Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском More European responsibility for a sustainable transatlantic relationship ' US geopolitical priorities will continue to shift to the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. ' Regardless of the outcome of the US elections, it can be assumed that US defense resources will be withdrawn from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. ' Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, espionage, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. Militarily, Russia is threatening the European NATO partners. Europe must function as a credible deterrent against this threat. ' In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. ' The US is still the backbone of NATO's defense capabilities in areas such as reconnaissance and deterrence. European countries must contribute significantly more to their defense capability to complement US support and take over parts of it in the medium term. ' By collaborating with partners in the Indo-Pacific, Germany and other European NATO members promote interoperability and competence and signal to the US a willingness to contribute to security beyond the defense of the European Alliance area. ' Whoever rules from the White House after January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and engagement in NATO is scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. Introduction The US election campaign is being followed with great interest by security experts and transatlanticists in Europe. This is because the outcome of the election on November 5 will have a major impact on the future of NATO - and thus the most successful defense alliance of all time. This Monitor analyzes what an election victory by Donald Trump on the one hand and an election victory by Kamala Harris on the other could mean for the transatlantic alliance and how the European NATO partners must position themselves to keep transatlantic relations on a sustainable footing. The geopolitical priorities of the USA will continue to shift towards the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. For decision-makers in Germany and other European NATO states, this means that there is an urgent need to consistently develop their defense policy and take responsibility for security policy. This is the only way to ensure peace and freedom in the European NATO states in the future. A decisive strengthening of European defense capabilities should be the key to shaping a sustainable and future-proof transatlantic partnership. Concerns about a second term for Donald Trump: Trumpproofing NATO There is concern in many European capitals that a second term in office for Donald Trump could have a decisive impact on the stability of transatlantic relations and NATO.1 The buzzword “Trumpproofing NATO” is therefore being used on both sides of the Atlantic to prepare for a possible second Trump administration. There are plenty of reasons for this. Trump has openly threatened to reduce the US troop presence in Europe, restrict intelligence sharing with NATO allies, cut a deal with Russia over Ukraine's head and revoke NATO's Article 5 security guarantee for those who do not contribute sufficiently.2 Take him seriously, not literally!  Trump's unpredictability is part of his political strategy. And so, Europe should prepare for various scenarios. The recommendation made by Republican MPs to their transatlantic partners at the recent NATO summit in Washington appears to be quite groundbreaking: Trump is not to be taken literally, but he should certainly be taken seriously.3 European decision-makers should also look at existing security policy ideas from Trump's environment, as he could - without a security policy strategy of his own - use these as a guide. “Dormant-NATO” - possible withdrawal of large parts of US troops  The concepts of conservative security policy pioneers such as Elbridge Colby4, Sumantra Maitra5 and Dan Caldwell6 are well-known. Colby was the architect of the national security strategy under Trump in 2018 and is considered a candidate for a top security policy post in a possible Trump II administration.7 Caldwell is Vice President and Maitra is a Senior Fellow at the influential Trump-affiliated think tank “Center for Renewing America”. The aforementioned experts advocate an increase in defense spending by European NATO members far above the 2014 target of two percent of gross domestic product.8 Furthermore, they call not only for increased burden-sharing, but also for burden-shifting within NATO.9 So far, Western Europe has acted as a free rider and exploited the US involvement in NATO (“freeriding”) - an insight that has long been shared by Republicans and Democrats, albeit in different tones.10 However, the Republicans go further: in view of rising debts, problems with recruiting soldiers and a defense industry that cannot keep up with the challenge posed by Russia and China, the US can no longer avoid a realignment of NATO.11 Maitra's “Dormant NATO” concept suggests that the USA should only be active in Europe with a limited naval and air force presence in future and would only operate in acute threat situations and in extreme emergencies with nuclear deterrence.12 The majority of the infantry, armored forces, logistics and artillery previously provided by the USA should therefore be provided by the Europeans.13 According to Maitra, the costly US leadership role in NATO is no longer in the interests of the United States, as Russia no longer poses an immediate threat to the US.14 Europe is therefore called upon to take over the conventional defense of its own continent, which is also justified by the fact that the US must focus its security policy resources on the Indo-Pacific and the protection of Taiwan. About Ukraine, Trump is considering a deal with Russia if he wins the election. The content of such a deal could be the end of NATO's eastward expansion and the rejection of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Trump could also negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Moscow's Ukrainian territorial claims - over the heads of Ukraine.15 JD Vance - Isolationist approaches of a vice-presidential candidate Donald Trump's vice-presidential candidate JD Vance also criticizes NATO and calls for US resources to be prioritized in Asia, particularly to deter a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, his position on Ukraine stands out in particular: he is completely opposed to US military aid for Ukraine.16 Vance believes that Ukraine cannot win the war against Russia in purely numerical terms and is in favor of negotiations with Russia.17 Another accent of the vice presidential candidate is his clear criticism of the rules-based world order. With him as Vice President, a break with the traditional foreign policy of the United States could become more likely.18 However, Vance has also shown himself to be very changeable in terms of his opinions and convictions, which is why he - like Trump - is difficult to assess overall. Despite the ambiguities and versatility that Trump and his foreign and security policy makers stand for, they are united by a tendency towards isolationism and criticism of NATO. Although a withdrawal from NATO is unlikely, Trump could drastically reduce the US role in the European security architecture. A Trump II scenario could pose further dangers for Ukraine in particular. Continuity under Kamala Harris? While the transatlantic agenda of a Democratic presidential candidate Biden was considered predictable, the nomination of Kamala Harris has brought a new dynamic to the debate about the future of transatlantic relations in case of a Democratic victory. Against this backdrop, it makes sense to look at the defense policy approaches that a Kamala Harris presidency could entail. Would Kamala Harris mean continuity in transatlantic relations? Would Harris be a transatlanticist? Kamala Harris gained important insights into foreign and security policy not only as Vice President, where she was present in the Oval Office or Situation Room for all important foreign policy decisions,19 but also as a Senator on the Home-land Security and Intelligence Committees. This applies to the investigation into Russian influence on the 2016 US elections in the Intelligence Committee, which is also likely to have shaped her view of Vladimir Putin.20 Kamala Harris is regarded as an advocate of transatlantic cooperation. As Vice President, Harris took part in Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland in the summer, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky six times and attended the Munich Security Conference three times. There she reaffirmed the USA's unwavering commitment to NATO and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.21,22 Her previous statements during the election campaign - particularly at the Democratic Party conference - also indicate that her foreign policy approach will continue to be in line with Joe Biden's NATO policy. Harris emphasized the importance of alliances, her commitment to NATO and her support for Ukraine against the Russian occupation. In the TV duel against Donald Trump, she described NATO as “the greatest military alliance the world has ever known ”23 and announced that she would continue to support Ukraine if she won the election. However, she left open whether she would supply Ukraine with added weapons or authorize the use of American weapons against targets on Russian soil.24 Her current security advisor, Phil Gordon, a proven expert and friend of Europe, is also being touted as a candidate for a high-ranking position in a possible Harris administration.25 There are therefore initial indications that the transatlantic alliance would continue to play an important role in foreign and security policy under Kamala Harris. Tim Walz: Foreign policy profile Harris' candidate for Vice President, Tim Walz, does not yet have a clear foreign policy profile. However, as a long-standing and high-ranking representative of the National Guard, he has ability in military matters. In the past, he has spoken out against military operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.26 He also joined Republican politicians in 2016 who spoke out against cuts to the military, as it needs to be well funded in order to meet the challenges in the world.27 The China expert spoke out against Trump's trade arms race with China, but also denounced human rights violations. Walz clearly condemned the Russian war of aggression, signed a law as governor of Minnesota that ended the state's investments in Russia28 and expressed his support for Ukraine29. However, many of his foreign policy positions are unlikely to be completed and will depend on which advisors he chooses to surround himself with. Generational change in the White House Despite Kamala Harris' fundamental support for NATO, her inauguration would mark a generational change in the White House. While President Joe Biden, who was born three years before the end of the Second World War, was significantly socialized politically by the Cold War, Harris began her political career a good twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and does not share the same historical ties to Europe. At the same time, Harris must respond to changing domestic and geopolitical realities. The United States is still the global superpower with a claim to military leadership. However, NATO has recently lost support in public opinion in the USA and the willingness to fund European defense is dwindling.30 Support for Ukraine is also viewed increasingly critically.31 There is also a consensus in broad circles of the Democratic Party that Europe must take more responsibility for its own defense. The economic policy agenda now announced by Harris in the election campaign would be enormously costly.32 This makes a significant increase in defense spending unlikely. The public, politicians and experts33 now perceive China as by far the greatest threat to the security and prosperity of the United States, and Harris is also concerned about China's quest for global political power. Harris has already announced at the party congress that she will ensure that America wins the competition for the 21st century against China.34 In view of increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the transfer of additional military resources, particularly air force and navy, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region will be unavoidable in the medium term. About NATO, the difference between a Harris and a Trump-led administration is likely to lie in the scope and speed of the withdrawal of US defense resources from Europe. While a withdrawal under Trump could be implemented quickly, an election victory for Harris is more likely to mean a gradual withdrawal and would give the Europeans time to position themselves better in terms of defense policy.35 NATO is still the most important instrument for European defense cooperation. Against the backdrop of the volatile security environment and the shift in priorities in the USA, Europeans must take on more responsibility for the defense of their own continent. This is the only way to ensure that NATO is still a successful defense alliance in the future. However, this debate should not be about Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, but about improving military capabilities to deter and defend against attacks on alliance territory. In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. This can only take place in close coordination with the USA and within NATO structures. Europe's security still depends on the USA. Because even if the European pillar of NATO is placed on a more stable footing, European security can only be guaranteed with American support for the near future. The USA is indispensable in NATO. The partners lean on its capabilities and are guided by developments. The US defense budget accounts for around two thirds of defense spending within NATO. There are currently around 85,000 soldiers stationed in Europe.36 This means that US defense spending is almost ten times higher than that of Germany, which has the second highest defense budget in NATO. A substantial proportion of US defense spending currently goes towards protecting European NATO members.37 At the same time, nine NATO countries, including Canada, Spain, and Italy, still spend less than two percent of their GDP on defense. Most of the so-called "strategic enablers", such as reconnaissance, aerial refueling and satellite communications, are currently provided by the USA, whose forces, in contrast to most European armies, are quickly deployable, combat-ready and equipped with sufficient stocks of ammunition.38 Despite all the debates that are taking place in this regard, the nuclear umbrella is likely to remain Europe's life insurance in the future. "New" threat situation requires a rethink. Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference39 in 2007 was followed by action: Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, its illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of the protracted conflict in the Donbass in 2014, its withdrawal from the arms control and security architecture and finally its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.40 The assumption is that, in the event of military success in Ukraine, Putin will declare further territorial claims and take military action. Security experts warn that Russia could press ahead with its imperial expansionism in just a few years and be capable of waging war against a NATO country.41 Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, cyber-attacks and disinformation.42 However, Russia is not the only threat to European security. From the Sahel to the Middle East, there are numerous complex challenges: Terrorism, ongoing conflicts and fueled instability on the southern flank have a negative impact on Europe. The resulting migration movements also have destabilizing effects. Military exercises with Chinese participation in Belarus and cyber-attacks on European NATO partners are also signs of China's growing claim to power in Europe. The ever-closer cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a challenge for NATO. Decisive strengthening of the European security architecture for a sustainable transatlantic relationship For NATO to support a sustainable foundation, the European and German security architecture must be better secured and coordinated in the future. In the long term, defense spending in Europe should be increased beyond the envisaged two percent of gross domestic product and permanently integrated into national budgets. Resilience means creating resilience, deterrence, and defense capability. In the case of Germany, the threat situation and the resulting security policy requirements do not yet appear to be sufficiently anchored in political awareness. A consistent rethink is needed here. More efficient organization of defence structures and military procurement is needed. At present, the Bundeswehr is only partially capable of defending the country and the alliance, also in view of the gaps that have arisen due to the transfer of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. A study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy found that at the current rate of procurement, Germany would need up to almost 100 years to reach the military stocks of 20 years ago.43 Although the turnaround in Germany has been proclaimed, it has not been sufficiently driven forward politically and has not been set up sustainably in terms of financial policy - beyond the special fund. A consistent implementation of the turnaround for a defensible Germany would inevitably require painful savings elsewhere. This must be considered in the domestic political discourse to prepare the public for future necessities. This also includes the debate on compulsory military service and the creation of a new security culture in society. This will only be possible if the threat situation and, conversely, the need for a turnaround are communicated in all their urgency and consistency. In the German arms industry, ability building and close cooperation and coordination with European partners are of crucial importance.44 Promises made to NATO partners must be backed up financially, in terms of personnel, structure and material. While Russia has switched to a war economy, Europe is finding it difficult to significantly increase production. This also requires a stabilization of defence spending. To build up sustainable abilities, the industry needs planning security. And the budget, which provides for hardly any growth in defense spending, does not offer this.45 It is precisely this planning security that would enable the defense industry to create new jobs in the long term and thus take on employees who currently have less of a future in the weakening automotive industry, for example. The (not yet officially published) draft for the new National Security and Defense Industry Strategy, which aims, among other things, to ease access to loans and capital market-based financing for the security and defense industry (SVI), sends a positive signal. The draft states that the “SVI activities are fundamentally compatible with ESG criteria” (Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance) from the perspective of the federal government.46 Strengthening joint commitment in the Indo-Pacific It is not only the USA that has recognized the danger of China's desired supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. European NATO members also see increasing challenges in Asia and have an interest in supporting a rules-based order and free sea and trade routes in the Indo-Pacific, which is of crucial importance not least for an export nation like Germany. European NATO states, including Germany, are becoming increasingly involved in the Indo-Pacific region.47 At the anniversary summit in Washington in July, NATO toughened its tone towards China and clearly stated the danger posed by the ever closer cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.48 At the same time, cooperation with the so-called Asia-Pacific 4, the NATO partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, is becoming closer. This cooperation must be further strengthened, for which the partner countries Australia49 and Japan50 or the multinational maneuver RIMPAC51 are particularly suitable. By cooperating with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and participating in multinational exercises and freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs), Germany and other European NATO members not only defend their interests and promote interoperability and competence, but also signal to their partner, the USA, their willingness to get involved beyond the defense of the European alliance territory and make a contribution to transatlantic security.52 NATO is not a one-way street: clearly communicating added value for the USA. Without the leadership of the United States, NATO will not be able to continue its success story. For this reason, it is crucial to convince the American side and to highlight the strategic interest of the US in preserving this treaty-based peace order and stability in Europe.53 In doing so, the European NATO partners should not only effectively communicate their defense policy progress, but also increasingly provide up-to-date data and figures on the benefits of NATO engagement for the US. The evidence shows that US security engagement has significant positive effects on US trade. According to calculations, trade losses that could result from a US withdrawal from international security commitments in the medium and long term would exceed the potential savings in defense resources.54 European partner states are also making significant purchases of military equipment in the US, as illustrated by the example of the F35 fighter aircraft, for which numerous European states have concluded purchase agreements.55 Since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, European demand for US military equipment has risen sharply and in 2023 the US Department of Defense recorded record sales of military equipment and hardware, particularly to European partners and allies.56 NATO's deterrent effect has been instrumental in preventing armed conflict in member countries since its start. The stability that the alliance guarantees therefore also relieves the strain on American resources. Whoever takes office in the White House on January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and involvement in NATO are scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. A vacuum in Europe would not only be used by Russia, but also by China to expand its presence and influence on the continent. A US withdrawal from NATO in favor of a stronger focus on its strategic rival China could therefore ultimately play right into the latter's hands. References 1 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 2 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/07/11/trump-nato-republicans-con-gress/ (last request 15.08.2024) 4 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/31/elbridge-colby-trump-foreign-policy-military-china/ (last request 16.08.2024) 5 https://americarenewing.com/team/sumantra-maitra/ (last request 20.08.2024) 6 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/foreign-policy-republican-american-power (last request 02.09.2024) 7 https://www.politico.eu/article/former-president-donald-trump-ally-europe-joe-biden-us-elec-tions-pentagon/ (last request 16.08.2024) 8 https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-ally-warns-eastern-europe-to-rapidly-increase-defense-budgets/ (last request 21.08.2024) 9 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 29.08.2024) 10 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 11 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 15.08.2024) 12 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 13 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 14 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 15 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 16 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/j-d-vance-trump-foreign-policy-china-ukraine-vice-presi-dent-pick/ (last request 15.08.2024) 17 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 18 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 19 https://english.elpais.com/usa/elections/2024-09-02/kamala-harriss-foreign-policy-continuity-in-substance-a-new-style-in-form-and-the-hot-potato-of-gaza.html# (last request 02.09.2024) 20 Vgl. https://www.npr.org/2024/07/24/nx-s1-5049698/a-perspective-on-kamala-harris-poten-tial-foreign-policy-priorities (last request 08.08.2024)21 Vgl. https://de.usembassy.gov/de/rede-von-us-vizepraesidentin-kamala-harris-auf-der-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-2023/ (last request 08.08.2024) 22 Der Artikel 5 zum Bündnisfall der NATO sieht vor, dass im Falle eines bewaffneten Angriffs gegen ein Mitgliedsland, die anderen Mitgliedsstaaten dem angegriffenen Land Beistand leisten. Vgl. Nordatlantikvertrag: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selec-tedLocale=de (last request 08.08.2024) 23 https://www.youtube.com/live/SGRydccYp0c?si=L4RBnZ0pBsF_JGmm (last request 12.09.2024) 24 https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4874527-the-debate-failed-on-foreign-policy/ (last request 12.09.2024) 25 Vgl. https://www.politico.eu/article/philip-gordon-us-politics-kamala-harris-us-elections-eu-rope-joe-biden-emmanuel-macron/ (last request 08.08.2024) 26 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/07/harris-walz-us-election-progressive-foreign-policy-war-israel-gaza-ukraine/ (last request 09.08.2024) 27 https://fpc.org.uk/us-presidential-election-what-would-a-harris-walz-foreign-policy-look-like/ (last request 02.09.2024) 28 https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/gov-walz-signs-bill-ending-state-investments-in-russia/ (last request 02.09.2024) 29 https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/tim-walz-vp-harris-veterans-00172782 (letzter Ab-ruf 14.08.2024) 30 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/08/americans-opinions-of-nato/ (last request 12.09.2024) 31 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67649497 (last request 09.08.2024) 32 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/08/16/kamala-harris-2024-policy-child-tax-credit/ (last request 19.08.2024) 33 https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5038077/pacing-challenge (last request 30.08.2024) 34 https://www.ft.com/content/5d50d474-dc4d-4504-8002-7a81874153a8 (last request 03.09.2024) 35 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/natos-missing-pillar (last request 21.08.2024) 36 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 (last request 09.08.2024) 37 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 03.09.2024) 38 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 30.08.2024) 39 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (last request 04.09.2024) 40 https://ecfr.eu/publication/defending-europe-with-less-america/?amp (last request 03.09.2024)41 https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wir-mussen-raketenabwehr-aufbauen-bundeswehr-sieht-russland-in-funf-bis-acht-jahren-zu-krieg-gegen-nato-fahig-11406908.html (last request 15.08.2024) 42 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 43 https://www.ifw-kiel.de/de/publikationen/aktuelles/kriegstuechtig-in-jahrzehnten-deutsch-land-ruestet-viel-zu-langsam-gegen-russische-bedrohung-auf/ (last request 18.09.2024) 44 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 45 https://www.dbwv.de/aktuelle-themen/verband-aktuell/beitrag/wuestner-sich-die-augen-zu-halten-reicht-nicht (last request 15.08.2024) 46 https://table.media/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/12162241/Entwurf_Strategie-Staerkung-SVI.pdf (last request 12.09.2024) 47 https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/german-air-force/pacific-skies-24- (last request 05.09.2024) 48 Vgl. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nato-jubil%C3%A4umsgipfel-2024-mehr-verantwortung-zemle/ (last request 08.08.2024) 49 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/fernbeziehung (last request 04.09.2024) 50 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/die-zusammenar-beit-zwischen-japan-und-der-nato (last request 04.09.2024) 51 https://www.cpf.navy.mil/RIMPAC/ (last request 05.09.2024) 52 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/memo-to/nato-leaders-indo-pacific/ (last request 05.09.2024) 53 https://youtu.be/2_djNsTnJcI (last request 14.08.2024) 54 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR518.html (last request 04.09.2024) 55 https://euro-sd.com/2024/07/articles/39541/f-35-in-europe-a-takeover/ (last request 04.09.2024) 56 https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3736017/dod-has-seen-huge-in-crease-in-military-sales-since-ukraine-invasion/ (last request 04.09.2024)

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском There’s a degree of irony that countries attending the 2024 Brics summit this week voted to adopt the Kazan declaration (named for the capital city of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan in Russia, where the summit is being held). The declaration’s first clause emphasises that “all states should act consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter in their entirety”. There’s also a certain amount of chutzpah on the part of conference chair, Vladimir Putin, whose ongoing invasion of Ukraine is so egregiously in breach of that charter.  Article one stresses that the primary purpose of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security”. Article two rules that: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”. If that’s not clear enough, it goes on to further insist that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”  Still, its a funny old world in which the UN secretary general, António Guterres, pitches up at a summit whose host is wanted on an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court on charges relating to the alleged illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. In a country whose troops are currently fighting in Ukraine in direct contravention of the UN’s charter.  To add a further layer of irony, October 24 is the 79th anniversary of the entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945.  Guterres called on Putin to agree a peace deal “in line with the UN Charter, international law and UN General Assembly resolutions”. The Russian leader is perhaps more likely to listen to a deal proposed by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. He said: “We must uphold the three key principles: no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames and strive for swift de-escalation of the situation.”  The UN chief’s idea of a just peace would call for Russia to give up its illegal occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Xi’s proposal appears to call for a deal based on the status quo – virtually the opposite, in other words.  This is pretty much all Ukraine can hope for, as far as the University of Portsmouth’s Frank Ledwidge is concerned. Ledwidge, who has written regularly for The Conversation since Putin launched his invasion in February 2022 and is well plugged into defence and intelligence networks in Nato as well as in Ukraine itself, believes that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia – at least as things stand.  Ledwidge says Ukraine’s western allies are partly to blame for the maximalist aims of the country’s president Volodymyr Zelensky. Western rhetoric has not properly been matched by sufficient weapons or the permission to use them as effectively as the situation warrants. Now is the time for realism, he writes:  A starting point could be accepting that Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk are lost … Then we need to start planning seriously for a post-war Ukraine that will need the west’s suppport more than ever.  One of the key factors that Ledwidge stresses is that just one of Russia’s allies, North Korea, has supplied twice as many artillery shells this year as the whole of Europe. Now North Korean troops are apparently also about to join their Russian comrades on the battlefield. This, writes Ra Mason – a Korea specialist at the University of East Anglia – will help ease the pressure on Putin to bring forward his mobilisation plans.    It’s a diplomatic coup for Putin, Mason believes – it’s a “clear show of opposition towards the Washington-led global order”, which “deals a further blow to the myth that the Russian Federation is isolated, as an international pariah, in a world led by western powers.”  But a military coup de grace against Ukraine? Probably not. The jury is out on how effective North Korea’s “poorly equipped, unmotivated and undernourished” troops will be against Ukraine’s highly motivated defenders. It will also be interesting to see where and how they are deployed. If sent to the frontlines in Kursk, they’ll be helping an ally in its struggle against an incursion by Ukrainian forces. If deployed inside Ukraine, they’ll join Russia in breach of international law. Mason concludes:  If sent into new theatres of war against state-of-the-art Nato-supplied weaponry, it could effectively mean waves of ill-prepared cannon fodder being thrown into the meat grinder of Donbas’ trenches.  Incidentally, the term “meat grinder” has been much bandied about of late. It follows reports from US intellegence recently that, while Russian forces have been making rapid advances and gaining a significant amount of ground in recent weeks, they are doing so at considerable cost in terms of dead and wounded. September was a particularly bloody month, with reports of Russian losses of more than 1,000 men a day, killed or wounded.  But Russian military strategists are well versed in such pyrrhic victories, writes historian Becky Alexis-Martin, who points to equally savage losses in Russia’s defence against Napoleon and in the first and second world wars. Stalin, in particular, was able to defeat the Nazi war machine by, inter alia, throwing millions of troops at their enemies (and incurring terrible casualties). But it’s not a strategy that guarantees success. And terrible psychological effects are beginning to manifest themselves in veterans returning from Ukraine with severe and often violent post-traumatic stress disorder.  The diplomatic front  As if things weren’t bad enough for Zelensky on the battlefield, the Ukrainian president was dealt a serious blow earlier this month when the US president, Joe Biden, was forced by extreme weather events, including a hurricane hitting the state of Florida, to cancel the planned meeting of the heads of government of up to 50 of Ukraine’s western allies in Germany. The “Ramstein Group”, so-called after the German air base at which they meet, was scheduled to meet in the second week of October to consider Zelensky’s “victory plan”. Stefan Wolff, an international security expert at the University of Birmingham writes that the Ukrainian president was hoping to get some degree of commitment for a path to Nato membership for Ukraine as well as permission to use western-supplied long-range missiles against targets deep inside Russia.  Neither of these seem likely to happen in the short term, says Wolff. Like Ledwidge, Wolff thinks Ukraine is doomed to defeat unless its allies double down on their aid – and fast. And like Ledwidge, Wolff sees little indication of that happening any time soon.  When it comes to continuing US support for Ukraine’s war effort, all eyes are now firmly fixed on November 5. The outcome of the presidential election will be seriously consequential for Ukraine’s future. Both candidates have made their positions clear and there is considerable difference between the two positions.  Donald Trump has said any number of times that had he not lost that “rigged and stolen” election to Biden in 2020, Putin would never have invaded Ukraine in the first place. Still, he says, if he wins this one, he’ll bring the war to a very rapid conclusion. But it remains to be seen, given Trump’s oft-stated admiration for Putin, whether the conclusion will be palatable to Kyiv – or to Nato in general.  Trump’s opponent, Kamala Harris, said the former president’s proposals are not “proposals for peace, they’re proposals for surrender”. As vice-president during the Biden administration, she flew to Europe not long after the invasion in February 2022 to help shore up support for Kyiv. Harris has also regularly restated her intention to continue to back Ukraine against Russia. In the only debate of the campaign she said that Ukraine was not Putin’s final stop and that he has “his eyes on the rest of Europe, starting with Poland”.  Poland, incidentally, is an interesting case in point. While it is Ukraine’s firmest ally and it leadership is four-square behind Kyiv, the people are curiously divided on the country’s support for Ukraine. You can read more about that here.  One imagines that Zelensky is as transfixed as anyone else on the 2024 US presidential election campaign as it heads into its final ten days. All we can tell you is that the polls are still very, very close. Well within most pollsters’ margin for error, in fact. A poll of polls, which combines polls from different agencies, published on the website FiveThirtyEight on October 22 shows that Harris leads Trump by 48.1% to 46.3% in the national popular vote. But the accepted popular wisdom is that the complex electoral college system used in the US may well favour Trump’s candidacy.  We’ll be providing daily updates on the US presidential race and full coverage of election day on November 5 and its aftermath.  Update: this article originally said that Vladimir Putin launched Russia invasion of Ukraine in February 2024. This has now been corrected to February 2022. Apologies for the error. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ladies and Gentlemen, Today marks a truly historic milestone. Let me begin by thanking the Chief Negotiators for their dedication and determination. They worked tirelessly, over many years, for an ambitious and balanced agreement – and they succeeded. The bond between Europe and the Mercosur countries is truly one of the strongest in the world. It is a bond anchored in trust, enriched by a shared heritage, that spans centuries of mutual learning and growth. In fact, exactly 30 years ago, in 1994, my predecessor Jacques Delors stood here in Montevideo. He met with your father, dear Luis, who was then President of Uruguay. Together they shared a bold vision. A vision of deeper integration, not only within Europe and Mercosur, but also between them. Today, in Montevideo, we are turning that vision into reality. We are strengthening this unique partnership as never before. And in doing so, we are sending a clear and powerful message to the world. First, in an increasingly confrontational world, we demonstrate that democracies can rely on each other. This agreement is not just an economic opportunity, it is a political necessity. We are like-minded partners. We both believe that openness and cooperation are the true engines of progress and prosperity. I know that strong winds are blowing in the opposite direction – towards isolation and fragmentation. But this agreement is our clear response. We stand together on the global stage, as partners. Second, we are sending a message to our people and businesses in our regions: This agreement was designed with your interests at heart. It is made to work for you. It means: more jobs – and good jobs – more choices and better prices. The European Union and Mercosur create one of the largest trade and investment partnerships the world has ever seen. We are taking barriers down and we are allowing investments in. We are forming a market of over 700 million consumers. This partnership will strengthen entire value chains; it will develop strategic industries; it will support innovation; and it will create jobs and values, on both sides of the Atlantic. Third, we are showing the world that trade can – and must – be guided by values. Trade agreements are more than economic frameworks. They are a way to build communities of shared values. The EU-Mercosur agreement reflects our steadfast commitment to the Paris Agreement and to the fight against deforestation. President Lula's efforts to protect the Amazon are welcome and necessary. But preserving the Amazon is a shared responsibility of all humanity. This agreement ensures that investments respect Mercosur's extraordinary yet fragile natural heritage. My fourth message is that, economically, this is a win-win agreement. Europe is already a leading investment and trade partner for Mercosur. So you know how we do business together. We are focused on fairness and mutual respect. EU-Mercosur will bring meaningful benefits to consumers and businesses, on both sides. It will facilitate European investments in strategic industries across all Mercosur countries: like sustainable mining, renewable energy and sustainable forest products, just to name a few. It will also make it easier to invest in sectors that directly impact the people's daily lives. For example, expanding the electricity grid to rural and remote areas and advancing digitalisation across the region. Finally, let me address my fellow Europeans: This agreement is a win for Europe. 60,000 companies are exporting to Mercosur today – 30,000 of them are small and medium-sized enterprises. They benefit from reduced tariffs, simpler customs procedures and preferential access to some critical raw materials. This will create huge business opportunities. To our farmers: We have heard you, listened to your concerns and we are acting on them. This agreement includes robust safeguards to protect your livelihoods. EU-Mercosur is the biggest agreement ever, when it comes to the protection of EU food and drinks products. The agreement protects 350 EU geographical indications. In addition, our European health and food standards remain untouchable. This is the reality – the reality of an agreement that will save EU companies EUR 4 billion worth of export duties per year while expanding our markets and opening new opportunities for growth and jobs on both sides. I want to thank President Lacalle Pou for hosting this Summit and for bringing us together in Montevideo. This is a good day for Mercosur, a good day for Europe and a landmark moment for our shared future. A whole generation dedicated their effort, vision and determination to bring this agreement to life. Now, it is our turn to honour that legacy. Let us ensure that this agreement delivers on its promises and serves the generations to come. Thank you very much.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now? One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad. But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers. What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham? Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad. The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world. In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.” The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.” This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid. Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria. Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success? Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia. Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria. The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war. It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold. This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics. Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally. How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria? To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations. Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement. This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services. Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups. Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses. In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government. This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups. In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs. Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests. Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off. What does the US think of the group and al-Golani? The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions. Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani. However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list. What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader? First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad. But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies. First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large. This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws. Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups. Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity. Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country. However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support. Sections of this article were first published in an article for The Conversation on Dec. 2, 2024.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. All in all, Trump’s next presidency will surely bring a lot of interesting developments, which are likely to fuel a new world order.  References - A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017. NSS_BookLayout_FIN_121917.indd - Agenda 47. https://www.donaldjtrump.com/platform - Associated Press, Nov. 8, 2024. “The Kremlin has revised its nuclear policy. Does that make the use of atomic weapons more likely?” https://apnews.com/article/russia-nuclear-doctrine-putin-ukraine-war-b5ee115aa2099fa247f630e16da861d8- Bahari, Diana Mutiara, and Ahmad Sahide. 2022. “The Comparison of The United States Foreign Policy Against The Islamic World Under President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump Administration.” Journal of Islamic World and Politics 6 (2): 270–97. https://doi.org/10.18196/jiwp.v6i2.13060. - Berg, Aslak and Meyers, Zach. Oct. 3, 2024. “Surviving Trump 2.0: What does the US election mean for Europe's economy?” https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/surviving-trump-20-what-does-us-election-mean-europes-economy - Bodner, Matthew, Luce, Dan De and Smith, Alexander. Dec. 2, 2024. “Russian troops mass on Ukraine's border. West worries this isn't like the last time.” https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-troops-mass-ukraines-border-west-worries-isnt-last-time-rcna7203 - Carreras, Miguel, Giancarlo Visconti, and Igor Acácio. 2021. “The Trump Election and Attitudes toward the United States in Latin America.” Public Opinion Quarterly 85 (4): 1092–1102. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfab055. - Election Centre 2024, CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/election/2024 - Entous, Adam, Schmitt, Eric and Barnes, Julian E. Nov. 17, 2024. “Biden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missiles.” https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html- Fit for 55, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/ - Germany must become 'the best equipped armed force in Europe', Scholz says. Euronews, September 16, 2022. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/16/germany-must-become-the-best-equipped-armed-force-in-europe-scholz-says- Hansler, Jennifer. Nov. 6, 2024. “Trump’s victory could mean US withdraws support for Ukraine in war with Russia.” https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/06/politics/trump-election-ukraine-war-russia-intl/index.html- James, Toby S. 2021. “The Effects of Donald Trump.” Policy Studies 42 (5–6): 755–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2021.1980114. - Kawashima, Shin. 2017. "Japan–US-China Relations during the Trump Administration and the Outlook for East Asia." Asia-Pacific Review 24 (1): 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2017.1328800. - Liptak, James. Sept. 23, 2014. “Countries bombed by the U.S. under the Obama administration.” CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/23/politics/countries-obama-bombed/index.html - Macgregor, Douglas & Ramaswamy, Dave, Nov. 19, 2024. “Trump and the Storm of the Century. The U.S. is sleepwalking into disaster in the Middle East.” The American Conservative. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/trump-and-the-storm-of-the-century/ - Mansbach, Richard W. 2021. "America’s Foreign Policy under Donald Trump.” In, 201–34. oxford university. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197618721.003.0010. - National Security Strategy. Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany (2023). Federal Foreign Office, Werderscher Markt 1, 10117 Berlin. - Nczas Info. Nov. 12, 2024. “Szokujące słowa wiceszefa MSZ. Oddamy jeszcze więcej Ukrainie? „Jesteśmy gotowi przejąć dużą część kosztów” [VIDEO]”. https://nczas.info/2024/11/12/szokujace-slowa-wiceszefa-msz-oddamy-jeszcze-wiecej-ukrainie-jestesmy-gotowi-przejac-duza-czesc-kosztow-video/ - Newman, Benjamin, Jennifer L. Merolla, Sono Shah, Danielle Casarez Lemi, Loren Collingwood, and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan. “The Trump Effect: An Experimental Investigation of the Emboldening Effect of Racially Inflammatory Elite Communication.” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (2021): 1138–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000590. - OCHA, Dec. 5, 2024. “The Whole of Syria Flash Update No. 2 - Recent Developments in Syria (As of 5 December 2024)”. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-flash-update-no-2-recent-developments-syria-5-december-2024 - Ott, H, Dec. 9, 2024. “What to know after Syrian rebels force Bashar al-Assad from power in a rekindled civil war”. CBC News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-war-assad-ousted-what-to-know/ - Pew Research Centre, The biggest problems and greatest strengths of the U.S. political system. Sept. 19, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/the-biggest-problems-and-greatest-strengths-of-the-u-s-political-system/ - Pew Research Centre, Top Problems Facing the U.S., May 23, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/05/23/top-problems-facing-the-u-s/ - Sahide, Ahmad, Misran Misran, and Ali Maksum. 2024. “Indonesian Media Framing against Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election.” Multidisciplinary Reviews 7 (5): 2024097. https://doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2024097. - Sky News. April 16, 2024. “Are we heading for World War Three? Experts give their verdicts.” https://news.sky.com/story/are-we-heading-for-world-war-three-experts-give-their-verdicts-13116540 - South China Morning Post, Nov. 21, 2024. “China war scenario calls for US boost in defence spending to more than 3% of GDP. China’s projected military industrial base cannot be matched without increased spending, lawmakers hear”. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3287467/china-war-scenario-calls-us-boost-defence-spending-more-3-gdp?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage- Teller, Neville, June 28, 2024. “'The End of Israel': Building a case against Netanyahu – review. The End of Israel is undeniably thought-provoking and, in a world where exchanges of differing views is being increasingly inhibited, to be welcomed.” The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-808080- The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752 - The First Battle of the Next War, Jan. 2023. A Report of the CSIS International Security Program. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ- Tinline, Phil. July 19, 2023. “Imagining Armageddon: the mad and dangerous ideas of Herman Kahn”. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/policy/defence-news/62117/imagining-armageddon-herman-kahn-nuclear-ladder- USA FACTS, How is the U.S. economy doing? https://usafacts.org/state-of-the-union/economy/ - VoA, Dec. 3, 2024. „West pushes for more Ukraine military aid, not NATO membership”. https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-support-in-focus-as-nato-foreign-ministers-meet/7885166.html - Xinhua, Nov. 18, 2024 b. “Full Text of Chinese President's signed article in Brazilian media”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/597977#Full-Text-of-Chinese-president's-signed-article-in-Brazilian-media--2024-11-18 - Xinhua, Nov. 19, 2024. “G20 Summit: Xi calls for multipolar world, inclusive globalization”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/newsletter/top_headlines/article/581033

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.