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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Geopolitical tensions have intensified across the Middle East, amplifying the Iran-Israel standoff and reshaping regional power dynamics. Israel, deeply impacted by recent events, has adopted a more aggressive security stance, intensifying efforts to neutralise perceived threats from Iran’s regional network of proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shiite militias. Far from being minor, these dramatic developments reshape the strategic balance between Iran and Israel while considerably limiting Tehran’s options moving forward.  Strengths and Constraints of Iran’s Asymmetric Strategy  Hezbollah remains the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East, meticulously armed and funded for nearly 40 years to indirectly challenge Israel and the US. With around 150,000 missiles and 80,000 fighters, this Lebanese Shiite militia serves as one of Iran’s main spearheads against Israel, providing a strategic foothold in southern Lebanon, and exerting pressure on Israel’s northern border. However, the destruction of nearly half of Hezbollah’s military capabilities over the past year, as reported by Israeli sources, along with the loss of key military and political leaders, is severely altering the balance between Israel and Iran. While Hezbollah has historically been a strategic shield for Iran, it is now fully reliant on the actions—or inactions—of the Iranian leadership.  The dismantling of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities and the disruption of its decision-making apparatus come alongside the crippling of Hamas—another long-time ally of Tehran in its struggle against Israel. After nearly a year of conflict with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas is facing existential challenges, and its leaders, including figures like Yahya Sinwar, have had their ability to act severely weakened.   It would be premature to consider an end to Hamas and Hezbollah. Both groups remain key players in the conflict with Israel despite heavy airstrikes on their command-and-control centers. Despite recent setbacks, they continue receiving support from Iran and other allies, while their actions in Gaza and the Galilee persist. But, although these two organisations remain active, and their ability to recover shouldn’t be underestimated, their operational strength and impact on the balance of power with Israel have been significantly weakened. This, in turn, reduces the short-term influence of their Iranian sponsor in the Levant.   The limits of ballistic deterrence and the nuclear temptation  The neutralisation of Hezbollah and Hamas has significantly reduced the Islamic Republic of Iran’s room for maneuver, and its leaders are faced with choices that, as many analysts observe, all carry major disadvantages.  The ballistic confrontation between Iran and Israel has clearly highlighted the limitations of conventional military capabilities for Tehran. On 13-14 April, Iran launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for the destruction of an annex of its embassy in Damascus. On 1 October, Tehran launched a new salvo of missiles in what it called Operation True Promise Two, in response to the elimination of key Iranian-backed leaders like Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah.   In both cases, the Iranian attacks were aimed at conveying resolve to Israel, reestablishing deterrence, and reassuring the various components of the “Axis of Resistance,” increasingly concerned about Iran’s relative idleness. Each time, however, Israel’s air defence system, supported by its American ally, intercepted the vast majority of Iranian projectiles. During the April exchange of fire, the IDF responded by targeting an airbase in Isfahan tasked with safeguarding the Natanz nuclear facility, highlighting Iran’s vulnerabilities and limitations in its ballistic missile defences.  Given the limitations of its ballistic shield and the diminished potential of its proxy network, Iranian political and military leaders are increasingly aware that these resources are not enough for protecting the Islamic regime. Confronted with Israel’s strategy to contain Iran by dismantling its asymmetric warfare capabilities, they recognise a significant decline in terms of strategic depth. Acknowledging this mounting pressure, they are prompted to seek alternative solutions to compensate for these losses. Consequently, they are rationally driven to fortify the security of their Iranian stronghold by enhancing their nuclear deterrent capabilities.  Since 7 October 2023, the Islamic regime has significantly accelerated its nuclear activities, enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels. By the end of 2023, Iran was producing about nine kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent monthly, raising concerns due to its rapid potential for further enrichment. Despite earlier pauses in production, the rate has surged in response to heightened geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the US, and allies have criticised this acceleration. This summer, Kamal Kharrazi, a close aide to Iran’s Supreme Leader, raised international concerns by mentioning a potential “change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine.”  The Eastern Pivot and Its Drawbacks  However, with no indication that Iran will be able to acquire an effective nuclear umbrella in the short term, the mullahs and the Guardians are compelled to consider alternative solutions. On the diplomatic front, Iranian leaders are faced with two equally unsatisfactory options due to their negative implications for Iranian sovereignty. The first possibility would be to seek a reconciliation with the West. Tasked with embodying this scenario, President Massoud Pezechkian recently expressed Tehran’s desire to renew ties with liberal democracies and reopen negotiations over their nuclear dispute. However, significant mistrust and numerous obstacles still hinder the warming of relations, especially if a new Republican administration takes office in Washington.  The alternative path, already widely explored by Tehran, is to move forward with the so-called “Look East” doctrine. In fact, Tehran has continuously sought to strengthen its ties with Beijing and Moscow in recent years. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a comprehensive economic and security agreement, marking a significant step towards deeper cooperation. In September 2021, Iran began its accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional bloc led by Russia and China. Since February 2022, Iran has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has even provided logistical and military support to Moscow.   At the September 2022 SCO summit, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping welcomed the Islamic Republic, highlighting the regime’s growing ties within a bloc opposing Western influence. In January 2023, Iran became a full BRICS member, and, recently, Tehran and Moscow have enhanced their military collaboration, raising concerns about potential nuclear cooperation. Nonetheless, this pivot toward the Eastern bloc could threaten Iranian sovereignty by tying the regime’s future more closely to that of Russia and China, undermining Iranian nationalism and the aspiration to preserve independence.  The Islamic regime teetering on the brink of profound transformation  Faced with a drastic reduction in its international geopolitical room for maneuver, the Islamic Republic is also going through a serious economic crisis while facing a growing questioning of its internal political legitimacy. In all respects, the regime is at a crossroads; a decisive turning point that could go so far as to destabilise its political foundations.   In the past, showing extraordinary resilience, Tehran has always managed to get out of trouble by maintaining the course of its multifaceted policy conducted on all fronts and by all available means. Placed in a position of military and economic inferiority, the Iranian outsider has adopted an asymmetrical approach with considerable success by striving to avoid frontal combat and by striking blows where it was not expected. In this, the Iran of the mullahs and the guardians has managed, to borrow Henry Kissinger’s words, to “win by not losing.”  The capacity of Islamist leaders to navigate significant challenges and uphold their once unchallenged grip on the country now seems to be wavering. Increasing threats, coupled with a narrowing of strategic options, have placed the regime in a precarious position. The tactics and remedies that previously aided in maintaining the system’s stability no longer appear adequate to ensure the longevity of the political and ideological regime established in 1979.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s airstrikes of Oct. 26, 2024 – which hit around 20 military targets in Iran, Iraq and Syria – had been anticipated for weeks. Indeed, the operation followed a promise from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to retaliate for an earlier ballistic missile attack by Tehran in early October. The move also follows a pattern that has seen Iran and Israel take turns to up the ante in what was for a long time a “shadow war,” but which has has now developed into direct confrontation. These tit-for-tat attacks prompted widespread fears that the whole region was poised to enter a more escalatory phase. But, counterintuitive though it may seem, I believe that the latest Israeli strikes may actually have defused tensions. To understand why, it is worth analyzing the nature and scale of the Israeli operation, as well as the likely stance of decision-makers in Israel, Iran and the United States in the aftermath of the attack. A calibrated attack by Israel The October air assault by Iran was itself retaliation for a series of Israeli operations against Iran’s proxy group Hezbollah. These included the assassination of a high-ranking Hamas official in Tehran on the eve of the inauguration of Iran’s new president in July and the killing of Hezbollah’s leader in late September. Similarly, an earlier air assault on Israeli targets in April by Tehran was in response to Israeli provocations this spring – including a strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, on April 1 that killed two senior military officers. Many observers anticipated, or feared, an Israeli response to Iran’s October missile and drone attack to be heavy, and punishing – Israel certainly has the military capability to do so. But rather than target vital infrastructure in Iran or the country’s nuclear facilities, Israel instead opted for “precise and targeted” strikes on the Islamic Republic’s air defense and missile capabilities. The somewhat limited scope of the Israeli operations suggests that the strike was designed to send a strong message to Iran’s supreme leader and Iranian military commanders. In essence, Israel was signaling that it has the capability to strike at the heart of Iran, while holding back from a full-throttled attack that would have had further damaged Iran’s fragile economy. While it will take time for a full assessment of the effectiveness of Israel’s strikes to emerge, early indications suggest that they succeeded in revealing weaknesses in Iran’s overall security. These weaknesses that could be further exploited against other more important targets, such as oil and gas production facilities or even nuclear power sites, should Iran or its partners in the so-called “axis of resistance” choose to retaliate. A cautious response in Iran Despite the apparent success of Israel’s attacks against a wide range of targets, statements from Iranian leaders suggest the operational impact was limited. An Iranian Foreign Ministry statement condemned the attack, noting that Iran “had a right to self defense.” But at the same it added that Iran would “uphold its commitments for regional peace and stability.” Reading into those words, it suggests to me that Iran is not immediately seeking to retaliate and escalate tensions further. Of course, that could change. Further messages by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini or Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani may give a clearer indication whether Iran will seek to retaliate, and how. But with Iran well-aware of the impact that escalation – and the potential for more U.S.-led sanctions and heightened support for Israel – would have on its ailing economy, it may well calculate that a return to the pre-escalation status quo with Israel is in its interests. In Washington, a wary White House A return to the shadow war between Israel and Iran – as opposed to open warfare – would no doubt be welcomed in Washington. Since the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the Biden administration has been caught between competing obligations and concerns. This has included supporting longstanding ally Israel, while not alienating friendly Arab governments and trying to avoid conflict creep into all out war in the region. Meanwhile, in an election year, the Democratic ticket in particular is trying to balance its support for a largely pro-Israel Jewish voting block with a need not to offend potentially important Muslim votes in key states, nor a more pro-Palestinian youth vote. Escalation of conflict in the region does nothing to help the White House in these respects. Yet President Joe Biden’s decades-long relationship with Netanyahu has not led to outcomes that the administration has sought. Washington has not succeeded in pushing its ally toward a ceasefire in Gaza, nor a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon. And with the U.S. election looming on Nov. 5, elevated tensions in the Middle East on various fronts could impact how voters perceive Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump — especially in the battleground state of Michigan, where the Democratic ticket may lose votes among Arab and Muslim Americans angered over the Biden administration’s perceived pro-Israel stance. Threading the needle? Predicting what will happen next in the Middle East has escaped the most seasoned analysts. It may take days, weeks or even months to assess whether this latest airstrike by Israel will lead to a further escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel – or whether a more de-escalatory dynamic settles over the region. But there are good reasons to believe that decision-makers in Iran, Israel and the U.S. know that more escalation is in no one’s interests. And the latest salvo may have just done enough to satisfy Israel, while providing cover for Tehran to say that there is no need to return fire in kind.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Hamas will soon begin the process of deciding who will next head the militant Palestinian organization following the Oct. 16, 2024, killing of former leader Yahya Sinwar – but the task won’t be easy, or quick. What makes his replacement as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau a hard one is that since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack – for which, Sinwar was seen as the main architect – Israel has killed many of the senior political and military commanders that would be in line to replace him, or at least be tasked with determining the future direction of Hamas. Just two months before Sinwar’s death, his predecessor in the role, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran, purportedly in an Israeli operation. Meanwhile, Hamas’ military chief, Mohammed Deif, was killed in July and Saleh Arouri, a senior Hamas official and deputy of Haniyeh, was earlier killed in a Beirut drone strike. As an expert on Palestinian politics, I believe the death of Sinwar will leave a vacuum in Hamas that will likely last for many months, if not years. The question is whether the group eventually opts for a leader who continues Sinwar’s hard-line legacy or tries to moderate Hamas’ approach. Sinwar’s legacy Sinwar’s uncompromising stance has shaped not only Hamas but also the Palestinian cause. Born and raised in the Gazan refugee camp Khan Younis, Sinwar joined Hamas in the early days of the organization, which was established in 1987. He quickly rose through the ranks and was responsible for establishing Majd, a security agency within the military wing of Hamas responsible for apprehending and executing Palestinian collaborators with Israel. Sinwar confessed to Israeli interrogators to have killed and buried 12 suspected collaborators – earning him a life sentence in Israeli jail. He served 22 years before being released in a prisoner-swap deal in 2011, which also saw the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. A few years later, he made it to the top of Hamas, serving as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau in Gaza since 2017. After Haniyeh’s assassination in late July, 2024, Sinwar assumed overall leadership. Throughout, Sinwar has been a proponent of Hamas’ hard-line stance on Israel – an approach that won him respect within the organization. Less than a year after assuming power in Gaza, Sinwar endorsed the “Great March of Return and Breaking the Siege” protests of March 2018 along Israel-Gaza borders. The demonstrations – during which Israeli troops shot dead scores of Palestinian protesters – succeeded in galvanizing international support for the Palestinian cause. The protests may have also contributed to Israel’s decision in August of that year to allow Qatar to begin making monthly payments of millions of dollars to Hamas and Gaza in an attempt to defuse and de-escalate tensions. More concessions came as Israel tried to satisfy Sinwar and avoid the further escalation of unrest in Gaza, including allowing Gazan laborers to work in Israel for the first time since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005. But Sinwar had less success in getting Israel to agree to releasing the fellow Hamas members he had left behind in Israeli jails and had vowed to get out. He tried many times to strike a deal for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and two civilians, but Israel was not interested. That failure probably contributed to Hamas’ decision to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. How Hamas reacts to blows The killing of Sinwar has weakened Hamas, but Hamas as an idea and an ideology is harder to kill. Israel knows this. In March 2004, an Israeli missile struck and killed Hamas’ founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin; a month later, his successor Abdel Aziz Rantisi was also killed. But those deaths did not weaken Hamas. On the contrary, the organization grew more radical. A younger and more defiant leadership took over the organization, which fought Israel repeatedly from 2008 onward, culminating int the Oct. 7 attacks. Hamas’ reaction to that double blow may give an insight into the current decision-making process now. The killing of Yassin was an opportunity for Hamas to revise its military tactics against Israel – which then mainly consisted of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. But in the end, Hamas vowed to continue the violent struggle against Israel. Moderation or radicalization? Hamas is again at a crossroad. It is weakened, alienated from Arab moderate governments and increasingly unpopular among Gazans. But throughout the last year of conflict it has remained defiant. Footage of an injured Sinwar, fighting to the last and trying to down an Israeli drone with a stick, has only added to his legacy, making him a legend to many supporters. The new leadership will have to chose between continuing down the road of radicalization that Sinwar represented or opting for moderation. But Israel is not making that second option any easier. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s only offer to Hamas is total surrender – he has not left the group any face-saving exit. So it seems likely that Hamas will choose to continue the fight. As such, one of the most likely candidates for post-Sinwar leadership of Hamas is Khalil al-Hayya, a Palestinian politician who has served as the deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau since August 2024. Al-Hayya is known for his hawkish attitude toward the idea of Hamas’ reconciliation with rival Palestinian group Fatah, and his hawkish statements on Israel. After Sinwar’s death, he vowed to continue the fight against Israel, an indication that the spirit of Sinwar will continue to guide Palestinian resistance in the coming years. His main challenger for the role of leader is Khaled Mashaal, who served as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau from 1996 to 2017 and currently serves as its chairman in exile. Mashaal, who has a large network of regional and international allies, is considered a more moderate option. He was responsible for drafting Hamas’ 2017 manifesto – seen as a departure from the earlier, more radical and blatantly antisemitic 1988 charter. Collective leadership: Room for maneuver? But a decision on who will assume the role of leader is not expected immediately. Hamas appears more inclined toward collective leadership until scheduled elections in March 2025, if conditions permit. In the meantime, a five-member committee that was formed in August following the assassination of Haniyeh will take over decision-making. The committee is tasked with “governing the movement during the war and exceptional circumstances, as well as its future plans,” and the new committee is authorized to “make strategic decisions,” according to Hamas sources who spoke to Agence France-Presse reporters. Collective leadership of this sort would seemingly indicate that at present Hamas sees no single person as being able to fill the vacuum left by Sinwar. It would also give Hamas potentially more room to maneuver regarding negotiations with Israel and regional players, as some members of the committee are seen as acceptable faces to moderate Arab governments. Collective leadership also provides Hamas with a survival mechanism, making it harder for Israel to claim the type of success it has so far achieved in assassinating named Hamas “leaders.” No doubt, Israel has weakened Hamas with this strategy – notably with the killing of Sinwar. And while the assassination of leading Hamas figures does not constitute “total victory” over the group, as Israel wants, it does make the choice in choosing the next leader that much harder for Hamas.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction In 2010, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was established and ratified in 2011, with membership expanding to 33 countries. According to the organization’s statements, its aims include “deepening the integration of Latin American countries, promoting international peace, and respecting human rights.” Additionally, there is an implicit ambition among several members to reduce the political and economic influence of the US in the region, as suggested by the context of some of the organization’s statements.[2] With a total population of about 635 million people, covering an area of about 22 million km², and accounting for 17% of the United Nations (UN) voting power, their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis for 2023 is approximately $12.8 trillion, equivalent to 7.8% of the world’s GDP. However, four of the 33 countries contribute more than $9.6 trillion, or about 75% of the GDP. These four countries also comprise 68% of the total population of the regional group, as shown in the following table:[3]   CELAC’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood The Latin American and Caribbean region has the highest percentage of leftist political regimes in the world. Among the 19 most significant countries in the region, 12 are now run by left-wing governments, accounting for 63% of the total. These leftist-led countries represent 92% of the region’s people and 90% of its GDP.[4] This demographic and economic dominance is clearly reflected in CELAC’s stance on two interconnected issues: the position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood, marked by varying degrees of rejection of Israeli policy, and a relative independence from US influence in the region. First: CELAC’s Stance as a Political Bloc on Operation al-Aqsa Flood[5] At the eighth CELAC summit, held in March 2024 in Kingstown, the capital of St.Vincent and the Grenadines, a lack of consensus emerged among the members regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Despite the compromise language in the conference statement, 27 countries endorsed it while 6 countries opposed it.[6] The resolution included the following points:[7] a. Condemning the killing of civilians on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides and emphasizing the need to protect civilians in accordance with international law.b. Supporting the UN General Assembly call for a ceasefire.c. Demanding the immediate and unconditional release of hostages.d. Urging the delivery of humanitarian aid to the affected areas in the Gaza Strip (GS).e. Calling for a peaceful solution based on the two-state solution. Second: Stances of the Central States within CELAC[8] Countries with left-leaning governments are often the most vocal in supporting the Palestine issue, as reflected in their leaders’ statements. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro slammed “the international position regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza,” and pointed out that “international justice exists only to protect the interests of American, European, and Western imperialism, in order to conceal the massacres committed against Palestinian families.” Brazilian President Lula da Silva aligned with this view, calling on “the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to set aside their differences and put an end to the genocide in Gaza.” He reiterated his call for an immediate ceasefire, as outlined in the CELAC statement from the 8th Congress. Additionally, he noted Brazil’s efforts to support UN Security Council resolutions aimed at halting the fighting in GS, which were vetoed by the US. Colombian President Gustavo Petro criticized both the United States and Europe for supporting “Israel in committing genocide against the Palestinians,” with similar sentiments expressed by Nicaragua. Generally, the positions of CELAC countries, particularly the major powers, can be categorized into three distinct stances, as illustrated in the table below:[9]   1. Countries closest to the Israeli position: This group varies in their level of support for Israel, as illustrated by the following indicators: a. The Salvadoran stance is notably one of the most vehement against the Palestinians, despite President Nayib Bukele being a Christian of Palestinian descent who calls for the “demise of the Palestinian resistance.” This position aligns closely with that of Paraguay, one of the few countries to label the Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” and announce plans to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Paraguay’s stance on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is marked by a consistent lack of condemnation at the UN and frequent abstentions from voting on resolutions that support Palestinian rights. b. The Jewish minority in Argentina plays a significant role in influencing the government. With a population of between 300–400 thousand, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. The attacks on Jewish institutions in Argentina during 1992–1994, which were linked to Iran—a key supporter of Palestinian resistance—also influenced the government’s stance, despite opposition from the pro-Palestinian Worker’s Left Front – Unity party. c. Guatemala, with a population of about 18 million, was the first Latin American country to move its embassy to Jerusalem. It is also one of the centers of gravity for Anglican Christianity, which tends to be more sympathetic to Zionism. 2. Countries that have adopted a middle ground, attempting to balance support for and opposition to both sides of the conflict: a. Both Mexico and Brazil criticized the attack on Israel on 7/10/2023, but strongly condemned the Israeli response. b. In the diplomacy of Brazil and Mexico, a role reversal was observed. The presidencies of both countries adopted more articulate positions than their foreign ministries, where traditional diplomatic language prevailed. c. Mexico has not severed ties with Israel; however, its representatives at the UN have sharply criticized the Israeli government. d. Ecuador can be included in this group due to its effort to mediate peace between the Palestinian resistance and Israel by sending Ecuadorian Vice President Verónica Abad in October 2023. Additionally, Ecuador has backed Palestine’s bid for full membership in both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, though it has explicitly condemned the resistance attack that occurred in October 2023. 3. Countries that support Palestinian rights are typically left-leaning and their policies often exhibit the following characteristics: a. Nicaragua unequivocally supported the Palestinian position and even received some Palestinian leaders after the war. b. Colombia has taken a definitive stance in strong support of Palestine. It is one of the most vocal critics of Israeli policies, culminating in its decision to sever diplomatic ties with Israel. Colombian President Gustavo Petro has sharply condemned Israeli actions in Gaza, labeling them as “genocide.” It is important to note that Colombia’s position is significant given its historical and strategic ties with Israel. Although Colombia relies on Israeli military equipment for combating armed opposition and drug trafficking groups, and there has been a free trade agreement between the two countries since 2020, as well as various agreements since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957, trade data shows a 53% decline in trade between Israel and Colombia following the recent conflict, compared to 2022. c. The Cuban and Venezuelan position was a continuation of their traditional support for the Palestinian right, and Cuba justified the Palestinian attack on 7/10/2023 as a reaction to 75 years of oppression of the Palestinians. d. Bolivia did not condemn the Palestinian attack in October, instead focusing its statements on de-escalating the conflict between the two sides. However, the lack of Israeli response to its calls led Bolivia to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Additionally, Bolivia supported South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and endorsed a case before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Colombia and Belize have also cut ties with Israel. Notably, during the last week of June 2024, Bolivia experienced a failed coup attempt, raising suspicions that the US and Israel may have been involved as retaliation for Bolivia’s clear stance on the Gaza war.[10] e. The significant presence of the Palestinian community in Chile, the largest in Latin America with nearly half a million having Palestinian roots, has notably influenced Chilean politics. This influence is reflected in the Chilean Senate’s Human Rights Commission decision to ban companies from importing goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. A US State Department official characterized this decision as one that unfairly singles out Israel.[11] f. Honduras has exhibited a decrease in its support for Israel following Israeli attacks on civilians, leading the government to summon the Israeli ambassador to protest these actions. In 2021, Honduras was one of the first countries to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, joining Guatemala and Paraguay, which had made similar moves in 2018. However, Guatemala reversed its decision and returned its embassy to Tel Aviv shortly thereafter. The shift in Honduras’ stance can be attributed to the change in leadership from a right-wing to a left-wing administration after Xiomara Castro assumed the presidency in 2022. g. Since the beginning of the war, Latin American countries’ positions in support of Palestine have evolved at the diplomatic level in particular, and have begun cutting ties and recalling ambassadors from Israel, which was initiated by Chile, Colombia, and Honduras, while Bolivia and Belize cut diplomatic ties with Israel completely. Bolivia was one of the five countries that referred the situation in GS to the ICC for investigation in November 2023. In the referral, Bolivia cites evidence of crimes against Palestinians including murder, torture, inhumane treatment, persecution, apartheid, forced displacement, and the destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage. Mexico and Chile did the same in January 2024, whereas Brazil’s and Colombia’s foreign ministries issued statements supporting South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICJ. The Brazilian position has been the leading one, which has strained relations between Brazil and Israel despite efforts by the Brazilian Israelite Confederation (CONIB) to mend fences. However, the Brazilian president’s remarks that “what is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people hasn’t happened at any other moment in history” except one: “When Hitler decided to kill the Jews,”[12] combined with the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s endorsement of European countries’ recognition of Palestine as a state and support for a two-state solution, have solidified Brazil’s stance against Israeli policies. CELAC’s Vote at the UN A review of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions reveals that the countries most resistant to supporting resolutions favoring Palestinian demands are Guatemala, Paraguay and Argentina, followed by Haiti, Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador. These countries often either oppose or abstain from voting. Argentina, with a population of nearly 46 million, is the most significant ally of Israeli policy. This is followed by Guatemala with about 18 million people, Paraguay with around 7 million, Panama with 4.5 million and Uruguay, with approximately 3.5 million people. Argentina ranks third among CELAC countries in terms of GDP and fourth in terms of population. Argentina’s stance on Palestinian rights reflects the political shift introduced by President Javier Milei, who aims to align Argentina more closely with the Western capitalist bloc through his foreign policy.[13] Argentina did not support the General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire in December 2023 and opposed the resolution to grant Palestine full membership in the UN. The Argentine position can be attributed to the following reasons:[14] a. President Javier Milei’s religious inclination towards Judaism was evident in his prayers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in 2021, accompanied by Rabbi Shimon Axel Wahnish, who was later appointed as Argentine ambassador to Israel. Although the Argentine president is a Catholic Christian, some sources suggest he is considering converting to Judaism. However, other sources claim that President Milei’s display of Jewish faith is a way to express repentance and counter accusations that he concealed his support for a Nazi sympathizer. b. The Argentine president’s intention to strengthen ties with the Jewish minority in Argentina, as previously mentioned, faced opposition from nearly four thousand Argentine Jewish intellectuals, who voiced concern over Milei’s “political use of Judaism.” This concern was highlighted when he became one of the first world leaders to visit Israel after the war erupted, offering high praise for Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies and pledging to move Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Interestingly, the Argentine president demonstrated a clear bias towards Israel when he cut his state visit to Denmark short, following the Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024, which was in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. President Meli then convened a crisis committee alongside the Israeli ambassador to Argentina and his security minister, who began criticizing the positions of other Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Chile, describing them as “Islamic hotbeds” and accusing them of hosting Hezbollah elements. He also criticized the defense agreement Iran concluded with Bolivia in July 2023. c. Milei, a university economics professor, bases his economic ideology on far-right principles and anti-leftist Peronism in Argentina, making him the most eager to strengthen the relationship with the US and, consequently, with Israel. d. It is noted that trade relations between Israel and Argentina are escalating significantly. Israeli exports to Argentina increased annually by 15.2% from 2017 to the end of 2022, reaching $156 million in 2022. Similarly, Argentine exports to Israel increased annually by 25.2%, reaching $200 million in 2022. Third: Trends in Public Opinion in CELAC Countries Quantitative studies on access to information and data from various sources show that Latin American countries lead the world in relying on social media for obtaining and sharing information. This trend has influenced Israel’s public image in the region.[15] Public opinion polls in Latin America reveal that approval of the way US President Joe Biden’s is dealing with the GS war is modest. A survey of six major Latin American countries showed the following results:[16]   The approval rate with Biden’s GS war policy in six countries is notably low, at around 26%. In contrast, the same survey indicates that the disapproval in these countries is more than double the approval rate, reaching approximately 57%. Meanwhile, the people of CELAC countries expressed their solidarity with Palestine after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This solidarity was evident in demonstrations involving former presidents, civil society organizations, popular sectors, football associations, artists and universities, particularly in Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina, etc. Conclusion The “instability” in political orientations towards international issues is a key feature of Latin American countries’ policies, largely due to the frequent shifts in political regimes and the consequent changes. In analyzing the positions of Latin American countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict, four factors seem to be the most significant in shaping this relationship:[17] 1. The political shifts between leftist and rightist regimes, whether due to coups or presidential elections, often characterize these countries as “unstable.” This is particularly evident in major countries within this group, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia. This instability is reflected in their stances on the Arab-Israeli conflict: leftist regimes typically support Palestine, while rightist ones back Israel. 2. The positions of these countries on Israel are notably influenced by US policies. Some countries align with the US stance to avoid potential pressure, a pattern observable since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. 3. A growing trend among Catholic Christians toward Anglicanism, which shares a closer religious alignment with the Israeli position. 4. Israeli presence in the technological sector of the Latin American economy is significant. In major Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, more than 450 Israeli companies are active in this industry. The data we have discussed highlight the need for resistance forces to recognize the significance of this region in the following ways: 1. Despite a noticeable division among Latin American countries in their responses to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath, the balance of support leans considerably toward the resistance. This is due to the increasing leftist inclination in the region, particularly in its major countries. Demonstrations in support of Palestine have occurred in Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Peru and Chile. 2. Cutting ties with Israel, recalling ambassadors, or participating in cases against it in the ICJ and the ICC by Latin American countries is perhaps the most significant in terms of political impact. This development requires follow-up, including providing these countries with relevant information and support to reinforce this trend. 3. Despite their Anglican background, public opinion trends in these countries reveal a strong sympathy for Palestinian suffering, which is more than twice as significant as the sympathy for Israel. This is evident from the approval rates toward President Biden’s pro-Israel policies. These findings suggest the need for engaging with leftist forces in the region based on shared libertarian values. 4. Comparing the trade between Latin American and Israel, which was $6 billion in 2022, to the trade with Arab countries, the trade volume with the Gulf countries alone is more than three times greater than that with Israel. However, the political influence of these trade relations with the Arab world remains relatively modest.[18] 5. Arab and Palestinian diplomacy should focus on four Latin American countries-Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia—due to their significant political, economic and demographic influence in the international arena. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals. [2] CELAC/ Zone of Peace: “A key step to countering the globalization of militarism” – UN Expert, site of The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3/2/2014, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2014/02/celac-zone-peace-key-step-countering-globalization-militarism-un-expert [3] World Economic Outlook Database: October 2023, site of International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October/weo-report?c=311,213,314,313,316,339,218,223,228,233,238,321,243,248,253,328,258,336,2; GDP, PPP (current international $) – Latin America & Caribbean, site of World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=ZJ; and List of Latin American and Caribbean countries by GDP (PPP), site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_American_and_Caribbean_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)#cite_note-1 [4] Latin America’s left-wing experiment is a warning to the world, site of The Economist newspaper, 18/5/2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/05/18/latin-americas-left-wing-experiment-is-a-warning-to-the-world [5] For a historical overview of Israel’s relations with Latin America, see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Academic Paper: Israeli Relations with Latin America, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/4/2021, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2021/04/05/academic-paper-israeli-relations-with-latin-america/ [6] Estimates vary, but the number of signatories is likely to be 27, see CELAC member states divided over Israel-Gaza war stance, site of SEARCHLIGHT, 5/3/2024, https://www.searchlight.vc/front-page/2024/03/05/celac-member-states-divided-israel-gaza-war-stance; and Brazil, 23 other Celac countries call for immediate ceasefire in Gaza, site of Agencia Brasil, 4/3/2024, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2024-03/brazil-23-other-celac-countries-call-immediate-ceasefire-gaza [7] CELAC summit fails to take unanimous position on Gaza, site of iWitness News, 2/3/2024, https://www.iwnsvg.com/2024/03/02/celac-summit-fails-to-take-unanimous-position-on-gaza [8] Latin American peace, anti-imperialism, and Gaza at the heart of CELAC, site of Al Mayadeen English, 1/3/2024, https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/latin-american-peace–anti-imperialism–and-gaza-at-the-hear; Oliver Stuenkel, The Israel-Hamas War Is Inflaming Polarization in Latin America, site of Americas Quarterly (AQ), 16/11/2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-israel-hamas-war-is-inflaming-polarization-in-latin-america; Ecuador VP says she will go to Israel amid spat with president, Reuters News Agency, 28/11/2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ecuador-vp-says-she-will-go-israel-amid-spat-with-president-2023-11-28; and At CELAC, Lula extols the potential of Latin Americans and Caribbeans as an integrated bloc, site of Planalto, 5/3/2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/03/at-celac-lula-extols-the-potential-of-latin-americans-and-caribbeans-as-an-integrated-bloc [9] For detailed information on the positions of CELAC countries, either individually or as a bloc, please refer to the following references, see Rogelio Núñez Castellano and Carlos Malamud, Latin America and the Gaza crisis, site of The Elcano Royal Institute, 24/11/2023, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-and-the-gaza-crisis; Enrique Reina (@EnriqueReinaHN), site of X (Twitter), 3/11/2023, 10:01, https://x.com/EnriqueReinaHN/status/1720531624289575107; Brazil’s president withdraws his country’s ambassador to Israel after criticizing the war in Gaza, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-israel-ambassador-withdrawn-af9d295d989a86c4fcd8ca4531350f42; Colombia breaks diplomatic ties with Israel but its military relies on key Israeli-built equipment, AP, 3/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/colombia-israel-diplomatic-ties-military-equipment-0c04009ccfc6110e20ee358403509500; President Milei’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension in Argentina and beyond, AP, 3/6/2024, https://apnews.com/article/milei-judaism-hezbollah-israel-hamas-war-netanyahu-d8831369a6bc8a96205d4080d2b2045b; Argentina demands that Bolivia explain its new defense agreement with Iran, AP, 25/7/2023, https://apnews.com/article/argentina-bolivia-iran-defense-mou-2cb8c5917fdb6d3e01af4c67af969797; Israel/ Argentina, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg; Latin America divided and nuanced on Israel-Hamas conflict, site of Buenos Aires Times, 1/11/2023, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/latin-america-divided-and-nuanced-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict.phtml; Marta Tawil Kuri, Perspectives from the Global South: Latin America’s Fragmented Approach to Palestine, site of Arab reform initiative (ARI), 15/12/2023, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/perspectives-from-the-global-south-latin-americas-fragmented-approach-to-palestine; IntelBrief: Leaders in Latin America Speak Loudly on Gaza, site of The Soufan Center (TSC), 1/3/2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-1; Honduran president in Israel for opening of Jerusalem embassy, site of i24NEWS, 24/6/2021, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/1624517565-honduran-president-in-israel-for-opening-of-jerusalem-embassy; Angeline Montoya, In Honduras, the mixed track record of President Xiomara Castro, site of Le Monde, 10/2/2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/10/in-honduras-the-mixed-track-record-of-president-xiomara-castro_6015218_4.html; Latin America countries hold rallies in support of Palestine, site of Anadolu Agency (AA), 4/3/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/latin-america-countries-hold-rallies-in-support-of-palestine/3154305; Latin America: Demonstrations expressing support for Palestinians scheduled in several regional cities Oct. 20-22, site of Crisis24, 20/10/2023, https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/10/latin-america-demonstrations-expressing-support-for-palestinians-scheduled-in-several-regional-cities-oct-20-22; Gaza solidarity sweeps across Latin America, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 23/10/2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231023-gaza-solidarity-sweeps-across-latin-america; Alejandro Santos Cid, University Gaza solidarity protests extend to Mexico: ‘We are urgently calling for an end to genocide’, site of EL PAÍS, 4/5/2024, https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-05-04/university-gaza-solidarity-protests-extend-to-mexico-we-are-urgently-calling-for-an-end-to-genocide.html; site of PRIMICIAS, 7/10/2023, https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/ecuador-condena-ataque-hamas-israel (in Spanish) [10] See Lithium, severing ties with Israel, or rapprochement with Russia? What is the secret to the failed Bolivian coup?, site of RT, 28/6/2024, https://arabic.rt.com/world/1578053- الليثيوم-غزة-أم-موسكو-أيهم-كلمة-السر-في-الانقلاب-البوليفي-الفاشل/; and Türkiye and Bolivia: Experiences of Resisting Coups in a Changing World, site of Turk Press, 29/6//2024, https://www.turkpress.co/node/102003 [11] Patricia Garip, What Does Latin America Think About the Israel-Hamas War?, site of Foreign Policy, 29/1/2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/29/israel-hamas-gaza-war-latin-america-chile-argentina-colombia-mexico-genocide/ [12] Lazar Berman, Israel livid as Brazil’s Lula says Israel like ‘Hitler,’ committing genocide in Gaza, site of Times of Israel, 18/2/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-livid-as-brazils-lula-says-israel-like-hitler-committing-genocide-in-gaza/ [13] Argentina shifts historic position on Palestine as UN member state, Buenos Aires Times, 10/5/2024, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-shifts-historic-position-on-palestine-asun-member-state.phtml [14] AP and TOI STAFF, Argentinian president’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension, Times of Israel, 3/6/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/argentinian-presidents-surprising-devotion-to-judaism-and-israel-provokes-tension/; Argentina/ Israel, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/arg/partner/isr; and Israel/ Argentina, OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg [15] 4 Trends Among Latin American Internet Users That Will Impact the Market in 2022, site of Americas Market Intelligence (AMI), 9/1/2022, https://americasmi.com/insights/trends-latin-american-internet-users-marketing/#:~:text=In%20Latin%20America%2C%2083%25%20to,websites%2C%20broken%20down%20by%20country; and Annie Pforzheimer, Latin American Views on the Gaza War Are in Flux, site of The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune journal, November 2023, https://jstribune.com/pforzheimer-latin-american-views-on-the-gaza-war-are-in-flux [16] Survey conducted in Spring 2024, see Majorities disapprove of the way Biden is dealing with the Israel-Hamas war, site of Pew Research Center, 10/6/2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/11/how-well-is-biden-handling-international-issues/gap_2024-06-11_us-image-2024_5_06 [17]Gian Luca Gardini (ed.), External Powers in Latin America: Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism and South-South Cooperation (Routledge, 2021), pp. 153-163; and Political stability – Country rankings, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/Latin-Am [18]Chase Harrison, Explainer: Latin America’s Relationship with Israel and Palestine, site of Americas Society (AS), Council of the Americas (COA), 16/11/2023, https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-latin-americas-relationship-israel-and-palestine; and “Cultivating Ties: Deepening trade and investment between Latin America and the GCC,” site of Economist Impact, The Economist Group, 2022, https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/economist_impact__dcci_latam_report_10th_march_2022_english_web.pdf

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With Iran’s firing of some 180 ballistic missiles at Israel overnight, the Middle East is again on the brink of what would be a costly, ruinous regional war. Israel and its ally, the United States, shot down most of the missiles. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately vowed to retaliate for the attack. He called it a “big mistake” that Iran will “pay for”. The strike marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s calculations following weeks of escalating Israeli attacks on the leaders of its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their forces in both Gaza and Lebanon. Iran has traditionally outsourced its fighting to Hezbollah and Hamas. It has been very much concerned about getting dragged into direct confrontation with Israel because of the ramifications for the ruling regime – namely the possible internal dissent and chaos that any war with Israel might generate. When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran in late July, Iran’s leaders said they would respond appropriately. They basically left it to Hezbollah to do that. And as Israel intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks, another Iranian proxy group, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, claimed to have retaliated by launching missiles and drones at Israeli cities and US destroyers in the Red Sea. Israel responded with airstrikes on Yemen. In this context, from the Iranian point of view, it looked like Iran was just sitting on the fence and not performing its leadership role in challenging Israel. So, to a large extent, Iran had to exert its role as the leader of the so-called “axis of resistance” and get into the fight. Fighting Israel is very much a pillar of state identity in Iran. The Iranian political establishment is set up on the principle of challenging the United States and freeing Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. Those things are ingrained in the Iranian state identity. So, if Iran doesn’t act on this principle, there’s a serious risk of undermining its own identity. A delicate balancing act Yet there are clearly serious risks to this type of direct attack by Iran. Domestically, the Iranian political regime is suffering from a serious crisis of legitimacy. There have been numerous popular uprisings in Iran in recent years. These include the massive “Women, Life, Freedom” movement that erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody for allegedly not properly wearing her hijab. There is also a major dissenting view in Iran that challenges the regime’s anti-US and anti-Israel state identity and its commitment to perpetual conflict with both countries. So, the authorities in Iran have been concerned that direct confrontation with Israel and the US would unleash these internal dissenting voices and seriously threaten the regime’s survival. It’s this existential threat that has stopped Iran from acting on its principles. In addition, Iran has a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp and has an agenda of improving Iran’s relations with the West. He has been talking about reviving the Iran nuclear deal with the international community, sending signals that Iran is prepared to talk with the Americans. But the problem is the regional dynamics have completely changed since that deal was negotiated with the Obama administration in 2015. Iran has been a pariah state in recent years – and even more so since the conflict between Israel and Hamas began a year ago. Since then, no Western country would deem it appropriate or politically expedient to engage in nuclear talks with Iran, with the aim of alleviating international sanctions on the regime. Not at a time when Iran is openly calling for the destruction of Israel, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks on Israel, and now engaging in confrontations with Israel itself. So the timing is awful for Pezeshkian’s agenda of repairing the damage to Iran’s global standing. Ultimately, though, it’s not the president who calls the shots in Iran – it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council who consider matters of war and peace and decide on the course of action. The supreme leader is also the head of state and appoints the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC generals have been advocating for more serious and resolute action against Israel ever since the war in Gaza started. And it looks like the supreme leader has finally listened to this advice. So, the regime has been maintaining a delicate balance of these factors:preserving Iran’s state identity and what it stands for in the region, and the need to manage internal dissent and ensure its survival. In normal circumstances, it was easy for Iran to maintain this balance. It could manage its internal opponents through brutal force or appeasement and advocate an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Now, the scales have tipped. From the Iranian perspective, Israel has been so brazen in its actions against its proxies, it just didn’t look right for Iran to continue sitting on the fence, not taking action. As such, it has become more important for Iran to emphasise its anti-American, anti-Israel state identity and perhaps deal with an acceptable level of risk coming from a rise in internal dissent. Where things go from here With its attack on Israel, Iran is also prepared for another risk – direct retaliation from Israel and all-out war breaking out. The conflict in the region is really going according to Netanyahu’s playbook. He has been advocating for hitting Iran and for the United States to target Iran. Now, Israel has the justification to retaliate against Iran and also drag the United States into the conflict. Unfortunately, Iran is also now prepared to see the entire Persian Gulf get embroiled in the conflict because any retaliation by Israel and perhaps the United States would make US assets in the Persian Gulf, such as navy ships and commercial vessels, vulnerable to attacks by Iran or its allies. And that could have major implications for trade and security in the region. This is the way things are heading. Iran would know that hitting Israel would invite Israeli retaliation and that this retaliation would likely happen with US backing. It seems Iran is prepared to bear the costs of this.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and Iran are at war. In truth, the two sides have been fighting for decades, but the conflict has played out largely under the cover of covert and clandestine operations. The recent actions of both sides in this once “shadow war” have changed the nature of the conflict. It is not clear that de-escalation is on the horizon. On Oct 1, 2024, Iran launched a massive, direct attack against Israel notionally in retribution for Israel’s dual assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. It was the second such barrage in six months. By many accounts, the previous Iranian attack against Israel on April 13 – which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones – caused very little damage to Israel. Perhaps because of this, and likely in part due to U.S. encouragement of restraint, Israel’s immediate military response then – an airstrike against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in the Isfahan province – was somewhat measured. Many onlookers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that both sides would prefer to de-escalate rather than engage in ongoing open warfare. But further Israeli military operations since then have prompted escalatory Iranian military responses, forcing the conflict back out of the shadows. With Hamas’ capabilities and leadership degraded in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s military leaders announced in June that they were “ready to face” Hezbollah – the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group whose persistent rocket attacks against northern Israel have caused tens of thousands to evacuate the area. Israel pivots north Israel’s pivot from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chairman, Haniyeh, during his stay in Tehran. The purported Israeli operation was seen as an affront to Iran’s sovereignty. It was also an embarrassment that highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran’s internal security apparatus. Even though Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei vowed a “harsh response” against Israel, by September Iran had taken no action. Tehran’s inaction caused many Middle East analysts to question if the Iranian response would ever materialize – and by extension, what that would mean for Khamenei’s commitment to his proxy forces. If indeed Iran’s leadership opted for restraint following the assassination of Hamas’ top political leader, the same could not be said for its reaction to Israel’s multiphase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September. Israel began with a clandestine operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s command and control through the means of sabotaged explosive communications devices. Israel then carried out airstrikes eliminating Hezbollah’s top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country’s leaders describe as a “limited [ground] operation” into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border. Tehran’s Oct 1. attack in response against Israel was, according to many Middle East experts and indeed Iranian military leaders, primarily a retaliation for the two high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran’s defense strategy, I argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel’s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence. Challenging Israel’s advance Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel embarks on ground operations into southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops must now deal with what is perhaps the world’s most capable guerrilla fighting force – one that performed quite successfully during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Nevertheless, Israel’s ability to achieve a tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah’s top leaders – even in the midst of an ongoing localized war, and even after Israel’s leaders announced their intention to engage Hezbollah – reveals a far superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah. And that presents a huge blow to what is seen in Iran as the Islamic Republic’s crown jewel within its “Axis of Resistance.” In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership, regroup and organize against Israel’s ground invasion. The brutal art of save face? It also serves to help Iran save face, especially in how it’s seen by other parts of its external proxy network. Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault. Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support has no doubt contributed to Hamas being successfully degraded as a threat by Israel, with many of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israel’s military leaders to claim the group has been effectively defeated. Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic. Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found. Now that Israel has shifted its attention to Lebanon and scored several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to stand back and watch for two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate within Iran’s borders. And second, Iran’s proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see if Tehran will continue supporting them – or will abandon them, as it seemingly has done with Hamas. Reclaiming deterrence Perhaps above all, in Tehran’s calculus over how to respond is Iran’s need to restore a deterrence. The two defining features of Iran’s interrelated external, or “forward defense,” and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones. These Iranian defense strategies seek to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional U.S. allies with punishment via proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks; and second, by offering scapegoat targets against which Iran’s enemies can express their rage. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran’s hostile policies. Israel’s degradation of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran’s ability to deter attacks against the homeland. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk. Who plays the next move? These interweaving imperatives likely prompted Iran’s leaders to launch a second massive, direct missile attack on Oct. 1 against Israel. How effective the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran’s aims is unknown. The Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90% of the ballistic missiles reached their intended targets, while Israel and the United States characterize the attack as having been “defeated and ineffective,” despite unverified cellphone videos showing several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel. What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack. IRGC leaders met this warning with a counterthreat of their own that if Israel responds to the Oct. 1 attack militarily, Iran will again respond with unspecified “crushing and destructive attacks.” Rhetorically, neither side is backing down; militarily this may be true, too. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will dictate how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah, which have been followed by an ongoing air campaign, signal a new phase in the conflict amid heightened regional tensions. The sophisticated remote pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah on 17–18 September were followed by an intensive Israeli air campaign against the militant group, which is ongoing. These events were hailed by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant as a new phase in the country’s conflict with Hezbollah and a shift of gravity in Israel’s conflict from south to north. These actions, driven by intelligence breakthroughs and rapid decision-making, mark a critical moment in the ongoing conflict in the region and could have far-reaching implications for regional stability and Israel's political landscape. Israel’s ‘Use it or Lose it’ Moment The sensational events of last week were, arguably, a suboptimal military outcome for Israel. Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility for either attack, though the capability and intelligence from allies point to its involvement. The pager and then the walkie-talkie attacks were originally designed to be the opening salvo in a coordinated and total attack against Hezbollah. This would undoubtedly have been devastating, rendering communications obsolete for Hezbollah while being prepared to simultaneously hit hard with drone and missile strikes, maybe even alongside a ground incursion. Despite this careful planning, US sources have reported that Israel’s leaders were forced to either act instantly or risk losing this asset. This was a ‘use it or lose it’ moment, and has ultimately led Israel to ramp up its pressure on the north to follow what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah fairly identified as a ‘declaration of war’.  After the activation of the pager attack was forced upon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel followed up with the movement of the 98th Division, a paratrooper division, from Gaza to the northern border on 18 September. In addition to this, Gallant visited aircraft bases on the northern border in the immediate aftermath of the pager attack. Israel then activated another of its assets in the walkie-talkie attack, another ‘use it or lose it moment’ as reeling Hezbollah security officials (as well as embedded Iranian officers) began to look for other infiltrations. Israel has since begun a brutal missile campaign against Hezbollah with strikes in Southern Lebanon as well as in Beirut, where Israel reported the successful assassination of Ibrahim Aqil, a senior Hezbollah commander. According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, these attacks killed almost 500 and wounded many more on 23 September alone. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to Israel’s demand to withdrawing its troops and missile silos to beyond the Litani River. After activating their pager asset, Israeli commanders were forced to activate their walkie-talkie asset before it was detected. The forced use of these two key assets led Netanyahu to believe that this was his best chance to push for a victory against Hezbollah with further missile strikes and assassinations. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to its demands What is clear is that throughout this last week Netanyahu has been led by events, and not the other way around. Despite this, he will be delighted that he is one step closer to reclaiming the ‘Mr Defence’ reputation that has seen him serve a record eight terms as prime minister. After the shock of 7 October and the hostages that Israel has not been able to bring home, this is a moment of victory for the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence services and Netanyahu himself in re-asserting the competence and superiority of Israeli capabilities.  Israel will ultimately hope that ramping up pressure on Hezbollah through its continuing assassination and missile campaign will force its troops back behind the Litani River (some 18 miles from the current border, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701). This would allow Israel to return 200,000 displaced refugees to cities and villages in the north and score a major political and legitimacy goal.  A Crushing Blow for Hezbollah For Hezbollah, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks represented the most significant failure for the organisation since the 2006 war. In three days, Israel’s intelligence services blatantly proved their ability to infiltrate and destroy Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures. This began with the remote detonation of several thousand pagers on Tuesday and was followed up by the remote detonation of thousands of walkie-talkies used by the terrorist group on Wednesday. For Hezbollah this is a serious blow that carries a number of serious implications for the group. Firstly, the successful outcome of the Israeli operation exposed  fundamental weaknesses in the group’s command-and-control mechanisms. Hezbollah already operates in an extremely difficult command-and-control environment due to extensive human intelligence and Pegasus spyware, where Israeli intelligence can compromise mobile phones simply by sending them a signal. This environment has forced Hezbollah to operate on a network of cells which rely on almost constant top-down delegation. The inevitable restructuring as well as the human capacity that Hezbollah has lost will hamper the group’s ability to effectively resist Israel’s attacks. Secondly, there has been an impact on Hezbollah’s legitimacy.  Israel’s attacks are a humiliation for the group, representing as they do a colossal security failure. Hezbollah’s inability to prevent the attacks and protect Lebanon (as it claims to do) makes its position extremely difficult. The severity of this legitimacy hit is demonstrated by Nasrallah being forced to admit that Hezbollah has suffered a major and unprecedented blow. Finally, Hezbollah’s position is made more difficult by its lack of credible options to respond. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion.  At the same time, however, Nasrallah has furious internal stakeholders demanding revenge. The only real pressure valve available to him in this extremely difficult position is being able to claim attacks by the Axis of Resistance as consequences for Israel’s actions. This axis is comprised of an aligned group in the region, led by Iran and including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and various militia groups, who claim to resist Israel and its allies. Wider Questions for the Axis of Resistance This is a major test for the Axis of Resistance. Iran has watched seemingly powerlessly as Hezbollah, its ally, has been pummelled again and again by Israel. The refugees streaming out of Southern Lebanon towards Beirut are another example of the pressure Israel is applying on Hezbollah. Iran is also yet to respond to Israel’s assassination of Ismayel Haniyeh in Tehran in July. Iranian leaders and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures will be increasingly frustrated that they have been unable to re-establish credible deterrence against Israel. This is a particularly sore point as it is fairly clear by now that their April missile and drone strikes against Israel were ineffective in achieving this. We can expect to see an evolving Iranian strategy that aims to place maximum diplomatic pressure on Israel through moves such as encouraging proxies to strike at Israel, as well as threatening regional stability and shipping lanes. We may also see Iran to make diplomatic overtures to the West to exert more diplomatic pressure. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion Something to be aware of is that there are multiple smaller militia groups and individual cells within Hezbollah that have the potential for escalation. Many of these smaller or splinter groups may feel that they must respond to Israel with an independent attack that pre-empts or goes beyond Hezbollah’s so far very measured response. This danger is illustrated by previous attacks on UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, such as the attack that resulted in the death of Private Sean Rooney in December 2022. If one of these smaller groups was to hit an Israeli population centre, either on purpose or by mistake, the tension could easily spill over into a larger-scale conflict. The US–Israel Relationship An interesting dynamic to note is that the pager attacks and subsequent missile campaign represent another case of Israel making aggressive decisions without first consulting the US. Prior examples of this include the decision to invade Rafah, rejecting any possibility of a future Palestinian state as part of negotiations, and missile campaigns on non-combat areas in Gaza. As the US is Israel’s main ally and security guarantor, this trend embodies the increasing risk appetite of the current Israeli government. This is likely due to an assessment of the strategic environment, particularly Iran’s reluctance to enter a full-scale conflict, but also represents a political calculation by Netanyahu. Once again, the only way for Netanyahu to safeguard his short-term survival is by taking decisions that ensure Israel remains in a state of conflict. Followers of Israeli politics will not need reminding that Netanyahu faces three criminal cases that will progress as soon as he loses the premiership. The escalation perhaps also reflects a weakness in the US’s security arrangements, as it has been unable to effectively dissuade and disincentivise its own allies from escalation. The US has made it very clear that its priority, especially approaching the presidential election, is for regional de-escalation. This is illustrated by the exhaustive diplomatic efforts made since 7 October to reach a settlement between Iran, Hezbollah and Israel in order to keep the border cool. When the new US administration takes office later this year, its first priority in terms of Middle East policy must be addressing the balance of power between Washington and the Israeli prime minister.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in early October 2023, many observers jumped to a grim conclusion that, from then onward, the Middle East was hurtling at an ever-increasing speed toward another major regional conflict. The military operation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip was to be followed by fierce hostilities in the West Bank, then by a large-scale border clash between Israel and Lebanon, and, finally, by an Israeli–Iranian war, which had been looming on the political horizon for years and was literally just a step away, with the likely involvement of several key regional and global actors, including the United States. Limits to escalation  But in the 11 months that have passed since the Hamas attack on Israel, no major war has broken out in the Middle East. Israel, as predicted, is stuck in Gaza for long. The death toll among Palestinian civilians has passed 40,000, with the number of wounded approaching 100,000, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons now in the seven figures. For the people of Gaza, everything happening there is not a targeted anti-terrorist operation, but an all-out war in every sense. While the neighboring West Bank also saw an escalation, it was much more limited—around 600 Palestinians and several dozen Israelis have died there over the past 11 months. This is still many times more than in previous years (28 people were killed there in 2020, 86 in 2021, and 146 in 2022), but it is clear now that the West Bank has not become a second Gaza today, nor is it likely to become one overnight. Along the line of confrontation between the IDF and Hezbollah forces on the Israeli–Lebanese border, nothing extraordinary has occurred so far either, except for a rocket strike at a soccer field in the town of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights on July 27, which killed 12 Druze teenagers. True, Hezbollah has fired an unprecedented number of missiles at Israel over the past 11 months, up to 6,000 according to some reports. Israel, in response, has launched massive retaliatory and even preemptive strikes on southern Lebanon. But the preliminary results of this duel were relatively minor: 21 civilian and 20 military deaths on the Israeli side, and around 375 fighters and civilians killed on Hezbollah’s side. Even the latest attack on Sunday, August 25, which was announced in advance and involved 340 rockets along with dozens of Hezbollah drones, seems to have caused no significant damage to Israel. In any case, nothing comparable to the IDF’s deep incursion into southern Lebanon in July 2006 (known as the Second Lebanon War) is happening now or is likely to happen soon. In recent months, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to escalate by conducting precision strikes on prominent figures of its adversaries. On April 1, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an Iranian embassy annex building in Damascus, killing 16 people, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, one of the top military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 30, senior Hezbollah operative Fuad Shukr was killed in a Beirut suburb, and on July 31, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran (Israel never claimed responsibility for his death). After each of these incidents, experts predicted a sharp increase in the risks of escalation. But the Iranian leadership’s response to these developments was surprisingly restrained (as was Tehran’s earlier response to the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani in early 2020 by the U.S. military in a Baghdad suburb). The leaders of most Arab states also showed restraint in their response to the events in Gaza. The highly emotional reaction of the Arab street did not translate into decisive actions comparable to the oil embargo imposed on Israel and its allies following the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Efforts to further promote the Abraham Accords between Israel and the conservative Arab monarchies continued, albeit fading from the public eye. The only consistent supporters of Palestine were the stubborn Yemeni Houthis, who have attacked foreign ships in the Red Sea. However, it was Egypt—not Israel—that suffered the most from these attacks, losing nearly half of its revenues from the Suez Canal. Reasons for restraint  Although the trigger of a major regional war was pulled almost a year ago, the bomb itself never exploded. This situation calls for an explanation, particularly to assess the risk that the bomb might eventually detonate in the foreseeable future, among other things. One explanation for the current situation around Palestine lies in the distinct nature of Hamas, which has an ambiguous reputation in the Arab world. Cairo does not hold it in high regard, and Egypt’s current military leadership, not without reason, draws parallels between Palestinian radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Russia) at home, which has been driven deep underground, but was, alongside Israel, among the founding fathers of Hamas. Damascus has not forgotten that at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the political opposition rather than President Bashar Assad. Opinions of Hamas are divided in the Gulf states—while the group can count on some patronage and even political support in Doha, Abu Dhabi is much more skeptical and doubtful of the former rulers of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, all regional actors are under pressure from the international community, which for various reasons does not want further escalation. The U.S. has no interest in a major regional war in the Middle East with an uncertain outcome, especially in the run-up to the presidential election in November. Thus, Washington is focused on maintaining the regional status quo. China has even less reason to welcome such a conflict, in the first place because it would immediately drive global hydrocarbon prices up and create many transportation and logistics issues for Beijing. Moscow could possibly count on some short-term gains from a major Middle East conflagration. The West would have to shift attention away from Ukraine for a while, while prices for Russian oil and gas would skyrocket. But the negative consequences of long-term destabilization in such an important region for Russia are so great that they undoubtedly outweigh any short-term gains. It is no coincidence that at his meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on August 13, President Vladimir Putin emphasized Moscow’s commitment to preventing further escalation and promoting a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It is also plausible that during the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Iran on August 5, Moscow urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to refrain from radical responses to Israel—not only to minimize possible civilian casualties but also to avoid provoking a direct conflict with the U.S. Postmodernity as inoculation against war  However, the core reasons lie not outside, but inside the region. It appears that key actors—from Egypt to Syria, and from Turkey to Iran—are unwilling to engage in a full-blown war. Middle Eastern leaders are reluctant to shoulder the numerous risks and costs associated with a major armed conflict in one way or another. True, the arms race in the Middle East region received a powerful new boost in October 2023 and is likely to accelerate later. Belligerent anti-Israeli rhetoric—not only in the Arab world but also in Iran and Turkey—will also persist. Isolated tragic incidents—both planned and accidental—will continue. Yet a major war is a different matter. This is not because all Middle Eastern leaders are exceptionally compassionate and peace-loving, but because almost none of them today can be fully confident in their own power and resilience. It is still possible to maintain a limited military presence near and far, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan does in Syria and Libya. But repeating the experience of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions wounded, is now a no-go: Middle Eastern societies have changed too much over the past 40 years, and the region has advanced too far down the path of postmodernity. It is hardly a coincidence that the strongest proponents of escalation are the Houthis, who are the least affected by the postmodern values and lifestyle in the Middle East. Perhaps even Tehran can no longer count on the unconditional loyalty of the new generation of Iranian citizens, who would have to pay with their own blood for the decisions of the political and military elite leading to a major regional war. In any case, the victory of the only “reformist” candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in the recent presidential election is a clear signal from society to the leadership of the Islamic Republic that people want peace, stability and economic development, rather than new military exploits or social and political upheavals that invariably accompany them. Even Israel—for all the outward determination of the current cabinet to see things through to the end—is no exception to this rule. The costs of the Gaza operation have already topped $60 billion, a staggering sum for a relatively small country, meaning inevitable budget deficits, tax hikes and cuts to social programs. Israel’s call-up of reservists has already drained the national economy, and its effects will be felt for a long time. Most importantly, as the Gaza offensive has once again shown, starting a war is easy, but ending it is very difficult. The prospect of a second Gaza in the West Bank or southern Lebanon is far from appealing, even for a politician as determined as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Armageddon is off the table? It is fair to assume that the current situation in the Middle East reflects the broader state of global politics. After February 24, 2022, many experts expressed a gloomy belief that “the world is entering a new era of big wars” and that the confrontation between Russia and the West would inevitably lead to a chain reaction of major armed conflicts all over the planet. They predicted an imminent U.S.–China military clash over Taiwan, an armed standoff between China and India in the Himalayas or between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, a rapid escalation on the Korean Peninsula and numerous new conflicts across Africa, among others. Fortunately, none of the above scenarios have so far come to pass. Many other ominous predictions have not come true either. ECOWAS member states opted out of a military intervention in Niger. The Libyan National Army’s threat of a border conflict with Algeria never materialized. Even Venezuela’s eccentric leader Nicolas Maduro seems to have changed his mind about going to war with neighboring Guyana over disputed territories. The number of conflicts in the world has not decreased, but the ongoing ones are predominantly low-intensity conflicts rather than conventional wars, after all. The international system, though shaken, has overall remained standing—for now. Of course, it is too early to sit back. The situation can explode at any moment and almost anywhere: there are more than enough flashpoints around the world, while the level of trust or even basic communication between the great powers has dropped to near zero. In today’s international environment, any negative scenarios are possible, down to the most apocalyptic ones. And this unsettling uncertainty is now very much felt in the Middle East as well. But for now, there is still hope that the unfolding transition to a new world order will be less destructive and less costly for humanity than many professional pessimists have imagined in recent years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  When the UN General Assembly passed the 1947 partition resolution on Palestine, Brazil was presiding over the meetings, and its delegate delayed the vote multiple times to secure the maximum number of votes in favor of the partition. From that point until 2002, Brazilian policy closely aligned with the US position on Israel. However, with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s election in 2002, Brazil’s stance became less aligned with Israel and shifted toward a more balanced and neutral approach between conflicting international poles. This shift, however, was not consistent and fluctuated, particularly during the 2019–2022 period under President Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government. After Lula da Silva’s return to the presidency in early 2023, Brazilian policy once again moved towards a less pro-Israel stance, particularly in response to the aftermath of the Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Brazil holds substantial qualitative significance in Latin America, encompassing around 47.8% of the continent’s area and accounting for nearly half of its population (214 million out of approximately 434 million). First: Determinants of Brazilian Foreign Policy on the Palestine Issue  Three key factors largely shape Brazil’s policy toward Palestine: 1. The Influence of the Brazilian Agricultural Lobby The trade relationship, particularly in the agri-food sector and related investments, is a key factor in Brazil’s policy towards the Middle East. Agri-food products account for 27% of Brazil’s agricultural trade, amounting to $18 billion with Arab countries, $2 billion with Iran, and $2 billion with Israel. In comparison, trade with the Palestinian Authority (PA) stands at approximately $30 million, making Israeli trade with Brazil 60 times larger than that with the PA. Furthermore, Israel was the first country outside South America to sign a trade agreement with Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, in 2007, where Brazil is the leading member. The agricultural sector wields significant influence within the government, with 300 members of the Brazilian legislature—two-thirds of the body—affiliated with its interests. This powerful lobbying presence allows them to block any policies that might negatively impact the agricultural sector. A notable example of their influence is the successful obstruction of Bolsonaro’s plan to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem. After receiving a warning from the LAS that such a move could harm trade relations between Brazil and Arab countries, the agricultural lobby’s pressure led Bolsonaro to instead open a commercial representation office in Jerusalem, rather than relocating the embassy. 2. The Growing Movement of Christian Zionism Studies in political sociology from Latin America indicate a growing shift from Catholicism to Evangelicalism, which may increase the potential for conversion to “Christian Zionism” within the Evangelical movement. Christian Zionism advocates for the establishment of a “Jewish state” in the Promised Land as a precursor to Christ’s return. Some estimates suggest that the proportion of Christian Zionists in Brazil could reach 40% within the next decade. The Pentecostal movement, which supports both Bolsonaro and Israel, plays a significant role in this trend. A concerning aspect of this movement is its deepening influence within political power structures, as it currently holds 25% of the seats in the parliament and 17% in the Senate. 3. Brazil-Israel Security Relations The 1970s marked the beginning of security relations between Brazil and Israel. Faced with intense leftist pressures, right-wing administrations in Latin America sought support from the US and other powers, including Israel. These security ties were formalized in 2008, and even during his second presidency (2007–2010), leftist leader Lula da Silva continued this policy by signing a security cooperation agreement with Israel to leverage its technological advancements. In 2014, Brazil engaged an Israeli security and defense systems company to manage and coordinate security for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, and the relationship has continued since. Second: The Impact of Brazilian-Israeli Relationship Determinants on Operation al-Aqsa Flood’s Ramifications  It is challenging to grasp Brazil’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood without considering the three preceding variables, which have led Brazilian scholars to describe the country’s approach as equidistant diplomacy. This approach avoids taking a clear side in the conflict, irrespective of the ruling political movement. This diplomatic stance is evident in the pro-Israeli right wing (the Liberal Party) retracting some of its previous positions of support for Israel, while the left wing (the current ruling Workers’ Party) has not supported the Palestinian side as strongly as expected. The following practices illustrate this relative equidistance: 1. The ruling left-wing government in Brazil has adopted the accusation that Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip (GS), describing it as a “Holocaust.” Brazil has backed South Africa’s initiative to bring the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), reflecting its alignment with the BRICS group, which includes both countries. Additionally, in May 2024, the Brazilian government blocked a deal to purchase Israeli weapons. It has continued to criticize the expansion of Israeli settlements, advocating for a two-state solution and the Palestinian right to self-determination. Brazil has also played a role in drafting and supporting resolutions at the UN General Assembly and Security Council calling for a ceasefire in GS. However, da Silva condemned the resistance attack on 7/10/2023 as an “act of terrorism,” while asserting that the Israeli response was “disproportionate to the Palestinian action.” Although da Silva recalled his ambassador from Israel, he did not sever diplomatic relations. The commercial office in Jerusalem continued its operations as usual. Security ties were not fully severed but were instead “suspended.” While trade in food between the two sides continued, Israel blocked the departure of some Brazilians from GS following the outbreak of hostilities, permitting their exit only after more than a month, whereas individuals of other nationalities were allowed to leave sooner. 2. The right-wing opposition, known for its strong alignment with Israel, has organized a series of meetings with the Israeli ambassador and has provided venues for him to screen films that claim to depict “terrorist activities” by resistance groups. A Brazilian state also awarded Benjamin Netanyahu the title of “honorary citizen,” and Bolsonaro’s wife cast her vote in recent elections while wearing a T-shirt depicting an the Israeli flag. This aligns with right-wing policies that mirrored those of US President Donald Trump, including recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, supporting the Abraham Accords between Arab countries and Israel, and denying the existence of Palestine. Additionally, Netanyahu was hosted as the first Israeli prime minister to visit Brazil. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro decided against moving the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem after receiving warnings from the agricultural lobby, as previously mentioned. Conclusion  The information above highlights Brazil’s significant qualitative influence, particularly in Latin America, and the presence of overlapping factors in decision-making. It also underscores the current favorable environment under President da Silva’s leadership to support the Palestine issue, driven by the severe Israeli actions and the war on GS. Thus, it is essential to intensify efforts to develop the relationship with Brazil both officially and publicly. This includes increasing activities and events in Portuguese, facilitating visits and engaging directly with Brazilian agricultural lobbies and through Arab diplomats. Additionally, Arab Christians, especially Palestinians living in Brazil, should actively engage with Brazilian Christian communities, particularly the Catholic sectors.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The next president of the US will face various challenges that divide the nation, including a nuclear defense policy. The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy. Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal. The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those threats, along with China’s growing military might, US Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China. Thanks to those events and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people. And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China. The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation  The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5th, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.) At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21st, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities. Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow. Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable. The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it. In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.) Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5th, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them. The Three-Way Arms Race  Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable. Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states. Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike. Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China. As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program. The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China. “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal. Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation. The Need for Citizen Advocacy  For many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale. And one thing should be made clear: adding more weapons to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.” A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).