and resist compromise. Xi Jinping frames China as a five-thousand-year-old civilisation whose territory includes Taiwan and the South China Sea. He presents the Communist Party as the guardian of a civilisational tradition stretching back to Confucius, giving contemporary disputes an aura of timeless legitimacy. Narendra Modi portrays India as an ancient Hindu civilisation restoring its rightful place after centuries of foreign domination. Each case is distinct, but the message is similar: our civilisation is exceptional, our sovereignty absolute, and our values not up for negotiation.    A troubled summit  Against this backdrop, the Alaska meeting was never likely to produce more than gestures. Trump may genuinely want peace and to be remembered as the leader who ended the war. Yet he is dealing with a counterpart who has justified the invasion of Ukraine in civilisational and existential terms. For Putin, Ukraine is not only territory but a symbol of Russia’s identity and sovereignty, cast as a bulwark against Western encroachment. Within this frame, Russia would view restoring Ukraine’s borders, accepting its European orientation, or tolerating a long-term American presence in the region as defeats of principle rather than concessions of interest.  Trump’s ambition to end the war faces an almost insoluble dilemma. Europe will reject a settlement that rewards aggression, while Putin refuses to surrender territory he has cast as integral to Russian civilisation. Land swaps seem practical but please neither side. If the conflict were to remains frozen, Ukraine will be fractured and the deeper issues unresolved. Peace demands compromise, but compromise undermines the very narratives on which Moscow has built its legitimacy. As a result, unless Putin retreats from his civilisational framing of the war, any settlement will remain elusive and Ukraine’s future uncertain.  Dr Nicholas Morieson is a Research Fellow at the Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne. He is the author of three books, including Weaponizing Civilizationalism for Authoritarianism: How Turkey, India, Russia, and China Challenge Liberal Democracy (Palgrave 2025).  This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Introduction Geopolitical tensions are making global trade increasingly difficult. In order to reduce the associated risk of default, companies are shifting their trade relations to trading partners that are politically similar to them. In the course of the beginnings of geo-economic fragmentation, politically and economically like-minded countries are also gaining in importance for German and European decision-makers. Liaison countries1 in particular can form a counterforce to the trend towards polarization in foreign trade - especially between the USA and China: they are characterized by a pronounced economic and trade policy openness that overrides differences between geopolitical or ideological camps. Consequently, the question arises: How can relevant connecting countries for Germany and Europe be identified? What opportunities and risks do closer trade relations with these countries offer in order to strengthen foreign trade resilience in geopolitically uncertain times?  With a high degree of openness - defined as the sum of imports and exports in relation to gross domestic product - of over 80 percent2 , the German economy is strongly integrated into global trade. Accordingly, the disruptive effect of geo-economic fragmentation on the German economy would be above average. The defensive strategy to strengthen Germany's economic security by pushing for trade policy independence would only reinforce geo-economic fragmentation. Against the backdrop of comparatively high economic vulnerability, it is necessary to focus on those potential partner countries with which German and European foreign trade could be developed and expanded even under the condition of increasing fragmentation.  Geoeconomic Fragmentation  The term "geo-economic fragmentation" is used to describe the politically motivated reorganization of global goods and financial flows, in which strategic, economic and political interests primarily determine the choice of countries of origin and destination for trade flows.3 In the scenario of geo-economic fragmentation, the result would be the formation of a bloc within the global community of states, which would fundamentally change the regulatory structure of global economic networking. In this case, trade and investment would probably concentrate from a previously diverse range of economic partner countries - prior to the formation of the bloc - on those countries that now - since the formation of the bloc - belong to the same bloc.  The likelihood of this scenario occurring and leading to an increased fragmentation of the global economic order has increased again in the recent past. For example, Donald Trump's second term as US president is causing increasing geopolitical uncertainty worldwide.  Statements on the concrete form of a possible demarcation of potential blocs are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. However, the division of a large part of the global economy into a "US bloc" and a "China bloc" is a conceivable scenario for which German politics and business should prepare.  Data already shows that, at a global level, foreign trade openness has decreased in the recent past. Data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) illustrates the increasing hurdles in global trade in goods. While 3.1% of global imports were still affected by tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade in 2016 - including under WTO rules - this figure rose to 11.8% in 2024 over the following years.4 This development goes hand in hand with a noticeable loss of importance and enforcement of the WTO since the 2010s, which previously played a central role as the guardian of the rules-based global economic order.  Studies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have already found indications of an incipient geo-economic fragmentation along potential bloc borders. It shows that trade in goods and foreign direct investment between countries that would belong to the opposing camp in the event of a bloc formation declined on average in 2022 and 2023 - in contrast to foreign trade between countries that are geopolitically close.5  In this initial phase of geo-economic fragmentation, liaison countries are beginning to establish themselves as a counterforce, holding the fragmenting global community of states together with new trade and investment routes.  Identification of liaison countries Specifically, liaison countries have the following characteristics: a pronounced openness to foreign trade in the form of a high foreign trade quota and low tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, as well as pronounced economic relations with partner countries from different geopolitical camps. The geopolitical orientation of countries can be examined using data on voting behavior within the United Nations.6 This involves analyzing whether a country can be assigned to the US or Chinese camp - or whether there is no pronounced proximity and therefore political neutrality or "non-alignment" in the sense of ideological independence. The data-based identification of connecting countries is relatively new. Empirical analyses are also limited to connecting countries in the context of US-Chinese foreign trade - specifically US imports from China. In this case, the characteristics of a connecting country can be broken down into (1) "non-alignment" - i.e. a geopolitical distance to both a Western and an Eastern bloc - as well as (2) an increase in imports and foreign investment from China and (3) a simultaneous increase in exports to the United States. In a narrower sense, this is an evasive reaction to trade restrictions, i.e. circumventing trade. If the foreign trade indicators - specifically the trade and investment data relating to the US and China - of "non-aligned" countries for the period from 2017 to 2020 show corresponding characteristic-related changes compared to previous years, these can be identified as countries connecting the US and China.  The analysis of trade data shows that the value of direct exports from China to the USA fell during Donald Trump's first term in office. At the same time, both Chinese exports to some of the "non-aligned" countries and exports from these countries to the USA have increased significantly. These countries have presumably stepped in as a link on the export route from China to the US after the previously direct trade flow was interrupted by trade barriers and had to find a new route. Companies producing in China are therefore likely to have sought new, indirect ways to maintain access to the US sales market.  A certain statistical inaccuracy in the foreign trade data makes it difficult to draw a definitive conclusion in this context. It should be noted: No single commodity can be tracked across national borders in trade data collection. Whether the additional goods imported from China actually found their way to the United States can only be assumed approximately. However, if the trade flows are aggregated, a clearer picture emerges and the circumvention trade via selected connecting countries - including Vietnam and Mexico - becomes visible.  Data on foreign direct investment rounds off the analysis.7 "Non-aligned" countries in which an increase in Chinese investment can be seen between 2016 and 2020 in addition to trade flows can be identified as connecting countries. Here, too, available data suggests that the companies concerned either exported their goods to the United States via a stopover or even outsourced parts of their production destined for the US market to connecting countries. Five connecting countries between the US and China Based on the 2017-2020 study period, various connecting countries can be empirically identified that were used to indirectly maintain access to the US market. In terms of foreign trade volume, the economically most important connecting countries include Mexico, Vietnam, Poland, Morocco and Indonesia.8 All five countries are characterized by the fact that both their exports of goods to the US and their imports of goods from China increased significantly between 2017 and 2020. In addition, greenfield investments (foreign direct investment to set up a new production facility) have risen significantly compared to the period before 2017.  However, the five countries show different priorities in their development, which differentiate them in their role as connecting countries between the USA and China. In Vietnam, exports to the USA in particular have risen sharply. China has been the most important procurement market for Vietnamese companies for years. Poland, Mexico and Indonesia are characterized as connecting countries primarily by the significant increase in imports from China. Morocco, in turn, was able to attract more Chinese foreign investment in particular. Greenfield investments have almost tripled here since 2017. However, Poland - a rather surprising candidate for the role of liaison country, as it is intuitively assigned to the US-oriented bloc - is positioned fairly centrally between the US and China according to the analysis of voting behavior within the United Nations9. In addition, Poland qualifies primarily due to the sharp rise in greenfield investments from China, primarily in the expansion of domestic battery production.10  It cannot be concluded from the previous studies on the USA and China whether German companies are also circumventing trade barriers from the USA via the countries identified. As the trade policy conflicts between the US and China differ significantly from those between the EU and China, there has been a lack of comparable empirical data to analyze connecting countries in the EU context. Opportunities and challenges As the German economy is strongly oriented towards foreign trade and is closely networked with both the USA and China, German companies play a particularly exposed role in the area of tension between the USA and China. Increased economic exchange with potential connecting countries would offer German companies an opportunity to mitigate the expected shock of a geopolitical bloc. They could at least maintain international trade to a certain extent and thus secure some of the endangered sales and procurement markets. On the other hand, there are also costs associated with expanding foreign trade relations with potential connecting countries. The greater complexity also increases the risk in the value chains. Companies that position themselves wisely within this trade-off buy themselves valuable time in the event of a shock to reorganize themselves against the backdrop of changed foreign trade conditions.  From the perspective of foreign trade policy, it is also possible to examine the extent to which stronger foreign trade cooperation with (potential) connecting countries could have advantages. The trade-off between resilience and complexity must then be assessed at a macroeconomic level, beyond individual company interests. In order to make it easier for companies to connect to potential connecting countries and to create appropriate framework conditions, German and European policy can build on existing comprehensive strategies at national and European level. Both the China Strategy11 and the National Security Strategy12 focus foreign policy on connecting countries as part of a stronger economic and political risk diversification. There is also a similar framework at European level with the EU's Strategic Compass13 . Following on from this, the German government could create targeted incentives to open up new markets in liaison countries, which would diversify critical supply chains and reduce one-sided dependencies.  At the same time, connecting countries pose a challenge. These can be used to circumvent foreign trade measures such as sanctions if flows of goods can find alternative routes via connecting countries more easily than before.  In order to realize opportunities and overcome challenges, close cooperation between science, politics and companies is required. This first requires the identification of a selection of potential connecting countries through scientifically sound analysis. This creates the basis for the subsequent steps in which European and German policymakers work closely with companies to create attractive framework conditions for trade with potential connecting countries - for example through bilateral trade agreements.  Attractive foreign trade framework conditions can create the necessary incentive to actually expand trade relations with potential connecting countries. Companies need to weigh up individual cases and make forward-looking decisions: To what extent is there a risk of a loss of production triggered by geopolitical conflicts? And how much would the complexity of the value chain increase if more potential connecting countries were included? Ultimately, the actual choice of preferred sales and procurement markets lies with the individual companies. LicenseThis work is licensed under CC BY 4.0 References1. Verbindungsländer werden im Sinne von Connectors verstanden, vgl. Gita Gopinath/Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas/Andrea F Presbitero/Petia Topalova, Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?, Washington, D.C.: IMF, April 2024 (IMF Working Paper) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-ColdWar-547357/>. 2. Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), Außenwirtschaft. 2025, <https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Wirtschaft/Globalisierungsindikatoren/aussenwirtschaft.html#246 078/>.  3. Shekahar Aiyar/Franziska Ohnsorge, Geoeconomic Fragmentation and ‚Connector’ Countries, Online verfügbar unter:  <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/121726/1/MPRA_paper_121726.pdf>.4. WTO, WTO Trade Monitoring Report, Genf, November 2024, <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/factsheet_dec24_e.pdf/>. 5. Gita Gopinath/Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas/Andrea F Presbitero/Petia Topalova, Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?, Washington, D.C.: IMF, April 2024 (IMF Working Paper) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-ColdWar-547357/>.  6. Michael A. Bailey/Anton Strezhnev/Erik Voeten, »Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data«, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (2017) 2, S. 430-456, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002715595700/>.7. Gita Gopinath/Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas/Andrea F Presbitero/Petia Topalova, Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?, Washington, D.C.: IMF, April 2024 (IMF Working Paper) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-ColdWar-547357/>. War-547357. 8. Enda Curran/Shawn Donnan/Maeva Cousin, »These Five Countries are Key Economic ‚Connectors‘ in a Fragmenting World«, in Bloomberg (online), 1.11.2023, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-1102/vietnam-poland-mexico-morocco-benefit-from-us-china-tensions/>.9. Michael A. Bailey/Anton Strezhnev/Erik Voeten, »Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data«, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (2017) 2, S. 430-456, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002715595700/>.  10. Enda Curran/Shawn Donnan/Maeva Cousin, »These Five Countries are Key Economic ‚Connectors‘ in a Fragmenting World«, in Bloomberg (online), 1.11.2023, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202311-02/vietnam-poland-mexico-morocco-benefit-from-us-china-tensions/>.11. Auswärtiges Amt, China‐Strategie der Bundesregierung, Berlin, Juli 2023, <https://www.auswaertigesamt.de/resource/blob/2608578/810fdade376b1467f20bdb697b2acd58/china-strategie-data.pdf/>.  12. Auswärtiges Amt, Integrierte Sicherheit für Deutschland: Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, Berlin, Juni 2023, <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5636374/38287252c5442b786ac5d0036ebb237b/nationalesicherheitsstrategie-data.pdf/>.  13. Rat der Europäischen Union, Ein Strategischer Kompass für Sicherheit und Verteidigung, Brüssel, März 2022, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/de/pdf/>.

I. Introduction Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, its most immediate and visible consequences have been loss of life and large numbers of refugees from Ukraine. However, given the interconnected structure of the international political, economic, and policy systems, the ramifications of the Ukraine conflict can be felt well beyond Ukraine and Russia. Much of the recent literature and commentaries have focused on the military and strategic lessons learned from the on-going Ukraine conflict (Biddle 2022; 2023; Dijkstra et al. 2023). However, there are not many quality analyses of economic effects of the Ukraine war on Eastern European countries, including Russia and Ukraine. This paper focuses on the economic effects of the Ukraine war on nine Eastern European countries, including Russia and Ukraine. This is because although Eastern European countries are neighbors of Russia and Ukraine and have had significant negative economic outcomes from the Ukraine war, these countries were mainly ignored by researchers. II. The Economic Effects of the Ukraine war The impacts of war are far-reaching and devastating. War causes immense destruction of property and loss of life. It also creates psychological trauma for those who have experienced it firsthand. War can also have long-term economic impacts, such as higher unemployment and increased poverty. War can also lead to the displacement of people, as we have seen the millions of refugees who had been forced to flee their homes due to conflicts. War can also have political effects, such as creating new states or weakening existing nations. It can also lead to the rise of authoritarian regimes in many post-war nations. War can also lead to increased militarization as nations seek to protect themselves from future conflicts. The Ukraine war might have broader economic consequences. The supply chains may be affected because of the destruction of infrastructures and resources. War mobilization may affect the workforce and economic production. Actors in the economy may also act strategically to deploy resources elsewhere or to support the war effort because the war has affected incentive structures of workers and business. These effects can be local to geographical areas engulfed in conflict but also cause ripple effects to a wider regional area and to the global economy. Trade, production, consumption, inflation, growth and employment patterns may all be influenced. Peterson .K. Ozili.(2022) claimed that the scale of the Ukraine war had its negative impact on the economies of almost all countries around the world. According to Ozili, the main effects of the Ukraine war on the global economy are several, but this paper focuses on two below: Rising Oil Gas Prices  and inflation – European countries import a quarter of their oil and 40% of their natural gas from the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is the second largest oil producer in the world and the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe, and after the invasion, European oil companies will have problems getting these resources from the Russian Federation. Even before the Russian invasion, oil prices were rising because of growing tensions between countries, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other factors, but remained in the $80–95 per barrel range. After the invasion, this price reached the value of $100. Natural gas prices rose 20% since the war began. Rising gas & oil prices can drive high inflation and increase public utility bills. Decline in production and economic growth. Rising oil and gas prices lead to high inflation and, therefore, a decline in consumption, supply and demand, thereby causing decline in growth and production. This paper focuses on inflation and GDP growth of nine Eastern European countries regarding the economic effects of the Ukraine war. Ozili (2022) claimed that very high inflation was a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 1 shows, inflation in the EU jumped in the first month of the invasion, and the increasing trend continues. EU inflation in 2022 peaked in October and amounted to 11.5% that was a historical record. However, inflation has slowly declined as energy prices have gone down. This higher inflation in Europe basically resulted from energy price increase. As Figures 2, 3, and 4 show, energy prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022. As Figure 2 shows, energy prices have been the most important component of high inflation in the EU.  Figure 1: Average inflation rate in the EU (%). Source: EurostatCreated with Datawrapper     Figure 2: Main components of inflation rate in the Euro areas.  Figure 3: Natural gas prices in Europe, January 2021- end 2024  Figure 4: Crude oil price, January 2020-January 2025 Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper Inflation skyrocketed not only in the EU member countries, including Eastern European countries, but also in Russia and Ukraine.  Figure 5: Inflation rate in Russia, 2021-2025 As Figure 5 shows, inflation rate in Russia averaged 8.16 % from 2003 until 2025, but it reached an all time high of 20.37 % in April of 2022 just after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2022, Russia experienced high inflation, with the average annual rate reaching approximately 13.75%. This surge in inflation was largely attributed to the economic impact of Western sanctions and increased government spending related to the war in Ukraine. From end of 2022 and throughout 2023, however, inflation was brought under control, but in 2024 inflation started to climb again. The inflation rate in Russia has been moderately high in 2024 and 2025, reaching to 9.5% in 2024 and 9.9% in May 2025 and 9.4% in June 2025.   Figure 6: Inflation rate in Ukraine, 2021-2025 The Ukrainian economy has undergone harsh conditions with the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following the start of the invasion, inflation skyrocketed to 26.6% in October 2022 from 10.0% in 2021. Inflation in Ukraine started to slow down from the end of 2022 throughout 2023, reaching 5.1% in November 2023. However, inflation began to rise from early 2024 and then grew to 12% in December 2024. As Figure 5 & 6 shows, inflation rates in Russia and Ukraine do not follow the pattern of EU countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and then has slowly declined over time. Rather inflation in Russia and Ukraine skyrocketed in 2022 and then slowed down in 2023 and started to climb again in 2024 and 2025. As Figure 7 shows, inflation in Eastern European countries has been also very high just after Russia invaded Ukraine. Hungary’s annual inflation rate surged in 2022, reaching a peak of 26.2 % in January 2023. By mid-2023, it began to decline, and by 2024, it showed a gradual decline trend, reaching 3.7 % in 2024. And inflation in Hungary slightly increased in 2025, reaching 4.6% in June 2025 and 4.4% in May 2025.  The Czech Republic(Czechia) experienced a significant surge in inflation in 2022, with the average inflation rate reaching 15.1%. This marked the second-highest inflation rate since the Czech Republic’s independence in 1993.  Two factors mainly contributed to this surge: High energy prices:The global energy crisis, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, significantly impacted energy prices in the Czech Republic.  Increased food prices: The rising energy costs also led to higher food prices, with some sectors experiencing inflation rates as high as 26%.  The inflation rate in the Czech Republic in 2023 was relatively high, reaching 10.7%. However, inflation significantly declined in 2024 and 2025. The average annual inflation rate in the Czech Republic for 2024 was 2.4%. The inflation rate in 2025 was also low, recording 2.7% in July 2025. Poland also experienced a significant increase in inflation in 2022, with the average inflation rate reaching 14.2%. The inflation was down to 11.47% in 2023, but it was still high. The rate continued to fall, reaching 3.72% in 2024. In July 2025, inflation dropped to 3.1%. Similarly, Bulgaria experienced a significant surge in inflation in 2022, reaching a peak of 18.7 % in September 2022. However, Bulgaria’s annual inflation rate continued to decline from 13.02% in 2022 to 8.6% in 2023 and 2.6% in 2024. The inflation in June 2025 was 3.1%.  Romania experienced a significant surge in inflation in 2022, reaching a peak of 14.6 in November 2022. However, the annual inflation rate in Romania declined from 13.8% in 2022, recording 10.4% in 2023 and 5.58% in 2024. The inflation rate reached a more moderate rate of 5.8% in June 2025.  Slovakia experienced a significant surge in inflation in 2022, reaching a peak of 15.4 % in November 2022. However, the annual inflation rate in Slovakia declined to 10.96% in 2023, and 3.15% in 2024. The inflation rate in Slovakia reached a more moderate rate of 4.3% in June 2025.  Slovenia had much lower inflation rate than other Eastern European countries. The annual inflation rate in Slovenia was 8.83% in 2022, 7.45% in 2023, and 1.97% in 2024. The inflation rate in Slovenia reached a relatively low rate of 2.2% in June 2025.  Unlike Russia and Ukraine, these Eastern European countries followed the pattern of EU countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and then has slowly declined over time.   Figure 7: Inflation rate in Eastern Europe during the Ukraine war Very high inflation in Europe during the early stage of Ukraine war basically resulted from energy price increase as Figures 2, 3, and 4 show. It is because European countries were heavily dependent on Russian energy. Figure 8 shows that a number of Eastern European countries were significantly dependent on Russian energy in 2020 before the Ukraine war. For example, Slovakia and Hungary depended on Russia for more than 50 % of their energy use. Moreover, Europe was the largest importer of natural gas in the world. Russia provided roughly 40% and 25% of EU’s imported gas and oil before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 9 shows, major gas importers from Russia in 2021 were European countries.  Figure 8: EU member country’s dependence on Russia energy  Figure 9: Major EU importers from Russian Gas in 2021. However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 9,119 new economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia, making it the most sanctioned country in the world. At least 46 countries or territories, including all 27 EU nations, have imposed sanctions on Russia. EU trade with Russia has been strongly affected by the sanctions, resulting in a 58% decline in exports to Russia and an 86% drop in imports from Russia between the first quarter of 2022 and the third quarter of 2024. In the response, as Figure 10 shows, Russia cut its gas exports to the EU by around 80% since the Russian invasion, resulting in higher gas price in Europe.  Figure 10: Monthly Russia-EU pipeline gas flows, 2022-2025 Nonetheless, Figure 11 show that Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic have been major  importers of Russian gas and oil after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while Figure 12 shows that Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Czech Republic have been major importers and consumers of Russian gas after the Ukraine war. Figure 11: Largest importers of Russian fossil fuels (January 1, 2023 to February 16, 2025)  Figure 12: Selected European countries’ imports of Russian natural gas as shares of total consumption. As energy prices in Europe skyrocketed, inflation, including food price also skyrocketed in Europe. As a result, consumption in Europe was down and GDP growth declined in Europe after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Ozili claimed, lower growth rate was also a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 13 shows, GDP in EU was down to 3.5 % in 2022 compared to 6.3% in 2021, and it was further down to 0.8 % in 2023 because of economic stagnation and high inflation caused by the Ukraine war.  Figure 13: Average annual GDP growth rate in EU, 1996-2025. Like EU countries, Russia, Ukraine and some Eastern European countries experienced negative growth rates in 2022 & 2023 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia’s economy has undergone significant transformation since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As Figure 14 shows, Russia GDP growth rate for 2022 was -2.07%, a 7.68% decline from 2021. This decline in GDP was due to international sanctions, the withdrawal of foreign companies and overall economic uncertainty. However, the impact was largely offset by a favourable terms-of-trade from higher commodity prices and support from third countries – especially China, Turkey, the UAE and countries bordering Russia – which have served as conduits for sanctions evasion.  Figure 14: Russia GDP Growth Rate By 2023, the Russian economy had increasingly shifted to a war footing. As Figure 15 shows, military spending significantly increased after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Surge in government spending such as military spending, counter-sanctions measures and credit growth boosted investment, construction and overall economic activity in Russia. The military-industrial sector benefitted the most, as did private consumption driven by war-related payments and high real wage growth resulting from the tight labor market. Meanwhile, sectors reliant on Western markets or foreign companies continued to struggle. As a result, Russia’s GDP grew by 3.6 percent in 2023 and 4.3 percent in 2024. Economic expansion resulted from rising government expenditure and investment in its military as it continues its war against Ukraine.  Figure 15: Russia military spending By the end of 2024 and in early 2025, however, signs of economic stagnation had become evident. Even the military-industrial sector began to stagnate. The economy had butted up against its supply-side constraints. In the first quarter of 2025, annual growth slowed to an estimated 1.4 % (from 4.5 % in the last quarter of 2024. Economic contraction was driven by falling activity in trade, mining, real estate and leisure, which growth in agriculture, manufacturing and public administration were not able to offset.  Figure 16: Ukraine GDP growth rate Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 significantly affected Ukraine economy. As Figure 16 shows, Ukraine’s GDP growth rate for 2022 was -28.76%, a 32.08% decline from 2021. GDP growth rate in Ukraine averaged 1.33% from 2000 until 2025, reaching a record low of -36.60 % in the second quarter of 2022. Ukraine’s economy started to bounce back in 2023 and the GDP growth rate in Ukraine for 2023 was 5.32 %, a 34.08 increase in 2022. GDP growth rate reached an all time high of 19.30% in the second quarter of 2023. The GDP growth for 2024 was down to 2.9%. In the first quarter of 2025, Ukraine’s GDP grew 0.9%. However, the Ukrainian economy has been propped up by financial support from Western countries, including military and humanitarian aid, as well as loans from frozen Russian assets. Financing from abroad has been essential in sustaining Ukraine’s ability to survive. Ukraine’s 2024 public sector deficit rose to a record 1.832 trillion hryvnia, or almost 24 % of GDP. Over 60 % of spending went to defense and domestic security. Ukraine’s foreign partner countries provided approximately $42 billion in direct budget support in 2024, of which a large chunk ($17.5 billion) was provided via the EU’s Ukraine Facility. In 2025, Ukraine’s financing situation looks brighter compared to the beginning of 2024, when the EU’s 50-billion-euro Ukraine Facility and America’s over-60-million-dollar Ukraine aid package were blocked due to legislative intransigence. The structure of 2025 deficit financing in Ukraine represents a big change from 2024 as a substantial part of the deficit will be covered out of the yield on Russia’s frozen assets. Last summer, G-7 leaders agreed on an Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) arrangement allowing for the use of 183 billion Euro of frozen Russian assets (end-2024) in the EU area to help Ukraine. The ERA program does not draw on the Russian assets directly but uses its proceeds to finance payments and costs of a $50 billion loan. As Figure 17 shows, ERA disbursements allocated to Ukraine will come to nearly $22 billion in 2025 and $11 billion in 2026. The new Trump administration has yet to withdraw from the ERA program, even if substantial cuts have already been made in e.g. USAID financing to Ukraine. The US remains the ERA program’s largest supporter, accounting for a total disbursement commitment of $20 billion. Figure 17: ERA program for Ukraine from Western countries, 2023-2026 Moreover, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker from Kiel University, Ukraine has received 267 billion euros in aid over the past three years. Half of this has been in weapons and military assistance, with 118 billion euros in financial support and 19 billion euros for humanitarian aid. European countries contributed more than the US: 62 billion euros in arms and 70 billion euros in other aid from Europe, compared with 64 billion euros in arms and 50 billion euros in other aid from the US. On the other hand, the Ukraine war caused a massive refugee crisis to Eastern European countries. The Ukraine war made millions of Ukraine people cross the border into neighboring countries in Eastern countries, affecting the economy of each nation. Table 1 shows the number of Ukraine refugees settled in Europe. Most of the Ukraine refugees settled in Poland and the Czech Republic, followed by Romania, Slovakia, and Moldova. These Ukraine refugees had significant impacts on Eastern European economy, in particular on Poland and Czech Republic. Table 1: Number of refugees from Ukraine settled in EuropeSource: UNHCR Operational Data The Ukraine war affected Poland’s economy in several ways, creating both difficulties and opportunities. First, there were problems with energy supplies that could threaten Poland’s access to power. The conflict in Ukraine has shaken up Poland’s energy market quite a bit, affecting its gas and oil supplies and leading to a spike in prices. Right after the conflict began, gasoline prices in Poland jumped by more than 40% as Figure 18 shows. This is mainly because Poland used to get a lot of its energy from Russia, and now, because of the Ukraine war and the sanctions that followed, there’s been a big disruption. As Figure 19 shows, food prices also skyrocketed just after the Ukraine war.  Figure 18: Gasoline price in Poland Figure 19: Food inflation in Poland Food inflation in Poland averaged 4.11 % from 1999 until 2025, reaching an all time high of 24.00 % in February of 2023. Moreover, there has been the arrival of more than 1 million Ukraine refugees, which put pressure on jobs and public services in Poland. The Polish government has had to increase its public spending significantly to provide housing, healthcare, and social services for the newcomers. This sudden increase in spending seemed overwhelming at first, but it also brought potential economic benefits in the long run. For example, the influx of Ukraine refugees boosted demand for local goods and services, which in turn stimulated the Polish economy. Despite both difficulties and opportunities that the Ukraine war brought to Poland, Poland’s GDP growth rate in 2022 was 5.3%. This indicates a strong economic performance, although it was slightly lower than the 6.9% growth rate in 2021. However, Poland's GDP growth rate in 2023 was down to 0.2%. This signifies a significant slowdown compared to the 5.3% growth in 2022. The slowdown was attributed to factors like energy inflation-induced decline in household spending and stagnant consumption. Poland’s real GDP grew by 2.9% in 2024, exceeding initial expectations, which were set at 2.8%. As inflation was down, it allowed for consumer spending and contributed to economic expansion. The Polish economy continues to grow by 3.2% in the first quarter of 2025. Figure 20: annual GDP growth rate in Poland, 2016-2024 The Czech economy has experienced significant impacts from the Ukraine war due to supply chain disruptions and rising energy & food prices. As Figure 21 and 22 show, gasoline and food prices in Czech Republic skyrocketed just after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Gasoline prices in Czech Republic skyrocketed in June 2022 at 2.05 USD/Liter from 1.12 USD/Liter in May2020. Gasoline prices in Czech Republic averaged 1.48 USD/Liter from 1995 until 2025, reaching a high of 2.05 USD/Liter in June of 2022 and a record low of 0.72 USD/Liter in December of 1998. Figure 21: Gasoline price in the Czech Republic  Figure 22: Food inflation in the Czech Republic As a result, after a solid recovery from Covid-19 pandemic in 2021 with 4.0% growth rate, economic activity slowed down in 2022-2023 as a result of the consequences of the war in Ukraine, including EU sanctions on Russia and rising energy & food prices. Nonetheless, the Czech achieved a moderate growth in 2022 with a growth rate of 2.8% but the Czech economy contracted by -0.1% in 2023 and has been weak with a growth rate of 1.1% in 2024 and 0.7 % in the first quarter of 2025. Figure 23: annual GDP growth rate in Czech Republic, 2016-2024 Hungary’s economy has faced significant challenges due to the war in Ukraine, including increased energy costs, inflation, and disruptions to trade and supply chains. Hungary economy grew by 4.6 % in 2022, but declined to -0.91% in 2023 due to the extremely high inflation and weak consumptions. The consumer price in Hungary rose to a peak of 25.7% in January 2023, the highest rate in the EU. High inflation was driven by surging energy and food prices as Figures 24 and 25 show. The Hungary economy has been weak with the growth rate of 0.5 % in 2024. The GDP expanded by 0.1% in the second quarter of 2025. Figure 24: Gasoline price in Hungary Figure 25: Food inflation in Hungary  Figure 26: annual GDP growth rate in Hungary, 2016-2024 Bulgaria’s economy has faced challenges from the Ukraine ware, due to increased energy prices and disruptions in trade. As Figure 27 shows, the initial economic recovery was stronger than anticipated, with a 4.0% GDP growth in 2022, but the Ukraine war’s impact, coupled with inflation and global economic headwinds, led to a slowdown. Bulgaria’s economy expanded by 1.89 % in 2023. Then Bulgaria GDP bounced back to 2.8 % in 2024 and by 3.1% in the first quarter of 2025. Figure 27: annual GDP growth rate in Bulgaria, 2016-2024 Romania’s economy has experienced both positive and negative impacts from the Ukraine war. As Figure 28 shows, the Romanian economy displayed unexpected strength in 2022, with a 4.8% growth rate thanks to strong private consumption and investment. However, the Ukraine war’s effects, particularly on energy prices and supply chains, dampened Romanian growth. Romanian growth rate for 2023 was 2.2%, but it moderately rebound in 2024 with a 2.8% growth rate. The Romanian GDP increased by 0.3% in the first quarter of 2025. Romania faced challenges related to fiscal deficits, public debt, and inflation. Romania’s ability to navigate these challenges and capitalize on opportunities, such as EU support and its strategic geographic location, will be crucial for its long-term economic prosperity.  Figure 28: annual GDP growth rate in Romania, 2016-2024 Slovakia’s economy has faced significant challenges due to the war in Ukraine, mainly through energy & food price shocks and disruptions to trade and supply chains. As Figure 29 and 30 show, gasoline and food price in Slovakia significantly increased. Slovakia’s economy grew by 0.45% in 2022, a 5.28% decline from 2021. GDP growth rate for 2023 was 1.38 %. GDP growth in Slovakia moderately bounced back in 2024 with a growth rate of 2.0. In the first quarter of 2025, Slovakia economy grew by 0.2 %.  Figure 29: Gasoline price in Slovakia Figure 30: food inflation in Slovakia Figure 31: annual GDP growth rate in Slovakia, 2016-2024 In 2022, Slovenia experienced a slow economic growth with 2.7%, a 5.69% decline from 2021. due to the Ukraine war and subsequent energy price hikes and supply chain disruptions. Slovenia’s economy has been hurt by the Ukraine war and subsequent flooding in 2023 and 2024 with a 2.1 % and 1.5 % growth rate, respectively. Slovenia’s GDP growth was down to -0.7 % in the first quarter of 2025.   Figure 32: annual GDP growth rate in Slovenia, 2016-2024 III. Conclusion  This paper analyzed the economic effects of the Ukraine war on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern European countries with a focus on inflation and GDP growth. The paper showed that after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, inflation skyrocketed not only in the EU member countries, including Eastern European countries, but also in Russia and Ukraine. However, the pattern of inflation was different. Inflation in Russia and Ukraine did not follow the inflation pattern of EU member countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and then has slowly declined over time. Rather inflation in Russia and Ukraine skyrocketed in 2022 and then slowed down in 2023 and started to climb again in 2024 and 2025. Inflation in Eastern European countries followed the pattern of EU member countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and has then slowly declined over time. On the other hand, the pattern of GDP growth was different, depending on the individual conditions of each nation, although most countries experienced economic decline in 2022 relative to 2021. Some countries such as Ukraine and Russia experienced negative growth in 2022 and then recovered from 2023. Other countries such as Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czech Republic experienced moderate growth in 2022 and then slowed down over time. Still other countries like Slovakia and Slovenia experienced very low GDP growth over the period of 2022-2025.  References Biddle, Stephen D. 2022. “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver.” War on the Rocks. November 22. https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/ukraine-and-the-future-of-offensive-maneuver/.Biddle, Stephen D. 2023. “Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine.” Foreign Affairs 102 (5): 153–164.Dijkstra, Hyllke, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Nicole Jenne, and Yf Reykers. 2023. “What We GotWrong: The War Against Ukraine and Security Studies.” Contemporary Security Policy 44(4): 494–496. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298Ozili, P.K., 2022, Global Economic Consequence of Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Available online at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4064770(open in a new window)

Abstract This analysis examines European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting the EU’s evolving role as a security actor. The August 18, 2025, White House summit marked a key moment, with EU leaders pledging "ironclad" security guarantees modelled after NATO’s Article 5, without formal NATO membership for Ukraine, and proposing a "reassurance force" of European troops post-ceasefire. The EU commits to unrestricted Ukrainian military capabilities, sustained economic and military aid, and intensified sanctions against Russia. While the EU aims to bolster Ukraine’s self-defence and facilitate peace talks, challenges persist, including funding, coordination with the U.S., and Russia’s rejection of guarantees involving Western troops. The EU’s approach reflects a strategic shift toward a more assertive Common Foreign and Security Policy, though institutional limitations remain. The guarantees are intertwined with Ukraine’s EU accession ambitions, carrying significant geopolitical and financial implications for the European security architecture and regional stability.Key Words: Ukrainian War, European Security, EU, U.S., Russia Introduction The ongoing war in Ukraine likely marks the end of the post-Cold War security environment in Europe and the rest of the world. The old international system, based on the benign hegemony of the United States and its dominance in international institutions, is witnessing the vanishing of the pretence of the leading role of international law and international regimes before our eyes. What is emerging brings back memories of the 19th-century Concert of Europe, where the great powers of Europe— Austria, France, Prussia (later Germany), Russia, and the United Kingdom —came together to maintain the European balance of power, political boundaries, and spheres of influence. This time around, however, there are fewer players, and the gameboard is genuinely global. The U.S., China and Russia do not leave much space for other players, at least in the global context. The EU declares itself to be a global player, matching the influence of the big three, but in all honesty, it is not treated as such by them.  This analysis looks at the latest developments regarding the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine (a proxy war between NATO and Russia) and specifically at the role of the EU and its proposed security guarantees offered to Ukraine. The August 18 Meeting On August 18, 2025, a meeting took place at the White House. It included U.S. President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and leaders from Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Finland, the European Commission, the European Council, and NATO. They talked about ways to stop Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A key topic was security guarantees for Ukraine. The EU promised strong protection for Ukraine's independence and borders. This is intended to prevent future Russian attacks, even though Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO soon. These promises build on earlier security agreements but demonstrate a more unified European effort, with the U.S. providing support but not leading with troops or NATO membership.  Ironclad Security Guarantees Equivalent to NATO's Article 5 (Collective Defence) The EU promised to give firm, long-term security promises to Ukraine, similar to NATO's Article 5. This means an attack on Ukraine would be seen as an attack on those who promised to help. However, these promises would not be part of NATO to avoid upsetting Russia or requiring all NATO members to agree. European leaders, including those from the "Coalition of the Willing," are prepared to deploy a "reassurance force" or peacekeepers to Ukraine once the fighting ceases. This force would comprise troops from different European countries, taking turns to monitor and enforce any peace agreement, with a primary focus on preventing new attacks. EU officials stated that Russia cannot halt these plans or Ukraine's future aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Trump said the U.S. will work with Europe and might provide air support, but will not send American ground troops, making Europe the "first line of defence." Meanwhile, the U.S. will support by selling weapons.[1]  No Restrictions on Ukraine's Military Capabilities   EU leaders want Ukraine's military to have no limits on size, type, or actions. This means Ukraine can make weapons at home and get more from Western countries without Russia stopping them. The aim is for Ukraine to have a strong army for many years. Europe will also increase its own military production to help. Ukraine plans to buy $90 billion in U.S. weapons, mostly paid for by Europe. This includes planes, air defence systems, and drones. A formal agreement is expected within 10 days of the meeting.[2]  Sustained Economic and Military Support, Including Sanctions The EU has pledged to continue providing Ukraine with military, financial, and humanitarian assistance until a lasting peace is achieved. They will also increase sanctions and economic actions against Russia to maintain pressure. Leaders say they will support Ukraine as long as the fighting continues, and they will not force Ukraine to give up any land. Only Ukraine can decide about its territory. Europe is prepared to undertake most of this effort and may allocate an additional €40 billion for weapons if necessary. They will work with the U.S. to get support from Trump.[3]  Facilitation of Further Talks and Peace Efforts EU leaders aim to facilitate a meeting between Trump, Zelenskyy, and Putin. They say any agreement must include Ukraine's views and protect Europe's safety. They are glad Trump is pushing for peace, but say a ceasefire is not needed for security promises. Moscow's complaints, like those about NATO forces, will not stop their plans. This shows Europe is united. Leaders like Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa have stated that there will be no official changes to borders, and they fully support Ukraine's membership in the EU.[4] There were concerns that Trump might pressure Ukraine to make concessions during his meeting with Putin on August 15, 2025, in Alaska. European leaders quickly organised a meeting at the White House to influence Trump. This was seen as a way to win him over. Russia does not want NATO or Western troops in Ukraine, seeing it as a threat. Some experts argue that there is a "security guarantee paradox": if the protection is too weak, it will not benefit Ukraine; if it is too strong, Russia may not agree to any deal.[5] EU officials are hopeful, but they face several challenges. These include securing funding (Europe will cover most costs), managing rotating forces, and ensuring the U.S. remains committed after Trump's term.[6] Recent Military and Diplomatic Developments The Russia-Ukraine war started in February 2022. In August 2025, fighting and diplomatic talks increased. Russian troops are moving forward in eastern Ukraine, especially in Donetsk, with many attacks. Ukraine is hitting Russian targets. U.S. President Donald Trump is leading peace talks after meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on August 15. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders are also involved. However, significant disagreements persist regarding land, security, and ceasefires. There is no quick solution yet. Russian Advances and Territorial Gains Russian forces have concentrated on Donetsk and taken more land. From July 8 to August 5, 2025, Russia gained 226 square miles, continuing its slow progress in the area.[7] By mid-August, Russia controls large parts of Donbas and continues to advance, even though Ukraine is fighting back.[8]   Source: https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-aug-6-2025  On August 19, Russia launched its most significant attack of the month, using drones and missiles against Ukrainian targets, resulting in civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.[9] On August 18, there were similar long-range attacks. On August 19, Ukraine and Russia swapped the bodies of dead soldiers. Ukraine has increased attacks on Russian energy sites to cut off war funding.[10] After the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska, Trump met with Zelenskyy and leaders from the EU and UK on August 18 to discuss peace. Trump seems to support giving some Ukrainian land, like parts of Donbas, to Russia for peace. He also suggests U.S. air support as a security promise. A U.S. envoy stated that there is progress: Putin has agreed to U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine and has relinquished some territory.[11] Plans for direct talks are being made. Putin suggested Moscow as the meeting place, but this has not been confirmed yet (as of August 20).[12] European leaders, including EU figures, seem to welcome these efforts but insist on continued sanctions against Russia and reject Budapest (Hungary) as a site due to past failed assurances.[13 ] In the meantime, Ukraine demands robust security guarantees (e.g., deterrence against future attacks) and $90 billion in aid.[14 ] Russia, however, rejects European guarantees, insists on territorial concessions, and maintains unchanged objectives. As of now, no ceasefire has been agreed upon; however, Russia claims to be open to one.[15 ] Where Does the EU Stand in General? EU leaders stress that a strong Ukraine is the best guarantee against Russia. According to the statement of 12 August, issued by the European Council and the Council of the European Union: “The European Union, in coordination with the U.S. and other like-minded partners, will continue to provide political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine as Ukraine is exercising its inherent right of self-defence. It will also continue to uphold and impose restrictive measures against the Russian Federation. A Ukraine capable of defending itself effectively is an integral part of any future security guarantees. The European Union and its Member States are ready to further contribute to security guarantees based on their respective competences and capabilities, in line with international law, and in full respect of the security and defence policies of certain Member States, while taking into account the security and defence interests of all Member States. The European Union underlines the inherent right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny and will continue supporting Ukraine on its path towards EU membership”.[16]  According to EU top diplomat, Kaja Kallas (High Representative/Vice-President (2024-2029) responsible for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy),[17] the idea of letting Russia keep Ukrainian territories (proposal as signalled by Trump) was a "trap that Putin wants us [the EU] to walk into".[18] She stressed that Russia has offered no concessions and that credible security measures, such as bolstering Ukraine's military, are essential—though specifics on contributions remain up to individual member states. In a like-minded fashion, French President Emmanuel Macron rather hawkishly and not very diplomatically echoed this, describing Putin as a "predator, and an ogre at our [Europe] doorstep" and expressing "the greatest doubt" that he would be willing to work towards peace. In short, the foremost European leaders are still ready to challenge Russia. They enjoy peace at home while using Ukraine as a battleground. Their new ideas about Ukraine's safety and Europe's security are bold and raise concerns about possible problems. The “Devil Lies in Details” The European Union is part of the "Coalition of the Willing" due to its key members. According to Wikipedia, this group comprises 31 countries. They have promised to support Ukraine more strongly against Russia than the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. They are ready to join a peacekeeping force in Ukraine by sending troops or providing other forms of support.[19] The peacekeeping force is envisaged to be deployed only once Ukraine and Russia sign a "comprehensive ceasefire agreement" or "peace deal" to settle the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The initiative, led by the United Kingdom and France, was announced by British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer on 2 March 2025, following the 2025 London Summit on Ukraine under the motto "securing our future".[20] The EU has been developing plans for Ukraine's security in the aftermath of the war. The primary goal is to stop future Russian attacks, short of offering NATO membership to Ukraine. Recent plans include military, diplomatic, and financial help, with the EU and U.S. working together. These plans are still changing due to ongoing talks, Russian objections, and questions about their enforcement. The focus is on helping Ukraine defend itself and providing additional support, including air and sea protection. The EU wants Ukraine to be able to defend itself. This is important for any promises they make. The EU and its member states are ready to provide assistance based on their capabilities. They will follow international law and their own defence rules.[21] This includes ongoing military aid but does not specify sending troops or creating new plans. In this context, European Council President Antonio Costa has called for faster work on "NATO-like" guarantees. These could be similar to Article 5, where an attack on Ukraine would lead to talks and actions from allies.[22] NATO and European leaders are discussing a new plan similar to "Article 5." This plan would prompt allies to discuss within 24 hours in the event of an attack. They would work together on responses, such as increasing military forces and providing aid for rebuilding. This idea is similar to agreements with countries like the UK and France, which focus on building strength and recognising borders.[23] EU accession for Ukraine could trigger the bloc's mutual defence clause, offering a "strong guarantee" in principle, although its practical enforcement is debated.[24] Air and sea security are important. A "sky shield" is planned to protect the air over western and central Ukraine, including Kyiv. European fighter jets, with possible U.S. support, will enforce this. The jets might be stationed in Poland or Romania. There will be rules for dealing with Russian actions, like missile attacks. In the Black Sea, measures will prevent Russian naval threats and keep shipping safe from ports like Odesa using intelligence and patrols.[25] Some countries, such as France and the UK, may deploy a small number of troops. These troops could help with training in cities like Kyiv or Lviv, or they might help secure ports and airbases.[26] Sending large numbers of troops is not feasible due to Ukraine's vast size and Russia's demands. Instead, the focus is on training, sharing information, managing supplies, and equipping Ukraine's military with weapons. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said that guarantees might be ready by August 29, 2025. These include U.S. assistance, valued at $90 billion, which includes weapons such as planes and air defences. Europeans will be the "first line of defence," with the U.S. helping in other ways. However, there are concerns: Russia wants to be part of the talks and does not want foreign troops. Some reports also question the coalition's strength and clarity, particularly in the absence of firm U.S. promises. Possible Broader Geopolitical Ramifications First, supporting Ukraine’s borders could strengthen the EU’s role in European security. This would indicate a shift towards a stronger EU foreign and security policy, as well as a more unified European defence system. However, the EU’s current tools, such as Article 42(7) TEU and PESCO, are not particularly robust. They have limitations in how they operate and face financial and organisational problems. This makes it challenging for the EU to establish itself as a strong security force without assistance from NATO and the U.S.[27] Second, the EU’s security guarantee to Ukraine is likely to intersect closely with NATO’s role, as the EU’s defence efforts currently complement but do not replace NATO’s collective defence framework. The EU remains dependent on NATO (especially the U.S.) for significant military capabilities, and the guarantee could deepen cooperation but also create institutional competition or overlap. The transatlantic alliance’s unity and the U.S. continued engagement are critical factors in the guarantee’s effectiveness.[28] Third, an EU guarantee of Ukraine’s security could also send a strong geopolitical signal to Russia, potentially deterring further aggression and affirming the EU’s commitment to the European security order. However, it may also escalate tensions with Russia, which views such guarantees as a threat to its sphere of influence.[29] This dynamic affects not only Ukraine but also other countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, such as Georgia, which is vulnerable to Russian pressure and exclusion from security arrangements.[30] Fourth, guaranteeing Ukraine’s security is linked to its EU accession ambitions. While Ukrainians see EU membership as essential recognition of their sovereignty and security, many Europeans view it as a component of a future negotiated settlement with Russia. The EU’s guarantee thus has implications for the pace and nature of enlargement, potentially affecting the EU’s cohesion and its relations with neighbouring countries.[31] Fifth, the EU’s security guarantees would likely entail substantial financial commitments, including military aid, reconstruction support financed through mechanisms such as the European Peace Facility (EPF), and the utilisation of frozen Russian assets. These financial undertakings have implications for EU budgetary policies, fiscal solidarity, and the development of a European defence industrial base, which is currently fragmented and underfunded. Conclusion The EU declares itself to be a global player and consequently engages as a broker in preparing peace talks with Russia. Moreover, it envisions itself as a guarantor of peace on the European continent and Ukrainian security, as well as its territorial integrity.  Two important questions, however, remained unanswered.  First, given the EU's engagement against Russia alongside Ukraine, as well as its most prominent member states' support for the Ukrainian war effort, one would be correct to question the intentions of at least some European political leaders. On one hand, the openly adversarial stance against Russia may produce some deterrence-like effects (although, in all honesty, it is difficult to prove). On the other hand, it definitely does prolong the conflict at the expense of Ukraine and its people.  Second, the following analysis will examine the extent to which the EU's guarantees for Ukraine are in reality. Political declarations and paper documents can convey a wide range of statements, including the most hawkish and resolute. The real test, however, always involves actual acting in the face of challenges and dangers. Will Europeans actually be ready to back their words with actions? Will they be able to perform at the required level militarily and economically? The 20th-century experience would suggest otherwise. References1  Roth, A., & Sauer, P. (2025, August 19). Trump rules out sending US troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/19/european-leaders-ukraine-russia-trump 2  Magramo, K., Kent, L., Lister, T., Edwards, C., Chowdhury, M., Sangal, A., Hammond, E., & Liptak, K. (2025, August 18). Trump meets Zelensky and European leaders at White House. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-ukraine-zelensky-russia-putin-08-18-25 3  Europe must shoulder ‘lion’s share’ of Ukraine’s security, Vance says. (2025, August 21). AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/21/europe-must-shoulder-lions-share-of-ukraines-security-vance-says 4  Mangan, D., Breuninger, K., Doherty, E., & Wilkie, C. (2025, August 18). Trump-Zelenskyy meeting paves the way for Ukraine security guarantees, trilateral talks with Putin. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/18/trump-zelenskyy-ukraine-putin-live-updates.html 5  Rutland, P. (2025, August 22). The ‘security guarantee’ paradox: Too weak and it won’t protect Ukraine; too robust and Russia won’t accept it. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/the-security-guarantee-paradox-too-weak-and-it-wont-protect-ukraine-too-robust-and-russia-wont-accept-it-263518 6  Schwartz, F., Barigazzi, J., & Webber, E. (2025, August 13). Trump tells European leaders US could provide security guarantees for Ukraine. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/13/trump-european-leaders-security-ukraine-00508598 7  The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Aug. 6, 2025. (n.d.). Russia Matters. Retrieved August 21, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-aug-6-2025 8  A timeline of territorial shifts during Russia’s war on Ukraine. (2025, August 18). PBS News. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-territorial-shifts-during-russias-war-on-ukraine 9  Ukraine hit by multiple Russian strikes amid US-led push for end to war. (2025, August 19). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/19/ukraine-hit-by-multiple-russian-strikes-amid-us-led-push-for-end-to-war 10  Harvey, A., Mappes, G., Novikov, D., Sobieski, J., Young, J., Barros, G., Kagan, F. W., & Trotter, N. (2025, August 19). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2025. Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025 11  Smolar, P. (2025, August 19). War in Ukraine: Diplomatic efforts intensify ahead of possible Zelensky-Putin meeting. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/08/19/war-in-ukraine-diplomatic-efforts-intensify-ahead-of-possible-zelensky-putin-meeting_6744508_4.html 12  Magramo, K., Yeung, J., Lau, C., Kent, L., Edwards, C., Chowdhury, M., Powell, T. B., Sangal, A., & Hammond, E. (2025, August 20). August 19, 2025: White House says Putin-Zelensky meeting plans are ‘underway’ following Trump meetings. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/trump-ukraine-russia-zelensky-putin-08-19-25 13  European Union Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine. (2025, August 12). European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine/ 14  Hatton, B., & Davies, K. M. (2025, August 19). Despite a flurry of meetings on Russia’s war in Ukraine, major obstacles to peace remain. AP. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-trump-europe-next-steps-527983fab40e58208e9e18c943de696a 15  Westfall, S., & Ilyushina, M. (August 19). Here’s what Russia and Ukraine have demanded to end the war. The Washington Post. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-trump-europe-next-steps-527983fab40e58208e9e18c943de696a 16  European Union Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine. (2025, August 12). European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine/ 17  See more at: https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/kaja-kallas_en 18  Wilson, T., & Lau, S. (2025, August 22). Proposed Ukraine land concessions are Putin’s trap, EU’s top diplomat tells BBC. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8zdezm507o 19  Coalition of the willing (Russo-Ukrainian War). (n.d.). Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved August 22, 2025, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_of_the_willing_(Russo-Ukrainian_War) 20  Martin, D. (2025, March 2). Britain and France to lead ‘coalition of the willing’ to save Ukraine. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/03/02/britain-france-lead-coalition-willing-save-ukraine/ 21  European Union Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine. (2025, August 12). European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine/ 22  Tidey, A. (2025, August 19). EU and allies must “accelerate” work on Ukraine’s NATO-like security guarantees, Costa says. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/19/eu-and-allies-must-accelerate-work-on-ukraines-nato-like-security-guarantees-costa-says 23  Webber, M. (2025, August 20). Ukraine war: what an ‘article 5-style’ security guarantee might look like. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-an-article-5-style-security-guarantee-might-look-like-263475 24  Is EU accession a security guarantee for Ukraine? (2025, August 22). The New Union Post. https://newunionpost.eu/2025/08/21/ukraine-security-guarantee-eu-accession/ 25  Gardner, F. (2025, August 19). What security guarantees for Ukraine would actually mean. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2qr08l1yko 26  Harding, L. (2025, August 19). What security guarantees might Ukraine get in return for a peace deal? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/19/what-security-guarantees-might-ukraine-get-in-return-for-a-peace-deal 27  Genini, D. (2025). How the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook of European Law. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeaf003 28  Genini, D. (2025). How the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook of European Law. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeaf003 29  Beta, S., Hetherington, K., Contini, K., Zajda, M., Smyrnova, H., Bidnyi, I., Lipska, N., Bahno, M., Tsios, I., Lysenko, L., & Zimmerman, L. (2025, February 5). The Legal Basis for EU Security Guarantees for Ukraine. PILPG. https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/lawyering-justice-blog/2025/5/2/xebqjexqu8ccgsvbo2rmcv4w5an13q 30  Brotman, A. (2025, August 22). The Importance of Security Guarantees for Ukraine and Europe. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-importance-of-security-guarantees-for-ukraine-and-europe/ 31  Brotman, A. (2025, August 22). The Importance of Security Guarantees for Ukraine and Europe. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-importance-of-security-guarantees-for-ukraine-and-europe/  

In February 2019, the Turkish Naval Force carried out a large-scale military exercise in the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to test the operation of the new weapons and naval systems acquired by the country over the last decade. At first, this event did not generate adverse reactions from the international community, but six months later alarm bells rang when, during a speech by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at Turkey’s National Defense University, a map was publicly displayed showing what the Republic of Turkey considered to be its sovereign maritime domains. This later became associated with a concept known as Mavi Vatan. Proposed by Admiral Cihat Yaycı and developed by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Mavi Vatan or the Blue Homeland Doctrine is a project and geostrategic representation of Turkey with the intention of claiming the state’s supposed jurisdiction over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. It demonstrates Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the limits established by international law—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)—and upholds its right to the legitimate defense of sovereignty over what it asserts are its maritime domains: 462,000 km² comprising its territorial waters, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and its continental shelf (Denizeau, A., 2021).  Figure 1: Map of ‘Mavi Vatan’ or the Blue Homeland Doctrine publicly displayed during President Erdoğan’s speech at Turkey’s National Defense University (August 2019). Source: Wikimedia Commons ‘Mavi Vatan’ not only represents a historical claim regarding the events of 2004, when the Republic of Cyprus became an official member of the European Union and established its own maritime borders as a state, which, under the framework of international law, pushed the Republic of Turkey into a narrow strip of sea in which to operate. At the same time, Mavi Vatan emerged as a solution to the growing security challenges that have arisen in the last decade of the 21st century, challenges that have threatened not only the integrity of the state itself but also all those elements that guarantee its survival in the international arena; in this case, Turkey’s access to energy resources. With projections that the Republic of Turkey will reach 90 million inhabitants by 2030 (Martín, L; n.d.), the Turkish state is aware of the increasing energy demands needed to adequately meet the needs of a rapidly growing population. To satisfy that demand, it is compelled to seek optimal sources of income to achieve this purpose. In response—and knowing of the large hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in recent years (Zeballos Rivero, M., 2024)—Turkey has turned to Mavi Vatan as a solution. If successfully implemented, it would allow Turkey to establish an area for the exploration and exploitation of resources lying beneath these waters to cover its urgent energy needs. The problem? Turkey is not the only interested party. Countries such as Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt, sharing coastlines with the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, are also engaged in heated disputes over legitimate access to these energy resources. However, the most pressing rivalry remains between Turkey and Cyprus, who, having relatively greater capacities to extract energy resources, have been at the forefront of an active dispute to claim sovereignty over these hydrocarbons.  Figure 2: Map of the EEZs of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and also of Mavi Vatan. Source: Emmanouilidis, C. (2020, August 31). Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. European Data Journalist Network. https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/es/cp_data_news/tensiones-en-el-mediterraneo-oriental/ On the one hand, there is the Cyprus–Egypt–European Union alliance, which has agreed upon and mutually recognized the maritime boundaries corresponding to each of them in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, while clearly omitting the possible sovereignty claims of other countries in the disputed area (s.autor, 2024). On the other hand, there are Turkey’s individual efforts, which, in its quest to gain access to hydrocarbon resources in the sea in question, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2019 with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to establish an EEZ stretching from Turkey’s southern coast to the northwestern area of the North African country. This agreement granted the Turks rights to hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the zone (s.autor, 2024). Although the agreement was suspended in 2021, Turkey has continued to promote ongoing exploration expeditions in the region, which have even extended to Somali waters, with whom it already has agreements in this field. The firm actions taken by states in the region demonstrate that, beyond being an ambition for access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the dispute actually represents an active risk to stability and security in the region. Firstly, from the energy dimension: given the importance of energy resources for human development, the continuation of hostilities among the involved states prevents the establishment of cooperative mechanisms that would allow all parties to benefit from the issue. Instead, it risks generating a zero-sum game in which only the strongest state would emerge victorious while the others remain vulnerable to an imminent energy crisis, thereby putting thousands of human lives at risk. Secondly, from the military dimension, there is the latent possibility that an armed conflict could erupt at any moment in the Eastern Mediterranean over immediate access to the contested resources. Without underestimating the military capabilities of the other countries involved, it is important to highlight the case of Turkey, which in recent years has significantly expanded its military capacities as part of the reformulation of its Foreign Policy. This has allowed Turkey to position itself as the ninth-strongest military power in the world (Global Fire Power, 2025) and the second-largest army within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the opposite side lies Cyprus, which, although it does not possess the same military capabilities as the Republic of Turkey, does benefit from the direct support of the European Union, which, if necessary, could easily respond to potential acts of aggression in a military conflict in the region. Both sides of the dispute—Turkey and the European Union along with Cyprus—truly have sufficient resources to escalate the conflict if they so desire, but they have not done so for reasons that remain unclear. For now, the situation remains uncertain. Beyond warnings or complaints from some states and/or international organizations, there has been no decisive action to put an immediate end to the conflict, since, in reality, no large-scale crisis has yet warranted such a response. However, it is important not to underestimate the phenomenon: the fact that it has not yet generated a major impact does not mean it could not do so one day, especially considering the great capacities the involved states have both to act and to respond to possible aggression. Historically, disputes over energy resources have generated unprecedented wars that have cost thousands of lives—for example, the Gulf War in 1991. It is therefore necessary to continue monitoring such situations to prevent them from escalating into conflicts as violent as those of the past. Thus, diplomatic channels between all parties to the conflict must be pursued, with the aim of generating cooperative solutions that foster peace and prosperity among nations, rather than new problems. ReferencesDenizeau, A. (abril, 2021) “Mavi Vatan, the ‘Blue Homeland’: The Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey”, Études de l’Ifri, Ifri.E. (2019, 30 diciembre) La lucha por los recursos en el Mediterráneo Oriental. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/la-lucha-por-los-recursos-en-el-mediterr%C3%A1neo-oriental-/1685950Global Fire Power (2025). 2025 Military Strength Ranking. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.phpJager, J.; Norris, A. (2021, 27 septiembre). The Mavi Vatan Doctrine and Blue Homeland Anthem: A Look At Turkey’s Maritime Worldview. Center for International Maritime Security. https://cimsec.org/the-mavi-vatan-doctrine-and-blue-homeland-anthem-a-look-at-turkeys-maritime-worldview/Kaya Ulger, I. (2020, 14 octubre) Turquía continúa defendiendo su “patria azul”. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/turqu%C3%ADa-contin%C3%BAa-defendiendo-su-patria-azul-/2005458Mason, S. (2020, 20 septiembre). Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy - War on the Rocks. War On The Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/Martín, L. (s. f.).   ‘Mavi Vatam’: la doctrina turca de la ‘patria azul‘. Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/-mavi-vatam-la-doctrina-turca-de-la-patria-azul-3Menjón, D. M. (2021, 7 octubre). Dossier Geopolítico Especial: Teoría de la “Patria Azul”. Turquía se proyecta sobre el mar (de la energía). Hermes Kalamos. https://www.hermes-kalamos.eu/dossier-geopolitico-especial-teoria-de-la-patria-azul-turquia-se-proyecta-sobre-el-mar-de-la-energia/S. a. (2024, 10 abril) Cihat Yayci: Libia es un socio estratégico y un aliado para proteger y promover la seguridad de Turquía. OtraLecturA https://otralectura.com/2024/03/15/cihat-yayci-libia-es-un-socio-estrategico-y-un-aliado-para-proteger-y-promover-la-seguridad-de-turquia/S.a. (s. f.). Mavi Vatan-2019 Tatbikatının Ardından Enerji-Politik Ağırlıklı Bir Değerlendirme. Euronewsport İş dünyasından haberler. https://euronewsport.com/mavi-vatan-2019-tatbikatinin-ardindan-enerji-politik-agirlikli-bir-degerlendirme/Zeballos Rivero, M. (2023, 22 marzo). Creciente tensión entre Turquía y Grecia por reservas de gas en el Mediterráneo. Global Affairs And Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/creciente-tension-entre-turquia-y-grecia-por-reservas-de-gas-en-el-mediterraneo 

Abstract This analysis critically examines the European Union's security guarantees for Ukraine as of 2025, amid ongoing conflict and geopolitical tensions. Despite ambitious diplomatic efforts and increased defence spending, the EU faces significant economic and military challenges that undermine its capacity to ensure Ukraine's security and territorial integrity.Economically, the EU struggles with sluggish growth, structural inefficiencies, high public debt, and trade deficits, particularly with China, limiting resources for sustained military investment. Militarily, the EU's fragmented forces and reliance on NATO contrast sharply with Russia's extensive, war-driven military production and strategic nuclear capabilities.The war in Ukraine demonstrates the increasing prominence of drones and missiles, areas where the EU lags behind both Ukraine and Russia in production scale and innovation. Furthermore, the shifting global order towards multipolarity and the strategic alignment of Russia and China further constrain the EU's role as a formidable security actor beyond its borders. Key Words: EU, Ukraine, Security, Guarantees Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement on September 5, 2025, warning that any foreign troops deployed to Ukraine — particularly in the context of the "coalition of the willing" led by France and the UK — would be considered legitimate targets for Russian forces. This was in direct response to a summit in Paris on September 4, where 26 countries pledged to contribute to a potential postwar security force for Ukraine, which could involve deploying troops on the ground, at sea, or in the air to deter future aggression after a ceasefire. Putin's exact words, as reported from his appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, included: "Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction."[i] He further emphasised that even post-ceasefire, he saw no need for such forces if a long-term peace is achieved, adding, "If decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop."[ii] The "coalition of the willing" refers to a group of primarily European and Commonwealth nations, co-chaired by France and Britain, formed in early 2025 to provide security guarantees for Ukraine amid ongoing peace efforts led by US President Donald Trump. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Putin's stance, calling the presence of any foreign or NATO forces near Russia's border a threat and unacceptable.[iii] While Putin did not explicitly name the "coalition of the willing" in his quoted remarks, the timing and context—immediately following the Paris summit announcements—make it clear his warning targets their proposed deployments.[iv] As bold as President Putin's statement is, the EU has been making lots of noise in recent months regarding European guarantees for the future of Ukrainian security and its territorial integrity. This analysis aims to provide a "hard-eyed" assessment of the formidability of these claims, following a previous piece that analysed European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine's territorial integrity, published here: An analysis of European Diplomatic Efforts to Support Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity. Challenges and Opportunities. EU Economic Stance and Prospects As of 2025, the European Union's economy remains sluggish, troubled by structural inefficiencies and mounting external pressures. Arguably, the EU bloc is increasingly uncompetitive on the global stage. Despite some stabilisation in inflation and resilient labour markets, the overall trajectory suggests a region struggling to keep pace with the United States and China, with GDP growth forecasts hovering around a dismal 1% — well below the global average of 3.2%. This underperformance is not a temporary hiccup but a symptom of deep-rooted issues, including overregulation, demographic decline, and dependency on volatile external factors.[v] Critics argue that the EU's adherence to rigid "globalist" policies, such as burdensome environmental regulations and fragmented fiscal strategies, has stifled innovation and exacerbated trade imbalances, leading to a €305.8 billion deficit with China in 2024 alone. It is pretty probable that without radical reforms, the EU risks sliding into prolonged stagnation or even collapse, as high energy costs erode competitiveness in export markets. State of the Union (2025,10 September ) openly admits that "In the trade of goods, the EU has long had a trade deficit with China. The deficit amounted to €305.8 billion in 2024, surpassing the €297 billion deficit of 2023, but lower than the record trade deficit of €397.3 billion reached in 2022. In terms of volume, the deficit increased from 34.8 million tons in 2023 to 44.5 million tons in 2024. In the period 2015-2024, the deficit quadrupled in volume, while it doubled in value.China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and its biggest for imports. EU exports to China amounted to €213.3 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €519 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 0.3% and 4.6% respectively. In 2024, EU imports of manufactured goods accounted for 96.7% of total imports from China, with primary goods comprising just 3%. The most important manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (55%), followed by other manufactured goods (34%), and chemicals (8%). In 2024, EU exports of manufactured goods constituted 86.9% of total exports to China, with primary goods making up 11.5%. The most exported manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (51%), followed by other manufactured goods (20%), and chemicals (17%).[vi] The EU's core metrics reveal an economy that is stable but uninspiring, to put it mildly, with persistent disparities across member states that undermine cohesion.   *Created by Grok – prompt: critical evaluation of the EU economic situation as of 2025. These figures highlight internal fractures: Southern Europe (e.g., Spain at 2.6%) outperforms the core (Germany at 0%), but overall, the bloc's growth is "stuck in first gear," with services stagnant and manufacturing barely registering. Household savings are rebuilding, but consumer confidence remains low amid trade disruptions and geopolitical noise. At its core, the EU suffers from endemic structural flaws that no amount of monetary tinkering can fix. An ageing population—projected to strain fiscal sustainability—exacerbates labour shortages and boosts welfare costs, while policies to increase participation among older workers and women remain inadequate.[vii] Productivity has lagged behind that of the US and Asia for over 15 years, hindered by fragmented regulations that impede innovation in AI and biotech.[viii] The much-touted Green Deal, while environmentally ambitious, imposes extreme costs on industries, with 44% of firms reporting trade disruptions from China (mostly dumping). Energy dependency, exposed by the Ukraine war, has led to sky-high costs that "erode competitiveness," pushing the EU toward deindustrialisation. Critics decry the EU as a "technocratic regime" where national sovereignty is eroded by Brussel’s alleged blackmail tactics, rendering parliaments mere puppets and stifling bold reforms. The EU's economy is dangerously exposed to global headwinds, with risks tilted firmly downward.[ix] Escalating US-China trade tensions, including potential Trump-era tariffs, threaten exports (over 50% of GDP), particularly in the automotive and machinery sectors.[x] Geopolitical conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East disrupt supply chains and energy prices, while climate events add further volatility.[xi] The loss of the "peace dividend" forces a diversion of resources to defence, inflating costs and deterring investment. Capital outflows to a faster-growing US, driven by tax cuts, compound the issue, leaving Europe starved of investment. Politically, instability, such as France's government collapse over budget cuts (€44 billion), signals deeper fractures, risking social unrest and further eroding confidence.[xii] The analysis above only scratches the surface. To have a better picture, one should also look at current and projected budget deficits and public debts. For example, according to the EU-27, the total public debt was approximately €14.2 trillion in Q1 2025.[xiii] As for budget deficits, the aggregate EU-27 deficit stood at -2.9% of GDP in Q1 2025, according to Eurostat. [xiv] Looking forward, the situation does not seem to look much better. The prospects for public debt and budget deficits in the EU-27 over the next 5 to 10 years are characterised by gradual upward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios due to persistent deficits, ageing populations, increased defence spending, and potential shocks like higher interest rates or geopolitical tensions. Based on the latest forecasts from the European Commission (Spring 2025), IMF (April 2025 World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor), and other analyses as of September 2025, debt levels are expected to stabilise or edge higher in the short term (2025–2026), with longer-term sustainability risks emerging from megatrends like climate adaptation and demographic shifts. No comprehensive projections extend fully to 2035, but medium-term analyses (up to 2030) suggest debt could rise to 85–90% of GDP for the EU aggregate if fiscal consolidation is uneven. Deficits are projected to hover around -3% of GDP, testing the Maastricht 3% limit, with calls for prudent policies to avoid unsustainable paths.[xv] It is against this backdrop that the SAFE investments, of which I have written here, here, here and here will have to be somehow balanced against other public policies, including immigration, education, public healthcare or housing. The picture does not look good for the EU, to put it mildly. Current European Military Capabilities as Compared to Russia The EU The European Union's military and defence capabilities remain fragmented, relying on the collective forces of its 27 member states rather than a unified army. As of 2025, the EU and the UK boast approximately 1.4 million[xvi] active personnel, over 7,000 tanks, 1,300 combat aircraft, and a naval fleet including 18 submarines and multiple aircraft carriers, primarily from France and Italy. Combined defence spending has risen to approximately 2% of GDP, totalling €343 billion as of 2024, but gaps persist in strategic enablers, such as air defence, munitions, and cyber capabilities.[xvii] The EU's strengths include industrial bases in countries such as Germany and France, which support exports and innovation in areas like drones and AI. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) facilitate missions, while PESCO fosters joint projects. Recent initiatives, such as the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan, aim to mobilise €800 billion for investments, including €150 billion via the SAFE loan instrument, targeting two million artillery rounds in 2025, enhanced drone systems, and military mobility.[xviii] The EU's major weaknesses include a heavy reliance on NATO, particularly on US troops, with estimates suggesting that Europe needs an additional 300,000 soldiers and €250 billion annually to achieve independence. This includes addressing shortfalls in tanks (1,400 needed), artillery, and shells (one million for sustained combat). Challenges include political divisions, with Hungary blocking aid, and supply chain vulnerabilities amid climate threats.[xix] Overall, while progress toward a "European pillar" in NATO accelerates, achieving full strategic autonomy by 2030 hinges on member states' commitment to joint procurement and increased spending. The Russian Federation Russia's military capabilities in 2025 are formidable yet strained by the ongoing Ukraine war, with approximately 1.1 million active personnel, including 600,000 deployed near Ukraine.[xx] According to the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Russia's Defence spending reached 15.5 trillion roubles ($150 billion), or 7.2% of GDP, up 3.4% in real terms from 2024, funding war efforts and modernisation. Inventory includes roughly 5,000 tanks (after refurbishing Soviet stocks amid 3,000+ losses), 1,000 combat aircraft (down from pre-war due to 250 losses), and a navy with one aircraft carrier, 60 submarines, and 800 vessels total, emphasising submarine advancements.[xxi] Russia's strengths seem to lie in strategic nuclear forces (1,550 deployed warheads, up to 2,000 non-strategic), electronic warfare, drone production (over 100 daily), and global power projection via naval deployments. Adaptations include glide bombs and unmanned systems, enabling incremental gains in Ukraine despite 750,000 - 790,000 casualties.[xxii] According to experts, Russia's weaknesses include degraded conventional forces against NATO, stagnation in innovation, sanctions-driven dependencies on China/Iran/North Korea, labour shortages, and rising costs that hamper the development of advanced technology.[xxiii] Reforms prioritise nuclear deterrence, robotics, and force enlargement, but demographic/economic constraints may limit rebuilding over a decade. Overall, Russia sustains attrition warfare but faces sustainability challenges for broader threats.[xxiv] The Realities of the Current Wars – the case of the war in Ukraine The war in Ukraine is surprisingly static in a sense in which the First World War was static. We can observe numerous troops fighting a 21st-century version of a trench war, at least to an extent where the front lines seem pretty much fixed. Technological aspects of the Ukrainian war are, however, decidedly different from a hundred years ago. The war in Ukraine is marked by an extensive use of drones. The analysis of available data from the military, UN reports, and media, up to mid-2025, indicates that the weapons causing the highest number of casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war are primarily drones and artillery systems. These two account for most of both military and civilian losses, with a notable shift toward drones in recent years. Total casualties exceed 1.2 million (primarily military, including killed and wounded), though exact figures are estimates due to underreporting and classification issues.   *Generated by Grok. Prompt: What weapons cause the most significant number of casualties in the Ukrainian war? Multiple Sources. Please see below.[xxv] According to publicly available data, military casualties dominate, with around 1.2 million total for Russia and Ukraine combined.[xxvi] As for civilians, the estimates indicate around 50 thousand casualties, mostly from wide-area explosives.[xxvii] Can the EU be a Formidable Military Power of Tomorrow? The existing intel indicates that the drones are responsible for 70 to 80% of battlefield casualties. Exact numbers are naturally difficult to come by, but experts estimate that the total usage of drones likely exceeds production slightly due to imports/donations. Having said that, the production is probably the best indicator. Consequently, the cumulative totals since 2022 exceed 10 million, with 2025 projected to add 7-9 million drones to the battlefield.[xxviii] If this trajectory continues, it means that the future wars will increasingly be fought with drones and missiles, probably operated by AI systems. So how about the EU? The EU production is small-scale and high-value, with countries like France (Parrot SA, Thales) and Germany (Flyability) among the global top 10 manufacturers. No specific unit numbers, but the EU lags in mass production, urging scaling to millions annually for defence. The current output is likely in the tens to hundreds of thousands, primarily focused on (ISR) – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.[xxix] Tellingly, "Defence Data 2024-2025" from the European Defence Agency (EDA) does not even explicitly mention drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At best, the document alludes to the substantial increase in defence investment, procurement, and R&D in the EU Member States in the future, strongly suggesting that unmanned systems, including drones, are part of ongoing and future defence capability developments.[xxx] Interestingly, it is Ukraine that outpaces the EU in its own domestic production of drones. According to the Global Drone Industry 2025 Market Report, Ukraine produced over 2 million drones domestically in 2024 and, per President Zelensky in early 2025, has the capacity to build 4 million drones annually.[xxxi] Among other interesting information, one finds: 1. The global drone market was valued at about $73 billion in 2024 and is forecast to reach $163+ billion by 2030, with a 14%+ CAGR in the latter 2020s2. Military and defence end-use accounted for about 60% of the total drone market value in 2024.3. DJI (Chinese producer) held an estimated 70%+ share of the global drone market by 2024. One of the most promising developments in this respect appears to be the Eurodrone, officially known as the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS), a twin-turboprop unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions. It is being developed collaboratively by Airbus (leading the project), Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo, under the management of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), to meet the needs of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The program aims to provide a sovereign European capability that's affordable, operationally relevant, and certified for flight in non-segregated airspace, thereby reducing reliance on non-European systems, such as the U.S.-made Reaper drone.[xxxii] As of 2025, it's in the development phase, with the prototype assembly underway and a maiden flight targeted for mid-2027, followed by initial deliveries around 2029-2030. As such, it is still more of a project rather than any real formidable capability.   Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/20005/total-forecast-purchases-of-weaponized-military-drones/   Source: https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis Apart from drones and UAVs, it is missiles that feature prominently in the modern battlefield. Here, the EU's production capabilities seem equally modest. EU production has indeed tripled overall since 2022, driven by the war. Still, it remains defensive-oriented, with slower scale-up due to component shortages (e.g., rocket motors) and a reliance on U.S. partners. Offensive long-range strike capabilities are limited, with focus on air-defence interceptors under initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI).[xxxiii] Key systems include U.S.-made Patriot (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) and European Aster 30 (via MBDA's Eurosam). Global Patriot production is 850 – 880 annually, but Europe receives only 400 – 500. Aster output is 190 – 225 in 2025, nearly all for Europe. Combined, EU availability is 600 – 700 interceptors per year. Under a 2:1 targeting ratio (multiple interceptors per incoming missile), this equates to defending against 235 – 299 ballistic missiles annually. Projections aim for 1,130 by 2027 and 1,470 by 2029, with licensed production in Germany (e.g., Rheinmetall).[xxxiv] Recent analyses indicate Russia has significantly boosted its missile manufacturing since 2022, shifting to a wartime economy with 24/7 operations and foreign inputs (e.g., from North Korea and Iran). Estimates for 2025 suggest an annual output in the thousands, far outpacing pre-war levels, though exact figures are classified and reliant on external intelligence.[xxxv] As for ballistic missiles, Russia's Production of short- and medium-range systems such as the 9M723 (Iskander-M) and Kh-47M2 (Kinzhal) has surged. Pre-war estimates pegged 9M723 at around 72 units per year, but by June 2025, this had risen to at least 720 annually, with monthly output at 60 – 70 units. Kinzhal production stands at 10 – 15 per month (120 – 180 annually). Combined, these yield 840 – 1,020 ballistic missiles per year, marking a 66% increase over the past year and a 15–40% jump in Iskander output alone during the first half of 2025. Regarding cruise missiles, Russia's output has similarly expanded, with the Kh-101 rising from 56 pre-war to over 700 annually. Total land-attack cruise missiles (including 3M-14 Kalibr, Kh-59, and P-800 Oniks adaptations) could reach up to 2,000 per year. Stocks are estimated at 300 – 600 units currently, with projections for 5,000 by 2035. All in all, most experts point to a significant "missile gap" favouring Russia, where its 840 – 1,020 annual ballistic missiles alone exceed the EU's defensive capacity (e.g., intercepting only 300 ballistic threats per year). Russia's total missile/drone output dwarfs EU efforts. However, that is not all; one should also examine the usage and development of AI and AI-driven and operated military systems. This limited analysis does not allow an in-depth look into the matter. I have written about it here, claiming that the current war in Ukraine is also a huge lab for testing AI and AI-driven military systems. Apparently, the "AI arms race" gives Russia's wartime AI applications (e.g., drone swarms) a practical edge, potentially outpacing the EU's ethical focus by 2–3 times in deployment speed. Russia's budget allocations (5–15%) exceed the EU's EDF share (4–8%), but EU venture surges (500% growth) and NATO ties provide qualitative advantages in reliable, regulated AI. Gaps include Russia's hands-on war experience versus the EU's potential lag, with calls for international law bans and more substantial EU investments to counter the risks of escalation. Optimistically, Europe's rearmament ($865 billion) could close the divide by 2030, but analysts warn of vulnerabilities without faster AI scaling.[xxxvi] Last but not least, similar arguments can be made about the munition production capabilities. To cut a long story short, the answer to the question presented in the title of this section has to be rather negative. For example, even NATO officials, including Secretary General Mark Rutte, claimed Russia produces three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO in a year," implying 9 – 12 million annually, or even 20.5 million for a 12 times advantage. However, analysts critique these as exaggerated, noting Russia's industrial limits make figures above 4 – 6 million unfeasible without full mobilisation. External supplies bolster output: North Korea delivered ~7 million rounds by mid-2025. Russia's $1.1 trillion rearmament plan through 2036 supports long-term growth, but 2025 estimates hover at 3 – 4 million new/refurbished shells.[xxxvii] The New World Order - Incoming!!! Importantly, if the EU were to offer security and territorial integrity guarantees to Ukraine outside NATO, it would not face Russia alone. It would, or should I instead say will, face Russia and China cooperating and supporting each other, with other members of BRICS, remaining negatively neutral, that is, informally supporting Russia. I suggest that, especially a European reader, carry out a little experiment. I propose that they take any map of the world that is printed in China and locate Europe. When looking at the map, the reader is advised to compare the sizes of the territories of the EU countries with those of Russia (and China combined). Apart from that the reader is advised to compare the GDP output of the EU as Against that of Russia and China, their GDP structures, the international trade vectors, structures and volumes, the number of people, natural resources (rare earths as well as gas and coal, the number and strength of TNCs (Trans-National Companies) with headquarters in Asia and Europe. In other words, carry out a simple geopolitical comparison. To say that the EU does not look impressive as compared to Russia and China is to say nothing. When carrying out such a comparison, the observer should swiftly realise that the EU is a small region in the upper left-hand corner of the map and that its relevance and importance regarding most, if not all, of the indicators mentioned above is diminishing. The fact of the matter is that we are witnessing an absolute overhaul of the international system towards a multipolar model with the centre of gravity away from the collective west. There does not seem to be much room for Berlin, Paris or Brussels for that matter to operate as a formidable security agent outside Europe perimeter not only by the virtue of the lack of capabilities and military tools but perhaps most importantly by the lack of international recognition by the three Great powers (USA., China and Russia) and global actors such as BRICS. References[i] Soldatkin, V. (2025, September 5). Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be fair targets. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-any-western-troops-ukraine-would-be-fair-targets-2025-09-05/[ii] Walker, S. (2025, September 5). Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘legitimate targets’, Putin says. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/05/western-troops-ukraine-legitimate-targets-vladimir-putin-says[iii] Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘targets’ for Russian forces: Putin. (2025, September 5). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/5/western-troops-in-ukraine-would-be-targets-for-russian-forces-putin[iv] Putin says Russia would consider foreign troops deployed in Ukraine “legitimate targets.” (2025, September 5). CBS NEWS. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-putin-says-foreign-troops-legitimate-targets/[v] The Conference Board Economic Forecast for the Euro Area Economy. (2025, September 5). The Conference Board. https://www.conference-board.org/publications/eur-forecast[vi] China. EU trade relations with China. Facts, figures and latest developments. (2025, September 9). European Cmmission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en#:~:text=Trade%20picture,%2C%20and%20chemicals%20(17%25).[vii] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[viii] 3 priorities to boost Europe’s competitiveness in a changing world. (2025, February 20). World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/02/europe-growth-competitiveness/[ix] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[x] Barkin, N. (2025, September 2). Watching China in Europe—September 2025. German Marshall Fund. https://www.gmfus.org/news/watching-china-europe-september-2025[xi] Petersen, T. (2024, December 12). European Economic Outlook 2025: Multiple Crises Dampen the Upswing. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://bst-europe.eu/economy-security-trade/european-economic-outlook-2025-multiple-crises-dampen-the-upswing/[xii] Experts react: The French government has collapsed again. What does this mean for France, the EU, and Macron? (2025, September 8). Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-the-french-government-has-collapsed-again-what-does-this-mean-for-france-the-eu-and-macron/[xiii] Public debt at 88% of GDP in the euro area. (2025, July 21). Eurostat. https://formatresearch.com/en/2025/07/21/debito-pubblico-all88-del-pil-nellarea-euro-eurostat/[xiv] Government finance statistics. (2025, October 21). Eurostat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_finance_statistics[xv] International Monetary Fund. (2025). World economic outlook: A critical juncture amid policy shifts. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO, Europe’s debt set to surge again in new era of uncertainty, IMF warns. (2025, April 24). POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-debt-surge-uncertainty-international-monetary-fund/, Global Economy Faces Trade-Related Headwinds. (n.d.). World Bank Group. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects , Euro Area: IMF Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Mission on Common Policies for Member Countries. (2025, June 19). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/mcs-06182025-euro-area-imf-cs-of-2025-mission-on-common-policies-for-member-countries or Stráský, J., & Giovannelli, F. (2025, July 3). OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/07/oecd-economic-surveys-european-union-and-euro-area-2025_af6b738a/full-report/repurposing-the-eu-budget-for-new-challenges_b90b1f1d.html[xvi] European Commission (2025, February 21). Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed. Brugel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed[xvii] European Commission, EU defence in numbers. European Council, Council of the European Union. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/[xviii] European Commission, Acting on defence to protect Europeans. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en[xix] Mejino-Lopez, J., & Wolff, G. B. (2025). Boosting the European Defence Industry in a Hostile World. Interconomics, 60(1), 34–39. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/boosting-the-european-defence-industry-in-a-hostile-world.html[xx] Carlough, M., & Harris, B. (n.d.). Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries. Retrieved June 3, 2025, from https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/comparing-size-and-capabilities-russian-and-ukrainian-militaries[xxi] Defense Intelligence Agency. (2025). 2025 worldwide threat assessment: Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, United States House of Representatives. U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/2025%20Worldwide%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf[xxii] U.S. Naval Institute Staff. (2025, May 29). Report to Congress on Russian Military Performance. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2025/05/29/report-to-congress-on-russian-military-performance[xxiii] Boulègue, M. (2025, July 21). Russia’s struggle to modernize its military industry. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-people/mathieu-boulegue[xxiv] Foreman, J. (2025, July 9). Military lessons identified by Russia, priorities for reform, and challenges to implementation. New Eurasian Strategies Centre. https://nestcentre.org/military-lessons/[xxv] Adams, P. (2025, July 18). Kill Russian soldiers, win points: Is Ukraine’s new drone scheme gamifying war? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80p9k1r1dlo, Drones become most common cause of death for civilians in Ukraine war, UN says. (2025, February 11). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-become-most-common-cause-death-civilians-ukraine-war-un-says-2025-02-11/, Grey, S., Shiffman, J., & Martell, A. (2024, July 19). Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/, Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians. (2025, August 1). Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://aoav.org.uk/2025/ukraine-casualty-monitor/, Court, E. (2025, February 13). What is the death toll of Russia’s war in Ukraine? Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://kyivindependent.com/a-very-bloody-war-what-is-the-death-toll-of-russias-war-in-ukraine/[xxvi] The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, July 16, 2025. (n.d.). Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-16-2025[xxvii] Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to July 31, 2025. (2022, February 24). STATISTA. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/[xxviii] A Perspective on Russia, Facon, S. (n.d.). A Perspective on Russia. Centre for New American Security. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-russia/ See also: The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond. (2025, May 28). Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond and Reeves, T. (2025, May 28). JUST IN: Russia Expands Drone Capabilities as Ukraine Conflict Continues. National Defence. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/28/as-russia-ukraine-war-continues-so-does-drone-innovation[xxix] Top 10 Drone Manufacturing Countries in 2025: Global Leaders, Trends, and Analysis. (2025, July 19). QUASA. https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis[xxx] European Defence Agency. (2025). Defence Data 2024-2025. European Defence Agency. https://www.eda.europa.eu[xxxi] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (2025, July 16). Tech Space 2.0. https://ts2.tech/en/global-drone-industry-2025-market-report/[xxxii] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (n.d.). EUROPEAN MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – MALE RPAS (EURODRONE). Retrieved September 15, 2025, from https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/european-medium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-male-rpas-eurodrone/[xxxiii] Casimiro, C. (2025, August 14). European Defense Production Triples Since Russia-Ukraine War: Report. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/european-defense-production-tripled/[xxxiv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, July 6). Europe’s Missile Gap: How Russia Outcompetes Europe in the Conventional Missile Domain. MIssile Matters - with Fabian Hoffmann. https://missilematters.substack.com/p/europes-missile-gap-how-russia-outcompetes[xxxv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, September 8). Denial Won’t Do: Europe Needs a Punishment-Based Conventional Counterstrike Strategy. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/denial-wont-do-europe-needs-a-punishment-based-conventional-counterstrike-strategy/[xxxvi] Zysk, K. (2023, November 20). Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence AI in a Time of War. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war and Cohen, J. (2025, June 30). The Future of European Defense. Goldman Sachs. https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense[xxxvii] Lehalau, Y. (2025, July 25). Is Russia Outpacing NATO In Weapons Production? Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nato-weapons-production-us-germany/33482927.html