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Defense & Security
This paper explores how Russians’ fears have evolved from 2014 to 2025—shifting from war and repression to economic hardship and social control. It reveals how political pressure, sanctions, and digital isolation have reshaped everyday anxiety and public

Fears and concerns of russians

by World & New World Journal

If you ask the average person in any country about their concerns, their answers would likely be very similar. Across the globe, people are generally most worried about the uncertainty of the future, particularly regarding their finances. This holds true whether you're in the United States, China, or elsewhere. However, does this trend remain the same for a country in a state of war?2014: The Sochi Olympics & The Annexation of CrimeaThe year 2014 was significant for Russia, both economically and politically. It was marked by two major events: the Sochi Winter Olympics and the annexation of Crimea.The 2014 Winter Olympics were held in Sochi, a Russian resort city. To host the games, the government spent an enormous amount of money, over $50 billion, on transportation infrastructure and new sports complexes. In recent decades, the Olympics have been seen as a way for nations to exert "soft power," and there were even speculations in 2010 that Russia may have paid its way to host the games. Despite the celebration of the event's successful conclusion, this period was immediately followed by a major political decision.During late 2013 and early 2014, Ukraine's internal political situation was highly unstable. Many Ukrainians were unhappy with their pro-Russian government's policies, believing that President Yanukovych was a "Russian puppet" who had denied the country a chance to join the European Union. Yanukovych's suspension of a key pact with the EU sparked mass protests and eventually a revolution.While the world's attention was focused on the Olympics and the political turmoil in Ukraine, Russia swiftly moved its troops into the Crimean Peninsula. With military and political pressure, the Crimean government held a referendum, after which the majority of citizens voted to join Russia. This move led to massive international sanctions against Russia, which put its rapidly rising economy under immense pressure.Russian Concerns in 2014This period of political and economic pressure was reflected in the concerns of ordinary Russians. According to a Levada Center survey from May 2014, the top concerns for Russians were:Illness or death of relativesPoverty or job lossWorld warCrimePolitical repressionPublic humiliationHealth threatsHowever, the trends in these fears showed some notable changes compared to the previous decade (1999–2014). Excluding health concerns, these trends indicate that Russians became increasingly worried about the country's political and economic situation. The fear of war also increased due to the instability in Ukraine and the repercussions of their president's actions on the lives of ordinary citizens.2018-2019: The World Cup, Pension Reform, and Shifting Public ConcernsThe period of 2018 to 2019 was a abundant in all the aspects time for Russia, marked by a contrast between a successful international event and a significant domestic political turmoil. The main events of this year were the presidential election, the FIFA World Cup, and a highly questionable reform.Political Discontent and Public ProtestsIn the run up to the 2018 presidential election, Vladimir Putin, in order to secure his presidential spot banned all possible candidates from joining the race. One of the prominent opponents of Putin was Alexey Navalny, who was massively supported by younger generation. Along with allegations of widespread election fraud and a controversial pension reform, it acted as a major catalyst for public protests. Critics argued that with a low average life expectancy (66 years for men), many Russians would not live long enough to collect their state pensions.These events, combined with a documentary by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation exposing government corruption, fueled significant public demonstrations and damaged government’s image. Tens of thousands of people across Russia joined in these protests, leading to a major surge in political anxiety. Authorities responded with a lockdown, arresting many participants and detaining even more people. Educational institutions reportedly pressured students to not participate, threatening them with dismissal. Navalny himself was repeatedly arrested.Despite the size of protest, there were no results, nothing has changed.The Impact of the FIFA World CupIn stark contrast to the domestic political turmoil, the 2018 World Cup provided the government with a platform for soft power and a temporary boost in national image. While not considered an economic success, and costing over $14 billion with a minor economic benefit, the tournament significantly increased global attention on Russia. This international spotlight, along with a more stable economic situation, created a sense of national pride and momentarily overshadowed the public's grievances.Changing Public Fears (2014 vs. 2019) Data from the Levada Center highlights how Russians' concerns shifted between 2014 - 2019. The two periods show a marked increase in fears related to political instability and government repression. The most significant changes were in political concerns. The fear of "abuse of power" saw the largest jump, increasing by 18 percentage points to 33%. Along with the fear of a "return to repression" and a "tightening of the political regime", which increased by 15 pp and 13 pp, respectively. These statistics underscore a growing public distrust and disbelief in the government, fueled by the 2018 pension reform, “rigged” election and protests. As an expert, Denis Volkov, explained, "People decided that the authorities violated their obligations, deceived them," which directly links the pension reform to the surge in political anxiety.Despite these growing fears, a different Levada poll from late 2019 showed a slight increase in confidence in the government. This could be attributed to the successful staging of the World Cup and a powerful state propaganda campaign aimed at "reconciling people with reality." However, the long-term trends clearly indicate a population increasingly concerned with their political rights, personal freedom and security.2025: Economic Struggles and New Public RestrictionsFollowing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has faced harsh sanctions and economic challenges. While the government has responded with tight control over public discourse, these policies and their consequences have significantly altered the concerns of ordinary citizens.Russian public opinion has evolved throughout the conflict. Initially, there was a surge of patriotic sentiment, but as the war continued, public anxieties have shifted. While the fear of war remains a concern, the focus has increasingly moved toward domestic issues, such as the economy and social tensions. 2025 polls indicated that a majority of Russians supported peace negotiations to end the war, rather than continuing military action. This change is likely correlated with a growing economic impact of the war, as well as drone attacks and their damage on Russian territory, which brought the conflict’s sclale closer to home for many of Russians.  Economic and Social ConcernsEconomic stability has long been a top concern for Russians, and the current situation has only amplified these fears. Since the invasion, government spending on the military has skyrocketed, leading to a massive budget deficit. In an effort to stabilize the economy and combat rapid inflation, the Central Bank, under the leadership of Elvira Nabiullina, implemented a policy of extremely high interest rates, at one point reaching 21%. While this was a logical, albeit painful, economic maneuver to slow down inflation, it had a harsh effect on ordinary citizens, making things like mortgages and loans prohibitively expensive. This has led to a major rise in public concern over the country's economic future, with a significant portion of the population now worried about the state of the "cold" or stagnant economy.Another major concern is the issue of immigrant labor. Russia's aging population and the war have created a severe labor shortage, which is being filled by migrant workers, primarily men from Central Asian countries. These migrants often take low-paying, difficult jobs that Russians are unwilling to do. Despite their essential role in the economy, particularly in industries like construction, their presence has led to social tensions. Public fear, often fueled by nationalist sentiment and concerns over crime, remains a major issue. While some younger Russians may be more tolerant, the general atmosphere is a complex mix of necessity and xenophobia.Public Restrictions and Digital IsolationThe government has also tightened its control over public life and information. Laws restricting dissent and free speech have escalated, with hundreds of people being jailed under new repressive measures. Many journalists and activists have fled the country, and critical discussion is now largely impossible.A major part of this ban has been on internet and digital communication. Following the 2022 invasion, many social media platforms left Russia, forcing users to rely on VPNs to access sites like Instagram and Facebook. Further restrictions have been implemented, including limitations on popular messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. These measures were officially justified as a way to minimize fraud, but they have also been seen as a way to promote state-sponsored apps and control communication. For many Russians, especially the youth, this digital isolation has become a significant source of frustration, with reports of internet slowdowns and service outages becoming more common.How these concerns differ within age groups?While many fears are shared across generations, their intensity and focus vary significantly by age.  For all age groups, the fear of illness of loved ones remains the strongest emotional anchor, symbolizing the dominance of private, family-centered values in contemporary Russian life. Additionally, the fear of war unites all age brackets, suggesting a collective awareness of geopolitical instability and the lasting psychological effects of military conflict.Generational PatternsRecent data [1] reveals distinct generational patterns of fear and anxiety. While most citizens share concerns about security, stability, and well-being, the intensity and content of these fears vary sharply across age groups.Younger Russians (18–30) display the highest levels of anxiety about political instability and future uncertainty. Nearly one-third fear a civil war (32%), and about the same proportion express concern about migration (29%) and environmental threats (27%). These fears reflect their heightened sensitivity to social unrest and global crises, likely influenced by online political discourse.Middle-aged groups (31–60) tend to focus more on economic and social pressures. Concerns about rising prices and impoverishment (up to 29%), interethnic conflicts (29%), and terrorist threats (30%) dominate their worldview. This generation, responsible for families and careers, appears most affected by inflation, inequality, and the broader sense of insecurity in everyday life.In contrast, older respondents (60 and above) prioritize personal health and family safety over political or economic fears. For this group, the focus shifts inward, from collective or national threats to the vulnerabilities of aging and declining health.This progression from systemic to personal anxieties suggests that as individuals age, their fears become less ideological and more existential, mirroring the broader transformation of Russian society.ConclusionOver the past decade, Russian fears have evolved with political shocks, economic turbulence, and social change, yet in many ways, they remain strikingly universal. Like people in most countries, Russians fear illness, poverty, and war above all else. What distinguishes Russia is not the content of its fears, but the context that amplifies them: authoritarian governance, prolonged sanctions, and ongoing conflict.The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2018 protests, and the 2022-25 wartime restrictions each reshaped the emotional landscape of Russian society. Political repression and economic instability deepened existing anxieties, turning collective uncertainty into a defining feature of everyday life. Still, beneath these structural pressures, the same human concerns remain love for family, fear of loss, and hope for security.Ultimately, Russia is not an exception, but a reflection of the modern world: a nation where political fear overlays universal human vulnerability, and where personal and national uncertainty continues to define what it means to live in the 2020s.Note[1] It is important to acknowledge that the FOM is a state-funded organization, and the accuracy of its results may be subject to scrutiny.

Defense & Security
Warsaw, Poland - 14 January 2025 - Flags of NATO, the EU and Poland waving in the wind next to each other

The tongue of the Balance and the Tip of the Spear. The role of Poland in European Geopolitics

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This paper examines Poland's pivotal role in European geopolitics amid escalating tensions following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Highlighting the September 2025 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace—marking NATO's first engagement with Russian assets within allied territory—it analyses Poland's military, diplomatic, and strategic responses, including border closures with Belarus and the NATO-led Iron Defender-25 exercise.The study contextualises Poland's historical significance from its 1918 independence through Cold War dynamics to its contemporary position as a key NATO and EU member. Poland's substantial support to Ukraine, encompassing military aid, humanitarian assistance, and political advocacy, underscores its role as both a regional security actor and a logistic hub.The paper also addresses challenges stemming from refugee influxes and bilateral tensions, while discussing broader implications for EU security and autonomy, particularly regarding Ukraine's potential membership in the EU. Through this lens, Poland emerges as both a bulwark against Russian aggression and a spearhead of European defence initiatives, navigating complex geopolitical pressures with strategic resolve. Key Words: Poland, Ukraine, Geopolitics, Security, Europe Introduction Between September 9 and 10, 2025, a contingent of 19 to 23 drones, alleged to be Russian, breached Polish airspace. This incident marked the first occasion since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine that NATO forces engaged and neutralised Russian assets within allied airspace.[i] Allegedly, the drones were part of a massive Russian assault on Ukraine, involving over 400 drones and missiles. At least four drones were shot down, primarily by Dutch F-35 jets, with support from Polish F-16s, Italian airborne early warning aircraft, and a Belgian aerial tanker. German Patriot systems in Poland were also on high alert.[ii] The drones caused minor damage, and no casualties were reported. Four Polish airports, including Warsaw's Chopin Airport, were temporarily closed due to the incursion. Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, described the event as a "large-scale provocation" and the closest the country had come to open conflict since World War II. Poland invoked NATO's Article 4, prompting consultations among allies, and an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was requested. Polish officials, including Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, assert the incursion was deliberate, citing the number of drones and their flight paths, some of which reached deep into Poland, including near Gdańsk. The drones, identified as Gerbera models (simplified versions of Iran-designed Geran drones), were unarmed, suggesting they might have been decoys to test NATO's air defences. Russia denied targeting Poland, claiming the drones veered off course due to Ukrainian jamming, a claim supported by Belarus but dismissed by Polish and European leaders. Intelligence officials are divided on whether the incursion was intentional or accidental, with some suggesting Russia aimed to probe NATO's response without escalating to direct conflict.[iii] NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte condemned Russia's "reckless behaviour," and leaders from the US, UK, France, Germany, and others expressed solidarity with Poland, calling the incident a serious escalation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy labelled it a "dangerous precedent" and offered Poland anti-drone training, leading to a Poland-Ukraine agreement on joint drone defence initiatives. The EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, proposed a "drone wall" to protect Europe's eastern flank.[iv] The incident occurred amid heightened Russian attacks on Ukraine and joint Russia-Belarus military exercises (Zapad 2025), raising concerns about regional stability. Some analysts believe Russia was testing NATO's resolve, especially after failed US-brokered peace talks. NATO has since bolstered its eastern defences, and Poland has closed its border with Belarus, citing security threats. The Zapad (meaning "West" in the Russian language) series began in 2009 as part of the Union State agreement between Russia and Belarus, alternating with other drills, such as Union Shield. Previous exercises often raised alarms among NATO members due to their scale and proximity to alliance borders. For instance, Zapad 2017 involved scenarios with fictional states resembling the Baltic nations.[v] At the same time, Zapad 2021 reportedly included up to 200,000 troops and integrated Belarusian forces more deeply into Russian command structures, with elements simulating operations involving Ukraine. The 2023 Zapad exercise was cancelled, attributed to Russia's resource strain from the Ukraine conflict. Notably, similar drills like Union Resolve in early 2022 were used to mask troop buildups for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, fuelling suspicions around Zapad events. Zapad 2025 took place from September 12 to 16 across 41 land and maritime training areas in both Russia and Belarus. Around 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercise, which also involved up to 7,000 Belarusian soldiers and 10,000 pieces of military hardware.[vi] The operation explicitly framed itself as a defensive measure to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union State. Still, it also incorporated high-intensity combat simulations, including the theoretical deployment of tactical nuclear capabilities and advanced missile systems. Despite the presence of military observers from NATO nations and other allied countries at the Zapad 2025 military exercises, the event has raised concerns about regional security, particularly among Poland and the easternmost members of NATO. According to the world's oldest and one of the most cited think tanks specialising in international security, the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), "Zapad 2025 appears as a meticulously calibrated, scaled-down, and geographically-constrained exercise. This is a deliberate and rational adaptation to the immense human and material costs of the ongoing large-scale war in Ukraine and the persistent strain of international sanctions. The exercise worked as a multi-layered instrument of a state in wartime, even though not fully mobilised. Politically, it fostered a perception of resolve continuity to both domestic and international audiences, strengthening the Russian-Belarusian closeness and deploying calibrated, low-resource deterrent messaging. Militarily, it worked as a field laboratory where Russia stress-tested and refined its Initial Period of War (IPW) playbook, incorporating direct lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield. The focus this time was on high-leverage capabilities, such as long-range precision fires, integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), and electronic warfare (EW), while conserving mass and materiel that are critically needed in Ukraine."[vii]Polish reaction to ZAPAD 2025Poland responded resolutely to the joint Russia-Belarus Zapad 2025 military exercises, viewing them as a provocative threat due to their proximity to the Polish border, aggressive scenarios (including nuclear elements and targeting the strategic Suwałki Gap), and the broader context of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and recent incidents like Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace. The reactions encompassed military, border security, diplomatic, and intelligence measures, reflecting heightened tensions and a focus on deterrence.[viii] Poland closed all border crossings with Belarus, including railway lines, effective midnight on September 11-12, 2025 (local Polish time), for an indefinite period until the perceived threat subsided.[1] This decision, announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, was justified by the exercises' aggressive nature, their location near the border, and ongoing hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus, such as arson attacks, sabotage, propaganda, disinformation, and espionage. The closure impacted the transit of Chinese and Russian goods. Additional measures included heightened vigilance at the frontier, with Poland coordinating with allies like Lithuania, which also ramped up security at its borders with Belarus and Russia.[ix] Additionally, Poland deployed up to 40,000 soldiers to its eastern border with Belarus as a direct counter to the drills, emphasising preparedness amid the perceived escalation. In a pre-emptive move, Poland led the NATO-backed Iron Defender-25 exercise, starting on September 2, 2025, as its primary military response.[x] This was described as the largest NATO-led drill of the year, involving approximately 30,000 troops (including Polish Armed Forces, NATO battlegroups, Air Force, Navy, Territorial Defence Forces, and Special Forces) and over 600 pieces of heavy equipment, such as U.S.-made Abrams tanks, K9 howitzers, and Gladius drone systems. The multi-domain exercise (land, sea, air, cyberspace) incorporated lessons from the Ukraine war, testing combat effectiveness in realistic scenarios to enhance interoperability and demonstrate alliance unity. Poland's Defence Ministry framed it as non-targeted training but a clear signal of readiness against potential threats, including large-scale drone attacks and Russia's Iskander-M missile deployments in Kaliningrad. Concurrent NATO drills were also conducted along the border.[xi] Historical Context For a non-specialist, especially one from outside Europe, Poland may seem a big unknown. Let us then very briefly examine the role of Poland in European Politics from a historical perspective over the last one hundred years. Poland's role in European history since 1918 has been transformative, serving as both a symbol of national resilience and a catalyst for broader continental change. From regaining independence after 123 years of partition to becoming a cornerstone of modern European integration, Poland's journey reflects the complex dynamics of 20th and 21st century European politics. Poland re-emerged as an independent state in 1918 following the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. The newly reconstituted Second Polish Republic faced immediate challenges, including border conflicts with neighbouring states from 1918 to 1921 and internal struggles with multiethnic tensions and economic dislocation.[xii] The interwar period was characterised by political instability, debates over competing leadership visions, and the legacy of partitions that shaped Poland's regional ambitions and democratic consolidation efforts.[xiii] Poland became the epicentre of World War II, suffering devastating military occupation under both Nazi and Soviet policies. The country experienced unprecedented civilian trauma, displacement, and the systematic extermination of its population.[xiv] Historians still debate the numbers, but recent analyses suggest that the nation might have lost much more than initially was suggested. Instead of six million, some historians suggest that nine million would be a more realistic number, which would constitute almost 24% of the Polish population.[xv] This wartime destruction fundamentally reshaped Poland's demographics, political landscape, and postwar boundaries, leaving an indelible mark on European memory of the war. After 1945, Poland fell under the Soviet sphere, adopting a communist system that profoundly shaped its institutions, economy, and foreign policy throughout the Cold War. The Soviet-backed regime implemented state socialism, which combined industrialisation with political repression, resulting in periodic episodes of mass dissent.[xvi] Notably, as a member of the Warsaw Pact,[xvii] Poland occupied a central strategic position within the Central and Eastern European architecture, serving as both a critical forward staging area and a substantial contributor to the alliance's conventional forces throughout the Cold War period (1955 - 1989). As part of the "Northern Tier" alongside East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Poland's territory formed the primary staging ground for Soviet operational plans targeting Western Europe, providing essential buffer protection for Soviet rear areas while controlling crucial East-West transit routes across Central Europe.[xviii] The Polish People's Army constituted one of the largest non-Soviet contingents within the Warsaw Pact, with substantial ground forces integrated into Soviet-designed offensive operations that emphasised rapid cross-border campaigns and coalition warfare capabilities. Polish military doctrine was heavily subordinated to Soviet operational art, with force structures, equipment procurement, and training programs synchronised to complement Soviet General Staff concepts rather than independent national defence requirements.[xix] Poland's armed forces regularly participated in major Warsaw Pact exercises that rehearsed theatre-level offensive operations, serving as integral combat elements whose contributions were deemed necessary for the alliance's conventional surprise-attack options. However, this integration came at the cost of operational autonomy, as Soviet personnel and advisers maintained significant influence over Polish military leadership and strategic planning throughout much of the Cold War period. The relationship revealed inherent tensions between Polish national interests and Soviet strategic imperatives, particularly during political crises such as the 1980 - 1981 Solidarity period, when Moscow considered military intervention but ultimately relied on Polish authorities to maintain internal order. By the 1980s, while Poland remained formally committed to Warsaw Pact structures, domestic political changes increasingly undermined the reliability and willingness of Polish forces to serve Soviet strategic objectives, contributing to the gradual erosion of the alliance's military cohesion.[xx] The independent trade union Solidarity, born from mass strikes in 1980, became the primary catalyst for Poland's transition from communism. Despite the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the movement persisted and eventually led to the Round Table negotiations and the pivotal 1989 elections, which produced rapid systemic change.[xxi] Poland's peaceful transition initiated processes that reverberated across Eastern Europe, contributing to the end of the Cold War order. Poland's post-1989 trajectory transformed it from a transition exemplar to an active Euro-Atlantic partner. The country joined NATO in 1999 and acceded to the European Union in 2004, completing its integration into Western institutions.[xxii] Today, Poland serves as the largest economy in Central Europe. It plays multiple roles as a security actor countering Russian influence, a close US partner, and a significant voice in EU decision-making.[xxiii] Below, the reader will find a comprehensive table that contains key political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Source: Grok – prompt: Create a table with the most important political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Visualisation by gamma.app. The Role of Poland in the Ukrainian War As allegedly a Chinese saying goes, "one picture is worth a thousand words", one needs to look no further than at a map of contemporary Europe to understand the central and therefore strategically important location of Poland. Source: https://www.escape2poland.co.uk/poland-guide/poland-map From the very beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Poland has emerged as one of Kyiv's staunchest allies, providing multifaceted support amid escalating geopolitical tensions. This assistance has spanned military, humanitarian, political, and economic domains, reflecting Warsaw's strategic interest in countering Russian aggression while bolstering regional stability. By mid-2025, Poland's total aid to Ukraine has approached $9 billion, equivalent to about 4.91% of its GDP.[xxiv] In the military sphere, Poland has delivered 47 aid packages, positioning itself as Europe's primary logistics hub for defence supplies, with 80% of allied donations transiting through its borders. Cumulative military support has reached €4.5 billion by May 2025, including over 300 T-72 and PT-91 Twardy tanks, BWP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, reconnaissance drones, and 100 million rounds of ammunition. Poland also trained Ukrainian troops on NATO equipment and, in April 2024, offered to repatriate draft-eligible Ukrainian men residing in Poland to bolster Kyiv's forces. A July 2024 bilateral security agreement further commits Warsaw to ongoing defence cooperation.[xxv] Humanitarian efforts have been equally robust, with Poland hosting over 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees by 2025, after more than 7.57 million crossed its borders since the invasion's onset.[xxvi] Warsaw established nine reception points on day one and spent €40 billion (1.9% of GDP) on refugee and humanitarian aid from 2022 to 2024, including welfare, medical supplies, and integration programs.[xxvii] By 2024, Ukrainian refugees reportedly contributed a net 2.7% boost to Poland's GDP through employment, with rates rising from 61% to 69%. However, public support has waned, dropping to 45% for long-term stays by 2025, amid political debates over extending benefits.[xxviii] Politically, Poland condemned the invasion through a unanimous Sejm resolution on February 24, 2022, and has advocated for Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO within forums like the Lublin Triangle. Leaders like President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk have emphasised "non-negotiable" solidarity, pushing for sanctions and intelligence sharing. Tensions flared in 2023 over grain imports, leading to temporary bans and border protests, but dialogue resumed with high-level meetings in 2024.[xxix] Economically, Poland's aid encompasses reconstruction involvement, energy interconnections, and trade facilitation, with refugees contributing to growth. As of September 2025, Warsaw has joined the "Coalition of the Willing" for sustained defence pledges, although domestic fatigue and the 2025 elections pose challenges to its long-term commitment. Overall, Poland's role has solidified its regional leadership, balancing altruism with security imperatives.[xxx] The overall picture regarding the actual situation in Poland regarding the costs and benefits of Ukrainian immigration is not all roses. The influx has triggered notable social, economic, and infrastructural strains. Public support for long-term refugee stays has declined amid growing fatigue and political debates. Key challenges include social tensions, housing pressures, welfare strains, and integration barriers. Rarely, but especially painful from a Polish perspective, are anti-Polish sentiments manifested by some Ukrainians, mostly on social media, which often refer to support for Stepan Bandera, seen as a founder of the modern Ukrainian State. Stephan Bandera, was a Ukrainian nationalist leader associated with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — and a prominent instigator of Volhynia Massacre of 1943 - 1944. During the massacre, UPA forces killed up to 200,000 ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (civilians – mostly women and children) as part of ethnic cleansing efforts. Consequently, Bandera, viewed as a hero in Ukraine for resisting Soviet and Nazi occupations, is often equated in Poland with perpetrators of genocide. SAFE and European Autonomy As analysed here, the EU is in favour of Ukraine's integration into European defence cooperation through the SAFE fund, which highlights Ukraine's unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. With its vast resources, Ukraine can potentially strengthen the EU and contribute to its economic and political growth, thereby enhancing European geopolitical influence. On the downside, Ukrainian semi- or full membership in the EU, which is likely to include membership in the postulated European Defence Union (EDU), will further stretch the EU dangerously to the East, shrinking the geographical distance between the EU and Russia. Consequently, Europe is likely to face an elevated strategic challenge posed by Russia, given its military potential and, most importantly, the historical and current context of political and economic adversary relations. Simply speaking, once Ukraine becomes an EU member, the EU will be exposed to constant security challenges to a degree much higher than before. The theory of escalation by Herman Kahn should therefore be studied in detail by European policymakers and military leaders to make sure that Europe does not find itself again drawn into a military conflict that may damage its societies for generations to come.[xxxi] Curiously, political leaders of Poland (such as Prime Minister Donald Tusk or Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski), supported by Estonian, German, French and British leaders, strike somewhat risky poses and flex muscles verbally challenging the delicate status quo. For example, a recent Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace (8-9 September 2025) produced a lot of chaos and uncertainty. As a consequence, some damage was done to civilian infrastructure. Polish authorities were quick to declare that Russian drones had caused the damage. Only later did it transpire through media reports that the damage had, in fact, been caused by friendly fire. A Polish missile mistakenly hit the civilian infrastructure instead of a hostile drone.[xxxii] Similarly, on November 15, 2022, during a massive Russian missile barrage targeting Ukrainian infrastructure, a missile struck a grain drying facility in the Polish village of Przewodów (near the Ukraine border), killing two Polish civilians and causing an explosion.[xxxiii] Initial reactions from the Ukrainian and the Polish governments hinted at Russian agency. Later on, it turned out that it was, in fact, a Ukrainian missile that mistakenly hit the Polish territory.[2] Interestingly, in a recent interview, the former President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, admitted that the Ukrainian side clearly used the event as an attempt to force the Polish hand to join the war against Russia.[xxxiv]Poland, once again, finds itself at the forefront of the geopolitical border between the collective West and Russia, and once again, it serves as both a bulwark and a spearhead. A role that never really paid any dividends in the 20th century. A role that cost millions of lives, destruction and decades of servitude. Broader Geopolitical Context In a broader geopolitical context, the Polish government has recently taken a significant step by blocking the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. The closure of the border with Belarus halted all road and rail traffic, including a critical rail route that handles about 90% of EU-China freight train shipments — part of China's Belt and Road Initiative — valued at around €25 - 30 billion annually. The disruption affected perishable goods, forced rerouting to less efficient paths, such as the Middle Corridor (via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), and led to potential losses for Chinese investors. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski emphasised to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on September 16 that security took precedence over trade, rejecting the initial request to reopen. The border reopened on September 25, allowing rail trade to resume gradually, though short-term congestion and instability persisted.[xxxv]Initially, Poland was positive about OBOR, which was formally launched back in 2013. Poland's participation positioned it as a key European gateway, leveraging its central location for rail, port, and trade links. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Poland in June 2016 and held a meeting with then-President Andrzej Duda and then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło. They signed a declaration elevating ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, emphasising OBOR cooperation in trade, investment, and infrastructure. The next several years saw a focus on rail and port projects where Poland positions itself as a "hub" for the Silk Road Economic Belt, with investments in logistics and connectivity.[xxxvi] In June 2024, President Xi met Duda in Beijing to mark 75 years of diplomatic relations. They issued an Action Plan (2024–2027) for strengthening the partnership, including high-quality OBOR cooperation.Recent events show that the Polish leadership has reevaluated its role in global and European geopolitics. By doing so, it appears that the Polish political leadership is playing a high-stakes game in the current geopolitical arena — a picture all too familiar to anyone who has studied the history of World War II. We can only hope that this time the future will not bring an all-European war.  [1] The border was reopened at midnight 25 of September.[2] The Ukrainian side has issued no official acknowledgement nor any compensation.   [i] Easton, A., & Lukiv, J. (2025, September 11). Poland says it shot down Russian drones after airspace violation. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c147065pzdzo[ii] Charlish, A., Kelly, L., & Erling, B. (2025, September 11). Poland downs drones in its airspace, becoming first NATO member to fire during war in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10/[iii] Walker, S. (2025, September 15). Russian drone incursion into Poland ‘was Kremlin test on Nato.’ The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/14/russian-drone-incursion-poland-nato-ukraine-europe[iv] Emergency Briefing on Drone Incursion into Poland. (2025, September 12). Security Council Report. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/emergency-briefing-on-drone-incursion-into-poland.php[v] Yeryoma, M. (2025, August 26). As Russia-Belarus Zapad military exercises begin, here’s everything you need to know. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-russia-belarus-zapad-2025-military-drills-set-for-september/[vi] Bifolchi, G. (2025, September 17). Russia-Belarus Joint Military Exercise “Zapad-2025”: Intel Briefing. The Kyiv Independent. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/09/17/russia-belarus-zapad-2025/[vii] Minniti, F. (2025, September 22). Wartime Zapad 2025 Exercise: Russia’s Strategic Adaptation and NATO. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/wartime-zapad-2025-exercise-russias-strategic-adaptation-and-nato[viii] Query, A. (2025, September 20). Iron Defender-25: Is NATO Finally Ready to Shield Its Eastern Flank? UNITED24 MEDIA. https://united24media.com/world/iron-defender-25-is-nato-finally-ready-to-shield-its-eastern-flank-11795[ix] Poland to close Belarus border due to Russia-led military exercises, PM says. (2025, September 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-close-belarus-border-due-russia-led-military-exercises-pm-says-2025-09-09/[x] Polska odpowiedź na “Zapad-2025”. “Unikamy eskalacji, nie boimy się.” (2025, August 9). Polskie Radio24.Pl. https://polskieradio24.pl/artykul/3562822,polska-odpowiedz-na-zapad-2025-unikamy-eskalacji-nie-boimy-sie[xi] Federation of Exercises codenamed IRON DEFENDER-25 - One Goal, Many Forces, Shared Readiness. (2025, August 26). Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland. https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/federation-of-exercises-codenamed-iron-defender-25--one-goal-many-forces-shared-readiness[xii] J. Lukowski and H. Zawadzki, "Independence regained and lost, 1914–1945," in A Concise History of Poland, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Also J. Böhler, Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland, 2018.[xiii] Górny, M. (2019). A Century of Selective Ignorance: Poland 1918–2018. Slavic Review, 78(3), 654–662. doi:10.1017/slr.2019.227  [xiv] A. J. Prazmowska, Poland: A Modern History, 2010. Also P. D. Stachura, Poland in the Twentieth Century, 1999.[xv] Davies, N. (n.d.). Europa walczy 1939-1945. Nie takie proste zwycięstwo. ZNAK.[xvi] A. Kemp‑Welch, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History, Cambridge University Press, 2008.[xvii] See more at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Pact[xviii] M. Sadykiewicz, "Organizing for Coalition Warfare The Role of East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning," RAND, 1988.[xix] Jones, C. D. (2003). Soviet military doctrine as strategic deception: An offensive military strategy for defense of the socialist fatherland. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 16(3), 24–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040308430567[xx] Mastny, V. (1999). The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War. Europe-Asia Studies, 51(2), 189–211. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153609[xxi] A. Paczkowski and C. Manetti, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, 1980–1989, 2015.[xxii] A. F. Tatham, "The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and European Law," in European Law and the Eastern Enlargement, Brill, 2013.[xxiii] R. Zięba, "The Evolution of Poland's International Roles," in Central Europe and the Changing International Order, 2020. Or A. Szczerbiak, "A model for democratic transition and European integration? Why Poland matters?" Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 2016.[xxiv] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxv] Palowski, J. (2025, April 8). Poland delivered 100 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine. Details on Germany and USA. Defence 24.Com. https://defence24.com/defence-policy/poland-delivered-100-million-rounds-of-ammunition-to-ukraine-details-on-germany-and-usa Also Słowański, M. T. (2025, January 13). Poland and Ukraine: A Partnership Forged in Resilience. Fair Observer. https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/poland-and-ukraine-a-partnership-forged-in-resilience/[xxvi] Fusiek, D. A. (2022, November 28). The needs of refugees. European Investment Bank. https://www.eib.org/en/stories/ukrainian-poland-infrastructure-refugees[xxvii] See more at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location/10781[xxviii] See more at: UKRAINE EMERGENCY. (2025, September 25). UNHCR. https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/[xxix] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxx] Ukrainian refugees give Poland big economic boost, report says. (2025, June 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-refugees-give-poland-big-economic-boost-report-says-2025-06-10/[xxxi]https://www.amazon.com/Escalation-Metaphors-Scenarios-Herman-Kahn/dp/1412811627#:~:text=In%20this%20widely%20discussed%20and,closer%20to%20all%2Dout%20war.[xxxii] Kacprzak, I., & Zawadka, G. (2025, September 16). Polska rakieta uderzyła w dom na Lubelszczyźnie. Rzeczpospolita. https://www.rp.pl/wojsko/art43015001-polska-rakieta-uderzyla-w-dom-na-lubelszczyznie[xxxiii] Henley, J. (2022, November 16). Missile that hit Poland likely came from Ukraine defences, say Warsaw and NATO. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/poland-president-missile-strike-probably-ukrainian-stray[xxxiv] Scheffer, J. (2025, September 5). Poland’s Ex-President Duda Exposes How Ukraine Tries to Pull Allies into War. Hungarian Conservative. https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/ukraine-war-andrzej-duda-allies-false-flag-drone-strike/[xxxv] Dean, J. D. (2025, September 23). Poland to China: So, You Want to Play Hybrid War? Hungarian Conservative. https://cepa.org/article/poland-to-china-so-you-want-to-play-hybrid-war/[xxxvi] Jakubowski, A., Komornicki, T., Kowalczyk, K., & Miszczuk, A. (2020). Poland as a hub of the Silk Road Economic Belt: is the narrative of opportunity supported by developments on the ground? Asia Europe Journal, 18, 367–396. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-020-00571-6

Defense & Security
Flags of Ukraine and the European Union on flagpoles near the office of the President of Ukraine. Kyiv

Assessment of the Limitations of the EU's guarantees regarding Ukraine's security and territorial integrity

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This analysis critically examines the European Union's security guarantees for Ukraine as of 2025, amid ongoing conflict and geopolitical tensions. Despite ambitious diplomatic efforts and increased defence spending, the EU faces significant economic and military challenges that undermine its capacity to ensure Ukraine's security and territorial integrity.Economically, the EU struggles with sluggish growth, structural inefficiencies, high public debt, and trade deficits, particularly with China, limiting resources for sustained military investment. Militarily, the EU's fragmented forces and reliance on NATO contrast sharply with Russia's extensive, war-driven military production and strategic nuclear capabilities.The war in Ukraine demonstrates the increasing prominence of drones and missiles, areas where the EU lags behind both Ukraine and Russia in production scale and innovation. Furthermore, the shifting global order towards multipolarity and the strategic alignment of Russia and China further constrain the EU's role as a formidable security actor beyond its borders. Key Words: EU, Ukraine, Security, Guarantees Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement on September 5, 2025, warning that any foreign troops deployed to Ukraine — particularly in the context of the "coalition of the willing" led by France and the UK — would be considered legitimate targets for Russian forces. This was in direct response to a summit in Paris on September 4, where 26 countries pledged to contribute to a potential postwar security force for Ukraine, which could involve deploying troops on the ground, at sea, or in the air to deter future aggression after a ceasefire. Putin's exact words, as reported from his appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, included: "Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction."[i] He further emphasised that even post-ceasefire, he saw no need for such forces if a long-term peace is achieved, adding, "If decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop."[ii] The "coalition of the willing" refers to a group of primarily European and Commonwealth nations, co-chaired by France and Britain, formed in early 2025 to provide security guarantees for Ukraine amid ongoing peace efforts led by US President Donald Trump. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Putin's stance, calling the presence of any foreign or NATO forces near Russia's border a threat and unacceptable.[iii] While Putin did not explicitly name the "coalition of the willing" in his quoted remarks, the timing and context—immediately following the Paris summit announcements—make it clear his warning targets their proposed deployments.[iv] As bold as President Putin's statement is, the EU has been making lots of noise in recent months regarding European guarantees for the future of Ukrainian security and its territorial integrity. This analysis aims to provide a "hard-eyed" assessment of the formidability of these claims, following a previous piece that analysed European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine's territorial integrity, published here: An analysis of European Diplomatic Efforts to Support Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity. Challenges and Opportunities. EU Economic Stance and Prospects As of 2025, the European Union's economy remains sluggish, troubled by structural inefficiencies and mounting external pressures. Arguably, the EU bloc is increasingly uncompetitive on the global stage. Despite some stabilisation in inflation and resilient labour markets, the overall trajectory suggests a region struggling to keep pace with the United States and China, with GDP growth forecasts hovering around a dismal 1% — well below the global average of 3.2%. This underperformance is not a temporary hiccup but a symptom of deep-rooted issues, including overregulation, demographic decline, and dependency on volatile external factors.[v] Critics argue that the EU's adherence to rigid "globalist" policies, such as burdensome environmental regulations and fragmented fiscal strategies, has stifled innovation and exacerbated trade imbalances, leading to a €305.8 billion deficit with China in 2024 alone. It is pretty probable that without radical reforms, the EU risks sliding into prolonged stagnation or even collapse, as high energy costs erode competitiveness in export markets. State of the Union (2025,10 September ) openly admits that "In the trade of goods, the EU has long had a trade deficit with China. The deficit amounted to €305.8 billion in 2024, surpassing the €297 billion deficit of 2023, but lower than the record trade deficit of €397.3 billion reached in 2022. In terms of volume, the deficit increased from 34.8 million tons in 2023 to 44.5 million tons in 2024. In the period 2015-2024, the deficit quadrupled in volume, while it doubled in value.China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and its biggest for imports. EU exports to China amounted to €213.3 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €519 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 0.3% and 4.6% respectively. In 2024, EU imports of manufactured goods accounted for 96.7% of total imports from China, with primary goods comprising just 3%. The most important manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (55%), followed by other manufactured goods (34%), and chemicals (8%). In 2024, EU exports of manufactured goods constituted 86.9% of total exports to China, with primary goods making up 11.5%. The most exported manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (51%), followed by other manufactured goods (20%), and chemicals (17%).[vi] The EU's core metrics reveal an economy that is stable but uninspiring, to put it mildly, with persistent disparities across member states that undermine cohesion.   *Created by Grok – prompt: critical evaluation of the EU economic situation as of 2025. These figures highlight internal fractures: Southern Europe (e.g., Spain at 2.6%) outperforms the core (Germany at 0%), but overall, the bloc's growth is "stuck in first gear," with services stagnant and manufacturing barely registering. Household savings are rebuilding, but consumer confidence remains low amid trade disruptions and geopolitical noise. At its core, the EU suffers from endemic structural flaws that no amount of monetary tinkering can fix. An ageing population—projected to strain fiscal sustainability—exacerbates labour shortages and boosts welfare costs, while policies to increase participation among older workers and women remain inadequate.[vii] Productivity has lagged behind that of the US and Asia for over 15 years, hindered by fragmented regulations that impede innovation in AI and biotech.[viii] The much-touted Green Deal, while environmentally ambitious, imposes extreme costs on industries, with 44% of firms reporting trade disruptions from China (mostly dumping). Energy dependency, exposed by the Ukraine war, has led to sky-high costs that "erode competitiveness," pushing the EU toward deindustrialisation. Critics decry the EU as a "technocratic regime" where national sovereignty is eroded by Brussel’s alleged blackmail tactics, rendering parliaments mere puppets and stifling bold reforms. The EU's economy is dangerously exposed to global headwinds, with risks tilted firmly downward.[ix] Escalating US-China trade tensions, including potential Trump-era tariffs, threaten exports (over 50% of GDP), particularly in the automotive and machinery sectors.[x] Geopolitical conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East disrupt supply chains and energy prices, while climate events add further volatility.[xi] The loss of the "peace dividend" forces a diversion of resources to defence, inflating costs and deterring investment. Capital outflows to a faster-growing US, driven by tax cuts, compound the issue, leaving Europe starved of investment. Politically, instability, such as France's government collapse over budget cuts (€44 billion), signals deeper fractures, risking social unrest and further eroding confidence.[xii] The analysis above only scratches the surface. To have a better picture, one should also look at current and projected budget deficits and public debts. For example, according to the EU-27, the total public debt was approximately €14.2 trillion in Q1 2025.[xiii] As for budget deficits, the aggregate EU-27 deficit stood at -2.9% of GDP in Q1 2025, according to Eurostat. [xiv] Looking forward, the situation does not seem to look much better. The prospects for public debt and budget deficits in the EU-27 over the next 5 to 10 years are characterised by gradual upward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios due to persistent deficits, ageing populations, increased defence spending, and potential shocks like higher interest rates or geopolitical tensions. Based on the latest forecasts from the European Commission (Spring 2025), IMF (April 2025 World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor), and other analyses as of September 2025, debt levels are expected to stabilise or edge higher in the short term (2025–2026), with longer-term sustainability risks emerging from megatrends like climate adaptation and demographic shifts. No comprehensive projections extend fully to 2035, but medium-term analyses (up to 2030) suggest debt could rise to 85–90% of GDP for the EU aggregate if fiscal consolidation is uneven. Deficits are projected to hover around -3% of GDP, testing the Maastricht 3% limit, with calls for prudent policies to avoid unsustainable paths.[xv] It is against this backdrop that the SAFE investments, of which I have written here, here, here and here will have to be somehow balanced against other public policies, including immigration, education, public healthcare or housing. The picture does not look good for the EU, to put it mildly. Current European Military Capabilities as Compared to Russia The EU The European Union's military and defence capabilities remain fragmented, relying on the collective forces of its 27 member states rather than a unified army. As of 2025, the EU and the UK boast approximately 1.4 million[xvi] active personnel, over 7,000 tanks, 1,300 combat aircraft, and a naval fleet including 18 submarines and multiple aircraft carriers, primarily from France and Italy. Combined defence spending has risen to approximately 2% of GDP, totalling €343 billion as of 2024, but gaps persist in strategic enablers, such as air defence, munitions, and cyber capabilities.[xvii] The EU's strengths include industrial bases in countries such as Germany and France, which support exports and innovation in areas like drones and AI. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) facilitate missions, while PESCO fosters joint projects. Recent initiatives, such as the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan, aim to mobilise €800 billion for investments, including €150 billion via the SAFE loan instrument, targeting two million artillery rounds in 2025, enhanced drone systems, and military mobility.[xviii] The EU's major weaknesses include a heavy reliance on NATO, particularly on US troops, with estimates suggesting that Europe needs an additional 300,000 soldiers and €250 billion annually to achieve independence. This includes addressing shortfalls in tanks (1,400 needed), artillery, and shells (one million for sustained combat). Challenges include political divisions, with Hungary blocking aid, and supply chain vulnerabilities amid climate threats.[xix] Overall, while progress toward a "European pillar" in NATO accelerates, achieving full strategic autonomy by 2030 hinges on member states' commitment to joint procurement and increased spending. The Russian Federation Russia's military capabilities in 2025 are formidable yet strained by the ongoing Ukraine war, with approximately 1.1 million active personnel, including 600,000 deployed near Ukraine.[xx] According to the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Russia's Defence spending reached 15.5 trillion roubles ($150 billion), or 7.2% of GDP, up 3.4% in real terms from 2024, funding war efforts and modernisation. Inventory includes roughly 5,000 tanks (after refurbishing Soviet stocks amid 3,000+ losses), 1,000 combat aircraft (down from pre-war due to 250 losses), and a navy with one aircraft carrier, 60 submarines, and 800 vessels total, emphasising submarine advancements.[xxi] Russia's strengths seem to lie in strategic nuclear forces (1,550 deployed warheads, up to 2,000 non-strategic), electronic warfare, drone production (over 100 daily), and global power projection via naval deployments. Adaptations include glide bombs and unmanned systems, enabling incremental gains in Ukraine despite 750,000 - 790,000 casualties.[xxii] According to experts, Russia's weaknesses include degraded conventional forces against NATO, stagnation in innovation, sanctions-driven dependencies on China/Iran/North Korea, labour shortages, and rising costs that hamper the development of advanced technology.[xxiii] Reforms prioritise nuclear deterrence, robotics, and force enlargement, but demographic/economic constraints may limit rebuilding over a decade. Overall, Russia sustains attrition warfare but faces sustainability challenges for broader threats.[xxiv] The Realities of the Current Wars – the case of the war in Ukraine The war in Ukraine is surprisingly static in a sense in which the First World War was static. We can observe numerous troops fighting a 21st-century version of a trench war, at least to an extent where the front lines seem pretty much fixed. Technological aspects of the Ukrainian war are, however, decidedly different from a hundred years ago. The war in Ukraine is marked by an extensive use of drones. The analysis of available data from the military, UN reports, and media, up to mid-2025, indicates that the weapons causing the highest number of casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war are primarily drones and artillery systems. These two account for most of both military and civilian losses, with a notable shift toward drones in recent years. Total casualties exceed 1.2 million (primarily military, including killed and wounded), though exact figures are estimates due to underreporting and classification issues.   *Generated by Grok. Prompt: What weapons cause the most significant number of casualties in the Ukrainian war? Multiple Sources. Please see below.[xxv] According to publicly available data, military casualties dominate, with around 1.2 million total for Russia and Ukraine combined.[xxvi] As for civilians, the estimates indicate around 50 thousand casualties, mostly from wide-area explosives.[xxvii] Can the EU be a Formidable Military Power of Tomorrow? The existing intel indicates that the drones are responsible for 70 to 80% of battlefield casualties. Exact numbers are naturally difficult to come by, but experts estimate that the total usage of drones likely exceeds production slightly due to imports/donations. Having said that, the production is probably the best indicator. Consequently, the cumulative totals since 2022 exceed 10 million, with 2025 projected to add 7-9 million drones to the battlefield.[xxviii] If this trajectory continues, it means that the future wars will increasingly be fought with drones and missiles, probably operated by AI systems. So how about the EU? The EU production is small-scale and high-value, with countries like France (Parrot SA, Thales) and Germany (Flyability) among the global top 10 manufacturers. No specific unit numbers, but the EU lags in mass production, urging scaling to millions annually for defence. The current output is likely in the tens to hundreds of thousands, primarily focused on (ISR) – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.[xxix] Tellingly, "Defence Data 2024-2025" from the European Defence Agency (EDA) does not even explicitly mention drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At best, the document alludes to the substantial increase in defence investment, procurement, and R&D in the EU Member States in the future, strongly suggesting that unmanned systems, including drones, are part of ongoing and future defence capability developments.[xxx] Interestingly, it is Ukraine that outpaces the EU in its own domestic production of drones. According to the Global Drone Industry 2025 Market Report, Ukraine produced over 2 million drones domestically in 2024 and, per President Zelensky in early 2025, has the capacity to build 4 million drones annually.[xxxi] Among other interesting information, one finds: 1. The global drone market was valued at about $73 billion in 2024 and is forecast to reach $163+ billion by 2030, with a 14%+ CAGR in the latter 2020s2. Military and defence end-use accounted for about 60% of the total drone market value in 2024.3. DJI (Chinese producer) held an estimated 70%+ share of the global drone market by 2024. One of the most promising developments in this respect appears to be the Eurodrone, officially known as the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS), a twin-turboprop unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions. It is being developed collaboratively by Airbus (leading the project), Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo, under the management of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), to meet the needs of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The program aims to provide a sovereign European capability that's affordable, operationally relevant, and certified for flight in non-segregated airspace, thereby reducing reliance on non-European systems, such as the U.S.-made Reaper drone.[xxxii] As of 2025, it's in the development phase, with the prototype assembly underway and a maiden flight targeted for mid-2027, followed by initial deliveries around 2029-2030. As such, it is still more of a project rather than any real formidable capability.   Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/20005/total-forecast-purchases-of-weaponized-military-drones/   Source: https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis Apart from drones and UAVs, it is missiles that feature prominently in the modern battlefield. Here, the EU's production capabilities seem equally modest. EU production has indeed tripled overall since 2022, driven by the war. Still, it remains defensive-oriented, with slower scale-up due to component shortages (e.g., rocket motors) and a reliance on U.S. partners. Offensive long-range strike capabilities are limited, with focus on air-defence interceptors under initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI).[xxxiii] Key systems include U.S.-made Patriot (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) and European Aster 30 (via MBDA's Eurosam). Global Patriot production is 850 – 880 annually, but Europe receives only 400 – 500. Aster output is 190 – 225 in 2025, nearly all for Europe. Combined, EU availability is 600 – 700 interceptors per year. Under a 2:1 targeting ratio (multiple interceptors per incoming missile), this equates to defending against 235 – 299 ballistic missiles annually. Projections aim for 1,130 by 2027 and 1,470 by 2029, with licensed production in Germany (e.g., Rheinmetall).[xxxiv] Recent analyses indicate Russia has significantly boosted its missile manufacturing since 2022, shifting to a wartime economy with 24/7 operations and foreign inputs (e.g., from North Korea and Iran). Estimates for 2025 suggest an annual output in the thousands, far outpacing pre-war levels, though exact figures are classified and reliant on external intelligence.[xxxv] As for ballistic missiles, Russia's Production of short- and medium-range systems such as the 9M723 (Iskander-M) and Kh-47M2 (Kinzhal) has surged. Pre-war estimates pegged 9M723 at around 72 units per year, but by June 2025, this had risen to at least 720 annually, with monthly output at 60 – 70 units. Kinzhal production stands at 10 – 15 per month (120 – 180 annually). Combined, these yield 840 – 1,020 ballistic missiles per year, marking a 66% increase over the past year and a 15–40% jump in Iskander output alone during the first half of 2025. Regarding cruise missiles, Russia's output has similarly expanded, with the Kh-101 rising from 56 pre-war to over 700 annually. Total land-attack cruise missiles (including 3M-14 Kalibr, Kh-59, and P-800 Oniks adaptations) could reach up to 2,000 per year. Stocks are estimated at 300 – 600 units currently, with projections for 5,000 by 2035. All in all, most experts point to a significant "missile gap" favouring Russia, where its 840 – 1,020 annual ballistic missiles alone exceed the EU's defensive capacity (e.g., intercepting only 300 ballistic threats per year). Russia's total missile/drone output dwarfs EU efforts. However, that is not all; one should also examine the usage and development of AI and AI-driven and operated military systems. This limited analysis does not allow an in-depth look into the matter. I have written about it here, claiming that the current war in Ukraine is also a huge lab for testing AI and AI-driven military systems. Apparently, the "AI arms race" gives Russia's wartime AI applications (e.g., drone swarms) a practical edge, potentially outpacing the EU's ethical focus by 2–3 times in deployment speed. Russia's budget allocations (5–15%) exceed the EU's EDF share (4–8%), but EU venture surges (500% growth) and NATO ties provide qualitative advantages in reliable, regulated AI. Gaps include Russia's hands-on war experience versus the EU's potential lag, with calls for international law bans and more substantial EU investments to counter the risks of escalation. Optimistically, Europe's rearmament ($865 billion) could close the divide by 2030, but analysts warn of vulnerabilities without faster AI scaling.[xxxvi] Last but not least, similar arguments can be made about the munition production capabilities. To cut a long story short, the answer to the question presented in the title of this section has to be rather negative. For example, even NATO officials, including Secretary General Mark Rutte, claimed Russia produces three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO in a year," implying 9 – 12 million annually, or even 20.5 million for a 12 times advantage. However, analysts critique these as exaggerated, noting Russia's industrial limits make figures above 4 – 6 million unfeasible without full mobilisation. External supplies bolster output: North Korea delivered ~7 million rounds by mid-2025. Russia's $1.1 trillion rearmament plan through 2036 supports long-term growth, but 2025 estimates hover at 3 – 4 million new/refurbished shells.[xxxvii] The New World Order - Incoming!!! Importantly, if the EU were to offer security and territorial integrity guarantees to Ukraine outside NATO, it would not face Russia alone. It would, or should I instead say will, face Russia and China cooperating and supporting each other, with other members of BRICS, remaining negatively neutral, that is, informally supporting Russia. I suggest that, especially a European reader, carry out a little experiment. I propose that they take any map of the world that is printed in China and locate Europe. When looking at the map, the reader is advised to compare the sizes of the territories of the EU countries with those of Russia (and China combined). Apart from that the reader is advised to compare the GDP output of the EU as Against that of Russia and China, their GDP structures, the international trade vectors, structures and volumes, the number of people, natural resources (rare earths as well as gas and coal, the number and strength of TNCs (Trans-National Companies) with headquarters in Asia and Europe. In other words, carry out a simple geopolitical comparison. To say that the EU does not look impressive as compared to Russia and China is to say nothing. When carrying out such a comparison, the observer should swiftly realise that the EU is a small region in the upper left-hand corner of the map and that its relevance and importance regarding most, if not all, of the indicators mentioned above is diminishing. The fact of the matter is that we are witnessing an absolute overhaul of the international system towards a multipolar model with the centre of gravity away from the collective west. There does not seem to be much room for Berlin, Paris or Brussels for that matter to operate as a formidable security agent outside Europe perimeter not only by the virtue of the lack of capabilities and military tools but perhaps most importantly by the lack of international recognition by the three Great powers (USA., China and Russia) and global actors such as BRICS. References[i] Soldatkin, V. (2025, September 5). Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be fair targets. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-any-western-troops-ukraine-would-be-fair-targets-2025-09-05/[ii] Walker, S. (2025, September 5). Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘legitimate targets’, Putin says. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/05/western-troops-ukraine-legitimate-targets-vladimir-putin-says[iii] Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘targets’ for Russian forces: Putin. (2025, September 5). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/5/western-troops-in-ukraine-would-be-targets-for-russian-forces-putin[iv] Putin says Russia would consider foreign troops deployed in Ukraine “legitimate targets.” (2025, September 5). CBS NEWS. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-putin-says-foreign-troops-legitimate-targets/[v] The Conference Board Economic Forecast for the Euro Area Economy. (2025, September 5). The Conference Board. https://www.conference-board.org/publications/eur-forecast[vi] China. EU trade relations with China. Facts, figures and latest developments. (2025, September 9). European Cmmission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en#:~:text=Trade%20picture,%2C%20and%20chemicals%20(17%25).[vii] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[viii] 3 priorities to boost Europe’s competitiveness in a changing world. (2025, February 20). World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/02/europe-growth-competitiveness/[ix] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[x] Barkin, N. (2025, September 2). Watching China in Europe—September 2025. German Marshall Fund. https://www.gmfus.org/news/watching-china-europe-september-2025[xi] Petersen, T. (2024, December 12). European Economic Outlook 2025: Multiple Crises Dampen the Upswing. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://bst-europe.eu/economy-security-trade/european-economic-outlook-2025-multiple-crises-dampen-the-upswing/[xii] Experts react: The French government has collapsed again. What does this mean for France, the EU, and Macron? (2025, September 8). Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-the-french-government-has-collapsed-again-what-does-this-mean-for-france-the-eu-and-macron/[xiii] Public debt at 88% of GDP in the euro area. (2025, July 21). Eurostat. https://formatresearch.com/en/2025/07/21/debito-pubblico-all88-del-pil-nellarea-euro-eurostat/[xiv] Government finance statistics. (2025, October 21). Eurostat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_finance_statistics[xv] International Monetary Fund. (2025). World economic outlook: A critical juncture amid policy shifts. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO, Europe’s debt set to surge again in new era of uncertainty, IMF warns. (2025, April 24). POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-debt-surge-uncertainty-international-monetary-fund/, Global Economy Faces Trade-Related Headwinds. (n.d.). World Bank Group. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects , Euro Area: IMF Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Mission on Common Policies for Member Countries. (2025, June 19). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/mcs-06182025-euro-area-imf-cs-of-2025-mission-on-common-policies-for-member-countries or Stráský, J., & Giovannelli, F. (2025, July 3). OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/07/oecd-economic-surveys-european-union-and-euro-area-2025_af6b738a/full-report/repurposing-the-eu-budget-for-new-challenges_b90b1f1d.html[xvi] European Commission (2025, February 21). Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed. Brugel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed[xvii] European Commission, EU defence in numbers. European Council, Council of the European Union. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/[xviii] European Commission, Acting on defence to protect Europeans. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en[xix] Mejino-Lopez, J., & Wolff, G. B. (2025). Boosting the European Defence Industry in a Hostile World. Interconomics, 60(1), 34–39. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/boosting-the-european-defence-industry-in-a-hostile-world.html[xx] Carlough, M., & Harris, B. (n.d.). Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries. Retrieved June 3, 2025, from https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/comparing-size-and-capabilities-russian-and-ukrainian-militaries[xxi] Defense Intelligence Agency. (2025). 2025 worldwide threat assessment: Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, United States House of Representatives. U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/2025%20Worldwide%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf[xxii] U.S. Naval Institute Staff. (2025, May 29). Report to Congress on Russian Military Performance. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2025/05/29/report-to-congress-on-russian-military-performance[xxiii] Boulègue, M. (2025, July 21). Russia’s struggle to modernize its military industry. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-people/mathieu-boulegue[xxiv] Foreman, J. (2025, July 9). Military lessons identified by Russia, priorities for reform, and challenges to implementation. New Eurasian Strategies Centre. https://nestcentre.org/military-lessons/[xxv] Adams, P. (2025, July 18). Kill Russian soldiers, win points: Is Ukraine’s new drone scheme gamifying war? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80p9k1r1dlo, Drones become most common cause of death for civilians in Ukraine war, UN says. (2025, February 11). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-become-most-common-cause-death-civilians-ukraine-war-un-says-2025-02-11/, Grey, S., Shiffman, J., & Martell, A. (2024, July 19). Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/, Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians. (2025, August 1). Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://aoav.org.uk/2025/ukraine-casualty-monitor/, Court, E. (2025, February 13). What is the death toll of Russia’s war in Ukraine? Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://kyivindependent.com/a-very-bloody-war-what-is-the-death-toll-of-russias-war-in-ukraine/[xxvi] The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, July 16, 2025. (n.d.). Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-16-2025[xxvii] Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to July 31, 2025. (2022, February 24). STATISTA. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/[xxviii] A Perspective on Russia, Facon, S. (n.d.). A Perspective on Russia. Centre for New American Security. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-russia/ See also: The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond. (2025, May 28). Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond and Reeves, T. (2025, May 28). JUST IN: Russia Expands Drone Capabilities as Ukraine Conflict Continues. National Defence. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/28/as-russia-ukraine-war-continues-so-does-drone-innovation[xxix] Top 10 Drone Manufacturing Countries in 2025: Global Leaders, Trends, and Analysis. (2025, July 19). QUASA. https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis[xxx] European Defence Agency. (2025). Defence Data 2024-2025. European Defence Agency. https://www.eda.europa.eu[xxxi] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (2025, July 16). Tech Space 2.0. https://ts2.tech/en/global-drone-industry-2025-market-report/[xxxii] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (n.d.). EUROPEAN MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – MALE RPAS (EURODRONE). Retrieved September 15, 2025, from https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/european-medium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-male-rpas-eurodrone/[xxxiii] Casimiro, C. (2025, August 14). European Defense Production Triples Since Russia-Ukraine War: Report. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/european-defense-production-tripled/[xxxiv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, July 6). Europe’s Missile Gap: How Russia Outcompetes Europe in the Conventional Missile Domain. MIssile Matters - with Fabian Hoffmann. https://missilematters.substack.com/p/europes-missile-gap-how-russia-outcompetes[xxxv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, September 8). Denial Won’t Do: Europe Needs a Punishment-Based Conventional Counterstrike Strategy. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/denial-wont-do-europe-needs-a-punishment-based-conventional-counterstrike-strategy/[xxxvi] Zysk, K. (2023, November 20). Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence AI in a Time of War. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war and Cohen, J. (2025, June 30). The Future of European Defense. Goldman Sachs. https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense[xxxvii] Lehalau, Y. (2025, July 25). Is Russia Outpacing NATO In Weapons Production? Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nato-weapons-production-us-germany/33482927.html

Defense & Security
Mersin Turkey - 23.06.2021: Yavuz Drillship on the mediterranean sea. Drillships of Turkey which is search and drill for natural gas and oils.

Mavi Vatan: The turkish strategy for Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea

by Jessica Martínez Pluma

In February 2019, the Turkish Naval Force carried out a large-scale military exercise in the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to test the operation of the new weapons and naval systems acquired by the country over the last decade. At first, this event did not generate adverse reactions from the international community, but six months later alarm bells rang when, during a speech by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at Turkey’s National Defense University, a map was publicly displayed showing what the Republic of Turkey considered to be its sovereign maritime domains. This later became associated with a concept known as Mavi Vatan. Proposed by Admiral Cihat Yaycı and developed by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Mavi Vatan or the Blue Homeland Doctrine is a project and geostrategic representation of Turkey with the intention of claiming the state’s supposed jurisdiction over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. It demonstrates Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the limits established by international law—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)—and upholds its right to the legitimate defense of sovereignty over what it asserts are its maritime domains: 462,000 km² comprising its territorial waters, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and its continental shelf (Denizeau, A., 2021).  Figure 1: Map of ‘Mavi Vatan’ or the Blue Homeland Doctrine publicly displayed during President Erdoğan’s speech at Turkey’s National Defense University (August 2019). Source: Wikimedia Commons ‘Mavi Vatan’ not only represents a historical claim regarding the events of 2004, when the Republic of Cyprus became an official member of the European Union and established its own maritime borders as a state, which, under the framework of international law, pushed the Republic of Turkey into a narrow strip of sea in which to operate. At the same time, Mavi Vatan emerged as a solution to the growing security challenges that have arisen in the last decade of the 21st century, challenges that have threatened not only the integrity of the state itself but also all those elements that guarantee its survival in the international arena; in this case, Turkey’s access to energy resources. With projections that the Republic of Turkey will reach 90 million inhabitants by 2030 (Martín, L; n.d.), the Turkish state is aware of the increasing energy demands needed to adequately meet the needs of a rapidly growing population. To satisfy that demand, it is compelled to seek optimal sources of income to achieve this purpose. In response—and knowing of the large hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in recent years (Zeballos Rivero, M., 2024)—Turkey has turned to Mavi Vatan as a solution. If successfully implemented, it would allow Turkey to establish an area for the exploration and exploitation of resources lying beneath these waters to cover its urgent energy needs. The problem? Turkey is not the only interested party. Countries such as Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt, sharing coastlines with the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, are also engaged in heated disputes over legitimate access to these energy resources. However, the most pressing rivalry remains between Turkey and Cyprus, who, having relatively greater capacities to extract energy resources, have been at the forefront of an active dispute to claim sovereignty over these hydrocarbons.  Figure 2: Map of the EEZs of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and also of Mavi Vatan. Source: Emmanouilidis, C. (2020, August 31). Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. European Data Journalist Network. https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/es/cp_data_news/tensiones-en-el-mediterraneo-oriental/ On the one hand, there is the Cyprus–Egypt–European Union alliance, which has agreed upon and mutually recognized the maritime boundaries corresponding to each of them in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, while clearly omitting the possible sovereignty claims of other countries in the disputed area (s.autor, 2024). On the other hand, there are Turkey’s individual efforts, which, in its quest to gain access to hydrocarbon resources in the sea in question, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2019 with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to establish an EEZ stretching from Turkey’s southern coast to the northwestern area of the North African country. This agreement granted the Turks rights to hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the zone (s.autor, 2024). Although the agreement was suspended in 2021, Turkey has continued to promote ongoing exploration expeditions in the region, which have even extended to Somali waters, with whom it already has agreements in this field. The firm actions taken by states in the region demonstrate that, beyond being an ambition for access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the dispute actually represents an active risk to stability and security in the region. Firstly, from the energy dimension: given the importance of energy resources for human development, the continuation of hostilities among the involved states prevents the establishment of cooperative mechanisms that would allow all parties to benefit from the issue. Instead, it risks generating a zero-sum game in which only the strongest state would emerge victorious while the others remain vulnerable to an imminent energy crisis, thereby putting thousands of human lives at risk. Secondly, from the military dimension, there is the latent possibility that an armed conflict could erupt at any moment in the Eastern Mediterranean over immediate access to the contested resources. Without underestimating the military capabilities of the other countries involved, it is important to highlight the case of Turkey, which in recent years has significantly expanded its military capacities as part of the reformulation of its Foreign Policy. This has allowed Turkey to position itself as the ninth-strongest military power in the world (Global Fire Power, 2025) and the second-largest army within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the opposite side lies Cyprus, which, although it does not possess the same military capabilities as the Republic of Turkey, does benefit from the direct support of the European Union, which, if necessary, could easily respond to potential acts of aggression in a military conflict in the region. Both sides of the dispute—Turkey and the European Union along with Cyprus—truly have sufficient resources to escalate the conflict if they so desire, but they have not done so for reasons that remain unclear. For now, the situation remains uncertain. Beyond warnings or complaints from some states and/or international organizations, there has been no decisive action to put an immediate end to the conflict, since, in reality, no large-scale crisis has yet warranted such a response. However, it is important not to underestimate the phenomenon: the fact that it has not yet generated a major impact does not mean it could not do so one day, especially considering the great capacities the involved states have both to act and to respond to possible aggression. Historically, disputes over energy resources have generated unprecedented wars that have cost thousands of lives—for example, the Gulf War in 1991. It is therefore necessary to continue monitoring such situations to prevent them from escalating into conflicts as violent as those of the past. Thus, diplomatic channels between all parties to the conflict must be pursued, with the aim of generating cooperative solutions that foster peace and prosperity among nations, rather than new problems. ReferencesDenizeau, A. (abril, 2021) “Mavi Vatan, the ‘Blue Homeland’: The Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey”, Études de l’Ifri, Ifri.E. (2019, 30 diciembre) La lucha por los recursos en el Mediterráneo Oriental. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/la-lucha-por-los-recursos-en-el-mediterr%C3%A1neo-oriental-/1685950Global Fire Power (2025). 2025 Military Strength Ranking. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.phpJager, J.; Norris, A. (2021, 27 septiembre). The Mavi Vatan Doctrine and Blue Homeland Anthem: A Look At Turkey’s Maritime Worldview. Center for International Maritime Security. https://cimsec.org/the-mavi-vatan-doctrine-and-blue-homeland-anthem-a-look-at-turkeys-maritime-worldview/Kaya Ulger, I. (2020, 14 octubre) Turquía continúa defendiendo su “patria azul”. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/turqu%C3%ADa-contin%C3%BAa-defendiendo-su-patria-azul-/2005458Mason, S. (2020, 20 septiembre). Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy - War on the Rocks. War On The Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/Martín, L. (s. f.).   ‘Mavi Vatam’: la doctrina turca de la ‘patria azul‘. Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/-mavi-vatam-la-doctrina-turca-de-la-patria-azul-3Menjón, D. M. (2021, 7 octubre). Dossier Geopolítico Especial: Teoría de la “Patria Azul”. Turquía se proyecta sobre el mar (de la energía). Hermes Kalamos. https://www.hermes-kalamos.eu/dossier-geopolitico-especial-teoria-de-la-patria-azul-turquia-se-proyecta-sobre-el-mar-de-la-energia/S. a. (2024, 10 abril) Cihat Yayci: Libia es un socio estratégico y un aliado para proteger y promover la seguridad de Turquía. OtraLecturA https://otralectura.com/2024/03/15/cihat-yayci-libia-es-un-socio-estrategico-y-un-aliado-para-proteger-y-promover-la-seguridad-de-turquia/S.a. (s. f.). Mavi Vatan-2019 Tatbikatının Ardından Enerji-Politik Ağırlıklı Bir Değerlendirme. Euronewsport İş dünyasından haberler. https://euronewsport.com/mavi-vatan-2019-tatbikatinin-ardindan-enerji-politik-agirlikli-bir-degerlendirme/Zeballos Rivero, M. (2023, 22 marzo). Creciente tensión entre Turquía y Grecia por reservas de gas en el Mediterráneo. Global Affairs And Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/creciente-tension-entre-turquia-y-grecia-por-reservas-de-gas-en-el-mediterraneo 

Defense & Security
Bricked wall with stop terrorism sign

Causes of women involement in terrorism

by Eraj Farooqui

AbstractThis paper explores the complex factors that contribute to women's participation in terrorism, a subject that has attracted more scholarly interest, particularly in the wake of 9/11. The discipline is nonetheless politicised and divided despite a great deal of study, which is frequently made worse by a lack of primary data. Women, who are typically thought of as quiet and non-violent, have taken on important roles in terrorist groups, especially during the 1990s, where they have participated in high-profile attacks and leadership roles. The study identifies the main factors: political, religious, personal, and gender equality—that motivate women's participation. Examples show how different organisations differ in that some encourage women to participate actively, while others limit their positions. The study also examines how terrorism has changed over time, with a particular emphasis on its gendered aspects, and assesses how contemporary organisations such as the Islamic State have reshaped the roles of women in terrorist networks. Finally, by illuminating the ideological, cultural, and societal factors that lead to women's radicalisation and involvement, this research offers an in-depth examination of the relationship between gender and terrorism.Keywords:  Terrorism , Women , Political , Religion , Personal , Gender-equality Introduction The reasons behind female terrorism have been extensively studied and debated by numerous academics. Even though there is a wealth of study, a substantial portion of it is contradictory or incomplete. Frequently, the highly politicised word of terrorism has led to contradictory claims in the research. To understand why individuals resort to women terrorism, scholars highlight political, religious, social, and personal causes. In our culture, women were seen as housewives and peaceful members of society, and terrorist groups were controlled by men. Research on women and terrorism can be done on a variety of subjects; however, this paper will mostly focus on the causes of why women participate in terrorism. After 9/11 the academic research on scholarly papers on terrorism have increased by 300% since 9/11.[1] The connection between terrorism and gender is often overlooked due to governments' reluctance to reveal the primary causes and the reluctance to provide reliable data. Researchers often avoid original sources for security reasons. A 2009 review by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor found a reluctance to describe events, excessive narrative analysis, and reliance on secondary sources. [2] The word "terror" comes from the Latin verb "terrere" which means to frighten. It was originally used by the Romans in 105 B.C. to characterise the terror that engulfed Rome during the attack by the Cibri tribe. During the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, Maximilien Robespierre incited fear among the people.[3]The word "terrorist" was used by Edmund Burkey in the Regicide Peace letter. With the end of Reign of Terror, the word ‘terrorism’ gained popularity.[4] Terrorism, a deliberate use of force or intimidation, is a significant issue in the 21st century, often driven by ideological, religious, or political factors. However, the term "terrorism" has no widely recognised definition. There are four distinct stages of modern terrorism. The first wave of terrorism began in Russia and spread to Western Europe and the United States, using revolutionary and anarchist beliefs.[5]  The final wave is founded on religious beliefs that the world is currently dealing with. This wave started in 1979 when Iran underwent an Islamic revolution. Because of gender norms, terrorists are frequently perceived as masculine attackers. Women are perceived as powerless, passive, and victims during times of conflict, but it is important to remember that if they participate in terrorism, they may pose a greater threat than men.[6]And since 1990, women have gained prominence in terrorist organisations, assuming leadership positions and taking part in more brutal assaults. More media attention is given to female attackers, and people are more curious about the motivations behind their actions. Additionally, terrorist organisations are recruiting more women as a result of this. Although they have historically been involved in terrorist organisations, women's numbers have been small. As an example, the number of female suicide attackers has surged from eight in the 1980s to well over 100 since 2000, indicating a growth in the involvement of women in terrorist actions.[7]  On the other hand as per Bloom’s report over 257 suicide attacks were carried out by female bombers between 1985 and 2010, accounting for 25% of all terrorist incidents. Since 2002, the proportion of female bombers in several nations has surpassed 50%.[8]The first known incidence of female political violence happened in 1878, when Zasulich shot Fedor Trepov, the governor of Saint Petersburg. David Rapoport identified this as one of the four waves of modern terrorism.[9] Weinberg and Eubank claim that women have primarily assumed leadership positions in left-wing revolutionary bands while being assigned to inferior positions in right-wing organisations. They mostly perform supporting and auxiliary functions for numerous religious institutions. [10]Gender, Palestinian Women, and Terrorism: Women's Liberation or Oppression? was written by Anat Berko and Edna Erez. stated that during his questioning, he discovered that many Palestinian men did not approve of women participating in suicide bombings because they saw them as inferior to men.[11] After doing study with a local terrorist organisation, Jacques and Taylor chose 30 male and female suicide bombers. He finished by studying the fact that males prefer to join terrorist organisations for religious and nationalistic reasons, but female suicide terrorists are motivated by personal ones. Mia Bloom’s book the Bombshell: Women and Terrorism examines the motivations of women who participate in terrorism,[12] with an emphasis on relationships, respect, revenge, and redemption. According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[13]The main reason women join the LTTE is to fight for gender equality; they participate in every aspect of the group and do so to avoid being discriminated against and repressed by the male-dominated society.  The following studies will provide an academic perspective on the causes of women's involvement in terrorism. The main focus will be on four causes: political, religious, personal, and gender equality, as well as a list of important terror occurrences conducted by female terrorists as a result of some key ideological beliefs. Religious Cause: Religious convictions have been the foundation of many terrorist organisations throughout history. The Crusaders can be categorised as a terrorist group. Although the Crusaders' main objective was to propagate Christianity, they also committed heinous acts of terrorism. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the fourth wave of contemporary terrorism, and David Rapport claims that it was the first instance of religious terrorism in the modern era. Religious terrorism's core principle is the promotion of violence in the name of furthering religious beliefs. For example, Al-Qaeda and ISIS promote an Islamic caliphate globally.[14] However, attempting to do so by using cruel and aggressive methods. Islam and terrorism have become more associated since 9/11, as terrorist organisations have posed a serious threat to Western ideologies and societal influences.[15] Gonzalez-Perez notes that suicide bombers frequently use the idea of martyrdom and benefits in the afterlife to lure people into justifying their acts.[16] Women are also part of religious terrorist organisations but there are two argument over women involvement in jihadi group. As explaind by Muhammad Khayr Haykal in his book Al-Jihad wa al-qital fi al-siyasah al-shar'iyyah. 1. Women were seen as having a responsibility in raising money for Jihadis, caring for children, and providing medical treatment.[17] 2.    The Islamic state should set up training facilities for women to learn how to wield weapons and combat techniques, according to Islamic legal expert Muhammad Khayr Haykal. According to him, all Muslims should be held accountable for jihad if it turns into fard ‘ayn, and women must be prepared for this possibility in order to perform their duty. This strategy permits the practice of female jihadism in martyrdom missions and on the battlefield.[18] Role of women in Al-Qaeda According to Robet Pape in his book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.[19]Highlights that male terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda oppose women's participation in terrorism. However the Tamil Tigers used twenty-three female attackers, the Palestinians used six, the Lebanese used six, the Chechens used fourteen, and the PKK used ten. Consequently, he concluded that Islamic fundamentalists oppose female fighters.[20] However, after the rise of the Islamic state, which encourages women to join their organisation and accept arms, the Pape argument is no longer regarded as legitimate. For example, some 200 women joined the Islamic State in Syria in 2014 after migrating from Western nations. Additionally, they more than doubled their numbers in 2015, reaching over 550 women.[21] This suggests that the Islamic State may assign women a direct role, such as suicide bombing, in a way that is different from that of many other jihadist organisations, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  In Al-Qaeda the women played a secondary role for.e.g: Al Qaeda also benefited strategically from the assistance that women provided. For instance, the female terrorists of Al Qaeda were strongly using the internet to try to convince men to join the worldwide Jihad. Some males are inclined to join these groups because they feel ashamed of their masculinity as a result of these communication strategies.[22]Women's roles in jihadist organisations are valued in that they bear children and raise them to be potential recruits for terrorist organisations. Usama Bin Laden thanked women by saying: "You have inspired and encouraged [men] to join jihad, and you have raised all the men who fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, and you are the ones who produced the squadron of heroic men who carried out the raids in New York and Washington."[23] On the other hand Ayman al-Zawahiri's wife, Umayma al-Zawahiri, also urged her "Muslim sisters" to raise their kids on the love of jihad in God's way and "to induce their brothers, husbands, and sons to protect Muslims' lands and properties. To support (male) jihadists with prayers and financial support. [24] Al Khansa'a was one of the authors of the online magazine that inspired Muslim sisters with her articles; while she did not advocate for women to fight in combat, she did counsel them to stay in shape and exercise so they would be prepared for jihad.[25] Al-Qaeda Iraq's founder and Al-Qaeda member Abu Musab al Zarqawi urged Iraqi women to join the military. In Talafa, Iraq, a US military recruiting centre was the target of the first female suicide bomber. According to the announcement made by al Qaeda in Iraq on its website, "A blessed sister carried out a brave strike defending her beliefs. May God include our sister among the group of martyrs.’’[26]According to Mia Bloom the attack was carried out under the alias "ghost group" because it was still forbidden for Al Qaeda Central to collaborate with women on suicide bombings.[27] The identities of male suicide bombers are mentioned by AQI members, but the names of female suicide bombers are never mentioned. As a result, it is challenging to determine the purpose or driving force for their membership in terrorist organisations. Despite the lack of data regarding female suicide bombers, certain enquiries and interviews provide us with comparable reasons why they chose to join AQI as female terrorists. After losing a loved one, women join terrorist organisations in order to kill the offender and get revenge for the deaths of their husbands and brothers. Furthermore, AQI members urged young females to die as martyrs, claiming that they would immediately enter heaven and be the prophet Muhammad's neighbours.[28] Al-Qaeda is therefore mostly a male organisation that discourages women from engaging in violent activities. Women's roles are limited to becoming teachers, fund-raisers, social media advocates, and moms of potential jihadists. Role of women in Islamic State(IS) Islamic State was founded in 1999. The Islamic State had the greatest number of foreign terrorist fighters in history, making it a unique terrorist organisation. About 41,490 foreign nationals from 8 nations joined the Islamic State with the goal of restoring the caliphate. Of the foreign terrorist fighters, about 4761 (13%) were female. Following Eastern Europe (44%), Western Europe (42%), the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand (36%), and other regions, Eastern Asia had the greatest percentage (70%) of women connected with the Islamic State.[29] The biggest motivation for joining an Islamic terrorist organisation is religion. Women typically played a supporting role in Islamic terrorist organisations prior to the rise of the Islamic State. However, the role of women in these organisations has grown stronger after the fall of Al-Qaeda and the rise of Islamic State in the Middle East. Muriel Dagauque, a Muslim woman who converted to Islam and was married to a Muslim man, was one of the Islamic State suicide bombers. She moved to Iraq with her spouse from Europe in order to become a martyr, and on November 9, 2005, she bombed herself.[30] Many jihadist suicide bombers are comforted by the assurance that they will be sitting next to God (Allah), experiencing only joy and no agony, before the first drop of their blood ever hits the earth.[31]Women joined the Islamic State mostly for religious reasons. Umm Layth, also known as Aqsa Mahmood, was a 21 year old Scottish university student who travelled to Syria to take part in Islamic State terrorist activities. Mahmood expressed her opinions on jihad with the following sentences.: "If not you, then your grandkids or their grandchildren. But do not worry, our cubs will eventually shed your blood. This Islamic dominion will become well-known and dreaded all over the world. Choose a side; this is a fight against Islam. You may either support them or support us.''[32] Role of women Chechnya Terrorism: Islam is the predominant religion in Chechnya, and Wahhabist terror ideology is linked to Chechen terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism.[33]The Wahhabi sect appears to have spread to the Chechen territories through other terror cells in the Middle East, such as al Qaeda.[34] This ideology which glorifies martyrdom and promotes jihad in order to establish a worldwide Muslim caliphate is a rationale for carrying out acts of retaliation and acting on behalf of a national separatist movement.[35] Chechen women, due to their Islamic influence, often wear black and traditional Muslim clothing, such as a head scarf or jilbab, which allows them to conceal weapons and bombs, as seen in the Dulbrov theatre incident.[36] Religion is one factor that contributes to women joining terrorist organisations, but it is not the only one; other factors also play a role. Political Cause According to Gus Martin, terrorism can occur under a variety of circumstances when there is political repression. First, the group is resentful of the injustices they perceive in society. The group also believes that their social dissent is insignificant. Last but not least, the group believes that there are problems with the system that can be fixed, which leads them to confront the conflict.[37] Despite the widespread belief that women do not participate in political violence, women have been planning attacks and taking part in political violence since 1800.[38] Violence is a tactic used by women who are dissatisfied with the government, have their opinions ignored, and are under-represented in organisational structures With anarchist and revolutionary beliefs, anarchism was the beginning point of the first wave of contemporary terrorism, which swept from Western Europe to America. Nonetheless, women's political motive persisted until the second wave of terrorism, when nationalism emerged as the primary driver of women's participation in terrorism.[39] However, they were only allowed to serve as scouts and messengers during the second wave of terrorism. David Rapoport claims that because women once again assumed leadership roles, there are some similarities between the first and second waves.[40] Vera Zasulich shot the governor of St. Petersburg; she said that she had a political purpose for doing so because the governor was well-known for his Polish insurrection and had ordered to execute political prisoner Arkhip Bogolyubov. This infuriated the revolutionary forces, and six people made the decision to kill the governor, but Zasulich was the first to take the initiative. This was the beginning of the first wave of terrorism. Despite the fact that women participated in political violence, her case is notable as the first instance of female political violence in the modern era or the first to be acknowledged. [41] Russian university students founded the group, which specifically targeted political figures. Vera Figner and Gesia Gelfman, Sofia Perovskaya, and three ladies from Narodnaya Volya had a key role in the March 13, 1881, assassination of Russian Emperor Alexander II in St. Petersburg.[42] The reason behind this act was that Tsar Alexander II released his renowned Emancipation Manifesto in 1861 after the Russian intellectuals struggled to achieve their demands. This was intended to end the peasantry's enslavement and, if feasible, bring about a new, more liberal era. Perovskaya and other disappointed reformers decided to accelerate change as it became evident that this new age was a false dawn. As a result, hundreds of revolutionaries left St Petersburg in 1874 to tour the Russian countryside and read pamphlets to the peasants about socialism, nihilism, and anarchism in an attempt to educate them for the day when they would destroy the Tsar.[43] In 1954 the Algerian muslim formed a group called National Liberation Front. Their major goal was to achieve independence from the colonial power France. FLN rose to prominence thanks to its female members, Zohra Drif, Dajmila Bouhard, and Samia Lakhdar. They were able to cross the French checkpoint and leave bombs in various locations, and as a result, three people died in an explosion on September 3, 1956, and several others were injured.[44]This movement occurred at the time of second wave of contemporary terrorism which was based on the idea of nationalism and anticolonialism. As per reports between 1970 and 1984, 451 Italian women joined terrorist organisations and then engaged in political violence. The bulk of these women had degrees and performed identical duties to those of male terrorists, they found, with 35% of them being students, 23% being clerks, secretaries, nurses, technicians, and 20% being instructors. A paramilitary group called Red Brigade was established in 1970 and was engaged in terrorist activities around the nation. Because it supported Italy's withdrawal from NATO and dominated the Marixist-Leninist worldview. Known for its kidnapping and murderous activities, Red Brigades also killed former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and abducted James L. Dozier, a senior US officer at NATO. Barbara Balzerian had murdered him. Many female members of the Red Brigades participated in the group's violent assaults, and Margherita Cagol (Mara), one of the Red Brigade's co-founders and one of the first victim in an armed conflict with the police, became a symbol of the left-wing movement.[45]The most violent communist organisation throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the Red Army Faction which engaged in ideologically motivated terrorism in West Germany. Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin, co-founders, protested consumerism by burning a department store in Frankfurt in 1968.[46] A major problem is the Chechen people's desire for independence from Russia, which is driven by their nationalist and separatist beliefs. In the lengthy history of the Chechen Republic, Russians, have been the target of several violent attacks. Since June 7, 2000, Khava Barayeva and Luisa Magomadova stormed the temporary headquarters of an elite OMON (Russian Special Forces) squad in Alkhan Yurt, Chechnya, sparking the start of Chechnya's "Black Widows" movement. With two fatalities and five injuries, the incident brought attention to the group's notorious actions.[47]According to the report, women were responsible for 47% of all terrorist incidents and 81% of suicide attacks in the Chechen region between 2000 and 2005.[48] For more than 30 years, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) battled the Sri Lankan central government, mostly because of the Tamil minority's ethnic oppression. Their goal was to establish their own nation in Sri Lanka's north and east.[49] The use of female suicide bombers and the LTTE's high proportion of female members were well-known. The proportion of female LTTE members varied between 20 and 30 percent, with some estimates reaching as high as 50 percent in certain years.[50]According to LTTE theorist Anton Balasingham's wife, Adele Ann, a Tamil woman's decision to join the group was a sign to society that she was dissatisfied with the status quo and had the ability to rebel against authority.[51]To sum up, female revolutionaries have contested the idea that they are less capable of committing acts of terrorism or have less political clout, and. Additionally, nationalism and revolution are the main goals of the majority of terrorist organisations that are focused on women. Personal reason Personal causes, such as revenge, family instability, rape, personal tragedy, and revenge, are important motivations for the individual to join terrorism. Women are more likely to cite these as their original motivation in joining terrorist organizations than men. Mia Bloom, Jaques and Taylor, and Robert Pape have all proposed that the reasons behind female terrorists are different from those of male terrorists. According to them, the emotions of female terrorists such as family problems, discontent, and the desire to commit suicide are what motivate them. These motivations are further divided by Bloom into four categories: respect, relationship, revenge, and redemption. [52] 1. Women who experience sexual assault, including rape, may retaliate violently; some may even choose suicide bombing as a last resort. After women were raped in Iraq, Samira Ahmad Jassim, dubbed the "mother" of suicide bombers, was accused of encouraging rape victims to commit honour suicide and conducting 28 suicide attacks, according to the Die Welt article..[53] 2. During the Chechen War, Russian soldiers sexually assaulted many Chechen women. According to estimates from Doctors Without Borders, 85 percent of Chechen women experienced sexual assault at the hands of law enforcement and military during the Chechen War. Journalist Svetlana Makunina claims that after being drugged and raped, Chechen women were left with no choice but to commit suicide bombing.On the evening of May 21, 1991, LTTE suicide bomber Dhanu killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu. She clarified that she took this action after being gang-raped by Indian peacekeeping troops. 3. Another crucial element that encourages women to join terrorist groups is relationships. Family members and relatives, who are important in the recruitment process, could function as a conduit between the terror group and women. Sidney Jones claims that while some women freely choose to wed male terrorists, others are coerced by their relatives.[54] Many women join ISIS for a variety of reasons, including a desire to contribute to the caliphate, a desire for friendship with like-minded individuals, or direct pressure by family members and acquaintances.[55] For e.g., Shamima Begum was influenced by her friend Sharmena to join IS. Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers stated that instead of acting on their own initiative, female Palestinian suicide bombers are “at the mercy of, or in love with, their handlers.”[56] (women join terrorist organisations because they are forced by male) 4. Guillermo Galdos, and “Eliana Gonzales,” points out that male influence is not an essential prerequisite for recruiting women into violent organizations. In order to join revolutionary movements, women have reported willingly leaving their boyfriends, husbands, and kids. The oldest woman in Columbia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Eliana Gonzales Acosta, for instance, abandoned her husband, sister, and daughter to join the group.[57] 5. Many people who have been directly impacted by the acts of another group resort to terrorism. The revenge theory is the name given to this. An individual is more inclined to engage in terrorism if they have lost a friend or loved one to a terrorist organisation or the military.[58] Additionally, according to Jacques and Taylor, revenge influences people's decision to join terrorist groups.[59] In literature and art, the stereotype that women are more revengeful than males is mirrored. According to William Cosgrove's The Mourning Bride, "Heaven is furious, like love turned to hate, and Hell is furious, like a woman scorned.”[60]Russian negotiator suggests the difference between men and women is that “[Chechen women] are ‘zombified’ by their own sorrow and grief.[61] The Russian and international press called Chechen women bombers "Black Widows" as it was revealed that many were acting in retribution for the deaths of their husbands, kids, and brothers.[62]Since the takeover of the Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002, nineteen female bombers have appeared in black mourning garments with bombs attached to their bodies. They held 850 people hostage for two and a half days. Until Russian forces imposed persecution on the people and executed the terrorist. While these motivations were not limited to revenge or family difficulties, they were also gender specific. There are more men killed in these battles, resulting in an imbalance of women battling for retribution. Furthermore, women constitute the majority of rape victims in these communities, which motivates them to join. Gender Equality: According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[63]FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, was established to combat societal inequality and provide women with opportunities for advancement. Despite being predominantly dominated by women, the organization offers women's rights, sexual freedom, and opportunities for advancement in a patriarchal society.[64] FARC recruits in rural areas, where women often have fewer opportunities, highlighting the organization's societal focus on women's rights.[65]A woman who had spent many years of her life in the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army) was interviewed by Anne Phillips in 2012.[66]For the numerous reasons mentioned above, this woman, code-named "Athena," joined the FARC before turning thirteen. She explains why she joined this group  as it provides gender equality. She had economic reasons because she was from a rural area and lacked access to economic and educational opportunities. Women in Colombia's rural communities face a lack of opportunities, which leads to prostitution. Many women turn to the FARC as a viable alternative to prostitution. The FARC gives women a stable income. Women turn to the FARC because they are guaranteed food and other requirements. They are given the same opportunities as males and are able to support themselves. Also, by women joining terrorist organizations they are challenging gender stereotypes in their societies. O’Rourke says that women dislike these gender norms and rise out against them in opposition of the stereotyped female in their culture.[67]The LTTE gives women the same incentive to advance gender equality. According to LTTE women, they felt liberated and empowered within the organisation. By establishing sexual limitations and providing equal training chances, the LTTE established an environment that was equal for men and women. Women held leadership roles inside the LTTE and believed they were on par with the men themselves. Often, women join these groups to either learn about or escape gender inequality. CONCLUSION: The primary goal of this article was to examine the primary motivator for women to join terrorist organisations. For more than a century, women have been participating in terrorist activities, but only in recent decades have studies of terrorism examined female terrorists. Political, religious, personal, and gender equality are some of the motivations for women to join terrorist groups and participate in liberation movements. Since the 19th century, women have joined a variety of terrorist organisations; some conduct these horrible deeds to defend their beliefs or territory. Religion is another reason these women wish to sacrifice themselves in the name of Islam. They act in this way because they believe that, despite their crimes, they will be admitted to heaven if they commit murder for Islam. Women's terrorist operations might occasionally be motivated by personal issues. Although forced marriage, family issues, rape, the death of a loved one, and defiance of the patriarchal society are some of the main causes, other traumas could also influence their choices. However, each of the four factors has a major impact on women's decision to participate in terrorism. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, for example, are heavily influenced by religion. The Tamil Tigers and FARC, on the other hand, are primarily driven by personal motives and gender equality. Furthermore, the political cause of Red Brigade and the National Liberation Front has been their main source of motivation. "Personal, political, and religious motivations are the main cause behind women's involvement in terrorism," claim Cunningham and Bloom. In order to curb terrorists' actions in the modern world, it is critical to comprehend their objectives and the reason behind their organisation. Furthermore, since many highly educated women have joined terrorist organisations, we cannot claim that education may have a major influence. There is extremely little research on gender and terrorism, particularly on women's participation in terrorist actions. To determine the primary reason women, participate in terrorism, we must conduct additional research in this field. Due to the fact that the information offered is highly generalised. What steps should the government take to prevent women from joining terrorist organisations? What other variables might encourage women to join terrorist organisations? Researchers from all social science fields should conduct some research on these pressing concerns as political scientists alone are unable to provide these answers. Bibliography[1] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[2] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[3] Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism, 1st ed. 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Andy Knight and Tanya Narozhna, “Social Contagion and the Female Face of Terror: New Trends in the Culture of Political Violence,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 12, no. 1 (March 14, 2011).[34] Ibid.,33[35] Ibid.,33[36] LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 690.[37] Gus Martin , Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues , 8th ed. (SAGE Publications, Inc, 2024), 60.[38] Maha Butt, “Feminist IR Theory and Terrorism,” International Affairs Forum, accessed December 16, 2024, https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=0&ContentID=9152#:~:text=Analyzing%20terrorism%20from%20a%20feminist's,female%20terrorists%20as%20'women%20terrorists..[39] David Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.[40] Elena Gapova, “Gender Equality vs. Difference and What Post-Socialism Can Teach Us,” Womens Studies International Forum 59 (November 1, 2016).[41] “Vera Zasulich,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vera_Zasulich#cite_note-5.[42]Elena Gapova, “Gender Equality vs. Difference and What Post-Socialism Can Teach Us,” Womens Studies International Forum 59 (November 1, 2016).[43] James Crossland, “The Women Who Ended an Emperor,” History Workshop, last modified April 21, 2021, https://www.mybib.com/#/projects/39m8D0/citations/new/webpage.[44] Zeynep Bayar, “The Role of Women in Terrorism,” City University of New York (CUNY) , accessed December 15, 2024, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4346&context=gc_etds.[45] Ruth Glynn , Approaching Women, Terror, and Trauma in Cultural Perspective, 2013.[46] “Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof,” Encyclopedia.com, accessed January 2, 2025, https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/andreas-baader-and-ulrike-meinhof.[47] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists,” The Institute for National Security Studies, last modified August 2006, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Female-Suicide-Bombers-63-80.pdf.[48] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (September 22, 2006).[49]Peng Wang, “Women in the LTTE: Birds of Freedom or Cogs in the Wheel?,” Journal of Politics and Law 4, no. 1 (2011).[50] Karla J. Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 3 (May 2003).[51]“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/srilanka/terroristoutfits/ltte.htm.[52] Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[53]Mia Bloom, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism,” Gender Studies 28, no. 1–2 (June 1, 2011).[54] Sidney Jones, “Inherited Jihadism: Like Father, like Son,” International Crisis Group, last modified July 4, 2007, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/inherited-jihadism-father-son.[55] Daniel Milton and Brian Dodwell, “Jihadi Brides? Examining a Female Guesthouse Registry from the Islamic State’s Caliphate,” Combating Terrorism Center 11, no. 5 (May 2018).[56]Edward E. Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions,” International Interaction 12, no. 1 (January 9, 2008).[57]“GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[58]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 710.[59]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 322[60] “GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[61]Ibid.,63[62] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (September 22, 2006).[63]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[64]Natalia Herrera and Douglas Porch, “‘Like Going to a Fiesta’ – the Role of Female Fighters in Colombia’s FARC-EP,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (January 26, 2009).[65]Mia Kazman, “Women of the FARC,” William J.Perry Center, accessed December 23, 2024, https://wjpcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Women-of-the-FARC.pdf[66]Christine Balling, “Why Women Turn to the FARC -- and How the FARC Turns on Them,” Foreign Affairs, last modified June 1, 2012, accessed December 23, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2012-06-01/fighting-mad.[67]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 702

Defense & Security
Demonstrators protest against the war in front of the European Parliament after a special plenary session on the Russian invasion of Ukraine  in Brussels, Belgium on March 01, 2022.

An analysis of European Diplomatic Efforts to Support Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity. Challenges and Opportunities.

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This analysis examines European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting the EU’s evolving role as a security actor. The August 18, 2025, White House summit marked a key moment, with EU leaders pledging "ironclad" security guarantees modelled after NATO’s Article 5, without formal NATO membership for Ukraine, and proposing a "reassurance force" of European troops post-ceasefire. The EU commits to unrestricted Ukrainian military capabilities, sustained economic and military aid, and intensified sanctions against Russia. While the EU aims to bolster Ukraine’s self-defence and facilitate peace talks, challenges persist, including funding, coordination with the U.S., and Russia’s rejection of guarantees involving Western troops. The EU’s approach reflects a strategic shift toward a more assertive Common Foreign and Security Policy, though institutional limitations remain. The guarantees are intertwined with Ukraine’s EU accession ambitions, carrying significant geopolitical and financial implications for the European security architecture and regional stability.Key Words: Ukrainian War, European Security, EU, U.S., Russia Introduction The ongoing war in Ukraine likely marks the end of the post-Cold War security environment in Europe and the rest of the world. The old international system, based on the benign hegemony of the United States and its dominance in international institutions, is witnessing the vanishing of the pretence of the leading role of international law and international regimes before our eyes. What is emerging brings back memories of the 19th-century Concert of Europe, where the great powers of Europe— Austria, France, Prussia (later Germany), Russia, and the United Kingdom —came together to maintain the European balance of power, political boundaries, and spheres of influence. This time around, however, there are fewer players, and the gameboard is genuinely global. The U.S., China and Russia do not leave much space for other players, at least in the global context. The EU declares itself to be a global player, matching the influence of the big three, but in all honesty, it is not treated as such by them.  This analysis looks at the latest developments regarding the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine (a proxy war between NATO and Russia) and specifically at the role of the EU and its proposed security guarantees offered to Ukraine. The August 18 Meeting On August 18, 2025, a meeting took place at the White House. It included U.S. President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and leaders from Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Finland, the European Commission, the European Council, and NATO. They talked about ways to stop Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A key topic was security guarantees for Ukraine. The EU promised strong protection for Ukraine's independence and borders. This is intended to prevent future Russian attacks, even though Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO soon. These promises build on earlier security agreements but demonstrate a more unified European effort, with the U.S. providing support but not leading with troops or NATO membership.  Ironclad Security Guarantees Equivalent to NATO's Article 5 (Collective Defence) The EU promised to give firm, long-term security promises to Ukraine, similar to NATO's Article 5. This means an attack on Ukraine would be seen as an attack on those who promised to help. However, these promises would not be part of NATO to avoid upsetting Russia or requiring all NATO members to agree. European leaders, including those from the "Coalition of the Willing," are prepared to deploy a "reassurance force" or peacekeepers to Ukraine once the fighting ceases. This force would comprise troops from different European countries, taking turns to monitor and enforce any peace agreement, with a primary focus on preventing new attacks. EU officials stated that Russia cannot halt these plans or Ukraine's future aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Trump said the U.S. will work with Europe and might provide air support, but will not send American ground troops, making Europe the "first line of defence." Meanwhile, the U.S. will support by selling weapons.[1]  No Restrictions on Ukraine's Military Capabilities   EU leaders want Ukraine's military to have no limits on size, type, or actions. This means Ukraine can make weapons at home and get more from Western countries without Russia stopping them. The aim is for Ukraine to have a strong army for many years. Europe will also increase its own military production to help. Ukraine plans to buy $90 billion in U.S. weapons, mostly paid for by Europe. This includes planes, air defence systems, and drones. A formal agreement is expected within 10 days of the meeting.[2]  Sustained Economic and Military Support, Including Sanctions The EU has pledged to continue providing Ukraine with military, financial, and humanitarian assistance until a lasting peace is achieved. They will also increase sanctions and economic actions against Russia to maintain pressure. Leaders say they will support Ukraine as long as the fighting continues, and they will not force Ukraine to give up any land. Only Ukraine can decide about its territory. Europe is prepared to undertake most of this effort and may allocate an additional €40 billion for weapons if necessary. They will work with the U.S. to get support from Trump.[3]  Facilitation of Further Talks and Peace Efforts EU leaders aim to facilitate a meeting between Trump, Zelenskyy, and Putin. They say any agreement must include Ukraine's views and protect Europe's safety. They are glad Trump is pushing for peace, but say a ceasefire is not needed for security promises. Moscow's complaints, like those about NATO forces, will not stop their plans. This shows Europe is united. Leaders like Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa have stated that there will be no official changes to borders, and they fully support Ukraine's membership in the EU.[4] There were concerns that Trump might pressure Ukraine to make concessions during his meeting with Putin on August 15, 2025, in Alaska. European leaders quickly organised a meeting at the White House to influence Trump. This was seen as a way to win him over. Russia does not want NATO or Western troops in Ukraine, seeing it as a threat. Some experts argue that there is a "security guarantee paradox": if the protection is too weak, it will not benefit Ukraine; if it is too strong, Russia may not agree to any deal.[5] EU officials are hopeful, but they face several challenges. These include securing funding (Europe will cover most costs), managing rotating forces, and ensuring the U.S. remains committed after Trump's term.[6] Recent Military and Diplomatic Developments The Russia-Ukraine war started in February 2022. In August 2025, fighting and diplomatic talks increased. Russian troops are moving forward in eastern Ukraine, especially in Donetsk, with many attacks. Ukraine is hitting Russian targets. U.S. President Donald Trump is leading peace talks after meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on August 15. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders are also involved. However, significant disagreements persist regarding land, security, and ceasefires. There is no quick solution yet. Russian Advances and Territorial Gains Russian forces have concentrated on Donetsk and taken more land. From July 8 to August 5, 2025, Russia gained 226 square miles, continuing its slow progress in the area.[7] By mid-August, Russia controls large parts of Donbas and continues to advance, even though Ukraine is fighting back.[8]   Source: https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-aug-6-2025  On August 19, Russia launched its most significant attack of the month, using drones and missiles against Ukrainian targets, resulting in civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.[9] On August 18, there were similar long-range attacks. On August 19, Ukraine and Russia swapped the bodies of dead soldiers. Ukraine has increased attacks on Russian energy sites to cut off war funding.[10] After the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska, Trump met with Zelenskyy and leaders from the EU and UK on August 18 to discuss peace. Trump seems to support giving some Ukrainian land, like parts of Donbas, to Russia for peace. He also suggests U.S. air support as a security promise. A U.S. envoy stated that there is progress: Putin has agreed to U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine and has relinquished some territory.[11] Plans for direct talks are being made. Putin suggested Moscow as the meeting place, but this has not been confirmed yet (as of August 20).[12] European leaders, including EU figures, seem to welcome these efforts but insist on continued sanctions against Russia and reject Budapest (Hungary) as a site due to past failed assurances.[13 ] In the meantime, Ukraine demands robust security guarantees (e.g., deterrence against future attacks) and $90 billion in aid.[14 ] Russia, however, rejects European guarantees, insists on territorial concessions, and maintains unchanged objectives. As of now, no ceasefire has been agreed upon; however, Russia claims to be open to one.[15 ] Where Does the EU Stand in General? EU leaders stress that a strong Ukraine is the best guarantee against Russia. According to the statement of 12 August, issued by the European Council and the Council of the European Union: “The European Union, in coordination with the U.S. and other like-minded partners, will continue to provide political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine as Ukraine is exercising its inherent right of self-defence. It will also continue to uphold and impose restrictive measures against the Russian Federation. A Ukraine capable of defending itself effectively is an integral part of any future security guarantees. The European Union and its Member States are ready to further contribute to security guarantees based on their respective competences and capabilities, in line with international law, and in full respect of the security and defence policies of certain Member States, while taking into account the security and defence interests of all Member States. The European Union underlines the inherent right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny and will continue supporting Ukraine on its path towards EU membership”.[16]  According to EU top diplomat, Kaja Kallas (High Representative/Vice-President (2024-2029) responsible for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy),[17] the idea of letting Russia keep Ukrainian territories (proposal as signalled by Trump) was a "trap that Putin wants us [the EU] to walk into".[18] She stressed that Russia has offered no concessions and that credible security measures, such as bolstering Ukraine's military, are essential—though specifics on contributions remain up to individual member states. In a like-minded fashion, French President Emmanuel Macron rather hawkishly and not very diplomatically echoed this, describing Putin as a "predator, and an ogre at our [Europe] doorstep" and expressing "the greatest doubt" that he would be willing to work towards peace. In short, the foremost European leaders are still ready to challenge Russia. They enjoy peace at home while using Ukraine as a battleground. Their new ideas about Ukraine's safety and Europe's security are bold and raise concerns about possible problems. The “Devil Lies in Details” The European Union is part of the "Coalition of the Willing" due to its key members. According to Wikipedia, this group comprises 31 countries. They have promised to support Ukraine more strongly against Russia than the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. They are ready to join a peacekeeping force in Ukraine by sending troops or providing other forms of support.[19] The peacekeeping force is envisaged to be deployed only once Ukraine and Russia sign a "comprehensive ceasefire agreement" or "peace deal" to settle the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The initiative, led by the United Kingdom and France, was announced by British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer on 2 March 2025, following the 2025 London Summit on Ukraine under the motto "securing our future".[20] The EU has been developing plans for Ukraine's security in the aftermath of the war. The primary goal is to stop future Russian attacks, short of offering NATO membership to Ukraine. Recent plans include military, diplomatic, and financial help, with the EU and U.S. working together. These plans are still changing due to ongoing talks, Russian objections, and questions about their enforcement. The focus is on helping Ukraine defend itself and providing additional support, including air and sea protection. The EU wants Ukraine to be able to defend itself. This is important for any promises they make. The EU and its member states are ready to provide assistance based on their capabilities. They will follow international law and their own defence rules.[21] This includes ongoing military aid but does not specify sending troops or creating new plans. In this context, European Council President Antonio Costa has called for faster work on "NATO-like" guarantees. These could be similar to Article 5, where an attack on Ukraine would lead to talks and actions from allies.[22] NATO and European leaders are discussing a new plan similar to "Article 5." This plan would prompt allies to discuss within 24 hours in the event of an attack. They would work together on responses, such as increasing military forces and providing aid for rebuilding. This idea is similar to agreements with countries like the UK and France, which focus on building strength and recognising borders.[23] EU accession for Ukraine could trigger the bloc's mutual defence clause, offering a "strong guarantee" in principle, although its practical enforcement is debated.[24] Air and sea security are important. A "sky shield" is planned to protect the air over western and central Ukraine, including Kyiv. European fighter jets, with possible U.S. support, will enforce this. The jets might be stationed in Poland or Romania. There will be rules for dealing with Russian actions, like missile attacks. In the Black Sea, measures will prevent Russian naval threats and keep shipping safe from ports like Odesa using intelligence and patrols.[25] Some countries, such as France and the UK, may deploy a small number of troops. These troops could help with training in cities like Kyiv or Lviv, or they might help secure ports and airbases.[26] Sending large numbers of troops is not feasible due to Ukraine's vast size and Russia's demands. Instead, the focus is on training, sharing information, managing supplies, and equipping Ukraine's military with weapons. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said that guarantees might be ready by August 29, 2025. These include U.S. assistance, valued at $90 billion, which includes weapons such as planes and air defences. Europeans will be the "first line of defence," with the U.S. helping in other ways. However, there are concerns: Russia wants to be part of the talks and does not want foreign troops. Some reports also question the coalition's strength and clarity, particularly in the absence of firm U.S. promises. Possible Broader Geopolitical Ramifications First, supporting Ukraine’s borders could strengthen the EU’s role in European security. This would indicate a shift towards a stronger EU foreign and security policy, as well as a more unified European defence system. However, the EU’s current tools, such as Article 42(7) TEU and PESCO, are not particularly robust. They have limitations in how they operate and face financial and organisational problems. This makes it challenging for the EU to establish itself as a strong security force without assistance from NATO and the U.S.[27] Second, the EU’s security guarantee to Ukraine is likely to intersect closely with NATO’s role, as the EU’s defence efforts currently complement but do not replace NATO’s collective defence framework. The EU remains dependent on NATO (especially the U.S.) for significant military capabilities, and the guarantee could deepen cooperation but also create institutional competition or overlap. The transatlantic alliance’s unity and the U.S. continued engagement are critical factors in the guarantee’s effectiveness.[28] Third, an EU guarantee of Ukraine’s security could also send a strong geopolitical signal to Russia, potentially deterring further aggression and affirming the EU’s commitment to the European security order. However, it may also escalate tensions with Russia, which views such guarantees as a threat to its sphere of influence.[29] This dynamic affects not only Ukraine but also other countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, such as Georgia, which is vulnerable to Russian pressure and exclusion from security arrangements.[30] Fourth, guaranteeing Ukraine’s security is linked to its EU accession ambitions. While Ukrainians see EU membership as essential recognition of their sovereignty and security, many Europeans view it as a component of a future negotiated settlement with Russia. The EU’s guarantee thus has implications for the pace and nature of enlargement, potentially affecting the EU’s cohesion and its relations with neighbouring countries.[31] Fifth, the EU’s security guarantees would likely entail substantial financial commitments, including military aid, reconstruction support financed through mechanisms such as the European Peace Facility (EPF), and the utilisation of frozen Russian assets. These financial undertakings have implications for EU budgetary policies, fiscal solidarity, and the development of a European defence industrial base, which is currently fragmented and underfunded. Conclusion The EU declares itself to be a global player and consequently engages as a broker in preparing peace talks with Russia. Moreover, it envisions itself as a guarantor of peace on the European continent and Ukrainian security, as well as its territorial integrity.  Two important questions, however, remained unanswered.  First, given the EU's engagement against Russia alongside Ukraine, as well as its most prominent member states' support for the Ukrainian war effort, one would be correct to question the intentions of at least some European political leaders. On one hand, the openly adversarial stance against Russia may produce some deterrence-like effects (although, in all honesty, it is difficult to prove). On the other hand, it definitely does prolong the conflict at the expense of Ukraine and its people.  Second, the following analysis will examine the extent to which the EU's guarantees for Ukraine are in reality. Political declarations and paper documents can convey a wide range of statements, including the most hawkish and resolute. The real test, however, always involves actual acting in the face of challenges and dangers. Will Europeans actually be ready to back their words with actions? Will they be able to perform at the required level militarily and economically? The 20th-century experience would suggest otherwise. References1  Roth, A., & Sauer, P. (2025, August 19). Trump rules out sending US troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/19/european-leaders-ukraine-russia-trump 2  Magramo, K., Kent, L., Lister, T., Edwards, C., Chowdhury, M., Sangal, A., Hammond, E., & Liptak, K. (2025, August 18). Trump meets Zelensky and European leaders at White House. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-ukraine-zelensky-russia-putin-08-18-25 3  Europe must shoulder ‘lion’s share’ of Ukraine’s security, Vance says. (2025, August 21). AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/21/europe-must-shoulder-lions-share-of-ukraines-security-vance-says 4  Mangan, D., Breuninger, K., Doherty, E., & Wilkie, C. (2025, August 18). Trump-Zelenskyy meeting paves the way for Ukraine security guarantees, trilateral talks with Putin. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/18/trump-zelenskyy-ukraine-putin-live-updates.html 5  Rutland, P. (2025, August 22). The ‘security guarantee’ paradox: Too weak and it won’t protect Ukraine; too robust and Russia won’t accept it. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/the-security-guarantee-paradox-too-weak-and-it-wont-protect-ukraine-too-robust-and-russia-wont-accept-it-263518 6  Schwartz, F., Barigazzi, J., & Webber, E. (2025, August 13). Trump tells European leaders US could provide security guarantees for Ukraine. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/13/trump-european-leaders-security-ukraine-00508598 7  The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Aug. 6, 2025. (n.d.). Russia Matters. Retrieved August 21, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-aug-6-2025 8  A timeline of territorial shifts during Russia’s war on Ukraine. (2025, August 18). PBS News. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-territorial-shifts-during-russias-war-on-ukraine 9  Ukraine hit by multiple Russian strikes amid US-led push for end to war. (2025, August 19). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/19/ukraine-hit-by-multiple-russian-strikes-amid-us-led-push-for-end-to-war 10  Harvey, A., Mappes, G., Novikov, D., Sobieski, J., Young, J., Barros, G., Kagan, F. W., & Trotter, N. (2025, August 19). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2025. Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025 11  Smolar, P. (2025, August 19). War in Ukraine: Diplomatic efforts intensify ahead of possible Zelensky-Putin meeting. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/08/19/war-in-ukraine-diplomatic-efforts-intensify-ahead-of-possible-zelensky-putin-meeting_6744508_4.html 12  Magramo, K., Yeung, J., Lau, C., Kent, L., Edwards, C., Chowdhury, M., Powell, T. B., Sangal, A., & Hammond, E. (2025, August 20). August 19, 2025: White House says Putin-Zelensky meeting plans are ‘underway’ following Trump meetings. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/trump-ukraine-russia-zelensky-putin-08-19-25 13  European Union Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine. (2025, August 12). European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine/ 14  Hatton, B., & Davies, K. M. (2025, August 19). Despite a flurry of meetings on Russia’s war in Ukraine, major obstacles to peace remain. AP. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-trump-europe-next-steps-527983fab40e58208e9e18c943de696a 15  Westfall, S., & Ilyushina, M. (August 19). Here’s what Russia and Ukraine have demanded to end the war. The Washington Post. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-trump-europe-next-steps-527983fab40e58208e9e18c943de696a 16  European Union Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine. (2025, August 12). European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine/ 17  See more at: https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/kaja-kallas_en 18  Wilson, T., & Lau, S. (2025, August 22). Proposed Ukraine land concessions are Putin’s trap, EU’s top diplomat tells BBC. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8zdezm507o 19  Coalition of the willing (Russo-Ukrainian War). (n.d.). Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved August 22, 2025, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_of_the_willing_(Russo-Ukrainian_War) 20  Martin, D. (2025, March 2). Britain and France to lead ‘coalition of the willing’ to save Ukraine. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/03/02/britain-france-lead-coalition-willing-save-ukraine/ 21  European Union Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine. (2025, August 12). European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine/ 22  Tidey, A. (2025, August 19). EU and allies must “accelerate” work on Ukraine’s NATO-like security guarantees, Costa says. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/19/eu-and-allies-must-accelerate-work-on-ukraines-nato-like-security-guarantees-costa-says 23  Webber, M. (2025, August 20). Ukraine war: what an ‘article 5-style’ security guarantee might look like. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-an-article-5-style-security-guarantee-might-look-like-263475 24  Is EU accession a security guarantee for Ukraine? (2025, August 22). The New Union Post. https://newunionpost.eu/2025/08/21/ukraine-security-guarantee-eu-accession/ 25  Gardner, F. (2025, August 19). What security guarantees for Ukraine would actually mean. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2qr08l1yko 26  Harding, L. (2025, August 19). What security guarantees might Ukraine get in return for a peace deal? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/19/what-security-guarantees-might-ukraine-get-in-return-for-a-peace-deal 27  Genini, D. (2025). How the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook of European Law. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeaf003 28  Genini, D. (2025). How the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook of European Law. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeaf003 29  Beta, S., Hetherington, K., Contini, K., Zajda, M., Smyrnova, H., Bidnyi, I., Lipska, N., Bahno, M., Tsios, I., Lysenko, L., & Zimmerman, L. (2025, February 5). The Legal Basis for EU Security Guarantees for Ukraine. PILPG. https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/lawyering-justice-blog/2025/5/2/xebqjexqu8ccgsvbo2rmcv4w5an13q 30  Brotman, A. (2025, August 22). The Importance of Security Guarantees for Ukraine and Europe. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-importance-of-security-guarantees-for-ukraine-and-europe/ 31  Brotman, A. (2025, August 22). The Importance of Security Guarantees for Ukraine and Europe. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-importance-of-security-guarantees-for-ukraine-and-europe/  

Defense & Security
Jerusalem - March 01, 2020: Campaign billboard for

Shutdown Nation: The Political Economy of Self-Destruction

by Shir Hever

Abstract This article examines that the shift in Israeli society and political economy from ethnic socialism to individualistic capitalism was accompanied by a shift from a strategic and collectivist liberal Zionism to a nonstrategic individualistic right-wing populism. It is a shift that made the State of Israel vulnerable to shock and crisis, and turned it “from a startup nation to a shutdown nation.” Unlike the crisis caused by the 1973 war, Israel lacks the tools to cope with the crisis of October 7 and embarks on a path of self-destruction.Keywordssettler colonialism, right-wing populism, Middle East economies 1. Introduction: Zionism’s Transition From Collectivist to Individualistic Settler Colonialism The State of Israel is a settler-colonial project (Robinson 2013), and as such has never been self-sufficient. Israel’s first prime minister David Ben-Gurion cultivated Israel’s alliance with Western imperialism as part of a strategy to keep the Israeli military supplied with modern weapons and trading partners. Meanwhile, some neighboring Arab states cultivated an alliance with the Soviet Union. The bane of colonial societies is always the same: arrogance, and in Israel’s arrogance the seeds of its downfall were planted. Israeli society, very much like the white population of apartheid South Africa, developed a culture on racist foundations, and the disdain of the Indigenous Palestinian population spread to a patronizing and racist attitude towards Israel’s non-white Jewish population (Mizrahim and black Jews; Ben-Eliezer 2007). The history of Israel’s political economy can be traced along the trajectory of this arrogant approach and the events that confirm, or undermine, Israel’s arrogance. I briefly mention two such seminal events before proceeding to the more contemporary developments. The first was the war of 1967, which has given rise to Israel’s messianic religious right wing, certain that God is on Israel’s side. Israel’s “miraculous” victory against three Arab armies in just six days, commemorated in Israel’s name for the war “The Six Day War,” confirmed every racist stereotype in Israel’s colonialist culture. Popular songs celebrating Israel’s victory hit the radios, and the project of building illegal settlements on occupied Palestinian land, deporting prominent Palestinian leaders, and using collective punishment, such as home demolitions, have put a strain on Israel’s alliance with the imperialist West. Israel’s military industry was transformed by these events. After France, Israel’s biggest arms supplier at the time, imposed a military embargo on Israel because of the occupation, a new school of thought emerged in Israel’s security elite, arguing that Israel does not need to rely on foreign suppliers and could potentially produce all of its weapons and ammunition locally. The victory also gave rise to what Israelis have later retroactively called “the Conception”—the arrogant belief that Arab states will never try to defeat Israel on the battlefield again—having been overwhelmed by Israel’s superiority. The second event worthy of note occurred just over six years later, the war of 1973, also known as the October War. On October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack that shattered Israel’s “Conception.” Israeli forces suffered heavy casualties, lost battles, and were forced to withdraw until the United States intervened with large-scale arms shipments. Israel’s dependency on Western support became undeniable. Even though Israeli forces, with the help of US weapons, eventually pushed back the Syrian and Egyptian armies, Israel was bloodied and traumatized. Israeli economists referred to the following decade as the “lost decade”—in which public resources were diverted to the arms industry and a large section of the workforce was recruited for extended military service with the reserves. The generation who fought in the 1973 war became wary of the danger of colonial arrogance (Bar-Joseph 2003). It was the generation that called for moderation in politics, for strategic thinking. The self-sufficiency illusion was nixed. Instead, Israel worked hard to position itself within global politics as a “bastion” against communism (just like South Africa did), and after the fall of the Soviet Union as a bastion against Islamic terrorism. The Oslo Peace Process was supposed to be Israel’s alibi, a show of willingness to compromise over territory in exchange for Western political legitimacy and normalization with Arab neighbors. Instead of a self-sustaining economy, Israel developed its political economy as a niche economy, becoming the world capital of the homeland security sector, with hundreds of companies exporting Israel’s “security expertise” in the form of surveillance technology, culminating in the export of spyware (Loewenstein 2023: 207). 2. Rise of the Right-Wing Populism in Israel The liberal Zionist project to rationalize colonialism has gradually failed, because of arrogance. In his article in Hebrew “A factory for blind spots” Ran Heilbronn explained the collapse of Israel’s security “expertise” through the reliance on technology and the belief that reality exists in the data, rather than the data being a tool to describe reality (Heilbronn 2024). The Israeli security industry conceived of the occupation as a laboratory for developing tools of oppression and marketing them as “field-tested” (Loewenstein 2023: 49). It has failed to reflect that the identity of the self-appointed security experts as colonizers makes them predictable. This is especially the case in their tendency to repeatedly underestimate Palestinians, because respecting the ability of Palestinians to develop creative methods of resistance and outwit Israeli oppressive measures undermines the racist arrogance that is necessary to justify apartheid (Shlaim 2015: 133–180). The rise of the populist right wing in Israel can be explained through the intergenerational discourse among Jewish Israeli society. The generation that fought in the militias to expel the Indigenous Palestinian population and establish the State of Israel, as well as its children, were raised on the collectivist values and glorifying sacrifice (Feige 2002: v–xiv). As a popular 1948 song by Haim Gouri played on official state ceremonies states, “love consecrated in blood will blossom amongst us once again.” Subsequent generations, those born since 1967, the “euphoria” period (including the baby-boom generation after the 1973 war; Ozacky-Lazar 2018: 18–24) and their children, have been raised on the sense of entitlement to the spoils of war for which their parents and grandparents made great sacrifices. Calls for further expanding the borders, acquiring more land, and building more settlements, which were consistently made by the settler movement, have been perceived by the older elites as an ungrateful disrespect to their own sacrifices, and that Israel is at a risk of overextending itself and losing everything. This has become the main narrative of liberal Zionism (Ayyash 2023). The intergenerational shift from strategic, “rational” Zionism based on calculated sacrifice for the purpose of colonizing Palestine while maintaining both a Jewish majority and good relations with the West, toward a religious populist Zionism built on a sense of entitlement, dismissing threats and obstacles to the Zionist Project, is a shift dialectically inherent to the colonial process and inseparable from it (Sabbagh-Khoury 2022). Every colonial society has a “founders” generation that is honored for its commitment to the collective national project at great personal costs, which is followed by increasingly entitled generations who are born with privileges and do not feel the need to earn or defend them. The colonial mythology exaggerates the significance of the founders’ efforts who “gave their lives to ensure that this land will be ours for posterity.” The demand from younger generations to make efforts to secure the land and the privileges of the colonizers diminishes from the mythology and is therefore rejected. The younger generations simply expect to inherit their privileges (Veracini 2010: 40). The right-wing advocates of collectivist nationalism and sacrifice (following the path of Jabotinsky, who in his Iron Wall manifesto warned that Palestinians will never give up their struggle against colonial domination, and Zionism must engage in an eternal battle (Jabotinsky 1923), have all but disappeared, being replaced by the right-wing populists, led most prominently by Benjamin Netanyahu. The main attraction of the right-wing populism is the idea of impunity: Israel can have its cake and eat it too. Disregard international law and international pressure, underestimate the potential of Palestinian resistance, and not make any sacrifices (Shad 2015: 167–178). As the rate of conscription to the Israeli military plummeted since the 1990s (Arlosoroff 2019; Shalev 2004: 88–101), Israelis became accustomed to justifying military aggression against Palestinians from the comfort of their armchairs. While refusal to serve remains a marginal phenomenon, draft dodging had become the norm, rather than the exception (Perez 2018). Yagil Levy referred to this shift as a capital-intensive warfare, using technology and expensive weaponry to multiply the impact of a smaller number of soldiers, thereby also increasing the negotiating power of those soldiers who were able to make demands for material and nonmaterial rewards in exchange for their military service, which conscripts would normally not be able to make (Levy 2003: 222). The populist right wing conflates the State of Israel with the Jewish people, ignoring both the existence of non-Jewish Israelis and the existence of non-Israeli Jews. Instead of addressing criticism and planning strategic responses, populists use ad-hominem attacks to delegitimize criticism. Netanyahu dismisses critique against Israel’s apartheid and war crimes as “antisemitic” whether it’s the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestments, Sanctions; Black 2014), legal action from the International Court of Justice or from the International Criminal Court (Heller 2019), or even recognition of the State of Palestine (Landale 2024). Eventually this populist argument has become mainstream so that even opposition leaders from the liberal Zionist factions adopted it (TOI Staff 2022). The liberal Zionist forces found themselves at a disadvantage after the invasion of Lebanon in 2006, which was seen as a military failure, and was exploited by the far right to accuse the government of weakness (Erlanger 2006). The Israeli attack against Gaza just before the February 2009 elections claimed the lives of over 1,400 Palestinians, most of them civilians. The leader of the liberal-Zionist camp at the time, Tzipi Livni, served as minister of foreign affairs. Her position was (and remains) that the liberal Zionist camp is more strategic and has more tools to secure Jewish control over Palestine than the populist right wing (Livni 2018). This argument backfired because the populist right wing grew domestically stronger in the face of threats of international restrictions. The same process occurred in 2022 with the publication of four reports about Israeli apartheid (Abofoul 2022), leading to the collapse of the last liberal Zionist government, which could not come up with a strategy to defend Israel from the accusation of apartheid. Just like the brutal attack on Gaza in the winter of 2008, the government of liberal Zionist parties tried to demonstrate its brutality toward Palestinians accusing six Palestinian civil society organizations of terrorism without showing evidence (OHCHR 2022) and by granting impunity to the soldier who murdered Al-Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh on May 11, 2022, in the course of the military campaign in the Jenin refugee camp (Al Jazeera 2022). This tactic failed in the elections of November 2022 just as it failed in the February 2009 elections. In early 2023, with the most far-right government in Israel’s history embarking on the judicial overhaul project, the people who protested the government’s antiliberal policy were the very same who maintain and profit from Israel’s security sector (Goodfriend 2023). Protestors in Tel-Aviv have adopted the slogan of the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestments, Sanctions) “from startup nation to shutdown nation” and printed it on a huge banner that they carried through the streets (Ben-David 2023), warning that Israel’s economy will shut down because of the policies of the far-right government. The demonstrators holding the sign were likely unaware of the fact that the slogan was coined by BDS, which is another example of blind spots caused by an unsustainable colonial situation. The prediction was prophetic, but interestingly the very same people who argued that Israel’s military strength is directly connected to the economic strength of its security sector, who warned against the economic collapse, did not predict the simultaneous collapse of Israel’s military strength. The rise of right-wing populism in Israel is fueled by elements that are inherent to the Israeli case: the settler-colonial intergenerational conflict, the economic transformation of the social contract, and the shift in the military structure and the role of militarism in society. Nevertheless, a fourth factor cannot be ignored, which is the rise of the populist right wing in the whole world, with the polarization of politics after the dashed expectations following the nineties (Greven 2016). The model of the right-wing populist leader—racist, hedonist, and corrupt—was only known in two countries in the nineties: in Israel with Netanyahu’s first term and in Italy with Silvio Berlusconi, before becoming widespread in the rest of the world starting in 2016. 3. The Systemic Vulnerability A key difference between the crisis of the 1973 war, and the crisis that Israel is experiencing since October 7, 2023, is the change in the economic structure of Israel. In its first three and a half decades of existence, Israel had a corporatist economic structure (Shalev 1986: 362–386), in which the government, unions, and the private sector cooperated to bolster and maintain the apartheid economic system, until the neoliberal reforms of 1985 (Ben Basat 2002: 1–22). Israel’s federation of labor unions—the Histadrut—played a central role in keeping Palestinian workers from the occupied West Bank and Gaza as a cheap and exploited labor force both before and after the reforms (Hiltermann 1989: 83–91). The reforms, however, changed the social contract at the base of the settler-colonial state. From a nationalist project in which the privileges of the Jewish population are collectively protected and collectively enjoyed by the Jewish population at the expense of the Indigenous Palestinian population, the neoliberal reforms turned Israel into an individualistic society in which privileges are enjoyed individually and reproduced by market forces for profit (Shalev 1986). In parallel to the way that a neoliberal order restructures the social contract between state and citizen, it also restructures the contract between state and soldier. As Yagil Levy argues, the Israeli tech sector serves as a reward mechanism to attract recruits into prestigious units, such as the notorious unit 8200, for the prospect of future lucrative employment in the private sector. This “negotiation,” to borrow Levy’s term, creates a military vulnerability. The collapse of Israel’s tech sector impacts the motivation of soldiers to serve in Israel’s technological units (Levy 2012: 47). The capitalist structure is more vulnerable. In the absence of a strong social safety net, individuals are expected to make their own risk assessment (Swirski et al. 2020: 5). Modern finances are a system of management expectation. Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler have shown that the depths of crisis in capital can be measured in a time perspective. Cyclical crisis is marked by short-term expectations coupled with a long-term expectation for recovery. Investors attempt to build predictive models based on their assessment of future developments. In a systemic crisis, however—what Kliman, Bichler, and Nitzan call “systemic fear”—the predictive models are built on historical data, and investors are making fewer references to the future (Kliman et al. 2011: 61–118). One of the first voices to herald that the State of Israel has reached a dead-end was Marwan Bishara, who focused on the aspect of Israel’s regional integration into the Middle East, which remains an essential strategic element in Israel’s sustainable existence, but which could not continue after Israel embarked on the onslaught against the Gaza Strip, intentionally targeting civilians (Bishara 2023). The oppressive structure of the State of Israel is vulnerable to the external pressure that is applied by Palestinian resistance, which takes the form of both armed and unarmed resistance. The armed resistance is much less relevant to the discussion here, because the capitalist vulnerability is suspended in times of “security crisis,” framed as a temporary time in which collective mobilization and sacrifice are necessary. The unarmed forms of Palestinian resistance such as BDS expose the vulnerability of Israel’s apartheid and challenge the sustainability of the oppressive structures (Awad 1984). The slogan “they oppress, we BDS” leaves Israelis with no choice but to consider whether the same methods used to crush the Palestinian resistance are in the end self-defeating (Barghouti 2020). Palestinian resistance has developed through stages, searching for means to overcome Israeli oppression. Collective leadership replaced individualistic leadership in order to survive assassinations (Baylouny 2009). Intersectional and progressive alliance building proved effective in creating solidarity in the heart of Israel’s Western support bases, especially North America and Western Europe (Salih et al. 2020). While liberal Zionism excelled in infiltrating Palestinian society and sabotaging its resistance (Cohen 2009), the populist right adopts the dehumanization of Palestinians as a fact, rather than a tool, and is therefore unable to infiltrate Palestinian society effectively. As Major General Amos Gilad said in 2011 “we don’t do Gandhi very well” (Dana 2011)—Palestinians found the weak point in Israel’s oppressive regime. Israel’s closest allies begin to contemplate the unthinkable—the end of the Zionist state. For Germany, whose unconditional support for Israel turned into a quasi-state religion due to an intentional conflation of Judaism and the State of Israel (Moses 2021), the notion that the State of Israel will cease to exist is more controversial than the speculations about the imminent demise of the GDR (German Democratic Republic, which was dismantled in 1990). Nevertheless, even German mainstream media cannot silence the shutdown nation voices when they come from Israeli Jews or former Israeli Jews (Tschemerinsky 2024). Two prominent Israeli economists, Eugene Kandel and Ron Tzur, wrote a scathing report in which they come to the conclusion that Israel will not survive to its 100th year and kept the document a secret, worried that it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Faced with lack of interest from the government, however, they gave interviews about the report (Arlosoroff 2024). Israeli billionaire Gil Schwed compared Israel to Afghanistan—a state that collapsed under an Indigenous insurgency and abandoned by its US ally, and which does not attract foreign investments (Cohen 2024). The Haaretz newspaper published its editorial on Israel’s Independence Day with the headline that Israel will not survive to celebrate its 100th Independence Day. In the English version of the newspaper, the headline was qualified with the extra text “unless we are rid of Netanyahu” (Haaretz 2024). The expected delayed collapse is meaningless in a capitalist economy. Investors who believe that the State of Israel is a time bomb with a twenty-year timer will not buy Israeli bonds, nor invest in the economy. Parents will not want to raise children into (what they perceive as) an inevitable catastrophe and will exhaust all available options for leaving with their family (Silverstein 2024). Three Israeli historians have also addressed the events of October 7 and their aftermath as the end of the Zionist projects. Moshe Zimmermann, a Zionist scholar of German history and German-Israeli relations, commented in an extended interview that the Zionist project set up to create a secure haven for Jews, but that the State of Israel, the result of the Zionist project, has failed to protect its Jewish citizens on October 7, to take responsibility for the failure, or to develop a strategy to create more security in the future (Aderet 2023). From the opposite perspective, Ilan Pappe, an anti-Zionist scholar of the history of Palestine, published an essay listing six indicators to the demise of the Zionist project (Pappé 2024). Although the State of Israel does not by definition share the same fate of the Zionist project, and can conceivably exist without a Zionist government, Israeli institutions have, nevertheless, in the moment of crisis after October 7, published statements attesting to the centrality of Zionism to Israel’s existence as a state. The strongest example of these statements is the letter written by the Hebrew University to Knesset member Saran Haskel justifying the suspension of Prof. Nadera Shalhouv Kevorkian over her criticism against Zionism, by stressing that the Hebrew University is a Zionist institution (rather than an academic institution in which a plurality of opinions is encouraged) (Odeh 2024). Such unanimous agreement among Zionists and anti-Zionists about the fate of the Zionist project and its significance to the future of the State of Israel is an unprecedented consensus. Six months into the war, a third Israeli historian, Yuval Noah Harari, wrote that Israel is entering an unsustainable phase of global isolation and military defeat, and that only a quick ceasefire and structural change of policy (i.e., a break from Zionism) could save the State of Israel from demise (Noah-Harari 2024). 4. Conclusion It is this vulnerability, a society built on individualism and privilege, which made the October 7 attack a much bigger trauma for Israelis than other disasters that claimed the lives of hundreds, or even thousands, such as the 1973 war. The Israeli discourse cannot imagine a scenario in which the State of Israel and the Zionist project will recover from the crisis. Despite obsessive discussions about recovery (Bachar 2024), the need for national unity (Shwartz 2024), waging war until the “total victory” (Tharoor 2024)—the public discourse is full of Cassandrian predictions of doom—and every failure of the public institutions, whether in education, housing, electricity production, or health care, is seen as the tip of a much bigger iceberg (Motsky 2024). A state, its political economy, and its political culture require more than just institutions de jure to function. It requires a collective belief in a sustainable political project with a perspective into the future. The future of the people living in historical Palestine, between the river and the sea, whether Palestinians or Israelis, is very uncertain, but one thing seems almost certain—the current political system will not stay in place for long—and the process of its collapse carries a tremendous economic significance. It is too early to say how exactly the political changes effect the economic changes. The threat of economic crisis is tremendous, just as economic efforts are needed to recover from the war, rebuild the Gaza Strip, and treat the physical and mental injuries suffered. It can lead to default on the debt, hyperinflation, and pauperization of thousands. But the potential for ending Palestine’s isolation in the Middle East and opening trade, the resources diverted from security and the military to civilian purposes, and a recovery of the tourism sector can paint a positive scenario as well. Liberal Zionism developed an effective, albeit highly immoral, strategy of settler colonialism. It cultivated a strong Jewish collective around a myth of individual sacrifices for the sake of the nation. This strategy contributed to Israel’s ability in its first decades to expand its territory through illegal occupations while maintaining good relations with the West. But in the long run, it contained the dialectic seeds of its own destruction. Younger generations were taught to accept the achievements of liberal Zionism as permanent, so why should they sacrifice anything? For decades, liberal Zionists warned that the populist right wing undermines the foundations of the Zionist project itself. But even though these warnings were accurate, liberal Zionists failed to acknowledge how the system of Jewish supremacy and apartheid that they have established eventually and unavoidably led to the takeover of the Zionist project by an entitled and unstrategic generation. An important caveat must accompany this article. The weakness of Israeli institutions is in their ability and their willingness to perceive reality. All three historians quoted here for their texts about the imminent end of the Zionist project share a common blind spot: they do not acknowledge the role of the Palestinian resistance in bringing down the Zionist project, and speak in terms of tragedy (the tragic hero bears responsibility for his own downfall). The caveat here is that I too, the author, may not necessarily be in a better position to perceive reality. 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Defense & Security
The national flag of the Arab League on the background of flags of other countries

Arab-Israeli Mix: Low-scale Protests and the Increase in Terrorism Following the Outbreak of the Swords of Iron War

by Gadi Hitman , Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer

AbstractThis article seeks to examine the behavior patterns of the Arab society in Israel since the Israel-Hamas War began in October 2023. The uniqueness of this population is the ethnic-national and religious differences between it and the Jewish majority and their identification with the Palestinians. Theoretically, the behavior patterns will be analyzed using a model of three variables: religion, citizenship, and nationality. This qualitative study, based on interviews, media clips, and public statements by Arab public leaders, identifies several opposing trends: an increase in the scope of terrorism, protests on a limited scale, and the lack of a uniform response by the Arab leadership to the Hamas attack and the war that followed it.KeywordsArab society in Israel, terror, protest, leadership, Hamas, citizenship, identity Introduction On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led militants attacked Israel, killing more than 1,100 Israelis, including at least 20 Arab citizens. The Israeli response was a declaration of war on Hamas, which led to mass destruction within the Gaza Strip. As of December 2024, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, more than 46,000 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces (AP, 2025). This is the highest number of victims on the Palestinian side since 1948. This figure raises a question regarding the reaction of Arab society in Israel, whose ethnic-national identity is the same as that of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Scholars dealing with majority–minority relations, as in the case of Jews and non-Jews in Israel, tend to agree that 1948 was a turning point that affected the mutual relations between the parties. Israel became a sovereign state for Jews, which obliged it to establish a policy toward the non-Jewish minority, also called the Arabs in Israel. The established policy was based on two pillars: First, Israel sought to be a democracy, and hence, basic rights, such as citizenship, were given to the Arab minority. Second, Israel saw the Arab minority as a security threat due to its ethnic and religious affinity with the larger Arab world. This concern led to the imposition of a military administration (1948–1966) on the Arabs in Israel, which led to the creation of, on the ground, the following reality: a Jewish majority lives alongside an Arab minority. Both sides held common citizenship but differed in two characteristics, religion and nationality. This is how majority–minority relations revolve around a fixed triangle that serves as a basis for analyzing mutual relations both in routine and in cases of tension between the parties (Boimel, 2007). Historically, the Arabic society in Israel has recorded many incidents of protests on national, religious, or civil grounds. Protest events that degenerated into violence included 1958 events in Nazareth; on Land Day in 1976; in 1982 after the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (Sabra and Shatila); in the case of Umm el-Fahem lands in 1998; in the events of October 2000, and in May 2021 (Hitman, 2023). The ongoing war between Hamas and Israel since October 2023 is another case study that makes it possible to analyze the behavior of Arab society in Israel. Theoretical Framework The interaction between the state (or regime) and the people, namely, civilians, residents, illegal immigrants, and foreigners, is among the prominent topics that have been studied in recent decades (Coutin, 2011; Nyers, 2018). The existing sociological, political, anthropological, and legal literature delineates and analyzes case studies of confrontations between these parties worldwide. When case studies of mass protest or collective violence are discussed, the relevant questions are why, when, or what led to the clash between the state and the people and what led to an escalation. Every group of people has six potential methods to use when it is forced to respond to a regime’s policy or when it strives to achieve its goals through self-initiative: dialogue, separatism, indifference, identification, protest, and violence (Hitman, 2020). Israel is a multicultural country with a heterogeneous population consisting of Jews and non-Jews. Within these two categories are cultural subcategories: among the Jews, there are ultra-Orthodox, religious, traditional, and secular communities. Among the non-Jews, there are Arabs (Muslims and Christians), Druze, and other religious, ethnic, and linguistic minorities who have cultural freedom. As far as this study is concerned, the analysis distinguishes between the Jewish majority and the non-Jewish or Arab minority, whose religious and national identity is not that of the Jews. The cultural, religious, ethnic, and national diversity in such diverse societies raises questions about minority rights and how to achieve them. The differences between the Jewish majority and the non-Jewish minority are religious and national. The common denominator is that they are all citizens of Israel. The differences between the groups within Israel and the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not yet come to a solution create a basis for friction between the parties on religious, national, or civil grounds. The last outbreak in May 2021 came after more than two decades of peaceful relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority following the events of October 2000 (Barnea, 2024). During these decades, Israeli Arab citizens, most of whom define themselves as Palestinians, had several opportunities to escalate the security situation within the state and challenge the regime: Operation Defensive Shield in Jenin (2002), the Second Lebanon War (2006), Operation Cast Lead (2008), the Marmara Flotilla (2010), Operation Pillar of Clouds (2012), Operation Protective Edge (2014), and the Nation-State Bill (2018) passed by Knesset. In all these cases, the Arab Israeli citizens’ response was to protest within the framework of the law (Frisch, 2017). The conceptual framework and the brief historical overview allow a discussion of the action patterns of Arab society in Israel following the war that began in October 2023. Even if the end date of the war is still unclear, it seems that after more than a year of ongoing hostilities, certain trends within this population can be pointed out. This article seeks to assert two preliminary claims. First, the scale of protest by Arab society in Israel in response to the war in Gaza is low and offers several explanations for this. Second, there has been a moderate increase in the scope of terrorism by individuals within Arab society, apparently due to the influence of the war. The article also aims to analyze the public statements of the Arab leadership in Israel and examine whether there is a consensus or differences in approaches that originate from different ideologies. Based on the triangle model of citizenship, nationalism, and religion, the study hypotheses are: 1) The increasing number of terrorist attacks, as noted below, carried out by Israeli Arabs since October 2023 indicates identification with the Palestinians in Gaza on a national basis. 2) The limited number of protests within the framework of the law reflects a tendency of most of the Arab public to prefer Israeli citizenship over national or religious identification with the Palestinians and with Hamas. 3) The public positions of the Arab leadership reflect ideological differences: Mansour Abbas adheres to a civil partnership, while his political opponents from the Joint List cling to their Palestinian national identity. Methodology This study adopts a combined qualitative and quantitative methodology based on the three hypotheses it seeks to confirm or refute. In the quantitative aspect, it maps the cases where there was a possibility of protest or violence on the part of the Arab society in Israel following the outbreak of the war in October 2023. Such events could be protests against the delivery of the law, clashes with the security system, or terrorist acts against Jews. Qualitative research aims to examine feelings, ideas, and experiences that are often impossible to translate into quantitative numerical data. The religious, national, or civil narrative is the most common tool to examine feelings and thoughts in qualitative studies because it allows researchers to analyze testimonies from their statements and activities. Thus, qualitative methodologies are likely to be used when seeking perceptions, opinions, and approaches, as in this specific study (Ugwu & Eze Val, 2023).In the qualitative aspect, statements were collected from the Arab society on social networks, leading Israeli and global news websites, and statements from public figures at the national level. It was then analyzed according to keywords relevant to this study, such as Israeli occupation, jihad, condemnation of Hamas terrorism, support for Palestinian terrorism, and identification with the victims in Israel and Gaza. Incidents of Terrorism In general, the number of Israeli Arabs involved in terrorism since 1948 is low (Abu Mookh, 2023; Kobowitz, 2019). Despite ethnic-national and religious diversity, which creates significant potential for sparking violence, various reasons have led to a trend of low-volume terrorism. An analysis of the data in the decade preceding October 2023 reveals the following picture: 1) According to the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), in 2013, the involvement of Israeli Arabs in terrorist attacks continued to be minor. The characteristics of terrorism in this case were twofold: going to Syria and joining ISIS or connecting to terrorist infrastructures of Palestinians in the West Bank (Shabak, 2013). 2) Most terrorist incidents involving Israeli Arabs in 2014 (a total of 10 cases) were related to outbreaks of protest and disorder, which included the use of Molotov cocktails attacks against Jewish drivers and setting fire to their cars. One case of the murder of a young Jewish woman by a Bedouin taxi driver stands out (Shabak, 2014). 3) In 2015, there was an increase (a total of 41 Israeli Arabs joined ISIS; a total of 15 terror attacks) in the scope of terrorism committed by Israeli Arabs: shooting and stabbing attacks in which 2 Israelis were killed and 13 wounded. This was also a year in which ISIS was at its peak, and this affected dozens of Israeli Arabs who joined its ranks. ISIS terrorist cells were exposed in several Arab communities, and Israel’s security forces arrested 41 Israeli Arabs (Shabak, 2015). It was likely due to the influence of propaganda by ISIS, which included calls to harm infidels. Between 2018 and 2022, the trend of terrorism by Israeli Arabs continued on a low scale (Abu Mookh, 2023; Kobowitz, 2019). An exception was the month of May 2021, in which violent clashes occurred between Arabs and Jews and security forces (Wall Guard incidents). These attacks resulted in the deaths of 14 Israelis, the vast majority of them members of the security system, such as soldiers and police (Nassar, 2022; Schlesinger, 2018). Regardless, the average number of attacks carried out by Israeli Arabs was four per year, significantly lower compared to the number since the war in Gaza began in October 2023. This indicates that the majority of Arab society has chosen to uphold the law and not risk punishment on criminal or security grounds that have the potential to harm the chances of integration into Israeli society. In this case, the civil element prevailed over the other elements in the relationship triangle. Based on media reports, since October 7, 2023, there has been a real increase in terror attempts and attacks by Israeli Arabs against Jews (mainly security forces). Based on various media and newspaper sources, one can identify that at least 13 cases were registered since October 7, of which Israeli Arabs executed 9 attacks and 4 were thwarted by the Israeli security forces. An analysis of these cases leads to the following insights. First, most of the perpetrators chose to commit stabbing attacks (six cases). In other cases, there were mob attacks, throwing stones, and one an attack that was a combination of a mob followed by an attack with an ax. Second, all involved were males between the ages of 13 and 28. An unusual case involved 9- to 10-year-old children throwing stones in the city of Lod (central Israel). Third, two Jews were murdered, and at least ten were injured, some of them severely. Fourth, all the attacks that were not thwarted were carried out by a single attacker and without the support of institutionalized terrorist organizations. Most of the victims were killed, and most of the perpetrators were affected by the security escalation in Israel, which is also a combination of religious (Hamas) and national (Palestinian) identification of the perpetrators. Finally, a geographic analysis of the attacks indicates diverse areas that include the north of Israel (4), the center (3), and the south (2) (Elbaz et al., 2024; El-Hai & Zeitoun, 2024; Eli & Moghrabi, 2024; Lalotashvili, 2023). An analysis of the terrorist attacks by the Arab population in Israel would not be complete without referring to terrorist attempts that the security forces in Israel managed to thwart. In March 2024, the Israeli media revealed that the Shin Bet and the police had uncovered a cell headed by Muhammad Khaled and Muhammad Yosef, residents of the city of Sakhnin (northern Israel). They intended to carry out terrorist acts in Israel, and members of their group purchased weapons originating from the West Bank. Khaled was in contact with the Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, which provided him with instructions for preparing explosives and directed him to recruit more members to promote terrorist activity (Alkalai, 2024). A senior police officer estimated that the events of the war in Gaza led to the decision of several individuals to establish a terror cell as part of their identification with Hamas. As part of the cooperation with the Palestinians (Hamas members from the Gaza Strip), the possibility of damaging strategic facilities within Israel was also examined (Hachmon, 2024). In July 2024, three young civilians from Kalansawa (central Israel) were arrested on suspicion of having contact with Palestinian terrorists from the West Bank and supplying weapons to terrorist elements. As part of the investigation, among other things, a pipe bomb, an M16 rifle, a Carlo rifle, another gun, and ammunition were seized (Diaz, 2024). In April 2024, a terrorist network consisting of Arab Israelis and Palestinian residents of the West Bank was exposed for conspiring to carry out serious and extensive terrorist activity throughout Israel (Koriel et al. 2024). The head of the cell is Bilal Nasasara, an Israeli Arab living in Rahat in the south of the country, who was responsible for recruiting operatives from Israel. During their investigations by the ISA, it was revealed that the suspects planned to carry out attacks near IDF bases and secure facilities, including the Ben-Gurion Airport. They also planned to assassinate the Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir after obtaining an RPG missile and kidnap IDF soldiers (Hacohen, 2024). Casualties among Israeli Arab Society following Hamas’ Attack The analysis of the terrorist data is only part of the characteristics and phenomena of the Arab society in Israel since October 2023. Close to 30 Muslim Arabs, citizens of Israel, were also murdered by Hamas (Goldman & Koplewitz, 2023) despite a fatwa from Hamas itself that forbids harming them (Izz al-din al-Qassam, 2022). Among the murdered were pregnant women (Sharon, 2023). These figures and the cases presented below illustrate the shared fate of living together as citizens of Israel. In this respect, the terrorist attack by Hamas did not distinguish between Jewish and Muslim victims. One of the prominent phenomena observed during the Hamas attack on Israel was the mutual guarantee between Jews and Muslims, all citizens of Israel. The story of Amer Abu-Sabila illustrates the shared fate of Muslims and Jews on October 7. Abu-Sabila, a 25-year-old father of two toddlers and an Israeli citizen from the Bedouin community in the Negev, saw Hodaya, the mother of two young daughters, in her car trying to escape the scene after her husband had been murdered before her eyes. Due to the intensity of the trauma, she was having difficulty driving, so Abu-Sabila got into her car to take her and her daughters to what he thought would be a safe place—Shderot police station. No one knew that at that time, armed terrorists were surrounding the police station building to take it over. When they arrived at the police station, Amer and Hodaya were murdered by Hamas terrorists, while the two little girls, aged 3 and 6, lay on the floor of the car in the back seat, witnesses to the horror (Times of Israel, 2023). Eventually, the two girls were rescued by the Israeli security forces who arrived at the scene a little later (Gabai, 2023). Abd al-Karim Nasasara from the Bedouin settlement of Kseifa in the Negev was also murdered by Hamas terrorists when he tried to rescue young people from the Nova music festival in Re’im (October7memorial, 2023). The 23-year-old Awad Musa Darawshe, from the northern Israeli village of Iksal, was in the festival complex as an ambulance driver and paramedic. When the terrorists entered, he found himself being approached by many wounded. He chose to stay and care for them until he was murdered (Hauzman, 2023). Yosef al-Ziadna, a resident of Rahat, was a minibus driver who took young people to the Nova festival on Friday. When frightened young people called him on Saturday morning at the start of the Hamas attack, al-Ziadna did not think twice and went to rescue them despite the entire area being under attack. With extraordinary bravery and despite continuous gunfire, he tried to save as many young people as possible. He managed to get 30 survivors of the massacre into his vehicle and save their lives. Al-Ziadna himself lost a relative who was murdered, and four of his family members were kidnapped to Gaza (Kidon & Cohen, 2023). Condemnations of the Hamas Attack among Arab Leaders The Arab political leadership in Israel is divided upon ideological lines: there are communists, Islamists, and nationalist parties. Among the Islamic parties is the United Arab List or the southern branch of the Islamic Movement (hereafter: Ra’am), headed by Knesset member Mansour Abbas. Ra’am represents the southern faction of the Islamic Movement in Israel. In contrast, the northern faction of the Islamic Movement, led by Sheikh Raed Salah, was outlawed by the State of Israel in 2015. On the other side, there are nationalist parties—Balad, led by Sami Abu Shehadeh, and Ta’al, led by Ahmad Tibi—and the communists (Hadash), led by Ayman Odeh. This section examines some of the statements of Arab leaders in the wake of the October 7 attack (Hitman, 2018). Mansour Abbas was the first Arab leader to condemn the Hamas attack as early as noon on October 7, when the dimensions of the disaster were not yet so clear. On his Twitter account, he denounced the “unfortunate, tragic, and obscene” events and called on all citizens of the country, Jews and Arabs, to behave responsibly and not be drawn into incitement. On October 10, he called on Hamas to release the abductees in their hands because “Islamic values command us not to imprison women, children, and the elderly” (Abbas, 2023). On November 6, he became the first Arab leader to meet with the heads of the families of the abductees (Shavit, 2023). On November 10, Abbas said in a TV interview that since the beginning of the war, he had been working as hard as possible to help free the hostages by appealing to religious leaders in the Muslim world. He watched the documentary Bearing Witness to the October 7th Massacre to feel the pain of the victims (Shinberg, 2023). Abbas also called for the removal of Knesset member Iman Khatib Yassin from his party, who claimed there was no massacre. He came out against the Balad demonstration that took place the day before—November 5, 2023—and claimed that Balad does not represent the mindset of Arab society. What does represent the mood in Arab society, according to Abbas, is the survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in November 2023, which showed an unprecedented record of 70% identification of Israeli Arabs with the state (Abu Mookh, 2023). He concluded by saying that the goal is for Jewish and Arab societies to overcome this crisis together in peace (Oko, 2023). Statements and actions of this kind reflected Abbas’s choice of a civil partnership between Jews and Arabs in Israel, a position he has been advocating in recent years and stands in contradiction to the position of other political parties that prefer to highlight the Palestinian national identity. In another survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (December 25, 2023), more than half of Arab society supported the positions of Abbas, according to whom the Hamas attack does not reflect Arab society and the values of Islam. Furthermore, most Arab societies supported the war effort (As’ad & Kaplan, 2023). Ahmad Tibi condemned the harm to civilians (but not fully), hurled accusations at the government and the Israeli right wing, and wrote about the need for an end to the occupation and peace for all parties (Tibi, 2023). On October 11, Tibi spoke about the efforts he was making to prevent incitement in the mixed cities, and on October 13, he addressed the Knesset, speaking about the difficult times and the horrific acts of murder committed in the South. He also spoke about the fact that there were Jewish victims as well as Arabs (Muslims) and condemned the events, but at the same time, he stated that revenge in the Gaza Strip was not the solution to the conflict (Tibi, 2023). Ayman Odeh wrote on his Twitter account on October 10, 2023 that the blood of the innocent was crying out and that there was another way, the way of peace, to be realized through the vision of two states (Odeh, 2023). In another post on the same day, he wrote that he had made calls to console his Jewish friends from Netiv HaAsara, his Arab friends from the Negev, and his friends from the Gaza Strip for the loss of their loved ones (Odeh, 2023). On October 11, Odeh, like Tibi, wrote that he was trying with local leaders in mixed cities and with the police to prevent violence and called on the Arab public to show restraint and responsibility. On October 13, in his speech in the Knesset, Odeh stated that nothing in the world, not even the occupation, justified harming civilians. He claimed that revenge in the Gaza Strip is not the solution and that only a political solution aimed at peace would bring security (Odeh, 2023). Theoretically and empirically, these statements reflected rhetorics to merge authentic sympathy for the Israeli (Jew and Arab) victims and, at the same time, to call for a solution to the ethno-national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Sami Abu Shehadeh did not condemn the atrocities of October 7. Instead, he accused US President Joe Biden of giving Israel the green light to carry out ethnic cleansing of Gazans, expressing his pain about this (Abu Shahadeh, 2023). On October 17, Abu Shahadeh wrote on Twitter of the hypocritical Western approach toward Israelis and Palestinians. Given Biden’s visit to Israel on October 18, he asked whether Biden intended to pass through the Gaza Strip and see the Israeli damage or talk to the families of the injured Gazans (Abu Shahadeh, 2023). Raed Salah, the leader of the northern faction of the Islamic Movement, distributed a video on Al-Jazeera in which he addressed the international audience and asked every Muslim, Christian, and Jew to call for an end to the war (YouTube, 2023). He called on the public to spread peace, oppose damage to mosques, churches, and synagogues, and allow freedom of prayer. He spoke against harming the innocent: the elderly, women, and children (Al-Jazeera, 2023). In this video, Salah used general phrases about harming innocent people. There was no reference in it to the massacre committed by Hamas on October 7 or its condemnation. A month after the start of the war, Salah appealed in an interview on Al-Jazeera to every person of conscience in the world to call for an end to the humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip. In addition, he praised the European nations, who, unlike their governments, showed humanity and took to the streets (YouTube, 2023). Sheikh Salah’s activity reflects full religious identification with Hamas (both movements emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood). His call for a worldwide protest against Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip was the maximum he could do. He chose not to incite a protest inside Israel because the faction he heads was outlawed, and he knew he risked another indictment. In this case, he took advantage of his right as a citizen in a democratic country to raise his voice without breaking the law. Kamal Khatib, Salah’s deputy within the northern branch of the Islamic Movement, also ignored Hamas’ atrocities and focused on accusing the Israeli side. On October 11, he wrote on Facebook that there was Jewish incitement against Arab Israeli leaders and that Jewish groups had distributed lists with the names and addresses of Arab leaders in Israel and defined them as a fifth column (Khatib, 2023). He said that the threats would not affect them or change their identity. He signed off the post with the following sentence: “We are getting closer to salvation, be happy” (Khatib, 2023). On October 24, he uploaded a video to the YouTube channel of Muwatini 48, a channel associated with the northern faction of the Islamic Movement, under the title: “Has the military government returned?” In the video, he said: “Since 7 October, what has happened in Israel, our people in the Palestinian interior have been exposed to an unprecedented attack.” He talked about gagging, preventing demonstrations, and preventing freedom of expression, as well as about the hundreds arrested and indicted. He concluded by saying he was not afraid of any threat and was proud of his Palestinian and Islamic identity (YouTube, 2023). In terms of reviewing the statements of the leaders of the Arab public after the massacre of October 7, their statements are not uniform and reflect personal (and collective) identity and ideology. The Islamic Movement’s Northern Branch was careful about expressing support for Hamas but emphasized religious and Palestinian identity. The nationalists focused on the Palestinian side being the victim of the conflict, and the communists called for a peaceful solution and coexistence between the parties. Anti-war Protests among the Arab Public Hamas attempted to recruit Israeli Arabs to its ranks as early as on October 7. In a recorded speech published on that day, Muhammad Deif, the commander of the military wing of Hamas, called on the Arabs of Israel to join Hamas (YouTube, 2023). Hamas sees the Israeli Arabs as a significant force that can help them in any conflict with Israel due to their proximity to major traffic routes and population concentrations (MEMRI, 2023). Previously, in May 2021, Hamas managed to mobilize the Israeli Arabs, who broke out in violent riots all over the country, especially in mixed cities (Hitman, 2023). Scholars in the Muslim world affiliated with Hamas also tried to harness the Muslim citizens of Israel for war against the State of Israel. For example, on November 7, 2023, the International Union of Muslin Scholars (IUMS) issued a fatwa regarding the duty of the governments of Arab countries and Muslims worldwide concerning the war in Palestine. They stated that all Muslims have an obligation to go out and fight for the victory of Gaza; according to the circle theory, with the first circle being the Palestinians in the West Bank, the second being the 1948 Arabs living in Israel, followed by the Arab countries neighboring Israel and, finally, the other Arab and Muslim countries (Ijtihad & Fatwa Committee of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, 2023). All these efforts were made based on a common national and religious identity. Unlike May 2021, when Israeli Arabs erupted in violent riots all over Israel, the religious leadership of the Muslims in Israel, namely the Islamic Movement’s two factions, did not respond to this call by IUMS. The Arab society in Israel responded to the war in Gaza with demonstrations and manifestations of protest. An exception in this context is the story of teacher Rami Habiballah from the north of Israel, who contacted Hamas operatives abroad to promote terrorist attacks in Israel during the war (Senyor & Mughrabi, 2024). The constant dilemma of the Arab residents of Israel, based on the triangle model presented in this article, was also expressed in the manifestations of the protest. On the one hand, some lost their family members in the war, and, on the other hand, some called for an end to it, claiming identification with Gaza. On October 12, 2023, the police dispersed a 15-vehicle Hamas support convoy in Umm el-Fahem and detained four people for questioning (Machol, 2023). On October 18, before the IDF’s ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, Arab demonstrators took to the streets of Haifa Um el-Fahem and Taiba, calling for an end to the war in the Gaza Strip. Following the demonstrations and clashes with the police, several protesters were arrested (Khoury, 2023). On November 9, 2023, senior figures in the leadership of the Arab public, including Muhammad Barakeh, head of the Monitoring Committee of the Israeli Arab Leadership, and senior members of Balad (Abu Shehadeh, Hanin Zoabi, and Mtanes Shehadeh), organized a demonstration against the war in the northern city of Nazareth. The senior leadership of the Arab public in the country was invited to the demonstration. The demonstration was dispersed because the police claimed it was illegal (Sha’alan, 2023). In January 2024, a protest was held in Haifa to stop the war. This protest was the first of its kind, as both Jewish left-wing activists and Israeli Arabs from Haifa attended it. The protesters called for peace, an end to the war, and a stop to the cycle of bloodshed (Al-Jazeera, 2024). Unlike previous protests, the participants were asked to demonstrate their shared citizenship and concern for the victims and express their hope for ending the conflict. On March 2, 2024, a demonstration was held in Kafr Kanna. The demonstration was organized by the Supreme Monitoring Committee of the Israeli Arab Public after many difficulties in obtaining the necessary approvals from the Israeli police. In this demonstration, calls were heard for an end to the war in the Gaza Strip, identification with the Palestinians, and resistance to the occupation. In addition, Barakeh addressed the common national identity of the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians, stating that the Arab public would not forget what is happening in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that the Arab public was best suited to protecting Al-Aqsa and the holy places from “the occupying Zionists” (Halevi, 2024). It can be observed that despite the severe war in the Gaza Strip, the destruction, and the many Gazan casualties, there was no escalation in the reaction of Israeli Arabs. Unlike the violent events of May 2021, they chose to maintain a low profile and limit their actions to calling for an end to the war through nonviolent demonstrations. This pattern of sporadic demonstrations led residents of the Gaza Strip to accuse Israeli Arabs of not participating in the protests, not supporting Gazans, and remaining silent throughout the war (Zbeedat, 2024). This situation can be understood considering that Israeli Arabs were also affected by the Hamas attack. Two additional reasons for the lack of violent incidents between Jews and Arabs are the enforcement policies of the Israeli police and the Ministry of Justice against expressions of support for Hamas or Gaza and the informational campaign by the Israeli government aimed at the Arab public (Sha’alan, 2024). In practice, the Israeli establishment implemented a stringent enforcement policy against anyone suspected of supporting Hamas or encouraging terrorism within Israel, particularly on social media. This was the case in November 2023, when the police arrested 103 suspects for expressing support for Hamas, with 46 indictments filed. In comparison, from 2018 to 2022, only 88 indictments were filed (Ma’anit et al., 2023). The fact that in the summer of 2024, the number of demonstrations by Arab society against the war has significantly decreased shows not only a routine in the shadow of war but a growing understanding that despite identification with the Palestinian nation, life has its own dynamics, and being citizens of a democratic state creates opportunities for them (alongside threats due to being a minority group). In almost all cases, the decision to stick to peaceful demonstrations is an expression of the clear preference of the Arab public to stick to their citizenship. The fact that the police arrested a few hundred out of a population of 1.5 million is also evidence that the majority of Arab society in Israel sympathizes with the Palestinian nation but remains indifferent when it is required to act in protest or violence to promote Palestinian national interests. Finally, the ongoing war has increased the lack of trust between Jews and Arabs. It is a common phenomenon in majority–minority interaction, especially when the political–identitarian conflict is intractable (Vered & Bar-Tal, 2017). The two cases below illustrate this argument: • Maisa Abd Elhadi, an Arab citizen of Israel from Nazareth, is known for her roles in numerous Israeli series and films and for representing Israel at international festivals. After the Hamas attack, Abd Elhadi posted content on social media expressing support for the terrorist organization and showing enthusiasm for the abduction of Israeli soldiers and civilians to the Gaza Strip (Sever & Machol, 2023). As a result, she was detained for questioning by the police, the broadcasting company HOT announced the termination of its association with her, and her representation agency, Kafri ended its contract with her (Mish’ali, 2023). Ultimately, she was released after 1 day of detention and placed under house arrest with restrictive conditions until December 2024 (Moshkovitz, 2023). • Dr. Abed Samara, the head of the cardiac intensive care unit at Hasharon Hospital, was suspended from his position in mid-October after the hospital’s management interpreted posts he made on Facebook expressing support for Hamas (Drucker, 2023; Efrati, 2023). After a month and a half of suspension and a battle to clear his name with the hospital administration, Samara decided in early December to leave the hospital where he had worked for 15 years due to the hostile atmosphere and the breach of trust between him and the management. The war between Israel and Gaza since October 2023 was another opportunity for Hamas to mobilize Arab society in Israel to support it on the basis of a common national identity. The long duration of the war resulted in reactions within the Arab society that highlighted identification with the Palestinian victims which was mainly expressed in support from afar through social platforms. Along with this, there was a minor increase in the number of terrorist attacks, although the protest was in low numbers. The Israeli government, against the backdrop of the war, took a rigid approach toward Arab demonstrators in an attempt to deter any escalation. Yet, the vast majority of the Israel Arabs did not participate in protests or engage in violence. Conclusion Like previous conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, the war in the Gaza Strip once again illustrated the complexity of Israeli Arabs’ reality and identity. They have Israeli citizenship and live among Jews. At the same time, their national and religious identities are different from the Jewish majority. This permanent situation and their activity since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip in October 2023 lead to several conclusions. First, they have no immunity against possible harm from terrorism. Second, their national and religious identity led a small number of them to act illegally and violently and carry out terrorist attacks against Jews. Third, compared to 2014, there has been an increase in the number of terror attacks carried out by Israeli Arabs. It is an outcome of shared national (and sometimes religious) identity with the Palestinians. Fourth, the vast majority of Arab society in Israel did not take part in protests or violence in response to the war. They remained passive and continued their lives without risking punitive measures from the government. In this context, it is worth noting that there has been an increase in the Arab society’s level of fear of the Israeli establishment, and some of the elements representing it have announced strict enforcement in the case of identifying with Hamas or breaking the law. Finally, the Arab leadership is not united in its attitude to the war. Their public statements reflect a traditional ideological difference, which puts an insurmountable barrier to forming a unified front of a minority society that constantly asks to improve its standard of civil life. Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ORCID iDGadi Hitman https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9018-1241ReferencesAbbas Mansour. (2023, October 7). 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Shin Bet: We arrested a terrorist squad from Mahrat that planned to assassinate Ben Gabir and kidnap Israelis to Tulkarm [Hebrew]. Ynet. https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hyq7sy21cLajnat al-Iftaa’ Katā’ib al-Shahid Izz al-dīn al-Qassam. (2022). Fatāwā al-Mujāhidīn. Katā’ib al-Shahid Izz al-dīn al-Qassam.Lalotashvili Liza. (2023, November 7). Minors from Lod were caught after throwing stones at a bus [Hebrew]. News08. https://tinyurl.com/yyds9xy4Ma’anit Hen, Shim’oni Yahya Ran, & Hajj Dia. (2023, November 3). The number of arrests for postings on social media is skyrocketing, and the limits of freedom of expression are unclear [Hebrew]. Haaretz. https://tinyurl.com/6kxdf8knMachol Mishel. (2023, October 13). A support convoy for Hamas in Umm el-Fahem was stopped by the police; suspect detained [Hebrew]. Israel Today. https://tinyurl.com/3reheburMEMRI. (2023, May 9). An article on the Hamas website presents Israeli Arabs with ways of harming it in a future war against it [Hebrew]. MEMRI: The Middle East Media Research Institute. https://tinyurl.com/33xs3ab7Mish’ali Gil. (2023, October 24). ‘Manifestations of anti-Semitism will not be forgiven’: The agency that represented the actress who supported Hamas cut off contact with her [Hebrew]. Mako.co.il. https://tinyurl.com/4995fu98Moshkovitz Israel. (2023, October 5). The actress Maisa Abdel Hadi, who published support for Hamas, was released to house arrest [Hebrew]. Ynet. https://tinyurl.com/4w6ekseaNassar Furat. (2022, March 27). Attack in Hadera: 2 killed and 10 injured by the shooting of two terrorists [Hebrew]. Mako.co.il. https://www.mako.co.il/news-law/2022_q1/Article-7c4ccf0ad7ccf71026.htmNyers Peter. (2018). Irregular citizenship, immigration, and deportation. Routledge. October7memorial. (n.d.). In memoriam of: Abd al-Karim Hassan Nasasara. October7memorial.com. https://tinyurl.com/cs99brymOdeh Ayman. (2023, October 10–13). Ayman Odeh’s Twitter accounts. https://x.com/AyOdeh/status/1711666524115632566; https://x.com/AyOdeh/status/1712012007547740533; https://x.com/AyOdeh/status/1712707148386353467Oko Gideon. (2023, October 11). Mansour Abbas in an interview: ‘Condemns any incitement or identification with the crimes of 7 October, feels the pain of the victims’ [Hebrew]. Mako.co.il. https://tinyurl.com/3p6dbv5dSchlesinger Eli. (2018, February 5). The terrorist who murdered Itamar Ben-Gal the 14th is an Israeli Arab resident of Jaffa [Hebrew]. Bhol.co.il. https://www.bhol.co.il/news/893130Senyor Eli, & Mughrabi Ali. (2024, February 11). A serious security affair in the north: A teacher is accused of trying to aid Hamas [Hebrew]. Channel 13. https://tinyurl.com/bdjmmcd6Sever Merav, & Machol Mishel. (2023, October 25). After supporting Hamas: The actress Maisa Abdelhadi was released to house arrest [Hebrew]. Israel Hayom. https://tinyurl.com/4hhx5x3rSha’alan Hasan. (2023, October 20). The dilemma of the Israeli Arabs: ‘The extremists are trying to drag us into a confrontation’ [Hebrew]. Ynet. https://tinyurl.com/54zpxs2fSha’alan Hassan. (2024, March 2). About 2,500 protesters in Kfar Kana calling for an end to the war. Ynet. https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/b1ynffl6pShabak. (2013). ISA annual report 2013 [Hebrew]. Shabak. https://www.shabak.gov.il/moreshet/study/2013/Shabak. (2014). ISA annual report [Hebrew]. https://www.shabak.gov.il/media/vfzlf4gb/%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%99-2014.pdfShabak. (2015). ISA annual report [Hebrew]. https://www.shabak.gov.il/media/daofn2ys/%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%99-2015.pdfSharon Yaniv. (2023 December 3). S. Abu Rashed was in advanced pregnancy when terrorists shot her in the stomach on 7 October. The bullet killed the fetus, and the mother survived [Hebrew]. Davar Hayom. https://tinyurl.com/2s35937eShavit Liri. (2023, November 6). Liri Shavit’s Twitter account. https://x.com/lirishavit/status/1721555547013427367Shinberg Shalev. (2023, October 16). Abbas to the government: “Not to ignore the suffering of innocents in Gaza”. Kol Rega. https://www.kore.co.il/viewArticle/142323Tibi Ahmad. (2023, October 7). Ahmad Tibi’s Twitter account. https://x.com/Ahmad_tibi/status/1710682823676322080Times of Israel. (2023, October 23). Amer Abu Sabila, 25: Killed trying to save two young girls in Sderot. The Times of Israel. https://tinyurl.com/yvjukbe9Ugwu Chinyere N., & Eze Val H. U. (2023). Qualitative research. IDOSR Journal of Computer and Applied Sciences, 8 (1), 20–35.Vered Soli, & Bar-Tal Daniel. (2017). Intractable conflict and peacemaking from a socio-psychological approach. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. YouTube. (2023, October–November). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-4hzW5F8GU; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XjVi-_0w6H0; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-cxL5_Nw1l0Zbeedat Nagham. 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Defense & Security
China Cyber Security Ransomware Email Phishing Encrypted Technology, Digital Information Protected Secured. 3d illustration

Chinese cyberespionage: The Invisible War That Threatens the West

by Gabriele Iuvinale

On March 4, the U.S. Department of Justice charged ten Chinese nationals with carrying out massive hacks against government agencies, media outlets, and dissidents in the United States and around the world. They allegedly acted on behalf of the Chinese company i-Soon, under contract from the Beijing government. Two officials from China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were also indicted, identified as the ones “directing the attacks.” According to documents held by the U.S. justice system, China’s domestic intelligence services (MPS) and foreign intelligence (Ministry of State Security, MSS) relied on a vast network of private companies and domestic contractors to hack and steal information, thereby masking the Chinese government’s direct involvement. In some cases, the MPS and MSS paid private hackers to target specific victims. In many others, the attacks were speculative: hackers identified vulnerable computers, breached them, and extracted information that was later sold — either directly or indirectly — to the Chinese government. The Growth of Chinese Cyberespionage and Its Main Areas of Operation This is not an isolated case. Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) hacking program has expanded rapidly. In 2023, then-FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that it was larger than that of all other world powers combined. This increase in power and sophistication has led to success in three key areas: political interference, sabotage of critical infrastructure, and large-scale intellectual property theft. Beijing integrates computer networks, electronic warfare, economic, diplomatic, legal, military, intelligence, psychological, and military deception resources, along with security operations, to weaken states, make them economically dependent on China, and more receptive to a “new authoritarian world order with Chinese characteristics.” For this reason, unlike traditional interpretations, Chinese state-sponsored hacking should be understood within a broader context — where control over technology, strategic infrastructure, and global supply chains is part of “trans-military” and “non-military” warfare operations, as described by two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) colonels in the 1999 book “Unrestricted Warfare”. This approach is known as liminal warfare — an escalating conflict in which the spectrum of competition and confrontation with the West is so wide that the battlefield is, quite literally, everywhere. Cyberespionage as a Tool of Electronic Warfare In electronic warfare, hacking is used for sabotage during times of crisis or conflict. These actions are led by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. In 2023, it was discovered that a hacker group linked to the PLA, known as “Volt Typhoon”, had infiltrated a wide range of critical infrastructure in the U.S. for years, including ports, factories, and water treatment plants — both on the mainland and in strategic locations like Guam. “Volt Typhoon is a military operation with political and potentially military strategic purposes,” explained Ciaran Martin, former director of the UK’s cybersecurity agency. Led by the PLA’s cyber unit, the operation involved installing readiness capabilities — “digital traps,” as some call them — within critical U.S. infrastructure. In addition to a sustained attack in 2023 on a power company in Massachusetts, which aimed to extract sensitive data about its operational technology (OT) infrastructure, “Volt Typhoon” gained notoriety for multiple attacks on telecommunications systems in the U.S. and other critical infrastructures globally. One of its subunits, “Voltzite”, targeted the Littleton Electric and Water Departments, prompting the FBI and cybersecurity firm Dragos to respond jointly and publish a detailed report on the attack and its mitigation. Intellectual Property Theft Through Cyberespionage The most damaging channel for intellectual property theft is cyberespionage. These intrusions allow Chinese companies — sometimes with direct support from the Communist Party or the state — to access information on operations, projects, and technology from foreign firms. China has used state-backed and coordinated cyberespionage campaigns to steal information from companies in strategic sectors such as oil, energy, steel, and aviation. These actions serve both to acquire science and technology and to gather intelligence useful for future attacks on military, government, or technical systems. In the United States, there have been numerous precedents: • In 2014, five PLA hackers were indicted for economic espionage.• In 2017, three hackers linked to the Chinese firm Boyusec were charged with stealing confidential business information.• In 2018, two Chinese nationals were indicted for intellectual property theft.• In 2020, two hackers connected to the MSS were charged with targeting COVID-19 research. Among these, the 2018 indictment stands out as part of a broader U.S. effort to raise awareness about Chinese cyberespionage. On that occasion, Chinese hackers carried out a campaign known as “Cloud Hopper”, which involved a supply chain attack on service providers like Hewlett Packard and IBM. The defendants worked for Huaying Haitai and collaborated with the Tianjin State Security Bureau of the MSS. In 2017, the U.S. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated that such crimes cost the U.S. economy up to $600 billion annually — a figure comparable to the Pentagon’s defense budget and greater than the combined profits of the 50 largest companies in the Fortune 500. Beyond the United States: The Global Impact of Chinese Cyberespionage In June 2024, Dutch military intelligence (MIVD) warned that Chinese cyberespionage was broader than previously believed, affecting Western governments and defense companies. A 2023 cyberattack on the Dutch Ministry of Defense reportedly affected at least 20,000 people within a few months. In 2018, the Czech Republic’s National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NUKIB) issued a warning about risks linked to China. Since then, the country has strengthened its capabilities and controls against Beijing and has worked on mechanisms to counter foreign information manipulation. According to U.S. prosecutors, dozens of European parliamentarians have been targeted by Chinese attacks. In March 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted hackers linked to the MSS for attacking “all EU members” of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a coalition critical of Beijing. In 2021, the hackers sent over a thousand emails to around 400 accounts linked to IPAC, attempting to spy on their internet activity and devices. In addition, ASML, the Dutch leader in semiconductor lithography, suffers “thousands of security incidents per year,” including several successful infiltration attempts by Chinese actors. Research centers like Imec (Belgium) are also frequent targets. Belgium has expelled Chinese researchers suspected of espionage. The European Union has reinforced security and identified advanced semiconductors as one of four critical technologies requiring risk assessments and enhanced protection. Notably, APT41 is one of the most active and sophisticated Chinese cyberespionage groups, based in the PRC and linked to the MSS. According to Google’s Threat Intelligence Group, APT41 combines state espionage with ransomware attacks — malicious programs that encrypt files and demand financial ransom to restore them — making attribution more difficult. Unlike other PLA-aligned groups whose operations are region-specific, APT41 acts globally, attacking strategic sectors in the U.S., Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It also carries out financially motivated operations, particularly in the gaming industry. Mandiant, a global cybersecurity leader, highlights APT41’s technical capabilities: it frequently exploits zero-day and n-day vulnerabilities and uses techniques like phishing, social engineering, and SQL injections. Since 2020, APT41 has conducted large-scale campaigns against over 75 companies in more than 20 countries. It is responsible for compromising supply chains, such as in the “ShadowHammer” campaign targeting ASUS, which affected over 50,000 systems in 2018. APT41 is also linked to the use of “MESSAGETAP” malware in telecommunications networks. The Role of Chinese Universities in Cyberespionage Chinese universities also collaborate with the PLA and MSS in state-sponsored cyberespionage operations. Shanghai Jiao Tong University works directly with the Chinese military on such operations. Zhejiang University and the Harbin Institute of Technology are key centers for recruiting hackers. Xidian University offers students hands-on experience at provincial MSS offices and previously maintained ties with the Third Department of the PLA’s General Staff before its reorganization in 2015 into the Network Systems Department. One of its graduate programs is co-directed with the Guangdong Office of the Chinese Information Technology Security Evaluation Center (ITSEC), an MSS-run office that leads an active team of contractor hackers. Southeast University also maintains links with security services and co-manages the “Purple Mountain Lab” with the PLA’s Strategic Support Force. There, researchers collaborate on “critical strategic requirements,” operating systems, and interdisciplinary cybersecurity studies. The university also receives funding from the PLA and MSS to develop China’s cyber capabilities. The Cybersecurity undergraduate program at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) is taught at a PLA information engineering base. Within this program, SJTU claims to work on “network and information systems testing and evaluation, security testing for connected smart networks, APT attack and defense testing, and key technologies for cyber ranges.” Universities associated with the MSS for talent recruitment include the University of Science and Technology of China, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Xi’an Jiao Tong University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Nanjing University, and the Harbin Institute of Technology. In addition, some cybersecurity firms — such as Beijing TopSec — collaborate with the PLA in hacking campaigns, operator training, and developing future hackers. This article was originally published by Agenda Digitale and later by Expediente Abierto, who granted us permission for its translation and republication.

Defense & Security
Kyiv, Ukraine - July 19, 2023 Thousands of flags have been planted at the makeshift memorial for fallen soldiers in Maidan Square. Each flag is a tribute to someone who was killed by Russia's war.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict: An international humanitarian law review of the involvement of foreign fighters

by Khoirunnisa Khoirunnisa , Brian Matthew , Didi Jubaidi , Agung Yudhistira Nugroho

AbstractThe increasing presence of foreign fighters in the armed conflict in Ukraine has posed significant challenges to the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These foreign fighters, often motivated by political, ideological, or religious reasons, do not neatly fit into traditional legal categories such as lawful combatants, civilians, or mercenaries. Their involvement on both sides of the conflict between those supporting either Ukrainian forces or Russian-backed groups, presents a complex issue that requires careful consideration within the context of IHL, which currently lacks clear provisions for addressing their legal status. This study focuses on the research question: Does the involvement of foreign fighters in the armed conflict in Ukraine comply with the principles of International Humanitarian Law? This issue is particularly important as it exposes significant gaps in IHL, revealing its inability to adequately address the complexities of modern armed conflicts involving non-state actors. Employing a juridical-normative approach, this study examines the application of IHL to foreign fighters in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, focusing on their rights, responsibilities, and accountability. The findings show that IHL lacks specific provisions to regulate the legal status of foreign fighters, relying instead on general human rights principles that fail to address their unique circumstances. This creates a legal vacuum, undermining both their protection and the enforcement of accountability for violations. The study concludes that targeted reforms in IHL are urgently needed to establish clear legal standards for the classification, protection, and prosecution of foreign fighters, thereby strengthening the overall humanitarian framework for contemporary armed conflicts.KeywordsForeign fighters, Russia, Armed conflict, Humanitarian law, Ukraine 1. Introduction The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has been ongoing since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, has escalated into a complex and devastating war. This conflict, deeply rooted in geopolitical tensions, has drawn the attention of the international community, not only due to the implications for regional stability but also for the growing role of foreign fighters. The involvement of foreign fighters in the conflict adds a new layer of complexity to the already volatile situation. These individuals, who join armed conflicts in foreign territories, are often motivated by political, ideological, religious, or financial reasons, and their presence in Ukraine raises serious legal, political, and humanitarian questions (Asya et al., 2024). The role of foreign fighters has become increasingly significant in modern warfare, with their participation often blurring the lines between combatants, civilians, and mercenaries (Anjelika et al., 2024)The primary challenge posed by the involvement of foreign fighters in Ukraine lies in the legal uncertainty surrounding their status under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL, which governs the conduct of armed conflicts and seeks to protect individuals who are not actively participating in hostilities, does not provide clear guidelines for foreign fighters. These fighters, who do not represent a state or recognized party to the conflict, do not neatly fall into categories such as lawful combatants or civilians, making their legal status ambiguous. This creates a gap in the legal framework, complicating the application of IHL to their actions and raising critical questions about accountability, rights, and protections under international law (Alexander, 2023) (see Table 1, Table 2).   The significance of this study stems from the need to address these legal uncertainties and to understand how IHL can be adapted to regulate the involvement of foreign fighters in modern conflicts. Despite the growing prevalence of foreign fighters in conflicts around the world, the existing body of IHL has not sufficiently addressed their status or the challenges they pose to the protection of human rights and the enforcement of accountability (Paulussen, 2021). By focusing specifically on the Ukraine conflict, this study aims to fill a significant gap in current legal scholarship by analyzing the implications of foreign fighters' participation through the lens of IHL. The involvement of foreign fighters in the Ukraine conflict has profound implications not only for the legal treatment of these individuals but also for the broader geopolitical context (Idris & Mu'tashim, 2023). Their participation exacerbates tensions between Russia and Western countries, as foreign fighters supporting Ukraine often come from nations with opposing political interests to Russia. This dynamic further complicates diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the conflict and maintaining international peace. Additionally, the presence of foreign fighters contributes to the growing trend of non-state actors engaging in warfare, challenging traditional notions of state sovereignty and complicating international efforts to regulate armed conflict (Lekatompessy et al., 2024). From a humanitarian perspective, the presence of foreign fighters increases the risks of violations of IHL and human rights, as these individuals may not be subject to the same legal frameworks as state actors. The lack of clear legal provisions for foreign fighters leaves them vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, and violations of their rights, while also creating a situation in which accountability for violations becomes difficult to enforce (Akbar & Sadiawati, 2023). This not only undermines the protection of civilians but also weakens the enforcement of humanitarian norms, further complicating the efforts of international organizations and states to address violations of IHL. This study is particularly important because it seeks to address the legal vacuum that exists concerning foreign fighters in the Ukraine conflict. By examining the application of IHL to foreign fighters, this research contributes to the broader field of international law by proposing a more comprehensive framework for regulating their involvement. Through this examination, the study aims to provide concrete recommendations for legal reforms within IHL that would better address the challenges posed by foreign fighters in modern armed conflicts. The rationale for this study lies in the growing recognition that IHL, as it currently stands, is insufficient to address the complexities of modern warfare, particularly when it comes to the participation of non-state actors like foreign fighters. As the world witnesses an increasing number of foreign fighters engaging in conflicts worldwide, it is essential to adapt international legal frameworks to these new realities. This study not only contributes to the understanding of IHL's limitations but also proposes practical legal reforms that could enhance its effectiveness in protecting human rights and ensuring accountability in future conflicts. The involvement of foreign fighters in Ukraine represents a critical point at which the gaps in IHL are laid bare. As such, this study holds significant relevance for policymakers, international legal scholars, and human rights advocates, as it highlights the urgent need for reform and provides insights into how IHL can evolve to better respond to contemporary challenges. By addressing the legal status and accountability of foreign fighters, this study aims to contribute to the development of a more robust and responsive international legal system that can effectively address the complexities of modern warfare and uphold humanitarian principles in the face of emerging threats. 1.1. Literature review Previous research by Akbar and Sadiawati (2023), titled "Analysis of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in Terms of Humanitarian Law", focuses on examining violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions during the invasion and emphasizes the role of the United Nations in promoting global peace. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the international legal framework, particularly humanitarian law, in addressing war crimes and violations committed during the conflict. Similarly, Nasution and Raudia (2022, pp. 361–374), in their article "Analysis of Russian War Violations in the 2022 Ukrainian Conflict Based on the Perspective of International Humanitarian Law", discusses the breaches of humanitarian law committed by Russia during the conflict. Their study highlights key violations under international legal standards and emphasizes the need for accountability based on humanitarian law principles. Masri et al. (2024), in their study titled "Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict", explore the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) within the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Their research delves into how IHL has been enforced and its effectiveness in mitigating harm during the conflict. While these studies extensively analyze IHL violations in the Russia-Ukraine war, they focus primarily on state actors, with limited attention to the role of foreign fighters. This paper fills this gap by analyzing the participation of foreign fighters, their classification under IHL, and the legal protections afforded to them. 1.2. Theoretical framework1.2.1. Theories of state sovereignty and territorial integrity The theory of state sovereignty and territorial integrity originates from classical thinkers like Bodin (2009), Hugo Grotius (1964), and Kant (1991). Bodin defined sovereignty as supreme authority free from external interference, while Grotius emphasized its role as a cornerstone of international law. Kant argued that territorial integrity was vital for peaceful inter-state relations. These principles were codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945), prohibiting threats or force against a state's territorial integrity or political independence. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, these principles are acutely relevant. Russia's annexation of Crimea (2014), support for separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, and the 2022 invasion breach sovereignty and international law. Moerdijat (2022) highlights these violations' severity, while Pisano (2022) examines their destabilizing effects on regional geopolitics. Thus, this theory offers a legal and analytical lens to assess the conflict's ramifications for the global order. 1.2.2. Theories of international humanitarian law (IHL) The development of IHL stems from contributions by scholars like Jean Pictet, who stressed protecting individuals in conflicts, and Hugo Grotius, whose De Jure Belli ac Pacis advocated for war regulation through moral and legal principles. J.F. Murphy (1982) linked IHL with human rights, Antonio Cassese (2013) explored IHL's role in mitigating human rights violations during war, and Theodor Meron (2006) advanced civilian protections and war crime regulations. These foundations emphasize protecting non-combatants, limiting warfare methods, and clarifying states' obligations. In Ukraine, IHL faces challenges like the ambiguous legal status of foreign fighters. Akbar and Sadiawati (2023) highlight gaps in their protections, while the BBC (2023) reports on the Wagner Group's role in exacerbating violations, such as civilian attacks and disproportionate force. These challenges underscore the need for stricter adherence to IHL to mitigate humanitarian crises and uphold legal standards. 1.2.3. Theories of globalization in modern warfare Theories on globalization's impact on warfare are shaped by thinkers like Mary Kaldor (2013), who contrasts traditional "old wars" with "new wars" involving non-state actors, and Zygmunt Bauman (1998), who links globalization to interconnected dynamics reshaping warfare. Robert D. Kaplan (1994) connects globalization to growing socio-economic inequalities and asymmetric conflicts. These theories argue that globalization's technological, economic, and communicative aspects have transformed war by introducing non-state actors and advanced technologies. The Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrates globalization's role in modern warfare. The participation of foreign fighters, whether aiding Ukraine's International Territorial Defense Legion or Russia's Wagner Group, reflects globalization's influence. Mehra and Thorley (2022) note motivations like ideology and economics, while Chakyan Tang (2022) highlights both solidarity and challenges introduced by non-state actors. Globalization expands conflicts' scope and complexity, complicating regulation while reshaping modern warfare's nature. 2. Methodology This research employs a juridical-normative method using a legal approach to examine the Ukraine-Russia conflict within the framework of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Gunawan et al., 2023). The primary objective is to explore how the actions of the parties involved align with the established principles and norms of international law. A juridical-normative approach is used to systematically analyze laws, regulations, and legal principles applicable to the conflict, particularly focusing on how these norms are implemented or potentially violated by the involved actors. The study relies on qualitative normative research methods, which involve document analysis of legal texts and secondary sources to gain a comprehensive understanding of the legal framework governing the conflict. This includes examining court decisions, legal doctrines, international treaties (such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions), and other relevant international instruments. Secondary sources, such as legal theories and expert opinions, also form a key part of the analysis. Through this approach, the research offers a comprehensive analysis of compliance with, or violations of, the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the conflict. The document analysis process, as the primary data collection method, incorporates legal hermeneutics to interpret and clarify the meaning of legal texts, ensuring an accurate understanding of their application in the context of the Ukraine conflict. Comparative analysis is also employed to examine how IHL principles have been applied in similar conflicts, providing a benchmark for evaluating their implementation or breach in this case. The analysis focuses on primary legal materials, including treaties, conventions, official communications, and resolutions from international organizations, to establish a foundational understanding of the legal framework. These are complemented by secondary legal materials, such as academic literature, legal commentaries, and expert opinions, which provide critical insights and context. This methodological combination ensures a robust and nuanced evaluation of how IHL principles are being upheld or violated, strengthening the validity and reliability of the findings. 3. Results and discussion3.1. Legal framework for foreign fighters The status of foreign fighters under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) remains contentious and ambiguous. While the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols primarily regulate the conduct of state actors and recognized combatants, they offer limited guidance for non-state participants, such as foreign fighters. These individuals find themselves in a legal gray area, as the Geneva Conventions focus mainly on the protection of civilians and combatants who are part of a state's armed forces or organized resistance groups. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II extend limited protections to non-state actors involved in non-international armed conflicts, emphasizing humane treatment and prohibiting acts like torture or degrading treatment (M, 2001). However, these provisions do not explicitly address the legal status, rights, or obligations of foreign fighters who may not be formally part of an organized state or non-state armed force. Additional Protocol I further complicates this issue. For example, Article 47 of Protocol I explicitly excludes mercenaries from the status of combatants or prisoners of war (POWs), effectively denying them the legal protections afforded to lawful combatants (Geraldy Diandra Aditya, Soekotjo Hardiwinoto, 2017). This exclusion raises questions regarding the legal status of foreign fighters who may not fit neatly into the categories of lawful combatant, civilian, or unlawful belligerent. As a result, the legal position of foreign fighters in modern armed conflicts, such as the Ukraine-Russia conflict, remains unclear and potentially subject to exploitation or abuse. A table listing key international treaties, conventions, and resolutions relevant to foreign fighters could illustrate the legal tools available for regulating their conduct and holding them accountable. The table could include categories such as. 3.1.1. Legal status and responsibilities of foreign fighters Foreign fighters have become a notable element of modern conflicts, including in Ukraine, where individuals from various countries have joined both sides of the conflict. Their participation raises significant legal and ethical questions, particularly regarding their status under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the accountability for their actions. IHL, as defined by the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions, does not explicitly mention "foreign fighters" but provides a legal framework for determining their status based on their activities and allegiance. Foreign fighters are typically categorized as either lawful combatants, unlawful combatants, or civilians, and their rights and responsibilities are governed by the laws of war (Hasan & Haque, 2023). a. Lawful Combatants, foreign fighters who join the armed forces of a state party to the conflict (e.g., Ukraine in the context of the Russian invasion) may be considered lawful combatants. As lawful combatants, they are entitled to the protections of IHL, including protection from being targeted and humane treatment if captured. They are subject to the laws of armed conflict, particularly the Geneva Conventions, and must adhere to principles such as distinction, proportionality, and the prohibition of unnecessary suffering. However, this status is contingent upon them being members of an organized military force that follows IHL regulations.b. Unlawful Combatans, foreign fighters who join non-state armed groups, such as mercenaries or irregular militias not recognized under IHL, are considered unlawful combatants. They are not entitled to the same protections as lawful combatants and may be prosecuted for violations of IHL, including acts that could constitute war crimes. The status of unlawful combatants often leads to challenges in terms of legal accountability, as their actions may not be adequately covered by state-based military tribunals or national courts. International efforts to hold foreign fighters accountable for violations such as the targeting of civilians or the use of prohibited weapons can be complicated by the lack of a clear framework for prosecuting non-state actors.c. Civilians, foreign nationals who participate in the conflict but do not take a direct part in hostilities are considered civilians and are protected by IHL. Their involvement in combat can alter their status, and they may lose their protection from direct targeting once they engage in hostilities. This creates a complex dynamic for the prosecution and accountability of foreign fighters, as their status may change based on their activities in the field. A table that compares the legal status of foreign fighters in different contexts could help clarify the varying rights and responsibilities under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The table could include categories such as: Here is the map illustrating the geographical origins of foreign fighters in the Ukraine conflict, showing their involvement with either the Ukrainian or Russian side. This visual provides a global context to their participation. 3.2. Ukraine's historical struggle: Russia's colonialism and imperialistic attitudes The relationship between Russia and Ukraine stretches back for centuries, characterized by a complex and often turbulent history. From the medieval period to modern times, Ukraine has faced numerous instances of Russian dominance and interference, which has shaped its national identity and its ongoing struggle for independence. This historical context is essential to understanding Ukraine's motivations to fight, as it reflects a long-standing resistance to Russian colonialism and imperialism. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Russia began consolidating its control over Ukrainian territories, particularly after the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, which marked the beginning of Ukrainian subordination to the Tsarist empire (Britannica, 2025). Over the centuries, Ukraine's autonomy was eroded, and it became an integral part of the Russian Empire, with many Ukrainians subjected to harsh policies of Russification. The suppression of Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity under Tsarist rule set the stage for future tensions. The most devastating chapter of this colonial history came under Soviet rule, which exacerbated the sense of Russian imperialism. The Holodomor, a man-made famine in the early 1930s, is one of the darkest episodes in Ukrainian history. Millions of Ukrainians perished as a result of Stalin's policies, which sought to enforce collectivization at the cost of the Ukrainian people. This tragedy has left a lasting scar on the collective memory of Ukraine, fueling a deep-seated distrust of Russia and reinforcing the narrative of Ukrainian victimhood under Russian imperialism. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Ukraine's declaration of independence, Russia has continually sought to exert influence over Ukraine, often invoking its imperial past to justify intervention. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its ongoing military actions in eastern Ukraine are seen by many as a continuation of the imperialistic attitude that has defined Russia's relationship with Ukraine for centuries. Ukraine's motivation to fight in the current conflict is deeply rooted in its desire to protect its sovereignty and preserve its cultural and political independence from Russian influence. This struggle is not just a response to Russia's aggression but a continuation of a centuries-long fight for self-determination, dating back to the period of Tsarist colonialism and reinforced by the Soviet era. The ongoing war represents Ukraine's determination to break free from the chains of Russian imperialism and secure its future as an independent, sovereign nation. 3.3. International humanitarian law review of Russia's armed attack in Ukraine After the Russian annexation of Crimea, tensions in relations between Russia and Ukraine continued until February 2022. These tensions began when NATO sought to expand its membership into Eastern Europe by inviting Ukraine to join as a member (Andi Antara Putra & Dantes, 2022). NATO has expressed its commitment to Ukraine's future membership, stating: "We reaffirm that we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met (NATO, 2024b)." This position underscores NATO's openness to Ukraine's membership, contingent upon unanimous agreement among current member states and Ukraine's fulfillment of specified criteria. While NATO has not issued a formal invitation to Ukraine, it acknowledges Ukraine's aspirations and is actively supporting its progress toward potential membership. This support includes enhancing interoperability and implementing democratic and security sector reforms (NATO, 2024a). This represents an escalation of tensions between Russia and Western countries, especially NATO, as Eastern Europe has become a critical arena for competing geopolitical interests. NATO's post-Cold War expansion, which saw the inclusion of former Eastern Bloc countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states, has been interpreted by Russia as a direct encroachment on its sphere of influence and a threat to its security. This tension was further amplified by NATO's 2008 declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members, which Russia perceived as a red line. The strategic importance of Eastern Europe, both as a buffer zone and as a transit corridor for energy resources, adds to the stakes for both NATO and Russia. Russia's aggressive actions, including the 2014 annexation of Crimea and its ongoing involvement in Eastern Ukraine, can be seen as attempts to counterbalance NATO's growing presence in the region. Conversely, NATO's military support to Eastern European nations underscores its commitment to collective defense and the deterrence of Russian aggression, further fueling the geopolitical rivalry. Geopolitical influence and efforts to strengthen military presence in the region are important factors in the dynamics of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Russia's insistence that it will not allow Ukraine to "break away," viewing it as a threat to its interests and security (Mamfaluthy, 2014), raises significant tensions with international law principles, particularly the respect for national sovereignty. The United Nations Charter guarantees every state the right to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, which includes Ukraine's right to determine its domestic and foreign policies without external interference. While Russia argues that Ukraine's potential NATO membership or Western alignment threatens its security, such concerns do not justify actions that violate Ukraine's sovereignty, such as the annexation of Crimea or support for separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Although international law permits states to take measures to protect legitimate security interests, these must align with legal norms and avoid infringing on the sovereignty of other states. Russia's actions contravene these principles, as reaffirmed by UN General Assembly resolutions recognizing Ukraine's territorial integrity. This tension highlights a clash between Russia's realpolitik approach to securing its strategic interests and the international legal obligation to respect the sovereignty and independence of other nations. In Putin's view, all countries that are members of NATO have the full right to organize and protect their territories from all threats, both from within and outside the country (Pradana & Ramadhoan, 2022). Putin's opinion reflects the view that NATO membership by countries surrounding Russia, including Ukraine, is perceived as a threat to Russia's security. This is reflected in concerns over the deployment of NATO military infrastructure near Russia's borders, which could be perceived as a direct threat to Russia's strategic interests. Putin has therefore insisted on taking measures he deems necessary to protect Russia's interests and sovereignty. This has led to increased tensions between Russia and Western countries that support Ukraine's membership in NATO. Russia's response to Finland's NATO membership contrasts sharply with its actions toward Ukraine, mainly due to the differing historical and cultural ties with each country. Finland views its NATO membership primarily as a defensive strategy, while Ukraine's relationship with Russia has deep historical and cultural roots. Finland's strong military, combined with NATO's collective defense principles, serves as a deterrent to Russian aggression, whereas Russia, already heavily engaged in Ukraine, avoids provoking NATO. This difference highlights that Russia's actions toward Ukraine are driven by regional dominance ambitions, rather than NATO expansion. Russia's intervention in Ukraine violates the principle of non-intervention, which is a fundamental tenet of international law. Non-intervention asserts that each state has the right to manage its internal affairs without external interference (Octavia & Husniyah, 2023). Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter emphasizes the importance of peaceful dispute resolution and the avoidance of armed conflict. Russia's actions also contravene the Declaration on Principles of International Law (A/RES/25/2625, 1970), which upholds the national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of states, emphasizing that disputes should be resolved peacefully and without violence (Mahfud, 2015; Rudy, 2011). Furthermore, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice broadens the sources of international humanitarian law (IHL), allowing for inclusion of legal principles recognized by civilized nations, international organizations, and expert opinions, not limited to international treaties (Budisantosa, 2021). This further underscores the importance of respecting IHL and the sovereignty of states in the global legal framework. While the international treaties that are the main foundation of IHL are the Hague Conventionand the Geneva Convention (Pasorong et al., 2023). The Hague Convention regulates the laws of war governing the treatment of individuals and property in armed conflicts, while the Geneva Convention sets minimum standards for the treatment of war victims, including the protection of civilians, prisoners of war, and medical personnel. These two conventions form an important legal framework for safeguarding humanity during armed conflicts and have been the main basis for the formation of further IHL rules. IHL cannot cover all actions in international wars, but parties to armed conflicts are obliged to respect and uphold the basic principles of IHL these include (Danial, 2017). a. The Humanitarian Principle: Demands that actions in armed conflict should take into account the interests of humanity and avoid unnecessary suffering of individuals not involved in the conflict.b. Military Interests: Recognizes that military actions taken should be proportionate to the military objectives to be achieved and should minimize unnecessary losses.c. Proportionality: States that military actions must be in accordance with legitimate military interests and must be proportionate to the threat faced.d. Distinction: Stipulates that parties to a conflict must distinguish between individuals participating in the conflict (military) and those not participating (civilians), as well as between military and non-military objects.e. Prohibition of Unnecessary Suffering: Prohibits acts that cause unnecessary suffering or that are incompatible with legitimate military objectives.f. Separation of Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello: Distinguishes between the law governing the authority to use military force (Ius ad Bellum) and the law governing the behavior of the parties to the conflict (Ius in Bello). Russia's armed attack on Ukraine violated several fundamental principles of international humanitarian law (IHL). First, it breached the principle of state sovereignty by violating Ukraine's territorial integrity and political independence, contravening Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against another state's territorial integrity. Second, the attack violated the principle of distinction, as there have been reports of civilian casualties from Russian military strikes, which should have been targeted at combatants and military objectives. Third, the strikes caused unnecessary suffering to the civilian population and infrastructure, violating the prohibition against unnecessary suffering in IHL. Overall, Russia's actions are considered serious violations of IHL and universally recognized humanitarian principles. 3.4. Foreign fighters in the context of international humanitarian law The conflict in Ukraine has brought attention to the complexities of international law, particularly regarding foreign fighters in armed conflicts. According to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the conflict qualifies as a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC), which involves non-state armed groups like insurgents or separatists against state forces (Brits, 2017; Mehra & Thorley, 2017; Mehra & Thorley, 2022). However, the involvement of Russia complicates this classification, leading some to argue the conflict may be an International Armed Conflict (IAC) governed by the Geneva Conventions and the First Additional Protocol, which set standards for the protection of civilians and prisoners of war (Susetio & Muliawan, 2023). The Second Additional Protocol (APII) further outlines protections for civilians and individuals not directly participating in hostilities, providing essential legal instruments for the Ukraine conflict (Ismail, 2018). Despite the ongoing debate over the conflict's classification, IHL standards, including protections against torture and inhumane treatment, apply. These standards include principles such as proportionality and distinction, aiming to safeguard civilians and regulate military conduct (Gisel et al., 2020; Murray, 2019). The classification of the conflict is crucial in determining the application of IHL, especially regarding civilian protection, and distinguishing between military targets and non-combatants (Diakonia, 2022). The influx of foreign fighters, particularly through the International Territorial Defense Legion initiated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, has further complicated the conflict. Since 2014, thousands of foreign fighters from 55 nations have joined the conflict, which could escalate tensions and potentially violate IHL if human rights abuses occur (Egle E. Murauskaite, 2022; Nigel Walker, 2023). The presence of foreign fighters raises significant questions regarding their legal status and responsibilities within the conflict. The term "Foreign Fighters" lacks a universally accepted definition in international law. The most authoritative definition originates from UN Security Council Resolution 2178, which references "foreign terrorist fighters." A foreign terrorist fighter is defined as an individual who travels to a country other than their own to engage in activities that support terrorism, including (Bramantyo, 2023). a. Committing acts of terrorism, characterized by violence or threats aimed at instilling fear or causing harm to civilians for political objectives.b. Planning or preparing acts of terrorism, such as target surveillance, recruitment, or weapon acquisition.c. Participating directly in acts of terrorism, providing logistical support, or harboring perpetrators.d. Receiving or providing terrorism-related training, which includes the use of weapons, explosives, or guerrilla tactics. The UN Security Council's approach to foreign fighters emphasizes counterterrorism, evident in the focus of Resolution 2178 on their roles in terrorism. However, this counterterrorism perspective has been adopted at the national level by various member states, shaping their responses to foreign fighters. Various definitions of "foreign combatants" have emerged in academic literature, with one prevalent definition describing individuals motivated by ideology, religion, or kinship to leave their country to join an armed conflict abroad (Van Poecke & Cuyckens, 2023). Key aspects of this definition include. 1) Motivation, foreign combatants are driven by ideological, religious, or familial factors rather than personal gain.2) Movement, they travel from their home country to engage in conflict in another nation.3) Active involvement, their participation extends to combat or related activities. The classification of "foreign combatants" specifically refers to individuals joining non-state armed groups in conflicts abroad, often motivated by ideological, religious, or kinship ties (Baker-Beall, 2023). This classification excludes mercenaries or volunteers driven by other factors. While national security and counterterrorism are frequently the focus of discussions about foreign fighters, categorizing them as terrorists does not negate the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which applies equally to all belligerents, including foreign fighters. Their actions in armed conflicts should be evaluated according to IHL principles (Ho, 2019). The term "foreign terrorist fighters" may complicate legal proceedings by focusing primarily on counterterrorism rather than recognizing the nuances of foreign fighter involvement in armed conflicts. These individuals often participate in both non-state armed conflicts and terrorist activities (Karska & Karski, 2016). The distinction between "foreign fighters" and "mercenaries" is also important, as foreign fighters typically join armed groups for ideological reasons, whereas mercenaries are financially motivated (Floress, 2016; Dano, 2022). Russia's use of the term "mercenaries" may be intended to influence public perception and emphasize the economic aspects of their participation.  Article 47 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol (API) to the Geneva Conventions outlines the legal status of foreign fighters and the limitations on applying the Convention's provisions to individuals from non-signatory states. However, Article 47(2) reinforces that human rights protections remain in effect for foreign fighters, and the responsibilities of conflict parties under IHL are unaffected (Gregorious, 2023). As foreign fighter involvement in conflicts like Ukraine increases, challenges arise regarding their legal status and protections under IHL, necessitating careful consideration of both legal and humanitarian aspects in addressing these issues. 3.5. Human rights of foreign fighters in the context of international humanitarian law The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia has resulted in severe material and psychological consequences for both the civilian population and combatants. Amidst this turmoil, the participation of foreign fighters has garnered significant attention, raising questions about their status and human rights within the framework of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Despite their involvement in armed conflict, foreign fighters retain certain rights and protections under IHL, necessitating a thorough assessment of their legal status, actions during the conflict, and involvement in armed groups. Thus, the protection of their human rights must be carefully considered in accordance with the principles of IHL, which guarantee fair and humane treatment for all parties involved. 3.5.1. Concerns regarding due process and human rights violations The recent sentencing of three foreign fighters to death by the Supreme Court of the Donetsk Republic has raised serious concerns about adherence to international legal standards. These sentences were issued after proceedings criticized for being swift and unfair, raising alarms about violations of the right to a fair trial, including access to legal counsel and the right to present a defense. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has previously reported violations in the region, indicating a troubling disregard for internationally recognized human rights norms. In response, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) intervened, directing Russia to halt the use of the death penalty and to respect the rights of foreign fighters. This underscores the critical need to uphold fundamental human rights, even amidst armed conflict, and to ensure that individuals engaged in hostilities receive basic protections recognized by international law. 3.5.2. The issue of citizenship and nationality The citizenship status of foreign fighters in the Ukraine conflict is complex due to varying national legal frameworks and policies regarding participation in foreign armed conflicts. Some countries have enacted laws revoking citizenship for involvement in terrorist activities or foreign conflicts, citing national security concerns, though critics argue these measures often lack transparency and due process, risking arbitrary deprivation of nationality. The revocation of citizenship leaves individuals in a legal limbo, vulnerable to prosecution or ill-treatment in other states. Statelessness, a common outcome of citizenship loss, exacerbates vulnerability by denying individuals access to basic rights like education, healthcare, and employment. This issue has significant implications for international human rights. The UN plays a key role in addressing these challenges by facilitating dialogue, monitoring compliance with international law, and advocating for human rights protections. Regional organizations, such as the EU, are also critical in promoting unified approaches and adherence to human rights standards in the treatment of foreign fighters. 3.5.3. Human rights protections under IHL The Geneva Conventions, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, emphasize the humane treatment of all individuals in conflict, including civilians and those detained. Article 3 requires non-participants in hostilities, such as civilians and prisoners, to be treated humanely, ensuring respect for basic human rights regardless of nationality or political affiliation. In light of citizenship revocation, states involved in armed conflict must assess their obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to avoid human rights violations. Revoking citizenship can undermine protections for prisoners of war (POWs), who are entitled to humane treatment, a fair trial, and protection from torture. Arbitrary revocation of nationality risks violating due process, leaving individuals stateless and vulnerable to ill-treatment. States must ensure that national security policies do not compromise fundamental rights. Upholding human rights is not just a legal requirement but a reflection of a state's commitment to justice. International organizations, such as the United Nations and regional bodies, have a crucial role in monitoring compliance and advocating for the rights of those affected by armed conflict. 3.5.4. Obligations of states and international accountability The right to return is a fundamental principle in international law, safeguarding individuals from arbitrary state actions that could lead to statelessness or human rights violations. This right is especially relevant for foreign fighters, who may face citizenship revocation upon returning from conflict zones, further exacerbating their vulnerabilities. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stresses that states are obligated to investigate war crimes committed by their nationals and ensure accountability. Revoking citizenship and transferring legal responsibility to other states can create a culture of impunity and hinder accountability for war crimes. Denying the right to return can lead to further human rights abuses, including inhumane detention or exposure to violence in conflict zones. Article 12 of the ICCPR affirms that all individuals have the right to return to their own country, emphasizing that this right is not contingent on actions or affiliations. States must avoid arbitrary deprivation of nationality, particularly in conflict contexts, to preserve these rights. Adhering to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights standards is crucial to maintaining trust and accountability within the international community. A balanced approach that considers both security and humanitarian principles is necessary in addressing modern conflicts. 4. Research limitations While this study provides valuable insights into the legal frameworks surrounding foreign fighters in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is important to acknowledge several limitations. First, the study is limited to a normative analysis of IHL, focusing primarily on the legal aspects of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, without delving deeply into the political and social dynamics that also play a significant role in shaping the conflict. Second, the sources of data utilized are predominantly drawn from international legal documents and reports issued by international organizations, which may not fully capture the perspectives of all parties involved, particularly those who are underrepresented in global discourse. Third, while the study adheres to established international legal approaches, it faces challenges in assessing the practical application of IHL in the field, due to difficulties in obtaining sensitive or potentially biased information from diverse sources. Fourth, the research does not specifically address the role of third-party states supporting one of the conflicting parties, a dimension that could significantly complicate the interpretation of IHL. In light of these constraints, it is recommended that future research adopt a more holistic and inclusive approach to explore these complexities in greater depth. 5. Conclusion The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine involves direct military engagements between Russian and Ukrainian forces, along with the participation of pro-Russian separatist groups in eastern Ukraine. Foreign combatants have also become a significant factor on both sides of the conflict. Individuals from various countries have joined the Ukrainian side, either as volunteers or part of organized military units, while Russia has provided support to pro-Russian factions, including involvement of Russian foreign combatants. The legal status of foreign combatants is unclear under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which primarily addresses the rights and obligations of states, military forces, and civilians, leaving ambiguous the status of foreign combatants, whether they act on behalf of non-state armed groups or as independent volunteers. There is a need to avoid misusing terrorism laws that do not differentiate between foreign volunteers, combatants, and mercenaries, as this could undermine the core objectives of IHL, which include ensuring humane conduct in war. IHL's primary goal is to mitigate human suffering during war, not to prevent conflict. It aims to make warfare more humane, ensuring that all combatants, including foreign ones, enjoy the same human rights as nationals. Violations of these rights, such as deprivation of citizenship or the right to life, cannot be justified under any circumstances. As the conflict persists, all parties must respect IHL to safeguard the dignity of individuals and ensure justice and accountability in the conflict. CRediT authorship contribution statementKhoirunnisa Khoirunnisa: Conceptualization. Brian Matthew: Resources. Didi Jubaidi: Conceptualization. Agung Yudhistira Nugroho: Conceptualization.Data availability statementThe data used in this study were obtained from publicly available sources such as the Open Access Library, DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals) and , as indicated in the Data section of the article.Funding statementThis research was supported by a grant from xxxxxxxx which had no role in study design, data collection, analysis, interpretation of results, or writing of this article.Declaration of competing interestThe authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest associated with this publication. No financial, personal, or professional relationships with other individuals or organizations have influenced or could potentially influence the work presented in this manuscript.AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank all those who have provided technical support and valuable input during this research process.Khoirunnisa Khoirunnisa, Brian Matthew, Didi Jubaidi, Agung Yudhistira Nugroho, The Ukraine-Russia conflict: An international humanitarian law review of the involvement of foreign fighters, Social Sciences & Humanities Open, Volume 11, 2025, 101340, ISSN 2590-2911, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.101340.ReferencesAkbar and Sadiawati, 2023, M.N. Akbar, D. Sadiawati, Analysis of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in terms of humanitarian law, Jurnal Ilmiah Mizani: Wacana Hukum, Ekonomi, Dan Keagamaan, 10 (1) (2023), p. 160, 10.29300/mzn.v10i1.10760Alexander, 2023, A. 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