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Iran and Russia have entered a closer political, economic, and military relationship during the past two years, the trigger widely seen as the upsurge in defence cooperation following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This new relationship, described variously as a strategic alignment or strategic partnership, was seen by both Tehran and Moscow as necessary to meet mutual and separate critical national needs due to the restrictive effects on both of US and Western sanctions. Iran’s international affairs, since its 1979 Islamic revolution, have been largely shaped by two factors. The first is Iran’s strong adherence to national autonomy, maximum self-sufficiency, and non-alignment. The latter has included, as far as practical, a balance between East and West, or today, Global South and Global West. However, Iranians are cautious about trusting others. While, therefore, a strategic alignment with Russia, or potentially others, could be acceptable, a formal alliance that compromise’s autonomy, would not. The second factor is Iran’s relationship with the US, and in turn with Europe, other Western countries and the UN, and their use of sanctions to deter or change international adversarial differences. Iran-US relations since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution have been tense and conflicted, and especially with Iranian-supported regional state and non-state militia. Major US concerns include Iran’s support for “state and non-state terrorism,” human rights abuses, missile development, and their potential, some say intent, to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Decades of broadly-based US sanctions, along with EU and UN sanctions, the latter mostly nuclear related, have strongly impacted the nation. The one short period of Iran-US rapprochement commenced in 2016 when President Barack Obama successfully brought Iran onboard as a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA) or nuclear agreement. Obama’s aim was to firstly resolve the nuclear issue and use this as the stepping-stone to negotiations on other regional security issues. But this two-step process was undone by President Donald Trump‘s 2018 decision to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose US primary and secondary sanctions. Trump’s action, and President Joe Biden’s subsequent “failure” to rejoin the JCPOA and repeal related US sanctions, bitterly disappointed a large cast of international stakeholders, including Iran’s moderates and other JCPOA signatories. For Iran, the US could not be trusted to seriously seek rapprochement and repeal US sanctions either before, or foreseeably after, this year’s US presidential elections. This distrust extended also to the Europeans and others who would continue to remain subject to US secondary sanctions. Iran saw its future fundamentally with countries that were willing to openly trade with them, notwithstanding US sanctions, and other countries or organisations that were prepared to overlook or actively circumvent or evade sanctions. Multilateral outreach included Iran joining two major non-aligned groups in 2023, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and BRICS+6 (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa + 6). These comprise some 40 percent and 46 percent respectively of the world’s population, and some 20 percent and 30 percent of global GDP. BRICS also includes some 40 percent of global oil production. Key members of both include Russia, China, and India. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are part of the “+6 members” of BRICS, and are also Dialogue Partners of the SCO. Both organisations offer significant additional political and economic networking opportunities and economic options. Bilaterally, the relationship between Tehran and Moscow, from its imperialist Shah/Tsar and post-revolutionary Iran and USSR/Russia iterations to the late 1980s, has had its share of tensions and conflict, including territorial disputes. The past 30-year period from the early 1990s to 2021, however, has been relatively stable. Geographic proximity, including a maritime border across the Caspian Sea, facilitated a significant increase in trade, reportedly from some US$1 billion in 2005 to US$3.3 billion in 2021. Mutual security interests also saw an increase in regional military cooperation, including joint operations against ISIS in Syria, and increased Russian sales of military equipment to Iran. The relationship changed significantly in early 2022 due to Russia’s increased military equipment needs, and to help offset the broad impact of sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, and others on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Militarily, increased Iranian defence sales to Russia have included a range of munitions, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) systems, and potentially Iranian short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The UAV deal includes the construction of a factory for manufacturing thousands of Iranian drones in Russia’s Tartarstan province. In return Russia has sold, or agreed to sell, to Iran a range of advanced weapons systems, including the S-400 air-defence missile, helicopters, and SU 34 fighters. Enhanced cyber and satellite cooperation was also agreed. Russia has also passed to Iran many of the high technology Western weapons systems captured in Ukraine, enabling Iran to evaluate, copy, and develop counter-measures. Significantly, this new level of Iranian-Russian cooperation has lifted the military capability of both, with implications for the Middle East and Ukraine respectively. But how effective have the sanctions been? Iran has been subject to harsh sanctions since 1979, and developed a “resistance economy” involving official and extensive unofficial trade and financing arrangements. Because many related statistics are unreliable or unavailable, official GDP estimates may be highly inaccurate. Importantly, however, and despite fluctuations, the World Bank shows a consistent decline in Iran’s GDP since 1979. For Russia, due to shifting markets and higher prices for oil since early 2022, their GDP contracted some 2 percent only that year compared to a prediction of more than 11 percent, and has mostly recovered since. Economically, despite the challenges of sanctions, bilateral cooperation is strong, both economies still function, and their governments remain stable. Militarily, sanctions have facilitated closer cooperation between Iran and Russia, contrary to US, NATO, and allied interests. Are there areas for the US to negotiate the lifting of sanctions with Iran and Russia? US priorities for Iran could include rejoining the JCPOA, facilitating a reduction or cessation of state and non-state militia attacks against regional Israeli, US, and related maritime targets, and restricting specified military cooperation with Russia. US priorities for Russia could include various ceasefire compromises involving the war in the Ukraine, and restricting specified military cooperation with Iran. And the likelihood of progress? For the reasons above, progress on any issue between the US and Iran is very unlikely before this year’s US presidential elections. If or when afterwards would depend in large part on who was elected. For Russia, a ceasefire compromise in Ukraine could be possible if it gave them “temporary” retention of vast tracts of land captured post-2022. Timing will be dictated by battlefield outcomes, but the US Senate approval on 13 February of an additional US$60 billion of military assistance to the Ukraine, and its likely approval by Congress, makes a ceasefire in the foreseeable future unlikely.

Researchers in the INSS Russia program argue: Now is the time for Israel to change it approach toward Moscow Since October 7, Russia has sided with Hamas, refuses to condemn the murderous terror attack that the organization perpetrated in the western Negev, and has questioned Israel’s right to defend itself. Russia’s behavior should underscore to Israel the need to change its policy toward the Kremlin and to stand firmly with Western nations, under the leadership of the United States. Moscow’s firm support for Hamas in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 massacre represents a turning point in relations between Israel and Russia. While many world leaders have condemned the murderous attack on October 7, Russia has adopted an anti-Israel line and refrained from condemning Hamas. Only a week later after the attack, in a speech to leaders of former Soviet states in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the Hamas massacre was unprecedented, but in the same breath he accused Israel of a cruel response. He went on to compare the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip to the Nazi siege of Leningrad, which led to a high number of civilian causalities, estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Although Putin said that Israel has the right to self-defense, he added that the attack on innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip was unacceptable. It was only on October 16 that Putin, in a phone conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed condolences to the families of the murdered Israelis, but without condemning Hamas. Russia’s strategy of maintaining good relations with both sides in any given conflict is reflected in its policy of nurturing ties with Hamas. For Hamas too, ties with Russia are highly important, since it positions it as an organization that is welcome in one of the most important countries in the world. In principle, Moscow has clung to its position that Hamas – defined as a terrorist organization by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other members of the European Union – is a legitimate political organization. The relationship between Russia and Hamas has not always been as close as it is today. Throughout the 1990s and until Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, Russia condemned the organization’s terrorist activities and referred to its members as Islamic militants, fanatics, and extremists. The relationship changed dramatically after the election, when Putin declared that the organization was elected through a democratic and legitimate process. Russian Foreign Ministry officials began meeting regularly with Hamas representatives in 2006. In 2011, there was a temporary decline in relations after Hamas backed the opposition forces in the Syrian civil war. Hamas figures who were in Syria when the war broke out played an active role fighting alongside the opposition, while Russia supported President Bashar Assad. Nonetheless, ties were not severed, and over the years began to warm. Delegations of Hamas leaders visited Moscow, where they met with the Russian Foreign Minister and other senior officials, and meetings took place between Hamas officials and Russian diplomats in other countries. Russia did not adopt a consistent position during previous rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas and was influenced by its particular interests at the time. In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, there was a change in Russian policy as it sought to maintain an image of objectivity and deliberately scaled back its criticism of Israel – in contrast to previous conflicts, such as Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009. This was probably in response to Israel refraining from criticizing Russia over its invasion of Crimea. Russia’s current interests are not to Israel’s benefit. Moscow’s main goal at this time is to divert the attention of the West, under the leadership of the United States, away from Ukraine. An increase in US involvement in events in the Middle East serves this goal. At the same time, Russia blames the United States for the outbreak of the current conflict. Second, Russia aspires to restore its standing as an influential actor on the international stage, and thus is attempting to promote a ceasefire in Gaza. In addition, Russia’s relations with Iran have become a strategic alliance as a result of the war in Ukraine, and in order to safeguard it, Moscow has adopted a policy that is sympathetic to Iran’s allies, including Hamas. Moreover, it is very convenient for Moscow that the US is the focus of attention in the Middle East. Russia’s support for Hamas can be seen in the measures it has taken in the international arena. On October 16, Russia submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council on a ceasefire, but it failed to include any condemnation of Hamas and its attack on Israel. Rather, it condemned violence and terrorist acts against civilians, which could be interpreted as a condemnation of Hamas’s actions or of Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the Russian resolution suggested that Israel was responsible for the explosion at the al-Ahli hospital in Gaza, despite clear evidence that the rocket that hit the hospital was fired from within Gaza. On October 25, Russia used its veto power in the Security Council to block a US resolution calling for the condemnation of Hamas and supporting Israel’s right to defend itself. Later, Russian anti-Israel rhetoric became even harsher, returning to the terminology used by the Soviets, when on November 2, the Russian ambassador to the UN rejected Israel’s right to self-defense since it is an “occupying power.” Comments from senior Hamas officials also shed much light on how close the organization is to Russia. For example, in an October 8 interview with Russia Today, a state-run media outlet, senior Hamas official Ali Baraka said that Hamas had updated Moscow about the attack shortly after it began. During the war itself, when a delegation of senior Hamas officials visited Moscow, Mousa Abu Marzook said that “we look at Russia as our closest friend.” After the visit, Hamas thanked Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry for their efforts to halt “the Israeli violence against the Palestinian people.” Hamas leader Khaled Mashal also said in an interview with an Egyptian television station that the Russians were impressed with the Hamas attack and that they would teach it in their military academies. Russia’s support for Hamas is not limited to the international diplomatic sphere. There is evidence that Russian weapons have been found in Hamas’s possession, including anti-tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles that apparently were transported via Iran – while Russia turned a blind eye. In addition, in the same interview with Russia Today, Baraka claimed that Russia had given Hamas a license to manufacture its own modified version of the AK-47 (Kalashnikov) assault rifle and ammunition. Hamas’s armed wing uses Russian servers. On the economic front too, it is evident that Hamas relies heavily on the Russian crypto market, sending tens of millions of dollars into digital wallets controlled by Hamas (and Islamic Jihad), while bypassing US sanctions. According to Ukrainian reports, the Wagner Group helped to train Hamas terrorists. State-run Russian media has also adopted a clearly pro-Palestinian line. Russian propaganda seeks to justify the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine by highlighting the IDF’s killing of civilians and exaggerating the number of Palestinian causalities. After the blast at the al-Ahli hospital, the Russian media claimed that thousands of people had been killed – a figure higher even than the death toll reported by Gazans. Israeli soldiers are depicted as “immoral” because of the massive causalities they inflict on a civilian population, unlike the Russian soldiers who, according to state-run media, “would never be able to attack civilians, women, and children.” Russian social media channels, such as Telegram, are also awash with anti-Israel rhetoric and blatantly antisemitic comments. In the aftermath of the attempted pogrom against Israeli and Jewish passengers in Dagestan on October 29, Putin convened a meeting with the government and heads of the security establishment and drew a direct line between the war in Ukraine and the war between Israel and Hamas, accusing the United States and the West of undermining stability in Russia, the Middle East, and the entire world. He declared that “the fate of Russia and, indeed, of the whole world, including the future of the Palestinian people, is being decided” on the Ukrainian front. By connecting the two conflicts, Putin is clearly putting Russia on the side of Hamas and Israel on the opposing side, alongside the United States and the West. In effect, Putin has validated US President Joe Biden’s statement that Russia and Hamas are waging a war against democracy. Putin’s comments and Russia’s behavior in the aftermath of October 7 highlight the misconception that Russia would not oppose Israel at critical moments. The change that Israel must make in its policy vis-à-vis Russia is to stand unequivocally beside the United States – which includes supporting Ukraine. The quicker Israel adapts its policy to meet the challenge, the better its strategic balance in the Middle East and beyond will be.

Dear Madam President Ladies and gentlemen of the House, Dear visitors in the gallery! I just want to say that I am grateful. Grateful for this unanimous decision in this House. This is a really important signal that also strengthens my position. We must never forget: October 7 really was a breach of civilization. In terms of its cruelty, it was a day that actually eclipsed everything. In a region that is not short of atrocities as it is. I will never forget when I received a phone call on that Saturday with the question: Mr. Federal Minister, how good are your stomach nerves? And I said yes, they are good. And then I was sent videos and photos that I knew were authentic. These pictures will never leave me again. The last time I saw something similar was in connection with the Daesh videos. The cruelty, the bloodlust, the dehumanization. And I am therefore very grateful that we have such a clear position here in Austria. I believe that each and every one of us is called upon to take a clear stance on terrorism - no matter where, no matter how. Murder is murder! You must not put something into context, because that means relativizing it. Never in the history of mankind has a conflict come out of the blue. There is always a prehistory for everything. Also for the Russian attack on Ukraine, which we have not put into context either. And of course international humanitarian law applies. But that is precisely the difference - and several MEPs have emphasized this - that Israel is a constitutional state, a pluralistic democracy. It is struggling, it is trying to find the right path. And MP Matznetter also said that we don't want to be in the IDF's shoes. Because it's almost an inhuman task to keep a cool head in such an emotionally charged situation. Yes, they drop leaflets. Yes, they warn. They call for evacuation. They try to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. And yes, we see what we have actually always known, that Hamas deliberately uses civilian facilities such as schools, refugee camps, hospitals and others for their command centers, tunnel entrances, to hide their weapons there. In other words, as a democracy, as a constitutional state in the fight against terrorism, one hand is always tied behind its back. But that is the right thing to do, it has to be that way. You can see from Israel that they are trying. Three points now have priority: The first point is to prevent a wildfire. This is still not averted. It could end up being a three-front war. We are of course keeping a very close eye on developments in northern Israel and in southern Lebanon with Hezbollah. But, and I would like to emphasize this in particular: Austria is not blind with one eye, we see with both eyes. This applies to the West Bank. And I have to say quite frankly: I consider the settler violence that we see in the West Bank to be intolerable. It is also a lack of solidarity. We are currently dealing with a situation in which the Israeli army is stretched to the limit. And then I think it's a lack of solidarity within Israeli society if some people think they can vent their anger, their emotions and set fire to the West Bank. That could lead to a third front. We have to be very clear about this. The second point is of course - as has already been mentioned several times - the unconditional release of the hostages. I had the opportunity to meet some of the survivors of October 7 here in Vienna last week. It really got under your skin. When you meet a father who tells you that he is actually almost relieved because his child is among the dead and not among the hostages, it's hard to imagine what that must mean for these people. We have to stay on it. This is a terrorist organization, there can be no ifs and buts. There can be no negotiations. They must release the hostages unconditionally. The third point - this is also important to me: I myself was one of the first ministers to put development cooperation with Palestine on hold and ordered an evaluation. We do not want to support Hamas. At the same time, however, we do not want the civilian population to suffer. That would again be fertile ground for the next extremism. We have therefore made EUR 2 million available for humanitarian aid via the Austrian Development Agency. A further EUR 6 million for the region - for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan - which of course run the risk of being destabilized. I think it is good that the European Union has quadrupled humanitarian aid. But, and we saw the European Commission's report on development cooperation a few days ago, I believe we must not be naive. In future, we in Austria will take a very close look at which partner organizations - whether in Gaza or Israel, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mozambique - we work with. What does it say on their websites? What does the umbrella organization in which they are affiliated say? Is there racism, is there anti-Semitism? Are there lines that we cannot support because of our values? This is also a lesson for me from the horrific incident on October 7. In future, we need to take a much closer look at exactly who we are helping and how. Thank you very much!

President Al-Sisi, thank you for the speed and determination with which you have organised this conference. I consider this to be a very important conference following the terrible attack by Hamas on 7 October which, we must remember, was carried out against unarmed civilians with unprecedented, appalling brutality, and which, from our point of view, it is right to unambiguously condemn. It was only right for Italy to participate in this conference, given its historical role as a bridge for dialogue between Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and also considering the opportunities presented by this summit, despite the fact that starting positions may seem somewhat distant at times because, even if our starting viewpoints may not perfectly overlap, what does perfectly overlap is our interest – the interest of all leaders sitting around this table, and that interest is to ensure what is happening in Gaza does not become a much wider conflict, that it does not turn into a religious war, a clash of civilisations, as that would mean the efforts courageously made over the last years to the contrary, to normalise relations, would have been in vain. The impression I get – and I am saying this with my usual frankness – is that, considering the way Hamas carried out its attack, its real objective was not to defend the right of the Palestinian people, but rather to force a response against Gaza that would fundamentally undermine any attempts at dialogue and create an unbridgeable gap between Arab countries, Israel, the West, thereby definitively compromising peace and well-being for all citizens involved, including those it says it wants to defend and represent. This means that we are all the target, and I do not think we can fall into this trap: that would be very stupid indeed. This is why I believe it is important to be here, why I believe it is very important to continue dialogue and discussions. I believe there are a number of key points to be reiterated. Firstly, terrorism has hit the Muslim world more than it has the West. In fact, terrorist acts over time have weakened peoples’ legitimate demands, especially in the Muslim world. Within this dynamic, there is the choice of Hamas to use terrorism to prevent any kind of dialogue and any prospect of arriving at a concrete solution, also for the Palestinian people. However, no cause justifies terrorism. No cause justifies actions that are knowingly designed to target unarmed civilians. No cause justifies women being massacred and newborns being decapitated, deliberately filmed on camera. No cause. When faced with such actions, a State is fully entitled to claim its right to exist, defend itself and ensure the security of its citizens and borders. However, and this brings me to the second point, a State’s reaction cannot and must not ever be driven by feelings of revenge. This is why States are what they are; they are our point of reference. A State bases its reactions on precise security reasons, ensuring proportionate use of force and protecting the civilian population. These are the boundaries within which a State’s reaction to terrorism must remain, and I am confident that this is also the will of the State of Israel. Thirdly, our immediate priority remains humanitarian access, which is essential to prevent further suffering among the civilian population as well as mass exoduses that would contribute to destabilising this region. This is something we do not need. I consider the mediation work that has been carried out in this regard by several players attending this conference to be very important. I consider the European Commission’s decision to triple its humanitarian aid for Gaza, taking the total to over EUR 75 million, to also be very important. Italy is also working to increase bilateral aid, but an increase in resources must clearly be accompanied by very strict control over who uses those resources. Encouraging developments are coming from this morning. President Al-Sisi, I thank you for this too. We are very concerned about the fate of the hostages in the hands of Hamas, and, as you know, there are also Italians among them. We ask for the immediate release of all hostages, clearly starting with women, children and the elderly. It is important to keep working together to get vulnerable people and foreign civilians out of Gaza. Above all, we must do the impossible to avoid an escalation of this crisis, to avoid losing control of what may happen, because the consequences would be unimaginable. The most serious way to achieve this goal is to resume a political initiative for a structural solution to the crisis based on the prospect of two peoples and two States. This solution must be concrete and, in my view, it must have a defined time frame. The Palestinian people must have the right to be a nation that governs itself, freely, next to a State of Israel whose right to exist and right to security must be fully recognised. In this regard, Italy is ready to do absolutely everything that is necessary. Thank you again, Mr. President.