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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and Iran are at war. In truth, the two sides have been fighting for decades, but the conflict has played out largely under the cover of covert and clandestine operations. The recent actions of both sides in this once “shadow war” have changed the nature of the conflict. It is not clear that de-escalation is on the horizon. On Oct 1, 2024, Iran launched a massive, direct attack against Israel notionally in retribution for Israel’s dual assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. It was the second such barrage in six months. By many accounts, the previous Iranian attack against Israel on April 13 – which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones – caused very little damage to Israel. Perhaps because of this, and likely in part due to U.S. encouragement of restraint, Israel’s immediate military response then – an airstrike against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in the Isfahan province – was somewhat measured. Many onlookers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that both sides would prefer to de-escalate rather than engage in ongoing open warfare. But further Israeli military operations since then have prompted escalatory Iranian military responses, forcing the conflict back out of the shadows. With Hamas’ capabilities and leadership degraded in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s military leaders announced in June that they were “ready to face” Hezbollah – the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group whose persistent rocket attacks against northern Israel have caused tens of thousands to evacuate the area. Israel pivots north Israel’s pivot from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chairman, Haniyeh, during his stay in Tehran. The purported Israeli operation was seen as an affront to Iran’s sovereignty. It was also an embarrassment that highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran’s internal security apparatus. Even though Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei vowed a “harsh response” against Israel, by September Iran had taken no action. Tehran’s inaction caused many Middle East analysts to question if the Iranian response would ever materialize – and by extension, what that would mean for Khamenei’s commitment to his proxy forces. If indeed Iran’s leadership opted for restraint following the assassination of Hamas’ top political leader, the same could not be said for its reaction to Israel’s multiphase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September. Israel began with a clandestine operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s command and control through the means of sabotaged explosive communications devices. Israel then carried out airstrikes eliminating Hezbollah’s top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country’s leaders describe as a “limited [ground] operation” into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border. Tehran’s Oct 1. attack in response against Israel was, according to many Middle East experts and indeed Iranian military leaders, primarily a retaliation for the two high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran’s defense strategy, I argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel’s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence. Challenging Israel’s advance Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel embarks on ground operations into southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops must now deal with what is perhaps the world’s most capable guerrilla fighting force – one that performed quite successfully during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Nevertheless, Israel’s ability to achieve a tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah’s top leaders – even in the midst of an ongoing localized war, and even after Israel’s leaders announced their intention to engage Hezbollah – reveals a far superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah. And that presents a huge blow to what is seen in Iran as the Islamic Republic’s crown jewel within its “Axis of Resistance.” In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership, regroup and organize against Israel’s ground invasion. The brutal art of save face? It also serves to help Iran save face, especially in how it’s seen by other parts of its external proxy network. Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault. Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support has no doubt contributed to Hamas being successfully degraded as a threat by Israel, with many of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israel’s military leaders to claim the group has been effectively defeated. Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic. Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found. Now that Israel has shifted its attention to Lebanon and scored several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to stand back and watch for two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate within Iran’s borders. And second, Iran’s proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see if Tehran will continue supporting them – or will abandon them, as it seemingly has done with Hamas. Reclaiming deterrence Perhaps above all, in Tehran’s calculus over how to respond is Iran’s need to restore a deterrence. The two defining features of Iran’s interrelated external, or “forward defense,” and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones. These Iranian defense strategies seek to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional U.S. allies with punishment via proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks; and second, by offering scapegoat targets against which Iran’s enemies can express their rage. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran’s hostile policies. Israel’s degradation of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran’s ability to deter attacks against the homeland. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk. Who plays the next move? These interweaving imperatives likely prompted Iran’s leaders to launch a second massive, direct missile attack on Oct. 1 against Israel. How effective the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran’s aims is unknown. The Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90% of the ballistic missiles reached their intended targets, while Israel and the United States characterize the attack as having been “defeated and ineffective,” despite unverified cellphone videos showing several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel. What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack. IRGC leaders met this warning with a counterthreat of their own that if Israel responds to the Oct. 1 attack militarily, Iran will again respond with unspecified “crushing and destructive attacks.” Rhetorically, neither side is backing down; militarily this may be true, too. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will dictate how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah, which have been followed by an ongoing air campaign, signal a new phase in the conflict amid heightened regional tensions. The sophisticated remote pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah on 17–18 September were followed by an intensive Israeli air campaign against the militant group, which is ongoing. These events were hailed by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant as a new phase in the country’s conflict with Hezbollah and a shift of gravity in Israel’s conflict from south to north. These actions, driven by intelligence breakthroughs and rapid decision-making, mark a critical moment in the ongoing conflict in the region and could have far-reaching implications for regional stability and Israel's political landscape. Israel’s ‘Use it or Lose it’ Moment The sensational events of last week were, arguably, a suboptimal military outcome for Israel. Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility for either attack, though the capability and intelligence from allies point to its involvement. The pager and then the walkie-talkie attacks were originally designed to be the opening salvo in a coordinated and total attack against Hezbollah. This would undoubtedly have been devastating, rendering communications obsolete for Hezbollah while being prepared to simultaneously hit hard with drone and missile strikes, maybe even alongside a ground incursion. Despite this careful planning, US sources have reported that Israel’s leaders were forced to either act instantly or risk losing this asset. This was a ‘use it or lose it’ moment, and has ultimately led Israel to ramp up its pressure on the north to follow what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah fairly identified as a ‘declaration of war’.  After the activation of the pager attack was forced upon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel followed up with the movement of the 98th Division, a paratrooper division, from Gaza to the northern border on 18 September. In addition to this, Gallant visited aircraft bases on the northern border in the immediate aftermath of the pager attack. Israel then activated another of its assets in the walkie-talkie attack, another ‘use it or lose it moment’ as reeling Hezbollah security officials (as well as embedded Iranian officers) began to look for other infiltrations. Israel has since begun a brutal missile campaign against Hezbollah with strikes in Southern Lebanon as well as in Beirut, where Israel reported the successful assassination of Ibrahim Aqil, a senior Hezbollah commander. According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, these attacks killed almost 500 and wounded many more on 23 September alone. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to Israel’s demand to withdrawing its troops and missile silos to beyond the Litani River. After activating their pager asset, Israeli commanders were forced to activate their walkie-talkie asset before it was detected. The forced use of these two key assets led Netanyahu to believe that this was his best chance to push for a victory against Hezbollah with further missile strikes and assassinations. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to its demands What is clear is that throughout this last week Netanyahu has been led by events, and not the other way around. Despite this, he will be delighted that he is one step closer to reclaiming the ‘Mr Defence’ reputation that has seen him serve a record eight terms as prime minister. After the shock of 7 October and the hostages that Israel has not been able to bring home, this is a moment of victory for the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence services and Netanyahu himself in re-asserting the competence and superiority of Israeli capabilities.  Israel will ultimately hope that ramping up pressure on Hezbollah through its continuing assassination and missile campaign will force its troops back behind the Litani River (some 18 miles from the current border, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701). This would allow Israel to return 200,000 displaced refugees to cities and villages in the north and score a major political and legitimacy goal.  A Crushing Blow for Hezbollah For Hezbollah, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks represented the most significant failure for the organisation since the 2006 war. In three days, Israel’s intelligence services blatantly proved their ability to infiltrate and destroy Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures. This began with the remote detonation of several thousand pagers on Tuesday and was followed up by the remote detonation of thousands of walkie-talkies used by the terrorist group on Wednesday. For Hezbollah this is a serious blow that carries a number of serious implications for the group. Firstly, the successful outcome of the Israeli operation exposed  fundamental weaknesses in the group’s command-and-control mechanisms. Hezbollah already operates in an extremely difficult command-and-control environment due to extensive human intelligence and Pegasus spyware, where Israeli intelligence can compromise mobile phones simply by sending them a signal. This environment has forced Hezbollah to operate on a network of cells which rely on almost constant top-down delegation. The inevitable restructuring as well as the human capacity that Hezbollah has lost will hamper the group’s ability to effectively resist Israel’s attacks. Secondly, there has been an impact on Hezbollah’s legitimacy.  Israel’s attacks are a humiliation for the group, representing as they do a colossal security failure. Hezbollah’s inability to prevent the attacks and protect Lebanon (as it claims to do) makes its position extremely difficult. The severity of this legitimacy hit is demonstrated by Nasrallah being forced to admit that Hezbollah has suffered a major and unprecedented blow. Finally, Hezbollah’s position is made more difficult by its lack of credible options to respond. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion.  At the same time, however, Nasrallah has furious internal stakeholders demanding revenge. The only real pressure valve available to him in this extremely difficult position is being able to claim attacks by the Axis of Resistance as consequences for Israel’s actions. This axis is comprised of an aligned group in the region, led by Iran and including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and various militia groups, who claim to resist Israel and its allies. Wider Questions for the Axis of Resistance This is a major test for the Axis of Resistance. Iran has watched seemingly powerlessly as Hezbollah, its ally, has been pummelled again and again by Israel. The refugees streaming out of Southern Lebanon towards Beirut are another example of the pressure Israel is applying on Hezbollah. Iran is also yet to respond to Israel’s assassination of Ismayel Haniyeh in Tehran in July. Iranian leaders and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures will be increasingly frustrated that they have been unable to re-establish credible deterrence against Israel. This is a particularly sore point as it is fairly clear by now that their April missile and drone strikes against Israel were ineffective in achieving this. We can expect to see an evolving Iranian strategy that aims to place maximum diplomatic pressure on Israel through moves such as encouraging proxies to strike at Israel, as well as threatening regional stability and shipping lanes. We may also see Iran to make diplomatic overtures to the West to exert more diplomatic pressure. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion Something to be aware of is that there are multiple smaller militia groups and individual cells within Hezbollah that have the potential for escalation. Many of these smaller or splinter groups may feel that they must respond to Israel with an independent attack that pre-empts or goes beyond Hezbollah’s so far very measured response. This danger is illustrated by previous attacks on UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, such as the attack that resulted in the death of Private Sean Rooney in December 2022. If one of these smaller groups was to hit an Israeli population centre, either on purpose or by mistake, the tension could easily spill over into a larger-scale conflict. The US–Israel Relationship An interesting dynamic to note is that the pager attacks and subsequent missile campaign represent another case of Israel making aggressive decisions without first consulting the US. Prior examples of this include the decision to invade Rafah, rejecting any possibility of a future Palestinian state as part of negotiations, and missile campaigns on non-combat areas in Gaza. As the US is Israel’s main ally and security guarantor, this trend embodies the increasing risk appetite of the current Israeli government. This is likely due to an assessment of the strategic environment, particularly Iran’s reluctance to enter a full-scale conflict, but also represents a political calculation by Netanyahu. Once again, the only way for Netanyahu to safeguard his short-term survival is by taking decisions that ensure Israel remains in a state of conflict. Followers of Israeli politics will not need reminding that Netanyahu faces three criminal cases that will progress as soon as he loses the premiership. The escalation perhaps also reflects a weakness in the US’s security arrangements, as it has been unable to effectively dissuade and disincentivise its own allies from escalation. The US has made it very clear that its priority, especially approaching the presidential election, is for regional de-escalation. This is illustrated by the exhaustive diplomatic efforts made since 7 October to reach a settlement between Iran, Hezbollah and Israel in order to keep the border cool. When the new US administration takes office later this year, its first priority in terms of Middle East policy must be addressing the balance of power between Washington and the Israeli prime minister.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in early October 2023, many observers jumped to a grim conclusion that, from then onward, the Middle East was hurtling at an ever-increasing speed toward another major regional conflict. The military operation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip was to be followed by fierce hostilities in the West Bank, then by a large-scale border clash between Israel and Lebanon, and, finally, by an Israeli–Iranian war, which had been looming on the political horizon for years and was literally just a step away, with the likely involvement of several key regional and global actors, including the United States. Limits to escalation  But in the 11 months that have passed since the Hamas attack on Israel, no major war has broken out in the Middle East. Israel, as predicted, is stuck in Gaza for long. The death toll among Palestinian civilians has passed 40,000, with the number of wounded approaching 100,000, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons now in the seven figures. For the people of Gaza, everything happening there is not a targeted anti-terrorist operation, but an all-out war in every sense. While the neighboring West Bank also saw an escalation, it was much more limited—around 600 Palestinians and several dozen Israelis have died there over the past 11 months. This is still many times more than in previous years (28 people were killed there in 2020, 86 in 2021, and 146 in 2022), but it is clear now that the West Bank has not become a second Gaza today, nor is it likely to become one overnight. Along the line of confrontation between the IDF and Hezbollah forces on the Israeli–Lebanese border, nothing extraordinary has occurred so far either, except for a rocket strike at a soccer field in the town of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights on July 27, which killed 12 Druze teenagers. True, Hezbollah has fired an unprecedented number of missiles at Israel over the past 11 months, up to 6,000 according to some reports. Israel, in response, has launched massive retaliatory and even preemptive strikes on southern Lebanon. But the preliminary results of this duel were relatively minor: 21 civilian and 20 military deaths on the Israeli side, and around 375 fighters and civilians killed on Hezbollah’s side. Even the latest attack on Sunday, August 25, which was announced in advance and involved 340 rockets along with dozens of Hezbollah drones, seems to have caused no significant damage to Israel. In any case, nothing comparable to the IDF’s deep incursion into southern Lebanon in July 2006 (known as the Second Lebanon War) is happening now or is likely to happen soon. In recent months, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to escalate by conducting precision strikes on prominent figures of its adversaries. On April 1, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an Iranian embassy annex building in Damascus, killing 16 people, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, one of the top military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 30, senior Hezbollah operative Fuad Shukr was killed in a Beirut suburb, and on July 31, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran (Israel never claimed responsibility for his death). After each of these incidents, experts predicted a sharp increase in the risks of escalation. But the Iranian leadership’s response to these developments was surprisingly restrained (as was Tehran’s earlier response to the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani in early 2020 by the U.S. military in a Baghdad suburb). The leaders of most Arab states also showed restraint in their response to the events in Gaza. The highly emotional reaction of the Arab street did not translate into decisive actions comparable to the oil embargo imposed on Israel and its allies following the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Efforts to further promote the Abraham Accords between Israel and the conservative Arab monarchies continued, albeit fading from the public eye. The only consistent supporters of Palestine were the stubborn Yemeni Houthis, who have attacked foreign ships in the Red Sea. However, it was Egypt—not Israel—that suffered the most from these attacks, losing nearly half of its revenues from the Suez Canal. Reasons for restraint  Although the trigger of a major regional war was pulled almost a year ago, the bomb itself never exploded. This situation calls for an explanation, particularly to assess the risk that the bomb might eventually detonate in the foreseeable future, among other things. One explanation for the current situation around Palestine lies in the distinct nature of Hamas, which has an ambiguous reputation in the Arab world. Cairo does not hold it in high regard, and Egypt’s current military leadership, not without reason, draws parallels between Palestinian radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Russia) at home, which has been driven deep underground, but was, alongside Israel, among the founding fathers of Hamas. Damascus has not forgotten that at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the political opposition rather than President Bashar Assad. Opinions of Hamas are divided in the Gulf states—while the group can count on some patronage and even political support in Doha, Abu Dhabi is much more skeptical and doubtful of the former rulers of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, all regional actors are under pressure from the international community, which for various reasons does not want further escalation. The U.S. has no interest in a major regional war in the Middle East with an uncertain outcome, especially in the run-up to the presidential election in November. Thus, Washington is focused on maintaining the regional status quo. China has even less reason to welcome such a conflict, in the first place because it would immediately drive global hydrocarbon prices up and create many transportation and logistics issues for Beijing. Moscow could possibly count on some short-term gains from a major Middle East conflagration. The West would have to shift attention away from Ukraine for a while, while prices for Russian oil and gas would skyrocket. But the negative consequences of long-term destabilization in such an important region for Russia are so great that they undoubtedly outweigh any short-term gains. It is no coincidence that at his meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on August 13, President Vladimir Putin emphasized Moscow’s commitment to preventing further escalation and promoting a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It is also plausible that during the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Iran on August 5, Moscow urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to refrain from radical responses to Israel—not only to minimize possible civilian casualties but also to avoid provoking a direct conflict with the U.S. Postmodernity as inoculation against war  However, the core reasons lie not outside, but inside the region. It appears that key actors—from Egypt to Syria, and from Turkey to Iran—are unwilling to engage in a full-blown war. Middle Eastern leaders are reluctant to shoulder the numerous risks and costs associated with a major armed conflict in one way or another. True, the arms race in the Middle East region received a powerful new boost in October 2023 and is likely to accelerate later. Belligerent anti-Israeli rhetoric—not only in the Arab world but also in Iran and Turkey—will also persist. Isolated tragic incidents—both planned and accidental—will continue. Yet a major war is a different matter. This is not because all Middle Eastern leaders are exceptionally compassionate and peace-loving, but because almost none of them today can be fully confident in their own power and resilience. It is still possible to maintain a limited military presence near and far, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan does in Syria and Libya. But repeating the experience of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions wounded, is now a no-go: Middle Eastern societies have changed too much over the past 40 years, and the region has advanced too far down the path of postmodernity. It is hardly a coincidence that the strongest proponents of escalation are the Houthis, who are the least affected by the postmodern values and lifestyle in the Middle East. Perhaps even Tehran can no longer count on the unconditional loyalty of the new generation of Iranian citizens, who would have to pay with their own blood for the decisions of the political and military elite leading to a major regional war. In any case, the victory of the only “reformist” candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in the recent presidential election is a clear signal from society to the leadership of the Islamic Republic that people want peace, stability and economic development, rather than new military exploits or social and political upheavals that invariably accompany them. Even Israel—for all the outward determination of the current cabinet to see things through to the end—is no exception to this rule. The costs of the Gaza operation have already topped $60 billion, a staggering sum for a relatively small country, meaning inevitable budget deficits, tax hikes and cuts to social programs. Israel’s call-up of reservists has already drained the national economy, and its effects will be felt for a long time. Most importantly, as the Gaza offensive has once again shown, starting a war is easy, but ending it is very difficult. The prospect of a second Gaza in the West Bank or southern Lebanon is far from appealing, even for a politician as determined as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Armageddon is off the table? It is fair to assume that the current situation in the Middle East reflects the broader state of global politics. After February 24, 2022, many experts expressed a gloomy belief that “the world is entering a new era of big wars” and that the confrontation between Russia and the West would inevitably lead to a chain reaction of major armed conflicts all over the planet. They predicted an imminent U.S.–China military clash over Taiwan, an armed standoff between China and India in the Himalayas or between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, a rapid escalation on the Korean Peninsula and numerous new conflicts across Africa, among others. Fortunately, none of the above scenarios have so far come to pass. Many other ominous predictions have not come true either. ECOWAS member states opted out of a military intervention in Niger. The Libyan National Army’s threat of a border conflict with Algeria never materialized. Even Venezuela’s eccentric leader Nicolas Maduro seems to have changed his mind about going to war with neighboring Guyana over disputed territories. The number of conflicts in the world has not decreased, but the ongoing ones are predominantly low-intensity conflicts rather than conventional wars, after all. The international system, though shaken, has overall remained standing—for now. Of course, it is too early to sit back. The situation can explode at any moment and almost anywhere: there are more than enough flashpoints around the world, while the level of trust or even basic communication between the great powers has dropped to near zero. In today’s international environment, any negative scenarios are possible, down to the most apocalyptic ones. And this unsettling uncertainty is now very much felt in the Middle East as well. But for now, there is still hope that the unfolding transition to a new world order will be less destructive and less costly for humanity than many professional pessimists have imagined in recent years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  When the UN General Assembly passed the 1947 partition resolution on Palestine, Brazil was presiding over the meetings, and its delegate delayed the vote multiple times to secure the maximum number of votes in favor of the partition. From that point until 2002, Brazilian policy closely aligned with the US position on Israel. However, with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s election in 2002, Brazil’s stance became less aligned with Israel and shifted toward a more balanced and neutral approach between conflicting international poles. This shift, however, was not consistent and fluctuated, particularly during the 2019–2022 period under President Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government. After Lula da Silva’s return to the presidency in early 2023, Brazilian policy once again moved towards a less pro-Israel stance, particularly in response to the aftermath of the Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Brazil holds substantial qualitative significance in Latin America, encompassing around 47.8% of the continent’s area and accounting for nearly half of its population (214 million out of approximately 434 million). First: Determinants of Brazilian Foreign Policy on the Palestine Issue  Three key factors largely shape Brazil’s policy toward Palestine: 1. The Influence of the Brazilian Agricultural Lobby The trade relationship, particularly in the agri-food sector and related investments, is a key factor in Brazil’s policy towards the Middle East. Agri-food products account for 27% of Brazil’s agricultural trade, amounting to $18 billion with Arab countries, $2 billion with Iran, and $2 billion with Israel. In comparison, trade with the Palestinian Authority (PA) stands at approximately $30 million, making Israeli trade with Brazil 60 times larger than that with the PA. Furthermore, Israel was the first country outside South America to sign a trade agreement with Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, in 2007, where Brazil is the leading member. The agricultural sector wields significant influence within the government, with 300 members of the Brazilian legislature—two-thirds of the body—affiliated with its interests. This powerful lobbying presence allows them to block any policies that might negatively impact the agricultural sector. A notable example of their influence is the successful obstruction of Bolsonaro’s plan to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem. After receiving a warning from the LAS that such a move could harm trade relations between Brazil and Arab countries, the agricultural lobby’s pressure led Bolsonaro to instead open a commercial representation office in Jerusalem, rather than relocating the embassy. 2. The Growing Movement of Christian Zionism Studies in political sociology from Latin America indicate a growing shift from Catholicism to Evangelicalism, which may increase the potential for conversion to “Christian Zionism” within the Evangelical movement. Christian Zionism advocates for the establishment of a “Jewish state” in the Promised Land as a precursor to Christ’s return. Some estimates suggest that the proportion of Christian Zionists in Brazil could reach 40% within the next decade. The Pentecostal movement, which supports both Bolsonaro and Israel, plays a significant role in this trend. A concerning aspect of this movement is its deepening influence within political power structures, as it currently holds 25% of the seats in the parliament and 17% in the Senate. 3. Brazil-Israel Security Relations The 1970s marked the beginning of security relations between Brazil and Israel. Faced with intense leftist pressures, right-wing administrations in Latin America sought support from the US and other powers, including Israel. These security ties were formalized in 2008, and even during his second presidency (2007–2010), leftist leader Lula da Silva continued this policy by signing a security cooperation agreement with Israel to leverage its technological advancements. In 2014, Brazil engaged an Israeli security and defense systems company to manage and coordinate security for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, and the relationship has continued since. Second: The Impact of Brazilian-Israeli Relationship Determinants on Operation al-Aqsa Flood’s Ramifications  It is challenging to grasp Brazil’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood without considering the three preceding variables, which have led Brazilian scholars to describe the country’s approach as equidistant diplomacy. This approach avoids taking a clear side in the conflict, irrespective of the ruling political movement. This diplomatic stance is evident in the pro-Israeli right wing (the Liberal Party) retracting some of its previous positions of support for Israel, while the left wing (the current ruling Workers’ Party) has not supported the Palestinian side as strongly as expected. The following practices illustrate this relative equidistance: 1. The ruling left-wing government in Brazil has adopted the accusation that Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip (GS), describing it as a “Holocaust.” Brazil has backed South Africa’s initiative to bring the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), reflecting its alignment with the BRICS group, which includes both countries. Additionally, in May 2024, the Brazilian government blocked a deal to purchase Israeli weapons. It has continued to criticize the expansion of Israeli settlements, advocating for a two-state solution and the Palestinian right to self-determination. Brazil has also played a role in drafting and supporting resolutions at the UN General Assembly and Security Council calling for a ceasefire in GS. However, da Silva condemned the resistance attack on 7/10/2023 as an “act of terrorism,” while asserting that the Israeli response was “disproportionate to the Palestinian action.” Although da Silva recalled his ambassador from Israel, he did not sever diplomatic relations. The commercial office in Jerusalem continued its operations as usual. Security ties were not fully severed but were instead “suspended.” While trade in food between the two sides continued, Israel blocked the departure of some Brazilians from GS following the outbreak of hostilities, permitting their exit only after more than a month, whereas individuals of other nationalities were allowed to leave sooner. 2. The right-wing opposition, known for its strong alignment with Israel, has organized a series of meetings with the Israeli ambassador and has provided venues for him to screen films that claim to depict “terrorist activities” by resistance groups. A Brazilian state also awarded Benjamin Netanyahu the title of “honorary citizen,” and Bolsonaro’s wife cast her vote in recent elections while wearing a T-shirt depicting an the Israeli flag. This aligns with right-wing policies that mirrored those of US President Donald Trump, including recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, supporting the Abraham Accords between Arab countries and Israel, and denying the existence of Palestine. Additionally, Netanyahu was hosted as the first Israeli prime minister to visit Brazil. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro decided against moving the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem after receiving warnings from the agricultural lobby, as previously mentioned. Conclusion  The information above highlights Brazil’s significant qualitative influence, particularly in Latin America, and the presence of overlapping factors in decision-making. It also underscores the current favorable environment under President da Silva’s leadership to support the Palestine issue, driven by the severe Israeli actions and the war on GS. Thus, it is essential to intensify efforts to develop the relationship with Brazil both officially and publicly. This includes increasing activities and events in Portuguese, facilitating visits and engaging directly with Brazilian agricultural lobbies and through Arab diplomats. Additionally, Arab Christians, especially Palestinians living in Brazil, should actively engage with Brazilian Christian communities, particularly the Catholic sectors.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The next president of the US will face various challenges that divide the nation, including a nuclear defense policy. The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy. Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal. The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those threats, along with China’s growing military might, US Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China. Thanks to those events and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people. And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China. The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation  The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5th, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.) At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21st, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities. Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow. Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable. The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it. In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.) Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5th, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them. The Three-Way Arms Race  Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable. Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states. Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike. Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China. As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program. The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China. “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal. Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation. The Need for Citizen Advocacy  For many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale. And one thing should be made clear: adding more weapons to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.” A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Minimising the number of one’s enemies while multiplying one’s number of friends is a basic principle of diplomacy that has existed for centuries. The simplicity of the principle itself is more than compensated by the complexity of its practical implementation. In international relations, the price of friendship may be too high, limiting freedom of manoeuvre, while open hostility brings existing contradictions to the limit, radically resolving them in favour of one side or another. Advising a diplomat to expand alliances and limit confrontations is like advising a stock market player to buy shares when they are cheap and sell when they are expensive. It is obvious that minimising the number of rivals allows you to save resources, concentrate them on the tasks of internal development, and not be torn on several fronts. However, it is also obvious that competition may be preferable to concessions to the demands of the opposite side, especially when it comes to issues of principle. The situation is further complicated by the fact that countries can compete in some areas while remaining partners in others. Then adjusting the balance of cooperation and competition becomes even more difficult. The transition of international relations to extreme forms of rivalry is quite possible; history is full of such episodes. In such situations, the key task becomes not so much preserving the remnants of friendship as a preparation for the upcoming war, which the parties may consider inevitable, waging war by proxies, and entering into confrontation at a convenient moment. The bottom line is that the one who finds the optimal balance of allies and rivals will be able to conserve resources, and if confrontation is inevitable, will be able to withstand it, emerge victorious, and make use of the results of victory. The current state of international relations demonstrates a steady tendency towards the multiplication of deterrence tasks among the three key global centres of military power—the United States, China and Russia. Each of them has an increasing number of opponents. Moreover, the increase in their number, as well as the degree of confrontation, has its roots in the relatively favourable situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington, Beijing, and Moscow enjoyed much more favourable external conditions: the number of rivals was negligible, while the density of partnerships was unprecedented. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the United States had virtually no rivals among the major powers. Relations with Russia were defined by a network of arms control treaties. It was difficult to call them cloudless, but even a semblance of confrontation from the Cold War era was very difficult to imagine. The key security problem for the United States was radical Islamism in its terrorist guise; Russia actively helped the United States in its fight against international terrorism, and China simply did not interfere. North Korea and Iran formed an “axis of evil” whose nuclear ambitions Washington tried to restrain with sanctions. Moscow and Beijing, if they did not help the Americans, then at least tried to find the optimal formula for solving nuclear problems via the UN Security Council. Some twenty years later, the situation for the United States has changed quite radically. China is perceived as a powerful and long-term rival in all senses. We are talking about a military-political, economic, and even ideological rivalry. It is difficult to compare China with the USSR during the Cold War. But in all three of these dimensions, it represents an alternative to American politics. Although the United States would like to keep the rivalry with China under control, especially given the close ties between the two economies, the task of containing China will become a priority for decades to come. Russia has turned from a weakened and extremely cautious partner into a tough and uncompromising adversary, as its interests in the post-Soviet space are being infringed upon, and its economy and military-industrial complex are being restored. Enmity with it requires a manifold increase in investments in support of Ukraine, an increased presence in Europe, and the modernisation of nuclear potential, taking into account the advance appearance of new missile systems in Moscow. The arms control regime has been torn to shreds. Washington is trying to control the escalation but could find itself at war with Russia, with the unlikely but growing risk of a nuclear exchange. The DPRK has both nuclear weapons and missiles capable of launching them. It would now be more difficult to crush North Korea.  US enmity towards Russia and its rivalry with China has provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to emerge from isolation. The same goes for Iran. The aggravation of US relations with Russia and China plays into Tehran’s hands in overcoming isolation and the blockade. The “axis of evil” that the United States so actively fought against has only strengthened, and in interaction with Russia and partly China, it will continue to strengthen. Russia and China themselves are also getting closer. A military alliance is a long way off. Moscow and Beijing are not striving for it. But their interaction is now closer, and the United States will no longer be able to use Russia to balance China. Chinese diplomacy has been building an extremely cautious foreign policy since the late 1970s. Beijing has most consistently adhered to the principle of minimizing adversaries and maximizing friends. In many ways, China has achieved its goal, having managed to create favourable foreign policy conditions for enormous economic growth, increasing the well-being of citizens and modernising the army. The problem is that such PRC growth, even taking into account the lack of expressed ambitions, has caused growing concern in the United States. As a result, Beijing was faced with the fact that Washington decided to act proactively, containing China while the possibilities for such containment remained in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Perhaps the PRC leadership would prefer to continue to enjoy the benefits of global peace and live amid conditions of minimal competition. But the results of successful modernisation are now becoming an issue that the United States considers a security challenge. This means China will have to live in response to the American policy of containment, which includes the building of anti-Chinese alliances. Here, American diplomacy will try to place its bets, including in India. However, India is too large and powerful a country to play a passive role. China, in turn, is building a special relationship with the United States' European NATO allies. Here Beijing could take into account the Russian experience of “special” relations with the European Union. Finally, Russia at the turn of the century had practically no serious rivals. The country was seriously weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union and controversial reforms. Political relations with the West have gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, but still haven’t reached a critical level, having been compensated with a high level of economic cooperation. In Asia, relations with US allies Japan and South Korea were also especially cordial without the burdens that remained in matters of European security. Today, almost the entire collective West is fighting against a strengthened Russia in Ukraine, supplying Kiev with weapons and ammunition, and providing Ukraine with finances, intelligence, military specialists, etc. Economic relations have been undermined for a long time by sanctions. Tokyo and especially Seoul have taken a more cautious position, but are still forced to follow the American line. The bottom line is that all three powers, for various reasons, have found themselves in a situation where the tasks of containment, expanding confrontation, and the need to resolve security issues involve using force or the threat of its use. Past economic ties have not held back political contradictions. Apparently, we are only at the beginning of an exacerbation. After all, the real fight between the two key rivals—the USA and China—is yet to come. One can argue for a long time about what is the root cause of the increase in deterrence—mistakes of diplomats or objective factors giving rise to rivalry. The result is what’s important. The three largest military-political centres simultaneously faced deteriorating foreign policy conditions, whereas twenty years ago all three were in a much more peaceful environment. The fate of the future world order still depends on the ability of the ‘troika’ to control rivalry and on the results of such rivalry. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club. Original published in Russian. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ssha-kitay-rossiya-umnozhenie-sderzhivaniya/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Pacific Islands Forum came to an end, the underlying questions remain: who has a voice and legitimacy to influence the region, and who doesn’t  The Pacific Islands – a grouping largely made up of small island developing states – is in the middle of an increasingly contested strategic space, making regional politics an important, and closely observed, site. At the end of August, Pacific Islands Forum heads of government met in Tonga for the organisation’s annual leaders’ meeting. Along with the Pacific heads of government, other dignitaries were also present, including United Nations Secretary General António Guterres. This is the apex event on the regional calendar, and it came with a crowded agenda, including issues like climate change, transnational crime and health security. But one of the pressing issues facing the Forum is an existential one, as membership debates and geopolitical tussles highlight: the question of who and what the Forum represents. In recent years, divisions within the region have become apparent, including the perceived marginalisation of North Pacific countries in what was initially called the South Pacific Forum. These tensions culminated in the decision by five Micronesian states to leave the Forum in 2021, although this was later reversed. Yet, the final Forum communiqué demonstrates that Pacific leaders are on the same page on many issues, covering agreed outcomes relating to health, education, fisheries and other key issues. Climate change was highlighted as ‘a matter of priority to the Pacific region’ and as an intersecting and broad-ranging issue affecting Pacific states. A new Pacific Policing Initiative – a proposal to create a multinational Pacific police force and invest in subregional policing hubs – was endorsed, although in a nod to some debate surrounding its implementation, leaders emphasised the need for further consultation. Emerging geopolitical frictions  A controversy over the final version of the communiqué, however, highlights enduring divisions in the Forum. In the communiqué initially published online on Friday afternoon, paragraph 66 read that ‘Leaders reaffirmed the 1992 Leaders decision on relations with Taiwan/Republic of China.’ This refers to Taiwan’s established status as a ‘development partner’ of the Forum. After public statements from China’s special envoy for the Pacific Qian Bo criticising this language, the communiqué was taken offline and revised, with the paragraph referencing Taiwan removed. Forum officials blamed the confusion on an administrative error. Three of the 18 full members of the Forum recognise Taiwan: Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu. While the Pacific was once a key focus of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy, its influence has waned in the region in recent years with moves from Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Nauru to shift recognition to Beijing, prompted by a diplomatic offensive by the People’s Republic of China. In an increasingly contested geopolitical context, Taiwan’s status in regards to the Forum is likely to remain a difficult topic for member countries. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not UN member states. In light of rising strategic competition, issues of membership of the Forum also raise existential questions for its future. In 2016, the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full Forum members. But their political status does pose interesting questions for the Forum, especially considering the recent riots and ongoing tensions in New Caledonia. In the Forum communiqué, leaders reaffirmed a decision to send a mission to New Caledonia, a move that has been fraught; prior to the meeting, the French Ambassador to the Pacific had asserted that ‘New Caledonia is French territory and it is the [French] State which decides on who enters’. The communiqué also endorsed the applications for associate member status for Guam and American Samoa, two US territories with clear ambitions to accede to full membership status in the future as New Caledonia and French Polynesia have. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not United Nations member states and also do not issue their own passports. Yet, the 2016 decision represented a substantive shift in the principles of Forum membership, one likely to bolster the claims to full membership of other territories. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Forum is becoming more representative in encompassing more Pacific polities and acknowledging the remarkable diversity in political status that exists in the region. On the other, an expanding membership raises questions of the influence of metropolitan powers like France and the US in the Forum. This is an already fraught conversation given the perceived outsized influence of founding member states Australia and New Zealand. Pacific leaders have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. France and the US, along with Australia and New Zealand, all have colonial histories – and, for many, an enduring colonial presence – in the region. Given this context, their present and prospective roles in the Forum have been critiqued as preventing the institution from being a truly Pacific space. Pacific leaders like former Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. Behind all of these decisions and controversies are fundamental questions: who has a voice in the Forum and who does not; who has the legitimacy to exert influence in the region and who does not. Resolving these issues in a way that strengthens the Forum’s own legitimacy as the primary regional institution is a pressing and existential matter. In the midst of this, what was not on the Forum agenda is also worth considering. Even in the presence of two elected women heads of government – President Hilda Heine of Marshall Islands and Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa of Samoa – and even following last year’s endorsement of a Revitalised Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration, gender equality is absent from the 2024 communiqué.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Following a massive bombardment of Lebanon, Israel has begun a land invasion of its northern neighbour. Troops have entered southern Lebanon in a bid to push Hezbollah back beyond the Litani River, 29 kilometres from the Israeli border. The stated goal is to facilitate the return of some 60,000 displaced Israelis to their homes in northern Israel. By killing Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and several of his commanders over the weekend, Israel has already struck a serious blow to the group. This has boosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s profile, despite a majority of Israelis wanting to see his departure. Israel is now set to repeat its Gaza operations in Lebanon, with a view to reordering the Middle East in its own interests. But has it bitten off more than it can chew? Unsuccessful track record  Israel has been here before. It invaded Lebanon as far as the capital Beirut in 1982, in an attempt to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was trying to extinguish the Palestinian resistance to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem that had existed since the 1967 Israeli–Arab War. 1982 was also the year Hezbollah was formed with the help of the recently established Islamic government in Iran. Israel empowered its Lebanese Christian allies to massacre hundreds of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut. It also forced the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to shift its headquarters from Beirut to Tunisia. Israel then carved out a security zone to the north of its border, but faced stiff resistance from Hezbollah. As Israeli casualties mounted, the then prime minister Ehud Barak made a unilateral withdrawal in 2000. The pullout amplified Hezbollah’s popularity and strength as a formidable political and paramilitary force against Israel and its allies. Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006 in a bid to wipe out Hezbollah. It failed to achieve its objective. After 34 days of bloody fighting and substantial costs for both sides, it accepted a United Nations Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, with Hezbollah emerging triumphant. Defiant warfare  Netanyahu feels confident of success this time. He also has the backing of his extremist ministers, especially those of national security, finance and defence. He depends on their support for his domestic political survival. Israel has more firepower than ever before. It has displayed it in the Gaza war while revenging Hamas’s killing of more than 1,000 Israelis and abducting some 240 Israeli and foreign nationals on October 7.   In scorched-earth operations, the Israel Defense Forces have flattened swathes of the Gaza Strip and killed more than 40,000 of its civilians – 35% of them were children – with two million more having been repeatedly displaced. In this, the Netanyahu leadership has ignored the norms of warfare, international humanitarian law, a UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, and the International Court of Justice’s warning against genocidal actions. Further, he has brazenly deflected widespread global condemnation of Israeli actions. Buttressing his defiant stance has been the United States’ “iron-clad” military, financial and economic support of Israel. Washington has just approved a further US$8.7 billion (about A$12.5 billion) aid package in support of Israel’s Lebanon campaign. Netanyahu has had no compelling reason even to be amiable to Washington’s calls for restraint or ceasefire. Will this time be different? Netanyahu’s confidence is reinforced still further by Israel’s nuclear capability. Although undeclared, Israel reportedly possesses many nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and military supremacy in the region. Netanyahu and his supporters have claimed their use of disproportionate force to be legitimate in self-defence against what it calls the terrorist tentacles (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah) of the Iranian octopus. With the US and several of its Western and regional Arab allies having shared his posture, Israel is now focused once more on the unfinished business of uprooting Hezbollah. Hezbollah forms a key element of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US. Netanyahu knows destroying the group would mean the breakup of Iran’s national and regional security system. He is not averse to risking a direct confrontation with Iran, while remaining assured of full US support in such an event. Tehran cannot be expected to abandon Hezbollah, but it also has other domestic and foreign policy priorities. Newly elected Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian has assumed power with promises to reduce theocratic political and social restrictions and improve living conditions for most Iranians. Pezeshkian is also committed to improving Iran’s regional and international relations, including reopening negotiations with the West (particularly the US) regarding Iran’s nuclear program, so as to end US-led sanctions. Pezeshkian appears to have the backing of the powerful Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has shown a willingness to be pragmatic when needed. His foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that Hezbollah is capable of defending itself. For now, Tehran’s approach is to let Israel be trapped in Lebanon, as on previous occasions. Hezbollah is not Hamas: it is damaged but still quite well armed and strategically placed. The group will be able to wage an endless resistance to Israeli occupation. This could come at high human and material costs for the Jewish state that could also prevent many Israelis from returning home to northern Israel. At this stage, it is important to remember two points. One is that after a year-long pernicious campaign, Israel still has not completely succeeded in extinguishing Hamas’s resistance. The job of taking on Hezbollah in a ground war could prove to be much harder and more hazardous. The other is that, like Netanyahu, former US president George W. Bush sought to reorder the Middle East according to US geopolitical preferences. He intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq under the guise of a war on terrorism and promoting democracy. But America’s actions further destabilised the region. Since World War II, the application of brute force has rarely served as a viable substitute for diplomacy in managing world problems.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  The historical legacy of the Israeli-South African relationship has contributed to the current ambiguity between the two parties. During the early stages, South Africa’s political landscape was divided between a regime that pursued racial discrimination and viewed Israel as an ally from 1948 to 1994. This relationship intensified after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and continued to develop rapidly until 1987, when international efforts to isolate South Africa’s apartheid regime began. Over these two decades, Israeli-South African relations expanded across various fields, including cooperation on the Israeli nuclear project. With the collapse of the apartheid regime and the victory of the nationalist forces led by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, South Africa’s relationship with Israel began to diverge without completely rescinding its recognition of Israel as a state. At that time, Israel maintained an embassy in Pretoria and a commercial office in Johannesburg, while South Africa had an embassy in Tel Aviv. There were also reciprocal visits between officials of the two countries. Notably, South Africa’s first president, Nelson Mandela, visited Israel in 1999, though he had previously hosted Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat in South Africa a year earlier. Current Nature of the Relationship  The Israeli-South African relationship is characterized by South Africa’s support for Palestinian statehood in the 1967 occupied territories, while still maintaining recognition of Israel despite occasional strains. These strains have included several notable events: the recall of the South African ambassador in 2010, the operation of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement in South Africa since 2012, the hosting of a Hamas delegation in 2015, the withdrawal of the South African ambassador and embassy staff from Israel in November 2023 following the first month of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and finally, South Africa’s filing of a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Israel of “genocide of the Palestinian people” in December 2023. Major Changes Following Operation al-Aqsa Flood  In the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa flood, the relationship between Israel and South Africa experienced two key developments that will shape the future of their relationship: 1. The results of the June 2024 elections in South Africa, which saw 52 parties contesting, with 18 parties securing seats in parliament. Notably, the outcome of these elections highlights: a. The ANC, which has been the strongest advocate for the Palestine issue, has diminished in influence. Comparing its seat count from the 2019 to the 2024 elections, the number decreased from 230 to 159 seats, representing a loss of 71 seats, or 31% of its total voting power. b. This outcome suggests that the ANC will no longer be able to unilaterally pass its decisions, particularly in foreign policy, as it has been able to since 1994, when it enjoyed a comfortable majority to advance its governmental decisions. c. To further complicate the situation, other political forces that, to varying extents, opposed the ANC’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood have made significant progress and are now part of a national unity government. These forces include: • The Democratic Alliance (DA), which primarily represents white communities and supports Israel, increased its seats from 84 to 87 between 2019 and 2024. • The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), representing Zulu communities, grew its representation from 14 to 17 seats. • The Patriotic Alliance, which declared its support for Israel following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, secured 8 seats. These election results have diminished the ANC’s ability to monopolize decision-making, placing it in a difficult position as it balances its commitment to Palestine with its interest in maintaining the government coalition. 2. A growing number of countries have joined South Africa in bringing the genocide case against Israel before the ICJ under Articles 62 and 63 of the Court’s Statute. The following countries have formally requested to join the case: Nicaragua (February 8), Belgium (March 11), Colombia (April 5), Turkey (May 1), and Libya (May 10). Additionally, several countries have expressed their intention to join, including Egypt (May 12), Maldives (May 13), Mexico (May 24), Ireland (May 28), Chile (June 2), Spain (June 6), not to mention Palestine (June 3), and Cuba (June 22). However, the court has not yet ruled on any of these requests. The growing number of accession requests strengthens the credibility of South Africa’s case, reflecting the increasing international criticism of Israel. Future Role  South Africa is a significant center of influence on the African continent, ranking sixth in terms of population. However, its internal situation will play a critical role in determining its ability to maintain its political stance on the Middle Eastern conflict. The structure of the coalition government—led by President Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC, with a deputy from the DA—complicates decision-making, as previously noted. Additionally, traditional power dynamics suggest a country with diminishing regional and international influence. Beyond South Africa’s moral authority, rooted in its history of overcoming apartheid, the country faces considerable challenges. It ranks first globally in the Gini index [Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution]. Furthermore, its score of –0.72 on the Political Stability Index, coupled with a 33.55% unemployment rate, undermine its capacity to exert influence. An essential facet of South Africa’s international diplomacy is its efforts to shape global rules, aiming to achieve a “soft balance” with dominant regional and international powers. South Africa has effectively leveraged its diplomatic resources to strengthen its ties to various international networks and to reshape the global framework to its advantage. This success is exemplified by its early membership in the BRICS group, its active role in conflict resolution in Africa—having contributed to the settlement of nine African conflicts—and its efforts to enhance the African Union’s role. Notably, South Africa outpaced many global powers in drafting resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly between 1994 and 2023. This achievement is reflected in South Africa’s rise on the political globalization index, moving from approximately 47 points to about 89 points between 1994 and 2022. Additionally, South Africa’s leadership in raising the issue of “genocide” against Israel and the influx of countries from all continents seeking to align with South Africa further underscores this diplomatic trend, which the Palestinian resistance should strategically leverage. Conclusion  South Africa will continue to support the Palestine issue in the foreseeable future, though this support may be less effective due to the recent election results. However, it is crucial to strengthen ties with the ruling ANC and leverage its alliance with Al Jama-Ah Islamic party (which holds two seats) and other pro-Palestine parties, especially in advising on managing relations with South Africa. Additionally, it is important to capitalize on South Africa’s moral standing and its advancements in political globalization indicators.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”