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Defense & Security
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Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific

by Liviu Horovitz , Elisabeth Suh

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

Defense & Security
Top view of Russian army Shahid combat drone in the sky against clouds, flying over the ground war in Ukraine, drone attack, 3d render.

Military Production in Russia: Before and After the Start ofthe War With Ukraine. To What Extent has it Increased and how hasThis Been Achieved?

by Julian Cooper

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском To What Extent has it Increased and how has This Been Achieved? Abstract In February 2022, Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has to date continued for more than two years. In response, Western countries imposed increasingly strict sanctions. The Russian Armed Forces lost a significant quantity of armaments and by the autumn of 2022, the government faced the challenge of increasing sharply the production of weapons and munitions. Julian Cooper analyses the extent to which the challenge has been met, reviewing the available quantitative evidence in detail. His analysis confirms that there have been significant increases in the output of systems and munitions used extensively in the war. The author explores the means by which defence industry output has been increased and draws conclusions as to the nature of the Russian economic system and the institutional legacies of Soviet times. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine and this has been ongoing for over two years. In response, Western countries imposed increasingly severe sanctions in an attempt to constrain the development of the Russian economy and limit the ability of its industry to produce weapons. This is done by restricting access to imported high technology and dual-use goods, production equipment, components and materials. It soon became evident that the invasion had not gone according to Russia’s original expectations of a rapid operation. Instead, a protracted conflict developed with heavy losses in both human and material terms for both sides. The Russian Armed Forces lost a significant quantity of armaments, in particular tanks and armoured vehicles, artillery and air defence systems, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. By the autumn of 2022, the Russian government faced the challenge of increasing sharply the production of weapons and munitions vital to the successful completion of the operation which, though not acknowledged in Russia, had become a war. This article explores the extent to which Russia has been able to meet this challenge at a time when its defence industry is experiencing sanctions and a range of economic constrains, not least a shortage of labour exacerbated by a partial mobilisation of personnel to serve in the armed forces. The article comprises four parts. The first looks at the methods of measuring the output of the Russian defence industry. The second examines the available quantitative data in physical terms. The third section seeks to explain how it has been possible for Russia to increase significantly the output of some types of weapons and munitions in a relatively brief period of time. Finally, some conclusions are drawn as to Russia’s ability to adapt its defence industry to wartime conditions, and prospects for the future. Measuring the Output of the Russian Defence Industry In Soviet times, the production of weapons, munitions and other military-related goods was shrouded in almost total secrecy. This relaxed to some extent after the end of the Soviet Union, but to this day, Russia’s official statistical agency, the Federal Service for State Statistics, generally known as Rosstat, does not openly publish data on the military output of the country’s defence industry. However, this secrecy has its limits as the defence minister and other senior officials of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), in particular the deputy minister responsible for arms procurement, do release data on the output of some weapon systems, annual targets for the state defence order, and information on implementation, as will become clear later in this article. However, since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the volume and level of detail have diminished and even more so since February 2022. In addition, President Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, the minister for industry and his deputies also reveal details from time to time, as do the heads and other leaders of corporate structures producing military goods, such as Rostekh, Roscosmos, the United Aircraft Corporation (OAK) and the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK). A study of the data covering many years indicates that on the whole, the data released is reliable, with misrepresentation but no evident falsification. But one has to be alert to changes in the definitions employed, in particular whether the figures given apply to the output of new systems only, or to the total procurement of new, modernised and repaired older systems, an issue that has become significant since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Earlier works of the present author have sometimes focused on detailed analyses of quantitative data of this nature.1 In recent times, some observers have questioned the reliability of this type of information. An April 2024 CSIS report on Russia’s defence industry declared that, ‘While … the official data and statements from the Russian MOD are most likely exaggerated, and therefore should be taken with a grain of salt, they demonstrate the Kremlin has placed renewed emphasis on strengthening the domestic defence industrial sector’.2 While exaggerated statements are indeed often made, the degree of scepticism expressed is overstated in relation to the data. Undoubtedly, great care is needed in its analysis, but it still provides, as accepted by the authors of the CSIS report, a good overall picture of the general trend of development of military production. There is also an additional check on this, namely Rosstat’s regular reports of changes in the output of the manufacturing industry in rouble terms.3 Again, careful analysis is required with an informed knowledge of the industrial classification used, but the overall trends revealed reflect those provided by the quantitative data available from other sources. At a time when quantitative data on various aspects of the Russia economy is being strictly limited by the Russian authorities, not least on budget spending and foreign trade flows, it is better to have imperfect and fragmentary data than none at all. Measuring the Output of Military Goods in Physical Terms Reports of the output of military goods often appear in Russian media, though the data tends to be fragmented, often lacking precise definition and timescales. There are also similar reports of the output of civilian goods manufactured by defence industry companies. This section examines this evidence in detail from 2019, three years before the start of the Ukraine war, until the end of 2023, and plans for 2024, paying particular attention to the types of military goods that have played a significant role in the current combat. Every year in December, the Russian MoD reports on some of the new weapons procured during the year and plans for the following year. This evidence is presented in Table 1, in the Appendix section at the end of this article. From the table, it can be seen that since 2020, plans for the deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) have not been fully implemented, probably because of the failure to develop the Sarmat heavy missile to a point when it can be put into service. The acquisition of Borei-class strategic nuclear submarines has proceeded fairly smoothly and modernised/new Tu-160 strategic bombers are gradually entering service. These developments and the MoD’s procedure for reporting plans and outcomes leave no doubt that in Russia, the development and procurement of strategic nuclear systems remains the highest priority regardless of the war. Taking into account the military technology priorities of the war, it is probably best to consider the production of weapons on a sector-by-sector basis. Clearly, the war has given rise to a greatly increased demand for equipment and munitions for the ground forces, some types of combat aircraft and UAVs, certain types of missiles, air defence systems and electronic warfare systems. Demand for new naval vessels has been less urgent with the exception of nuclear submarines. Aircraft For the aircraft industry, the trend is clear. The production of some types of planes and helicopters found to be of value in the war has increased. However, data from 2020 onwards refers to both new aircraft and modernised older ones, making it very difficult to establish the number of the former. In the case of combat systems, the evidence indicates increased production of a few models, for example the Su-35S and Su-34, considered vital to the war and in one case, the Su-57, considered important for status reasons. Table 2 summarises the available data for 2019–23. The Su-57 is Russia’s first ‘fifth’ generation aircraft, although all serially built examples so far have an engine that is not really one of that status. It is a matter of great pride to the Russian leadership, although it has played only a modest role in the war. In the view of a leading Russian military specialist, the very costly and complex fifth generation aircraft ‘as yet are still absolutely not suited to real combat use …. The loss of a fifth-generation plane is on the one hand, a large financial loss, and a significant reputational loss’.4 Helicopters As for helicopters, it is very difficult to establish the number built for use by the armed forces in recent years. The building of civilian helicopters has been quite seriously affected by sanctions but this appears not to be the case for the main combat systems, the Ka-52/52M and the Mi-28NM. The Russian Air Force signed a contract for the former in August 2021, with 15 to be delivered in 2022 and another 15 in 2023. A new contract for an undisclosed number was signed in the summer of 2022. In July 2023, then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the volume of production of the Ka-52/52M had doubled compared with the preceding year, suggesting there were 30 planned for 2023.5 Serial production of the Mi-28NM started in 2020 and in that year a contract was signed for 98 units under the state armament programme to 2027.6 Shoigu also said in July 2023 that production of the Mi-28NM had increased three-fold from 2022, which in the view of a leading specialist on Russian aviation, Piotr Butowski, probably meant a target of up to 50 in 2023.7 One analyst concluded after a detailed study of the evidence that the armed forces received a total of 110 helicopters in 2022 against a plan for the year of 71, and actual deliveries of 48 in 2021, with a possible total of up to 125 units supplied in 2023.8 UAVs The evidence for the number of drones built is not easy to interpret as it depends on the type and scale of UAV that is being counted. There is no doubt that the number produced has increased sharply since 2020 when less than 1,000 were made. It appears that in the year 2022 the number increased to only a modest extent but then surged in 2023, reaching more than 20,000.9 This total almost certainly excludes the small first-person-view (FPV) type drones, now in large-scale use at the frontline on both sides and being assembled at quite a few locations in Russia, with components mainly imported from China. The two main types of Russian UAV that have had an impact on the battlefield are the Orlan family of reconnaissance drones, developed and built by the Special Technology Centre in St Petersburg, and the Lancet loitering system of Zala Aero, part of the Kalashnikov Concern. Both companies have been active in acquiring a range of Western components for their UAVs. The widely used Orlan-10, for example, has a small petrol engine built by Saito, a Japanese company.10 Naval Equipment The production of new naval equipment has not been a priority during the war apart from the building of nuclear submarines, the output of which is shown in Table 1. The handover of new naval vessels has been somewhat erratic, with the tendency to bunch in certain years. This has been partly because the building of surface ships in recent years has been disrupted to some extent by problems of engine supply. The building of Project 11356 frigates was abandoned when Ukraine stopped supplying power units. Ukrainian engines were also to be fitted to Project 22350 frigates, but in this case Russia managed to replace the engine and reduction gearing, permitting the hand over in 2023 of the Admiral Golovko.11 Project 21631 small missile ships originally had German engines but the supply ended in 2014. It was first decided that a Chinese engine would be used instead, but it was not suited for a naval ship, resulting in long delays before a domestically built alternative was developed.12 Similar problems appeared for Project 22800 Karakurt-class small missile ships, and at one point it appeared that they could end up with Chinese power units. However, those proved not to be adequate and a Russian replacement was found but not before there were delays in completing ships under construction.13 Project 22160 patrol boats were originally designed to have German MAN diesel engines and the first boat handed over in 2018 was fitted with one, but later ones, with some delay, had new Russian-built power units.14 Ground Forces Munitions Turning to the production of weapons and munitions for the ground forces, the availability of reliable quantitative evidence is more problematic, as it is often fragmentary, lacking definition and with growth figures between periods without adequate specification of dates. Table 3 summarises the available evidence. Tanks The data on the output of tanks has not been easy to assess. There are three categories: newly built ones, in recent times the T-90 and a few T-14 Armata; modernised older tanks, T-72 and T-80; and old tanks removed from storage, the T-54, which have undergone what the Russian MoD calls ‘capital repair’. Since the start of the war in 2022, any total given by the MoD is an aggregate figure covering all three. Main tank producer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) builds the T-90 and Armata, plus the modernised T-72, while modernised T-80 tanks are built by Omsktransmash, an affiliate of the UVZ holding company. Work on the renovation of older tanks is undertaken by Russian tank repair works, the output of which is hardly ever revealed.15 The Russian MoD said that in 2021, its ground forces were to receive more than 240 new and modernised T-72B3M, T-80BVM and T-90M Proryv tanks.16 The number of new T-90M was reported to be set at 70 units, with the remaining 170 tanks being modernised.17 This provides a base for assessing more recent data. In 2023, a total of 1,530 new, modernised and refurbished tanks were produced, which, according to the MoD, is a 3.6 times increase from the preceding year. This suggests an output of about 425 units in 2022, 1.8 times the 240 of 2021. Interestingly, in March 2023, deputy chair of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, declared that 1,500 tanks would be made in that year,18 followed a few days later by Putin, who said over 1,600 new and modernised tanks would be produced.19 Observers were quick to note that the total must include older tanks withdrawn from reserves, but were puzzled as to how many new tanks would be built. Military specialist Roman Skomorokhov, in a review of potential industrial manufacturers of tanks, concluded that in the short term, UVZ was the only manufacturer able to build new tanks, with a possible output of 500–600 a year at best.20 It is unlikely that UVZ has managed to build such a large number of tanks, especially when part of its production shop for tanks is being used to build small volumes of complex Armata systems. According to one anonymous source within Rostekh, the capacity of UVZ in October 2022 was 200–250 tanks.21 The work of Omsktransmash building modernised T-80s must be taken into account as well. In 2017, the factory received a contract to modernise 62 units of T-80BV to T-80BVM level and delivered 31 in 2018 and another 31 in 2019.22 In August 2020, there was a new contract for the modernisation of more than 50 T-80BVM tanks but no information has been revealed on its completion date or on the scale of additional contracts.23 However, in the autumn of 2023, Aleksandr Potapov, general director of UVZ, to which the Omsktransmash factory belongs, revealed that the MoD had called for the resumption of the serial production of T-80 tanks from scratch, an activity not undertaken since the 1970s.24 It is not known whether that has been implemented. Meanwhile, there have been several reports of the delivery to the front of batches of modernised T-80BVM. This suggests that in 2023, Omsktransmash and UVZ may have produced around 350 new and modernised tanks out of the total output of 1,530, meaning around 1,200 old tanks have undergone capital repair. This accords well with an IISS estimate of 1,180–1,280 units based on it monitoring the work of storage bases in Russia using commercial overhead imagery.25 As for the new T-14 Armata, Aleksei Krivoruchko, MoD deputy defence minister, said in August 2021 that the army would get 20 of them by the end of the year, with serial production set to start in 2022.26 There were reports in 2023 that it had been sent to the front to see action but there was little visible evidence to support this.27 There was speculation that it was found too complex and costly to risk using in real combat conditions and this was confirmed in early 2024 by the general-director of Rostekh, Sergei Chemezov, who said that it was not being used in the ‘special military operation’ zone because of its high cost and noted that it was cheaper for the army to buy T-90 tanks.28 Not surprisingly, this generated some scathing press comment about Russia’s preference for costly ‘parades’ and ‘white elephant’ tanks of no use in combat.29 Armoured Vehicles There are similar difficulties in assessing the output of armoured vehicles. The term usually covers infantry fighting vehicles (BMP) and armoured personnel carriers (BTR). However, sometimes it is extended to include armoured vehicles of the airborne forces like the BMD-4M and older Soviet systems such as the MT-LB. Many of these vehicles have been accumulated in the reserve stores of the MoD. Before the war, the annual output of armoured vehicles appears to have been modest, but it was stepped up quite rapidly in the second half of 2022 and more intensively in 2023, when, according to Shoigu, a total of 2,518 units of new, modernised and repaired machines was acquired. The new ones will have been BMP-3s built by the Kurganmashzavod company, which also produces modernised BMP-2 and now batches of repaired BMP-3. From the late summer of 2022, the factory has been working a six-day week in 12-hour shifts. It claimed that in the first half of 2023, it produced 95% of the total armoured vehicle output achieved in 2022 and planned to increase output by another 30% in the second half of 2023.30 New BTR-82A armoured personnel carriers are produced by the Arzamas Machine-building Factory of the Voennaya-Promyshlennaya Kompaniya (also known as Military Industrial Company). The earlier model, the BTR-80, is modernised by a repair factory to become the BTR-82AM. In 2020, the MoD ordered a total of at least 460 of both types, including 130 new BTR-82A. In addition, it planned to repair and refurbish 330 old BTR-80 units from reserves.31 In 2021, another order was made for more than 300 BTR-82A and BTR-82AM.32 In late 2021, it was announced that in spring 2022, state testing was to begin for the Bumerang armoured transporter first seen in 2015. It is not known if this happened, but in March 2023, there were sightings of a few Bumerang being transported to near the warzone. However, there were no reports of its use in combat and it may well be that this new system, like the Armata tank, was considered to be too complex and costly to be put into service in the war.33 Artillery Unfortunately, detailed information on the volume of production of artillery systems is not available. Occasionally, the MoD does report a total figure for missile systems and artillery (raketnye kompleksy i artilleriya). In 2018, a total of more than 120 units was reported, which included Kornet and Khrizantema-SP anti-tanks systems, Msta-SM howitzers, Iskander-M, and Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles. In 2020, the number increased to 551 units and in 2023, showed a very significant increase to more than 4,250 units.34 There are large stocks of old artillery systems so this total probably includes many that were restored for use during the year. The production of artillery is undertaken by several enterprises, with the largest producers consisting of: Perm Motovilikhinskiye Zavody, making a range of systems including 152-mm howitzers Msta-B and D-20, and 120-mm self-propelled systems Nona-S, Nona-SVK, Vena and the 240-mm Tyul’pan; and Volgograd Titan-Barrikady, making launch systems for the Iskander-M and the Bereg and Bastion shore naval artillery complexes.35 In addition, there is the Ekaterinburg Factory No. 9 imeni Kalinina, under Rostekh, producing barrel artillery systems, including the Soviet-era towed D-30A howitzer and guns for T-72 and T-90 tanks; Uraltransmash making the Msta-S 152-mm self-propelled howitzer widely used in the war; and UVZ making the 152-mm self-propelled Malva, developed by the Burevestnik Central Scientific Research Institute.36 Munitions and Missiles A final category of systems produced for the armed forces is munitions and missiles, sometimes summarised in Russian sources as means of destruction (sredstva porazheniya). This includes explosives, cartridges for small arms, artillery shells of various calibres, bombs, mines, missiles for multiple rocket launchers (MLRS), anti-tank systems, air defence systems and operational systems such as the Iskander-M. Given the wide range of products made by different branches of the defence industry, assembling data is extremely difficult, but munitions are clearly of such importance for Russia’s war effort that the topic merits treatment in some detail. To begin, it is probably easiest to start with the branch usually termed in Russian as munitions and special chemicals (boepripasy i spetskhimiya), which produces cartridges, shells, explosives, fuel for missiles and other chemicals. The munitions industry in Russia has been problematic since 1992. During the 1990s and early 2000s, there was little investment in the sector, and production volumes shrank rapidly, resulting in some enterprises closing down. Production equipment aged steadily, and many experienced personnel left the sector. A fundamental problem has been the vast spare capacities maintained in order to rapidly expand production in the event of a war. This appears to have been the case until recent times. According to the specialist on defence matters, Viktor Murakhovskii, more than 70% of capacity was for mobilisation. If state support for this was inadequate, enterprises would become loss making.37 For this reason, quite a few munitions plants were made so-called federal ‘treasury’ (kazennyi) enterprises, with guaranteed budget support regardless of their economic performance, thereby enabling them to keep reserve capacities. Many munitions enterprises are under the state corporation Rostekh and its holding Tekhnologiya Mashinostroeniya (Tekhmash), with its management company Tekhnodinamika. In late 2021, Rostekh had more than 30 enterprises and institutes engaged in the development and production of a wide range of munitions.38 In late 2022 and early 2023, there was mounting evidence of official concern that the domestic munitions industry was not adequately meeting the demand of the armed forces engaged in the war. Then Minister of Trade and Industry and Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov acknowledged that for a long time the munitions branch of the defence industry had been producing in limited quantities simply to top up stocks. He claimed, however, that in 2022, the volume of output of some munitions had increased from three to 10 times but more needed to be done.39 This prompted a number of military journalists to openly discuss the fact that very high rates of use of some munitions, notably those for artillery systems, had run down stocks necessitating prompt action to maintain supplies.40 At the end of December 2022, there was some decisive action to bring order to the munitions industry. A presidential edict was issued for 14 of the most prominent companies of the branch, including several treasury enterprises, to be transferred to the Rostekh state corporation for conversion into joint stock companies with 100% federal ownership. This was followed by a government order for its implementation. The list included the Kazan, Perm and Tambov (Kotovsk) powder factories and leading munitions producers such as the Kazan factory of precision machine building, Samara Kommunar works, Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Sverdlova and Avangard of Sterlitamak, Bashkortostan.41 The aim was clearly to improve their management and modernise them as quickly as possible, drawing on the considerable experience of Rostekh in turning round failing enterprises. Whether this move will enhance the industry’s ability to meet the urgent needs of the war remains to be seen. In May 2023, it was reported that Tekhmash had more than 50 enterprises, suggesting a quite sizeable expansion to meet increased wartime needs.42 From about September 2022, there were reports of factories switching to multi-shift work and hiring additional workers including at the Perm powder works. It is probably significant that soon after, it was also reported that the military production division (the Special Design Bureau (SKB)) of the nearby Motovilikhinskie Zavody, which builds MLRS, was doing the same.43 A major concern has been the production of large-calibre artillery shells, in particular 152 and 122mm shells for artillery systems, 125 and 115mm for tank guns and 120 and 82mm for mortars. The production of artillery shells involves division of labour, with some enterprises producing explosives or shell casings and others doing both. Leading producers include Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Ya M Sverdlova, with a branch in Biisk united with Biissk Oleumnyi Zavod. The factory is a basic producer of large calibre fragmentation munitions and also a leading producer of HMX (octogen) and hexogen. The Kopeisk Zavod Plastmass builds munitions as its basic activity, while the casings for them are made by Kirov Zavod Sel’mash, a large multi-product enterprise of Tekhnodinamika. Some enterprises involved in the production of large-calibre shells underwent enlargement in recent years. The Verkhneturinskii Mekhanicheskii Zavod (VTMZ) of Tekhnodinamika built a new shop to make artillery shell casings for field and tank artillery. It was estimated that it would result in a 150% increase in production for the state defence order after the shops were in full operation by the end of 2021.44 Kopeisk Zavod Plastmass created a new automated shop for the assembly of 100 to 152mm munitions for tank, field and ship guns before the war started, which was designed to secure a 150% increase in output. The plan was for the shop to be completed and put into action by 2023.45 Both these cases raise an interesting question: did Rostekh receive signals prior to the war that some expansion of capacities was desirable? Another type in high demand has been missiles for MLRS. The main developer and manufacturer of MLRS has long been the Tula NPO Splav imeni A N Ganicheva, which also produces missiles for them. Its products include the Grad, Uragan and Smerch systems and modified variants, the Tornado-G and Tornado-S. In July 2020, the CEO of Rostekh opened a new shop at Splav for the production of munitions for MLRS, but reports did not indicate its capacity.46 In early 2024, the factory was visited by Defence Minister Shoigu and it was reported that new capacity introduced into service in 2023 had made possible a fourfold increase in the production of munitions for MLRS.47 Another class of munitions is those for the mobile ballistic missile system Iskander-M (9K720). This operational–tactical system, which has a range of warheads including a nuclear option, was developed by the Kolomna Scientific Production Corporation Design Bureau of Machine Building. Missiles for it are developed by the Ekaterinburg OKB Novator and produced by the Votkinsk Machine-Building Factory. Sources did not indicate the volume of production of the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, also developed by OKB Novator. Russia has a distinct class of equipment for the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops (RChBD). In 2023, this amounted to 150 units of equipment, including the TOS-1A Solntsepek heavy thermobaric rocket launch system produced by Omsktransmash.48 When visiting the factory in April 2024, Shoigu was informed that the volume produced in 2023 had grown by 2.5 times by increasing capacity and round-the-clock work.49 According to Shoigu speaking in February 2024, the volume of production of munitions for it has been increased by 12 times.50 The producer has not been identified. In April 2024, a new longer-range system, the TOS-3 Drakon, was reported to be on the eve of final testing prior to serial production.51 Another class of munitions often used in Ukraine are bombs launched from aircraft. Data is lacking on the volume produced but developments are sometimes discussed in the media, including the work of certain enterprises, although their identity is not always revealed. In March 2024, Shoigu visited enterprises in Nizhegorodsk Oblast producing bombs and shells for artillery and tanks. One factory, clearly distinguishable as Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Y M Sverdlova, a very large producer of shells and bombs, was producing the heavy aviation bomb FAB-500 and reported significant increases in the scale of output, a doubling of the FAB-1500 output, and, in February 2024, the start of ‘mass production’ of the three-tonne high-explosive FAB-3000 which dates back to Soviet times and is intended for destroying highly protected targets, both industrial and military.52 The Dzerzhinsk factory is also bringing back into use from reserves the most powerful of all Soviet/Russian conventional artillery shells, the Tyul’pan 240-mm mortar, in use in the war against very heavily fortified structures.53 It was claimed in March 2024 that the enterprise, which in 2023 was taken into Rostekh, had over the past year achieved a fivefold increase in the volume of production of artillery shells and aviation bombs by bringing conserved capacities back into use and installing new equipment.54 Civilian Goods Finally, a brief look is taken at the output of civil and dual-use goods of importance to the economy during the war, some manufactured by companies of the defence industry. Table 4 presents evidence of the changing output of some important civilian goods from 2019–23. The table shows the impact of sanctions in 2022 and 2023 but also perhaps in some cases the fact that priority for military production has caused diminished focus on civil goods or, in the case of rail freight wagons built by UVZ, reduced output because of the transfer of some capacity to basic military goods, tanks and armoured vehicles. The building of civilian passenger aircraft has been very seriously affected by sanctions which have deprived almost all aircraft that were built earlier of their power units. To some extent, the same applies to helicopter and ship production. Sanctions probably also account for the reduced output of trucks, excavators and also integrated circuits, the production of which is to some extent dependent on imported materials and gases. But the machine tool industry that was already reviving after the sanctions imposed in 2014 has shown new growth, with increased output of both metal-cutting and metal-forming machines in both 2022 and 2023. Russia remains dependent to a significant extent on imported machine tools, but now these are supplied mainly by Chinese companies rather than those of Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan or the US. In 2021, 69% of imported metal-cutting and - forming machine tools came from ‘unfriendly’ countries, which dropped to 39% in 2022, while China’s share increased from 22% to 46%.55 Paths to Increasing the Output of Military Hardware The data assembled raises an interesting question: how has it been possible for the Russian defence industry to increase the output of some weapons and munitions to a significant extent in a relatively brief period of time? This is a topic that requires additional research but a number of paths can be identified. One factor has clearly been the policy turn in the autumn of 2022 to change the institutions responsible for leading and managing the work of the defence industry. Before that, fulfilling the state defence order for new weapons and the modernisation and repair of older systems had been the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, working with Rostekh, Rosatom, Roskosmos and other corporate bodies involved in military work, and with the MoD as the principal customer, actively monitoring the implementation of contracts. Overall responsibility for policy was in the hands of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) with the president of Russia as its chair. Since the war, there have been significant changes. In 2022, there was not a single VPK meeting with Putin as chair; indeed, he has not chaired a VPK meeting since 2017. Instead, Putin had three meetings with representatives of the defence industry, the first in September 2022 with a number of enterprise leaders, the second in December of the same year, and the third in May 2024 with some enterprise leaders and new ministers.56 The focus of the VPK has always been the state defence order for weapons, not other aspects of supplies to the armed forces, such as uniforms, food, fuel, lubricants and medicines. With the adoption of partial mobilisation, it quickly became clear that the rapid build up of deliveries of these non-weapon items presented a serious challenge. This almost certainly accounts for the decision by Putin in October 2022 to create a new structure to ensure that all necessary supplies for the special military operation were produced and delivered. A Coordination Council of the government was formed with the aim of meeting needs appearing in the pursuit of the war, including the delivery and repair of armaments, uniforms, medical–sanitary provision, repair and reconstruction work and logistics. The council is chaired by the prime minister and its participants are representatives of all the main ‘power’ ministries – MoD, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Emergency Situations, Rosgvard, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, the Main Directorate of Special Programmes (responsible for ensuring the survival of the government in the event of war by creating and managing secure bunkers, so-called ‘special objects’), and some other federal ministries.57 The Coordination Council met six times in 2022, nine times in 2023 and once in the first two months of 2024. It discussed a wide range of issues relating to the production and delivery of equipment to the forces engaged in the war with the participation of the relevant government agencies and the leaders of departments of the government’s own central office.58 It appears to be a body that monitors production and deliveries and decides on prompt action if problems are identified. Another official monitoring the work of the defence industry and the implementation of the state defence order is Dmitrii Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council and first deputy chair of the VPK. He was appointed to the post by Putin in December 2022 with the job of leading a working group to monitor the production and delivery of armaments to the armed forces. There have been visits by Medvedev and sometimes the working group to quite a few defence enterprises, including UVZ and Omsktransmash, to examine tank building. He has also visited producers of munitions and missile and in March 2024, visited Tambovskii Porokhovoi Zavod (Tambov Gunpowder Plant), a major producer of explosives, where the working group discussed investment plans.59 Given that Medvedev is independent of the government and the MoD, it is possible that Putin felt the need for another set of eyes and ears to check on both and report directly to himself. Not surprisingly, the monitoring of arms production is also a concern of the MoD and its minister, Shoigu (replaced in mid-May 2024), who has quite often visited companies considered vital to the war and national security more generally. In early 2024, he visited the Ekaterinburg Uraltransmash works for the production of artillery systems, where he sharply criticised the chief designer for delays in bringing new models into production.60 He also visited the Dubna Raduga design bureau of the Tactical Missile Corporation (KTRV) responsible for a range of air-launched cruise missiles. There, he called for longer-range missiles and increased production.61 In March 2024, it was clear Russia was concerned about the production of munitions. As noted above, Shoigu visited the Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Sverdlova and shortly after, as reported by the MoD, the ‘defence enterprises in Altai krai’.62 As is often the case, the local media were more forthcoming. They reported that in the same month, he also visited Biisk Oleumnyi Zavod, which produces explosives and is affiliated to the Dzherzhinsk works, and a major producer of munitions, Biisk Sibpribormash, a large volume supplier of a range of shells, bombs, cartridges and missiles for MLRS. At the former, he made clear his dissatisfaction with its rate of building new production facilities to double its capacity, and at the latter, he was informed that the volume of output had increased 3.5 times from 2022, about 300 new machine tools had been installed and an additional 1,600 workers taken on.63 In 2023, his visits included the Arsen’ev Progress works to check on the production of Ka-52M combat helicopters.64 While there has been some stability in the staffing of leading posts in the defence industry, the same cannot be said of the MoD in relation to logistics and securing the delivery of equipment and munitions to the front. Since the war started in February 2022, there have been four different deputy ministers for logistics, or ‘material and technical supply’ as it is known in Russia. First there was Dmitrii Bulgakov, in post for 12 years until dismissed in September 2022. He was replaced by Mikhail Mizintsev, the chief of the National Management Centre for Defence, but he resigned in April 2023 and was replaced by Aleksei Kuz’mentsev, appointed from the troops of the National Guard but with a background in logistics. He was in post for less than a year and in March 2024 was replaced by Andrei Bulygin, whose MoD career from 2011 was in logistics.65 When Russia decided to boost the output of certain weapons and munitions, some companies rapidly introduced multi-shift work and under the mobilisation conditions imposed on the defence sector, workers had little choice but to adapt to more demanding working regimes, often working weekends or during public holidays. At the end of 2022, workers in large enterprises of the defence industry of the Sverdlovsk region were working a six-day work week, of up to 12 hours per day, compensated by increased pay.66 This policy option is advantageous in that it probably required modest changes in the production equipment installed. It also appears that in quite a few cases, output was also increased by bringing into use spare capacities and making more intensive use of production shops. In addition, some civilian enterprises were engaged in supplying components to defence companies: according to Manturov, 850 companies are now participating in this.67 A path not often discussed openly but possibly very important in some branches of the defence industry is the bringing into operation of reserve mobilisation capacities. As this author has discussed in detail in a 2016 publication,68 Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a very elaborate system of mobilisation preparation in the event of war with the creation and maintenance of large reserve capacities at many industrial enterprises, stockpiles of materials and components and state mobilisation reserves of weapons, munitions, production equipment, fuel and other goods considered vital in a war or other national emergency. The system underwent reform in the 1990s and 2000s, to some extent reducing its scale and focusing it on a more limited set of defence-related companies considered essential to the country’s military capability. It has remained shrouded in secrecy. The evidence suggests that the enterprises most likely to retain mobilisation capacities were those producing munitions, missiles, ground forces equipment and certain types of aircraft and air defence systems. During the war there have been occasional explicit references to bringing mobilisation capacities into operation. In December 2022, at a meeting of the Coordination Council, Premier Mikhail Mishustin noted that during the previous two months, the government had adopted a number of normative acts for the introduction of ‘special measures’ in the economy for securing a steady flow of deliveries relating to the special military operation. They had opened up the possibility for the lead executors of the state defence order to use the entire production and technological potential, ‘including the partial or full de-conservation of mobilisation capacities and objects’.69 Another path of increasing the volume of deliveries to the armed forces is probably the release of so-called ‘emergency reserves’ (neprikosnovennykh zapasov). These reserves, part of the general mobilisation system, include many goods considered vital in a war or emergency, including foodstuffs, medicines, fuel and materials, but also materiel and systems of armament for the armed forces. The nature and volume of these reserves, managed by the Federal Agency for State Reserves, has always been a matter of extremely strict secrecy and those relating to the armed forces are rarely discussed openly.70 An exception was in 2022 when an issue of the MoD journal Vooruzhenie i ekonomika published an article on the role of the reserves, making it clear that they include stocks of weapons and other military equipment created in peacetime in order to secure the mobilisation and strategic deployment of the armed forces, especially during the early period of a war.71 It is stressed that older weapons, though often less effective than new ones, can still have military value, so keeping them in reserve, plus having munitions for them, remains important. The authors suggested that the funding of emergency reserves of armament and other material means should be at least one third of the amount of funding devoted to procurement under the state defence order.72 Interestingly, a January 2024 Ukrainian intelligence assessment of Russian missile and artillery ammunition production noted that ‘they are now trying to maintain a certain strategic reserve. As a rule this is about 30%’.73 After initial serious setbacks when the expected rapid success of the invasion of Ukraine failed to materialise, and once the Ukrainian counter-offensive also did not bring decisive results, Russia proved to be resourceful in adapting to a different form of warfare, attritional rather than a war of manoeuvre. Indeed, as has been argued by Alex Vershinin, Russia has probably adapted to a protracted war of attrition more successfully than Ukraine and its NATO allies.74 The Soviet Union produced, in the main, relatively simple, low-cost but rugged equipment in large quantities and maintained substantial stocks in the event of war. The Soviet leadership, civil and military, was well aware that Western countries, especially the US, produced more costly, higher technology conventional weapons. This thinking lived on in post-communist Russia and stocks were retained though on a smaller scale. The production of new weapons for a long time was focused on upgrades of Soviet systems but from about 2010, attempts to develop some new, higher technology systems began to increase and the country’s political, military and industrial leaders clearly took pride in these very expensive new developments as symbols of Russia’s regained status as a great power. At the same time, as discussed above, the basic elements of the Soviet system of mobilisation to prepare for war were also kept intact though reduced in scale. In Vershinin’s words, ‘Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win’.75 In May 2024, a new Russia government was approved, with significant changes in personnel concerned with defence and arms production. Sergei Shoigu was appointed secretary of the Security Council and Putin’s deputy leader of the Military-Industrial Commission, replaced as defence minister by Andrei Belousov, previously first deputy prime minister and a career economist with no direct experience of the military. He was replaced as first deputy premier by Denis Manturov, previously industry minister overseeing the defence industry; this position is now occupied by Anton Alikhanov, previously governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast. Putin gains two assistants in the Presidential Administration responsible for oversight of the defence industry: Aleksey Dyumin, previously governor of the Tula region, where the major concentration of defence industry companies is; and Nikolai Patrushev, formerly Security Council secretary, who will monitor the shipbuilding industry.76 Dyumin has been appointed to both the Coordination Council and the VPK.77 These changes indicate a determination to maintain the war effort, spend the military budget in a cost-effective manner, and ensure that needed weapons and munitions are produced and delivered to the forces in an effective manner. This is a government for a protracted war of attrition. Conclusion Since the start of the war, Western perceptions of Russia’s capabilities have undergone gradual change. At first there was much talk of military incompetence, an economy likely to falter and perhaps eventually collapse as sanctions mounted, and armed forces rapidly losing equipment and facing a munitions famine. But as Ukraine’s counter-offensive failed to make much progress and Russia’s forces dug in for a long war, attitudes began to change, and this was accompanied by an awareness that Russia’s economy was performing with greater vigour than expected, notwithstanding sanctions, achieving 3.6% growth in 2023.78 By the second half of that year, it also became apparent that weapons and munitions were still being supplied to Russian troops at the front in increasing quantity, a reality confirmed by the analysis of this article. There should be no surprise that Russia has come through the war as it has. After all, as Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes wrote in June 2014 during the first round of Russian combat with Ukraine, Russia is resilient: ‘Much is made of the alleged weakness of today’s Russian economy. This notion that the Russian economy is somehow fragile is the backbone of the sanctions argument. But inefficiency – which definitely does characterize Russia’s economy – is not the same as fragility. The very features of the Russian economy that account for its inefficiency and lack of competitiveness in the global economy are also its strengths in term of robustness to shocks’. Rather than considering the country as ‘a cockroach of an economy’, they conclude, ‘perhaps a more appropriate metaphor is Russia’s own Kalashnikov automatic rifle – low-tech and cheap but almost indestructible’.79 But there is an additional dimension to the Kalashnikov economy that merits serious attention: it is an economy that can be quickly mobilised to increase military production if the country’s leadership decides that is what is required. This is precisely what happened when Putin and the military leadership realised that there would not be a rapid end to the fighting. The defence industry and its main suppliers in other branches of the economy were very quickly switched to a wartime regime, which in Russian conditions was relatively easy, as most of the companies are state-owned and can readily be ordered to increase production, adopt multi-shift regimes of work, and enlarge capacities with budget funding guaranteed. The administrative structures for managing military production were adapted to the new conditions and the implementation of orders was very closely monitored. If inputs were found to be in short supply, reserve stocks were drawn down and imports secured by one means or another. However, contrary to a view often expressed by observers, Russia does not have a ‘war economy’. In the words of Vladimir Inozemtsev, it has an economy ‘adapted to war’ – the state-controlled defence sector operates within the framework of a functioning market economy.80 The government and the military focused efforts on military hardware considered essential to the conduct of the war, with lower priority for equipment required by the forces but not seen as being in urgent demand. The only real exception appears to have been the ongoing modernisation of the country’s strategic nuclear capability. In principle, there would seem to be no reason why this mobilised defence effort cannot be maintained for quite a long period of time. Budget allocations to the military have sharply increased in 2024, a large part of this additional funding probably going to the defence industry and investment in additional capacities identified as essential. While provisional intentions for 2025 and beyond suggest reduced funding for the military, as argued elsewhere, this could easily change in the federal budget for 2025–27, the drafting of which has started in July 2024.81 It is not without irony that advanced Western economies may now find the need to look closely at Russia to understand how to adapt to an age when a style of warfare typified by attrition may become more common than previously expected.   Notes 1 See, for example, Julian Cooper, Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011-2015 (Kista: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016), , accessed 30 March 2024. 2 Maria Snegovaya et al., ‘Back in Stock? The State of Russia’s Defense Industry After Two Years of the War’, CSIS, April 2024, p. 6. 3 See Rosstat, ‘Indeksy proizvodstva po Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Godovye dannye s 2015 g’ [‘Indexes of Production for the Russian Federation. Annual Data from 2025’], renewed 31 January 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 4 Roman Skomorokhov, ‘Ubiitsy idut za Su-57 ili Kto na nas s pyatym?’ [‘Killers are Going After the Su-57 or who is Coming After us With the Fifth?’], Top War, 26 February 2024, , accessed 26 February 2024. 5 BMPD, ‘Modernizirovannyi boevoi vertolyot Ka-52M’ [‘Modernised Combat Helicopter Ka-52M’], 23 July 2023, , accessed 25 July 2023. 6 Nikolai Grishchenko, ‘Nachalos’ seriinoe proizvodstrvo udarnykh vertoletov Mi-28NM’ [‘Serial Production of Mi-28NM Attack Helicopters has Started’], rg.ru, 30 September 2020, , accessed 4 February 2024. 7 BMPD, ‘Modernizirovannyi boevoi vertolyot Ka-52M’ [‘Modernised Combat Helicopter Ka52M’]. 8 Dmitrii Levichev, ‘Skol’ko my vypuskaem boevykh samoletov i vertoletov’ [‘How Many Combat Aircraft and Helicopters do we Produce?’], proza.ru, 30 December 2023, , accessed 10 January 2024. 9 Arms Trade, ‘General armii Valerii Gerasimov provel brifing dlya inostrannykh voennykh attashe’ [‘Army General Valerii Gerasimov Gave a Briefing to Foreign Military Attachés’], 21 December 2023, , accessed 1 August 2024. 10 Nikolay Staykov, ‘Catching Spiders: Russia’s Drone Companies and Sanctions Evasion’, The Insider, 19 February 2024, , accessed 19 February 2024. It can easily be established that the Saito engines are of a type fitted to model aircraft and therefore not subject to sanctions. 11 BMPD, ‘Progress v proizvodstve korable’nykh gazoturbinnykh dvigatelei V Rossii’ [‘Progress in the Production of Ship Gas Turbine Engines in Russia’], 30 November 2020, , accessed 5 April 2024. 12 BMPD, ‘Sdacha malogo raketnogo korablya “Vyshnii volochek” zatyagivaetsya iz-za problem s Kitaiskim dvigatelyami’ [‘Hand Over of Small Missile Ships ‘Vyshnii Volochek’ is Being Delayed Because of Problems With the Chinese Engines’], 7 February 2018, , accessed 10 May 2024. 13 BMPD, ‘Eshche o probleme dizel’nykh dvigatelei dlya malykh raketnykh korablei proekta 22800’ [‘Once Again on the Problems of Diesel Engines for Small Missile Ships of Project 22800’], 22 October 2018, , accessed 10 May 2024. 14 Mil.Press Flotprom, ‘Aleksandr Karpov: Kolomenksii dizeli khorosho pokazali sebya na patrul’nom korable proekta 22160’ [‘Aleksandr Karpov: Kolomensk Diesels Have Shown Themselves Well on Project 22160 Patrol Boats’], 9 July 2019, , accessed 10 May 2024. 15 See Julian Cooper, ‘How Many Operational Tanks Does Russia Have and will the Number Soon Increase?’, unpublished paper, University of Birmingham, May 2023, , accessed 25 May 2024. 16 TASS, ‘Sukhoputnye Voiska VS RF V 2021 godu poluchat svyshe 240 noveishykh tankov’ [‘The Russian Armed Forces’ Ground Forces Will Receive Over 240 New Tanks in 2021’], 11 September 2021, , accessed 20 May 2024. 17 Ivan Potapov, ‘V Pol’she nazvali chislo tankov u Rossii’ [‘In Poland Number of Russian Tanks Given’], 27 September 2021, , accessed 18 May 2024. 18 SCRF, ‘Zamestitel’ predsedatel’ Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiikoi Federatsii D. A. Medvedev otvetil na voprosy Rossiiskikh zhurnalistov i pol’zovatelei sotsial’noi seti “Vkontakte”’ [‘Deputy Chair of the Rf Security Council D a Medvedev Answered Questions of Russian Journalists and Users of the Social Network Vkontakte’], 25 March 2023, , accessed 20 March 2024; Dary’a Fedotova, ‘Vyyasnilsya sostav tankovoi armady, o kotoroi rasskazal Dmitrii Medevedev’ [‘Has Been Explained the Composition of the Tank Armada Which Medvedev Spoke of’], MK.ru, 23 March 2023, , accessed 10 March 2024. 19 Komsomol’skaya Pravda, ‘Putin zayavil namereniyakh Rossii proizvesti bolee 1,6 tysachi tankov za god’ [‘Putin Declared the Intention of Russia to Produce More Than 1,600 Tanks a Year’], 25 March 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 20 Roman Skomorokhov, ‘Kto dast’ Rossiiskoi armii bronyu’ [‘Who Gives Russia’s Army Armour’] Top War, 1 April 2023, , accessed 1 April 2023. 21 Georgii Aleksandrov, ‘Dulo dryan’ [‘The Barrel is Rubbish’], Novaya Gazeta, 31 October 2022, , accessed 1 November 2022. 22 Top War, ‘“Omsktransmash” polnost’yu vypolnil goskontrakt po postavke OBT T-80BVM’ [‘Omsktransmash Has Fully Met Stat Contract for Delivery of T-80BVM Main Battle Tank’], 12 December 2019, , accessed 19 December 2019. 23 Interfax.ru, ‘“Omsktransmash” po kontrakt s Minoborony RF modernizruet bolee T-80BV’ [‘Omsktransmash is Upgrading over 50 T-80BV Tanks under a Contract with the Russian Defence Ministry’], 26 August 2020, , accessed 10 March 2024. 24 Evgenii Kuprienko, ‘V Omske vozobnovyat proizvodstva tanka T-80’ [‘T-80 Tank Production to Resume in Omsk’], Superomsk, 11 September 2023, , accessed 10 March 2024. 25 Defence analysts Yohann Michel and Michael Gjerstad conclude that at current attrition rates, Russia will be able to sustain its assault on Ukraine for another two to three years or maybe even longer. See Yohann Michel and Michael Gjerstad, ‘Equipment Losses in Russia’s War on Ukraine Mount’, IISS, 12 February 2024, , accessed 12 February 2024. 26 Gazeta.ru, ‘V Rossiiskuyu armiyu do kontsa 2021 goda postupyat 20 tankov T-14 “Armata”’ [‘By End of the Year Russian Army Will Get 20 T-14 Armata Tanks’], 10 August 2021, , accessed 12 March 2024. 27 See, for example Top War, ‘Istochnik podtverdil primenenie tanka T-14 “Armata” v zone SVO podrazdelenyami “Yuzhnoi” gruppirovki voisk’ [‘A Source has Confirmed the Use of a T-14 Armata Tank in the Zone of the Special Military Operation by Subdivisions of the “Southern” Grouping of Troops’], 19 July 2023, , accessed 19 July 2023. 28 Ivan Potapov, ‘Chemezov ob”yasnil otsutstvie T-14 “Armata” v zone SVO’ [‘Chemezov Explained the Absence of T-14 “Armata” in the SVO Zone’], Lenta.ru, 4 March 2024, , accessed 4 March 2024. 29 See, for example, ‘“Tanki dorozhe zhiznei?”. Glava “Rostekha” priznal, chto tank “Armata” iz-za dorogovizny okazalas’ “belymn slonom” i ne budet uchastvovat’ v voine. Eto vyzvalo nasmeshki i kritiku v Z-soobshchestve’ [‘Tanks More Valuable Than Lives. Head of Rostekh has Acknowledged That the Armata Tank Because of its Cost has Turned out to be a ‘White Elephant’ and Will not Participate in the War’], Republic, 5 March 2024. 30 Anton Valagin, ‘Kurganmashzavod ustanovil rekord po postavkam BMP-2M i BMP-3’ [‘Kurganmashzavod Sets Record for Deliveries of BMP-2M and BMP-3’], RG.ru, 11 July 2023, , accessed 12 March 2024; Ria.ru, ‘“Kurganmashzavod” narastit vypusk boevykh mashin pekhoty eschche na 30 Protsentov’ [‘Kurganmashzavod to Increase Production of Infantry Fighting Vehicles by Another 30%’], 11 July 2023, , accessed 15 March 2024. 31 Kirill Ryabov, ‘Rezul’taty proizvodstva BTR-82A(M)’ [‘Results of the Production of BTR-82A(M)’], Top War, 2 March 2021, , accessed 10 March 2024. 32 Alexander Karpov and Alena Medvedeva, ‘“Effektivnaya ognevaya podderzhka”: Kak modernizirovannye bronetransportyory BTR-82A usilyat sukhoputnye voiska Rossii’ [‘“Efficient Fire Support”: How Modernised BTR-82A Armoured Personnel Carriers Will Strengthen the Russian Ground Forces’], RT in Russian, 28 February 2021, , accessed 11 March 2024. 33 Ria.ru, ‘Voennyi predstavitel’ anonsiroval gosispytaniya bronemashiny “Bumerang”’ [‘Military Representative Announced the State Testing of the Armoured Vehicle Bumerang’], 25 November 2021, , accessed 27 February 2024. The Reporter, ‘V zonu SVO napravlyaetsya noveishie bronetransportery “Bumerang”’ [‘The Newest Boomerang Armoured Personnel Carriers are Heading to the SVO Zone’], 1 March 2023, , accessed 27 February 2024. 34 MoD RF, p. 122, ; Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, ‘V Rossiiskie voiska za god postavleno svyshe 1,7 milliona edinits tekhniki’ [‘Over 1.7 Million Units of Equipment Were Delivered to the Russian Troops in One Year’], 27 December 2023, , accessed 25 February 2024. 35 Gleb Aleksushin, ‘Rossiiskie zavody stroyashchie artilleriyu - chem my raspolagaem’ [‘Russian Factories Building Artillery - What so We Possess’], Mify i tainy istorii [Myths and Mysteries of History], 3 December 2022, , accessed 25 February 2024. 36 Rostekh, ‘Rostekh zavershili kontsentratsii artilleriyskikh zavodov po sistema-pushki-vystrel’ [‘Rostec has Completed the Concentration of Artillery Factories According to the Gun-shot System’], 28 June 2023, , accessed 1 August 2024; UVZ, ‘V Rossii zavershili ispytaniya samokhodnogo artilleriiskogo orudiya “Mal’va”’ [‘In Russia the Testing of the Self-propelled Artillery Gun Malva has Been Completed’], 18 May 2023, , accessed 1 August 2024. 37 Sergei Val’chenko, ‘Ekspert nazval glavnye problemy Rossiiskii boepripasnoi otrasli’ [‘Expert has Named the Main Problems of Russia’s Munitions Branch’], 29 May 2022, , accessed 1 August 2024. 38 Rostekh, ‘Key Companies’, , accessed 21 October 2021. Note: site is no longer accessible. 39 Artem Feoktistov, ‘Manturov: Porokhovaya i boepripasnaya otrasli nuzhdayutsya v kratnom roste ob”emov proizvodstva’ [‘Manturov: Gunpowder and Ammunition Industries Need Multiple Growth in Production Volumes’], Gazeta.ru, 3 January 2023, , accessed 4 January 2023. 40 See Rob Lee, ‘Viktor Murakhovsky, Rybar and Ilya Kramnik posted about Russia’s artillery ammo issues. They suggest Russia produces/refurbishes 300k rounds per year (and had 2.6 million tons in storage in 2013) but was often firing 100k over the span of a couple of days.’, X post, 5 January 2023, , accessed 10 January 2023. 41 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 30.12.2022 No.987’ [‘Edict of the Russian President of 30 December 2022 No.987’], 30 December 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023; Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Rasporyazhenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 31.12.2022 No. 4390-r’ [‘Order of Russian Government of 31 December 2022’, 31 December 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023. 42 Ria.ru, ‘Rossiya v 20 raz narastila vypusk boepripasov dlya reaktivnoi artillerii’ [‘Russia has Increased Production of Rocket Artillery Ammunition by 20 Times’], 17 May 2023, , accessed 10 February 2024. 43 Yulian Rozhkova, ‘Iz-za uvelicheniya gosoboronzakaza Permskii porokhovoi zavod planiruet nanyat’ 350 sotrudnikov’ [‘Due to the Increase in State Defence Orders, the Perm Gunpowder Plant Plans to Hire 350 Employees’], 59.ru, 3 September 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023; Olga Yakuncheva and Marina Kuznetsova, ‘Oboronnye predpriyatiya Prikam’ya chastixhno perershli na kruglosutochnuyu rabotu’ [‘Defense Enterprises of the Kama Region Have Partially Switched to Round-The-Clock Work’], 59.ru, 19 September 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023. 44 Rostekh, ‘Rostekh otrkyl na Verkhneturinskom zavode novyi tsekh po proizvodstvodstvu korpusov snaryadov’ [‘Rostec Opened a New Workshop for the Production of Shell Bodies at the Verkhneturinskii Plant’], 1 July 2021, , accessed 5 March 2024. 45 Rostekh, ‘Rostekh zapustit novyi avtomatizirovannyi tsekh po proizvodstvu boepripasov’ [‘Rostec to Launch New Automated Ammunition Production Facility’], 22 September 2021, , accessed 5 March 2024. 46 Interfax.ru, ‘Novyi tsekh po proizvodstvu snaryadov dlya RSZO otkrylsya na Tul’skom “Splav” - vlasti regiona’ [‘New Workshop for Production of MLRS Shells Opened at Tula’s Splav - Regional Authorities’], 24 July 2020, , accessed 5 March 2024. 47 Aleksandr Tikhonov, ‘Ministr Oborony RF… proveril khod vypolneniya gosoboronzakaza predpriyatiyam OPK v Tul’skoi Oblasti’ [‘Minister of Defence of RF Expert has Checked the Fulfilment of State Defence Order at Enterprises in Tula Oblast’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 2 March 2024, pp. 1–2. 48 Krivoruchko, ‘S uchyotam vozrosshikh potrebnosti armii’ [‘With Account of Growing Needs of the Army’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 29 January 2024, pp. 1–3. 49 MoD, ‘Ministr Oborony RF proveril vypolnenie gosoboronzakaza predpriyatiem OPK v Omskoi oblasti’ [‘Minister of Defence RF has Checked the Fulfilment of State Defence Order at Enterprises in Omsk Oblast’], 19 April 2024, , accessed 19 April 2024. 50 Aleksandr Tikhonov, ‘Reshitel’no deistvuem na vsekh napravleniyakh’ [‘Decisive Action in All Directions’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 28 February 2024, pp. 1-2. 51 Kirill Ryabov, ‘Tyazhelaya ognemetnaya sistema TOZ-3 “Drakon” nakanune ispytanii’ [‘Heavy Thermobaric System TOZ-3 “Drakon” on the Eve of Testing’], Top War, 11 April 2024, , accessed 11 April 2024. 52 Varvara Kosechkina, ‘Rossiiskii zavod nachal v tri smeny vypuskat’ trekhtonnye superbomby.na chto oni sposobny?’ [‘Russian Plant Starts Producing Three-Ton Super Bombs in Three Shifts. What are They Capable of?’], 21 March 2024, , accessed 21 March 2024. 53 Sergei Ptichkin, ‘Boepripasy dlya oruzhiya “sudnogo dnya” poshli v seriyu’ [‘Ammunition for Doomsday Weapon Enters Production’], RG.ru, 28 March 2024, , accessed 30 March 2024. Note: the article does not identify the factory but from the photograph of Shoigu inspecting the munitions, it is clear that it was taken when he visited Dzerzhinsk works in March 2024. 54 Dzerzhinsk Vremya [Dzerzhinsk Time], ‘Sergei Shoigu proveril vypolnenie gosoboronzakaza v Dzerzhinske’ [‘Sergei Shoigu Checked the Fulfilment of the State Defence Order in Dzerzhinsk’], 22 March 2023, , accessed 12 March 2024. Note: Zavod imeni Sverdlova (then Zavod No. 80) was a leading munitions producer during the 1941–45 war, producing half of all explosives, 147 million artillery shells and 5.6 million aviation bombs. See Alexandra Vikulova et al., ‘Dzerzhinksii zavod No. 80 imeni Ya. M. Sverdlova’ [‘Dzerzhinskii Zavod No. 80 Named After Ya M Sverdlov’], , accessed 22 March 2024. 55 ‘Importozameshchenie v deistvii’ [‘Import Substitution in Action’], RITM Mashinostroeniya [Rhythm of Machine Building] (No. 7, 2023), p. 34, , accessed 1 August 2024. The evidence suggests that most of the imports from sanctioning countries were in the first half of 2022, probably ordered before sanctions were imposed. The development of the machine tool industry is discussed in detail in Julian Cooper, ‘The Machine Tool Industry of Russia at a Time of War and Sanctions’, Post-Communist Economies (Vol. 36, No. 5, 2024). 56 President of Russia, ‘Vstrecha s rukovoditelyami predpriyatii OPK’ [‘Meeting With CEOs of Defence Industry Companies’], 20 September 2022, , accessed 20 February 2024; President of Russia, ‘Soveshchanie s rukovoditelyami organizatsii OPK’ [‘Meeting With CEOs of Defence Industry Organisations’], 23 December 2022, , accessed 20 February 2024; President of Russia, ‘Vstrecha s rukovoditelyami predpriyatii OPK’ [‘Meeting With CEOs of Defence Industry Companies’], 25 May 2024, , accessed 25 May 2024. 57 President of Russia, ‘Perechen’ poruchenii po voprosam obespecheniya potrebnostei, voznikayushchikh v khode provedeniya spetsial’noi voennnoi operatsii’ [‘Instructions on Meeting the Needs of the Special Military Operations’], 19 October 2022, , accessed 15 March 2024. 58 For the reports of meetings, see Russian Government, ‘Coordinating Council under the Government of the Russian Federation for Ensuring the Needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Troops, Military Formations and Bodies – Documents and Events’, , accessed 18 March 2024. 59 For meetings from October 2022 to March 2024, see Security Council of the Russian Federation, ‘News and Information’, , accessed 18 March 2024. 60 Iz.ru, ‘Shoigu raskritikoval rukovodsto “Uraltranmash” za sroki vypuska tekhniki’ [‘Shoigu Criticised the Management of Uraltransmash for the Timing of its Equipment Output’], 31 January 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 61 KTRV, ‘Sergei Shoigu s rabochim vizitom posetil golovnoe predpriyatie KTRV’ [‘Sergei Shoigu Made a Working Visit to the Head Enterprise of KTRV’], 12 January 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 62 Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘Ministerstvo Oborony RF Sergei Shoigu proveril vypolnenie gosoboronzakaza na predpriyatyakh oboronno-promyshlennogo kompleksa v Altaiskom krae’ [‘Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu Checked the Fulfilment of the State Defence Order at Enterprises of the Defence Industry in Altai Krai’], 30 March 2024, , accessed 30 March 2024. 63 Ibid.; ‘Posle vizit Shoigu v biisk stala ponyatna prichina smeny rukovodstva na oleumnom zavode’ [‘After Visit of Shoigu to Biisk it Became Clear Why the Leadership of the Oleum Factory was Changed’], 30 March 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. Sibpribormash has an interesting past; it was based on two munitions enterprises built very rapidly in 1970 as a response to the border conflict with China. See Arsenal Otechestva, ‘“Sibpribormash” - polveka v stroyu’ [‘Sibpribormash – Half a Century in Service’], 5 May 2021, , accessed 25 February 2024. 64 For visits reported on the MoD website, see . 65 See, for an overview of these developments, Anastasia Korochkina, ‘Putin Tretii Raz S Nachala “Spetsoperatsii” Smenil Zamministra Oborony Po Matobespecheniyu’ [‘Putin has Replaced the Deputy Defense Minister for Material Support for the Third Time Since the Start of the “Special Operation”’], Forbes Russia, 11 March 2024, , accessed 12 March 2024. 66 TASS, ‘Vypolnyayushchie gosoboronzakaz zavody Urala pereveli na shestidnevku rabochuyu nedelyu’ [‘Those Fulfilling State Defence Orders at Factories of the Urals Have Switched to a Six-day Working Week’], , accessed 20 January 2024. 67 Military News, ‘K proizvodstvu voennoi tekhniki v RF seichas privlecheny 850 grazhdanskikh predpriyatii - Manturov’ [‘850 Civilian Enterprises are Currently Involved in the Production of Military Equipment in the Russian Federation - Manturov’], 13 May 2024, , accessed 13 May 2024. 68 See Julian Cooper, ‘If War Comes Tomorrow: How Russia Prepares for Possible Armed Aggression’, Whitehall Report, 4-16 (August 2016). 69 Russian Government, ‘Zasedanie Koordinatsionnogo soveta po obespecheniyu potrebnostei Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, drugikh voisk, voinskikh formirovanii i organov’ [‘Session of the Coordination Council for Securing the Needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Troops and Military Formations’], 27 December 2022, , accessed 29 December 2022. 70 See Cooper, ‘If War Comes Tomorrow’, pp. 27–32. 71 A A Zaitsev, V I Molokanov, M V Fateev, ‘Rol’ I mesto neprikosnovennykh zapasov material’nykh sredstv v sisteme Vooruzheniya Vooruzhennylh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [‘The Role and Place of Emergency Reserves of Material Means in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation], Vooruzhenie i ekonomika [Armament and Economics] (Vol. 61, No. 3, 2022), pp. 133–34. 72 Ibid., pp. 139–40. 73 Uliana Bezpalko and Daria Dmytriieva, ‘Russians Motivated to Fight for Money, 1,000-1,100 People Join Army Every Day - Defense Intelligence Representative’, 15 January 2024, , accessed 20 January 2024. 74 Alex Vershinin, ‘The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine’, RUSI Commentary, 18 March 2024. 75 Ibid. 76 President of Russia, ‘Prezident odpisal ukazy o naznachenii chlenov pravitel’stva Rossiiskogo Federatsii i direktorov sluzhb’ [‘The President Signed Decrees on the Appointment of Members of the Government of the Russian Federation and Directors of Services’], 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2024; Anastasiya Maier and Aleksei Nikol’skii, ‘S takim vyzovami stolknetsya novyi ministrov oborony Belousov’ [‘What Challenges Will Face New Minister of Defence Belousov’], Vedomosti, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2024; Viktoria Polyakova and Yulia Ovchinnikova, ‘Patrushev v administratsii prezidenta naznachili kuratorom korablestroeniya’ [‘Patrushev Appointed as Shipbuilding Supervisor in Presidential Administration’], RBC, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2014; Victoria Polyakova and Julia Ovchinnikova, ‘Kreml’ ob”yasnil novye naznacheniya Oreshkina i Dyumina’ [‘The Kremlin Explained the New Appointments of Oreshkin and Dyumin’], RBC, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2024. 77 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 11 yun’ 2024 no.480’ [‘Edict of the President of the Russian Federation of 11 June 2024 No. 480’], 11 June 2024, , accessed 11 June 2024; President of the Russian Federation, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 11 yun’ 2024 no.477’ [‘Edict of the President of the Russian Federation of 11 June 2024 No.477’], 11 June 2024, , accessed 11 June 2024. 78 Rosstat, , accessed 20 April 2023. 79 Clifford G Gaddy and Barry W Ickes, ‘Can Sanctions Stop Putin?’, Brookings, 3 June 2014, , accessed 10 February 2024. In relation to the current war, Richard Connolly has also argued that Russia has a ‘Kalashnikov economy’, ‘quite unsophisticated but durable, built for large-scale use and for use in conflicts’. See Andrew Roth, ‘“A Lot Higher Than We Expected”: Russian Arms Production Worries Europe’s War Planners’, The Guardian, 15 February 2024. 80 Vladislav Inozemtsev, ‘Kak rossiiskaya ekonomika prisposobilas’ k voine’ [‘How the Russian Economy Adapted to War’], Important Stories, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2014. In the present author’s view, the US Treasury’s claim in July 2024 that Russia is completing ‘transition to a full wartime economy’ is an overstatement. See US Department of the Treasury, ‘As Russia Completes Transition to a Full War Economy, Treasury Takes Sweeping Aim at Foundational Financial Infrastructure and Access to Third Country Support’, press release, 12 July 2024, , accessed 15 July 2024. 81 See Julian Cooper, ‘Another Budget for a Country at War: Military Expenditure in Russia’s Federal Budget for 2024 and Beyond’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (No. 2023/11, December 2023), p. 22, , accessed 20 June 2024. Appendix Table 1: Ministry of Defence Annual Reports of Intentions and Implementation, 2019–24 (units)   P: planned procurement A: actual procurement 1. Planned and actual procurement data for 2019 includes new aircraft only; from 2020, explicit from 2021, implementation includes both new and modernised aircraft. 2. Data from 2019–21 includes tanks and armoured vehicles, but for 2022, planned procurement adds ‘artillery arms’. It is not known whether this also applies for 2023. 3. For 2020, the source gives three divisions of Yars plus one Avangard, but the number of missiles in a division can vary. The MilitaryRussia.ru blog gives 11 divisions (9 Yars and 2 Avangard). For 2021, the source gives two divisions of Yars plus one Avangard, while MilitaryRussia.ru gives 11 divisions (9 Yars and 2 Avangard). See MilitaryRussia.ru, ‘RS-24 Yars / Topol-MR - SS-X-29 / SS-29 / SS-27 mod.2 SICKLE-B’, last updated 10 June 2024, , accessed 20 June 2024. No up-to-date entry on Avangard is available. Sources: Russian MoD, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Vooruzhennykh Sil RF v 2018 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2018’], and equivalent reports for each year 2019 to 2023, official reports based on the presentations of the MoD and other senior officials to the December enlarged board meetings of the MoD of each year, 5 June 2024. Table 2: Production of Combat Aircraft and Trainers, 2019–23 (units)    Sources: For data from 2019 to 2022, see BMPD, ‘Postavki boevykh samoletov v Vooruzhennykh Sily Rossii v 2022 godu’ [‘Delivery of Combat Aircraft to Armed Forces of Russia in 2022’], 11 January 2023, , accessed 3 March 2024. For 2023 data, Su-57: TASS, ‘Istochnik: peredavaemye VKS v 2024 godu seriinye Su-57 poluchat dvigatelei vtorogo etapa’ [‘According to a Source: Serial Su-57 Delivered to the Air Force in 2024 Will Have Engines of the Second Stage’], 28 December 2023, , accessed 3 March 2024; Su-35S: BMPD, ‘Novaya partiya istrebitelei Su-35S postavlena VKS Rossii’ [‘A New Batch of Su-35s Fighters has Been Delivered to the Russian Air Force’], 9 May 2024, , accessed 3 March 2024; Su-34M: on the assumption that eight aircraft are needed to complete a contract, see BMPD, ‘VKS Rossii poluchili tret’yu v 2023 godu partiyu frontovykh bombarsirovshchikov Su-34M’ [‘Russian Air Force has Received the Third Batch in 2023 of Su-34m Frontal Bombers’], 22 November 2023, , accessed 4 March 2024; Su-30MS2 and Yak-130: the author believes four Su-30MS2 were delivered but as there was another delivery in December, the estimated total is six. In 2023, there were two deliveries of Yak-130, with each batch usually consisting of two trainers. See BMPD, ‘VKS Rossii postavleny novye istrebiteli Su-30SM2 i uhceboboevye samolyoty Yak-130’ [‘Russian Air Force Supplied with New Su-30sm2 Fighters and Yak-130 Trainer-Combat Aircraft’], 2 December 2023, , accessed 4 March 2024. Table 3: Production of Equipment for the Ground Forces, 2019–24 (units)     * New, modernised and repaired. ** Author’s estimate. 1. Artillery systems, self-propelled howitzers, MLRS, means of artillery reconnaissance and counter-battery struggle. These appear to include new, modernised and repaired arms. 2. All types, including means of remote mining and robot demining systems. 3. Small arms, grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and air defence systems. 4. Also know in Russian as sredstva porazheniya (means of destruction). 5. Includes Tsirkon, Kalibr and Uran cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. 6. Grad and Uragan MLRS. Sources: Tanks and armoured vehicles: For 2019 data, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2019 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2019’], ; for 2020 data, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2020 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2020’], . Tanks: for 2021 data, Vasilii Kuchushev, ‘Arsenal-2021. Chem v etom godu popolnilas’ Rossiiskaya armiya’ [‘Arsenal 2021. What the Russian Army has Received This Year’], 22 December 2021, , accessed 2 March 2024; in 2023, Shoigu stated 1,530 tanks were produced, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2023 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2023’], ; for the period from February 2022–end 2023, Shoigu said that production increased 5.6 times, with a 3.6 times increase for BMP, and a 3.5 times increase for BTR, . Armoured vehicles: for 2021, there were a total of 900 tanks and armoured vehicles, this value was calculated after subtracting 240 tanks, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2021 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2021’], ; for 2023, Shoigu stated that there were 2,518 BMP and BTR, . Vehicles (mainly military trucks): for 2021, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2021 godu’ [Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2021’], ; for 2023, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2023 godu’ [Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2023’], . Missile and artillery: for 2023, Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, ‘V Rossiiskie voiska za god postavleno svyshe 1,7 milliona edinits tekhniki’ [‘Over 1.7 Million Units of Equipment Were Delivered to the Russian Troops in One Year’], 27 December 2023, , accessed 2 January 2024. Engineering equipment: Aleksei Krivoruchko, ‘S uchyotam vozrosshikh potrebnosti armii’ [‘With Account of the Growing Needs of the Army’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 29 January 2024, pp. 1–3. Portable weapons: Ibid., pp. 1–3. Electronic warfare systems: Ibid., pp. 1–3. Kh-101 cruise missiles: Jack W Watling and Gary Somerville, ‘A Methodology for Degrading the Arms of the Russian Federation’, RUSI Occasional Papers, June 2024, p. 8 (Reports on Russian missile production seen by the authors in February 2024). All munitions, missiles and aviation munitions, missiles: Ibid., pp. 1–3. Munitions: for data on artillery shells for 2023 and 2024, and MLRS rockets, Watling and Somerville, ‘A Methodology for Degrading the Arms of the Russian Federation’, p. 7 (Russian MoD reports on munitions production seen by the authors in February 2024). New and restored large-calibre munitions: Dmitrii Levichev, ‘Skol’ko snaryadov my proizvodim dlya nashei armii’ [‘How Many Shells do we Produce for Our Army?’], Pozaru.ru, 18 March 2023, , accessed 5 March 2024. For the period of February 2022–end 2023, there was a 17.5 times increase in production of artillery munitions, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2023 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2023’], . Table 4: Output of Selected Civilian Goods in Unit Terms, 2019–23 (units)     Sources: For data from 2019–22 except civilian ships, see Rosstat, ‘Proizvodstvo osnovnykh vidov produktsii v natural’nom vyrazhenii (godovoi dannye) so 2017 god - v sootvestvii OKPD2’ [‘Production of Main Types of Products in Physical Terms (Annual Data Since 2017 – in Accordance With OKPD2)]’, 11 October 2023, , accessed 1 March 2024; for data on rail freight wagons, 2020, see ‘Proizvodstva gruzovykh vagonov’ [‘Production of Rail Freight Wagons 2020–23’], , accessed 10 February 2024.ournal

Defense & Security
Russia flag with the Palestine flag 3D rendering with blue sky background

Political Insights (9): Russia’s Strategy Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Israeli War on Gaza Strip

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Major powers shape their foreign policy with a global view, positioning each region based on their opponents’ strategies there. Russia has recognized the need to develop its strategy in the Middle East to counter Western efforts to further disintegrate the Russian Federation after the Soviet Union’s collapse, particularly by fueling separatist inclinations within it. This is crucial for Russia, which includes 22 republics and 89 federal entities, with minorities making up 19% of its population. Russia recognized this trend through the following indicators: 1. The US call at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council Conference in Prague in 2003 to expand NATO’s work east and south, i.e., in an area extending from the Maghreb to Central Asia. 2. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, a practical implementation of NATO’s expansion. 3. In 2021, the Israeli army was shifted from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the Central Command (CENTCOM), whose work covers the area of NATO’s expansion. Russian Strategy in the Middle East The “core” of Russia’s strategy in the Middle East is security and defense, evidenced by its foreign interventions in regions where NATO competes, including Georgia, Crimea, Syria, Libya, Belarus, Ukraine and the Sahel, as affirmed in Shanghai Cooperation Organization discussions. This focus is underscored by 40–50% of Russia’s military sales being directed to the region, alongside efforts to establish military bases in Syria, Libya and Sudan. Additionally, the development of the Russian-Chinese-Iranian strategic triangle, consolidated in 2019 with joint naval maneuvers, has deepened following the war in Ukraine. The Russian Strategic Framework Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The above outlines Russia’s strategic approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on Gaza Strip (GS) as follows: 1. Russia perceives Iran from two perspectives: as its strongest ally in the region and as the central figure in the axis of resistance. Operation al-Aqsa Flood has tested the Russian-Iranian relationship regarding its consistency. The Russian reaction to Israeli attacks on Syria remains insufficient. However, this does underline how Israeli policies are widening the rift in Russian-Israeli relations and gradually nudging Russia towards aligning with the resistance axis, especially given Israel’s support for the Western side in the Ukraine conflict. 2. Russia has feared that the GS war would impact its social stability for the following reasons: a. Riots erupted in Muslim-majority Dagestan following the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Israel shortly after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. b. Many of the Jews who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union hail from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is concerned that differences among these countries could destabilize its internal situation. 3. Russia exploited Western social unrest on the streets, in universities and within institutions to highlight double standards in comparing Western attitudes toward Israel and Russia. Operation al-Aqsa Flood diverted attention from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 4. Operation al-Aqsa Flood redirected some US and Western aid from Ukraine to Israel, easing pressure on Russia. 5. The Israeli stance aligning with Ukraine prompted Russia to seek closer ties with Hamas. Russia utilized this approach to bolster its standing in Muslim countries and the developing world, bridging gaps with Islamic factions concerning its 2015 intervention in Syria. This was underscored by Russia hosting a Hamas delegation on 26/10/2023, resulting in the release of 3 out of 6 Russian captives, and another delegation on 24/6/2024. 6. The Ukrainian conflict compelled Israel to take a firm stance, publicly condemning Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, which subsequently strained Russia’s willingness to mend relations with Israel post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood. 7. If the Ukraine war has unified Western positions against Russia, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has created disparities that Russia is attempting to exploit, particularly following the stance of several European countries, spearheaded by Spain, on recognizing Palestine. 8. Russian public sentiment towards Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath is mirrored in the findings of a poll conducted by the Levada Center on 25/10/2023: • 88% of Russians are aware of the new escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in comparison with a poll regarding events in Ukraine, in which 86% stated they are closely following events. • 66% are not ready to support either side in the conflict. • 21% rather sympathize with the Palestinians, and 6% sympathize with Israel. • Older Russians are nearly four times more likely than younger people to express sympathy towards Palestine, a contrast to the prevailing sentiment in the West. • Only 46% of Russian Muslims sympathize with Palestine, mirroring the sentiment in Central Asian countries. • Respondents noted that the main responsibility for what is happening lies with the US and NATO countries (45%), while 12% place responsibility on Israel, and 8% of respondents place the blame on Hamas/Palestinian side. Russian diplomacy aligns closely with the Axis of Resistance in UN voting on international resolutions. However, regarding the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued rulings against Putin similar to those against the Israeli prime minister and defense minister, Russia does not adhere to the ICC’s rulings, as it is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the court. Concerning the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the genocide case involving Israel, Russia supports the court’s recognition of the principle of Palestinian genocide, emphasizing the urgency of halting violence. Russia’s General Attitudes Toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood Russia’s general stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on GS can be outlined as follows: 1. Endorsing a two-state resolution with a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem as its capital, with full UN membership for this Palestinian state; treating the West Bank (WB) and GS as a unified territory; calling for cessation of Israeli settlements and displacement of Palestinians; and upholding Hashemite guardianship over holy sites. 2. Choosing not to mediate between the resistance groups and Israel, deferring this role to the US, Qatar and Egypt. Nonetheless, Russian statements have reiterated the call for a lasting ceasefire in GS and the urgent release of captives without conditions. This stance was underscored in the April 2024 (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) BRICS statement. Russia has also implicitly criticized Ansar Allah’ activities in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, citing their impact on international maritime navigation freedom. Additionally, Russia has been unable to halt Israel’s ongoing airstrikes on Syrian targets. 3. Inviting delegations from the resistance to consult or assist Palestinians in resolving their internal political issues, seen by Israel as Russian recognition of the legitimacy of all resistance forces. 4. Enhancing Russia’s perception in the Arab public opinion, particularly within segments critical of Russia’s involvement in Syria since 2015. 5. Highlighting the double standards in the Western value system, particularly in how GS and Ukraine are positioned and compared. 6. Russia’s relatively advanced political stance contrasts sharply with its limited financial assistance to Palestine. 7. Between 2018 and 2023, Russia saw a 58.3% increase in exports to Israel and a 27.4% increase in imports. However, the Ukraine crisis and subsequent events have slowed down this growth.

Defense & Security
Russia versus the European Union, country confrontation concept, European Union flag versus Russian flag, conflict of interest concept

The new order will be with safeguards

by Timofey Bordachev

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском It is generally accepted that an international order is not the result of specific agreements, but the product of a common understanding of what can and cannot be done in relations between states. It is also generally accepted that all significant powers need to have relatively common ideas about why they recognize each other's right to exist and do not interfere in their internal affairs. In particular, the late Henry Kissinger wrote a lot about this, whose ideas were considered the standard of geostrategic thinking not only in the West, but also in our country. However, the coming times, apparently, will require a more creative approach to established views on how states can guarantee each other respect for basic interests and values. After all, it is the attack on them that always becomes the cause of conflict, as we are convinced by the example of the current military-political confrontation in Europe. In his speech at the UN Security Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that any agreement with the West on European security will have to contain "safeguards against unscrupulous interpretations." It is currently quite difficult to imagine what such safety catch might look like in physical terms, although the diplomats probably already have ideas on this topic. It can be guessed what the nature of such mechanisms should be. It is clear that the mechanisms should be aimed against the negative manifestations of the West's behavior. First, it is the West's desire to constantly create threats to others, as a central part of the global diplomatic game. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the physical ability to create such threats. The safety catches in this case are technical ways to ensure a situation where a state (or bloc) cannot change its behavior to hostile or take advantage of the omission in its selfish interests. Precisely cannot. Because "does not want" no longer works after, for example, Finland joined NATO. And the alliance itself simply trampled all the formal and informal principles on which they tried to build a security system in Europe after the Cold War. We see that not a single concluded then agreement works. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the main treaties on which the "rigid" framework of European security was based. NATO expansion to the east, in fact - the expansion of the territorial base of the American military presence in Europe - made all agreements in the field of conventional weapons meaningless. So, to come up with a new legal basis for peace in Europe is not a trivial task at all. And it remains to rely on the recognized skill of Russian diplomacy. A universal order that would suit everyone is unlikely now. It has always been relative before. However, in the century before last, there was at least a general idea among the leading powers about the principles on which the internal order in each of them should be based. Now it is difficult to think that Western countries will agree to recognize the right of Russia, China or other states to determine their own lives. First, any security order will inevitably be technical in nature, and not based on a common understanding of challenges and threats. This means that it will have little room for principles and a lot for specific parameters of how the West will not be able to threaten Russia's core interests. Russia's proposals at the end of 2021 already contained a fairly large number of such features of a functioning European security system. Apparently, they will have to return to them after the United States is ready to sit down at the table of serious negotiations. Much here will depend on how soon the understanding of the impossibility of continuing to pursue an irresponsible policy prevails in America itself. At least now, anxiety for the future of their country is heard in the statements of some American politicians. We will see to what extent their understanding that the reasons for the US difficulties relate to the internal situation can be translated into concrete decisions. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine that there will be a place for such a concept as trust in future agreements. Unfortunately, it is not available to all political systems without exception. We ourselves see how the Americans openly declare that any new administration can easily revise the agreements reached by the previous one. Continuity of policy is disappearing in the West – and this has always been the basis of stable diplomatic relations. Moreover, the modern world is extremely diverse. Trust is possible – as in the relations between Russia and China – in situations where both sides share a common understanding of the main threats. Russia and the West cannot have such a common understanding now. Simply because the entire surrounding world poses a threat to the United States and its satellites. And until Westerners can adapt to the new international reality, it will be quite difficult to take their words seriously. Therefore, trust in matters of European security should be based on the physical impossibility for the West to violate any agreements. And no one in Russia doubts that the desire to do so will periodically arise there. Thirdly, the legal basis for European security will most likely become broader. The situation in Europe has long ceased to be the business of the Europeans themselves. Especially since the positions of two powers with the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world – Russia and the United States – directly touch here. Their indirect proximity is a concern for the entire world and has little to do with the affairs of Europe. It is no coincidence that the most adequate proposals for ending the armed confrontation in Ukraine are currently coming from China, India, Brazil, or even African countries. The Europeans, in turn, are not prepared to offer anything at all that would reflect objective reality. They are simply going with the flow. In other words, security in Europe is simultaneously a local and global problem. The broader international community itself must guarantee how the West will comply with its probable obligations. And finally, the technical aspects themselves could include things that have not been widely used in international practice before. For example, the complete or almost complete demilitarization of individual territories and entire states. Unfortunately, the practice of the last 30 years has shown that not all states can bear such a heavy burden as the right to independently determine the parameters of their defense policy. The Baltic republics of the former USSR, Finland or the same unfortunate Ukraine could live quite happily if their political elites were not tempted to use the conflict with Russia to retain power despite any economic difficulties. Then they would probably have to work better on internal development, fit into the world economy, and not turn into centers of instability. In other words, the countries that cannot play an independent role in determining regional security should be relieved of the physical ability to create problems for it. Perhaps such an experience will become more widespread in the future. At least because the risk of turning sovereign states into springboards for confrontation between great powers is too great. The main technical and legal parameters of the European security system have yet to be invented by diplomats and agreed upon by politicians. However, it is already clear from bitter experience that it is no longer possible to leave the situation here in a state of uncertainty – it is too threatening to universal peace and survival.

Defense & Security
A child in a destroyed house. Ukrainian children during the war.

The Children of War

by Lila Roldán Vázquez

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shaken the world order and has seriously disrupted international peace and security. The geopolitical impact, the causes of the war and the reasons invoked to justify the armed aggression have been widely discussed. Among the many facets of the war, there is one issue that requires special attention, since it constitutes, without a doubt, one of its most serious consequences: the death of hundreds of children and the abduction of thousands of them, in flagrant violation of humanitarian law. We aim to analyze the circumstances and consequences of these actions, which may constitute a war crime, and to evaluate their impact in the medium and the long term. Children as victims of the war Motyzhyn is a village in the Bucha region, forty-five kilometers west of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. It was occupied by Russian forces in the days following the invasion of February 24, 2022, for about a month and a half. Several houses in the town were destroyed and its school partially demolished. When the Russian troops had to withdraw, the bodies of five civilians who had been executed were found, with their hands tied behind their backs. Among them were the village’s mayor, her husband and their son, who had refused to collaborate with the invaders. Today, the school in Motyzhyn is being rebuilt, but the children and young students who saw their teachers and neighbours die cannot forget the images of war. A group of teenagers trembles as they give their testimony. They express their fear of not being able to have a safe, peaceful life, of not having a future in their land. Their lives are marked forever. They are not the only ones. The stories of children witness of atrocities number in the hundreds. There are thousands of children separated from their parents, either because they have died, or because the children themselves have been displaced away from the front of the war, or because they have been kidnapped and taken to occupied territories or outside of Ukraine, to Russia or Belarus. In March 2022, just a month after the full-scale Russian invasion, the United Nations estimated that 78 children had already died and 105 had been injured.' Just over a year later, on June 1, 2023, the UN issued a report according to which the number of children killed in Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion reached 525. The report also stated that there were at least 1047 children injured in 289 cities, towns and villages throughout Ukraine, both in the areas controlled by the Government and in those occupied by Russia, from that same date.2 The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, deployed in 2014 in the wake of the occupation of the Crimean peninsula occupation and the armed conflict in the east of the country, stated that until June 2023, the Russian invasion of February 2022 has caused a total of almost 9.000 civilian deaths and more than 15.000 injuries, warning that the real number could be considerably higher, due to the difficulties faced by UN observers in accessing some areas of Ukraine where intense fighting was recorded. In October, the said Observation Mission updated the number of civilian deaths at almost 10.000 people and tens of thousands of wounded. To the figures detailed in the referenced reports, which are not exhaustive, since no certain data is available on the areas occupied by the Russian Federation, we must naturally add the victims —-dead and injured children that have occurred since the date of evaluations so far. New cases are registered practically every day. The war in Ukraine has not only caused death and injury to children and adolescents. Forced displacement, abandonment of their homes, disruption of schooling and a normal life, are also indelibly marking their lives. In the first days of the Russian invasion, millions of families were separated, mothers and younger children leaving Ukrainian territory while fathers and older siblings joined the national forces. These massive displacements to, preferably, neighbouring countries -Poland, Romania, Moldova- and from there to other destinations, were carried out under very precarious emergency conditions. Most of the displaced had to remain for long months in refugee camps. According to information collected by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), some children had to escape from Ukrainian territory alone, thereby increasing their exposure to possible abuse, sexual exploitation and human trafficking. During the course of the war, there were also numerous internal displacements from Ukrainian regions where there is greater war activity to regions considered safer, with the consequent unavoidable consequences: housing precariousness, interruption of schooling and special difficulties for institutionalized or disabled children. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, established by the Human Rights Council on March 4, 2022, to investigate alleged violations and abuses of human rights, violations of International Humanitarian Law and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation (Resolution 49/1)3, documented sexual crimes and gender violence against civilians, in victims from 4 to 82 years of age. The Commission certified cases of children who were raped, tortured, illegally detained, murdered and injured in indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons. On April 4, 2023, the Council, through Resolution 52/32, Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression, extended the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry for a new period of one year. This Resolution, approved by 28 votes (Argentina), 2 against (China and Eritrea) and 17 abstentions (Bolivia, Cuba, India and others), in its paragraph 17 “Stresses the importance of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of children and protecting children from all forms of violence, including sexual and gender -based violence, and emphasizes the importance of investigating and documenting violations and abuses of the rights of the child and violations of international humanitarian law, including forcible transfers and deportation, by relevant mechanisms, including the Commission of Inquiry”.4 In its October 2022 report, the Commission of Inquiry signalled that it had found evidence of the commission of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law corresponding crimes, by the Russian authorities, in areas under their control on Ukrainian territory: “The evidence collected demonstrates that the Russian authorities have committed the war crimes of murder, torture, rape and other sexual violence and the deportation of children to the Russian Federation”.5 Shortly after the full-scale invasion began, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) entrusted its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) with monitoring the situation in Ukraine. In the three reports submitted to date, in July and December 2022 and in July 2023, the ODIHR refers to the children’s situation. In the first of those reports, the high number of hospitals and schools bombed by the Russian Army is recorded, in “apparent violation of their protected status under International Humanitarian Law”. The report indicates that, according to information from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, 1899 educational establishments were damaged and 215 were destroyed as of June 30, 2022.6 Also, in the OSCE’s sphere, the Moscow Mechanism adopted in 1991 allows its Member States to request the appointment of an ad hoc mission of independent experts to investigate a particular problem related to the human dimension of the OSCE, either in their own territory or in that of another Member of the Organization. Ukraine first invoked the application of this Mechanism on March 3, 2022, with the support of 45 Member States. A mission of three experts appointed under this framework was given a broad mandate, which was to establish possible contraventions of OSCE commitments, violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law; as well as possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including due to deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; and to collect and analyse this information with a view to presenting it to the corresponding accountability mechanisms, as well as to the courts or tribunals with jurisdiction in the matter. The Mission, whose mandate was renewed twice, prepared three reports: in April and December 2022 and in June 2023. In their First Interim Report of April 2022, the experts confirmed that the conflict has affected children in many different ways: first, they are among the direct victims of the war and, even if they are not directly victims, many of them have lost their parents, which implies a family life interrupted forever. The report stated that, according to United Nations figures, more than half of the Ukrainian population under 18 years of age -that is, 4.3 million people- had been displaced from February 24, 2022, to that date. More than 1.8 million had left the country, while the remaining 2.5 million were internally displaced. Many of these children and adolescents —among them several thousand who were institutionalized before the conflict- have travelled alone, exposing themselves to numerous risks: dying or being injured during displacement, the risk of human trafficking and exploitation, the risk of child labour, the risk of forced recruitment or the risk of gender violence. Likewise, the Report stated that the conflict has caused the largescale destruction of civil infrastructure and the interruption of vital services, such as food, water and electricity or the provision of health services, all of which also affect children.7 In May 2022, Missing Children Europe also published a report on the children who were reported missing in Ukraine during the first 60 days of war and called on the European Union and its Member States to provide support and protection to all children and families at risk of entering that condition as a result of the conflict.8 Forced displacement and kidnapping of children In early June 2022, on International Children’s Day, President Zelenskyi noted that as of that date, there were already 200.000 Ukrainian children who had been forced to leave the country and were dispersed in the territory of the Russian Federation. The purpose of those forced transfers of Ukrainian children, according to the president, “is not only to steal them, but to make those who were deported forget about Ukraine and unable to return.9 Ukraine has denounced, and Russia has admitted, the displacement of thousands of children to territories occupied by the Russian Federation or to its territory, although the figures indicated by both states differ. At the end of September 2023, the official website of the Government of Ukraine that provides updated data and consolidated information on children suffering from the consequences of the armed conflict, registered 19.546 deportees or forcibly displaced minors. According to statements by Ukrainian officials, this figure includes children who have crossed the border with the Russian Federation accompanied by their parents. It would also include those children sent —presumably with paternal consent- to summer camps. For its part, the Russian Federation maintains that approximately 744.000 Ukrainian children, transferred for reasons of “evacuation”, “medical treatment”, “vacation” or “rehabilitation travel”, now live in Russia or Russian-occupied territories. As of July 2023, the office of the Russian Federation Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, reported that of the approximately 4.8 million residents of Ukraine “accepted” in Russia since the beginning of the war, more than 700.000 would be minors, the vast majority of whom would have arrived in that country with their parents or other relatives.10 There was information and statements coming from Russia prior to that date, which would make said figure plausible.11-11bis The Ukrainian authorities have stated, however, that these figures could be exaggerated: Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmitro Lubinets, suggested that the number of children could reach 150.000.12 Meanwhile, the President’s Commissioner for Children’ Rights, Daria Gerasymchuk, estimates that there could be “between 200 and 300 thousand abducted children”.13 Although all the information available coincides in a very high number of deported minors, the difficulties in establishing accurate figures are evident, given the lack of information shared between the authorities of both countries and the complexity of the regulatory situation, since some Ukrainian territories have been “annexed” by the Russian Federation (without the recognition of the international community) and Putin’s government applies the legislation of that country to them, regarding matters such as nationality, citizenship, adoption and custody of minors. The difficulties that this creates from the point of view of Private International Law, in cases of parents or legal guardians of minors who require their return, as well as of Public International Law in restitution claims filed by the government of Ukraine, must be the subject of a detailed study. In its report to the Human Rights Council, the Monitoring Mission in Ukraine points out the lack of information about Ukrainian children, some of them institutionalized and with physical and intellectual disabilities, who have been transferred to localities within the occupied zones or deported to Russia. Cases are mentioned of children who were sent to summer camps in Russia, supposedly with their parents’ consent, but who were then not returned to their homes. The UN Mission warns that the government of the Russian Federation did not identify those children or reunite them with their families.14 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine identified three situations in which Russian authorities have transferred unaccompanied Ukrainian minors from an area controlled by them in Ukrainian territory to another area in the same situation or to the territory of the Russian Federation: i) minors who lost their parents or contact with them during the hostilities; ii) minors who were separated as a result of the arrest of their parents; iii) minors placed in public institutions. According to the Commission, in some of those cases the transfers were made in violation of International Humanitarian Law and qualify as illegal transfers or deportations, which constitutes a war crime. Another worrying aspect of the deportations is also pointed out, which arises from information provided by Commissioner Lvova -Belova, as well as from interviews with relatives or legal representatives of some children and from press information, and which refers to the placement of minors in foster families in the Russian Federation, with the ostensible goal of having them remain in that country for extended periods of time.15 Indeed, of the 31 minors transferred to the Russian Federation from a public institution in the city of Donetsk in May 2022, one was placed in the custody of Mrs. Maria Lvova- Belova, who in September of that year announced that the minor had been granted a Russian passport and he was now “ours”. This is not a unique case, as other abductions of Ukrainian children by Russian families have already been confirmed. Regarding the response of the Russian government to the concerns raised by the Commission and by public opinion in general, regarding an eventual mechanism agreed between the two States for the return of transferred children, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared in September 2023 that “If families are located, we will assist them in reunifying with those children”.16 Mrs. Maria Lvova-Belova in turn pointed out that if a child “has a parent with full parental rights, the family has every possibility of being reunified”.17 However, there are very few cases in which transferred minors have been returned to their parents, in response to private initiatives by the parents, legal guardians or the minors themselves. Occasionally, third States have also intervened to obtain the return of some children. However, these are always specific cases: the majority of transferred minors have not returned to Ukraine or been able to reunite with their parents; on the contrary, they have remained in the Russian Federation for long periods of time, since their abduction. These actions contravene the legal requirement of International Humanitarian Law, in the sense that evacuations of children must be temporary and can only occur in cases of force majeure for reasons of health or medical treatment. Considering these parameters, the Commission considered that transfers that continue over time are assimilated to illegal deportations, which constitutes a war crime. The reports of the OSCE-ODIHR, by direct mandate of the Organization or in application of the Moscow Mechanism, also refer to forced transfers of civilians and in particular to forced transfers and deportations of children. Furthermore, the Observation mission carried out by the third ODIHR report on application of the Moscow Mechanism in June 2023, was specifically designated to address that issue and was expressly mandated to “...establish the facts and circumstances involving possible violations of relevant OSCE commitments, violations and abuses of human rights and violations of International Humanitarian Law and Internacional Human Rights Law, as well as possible cases of war crimes and crimes against Humanity, associated with or resulting from the forcible transfer of children within areas of the territory temporary controlled or occupied by Russia and/or their deportation to the Russian Federation...”.18 In their reports, the experts address with great concern the forced transfers and deportations of unaccompanied children, signalling that the policies applied by the Russian Federation in such cases could be contrary to International Law. The last of these reports established that the reasons more commonly invoked to justify the organized displacement of these children are: i) evacuation for security reasons; ii) transfer for adoption or foster care purposes; and iii) temporary stays in the so-called “recreation camps”. “Evacuation for security reasons” was invoked as legal support for the massive transfers of the civilian population, including children, which were carried out from the Ukrainian regions so called “Donetsk and Luhansk republics”, even from a week prior to the invasion of 24 February 2022. By the 20th, the authorities of the Rostov region, in the Russian Federation, reported that more than 2.904 children from those regions of Ukraine had entered their territory. Regardless of the reasons invoked for their transfer or the form of integration: whether by adoption —preferably in cases of children from Crimea— or by virtue of temporary guardianship or custody, Ukrainian children find themselves in an entirely Russian environment, including language, customs and religion and are exposed to information campaigns aimed at re-educating them, as well as giving them military education. The authorities of the Russian Federation do not take any measures to actively promote the return of Ukrainian children to their country, but rather create obstacles for families seeking to recover them. The experts appointed by the ODIHR reported that, according to statements by officials and the media, the Russian Federation transferred children from occupied territories to “holiday camps”, but once transferred to Crimea or to Russian territory, they are not returned to their families as originally agreed. Cases are cited in Kherson, where in the wake of violent attacks and schools closures, some parents accepted Russia’s offer to take their children to camps in Crimea but were then unable to contact or retrieve them.19 Some Ukrainian minors were even forcibly transferred to Belarus, as it was admitted by the director of the Belarusian Red Cross, Dzmiytryi Shautsou, who pointed out that these transfers had been made for rehabilitation treatments. The authorities of that country recently admitted that more than a thousand children are in Belarus “for health reasons’. The ODIHR experts assessed that “although certain displacements carried out by the Russian Federation were in line with its obligations under International Humanitarian Law, other practices of non-consensual evacuation, transfers and prolonged displacement of Ukrainian children constitute violations of International Humanitarian Law, and in certain cases involve serious violations of the Geneva Convention IV (GCIV) and war crimes, particularly a violation of the prohibition of forcible transfer or deportation under article 49 of the GCIV”.20 They also considered that altering the nationality of Ukrainian children is a violation of Article 50 of the GCIV. Imposition of citizenship and illegal adoptions Just three months after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine began, President Vladimir Putin issued a Decree (330/2022) to facilitate the procedures for attributing Russian citizenship to those Ukrainian children who were not under their parents’ care, which opens the way for subsequent adoption by Russian families.21 This decree also grants directors of orphanages located in occupied territories the possibility of demanding Russian citizenship for minors under fourteen years of age, admitted to the institutions under their charge, without asking for their consent. In January 2024, Putin issued a new Decree (11/2024) officially aimed at facilitating the process of granting Russian citizenship to foreign nationals and stateless persons. This decree establishes that Ukrainian orphans and children who are not in family care can receive Russian citizenship by Putin’s personal decision alone, without considering all or some of the requirements of federal legislation.22 The naturalization process can be carried out by whoever has legal guardianship of the child or by the head of a Russian organization responsible for the minor. According to the Commissioner for Human Rights of Ukraine, Dmytro Lubinets, the next step after the granting of Russian citizenship is adoption by a Russian family: in this way deported Ukrainian children no longer count de jure as Ukrainians on Russian territory. The observation missions designated to evaluate possible violations of International Humanitarian Law in the framework of this war, had already expressed their concern about the adoption of the first decree (330/2022), highlighting that International Humanitarian Law prohibits the Russian Federation from changing the status of those children and that the procedures of the Russian Federation do not appear to include measures for the reunification of families or to ensure the principle of respecting the child’s best interest. Applicable international law prescribes that children have the right to retain their identity, name, nationality and family relationships and that children should not be separated from their parents against their will, except when the separation is carried out in accordance with due process of law and if it serves the children’s best interest. Following the issuance of Decree No. 330 by President Putin, several Russian officials admitted that Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine had been “adopted” by Russian families. A Russian-appointed Kherson regional administration official, speaking to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, announced that starting February 24, 2022, children born in that region would automatically acquire Russian nationality. Likewise, orphaned children would also be registered as Russian citizens.23 Shortly after, Ms. Maria Lvova-Belova stated that several Russian families had obtained temporary custody rights over 108 orphans from the Donbass region and, as she noted, “now that the children have received Russian citizenship, temporary custody can be transformed into permanent”.24 In October 2022, Lvova-Belova announced that already 350 orphaned children from Donbass had been placed in foster families in sixteen regions of the Russian Federation. The Commissioner’s Office reported that months earlier, in February 2022, around 2.000 orphaned children or children placed in public institutions without parental control, had been transferred to the Russian Federation and subsequently, those from Donetsk and Luhansk were placed in foster families or in public institutions. Lvova-Belova declared that she herself had adopted a fifteen-year-old minor transferred to the Russian Federation in a group that came from a public institution in the city of Donetsk. In a bulletin from her Office (2023), it was recorded that the other minors in that group were placed in family centers and later in foster families or under temporary custody of residents of the Moscow region. One of those minors, 17 years old Bohdan, was effectively “placed” in the care of a Russian family, given Russian documents, and recently received a summons to report to a recruiting office. Which means that he would probably have been forced to fight against his own country’s army. Bohdan, who in March 2023 had already tried to escape and return to Ukraine, was detained at the border. He was finally able to return to his country last November, thanks to the notoriety that his case gained and efforts from the governments of Ukraine and Qatar.25 Children’s relocations to the Russian Federation for the purposes of adoption or custody has been practiced with children from Crimea since the peninsula’s illegal annexation in 2014 and the subsequent application of Russian family laws. In October of that same year, the so-called Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the occupation administration of the peninsula made public an initiative called the “Train of Hope”, so that “families coming from other regions of the Russian Federation” can contact orphans and children who were not under parental care, with the aim of “placing” them in their families. Within the framework of the investigations conducted by designated international experts, the Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea reported that more than 1.000 children from the peninsula could have been deported to various parts of the Russian Federation through this initiative. The new legislation on the adoption of Ukrainian minors ordered by President Putin has even benefited a renowned Russian congressman, Sergey Mironov, president of the Only Russia political party -of the opposition authorized by the Russian State- who would have adopted with his wife, Inna Varlamova, a little two-year-old girl, Margarita, transferred to Moscow along with 47 other minors from a center for infants in Kherson. According to statements from the centre’s employees, it was Russian soldiers and officials who took Margarita —who had already been previously visited by Mrs. Varlamova, and shortly after returned to “evacuate” the rest of the children.26 Children forcefully transferred to Russia must attend schools with local curricula and books —-even some that have been edited or adapted since the beginning of the war to give a biased vision of History-, they are not allowed to speak Ukrainian and must express pro-Russian feelings, singing for example the national anthem of the Russian Federation, as part of a re-education campaign which includes “patriotic” and military instruction. The Moscow-appointed governor of the Zaporizhia region -which, although illegally annexed by Russia, is not fully occupied by its army- reported that the Russian Ministry of Culture had transferred more than 300 children from that region to Moscow and Saint Petersburg, in order to educate them in Russian culture, within the framework of a program that foresees the participation of more than 2.500 schoolchildren. From the Russian Federation, the governor of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, announced the launch of a three-year program in which more than 500 Ukrainian children from the Volnovaya region, in the occupied zone of Donetsk, will participate and will visit cultural heritage sites in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod. The forced reintegration and re-education of a large number of Ukrainian children can have serious ethnic and sociological consequences, causing a severe impact on the future projection of Ukrainians as a national group, by constituting a factor of disruption in its continuity. Psychological Impact The row of seven or eight children standing in front of a group of academics and foreign visitors, in the classroom of a school in which others are still completely destroyed, is a devastating image. They are teenagers, perhaps between twelve and sixteen years old, and some of them are holding hands to support each other. Only two or three of them speak, sometimes through tears; the others nod with eyes still full of terror. They have seen death and destruction and when they speak, they tell how hard the experience of the Russian occupation has been, but they also talk about their future. They are convinced that it will be very hard, that they will have a very different life than the one they had or dreamed of eighteen months ago, although they are also sure that they want to fight for that future. They don’t want to leave Ukraine, they say, they just want to be left alone to recover, study and rebuild their country. In its report on the psychological impact of the war on Ukrainian children and adolescents, “A Heavy Toll”, the nongovernmental organization Save the Children estimated that “the boys and girls in Ukraine have been forced to hide underground for an average of 920 hours in the last year (2022) - which is equivalent to 38,3 days, or more than a month- since the reactivation of the conflict on February 24 of last year’. They have been “constantly faced with danger” with “the psychological distress of having witnessed violence, separation from family and friends, displacement or lack of access to education”. The fighting has forced the closure of schools in many parts of the country and in those cases only the possibility of online education remains, but less than 30 percent of Ukrainian children have access to an individual computer and frequent power outages make access difficult for those who do have them. Many of them have lost years of education due to the duration of the conflict in the east since 2014, the quarantine due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing hostilities in the country.27 As mentioned above, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has documented cases in which minors have been raped, tortured, illegally confined, killed or injured in indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons. This exposure to permanent explosions, crimes, forced displacement and separation from family members profoundly affects the well-being and mental health of children and adolescents. 75 % of parents report that their children have symptoms of psychological trauma and that 1 in 6 children report memory problems, attention deficits and a decrease in their learning ability. The hostilities have had a significant impact on children’s right to education due to damage or destruction of hundreds of schools and daycare centers.28 Minors in recreational or educational fields. The ZMINA Center for Human Rights, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization, has verified the existence of at least 43 “camps” in the occupied areas of Ukraine, where the occupation authorities intern minors. Likewise, according to statements by Russian officials, a distribution of children from the occupied areas was organized in different centers for minors in Russian territory, assigning correspondence between districts or regions of Ukraine and regions of the Russian Federation. In cases of parents in a vulnerable situation, or who, due to the violence of the fighting in the area or the lack of housing or food, wish to protect their children, the occupation authorities offer them to sign a “consent for the transfer” document for a certain period of time, which does not specify the person who will take care of the minor. At the same time, the child’s documents and birth certificate are confiscated. The children are not returned at the end of the “recreation stay”: in some cases, the “stay” is extended, in others the children are transferred to another camp without their parents’ knowledge, and sometimes Russian regional leaders declare that the children will not return. One of the main objectives of internment in these camps would be the re-education of minors: according to the ZMINA report, at least 32 of the 43 camps are “actively and systematically involved in providing education and cultural development” of the Ukrainian children according to the Russian system. The program includes narratives about the nature of the large-scale invasion and the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Minors receive lessons on “main or important topics”, such as the peace-keeping operations of the Russian army in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia or Kazakhstan, the defeat of terrorists in Syria, the protection of Russian nationals and the “liberation” of the Donbass. And they must speak exclusively in the Russian language. The ZMINA'’s report recalls that according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, States are obliged for respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference. ... Due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background. The education of children under 15 years old, orphaned or separated from their families as a result of the war, should be entrusted to people with the same cultural traditions and, as far as possible, of the same nationality, language and religion.29 The Ukrainian government has established in Kyiv a center for the care of minors affected by the war, whether they are attacks’ survivors, recovered from deportations or who have remained in a filtration center: the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights, Minors are received there to give them support; they usually have an initial conversation with those responsible for the Center and are provided assistance with a multifunctional team of doctors, psychologists and other professionals. Margarita, 6 years old and her sister Xenia, 12, both of them born in Mariupol, recently passed through that Center. They had been deported to Russia and once recovered, were able to reunite with their mother. Their father is still a prisoner in the Russian Federation. And there now is Oleg, 12 years old, who gives a heartbreaking testimony: coming from a small town near Mariupol, he remembers the night when he heard 22 “Grads” explosions and shortly after the town was occupied. Oleg and his family spent two months in a basement, without bread or running water. One day when his mother and aunt went to another town in search of food, explosions were heard near the shelter. Oleg went out and found bodies of his neighbours lying on the street. Russian soldiers detained him, and he spent two months in a “filtration camp” until his family was able to rescue him. Today, Oleg suffers from eating disorders, psychological disorders and aggressiveness. Minors in “filtration camps”. Particular attention should be given to cases of minors who, by themselves or with their parents or relatives, have been detained by the Russian military or authorities appointed by the Russian government, for prolonged periods of time, in order to determine their status and loyalty to Ukraine. The “filtration” consists of a process of interrogating civilians from territories occupied by Russia in its military campaign, to find out their political opinions. It also includes the collection of biometric data and the requisition of their personal effects, including their cell phones. This process can last several hours or be extended for more than a month. If the parents of a minor fail to “approve” the filtration and are detained or forcibly disappeared, the minor will be deported to the Russian Federation. In September 2022, United Nations Under- Secretary General for Political Affairs and Peace -Building, Rosemary DiCarlo and Under- Secretary General for Human Rights and Head of UN Haigh Commissioner for Human Rights Office (OHCHR) in New York, Ilze Brands Kehris, presented reports to the Security Council, in which they addressed the “filtration” system practiced by Russia in the occupied Ukrainian territories. Rosemary DiCarlo, while mentioning the very high number of refugees and internal displaced people provoked by the war, emphasized that the persistent reports of forced displacements, deportations and the so called “filtration camps” are extremely worrying and demanded that such information be investigated with due diligence and with the cooperation of competent authorities. She added that the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine must have free access to all the individuals detained in connection with the war. llze Brands Kehris informed the Council that the OHCHR has verified that the Russian armed forces and armed groups related to them have subjected Ukrainian citizens to the practice of “filtering”, a system of security checks and collection of personal data during which they practice detailed searches and interrogations, and women and girls are at risk of sexual abuse. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations responded to these presentations that the term “filtration” does not have a clear definition in International Humanitarian Law and that the identification of Ukrainian citizens who want to emigrate to the Russian Federation is a normal practice for any army. Recalling that his country is the largest recipient of Ukrainian refugees, he underlined that this is a registration process, not “filtration.”30 International reaction The Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the Russian Federation is a party, prescribes in its Article 6 that “States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life” and that the Parties “shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child”.31 Given the increasingly critical conditions for minors in war zones, the UN General Assembly created in 1997 the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflicts, with the mandate of evaluating the progress, the measures adopted, and the difficulties detected in the protection of children in situations of armed conflicts. In a 2004 report, the Special Representation detected the six mayor violations against children committed in that context, one of which is the abduction of children. In 2015, following a new report that -particularly evaluating the situation of children in armed conflicts in African countries— highlights this crime, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2225 (2015) on the subject in which, among other recommendations, the resolution called for the “immediate, safe and unconditional” release of children kidnapped during the conflict.32 In July 2022, once a pattern of violations against children in the framework of conflict had been proved, Ukraine was included as a “situation of concern” in the UN Secretary General’s Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflicts. From this inclusion, the Organization has the responsibility of controlling and reporting on serious violations against children, which has been accomplished through the UN Human Rights Observation Mission (created previously, in 2014, following the invasion of Crimea) and from 2022, also through the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, whose reports we have commented on. In an almost unprecedented decision -with the only exception of Libya in 2011-, on April 7, 2022, the United Nations General Assembly decided the suspension of the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council, by 93 votes in Favor, 24 against and 58 abstentions (Argentina voted in Favor). In the text of the Resolution, the General Assembly expresses “grave concern at the ongoing human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, in particular at the reports of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation, including gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights...”. In its decision, the General Assembly considered the expressions of concern by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, as well as the latest update on the human rights situation in Ukraine by the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine, of 26 March 2022.33 At the Latin-American regional level, the Organization of American States (OAS) approved a Communiqué34 and a Resolution35 condemning the Russian Federation for the invasion of Ukraine, and finally decided to suspend it as an Observer Member of the Organization.36 The European Parliament also adopted a decision on this issue. In July 2023, the European body issued a Joint Motion for a statement on the detention of two Ukrainian minors by Russian authorities and the denunciation of their actions against minors, citing numerous reports on the oppression of Ukrainian children, “the victims most vulnerable of the Russian war of aggression”. Parliament mentions figures of deceased and injured minors and those deported to Russia (around 19.500), as well as those missing (3.924) and condemns the deliberate Russian targeting of minors through measures that include forced transfer within the territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia, illegal deportations to Belarus and Russia, illegal adoptions and attempts to impose re-education on them.37 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a Resolution in April 2023, in which it stated that the forcible transfer and Russification of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation “indicates an intention to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainian identity, as well as the cultural and linguistic characteristics of its people” and highlighted that “the forced transfer of children from one group to another with the intention of destroying, totally or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group is considered a crime of genocide” according to the Convention against Genocide, in the first pronouncement of an international organization in that regard.38 In November of that same year, PACE approved the creation of a Special Committee for Ukrainian Children’s Affairs and in January 2024 it adopted Resolution 2529 (2024) in which “the Parliamentary Assembly firmly reiterates its condemnation of the full-scale war of aggression being waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the massive violations of the rights of Ukrainian children, who are particularly vulnerable victims of this war. Children should never be used as means of exerting pressure, or as war trophies”. Through the Resolution, “The Assembly calls upon member States’ parliaments to enhance their political support towards meeting the objectives of the humanitarian response plan for Ukraine, with a specific emphasis on the needs of internally displaced children and their families”.39 The kidnapping and transfer of Ukrainian children was the crime -a potential war crime for which, unlike the economic sanctions applied to institutions and individuals of the Russian Federation, international justice held President Vladimir Putin directly responsible. In late February 2022, International Criminal Court prosecutor Karim Kahn opened an investigation for war crimes and crimes against Humanity. Slightly more than a year after, on March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with the support of the UN, issued an arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin, in connection with alleged war crimes related to the deportation and “illegal transfer” of Ukrainian children. The international arrest warrant is extensive to the Russian Government’s Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova. In his statement on the decision, Prosecutor Kahn indicated that, based on the evidence collected, there are sufficient indications to believe that Putin and Lvova-Belova bear criminal responsibility for the illegal deportation and transfer or Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. He added that many of these children have been put for adoption in that country and that, by decree, President Putin had modified the applicable law in order to facilitate the granting of Russian citizenship to these children and, consequently, expedite their adoption by Russian families. Prosecutor Kahn also pointed out that these actions, among others, demonstrate the intention to permanently separate these children from their country of origin.40 The recovery of minors abducted by the Russian Federation is extremely difficult, given the particular conditions in which deportations take place and the subsequent distribution of children in territories occupied by Russia or in its own extensive territory, to which is added the change of identity through the granting of Russian nationality and adoptions. And as Belgian diplomat Mariam Lambert, who works with a non-governmental organization in the recovery of Ukrainian children, says: “they must be brought back quickly, because the more time passes, the more difficult it will be to track them and it will be much more traumatic for the children, after a new transfer, a new change in their lives, with the consequent psychological impact”. Many States and non-governmental Human Rights organizations constantly demand that Russia cease these kidnapping and deportation actions and return the minors currently in its possession. Recently, efforts carried out by Qatar have managed to return several minors between two and seventeen years old to Ukraine and their families, four the first time in October 2023 and six more in the first days of December the same year. Qatar also mediated for the return of Bohdan, a Ukrainian teenager who had been placed with a foster family in Moscow province and then summoned to military service, as we mentioned above. 41-41bis In December 2023, the Ukrainian Government convened the first meeting of the International Coalition of Countries for the Return of Ukrainian Children, which was attended by seventy-two high-level representatives from several countries - Canada, Qatar, the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, the Netherlands, Estonia, among others- and international organizations such as the United Nations Observation and Monitoring Mission, UNICEF, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, among others. The objective of this international coalition is to support Ukraine in the return of forcibly transferred minors, as well as their rehabilitation and reintegration. Unfortunately, between the noise of war cannons and the geopolitical confusion on the international scene, the tragedy of the Ukrainian children is not adequately addressed by the international media nor, consequently, sufficiently known. It is, however, one of the most worrying aspects of this war, in which Putin seeks precisely the extinction of the Ukrainian identity and the people of Ukraine as an independent nation. The world, Western or not, must open its eyes to this true tragedy and demand in every stance the restitution of the children of Ukraine and the interruption of a practice that defies all moral parameters and international coexistence. References: 1 United Nations. “One month after the war, note that half of Ukraine’s children have been displaced”. 15 March 2022. https://news.un.org/es/story/2022/03/1506172 2 United Nations. “More than 1500 children dead or injured in Ukraine’s war”. 1 June 2023. https://news.un.org/es/story/2023/06/1521552 3 Resolution 49/1 adopted by the Human Rights Council, March 4, 2022. Situation of Human Rights in Ucrania following the Russian invasion. 4 Resolution 52/32 adopted by the Human Rights Council,, April 4, 2023. Situation of Human Rights in Ucrania following the Russian invasion. 5 International Independent Investigative Commission Report to the UN General Assembly. October 18, 2022 6 OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Interim Report on reported violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Ukraine. 7 OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 132/2022 - ODIHR.GAL/26/22/Rev.1 - Report of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism’s mission of experts entitled ‘Report On Violations Of International Humanitarian And Human Rights Law, War Crimes And Crimes Against Humanity Committed In Ukraine Since 24 February 2022'. 8 War on Ukraine responsible for surge in missing children cases, Missing Children in Europe, 25 May 2022. https://missingchildreneurope.eu/press-releaseimed-2022/ 9 President Zelenskyi: 243 Ukrainian children have died, 446 have been injured and 39 remain disappeared, warning that these numbers could be even bigger, since there is no reliable information on the zones occupied by Russia. The Associated Press, “Volodymyr Zelenskyy Says 200,000 Children among Ukrainians Forcefully Taken to Russia,” First post, 2 June 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/world/volodymyr-zelenskyv-says-200000-children-among-ukrainians-forcefully-taken-to-russia-10747981.html 10 https://www.currenttime.tv/a/v-rossiyuvyvezli-bolee-700-tysyach-ukrainskihdetey/32527102.html 11 In May 2022, Russian news agency TASS published declarations from an official of the Russian Federations’ Ministry of Defense, Mikhail Mizintsev, on the transfer of a million people from Ukraine to Russia, including approximately 200.000 children, in the previous two months. The official added that this figure included more than 1.800 children who had been “evacuated to the Russian Federation” the day before from dangerous zones in Donetsk, Luhansk and other Ukrainian regions, “without the participation of the Ukrainian authorities”. 2 In July 2022, the same TASS agency reported that more than 2.8 million Ukrainians had entered the Russian Federation from Ukraine, including 448.000 children, in a dispatch collected by Human Rights Watch (09/2022) and by the OSDE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (12/2022). “We had no choice’: ‘Filtration’ and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia”, Human Rights Watch, 1 September 2022, https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forciblytransferring-ukrainiancivilians#fin107. 11 bis За год с Украины и из Донбасса на территорию РФ прибыло 5,3 млн беженцев, ТАСС, 20 февраля 2023. 12 Кількість незаконно вивезених у росію українських дітей може сягати 150 тисяч, Укрінформ, 17. 2. 2023. 13 У Офісі Президента заявили, що у росії створили понад 70 таборів для "перевиховання" депортованих дітей з України, Рубрика, 23 квітня 2023 14 Head of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine presents the latest human rights report 06 October 2023. https://ukraine.un.org/en/248423-head-unhuman-rights-monitoring-mission-ukraine-presents-latest-human-rights-report. 15 UNGA - A/78/540 Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. 16 See United Nations Web TV, “Press conference: H.E. Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation”, September 23, 2023. 17 See Maria Lvova-Belova, “Activities of the Russian Federation Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova to protect children during a special military operation”, The Bulletin, no. 1, 4 April 2023 (2023). 18 ODIHR.GAL/37/23/Rev.1/Corr.1 4 May 2023. Report on violations and abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, related to the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation. 19 Ibid. 20 ODIHR.GAL/37/23/Rev.1/Corr.1 4 May 2023. Report on violations and abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, related to the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation. 21 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 30.05.2022 No. 330, Russian Federation official internet portal of legal information, 30 May 2022, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202205300008. 22 President of the Russian Federation’s Decree 11/2024, January 4th, 2024. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/sXZxkRw7u0DOOSE2Snp3416FcAPNuPRL.pdf 23 “Moscow says babies born in occupied Kherson will automatically get Russian citizenship”, New York Times, 16 June 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kherson-babies-russian-citizenship.htm. 24 Lvova-Belova: Families from six regions of the Russian Federation will take custody over 108 orphans from Donbas, RGRU, 15 July 2022. 25 Ukrainian teen who received call-up to Russian army. BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67368313, 10/11/2023. 26 “Missing Ukrainian child traced to Putin ally” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646. 23/11/2023 27 Save the Children, A Heavy Toll – Full Report, 02/12/23. Boys and girls in Ukraine have spent 900 hours in bunkers, more than a month of their lives. https://www.savethechildren.es/sites/default/files/2023-02/ 28 A/77/5332/2322-23590 Report of the Independiente International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine - https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/637/77/PDF/N2263777.pdf? Open Element 29 Forcible Transfer and Deportation of Children from the Temporary Occupied Territories of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Analytical Report by the Human Rights Center ZMINA, April 2023. 30 UN Security Council, “Reports of Russian Federation Forces Putting Ukrainian Civilians in ‘Filtration’ Camps Must Be Investigated” SC/15023, 7 September 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15023.doc.html 31 Convention on the Rights of the Child. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instrumentsmechanisms/instruments/conventionrights-child 32 United Nations Security Council: Resolution 2225 (2015) adopted by the Security Council in its 7466a session, on June 18, 2015. https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2015/10114.pdf, Dr. Virginia Gamba, of Argentine nationality, has occupied the position of Secretary General Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflicts since April 2017. 33 UNGA, Eleventh extraordinary period of emergency sessions. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on April 7, 2022, ES-11/3 Suspension of the Russian Federation’s right to integrate the Human Rights Council. 34 Organization of American States General Secretariat Communiqué Comunicado C-008/22. Source: OAS. 35 Organization of American States Permanent Council Resolution “The crisis in Ukraine” (CP/RES. 1192 (2371/22), 3/25/2022. Source: OAS. 36 Organization of American States Permanent Council Resolution CP/RES. 1195 (2374/22), 4/24/2022. Source: OAS. 37 European Parliament “Joint Motion”. European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 2023 on the torture and criminal prosecution of Ukrainian minors Tihran Ohannisian and Mykyta Khanhanov by the Russian Federation (2023/2735(RSP)) 38 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9075/the-forcible-transfer-and-russification-ofukrainian-children-shows-evidence-ofgenocide-says-pace, Resolution 2495 (2023) https://pace.coe.int/en/files/31776/html, 4/27/23. 39 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 2529 (2024) Situation of the children of Ukraine, 25 January 2024. https://pace.coe.int/en/files/33348/html 40 ICC, Statement by Prosecutor Karim A. Khan KC on the Issuance of Arrest Warrants against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova, 17 March 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-againstpresident-vladimir-putin 41 Russia returns four Ukrainian children in Qatari deal. BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67121574, 10/16/2022 41 bis Qatar announces return of 6 Ukrainian children from Russia. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/gatar-announces-release-of-6-ukrainian-children/. 12/16/2023.

Defense & Security
Angry bear against the background of the Russian flag

Boil the bear: The risky path in the face of Russian aggression

by Enrico Tomaselli

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском According to the EU, Russia had set several red lines, but then allowed them to be crossed without reacting. Therefore, gradually increasing the temperature can be a good strategy... Whereas, throughout the first two years of NATO's war against Russia in Ukraine, the record of warmongering was almost equally shared between the US and the UK, more recently it has been attributed to Macron. The reasons are diverse, ranging from the great difficulty France is currently facing to the illusion of being able to take advantage of the German crisis to assume European leadership, including the political dwarfism of its president. But the underlying reason is that European leaders, almost unanimously, have essentially resigned themselves to carrying out the task left by the US: taking on the burden of the conflict in the East, supporting Kiev even beyond the last Ukrainian, if necessary. Also in this case, the reasons why Europeans have convinced themselves that they cannot escape this task are multiple. What matters is understanding how they believe they will do it, when they believe they will do it, and, obviously, if they really believe they can do it. Judging by how interventionist statements are intensifying, it seems that the timeline is not so distant; probably, in the European offices, they envision initiating an operational phase at least after the US elections, also to have a clearer idea of the White House's orientations and the timing of their public announcements. At the same time, the evolution on the battlefield does not seem very compatible with these optimistic forecasts: the arrival of good weather has already revitalized the Russian initiative along the entire front line, and the structural deficiencies of the Ukrainian army are evident. Events, therefore, could accelerate. Regarding the how, it seems quite clear that the idea is to boil the Russian bear like the proverbial frog. Step by step, counting on Moscow wanting to avoid an escalation, they will end up letting things happen without a strong response. In conclusion, it is believed that Russia had set several red lines, but then allowed them to be crossed without reacting. Therefore, gradually increasing the temperature can be a good strategy. Furthermore, the public discourse (the narrative used to prepare public opinion) is a mix of nonsense and half-truths, but reading them carefully, the design becomes clear. Macron puffs up his chest and makes aggressive statements, but then between Ukrainian requests and European readiness, the scheme emerges: start by training the Ukrainians in Ukraine (150,000 men...) so they are closer (and prepared) to the front [1]. After all, NATO countries have been training them for years, only the location changes... One imagines that such a debut would be more acceptable to European citizens, and that after all Moscow would not react beyond "strong protests." Then we'll see from there. Clearly, the weak point is the actual possibility of creating the design according to your own scheme. Firstly, the premise is that Russia behaves exactly as expected in Brussels, which, however, is not at all a fact. As always, caught up in their autism, European leaders do not listen, and even if they do, they do not understand. Here, in fact, we are beyond the light statements of Medvedev; when a diplomat like Lavrov clearly says that if Europeans want war they are prepared, it should not be taken lightly. Moreover, when Monti in turn says that "to build Europe" blood must be shed, he is simply more sincere and pragmatic than Macron. The problem, of course, is that a small-step scheme simply runs the risk of resulting in a series of useless steps. The critical problems of the Ukrainian army are basically three: lack of artillery ammunition, lack of personnel, lack of anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems. For the first one, Europeans are unable to remedy it. Even if the Russian industrial relative production did not grow (as it is happening) and remained at current levels, Europeans would take years and years to match it. As for the second one, the difficulties to solve it would be at least the same. Sending even 20-30,000 men would not have a decisive impact. Firstly, we would be talking about men with no real combat experience, let alone in a war of attrition like the one being fought. The logistic support would be very complicated, as the rear would have to be located in Poland and/or Romania, a thousand kilometers from the front. And anyway, even such a figure would amount to 5,000-6,000 men in combat. Irrelevant. It would be necessary to send at least 200 or 300 thousand men, practically the entire European NATO force, to have any impact. The Europeans could transfer almost all of their missile/anti-aircraft defense systems, leaving their respective countries almost defenseless, but this would also have a limited impact over time: the Russians would exploit the large quantities they have to saturate the defenses and destroy the batteries one after another (as Iran did with Israel). The only thing that could introduce an element of discontinuity would be the intervention of the air force. European fighter-bombers taking off from airfields outside of Ukraine, striking Russian rear areas. But this would inevitably bring the war to European soil, as it is clear that at that point the Russians would strike the departure air bases with their ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The same would happen if missile defense batteries from neighboring countries were used. Furthermore, if this level of intervention were to create problems for the Russian armed forces, it is virtually certain that at that point Moscow would resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Because for Russia, the risk of defeat in this war equates to an existential threat. And here Macron comes into play again, boldly promising the coverage of the French nuclear umbrella, the 'force de frappe'. Unfortunately, the comparison with the Russian Federation is ruthless, and the quantity of French nuclear weapons (as well as the aircraft carriers to deliver them to the target) is ridiculously smaller: At most, France can offer the shelter of a cocktail umbrella, and Moscow would turn Paris into a milkshake. Therefore, the European strategy of boiling the Russian bear slowly – though as stupid as a frog - cannot work. Gradualness simply runs the risk of exacting a very high price (in terms of casualties, wounded, destroyed weapon systems, etc.) without achieving any noteworthy result. On the other hand, an acceleration, by promptly engaging a significant force in combat, is practically equivalent to plunging Europe into a prolonged conflict, without equally managing to change the terms of the equation. Without direct intervention from the US, European countries alone are absolutely incapable of significantly engaging Russia [2]. But direct engagement is exactly what Washington shies away from, and they are very aware that once you put boots on the ground, there's no turning back, and the logic of war drags you deeper and deeper. Something they learned well from Vietnam, and they have never forgotten. Therefore, combat continues to present itself as a gamble. It's like having far fewer chips than your opponent and still betting everything without even holding a pair of twos in your hand. In all of this, of course, we have not taken into account at all the fact that there is no unified point of view - beyond the facade - among the different European capitals. Likely, there are countries - not only Hungary, or Slovakia, but also Germany and Italy... - that secretly hope for an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian army, to render any hypothesis of deploying their own forces useless. Although the scenario briefly described is very realistic, it is clear that there are those who believe that Europeans would have an excellent opportunity in a confrontation with Russia. That this is believed possible among political leaders, although dangerously disheartening, is also plausible; much worse is when it is supported by senior NATO military commanders, whose opinion cannot fail to influence political decisions. And quite a few generals, French, German, and from other countries, seem convinced that they can win the game (or perhaps just dream of a moment of glory, after a lifetime behind a desk or playing war games). [3] Certainly, what happens on the European chessboard also depends on what happens elsewhere, because this is a global game where everything is interconnected. The problem is that European leaders not only lack decision-making power, not even marginally, regarding this dimension, but they also completely lack global vision. The real one, of course, not the one that appears in the news. The coming months, therefore, will be full of consequences for the Europeans, but they will also be largely played as pawns, with their movements directed largely from outside, while the effects will be almost entirely at our expense. And it is clear that the interest of the US is to push the Europeans, but not NATO, to assume the risks and burdens of the conflict, which Washington would like to prolong indefinitely. [4] The inadequacy of leadership is another risk factor, in addition to the objectives. In this context, as we see, these leaders tend to curl up like a hedgehog; aware of their own weakness, both against the enemy they are confronting and their own citizens who do not wish to die for Kiev (not even for Washington), they are increasingly moving towards the militarization of public space, the restriction of democratic spaces, and an authoritarian shift. They wage war on the dissent of their citizens today so that they can wage war on Russia tomorrow. And if the European peoples lose this war, they will be dragged into another one, in which defeat could coincide with the extinction of European civilization as we have known it. Notes [1] According to The New York Times, due to the shortage of troops, the Kiev government has asked the US and NATO to "contribute to the training of 150,000 new recruits" within Ukraine so that they can be deployed to the front lines quicker. Obviously, this is a gigantic absurdity. However, these training camps should be located as far away from the front lines as possible to minimize the risk of being targeted (large troop concentrations are obviously an attractive target), and they would require adequate protection against air attacks; the risks and logistical efforts would far outweigh the minimal benefit of having recruits in training a little closer to the battle line. This is blatantly a ploy to bring NATO military personnel onto the ground. [2] A research done by the British newspaper 'The Daily Mail' established that in the event of an open conflict between NATO and Russia, NATO forces would not be sufficient. Although the strength of the Atlantic Alliance appears superior in numerical terms, this superiority is essentially due to the armed forces of the US, without which it significantly deteriorates. Additionally, the research does not consider, even marginally, factors such as industrial production, experience, combat capability, etc. [3] According to the commander of the combined armed forces of the Alliance in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli (USA), the Russian armed forces "lack the skills and capabilities to operate on the scale necessary to exploit any advances to gain a strategic advantage." [4] In this regard, a reputable American magazine like 'Foreign Affairs' has explicitly indicated this direction, and certainly not by chance. According to the FA, which is obviously closely aligned with the State Department, "European countries must do more [...] They should seriously consider deploying troops in Ukraine to provide logistical support and training, to protect Ukraine's borders and critical infrastructure, or even to defend Ukrainian cities. They must make it clear to Russia that Europe is willing to protect Ukraine's territorial sovereignty". After dismissing the idea that this could lead to World War III, the authors cunningly suggest that "a strictly non-combat mission would be easier to sell in most European capitals". However, they immediately stress that "Europe should consider a direct combat mission to help protect Ukrainian territory". In fact, "since European forces would operate outside the framework and territory of NATO, any losses would not trigger a response under Article 5 and would not involve the United States". And to reassure European leaders - to whom the message is clearly directed - they add: "At a certain point, European leaders must ignore Putin's threats, as they are nothing more than propaganda." The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

Defense & Security
Troop carrier and tank with Ukrainian flag, Ukraine

The War in Ukraine among contemporary Armed Conflicts

by Anton Bebler

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract The war in Ukraine is the biggest, bloodiest and longest war in Europe since 1945. Its initial stage holds similarities with several other armed conflicts and wars in the last 50 years on Cyprus and in the territories of the former Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Among the cases in ex-Yugoslavia the greatest similarity is seen with the war in Croatia (1991–1995). These conflicts stemmed from almost simultaneous breakdowns of two multinational ‘socialist federations’ and their communist regimes. The dissimilarity of the second stage of the war in Ukraine and the war in Croatia is primarily due to the processes of NATO and EU enlargement coupled with the USA’s policy of using NATO enlargement and Ukraine as tools to harm and weaken Russia. The conflict about Ukraine developed into an indirect war between Russia and the US-led West, where Ukraine is the West’s proxy and the main victim. The final outcome of the war in Ukraine will be decided on the battlefield and not around a diplomatic table. Still, it will be very different from that in Croatia. Responsibility for the war in Ukraine and its consequences must be shared between the two direct belligerents, the co-responsible USA and other NATO members. Introduction Among about four dozen contemporary wars, the armed conflict in Ukraine since 2014 stands out as an exceptional event. It involves in its second stage four nuclear powers –one as a direct belligerent and three as providers of many-sided assistance to the second belligerent, with the presence of military personnel of all four nuclear powers on the territory of Ukraine. The war has been the biggest, bloodiest and longest war in Europe since 1945. It has also produced a strong impact on Europe and the broader international community. According to two measures (at least), the war in Ukraine has been exceeded by a number of other wars since 1945, namely those occurring in Asia and Africa. In terms of mortality, it has been exceeded by the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Iraq. In terms of duration, it is unlikely to be longer than the wars in Vietnam, Algeria, Sudan and Afghanistan. Among all these armed conflicts, the war in Ukraine may be sharply distinguished by the reverse ratio between military and civilian mortality. In the European framework, the central trigger of the first stage of the war in Ukraine was similar to what caused the armed conflicts and outright wars occurring between 1974 and 1999 on Cyprus, in Moldova, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan as well as on the territory of the SFRY. Among the former, the first stage of the war in Ukraine most resembled the war in Croatia (1991–1995). The war in Croatia, which started prior to its international recognition, and the war in Ukraine 22 years after its recognition as an independent state, display a number of similarities that not accidental. The second stage of the war in Ukraine has had several similarities with the war in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999) which ended up with forceful separation of Kosovo from Serbia. The similarities The wars in Croatia and Ukraine involved two adversary pairs of neighboring and partly overlapping Slavic nations. These wars unfolded in the territories of two defunct ‘socialist federations’ – the SFRY and the USSR. The causes of both wars were closely related to the almost simultaneous breakdowns of these two federations in 1991 and the demise of their communist regimes that had preceded and caused the breakdowns. The institutional structure of the SFRY was modelled after and closely resembled the structure of the older ‘socialist federation’, the USSR. Shared features of the two included the division of each federation into full-fledged republics and autonomies. Most or all of these federal units were ethnically designated. The minorities of the biggest ethnic groups (Serbs and Russians) were not accorded autonomy within other republics. In both cases, war followed the declarations of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’ and referenda organized by some members of the Serbian community in southwest Croatia and some members of the Russian and Russian-speaking community living in Eastern Ukraine. In each case, the central governments refused to negotiate with the insurgents and decided to suppress them militarily. The armed conflicts in Croatia and Ukraine developed into partly different combinations of civil and interstate wars. The civil war component referred to an armed conflict between the ultranationalist regime in the former second-most populous republic on one hand, and part of the biggest national minority related to the largest ethnic group in the former federation, on the other. The civil war deepened the divisions based on loyalty within both the Serbian community in Croatia and the Russian community in Ukraine. Each war was fought almost exclusively on the territory of the former second-most populous republic, which suffered the most. In both wars, the two sides were responsible for gross violations of international humanitarian law. International sanctions were applied in these two wars. The causes of each war were tangibly related to profound geopolitical changes underway in Europe about 35 years ago. These changes entailed the slackening and termination of the Cold War between two military-political blocs and the wave of liberal-democratic transformation of political systems in Eastern Europe. Over the span of 3 years, about 30 different state entities declared their sovereignty in the area of 3 ‘socialist federations’ (Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia). Of these, 23 entities survived and soon gained universal recognition as sovereign states, including Croatia and Ukraine. The specificity of the war in Ukraine Ancestors of today’s Russians and Ukrainians shared in the distant past close to 400 years of common history in Kievan Rus. In the XIII century this large state formation was destroyed by the invasion of Tatars-Mongols. The subsequent centuries-long domination of Lithuanian and Polish feudal rulers over the ancestors of today’s Ukrainians contributed greatly to their cultural and language distancing from the Russians. In 1648, the Cossack ancestors of some of today’s Ukrainians rebelled against Polish feudal rule, in 1654 begged for protection and voluntarily submitted themselves to Moscow Tsardom. For two and a half centuries, until 1917 they remained as part of the Russian empire, named Ruthenia and later Malorossiya. In 1918, an independent state was proclaimed under the new name Ukrainian People’s Republic. The name Ukraine remained under the Bolsheviks and in 1922 Soviet Ukraine became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. Over several decades, the territory of Soviet Ukraine was more than doubled by Moscow in several successive stages in 1920–1922, 1939–1940, 1945–1947 and 1954. This was accomplished by including into it the lands of Novorossiya, with millions of Russian and Russian-speaking people in the East and South, as well as annexed parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and part of Moldova in the West. In all of these cases, this was done without their population’s consent. In 1992, all these territorial gains became parts of independent Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, whereas the collective rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population were left unprotected. From 1945 for more than four and a half decades Ukraine enjoyed Moscow’s symbolic gift – the status of a UN founding member although it had been a constituing part of another UN founding member (USSR). When Ukraine, at Moscow’s initiative attained independence it did not have to apply for UN membership which from then on it deserved. Divergent political and economic developments in the two independent states exposed a number of different interests and of problems unresolved at the time of separation. These issues, in somewhat different combinations during the two stages of the war contributed to three groups of conflictual relations: (1) between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, (2) inside Ukraine and (3) between the Russian Federation and the West, primarily USA. The non-recognition of collective minority rights by the Ukrainian authorities became a growing political problem with the rise of Ukrainian ultranationalism. Combined with divergent attitudes in Western and Eastern parts of the country concerning Ukraine’s relations with Russia, EU and NATO, language-related problems contributed tangibly to political explosions in Ukraine in February/March 2014. Since 1991, two processes have altered the geopolitical map of Europe. These are the Eastward expansion of the US-dominated NATO along with the closely intertwined enlargement of the European Union. The first stage of these two processes in 1990–1991 – the absorption of Eastern Germany into both organizations – had no impact on the internal crisis in Yugoslavia, including the conflict in Croatia. Two decades later, however, the process of NATO expansion had already reached the borders of both Ukraine and Russia, thereby adding a very real extra-regional component to the conflict in and about Ukraine. For over two decades, one of the USA’s geostrategic goals has been by fostering ‘color revolutions’ to bring about regime change in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine and also Russia. By using Ukraine as a tool, the USA has endeavored to harm and weaken Russia. Under US pressure and notwithstanding German and French objections, at the NATO summit held in Bucharest in April 2008 Ukraine was promised membership in the alliance, yet without stating a date. Openly and strongly opposed by Russia, this decision unleashed a chain of events, 6 years later leading to a war in Ukraine. The European Union and its policy of Eastern neighborhood negatively contributed to these developments. The prospect of an association agreement with the EU deepened the internal political conflict in Ukraine and motivated a mass protest movement that was exploited in February 2014 to stage a US-guided coup d’état in Kyiv. The combination of Ukraine’s promised membership in NATO and the new regime in Kyiv fully dependent on the USA foretold that Russia would certainly lose its old naval base in Sevastopol, for which it had paid high rent since 1992. Moreover, as a NATO naval and air base, Sevastopol would pose a direct threat to Russia and its geopolitical position in the Black Sea and Mediterranean area. To thwart this threat, lightly armed detachments of Russian marines, already legally stationed on Crimea, were ordered to move in unmarked uniforms to take control of the entire peninsula. They did so without facing any resistance, on Kyiv’s strict orders, from the about 22,000 Ukrainian troops or inflicting any casualties. The Ukrainian officialdom then simply vacated Crimea. This takeover was soon followed by a successful referendum accompanied by international observers on approving Crimea’s legal separation from Ukraine and it rejoining Russia. Moscow thus took back Nikita Khrushchev’s present to Ukraine on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of its unification with Russia. First stage of the war in Ukraine Closely related to the dramatic developments in Kyiv, there were uprisings in several Ukrainian cities and proclamations of ‘‘sovereignty’’ and ‘‘autonomy’’ in Lugansk and Donetsk. These uprisings largely featured protests against the discriminatory measures adopted by the new authorities against the Russian and Russian-speaking population. The ultranationalist regime in Kyiv responded on 13 April 2014 by branding the protesters ‘‘terrorists’’, declaring a “wide anti-terrorist operation” and entrusting the Ukrainian Army to carry it out. This military operation launched the first stage of the war in Ukraine. In its attacks on the Donbas autonomists, the Ukrainian Army employed bombers, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery while battalions of Ukrainian ultranationalist volunteers with neo-Nazi leanings and financed by Ukrainian oligarchs used artillery and light weapons. On the defending side, there were about 35,000 members of the territorial people’s militias of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics as well as Russian and other (including Serbian) volunteers. The Russian Federation offered multi-sided support to the two besieged republics, encompassing financial, material, humanitarian and military assistance. Russian professional military personnel were integrated into the local militias and did not operate as separate and regular units of the Russian Army. At the same time, the US and British armed forces offered very sizeable material and other military assistance to the Ukrainian Army, also involving thousands of advisors and instructors. In numbers, they were comparable to the Russian military personnel on the other side of the frontline. By February 2022, this armed conflict had led to 14,000 to 20,000 dead. Two armistice agreements, Minsk 1 and Minsk 2, did not halt the Ukrainian shelling of Ukrainian territory, which was responsible for thousands of casualties among the civilian population of the two self-proclaimed republics. These attacks continued for more than 9 years, accompanied by gross violations of international humanitarian law. In February 2015, Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine signed the Minsk 2 agreement. It was co-signed by the leaders of Germany, France and Russia and unanimously adopted as a resolution by the UN Security Council, thereby becoming part of international law. The Minsk 2 agreement provided for peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas. Nonetheless, Petro Poroshenko and his successor Volodimir Zelenski refused to implement most of Ukraine’s 12 obligations, including the key provisions under which Ukraine was to grant constitutionally guaranteed autonomy to the Russian and Russian-speaking population in Donbas. In addition, Zelenski reneged on his pre-election promise that saw him win the election in 2019 and did not stop the war. Second stage of the war in Ukraine On 21 March 2021, Zelenski blatantly violated the Minsk 2 agreement and international law by ordering the Ukrainian Army to liberate the territories of the two republics and Crimea. The bulk of the Ukrainian Army was then relocated to their vicinity, clearly visible by Russian satellites. Instead of peaceful resolution of the conflict, Zelenski, no doubt with the USA’s full approval, thus decided on full-scale military suppression of the Donbas autonomists and on reconquering Crimea, well aware that it would provoke a strong reaction from Russia. On 16 February 2022, upon his order the Ukrainian Army initiated the second and much more violent stage of the war. From that date on, the intensity of Ukrainian shelling started to grow from several tens to 1,500 explosions daily. Combined with movements of Ukrainian troops, this strongly indicated that a massive attack was coming as part of implementation of the March 2021 order. It was very similar to the Georgian offensive against the self-proclaimed Republic of Southern Ossetia on 7 August 2008. This escalation was no doubt coordinated with US President Joe Biden, who publicly predicted that Russia would invade on 16 February 2022. Ukraine’s stepping up the level of violence successfully provoked a predictable Russian response. On the political and legal levels, this entailed the Russian Federation’s recognition of the two republics as independent states, signing two agreements on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, accepting their pleas for assistance and protection in line with Art. 51 of the UN Charter and invoking the Responsibility for Protect. In the latter the Russian Federation used a very similar justification as did NATO in 1999 for its aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the military level, Putin was faced with the real prospect of Ukraine quashing the two client Russian-speaking parastates. This would have submitted their discriminated Russian and Russian-speaking majority population to retribution by the Ukrainian ultranationalist and assimilationist regime, causing it to flee en masse across the border. He later explained that moral duty is higher than legality. Putin could not, also for domestic reasons, afford a humiliating political defeat similar to that suffered by Slobodan Milosevic in Croatia in August 1995. Unlike in August 2008 in Georgia, he did not wait for an all-out Ukrainian attack. Putin knew full well that stronger Western sanctions than those currently in place would follow, even if Russia’s response to the Ukrainian offensive were only moderate. Probably on the basis of a faulty assessment of both Ukraine’s capacity and determination to resist and the West’s response, he precipitously and knowingly in violation of international law ordered a ‘special military operation’ with an invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, by a limited contingent of Russian land forces. This move was combined with extensive destruction of the Ukrainian air force, the air defense system, and other military infrastructure. Ignoring an axiom of military science, an invading force of some 90,000 Russian land troops was sent against the Ukrainian Army thrice superior in numbers. It was also grossly insufficient and unprepared to accomplish the officially declared task of “demilitarizing” and “denazifying” entire Ukraine. In spite of its shortcomings, this force managed to swiftly occupy additional 15% or so of Ukrainian territory (some as a diversion and only temporarily) and effectively protected the two republics. It additionally established and secured a land bridge between Crimea and Donbas, made the Azov Sea part of Russia’s internal waters, took control of the largest European nuclear power station at Zaporizhie, and deprived Ukraine of its stocks of plutonium and uranium. These stocks would have been sufficient to make Ukraine the world’s fourth-strongest nuclear power. The latter was an effective response to Zelenski’s earlier declaration that Ukraine was intending to again acquire nuclear weapons. Preventing this dangerous prospect certainly served as an additional and important incentive for Putin’s decision. For USA, the by far most frequent transgressor of international law, provoking Russia into an act of aggression fitted nicely with the their strategic goal. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided a perfect occasion for demonizing and isolating it internationally and for uniting the West under USA’s guidance on imposing on Russia an unprecedented array of drastic economic and other sanctions. These punitive measures were expected to quickly ruin the Russian economy, hopefully bring down Vladimir Putin’s regime, defeat Russia militarily without losing American lives, and cause the fragmentation of Russia into several states (as elaborated earlier publicly by Zbigniew Brzezinski and the RAND Corporation). However, these hopes have not materialized. Moreover, the effects of the Western sanctions proved to be more harmful to the EU economies than to Russia while in no way helping Ukraine. The two wars compared Still officially undeclared by both direct belligerents, the war in Ukraine is already twice as long as the war in Croatia, and is still ongoing. There are also other important differences caused by the mismatch between Croatia and Ukraine in the size of their population and territory (approximately 1:10), and by the different configuration and extent of the theatres of war. Further, there are differences in the size and structure of the armed forces involved, in the disparities between Serbia’s and Russia’s military capabilities compared to the respective capabilities of Croatia and Ukraine. The war in Ukraine in its second stage is also unlike the war in Croatia due to the massive use of particular weapons systems (notably drones and missiles). Vast differences also exist in the direct involvement of international organizations and other external actors in the two wars. In the autumn of 1991, the European Economic Community (EEC) sent Croatia its first mission of white-clad and unarmed observers who as impartial intermediaries tried unsuccessfully to stop the armed clashes between the Croatian police and Serbian insurgents. The United Nations established UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) in February 1992, operating from Zagreb. It was followed by UNCRO (UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia) in 1995–1998, UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Croatia) in 1996–1998, and UNMOP (UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka) in 1996–1997. For several years, the UN-supported International Conference on Former Yugoslavia was active operating from Geneva. In comparison, there have been no UN or EU peacekeeping or observer missions in Ukraine. The UN General assembly has adopted a number of resolutions related to the war in Ukraine. In several resolutions it deplored and condemned Russia’s invasion with huge majorities for and only five votes against. The OSCE had no observer missions in Croatia, but deployed two such missions in Ukraine, notably the sizeable OSCE Special Monitoring Mission from 2015 until March 2022. In addition, the OSCE played an active role in facilitating the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 ceasefire agreements. Extra-regional states were not openly involved in the war in Croatia. In 1991–1992, the Croatian forces included 456 foreign fighters (British, French, German et.al.), accompanied by about 2,000 private American military instructors. On the other hand, Ukraine has received huge support from several dozen foreign states, in particular the USA, as well as other NATO and EU members in the form of heavy arms, ammunition, training, intelligence, economic and humanitarian assistance. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, since 2022, 13.387 foreign fighters, mercenaries and volunteers joined the Ukrainian Army of whom 5.962 lost their lives. Polish citizens have been most numerous in both categories – 2.960 enlisted and 1.497 dead. They are followed by Americans and others. This strong external involvement transformed the local war into an extra-regional armed conflict between Russia and the US-led collective West, with Ukraine acting and sacrificing its soldiers and itself as the West’s proxy. The war in Croatia and its outcome were closely linked with the war in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, while there has been no similar regional linkage of the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has also had by far a bigger international political and economic impact on other countries, not only in Europe, than the war in Croatia. Most importantly, there are enormous differences between the two wars in the number of dead (at least 1:25), number of refugees and displaced persons (approximately 1:25), and extent of destruction and amount of economic damage (at least 1:20). The war has inflicted considerably greater damage on Ukraine as a state and on Ukrainian society than the war did on Croatia. Since 2014, the population under Kyiv’s control has so far been reduced by at least one-third and the territory by close to one-fifth. It is estimated that the Ukrainian Army, National Guard and volunteers have suffered well over 400,000 deaths. Ukraine has also lost a good deal of its industrial capacity, agriculture, energy generation and critical infrastructure. The war’s continuation suits the USA’s geostrategic, chiefly anti-Russian objectives, whereas Ukraine is paying a horrible price for them. The dragging on war of attrition is sapping Ukraine’s ability to sustain itself, at least in its already rump shape. It increases the probability of Ukraine becoming (again) a landlocked country on less than a half of its territory internationally recognized since 1992. The first stage of the war in Ukraine and the war in Croatia revealed substantial similarities as far as their causes and destructive consequences were concerned. On the other hand the second stage of the war in Ukraine strongly differs by being predominantly an interstate war and the first interstate armed conflict in Europe caused by NATO enlargement. As a result, the war in Ukraine is sharply distinguished by its magnitude, destructive outcomes, violations of international humanitarian law, international impact, and the involvement of great powers. At the beginning of the second stage of the war in Ukraine, the Russian Army pre-empted the anticipated Ukrainian version of an offensive akin to the Croatian operations “Flash” and “Storm”. It not only prevented the possibility of Volodimir Zelenski’s triumphant entrance in Donetsk like Franjo Tudjman’s entrance in Knin. The Russian Federation also annexed four Ukrainian provinces with Russian and Russian-speaking majorities in their populations and the Russian Army occupied a good share of them. In 2014 and 2022, Moscow thus took back a considerable part of former Novorossiya given to Soviet Ukraine in 1920 and 1954. Unlike in Croatia, but like in Kosovo (1999) the war in Ukraine has extended the list of the more than three dozen new or de facto changed borders between European states since 1945. Responsibility for the war in Ukraine In a speech given at the UN General Assembly, US President Joe Biden ascribed Russia with full responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Yet, in fact, a number of states are directly responsible or co-responsible for its outbreak and continuation, including notably USA. First, the war was initiated by the Ukrainian Army in April 2014 according to orders of the Ukrainian interim Presidency. Under two subsequent Presidents Poroshenko and Zelenski, Ukraine violated two armistice agreements and sabotaged realization of the Minsk 2 agreement on peaceful resolution of the Donbas conflict. President Zelenski failed to fulfil his pre-election pledge to end the war, a pledge that had seen him win the election in 2019. On 21 March 2021, he ordered the Ukrainian Army to attack Donbas and Crimea in direct violation of both the Minsk 2 agreement and of international law. The Ukrainian leadership’s orders to steeply increase the artillery shelling of Donetsk from February 16, 2022 on, together with the movement of troops provoked an invasion by the Russian army. This led to the armed conflict transforming from an internal to largely an interstate war. In April 2022, President Zelenski reneged on an initialed agreement with the Russian Federation on resolving the conflict, as forged with assistance from the leaders of Israel and Turkey as intermediaries. Ukraine is responsible for the casualties and damage caused by its forces in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the Russian Federation has grossly violated the UN Charter, the Helsinki principles, and a dozen international treaties and agreements by which it guaranteed Ukraine’s security and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders. In February 2014, it committed an act of aggression by occupying and annexing Crimea. On 24 February 2022, it committed a second act of aggression by invading, occupying and annexing four Ukrainian provinces. The Russian Federation is responsible for the casualties and huge damage the Russian armed forces have caused on Ukrainian territory. The leading NATO members are co-responsible for the outbreak and continuation of the interstate conflict and war in and over Ukraine. This primarily applies to the USA, which knowingly unleashed a chain reaction in the conflictual relations between NATO and Russia. The USA used NATO to embroil EU in this conflict, even though that contradicts the objective economic and other interests of many EU members, notably Germany. This chain reaction led to the political conflict deteriorating into a war in which the USA is using Ukraine as a tool to harm and weaken Russia. Germany and France with their swindling signatures under the Minsk 2 agreement and with subsequent policies for 7 years allowed Ukraine’s sabotaging of peaceful solution of the Donbas conflict. As leaders in the European Union’s collective foreign policy, they encouraged and supported Ukraine’s active preparations for a war with Russia. The Western powers became co-responsible for the transformation from a relatively limited internal war in Ukraine into a wider, much more lethal, bloody and destructive, predominantly interstate war. In April 2022, the USA and Great Britain prevented the conclusion of an initialed Russian-Ukrainian agreement on resolving the conflict. The members of NATO and EU by politically encouraging and by providing arms and funds to Ukraine have been enabling the continuation of this war. Without this intrusion, the war in Ukraine would already be over and very probably on better terms for Ukraine than there will actually be. The NATO and EU members will certainly fail to achieve their main declared goal – Ukraine’s victory and hence Russia’s military and political defeat. This applies chiefly to the leader of the West. After that in Afghanistan, the USA will suffer one more political defeat. On the other hand, the USA has this time been rather successful in realizing several related goals. The USA has solidified its hegemony in the Western camp and in most of Europe, reactivated NATO, attracted two new members Finland and Sweden, bolstered its dominant role in the alliance, subordinated even further and simultaneously economically and politically weakened the European Union, for quite some time poisoned Germany’s and the EU’s relations with Russia, and inflicted very considerable economic and political damage on Russia. Conclusion Ukraine is today much farther away from accomplishing its cardinal strategic goal – to re-establish its sovereignty on the entire internationally recognized territory – than it was in February 2022, let alone in February 2014. Moreover, another goal remains unattained. It was stated in Zelenski’s decree as a condition for lifting the prohibition on any negotiations with the Russian Federation – to remove Putin from the position of President. However, with his mandate expired in May 2024 Zelenski himself will certainly be out of his presidential office much sooner than Putin will be from his. On the other hand, the Russian Federation has achieved some of its strategic goals, albeit not the two declared principal ones – Ukraine’s permanent “neutralization” and “demilitarization”. Due to the two sides’ mutually excluding objectives, the final outcome of the war in Ukraine will not be decided around a diplomatic table as a compromise. Like what happened in Croatia in August 1995 and very recently in September 2023 with the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, it will be decided on the battlefield. Still, the outcome will be very different from both cases mentioned above and certainly will not be viewed as just by both belligerents. Just like how almost all wars end. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Baud, Jacques (2023): Ukraine entre Guerre et Paix. Paris, Max Milo. Bebler, Anton (ed.). (2015): ‘Frozen conflicts’ in Europe. Opladen, Barbara Budrich. Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997): Geostrategy for Eurasia. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 56–68. Goldstein, Ivo (2008): Hrvaška zgodovina. Ljubljana, Društvo Slovenska Matica. Larrabee, F. Stephen, Peter A. Wilson and John Gordon (2015): The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation. Maver, Aleš (2023): Ukrajina: Od Igre Prestolov do Vojne za Samostojnost. Celje, Celjska Mohorjeva Družba. Pleiner, H. (2023): Der Konflict um die Ukraine. ÖMZ 5: 571–583. Wien. Plokhy, Serhii (2022): Vrata Evrope: zgodovina Ukrajine. Ljubljana, UMCO.

Defense & Security
Ukrainian military woman with Ukrainian flag in her hands on the background of an exploded house

Ukraine is losing the war and the west faces a stark choice: help now or face a resurgent and aggressive Russia

by Stefan Wolff , Tetyana Malyarenko

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is now experiencing a level of existential threat comparable only to the situation immediately after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. But in contrast to then, improvements are unlikely – at least not soon. Not only have conditions along the frontline significantly worsened, according to the Ukrainian commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrsky, but the very possibility of a Ukrainian defeat is now discussed in public by people like the former commander of the UK’s Joint Forces Command, General Sir Richard Barrons. Barrons told the BBC on April 13 that Ukraine could lose the war in 2024 “because Ukraine may come to feel it can’t win … And when it gets to that point, why will people want to fight and die any longer, just to defend the indefensible?” This may be his way of trying to push the west to provide more military aid to Ukraine faster. Yet the fact that the Nato secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, publicly accepts that to end the war Ukraine will have to negotiate with Russia and decide “what kind of compromises they’re willing to do” is a clear indication that things are not going well for Ukraine. There are several reasons for what appears to be an increasingly defeatist narrative. First is the worsening situation at the front where Ukraine lacks both manpower and equipment and ammunition to hold the line against Russia. This will not change any time soon. The new Ukrainian mobilisation law has only just been approved. It will take time to train, deploy and integrate new troops at the front. At the same time, Russia’s economy has been resilient to western sanctions and seen growth driven by the war. On top of deliveries from Iran and North Korea dual-use technology, including electrical components and machine tools for arms manufacture, has been supplied by China. Moscow has also managed to produce a lot of its own equipment and ammunition. Much of this is being made in facilities beyond the reach of Ukrainian weapons. This is not to say that all is well with Russian resupplies, but they are superior to what Ukraine can manage on its own in the absence of western support. Bleak outlook This changing balance of capabilities to sustain the war effort, which now increasingly favours Russia, has enabled the Kremlin to adopt a strategy of grinding down Ukrainian defences along long stretches of the front, especially in Donbas in the east, where Russian pressure has been applied in recent months.     There is also a large concentration of Russian troops across the border from Kharkiv at the moment. Ukraine’s second-largest city has come under increased Russian attacks over the past several weeks which has led to mandatory evacuations from three districts in the region. The approximately 100,000 to 120,000 Russian troops would not be sufficient for another successful Russian cross-border offensive, but they are enough to tie down large numbers of Ukrainian forces which, therefore, cannot be used in other potentially more vulnerable areas of the frontline. Short of a sudden collapse of a significant part of the Ukrainian defence lines, a massive Russian advance is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But part of what Russia is trying to do right now with its broad push against Ukraine’s defences is probe for weaknesses to exploit in a larger offensive later in the spring or early in the summer. In this context, it is important to remember Russia’s proclaimed overall goals, especially the Kremlin’s territorial claims to all four of the regions Moscow annexed in September 2022. There is no indication that these objectives have changed, and Russia’s current operations on the battlefield are consistent with this. Capturing the remainder of the Donetsk region would be the first step and provide a basis for subsequent further gains in the Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine and the Kherson region in the centre, especially retaking the city of Kherson, which Ukraine liberated in late autumn 2022. A Ukrainian withdrawal behind better defensible positions away from the current frontline in Donbas would make the former goal – capturing all of Donbas – more achievable for Russia, but deny the Kremlin success in Zaporzhiya and Kherson. It would also frustrate any Russian hopes of capturing the remainder of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast all the way through to Odesa. Whether this Ukrainian strategy can succeed, however, will significantly depend on what kind of western support will be forthcoming and how soon. Help wanted – right now The most optimistic outcome is that Kyiv’s western allies rapidly increase military support for Ukraine. This must include ammunition, air defence systems, armoured vehicles and drones. At the same time, the western defence industrial base, especially in Europe, needs to switch to a similar war footing as in Russia. On that basis, the situation along the frontlines could stabilise and whatever offensive moves Russia has planned now would not gain much new ground. This most optimistic outcome would constitute a slightly improved situation for Ukraine – any more than that is unlikely at present. The worst case would be a collapse of parts of the frontline that would enable further Russian gains. While not necessarily likely as things stand right now, if it were to happen it would also be a major problem for morale in Ukraine. It would empower doubters in the west to push Ukraine into negotiations at a time when it would be weak, even if almost three-quarters of Ukrainians are open to the idea of negotiations. The worst outcome therefore is not Moscow taking Kyiv, but a military defeat of Ukraine in all but name. A major Russian offensive in the summer, if successful, would force Kyiv into a bad compromise. Beyond defeat for Ukraine, it would also mean humiliation of the west and a likely complete fracturing of the so far relatively united front of support for Kyiv, thus further empowering the Kremlin. In such a scenario, any compromises imposed by Russia on Ukraine on the back of Kremlin wins on the battlefield would probably be mere stepping stones in Putin’s unending quest to restore the Russian empire of his Soviet dreams.

Defense & Security
The national flags of NATO members fly outside the organization's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on April 3, 2023.

NATO anniversary 2024 - 75 years of the defense alliance

by Christina Bellmann

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français What is required of member states between now and the Alliance's anniversary summit in Washington D.C. from July 9 to 11 75 years after its founding, NATO is facing an unprecedented set of challenges. The global security landscape is changing rapidly - from the ongoing war in Ukraine to crucial elections on both sides of the Atlantic. The summit in Washington D.C. will not only be a celebration of the past, but also a crucial marker for the future direction of the Alliance.  NATO is in troubled waters ahead of its 75th birthday - on the one hand, it is not 'brain dead' but offers protection to new members - on the other hand, the challenges are enormous in view of the war in Ukraine.  In the third year of the war, the military situation in Ukraine is serious. The military is coming under increasing pressure and European partners are delivering too little and too slowly.  Western support must be stepped up in order to influence the outcome of the war - Russia's future behavior towards its neighbors also depends on this.  Elections will be held on both sides of the Atlantic in 2024 - the US presidential election in November will be particularly decisive for NATO.  Two thirds of NATO member states are well on the way to meeting the two percent national defense spending target - Germany in particular must ensure that this target is met in the long term.  Now it is up to the leadership of larger countries such as Germany, France and Poland to develop traction in European defense in order to present a future US president with a resilient burden-sharing balance sheet and not leave Ukraine - and the European security order - in the lurch. Return to the core mission In the 75th year of its existence, the North Atlantic Defense Alliance has returned to its core mission: deterrence and defense against a territorial aggressor. NATO defense planning will be reviewed for its resilience before the NATO summit in Washington D.C. from 9 to 11 July 2024. What challenges does the Alliance face in its anniversary year and what needs to happen between now and the NATO summit to make the summit a success? The state of the Alliance ahead of the summit NATO is in difficult waters ahead of its 75th anniversary. On the one hand, it has proven since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression that it is capable of acting and not brain-dead. The two new members, Finland and Sweden, have given up their decades of neutrality because their populations are convinced that they are better protected against Russian aggression within the 30 allies, despite the excellent condition of their military. On the other hand, the admission process has taken much longer than was to be expected given the high level of interoperability of both countries with NATO standards. It took a good twenty months since the application was submitted for both flags to fly on the flagpoles in front of NATO headquarters in Brussels - the internal blockade by Turkey and Hungary is an expression of the Alliance's challenge to maintain a united front against the Russian threat. The Vilnius decision of 2023 to adhere to the previous two percent target for annual defense spending as a percentage of national gross domestic product (GDP) as a minimum figure in future and even to strive for additional spending beyond this is an enormous effort for the members of the alliance - and the biggest point of criticism from its sceptics. The implementation of this goal goes hand in hand with the further development of the defense posture, which was also decided in Vilnius. This includes new regional defense plans that provide for more combat-capable troops that can be deployed more quickly. The Washington summit will show how far the Alliance has come in this respect in a year - gaps between targets and actual capabilities would consequently have to be covered by investments that go beyond the two percent GDP contributions. There are also a number of other important events and factors that will influence the summit. Ukraine's military situation In the third year of the war, the military situation in Ukraine is serious. The fighting has largely turned into a war of position, with high casualties on both sides. The sluggish supply of support from the West means that the Ukrainians have to make do with significantly less than their defense needs. The European Union has failed to meet its promise to deliver one million 155-millimetre shells within a year (by March 2024), while the Russian war economy is producing supplies in multiple shifts. This imbalance is making itself painfully felt in the Ukrainian defense - due to the material deficit, nowhere near enough Russian positions can be eliminated and Russian attacks repelled, and Ukrainian personnel on the front line are depleted. President Volodymyr Zelensky is coming under increasing pressure to mobilize fresh forces for the front. As a result, the Ukrainian military is having to give up some of its terrain in order to conserve material and personnel and take up the most sustainable defensive position possible for the coming weeks and months until relief hopefully comes. comes.1 The Czech initiative to procure half a million rounds in 155 millimeter caliber and 300,000 rounds in 122 millimeter caliber on the world market for Ukraine by June 2024 is urgently needed - but it does not change the fact that Europe and the West are delivering too little and too late, despite the efforts that have been made so far and must continue to be made.2 Even if the US and Europe were to produce at full speed, it would only be half of what Russia produces and receives in support from its allies. Western support therefore urgently needs to be ramped up, as it is of crucial importance for the outcome of the war - and for Russia's future behavior in its neighborhood. Upcoming elections A series of landmark elections will take place on both sides of the Atlantic in the run-up to the summit. The US presidential elections in November 2024 will be of the greatest importance for the future direction of NATO. To date, the USA has been the largest single supporter of Ukraine in the military field; in addition, the USA has decisive weight in the coordination of concrete support from NATO countries - the German Chancellor has repeatedly oriented himself towards US arms deliveries when it comes to the question of German support or even made this a condition for his own commitments.3 While the Democrats in the US Congress continue to support aid packages to Ukraine, the Republican Party is dominated by voices around presidential candidate Donald Trump calling for this "European war" to be left to the Europeans and for domestic challenges to be addressed instead.4 This has led to a months-long blockade of further aid amounting to 60 billion US dollars in the US House of Representatives, which is led by a wafer-thin majority of Republicans. Ukraine urgently needs these supplies to avert shortages in ammunition and air defense. At the time of publication of this Monitor, a release of the funds is not in sight. In terms of foreign policy, there is a bipartisan consensus that the real danger for the USA lies in a systemic conflict with China. Among Republican supporters, impatience with the continuation of the war is increasing, while approval for further support for Ukraine is decreasing. The mood among the general population is similar: between April 2022 and September 2023, the view that the US is doing "too much" for Ukraine increased (from 14% to 41%).5 On the European side, the most important milestone for further support for Ukraine is the election of the new European Parliament from 6 to 9 June 2024. Since the outbreak of the war, approval ratings in the EU for support for Ukraine have been remarkably stable.6 Even in the face of a sometimes difficult economic environment in the 20 eurozone states, approval ratings for the continuation of aid to Ukraine have only fallen slightly in a few EU states - starting from a high level. While the broad center of the EP groups (EPP, S&D and Renew) are united in their support for Ukraine and the transatlantic alliance, the foreign and security policy positioning of the far-right parties of the ECR and ID groups and the non-attached groups is not always clear. According to Nicolai von Ondarza and Max Becker from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), while the ECR parliamentary group "largely plays a constructive and compatible role" in foreign and security policy, including with regard to NATO and Ukraine, parts of the ID parliamentary group such as the French Rassemblement National (RN) or the German AfD either voted against resolutions critical of Russia in parliament or abstained.7 According to Olaf Wientzek from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, both the ECR and ID can expect significant seat gains in the upcoming EP elections.8 In terms of numbers, the ID and ECR groups are competing with Renew to be the third strongest force behind the EPP and S&D - according to current estimates, they all have between 80 and 90 seats. It would be conceivable for the currently non-attached Hungarian Fidesz (currently 13 MEPs) to join both the ECR and ID. In view of the increasing co-decision role of parliament - including for further Ukraine support packages - it is important for the EU how these parties and party alliances position themselves in terms of foreign and security policy.9 In fact, parties in the ID faction represent Russian propaganda within Europe in order to exert influence through disinformation, subversion and mobilization and thus undermine the social consensus with regard to Ukraine and NATO.10 This may also become apparent in individual elections, such as in the eastern German states in September 2024. Economic pressure - prioritizing defence? Global inflation averaged 6.2% in 2023. Current forecasts assume falling inflation rates in the Euro-Atlantic region over the course of 2024 to 2026.11 At the same time, however, global economic growth of 3.1% (2024) and an expected 3.2% (2025) compared to the previous year is well below the projections for the post-pandemic recovery.12 The combination of higher consumer prices and slower economic recovery continues to pose the risk of declining approval for strong support within the populations of the European Ukraine-supporting states. Protests in the face of announcements of cuts in various policy areas have demonstrated this in Germany and Europe over the past year. This does not make it easy to prioritize defence spending from a national perspective for the coming years. In the case of Germany, the defense budget is competing with all other departments in the budget negotiations for 2025, which are calling for an increase in social spending and investments in view of the current burdens on the population.13 At the same time, inflation does not stop at military procurement. As early as 2022, Germany therefore had to cancel a number of planned procurement projects due to increased costs.14 The cost increase also affects the maintenance of existing equipment and personnel. Even if Germany nominally reaches the two percent target in 2024, the increases in national defense spending within the Alliance will actually be lower when adjusted for inflation. Systemic threat from China The increasing systemic confrontation with China is not only identified in the US national security strategy; for the first time, China was classified as a concrete threat by NATO in its Strategic Concept of 2022. China is threatening to annex the democratically governed island of Taiwan to its territory, possibly by military means.15 This would have enormous global escalation potential and far-reaching effects on important international sea routes. Concerns about free trade routes are leading to a convergence of threat perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic. As a result, many European partners are rethinking their relations with China - as is Germany in its China strategy. China's global ambition to restructure the existing multilateral order according to its own ideas does not only affect Taiwan's independence. China's supremacy in key technical and industrial sectors as well as critical infrastructure, rare raw materials and supply chains would lead to a deepening of existing dependencies. Because the USA sees China as a systemic threat to international order, freedom and prosperity, it has been refocusing its efforts since President Obama took office. European NATO partners are therefore expected to invest in Europe's security themselves. Only greater burden-sharing by the Europeans would enable the USA to focus its attention more strongly on the Indo-Pacific. Challenges in new dimensions In addition to the geopolitical challenges outlined above, NATO designated space in 2019 as an additional battlefield to the existing fields - land, air, sea and cyberspace - due to its increased importance.16 In recent decades, China has rapidly expanded its presence in space in both the civilian and military sectors.17 The war in Ukraine has once again underlined the importance of satellite-based intelligence and the significance of connected weapons for combat. In addition, the effects of man-made climate change, which also have an impact on security in the Euro-Atlantic alliance area, have recently become increasingly apparent. At the 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, the Alliance set itself the goal of becoming a leading international organization in understanding and adapting to the effects of climate change on security.18 To this end, it adopted the "Climate Change and Security Action Plan". The NATO countries' homework A successful NATO summit in the anniversary year 2024 would send an important signal of the unity and defense capability of the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the face of Russia's breach of international law in a time of systemic competition. NATO member states are confronted with a complex threat situation ahead of the next summit in Washington D.C.. These give rise to various requirements: More NATO members must reach the two percent target In financial terms, the Washington summit will probably be considered a success if a substantial number of member states reach the two percent target. In 2023, this was the case for eleven countries (Poland, USA, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Latvia, UK, Slovakia).19 In February 2024, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced on the sidelines of a meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group in Brussels that 18 countries would reach the target by the summit.20 Germany, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Denmark, Albania and North Macedonia are the countries that have recently reached the target.21 The newest NATO member, Sweden, increases the number to.19 Achieving the two percent target for defense spending is not an end in itself. The discussion within NATO as to whether one should deviate from the numerical contribution target and instead assess the actual capabilities contributed by the individual member states is not a new one. Amounts of money to measure collective defense remain the simplest way to approximate burden-sharing within NATO - and until all countries have achieved this, it will remain the relevant metric in the political discussion. From NATO's perspective, the gap between the desired capabilities listed in the defense plans and the troop contingents registered by the member states has widened steadily of late. In reality, there is no way around increased defense spending in order to adequately equip the required personnel, who would have to be subordinate to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) in an emergency - from a military perspective, the demand is therefore increasingly being made that two percent should be the minimum target. In order to achieve all the required capabilities, larger contributions are needed from all nations. Due to the threat situation and political pressure, it seems possible that 21 countries, i.e. two thirds of the member states, will meet the two percent target by the NATO summit in Washington. In addition to the 19 countries mentioned above, these are France22 and Montenegro.23 Turkey wants to achieve the target by 2025,24 although this commitment is uncertain in view of the poor economic situation. Italy wants to spend two percent within the next two years25, while Norway should reach the target by 2026 according to Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere26. Slovenia has set 2027 as the target date for meeting the commitments27, while Portugal, Spain and Belgium have set 2030 as the target date. Canada (1.38%), Croatia (1.79%) and Luxembourg (0.72%) have not provided any information. Reduce bureaucracy, speed up procurement In material terms, the main aim is to convert the increased defense spending into "material on the farm" in a timely manner. To achieve this, the planning and procurement processes in many European countries need to be accelerated, made less bureaucratic and at the same time better coordinated. The common European defense will require massive improvements in the coming years. Some announcements have already been made during the pre-election campaign for the European Parliament; here, too, what counts is how the announcements are implemented after the election. Progress must also be made in the area of research and development in order to invest scarce resources in state-of-the-art systems. The question of joint development versus off-the-shelf procurement of available equipment will also have to be decided in many cases. A rethink in European procurement is essential for this. This is primarily the responsibility of the European nation states: long-term contracts with the arms industry must be concluded urgently, cooperation initiated and loans granted for production. Strengthening EU-NATO cooperation and NATO partnership policy NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass show a strong convergence in threat analysis. The EU has effective starting points and tools, particularly for cross-cutting challenges such as combating climate change, the threat of hybrid attacks and the protection of critical infrastructure. With the European Peace Facility and other instruments, a concrete institutional framework has been created to strengthen the European pillar in NATO and contribute to fairer burden-sharing on both sides of the Atlantic. The EU and NATO should further intensify the exchange on common challenges and utilize the strengths of the respective forum. In addition to the partnership with the EU, the member states should continue to promote NATO's partnership policy. 2024 marks the 25th anniversary of NATO's eastward enlargement and the 30th anniversary of NATO's Partnership for Peace program. In view of a global confrontation with Russia and an increasingly aggressive China, it is worth taking a look at the instruments that were devised during the Cold War with a view to 'like-minded' partners outside the Alliance. NATO's partnership policy - adapted to the new circumstances - is an ideal instrument for forging close ties with democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific that share NATO's interests and values.28 Investing in interoperability NATO must continue to act as a "guardian of standards" in favor of military interoperability. This year's major exercises as part of "Steadfast Defender 2024" and "Quadriga 2024" will show, among other things, which weaknesses still exist in the various dimensions of interoperability in practical tests. In addition, care must be taken to ensure that military innovations from pioneers within NATO do not leave the Alliance's other allies behind in technical terms. This does not mean that technological progress is slowed down in a race to the bottom; instead, member states with lower expenditure on research and development must be enabled to catch up more quickly - especially in areas such as space technology and the use of artificial intelligence in warfare, it is becoming increasingly important to avoid the technological gap between the members of the alliance. What does this mean for Germany? The Federal Chancellor's announcement on February 27, 2022 that the establishment of the 100 billion euro special fund heralded a turning point in Germany's security policy was seen everywhere in Germany and within the Alliance as the right decision in view of Russia's aggression. In his speech, Olaf Scholz emphasized that Germany was not seeking this expenditure to please allies. The special fund serves national security. However, the acute threat to European security remains and although the NATO target will be reached in 2024, the future of Germany's defense budget is anything but certain. However, investment in the Bundeswehr's defense capabilities is essential to contribute to credible deterrence. The foundation for securing sustainable defense spending in Germany's medium-term financial planning must be laid now, otherwise two percent - depending on the spending status of the special fund - may already be unattainable in 2026, when the regular federal budget is once again used as the basis for calculating the NATO target. As the budget for 2025 will not yet have been decided at the NATO summit in July 2024, the Chancellor will need to make a credible commitment to the allies that Germany will not fall behind. The Bundeswehr will also have to stretch itself enormously in order to achieve the troop levels announced for the new defense plans. The number of servicewomen and men is currently stagnating at just under 182,000. 29 In order to be able to provide the brigade in Lithuania in addition to the nationally required forces and to meet the division commitment for 2026, the Bundeswehr must come significantly closer to the target figure of 203,300 active servicewomen and men by 2027.30 The questions of how many of the 182,000 soldiers available on paper are also willing to become part of the brigade in Lithuania and how many of the total number are actually deployable in an emergency have not even been asked at this point. What counts now - political leadership The security situation in Europe is serious and NATO has no shortage of challenges in its 75th year of existence. It is in good shape to meet these challenges and has welcomed two strong nations into its ranks, Finland and Sweden. However, it is now important not to let up in the efforts that have been agreed. A united external stance is key here, as the current NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg never tires of emphasizing. His successor will have to continue this. Even more important, however, are actual, concrete and substantial actions - the English expression "put one's money where one's mouth is" must be the leitmotif of all European NATO nations in view of the US elections at the end of the year, regardless of the outcome. Ultimately, political leadership is what counts within the alliance in virtually all the areas mentioned - and it matters now. Many smaller countries in Europe look to the larger member states such as Germany, France and Poland for leadership. This applies both in terms of sustainable compliance with the two percent target and when it comes to political agreement and cooperation in the field of armaments. Here, the larger states have a role model and leadership function that can develop traction and pressure on the Alliance as a whole. This political leadership will be more important than ever for the European representatives in NATO in 2024. At the moment, however, it seems questionable whether the current leadership vacuum can be filled before the NATO summit. Germany, France and Poland have not yet been able to develop a jointly coordinated stance that could have a positive effect. It is therefore also questionable whether the NATO summit will be able to send important signals beyond the minimum objectives. The US presidential election hangs over everything like a sword of Damocles - the erratic leadership style of another US President Donald Trump could be difficult to reconcile with the strategic goals of the alliance. Imprint This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or election campaigners or helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2024, Berlin Design: yellow too, Pasiek Horntrich GbR Produced with the financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany. References 1 Reisner, Markus: So ernst ist die Lage an der Front. In: Streitkräfte und Strategien Podcast, NDR Info, 12.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/0ne7 2 Zachová, Aneta: Tschechische Initiative: Munition für Ukraine könnte im Juni eintreffen. Euractiv, 13.03.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/gofh 3 Besonders eindrücklich bleibt das Beispiel der Lieferung schwerer Waffen in Erinnerung: so rang sich Bundeskanzler Scholz zur Freigabe der Lieferung Leopard-Panzer deutscher Fertigung erst nach amerikanischer Zusage von Abrams-Panzern von militärisch zweifelhaftem Mehrwert durch. 4 Dress, Brad: Ramaswamy isolates himself on Ukraine with proposed Putin pact. In: The Hill, 01.09.2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/c9ow 5 Hutzler, Alexandra: How initial US support for aiding Ukraine has come to a standstill 2 years later. ABC News, 24.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/h0z6 6 Grand, Camille u.a.: European public opinion remains supportive of Ukraine. Bruegel, 05.06.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/ipbu 7 von Ondarza, Nicolai und Becker, Max: Geostrategie von rechts außen: Wie sich EU-Gegner und Rechtsaußenparteien außen- und sicherheitspolitisch positionieren. SWP-aktuell, 01.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/a62v 8 Wientzek, Dr. Olaf: EVP-Parteienbarometer Februar 2024 - Die Lage der Europäischen Volkspartei in der EU. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 06.03.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/fv9b 9 s. Footnote 7 10 Klein, Margarete: Putins „Wiederwahl“: Wie der Kriegsverlauf die innenpolitische Stabilität Russlands bestimmt. In: SWP-Podcast, 06.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/7i5s 11 Potrafke, Prof. Dr. Niklas: Economic Experts Survey: Wirtschaftsexperten erwarten Rückgang der Inflation weltweit (3. Quartal 2023). ifo-Institut, 19. Oktober 2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/wunq 12 Umersbach, Bruno: Wachstum des weltweiten realen Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) von 1980 bis 2024. Statista, 07.02.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/5ohz 13 Petersen, Volker: Ampel droht Zerreißprobe: Vier Gründe, warum der Haushalt 2025 so gefährlich ist. N-tv, 07.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/9fcl 14 Specht, Frank u.a.: Regierung kürzt mehrere Rüstungsprojekte. Handelsblatt, 24.10.2022, online unter: https://ogy.de/71z3 15 Vgl. Wurzel, Steffen u.a.: Worum es im Konflikt um Taiwan geht. Deutschlandfunk, 12.04.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/ddc1 16 Vogel, Dominic: Bundeswehr und Weltraum - Das Weltraumoperationszentrum als Einstieg in multidimensionale Operationen. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 01.10.2020, online unter: https://ogy.de/c7m1 17 Rose, Frank A.: Managing China‘s rise in outer space. Brookings, letzter Zugriff am 18.09.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/374g 18 Vgl. Kertysova, Katarina: Implementing NATO’s Climate Security Agenda: Challenges Ahead. In: NATO Review, 10.08.2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/ho94 19 Vgl. Statista: Defense expenditures of NATO countries as a percentage of gross domestic product in 2023. Abgerufen am 18.09.2023 online unter https://ogy.de/wtsb 20 Neuhann, Florian: Ukraine-Kontaktgruppe in Brüssel: Eine Krisensitzung - und ein Tabubruch? ZDF heute, 14.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/rezf 21 Mendelson, Ben: Diese Nato-Länder halten 2024 das Zwei-Prozent-Ziel ein. Handelsblatt, 15.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/quiu 22 Kayali, Laura: France will reach NATO defense spending target in 2024. Politico, 15.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/7vdd 23 https://icds.ee/en/defence-spending-who-is-doing-what/ 24 Vgl. Daily Sabah: Türkiye’s defense spending expected to constitute 2% of GDP by 2025. 21.10.2022, online unter https://ogy.de/xtbr 25 Vgl. Decode39: Defence spending: Rome’s path towards the 2% target. 20.07.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/c0g3 26 Waldwyn, Karl: Norwegian defence chief sounds alarm and raises sights. In: Military Balance Blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23.06.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/8b4a 27 Vgl. Army Technology: Russian threat driving Slovenia’s defence budget increase. 02.08.2022, online unter https://ogy.de/c5y7 28 Vgl. Kamp, Dr. Karl-Heinz: Allianz der Interessen. In: IP, Ausgabe September/Oktober 29 Vgl. Bundeswehr. Stand: 31.07.2023, abgerufen am 19.09.2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/m69j 30 Bundeswehr: Ambitioniertes Ziel: 203.000 Soldatinnen und Soldaten bis 2027. Online unter https://ogy.de/3pzs

Defense & Security
Russia and Ukraine Chess Figures

Dissecting the Realist Argument for Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

by Oguejiofor Princewilliams Odera

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français On 24 February 2022, Russian troops pushed into Ukraine from multiple fronts, bombarding cities like Kharkiv and the capital Kyiv. The invasion plunged Europe into its worst security crisis in decades and prompted a massive outpouring of military aid and economic sanctions on Russia from NATO and Western allies (Ramzy 2022). There were warning signs beforehand, as Russia had massed over 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders for months and issued demands to roll back NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe (Roth, Dan, David and Nana 2022). Yet the full-scale invasion still came as a shock via its violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force (United Nations 2022). From a liberal perspective emphasizing democratic norms, international law, and human rights, Russia’s actions were indefensible and morally reprehensible. However, six key realist arguments can explain Russia’s rationale for the Ukraine invasion; security dilemmas and geographical insecurity, attempt to regain a sphere of influence, implementation of an offensive realist strategy, revisionism against the U.S.-led liberal international order, diversionary war theory, and autocratic insecurity and domestic politics. Realist Theory and Core Tenets Realism is one of the leading theories in the study of international relations, originating from thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and later articulated by 20th century scholars like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz (Burchill, Andrew and Richard 2013). It posits that international politics is characterized by anarchy and a struggle for power between sovereign nation-states pursuing their own national interests (Waltz 1979). Key assumptions underpin the bulk of realism: 1. States are the primary actors and the fundamental units of analysis in the anarchic international system with no supranational authority. 2. All states possess offensive military capabilities that render them potentially dangerous to one another. 3. States can never be certain of other states’ future intentions or actions, leading to mistrust and worst-case scenario planning. 4. In this self-help system, states must look out for their own national interests and survival as the principal motive (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2014). 5. While economic and cultural factors are important, military force and power politics take primacy in realist analysis. Realism tends to view human nature as flawed and egoistic, distrustful of lofty ideals like global peace or international cooperation. It emphasizes pragmatism over moral principles and ethics, assuming states will act opportunistically when their interests require it (Carr 1964). The accumulation of military capabilities and economic power is seen as a means for states to increase their relative power and security in an anarchic, zero-sum world (Mearsheimer 2001). Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, place a significant emphasis on human nature and decision-making elites in their understanding of international relations. They argue that politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature (Chimni 2017). Morgenthau, in particular, has been described as one of the most important political thinkers of the 20th century and one of the greatest realist thinkers of all times (Chimni 2017). Classical realists believe that their pessimistic vision of human nature is reflected in politics and international relations. In contrast, neorealists or structural realists, like Kenneth Waltz, emphasize the constraints imposed by the anarchic structure of the international system (Lobell 2017). Waltz’s neorealism, first outlined in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics, argues that power is the most important factor in international relations. He posits that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system) (Waltz 1979). Within the neorealist school, there are two main schools of thought: defensive realism and offensive realism. Defensive realists, following Waltz, argue that states merely aim to maintain the existing balance of power for survival. They assert that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain security. They contend that aggressive expansion upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue is ensuring its security (Lobell 2017). On the other hand, offensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer see states as persistently seeking opportunities for relative gain and hegemony when possible. Mearsheimer, in his groundbreaking work “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, argues that states seek to maximize their power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. He contends that only by creating an imbalance of power in its own favour will a state be able to maximize its security (Üstündağ 2020; Wivel 2017). The Realist Rationale for Russian Invasion of Ukraine Ukraine shares a 1,500-mile border with Russia, and its core territory was formerly part of Russia until 1991 (Plokhy 2023). From Moscow’s perspective, the prospect of Ukraine aligning with the West and integrating with NATO was an existential threat to Russian power that it could not accept (Lindsay 2022). Realists argue that a Ukraine aligned with NATO could enable the deployment of offensive weaponry close to Russia’s borders and threaten its access to the Black Sea, a warm water port it has coveted for centuries (McCallion 2023). As the core of realist theory warns, the basic structure of an anarchic and self-help system means states can never feel secure about other states’ future intentions or actions (Waltz 1979). When one state enhances its security, it undermines another’s. According to Mearsheimer, “Because no state can ever be sure that other states will not use their offensive capabilities for aggressive purposes, every state is compelled to look for ways to guarantee its own survival” (2014, 77). Seen from this perspective, Russia’s invasion can be rationalized as a pre-emptive move to neutralize what it saw as an imminent strategic threat. Closely related to arguments about great power status is the realist notion of states pursuing spheres of influence or buffer zones to enhance their security. The realist argument is that all great powers in history, including Russia, have sought to control the security dynamics in adjacent regions by maintaining relations with nearby smaller states that are aligned with their interests (Mearsheimer 2019). Ukraine, with its geostrategic position between Russia and Europe, is viewed as critically important terrain in Russia’s desired sphere of influence. Realists argue that rather than the expansion of Western liberal democracy, Russia was fundamentally motivated to invade to reestablish a favourable balance of power, security arrangements, and compliant buffer states on its periphery (Trenin 2022). Allowing Ukraine to align itself closely with NATO and host potential offensive forces was seen as a step too far by Moscow. Beyond defensively reacting to perceived security threats in the region, it can be inferred that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects a calculated strategy of offensive realism – persistent and opportunistic efforts to enhance its power economically and militarily to establish regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001). Under this view, Putin aimed to take advantage of a window of opportunity and weakness in the West to redraw boundaries and spheres of influence in Europe. Putin is said to want to rebuild a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe, principally embracing former Soviet republics such as now independent Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine. He has frequently bemoaned their “loss” after the Soviet Union collapsed. Putin may also hope to demonstrate to the west (and Russians) that the country is still a superpower. (Tisdall 2022, para. 2). Related to the offensive realism interpretation, some realists frame Russia’s invasion as an act of revisionism against the U.S.-dominated liberal international order that emerged after the Cold War (Kotoulas 2022). For decades, Russia complained about perceived encirclement by NATO and about what it viewed as disrespect and disregard for its interests in relation to Ukraine and its own sphere of influence (Sakwa 2022). The realist view is that even after the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and its allies continued to expand in ways that threatened Russia’s core interests and left it feeling boxed in by the steady eastward march of NATO (Smith and Dawson 2022). From this perspective, Russia eventually decided it needed to upset the liberal order and use brute force to re-establish itself as a great power capable of exerting sway on its periphery. Russia under Putin has no intention of entering into an American-run liberal world order but instead wants a multipolar world in which Russia enjoys a blocking position if not an outright veto. This is because Putin himself is ideologically averse to western liberalism (Grant 2022). By forcefully altering borders and facts on the ground in Ukraine, the realist argument suggests Russia aimed to disrupt the Western-centric world order and assert its regional dominance. Another realist interpretation views Russia’s invasion through the lens of diversionary war theory – the idea that leaders may provoke external conflict to divert public attention from domestic turmoil or unpopular policies (Levy and Vakili 1992). There is precedent for Russian leaders using force abroad for domestic purposes, from Stalin’s invasion of Finland in 1939 to Putin’s wars in Chechnya and 2008 invasion of Georgia (Ferraro 2023). From this view, Putin faced a host of domestic challenges in 2022, from economic malaise, rampant corruption and wealth inequality, to the prospect of more anti-regime protests like those in 2020 and early 2022 (Sharifulin 2023; McHugh 2023). “The Russian invasion of Ukraine could have been an attempt by Putin to garner popularity by invoking a distorted interpretation of Russia’s history and playing on Russian nationalism” (Rogers and Yi 2022, para. 3). From the foregoing it is obvious that launching a nationalist, irredentist campaign to reconquer historically Russian lands in Ukraine may have been calculated to bolster Putin’s domestic standing and shift discussion away from internal grievances. The realist logic is that leaders will take aggressive foreign policy actions when domestic audiences become restive, to rally patriotic support and legitimacy. Finally, another related realist explanation rooted in Russia’s domestic politics is the theory of autocratic insecurity, or fear among authoritarian leaders like Putin that if they compromise or appear weak, it could undermine their regime survival (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012). This aligns with defensive realist logic, where states will act pre-emptively and uncompromisingly when core interests and stakes are their very existence. The argument is that Putin saw the 2022 events in Ukraine as an existential threat to his regime’s survival and legitimacy, given its claims to defend ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine (Pifer 2023). A miscalculation that resulted in losing influence over Ukraine could inflame nationalist opposition at home and tarnish Putin’s carefully cultivated strongman image. It is evident that Putin’s war is motivated by longstanding concerns that if Russia doesn’t reassert its control over the territories it traditionally dominated, his regime – along with Russia’s status as a great power – will be undermined. The autocratic insecurity thesis suggests Putin felt he had to escalate in Ukraine to ensure his own political survival and Russia’s place as a relevant great power. Counterarguments and Moral Debates While the realist perspective offers several compelling interpretations of Russia’s strategic calculations and motivations underlying the Ukraine invasion, it leaves many fundamental questions unanswered and provokes heated moral debates. First, even if Russia felt genuine security concerns or resented Western encroachment, it had many alternative foreign policy options short of a full-scale war that caused catastrophic death and suffering. Failure to pursue diplomacy or de-escalation is difficult for realists to fully explain or justify. Second, a core tenet of the Westphalian system of nation-states is that countries cannot violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others through force or aggression. Russia’s actions obliterated this international norm, raising questions about the validity of applying an amoral, power-politics lens that glosses over legal and human rights considerations (Kampmann 2021). Just as a burglar cannot be the judge of his own cause, you cannot allow a nation to be the sole arbiter of its own interests against those of the rest of the world whenever that happens to militate against the general interest and settlements Third, a consistently neglected component in realist thought is the key role of ideological and domestic factors in shaping interests and threat perceptions. Putin’s Russkiy Mir (“Russian World”) ideology views Ukraine as an artificial state and integral part of the greater Russia – a visceral belief that drove many of his decisions as much as geopolitical power calculations (Suslov 2022). The invasion thus cannot be fully explained without understanding the pseudo-historical mythmaking that permeated the Kremlin’s worldview. Finally, while providing interesting insights into Russia’s strategic cost-benefit analysis, realist arguments struggle to wrestle with the ethics and wisdom behind the invasion. Even if the goals aligned with maximizing Russia’s national interests, the terrible human costs and economic damage now suffered by Russia itself cast the decision as potentially catastrophic and self-defeating overreach. Conclusion In conclusion, the realist theoretical prism of international relations offers several potentially compelling rationales for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – security dilemmas, spheres of influence, offensive realism, revisionism against the liberal order, diversionary war, and autocratic insecurity. These arguments help elucidate how Russia assessed its strategic interests and the potential costs and benefits surrounding the attack. At the same time, the realist perspective is limited in several respects. It glosses over the war’s violation of international law and sovereignty norms. It cannot fully explain Russia’s diplomatic misfires or the moral dimensions surrounding humanitarian atrocities and the terrible destruction inflicted. And its focus on systemic incentives neglects the key role Russian domestic politics, pseudo-historical mythos, and Putin’s own ideological zealotry played in driving the conflict. 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