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In recent days, three Israeli-linked commercial vessels were targeted by ballistic missiles and drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, marking a clear escalation in maritime attacks in the critical Bab el Mandab strait between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis have claimed responsibility for two of the attacks, as well as an earlier hijacking of a Japanese-operated cargo ship by helicopter last month. On Sunday, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree reemphasised that all Israeli-affiliated vessels travelling along the Yemeni coast would be fair game if Israel does not cease its attacks on Gaza, which have claimed the lives of at least 15,500 Palestinians since October 7. Who are the Houthis? The Iranian-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, are insurgents that control most of Yemen’s north, including the nation’s capital, Sana'a. The group emerged in the 1980s as a political-religious revivalist movement out of the Zaydi sect from Yemen’s northern highlands, namely the ancient city of Saada. The movement’s broad motivations emerged from longstanding grievances that left many Zaydis feeling like second-class citizens within the wider Yemeni social and political order. Many in the Houthi leadership received religious education in Iran before returning to Yemen in the early 2000s and becoming more politically active. The Houthis are not mere Iranian “proxies”, however. Attempts to portray them as such tend to overemphasise this connection and ignore the indigenous nature and causes of the movement and its ideology. The group engaged in ongoing struggles against the Ali Abdullah Saleh-led Yemeni government throughout the 2000s, ultimately contributing to its collapse following the 2011 Arab revolts. Following the Arab Spring and increasing chaos in Yemen, the Houthis gained significant momentum. In 2014, they were able to oust the Saudi-backed transitional government and seize power over much of Yemen, rapidly blitzing into the country’s south – a move that shocked international onlookers in its brazenness and efficacy. In response, a Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition launched a military intervention, which they believed would rapidly overwhelm the insurgents with their technological superiority. The operation went awry, however. Thanks to their own tenacity, along with increasing support from Iran, the Houthis were able to bog down the coalition forces into a bloody stalemate. This brought untold misery to the wider Yemeni population, but allowed the Houthis to hold onto power over much of the country’s north. A series of backchannel negotiations led to a halt in the fighting in 2022. Although peace talks officially commenced in April, Yemen remains in a state of precarious peace. Because this is such a critical time for the Houthis, it begs the question: why are they risking their hard-won gains over a conflict thousands of kilometres away that doesn’t directly involve them? Why Israel? The Houthis are part of the so-called “axis of resistance”, an alliance of proxy militant and insurgent groups that Iran has built throughout the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Within this wider context, Israel has attempted to implicate Iran in Red Sea attacks, but Tehran denies it. To interpret the Houthi attacks on Israel as solely an extension of Iran’s wider geopolitical manoeuvring would be overlooking a crucial Houthi political strategy. The group’s support of the Palestinians is also a way of garnering domestic and regional support for its own position in Yemen. While many countries in the region have sought a detente with Israel in recent years, it’s clear that support for the Palestinians remains high among the wider Arab population. As such, the Houthis clearly see an opportunity to step into the vacuum and generate positive public opinion for their cause. This not only strengthens the Houthis’ authority at home, but is also critical to reinforcing the legitimacy of the Houthis as Yemen’s governing authority in the eyes of the international community. Why is the Bab el Mandab Strait important? Yemen has always been at the centre of regional geopolitics due to its strategic location on the Bab el Mandab Strait, also known as the “Gate of Tears,” which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean beyond. Because vessels need to traverse the 30-kilometre-wide strait to travel between Europe and Asia (via the Suez Canal), it serves a pivotal role in global trade and energy security. Oil and natural gas shipments pass through the strait from the Middle East to Europe and North America. Historically, the strait is no stranger to conflict. In 1973, for instance, Egypt blockaded the strait to prevent ships from reaching Israel during the October war. The Houthis are aware of how critical this waterway is. And its attacks on the vessels, which may seem to be a nuisance for now, could potentially cause larger problems for Israel and its allies. For Israel, diverting its shipments to Asia around the southern tip of Africa – instead of through the Red Sea – would significantly increase shipping costs and transit times. Any disruption to this trading route would have serious global economic costs, as well. Global maritime insurance companies are already hiking their prices and limiting their coverage of high-risk shipping as a direct result of the Houthi attacks. The Houthi threat also serves to ratchet up the wider tensions in the region, potentially changing the calculus of the US and Israel, who might become more cautious in their actions as a result. For the Houthis, these provocations are ultimately low cost and high return. Given the insurgent, battle-hardened and dispersed nature of the group, for example, it would be difficult for Israel or its allies to try to respond to the attacks. So, as long as the war in Gaza drags on, the Houthis will likely continue to play a disruptive role and look for new ways to create uncertainty and risk in the region.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, today, at the Knesset in Jerusalem, met with UK Foreign Secretary and former Prime Minister David Cameron and said at the start of their meeting: "Thank you, David, for coming here and standing with Israel. We hope to get our hostages out. It's not without its challenges. But we have to, we hope to get this first tranche out. And then we're committed to getting everyone out. We'll continue with our war aims, namely to eradicate Hamas, because Hamas has already promised that they will do this again and again and again. They're a genocidal terrorist cult. There's no hope for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, between Israel and the Arab states, if we don't eradicate this murderous movement that threatens the future of all of us. It's a larger battle of civilization against barbarism, the kind of savagery that you saw on your visit. It's the worst savagery perpetrated on Jews since the Holocaust. And just as the world united to vanquish the Nazis or vanquish al-Qaeda after 9/11 or vanquish ISIS, we have to unite to vanquish Hamas. Israel sustained proportionately twenty 9/11s – twenty 9/11s. It's as though 50,000 Americans were slaughtered in a single day and 10,000 were held hostage, including a nine-month-old baby. He can't walk, he can't talk, he's a hostage. What kind of people do this? The answer is these are not people; these are monsters. These monsters have to go. They'll go. We'll pursue the battle until that goal is achieved, and we give a different future for Gaza and for us." UK Foreign Secretary Cameron: "I just want to say thank you very much for finding the time to see me. I wanted to come in person and go to the sites of the country and go to Kibbutz Be'eri to see just the true nature of the horrific attacks that you faced. I think it's very important to do that and see that. And, you know, we stand with the people of Israel in sympathy for what you have gone through. I think that was important. Today, obviously, it's important we talk about this potential humanitarian pause. I think it's an opportunity to crucially get hostages out and to get aid into Gaza. There's never an excuse for this sort of hostage taking. All the hostages should be released. I hope everyone who's responsible and behind this agreement can make it happen, to bring relief to those families, including, of course, there are British nationals who have been taken hostage. And so that, let's hope that that can be delivered. Thank you for the time. There's lots of things to talk about. It's very good to see you again." Attending the meeting for the Israeli side were the Strategic Affairs Minister, the Director of the National Security Council, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, the Prime Minister's Military Secretary, the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser and the Israeli Ambassador to the UK. Attending for the British side were the British Ambassador to Israel and head of the Foreign Office Middle East and North Africa Division, among others.

Calls for a cease-fire and other limits on military operations and violence were made by governments, advocacy groups and political leaders around the world almost immediately after the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre of 1,200 Israeli civilians by Hamas. Israel immediately declared war on Hamas and began shelling and then invaded Gaza, leading to more than 11,000 civilian deaths and massive destruction. Global calls for cease-fires have continued to be made by hundreds of disparate organizations and tens of thousands of demonstrators. The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have issued calls for fighting to stop, to ensure “the immediate, continuous, sufficient and unhindered provision of essential goods and services to civilians throughout the Gaza Strip” and to ensure “immediate, full, sustained, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” for the U.N. and other agencies. To date, there has been no cease-fire, though in early November, Israel agreed to stop attacks for four hours a day to allow refugees to flee and aid to be distributed. And other efforts to establish a cease-fire agreement are reportedly underway. Those demanding a cease-fire are driven by humanitarian compassion and principles, primarily the need to protect civilians caught up in a terrible war. But as a scholar of mediation who also works as an international mediator, I know that cease-fires are technically complicated military and political undertakings that always entail risk and require specialist expertise. The basic requirements In addition to providing mediation training to senior international diplomats, I have done comparative research on what constitutes a strong cease-fire. I also have practical experience: In 2005 and 2006 I was a member of the African Union mediation team for ending violent conflict in Darfur, responsible for drafting the peace agreement’s cease-fire provisions. To this end, I facilitated tense negotiations between Sudanese military officers and Darfur rebels. On the basis of my research and experience, it is clear that a strong cease-fire agreement must always have clear and viable rules and timelines, including about the use and control of weapons, the movements of fighters and the activities of humanitarian agencies. The leadership and rank and file of the opposing forces must understand precisely what their responsibilities are in a cease-fire. They must know exactly what activities are prohibited and what activities are permitted. Moreover, the rules and procedures must be tailored to the particular political, military and geographic circumstances of each conflict. The details of a humanitarian cease-fire agreement for Gaza would look completely different from, say, the cease-fire agreement for Darfur. And it needs political will from the opposing parties, which varies from case to case and can change over time. A cease-fire for Gaza The relevant circumstances of Gaza include these facts: - Israel has much more powerful military capabilities than Hamas. - The fighting in Gaza is taking place in a densely populated area. - Hamas fighters are physically close to and perhaps even immersed in the civilian population of Gaza. - The U.N. and numerous other organizations have said it is essential for Hamas to release the Israeli hostages it holds. - The people of Gaza have critical humanitarian needs for food, water, shelter and safety, as well as hospital and medical support. - The Israeli government and Hamas would have to negotiate mutually acceptable ways of addressing these challenges.   It would also be important to consult the U.N. and other humanitarian agencies to determine what they need in order to provide humanitarian support and protect children, injured people and other vulnerable groups. The role of trust – and mistrust Opposing groups who are in violent conflicts inevitably hate and mistrust each other. It is therefore helpful for cease-fire negotiations to be supported by a mediator who is sufficiently trusted by the parties. The mediator can facilitate these negotiations through indirect dialogue – referred to as “shuttle diplomacy” – when the parties are unwilling or unable to meet face-to-face. In the Gaza crisis, Qatar, supported by the United States, is playing the mediator role. Qatari mediators are attempting to negotiate a deal between Hamas and Israel that could include the release of roughly 50 civilian hostages from Gaza in exchange for a three-day cease-fire. There are two other ways cease-fires can be strengthened in order to mitigate the hatred and mistrust between the parties. The first is by deploying cease-fire monitors – independent observers on the field of battle – who investigate alleged cease-fire violations. Their presence can help to deter violations. The second way is by setting up communication channels between the mediator and representatives of the warring parties to resolve disputes and address violations that inevitably arise. The goal is to prevent small-scale violations from escalating into large-scale violations that could herald a return to hostilities. Political will is important Israel and Hamas can overcome the technical difficulties of a Gaza cease-fire if they have the political will to do so. It is relevant that Israel and Hamas have previously negotiated cease-fires and truces in Gaza. And in 2023 a truce between Israel and the Gaza-based Islamic Jihad militant group was brokered by Egyptian mediators after cross-border attacks. A cease-fire brokered by the U.S. in November 2012 lasted 18 months. But none of the cease-fires was likely to hold in the long term because they were not linked to a political resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In responding to the Gaza crisis, some world leaders have appeared confused about the distinction between a truce, a humanitarian pause, a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. In general, there is no international consensus on the meaning of these terms. In Gaza, as in every case, the cease-fire objectives, rules and procedures matter more than the labels that are used. The current focus of international calls for a cease-fire is on humanitarian relief as a short-term objective. But the humanitarian situation, and the need to protect civilians in Gaza, will remain critical in the medium to long term. The question of a permanent cease-fire and long-term security arrangement will have to be part of any negotiations to finally resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If the vision of a two-state solution is realized, the challenge will be to ensure that both Israel and an independent Palestinian state can enjoy sovereignty and adequate self-defense without threatening each other.

Introduction:  After 50 days of the Israeli aggression on Gaza Strip (GS), it appears that the declared objectives of the Israeli occupation are still elusive, whether in “crushing” Hamas, freeing its captives, imposing an alternative governance system, or obtaining full assurances that GS will not pose a threat to its security in the future. On the other hand, despite the large number of killed and wounded, and the widespread destruction in the region, Hamas and the resistance forces, supported by popular backing, continue to demonstrate resilient resistance, inflicting significant losses on the occupying forces. They have even succeeded in imposing their conditions in the humanitarian pause and the first prisoner exchange deal. Having achieved victory on October 7, 2023, surrendering to Israeli conditions, which only aim to uproot resistance in GS or drain it of its substance, is not on the table. Consequently, the situation leans more towards a “bone-breaking” scenario and “mutual finger-biting.” This implies that the war may prolong, but to what extent remains uncertain! Key Israeli Considerations: After the fiftieth day of the war, Israeli considerations remain governed by the following: – Recovery of the security and deterrence theory, and considering the battle as “decisive” for the Israeli state, especially after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023 have struck at its core and undermined it in the eyes of many. The failure to regain a strong, secure environment would render the Zionist state project meaningless, turning it into a hostile environment. Its role as an advanced fortress for Western powers and a stabilizer for the region would also lose its significance. – Israel is haunted by the “fear of failure” in its aggression on GS and is reluctant to admit to a new strategic failure after its major setback on October 7. Acknowledging failure might embolden the resistance forces to impose their conditions, signaling the potential beginning of a countdown for the occupation. – There is a quasi-governmental and popular Israeli consensus on seeking revenge against Hamas and GS, reclaiming Israeli captives and preventing resistance forces in GS from posing a threat to the occupation and settlements in the GS envelope. However, there is a difference in opinion regarding the duration of the war and the acceptable final form. – Israel benefits from a stark imbalance in military capabilities, possessing the latest lethal weapons by land, sea and air, fueling its confidence in its military strength. – Netanyahu and the Likud party are experiencing a significant decline in popularity. Many believe that Operation Al-Aqsa Flood ended Netanyahu’s political life, potentially pushing him to continue the war in a quest for victory or a semblance of victory to rebuild his image and avoid his fate. – The international alliance led by the United States plays a significant role in influencing the duration of the war and adjusting Israeli objectives. The alliance has provided international cover for Israel’s aggression and its commission of heinous massacres, which led to having 15 thousand killed, including more than 6 thousand children and 4 thousand women. It provided Israel with weapons and money, and brought its forces to the region to show support and prevent any regional interference. However, time pressure is mounting due to ongoing massacres, increasing public discontent in the Western world, and Israel’s continued failure to achieve tangible accomplishments beyond destruction and civilian casualties. Therefore, a state of restlessness began to emerge, pushing towards more realistic goals. – Israel benefits from a weak or complicit Arab environment, incapable or unwilling to provide real military or logistical support to the resistance that could make a qualitative difference in favor of the resistance. – The increasing military and human losses for Israel push it to conclude the war. – Escalating economic losses, the costs of war, disruptions in various facilities, tourism setbacks and a loss of security present an additional pressure factor. – The failure of Israeli forces to free the captives and Hamas’ success in imposing its conditions on the occupation. Hamas and Resistance Calculations: – The resistance is banking on its significant achievement on October 7th and its readiness for a long-term battle. It relies on the quality of its fighters, numbering over 60 thousand, and the popular support rallying around it. – For the resistance, an Israeli victory and control over GS, imposing its conditions, would mean uprooting the resistance. This would drive them to fight to the end, unwilling to accept anything less than new gains for the resistance and the Palestinian people. Having demonstrated strength, efficiency, and continued field control for fifty days, the resistance remains capable of inflicting significant and increasing losses on the Israeli forces. It can still launch missiles at most areas of the 1948 occupied Palestinian territories. The prospect of its defeat in the foreseeable future becomes highly unlikely, if not impossible. – Overall, the political and military leadership structure of Hamas remains strong and cohesive, possessing high efficiency in controlling GS. This signifies a resounding failure for Israel after fifty days of aggression. – The resistance still holds the card of Israeli captives, and the military aggression has not succeeded in freeing a single prisoner. This remains a powerful card that Hamas can play in any future arrangements. – There are immense sacrifices, especially at the level of the supporting people and the level of massive destruction of homes, infrastructure, schools, hospitals, mosques and churches. However, these sacrifices have turned into fuel for the resistance and the widening revolution. They are no longer elements of submission and subjugation to the occupation. – The escalating Arab, Islamic, and international popular support for the resistance boosts its morale and puts pressure on political regimes to halt the aggression and support the resistance. – The continuation of aggression and massacres may eventually lead to an escalation of tension in the region. The situation may deviate from the norms of continuous conflict since the beginning of the war in southern Lebanon, raising concerns among regional and international powers about the possibility of it turning into a regional or global war. Conclusion: It appears that the Israeli occupation will exert every effort to extract a victory or the semblance of victory, considering it a fundamental necessity for its existence, stability, prestige and regional standing. On the other hand, the resistance aims to reinforce the victory it achieved on October 7th, and will not accept any concessions that would lead to its uprooting or subjugation, especially after the significant sacrifices made by both the resistance and its popular base. Therefore, the possibility of prolonging the duration of the aggression remains, but the resistance’s ability to continue its qualitative performance, coupled with the anticipated significant military, human and economic losses on the Israeli side, along with the escalating Arab and international public pressure and the widening conflict in southern Lebanon, will force the international alliance to lean towards more realistic solutions. This will also compel the Israel to backtrack on most of its demands. This process may take weeks, but the more intense the resistance becomes and the fewer genuine targets or pressure points the occupation has, the shorter the time frame will become. Eventually, it may resort to solutions to save face.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, today, at the Prime Minister's Knesset office, met with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo. Prime Minister Netanyahu showed them sections of the horrific footage from the IDF Spokesperson's Office and told them afterwards: "We face a peculiar kind of enemy, a particularly cruel and inhuman foe. They're genocidal. They're not fighting for this or that territory; they're fighting to eliminate the Jewish state in whatever boundary. They say so. Their charter says if you find a bush and a Jew is hiding behind it, kill the Jew. Kill all the Jews. Their goal goes beyond the destruction of Israel. They're part of an axis of terror: Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis. They say death to America—that's the Great Satan. Israel is the Small Satan. I hope I don't find any offense with any of you. You're a middle-sized Satan. They hate our free civilization. They want to bury it. They have an ideology that is mad. In the 21st century, after the Enlightenment, after the Scientific Revolution, after the advance of human rights and democracy, this is sheer madness. I don't give it relative moralism that says, moral relativism that says, well, they have this society. They can do these horrible things to women. They can do these horrible things to human beings. That's their value system. That's not a value system. That's something that has to be fought. And one thing that we discovered in the 21st century is that our assumption that we can live our civilized lives in our advanced countries, seeking peace, prosperity and progress, and we can just sit back and the barbarians will not come back, they come back. They come back in many places, and if we are unwilling to fight the barbarians, they will win. There's a great historian that I admire, an American Christian Humanist by the name of Will Durant, who wrote, in the last century he wrote "The History of Civilization." And he said history does not favor Jesus Christ over Genghis Khan. History favors the strong. Your moral values do not stand up if you're not willing to fight for them. Here is a classic case of savagery and barbarism against civilization. Now, this savagery has two techniques. One is to deliberately target civilians. The whole laws of war, humanitarian law, which we're committed to completely, makes a simple distinction. On one line, they draw, they draw a line in the middle of the world and they say on one line are combatants, and the other line are non-combatants. You can target the combatants. You should target the combatants. But don't deliberately target the non-combatants. They can be hurt, unintentionally. That accompanies every legitimate war. What the terrorists do is erase the sense of sin. They say everyone is a target. These girls in a music festival, these women. They're targets. Babies. They're targets. Old people. They're targets. Holocaust survivors. They're targets. Everyone is a combatant. Everyone! They not only target everyone, every citizen, no one is a civilian, no one is exempt from their murder, from their harm. They also hide behind their civilians. They deliberately implant themselves in hospitals, in schools, in residential areas, in UN facilities. They fire their rockets from there. Thousands of them. We might have an alert as we speak. There is no symmetry here! These people target directly our cities all the time. Thousands and thousands and thousands of rockets. Falling on Barcelona, falling on Madrid, falling on Brussels, falling on Antwerp. Or any one of the European cities. Thousands! Israel is a small country. They deliberately target civilians and they deliberately hide behind civilians and use them as a human shield. That's a war crime. So what is a democracy, committed to the human, to the laws of war, supposed to do? Do the laws of war give exemption to such criminals? And the answer is: They don't. They say do your best to target the terrorists. Do your best to minimize civilian casualties. But if we, the democracies, accept, say that under no circumstances should we go in because civilians tragically get killed, then we lost. We lost before we begin. You lost and you lost. Spain lost. Belgium lost. Because this will spread. You will see it. Very soon. Because the Axis of Terror is not going to stop. If they can emerge victorious here, they intend to bring down the Middle East, and next they'll go to Europe. After that they'll go elsewhere. If you think I'm exaggerating, I am not. This is where the pivot of history now is going to be decided. Do we stop them there? Or do they come to you? Now, how do you stop them? What do you do? What did the Western countries, what did the democracy do when terrorists embed themselves amidst civilians? Let me say from the start that any civilian death is a tragedy. Any one. And to avoid them, what you do is first, you try to get the civilians out of harm's way. And that's exactly what we did. We asked, called, sent leaflets, phoned the civilians in the areas where we were going to hit the terrorists, the Hamas terrorists, and we said please leave. When they tried to leave, Hamas kept them at gunpoint. Stay, because Hamas doesn't care that their civilians are killed. This is a messianic death cult that hides in the bunkers. As one of their spokesmen said: the underground belongs to Hamas; aboveground, so civilians, that's Israel's problem and the UN problem. Not their problem. On the contrary. It's their shield. So, what do you do? We ask them to leave. Hamas tries to stop them from leaving. Thankfully, many left. We set up a safe corridor, from the north of Gaza, where we were concentrating our effort against the terrorists, to the south. A safe zone in the south, safe corridor to the south. Hamas shot the safe corridor. They fired on the safe corridor, so the people would be trapped in. But they kept on leaving. I'm happy to say that there is a decline in civilian casualties, which is our goal. Our goal is to have none. And primarily that's because of the ground action. The ground action has resulted in the fact that the warnings that we give are addressed by the population, the civilian population that goes south. When they go south, we give them humanitarian support. There are about 150 trucks now going in. Probably go up to 200 and beyond: food, medicine, water. I have not seen yet the effort that I'd like to see from the UN and the international agencies to build there shelters. Winter is coming and there is no reason not to build tens of thousands of tents in the safe zone, next to the safe zone. Because they don't enter the safe zone, the UN, which I think is shocking. I said, okay, we'll give you a lot of little zones. And they're building little safe zones to get the population out of harm's way. Israel is doing everything in its power to get the population out of harm's way. Hamas is doing everything in its power to keep that population in harm's way. That's the facts. I'll give you an example – Hitler, the original Nazis, they invade Europe, they do these horrors on a mass scale. And by the way, these killers would do exactly what Hitler did if they could away with it. The difference is only in capability, not in intent and not in savagery. Hitler invades Europe, perpetrates these horrible savageries, the Holocaust and so on. And so on. And the Allies invade. They invade Normandy. The German army is in the cities. You've seen the footage. The Allies say, "No, we can't do anything. We can't fire," because they're amid civilians? Of course not. They try to do exactly what we are doing: try to minimize the cost. And then they go through the cities of France and they go through the cities of Germany. And unfortunately, many, many, many civilian casualties occur. I don't know what history would have been like if we had demonstrations and protests in the West against the Allies for incurring civilian, German civilian casualties. I know history would have been very different. But we are the Allies, along with the moderate Arabs, with the United States, with Europe. We're the Allies. And they're the new Nazis. Israel cannot be held to a standard that no one is being held to. We have to fight the terrorists. We're in complete compliance with international law. I think in many ways, we're setting a different standard. We seek to minimize civilian casualties, and Hamas seeks to maximize it. And I would strongly urge you to make that distinction, not merely because it's right and just, but because your very societies are on the line. You're next. This is a battle for civilization. It has to be won. We will win it, because we have no other choice. We don't have a future if we don't. Hamas has already said, 'We'll do it again and again and again.' So we'll have to eradicate them. Just as you couldn't leave a reduced Nazi presence, you know, in Germany. You couldn't do that. And we are not going to leave a reduced Hamas presence in Gaza. But the consequences are much bigger. And I think that we should all unite in making sure that this kind of savagery never shows its face again. I thank you." The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding.

A much-anticipated speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on November 3 largely echoed Iran’s pronouncements of support for Hamas and its threats of intervention in the group’s war against Israel. In a November 3 address, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned that skirmishing between Israel and Hezbollah could escalate into full-scale war. How likely is that? In his speech, Nasrallah warned that there is a possibility of Hezbollah’s intervention should Israel persist with its invasion of the Gaza Strip. Emulating his patrons in Iran, Nasrallah was at pains to suggest that Hamas’s October 7 assault in Israel was a wholly Palestinian operation, and that his preference is for the resulting war not to expand. However, to pressure Israel into a cease-fire, Hezbollah is likely to continue to inflame Israel’s northern border by launching limited attacks at Israeli targets from the group’s base in Lebanon. For now, the skirmishes are manageable, but as the conflict persists, Israel-Hezbollah clashes could escalate into a much bigger conflict. Hezbollah is one of the most lethal militant groups in the Middle East. Its fighters are battle hardened, having fought in Iraq and, most recently, Syria. Hezbollah also has approximately 150,000 missiles of various ranges that can inflict substantial damage on Israeli cities. In his speech, Nasrallah also stressed that his group was unaware of planning for the Hamas attacks on October 7, although he embraced them. Is there any sign that Iran and its proxies coordinated on the attacks? For years, Iran has been trying to bring together its various militias and proxies into what it calls the “Axis of Resistance.” Hezbollah is the central actor in this equation; its forces have been deployed in multiple battlefronts and have trained other militias in terrorist acts. Before the October 7 attacks, there were indications of coordination involving Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. During the summer, Hamas officials visited Iran and acknowledged receiving assistance from Tehran. Just prior to the attack, there were reports of Iranian military personnel meeting with both Hamas and Hezbollah operatives in Beirut, Lebanon. And this past weekend, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, attended a meeting with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during which the ayatollah “emphasized Iran’s permanent policy of supporting Palestinian resistance forces against Zionist occupiers,” Iranian media reported. It is entirely possible that Iran and Hezbollah were aware of Hamas’s planning and that they provided advice and assistance without knowing the exact date of Hamas’s invasion. This provides both with a measure of deniability despite their deep complicity. How has Iran reacted to the fighting in Gaza and the possible defeat of Hamas? Nasrallah’s speech was remarkably similar to the public pronouncements of Iranian officials, indicating that it could have been crafted in coordination with Iran. Both Hezbollah and Tehran have praised the October 7 attacks and celebrated the achievements of Hamas. They have both indicated that they had no prior knowledge of the assault but wholeheartedly approved of it. And they both have stressed that they do not wish to expand the war but could do so if Israel persists with its military campaign to wipe out Hamas and if civilian casualties mount. Nasrallah even went out of his way to absolve Tehran in his speech. “The events of [Hamas’s] Al-Asqa Flood operation unequivocally demonstrate that Iran exerts no control over the resistance factions, with the true decision-makers being the leaders of the resistance and their dedicated fighters.” It is curious that a leader of a Lebanese organization would comment on Iran’s role in this way. What’s at stake for Iran in the Israel-Hamas conflict? The credibility of the Axis of Resistance rests partly on Hamas surviving Israel’s retaliation. Hamas has become a core member of that resistance front, and its recent invasion has captured the imaginations of many Arabs. Moreover, Hamas gives Iran a degree of stature in the Sunni Muslim world that it needs given its complicity in the Syrian Civil War, which saw the killing of tens of thousands of Sunnis, at the least. Thus, the destruction of Hamas ill-serves Iran’s interests on many fronts. Still, on the domestic side, the regime stands to gain little with the Iranian public, which largely does not share its interest in supporting the Palestinian struggle against Israel.

Researchers in the INSS Russia program argue: Now is the time for Israel to change it approach toward Moscow Since October 7, Russia has sided with Hamas, refuses to condemn the murderous terror attack that the organization perpetrated in the western Negev, and has questioned Israel’s right to defend itself. Russia’s behavior should underscore to Israel the need to change its policy toward the Kremlin and to stand firmly with Western nations, under the leadership of the United States. Moscow’s firm support for Hamas in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 massacre represents a turning point in relations between Israel and Russia. While many world leaders have condemned the murderous attack on October 7, Russia has adopted an anti-Israel line and refrained from condemning Hamas. Only a week later after the attack, in a speech to leaders of former Soviet states in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the Hamas massacre was unprecedented, but in the same breath he accused Israel of a cruel response. He went on to compare the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip to the Nazi siege of Leningrad, which led to a high number of civilian causalities, estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Although Putin said that Israel has the right to self-defense, he added that the attack on innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip was unacceptable. It was only on October 16 that Putin, in a phone conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed condolences to the families of the murdered Israelis, but without condemning Hamas. Russia’s strategy of maintaining good relations with both sides in any given conflict is reflected in its policy of nurturing ties with Hamas. For Hamas too, ties with Russia are highly important, since it positions it as an organization that is welcome in one of the most important countries in the world. In principle, Moscow has clung to its position that Hamas – defined as a terrorist organization by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other members of the European Union – is a legitimate political organization. The relationship between Russia and Hamas has not always been as close as it is today. Throughout the 1990s and until Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, Russia condemned the organization’s terrorist activities and referred to its members as Islamic militants, fanatics, and extremists. The relationship changed dramatically after the election, when Putin declared that the organization was elected through a democratic and legitimate process. Russian Foreign Ministry officials began meeting regularly with Hamas representatives in 2006. In 2011, there was a temporary decline in relations after Hamas backed the opposition forces in the Syrian civil war. Hamas figures who were in Syria when the war broke out played an active role fighting alongside the opposition, while Russia supported President Bashar Assad. Nonetheless, ties were not severed, and over the years began to warm. Delegations of Hamas leaders visited Moscow, where they met with the Russian Foreign Minister and other senior officials, and meetings took place between Hamas officials and Russian diplomats in other countries. Russia did not adopt a consistent position during previous rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas and was influenced by its particular interests at the time. In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, there was a change in Russian policy as it sought to maintain an image of objectivity and deliberately scaled back its criticism of Israel – in contrast to previous conflicts, such as Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009. This was probably in response to Israel refraining from criticizing Russia over its invasion of Crimea. Russia’s current interests are not to Israel’s benefit. Moscow’s main goal at this time is to divert the attention of the West, under the leadership of the United States, away from Ukraine. An increase in US involvement in events in the Middle East serves this goal. At the same time, Russia blames the United States for the outbreak of the current conflict. Second, Russia aspires to restore its standing as an influential actor on the international stage, and thus is attempting to promote a ceasefire in Gaza. In addition, Russia’s relations with Iran have become a strategic alliance as a result of the war in Ukraine, and in order to safeguard it, Moscow has adopted a policy that is sympathetic to Iran’s allies, including Hamas. Moreover, it is very convenient for Moscow that the US is the focus of attention in the Middle East. Russia’s support for Hamas can be seen in the measures it has taken in the international arena. On October 16, Russia submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council on a ceasefire, but it failed to include any condemnation of Hamas and its attack on Israel. Rather, it condemned violence and terrorist acts against civilians, which could be interpreted as a condemnation of Hamas’s actions or of Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the Russian resolution suggested that Israel was responsible for the explosion at the al-Ahli hospital in Gaza, despite clear evidence that the rocket that hit the hospital was fired from within Gaza. On October 25, Russia used its veto power in the Security Council to block a US resolution calling for the condemnation of Hamas and supporting Israel’s right to defend itself. Later, Russian anti-Israel rhetoric became even harsher, returning to the terminology used by the Soviets, when on November 2, the Russian ambassador to the UN rejected Israel’s right to self-defense since it is an “occupying power.” Comments from senior Hamas officials also shed much light on how close the organization is to Russia. For example, in an October 8 interview with Russia Today, a state-run media outlet, senior Hamas official Ali Baraka said that Hamas had updated Moscow about the attack shortly after it began. During the war itself, when a delegation of senior Hamas officials visited Moscow, Mousa Abu Marzook said that “we look at Russia as our closest friend.” After the visit, Hamas thanked Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry for their efforts to halt “the Israeli violence against the Palestinian people.” Hamas leader Khaled Mashal also said in an interview with an Egyptian television station that the Russians were impressed with the Hamas attack and that they would teach it in their military academies. Russia’s support for Hamas is not limited to the international diplomatic sphere. There is evidence that Russian weapons have been found in Hamas’s possession, including anti-tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles that apparently were transported via Iran – while Russia turned a blind eye. In addition, in the same interview with Russia Today, Baraka claimed that Russia had given Hamas a license to manufacture its own modified version of the AK-47 (Kalashnikov) assault rifle and ammunition. Hamas’s armed wing uses Russian servers. On the economic front too, it is evident that Hamas relies heavily on the Russian crypto market, sending tens of millions of dollars into digital wallets controlled by Hamas (and Islamic Jihad), while bypassing US sanctions. According to Ukrainian reports, the Wagner Group helped to train Hamas terrorists. State-run Russian media has also adopted a clearly pro-Palestinian line. Russian propaganda seeks to justify the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine by highlighting the IDF’s killing of civilians and exaggerating the number of Palestinian causalities. After the blast at the al-Ahli hospital, the Russian media claimed that thousands of people had been killed – a figure higher even than the death toll reported by Gazans. Israeli soldiers are depicted as “immoral” because of the massive causalities they inflict on a civilian population, unlike the Russian soldiers who, according to state-run media, “would never be able to attack civilians, women, and children.” Russian social media channels, such as Telegram, are also awash with anti-Israel rhetoric and blatantly antisemitic comments. In the aftermath of the attempted pogrom against Israeli and Jewish passengers in Dagestan on October 29, Putin convened a meeting with the government and heads of the security establishment and drew a direct line between the war in Ukraine and the war between Israel and Hamas, accusing the United States and the West of undermining stability in Russia, the Middle East, and the entire world. He declared that “the fate of Russia and, indeed, of the whole world, including the future of the Palestinian people, is being decided” on the Ukrainian front. By connecting the two conflicts, Putin is clearly putting Russia on the side of Hamas and Israel on the opposing side, alongside the United States and the West. In effect, Putin has validated US President Joe Biden’s statement that Russia and Hamas are waging a war against democracy. Putin’s comments and Russia’s behavior in the aftermath of October 7 highlight the misconception that Russia would not oppose Israel at critical moments. The change that Israel must make in its policy vis-à-vis Russia is to stand unequivocally beside the United States – which includes supporting Ukraine. The quicker Israel adapts its policy to meet the challenge, the better its strategic balance in the Middle East and beyond will be.

Speech by Hanke Bruins Slot, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, at the UN Security Council quarterly open debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, 24 October 2023. The spoken word applies. Thank you, Mr President, I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Mr President, On 7 October, the world witnessed a horrific terrorist attack on Israel. The horrendous violence carried out by Hamas was not aimed at military targets. Rather, it was an attempt to destroy people’s souls. By taking hostages and, murdering civilians, and this threat from Hamas is far from over. In this context we should all stand united: by supporting Israel. And its right to self-defence against the terror threat of Hamas. As we’ve said before: the use of force in self-defence must be necessary and proportionate. And international humanitarian law must be respected. By all parties. This means that every possible measure to protect civilians must be taken. That humanitarian workers must be able to do their job safely and unhindered. And that UN premises and personnel remain safe from harm. All of this requires restraint on the part of Israel in the use of force. Mr President, the Kingdom of the Netherlands shares the concerns voiced by so many today. The situation for civilians in Gaza is catastrophic. They are in dire need of aid. We cannot afford to lose more time. So far, the first convoys have entered Gaza. We need a sustained flow of humanitarian aid of all basis needs. And much more is needed, including fuel. Water supplies need to be restored immediately. Humanitarian pauses are crucial to allow much-needed aid to get through. And a permanent humanitarian corridor is the only way to prevent the situation getting much worse. The Netherlands will step up its humanitarian response. We’ve committed an additional 10 million euros for immediate humanitarian relief; 8 million euros of which is for UNWRA. This funding aims to improve the living conditions for Palestinian citizens, including mental health and psychosocial support. We are also extremely concerned about the conflict spreading beyond the borders of Israel and Gaza. And we call on all concerned to prevent this from happening. We also urge all parties to do their utmost to prevent further escalation in the West Bank. In this context, we will continue with our development aid for stability. The Palestinian Authority fulfils an important role within their power in preventing a further deterioration and deserves our strong support. Settler violence is worsening an already tense situation. This must stop. Let me conclude, Mr President, by saying that our thoughts and prayers are with all the victims and the hostages that need to be released immediately and unconditionally. When the UN was created in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of the first major crises calling for urgent attention. Today, more than 75 years later, the need to find a solution to this conflict is more pressing and crucial than ever. The Netherlands calls on this Council to provide the leadership required to manage this crisis, contain it and provide perspective on sustainable peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians as the only way forward. In this context I would like to thank the tireless efforts of the UN and express my gratitude to the UN staff acting on the ground. We cannot go back to the status quo; the two-state solution is more urgently needed than ever. Because both sides need it, both sides are entitled to it, and both sides deserve it. Thank you, Mr President.

Whether Hamas’s October 7 assault has ended whatever prospects existed for forging diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains to be seen. The assumption that a second key goal of the attack was to get Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) to back away from a deal to recognize Israel may be true. But it is also possible that a protracted conflict in Gaza that invites a wider regional war—a prospect that now seems likely—could get Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader to revive the “Arab Peace Initiative” (API) that deceased Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdelaziz proposed in 2002. After all, there was a time not so long ago when some experts speculated that the initiative might “supplant” the Abraham Accords by providing an umbrella for a consensus of Arab governments, one that would address the key issue that the accords sidestepped: the creation of a Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. But such a step faces significant hurdles, not least of which is that no matter the outcome of Israel’s unfolding military campaign in Gaza, Hamas’s success (which surprised even its leaders) in breaching Israel’s defenses and spreading mayhem and death in southern Israeli towns and kibbutzim has made it and Islamic Jihad the paramount symbols in the Arab world of Palestinian resistance to any territorial compromise with Israel. Moreover, as Israel’s incursion creates massive civilian casualties, it is galvanizing the Arab street from Casablanca to Kuwait City, thus making it difficult for any Arab leader to make the case for revising a wider Arab initiative. And yet MBS might try, especially if he concludes that doing so would help consolidate his personal power before his eventual ascension to the throne. Such a move would represent a not insignificant change for the prince. After all, he had already signaled to the Biden administration that securing US support for a nuclear power plant under the umbrella of US security guarantees is far more important to the Saudis than conditioning the normalization of relations with Israel on a demand that Netanyahu’s government would surely reject—namely, to renounce Israel’s intended annexation of the occupied West Bank. Hamas’s assault may leave MBS with a newfound appreciation of the Palestinian issue. But his credibility as an interlocutor for the Palestinians has been tarnished by his lack of enthusiasm for embracing a cause that never topped his list. MBS Wins Either Way Reflecting on the implications of Hamas’s assault for Saudi Arabia, and for MBS in particular, one analyst argues that while the attack may have ended—or at least suspended—efforts to secure Israeli-Saudi normalization, this outcome would not represent a strategic or political loss for MBS. By changing the “discussion to MBS and Israel, away from MBS and Khashoggi,” he suggests, the crown prince got what he wanted: he has rehabilitated his image “just by talking.” Deal or no deal with Israel, MBS wins. However cynical it may be, this assessment is not off-base. In the rarified circles in which MBS thrives, where high-level diplomatic discussions and frequent appearances on global news programs fill his days and weeks, talking is a sign that he is in the game and that he counts. But knowing this, when it comes to the question of normalizing relations with Israel and other hot-button issues, he has been careful with his talk. Thus in a September 20 interview with Fox News, he noted, “For us, the Palestinian issue is very important, we need to solve that part.” Yet he avoided any direct mention of conditions while adding that, “We hope that we will reach a place that eases the life of the Palestinians.” There was no reference to the Arab Peace Initiative or a Palestinian state. Reiterating his hope that the ongoing discussions would give the Palestinians a “good life,” he showed optimism about the course of talks with the Biden administration. From a negotiating standpoint, this caution may have made sense. From his own vantage point, it also makes sense that MBS sees politics through the material lens of securing a “good life.” But from a diplomatic standpoint, his words were potentially problematic, as they suggested that the crown prince might be demanding less of the Israeli government and its leaders than the Biden administration. In late August, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken reportedly told Israel officials that they were “misreading the situation” if they thought that Israel would not have to make major concessions to the Palestinians for any deal with Riyadh. On September 13, he asserted that Saudi leaders told him that the “Palestinian piece is going to be very important,” thus seemingly anticipating the language that MBS used a week later in his interview with Fox News. Coordinated or not, these statements set off alarm bells, not in Israel, but in the United States. In a novel situation, several liberal Jewish organizations and a group of 20 Democratic Senators echoed Thomas Friedman’s September 5 opinion piece, in which he urged the administration to “just say no” to a Saudi-Israel deal that didn’t include an Israeli commitment to halting annexation and stopping actions that would preclude a Palestinian state, such as expanding settlements. This campaign was also tied to the stand-off between the Israeli government and the opposition regarding Israel’s “judicial reform” law. The authors of these demands knew that by insisting on linking Saudi-Israeli normalization to the Palestinian issue, the White House would make Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu navigate between two choices, one of which would probably lead to the collapse of his government. Thus the specter of US Jewish groups, Democratic senators and a prominent New York Times columnist delivering a message that MBS deliberately fudged, and that the administration seemed hesitant to place at the center of its talks with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Pulling Victory from the Jaws of Defeat? It is not unreasonable to assume that in the wake of the Hamas assault, MBS might talk his way out of an explosive situation that for the moment threatens to undermine Israeli-Saudi normalization, but could upend the entire superstructure of the Abraham Accords. If, in addition to producing a humanitarian crisis and thousands of civilian deaths, a prolonged Israeli incursion into Gaza triggers a wider regional war, the leaders of Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain might freeze their relations with Israel. This would be an enormous setback for the Biden administration, as it has bet nearly its entire Middle East policy on sustaining and expanding the accords. Since such an outcome would also put MBS in a tight spot, it is reasonable to expect that he, his ministers, and the semi-official Saudi press are getting busy revising the crown prince’s talking points in ways that emphasize his commitment to the Palestinians, thus perhaps setting the stage for an effort by him to dust off the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Indeed, it appears that the stage is already being set for such a shift. Careful not to get ahead of MBS, on the first day of Hamas’s attacks, the Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a statement that the kingdom was “closely following the developments of the unprecedented situation between a number of Palestinian factions and the Israeli occupation forces.” Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud then had a phone call with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, which according to the ministry noted “the kingdom’s rejection of targeting civilians in any way and the need for all parties to respect international humanitarian law.” Taking the message one small step forward, the editor of Saudi-owned newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat said that “Israel’s hubris has pushed it to miss several opportunities.” But as the summary of Saudi responses from which the above statements are all drawn shows, these remarks largely steered clear of Iran, and did not, of course, mention MBS’s recent observation about improving the lives of Palestinians. Echoing this tactical caution while moving the needle forward a little, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Mohammed Alyahya noted in a Washington Post editorial that MBS’s Fox News interview showed “his country’s commitment to easing the life of Palestinians through negotiations for normalization,” but prefaced this observation by stating that Saudi officials remain convinced that the “API is a solid foundation from which good-faith negotiations can proceed.” That position, he added, was also set out on September 23 at the UN General Assembly by the Saudi foreign minister. Thus the crown prince’s allies recast MBS’s tepid words on the Palestinians while placing his outreach to Israel under the umbrella of the API, a plan that is rejected by both Hamas and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Beyond the Dream Wagon These rejections reflect theocratic worldviews about Palestine that have been embraced by both Hamas and at least two ministers in Netanyahu’s government: Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. But this spirit of rejectionism is less the product of ideology or faith than an outcome of a stalemated conflict. That standoff has produced desperation among Palestinians who feel powerless, and a sense of either resignation or arrogant defiance among Israelis, born of the misconception that Israel could protect its security by sustaining the status quo or advancing the annexation of the West Bank. But the current sorry state of affairs was also a product of other factors, including the genocidal language of Iran and its allies in Lebanon, the apathy of Arab leaders, and the decision of the Biden administration to hitch its Middle East policy to a dream wagon of Arab-Israeli harmony that ignored the Palestinian issue. This was a fantasy because while the leaders of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia do not worry about democratic accountability, the sentiments of their people do matter. However charming and even welcomed, all the interfaith dialogue and prayer in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh will not produce conditions that will help Palestinians and Israelis toward some kind of imperfect but just peace. This lesson will now get a new hearing from Arab leaders, from the Biden administration, and perhaps eventually, from a new Israeli government. But the White House will have to make it clear to MBS and other Arab leaders that proposals to revive a wider Arab Peace Initiative must be based on much more than talk, or for that matter, on the kinds of diplomatic hedging that MBS has pursued with a hardline Iranian government that rejects Palestinian-Israeli peace of any kind. Enormous financial and institutional resources, as well as a display of political will the likes of which have not been seen in the region for decades, will all be required to create any hope of moving beyond this apparently hopeless moment. The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of World and New World Journal, its staff, or its Board of Directors. This paper was originally published by Arab Center Washington DC. Republished with permission. © Arab Center Washington DC, October 2023.’ 

As the Israel-Hamas war enters its fourth week, the Kingdom of Jordan finds itself on the frontline of the conflict and King Abdullah II a central figure in the regional and global diplomatic efforts to contain it. Facing a complex set of domestic and external challenges even before Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel and with a perilous ground war in Gaza now underway, the Hashemite Kingdom is bracing for a broader conflict and multiple spillover effects. A precarious reality at home and abroad Domestic pressures Jordan faces numerous challenges that King Abdullah II is under mounting pressure to address. Popular discontent with the perceived corruption and indifference of government officials and the royal family itself has been growing, though there are few signs that the survival of the monarchy is at risk. Fueling this discontent are the worsening socio-economic conditions after the Jordanian economy failed to absorb successive external shocks, namely the COVID‑19 pandemic and the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to official figures, the unemployment rate stood at 22.3% in Q2 2023 and over 40% for those aged 15‑24. Interest rates, which have continued to climb as the result of a sustained period of high inflation and the Jordanian currency’s peg to the United States dollar, are further squeezing household incomes. The price of essential goods remains elevated, by pre-2022 standards. Meanwhile, wage growth has broadly stagnated. Public debt has swelled to around 110% of GDP, increasing external debt service payments and thus placing a heavy burden on the country’s foreign currency reserves. About 27% of the population is living in poverty. Jordan’s persistent economic malaise has done little to dissipate the public anger and frustration that boiled over last December, when a nationwide strike over fuel price increases stemming from austerity measures mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sparked riots in several large cities, featuring clashes between anti-government protesters and supporters of the king along with skirmishes between protesters and police. These latest disturbances are part of a recurring pattern marked by chronic economic and fiscal crises, outbursts of public anger, and limited reforms. But it is important to note that in the past couple of years, the state has met growing popular dissent and disgruntlement with heightened repression. External challenges Despite having succeeded in repressing jihadist attacks from infiltrating the kingdom and playing a pivotal role in inter-Arab reconciliation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Jordan has continued to grapple with the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war. At the same time, Jordan’s relations with Israel have deteriorated. The kingdom is waging a tough battle against increasing drug and weapons trafficking and carrying a heavy refugee burden, further stretching its resources. Across its northern border with Syria, a prevailing state of lawlessness has transformed Jordan into a key transit route for the smuggling of captagon, a highly addictive and lucrative amphetamine, along with other drugs and weapons. In addition, the United Nations World Food Program’s (WFP) recent reduction by one-third of aid for the 119,000 Syrians residing in Jordan’s Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps has increased fiscal pressure on the government. Meanwhile, Jordan’s political relations with Israel have deteriorated. During Benjamin Netanyahu’s lengthy premiership (2009-2021), Jordan’s relations with Israel were frosty. Although bilateral relations somewhat improved during the 18-month tenure of Israel’s “Change Coalition” under Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid, the return of Netanyahu to power at the head of a hard right-nationalist coalition at the end of 2022 rekindled tensions. A rare meeting between King Abdullah and Netanyahu in Amman last January, aimed at easing tensions, was eclipsed three months later by a series of violent confrontations between Israeli police and Palestinians at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem. The 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel remains deeply unpopular in Jordan. According to a March 2022 survey conducted by The Jerusalem Post, 32% of respondents ranked Israel as the country that most threatens Jordan’s security, and 48% identified the Jewish state as the country most responsible for regional instability. The Doha-based Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies’ Arab Opinion Index 2022, issued in January of this year, found that 94% of Jordanian respondents opposed any recognition of or ties with Israel. Raising the specter of an upsurge of violence in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip last December as a new hardline government in Israel was about to take office, King Abdullah warned in a CNN interview, “We have to be concerned about a next intifada. […] And if that happens, that’s a complete breakdown of law and order and one that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians will benefit from.” The Jordanian leader could not have anticipated the shocking Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, yet his remarks at a conference in New York just two weeks earlier were prescient: “This belief by some in the region that you can parachute over Palestine — deal with the Arabs and work your way back — that does not work.” Grappling with conflict The war in Gaza has compounded the domestic and external challenges facing the Hashemite Kingdom. More than 2 million or 40% of all registered Palestinian refugees live in Jordan. Since the onset of the war, thousands of Jordanians have taken to the streets daily in Amman and around the country in pro-Palestinian rallies organized by opposition parties and to protest Israel’s bombing campaign and incursions into Gaza. Some young protesters attempted to storm the Israeli embassy while others reportedly demanded Jordanian authorities “open the borders” so they could join the fight to “liberate Palestine.” Hamas leaders have urged Jordanian tribes to enter the conflict against Israel. King Abdullah has faced growing calls to expel Israeli diplomats and abrogate Jordan’s peace deal with Israel. Two weeks into the war, at an emergency Middle Eastern summit in Cairo, the king channeled Jordanians’ growing public anger, harshly criticizing Israel for inflicting “collective punishment” on Gazan Palestinians. Jordanian diplomats have likewise lashed out publicly against Israel. Meanwhile, officials in Amman have directed their outrage and frustration not just at Israel but at Western “silence” in the face of Palestinian suffering and seemingly unconditional U.S. support for Israeli retribution. In an interview with CNN, Queen Rania, herself of Palestinian descent, decried the “glaring double standard […] in the face of such human suffering,” which “to many in our region it makes the Western world complicit.” On the 21st day of the conflict, a nonbinding resolution introduced by Jordan calling for “an immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities” was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, even as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the expansion of ground operations and a near-total communications blackout was imposed on the besieged enclave. As the war continues into its fourth week, Jordan is grappling with the multiple dimensions of a rapidly escalating conflict. On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have sought to contain the protests. The Ministry of Interior has banned gatherings and demonstrations in the Jordan Valley and border areas. Earlier, Jordanian police fired tear gas to disperse thousands of people protesting in an area around the Israeli embassy. Meanwhile, suspicion lingers that some Israelis may be flirting with the idea of a population transfer. Reflecting these concerns, a joint statement released during the Cairo summit, after King Abdullah’s meeting with Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, rejected “any attempt at the forced displacement of Gazans into Jordan and Egypt.” At an Oct. 17 press conference held following his meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, King Abdullah stated unequivocally, “There will be no refugees in Jordan and no refugees in Egypt,” declaring it a “red line.” Echoing the king, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi stated, alarmingly, that any attempt to displace Palestinians from the West Bank would be “considered a declaration of war.” The current conflict in Gaza has shaken the foundation of Jordan’s relationship with Israel. Reflecting the strain the conflict has placed on the relationship, Jordan has decided to pull its ambassador from Israel. Yet Jordan needs Israel and, thus, finds itself in a steadily worsening predicament. Facing a deepening water crisis and potentially destabilizing shortages, Jordan was inching closer to finalizing a binding agreement on a “climate barter” with Israel ahead of the 2023 U.N. Climate Change Conference (28th Conference of the Parties, COP28), when the Gaza war broke out. The initiative, dubbed Project Prosperity and sponsored by the United Arab Emirates, envisions the sale of desalinated water to Jordan from Israel and the purchase of green electricity by Israel from an Emirati-funded solar farm in Jordan. The Gaza war is likely at least to postpone, if not derail this project as well as delay completion of the previously approved “Jordan Gateway” joint industrial park. The possible adverse economic repercussions of the escalating conflict on Jordan extend beyond its relationship with Israel. Shortly before the Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel, an IMF report warned that mounting economic pressures threatened the “sociopolitical stability” of Jordan as well as Egypt and Lebanon. Supporters of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), protesting against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, are blocking oil tanker trucks from crossing into Jordan, saying they will not allow Iraqi oil to be exported to countries that have peace agreements with Israel. Depending on how long the Israel-Hamas war lasts and is fought, Jordan could suffer a sharp decline in tourism and foreign investment as well as a disruption of cross-border trade. The grand U.S.-backed plan to build a multimodal India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which would pass through Jordan, could become a casualty of the conflict in Gaza. The conflict has also complicated Jordan’s relationship with the United States. King Abdullah, Washington’s longstanding, stalwart regional partner, canceled his meeting with President Joe Biden in Amman in the aftermath of the deadly blast at al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza City. The U.S. veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a “humanitarian pause” in the conflict was surely greeted with displeasure in Amman. And the U.S. pledge of a $100 million package in humanitarian aid for the Palestinians reportedly was viewed by Jordanian (and Egyptian) officials as a token gesture. Because the U.S. is the single largest contributor of bilateral assistance to Jordan — aid that the country has come to greatly depend upon — Amman will likely tread carefully lest its differences with Washington over the conflict risk severely damaging the relationship. However, the longer the war and the greater the loss of civilian life in Gaza, the more difficult it will be for the Jordanian monarchy to balance the tasks of managing its relations with Washington on the one hand and the domestic political fallout from the conflict on the other. Conclusion Speaking at an Oct. 19 press conference, with diplomatic efforts having failed to yield results in ending the Gaza conflict, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Safad expressed his fear that “the worst is coming.” His apprehension appears to have been confirmed, as, a little over a week later, Israeli troops advanced into the northern part of the enclave, accompanied by a massive aerial and artillery bombardment and amid a communication blackout. With a dangerous new phase of the Israel-Hamas war having begun, Jordan awaits the repercussions, having little leverage and few policy options.