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In March 2021, the container ship Ever Given ran aground in the Suez Canal. The six days the canal remained closed raised a wave of concern worldwide as it blocked passage through this strategic route, which handles 30% of the world's container traffic. The incident caused serious delays in global supply chains, with its effects still being felt months after the crisis. The concern over the Ever Given case now pales in comparison to that provoked by attacks from the Houthi rebels, a Yemeni insurgent group, in the vicinity of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the entrance of the Red Sea, on the route from European markets through the Suez Canal. In early November 2023, this rebel group began bombarding Israeli and American targets in support of the Palestinian group Hamas. Their attacks, which have extended to commercial traffic venturing through the area, aim to provoke a collapse that forces Israel to halt its offensive in Gaza. Cost overruns and longer distances The impact of this situation on the global economy is not easily quantifiable, but initially, it has led to higher insurance costs for those who continue to use this route. Also, there are additional costs for shipping companies that, to avoid the area, have decided to divert traffic towards the route around the Cape of Good Hope. At 9,000 kilometers and 14 days longer, this route is currently safer than the Suez Canal. Furthermore, it can be expected that sustained tension in this area will eventually lead to an increase in energy prices. Approximately 12% of the world's traded oil passes through the Suez, first passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. All of this adds to the extra costs generated by delays resulting from circumnavigating Africa and the possibility of imbalances between supply and demand for inputs. All these factors create a scenario that, if sustained, will likely translate into an increase in consumer prices and a resurgence of inflation. This situation directly affects Europe, but also countries like China or India, not to mention the very negative effect it has on the economy of Egypt, the country that controls the Suez Canal. Difficulties and Risks This is not the only maritime passage facing difficulties. In Panama, the decrease in the depth of the canal, as a result of a prolonged drought, prevents the passage of heavier vessels, which must seek alternatives, often more expensive. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that, due to their location in areas of great geostrategic importance, the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) or the Strait of Malacca (Southeast Asia) may also become sources of instability, crucial points for international maritime transport. If instability persists, the search for alternative routes becomes an evident necessity. In fact, it is already underway. Besides the one around Africa, other routes to connect Asia and Europe could be explored: the Arctic route, limited by environmental and geopolitical reasons, could contribute, albeit probably modestly, to alleviating the situation. Others that combine land and sea segments could also do so. However, this latter option is complicated by the topography and the difficulty of finding routes that bypass conflict-ridden areas or do not give China the key to access them. Vulnerable Supply Chains Given the difficulties global supply chains have faced in less than five years (the COVID-19 lockdowns, the war in Ukraine, and now the attacks at the entrance of the Red Sea), it is pertinent to consider how to mitigate their vulnerability, whether it is advisable to redesign them, and even if free and globalized trade remains viable as it is known today. Issues such as redundancy in supply chains and diversification of suppliers and markets allow for the creation of resilient systems that ensure the flow of resources. Reconsidering the balance between just-in-time logistics and accumulation logistics to achieve greater autonomy would help cushion the effects of an interruption like the one currently experienced in the Red Sea. The other question is how to create an environment that restores freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. The United States launched the "Guardian of Prosperity" operation, which has not been supported by all countries trading through the canal and has also raised suspicions among those who see it as an undesirable alignment with Israel or as a safe path to the regional extension of the war in Gaza. Finding a solution that does not involve increased costs at all levels of global supply chains will be difficult. Rather, the goal is to calculate whether this increase compensates for what could be lost if the current situation, increasingly subject to the instability of the international system, is maintained.

Iran and Russia have entered a closer political, economic, and military relationship during the past two years, the trigger widely seen as the upsurge in defence cooperation following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This new relationship, described variously as a strategic alignment or strategic partnership, was seen by both Tehran and Moscow as necessary to meet mutual and separate critical national needs due to the restrictive effects on both of US and Western sanctions. Iran’s international affairs, since its 1979 Islamic revolution, have been largely shaped by two factors. The first is Iran’s strong adherence to national autonomy, maximum self-sufficiency, and non-alignment. The latter has included, as far as practical, a balance between East and West, or today, Global South and Global West. However, Iranians are cautious about trusting others. While, therefore, a strategic alignment with Russia, or potentially others, could be acceptable, a formal alliance that compromise’s autonomy, would not. The second factor is Iran’s relationship with the US, and in turn with Europe, other Western countries and the UN, and their use of sanctions to deter or change international adversarial differences. Iran-US relations since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution have been tense and conflicted, and especially with Iranian-supported regional state and non-state militia. Major US concerns include Iran’s support for “state and non-state terrorism,” human rights abuses, missile development, and their potential, some say intent, to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Decades of broadly-based US sanctions, along with EU and UN sanctions, the latter mostly nuclear related, have strongly impacted the nation. The one short period of Iran-US rapprochement commenced in 2016 when President Barack Obama successfully brought Iran onboard as a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA) or nuclear agreement. Obama’s aim was to firstly resolve the nuclear issue and use this as the stepping-stone to negotiations on other regional security issues. But this two-step process was undone by President Donald Trump‘s 2018 decision to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose US primary and secondary sanctions. Trump’s action, and President Joe Biden’s subsequent “failure” to rejoin the JCPOA and repeal related US sanctions, bitterly disappointed a large cast of international stakeholders, including Iran’s moderates and other JCPOA signatories. For Iran, the US could not be trusted to seriously seek rapprochement and repeal US sanctions either before, or foreseeably after, this year’s US presidential elections. This distrust extended also to the Europeans and others who would continue to remain subject to US secondary sanctions. Iran saw its future fundamentally with countries that were willing to openly trade with them, notwithstanding US sanctions, and other countries or organisations that were prepared to overlook or actively circumvent or evade sanctions. Multilateral outreach included Iran joining two major non-aligned groups in 2023, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and BRICS+6 (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa + 6). These comprise some 40 percent and 46 percent respectively of the world’s population, and some 20 percent and 30 percent of global GDP. BRICS also includes some 40 percent of global oil production. Key members of both include Russia, China, and India. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are part of the “+6 members” of BRICS, and are also Dialogue Partners of the SCO. Both organisations offer significant additional political and economic networking opportunities and economic options. Bilaterally, the relationship between Tehran and Moscow, from its imperialist Shah/Tsar and post-revolutionary Iran and USSR/Russia iterations to the late 1980s, has had its share of tensions and conflict, including territorial disputes. The past 30-year period from the early 1990s to 2021, however, has been relatively stable. Geographic proximity, including a maritime border across the Caspian Sea, facilitated a significant increase in trade, reportedly from some US$1 billion in 2005 to US$3.3 billion in 2021. Mutual security interests also saw an increase in regional military cooperation, including joint operations against ISIS in Syria, and increased Russian sales of military equipment to Iran. The relationship changed significantly in early 2022 due to Russia’s increased military equipment needs, and to help offset the broad impact of sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, and others on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Militarily, increased Iranian defence sales to Russia have included a range of munitions, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) systems, and potentially Iranian short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The UAV deal includes the construction of a factory for manufacturing thousands of Iranian drones in Russia’s Tartarstan province. In return Russia has sold, or agreed to sell, to Iran a range of advanced weapons systems, including the S-400 air-defence missile, helicopters, and SU 34 fighters. Enhanced cyber and satellite cooperation was also agreed. Russia has also passed to Iran many of the high technology Western weapons systems captured in Ukraine, enabling Iran to evaluate, copy, and develop counter-measures. Significantly, this new level of Iranian-Russian cooperation has lifted the military capability of both, with implications for the Middle East and Ukraine respectively. But how effective have the sanctions been? Iran has been subject to harsh sanctions since 1979, and developed a “resistance economy” involving official and extensive unofficial trade and financing arrangements. Because many related statistics are unreliable or unavailable, official GDP estimates may be highly inaccurate. Importantly, however, and despite fluctuations, the World Bank shows a consistent decline in Iran’s GDP since 1979. For Russia, due to shifting markets and higher prices for oil since early 2022, their GDP contracted some 2 percent only that year compared to a prediction of more than 11 percent, and has mostly recovered since. Economically, despite the challenges of sanctions, bilateral cooperation is strong, both economies still function, and their governments remain stable. Militarily, sanctions have facilitated closer cooperation between Iran and Russia, contrary to US, NATO, and allied interests. Are there areas for the US to negotiate the lifting of sanctions with Iran and Russia? US priorities for Iran could include rejoining the JCPOA, facilitating a reduction or cessation of state and non-state militia attacks against regional Israeli, US, and related maritime targets, and restricting specified military cooperation with Russia. US priorities for Russia could include various ceasefire compromises involving the war in the Ukraine, and restricting specified military cooperation with Iran. And the likelihood of progress? For the reasons above, progress on any issue between the US and Iran is very unlikely before this year’s US presidential elections. If or when afterwards would depend in large part on who was elected. For Russia, a ceasefire compromise in Ukraine could be possible if it gave them “temporary” retention of vast tracts of land captured post-2022. Timing will be dictated by battlefield outcomes, but the US Senate approval on 13 February of an additional US$60 billion of military assistance to the Ukraine, and its likely approval by Congress, makes a ceasefire in the foreseeable future unlikely.

There can be no meaningful peace without full recognition of Palestinian sovereignty. Only new leadership and new vision, on both sides, will help. No issue of foreign policy that does not involve direct Australian military participation has caused as much division as the current Gaza War. There are several reasons for this. Since the creation of the state of Israel, Australia has been one of its staunchest supporters. Originally associated with Labor, because of Dr Herbert Evatt’s role in the United Nations and Bob Hawke’s infatuation with Israel, allegiances have shifted. After leaving office Hawke himself became more critical and former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Bob Carr are now among Israel’s most trenchant critics, while the Liberals have embraced the Netanyahu government, seemingly impervious to criticisms of the carnage in Gaza. In part this is due to very effective pro-Israeli lobby groups and a Jewish community, which is one of the most ardently Zionist in the world. Another part is due to a reflexive mirroring of the United States; when Scott Morrison spoke of moving the Australian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem he was both following President Donald Trump and hoping to win over Jewish voters in the Wentworth by-election. Beyond these factors is a largely unspoken sense of identity with Israel, which projects itself as standing up for western values of democracy within a region marked by turbulence and autocracy. Israeli propaganda has been very effective in highlighting Hamas and Hezbollah terrorism while passing over atrocities performed by their own troops. That sense is increasingly being questioned by younger Australians, who see more clearly than the political class the realities of Israel/Palestine. Israel is unique in that it is a state that defines itself in ethnic terms but effectively governs a population half of whom do not share the definition of being a real Israeli. Yes, Arab citizens in Israel are recognised, but their status is legally other than that of Jewish Israelis. In the occupied West Bank the massive growth of Jewish settlements—now estimated to include over 700,000 people—has created a system that many observers liken to apartheid. Most importantly, it has made the idea of a two-state solution, which is the rhetorical fallback for almost all our politicians, impossible. There are many arguments about why progress towards such a solution, which seemed momentarily possible after the Oslo Accords of 1994, stalled, and both sides share responsibility. But the reality is that Israel, as the dominant power, effectively blocked any moves that might have given meaningful sovereignty to the Palestinians. Indeed it seems the Netanyahu government has gone further. Not only has it encouraged continuing settlements in areas that were designated as part of a Palestinian state, it appears that it tolerated the existence of Hamas in Gaza as a means of weakening the Palestinian Authority and therefore their ability to seek statehood. However the current conflict ends, it will leave behind such deep scars that only a combination of new leadership and new vision on both sides can find peace. There are several scenarios that are being advocated, and there is increasing interest in a single state, with strong communal protection for Jews and Palestinians. [Various possibilities of how this might evolve are discussed in the new edition of After Zionism, edited by Antony Lowenstein and Ahmed Moor]. If both Israelis and Palestinians have equal claims to the land—“From the river to the sea” is a slogan that supporters of both find appropriate—there is a massive imbalance between them. Israel has military might and the support of the United States; the Palestinians have guarded support from Iran and no more than rhetoric from the Arab world. As Gaza is relentlessly bombed, flights from Dubai and Abu Dhabi bring businessmen and tourists into Tel Aviv. Crucial to any settlement will be a willingness by Israel’s western defenders to put sufficient pressure on whomever is in government after the current conflict to make major concessions. Not only is the current government deeply tarnished by its security failures, it includes ministers who deny any Palestinian aspirations for sovereignty and speak openly of what can only be described as ethnic cleansing. While the current leadership of the Palestinian Authority is geriatric, corrupt, and incompetent, no Palestinian movement can accept the permanent denial of sovereignty which is Netanyahu’s often stated position. The Albanese government has inched away from total support for Israel, presumably with one eye on domestic sensitivities, inflamed by the Murdoch press, which consistently conflates denunciation of Israel with anti-Semitism. As Penny Wong is consistently attacked by both the Liberals and the Greens the government may well feel they are managing Australia’s response effectively, and Wong’s visit to the Middle East was a nicely calculated diplomatic coup. But there are ways in which Australia might go further, in particular by making it clear that the position of the current Israeli government is unacceptable, both morally and politically. I suspect a stronger stance by Australia would be welcomed by the Biden Administration, which is constrained by the politics of election year, and the president’s own long emotional ties to Israel, from exercising real pressure on the Netanyahu government. If Australia is to sound credible when speaking of human rights abuses in countries such as Myanmar and China, it needs to be willing to address them when it is inconvenient. That a plausible case can be made at the International Court of Justice against Israel on charges of genocide underlines the scale of the carnage currently experienced in Gaza. While it is possible to “stand in solidarity” with Israel in reaction to the brutality of 7 October, it is no longer possible to be “in solidarity” with the Netanyahu government.

At least a dozen countries, including the U.S., have suspended funding to the UNRWA, the United Nations agency responsible for delivering aid to Palestinian refugees. This follows allegations made by Israel that 12 UNRWA employees participated in the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack. The UNRWA responded by dismissing all accused employees and opening an investigation. While the seriousness of the accusations is clear to all, and the U.S. has been keen to downplay the significance of its pause in funding, the action is not in keeping with precedent. Western donors did not, for example, defund other U.N. agencies or peacekeeping operations amid accusations of sexual assault, corruption or complicity in war crimes. In real terms, the funding cuts to the UNRWA will affect 1.7 million Palestinian refugees in Gaza along with an additional 400,000 Palestinians without refugee status, many of whom benefit from the UNRWA’s infrastructure. Some critics have gone further and said depriving the agency of funds amounts to collective punishment against Palestinians. Refugee aid, and humanitarian aid more generally, is theoretically meant to be neutral and impartial. But as experts in migration and international relations, we know funding is often used as a foreign policy tool, whereby allies are rewarded and enemies punished. In this context, we believe the cuts in funding for the UNRWA fit a wider pattern of the politicization of aid to refugees, particularly Palestinian refugees. What is the UNRWA? The UNRWA, short for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, was established two years after about 750,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled from their homes during the months leading up to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli war. Prior to the UNRWA’s creation, international and local organizations, many of them religious, provided services to displaced Palestinians. But after surveying the extreme poverty and dire situation pervasive across refugee camps, the U.N. General Assembly, including all Arab states and Israel, voted to create the UNRWA in 1949. Since that time, the UNRWA has been the primary aid organization providing food, medical care, schooling and, in some cases, housing for the 6 million Palestinians living across its five fields: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, as well as the areas that make up the occupied Palestinian territories: the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The mass displacement of Palestinians – known as the Nakba, or “catastrophe” – occurred prior to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which defined refugees as anyone with a well-founded fear of persecution owing to “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.” Despite a 1967 protocol extending the definition worldwide, Palestinians are still excluded from the primary international system protecting refugees. While the UNRWA is responsible for providing services to Palestinian refugees, the United Nations also created the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine in 1948 to seek a long-term political solution and “to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation.” As a result, the UNRWA does not have a mandate to push for the traditional durable solutions available in other refugee situations. As it happened, the conciliation commission was active only for a few years and has since been sidelined in favor of the U.S.-brokered peace processes. Is the UNRWA political? The UNRWA has been subject to political headwinds since its inception and especially during periods of heightened tension between Palestinians and Israelis. While it is a U.N. organization and thus ostensibly apolitical, it has frequently been criticized by Palestinians, Israelis as well as donor countries, including the United States, for acting politically. The UNRWA performs statelike functions across its five fields – including education, health and infrastructure – but it is restricted in its mandate from performing political or security activities. Initial Palestinian objections to the UNRWA stemmed from the organization’s early focus on economic integration of refugees into host states. Although the UNRWA officially adhered to the U.N. General Assembly’s Resolution 194 that called for the return of Palestine refugees to their homes, U.N., U.K. and U.S. officials searched for means by which to resettle and integrate Palestinians into host states, viewing this as the favorable political solution to the Palestinian refugee situation and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this sense, Palestinians perceived the UNRWA to be both highly political and actively working against their interests. In later decades, the UNRWA switched its primary focus from jobs to education at the urging of Palestinian refugees. But the UNRWA’s education materials were viewed by Israel as further feeding Palestinian militancy, and the Israeli government insisted on checking and approving all materials in Gaza and the West Bank, which it has occupied since 1967. While Israel has long been suspicious of the UNRWA’s role in refugee camps and in providing education, the organization’s operation, which is internationally funded, also saves Israel millions of dollars each year in services it would be obliged to deliver as the occupying power. Since the 1960s, the U.S. – UNRWA’s primary donor – and other Western countries have repeatedly expressed their desire to use aid to prevent radicalization among refugees. In response to the increased presence of armed opposition groups, the U.S. attached a provision to its UNRWA aid in 1970, requiring that the “UNRWA take all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) or any other guerrilla-type organization.” The UNRWA adheres to this requirement, even publishing an annual list of its employees so that host governments can vet them, but it also employs 30,000 individuals, the vast majority of whom are Palestinian. Questions over the links of the UNRWA to any militancy has led to the rise of Israeli and international watch groups that document the social media activity of the organization’s large Palestinian staff. Repeated cuts in funding The United States has used its money and power within the U.N. to block criticism of Israel, vetoing at least 45 U.N. resolutions critical of Israel. And the latest freeze is not the first time the U.S. has cut funding to the UNRWA or other U.N. agencies in response to issues pertaining to the status of Palestinians. In 2011, the U.S. cut all funding to UNESCO, the U.N. agency that provides educational and cultural programs around the world, after the agency voted to admit the state of Palestine as a full member. The Obama administration defended the move, claiming it was required by a 1990s law to defund any U.N. body that admitted Palestine as a full member. But the impact of the action was nonetheless severe. Within just four years, UNESCO was forced to cut its staff in half and roll back its operations. President Donald Trump later withdrew the U.S. completely from UNESCO. In 2018, the Trump administration paused its US$60 million contribution to the UNRWA. Trump claimed the pause would create political pressure for Palestinians to negotiate. President Joe Biden restarted U.S. contributions to the UNRWA in 2021. Politicization of refugee aid Palestinian are not the only group to suffer from the politicization of refugee funding. After World War II, states established different international organizations to help refugees but strategically excluded some groups from the refugee definition. For example, the U.S. funded the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to help resettle displaced persons after World War II but resisted Soviet pressure to forcibly repatriate Soviet citizens. The U.S. also created a separate organization, the precursor to the International Organization for Migration, to circumvent Soviet influence. In many ways, the UNRWA’s existence and the exclusion of Palestinian refugees from the wider refugee regime parallels this dynamic. Funding for refugees has also been politicized through the earmarking of voluntary contributions to U.N. agencies. Some agencies receive funding from U.N. dues; but the UNRWA, alongside the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration, receive the majority of their funding from voluntary contributions from member states. These contributions can be earmarked for specific activities or locations, leading to donors such as the U.S. or European Union dictating which refugees get aid and which do not. Earmarked contributions amounted to nearly 96% of the UNHCR’s budget, 96% of the IOM’s budget and 74% of UNRWA funding in 2022. As a result, any cuts to UNRWA funding will affect its ability to service Palestinian refugees in Gaza – especially at a time when so many are facing hunger, disease and displacement as a result of war.

Introduction Despite the confusion in many writings between “geopolitics” and “geostrategy,” especially in Arabic writings, and despite their overlapping with political geography,[2] we will focus on the geostrategic dimension of the Arab region from a specific angle, which is international projects in the Middle East. We will limit research to Asian projects that may involve competition which might develop from competition to tension, dispute and conflict. After the beginning of the waning of Western influence and its “relatively” contemporary projects, such as the New Middle East, the Greater Middle East and the Arab NATO, two important Asian projects emerged: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced in 2013, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) announced in 2023. First: The Chinese Project Map of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative   Throughout 1949–1967, the Arab-Chinese relationship was captive to an ideological perspective (except for the period 1949–1955, when the picture of the Arab-Zionist conflict was unclear among the Chinese leadership). However, the transformation in this relation went through a transitional phase (1976–1978), then a gradual, quiet, pragmatic perspective prevailed leading to Saudi recognition of China in 1990, and Chinese recognition of Israel in 1992, thus opening the way for the growth of the Chinese-Middle Eastern relationship which was crowned by the BRI announced in 2013.[3] An academic study compares the motives and obstacles of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations, especially Arab relations, as follows:[4] 1. Chinese motives: Or the factors for growth in Arab-Chinese relations: a. The predominance of pragmatism in Chinese political discourse and behavior since 1978. b. The collapse of the Soviet Union has strengthened Chinese pragmatism since 1990. c. China’s increasing need for Arab oil, especially in conservative Arab countries, due to China’s achievement of record economic growth rates. d. The absence of pretexts for “democracy, human rights and bias toward certain religious sects over others, or ethnic tendencies (Kurdish, Berber or other)” in Chinese foreign policy. e. China does not link its aid or its overall relations with the Arab world to strategic political conditions, military presence or particular way of voting in international organizations. f. The increasing Arab tendency among Arab political elites, especially the new ones, to free themselves from the weight of some Western conditions for the relationship with them. g. The attractive force of the Chinese economic and technological development model has constituted an important factor in Arab awareness to the relationship with China. h. The rationality of Chinese decisions concerning the relationship with Arab countries, due to the increase in Chinese specialists in Arab affairs, the expansion of Arabic language teaching in Chinese universities, the spread of Confucius Institutes for teaching Chinese, and the increase in the number of Arab students in Chinese universities. i. The expansion of the base for Arab-Israeli normalization has lifted Chinese embarrassment regarding deepening its relations with Israel since 1992. j. The size of the Arab market on the one hand, and the large purchasing power of an important sector of this market’s consumers on the other hand, constitute an attractive force so that Chinese commodity orientation would be towards the region. 2. The obstacles to the development of Arab-Chinese relations: These include the following: a. The extent to which Chinese economic pragmatism and even mercantilism can curb the political, ideological and military influences of the Chinese Communist Party and some Chinese political elites in the long term. In China, there is a movement led by one of their most prominent thinkers, Wang Jisi, who calls on China to fill the void resulting from the US retreat in the Arab region by expanding its diplomatic and economic presence there. Another Chinese thinker, Qu Xing, head of the China Institute of International Studies, sees the necessity of pushing the US to immerse itself in the problems of the Middle East to deviate from restricting Chinese interests in the Pacific Basin.[5] This might be the background behind the tendency of Chinese project experts to expect that the next ten years will witness a shift in the strategy of the BRI, supplementing it with security and political doses.[6] b. A significant percentage of Chinese projects and development aid pledges have not been fulfilled or have not been completed according to the proposed plan, which reduces the credibility of the hoped-for Chinese projects. According to Chinese official reports, the level of direct foreign investments has declined, and there are projects that have been stopped, not to mention the Chinese focus on some sectors that are less important to the countries participating in the BRI, in addition to the burden of Chinese debt interest on the Belt and Road countries as Chinese interest ranges between 4.5 and 6%.[7] c. The corruption and instability in the region may greatly confuse Chinese plans to develop its relations with Arab sides. Given that the rate of political instability in the Arab region is the highest among other political regions, this makes the Chinese project vulnerable to radical transformations in the coming years, which pressures Chinese diplomacy to work on enhancing political stability variables. Taking into account that 23% of the BRI projects in 2022 were in the Middle East, an increase of about 6.5% compared to 2021, we realize why China will work to expand its circle of political mediations to ensure a safe environment for its initiative. This explains the mediation between Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran and the possibilities of increasing Chinese diplomatic role in settling the Palestine issue. d. The US determination to disrupt Chinese projects in the region, in light of the competition between them in different regions and issues, and especially in light of the heavy reliance of some Gulf countries on US armaments and protection from regional disturbances, not to mention the depth of US penetration of decision-making bodies in many Arab countries. e. The broad base of religious parties and intellectual movements and the possibility of them exploiting Chinese policies towards the Uyghur minority in the western Chinese provinces (about 12 million Muslims), may constitute a relative obstacle to the Chinese initiative. Second: The Indian Economic Corridor[8] Map of the Economic Corridor: India – Middle East – Europe   Arab-Indian relations extend back to the Sumerian period (3000 years BCE), where Persia formed a corridor for Arabs to India and China. With the advent of Islam, relations between the two sides increased, and even deepened during the colonial period and the emergence of the East India Company. Then there was the division of the Indian continent into Pakistan and India up to the contemporary period. These periods have witnessed cooperation at times and competition at others.[9] Three factors have formed the foundations of Arab-Indian relations in the contemporary period: 1. The role of the Indian National Congress (INC) and its non-aligned policies, which brought Indian politics closer to the Arab position, under the policies of the first Indian Prime Minister after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, regarding the Palestine issue. A stance strengthened under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966–1977 and 1980–1984). India was the first non-Arab and non-Muslim country to recognize the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), granting it full diplomatic representation. Although India recognized Israel in 1950, it was until 1992 that diplomatic representation between the two sides took place, the same year China and Israel exchanged diplomatic representation.[10] 2. The increasing Indian need for Arab oil with the increasing rates of Indian development. The continued economic and technological growth in India has led to an increased need for Arab oil, especially since it is the closest energy source to the Indian continent. Until 2023, Arab oil has been covering about 60% of Indian needs, while Arab-Indian trade amounts to $240 billion, most of which with the Gulf countries, including $84 billion with UAE and $53 billion with KSA.[11] 3. The expansion of commercial and demographic relations between India and both Israel and the Arab countries, especially in the Gulf region. Until 2022, Israel was the second source of Indian arms purchases after Russia. The roots of the Indian-Israeli military cooperation extend to the periods of Indian conflict with China (1962 and 1999) and with Pakistan (1965). Israel’s share in Indian arms purchases increased from 4.7% (2010–2015) to 13% (2015–2020). The takeover of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 represented a major shift in India’s weight in Israel’s military sales, as India has become the largest customer for Israeli arms, purchasing 42.1% of Israel’s military exports, followed by Azerbaijan (13.95%) then Vietnam (8.5%), all of which are Asian countries.[12] As for the Arab world, the volume of Arab-Indian trade amounted to $240 billion, as we mentioned above, in addition to the Indian demographic presence in the region, where according to Indian government figures, there are 8.751 million Indians in the Arabian Gulf, including more than 3 million in UAE and about 2.5 million in KSA.[13] This makes Indians the second largest population group in the Arab Gulf countries after the Saudis. All these factors formed the basis of putting forward the idea of the economic Indian-European corridor via the Middle East. Based on a memorandum of understanding between KSA, the European Union (EU), India, UAE, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and US, the participants in the G20 Summit in September 2023 committed to establish the IMEEC, to stimulate economic development, by enhancing connectivity and economic integration among Asia, the Arabian Gulf and Europe. The corridor will consist of two separate branches: the eastern corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf, and the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe. It will include a railway line that, when completed, will provide an efficient transit network linking existing ports to a network of railways to complement existing sea and land transport routes—allowing transit from and to India, UAE, KSA, Jordan, Israel and Europe. The participants intend to extend electricity and digital communication cables along railway routes, in addition to pipes to export clean hydrogen. This corridor will secure regional supply chains along the railway route in a way that facilitates trade flow and supports the increased focus on environmental, social and governmental impacts, all with the strategic goal of increasing efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing economic unity, generating job opportunities, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, thus leading to a transformative integration of Asia, Europe and the Middle East. In support of this initiative, participants commit to working collectively and expeditiously to arrange and implement all these new transit elements. The project will connect several ports along the way, including Haifa in Israel, Piraeus in Greece and three ports on the western coast of India: Mundra, Kandla and Jawaharlal Nehru. There are five ports in the Middle East that will be linked to Indian ports, namely Fujairah, Jabal Ali and Abu Dhabi in UAE, in addition to the ports of Dammam and Ras al-Khair in KSA. Third: India-China Competition Most of the political units in the Arab Levant were formed during the 20th century as a result of understandings, divisions and maneuvers between European countries (since the Arab Revolt until the defeat of the Ottoman State, Sykes-Picot, the Balfour Declaration, the establishment of Israel, etc.). Thus, it is not possible to separate the geographical map or the political conditions in this region from this European, English, French, Italian and German competition. Currently, there are two neighboring Asian countries that are rising and competing economically and technologically, namely India and China, and their rivalry has extended to the Arab region. Remarkably, the relationship between these two countries is dominated by intense competition and although China is India’s second trading partner, hostility and competition are the main characteristic of their relation, as evident in the following indicators:[14] a. The legacy of historical hostility between the two countries which included military clashes for more than six decades, and which have been repeated, albeit with less intensity, in 1962, 1967, 1987, 2018, and 2020 and lastly in December 2022. This conflict is mainly about border areas (about 3000 kilometers), especially in the Himalayas, and about demarcating the borders between the two countries. For while China denies the occurrence of demarcation and demands it, India considers the traditional borders to be the actual borders. Another competition is taking place between the two countries in the South China Sea, especially over oil exploration in this region, in addition they have been weaving alliances against the other. This is evident in the rapprochement between China and Pakistan (India’s traditional enemy) or the Iranian-Chinese rapprochement at the expense of some decline in the Indian-Iranian relationship, not to mention the growth of the Indian-US relationship in light of the deterioration of the US-Chinese relationship, and India’s support for the blockade policies on some Chinese economic sectors. b. with China’s presence in the region’s most important ports of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and although India has been able to relatively improve its relations with these countries. c. India’s participation in the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” which was established in May 2022 and brought together the US, Japan, India and Australia, and which China considered an “Asian NATO” because it calls for deepening military relations among the four countries, in addition to economic and diplomatic cooperation. d. The relationship between Israel and both India and China. In addition to Israel’s participation in the Chinese BRI and the Indian IMEEC, the so-called I2U2 group includes Israel, India, US and UAE, and its goal is to encourage cooperation among private sectors and businessmen in the four countries in water, energy, transportation, space, health, food security and technology, which China perceives as a kind of influence on its project, and it may also create Arab or Iranian problems with India. Fourth: The Theory of the Spread of International Conflicts Most studies of international relations indicate that international conflicts or wars do not remain limited to the direct parties to the conflict. Rather, tracking international conflicts and wars shows, in quantitative terms, that the vast majority of international conflicts have direct or indirect effects on neighboring and distant countries not involved in those conflicts. There is no doubt that the development of means of technical and commercial interconnection and the reduction of time and space, in light of accelerating globalization, have made preventing the repercussions of international conflicts a very complex matter. The influence and spread increase if the countries involved in the competition, conflict, or war are major countries or countries that are geographically adjacent or overlapping demographically. Since Chinese-Indian relations are more tense, and both countries are involved in trade, geo-economic and population relations, in addition to engaging in relations with rival countries in the region (Israel and Iran, Syria and Israel, Yemen and the Gulf states, Syria and Turkey), this affects the relations of the two countries with the Arab countries on the one hand, and it may, on the other hand, add new axes to the competing axes (normalization countries and resistance countries), some of which are closer to China and others closer to India. Moreover, since the major international powers (US, Russia and some European influence) are involved in the general situation of the Middle East, the above dynamics will increase the elements of instability in the region, even though it is already the least stable region in the world.[15] Fifth: The Future of the Region in Light of the Indian-Chinese Competition It is necessary to determine the future of the region in light of the competition between the two Asian poles by raising a number of rhetorical questions: 1. Is the Indian project an “obstruction” to the Chinese project in light of the economic competition between the two countries, and in light of the disputes I mentioned between them? This is said while noting that Indian policy under the BJP rule has become more inclined to US policies, contrary to the Indian policy under the INC rule. Noteworthy to say about 26 Indian parties have recently allied to confront the BJP in the elections scheduled to be held early 2024. The direct support of both US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the Indian project reinforces competitive concerns, especially since India is the largest customer of Israeli arms since 2014 after the BJP took control. Here, the Indian economic corridor may be a step to expand Saudi-Israeli normalization under the cover of the Indian project on the one hand, and US competition to disrupt the Chinese project on the other hand. 2. How will KSA reconcile its ties with India and with China if a severe conflict erupts between the two Asian giants? 3. Will the competition between the two projects make reaching strategic decisions in BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization more complicated? Could it paralyze them, given the stark differences among the major powers in this bloc? Was the recent inclusion of “Western-oriented” countries in the BRICS a mere coincidence? or part of a plan targeting China? 4. What are the possibilities of harm to the status of the Suez Canal if the region is crossed by railway from Eilat to Haifa or directly to Haifa while bypassing the canal? Preliminary Indian studies of the project indicate that it reduces the time needed for transporting goods from Haifa to Europe, although there are discrepancies among experts in estimating this period between 4 to 6 days or between 8 to 12 days. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen estimated that it would save 40% of the current time,[16] which threatens the third source of Egyptian income after remittances from workers abroad and tourism. In a study that was published in 2000 by the author, it pointed out to Israeli deliberations to make the Suez Canal less important in international transportation. It also pointed out to the encouragement of Asian projects in this field,[17] constituting a new erosion for Egypt’s economy, after the erosion inflicted by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which reinforces what we have suggested regarding Israeli plans to weaken Egypt in indirect ways.[18] 5. We mentioned earlier that about nine million Indian workers live in the Gulf countries (outnumbering the population of any country in the Gulf Cooperation Council except KSA), and the number of Chinese companies and employees in the Gulf countries is no less than 2.5 million people. Will this be a potential reason for the possibility of unrest between the two parties on Arab soil in case of intensification of competition and conflict between India and China? 6. Western support of the Indian project at the expense of the Chinese project: As we noted, the US, Israel, and EU have welcomed the Indian project. Indeed, media reports said that the Group of Seven (G7) countries pledged at their meeting in Tokyo in May 2023 to collectively mobilize $600 billion by 2027 to to counter the BRI, noting that the Chinese project has been supported by 150 countries and 30 international organizations, mobilizing nearly $1 trillion and creating over 3 thousand projects. The project is targeted for completion by 2049.[19] Will this polarization between the two projects be employed to manage their conflict on Arab soil? 7. Will the Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries (such as KSA and UAE), or those through which either or both projects (the Indian and the Chinese) pass, find themselves faced with the need to choose between the two giants, as Italy did when it announced that it would withdraw from the Chinese project? What about the positions of the nine million Indians if an Arab country takes a position opposed to the Indian position? 8. What are the possibilities and indicators of militarization of the two projects? India has conducted military exercises with some countries in the region, such as KSA, UAE, the Sultanate of Oman and Egypt in 2023,[20] and each time the scope of the exercises between the two sides expands. Since 2019, the Indian Navy has been conducting Operation Sankalp, under which its warships have been tasked with providing security for Indian-flagged vessels, specifically oil tankers, as they navigate the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman amid heightened tensions between Iran, US and others in the region. The Indian Navy has stationed a liaison officer at US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Bahrain, with the same personnel tasked with developing India’s cooperation with the Manama-based Combined Maritime Forces, a 38-nation maritime partnership that also includes Pakistan (India’s traditional adversary). These developments were cemented during the April 2020 2+2 ministerial dialogue between New Delhi and Washington. This clearly indicates two dimensions in Indian planning in the region: the strategic dimension and the economic dimension, which requires asking a central question: How will India reconcile its strategy toward Israel, Iran and KSA with all the differences among these important regional parties? China, for now, has managed to do this by leveraging its economic heft and regional states’ interest in using Beijing as a counterbalance to the US. “India will need to find other ways to strike a balance, specifically in its relations with Iran, which face the sanctions regime Washington has put in place.” Indeed, “New Delhi halted energy imports from Tehran both to comply with sanctions and in a show of intent to the US. This decision has come into question, especially after India picked up cheap Russian crude oil despite sanctions amid the war in Ukraine.”[21] 9. What if the two countries (China and India) begin to militarize their presence at a later stage, as we mentioned in the indicators and possibilities of militarization in the previous point? If the dispute and competition between them escalates, will India China establish bases in the Gulf states, Pakistan, or in the countries of the Horn of Africa from Djibouti to Sudan to protect their interests? This will increase the indicator of militarization in the Middle East. In addition to the Indian policies we mentioned in the course of militarization, China has carried out military activities to protect its citizens in a number of Arab countries or to rescue them during periods of instability, and it established some military bases or facilities for them, which was made clear in the White Paper released in 2019 by China’s State Council Information Office which stipulated the protection of Chinese interests, individuals and bodies abroad. This is not to mention arms sales to countries along the Road and Belt, where for example, 47% of Chinese arms sales during the 2017–2021 period were directed to Pakistan (India’s traditional enemy), while from 2012 to 2021, China’s military exports grew by 290% to KSA and by 77% to the UAE.[22] Conclusion The previous data indicate: 1. The importance of the Arab region to both China and India (as markets, energy sources and large labor absorption sites) makes the two Asian giants more eager to be present in the region. 2. The Chinese-Indian disputes are deep and may push the Arab region to forge political, economic or military connections, in order to manage the Chinese-Indian conflict there, especially in light of the lack of a unified Arab strategy. 3. The Gulf region may experience social unrest if Arab countries adopt policies inconsistent with the orientations of the two Asian countries, and it seems that this possibility is higher with India than with China. 4. If the interests of the two countries expand, the possibilities of militarization of the region are not excluded, which will impact the region’s policies and stability, especially if the Asian competition is accompanied by Western alliances with India, particularly by the US in the Middle East, all in order to confront the Chinese project. 5. Israel is trying to maintain its relations with the two Asian powers, and it appears to be reasonably successful in this aspect, which constitutes a challenge to some regional powers such as Iran, Syria and other Arab resistance wings. This requires the Arab side to support communication with the Indian opposition to the BJP, especially the INC, and to maintain “communication” with the less pragmatic trend in the Chinese Communist Party to benefit from its recommendations towards the region. 6. The strategic prospects of the Indian and Chinese projects indicate two conflicting possibilities: a. Transforming the conflict in the region from a zero-sum conflict into a non-zero-sum conflict by integrating Israel into the heart of Arab-Asian projects, which is what Israel as well as India and China seek. This will expand the circle of common interests among the parties to the projects at the expense of the contradictory interests at the heart of which is the Palestine issue. b. The failure of the first possibility means an increase in Asian competition between the Indian and Chinese projects, which may lead to the militarization of the region and an increase in regional polarization of the two projects. This will drag the region into new conflicts and higher levels of instability, especially since the Western side will remain present in these polarizations during the coming medium period, thus making the situation more complicated. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals. [2] The geopolitical concept is centered on the mutual influence between geographic variables and internal and external political behavior while the geostrategic concept is centered on planning based on identifying different geographical areas or regions that are more strategically important in their geographical location to achieve the state’s goals. For example, a country like Afghanistan cannot build a naval fleet since it is landlocked, but the first thing that Britain or Japan might think about is building a fleet. The geostrategic concept plans how to employ the strategic position of the geography to formulate the country’s foreign policy. For example, the strategic value of the location of Afghanistan cannot be compared to the location of Nepal from the perspective of the major and central countries competing on the international stage. The Egyptian writer Gamal Hamdan’s expression “the genius of place” can be considered a geostrategic expression, especially when he refers to the location or place, Egypt’s strategic character, and the heart of the world. See: Gamal Hamdan, Shakhsiyyat Masr: Dirasah fi ‘Abqariyyat al-Makan (Egypt’s Personality: A Study in the Genius of Place) (Dar al-Hilal, 1967), Chapter 25 entitled Egypt’s Strategic Personality and Chapter 26 entitled The Heart of the World. While Ali al-Wardi’s expression of the influence of the desert and the sea on Iraqi social behavior, including his political behavior, is an expression of the reflection of the natural geographical nature on political behavior, which represents geopolitics. See details in: Ali al-Wardi, Shakhsiyyat al-Fard al-‘Iraqi: Bahth fi Nafsiyyat al-Sha‘b al-‘Iraqi ‘ala Daw’ ‘Ilm al-Ijtima‘ al-Hadith (The Personality of the Iraqi Individual: An Investigation into the Psychology of the Iraqi People in Light of Modern Sociology), 2nd edition (London: Dar Laila Publications, 2001), pp. 48-55, and 75-78. See also Jan Wendt, “The Select Methods of Investigations in Geostrategy and Geopolitics,” Political Geography Studies in Central and Eastern Europe, Oradea, 2000, https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/5344/The_select_methods_of_investigations_in_geostrategy_and_geopolitics.pdf?sequence=1 [3] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Dirasat Mustaqbaliyyah fi al-‘Alaqat al-Duwaliyyah: Namadhij Tatbiqiyyah (Futures Studies in International Relations: Applied Models) (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2023), pp. 82-83. [4] Fazzur Rahman Saddiqui, China and The Arab World: Past and Present (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House Paper, 2022), pp. 84-92. [5] Walid Abd al-Hay, Does the Balancing Policy Restrict China’s Role in the Middle East? International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Foundation, Issue 207, January 2017, p. 26. (in Arabic) [6] Ruby Osman, Bye Bye BRI? Why 3 New Initiatives Will Shape the Next 10 Years of China’s Global Outreach, site of Time, 1/10/2023, https://time.com/6319264/china-belt-and-road-ten-years [7] Christoph Nedopil Wang, “Brief: China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2021,” site of Green Finance & Development Center, 2/2/2022, https://greenfdc.org/brief-china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2021; and NC Bipindra, China Completes 10 Years Of $1.4 Trillion BRI Project; Puts South Asia, Barring India & Bhutan, In A Bind, site of The EurAsian Times, 23/7/2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-completes-10-years-of-1-4-trillion-bri-project-puts [8] Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor, site of The White House, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Project-Gateway-Multilateral-MOU.pdf; and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, The Geopolitics of the New India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, site of ORF, 29/9/2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-geopolitics-of-the-new-india-middle-east-europe-corridor [9] For further details, see Hojjatollah Hezariyana and Ghaffar Pourbakhtiarb, A Historical Study of the Persian Gulf and Indo-Arab Trade Until the 5th Century AH, Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education, vol. 12, No. 11, 2021, pp. 6724-6725. [10] Sujata Ashwarya, “India’s policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue and Israel: the Indira Gandhi years,” Global Discourse journal, Bristol University Press, vol. 13, No. 23, 2022, pp. 2-5. [11] New Trade Initiative Offers India Major Gains in Middle East, site of VOA News, 27/9/2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/new-trade-initiative-offers-india-major-gains-in-middle-east/7287689.html [12] Azad Essa, India and Israel: The arms trade in charts and numbers, site of Middle East Eye, 31/5/2022, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-israel-arms-trade-numbers [13] Question No. 583 Indian Workers in Gulf Countries, site of Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9/12/2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/35979 [14] Derek Grossman, India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia, site of The Rand Blog, 21/8/2023, https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/08/india-is-pushing-back-against-china-in-south-asia.html; I2U2: India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, United States, site of U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/i2u2; Vijay Gokhale, Shivshankar Menon, and Tanvi Madan, A big-picture look at the India-China relationship, site of Brookings Institution, 20/9/2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-big-picture-look-at-the-india-china-relationship; What Kind of Group Is the 4-nation Quad?, site of Learning English, VOA news, 24/5/2022, https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/what-kind-of-group-is-the-4-nation-quad-/6587184.html; YP Rajesh, Krishn Kaushik and Martin Quin Pollard, Xi skipping G20 summit seen as new setback to India-China ties, site of Reuters, 5/9/2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/xi-skipping-g20-summit-seen-new-setback-india-china-ties-2023-09-05; and Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu, Rising tensions along the Indian-Chinese border, site of Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 8/8/2023, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-india-border-2 [15] Hasan Alhasan, The China-India Contest in the Middle East, site of The Diplomat, 21/7/2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-china-india-contest-in-the-middle-east [16] India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor to counter China?, site of Deutsche Welle (DW), 13/9/2023, https://www.dw.com/en/can-new-india-europe-middle-east-corridor-counter-china/a-66799232 [17] Walid Abd al-Hay, “The Future of the Strategic Position of the Arab World,” Journal of Strategic Issues, Arab Center for Strategic Studies, Issue 4, December 2000, pp. 146-147. (in Arabic) [18] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Future of Egyptian-Israeli Relations from the Israeli Perspective, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/6/2023, https://www.alzaytouna.net [19] India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor to counter China?, DW, 13/9/2023. [20] Indian Army to participate in largest ever joint military exercise in Middle East, says MoD, site of The Economic Times, 29/8/2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-army-to-participate-in-largest-ever-joint-military-exercise-in-middle-east-says-mod/articleshow/103176080.cms?from=mdr; and India, UAE conclude joint Arabian Gulf naval exercise, site of Arab News, 12/8/2023, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2354021/world [21] Kabir Taneja, How India views China’s diplomacy in the Middle East, site of Middle East Institute, 11/7/2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-india-views-chinas-diplomacy-middle-east [22] For details on China’s militarization activities, see Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun, PLA Navy’s 14 years of missions in blue waters safeguard intl trade routes, win more overseas recognition, site of Global Times, 1/8/2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1271933.shtml China increasing arms exports to Middle East and Eastern Europe, site of The Nation, 5/12/2022, https://www.nationthailand.com/world/china/40022762; Chinese Private Security Companies Along the BRI: An Emerging Threat?, site of Modern Diplomacy, 25/9/2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/25/chinese-private-security-companies-along-the-bri-an- emerging-threat; Chinese army prioritizes protecting China’s overseas interests, site of China Global Television Network (CGTN), 24/7/2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-07-24/Chinese-army-prioritizes-protecting-China-s-overseas-interests-IA9FouJ5ZK/index.html; and Andrea Ghiselli, Continuity and change in China’s strategy to protect overseas interests, site of The Frontier Post, 2021, https://thefrontierpost.com/continuity-and-change-in-chinas-strategy-to-protect-overseas-interests

Watch on YouTube A drone attack that killed three American troops and wounded at least 34 more at a base in Jordan has increased fears of a widening conflict in the Middle East – and the possibility that the U.S. may be further drawn into the fighting. President Joe Biden vowed to respond to the assault, blaming Iran-backed militias for the first U.S. military casualties in months of such strikes in the region. But to what extent was Iran involved? And what happens next? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on asymmetric warfare and militant groups in the Middle East, to answer these and other questions. What do we know about the group that claimed responsibility? Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, which translates as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, has claimed responsibility for the drone attack. However, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is not a single group per se. Rather, it is a term used to describe an umbrella organization, which, since around 2020, has included various Iran-backed militias in the region. Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon. Today, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity – that is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level the groups have their distinct agendas. The collective is notorious for its staunch anti-U.S. posture and dynamic military campaigns, such as a recent two-day drone operation targeting American forces at an Iraqi airbase. Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition remains elusive. This deliberate strategy hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. What do they hope to achieve in attacking a US target? Iranian-backed militias have been intensifying attacks on U.S. forces in recent months in response to American support for Israel in the Israel-Hamas conflict, and also to assert regional influence. Since the beginning of the conflict in October 2023, Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly struck American military bases in Iraq and Syria, recently expanding their attacks to include northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border. The deadly assault on Jan. 28 marks a significant escalation, though – it is the first instance during the Israel-Hamas war that American troops have been killed. Where is Tower 22 – the US base hit in drone attack? Three American troops were killed at a camp in Jordan near the Syrian border.   The attack in Jordan forms part of a strategy by Iranian-backed militias to counter Washington’s support for Israel in the Gaza conflict. But it is also aimed at advancing a wider goal of pushing U.S. forces out of the Middle East entirely. By coordinating attacks under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, these groups are trying to display a unified stance against U.S. interests and policy, showcasing their collective strength and strategic alignment across the region. What role did Iran have in the attack? Iran has officially denied any involvement in the drone strike. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports. Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, has provided such militias with money, weapons and training. However, the extent of Iran’s command and coordination in specific incidents like the Jordan attack remains unclear. At this stage, more concrete evidence is necessary to firmly implicate Iran. As Iran expert Nakissa Jahanbani and I recently explained in an article for The Conversation, Iran’s strategy in the region involves supporting and funding militia groups while granting them a degree of autonomy. By doing so, Iran maintains plausible deniability when it comes to attacks carried out by its proxies. So while Iran’s direct involvement in the attack has not been definitively established, Tehran’s long-standing support of groups like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is well documented, playing a significant role in the regional conflict dynamics and geopolitical strategies. What options does the US have to respond? It isn’t clear how the U.S. intends to respond to the attack. The Biden administration faces complex dynamics when it comes to responding to attacks linked to Iranian-backed militias. While a forceful military strike is an option that the Biden administration appears to be looking at, targeting Iran directly on its own soil is fraught with risks and may be seen as a step too far. Even when targeting Iranian interests or personnel, such as the assassination of Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, the U.S has conducted these actions outside Iranian territory. Iran’s denial of direct involvement in the attack further complicates the situation and makes it less likely that the U.S. attacks Iran in retaliatory strikes. But adopting a targeted approach, such as striking militia leaders outside of Iran, raises questions about the effectiveness of U.S. tactics in deterring Iran and its proxies. This strategy has been employed in the past, yet it has not significantly curbed Iran’s or its proxies’ aggressive actions. The concern is that while such strikes are precise, they may not be enough to deter ongoing or future attacks. The key to the strategy’s success may rest in identifying the most influential factors, or “centers of gravity,” that can effectively influence Iran’s behavior. This means determining key leaders, critical infrastructure or economic assets, which, if killed, destroyed or seized, could substantially alter Iran’s decision-making or operational capabilities. The Biden administration’s need to balance a strong response with the geopolitical consequences highlights the difficulties of navigating a tense and evolving situation. How might the attack affect the wider Middle East conflict? How the U.S. responds could reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape and influence the dynamics of proxy warfare in the region. A strong military response from Washington might deter Iranian-backed militias from future attacks, but it could also provoke them into taking more aggressive actions. In the short term, any U.S. retaliation – especially if it targets Iranian interests directly – could escalate tensions in the region. It could also exacerbate the cycle of tit-for-tat strikes between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict. And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power.

However a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is achieved, neither punishing Benjamin Netanyahu nor patronising a non-elected Palestinian administrative entity will produce tenable post-war governments. The only viable path will be one that is paved with political legitimacy. Two months after Hamas’ attack on Israel, UN Secretary General Antonio Gutterres invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter to formally bring the gravity of the war in Gaza to the attention of the Security Council. Gutteres judged that the war was “fast deteriorating into a catastrophe with potentially irreversible implications for Palestinians as a whole and for peace and security in the region.” While such concerns are thus being expressed at the highest international level, it remains an open question how Israel and Gaza are to be governed once a permanent ceasefire is eventually achieved. Unresolved and volatile conditions in local, regional, and international political environments indicate that a variety of factors will need to be considered in any credible post-war proposal. Locally ‒ in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza ‒ it is difficult to identify anything resulting from the November 2023 truce that was beneficial to the Netanyahu government. By allowing negotiations with Hamas to proceed (via Qatari mediators), in order to free a limited number of captives, Netanyahu was being drawn away from his initial position of outright refusal to “surrender to terrorists,” and drawn into a pragmatism of dividing members of hostage families from one another. Predictably, Netanyahu faced renewed public anger from the families of those still in captivity once the truce broke down. On the Palestinian side, and unpromising for both the Netanyahu government and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) in terms of their ability to manage future conflict in the West Bank, the release of 240 Palestinian teenage and women prisoners (some jailed for attempted murder) prompted scenes of public jubilation. This provided authentic propaganda for Hamas during the truce, spreading in real time on Telegram channels. One Palestinian former detainee announced she was proud of Mohommed Deif and Yahya Sinwar for not having forgotten her. Her gratitude to Hamas’ leaders in Gaza was an expression of popular resistance that is not likely to evaporate when the women and children return to their homes. Even less encouraging for the prospects of effective security cooperation between the PA and Israel in the West Bank, the release of these women and minors indicated simultaneously that Israel was unable to keep them incarcerated and that the PA had been able neither to prevent their incarceration previously, nor to free them now. Since 1994 the PA’s Western-endorsed security cooperation with Israel has proceeded alongside Israel’s “administrative detention” of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank, detained without trial or charge. The liberation of these 240 women and minors can only be attributed to the negotiation with Hamas into which Israel has been drawn. One poll conducted during the week of prisoner exchanges showcased a dramatic increase in Palestinian support for Hamas. These street-level displays, of course, do not indicate that Hamas is on the way to mobilising political imagination throughout the West Bank. Nor is it capable of forcing itself back into the sphere of government from which it was removed after winning the 2006 elections. But it would be difficult to describe the truce and the prisoner exchanges as having damaged Hamas’ popular legitimacy. Regionally, Israel’s siege on Gaza has elicited strong responses that have demonstrated increasing antagonism on and around Israel’s borders. To the north, Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called Netanyahu “the butcher of Gaza.” To the south, Yemeni Houthis have staged brazen attacks on Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea. In each case, Iran’s presence has been felt. Turkiye’s cultivation of diplomatic common ground with Tehran over Gaza has proved troublesome, while the Houthis have relied considerably on Iran for military aid. But glib condemnation of these regional alliances will be of little use when it comes to developing viable post-war political and governmental arrangements. Simply pointing the finger at Iran will not provide Israel with new geostrategic techniques for avoiding a multi-front war. Nor will it provide the United States with new geostrategic ideas for controlling the international disorder emanating from Gaza. At the international level, the strained position of the United States has become more pronounced, and the United Nations more vocal. As fighting resumed following the truce, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Israel’s war cabinet that it may not be able to count on many more months of international support for its siege on Gaza. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin meanwhile has suggested that Israel risked “strategic defeat” if it could not combine its war aims with the protection of civilians. The US-Israel relationship may be “ironclad” now as earlier, but the US government’s highest foreign policy and defence officials also seem to be acknowledging that Israel’s sovereignty has been challenged as never before. While Israel is naturally focussed on military objectives and geostrategic conditions, Blinken and Austin were making it clear that the lives of civilians in Gaza lives must also be taken into account. By 6 December, international pressure had come to fully bear on Israel’s prosecution of its war aims. While the UN Security Council’s permanent ceasefire resolution was vetoed by Washington, it was clear that what E.H. Carr called the “political community of nations” was keen to make its wishes heard. Ideally these wishes will lead to a cessation of hostilities, comparable to that achieved by Resolution 1701 in 2006, at the close of the second Lebanon war. However, a month later the wishes of the international community had not become a reality; no binding UN Security Council resolution had brought a ceasefire into effect. As the war proceeds into 2024, sceptics might be forgiven for observing that, today, declarations of international governance still have something about them of the “embryonic character” that Carr warned of in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 84 years ago. By whatever means a permanent ceasefire is achieved, all parties will eventually need to face the long-term question: “How are Israel and Gaza to be governed after the war?” In order to be credible, post-war proposals will need to put aside the attractions of punishment and patronage, and will need to come to terms with enduring fundamentals of political legitimacy. Punishing Benjamin Netanyahu by calling for his resignation may seem legitimate to the families whose loved ones have been killed or are still in captivity. Certainly, there are enough former Israeli statesmen and security chiefs who consider Netanyahu a disgrace or a liability. But having Netanyahu gone will not produce a new coalition government ˗ led by Benny Gantz or anyone else ˗ that can magically restore psychological security in the lives of Israelis and political stability in the State of Israel. Punishment will not induce rehabilitation. International patronage of an unelected Palestinian administrative body may be the best way to prevent inclusion of Hamas in a post-war government. Such a consideration may also ensure that the Palestinian Authority is “revitalised.” But this would be a repeat of 2007, when principles agreed among outsiders overturned Hamas’ election victory. At worst, a Palestinian government managed under international patronage would be a reversion to the post-Oslo dialectic that Anne Le More described in 2008 as “political guilt, wasted money.” Any credible proposal for democratic post-war government in Israel and Gaza will need to start from the political fundamentals as summed up by Olivier Roy: “there can be no democracy without political legitimacy.” The future will need to be governed by people and parties arising within local political life, and who are voted for by the local population, and who are held accountable by the political will of Israelis and Palestinians themselves.

The fighting continues between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas militants in and around Gaza. The death tolls continue to rise, but where do the weapons keep coming from? The Israeli government estimates that Hamas’ surprise attack on Oct. 7, 2023, killed 1,200 people in Israel. Since then, both sides have fired missiles and rockets, mortars and other weapons at each other. Israeli missiles and bombs have killed over 25,000 people in Gaza, according to the United Nations. Hamas has launched over 13,000 rockets and mortar rounds into Israel and killed 189 Israel Defense Forces soldiers. As a scholar of the global defense industry and international weapons trade, I see that both Israel and Hamas make some of their own weapons and get the rest from suppliers in other nations. Israel’s weapons supply Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been acutely aware that it is surrounded by hostile countries with many more inhabitants. Its defense strategy has emphasized self-sufficiency and advanced technology. This philosophy has been reinforced and refined by the nation’s experience in prior wars in 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973, as well as prior conflicts in Gaza and the West Bank. And its defense spending matches this priority. In 2022, Israel spent 4.5% of its gross domestic product on defense, a share that was the lowest in decades but more per person – US$2,623 – than any other country except Qatar. For a small country, Israel has a highly regarded defense industry, which can ramp up production on short notice in case of increased fighting. Three Israeli companies rank among the world’s top 100 arms producers: Elbit Systems manufactures ammunition and artillery; Israel Aerospace Industries produces unmanned aerial vehicles; and Rafael makes air defense systems. Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries collaborated to develop the highly regarded Iron Dome missile defense system. The U.S. provided development aid, and about half of Iron Dome’s components are made in America. Led by those firms, Israel has gone from being a net weapons importer to the world’s 10th-largest arms exporter. Much of its success in the weapons industry is a result of entrepreneurship and innovation within the overall economy, as well as civilian-military linkages. Since most Israelis are required to serve in the military, they develop decision-making and leadership skills at a young age. They also tend to be given tasks with high levels of responsibility. All of this contributes to the country’s startup and entrepreneurial culture. Israel also imports weapons from other countries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s arms transfers database, 68% of Israel’s weapons imports from 2013 to 2022 came from the U.S. Another 28% came from Germany. Imports are funded in part by $3.3 billion of military aid provided annually by the U.S., along with $500 million for missile defense cooperation. Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the U.S. has provided more than 5,000 MK-84 munitions, a type of 2,000-pound bomb. As of late December 2023, the U.S. had sent artillery shells, armored vehicles and basic combat tools to Israel, delivered in 230 cargo planes and 20 ships. U.S. military aid to Israel also includes stockpiled weapons. For years, the Pentagon has stored weapons in Israel, presumably for use by the U.S. military. But the U.S. has allowed Israel to draw down some of these supplies during the Gaza conflict. In fact, the U.S. has directed some of these stored armaments to be sent to Ukraine, which allows those warehouses in Israel to be restocked with more advanced equipment. Less sophisticated bombs and bullets shipped to Ukraine will free up space, to be filled with precision-guided munitions from the U.S. Hamas’ weapons supply In response to Israeli blockades, Hamas has constructed an elaborate and extensive tunnel complex under Gaza and across the Egyptian border. Hamas gets most of its weapons from Iran. The weapons are transported though Egypt and smuggled into Gaza through the tunnels. But Hamas’ weapons also include AK-47 assault rifles from China and Russia, and rocket-propelled grenades manufactured in North Korea and Bulgaria. In the murky global arms trade, it can be difficult to determine who is selling weapons to whom. A weapon manufactured in one country could end up in the hands of Hamas by way of one or more intermediary countries. Like nonmilitary goods, copycat armaments also are part of the weapons business. Hamas fighters are using a variety of Soviet-era weapon designs that have been copied and manufactured by China and Iran. Hamas even manufactures some arms in Gaza. Local factories, some of which are within the underground tunnels, produce mortars, rockets, rifles and bullets. Some countries, such as Russia, give Hamas permission to imitate their products. Iran trains Gaza-based engineers on design and production techniques. Ironically, when the Israeli military destroys buildings and equipment in Gaza, material from the ruins is recycled by Hamas factories into weapons. As the war progresses, Israel will likely be in a position to restock its depleted weapons, so long as Washington continues to provide political and military support. But with Israel now occupying much of Gaza, it will be far more difficult for Hamas to reload.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah was caught off guard by Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on 7/10/2023, followed by a widespread Israeli aggression on Gaza Strip (GS) and continuous incursions into various areas of the West Bank (WB). The PA has been confused, hesitant, helpless and weak in responding to the evolving confrontations and in taking practical measures against these aggressions. This situation raises questions about the factors influencing the PA’s position. First: Determinants and Influential Factors: The most important factors influencing the PA decisions and positions regarding the Israeli aggression on GS and incursions into WB can be summarized as follows: 1. The PA is concerned about its existence and role in light of threats from the right-wing Israeli government to undermine the PA, limit its role and accuse it of financing terrorism. The lack of condemnation of Hamas’ attack on October 7 has further complicated the situation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated the readiness of the Israeli army to confront the PA security forces, describing the Oslo Accords that established it as a “fateful mistake.” 2. There is a contrast in opinions within the PA regarding how to deal with the aggression on GS: one advocating neutrality, caution and waiting for the outcome of the confrontation between Hamas and the occupation forces, and the other emphasizing the necessity of taking practical actions to preserve the PA’s image and avoid condemnation for complicity and abandonment. News indicate that Mahmud ‘Abbas, Hussein al-Sheikh and Majed Faraj adopt the first, which has reflected clearly in the PA’s decisions and current position. 3. The security obligations imposed by the Oslo Accords, requiring the PA to coordinate security with Israel, maintain security conditions and prevent resistance activities. Unlike previous cases where the PA hinted at freezing security coordination with the occupation, it is noteworthy that no such position was made concerning the current aggression. 4. The US has called the PA to engage with its visions and arrangements in order to manage GS after the current confrontation with Hamas. The PA has responded to these demands, expressing its readiness to manage GS, after the end of confrontations, within a political framework that includes WB and GS. 5. The political rivalry with Hamas and the desire to weaken it as a strong political opponent. Some PA prominent influential figures believe that the current confrontation between Hamas and Israel presents a crucial opportunity to settle the competition with their political rival and regain control over GS. 6. The positions of influential Arab parties that seek to end Hamas’ rule of GS, weaken it and enhance the PA’s role in WB and GS. They also want to stop the increase of resistance activities in WB, which threaten the PA’s influence. 7. The PA’s fear of economic repercussions if it adopts positions that provoke the Israeli side. Israel has decided to withhold about $156 million from the monthly clearance funds, claiming that this amount includes salaries, allowances for employees and expenses for GS. There are indications that the Israeli security cabinet is considering the possibility of releasing the withheld clearance funds to the PA and allowing workers from WB to work inside the occupied Palestinian territories under new security conditions. 8. The decline of the PA’s popularity among Palestinians due to its weak position concerning the war on GS and its inability to resist the widespread incursions in WB. Numerous angry protests in WB cities have called for the resignation of the PA’s president. A recent opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Political and Survey Research in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung revealed a significant decline in the PA’s popularity. About 58% of respondents called for its dissolution, while 72% supported Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, and 64% opposed the PA’s participation in meetings with the United States, with the involvement of Arab countries, in order to discuss the future of GS after the war stops Second: The PA’s Position on the Aggression: Through monitoring the PA’s actions and positions during the 70 days of Israeli aggression on GS and the continuous invasions of WB cities, its stance can be summarized in the following points: 1. The PA had limited reaction, only declaring its rejection and condemnation of the Israeli aggression without undertaking effective and influential action to counter it. It relinquished its role in protecting the Palestinian people, or at least acknowledged its implicit inability to do so. 2. The PA participated in the meetings of joint Arab and Muslim action institutions and became a member of the committees derived from these meetings to follow-up their decisions. 3. The PA prevented its security forces from confronting the ongoing Israeli attacks in WB. It continued pursuing resistance groups and conducting arrests among Palestinian activists. 4. The PA worked to restrain popular activities in WB that support the resistance and oppose the Israeli aggression on GS. It limited the spaces for popular movement and prevented interaction with the Israeli forces. 5. The Palestinian mission at the United Nations (UN), along with some Palestinian ambassadors, have effectively clarified the Palestinian position, countered the Israeli narrative and worked to issue from the UN General Assembly resolutions to cease fire. They also confronted US proposals condemning the resistance. 6. The PA avoided calling for any joint national meetings to strengthen the internal front against the Israeli aggression. It emphasized that the PA and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are the sole representatives of the Palestinian people, excluding any other party. Conclusion In general, the PA’s position aligned with the official Arab stance, dominated by a negative view of the Palestinian military resistance and reformist Islamic movements. This aligns with its desire for the PA to replace Hamas in managing GS. Despite presenting itself as the representative of the Palestinian people, expressing their suffering and aspirations, its practical behavior on the ground in WB, especially through maintaining security coordination with Israel, suppressing popular movements and preventing any escalation of Intifadah, civil disobedience and armed resistance, established for a “comfortable” environment for Israel. It practically sidelined over three million Palestinians in WB from engaging in resisting activities, except under exceptional circumstances. It seems that the PA leadership prefers a policy of waiting, anticipating what will result from the Israeli aggression on GS, with some of its leaders considering the defeat of the resistance and the dominance of the occupation a matter of time. Consequently, the PA is the candidate to take over the administration of GS, but it refuses to overtly acknowledge this, so as not to appear that it is coming riding Israeli tanks. For this would lead to further deterioration of its already declining popularity and loss of credibility. It prefers having transitional phase before assuming responsibility, within a national consensus if possible and a broader vision for genuine progress in the peace process. Therefore, it is unlikely, in the coming days, that a substantial change in the PA’s position on the Israeli aggression on GS will occur, given the continued influence of the mentioned factors and while it is waiting for battle outcomes to become clear.

The killing of a Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon on Jan. 8, 2024, has raised concern that the conflict between Israel and Hamas could escalate into a regional war. Wissam al-Tawil, the head of a unit that operates on Lebanon’s southern border, was killed in a targeted Israeli airstrike just days after a senior Hamas leader was assassinated in Beirut and amid sporadic attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli targets. But how likely is a full-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah? The Conversation turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert on Lebanon-Israel relations at the University of Notre Dame, to assess what could happen next. What do we know about the latest strike? We know that it was an Israeli drone that killed al-Tawil. Hezbollah has since released picture of him with Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s secretary general, and Qassem Soleiman, the former head of Quds Force – one of Iran’s main military branches – who was assassinated by the U.S. in 2020. This suggests that al-Tawil was a major target for Israel, as he clearly had connections with top figures in Lebanon and Iran. The fact that it was a drone attack is also important. This suggests that the operation was based on good Israeli intelligence on al-Tawil’s whereabouts. This wasn’t a chance encounter. This was clearly a calculated and precise attack. After the operation, Israel said al-Tawil was responsible for a recent missile attack on Israel’s Mount Meron intelligence base in northern Israel. That attack was in response to the earlier assassination of a Hamas leader in Beirut. So what we are seeing is a pattern of tit-for-tat strikes. So this doesn’t mark an escalation? I don’t see the killing of al-Tawil as an escalation, as such. Rather, it is a targeted retaliation by Israel to the earlier Hezbollah strike on one of their facilities. There are some important things to note in that regard. It was just 10 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. This is still within the geographical area where the two sides have been exchanging fire since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas in Israel. So this is still within the realm of border skirmishes, to my mind, and falls short of full war. Is it in the interests of Israel to escalate conflict? I don’t think either side is interested in full-blown war, for different reasons. For Israel, the pressure is from outside the country. There is immense international pressure on Israel not to start a full-blown war with Hezbollah. Indeed, U.S. Secrtary of State Antony Blinken is currently in the region and visiting Israel with that message: Do not start a war with Hezbollah. I think there is a realization, certainly in the international community, that a full-blown war between Hezbollah and Israel will decimate Lebanon and also lead to major destruction in Israel. What about pressure within Israel? Certainly within Israel there is a strong lobby for war with Hezbollah. The thinking among Israeli military hawks here is a powerful military blow against Hezbollah would allow people living in the north of Israel to return to homes they evacuated when it looked like war might be in the cards. Indeed, the Israeli Ministry of Defense wanted preemptive war with Hezbollah after the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. But U.S. President Joe Biden stopped that from happening for the same reason that Blinken is currently trying to dissuade Israel from further escalating the conflict. And what about Hezbollah? How might it respond? Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, is between a rock and a hard place. The majority of Lebanese people clearly do not want a war. But any attack resulting in the deaths of high-ranking Hezbollah figures will be met by internal demands for action. But there is a tipping point for Hezbollah, as there is for the Israelis too – which is why this tit-for-tat pattern is such a risky matter. On the Lebanese side, if Israel hits strategic Hezbollah assets deep in Lebanon – that is, outside the border areas – or launch an attack that leads to mass civilian deaths then it might lead to full-blown conflict. But so far that has not been the case. The attacks by Israel have been surgical and precise. In the case of the Hamas leader killed in Beirut, it was only Palestinians killed. It was a humiliation for Hezbollah for sure – it happened in Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Beirut. But it wasn’t on Hezbollah assets, such as personnel, strategic sites or command centers. Israel has limited its attacks largely to the border area. Public sentiment is still very strongly against war in Lebanon. Certainly there is strong sympathy for Gazans. But the prevailing sentiment in Lebanon is that support cannot come at the price of Lebanese lives. And that suits the Hezbollah hierarchy at present. They know that the threat of war is their most important card. Once played, they can’t use it again. Is there a diplomatic way forward? Both parties are looking at diplomacy. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said that his country’s preferred path is “an agreed-upon diplomatic settlement.” Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the goal of returning Israeli citizens to their homes in the north would be done “diplomatically” if possible. But added, “If not, we will work in other ways.” Similarly in Lebanon, the talk is of a diplomatic solution – notably by enforcing United Nations Resolution 1701, which calls for Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River and for Israel to withdraw to the international border. So it isn’t that there isn’t a credible diplomatic path. And the fact that both sides use the language of diplomacy suggests there is no appetite for full-blown war. Indeed, the U.S. has long been trying to get Israel and Lebanon to resolve disputes over their shared borders. Both sides signed a U.S.-brokered maritime agreement in 2022, and there have been attempts at a similar deal in regards to the land boundary. There remained disagreement over 13 spots along the border. But since Oct. 7, the U.S. has tried to use the prospect of a negotiated land solution based on U.N. Resolution 1701 to diffuse tension between Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese government has said it welcomes U.S. efforts to resolve the disputes. On the Israeli side, too, they are going along with U.S. attempts to keep U.N. Resolution 1701 on the table – I think, mainly to keep America on side. Does Iran have any role in influencing Hezbollah’s response? Iran has immense influence over Hezbollah – it pays for military operations and equipment. But Hezbollah is not only an Iranian proxy; it has domestic considerations, and its interests lie with the Lebanese political scene. For that reason, Hezbollah is attuned to the domestic popular pressure in Lebanon against a war. Also, I don’t think Iran wants to see an escalation. Like Hezbollah, Iranian leaders know that threat of war – through their proxies in the region – is their most valuable asset. And I don’t think Iran is ready to use it. Iran might also be concerned that if fighting escalates, then it will be drawn into war. Iran has so far played a smart game since the Oct. 7 attacks – it has stayed away from the battlefield, while supporting the sporadic attacks on Israel by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria. But a full war between Israel and Hezbollah may draw Iran into direct confrontation with Israel and the U.S. And that is something that leaders in Tehran will most likely not want, especially after a terror attack in Iran on Jan. 3 exposed how vulnerable Iran is internally.