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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In the current global disorder, the countries that comprise Latin America are simultaneously emerging as key players in tipping the balance of global power and are courted by major powers seeking influence and access to their natural resources, infrastructure, and services. For a decade, China has been growing in importance in the region, driven by its interest in establishing itself there through the Belt and Road Initiative, loans, investment, and construction, challenging the United States for relevance on the continent as a preferred ally. Currently, another player of the magnitude of India is slowly but surely making inroads in Latin America in trade, financing, and political relations, and is being courted by many Latin American states as an alternative to the risks that staking everything on an alliance with China can entail. Brazil, the undisputed regional leader, maintains privileged relations with both Asian giants, and the three countries cooperate and share interests and forums, such as the BRICS+ and the G20+, where common projects are developed. Introduction: a relationship with historical background The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization led to growing regional competition in Asia, focused on both political influence and economic dominance. One of the most significant developments in the aftermath of these transformations has been the consolidation of China as a regional and, subsequently, global power. In the current context, China, India, and other nations are seeking to expand their alliances and redefine their strategies, including their relationship with Latin America, a region that has experienced multiple phases of engagement with external actors throughout its history. During the 19th and 20th centuries, interaction was centered on Europe and the United States; however, since the 21st century, the dynamics have diversified and taken on a multipolar character. Today, Latin American countries are the object of interest of various powers, from China and Japan to India and Iran. While China's presence in Latin America is evident and significant, India has traditionally maintained a more distant stance, except for Brazil.1 For decades, the limited interaction between India and Latin America was mainly attributed to factors such as geographical remoteness and lack of strategic opportunities. However, this perception has changed since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. In recent years, China has considerably expanded its influence in the region through various mechanisms, while India seeks first to integrate into this dynamic and, in the medium, to compete with China in certain areas. China has established itself as one of Latin America's main trading partners, as well as one of its largest global lenders and investors.2 Its influence does not currently compare with that of India, but rivals that of the United States, the only country that surpasses it in terms of exports and imports in the continent, and the European Union in multiple sectors. In the political and diplomatic sphere, China has made significant progress, such as persuading five Latin American countries - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama - to transfer their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China, although Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay are still doing so. It has also established alliances with countries sanctioned by the US - Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela - which it has supported with loans, military cooperation, and investment. However, in a context of global uncertainty, several Latin American countries are seeking to diversify their strategic alliances and reduce the risks of excessive dependence on a single power. In this scenario, India emerges as a relevant actor, with the potential to balance China's presence in the medium term in key sectors such as trade, infrastructure, supply chains, technology and defence, where India still has ample room for growth in the continent. China in Latin America: economic and strategic expansion China has indisputably been the most influential actor in Latin America between the two Asian powers, especially in the economic sphere, standing out for its participation in infrastructure projects in the Southern Cone as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Since the beginning of the 21st century, its presence in the region has grown rapidly, with Chinese state-owned companies consolidating themselves as key players in strategic sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology, surpassing in some areas even the United States, traditionally dominant in these areas. In addition, China has strengthened its influence through cultural and diplomatic mechanisms. The links between China and Latin America have historical roots dating back to the 16th century, when the Manila Galleon facilitated the exchange of goods such as porcelain, silk and spices between China and the Viceroyalty of New Spain. After the independence of Latin American countries in the 1840s, there was a major Chinese migration, with hundreds of thousands of workers employed on sugar plantations, in mines and as servants in countries such as Cuba and Peru, a phenomenon that persisted throughout the 19th century. Today, Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela are home to the largest Chinese communities on the continent. Initially, most Latin American countries did not recognize Mao's government after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949; however, following US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, most Latin American states established diplomatic relations with Beijing, thus initiating a period of cooperation in the cultural, economic and political spheres. On the economic front, China has established itself as a major player. In 2000, the Chinese market represented less than 2 % of Latin American and Caribbean exports, but its demand, especially for raw materials, has grown exponentially.3 By 2024, China would absorb 17% of these exports, with a value of more than 500 billion dollars.4 The main products exported by the region include soybeans and other vegetables, copper, oil and other raw materials, while imports from China consist mainly of manufactured goods. In countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, China has become the main trading partner.5 The strengthening of economic ties has been formalized through comprehensive strategic partnerships with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. China has also signed free trade agreements with Chile - the first country in the region to do so in 2005 - Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru, while negotiations with Uruguay remain stalled. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, twenty-two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have signed agreements with China, which have facilitated investments and loans amounting to more than USD 9 billion, equivalent to 6 % of China's total investment abroad. These investments, managed through the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank, have largely gone to energy and infrastructure projects, in many cases in exchange for oil. Venezuela has been the main recipient, doubling the amount received by Brazil, the second largest recipient.6 China's impact in Latin America is manifested in infrastructure development and the energy sector. Chinese investments have financed the construction of refineries and processing plants in countries with coal, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium deposits. In the case of copper, China is the main buyer of Chilean production, purchasing more than 40 % of the country's exports. China has also taken a special interest in lithium, with significant investments in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, countries that make up the so-called 'Lithium Triangle' and account for approximately half of global lithium reserves, although the development of these projects has raised environmental concerns.7 At the same time, China has promoted the financing of renewable energies, with outstanding initiatives such as the largest solar plant in Latin America in Jujuy, Argentina, and the Punta Sierra wind farm in Coquimbo, Chile. Since former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's historic thirteen-day tour of Latin America in 2001, high-level political exchanges have intensified. President Xi Jinping has visited the region five times since coming to power in 2013, most recently in November 2024, when he reaffirmed the construction of major projects, including the port of Chancay in Peru.8 China has financed various infrastructure projects in Latin America, including airports, roads, ports and rail networks. Chinese companies control more than a hundred ports around the world, of which at least a dozen are in Latin America and the Caribbean.9 In terms of technology and communications, China has promoted projects in artificial intelligence, smart cities and 5G networks, with the participation of companies such as Huawei. Likewise, cooperation in space has become relevant, with the installation of the largest Chinese space base abroad in Argentine Patagonia and the construction of satellite ground stations in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.10 China has also consolidated its presence in Latin America through soft power strategies, strengthening cultural and educational ties through the Confucius Institute, student scholarships and the expansion of Spanish-language media, such as CGTN and Xinhua. Furthermore, it has reinforced its image as a supportive actor at the international level, which was evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic with the supply of vaccines and medical equipment to governments in the region. In this context, China's influence in Latin America is projected as a long-term phenomenon, with implications that span the economic, political, and cultural spheres, in a scenario in which other powers, such as India, are also seeking a presence in the region. India's arrival and expansion in Latin America Historically, relations between India and Latin America have been limited due to geographical distance, the absence of common strategic interests and the lack of a consolidated bilateral agenda. Latin America occupied a marginal role in India's foreign policy, despite diplomatic visits such as Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's 1961 visit to Mexico and Indira Gandhi's 1968 visit to eight countries in the region. A significant change occurred in the 1990s, when India signed trade agreements with seven Latin American countries and promoted the FOCUS LAC program (1997), designed to strengthen economic relations with the region.The turning point in India's perception of Latin America came in 2014, when the newly appointed prime minister, Narendra Modi, participated in the BRICS Summit in Brazil. The expansion of the India-Mercosur Preferential Trade Agreement, initially signed in 2004, but extended in 2016,11 evidenced India's commitment to strengthening its ties with the region. Bilateral trade between India and Latin America currently stands at USD 43 billion, with Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia as its main trading partners. Like China, India finds in Latin America a key source of mineral resources, such as copper, lithium, and iron ore, essential for its growing industrial demand. An example of this was the strategic partnership agreement signed in 2023 between India's Altmin Private Limited and Bolivia's state-owned lithium company. The region has also become an important partner in the supply of oil: in recent years, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil have accounted for 30 % of crude oil exports to India. In return, India exports products from strategic sectors such as information technology and pharmaceuticals to Latin America. India is also involved in infrastructure development in the region, investing in railways, roads, and energy supply systems.12 In 2022, India's foreign policy gave a new signal of rapprochement with Latin America by bringing the Latin American members of the G20 (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) under the jurisdiction of the foreign minister, rather than a junior minister. In April 2023, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar made a historic visit to Guyana, Panama, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, marking the first time an Indian foreign minister had visited these countries. This tour reflected the growing importance of Latin America on India's diplomatic agenda as the region with the second highest number of projects spearheaded after Asia: India currently has 181 projects in Asia, thirty-two in Latin America and the Caribbean, and three in Central Asia and Oceania. These initiatives have expanded qualitatively in recent years, especially in terms of the size of the credit lines and the complexity of the projects.13 While on 3 August 2023 and on the sidelines of the ninth meeting of the Confederation of India-Latin America and Caribbean Industry in New Delhi, Jaishankar advocated deepening India-Latin America engagements, especially in the areas of agriculture, supply chain diversification and mutual resource sharing partnership. Thus, while China has captured greater political and diplomatic attention in the region, India's presence has raised expectations.14 Unlike China, India is a democracy and faces similar challenges to many Latin American countries, which has facilitated its rapprochement with the region. Its economic growth has sparked interest in Latin America, leading several governments to prioritize relations with India in their foreign policy strategies. Although its expansion in the region responds in part to the intention of countering China's influence, India seeks to consolidate itself as an actor with a vision of strategic autonomy and a stance aligned with non-alignment, promoting relations based on cooperation and the diversification of partners. However, its presence still faces structural limitations, such as the lack of effective regional integration and its limited participation in key Latin American blocs such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).15 At the G20 summit+, held in Rio de Janeiro on 18-19 November, Modi took the opportunity to hold bilateral meetings, apart from with Brazilian President Lula, with some of India's most important partners in the Latin American region, including Argentina and Chile, where a bilateral meeting with President Gabriel Boric marked the expansion of the India-Chile Preferential Trade Agreement, described by Chile as a genuine Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement on a par with those India has signed with the United Arab Emirates, South Korea or Japan, overcoming with Chile New Delhi's reluctance to corroborate these free trade agreements. India is aware that its influence in Latin America is minor compared to that of China, but it also recognizes its growth potential.16 One of its main resources to strengthen its presence in the region is soft power, especially through its cultural projection. Elements such as the Bollywood film industry, gastronomy, and traditional practices such as yoga have gained popularity in Latin America, facilitating the expansion of India's influence in the region and contributing to its positioning as an emerging global partner. Partners in BRICS+: China and India's influence on Brazil Both China and India have a special relationship with the Latin American giant, Brazil, as the three countries share several international forums, most notably BRICS+, of which Argentina - a candidate country and finally accepted as a member at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August 2023 - dropped out in early 2024, after Javier Milei's victory in the presidential elections. Brazil has been a key country in the expansion strategy of China, which has become the main trading partner and one of its main investors, and now of India in Latin America, especially due to the economic size, natural resources and regional leadership capacity of the Brazilian giant.17 All in all, China has a more dominant presence in the Brazilian economy, while India is gaining space in the technology, pharmaceutical and energy trade sectors. If the trend continues, India could strengthen its influence, but it is unlikely to overtake China in the short to medium term. Starting precisely with China, diplomatic relations with Brazil have evolved significantly in recent decades, consolidating into a strategic link in the commercial, investment and technological spheres, except during Jair Bolsonaro's term in office between 2019 and 2023, when even China expressed concern over the hostile statements of the then Brazilian president.18 During the last two years the relationship has been on the right track and even in 2024 the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of official relations was celebrated. In March 2023, Lula visited China with the aim of strengthening trade and political ties between the two nations, which had deteriorated during Bolsonaro's term in office. During the visit, an agreement was announced to trade in yuan instead of dollars, reducing dependence on the US financial system and strengthening Brazil's financial autonomy in the international arena.19 Apart from politics, and although Brazil has never joined the Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral Sino-Brazilian trade has grown steadily since the mid-2000s, dominated by the export of raw materials, especially oil, and attracting important Chinese state-owned companies such as China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec in its acronym) and China National Petroleum Corporation. Subsequently, Chinese investment diversified into strategic sectors such as power generation and distribution, with the presence of conglomerates such as State Grid and China Three Gorges, manufacturing, with the arrival of Chinese companies from various sectors, These include BYD, TCL, Gree, Midea and Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, the mining sector, and the agricultural sector, where Chinese firms such as COFCO and Long-Ping High-Tech have expanded their operations, from product marketing to the manufacture of chemical inputs for agribusiness. In infrastructure, Chinese participation has been significant with projects driven by China Communications Construction Company and China Merchants Port, which in 2018 acquired the Paranaguá Container Terminal. The future seems to point towards increased Chinese investment in new communications infrastructure, energy transition and technology. In 2021, despite Bolsonaro's criticism, Brazilian regulators reversed their decision to ban Huawei from developing the country's 5G networks, which came weeks after China provided Brazil with millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccine20 , while two years later, the two countries announced their participation in joint technological projects such as the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) for monitoring the Amazon.21 India has also had a strong influence on Brazil, at least culturally, since Gandhi's time, as his teachings on non-violence gave rise to social movements and partly shaped the two countries' non-aligned foreign policy. Economically, Brazil is one of India's most important partners in Latin America, being the largest importer (over 41 %) and exporter (over 29 %) to India, with significant investments in sectors such as information technology, energy, mining, and automobiles. Already in 2022, India's exports to Brazil exceeded those of Germany, Australia, South Korea, or Indonesia. Brazil is now among the top ten export destinations from India, spurred by a 295% increase in refined oil sales. India's imports from Brazil increased, driven by purchases of soybean oil. Relations between Brazil and India have never been particularly intense, but under Lula's third presidency this has also changed. In the political sphere, they share strategic objectives, such as the reform of the UN Security Council, where they aspire to obtain a permanent seat, as well as their collaboration in global initiatives, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the aforementioned BRICS+ and the G20+ of emerging economies. In 2020, the 'Brazil-India Defence Dialogue' was established for the first time and agreements were signed to expand technological collaboration in the military field. Brazilian companies such as Taurus have entered into partnerships with Indian companies, such as Jindal, for the joint production of armaments. In addition, Brazil is exploring the export of military technology, including cargo and training aircraft, armored vehicles and submarines, to which China, a traditional supplier of aircraft and equipment to several countries on the continent, including Brazil, responded in January 2025 by offering the Brazilian government the acquisition of the fourth-generation Chengdu-10 fighter.22 Finally, both states wish to diversify their external relations. India, concerned about its geopolitical rivalry with China, seeks a pragmatic balance between close relations with the US and other regional actors, such as in the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD), while maintaining its long-standing ties with Russia. Historically, Brazil has sought to mitigate US influence in South America, something that continues under President Lula's government. However, like other Latin American countries, it is also aware of its economic vulnerability stemming from its high dependence on commodity exports to China and its current dearth of foreign investment. Another forum shared by Brazil, China and India is the G20+. The rotating presidency in 2024 was held by Lula da Silva, who focused the organization’s objectives on three priorities, highlighted in the final declaration: social inclusion and the fight against hunger and poverty; sustainable development, with energy transition and the fight against climate change and, thirdly, the reform of global governance institutions, both from China and India not only ratified the declaration, but even Narendra Modi devoted special attention to Brazil's priorities, echoing New Delhi's common interests in renewable energy, the elimination of poverty and hunger, and focusing on nutrition and food security.23 Xi Jinping, also present at the summit and later on an official visit to Brasilia, expressed his support for President Lula's proposal to create the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, underlining China's commitment to inclusive and equitable development, while signing 37 bilateral agreements between Brazil and China in various fields, such as trade, finance, infrastructure and environmental protection.24 Conclusion: Still unequal competition China and India have adopted different strategies in their relations with Latin America, strategies that have been marked by time in terms of their interest in being present in the continent. While China has established itself as a dominant player in recent times and in terms of investment and project financing in the main Latin American countries, India has awakened in the last decade after a historical lack of interest in this area and is beginning to focus an increasing presence on matters such as technological cooperation and trade in strategic sectors, especially the supply of crude oil. In fact, both China and India have realized that the South American region is a key partner for the supply of raw materials to economies in continuous expansion and, in terms of international politics, the consolidation of new alliances in the so-called global south. India is a potential competitor in several economic niches, and in some of them it is even a major player, such as in information technology, the pharmaceutical sector, where Indian companies have maintained a leading position in exporting products to Latin America, and the automotive industry, where sales are fairly balanced. However, they are the exception that proves the rule, since in general terms, China maintains a substantial advantage in trade and investment figures in Latin America, operating on a completely different scale to India and the result of its interest for much longer. Another difference between the two Asian giants in terms of their influence in Latin America is their involvement in treaties, agreements, and deeper bilateral relations with Latin American countries. Indeed, one of the main challenges for India lies in the lack of a stable institutional framework through which to strengthen its relationship with Latin American countries, unlike China, which has long established trade agreements and strategic initiatives with various countries and regional blocs, starting with the Belt and Road Initiative itself. India has not yet developed comprehensive free trade agreements, cooperation mechanisms similar to China's, or bilateral agreements with supranational groupings such as SICA, CELAC, Mercosur or the Pacific Alliance, which constrains the growth of its trade. On the other hand, India has an advantage over China, such as the prestige of its traditional non-alignment and its historical representativeness of developing countries. In a region like Latin America whose countries recurrent structural obstacles, such as inflation, social and political instability and chronic infrastructure deficits, the geopolitical context and the ideological leanings of the different governments make China's presence, its network of trade agreements and its diversified investment strategy stable... until now, as this may change in the future. Diversifying risks and investments with options such as India represents a positive factor for Latin American countries, as well as a significant challenge for India. The relationship between India, China and Latin America is beneficial for Latin American countries, which are expanding their possibilities for bilateral cooperation on issues such as trade, climate change and security, while increasing competitiveness between the two Asian giants in a scenario that has traditionally been geographically and culturally distant, but which is currently of unquestionable interest to them. So far, China's predominance in the region seems to remain unchanged and it has even overtaken the United States as the main trading partner and source of investment in most South American countries. Competing in this division could take India several years, although the Chinese example itself shows that the arrival of agreements, treaties, cooperation, and investment from India could exponentially increase its influence in the continent in a few years' time. In recent times, Latin America has diversified its economic and diplomatic relations, reducing its dependence on a single strategic partner, be it China or the United States, another major player in this game of competition in the region. Although the decline in the role of the United States is notorious, precisely because of the irruption of the Chinese presence,25 especially in the economy, many countries have continued to move towards greater autonomy and diversification of their international ties, a trend that seems to be consolidating, regardless of the changes in US policy with the beginning of Trump's second term in office in the United States and his policy towards Latin America. Both the desire to diversify relations beyond the China option and the possible US disinterest in the region may benefit India's interests, although it is clear that China will continue to be the dominant actor in the region. References 1 GANGOPADHYAY, Aparajita. "India-China Competitions in Latin America: Some Observations", Global & Strategis, Th. 8, No. 1. January-June, 2014. Available at: http://irgu.unigoa.ac.in/drs/bitstream/handle/unigoa/4110/Jurnal_Global_dan_Strategis_8%281%29_2014_1-13.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 13/3/2025).2 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues?", The Diplomat. 19 May 2022. Available at: India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues? - The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/india-vs-china-in-latin-america-competing-actors-or-in-separate-leagues/ (accessed 13/3/2025)3 DADUSH, Uri. 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Available at: Mercosur-India talks expected to expand preferential trade agreement - MercoPress https://en.mercopress.com/2016/08/15/mercosur-india-talks-expected-to-expand-preferential-trade-agreement (accessed 13/3/2025).12 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Latin America's tryst with the other Asian giant, India", Wilson Center. May 2022. Available in: Microsoft Word - LAP PUB Template.docx (accessed 13/3/2025).13 JAISHANKAR, Subrahmanyam. The Indian way. Strategies for an uncertain world. Harper Collins India, 2020, pp. 107-108.14 "Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement', The Hindu. 3 August 2023. Available at: Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement - The Hindu https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-bats-for-deeper-india-latin-america-engagement/article67153329.ece (accessed 13/3/2025).15 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century," Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief no. 634. April 2023. Available at: Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century https://www.orfonline.org/research/redrawing-india-latin-america-relations-in-the-21st-century (accessed 13/3/2025).16 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America", Observer Research Foundation. 10 December 2024. Available at: The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-g20-turns-new-delhi-s-eyes-on-latin-america (accessed 13/3/2025).17 BLASCO, Emili J. "Brasil: la persistente ambición de un país que se imagina a sí mismo como continente", Middle Powers: Transitando hacia un orden multipolar. IEEE Strategy Notebook, 225. June 2024. Available at: Ch. 5. Strategy Notebook 225.pdf (accessed 13/3/2025).18 SPRING, Jake. "Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil", Reuters. 26 October 2018. Available at: Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil | Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/world/bolsonaros-anti-china-rants-have-beijing-nervous-about-brazil-idUSKCN1MZ0DR/ (accessed 13/3/2025).19 "Brazil and China agreed to trade in each other's currencies to bypass the dollar", Infobae. 30 March 2023. Available in: Brazil and China agreed to trade in their currencies to bypass the dollar - Infobae https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/03/29/brasil-y-china-acordaron-comerciar-en-sus-monedas-para-eludir-el-dolar/ (accessed 13/3/2025).20 RIVERA, Jhonnattan. "Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei", Techbro. 1 March 2021. Available at: Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei - TechBros https://somostechbros.com/2021/03/01/brasil-aprueba-reglas-de-subasta-del-espectro-5g-sin-prohibicion-a-huawei/ (accessed 13/3/2025).21 CARIELLO, Tulio. "50 years of Brazil-China relations: Solid foundations for a sustainable future", Red China & Latin America. 1 September 2024. Available at: 50 años de relaciones Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para un futuro sostenible / 50 anos de relações Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para um futuro sustentável - Red China y América Latina https://chinayamericalatina.com/50-anios-de-relaciones-brasil-china-bases-solidas-para-un-futuro-sostenible/ (accessed 13/3/2025).22 "China offers Brazil the Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap", Galaxia Militar. 9 January 2025. Available in: China offers Brazil Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap. - Galaxia Militar, https://galaxiamilitar.es/china-ofrece-a-brasil-el-chengdu-j-10-para-cubrir-la-brecha-de-aviones-de-combate/ (accessed 13/3/2025).23 "Prime Minister's Remarks at the G20 Session on "Social Inclusion and the Fight Against Hunger and Poverty", Prime Minister's Office. 18 November 2024. Available at: Press Release: Press Information Bureau, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2074413 (accessed 13/3/2025).24 VILELA, Pedro Rafael. "Brazil and China sign 37 bilateral agreements", Agencia Brasil. November 21, 2024. Available at: Brasil y China firman 37 acuerdos bilaterales | Agência Brasil, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/es/politica/noticia/2024-11/brasil-y-china-firman-37-acuerdos-bilaterales (accessed 13/3/2025).25 RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ, María. "Iberoamérica ¿prefiere a mamá China o a papá Estados Unidos?", bie3: Boletín IEEE (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies), 34. April-June, 2024, pp. 542-559. Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/ejemplar?codigo=672227&info=open_link_ejemplar (accessed 13/3/2025).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction  We are only two and a half months into the new Trump administration. However, President Donald Trump's long-threatened tariffs have plunged the country into a trade war abroad. On-again, off-again, new tariffs continue to escalate uncertainty around the world. Trump already launched a trade war during his first term in office, but he has more sweeping tariff plans right now. The second Trump administration has embarked on a new and more aggressive tariff policy, citing various economic and national security concerns. His administration has proposed, imposed, suspended, revoked, and then reimposed various new tariffs. It could be difficult for average citizens to keep up with all the proposals. As of March 19, 2025, there are ten proposed or active tariff initiatives. They range from broad-based tariffs that cover all goods from a certain country (China, Mexico, Canada) to tariffs that cover certain types of goods (aluminum & steel), promises of future tariffs (copper, lumber, automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical), and promised retaliatory tariffs (European wine and other alcoholic beverages). Moreover, although we have seen more tariff announcements in the first two months of the second Trump administration than in the entire first Trump administration, "fair and reciprocal" tariff rollout will overpower the tariffs imposed until today. The ten tariff initiatives that are proposed or in play are as follows in Table 1.   This paper aims to evaluate economic impacts of tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. It first explains the effects of tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration and then forecasts the impacts of the second Trump administration's tariffs.  II. Literature on Tariff Effects A tariff is a type of tax that a government adds to imported goods. Companies importing goods pay the tariff to the government. If any part of a product arrives with a tariff, whether it is an imported avocado or a car built locally with imported steel, its cost is part of the price everyday consumers pay before sales tax.  Economists reject tariffs as an effective tool to improve the welfare of U.S. citizens or strengthen key industries. In a survey conducted during the first Trump administration, 93 % of economic experts did not agree that targeted tariffs on aluminium and steel would improve Americans' welfare. Recent research has strengthened economists' opposition to this policy instrument. Numerous studies demonstrate that American consumers entirely bear the burden of tariffs imposed during the first Trump administration, with disproportionately large impacts on lower-income U.S. households. A framework for analysing the impact of higher import tariffs on the economy is provided by Mundell and Fleming. Mundell (1961) claimed that the country that raised tariffs on imported products may benefit because more people choose domestically produced products over imported ones. Protection from foreign competition could also benefit domestic industries. Large countries can also benefit from improved terms of trade. However, increased tariffs on imported products are assumed to lead to an increase in the current account balance by increasing savings relative to investment. Higher savings dampen aggregate demand. The situation of households deteriorates because of rising consumer prices. Domestic industries are also negatively affected by lower household demand and the need to pay more for imported input products.  Over the years, Mundell and Fleming's model has been developed further by other scholars such as Eichengreen (1981), Krugman (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Eichengreen (2018). Overall, the theoretical literature demonstrates that higher import tariffs could affect the economy through various channels. The impacts of tariffs on the economy differ between a nation imposing the tariffs and nations exporting to the nation raising the tariffs. However, nations that are not subject to the increased import duties are also affected. Main effects of higher tariffs are as follows: Higher inflation: Higher import tariffs lead to higher prices for imported products. Depending on which tariffs are increased, this could lead to higher prices for both consumers and companies. Domestic firms may also raise their prices because of reduced competition from foreign companies (Cavallo et al. (2021)).  Higher consumer prices lead to a decline in real disposable household income, which hampers private consumption. Higher business costs have impacts on companies' profits, which in turn dampen employment and companies' willingness to invest. Companies are also more likely to pass on some of their higher costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. The rise in imported prices might be smaller in large countries, as they are more able to influence the world price of products. Increased consumption of other products: Higher imported prices can lead companies and consumers to increasingly buy cheaper domestic products. But it can also lead to increased imports of products from countries not subject to higher import tariffs.  Domestic industries are protected: Higher import tariffs improve the competitive position of domestic companies. These benefits can lead to increased investment, production, and employment in protected industries. However, the longer-term effect of protecting some domestic industries from foreign competition can be negative, as it might reduce incentives to improve production efficiency, thereby dampening productivity and GDP.  Decreased trade: Increased tariffs usually lead to reduced trade. This can lead to reduced knowledge transfer between nations in the form of less direct investment, reduced technology transfer, and reduced access to skilled labour. These factors in turn can lead to companies moving further away from the technological frontier, thereby hampering productivity (Dornbusch (1992) and Frankel and Romer (1999)).  Stronger exchange rate: When demand changes from foreign to domestic production, the exchange rate tends to rise to balance it out. One reason is that higher inflation often leads to higher interest rates relative to other nations. The nominal exchange rate might appreciate if imports decline significantly and demand for foreign currency drops. An appreciation of the exchange rate hampers exports but keeps imports cheaper.  Global value chains: Higher tariffs can lead to disruptions in global value chains by making imported inputs from abroad pricier. If firms are part of global value chains, higher costs for firms facing higher import costs may also lead to higher costs for domestic firms further down the production chain.  Uncertainty and confidence: Higher import tariffs may increase uncertainty about future trade policy and lead to increased pessimism among households and companies. Such uncertainty may hamper household consumption and business investment (Boer and Rieth (2024)).  III. Tariffs under the first Trump administration The first Trump administration's tariffs involved protectionist trade initiatives against other nations, notably China.  In January 2018, the Trump administration-imposed tariffs on solar panels and washing machines of 30–50%. In March 2018, the administration-imposed tariffs on aluminium (10%) and steel (25%), which are imported from most countries. In June 2018, the Administration expanded these tariffs to include the EU, Mexico, and Canada. The Trump administration separately set and escalated tariffs on products imported from China, leading to a trade war between the U.S. and China.  In their responses, U.S. trading partners imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products. Canada imposed matching retaliatory tariffs on July 1, 2018. China implemented retaliatory tariffs equivalent to the $34 billion tariff imposed on it by the U.S. In June 2019, India imposed retaliatory tariffs on $240 million worth of U.S. products.  However, tariff negotiations in North America were under way and successful, with the U.S. lifting steel and aluminium tariffs on Mexico and Canada on May 20, 2019. Mexico and Canada joined Argentina and Australia, which were the only countries exempted from the tariffs. But on May 30, Trump announced on his own that he would put a 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico starting on June 10, 2019. The tariffs would go up to 10% on July 1, and then by another 5% every month for three months, until illegal immigrants stopped coming through Mexico and into the U.S. Then the tariffs were averted on June 7 after negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico. U.S. tariffs on Chinese products had been applied as follows: On March 22, 2018, Trump signed a memorandum under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to apply tariffs of $50 billion on Chinese products. In response, China announced plans to implement its tariffs on 128 U.S. products. 120 of those products, such as fruit and wine, will be taxed at a 15% duty, while the remaining eight products, including pork, will receive a 25% tariff. China implemented their tariffs on April 2, 2018.  On April 3, 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative's office (the USTR) published an initial list of 1,300+ Chinese products to impose levies upon products like flat-screen televisions, medical devices, aircraft parts and batteries. On April 4, 2018, China's Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council decided to announce a plan to put 25% more tariffs on 106 U.S. goods, such as soybeans and cars.  In the response, On April 5, 2018, President Trump directed the USTR to consider $100 billion in additional tariffs. On May 9, 2018, China cancelled soybean orders exported from the United States to China. On June 15, 2018, President Trump released a list of Chinese products worth $34 billion that would face a 25% tariff, starting on July 6. Another list with $16 billion of Chinese products was released, with an implementation date of August 23.  On July 10, 2018, in reaction to China's retaliatory tariffs that took effect July 6, the USTR issued a proposed list of Chinese products amounting to an annual trade value of about $200 billion that would be subjected to an additional 10% in duties. During the G20 summit in Japan in June 2019, the U.S. and China agreed to resume stalled trade talks, with Trump announcing he would suspend an additional $300 billion in tariffs that had been under consideration. IV. Economic Effects of the Tariffs from the First Trump Administration Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported products and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (producers of domestic substitutes, foreign producers of the goods subject to the tariffs, producers in downstream industries, and consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), the following six outcomes came out at the level of individual firms and consumers as well as at the level of the national economy. 1. Increased costs for U.S. consumers Higher tariff rates lead to price increases for consumers of products subject to the tariffs and for consumers of downstream products as input costs rise. Higher prices in turn lead to decreased consumption, depending on consumers' price sensitivity for a particular product. For example, consider the monthly price of U.S. laundry equipment, which includes washing machines subject to tariff increases as high as 50% since February 2018. The monthly price of this equipment increased by as much as 14% in 2018 compared to the average price level in 2017, before the tariffs took effect (see Figure 1).   Figure 1: U.S. laundry equipment prices According to Jin (2023), many companies passed the costs of the Trump tariffs on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Following impositions of the tariffs on Chinese products, the prices of U.S. intermediate goods rose by 10% to 30%, an amount equivalent to the size of the tariffs. An April 2019 working paper by Flaaen, Hortaçsu, and Tintel not found that the tariffs on washing machines caused the prices of washers to rise by approximately 12% in the United States. A Goldman Sachs analysis by Fitzgerald in May 2019 found that the consumer price index (CPI) for tariffed products had increased dramatically, compared to a declining CPI for all other core goods. According to the Guardian, the Budget Lab at Yale University found that American consumer prices could rise by 1.4% to 5.1% if Trump implemented his comprehensive tariff plan, which would amount to an additional $1,900 to $7,600 per household. 2. Decreased domestic demand for imported goods subject to the tariffs and less competition for U.S. producers of substitute goods: U.S. producers competing with the imported products subject to the tariffs (e.g., domestic aluminium and steel producers) may benefit to the degree they are able to charge higher prices for their domestic products and may expand production because of increased profitability. Since March 2018, U.S. imports of steel and aluminium have faced additional tariff charges of 25% and 10%, making foreign supplies of these products more expensive relative to domestic products. Because of these tariffs, U.S. imports of these goods went down in 2018 and 2019 compared to what they were usually like in 2017 before the tariffs, while U.S. production went up (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). By the first quarter of 2020, real U.S. imports of steel and aluminium (adjusted for price fluctuations) had decreased by more than 30% and 16%, respectively, from their average 2017 levels. The quarterly production of steel and aluminium in the U.S. during this period, however, increased by as much as 13.5% and 9.0%, respectively, above average 2017 levels.   Figure 2: Domestic production and imports: Steel  Figure 3: Domestic production and imports: Aluminium 3. Increased costs for U.S. producers in downstream industries, resulting in a decline in employment U.S. producers that use imported products subject to the additional tariffs as inputs ("downstream" industries, such as auto manufacturers in the case of the aluminium and steel tariffs) might be harmed as their costs of production increase. Higher input costs are more likely to lead to some combination of lower profits for producers, which in turn might dampen demand for these downstream products, leading to some contraction in these sectors.  A study (2019) by Federal Reserve Board economists Flaaen and Pierce, which examined effects on the manufacturing sector from all U.S. tariff actions in 2018, found that higher input costs from the tariffs were associated with higher prices, employment declines, and reductions in output for affected firms. Another study (2020) by Handley, Kamal, and Monarch found that the higher input costs associated with the tariffs might have led to a decrease in U.S. exports for firms reliant on imported intermediate inputs. Handley, Kamal, and Monarch suggested that export growth was approximately 2% lower for products made with products subject to higher U.S. tariffs, relative to unaffected products. Another study (2019) by Federal Reserve Board economists Flaaen and Pierce found that the steel tariffs led to 0.6% fewer jobs in the manufacturing sector than would have happened in the absence of the tariffs; this cut amounted to approximately 75,000 jobs. A study (2024) by Ma and David concluded that the United States lost 245,000 jobs because of the Trump tariffs.  4. Decreased demand for U.S. exports subject to retaliatory tariffs  Retaliatory tariffs place U.S. exporters at a price disadvantage in export markets relative to competitors from other countries, potentially decreasing demand for U.S. exports to those markets. Since Q3 2018, after Section 232 retaliatory tariffs took effect in China, the EU, Russia, and Türkiye, U.S. exports to these trading partners subject to the tariffs declined by as much as 44% below their 2017 average values (Figure 4). U.S. exports to China subject to retaliation during the same period declined even further from their 2017 levels, falling as much as 68% on a quarterly basis. By contrast, during this same period, overall U.S. exports were as much as 10% higher each quarter relative to 2017, suggesting the retaliatory tariffs played a role in the product-specific export declines.  Figure 4: Declines in U.S. exports subject to retaliation A study by Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy, and Khandelwal published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in October 2019 estimated that consumers and firms in the U.S. who buy imports lost $51 billion (0.27% of GDP) because of the 2018 tariffs. This study also found that retaliatory tariffs resulted in a 9.9% decline in U.S. exports. This study also found that workers in counties with a lot of Republicans were hurt the most by the trade war because agricultural products were hit the hardest by retaliatory tariffs.  5. U.S. National Economy In addition to industry- or consumer-level effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect the broader U.S. national economy. Quantitative estimates of the effects vary based on modelling assumptions and techniques, but most studies suggest a negative overall impact on U.S. GDP because of the tariffs.  The Congressional Budget Office (2020) estimated that the increased tariffs in effect as of December 2019 would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5% in 2020, below a baseline without the tariffs, while raising consumer prices by 0.5%, thereby reducing average real household income by $1,277. From a global perspective, the International Monetary Fund estimated that the tariffs would reduce global GDP in 2020 by 0.8%. Dario Caldara et al. (2020) also found that in 2018, investment dropped by 1.5% because of the uncertainty caused by U.S. trade policy. Moreover, a study (2019) by Amiti, Redding, and David published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives found that by December 2018, Trump's tariffs resulted in a reduction in aggregate U.S. real income of $1.4 billion per month in deadweight losses and cost U.S. consumers an additional $3.2 billion per month in added tax. Furthermore, Russ (2019) found that tariffs, which Trump imposed through mid-2019, combined with the policy uncertainty they created, would reduce the 2020 real GDP growth rate by one percentage point.  6. Trade balance  The Trump administration repeatedly raised concerns over the size of the U.S. trade deficit, thereby making trade deficit reduction a stated objective in negotiations for new U.S. trade agreements. Broad-based tariff increases affecting a large share of imports may reduce imports initially, but they are unlikely to reduce the overall trade deficit over the longer period due to at least two indirect impacts that counteract the initial reduction in imports. One indirect effect is a potential change in the value of the U.S. dollar relative to foreign currencies. Another potential effect of U.S. import tariffs is retaliatory tariffs. Economists argue that while tariffs placed on imports from a limited number of trading partners may reduce the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with those specific nations, this is likely to be offset by an increase in the trade deficit or reduction in the trade surplus with other nations, leaving the total U.S. trade deficit largely unchanged.  Figure 5 shows the relative change in the U.S. goods trade deficit with the world as well as the bilateral U.S. deficits with three major partners, China, Mexico, and Vietnam, from 2017 to 2019. Since the U.S. tariffs took effect, the overall U.S. trade deficit has increased, rising 8% from 2017 to 2019. However, the U.S. trade deficit in goods with China declined by 8% from 2017 to 2019, while the U.S. trade deficit in goods with Vietnam and Mexico significantly increased by more than 40% during the same period.  Figure 5: Changes in the U.S. goods trade deficits with China, Mexico, and Vietnam According to Zarroli (2019), between the time Trump took office in 2017 and March 2019, the U.S. trade deficit increased by $119 billion, reaching $621 billion, the highest it had been since 2008. American Farm Bureau Federation data showed that agriculture exports from the U.S. to China decreased from $19.5 billion in 2017 to $9.1 billion in 2018, a 53% reduction.  V. What are the Potential Consequences of Trump's Tariff Plan? Last year, the Peterson Institute for International Economics examined the impact of President Trump's proposed tariffs based on his campaign promises, which would impose 10 % additional tariffs on US imports from all sources and 60 % additional tariffs on imports from China. The major outcomes were lower national income, lower employment, and higher inflation. McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024) at the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that both of Trump's tariff plans—imposing 10% additional tariffs on U.S. imports from all sources and 60% additional tariffs on imports from China—would reduce both U.S. real GDP and employment by 2028. But the former proposal damages the U.S. economy more than the latter. If other nations retaliate with higher tariffs on their imports from the U.S., the damage intensifies.  Assuming other governments respond in kind, Trump's 10 % increase results in U.S. real GDP that is 0.9 % lower than otherwise by 2026, and U.S. inflation rises 1.3 % above the baseline in 2025.  The 10 % added tariffs hurt the economies of Canada, Mexico, China, Germany, and Japan—all major US trading partners that see a lower GDP relative to their baselines through 2040. Mexico and Canada take much larger GDP hits than the U.S. The 60 % added tariffs on imports from China reduce its GDP relative to its baseline, much more than that of other U.S. trading partners. Mexico, however, sees a higher GDP than otherwise as some production shifts to Mexico from China. This paper focuses on Trump's universal 10 % tariffs rather than 60 % tariffs on imports from China because extreme 60 % tariffs on Chinese imports are not expected. McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024) assume the 10 % tariff increase is implemented in 2025 and remains in place through the forecast period. They also consider a second scenario in which U.S. trading partners retaliate with equivalent tariff increases on products they import from the U.S.  Figures 6–11 show the results for the uniform additional 10 % increase in the tariff on imports of goods and services from all trading partners.   Figure 6: Projected change in real GDP of selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) When tariffs go up by 10%, the U.S. real GDP goes down by 0.36 % by 2026, and it goes down even more in Mexico and Canada by 2027 (see Figure 6). Chinese GDP drops by 0.25 % below the baseline in 2025. After the initial demand-induced slowdown, U.S. GDP recovers as production shifts from foreign suppliers to U.S. suppliers, leading to a slightly lower long-term GDP of 0.1 % below baseline by 2030 in the U.S.   Figure 7: Projected change in employment (hours worked) in selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) The results for aggregate employment are like the GDP outcomes (see figure 7). Employment drops in the United States by 0.6 % by 2026 but recovers due to a supply relocation towards U.S. suppliers. U.S. employment returns to baseline eventually because real wages decline permanently to bring employment back to baseline by assumption.  Figure 8: Projected change in inflation in selected economies from an additional 10% increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) The imposition of higher tariffs increases prices of both consumer and intermediate goods, contributing to a rise in inflation of 0.6 % above baseline in 2025 (see figure 8).  The higher tariff is inflationary everywhere except in China due to the tightening of Chinese monetary policy to resist change in the exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar.   Figure 9: Projected change in the trade balance in selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024)) Figure 9 shows the change in the trade balance as a share of GDP. In theory, the trade balance can worsen or improve due to changes in exports and imports. From 2025 to 2028, the U.S. trade deficit narrows slightly but then widens as capital flows into the U.S. economy, appreciating the U.S. real effective exchange rate. By 2030, the U.S. trade deficit will worsen by 0.1 % of GDP due to capital moving from Mexico and Canada into the U.S. Government savings rise due to additional tariff revenues.  VI. Conclusion  This paper showed that tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration had negative impacts on the U.S. economy, particularly inflation, incomes, and employment. It also demonstrated that tariffs which will be imposed by the second Trump administration are expected to have negative effects on the U.S. economy. Then a question arises: "Why does Trump attempt to impose tariffs on products from abroad?" Today, more people mention tariffs as tools to protect U.S. companies and farmers. They are discussed as a tool for bringing back manufacturing businesses into the U.S. as well as a bargaining tactic in negotiations over the flow of fentanyl and immigration. Trump has used and promised to increase tariffs for three purposes: to raise revenue, to bring trade into balance, and to bring rival countries to heel. It is unclear whether Trump will achieve his goals. However, President Donald Trump believes that tariffs are a panacea. Trump believes that his tariffs would bring hundreds of billions—trillions— into the US Treasury. Moreover, Trump is confident that he can force countries to give up something he believes is in America's best interest. For example, his tariffs on Canada and Mexico have led Mexico and Canada to agree to expand their border patrols. Reference  Amiti Mary, Redding Stephen, David E, “The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare,” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 33 (Fall 2019): 187–210. Boer, L. and M. Rieth, “The Macroeconomic Consequences of Import Tariffs and Trade Policy Uncertainty,” IMF Working Paper 2024/013, International Monetary Fund. Cavallo, A., G. Gopinath, B. Neiman, and J. Tang (2021), “Tariff Pass-Through at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from US Trade Policy,” American Economic Review: Insights 3(1): 19-34.  Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, January 28, 2020. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf.  Dario Caldara et al., “The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 109 (January 2020), pp. 38-59. Dornbusch, R. (1992), “The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic perspectives 6 (1): 69-85.  De Loecker, J., P.K. Goldberg, A.K. Khandelwal and N. Pavcnik (2016), “prices, markups, and trade reform,” Econometrica 84(2): 445-510.  Eichengreen, B. (1981), “A Dynamic Model of Tariffs and Employment under Flexible Exchange Rates,” Journal of International Economics 11:341-359.  Eichengreen, B. (2018), “Trade Policy and the Macroeconomy,” Keynote address Mun dell-Fleming Lecture, International Monetary Fund, 13 March 2018.  Fajgelbaum, P.D., P.K. Goldberg, P.J. Kennedy and A.K. Khandelwal (2019), “The Return to Protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(1): 1-55.  Fitzgerald, Maggie, “This Chart from the Goldman Sachs Shows Tariffs are Rasing Prices for Consumers and It could Get Worse.” CNBC. May 13, 2019. Flaaen, A. and J.R. Pierce (2019), “Disentangling the effects of the 2018-2019 tariffs on globally connected U.S. Manufacturing sector,” Working Paper, Finance Economic Discussion Series 2019-086, Board of Governors Federal Reserve System, Washington DC.  Flaaen, A., A. Hortacsu and F. Tintelnot (2020), “The production relocation and price effects of US trade policy: the Case of Washing Machines,” American Economic Review 110(7): 2103-2127.  Frankel, J.A. and D.H. Romer (1999), “Does Trade Cause Growth,” American Economic Review 89 (3): 379-399. Handley, K., F. Kamal, and R. Monarch (2020), “Rising Import Tariffs, Falling Export Growth: When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism,” NBER Working paper 26611. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26611. Handley, K. and N. Limao (2022), “Trade Policy Uncertainty,” NBER Working Paper 29672.  Handley, Kyle, Fariha Kamal, and Ryan Monarch, “Rising Import Tariffs, Falling Export Growth: When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism,” National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 26611, January 2020. Jin, Keyu (2023). The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism. New York: Viking. Kreuter, H. and M. Riccaboni (2023), “The Impact of Import Tariffs on GDP and Consumer Welfare: A Production Network Approach,” Journal of Economic Modelling 126.  Krugman, P. (1982), “The Macroeconomics of Protection with a Floating Exchange rate,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 16: 141-182.  Ma, Xinru; Kang, David C. (2024). Beyond Power Transitions: The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations. Columbia Studies in International Order and Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.  McKibbin, W., M. Hogan, and M. Noland (2024), “The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 24-20.  Mundell, R. (1961), “Flexible Exchange Rates and Employment Policy,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 27: 509-517.  Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (1995), “Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux,” Journal of Political Economy, 103: 624-660.  Russ, Katheryn (December 16, 2019). “What Unilateralism Means for the Future of the U.S. Economy,” Harvard Business Review. January 2, 2020.  Zarroli, Jim. “Despite Trump’s Promises, The Trade Deficit is Only Getting Wider,” NPR. March 6, 2019.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With Donald Trump seemingly determined to push the US economy on a path towards autarky, our major trading partners will need to make alternative arrangements. This is especially the case with Canada, since its economy is so closely tied to the US economy. At this point, Mark Carney, the country’s new Prime Minister, knows there is little possibility of dealing with Trump rationally. Trump has bizarre and totally imagined grievances against Canada. His main complaint seems to be that the United States runs a $200 billion trade deficit with Canada, which Trump describes as Canada ripping off the United States. It’s hard to believe that anyone would say that selling stuff to a willing and well-informed customer is ripping them off. Presumably we buy stuff from Canada because it’s cheaper than the stuff we either produce ourselves or could buy from other countries. Also, the deficit is entirely due to purchases of oil from Canada, something Trump sought to promote in his first term. We have mostly balanced trade if we exclude oil. In fact, the claims of unfairness are based on a treaty that Trump himself negotiated in his first term. Trump can’t even get his numbers straight. Rather than being $200 billion, our trade deficit is less than one-third this size, at just over $60 billion. Trump’s erratic craziness makes the prospect of a real and lasting deal very dim. Carney has to look to secure stronger trade deals with more stable partners. Europe and Latin America are clearly part of the that story, but China needs to be too, as the world’s largest economy. There are opportunities for major gains from trade with China, especially in the auto sector, which had been thoroughly intertwined with the United States and Mexico. Carney has to work from the assumption that these links could be severed for the indefinite future. Here China’s enormous progress in developing electric vehicles offers a great opportunity to Canada. China now sells high quality, low-cost EVs. It has also developed battery technology to the point where a battery can be fully charged in six minutes, not much different than the time it takes to fill a tank of gas. Canada can in principle negotiate trade deals with China where it partially opens its market to its EVs, in exchange for a commitment to technology transfer. The plan would be that in a few years Canadian manufacturers would adopt the latest Chinese technology and supply much of the market themselves. Since Canada has more union-friendly labor law than the United States, they can structure their deal so that the factory jobs would be largely good-paying union jobs. This would be good for the environment, good for Canadian workers and consumers, and good for Canada’s economy, since it means car buyers will have considerably more money to spend on other items or to save. It would also set up a great contrast with the United States, where Trump is determined to try to lock the country into building and buying cars that rely on old-fashioned internal combustion (IC) engines. While Canadians are buying high-quality EVs, people in the United States will be buying IC cars for two or even three times the price. Furthermore, while we are paying $40 to $60 to fill our tanks every couple of weeks, Canadians will be able to power their vehicles for ten or fifteen dollars a charge. The move to EVs will also mean that Trump will have imposed a permanent cost on the US car industry, even if he eventually learns a little economics and discovers his tariffs were not a good idea. If Canada develops a vibrant EV industry, it will not be going back to the integrated production structure with the United States that it had with IC vehicle producers before the trade war. Trump is not going to be able to get Canadians to buy more expensive IC vehicles. The only way for the United States auto industry to go forward, if we move back towards more normal trade with Canada, will be for it to double-down on developing EVs itself. There obviously will be many other problems that Canada will have to deal with as it attempts to cope with unwinding decades of economic integrations with the United States, but working with China on adopting EV technology should be a no-brainer. In this area, Trump may have done Canada a big favor.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском To better understand the current situation in Turkey, where massive demonstrations have been taking place non-stop since the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu on March 19, we need to take a look at some Turkish words - with no real French translation - that have made their appearance, or reappearance, in the public sphere, and which reflect the rewriting of political rules that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government is currently enforcing. Arrested on March 19, along with dozens of his partners, elected representatives and members of the Republican People's Party (CHP, Kemalist), on charges of “corruption”, “terrorism” and “helping the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)”, Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, 53, elected in 2019 and re-elected in 2024, was stripped of his mandates and imprisoned on March 23. The authorities have also set about challenging his academic credentials, since, according to the Constitution, the President of the Republic must be a university graduate. However, Imamoglu's university degree, obtained 32 years ago at Istanbul University, has just been cancelled under pressure from the authorities. Ironically, Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself is suspected of not having actually obtained the university degree he claims to have, and cannot produce any proof of university attendance (photos, testimonials, etc.), even though the university from which he claims to have graduated asserts that he was indeed a student there. This brutal dismissal of a key political figure in Turkey, who appealed to both the secular electorate and conservative circles, and who was expected to be the opposition candidate against Erdogan in the 2028 presidential election, immediately sparked a widespread reaction. For the past week, the country has been swept by a wave of huge demonstrations, bringing together hundreds of thousands of people expressing their solidarity with the imprisoned leader. They range from young people and academics to citizens from towns traditionally loyal to the AKP. While the mainstream media remain strangely silent, and X has already blocked numerous opposition accounts at Ankara's request, figures put forward by the CHP General Secretary put the number of demonstrators at one million. Against this explosive backdrop, it's worth taking a closer look at some of the specific terms used in current Turkish public debate, which reflect the current situation in a country in turmoil. The “secret witness” (Gizli tanık) First term: Gizli tanık, French for “secret witness”. In Turkey, the use of “secret witnesses” was legalized by Law no. 5726 on Witness Protection, adopted on December 27, 2007 and published in the Official Gazette on January 5, 2008, at a time when the Gülenist movement dominated the judiciary in agreement with the ruling AKP. This system of Gizli tanık prevents the cross-examination of witnesses and facilitates the pre-trial detention, and subsequent conviction, of all suspects in political cases: all it takes is for a secret witness to testify against them. This practice was first introduced in 2007 in the Ergenekon trials. It was subsequently used against Kurds in the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) trials in 2009. It continues to be used in various court cases today. It was this “secret witness” that was used by the authorities to bring charges of corruption and terrorism against Imamoglu. Mayors dismissed and replaced by power-appointed administrators (Kayyum) Our second term, kayyum, refers to the crucial figure of the “guardian”. In Turkey, it refers to a person appointed by a court or civil authority to manage property, particularly real estate, or an institution. This measure comes into play when the head of an institution is unable to perform his or her duties or is removed from office for reasons defined by law. The application of kayyum appointments to municipalities in Turkey was legalized by decree-law no. 674, published on September 1, 2016, during the state of emergency instituted after the attempted putsch of July 15, 2016. This decree gave the Ministry of the Interior the power to remove mayors accused of being linked to terrorist organizations and appoint administrators in their place. Following the adoption of this regulation, many municipalities, particularly those run by the pro-Kurdish HDP party, were placed under administrative guardianship. Since 2016, a total of 160 kayyum appointments have been made. Among the charges against Imamoglu is the existence of an electoral agreement, dubbed the “Urban Pact”, concluded with the HDP ahead of the 2024 municipal elections. Paradoxically, this accusation comes at a time when the government is conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, the historic leader of the PKK, with a view to disarming the Kurdish movement. At dawn on March 23, 2025, the judge ordered that Ekrem Imamoglu be remanded in custody on the charge of “corruption”, while the charge of “terrorism”, the only one that would allow the appointment of a kayyum in Istanbul, remained under discussion. Gezi Park: reminiscences of the 2013 mobilization Our third term is Gezi, which literally means “promenade”. It refers to a park in the heart of Istanbul, adjacent to Taksim Square, a mecca for political mobilization. The “Gezi movement” refers to a wave of protest that erupted in Turkey in May 2013 following an urban redevelopment project threatening this park, one of the few green spaces in central Istanbul. Initially led by environmentalists, the mobilization quickly turned into a vast protest movement against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accused of authoritarianism and increasing interference in public life, with the desire to demolish the park being equated with a desire to deprive the opposition of a traditional gathering place. The protest was violently repressed by the police, and Gezi became a symbol of democratic resistance in Turkey, marking a lasting rift between the authorities and a section of civil society. The current protests are reminiscent of this movement in certain respects, but this time the motivation is strictly political. The aim is to denounce, above all, the manipulation of democratic rules by those in power. The participation or otherwise of Kurdish circles in these events is not insignificant. Whereas in 2013, Kurds only mobilized individually, in the context of the peace process with the AKP, today, the pro-Kurdish DEM party (which replaced the HDP in 2023), could officially lend its support to the pro-Imamoglu rallies. With its former leader Selahattin Demirtas, behind bars since 2016, sentenced last year to 42 years in prison, and Öcalan himself recently calling for the PKK's self-dissolution, DEM's position is being closely scrutinized. If the Kurds, in an organized way, join the protests in favor of Ekrem Imamoglu, the new movement has a chance of succeeding. On the other hand, if, as in Gezi, Kurdish political organizations - first and foremost the DWS and PKK - are reluctant to interfere with the ongoing peace process with Ankara, then the disorganized youth will once again find themselves helpless in the face of tear gas. Of course, it's up to the CHP to lead the movement. But the militant experience of the Kurdish movement far exceeds that of the middle-class youth who support the CHP; too individualistic, insufficiently committed, these citizens have much to learn in terms of mobilization from the Kurds, who have been fighting for decades. Bad loser (Mızıkçılık) Translation: “Refusing defeat, changing the rules during the game and using bad faith to consolidate power.” In plain English, it's the sore loser who doesn't accept defeat even before being defeated! This term is widely used by demonstrators to refer to the AKP's behavior - behavior reminiscent of that of the same party almost ten years ago. After the June 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey, the AKP had lost its absolute majority, but violence provoked by both the PKK and military forces, notably linked to the Kurdish question, had disrupted the political process. This situation had created a climate of insecurity and instability, leading to early elections in November 2015; these would enable the AKP to regain an absolute majority, strengthening Recep Tayyip Erdogan's position. Today, this tactic can be applied again to remove a potential opponent before the next elections. A new element has been added to this complex picture: the solidarity with Imamoglu shown by many Western mayors, who publicly denounce the attack on democratic principles and respect for the rule of law in Turkey. But could this support be manipulated by the Turkish government for propaganda purposes? In a climate where every gesture of international support is scrutinized, it is clear that this solidarity could be misused to reinforce the image of an isolated country, or to distract attention from the real domestic issues at stake. Ultimately, the situation in Turkey remains extremely fragile. In Istanbul, a metropolis of over 15 million inhabitants, the gamble of neutralizing a political opponent of this caliber entails considerable risks, especially in a context where youth and academics are mobilizing with vigor. Marked by unpredictable reversals, Turkey's trajectory leaves open the possibility that popular resistance will eventually force the government to back down, allowing Imamoglu to retain a promising political future beyond his current goals. But we said the same for Selahattin Demitas, who has been in prison for almost... ten years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The plans of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel can only weaken the Hebrew State's last regional allies. The expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza -which the breakdown of the truce by Israeli forces on 17 March is intended to provoke- could lead, by a domino effect, to the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt, while the annexation of the West Bank could have the same consequences in Jordan. The warmongering policy of the Netanyahu government has profoundly altered the strategic balance of power in the Middle East in favour of the Jewish state. Operation ‘Iron Swords’ in Gaza has considerably reduced the military capabilities of Hamas, which is said to have lost between 15,000 and 20,000 men and almost all its leaders. Hezbollah, decapitated, deprived of thousands of fighters and of its anchorage points south of the Litani river, is no longer able to maintain a sufficient threat to dissuade Israel from directly attacking its Iranian sponsor. And the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad's regime has completed the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’. Against this backdrop of a reversal of the strategic balance of power totally in Israel's favour, the Netanyahu government, spurred on by its radical wing embodied by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, could consider ‘settling’ the Palestinian question once and for all. To do so, he would have to continue the process of colonising the West Bank and force the Palestinians to abandon the Gaza Strip, in line with Donald Trump's announcements. Assured of the support of the White House, with no regional adversaries capable of standing up to him militarily, Netanyahu could, driven by a certain hubris, lay the foundations for the realisation of a ‘Greater Israel’ extended to Gaza and the biblical ‘Judea-Samaria’, that is the West Bank. Nevertheless, this apparently beneficial dynamic for Israel could, in the medium and long term, position the Hebrew State in a strategic impasse, seriously compromising its security and its chances of building a lasting peace with its neighbours. The resumption of the colonisation process in the West Bank has two very dangerous consequences for Israel: the rise of Hamas in the West Bank and a total discrediting of the Palestinian Authority set up after the 1993 Oslo agreements. Since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, demonstrations against the Palestinian Authority have become such a common occurrence that the regime of Mahmoud Abbas can only hold on to power at the cost of increasingly violent repression. In this context, it is hard to see what could prevent Hamas from taking power in the West Bank, which would open up a new front and a colossal new security challenge for Tsahal. The creation of a ‘Greater Israel’, over and above the legal and moral issues it would raise, seems all the more dangerous for the security of the Israeli state as it would weaken two neighbouring regimes which, until now, have contributed as much as possible to regional stability: Jordan and Egypt. The weakening of Jordan's indispensable partner In addition to weakening the Palestinian Authority, i.e. its only Palestinian partner and interlocutor, Israel's policy of relaunching the colonisation of the West Bank could cause a political earthquake in Tel Aviv's other partner: Jordan. The Hashemite kingdom, where almost 60% of the population is descended from Palestinians who fled the Nakba in 1948-1949 and the Israeli conquests after the Six-Day War in 1967, has been living with the rhythm of pro-Palestinian riots since Since 7 October 2023, Jordan has been evolving in sync with pro-Palestinian riots, which express the solidarity of the Jordanian street with the Palestinians, but also echo a sharp criticism of King Adballah's policy of rapprochement with the Jewish state since the Wadi Araba agreements signed by his father Hussein with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994. In fact, Jordan plays an active role in Israel's security by fighting terrorism and the establishment of Hamas in the refugee camps of Zarqa, Baqa, Jabal Al Hussein and Jerach. It also plays a fundamental strategic role in opposing Iran: Iranian missiles and drones all flew over Jordanian skies during the major attack carried out by Iran in April 2024, and Jordanian anti-aircraft defences helped to thwart the Iranian attack. This strategic position between Israel and the Persian Gulf via southern Iraq explains in particular the installation of Western bases such as Azraq, where European (French and German in particular) and American aircraft and air defence equipment are stationed. In the event of a massive Israeli air offensive against Iran's nuclear programme, Jordanian airspace would play an essential role, as it would be an obligatory route for Israeli aircraft on their way to Iran. However, Likud's policy continues to undermine this precious ally for Israel, by strengthening the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition force to the Hashemite monarchy. Organised around the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood movement is tolerated by the authorities and has achieved impressive electoral success: after the legislative elections in September 2024, the IAF became the main political force in the Jordanian parliament, winning 31 seats out of 138. This success is all the more spectacular given that the Jordanian electoral system only allows list voting at national level to fill 38 seats, the other 100 being reserved for local notables loyal to the regime and allocated via ballots organised in constituencies where the parties are not represented. The result of last September's Jordanian elections was therefore a veritable tidal wave for the Brotherhood. This phenomenon is essentially explained by the mobilisation of the electorate around the theme of support for Gaza, of which the numerous demonstrations that have shaken Jordan are another symptom. In this context, what would be the consequences for the Hashemite kingdom of stepping up settlement on the West Bank? The massive influx of Palestinian refugees would obviously strengthen the FIA, which is particularly well rooted in the Palestinian diaspora. This situation is all the more explosive in that the descendants of Palestinian refugees, despite having been granted Jordanian nationality, act as a veritable diaspora and refuse to cut ties with their country of origin. The very spectacular demonstrations that took place in the country during the last two weeks of April 2024 are the most recent proof of this. In order to condemn Jordan's aid to Israel in its war against Iran and to express their solidarity with Hamas and the ‘axis of resistance’, Jordanians of Palestinian origin are mobilising in Hiraks, youth movements that have emerged in the post-Arab Spring context, condemning the monarchy's ‘compromises’ with Israel as much as rising prices and unemployment. In this context, the King of Jordan finds himself forced to make his security partnerships with Israel invisible or even to reduce them, and could eventually withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba agreements, for fear of seeing social unrest rise and the Muslim Brotherhood inexorably gain in popularity. In the long term, the demographic and political rise of the Palestinian opposition to the Hashemite monarchy threatens the latter's vital prognosis and therefore Israel's security. The return of the Muslim Brotherhood to Egypt and the risk of the collapse of the Al-Sissi regime A similar reasoning can be applied to Egypt, where Marshal Al-Sissi's regime, in place since 2013, would not emerge unscathed from a massive influx of Palestinians from Gaza. The implementation of the Trump plan and the displacement of the two million Gazans in Egypt would considerably strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood in a country where it already holds a majority in public opinion, as demonstrated by the success of Mohamed Morsi in the 2012 elections, and has remained so despite the severe repression it has been the target of since then. By participating in the displacement of Gazans, the regime in Cairo would see itself accused by public opinion of participating in the Israeli colonisation of Gaza, which would lead to a reflex of solidarity on the part of the Egyptian street towards the Palestinians that the Egyptian military regime might not survive. As in Jordan, if Trump's plan for Gaza were to come to fruition, it is hard to see what could stop the Muslim Brotherhood from taking power in Egypt, even if it is currently operating clandestinely and organising itself primarily from abroad (Turkey and Qatar). However, calling into question the 1979 Camp David agreements and the total remilitarisation of the Sinai are undoubtedly the first measures that would be taken by a government aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose anti-Zionism is one of its main guiding principles. In addition to this security disaster for its southern border, Israel would see a new axis of resistance forming around it which, unlike the one currently led by Iran, would be Sunni, more rooted in regional nationalism and would bring together the major powers allied to the Muslim Brotherhood: Turkey, Qatar and HTC's Syria. In this hypothetical context, Israel would be surrounded by enemy states and its survival would once again be threatened, as was the case in the early 1960s before the Six-Day War of 1967. The Trump plan would accentuate the spectacular gap between, on the one hand, an Arab street that is very hostile to the normalisation of relations with Israel and anxious to defend the Palestinian ‘Dar Al Islam’ and, on the other hand, Arab regimes that have become partners or even allies of Israel. The inconsistencies of Trump's Middle East policy should be noted here: on the one hand, he intends to bring Israel closer to its Arab neighbours by extending the Abraham Accords of 2020 (which enabled the normalisation of relations between Israel on the one hand and Morocco, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Sudan on the other), while at the same time nurturing the breeding ground for insurrection on which the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is developing. Ultimately, implementing the Trump plan would have disastrous consequences for Israel: turning the streets of Arab countries against their respective governments in a confrontation that could lead to a new Arab Spring under the banner of anti-Zionism. In this respect, it is interesting to note that this scenario had already been anticipated by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the theorist of Al-Qaeda, at the time of the second intifada : “The opportunity for the jihadist movement to lead the ummah in the jihad for Palestine is greater than ever, because all the secular currents which were outbidding the Palestinian cause and competing with the Islamic movement for the leadership of the ummah in this cause have discovered themselves, in the eyes of the ummah, by recognising Israel's right to exist, engaging in talks and complying with international decisions to liberate what remains of Palestinian territory - or what Israel is willing to give up (the only difference being the amount of crumbs Israel will leave to Muslims and Arabs).” Trump and Netanyahu's plans: a disaster for Israel In conclusion, Trump's and Netanyahu's ‘plans’ for Gaza and the West Bank are not just a breach of international law and do not just raise a moral debate. First and foremost, they appear to be a strategic aberration that could very quickly backfire like a boomerang on the Jewish state. The definitive abandonment by Likud and its extremist allies of the two-state solution, and the resumption of the settlement process in the West Bank and possibly Gaza, are undermining Israel's Arab partners. They put an end to the process of normalisation pursued by Israel towards its neighbours since the Camp David agreements with Egypt in 1979 and could ultimately lead to a return to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the destruction of the Jordanian monarchy, two partners essential to Israel's security. This new anti-Zionist coalition led by the Muslim Brotherhood would be far more dangerous for Israel than the current Iranian-led resistance front. Unlike the Ayatollahs' regime, this new axis of resistance could strike Israel without using proxies, and maintain a climate of permanent insecurity on Israel's borders by hosting the rear bases of terrorist groups or militias fighting the Jewish state on its territory. The dream of a ‘Greater Israel’ remains an ideological chimera in which the security of the Israeli state could be the main victim in the long term.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Amid the economic downturn of the global economy during the early 2020s, Russia’s economy has demonstrated notable resilience and growth. Despite a brief period of GDP decline by 1.2 percent in 2022 on account of Western sanctions, Russia’s economy grew by an estimated 4.1 percent in 2023 and 2024. This exceeded the growth rates witnessed in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). During these years, Russia faced a cascade of more than 16,000 financial, trade, sectorial, logistical, personal and other punitive sanctions, unprecedented in world history. Moreover, financial assets abroad were frozen/stolen, and export pipelines were physically attacked. The Russian economy’s resilience in the face of external shocks can be explained by three reasons: 1) the result of 30 years of market reforms; 2) accumulation over these years of heavy experience in stress-resistant and anti-shock strategies; and 3) miscalculations of the West in its ability to isolate Russia’s economy. Due to the market institutions, the Russian economy is not only highly adaptive but also diversified. Russia is self-sufficient in energy, minerals, food, crops and water resources. It has a developed and stable domestic market and a stress-resistant banking system, cleared of major problem banks. The national innovation system provides a sound technological base, from vaccine creation to hypersonic technologies and the simultaneous competing development of two AI models. Streamlined healthcare regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic permitted the entry of targeted therapy medicines for autoimmune diseases in the market. The 2022 economic crisis is the fifth one in the history of modern Russia. Over time, the government, federal regulators, and the Central Bank have gained unique professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical policies. The same applies to businesses and even households, with the Russian middle class becoming adept at techniques of asset allocation across bank deposits, real estate, currency, and gold. Oil producers made a dramatic redirection of export flows. While in 2021, almost 100 percent of crude oil exports went to Europe, by the end of 2022, 80 percent went to Asian markets. If in 2021, the top three leading trade partners of Russia were China, Germany, and the Netherlands, then in 2023, it was China, India, and Tükiye. Russia is now Europe’s top trade partner with China and is one of the few countries with which China has a trade deficit. Paradoxically, Russia remains the second LNG supplier to the EU. Sanctions sharply stimulated domestic production. Since 2014, agriculture, food production, and manufacturing have been included in the import substitution sphere, which has proven to be quite successful. Today, without cancelling the efforts in manufacturing, the focus of industrial policy is shifting to services: first, medicine, education, and tourism. This transition relies heavily on large-scale digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence (AI) integration. Key areas such as taxation, customs, government, banking, and educational services have been digitised, increasing efficiency, easing demographic constraints, and reducing white-collar corruption. Macro policy instruments have also undergone another anti-crisis transformation: budget rules have been relaxed; the fiscal impulse has increased revenues and consequently demand, including credit demand. Economic expectations have improved. The intention is to manage inflation not only through demand compression but also through supply growth and the liberalisation of entrepreneurship. Formulated by Vladimir Putin, he said “Restraining price growth today is not only the task of the Bank of Russia, but also an assessment of the quality of the RF Government's work on stimulating supply growth”. The Russian government is simultaneously completing “de-offshorisation”—bringing key companies under Russian jurisdiction to special administrative districts created in advance.. At the same time, foreign holdings that acted as intermediaries and asset holders are being dismantled. Collectively, these can be called the Russian version of supply-side economics. What are its preliminary results? The Russian economy, by most indicators, including the level of consumption in 2023, has returned to the level of the end of 2021. The main economic problems of the Russian Federation remain labour shortage (at full employment) and closed export markets. According to the latest estimates of the World Bank, Russia has become one of the five largest economies in the world in terms of GDP in purchasing power parity. This result is attributed not only to the abovementioned factors, but also to the fact that for a long time, the depreciation of the ruble has been significantly outpacing the price growth. Therefore, the equivalent value of the consumer basket of goods in dollar terms has declined. Russia's support for the Global South is an expected reaction to the “unipolar world order”. Russia was the first to challenge it. Ten years ago, Kurt Campbell, warned that “dual containment of Russia and China is a nightmare for U.S. national security”, which by 2019 has become a reality. Sanctions against Russia strengthen ties between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and BRICS countries, and these organisations themselves are an obstacle to the fragmentation of the global economy. By 2025, Russia's supply-side economy will have reached a sustainable trajectory. The task of the current year is to eliminate imperfections of this model, including inflation (9.5 percent in 2024), labour market constraints (unemployment 2.3 percent in 2024), and high budget expenditures. Price pressure is a classic consequence of ultra-high defence spending. In addition, the government sees a downside risk to oil prices. Therefore, the goal for 2025 is to reduce overheating of the economy. The expected growth rate is around 1.5-2 percent of GDP. This can be pursued through fiscal consolidation and a tight monetary policy. However, inflation expectations and foreign trade conditions are still pro-inflationary. Therefore, inflation will have a “long braking path”. In 2025, the Central Bank expects inflation to fall only to 7-8 percent on an annual basis; however, by the end of 2024, the cooling of credit activity as a result of high lending rates became noticeable. They also overinflated the population's inclination to save. At the same time, the total volume of Russian budget revenues in December 2024 increased by 28 percent compared to the same month of the previous year. To summarise, it can be stated that the Russian economy, having successfully navigated the COVID-19 crisis, was well-prepared for the shock from the sanctions of 2022. After a slight holdback, it has entered the growth trajectory. The immediate effects of the sanctions have been borne, but they have come with “boomerang” consequences, both economic and political, especially in Germany. Russia could manage, not without certain difficulties, to increase defence production and at the same time maintain and even improve the living standards of the population.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A series of rapid domestic political changes in Lebanon has disrupted the established balance of power, creating a foundation for a reassessment of the positions of key players. Amid a pause in regional escalation, the debate on the decline of Hezbollah’s influence — long the dominant military and political force in the country, has become a topic in numerous publications. However, there is no consensus on the group's future: some experts predict its complete disappearance, while others, on the contrary, believe that the current conditions will serve as a catalyst for its restructuring. A sober view of what Hezbollah represents today seems more important than ever. Since the election of Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon and the subsequent appointment of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister, Lebanese politics has continued to undergo changes that are shaping its new landscape. The intensification of diplomatic contacts, escalating tensions in the border region, and unexpected administrative decisions — all these factors reflect the search for a renewed equilibrium that aligns with contemporary realities. Weakened by war and political shifts, Hezbollah finds itself at the center of these transformational processes. Hezbollah's Pyrrhic Victory With the end of active military operations in November 2024, the question arose regarding the extent of the damage suffered by the Shiite group. Despite all the statements by the organization's Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, about a "great victory" over the Zionist enemy, the pathos of his rhetoric is significantly devalued when confronted with the stark reality. In fact, the transition of Hezbollah’s current leader to this position from his long-held role as Deputy Secretary-General — a position he occupied for over 30 years under Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah — is directly linked to a key consequence of the war: significant losses within the organization’s ranks. One of the most devastating blows to the group was the physical elimination of the majority of its leadership. Since Hezbollah’s involvement in supporting Hamas's "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation, key figures within the organization have been consistently targeted and killed. Among them were prominent Radwan Unit commander Wissam Tawil, the heads of the Nasr and Aziz special units Talib Abdallah and Mohammed Nasser, as well as the overseer of Hezbollah’s rocket program and chief military advisor to the Secretary-General, Fuad Shukr. Additionally, Ibrahim Aqil, a member of the Jihad Council, Hezbollah’s main military body, was also eliminated. The most shocking event, however, was the death of Hezbollah's longtime leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, following an Israeli strike on Dahiyeh, the southern suburb of Beirut. The attack also claimed the lives of another Jihad Council member, Ali Karaki, and General Abbas Nilforoushan, a commander of Iran’s Quds Force. Hezbollah supporters would likely have reacted with even greater dismay to the elimination of Hashem Safi al-Din, the head of the group's Executive Council [1]. This is because the Shura Council, Hezbollah's main administrative body, is required to elect two Secretary-Generals every three years — one acting and the other "reserve". This procedure was established in the 1990s after the assassination of Hezbollah’s second leader, Abbas Musawi, to prevent internal discord and confusion in the event of a sudden elimination of the Secretary-General. Hashem Safi al-Din was precisely such a designated successor, yet due to his untimely death, he never had the opportunity to enact this contingency mechanism. The losses suffered by the Shiite group, of course, were not limited to its senior command. Before the launch of Israel’s Operation Northern Arrows, the number of Hezbollah casualties among rank-and-file members was estimated at around 400–500 fighters. However, by the end of the Third Lebanon War, Arab and Israeli sources reported that this number had risen to 3,000–4,000, accounting for approximately 6–8% of the organization's 50,000-strong force (as estimated by the U.S. Congress). This figure does not even include a significant number of non-fatal combat casualties — those wounded and rendered incapable of further service. It is also important to note that the number of casualties continues to rise even after the ceasefire agreement came into effect, as Israel’s interpretation of the agreement grants it "full military freedom of action" against Hezbollah. The Israeli military continues to carry out air and missile strikes on any targets suspected of harboring Hezbollah members or being linked to the group. By the end of December 2024, the number of ceasefire violations had already exceeded 300 cases. The "Blue Helmets" (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL) peacekeeping mission in Lebanon has expressed concern over Israel’s actions. Another crucial aspect of Hezbollah’s post-war situation is the state of its missile arsenal, which posed the primary threat to Israel. As of March 2024, the group was estimated to possess between 100,000 and 200,000 missiles, the majority of which were short-range rockets. According to U.S. and Israeli assessments, Hezbollah’s remaining arsenal now constitutes between 20% and 50% of its pre-war stockpile. However, independent analysts tend to agree only with the upper limit of this estimate. Thus, it becomes almost indisputable that the events of the Third Lebanon War have dealt a significant blow to Hezbollah. The hopes of its supporters for a swift and miraculous recovery are unlikely to materialize. Given the deteriorating geopolitical environment and growing internal pressure on Hezbollah within Lebanon, it remains unclear where the organization will find the resources for its restoration. At the same time, it would be premature to write off the Shiite group entirely. Even Israeli media acknowledge this, publishing bold headlines stating that Hezbollah has not been defeated. The most valuable asset of any political organization is its people, and in this regard, Hezbollah still holds strong advantages. Among objective Lebanese analysts, there is a consensus that support for Hezbollah within the Shiite community remains consistently high. Some even argue that its position has strengthened. Faced with widespread dissatisfaction with the group outside its sectarian base and increasing external pressure on Lebanon, Shiites fear becoming scapegoats. The fear of collective punishment is pushing them to rally around their traditional leadership, as they recognize that they are all in the same boat. Today, the ball is in Hezbollah’s court. The group must act with the utmost responsibility and precision to justify the trust of its supporters. A key focus of this strategy will be its cooperation with the new government, where Hezbollah and its allies, notably, still hold a significant position. The New Cabinet: Remembering Siniora or Bring Back My 2005 On Saturday, February 8, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced the completion of the formation of a new national government, calling it a "government of reform and salvation". The process took 26 days, which, for the country's political history in the 21st century, is almost a record. The only time a cabinet was formed faster was in 2005, when Prime Minister Fouad Siniora assembled his government in 19 days amid nationwide mobilization following the Cedar Revolution [2]. This rapid pace is, in fact, a testament to the critical state of Lebanon, whose governmental and bureaucratic system only begins to "wheeze into action" when it is just steps away from plunging into the abyss. The cabinet has been deliberately composed of 24 figures who are formally unaffiliated with political parties [3] and do not intend to participate in future elections. According to the prime minister's vision, this approach is meant to reduce political friction within the government and ensure its effective functioning. Instead of engaging in Lebanon’s traditional positional party politics, ministers are expected to focus solely on their respective portfolios. However, the consultation process between the prime minister and political forces somewhat dilutes the effectiveness of this strategy. Powerful parties still have a significant influence over appointments due to the requirement for parliamentary approval of the cabinet. Nevertheless, the composition of the new government has been strongly influenced by the personal vision of reform-minded President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam — an unusual situation for Lebanon. Ten ministerial candidates were directly nominated by this top-level tandem, while another twelve were backed by political forces [4]. Despite widespread predictions of doom, the Hezbollah-Amal duo — often referred to as the "Shiite duo" — secured four trusted representatives in the government, two from each organization. Another Shiite quota, assigned to the Minister of State for Administrative Development, became a compromise between the Prime Minister and Speaker Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal. However, in the final assessment, this was still framed as a "non-partisan" appointment made on behalf of the head of government. Thus, the configuration of Shiite ministers in the new cabinet clearly demonstrated the practical inevitability of Hezbollah and Amal’s continued influence. The political weight of the "Shiite duo" simply did not allow the Prime Minister to significantly limit their representation in the highest executive body, even though it seems that Nawaf Salam himself is at least somewhat interested in weakening Hezbollah and Amal’s positions. Furthermore, Amal managed to retain its long-standing monopoly over the Ministry of Finance, which was given to former MP Yassine Jaber, a member of the movement. This appointment was preceded by intense speculation, as the Finance Minister holds the second most powerful position in government after the Prime Minister. Any governmental decision that requires budgetary allocations must be signed off by the Finance Minister, meaning that the lack of approval could effectively block any government initiative. Although Jaber was quick to assure that he would not abuse his position, it is clear that President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, who are oriented toward the West and the Gulf monarchies, are unlikely to be pleased that a key tool for obstructing government operations remains in the hands of figures close to pro-Iranian Hezbollah. At the same time, it appears that in exchange for this “veto” power, another mechanism of obstruction for the Shiite duo has been neutralized — the current cabinet includes a Shiite minister who is not directly dependent on the will of Hezbollah and Amal. This means that if the four representatives of the duo decide to withdraw from the government in an attempt to delegitimize it, the Minister of State for Administrative Development, Fadi Makki, will remain in office. As a result, the argument about the lack of Shiite representation — and therefore the alleged illegitimacy of the cabinet — would become irrelevant. This move by the country’s leadership was not merely a symbolic concession — it is rooted in historical precedents. During the tenure of Fouad Siniora’s government (2005–2009), Hezbollah and Amal effectively withdrew [5] all five Shiite ministers from the cabinet, arguing that the government had become unrepresentative due to the absence of Shiite figures. At that time, Hezbollah and its allies demanded the formation of a national unity government in which the opposition — meaning themselves — would hold a so-called "blocking third". Government decisions in Lebanon require a two-thirds majority, meaning that a political force controlling at least one-third of the cabinet plus one minister has the power to veto decisions and, if necessary, bring down the government. The crisis peaked in 2008, leading to violent clashes between Hezbollah and pro-government forces, which resulted in over 100 casualties. The conflict was eventually resolved, but it remains a cautionary precedent in Lebanese politics. Since then, and until the formation of the current cabinet, every Lebanese government has had one political alliance that held the coveted "blocking third", effectively giving it the ability to stall the cabinet's work. This dynamic is precisely why Lebanon has experienced four governmental crises since 2009. Against this backdrop, Nawaf Salam’s decision to eliminate this risk in the new cabinet appears prudent, as it significantly reduces the chances of yet another executive power collapse. Meanwhile, the Minister of Finance remains a trump card in the hands of Nabih Berri, a highly skilled political tactician. It will only be played if the stakes become too high and the current political arrangement starts leading toward defeat. The Shiite duo is not in a position to oppose the government without cause, but it still has the leverage to defend its core interests when necessary. At the same time, the Shiite duo’s main domestic political opponents — the Lebanese Forces (LF) and Kataeb Party — secured a total of five ministerial portfolios. Additionally, two seats in the government went to candidates from the traditionally Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which has a long history of political maneuvering in pursuit of the best outcome for its community. Its de facto leader, Walid Jumblatt, has alternated between criticizing Hezbollah and aligning with it, depending on the political climate. Another ministerial position was assigned to Noura Bayrakdarian, a representative of the Lebanese branch of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) "Dashnaktsutyun". The Dashnaks have long been junior partners in the March 8 Alliance [6] and have maintained close ties with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Notably, for the first time in two decades, the FPM failed to secure a single cabinet appointment — a situation last seen during Fouad Siniora’s government. A particularly symbolic shift occurred with the Ministry of Energy, a traditional stronghold of the FPM, which was handed over to the Lebanese Forces (LF). The decoupling of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) from Hezbollah, which we previously discussed, largely predetermined the Shiite bloc’s isolation in the new government — this is the first time they are in the cabinet without a strong Christian ally (the Marada Movement has also been left "overboard"). Following the cabinet’s approval, FPM leader Gebran Bassil expressed willingness to work constructively in opposition, yet at the same time, he voiced serious dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister’s actions. According to Bassil, Nawaf Salam granted greater influence over the cabinet’s composition to Shiite and Druze forces, at the expense of Christian and Sunni interests. His discontent over FPM’s exclusion from the government was further evident during the parliamentary confidence vote. During the session, Gebran Bassil accused the Prime Minister of reneging on commitments made during consultations over his appointment. As a result, the FPM faction refused to support a vote of confidence in Nawaf Salam’s government, stating that the Prime Minister "did not deserve it". However, the parliamentary confidence vote left Gebran Bassil and his Strong Lebanon bloc in the minority. The ministerial statement delivered by the Prime Minister focused on the same priorities outlined in President Joseph Aoun’s inaugural speech: restoring the rule of law and sovereignty, reforming institutions, and committing to the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. The declaration contained at least two clear warning signals directed at Hezbollah. Nawaf Salam reaffirmed the government’s stance that only the state should have the authority to decide on matters of war and peace and hold a monopoly on the use of weapons. Regarding judicial independence, the declaration stressed the urgent need to shield the judiciary from interference and pressure, particularly in relation to the investigation of the Beirut port explosion. This was an explicit reference to the fact that the "Shiite duo" has been obstructing the work of Judge Tarek Bitar, who, in the course of his investigation, attempted to summon high-ranking members of the Amal Movement for questioning. In his speech, Mohammed Raad, the leader of Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, while offering a few policy recommendations, refrained from harsh criticism of the government and expressed the faction’s trust in it. Other MPs' speeches reflected cautious optimism toward the government's agenda, frequently emphasizing that their support was conditional and could only be justified by concrete steps toward promised reforms. Common ground for the speeches were calls to resolve the problems of depositors and the entire banking sector, to conduct electoral reform and future elections on time, and to economically revitalize depressed areas. The two most popular appeals turned out to be issues that opposing forces usually raise on their banners - the need to put an end to the Israeli occupation and to hand over all weapons to the state. Ultimately, 95 MPs voted to vote in confidence in the cabinet, 12 voted against it and 4 abstained from voting. Overall, the new Lebanese government appears to be, at the very least, an extremely interesting and therefore promising structure. Attention is drawn both to the stylistic aspects – the high representation of women and people with an academic background – and to the formal ones – the absence of a blocking third and the large number of ministers appointed by a tandem of senior officials. All this creates the impression of a very balanced and well-composed cabinet, which is likely to be largely capable of coping with the ambitious tasks of restructuring the country. At the same time, the cabinet in its current form will exist only until the parliamentary elections in May 2026, when the updated balance of power will be established. In this regard, the little over a year that the cabinet has seems to be a period that is insufficient to achieve all the goals set, but suitable for starting the flywheel of change. And despite the fact that Hezbollah and the new Lebanese leadership, represented by the president and prime minister, do not find understanding on all issues, there is something that unites them - to put it mildly, a cool attitude towards Israel. However, on this front, as it turns out, everything is not going as smoothly as we would like. Retreating "Israeli-Style": The IDF Bids Farewell, But Doesn’t Quite Leave… The ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel officially expired on February 18, by which time the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were expected to fully withdraw from Lebanese territory. However, few anticipated that the process would proceed without surprises, given reports of Israel’s interest in extending the agreement once again. Indeed, just one day before the deadline, Israeli military officials announced that, as a temporary measure, the army would maintain its presence on five strategic heights. The United States, as the leading party in the ceasefire monitoring committee established by the agreement, was quick to support this move. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s entire political leadership — including the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament — continues to insist on the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. Israel's strategy in the Lebanese direction remains in the logic of tough and uncompromising suppression of security threats. In reality, the "delay" of Israeli troops and the continuation of strikes devalue the entire meaning of the established agreements, giving one of the parties a "legal" opportunity to violate them. In turn, in response, the Israelis insist that Hezbollah is violating its obligations to care for the Litani River. Some experts suggest that the five strongholds in southern Lebanon will become objects of long-term occupation. Control over the hilly terrain along the perimeter of the Israeli border deep in Lebanese territory should obviously create a certain buffer zone, which in theory will secure the borders of the Jewish state. However, if the IDF does not plan to linger on Lebanese soil, it is not very clear until what point its military presence is necessary. In accordance with the agreements, this territory is taken under control by units of the Lebanese Armed Forces, which do not pose any threat to Israel. Moreover, the sincerity of statements about the temporary nature of such measures also calls into question the fact that the land component of the cross-border tensions between Hezbollah and Israel has never been the main cause for concern. The main threat has always come from the missile potential of the Shiite group. In his recent statement, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem predictably demanded a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory after October 18 and called on the government to pursue this without compromise. At the same time, he did not disclose what specific actions would be otherwise, but noted that “everyone knows how to deal with occupation.” The restrained tone of his remarks (albeit against the backdrop of the usual anti-Israeli rhetoric) and the lack of any particular threats in the words of the organization’s leader in the language of Hezbollah can be considered cautious statements. Without a doubt, the group at this stage does not have the resources to actively oppose Israel: deliberately going into confrontation today is the same as throwing a slingshot at a tank. Moreover, escalation puts at risk the predominantly Shiite population of southern Lebanon, which is a key component of the organization’s supporters and has already become refugees. The Waning Influence of Hezbollah In addition to the challenges of de-occupation of Lebanese territory, both domestic and foreign policy developments in recent months have been marked by other significant events. All of them point to a certain reconfiguration of Lebanon’s political landscape — one that, more often than not, appears to be unfavorable for Hezbollah. The expected shift is taking place in the system of foreign relations - preconditions for strengthening American-Saudi influence are emerging, namely, the name of the recently elected president of the country was associated with the protection of Washington and Riyadh. Thus, it is this alliance (but, above all, the Saudis) that has for many years acted as a counterweight to Iranian influence on Lebanon, the main conductor of which is Hezbollah. In January, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, visited Beirut for the first time in 15 years. He expressed support for the president and the prime minister in their course for reform. A few weeks later, the example of her Saudi colleague was followed by the deputy special representative of the US president for the Middle East, Morgan Orgatus. However, her visit caused much more noise: from indignation over a ring in the form of the Star of David at a meeting with the Lebanese president to an audience with an ally of Hezbollah, the speaker Nabih Berri, who during the conversation called Israel "absolute evil". It is curious that the American envoy's visit took place on the eve of the announcement of the cabinet composition. In this regard, her statements that «Hezbollah should not be part of this government in any form» did not go unnoticed, especially after the list of ministers was made public. Another big event was the announcement that Lebanon had a “future” again. Saad Hariri, the longtime leader of the Mustaqbal (Arabic for “future”) movement and former prime minister, announced his return to politics after a three-year hiatus on the twentieth anniversary of the assassination of his father, also Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Before the 2022 parliamentary elections, he announced that he would not participate in them and effectively dissolved his movement. This step left the Sunni forces fragmented (and therefore weak), and the Sunni part of Lebanese politics was left without a clear leader at the helm. This happened because Mustaqbal had long dominated this segment of society, and now Saad Hariri found the best opportunity to make a political comeback. His return to politics can also be seen as an additional factor in the growth of Saudi influence, since he himself is a native of Riyadh and a subject of the kingdom. His ties to the Al Saud family, which go back to his father, have never been a secret, but after the incident in 2017 [7], the relationship has been going through hard times. He also has certain connections to the Emirati elite, in particular to Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Finally, the most important news of recent weeks is the government-initiated ban on Iranian civilian aircraft landing in Lebanon, and in particular at Beirut's Rafik Hariri International Airport. After one of the Iranian airliners was denied landing, Hezbollah supporters began protests and blocked the road to the only international airport in the country. The government's extension of this measure, first until February 18, and now indefinitely, is due to information published by the IDF that Iran is sending funds to Hezbollah via aircraft. In his statement following the events, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem did not vigorously attack the country's leadership, noting that the decision was made under the threat of an Israeli «strike on the runway» if the Iranian plane landed. At the same time, he criticized the government's position, which assumes compliance with Israeli orders. This development once again demonstrates the waning power of Hezbollah and reveals how tense the situation is in Lebanon. *** The recent public funeral of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, as a symbol of the end of an era, involuntarily becomes the leitmotif of complex internal Lebanese processes. The flight of Israeli fighters over the funeral procession of many thousands and the absence of the president and prime minister, despite the invitation, make comments unnecessary. At present, in the words of the funeral speech of Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem, the time has come for “state responsibility” — Hezbollah is deliberately giving way to the proscenium (but not leaving), realizing the sensitivity of the moment and its own difficulties. And although today it seems that the new reality has already been formed, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this transition is still far from complete. Most likely, a somewhat predictable situation (if this is applicable to Lebanon at all) will be achieved only after the parliamentary elections in 2026. The path to them in the next year or so will be no less important, but electoral cycles often tend to present surprises. For now, Hezbollah's chosen line of minimizing conflict and a reasonable, but sometimes unyielding, conversation with the new government seems balanced. Three aspects will be key factors at this time that can determine Hezbollah's future. First, the degree of consolidation of the Shiite population around the organization. The extent to which the leadership manages its resources in relation to people is the extent to which the group will remain firmly on its feet. As after the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah (through its institutions such as Jihad al-Binaa [8]) is engaged in the reconstruction of housing in the affected areas and the payment of targeted compensation (rent). However, this campaign is already facing financial difficulties, despite the tens of millions of dollars spent, since the organization relies almost exclusively on Iran. In this and other dimensions, Tehran's position in the medium term is also critical. Second, the topic of Hezbollah's disarmament will acquire particular importance in the foreseeable future. This problem has already been outlined by the country's top leadership on several occasions, and has also been mentioned in the government's declaration to parliament and supported by a considerable number of deputies in their speeches thereafter. It is becoming clear that such statements are not a bluff, they are for the benefit of Lebanon's international image, but it is not yet at all obvious how this process can be set in motion without clashes within the country. The requisition of weapons from Hezbollah will mean a radical change in the ontological foundations of the group's existence. Strictly speaking, it will no longer be Hezbollah, but something else. The last defining aspect, certainly related to everything outlined earlier, is Israel's behavior. Its escalation will catalyze two mutually directed processes - the government will increasingly put pressure on Hezbollah with the goal of pacifying it or even disarming it, while the group itself will be less and less willing to do so. At the same time, the scenario in which the Israelis manage to completely defeat Hezbollah seems as unrealistic as the idea that Israel will soon abandon its assertive (if not aggressive) policy of suppressing security threats. In this regard, the development of the situation in the Washington-Tehran-Tel Aviv triangle will, for obvious reasons, continue to be relevant for Lebanon and Hezbollah. It is still too early to see Hezbollah as a dying swan. At this stage, the organization stands at a crossroads, where the choice of path carries significant consequences. Only time will tell whether the new leadership can make the right decisions, rebuild the organization's structure, and improve its internal Lebanese relations. The current state of international politics, with its unexpected twists and sudden outcomes, suggests that Hezbollah should rather be viewed as a black swan.  1. The Executive Council is one of the five main bodies of Hezbollah, responsible for the non-military and non-political development of the group (education, social support, medical care, media support, etc.). 2. The Cedar Revolution is a series of popular protests after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, centered around the Syrian military presence in Lebanon (both condemning and supporting it). As a result of the protests, Syrian troops were withdrawn from the country after 30 years on Lebanese soil. 3. According to the Lebanese newspaper L’Orient-Le Jour, the Minister of Youth and Sports Nura Bayrakdaryan is an active member of the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun party, however, according to the prime minister’s inaugural statements, the cabinet does not have any ministers who are party members. 4. There are 24 ministers in the government, including the prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively, the remaining 22 ministers are responsible for their respective areas. 5. The ministers stopped participating in the government's work and submitted their resignations, which, however, were not accepted by the prime minister. 6. The pro-Syrian (and/or pro-Iranian) parliamentary bloc that emerged as a result of the Cedar Revolution of 2005 was formed on the basis of three major political forces: Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, as well as their junior partners. 7. In November 2017, while serving as the prime minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri was effectively detained in Saudi Arabia. He then went on television to announce his resignation and condemn Hezbollah and Iranian influence in the country. The situation was later resolved and the prime minister was released. 8. Jihad al-Binaa is an organization within Hezbollah that is involved in the construction of infrastructure and the construction (reconstruction) of buildings.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On 8 December 2024, the streets of Damascus erupted in a mix of jubilation and uncertainty as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist militia with roots as an al-Qaeda offshoot, toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime after a stunning 11-day offensive. Overnight, Syria’s transitional government, led by HTS commander Ahmed al-Sharaa, emerged from the ashes of a decades-long dictatorship. Within days, Turkey reopened its embassy, Saudi Arabia offered a diplomatic relationship, and the U.S. lifted al-Sharaa’s $10 million bounty after a meeting. By December 2024, Qatar and France recognized this authority, while Russia, Britain, and Iraq showed openness. Yet, this swift acceptance of an unelected, terrorist-rooted regime—akin to the Taliban’s 2021 takeover— undermines established norms. It sidelines democracy, excuses HTS’s violent past, and frays a rules-based order as states favor strategy over law. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 and HTS’s rapid rise in Syria highlight a troubling trend: military control trumps democratic legitimacy and accountability. This pattern, driven by inconsistent global recognition standards, risks emboldening extremist factions—such as the Islamic State in Iraq, Al Qaeda in Yemen, and Lebanon’s Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-Islam, Hurras al-Din, and Jund al-Sham—to pursue similar strategies, further destabilizing a region already scarred by sectarian conflict. The rise of HTS has shown that states prioritize strategic interests over legal values. Turkey, a long-time supporter of the Syrian opposition, acted swiftly: on December 12, 2024, intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin visited Damascus, pledging support for stabilization efforts. Two days later, its embassy reopened, affirming prior ties. Saudi Arabia, countering Iran, followed: on January 24, 2025, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan met al-Sharaa in Damascus; a week later, on February 2, al-Sharaa’s Riyadh visit—his first as leader—sealed a diplomatic win. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s warm welcome signaled Arab recognition. Qatar recognized the transitional government and dispatched a delegation to Damascus on December 12. France endorsed HTS through envoy Jean-François Guillaume’s mid-December talks. The U.S. opted for de facto engagement, lifting al-Sharaa’s bounty after a December meeting. On February 12, Russia’s Vladimir Putin held a constructive call with al-Sharaa, moving to delist HTS as a terrorist group. Iraq invited al-Sharaa to a May 2025 Arab Summit, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi welcomed him to a March 4 Cairo summit, where he met Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and urged Israel’s withdrawal from southern Syria. The UN’s Geir Pedersen, meeting al-Sharaa in December, pushed for inclusivity under Resolution 2254. The Taliban’s slower path to acceptance contrasts sharply. Since seizing Afghanistan in 2021, it has ruled without elections or a constitution, lacking de jure recognition by February 2025 despite ties with China, Russia, and Pakistan. Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey keep pragmatic links, while Saudi Arabia reopened its Kabul embassy in December 2024. The U.S., via Qatar and UN channels, prioritizes humanitarian needs over legitimacy. Its exclusionary rule—banning women’s education, sidelining minorities—defies norms, hindering broader acceptance. HTS has gained quicker goodwill. Al-Sharaa’s inclusivity pledges, invitations to ex-Ba’athists like Farouk al-Sharaa, and prisoner releases suggest moderation. Unlike the Taliban’s gender apartheid, HTS avoids barring women from public life—though its stance is untested. Assad’s fall, marked by war crimes, casts HTS as a liberator. Yet, the world overlooks HTS’s dark past, swapping Assad’s autocracy for an unproven group. The vulnerability of parts of Asia and the Middle East to terrorist groups seizing power raises concerns that this could become a repeatable strategy. The constitutive theory, tying legitimacy to recognition, falters as HTS gains de facto and formal backing. If brute force proves sufficient for recognition, groups like ISKP in Afghanistan or AQAP in Yemen may seek to replicate this model. Hurras al-Din in Idlib, Jaish al-Adl on Iran’s border, or the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan could exploit vacuums. Syria risks losing oil fields to ISIS; Iraq’s fault lines invite resurgence; Yemen aids AQAP; Lebanon tempts jihadists; and Iran faces border threats. In Yemen, where Houthis battle a crumbling south, AQAP could seize on HTS’s success, potentially making Aden a jihadist hub. Lebanon, reeling from Hezbollah’s 2023-24 clash with Israel and economic collapse, invites Sunni extremists to exploit rifts—Arsal, a militant border town, could be next. Iraq’s rural areas, stalked by ISIS cells, risk resurgence if Baghdad weakens. These nations, scarred by proxy wars and failed governance, face greater threats as HTS’s model hints territorial conquest can win tolerance, if not legitimacy. The recognition of Syria’s HTS-led government could galvanize terrorist groups within, sparking crises as they emulate territorial takeover for acceptance. The unrest in Jaramana, a Damascus suburb, shows this: Syria sent forces after a militia linked to Assad’s regime killed an officer at a checkpoint, defying surrender. Lieutenant Colonel Hussam al-Tahan told SANA it targets illegal groups, but the clash—amid Israel’s Druze defense claim—reveals how militias, emboldened by HTS, could exploit weak authority. Hurras al-Din and Islamic State might seize territory, worsening chaos post-Assad.  This danger has erupted in Syria’s Alawite coastal strongholds, where security forces clashed with pro-Assad gunmen in Latakia and Tartous in early March 2025, leaving over 130 dead, per the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of HTS has fueled such unrest, inviting rival factions to seize territory and seek similar recognition. Israel, claiming to protect minorities, and Iran, potentially backing the Alawites, exploit this chaos—pushing Syria toward partition and creating a fractured state where power supersedes law. For global powers, HTS’s recognition poses a strategic quandary. Iran lost Assad—a major blow in the region. The U.S. and allies, vocal on democracy, weigh their anti-Iran stance against an unelected jihadist regime. This gain could falter if HTS turns radical or if Russia and China exploit the playbook, making the Middle East a proxy chessboard. The strategy—“take territory, wait for acceptance”—worked for the Taliban’s 20-year efforts and HTS’s rapid strike. Without stringent conditions, states risk legitimizing power without elections. Al-Sharaa’s claim on December 30 that elections might take four years met no pushback from the U.S. or Europe—a silence signaling stability over democracy, but at what cost? This precedent erodes core values of international relations, including democracy, accountability, and human rights. HTS’s unelected rule, like the Taliban’s, skirts these norms. De facto engagement—embassies, trade, talks—grants resources without treaty adherence. Their past atrocities—HTS’s civilian attacks, the Taliban’s Al Qaeda ties—go unaddressed, their intentions untested by enforceable promises. Trade with third parties, like China’s mineral deals in Afghanistan or Turkey’s ventures in Syria, risks fueling corruption—Afghanistan’s opium trade now accounts for 90% of the world’s heroin supply, thriving in a governance vacuum. The rush to recognize HTS reflects a realist scramble: Turkey secures its border, Saudi Arabia counters Iran, the U.S. and Israel weaken Tehran’s proxies—without troops. This low-cost, high-impact model could tempt wider use. States might back ISIS in Iraq or AQAP in Yemen to reshape the region. Turkey’s HTS success hinges on moderation; elsewhere, it risks chaos. The lack of a global standard—each state acting independently—undermines international law’s predictability. UN guidelines tying recognition to elections could align legitimacy without rigidity. For now, HTS fills Assad’s vacuum, but at a cost: A Middle East where terrorists become politicians, eroding democracy in a fragile region. Stability today risks a wildfire tomorrow—unless this game is rethought.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US. This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties – Russia and Ukraine – has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward. From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement – on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 –is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it. Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US. Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington – including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no Nato membership for Ukraine. These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is also likely to be keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.   Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American – let alone Ukrainian – terms. This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations. Pressure points Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine – and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end of the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps – pressure on Ukraine and on Russia – are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line. The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude. The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia. The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to pressure Russia in a similar way to Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]