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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations. Turkey recognized Israel in March 1949. Less serious ups and downs sometimes accompanied the bilateral relations between the two sides in the following decades. These relations continued during the rule of the Justice and Development Party over Turkey.The killing of 8 Turkish citizens by Israel in 2010, the reduction of tensions in 2016, the expulsion of ambassadors in 2018, and the existence of many ups and downs were important incidents in Turkey-Israel relations. While Erdoğan and Netanyahu met in New York in September 2023, seeking to normalize relations fully; the Israel-Gaza War on October 7, 2023, made Ankara to intensify its criticism and recall its ambassador from Israel. Although some Turkish diplomats continued to operate in Tel Aviv, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced in November 2024 that Turkey had severed all ties with Israel and currently had no relations with Israel. However, it appears that the Turkish embassy in Israel is operating and the Israeli diplomatic mission in Ankara is also open. Сhallenges Israeli-Turkish relations have reached a critical point, and the scope of tensions and disagreements has also expanded. Turkey has been one of the major critics of Israel in recent years, and the recent November 2024 announcement indicates an escalation of diplomatic tensions. Turkey’s approach to the Israel-Palestine crisis has been based on Turkey’s foreign strategy, increasing the status of Palestine in its foreign policy. Turkey, by opposing Israeli settlement in the West Bank, and using the international mechanism, emphasizing the two-state solution, etc., tries to play a leading role in diplomatic efforts on Palestine. But from Israel’s point of view, many of Turkey’s approaches include interfering in social and political issues inside Israel, are considered as weakening the Israeli government, reviving Muslim institutions, and inciting violence against Israel. Ankara has sought to cement its role in advancing Palestinian aspirations by engaging with various groups, including Hamas, offering to host Hamas political offices, mourning the assassination of Haniyeh, and occasionally “visiting” Hamas leaders from Turkey. In May, Erdoğan called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “vampire” and called on Muslims to fight the Jewish state. In this view, Israel is a threat to “all of humanity” and has been mistreating Gaza for years. Therefore, it must be pressured by holding Israel accountable for its “genocide” and actions in Gaza, the Islamic League of Nations, and the international community. Earlier this year, Turkey filed a request to join the genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in support of Palestine. On November 1, Turkey initiated an arms embargo, calling for a halt to arms sales to Israel. In addition, it seems that Turkey wants to facilitate access to its national interests and even a mediatory role in reaching peace with Israel by exerting appropriate influence between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Also, apart from Turkey’s explicit opposition to Israel’s war in Lebanon and the risk of expelling Palestinians, the disagreements in Syria could be an important current and future stage in Israeli-Turkish relations. Israel and Turkey are the main beneficiaries of Assad’s collapse in Syria, but Turkey is known to support Islamist and Salafi-jihadi factions. Although Benjamin Netanyahu called Assad’s fall on December 8 a “historic day,” Ankara does not accept Israel’s seizure of buffer zones, advance into Syrian territory, and bombing of Syrian military sites after the collapse. Turkey and Israel have pursued their red lines in Syria with highly contradictory plans. Turkey does not accept Kurdish parties and the PKK taking advantage of the new situation in Syria or Israel occupying Damascus and reaching northern Syria. Also, while many in Israel have declared the Kurds to be Israel’s “allies” and have emphasized the importance of protecting minorities in Syria, Turkey now sees the Kurdish threat as more prominent. In addition, Ankara is likely to have regional and international convergences in mind to pressure Israel by highlighting Israel’s role in Syria. In the geopolitical sphere, alliances and coalitions in the Eastern Mediterranean are also not in Turkey’s interest. Ankara does not want to witness the risk of anti-Turkish geopolitical-geoeconomic coalitions forming in the region with Israel’s presence. Dimensions of geopolitical and security cooperation between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus pose major challenges for Ankara,. Ankara is pursuing a two-state solution in Cyprus but knows that in the Cyprus tension and dispute between Turkey and Greece, Israel stands in the Athens and Cyprus front. Turkey has also had tumultuous relations with the European Union and the United States in recent years. Israel is an important partner and collaborator of Western military and political institutions. Ankara still seems reluctant to have broader ties with NATO. Turkey is also trying to reduce the possibility of Israeli cooperation (against Ankara’s interests) with the Greek-American community, Turkish opposition parties, Gulen, Armenians. Turkey and Israel announced trade barriers against each other in 2024 and relations deteriorated. Turkey announced a trade embargo against Israel in May 2024, imposing restrictions on the export of 54 products. However, despite trade through third countries, the trade situation has hurt the state of the economies of both sides, bilateral trade agreements, and their plans for joint initiatives for gas extraction and transportation. The Turk opposition continues to challenge Erdoğan for his continued supply of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey and the Turkish Kurcik radar base, and for his double standards. However, anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments have increased in Turkey. The Turkish government continues to face public backlash over the continued flow of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey, Turkey’s ongoing trade relations with Tel Aviv, and indirect trade through third countries. Even amid public outcry in Turkey, Zorlu Holding announced its intention to sell its stake in Israel’s Dorad Energy. In this context, Ankara cannot immediately increase economic ties with Israel. Opportunities for relations Ties with Israel will help Erdoğan use the Israeli influence in the United States to improve relations between Washington and Ankara. Maintaining the relationship could benefit from some intelligence, security, and military agreements or military-technological and defense cooperation, cooperation in the field of information exchange and regional security, Turkey’s military modernization, cooperation on illegal immigration, and human trafficking. Israel and Turkey both have common interests in areas such as the South Caucasus. However, easing tensions with Israel could help Athens compromise and reduce pressure on Ankara over the Greek islands, and militarize the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s transportation policy could reach the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean region by taking advantage of port connections in Turkey and strengthening projects such as the sea bridge from Iskenderun to the port of Haifa. Some key issues, especially geoeconomics in the Eastern Mediterranean and energy policy, and common interests in the field of energy could prevent a complete break. Israeli gas to Europe could help reduce Turkey’s dependence. Turkey is also still the conduit for 40 percent of Israel’s energy, which comes from Azerbaijan via Turkey. Israel was Turkey’s 13th largest export partner in 2023, and the total value of trade between Israel and Turkey reached $6.8 billion. Expanding economic relations and using the economy as a factor in strengthening relations can add to other dimensions of cooperation between the two actors. Outlook: Although tensions between Turkey and Israel have not escalated to a security or military level, Turkey has repeatedly warned that a war between Turkey and Israel could break out. However, many challenges remain. The level of pessimism about Ankara’s intentions in Israel is very high. Turkey cannot show a broad retreat on Turkey’s red lines in Palestine. The range of mutual pessimism and the role of different variables may hurt the outlook for the Turkey and Israel relationship.  Therefore, in the short term, it is inconceivable that the defense and security relations between Turkey and Israel will return to the level of relations of the 1990s. With Trump coming to power in the US, the long-term strategic tension between Israel and Turkey will become more difficult for Ankara’s interests. It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations. It is also possible that actors such as Baku could help reduce tensions. In this situation, it seems that Ankara, with a more pragmatic approach and a complex interaction of ideology, pragmatism, and geopolitical strategy of economic relations between the two countries, does not want to witness widespread, practical, or even military tension with Israel.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of B. Assad’s regime was the result of a number of internal and external contradictions, in which the Turkish factor played a key role. Ankara is celebrating the success of its diplomacy in Syria. The success in Syria is giving R. Erdogan wings In its diplomacy, Türkiye consistently tries to adhere to a pragmatic course of achieving its national interests. At the same time, Ankara’s policy does not represent the short-term ambitions of an adventurist leader, rather reflects a long-term programme in accordance with the doctrines and strategies of neo-Ottomanism and neo-pan-Turanism. Türkiye does not hide its ambitions; it makes public various programme provisions and concepts, which focus on raising the status of Turkish statehood to the rank of a regional superpower. For this reason, when former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu explained in Washington the essence of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, developed by him in the framework of his ‘Strategic Depth’, he noted Ankara’s attachment to the post-Ottoman space, i.e. to the peoples and countries that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, no nation freed from the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire will voluntarily return to the new Türkiye or become its vassal, however Ankara does not set (at least at this point in historical development) the task of reuniting independent entities of the post-Ottoman space with Türkiye. Ankara is trying to spread its influence and realise national interests in relation to geographical neighbours, to use its advantageous economic and geographical position on transit routes, which increases Türkiye’s status at the junction of Europe, Africa and Asia. For these purposes, the Turkish authorities are effectively using economic, political and military means. In North Africa, betting on one of the political forces in the devastated Libya and the local use of military forces – combined with the supply of weapons – provided Ankara with the opportunity to gain access to oil fields. The energy partnership with Russia and the consideration of Moscow’s crisis relations with the West have, in a certain sense, created not only trade and economic interests, but also the relative geopolitical dependence of the Russian Federation on relations with Türkiye. As a result, through partnership diplomacy, the Turks localised military and other threats from Russia to implement the geopolitical strategy of neo-pan-Turansim in the post-Soviet southeast. Ankara is supporting Turkic countries in local conflicts With regard to the newly formed Turkic countries, Türkiye did not rely only on Turkism and pan-Turkism, instead choosing a more flexible tactic: combining ethno-cultural kinship and ideological expansion with a more rational, economic (primarily energy, transport, communication and transit) integration strategy according to the formula ‘One people – two (three, four, five, six) states’. However, Ankara has strongly and consistently supported Turkic countries in local conflicts, providing them with the necessary military, military-technical, intelligence and diplomatic assistance. In this regard, the Turkish-Azeri tandem against Armenia in the Karabakh conflict is a good example. As a result, Türkiye, using its position in NATO and its allied relations with the UK and US, achieved the implementation of new strategic communications bypassing Russia to export oil and gas from the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea and then to Europe. This ambitious transport and energy programme, as well as the military victory in Karabakh, laid the foundation for strengthening the independence of Turkic countries and supporting common Turkic integration, which allowed Türkiye to create the international Organisation of Turkic States (OTG) and move towards the goal of a single Turan. In the Middle East, Türkiye supports is allied with Qatar and opposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which previously (2009) abandoned the transit project of a Qatari gas pipeline through Syria to Türkiye and Europe. Given the unsolvable intra-confessional (between Sunnis and Shi’as, Alawites) and inter-ethnic (the Kurdish issue) contradictions in Syria, President Erdogan waged a consistent battle to overthrow the undesirable regime, strengthen the pro-Turkish forces of Sunni Islamic radicals and local Turkmen in Syria, as well as to neutralise any forms of independence of the Syrian Kurds. Türkiye was not only aware of the plans of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) and the Syrian National Army* (SNA) for six months, but it was Türkiye itself that developed the plan for a military operation against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, providing them with the necessary military, technical, intelligence and diplomatic support. Türkiye said that Bashar al-Assad refused the hand that Erdogan extended to him and refused negotiations on Ankara’s terms with the recognition of the reality on the ground (i.e. the de facto Turkish occupation of the ‘security zone’ in the north-west of Syria). In response, Turkish proxy forces taught Assad a lesson by excommunicating him from power and removing him from Syria itself. Erdogan exhibited violent and aggressive rhetoric against Netanyahu because of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and took cosmetic measures within the framework of the trade embargo. In reality, Ankara did not follow Tehran’s example and did not provide military assistance to the Palestinians. Türkiye has not banned the transit of Azeri oil to Israel via its territory. Regarding the military operation against the Assad regime in Syria, Ankara skilfully used Tel Aviv’s signals about the launch of an offensive on Aleppo and Damascus. For some reason, the Turks are not blaming Israel for its numerous airstrikes on Syrian communications and the military arsenal of the former Syrian army, which greatly facilitated the advance of HTS* and SNA* forces in Syria. Ankara did not make harsh statements against Israel about the fact that the IDF entered the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and that Israeli tanks were 20km from Damascus. However, as the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak reports, Türkiye is threatening to shoot down the Israeli Air Force with its air defence systems if they support the Kurdish forces in Syria. Erdogan’s triumph Turkish media is enthusiastically celebrating Erdogan’s triumph in Syria and the fall of the Assad regime. At the moment, the Turks have strengthened their positions in Syria. The interim (or transitional) government in Damascus, headed HTS* leader Mohammed al-Jolani, is, in fact, an ally of Ankara. With even greater effort and reliance on the new Syrian authorities, Türkiye will obviously continue its policy of forcibly resolving and neutralising the Kurdish issue in Rojava. The fall of Assad allows Türkiye to repatriate more than 3 million Syrian refugees and strengthen its influence on domestic political life in a weak Syria. Finally, the Turks are counting on the implementation of the Qatari gas pipeline project in the near future, a project which was postponed due to the past position of Bashar al-Assad and his allies. It is no coincidence that on December 13, the heads of the Turkish and Qatari intelligence services met in Damascus, where they held joint talks with the leader of the HTS*, al-Jolani. Ankara and Doha have already announced their plans to open diplomatic missions in Syria. Immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, Türkiye announced on December 9 that it would help Syria rebuild its energy sector, although Ankara did not receive an official request from the new government. In turn, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar did not rule out that the Qatari gas pipeline project will be revived, as Syria has restored its unity and stability. Bayraktar stressed that it is necessary to ensure the safety of the gas pipeline. It seems that the question of ensuring the security of the future gas pipeline was also addressed by the Turkish and Qatari heads of intelligence with HTS* leader al-Jolani. The most openly pretentious statement vis-à-vis Syrian territory was the speech of President R. Erdogan at a party meeting, in which he proposed to review the results of the First World War and return the Syrian provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Damascus and Raqqa to Türkiye, as they were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. This is how neo-Ottomanism manifests itself in real life. However, Erdogan apparently forgot that following the results of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire lost and collapsed and the territories of the new Türkiye changed. The author of revised borders within the framework of the Versailles Treaty system was Türkiye’s eternal ally Great Britain. Following that logic, today Russia has the right to demand from Türkiye Kars, Artvin, Ardahan and Surmalu district with Mount Ararat, which the Bolsheviks unreasonably ceded in March, 1921, to Kemal Pasha. Which problems may await Türkiye following the regime change in Syria? Of course, at this stage Türkiye’s success in Syria is obvious, but it is unlikely to be the result of Turkish planning alone. The United States did not officially interfere in the situation surrounding overthrowing the Assad regime, but did not leave Syria either. Washington and Tel Aviv actually dragged Ankara into a joint plan to collapse Iran and Russia in Syria. Given the inaction of the Syrian authorities and the army, Moscow did not get involved in a new conflict. Tehran adheres to approximately the same position. Some experts believe that the newly elected US President D. Trump supposedly promised to redistribute spheres of influence with Russia, where Moscow gets peace in Ukraine in accordance with the reality on the ground, but withdraws from Syria. However, in Syria, the United States and Israel will support the Kurds, who are Türkiye’s main opponents. Ankara continues to insist on eliminating Kurdish structures in Syria, which may be at odds with the approaches of the United States and Israel. Russian expert Stanislav Tarasov believes that the Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in Syria can lead to sad consequences for the Turks and the loss of almost eight Kurdish-populated vilayets in the south-east of Türkiye itself with the involvement of the United States and Israel. At the same time, D. Trump’s focus on confrontation with Iran in Israel’s favour prolongs the risk of war waged by the Western coalition against Iran, in which Türkiye will face a military conflict with Tehran. It is more likely that Russia will abstain from intervening in such a conflict. Türkiye, however, could suffer significantly. Syria can either follow the path of ‘Iraqisation’ and the division of its territories into ‘zones of responsibility’ of external and internal forces or find itself divided between neighbours and new entities (including Israel, Türkiye, Iran and Kurdistan). * currently banned in the Russian Federation

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back perpetual wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. Within two weeks of the election of Donald Trump, outgoing US President Joe Biden took an extremely disruptive step in international relations, pushing the conflict in Ukraine to a much more dangerous level by authorising Kiev to use American long-range missiles against Russian territory, a rogue move certainly intended to hinder the détente his successor had announced.As if that weren’t enough, a week later, Turkey (the largest NATO army in Europe) launched an offensive in neighbouring Syria through intermediaries led by HTS*, the former Al-Nusra Front*, effectively tearing up the Astana agreements with Moscow and Tehran on its role in Syria. Towards the end of the Biden administration, two major escalations took place in the two largest military conflicts taking place today, in Ukraine and the Middle East, both geographically separated by Turkey, which has now entered the scene. At whose behest? It would be naive to think that Erdoğan took the initiative to stage the invasion of Syria without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the Americans, the British, the Israelis and the Europeans. Organising, training and arming tens of thousands of men on Syrian territory under his authority or in Turkey itself is an operation that requires logistical and intelligence coordination between various state and non-state entities. Anatolia is the Eurasian axis par excellence, where three tectonic plates meet (the Eurasian, the African and the Arabian). Geographically, Turkey has always been an asset to NATO, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is where the natural spaces of Turkish projection and influence collide with those of Russia. For decades, NATO has tolerated Turkey’s neo-imperial ambitions, especially during the Erdoğan era, even if they have historically been anti-Western. This is a strategic asset that the Atlanticists are saving for the right moment. In reality, Turkish nationalism has been expressed in these regions since the early 1980s, and in the 1990s, with the vacuum left by the post-Soviet chaos, its influence spread and the Turan project was revived, which is now very visible in the form of the Organisation of Turkic States. But Turanism isn’t Ankara’s only asset. On the one hand, the Turkish diaspora in Europe, on the other hand the Islamic charity and educational network that Turkey manoeuvres in Africa, and on the other hand the military expansion with several bases in a good dozen countries in Europe, Africa, the Caucasus and the Middle East, shape Turkey’s aspirations to project power in the world. The crossroads of the Levant The reactivation of the Syrian civil war, or even the dismemberment of the country, is full of contradictions, unlikely alliances and unclear objectives, but also the hidden but known interests of a number of external actors who have been trying to take over the country since 2011. It serves Israel well, after more than 40 years of occupation of the Golan Heights, which are legally Syrian. Tel Aviv could extend its dominance in the area in the face of a Syria that is likely to be dysfunctional and without an army. Netanyahu’s regional escalation is also his way out of the mess he got himself into over a year ago in Gaza and Lebanon, while he waits for the new US administration, full of Zionists in foreign policy positions. Coincidentally or not, the hordes of jihadists took over Syria the day after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was announced. It should come as no surprise that behind this episode lies a tacit pact between Ankara and Tel Aviv to eliminate Iranian influence from the region. The US role is more nebulous. Officially, it didn’t make a statement until the final fall of Assad. But it’s also a role that doesn’t need clarity because it’s the only power that has allowed itself to occupy Syria since 2014, especially with clandestine military bases in the centre-south and east of the country, justifying this blatant international illegality with the flimsy excuse of being able to “fight ISIS*”. In reality, the US is ensuring a strategic military presence with an eye on Iran and Russia, which will certainly be formalised with the next phase in Syria. In addition, Washington has several major players on the ground, such as the Kurds of the SDF, who control the north, and the Free Syrian Army, which confronts them. On the other hand, the leader of the HTS, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who now controls most of the territory, spent five years in US prisons in Iraq (including the notorious Abu Ghraib). Al-Julani will surely be the most important and valuable asset for American interests in this proxy war. But what have the Western powers given Erdoğan to make him take the initiative to conquer Syria? What is the bargaining chip? Is the new Syrian government willing to give up the Russian base in Tartus, or is its removal one of NATO’s conditions for Erdoğan? What about Palestine and the genocide in Gaza? Will Lebanon follow the possible fragmentation of Syria? Who will form the new government, and what will be its vision for the future? Will there be an energy agreement between Ankara, Baku and Brussels? What will happen to trade, energy and infrastructure relations between Turkey and Russia? Will Turkey still be a candidate for the BRICS? Many big questions have been asked. Syria and Ukraine, the same conflict The most worrying aspect of the current scenario is that the two ongoing conflicts, surrounded by volatile regions, are moving closer together. The HTS, brought to Syria by Ankara, has been in Ukraine learning new combat tactics and night attacks from Kiev troops using advanced drones supplied by Qatar. Unlike the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Qatar has never sympathised with the Assad government after it took over Aleppo. Among the members of the Arab League, Qatar, an ally of Turkey (which has a naval base in Doha), is the only Arab country that has consistently sided with the Syrian Salafist opposition since 2011. After Erdoğan’s move, Russia will not be able to accept a freeze in military activity on its borders, lest it see the enemy rearm. It is therefore impossible to expect a ‘Minsk 3’ for the Trump era. In any case, an understanding between Russia and the US is necessary. After such a dark four years of the Biden administration, which brought war again to Europe and the Middle East, there is certainly hope for better relations between the world’s two largest military powers. An escalation of the conflict in Ukraine is unthinkable. More immigration for a Europe in recession For Europe, the current situation in Syria is terrible because it opens up new prospects for hundreds of thousands more refugees, depending on how the situation in Syria develops. Assad’s Syria was a dictatorship, just like Gaddafi’s Libya, but it provided a stability that is no longer guaranteed. The ‘melting pot’ that Europe’s major cities have become after 20 years of perpetual US wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria also has the potential to bring the inter-community and interethnic problems of the Middle East onto European soil at a time of recession, as is the case in Germany. With this move, Turkey has opened the game and shown that it wants to compete with Russia for its sphere of influence. Erdoğan has taken on the destabilising role his external superiors have assigned him. Erdoğan’s alignment with Western designs in Syria opens a rift in relations with Moscow and should be seen as a declaration of intention. War on multipolarism The Syrian war, which has all the makings of a protracted affair, is also a far-reaching move against the BRICS, since Turkey was one of the main candidates for membership of the organisation. The control of this strategic region, which is increasingly in the domain of the Silk Roads and the BRICS, is now entering a period of predictable instability. Indeed, the very strange Hamas attack in October 2023 took place in the middle of the new members of the group (Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran), and launched a war on the region along the lines of the ‘creative destruction’ advocated by the neoconservative think tanks. Just when everything was getting ready for a new US administration that seemed at least minimally pragmatic and willing to engage in dialogue and put an end to the Ukrainian conflict, and to the joy that for the first time in three years a Western statesman was uttering the word ‘peace’, Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back the eternal wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups d’état, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. An old practice of those who can’t compete with economics, trade and diplomacy and think they can with wars. *- banned in the Russian Federation

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now? One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad. But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers. What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham? Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad. The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world. In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.” The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.” This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid. Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria. Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success? Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia. Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria. The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war. It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold. This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics. Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally. How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria? To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations. Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement. This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services. Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups. Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses. In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government. This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups. In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs. Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests. Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off. What does the US think of the group and al-Golani? The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions. Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani. However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list. What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader? First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad. But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies. First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large. This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws. Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups. Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity. Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country. However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support. Sections of this article were first published in an article for The Conversation on Dec. 2, 2024.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractThis paper draws on rapidly emerging literature on the role of artificial intelligence in military conflicts and warfare as well as its implications for international security. It departs from an assumption that the emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence on military power.This project intends to ascertain the role of autonomous weapons in modern military conflicts. In doing so, it further adds to the recent debates, which take place among scholars, military leaders as well as policy makers around the world regarding the potential for AI to be the source of future instability and a great power rivalry.It is suggested that there is an urgent need to regulate the development, proliferation and usage of autonomous weapons and weapon systems driven by AI before it is too late – namely the AI achieves cognizant skills. 1.DefinitionsEncyclopedia Britannica proposes that artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience.1Interestingly enough AI defines itself as referring to the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, particularly computer systems. These processes include learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and language understanding. AI enables machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and natural language processing. AI technologies encompass machine learning, neural networks, deep learning, and other advanced algorithms that allow machines to mimic cognitive functions.2In the context of the military, artificial intelligence refers to the utilization of AI technologies and systems to enhance military capabilities, operations, and decision-making processes. Military applications of AI include autonomous weapons systems, drones, cyber defense mechanisms, predictive analytics for strategic planning, and battlefield surveillance. AI can be used to analyze large volumes of data quickly, identify patterns, and make real-time decisions to support military objectives. While AI offers significant advantages in terms of efficiency and precision, there are ethical considerations and concerns regarding the potential risks of autonomous AI systems in warfare.32. AI in the War in Ukraine and Israel vs. Hamas - UkraineThe ongoing war in Ukraine is arguably the first “full scale drone War”, which also employs loitering munitions, autonomous ships, undersea drones for mine hunting and uncrewed ground vehicles being deployed.AI is heavily used in systems that integrate target and object recognition and geospatial intelligence. Analysis of satellite images, geolocating and analysing open-source data such as social media photos in geopolitically sensitive locations. On top of that neural networks are used, for example, to combine ground-level photos, drone video footage and satellite imagery.AI-enhanced facial recognition software has also been used on a substantial scale. AI is playing an important role in electronic warfare and encryption as well as cyber warfare, especially in support of defensive capabilities. Finally, AI has also been employed to spread of misinformation - the use of deep fakes as part of information warfare. The emergence of this new technology has created new actors, private companies further fueling the so-called privatisation of security: Palantir Technologies, Planet Labs, BlackSky Technology and Maxar Technologies are some examples of such.The AI driven systems make a fundamental change in the field so much so that the combined use of aerial and sea drones in the October (2022) attack on Russia’s Black Sea flagship vessel, the Admiral Makarov, was perceived by some analysts as perhaps a new type of warfare.4What makes this conflict unique is the unprecedented willingness of foreign geospatial intelligence companies to assist Ukraine by using AI-enhanced systems to convert satellite imagery into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantages. U.S. companies play a leading role in this.These examples illustrate that the current conflict in Ukraine is a testing ground for AItechnology.- Israel vs. HamasIsraeli military says it’s using artificial intelligence to select many of these targets in real-time. The military claims that the AI system, named “the Gospel,” has helped it to rapidly identify enemy combatants and equipment, while reducing civilian casualties.5 Allegedly, multiple sources familiar with the IDF’s (Israel Defensive Forces) targeting processes confirmed the existence of the Gospel, saying it had been used to produce automated recommendations for attacking targets, such as the private homes of individuals suspected of being Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives. In recent years, the target division has helped the IDF build a database of what sources said was between 30,000 and 40,000 suspected militants. Systems such as the Gospel, they said, had played a critical role in building lists of individuals authorised to be assassinated.6 According to IDF’s own website the use of these tools does not change the obligatory principles and rules in the Intelligence Directorate's SOP and related instructions. They do not generate orders for attacks. They do not generate new intelligence that could not otherwise be accessed by an intelligence analyst. They do not constitute the sole basis for determining targets eligible to attack – regardless of how accurate they are. On the contrary, these tools improve the quality of the intelligence process outcome. They facilitate the accessibility of the analyst to relevant information, and help the analyst be more informed of the most up-to-date and relevant intelligence sources, making the analyses more precise. They reduce the risk of errors that may occur in intelligence analyses.7 3. AI and War As far as the role of AI driven technologies and software is concerned it is probably useful to think about them as the third revolution in warfare. The first one being mostly about gunpowder and the second one being about nuclear weapons.Additionally, one should also bear in mind that AI is closely related to the so-called cyber domain, which in the literature is often referred to as the fifth domain of warfare. (The first one being land, the second being sea, the third being air and the forth being space, as in cosmic space.)While AI and associated technologies hold potential for reducing harms of war if developed and applied responsibly, there exist significant risks of technological escalation, loss of human control and value alignment that demand proactive international cooperation and oversight to guide research and use of these systems. Nonetheless all major powers, including US and China are working nonstop to develop relevant AI driven military systems hoping to achieve potential advantages against each other. These technologies include: machine learning/deep learning applications with military uses like drone/vehicle autonomy, cyber/info warfare and predictive analytics of populations/scenarios.At the same time AI poses novel challenges and escalatory risks that differ from past arms races and call for new frameworks of governance and norms. Autonomous weapons threaten to undermine international humanitarian laws by removing human accountability from targeting - problems of biases, uncertain risks of loss of meaningful human control. Other related risks include preemptive/predictive AI for mass surveillance, social control and information warfare which is likely to erode principles of sovereignty, privacy and consent.It does not take the stretch of imagination to expect a certain level of ‘techno-tyranny’ in the future. Job losses to robotic systems are probably a given and as such risk further politico-economic instability. This consequently calls for just transitions and perhaps even a universal basic income.The Opaque ‘black box’ nature of neural networks hinders verification and accountability, fuelling distrust. Furthermore, there is a potential for accidental or unintentional escalation. Without safeguards and transparency, AI may ultimately serve military-industrial complexes and geopolitical ambitions rather than global security needs.The fast-emerging technology needs to be urgently regulated. International initiatives for AI governance (norms or regimes) will probably have to be introduced by the UN and its technical bodies. These will have to include outcome accountability’ through system design, impact assessments, red lines on certain applications and universal access to benefits.As warns Heidy Khlaaf, Engineering Director of AI Assurance at Trail of Bits, a technologysecurity firm warns “AI algorithms are notoriously flawed with high error rates observed across applications that require precision, accuracy, and safety,”8Reportedly, in a simulation of a military exercise carried out by US Military Force, an AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue. The robot worked out its controller was stopping it 'completing objectives on test.9In parallel, Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. “The highest-level commander is the sole core decision-making entity for the overall operation, with ultimate decision-making responsibilities and authority,”104. AI and International SecurityIn terms of national security-level applications of an AI, one can clearly identify numerous milieu:- MilitaryAI is transforming military operations by enabling autonomous systems, such as drones and robots, to perform tasks that were previously carried out by humans. These systems can be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, target identification, and even combat. AI-powered algorithms can analyze vast amounts of data to provide real-time intelligence, enhance situational awareness, and support decision-making processes on the battlefield- CybersecurityAI is crucial in combating cyber threats, as it can detect and respond to attacks more effectively than traditional security measures. Machine learning algorithms can analyze network traffic patterns, identify anomalies, and detect potential breaches. AI can also help develop predictive models to anticipate future cyber threats and vulnerabilities, allowing organizations to strengthen their defenses proactively.- Intelligence and SurveillanceAI enables intelligence agencies to process and analyze massive volumes of data, including social media feeds, satellite imagery, and communication intercepts. Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms can extract valuable insights from unstructured data sources, aiding in counterterrorism efforts, identifying potential threats, and monitoring geopolitical developments.- Decision Support SystemsAI can assist policymakers and military leaders in making informed decisions by providing predictive analysis and scenario modeling. Machine learning algorithms can analyze historical data, identify patterns, and generate forecasts regarding potential  conflicts, resource allocation, or geopolitical developments. This helps in strategic planning and resource optimization.- Autonomous Weapons SystemsThe development of autonomous weapons systems raises ethical concerns and challenges in international security. AI-powered weapons can operate without direct human control, leading to debates about accountability, proportionality, and adherence to international humanitarian law. International efforts are underway to establish regulations and norms governing the use of such systems.- Diplomacy and Conflict ResolutionAI can facilitate diplomatic negotiations and conflict resolution by providing data-driven insights and analysis. Natural Language Processing algorithms can assist in analyzing diplomatic texts, identifying common ground, and suggesting potential compromises. AI can also simulate scenarios and predict the outcomes of different negotiation strategies, aiding diplomats in finding mutually beneficial solutions.- Threat Detection and PreventionAI can enhance early warning systems for various threats, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics. Machine learning algorithms can analyze patterns in data to identify potential risks and predict emerging threats. This enables governments and international organizations to take proactive measures to prevent or mitigate these risks.5. ConclusionIn the world of microelectronics, experts often talk about Moore's law: the principle that the number of transistors on chips doubles every two years, resulting in exponentially more capable devices. The law helps explain the rapid rise of so many technological innovations, including smartphones and search engines.Within national security, AI progress has created another kind of Moore's law. Whichever military first masters organizing, incorporating, and institutionalizing the use of data and AI into its operations in the coming years will reap exponential advances, giving it remarkable advantages over its foes. The first adopter of AI at scale is likely to have a faster decision cycle and better information on which to base decisions. Its networks are likely to be more resilient when under attack, preserving its ability to maintain situational awareness, defend its forces, engage targets effectively, and protect the integrity of its command, control, and communications. It will also be able to control swarms of unmanned systems in the air, on the water, and under the sea to confuse and overwhelm an adversary.11References*This paper was presented at International Studies Association 65th Annual Convention. San Francisco, California April 3rd – 6th 20241 Copeland, B. (2024, March 15). Artificial intelligence. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence2 How do you define artificial intelligence? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/3 How do you define artificial intelligence in the context of the military? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/4 Fontes, R. and Kamminga, J. (2023, March 24). Ukraine A Living Lab for AI Warefare. National Defence. NDIA’s Bussiness Technology Magazine. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/3/24/ukraine-a-living-lab-for-ai-warfare5 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start6 ‘The Gospel’: how Israel uses AI to select bombing targets in Gaza. (2023, December 1). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/the-gospel-how-israel-uses-ai-to-select-bombing-targets 7 The IDF's Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. (2024, June 18). IDF Press Releases: Israel at War. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idf-s-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing/8 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start9 Bowman, V. (2023, June 2). AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue on simulation. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/02/us-air-force-ai-military-drone-goes-rogue-simulation/10 Chen, S. (2024, June 16). Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3266444/chinese-scientists-create-and-cage-worlds-first-ai-commander-pla-laboratory?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage 11 Flournoy, Michèle A. 2023. “AI Is Already at War.” Foreign Affairs 102 (6): 56–69. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=bth&AN=173135132&site=ehost-live.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Major powers shape their foreign policy with a global view, positioning each region based on their opponents’ strategies there. Russia has recognized the need to develop its strategy in the Middle East to counter Western efforts to further disintegrate the Russian Federation after the Soviet Union’s collapse, particularly by fueling separatist inclinations within it. This is crucial for Russia, which includes 22 republics and 89 federal entities, with minorities making up 19% of its population. Russia recognized this trend through the following indicators: 1. The US call at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council Conference in Prague in 2003 to expand NATO’s work east and south, i.e., in an area extending from the Maghreb to Central Asia. 2. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, a practical implementation of NATO’s expansion. 3. In 2021, the Israeli army was shifted from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the Central Command (CENTCOM), whose work covers the area of NATO’s expansion. Russian Strategy in the Middle East The “core” of Russia’s strategy in the Middle East is security and defense, evidenced by its foreign interventions in regions where NATO competes, including Georgia, Crimea, Syria, Libya, Belarus, Ukraine and the Sahel, as affirmed in Shanghai Cooperation Organization discussions. This focus is underscored by 40–50% of Russia’s military sales being directed to the region, alongside efforts to establish military bases in Syria, Libya and Sudan. Additionally, the development of the Russian-Chinese-Iranian strategic triangle, consolidated in 2019 with joint naval maneuvers, has deepened following the war in Ukraine. The Russian Strategic Framework Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The above outlines Russia’s strategic approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on Gaza Strip (GS) as follows: 1. Russia perceives Iran from two perspectives: as its strongest ally in the region and as the central figure in the axis of resistance. Operation al-Aqsa Flood has tested the Russian-Iranian relationship regarding its consistency. The Russian reaction to Israeli attacks on Syria remains insufficient. However, this does underline how Israeli policies are widening the rift in Russian-Israeli relations and gradually nudging Russia towards aligning with the resistance axis, especially given Israel’s support for the Western side in the Ukraine conflict. 2. Russia has feared that the GS war would impact its social stability for the following reasons: a. Riots erupted in Muslim-majority Dagestan following the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Israel shortly after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. b. Many of the Jews who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union hail from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is concerned that differences among these countries could destabilize its internal situation. 3. Russia exploited Western social unrest on the streets, in universities and within institutions to highlight double standards in comparing Western attitudes toward Israel and Russia. Operation al-Aqsa Flood diverted attention from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 4. Operation al-Aqsa Flood redirected some US and Western aid from Ukraine to Israel, easing pressure on Russia. 5. The Israeli stance aligning with Ukraine prompted Russia to seek closer ties with Hamas. Russia utilized this approach to bolster its standing in Muslim countries and the developing world, bridging gaps with Islamic factions concerning its 2015 intervention in Syria. This was underscored by Russia hosting a Hamas delegation on 26/10/2023, resulting in the release of 3 out of 6 Russian captives, and another delegation on 24/6/2024. 6. The Ukrainian conflict compelled Israel to take a firm stance, publicly condemning Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, which subsequently strained Russia’s willingness to mend relations with Israel post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood. 7. If the Ukraine war has unified Western positions against Russia, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has created disparities that Russia is attempting to exploit, particularly following the stance of several European countries, spearheaded by Spain, on recognizing Palestine. 8. Russian public sentiment towards Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath is mirrored in the findings of a poll conducted by the Levada Center on 25/10/2023: • 88% of Russians are aware of the new escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in comparison with a poll regarding events in Ukraine, in which 86% stated they are closely following events. • 66% are not ready to support either side in the conflict. • 21% rather sympathize with the Palestinians, and 6% sympathize with Israel. • Older Russians are nearly four times more likely than younger people to express sympathy towards Palestine, a contrast to the prevailing sentiment in the West. • Only 46% of Russian Muslims sympathize with Palestine, mirroring the sentiment in Central Asian countries. • Respondents noted that the main responsibility for what is happening lies with the US and NATO countries (45%), while 12% place responsibility on Israel, and 8% of respondents place the blame on Hamas/Palestinian side. Russian diplomacy aligns closely with the Axis of Resistance in UN voting on international resolutions. However, regarding the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued rulings against Putin similar to those against the Israeli prime minister and defense minister, Russia does not adhere to the ICC’s rulings, as it is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the court. Concerning the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the genocide case involving Israel, Russia supports the court’s recognition of the principle of Palestinian genocide, emphasizing the urgency of halting violence. Russia’s General Attitudes Toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood Russia’s general stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on GS can be outlined as follows: 1. Endorsing a two-state resolution with a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem as its capital, with full UN membership for this Palestinian state; treating the West Bank (WB) and GS as a unified territory; calling for cessation of Israeli settlements and displacement of Palestinians; and upholding Hashemite guardianship over holy sites. 2. Choosing not to mediate between the resistance groups and Israel, deferring this role to the US, Qatar and Egypt. Nonetheless, Russian statements have reiterated the call for a lasting ceasefire in GS and the urgent release of captives without conditions. This stance was underscored in the April 2024 (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) BRICS statement. Russia has also implicitly criticized Ansar Allah’ activities in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, citing their impact on international maritime navigation freedom. Additionally, Russia has been unable to halt Israel’s ongoing airstrikes on Syrian targets. 3. Inviting delegations from the resistance to consult or assist Palestinians in resolving their internal political issues, seen by Israel as Russian recognition of the legitimacy of all resistance forces. 4. Enhancing Russia’s perception in the Arab public opinion, particularly within segments critical of Russia’s involvement in Syria since 2015. 5. Highlighting the double standards in the Western value system, particularly in how GS and Ukraine are positioned and compared. 6. Russia’s relatively advanced political stance contrasts sharply with its limited financial assistance to Palestine. 7. Between 2018 and 2023, Russia saw a 58.3% increase in exports to Israel and a 27.4% increase in imports. However, the Ukraine crisis and subsequent events have slowed down this growth.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.

Iran and Russia have entered a closer political, economic, and military relationship during the past two years, the trigger widely seen as the upsurge in defence cooperation following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This new relationship, described variously as a strategic alignment or strategic partnership, was seen by both Tehran and Moscow as necessary to meet mutual and separate critical national needs due to the restrictive effects on both of US and Western sanctions. Iran’s international affairs, since its 1979 Islamic revolution, have been largely shaped by two factors. The first is Iran’s strong adherence to national autonomy, maximum self-sufficiency, and non-alignment. The latter has included, as far as practical, a balance between East and West, or today, Global South and Global West. However, Iranians are cautious about trusting others. While, therefore, a strategic alignment with Russia, or potentially others, could be acceptable, a formal alliance that compromise’s autonomy, would not. The second factor is Iran’s relationship with the US, and in turn with Europe, other Western countries and the UN, and their use of sanctions to deter or change international adversarial differences. Iran-US relations since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution have been tense and conflicted, and especially with Iranian-supported regional state and non-state militia. Major US concerns include Iran’s support for “state and non-state terrorism,” human rights abuses, missile development, and their potential, some say intent, to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Decades of broadly-based US sanctions, along with EU and UN sanctions, the latter mostly nuclear related, have strongly impacted the nation. The one short period of Iran-US rapprochement commenced in 2016 when President Barack Obama successfully brought Iran onboard as a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA) or nuclear agreement. Obama’s aim was to firstly resolve the nuclear issue and use this as the stepping-stone to negotiations on other regional security issues. But this two-step process was undone by President Donald Trump‘s 2018 decision to unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose US primary and secondary sanctions. Trump’s action, and President Joe Biden’s subsequent “failure” to rejoin the JCPOA and repeal related US sanctions, bitterly disappointed a large cast of international stakeholders, including Iran’s moderates and other JCPOA signatories. For Iran, the US could not be trusted to seriously seek rapprochement and repeal US sanctions either before, or foreseeably after, this year’s US presidential elections. This distrust extended also to the Europeans and others who would continue to remain subject to US secondary sanctions. Iran saw its future fundamentally with countries that were willing to openly trade with them, notwithstanding US sanctions, and other countries or organisations that were prepared to overlook or actively circumvent or evade sanctions. Multilateral outreach included Iran joining two major non-aligned groups in 2023, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and BRICS+6 (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa + 6). These comprise some 40 percent and 46 percent respectively of the world’s population, and some 20 percent and 30 percent of global GDP. BRICS also includes some 40 percent of global oil production. Key members of both include Russia, China, and India. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are part of the “+6 members” of BRICS, and are also Dialogue Partners of the SCO. Both organisations offer significant additional political and economic networking opportunities and economic options. Bilaterally, the relationship between Tehran and Moscow, from its imperialist Shah/Tsar and post-revolutionary Iran and USSR/Russia iterations to the late 1980s, has had its share of tensions and conflict, including territorial disputes. The past 30-year period from the early 1990s to 2021, however, has been relatively stable. Geographic proximity, including a maritime border across the Caspian Sea, facilitated a significant increase in trade, reportedly from some US$1 billion in 2005 to US$3.3 billion in 2021. Mutual security interests also saw an increase in regional military cooperation, including joint operations against ISIS in Syria, and increased Russian sales of military equipment to Iran. The relationship changed significantly in early 2022 due to Russia’s increased military equipment needs, and to help offset the broad impact of sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, and others on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Militarily, increased Iranian defence sales to Russia have included a range of munitions, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) systems, and potentially Iranian short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The UAV deal includes the construction of a factory for manufacturing thousands of Iranian drones in Russia’s Tartarstan province. In return Russia has sold, or agreed to sell, to Iran a range of advanced weapons systems, including the S-400 air-defence missile, helicopters, and SU 34 fighters. Enhanced cyber and satellite cooperation was also agreed. Russia has also passed to Iran many of the high technology Western weapons systems captured in Ukraine, enabling Iran to evaluate, copy, and develop counter-measures. Significantly, this new level of Iranian-Russian cooperation has lifted the military capability of both, with implications for the Middle East and Ukraine respectively. But how effective have the sanctions been? Iran has been subject to harsh sanctions since 1979, and developed a “resistance economy” involving official and extensive unofficial trade and financing arrangements. Because many related statistics are unreliable or unavailable, official GDP estimates may be highly inaccurate. Importantly, however, and despite fluctuations, the World Bank shows a consistent decline in Iran’s GDP since 1979. For Russia, due to shifting markets and higher prices for oil since early 2022, their GDP contracted some 2 percent only that year compared to a prediction of more than 11 percent, and has mostly recovered since. Economically, despite the challenges of sanctions, bilateral cooperation is strong, both economies still function, and their governments remain stable. Militarily, sanctions have facilitated closer cooperation between Iran and Russia, contrary to US, NATO, and allied interests. Are there areas for the US to negotiate the lifting of sanctions with Iran and Russia? US priorities for Iran could include rejoining the JCPOA, facilitating a reduction or cessation of state and non-state militia attacks against regional Israeli, US, and related maritime targets, and restricting specified military cooperation with Russia. US priorities for Russia could include various ceasefire compromises involving the war in the Ukraine, and restricting specified military cooperation with Iran. And the likelihood of progress? For the reasons above, progress on any issue between the US and Iran is very unlikely before this year’s US presidential elections. If or when afterwards would depend in large part on who was elected. For Russia, a ceasefire compromise in Ukraine could be possible if it gave them “temporary” retention of vast tracts of land captured post-2022. Timing will be dictated by battlefield outcomes, but the US Senate approval on 13 February of an additional US$60 billion of military assistance to the Ukraine, and its likely approval by Congress, makes a ceasefire in the foreseeable future unlikely.

Researchers in the INSS Russia program argue: Now is the time for Israel to change it approach toward Moscow Since October 7, Russia has sided with Hamas, refuses to condemn the murderous terror attack that the organization perpetrated in the western Negev, and has questioned Israel’s right to defend itself. Russia’s behavior should underscore to Israel the need to change its policy toward the Kremlin and to stand firmly with Western nations, under the leadership of the United States. Moscow’s firm support for Hamas in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 massacre represents a turning point in relations between Israel and Russia. While many world leaders have condemned the murderous attack on October 7, Russia has adopted an anti-Israel line and refrained from condemning Hamas. Only a week later after the attack, in a speech to leaders of former Soviet states in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the Hamas massacre was unprecedented, but in the same breath he accused Israel of a cruel response. He went on to compare the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip to the Nazi siege of Leningrad, which led to a high number of civilian causalities, estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Although Putin said that Israel has the right to self-defense, he added that the attack on innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip was unacceptable. It was only on October 16 that Putin, in a phone conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed condolences to the families of the murdered Israelis, but without condemning Hamas. Russia’s strategy of maintaining good relations with both sides in any given conflict is reflected in its policy of nurturing ties with Hamas. For Hamas too, ties with Russia are highly important, since it positions it as an organization that is welcome in one of the most important countries in the world. In principle, Moscow has clung to its position that Hamas – defined as a terrorist organization by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other members of the European Union – is a legitimate political organization. The relationship between Russia and Hamas has not always been as close as it is today. Throughout the 1990s and until Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, Russia condemned the organization’s terrorist activities and referred to its members as Islamic militants, fanatics, and extremists. The relationship changed dramatically after the election, when Putin declared that the organization was elected through a democratic and legitimate process. Russian Foreign Ministry officials began meeting regularly with Hamas representatives in 2006. In 2011, there was a temporary decline in relations after Hamas backed the opposition forces in the Syrian civil war. Hamas figures who were in Syria when the war broke out played an active role fighting alongside the opposition, while Russia supported President Bashar Assad. Nonetheless, ties were not severed, and over the years began to warm. Delegations of Hamas leaders visited Moscow, where they met with the Russian Foreign Minister and other senior officials, and meetings took place between Hamas officials and Russian diplomats in other countries. Russia did not adopt a consistent position during previous rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas and was influenced by its particular interests at the time. In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, there was a change in Russian policy as it sought to maintain an image of objectivity and deliberately scaled back its criticism of Israel – in contrast to previous conflicts, such as Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009. This was probably in response to Israel refraining from criticizing Russia over its invasion of Crimea. Russia’s current interests are not to Israel’s benefit. Moscow’s main goal at this time is to divert the attention of the West, under the leadership of the United States, away from Ukraine. An increase in US involvement in events in the Middle East serves this goal. At the same time, Russia blames the United States for the outbreak of the current conflict. Second, Russia aspires to restore its standing as an influential actor on the international stage, and thus is attempting to promote a ceasefire in Gaza. In addition, Russia’s relations with Iran have become a strategic alliance as a result of the war in Ukraine, and in order to safeguard it, Moscow has adopted a policy that is sympathetic to Iran’s allies, including Hamas. Moreover, it is very convenient for Moscow that the US is the focus of attention in the Middle East. Russia’s support for Hamas can be seen in the measures it has taken in the international arena. On October 16, Russia submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council on a ceasefire, but it failed to include any condemnation of Hamas and its attack on Israel. Rather, it condemned violence and terrorist acts against civilians, which could be interpreted as a condemnation of Hamas’s actions or of Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the Russian resolution suggested that Israel was responsible for the explosion at the al-Ahli hospital in Gaza, despite clear evidence that the rocket that hit the hospital was fired from within Gaza. On October 25, Russia used its veto power in the Security Council to block a US resolution calling for the condemnation of Hamas and supporting Israel’s right to defend itself. Later, Russian anti-Israel rhetoric became even harsher, returning to the terminology used by the Soviets, when on November 2, the Russian ambassador to the UN rejected Israel’s right to self-defense since it is an “occupying power.” Comments from senior Hamas officials also shed much light on how close the organization is to Russia. For example, in an October 8 interview with Russia Today, a state-run media outlet, senior Hamas official Ali Baraka said that Hamas had updated Moscow about the attack shortly after it began. During the war itself, when a delegation of senior Hamas officials visited Moscow, Mousa Abu Marzook said that “we look at Russia as our closest friend.” After the visit, Hamas thanked Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry for their efforts to halt “the Israeli violence against the Palestinian people.” Hamas leader Khaled Mashal also said in an interview with an Egyptian television station that the Russians were impressed with the Hamas attack and that they would teach it in their military academies. Russia’s support for Hamas is not limited to the international diplomatic sphere. There is evidence that Russian weapons have been found in Hamas’s possession, including anti-tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles that apparently were transported via Iran – while Russia turned a blind eye. In addition, in the same interview with Russia Today, Baraka claimed that Russia had given Hamas a license to manufacture its own modified version of the AK-47 (Kalashnikov) assault rifle and ammunition. Hamas’s armed wing uses Russian servers. On the economic front too, it is evident that Hamas relies heavily on the Russian crypto market, sending tens of millions of dollars into digital wallets controlled by Hamas (and Islamic Jihad), while bypassing US sanctions. According to Ukrainian reports, the Wagner Group helped to train Hamas terrorists. State-run Russian media has also adopted a clearly pro-Palestinian line. Russian propaganda seeks to justify the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine by highlighting the IDF’s killing of civilians and exaggerating the number of Palestinian causalities. After the blast at the al-Ahli hospital, the Russian media claimed that thousands of people had been killed – a figure higher even than the death toll reported by Gazans. Israeli soldiers are depicted as “immoral” because of the massive causalities they inflict on a civilian population, unlike the Russian soldiers who, according to state-run media, “would never be able to attack civilians, women, and children.” Russian social media channels, such as Telegram, are also awash with anti-Israel rhetoric and blatantly antisemitic comments. In the aftermath of the attempted pogrom against Israeli and Jewish passengers in Dagestan on October 29, Putin convened a meeting with the government and heads of the security establishment and drew a direct line between the war in Ukraine and the war between Israel and Hamas, accusing the United States and the West of undermining stability in Russia, the Middle East, and the entire world. He declared that “the fate of Russia and, indeed, of the whole world, including the future of the Palestinian people, is being decided” on the Ukrainian front. By connecting the two conflicts, Putin is clearly putting Russia on the side of Hamas and Israel on the opposing side, alongside the United States and the West. In effect, Putin has validated US President Joe Biden’s statement that Russia and Hamas are waging a war against democracy. Putin’s comments and Russia’s behavior in the aftermath of October 7 highlight the misconception that Russia would not oppose Israel at critical moments. The change that Israel must make in its policy vis-à-vis Russia is to stand unequivocally beside the United States – which includes supporting Ukraine. The quicker Israel adapts its policy to meet the challenge, the better its strategic balance in the Middle East and beyond will be.