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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Bukele appears to have the green light from the United States to deepen his authoritarian project with the help of Beijing. Recently, the ruling Salvadoran party, Nuevas Ideas, inaugurated a political training school in Nuevo Cuscatlán. The event was headlined by Félix Ulloa, Vice President of the Central American country, and China’s ambassador to El Salvador, Zhang Yanhui. According to the Central American news portal Expediente Público, the institute was reportedly sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), following a previous visit to Beijing by Ulloa and Xavier Zablah Bukele – leader of Nuevas Ideas and cousin of the Salvadoran president – during which several interparty cooperation agreements were finalized. This event highlights the diversified strategies China employs to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere. While public attention toward the Asian giant typically focuses on intergovernmental diplomacy, trade relations, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), less consideration is given to the forms of cooperation carried out by various international outreach bodies tied to the CCP in Latin America. The Czech think tank Sinopsis, which specializes in Chinese studies, notes: “Unlike many other countries, China’s foreign affairs extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and transcend official state-to-state diplomacy […] This system consists of various bodies and operates under the overarching concept of total diplomacy.” The CCP behind the scenes According to Central American and Chinese-language media, Zablah Bukele and Félix Ulloa held a meeting in April 2024 with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the CCP. On that occasion, representatives of bukelismo signed an agreement with the CCP’s cadre school, securing Chinese sponsorship for the newly inaugurated Political Training Institute of Nuevas Ideas. The ILD was established in 1951 to promote ties between the CCP and other communist parties across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the organization turned its focus to cultivating relationships with leftist groups of all kinds, from European social democrats to liberation movements in the Global South. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, the ILD began adopting a pragmatic approach, fostering good relations with both left- and right-wing parties. For instance, center-right organizations like Argentina’s Republican Proposal (PRO) have maintained ties with the CCP since 2009. Xi Jinping, while maintaining this approach, has made the ILD’s operations more assertive, turning it into a key instrument of Chinese foreign influence. Various think tanks and scholars of Chinese foreign policy have noted the quiet diplomacy exercised by the Asian giant through the ILD and other bodies. These include the United Front Work Department and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which function as parallel bureaucracies to the MoFA and are characterized by opaque activities and a purported autonomy from Beijing. However, these organizations aim to connect various sectors of foreign politics and civil society with the CCP. In particular, the ILD builds influence networks by training foreign politicians. Beyond offering training courses funded in China, the department has promoted the construction of training centers in countries such as Tanzania. In this way, the ILD seeks to forge close ties with foreign elites who, in addition to promoting Chinese soft power narratives – such as the superiority of the one-party model or the primacy of development over democracy and civil liberties – can lobby on Beijing’s behalf in agencies, cabinets, and parliaments. In this sense, Chinese support for Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute marks a significant step forward in cooperation between the CCP and El Salvador’s ruling party. The ILD’s training programs have also become spaces for transmitting authoritarian know-how. Researchers such as Lina Benabdallah and Christine Hackenesch point out that the CCP promotes the Chinese governance model to foreign elites – a model based on mass surveillance technologies, personal data storage, and internet censorship, typically provided by state-owned enterprises like Huawei. These practices are presented as alternatives for strengthening public security and internal stability, but in practice, they reinforce state control and restrict civil liberties in adopting countries. The paradoxes of Bukelismo The link between Nuevas Ideas and the CCP raises questions about the ideological leanings of Nayib Bukele. Just a few weeks ago, the Salvadoran president hosted U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in San Salvador to seal, in Rubio’s words, “a historic agreement, the most extraordinary in the world” on migration. Suppose this event signaled El Salvador’s intent to become one of the United States’ most important regional partners. How should we now interpret the growing political cooperation with China, the U.S.’s main strategic rival? On one hand, it is understandable that El Salvador’s ruling party seeks alignment with the CCP. The inauguration of Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute, with ILD’s blessing, is another episode of authoritarian cooperation in Latin America, where a regime well-versed in repression and control transfers knowledge and resources to another with similar aims. Similar patterns have been observed in the region with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which collaborate among themselves and with extra-regional autocracies like Russia, Iran, and China itself. Given this, it is not surprising that a self-proclaimed socialist regime and another linked to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) would cooperate beyond ideological differences. In fact, this has been the ILD’s hallmark in the 21st century: pragmatism in engaging with parties across the spectrum, ensuring long-term ties with various governments. This phenomenon reflects a central feature of our times: the erosion of the left-right divide in favor of a new tension between democracies and autocracies. On the other hand, the indoctrination of Nuevas Ideas’ cadres might even be tolerable to Trump, given that some CCP perspectives align with his political agenda. The pursuit of a multipolar order that secures spheres of influence for major powers – such as the South China Sea or Greenland – as well as the promotion of illiberal models of democracy – like China’s “whole-process democracy” or the unitary executive without checks and balances – are not foreign concepts to Make America Great Again. Based on this, Bukele may seem to have the green light to deepen his authoritarian project with Beijing’s help. As long as the PRC does not interfere with U.S. strategic interests in El Salvador – such as migration management or control of critical infrastructure – the 47th American president might remain content, regardless of China’s growing soft power in the hemisphere.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise to power in 2002, one might ask whether we can speak of an Erdoğan Doctrine in Turkish foreign policy. The answer is no. Unlike classical doctrines that follow a consistent ideological or strategic framework, Erdoğan’s approach to both domestic and international politics is marked by pragmatic opportunism, transactional maneuvering, and tactical adaptability. His foreign policy does not stem from a fixed set of principles but rather from a fluid, recalibrated strategy designed to ensure political survival, power consolidation, and economic self-preservation. Yet, despite this adaptability, Erdoğan has consistently instrumentalized Islamism, Ottoman nostalgia, and Turkish nationalism as mobilizing forces, shaping both Turkey’s domestic landscape and its global positioning. These ideological currents serve not as doctrinal foundations but as strategic tools, deployed selectively to consolidate power and justify an increasingly interventionist and authoritarian foreign policy. Rather than an Erdoğan Doctrine, what we observe is a dynamic political strategy, one that shifts according to regional and global realities, balancing ideological rhetoric with realpolitik pragmatism. Erdoğan’s political trajectory has been characterized by extreme opportunism. Early in his tenure, he presented himself as a pro-Western democrat, championing Turkey’s EU membership and economic liberalization. However, as his grip on power consolidated, he shifted towards authoritarian populism, discrediting Western institutions and embracing an anti-Western, neo-Ottomanist discourse. His ability to manipulate ideological positions for strategic gain suggests that Erdoğan’s doctrine is less about consistent principles and more about sustaining power through ideological fluidity. This transactional nature extends to foreign policy, where Erdoğan has engaged in contradictory alliances. Turkey has simultaneously sought stronger ties with Russia while maintaining a position in NATO, balancing relations with Iran while confronting it in Syria, and denouncing Western imperialism while leveraging economic ties with the EU. The 2016 failed coup attempt marked a pivotal moment, after which Erdoğan’s rhetoric became deeply anti-Western, securitizing foreign policy as an extension of domestic political struggles. One of the defining characteristics of the Erdoğan strategy is the obliteration of the traditional boundary between domestic and foreign policy. In Erdoğan’s Turkey, foreign policy decisions are primarily driven by domestic political calculations rather than long-term strategic considerations. Military operations in Syria and Libya were framed as nationalist victories, consolidating Erdoğan’s support base while deflecting attention from economic crises. Political rivals and dissidents are routinely accused of being Western puppets or linked to foreign conspiracies, reinforcing anti-Western nationalism. Erdoğan actively uses the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a political tool, portraying himself as the protector of Muslims abroad and positioning Turkey as the leader of a global Islamic movement. This lack of distinction between internal and external affairs means that every foreign policy move is designed for domestic legitimacy. Military interventions, diplomatic crises, and economic policies are all packaged for domestic consumption to maintain Erdoğan’s image as a leader defying Western hegemony. Erdoğan has strategically invoked Islamist rhetoric and Ottoman nostalgia to mask domestic corruption, repression, and economic mismanagement. His use of Islamism is highly pragmatic rather than ideological. While Erdoğan once promoted a pro-business, moderate Islamist stance, he has increasingly aligned with more radical Islamic groups to rally conservative voters. Neo-Ottomanist narratives have been used to justify interventions in the Middle East and Africa, portraying Turkey as the rightful heir to regional leadership. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has become an ideological tool for Erdoğan, framing his rule as divinely sanctioned while attacking secular and Western influences. Erdoğan’s economic policies reflect the same transactional nature. He has oscillated between free-market policies to attract Western investment and state-led crony capitalism to consolidate his own economic elite. However, his militarization of foreign policy has created deep economic vulnerabilities. Erdoğan’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 missiles resulted in U.S. sanctions and exclusion from the F-35 program, exacerbating Turkey’s economic downturn.  Aggressive gas exploration efforts isolated Turkey from the EU and regional actors, worsening trade relations. While Erdoğan has relied on Qatari financial support, recent Gulf rapprochements have left Turkey geopolitically and economically vulnerable. Turkey’s economic dependence on Western markets and capital contradicts Erdoğan’s anti-Western rhetoric, further proving that his doctrine is driven by short-term political survival rather than a coherent strategic vision. Rather than a structured geopolitical vision, the Erdoğan strategy is best understood as a political survival mechanism that combines: Extreme pragmatism and transactionalism, shifting alliances and ideological positions as needed; the fusion of domestic and foreign policy, where foreign affairs are a continuation of domestic power struggles; the instrumentalization of Islamism and Ottoman nostalgia, masking authoritarianism and economic decline; short-term opportunism at the cost of long-term strategy, leading to Turkey’s increasing diplomatic and economic isolation. Erdoğan’s rule has been marked by ad-hoc decisions, contradictions, and reactive policies that serve his immediate political needs rather than a grand vision for Turkey’s future. This transactional-opportunism makes the Erdoğan Doctrine an impossibility—while he projects an image of Islamic, nationalist leadership, his foreign policy is dictated by opportunism, insecurity, and personal political survival. The consequences of this approach are a weakened economy, diplomatic isolation, and an increasingly authoritarian state, making the long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s model highly uncertain.  Another major characteristic of Erdoğan’s strategy is the securitization of domestic and foreign policy. Since Erdoğan ascended to the presidency in 2014, and particularly after the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant transformations. These changes are marked by a growing reliance on securitization—the framing of domestic and international challenges as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures. Erdoğan’s approach has been shaped by three key factors: Islamist ideology, Ottoman nostalgia, and the deep-seated trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres. These factors have driven Turkey into high-risk foreign policy ventures, many of which have backfired, leading to strategic isolation, economic instability, and declining influence on the global stage. Erdoğan’s political strategy has been centered on constructing an image of perpetual threat to the Turkish state and nation. This approach is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of betrayal and encirclement—most prominently symbolized by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which sought to partition Anatolia and subject it to foreign control. This “Sèvres Syndrome” has been instrumentalized to justify an aggressive foreign policy, military interventions, and an increasingly authoritarian domestic stance.  Erdoğan has fused Turkish nationalism with political Islam, portraying Turkey as both the heir to the Ottoman Empire and the champion of Sunni Muslims. This synthesis has fueled a revisionist foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. However, these ambitions have often led Turkey into conflicts with former allies and regional powers, undermining its strategic position. Erdoğan’s foreign policy, shaped by securitization, Islamist nostalgia, and historical trauma, has backfired spectacularly in multiple arenas. While he has sought to redefine Turkey as a great power, his tactics have instead led to growing regional isolation, economic instability, and internal discontent. The failure to balance nationalist rhetoric with pragmatic diplomacy has left Turkey more vulnerable than ever—caught between Western skepticism, Russian opportunism, and Middle Eastern volatility. Unless Erdoğan recalibrates his approach, Turkey risks further decline in both regional and global affairs. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdoğan came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation, shifting from a Western-oriented, EU-focused trajectory to a more assertive, independent, and, increasingly, anti-Western stance. While initially adopting a “thin populist” approach that emphasized regional engagement, neo-Ottomanist rhetoric, and Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and West, the AKP’s foreign policy has evolved into a “thick populist” approach dominated by a strong anti-Western narrative. This transformation was solidified after the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and, even more so, after the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, which the Turkish government blamed on the West-backed Gülen Movement. The growing securitization of Western powers and the increasing emphasis on Turkey’s Islamic and civilizational identity have led to an overt de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Erdoğan’s securitization of foreign policy has manifested in several high-risk ventures that have largely failed to achieve their intended objectives: Turkey’s military interventions in Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring) were aimed at eradicating the Kurdish YPG, which Ankara views as an extension of the PKK.  However, this policy has led to severe tensions with the United States, which has supported the YPG as a key ally against ISIS. The result is a diplomatic impasse that has weakened Turkey’s influence in Syria while increasing its military entanglements. Turkey’s intervention in Libya, backing the Government of National Accord (GNA) against Khalifa Haftar, was an extension of Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. While it temporarily secured Turkish energy and maritime interests, it alienated Egypt, the UAE, France, and Greece, leading to counteralliances that have restricted Turkish maneuverability.  Erdoğan’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system was framed as a move for strategic autonomy but resulted in sanctions from the United States and exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet program. While this was meant to demonstrate Turkey’s independence, it has made the country increasingly reliant on Moscow, further complicating relations with NATO. Erdoğan’s aggressive posture has damaged Turkey’s relations with Western allies, leading to economic consequences, loss of diplomatic leverage, and isolation in Europe. Erdoğan’s confrontational approach—such as threatening to flood Europe with refugees—has eroded trust and reinforced perceptions of Turkey as an unpredictable and transactional partner. Erdoğan’s security-driven foreign policy has had dire economic consequences. The Turkish lira has suffered dramatic depreciation, foreign investment has declined, and inflation has soared. The Turkish public, initially supportive of Erdoğan’s assertiveness, is increasingly disillusioned as economic hardship worsens. Erdoğan’s securitization of policy has created short-term political gains but long-term strategic vulnerabilities. No one takes Turkey as a credible ally. His nationalist-Islamist rhetoric has been effective in consolidating domestic support, especially among conservative and nationalist voters, but it has also deepened Turkey’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Finally, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has been anti-Western.  A key driver of Erdoğan’s anti-Western foreign policy has been the gradual populist transformation of the AKP and consolidation of his power by purging other prominent personalities within the party.  Initially, under the leadership of Erdoğan, the party adopted a moderate, reformist discourse that prioritized EU membership, economic liberalization, and cooperation with Western allies. However, over time, populist tendencies became dominant, with Erdoğan increasingly portraying himself as the true representative of the “real” Turkish people against both domestic and international elites. Populist foreign policy, as seen in Turkey and elsewhere, follows a binary logic that pits “the virtuous people” against “the corrupt elite.” In the Turkish context, this binary has been extended to the international arena, with the West—Europe and the United States—constructed as the foreign equivalent of the corrupt elite, standing in opposition to Turkey’s rightful role as a global power.  The early years of AKP rule were marked by a pragmatic approach that balanced Turkey’s Western orientation with a regionalist vision. This period saw active engagement with the EU, NATO, and the U.S., while at the same time expanding relations with the Middle East, Balkans, and Africa under Ahmet Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” doctrine. During this era, anti-Western rhetoric was limited, and Turkey’s regional activism was framed as complementary to, rather than a rejection of, its Western ties. Following the Gezi Park protests and, more dramatically, the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan’s rhetoric became openly hostile toward the West. Western governments were accused of plotting against Turkey, harboring terrorists, and undermining Turkey’s sovereignty. Erdoğan framed his leadership as a struggle against an imperialist West determined to prevent Turkey’s rise. As he declared in 2019, “Turkey is now a country whose agenda is not determined [by others] but who determines her own agenda.” Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy became an extension of Erdoğan’s domestic populist struggle, where anti-Westernism served as both an ideological tool and a strategy for political survival. Another major factor behind Turkey’s anti-Western turn is the fusion of Islamist and nationalist discourses, which have become the defining ideological pillars of Erdoğan’s foreign policy. This ideological shift is best understood through the contrast between Kemalism and Neo-Ottomanism. Traditionally, Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by Westernization, secularism, and nationalism. The country’s founding ideology sought integration with Europe, NATO membership, and alignment with the U.S. in the Cold War. However, Kemalist elites were also skeptical of foreign entanglements, leading to a cautious and isolationist diplomacy. Neo-Ottomanism and the “New Turkey” Vision of Erdoğan is anti-Western, Islamists, and serves for Erdoğan’s regime survival rather than national interest of the country. Under Erdoğan, a revisionist historical narrative emerged, portraying the Ottoman Empire as a great civilization that was undermined by Western colonialism and internal betrayals. In this vision, modern Turkey is the rightful heir of the Ottoman legacy and should reclaim its leadership role in the Islamic world. Erdoğan has repeatedly invoked the trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920)—which proposed partitioning Turkey—as evidence that the West continues to conspire against Turkish sovereignty.  This ideological framework has shaped Turkey’s new foreign policy identity, positioning it as a leader of the Muslim world rather than a subordinate member of the Western alliance. As Erdoğan’s government became more authoritarian and Islamist, relations with the EU steadily deteriorated. The post-2016 crackdown on opposition figures, journalists, and academics led to increasing criticism from European leaders, reinforcing Erdoğan’s narrative that the EU is hypocritical, biased, and Islamophobic. While Turkey officially remains an EU candidate country, Erdoğan has openly questioned the sincerity of European leaders, arguing that the EU is a “Christian club” that will never accept a Muslim-majority country.  Erdoğan’s government has rejected Western liberal values, reversing democratic reforms and undermining the independence of judicial institutions, the media, and civil society. As a result, Turkey has moved closer to authoritarian models seen in Russia, China, and the Gulf states. Erdoğan’s anti-Western and de-Europeanized foreign policy is not just a reaction to specific diplomatic disputes—it is a structural transformation rooted in populism, ideology, and strategic recalibration. By casting the West as Turkey’s primary “other,” Erdoğan has crafted a nationalist-Islamist narrative that legitimizes his power, mobilizes his base, and redefines Turkey’s role in the world.  While this approach has granted Turkey short-term strategic flexibility, it has also left it increasingly isolated, economically vulnerable, and diplomatically constrained. The long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s foreign policy remains uncertain, especially as domestic economic troubles and shifting global dynamics continue to reshape Turkey’s geopolitical landscape. One of the key arguments in understanding Turkey’s foreign policy shift is the interaction between domestic authoritarianism and international behavior. Unlike traditional middle powers, which pursue stability, Turkey’s domestic political dynamics—specifically Erdoğan’s populist authoritarian rule—have fueled its unusual, risk-prone foreign policy choices. Erdoğan has increasingly used foreign policy as a tool for domestic political survival, framing Turkey as a besieged nation fighting Western imperialists. Opposition parties are often accused of being aligned with “foreign agents” or Western powers, further deepening polarization. Nationalist rhetoric has been amplified during military operations, boosting public support for interventions in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US. This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties – Russia and Ukraine – has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward. From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement – on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 –is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it. Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US. Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington – including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no Nato membership for Ukraine. These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is also likely to be keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.   Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American – let alone Ukrainian – terms. This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations. Pressure points Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine – and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end of the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps – pressure on Ukraine and on Russia – are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line. The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude. The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia. The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to pressure Russia in a similar way to Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/] 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The election of General Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon marks the beginning of a new era of hope for a country that has been mired in crisis for decades. The election and General Aoun’s position This election is not just a step towards ending a protracted constitutional crisis, but the beginning of a critical period of challenges and opportunities that require wise leadership and a clear vision to achieve Lebanon’s security and prosperity. From the outset, General Aoun has shown himself to be a leader committed to transparency and clarity. His words after taking the oath of office were devoid of the usual diplomatic platitudes and reflected his honest character and deep love for his country. He has a clear vision and firm goals that prioritise restoring security and rebuilding Lebanon’s institutions on a solid foundation that serves its people and ensures justice. In his speech, Aoun stressed the importance of restoring the authority of the state and strengthening its sovereignty – essential foundations for building a secure future. His speech on institutional reform underlined his desire to strengthen the state and restore public confidence. He also stressed the importance of national unity and the vital role of youth in driving change, expressing his hope for Lebanon’s rebirth with the participation of all its citizens. Lebanon today faces many challenges, but these challenges can be the starting point for reconstruction and its rise. Restoring trust between the state and its people will require concrete steps to fight corruption and increase transparency, principles that Aoun stressed: “Lebanon will rise only thanks to its loyal citizens”. Moreover, fulfilling international commitments such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, which call for, among other things, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah, will be crucial to establishing stability and removing Lebanon from regional power struggles. Aoun’s firm stance that Lebanon “will not become a battleground for settling scores” offers hope for a sovereign and independent future for the country, free from regional tensions. At this critical juncture in Lebanon’s history, the appointment of a competent prime minister is an urgent task. This person must have both economic experience and integrity, be able to lead economic reforms and attract investment to restore confidence in state institutions. Such an appointment will lay the groundwork for the successful implementation of the plan to return Lebanon to a path of growth and stability, politically, economically and spiritually. Lebanon has always been a beacon of culture, diversity and tolerance and now, with the election of a new president, the Lebanese hope that the country will regain its rightful place among other nations of the world. Aoun recognizes the important role of the Gulf countries in supporting Lebanon’s renaissance and calls on them to return and invest in rebuilding the country’s economy. This call is not only economic: it is an expression of gratitude and appreciation for the vital role that the Gulf monarchies have historically played in Lebanon’s development. Position of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement In the second round of voting, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement decided to support the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president, ending a two-year presidential deadlock. The resounding statement by the ‘Shiite duo’ was that the crucial decision on the numerical and political quorum was largely up to the resistance movement and that the president could not be elected without it. Reluctantly, the ‘Shiite duo’ gave in to unprecedented foreign pressure, while still claiming a powerful presence in the Lebanese political arena. In fact, the ‘duo’ put Lebanon’s best interests and national harmony first. Mohammed Raad, head of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, paid tribute to the “martyrs of the resistance who defended the country so that a meeting uld be held, and national harmony could be achieved in this difficult period. By postponing the election of the president, we wanted to send the message that we are the guarantors of national harmony”. A consensus was reached before the second round during a meeting between Mohammad Raad and Ali Hassan Khalil and Joseph Aoun, who allayed the Shia duo’s fears about the military, security and politics. The meeting focused on the responsibilities of the new era, particularly in terms of reconstruction, forming a national government and preserving the achievements of the resistance movement. Joseph Aoun promised to rebuild what the Israeli enemy had destroyed, saying: “Our dead are the spirit of our determination, and our prisoners are the pillars of our strength”. Moscow welcomes Aoun’s election as Lebanese president This opens up prospects for strengthening Lebanon’s domestic political stability and improving the country’s difficult socio-economic situation, the Russian Foreign Ministry said. Moscow welcomes the resolution of the presidential crisis, which has lasted since October 2022. This opens up prospects for strengthening internal political stability in Lebanon and rectifying the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, the Foreign Ministry said. It said: “Russia believes that the restoration of a broad national consensus is the key to ensuring unity and civil peace in multi-confessional Lebanon. The Russian Federation reaffirms its unwavering position in support of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the friendly Republic of Lebanon. It is determined to further develop Russian-Lebanese relations and closely coordinate efforts in the interests of ensuring peace and security in the Middle East region, which is going through a period of military and political turbulence,” the ministry added. Aoun’s election is a milestone in Lebanon’s history. His honest leadership and transparent approach inspire hope for a bright future. But realising that hope will require collective effort and serious action. Lebanon deserves the best, and with strong leadership and the support of its people and allies, a country worthy of its history and status can be rebuilt. Let this new era be a great opportunity for a fresh start, and let us always remember that hope is built on action and commitment.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A wave of comments and reports has flooded the media landscape and social networks of the Middle East following the coup in Syria and the rise to power of new forces. These reactions reflect a diverse mosaic of opinions and perspectives on the reasons behind these events. Amid the general chorus of views, there is a noticeable trend celebrating the “victory of the Syrian people, oppressed for decades”. At the same time, the commentators’ euphoria over the regime’s unexpected fall is tempered by fears of uncertainty and the unpredictability of the country’s future. Headlines such as “Syria: No Victor!”, “Syria Is Further Away From Its Resurrection”, and “Today’s Syria in the Shadows of Internal Division” encapsulate these sentiments. Regional analysts predict conflicting scenarios for the country’s future: one envisioning a peaceful and bloodless transition to a new system of governance, and the other foreseeing a descent into chaos and civil strife. What Ash-Sharaa Proclaims Many writers focus their attention on the biography, actions, and statements of the head of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham*” (HTS), Al-Jolani – the unofficial leader of the conglomerate of forces now in power after the coup. They suggest that his public image is undergoing a transformation. Al-Jolani fought under the banner of “Al-Qaeda*” in Iraq, spent five years in an American prison there, and recently replaced his nom de guerre with his real name, Ash-Sharaa. According to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, his public appearances and interviews are designed for external audiences. These include the West first and foremost, followed by the Gulf states, Israel, neighboring countries, and influential actors in Syria such as Iran and Russia. Everything Ash-Sharaa communicates serves the purpose of projecting the message that he is no longer the man many once knew. He expresses a desire for good relations with the global community. In Damascus, doors have been opened to delegations from several European countries as well as the United States. The aim of these visits was to establish communication channels with Syria’s new rulers. In recent days, the new leadership has laid out the red carpet for visiting diplomats from Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar. Qatar has offered to provide technical assistance to resume commercial flights and has expressed interest in investing in various sectors of Syria, including energy. Jordan has voiced its “readiness to support Syria in areas such as trade, border security, electricity supply, and more”. It also seems that the Arab delegations visiting Damascus are unwilling to leave the field open for Turkey’s active involvement in Syria or allow it to impose its agenda on the Syrian people. Western countries are trying to determine their approach to relations with Syria’s new administration. They are waiting to assess its policies and actions before considering lifting the sanctions imposed on Damascus. Following a meeting with Ash-Sharaa, a U.S. representative announced the cancellation of the previously offered $10 million financial reward for information leading to his capture. Despite this, HTS* remains on the U.S. list of officially recognized terrorist organizations. Positive Signals from the New Syrian Authorities The new Syrian authorities appear eager to send positive signals emphasizing “social justice and equality among all religious and ethnic components”. These efforts aim to reassure the international community, gain recognition, and pave the way for official cooperation. Experts and political analysts find these signals encouraging. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, described statements about national unity and HTS’s promises not to impose its ideas on all Syrians as “reasonable and rational”. However, he expressed concerns about the nature of the new forces and their historical ties to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood* and Al-Qaeda*. Prominent Saudi researcher on political Islam and extremism, Yousef al-Dini, analyzed tweets from jihadist figures, including statements by Ash-Sharaa. He concluded that the primary issue HTS faces lies with the “remnants” of foreign fighters and mercenaries within their ranks. These individuals have struggled to adapt, lacking the pragmatism demonstrated by their leaders, he noted. The media across the Middle East highlight the atmosphere of caution and anticipation currently permeating Syrian society. The sudden upheavals have caught many off guard, disrupted established perceptions, and presented scenarios that do not rule out turbulent events. As Arab sociologists remind us, Syria is home to sixteen racial and ethnic groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Druze, Shiites, Alawites, Christians, Yazidis, and others. The history of the Syrian people has destined them to live intertwined within a shared social fabric, preserving the cultural heritage of the ancient Levant. The new regime in Syria faces a daunting challenge. To survive and sustain itself, it must transform its rhetoric into the reality of a lawful national state that embraces coexistence under one roof for all components of its diverse society. *Organisations banned in the territory of the Russian Federation

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel has a unique ability to secure favorable outcomes in agreements, especially in how they are implemented, achieving what it has not accomplished in its military campaigns. On November 27, started the truce between Hezbollah and Israel, images of jubilant Lebanese civilians returning to the villages they had been expelled from after more than two months of relentless Israeli bombings were abundant. The leaders of the "Party of God," who had confronted the occupation forces and managed to halt their advance into Lebanese territory, were speaking of (another) divine victory, akin to that of 2006. Many people, both inside and outside the country, aligned with the so-called axis of anti-Zionist resistance, praised the fighting capacity of the Lebanese combatants despite their setbacks, including the assassination of their general leader, Hasan Nasrallah, in September 2024. However, the developments during the weeks of the truce so far have once again demonstrated that Israeli governments have a unique ability to secure favorable terms in agreements, especially in how they implement them — achieving what they have not in their (devastating) military campaigns. Because, as always, the devil is in the details. The text approved for the truce in Lebanon — after 4,068 deaths, 16,670 injuries, and nearly a million and a half-displaced people — was so "vague" in certain aspects and, in others, left such a wide margin for Israeli leaders' particular interpretations that it could well be considered a "trap truce." And this is how it has unfolded: the occupying soldiers have expanded, during peacetime, into areas they had not reached during the war. They have continued destroying houses, warehouses, and factories where, they claim, enemy arsenals or "strategic sites" were located. They have set up checkpoints and access controls on certain roads and, worst of all, have killed dozens of Lebanese citizens returning to their homes or, according to Israeli military propaganda, engaging in suspicious activities, such as transporting bundles (which they claimed were weapons) in private vehicles or simply approaching "in a potentially dangerous manner" to the areas where the occupying detachments were stationed. None of these actions — expanding their presence, shooting at civilians, or destroying buildings — fell within the occupying force's powers. The wording of the agreement – "the parties reserve the right to intervene if the other violates the terms" — as mentioned, left ample room for interpretation. Why Hezbollah, and especially the Lebanese state, as a party involved in negotiating and enforcing the truce, accepted these terms and have not pressured the supervisory bodies or the so-called international community to curb Israeli abuses deserves a chapter of its own. If Hezbollah was already weakened by late 2024 due to the fall of the Syrian regime and developments in Lebanon, including the appointment of a president and prime minister entirely at odds with its vision of resistance, the circumstances surrounding the truce have further undermined its position. Gazans should pay close attention to what is happening in Lebanon. Tel Aviv has been using understandings, truces, and peace agreements for decades to reinforce its military victories or compensate for its battlefield defeats. You will never see them lose at the negotiating table. And when an agreement no longer suits them, they simply stop honoring it. Just ask the Syrians about the unilateral nullification of the 1974 agreement that marked the demarcation line between occupied Palestine and the Golan Heights. According to the Tel Aviv regime, the fall of the Assad government in December 2024 invalidated those stipulations. Taking advantage of the political chaos, they have advanced dozens of kilometers into Syrian territory. More space for their military bases and, if permitted, new settlements. Although, as in southern Lebanon two months ago, the people of Gaza took to what remains of the streets and squares in the Strip on Sunday, January 19, to celebrate the ceasefire, they would do well to remain cautious. Not only because the three announced stages — especially the third — are, as usual, vague, but also because, once again, the international guarantors are clearly aligned with the interests of Israel’s deceitful and indecent political and military ruling class. In Lebanon, the supervisors — a high-ranking U.S. military official and international forces — turned a blind eye to the continuous (but justifiable, in their opinion) Israeli violations. In Gaza, it will be Qatar, the United States, and Egypt who will be responsible for intervening in case of breaches. Wolves guarding the lambs, especially Washington, whose leaders have unequivocally aligned themselves with their close ally, Israel. However, the third stage will be the most ambiguous and dangerous of all, as it includes plans to reshape Gaza's government, excluding Hamas, of course. To achieve this, the plan would rely on other Palestinian entities — though no one knows who they are — and third-party countries. One of these is the United Arab Emirates, a behind-the-scenes collaborator in the neo-Zionist strategy in Palestine, and not at all inclined to sympathize with the Palestinian cause: Abu Dhabi and Dubai, for instance, prohibit the display of keffiyehs (Palestinian scarves) and flags, let alone the publication of messages supporting the Gazan resistance. Hours after the ceasefire began, Hamas, just in case, deployed hundreds of armed men into the streets to demonstrate who remains the predominant force in Gaza. Given this situation, it remains unclear how a new government will be imposed in the territory during this third phase without first sidelining the Palestinian militias. Israeli negotiators are skilled at creating temporary factors and phased timelines that ultimately yield favorable outcomes for them. They have been doing this since the Camp David Accords, signed in 1978 between Egypt and Israel. At that time, the evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula, taken from the Egyptians during the 1967 war, was carried out according to a phased timeline and based on four geographic areas where the Israelis defined security responsibilities along the demarcation lines. That treaty established a prototypical approach to negotiations with Arab rivals: the demilitarization of adjacent territories and control over border crossings. A maneuver aimed at establishing demilitarized and, as much as possible, depopulated areas. Thanks to Camp David, the Egyptian army is prohibited from setting up air bases or large-scale ground troop concentrations that could facilitate a hypothetical occupation of Israeli territory. This is not the case on the other side, where military installations are justified for security reasons (one of the propagandist perversions of Zionism is making much of the world believe that others wish to invade their territories; reality proves otherwise). As we have seen during these fifteen months of the campaign against Gaza, Egyptians cannot unilaterally decide who enters or exits through the Rafah crossing (in southern Gaza). For this reason, they must coordinate security arrangements with the other side, just as they do along the rest of the border perimeter. Worse still, the Israeli army ended up exclusively assuming jurisdiction over the so-called Salah al-Din Road or Philadelphia Corridor, which originally belonged to the Egyptians on the southern side, to more "efficiently" prevent arms shipments to Hamas and other armed militias. Later, after the Wadi Araba agreements in the 1990s, something similar was done with the Jordanians. Or, during the same decade, the (disastrous) Oslo Accords, which created the Palestinian National Authority and the A, B, and C territories where the Tel Aviv regime, as always, interprets areas of influence and settlement supervision in its own sui generis way, including control over access between them. The idea of intermediate demilitarized zones with barely any population is now being pushed again in southern Lebanon, where several Israeli representatives have already threatened that "they are not going to leave completely." They intend to replicate this in Gaza. The implementation of this ceasefire certifies the failure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Apart from devastating a 360-square-kilometer territory, killing, injuring, or expelling one-tenth of its population, and displacing the rest across the confines of the Strip, they have not achieved much. Of course, for the overarching plans of “brute-force” Zionism that the Palestinians are suffering from — in Gaza and also in the West Bank—breaking down Palestinian society and gaining new territories for their expansion projects represents an achievement. But they wanted more. They aimed to recolonize Gaza, impose a puppet government — just as submissive but more effective and aggressive than the Palestinian National Authority — publicize the release of prisoners held by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others, film the destruction of all tunnels excavated by Palestinian militias, and prove that their army is still the alpha male of the Middle East... But they have not succeeded. Little matters — this is what truces, and their interpretations are for, especially when international guarantors are sympathetic to the priorities of the Tel Aviv regime. To hint at what may lie ahead, consider that the Israeli army killed ten Palestinians in the hours following the agreement's implementation because Hamas had not submitted the list of names of the first three Israeli female prisoners to be released. The agreement did not state that this submission was a ‘sine qua non’ condition or that one side could resume bombing in such a case. What was agreed upon, however, establishes that the displaced — hundreds of thousands — may return to their ruined homes over the coming weeks. Yet, the agreement does not stipulate an immediate withdrawal of occupying troops, who may remain on the roads and corridors where they are stationed and block access for supposed security reasons. A similar situation is occurring in Lebanon, where occupying troops have up to sixty days to withdraw from their positions. Until they leave, their mere presence prevents residents from returning to their homes. The Greeks (Danaans) could not conquer Troy through war and instead relied on negotiation and gifts. Hence the famous line by Horace, spoken by the visionary priest Laocoön: "’Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes’" ("I fear the Greeks, even when they bring gifts"). The Zionist command is not as subtle but equally effective. No gifts, but when military solutions fail, they resort to negotiation, which always leaves something behind. Fear them, for they will find a way to twist the agreement, likely in the so-called second phase, and seek a formula to violate it in whole or in part. They are aided by a new U.S. president, a specialist in "creatively" rewriting agreements. For now, he has already forced them to negotiate, despite opposition from the ultra-Orthodox factions. He knows more than the recalcitrant sector of neo-Zionism: the goal is to achieve the same objective by other means. Here, everyone — or almost everyone — is conspiring against the Palestinians. They have long grown accustomed to resisting alone against the predators. This content is published under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Spain (CC BY-SA 3.0 ES) license. More information at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/es/.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Is it justifiable to continue not recognising the Taliban government, which has been in power for more than three years? This stance does nothing to improve the situation of Afghan women and prevents the international community from fully engaging on other critical issues in the country. Report from the field by a UN consultant.Working for the United Nations in AfghanistanWorking for the United Nations in Afghanistan today presents curious challenges. The Taliban government, in power since August 15, 2021, is not recognised. Despite this non-recognition, the UN maintains a considerable political presence in the country, while UN agencies, primarily providing humanitarian aid to the population to the tune of several billion dollars per year. When the Taliban took power, they assured the international community that foreign civilians could remain and that would be protected. Western diplomatic missions all left to avoid recognising the new regime, but UN agencies remained on the ground. Their presence was justified by the duty to assist the population. Afghanistan is indeed beset by multiple crises. The war has ended, but the country has been severely affected by climate change since at least the 1990s. Long droughts alternating with torrential rains, as well as the melting glaciers that feed irrigation canals, have caused a decline in agricultural productivity and rural exodus to cities. Adding to this is a severe economic contraction: the abrupt departure of the international community caused GDP to fall by 28% in one year. By autumn 2021, another year marked by drought, the UN was forecasting a possible famine. Somewhat reluctantly, the international community continued to fund activities in Afghanistan – on the condition that its funds did not benefit the Taliban.  There was no humanitarian catastrophe that first winter or in the years that followed, even though the dual climate and economic crises persisted, compounded by other disasters, both natural (earthquakes and floods) and political (Pakistan’s decision to expel hundreds of thousands of Afghans). The UN takes credit for averting a grave humanitarian crisis, although other factors, such as peace and solidarity among Afghans, may have contributed more. Contradictory positions UN agency leaders in Afghanistan must coordinate their activities with the new authorities, who had developed a strong grip on society even before returning to power during two decades of “shadow governance.” Their prudent administration of controlled areas, coupled with what many Afghans perceived as a national liberation war against a foreign occupation, had garnered a certain degree of popular legitimacy, which has grown since they assumed power. After 20 years of war and NATO’s withdrawal, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – the Taliban’s official name – is not going anywhere for now. This is clear to everyone in Afghanistan, including those within UN agencies.  However, the UN refers to the new regime as the “de facto authorities” stressing that they lack international legitimacy. The previous government, despite its complete collapse, still holds Afghanistan’s seat at the UN and most embassies worldwide. While some key states, notably China, Iran and Russia, have engaged with Kabul’s leaders, the Islamic Emirate lacks representation in international institutions, where the Taliban are still regarded as a terrorist organisation. Pressure on the Taliban to accept values that we see as universal – which they dispute – only radicalises them further. As the Taliban’s Director of International Trade told me in December 2023, citing their efforts against ISIS-K and the destruction of opium fields: “[The international community] wanted us to fight terrorism. We did. You were concerned about opium production harming your youth. We ended it. Yet, you have never publicly acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate solved the problems your [2001–2021 republic] government could not. Now, you constantly criticise us over Afghan women and expect us to listen. But this concerns our society, and you have no say in it.”​Within the UN, the perception of the Taliban as misogynistic religious barbarians to be categorically rejected is widespread. However, such rhetoric has no impact on the plight of Afghan women and complicates the work of UN staff on the ground. They must publicly reject the Taliban government while at the same time enjoy their protection and hospitality, and negotiate with them discreetly to achieve concrete outcomes.  Quiet exchanges yield results In April 2023, the Taliban announced that Afghan women could no longer work for the UN in the country. Yet, no women – to my knowledge – have been dismissed to date, and new recruits have even been hired, thanks to behind-the-scenes dialogue with Taliban leaders. Public UN criticism of the Taliban’s policies on women risks jeopardising such negotiations. International attention on Afghanistan remains narrowly focused on one issue: the condition of Afghan women. A French TV producer to whom I was pitching a few ideas about Afghanistan warned me that if my pitch didn’t involve “beards and burqas,” no network would be interested. While the plight of Afghan women, particularly girls barred from secondary and higher education, should not be minimised, other issues also deserve attention. For example, Afghanistan contributes almost nothing to climate change but suffers heavily from it. If desertification in this country of 40 million people continues, we can expect waves of migration to neighbouring and wealthier temperate countries. The Islamic Emirate is concerned about the climate threat and could be an effective partner in climate adaptation – but only if allowed to participate in international forums and access funding, such as those negotiated at COP 29. While the Taliban were invited to COP 29, they were only given an observer status. The FAO, for which I served as a strategic communications advisor, continues to implement programs for environmental preservation, reforestation, and irrigation projects. But when it comes to communication, it is crucial to clearly demonstrate that the benefits are exclusively for the affected communities, not the government. If a government official is present at an inauguration, we make it a point to avoid publishing their photo. The UNDP, another agency with a mandate on climate change, has halted all environmental programs to avoid any suspicion of collusion. Even the term “development”, which in UN parlance is associated with support to national governments, is now prohibited in agency communications in Afghanistan, replaced by the term “basic needs.” Despite their public hostility toward the Taliban, they continue to accept the UN because it eases pressure on their government regarding humanitarian aid, facilitates some level of dialogue with the international community, and brings an influx of dollars into a struggling economy. Although this acceptance allows the UN to maintain its presence on the ground, it could also be interpreted as implicit support for the Islamic Emirate. Highly sensitive to this accusation, UN agencies prefer to remain discreet and avoid investing in major projects the country urgently needs, such as those addressing climate change adaptation. Breaking the deadlock Refusing to acknowledge the Taliban government in Afghanistan seems to achieve little beyond giving Western politicians a moral boost as protectors of Afghan women. While this stance may comfort Afghan exiles hoping to regain power with Western backing, it changes nothing on the ground. Believing the Taliban will collapse under international public pressure after defeating the US and NATO is wishful thinking. A more transparent relationship with Afghanistan’s new rulers would improve the UN’s chances of having a positive impact on the country, especially in the medium and long term.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском  Through its recent official and popular position towards the Gaza war, China seeks to define its position as a leader and defender of the so-called “global south” to pass the policy of transformation towards a multipolar international world in the face of the United States of America and its allies in the West. China seizes the opportunity to express the urgent need to reshape the global system led by the West under the leadership of Washington. Here, both Moscow and Beijing see Israel's war on the Gaza Strip as having led to directing Western military support efforts from Ukraine in the face of Russia, Beijing's close ally, to Israel, while China views the war from the perspective of its confrontation with America. As China attempts to express global and popular public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as part of a much broader Chinese strategy aimed at winning the support of the countries of the Global South to its side.    Both Russia and China are working to benefit from the war in Gaza, by strengthening their roles as supporters of the countries of the Global South, and demonstrating the failure and bias of the United States and the international system led by Washington in dealing with the grievances of that large bloc of countries in the world in the South. This also serves to realize Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision of Chinese leadership of the Global South, which includes the majority of Arab countries and Palestine, which enhances Beijing’s efforts to confront Washington and its Western allies and reshape the international system in its favor. China has exploited anti-Israel sentiments globally and at home, in an attempt to strengthen its position within the framework of the Global South.  In its strenuous efforts to express world public opinion and the feelings of peoples, China is pursuing many and varied plans to support the issues of the developing global south, most notably the Palestinian cause, and to expose what China considers to be American double standards in dealing with the Palestinians compared to Israel.    China's assumption of the presidency of the UN Security Council in November 2023 comes immediately after Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” or the Gaza War in October 2023, succeeding Brazil, coinciding with the escalation of brutal Israeli military operations in Gaza. For this reason, China has risked angering Israel, as it sees broader stakes in the current conflict that go beyond the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Beijing sees the crisis as an opportunity to distinguish its position from the pro-Israel West and to enhance its reputation in the global south, many of whose countries strongly sympathize with the Palestinian cause, which serves China's image.  To this end, China has used a tough diplomatic rhetoric against Israeli crimes in the Gaza Strip, and has condemned the US position, especially the obstacles created by the US by voting against a series of Chinese and Russian ceasefire resolutions in the UN Security Council. In addition, China has supported various decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court to condemn Israel and arrest its Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu”.  China used its veto power against a draft resolution proposed by the United States of America on October 15, 2023, which did not include a call for an immediate ceasefire, or a permanent humanitarian truce for the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, "Chang Jun”  justified his country's opposition to the American draft resolution, because it includes many elements that divide rather than unite, and goes beyond the humanitarian dimension, and is unbalanced and mixes right and wrong, and does not reflect a strong call for a ceasefire and an end to the violence. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations “Jun” considered that the ceasefire is not just a diplomatic phrase, but means life and death for many civilians, which Washington did not understand, according to him. China also participated in the (Cairo Peace Summit 2023), which was held on October 21, 2023 in the New Administrative Capital, with China's call during the summit to stop the war in Gaza.  China's motivation for taking an interest in the Palestinian issue after the recent Gaza war may be more related to its competition with the United States and the image that China wants to project domestically and even internationally in light of its new position as a major global power. China wants to be seen as a wise and responsible superpower interested in mediation and peacebuilding. It is also likely that Beijing seeks to present an alternative viewpoint to the United States' perspective on peace to the world order, especially in the global South, where most countries in the region support the Palestinians.   Beijing has already come a long way in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from its active support for Palestinian factions recently to their invitation to China after the recent Gaza war to complete the Palestinian reconciliation process between all the warring Palestinian factions with Chinese support.  Since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip, Chinese positions and statements by officials in Beijing have carried a degree of escalation in tone towards Israel’s behavior. Beijing criticized the comprehensive Israeli bombing of civilians, condemned violations of international law, called for the implementation of the two-state solution, and called for the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to allow aid to enter the besieged Gaza Strip. Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi” went further, describing the Israeli bombing of civilians in Gaza as actions that go beyond the scope of self-defense.  Chinese state media have also been highly critical of Israel, and in most of their reports have cited Iranian media, with the Chinese emphasis that: “the illegal use of white phosphorus bombs by the Israeli army against Palestinian civilians exposes it to international accountability”. Chinese state media have also blamed the United States, Israel’s strongest supporter, and have been explicitly accused in Beijing, for fueling tensions in the region. China has also angered Israel by refusing to join the United States and other countries in designating Hamas as a terrorist organization, describing it instead as a Palestinian resistance movement.    In late October 2024, immediately after the Gaza war, the China Daily, a Chinese propaganda outlet, declared that: “the United States is on the wrong side of history in Gaza”. Elsewhere, Chinese state television reported that Jews represent 3 percent of the United States’ population but control more than 70 percent of its wealth. With all official and popular Chinese media keen to repeat the narratives that dominate the popular discourse in the Global South. This repetition is in line with the majority opinion in some countries of the South, and it allows China to present itself as an alternative to the image of the United States of America as a warmonger, hegemonic, hypocritical and unjust.         In July 2024, Hamas, Fatah and other Palestinian factions signed a preliminary agreement in the Chinese capital, Beijing, to form a transitional government for national reconciliation, with the aim of managing Gaza after the end of the war. The same group met in the Russian capital, Moscow, in February 2024, seeking to reach a similar agreement. At the same time, China was able to bring the Palestinian Fatah and Hamas movements together at the negotiating table in Beijing in two sessions of the National Dialogue during the months of April and June 2024, in a move that reflects China’s desire to interact with the Palestinian issue in a positive way.        Chinese official media is trying to support its position before Chinese public opinion at home and their sympathy for the people of Gaza, by emphasizing China's official discourse, which seeks to confirm that Beijing has made proposals to stop the war on Gaza, brought together the Palestinian movements Hamas and Fatah inside China, and called on the UN Security Council to calm the conflict. China also seized the opportunity of its meetings with Arab and Gulf foreign ministers to reaffirm the multiple peace plans it had previously proposed in favor of resolving the Palestinian issue. With the Chinese envoy to the Middle East “Zhai Jun” , confirming, with Palestinian and Arab officials, China's immediate call for an immediate ceasefire and providing humanitarian support to the Palestinian people.   As for the most prominent Chinese academic and research analyses of the Gaza war, Chinese Professor “Yan Shutong”, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at China's Xinhua University, described the matter as: “The Israel-Gaza war will reduce the global political influence of the United States. This has become very clear, because even its allies will have to distance themselves from it on this issue, and with the undermining of the United States' strategic relations with other major powers, the strategic balance between China and the United States will shift in China's favor”. Professor “Wang Yiwei”, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, also said: “China is now in a better position than the United States to help resolve conflicts, whether between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Russia and Ukraine, or Israel and the Palestinians”.  In this context, Professor Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, asserts that: “Beijing’s policy in the Middle East has been paralyzed by the conflict, given that the United States, which strongly supports Israel, is involved in this crisis, whether directly or indirectly. Who would listen to China?”. A report by the (international human rights organization Freedom House) described a wave of anti-Semitic sentiments on the Chinese Internet and Chinese media, especially popular ones related to Chinese social media, such as: the widely-used Chinese WeChat program, Weibo, QQ, and others. The Freedom House report confirmed that: “With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Chinese government has long promoted a narrative that places the blame squarely on Israel”. In light of the growing global and internal Chinese popular sympathy for the Palestinians, and the unprecedented spread of its manifestations within Chinese society via Chinese social media, and the holding of limited demonstrations in light of China’s sensitive internal policy towards popular demonstrations, decision-makers in Beijing find themselves facing a challenge to maintain a balanced position between the crimes committed by Israel against civilians in the Gaza Strip, and the position of the Palestinians in the Strip.   As an expert in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party in China, and constantly informed of all reports of Chinese think tanks and research centers, especially those related to the Middle East, it is noted that a number of Chinese analyses adopt a trend, vision, and perhaps another theory or school for the war in Gaza, namely the “theory of war between wars”, which later became clear to a large extent to be correct, meaning: that the war that was limited to the Palestinian Hamas movement and Israel, and Israel's practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, will expand to include a conflict between Israel and Iran, but through its agents in the region, which means waging wars on different fronts at the same time, namely the war of Israel against Hamas, targeting Palestinian resistance elements in the West Bank, confronting Hezbollah on the southern Lebanese front, confronting the threats of the Houthi militia in Yemen, fighting the Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and waging confrontations against Iran, which leads the axis of resistance.    To this end, China seized the opportunity of the 10th China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to be held on May 30, 2024, with the participation of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” and a number of Arab leaders, most notably Egyptian President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi”, to reflect the common desire to discuss aspects of China-Arab relations and ways to enhance them, deepen consensus between China and Arab countries, raise questions about the position of Gaza in China-Arab discussions, the limits of China's role in helping to stop the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and support the return to the path of political settlement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, leading to the two-state solution supported by major powers, most notably China.  Here, the Arab Summit, which was held in the Bahraini capital, Manama, on May 16, 2024, adopted the necessity of calling for an international peace conference that would contribute to restoring the negotiating track. This call intersects with the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call to hold an international peace conference during the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum, where he stressed in his speech before the forum on May 30, 2024, that Beijing wants to strengthen its relations with Arab countries to be a model for global stability, calling for an international peace conference aimed at ending the war between Israel and Hamas, noting that Beijing is ready to work with Arab countries to resolve issues related to hot spots in ways that support the principles of fairness and justice and achieve peace and stability in the long term. Xi Jinping stressed that war cannot continue indefinitely, justice cannot remain absent forever, and the two-state solution cannot be arbitrarily overthrown.     Based on the previous analysis, we reach the conclusion that the Chinese trend towards interacting with the Middle East issues and the recent Gaza war represents one of the pillars of the escalation of the Chinese role at the global level and among the developing countries of the Global South led by China. This trend coincided with the vision of the United States of America to limit its ties to the interactions of the Middle East, due to its high cost and to move eastward to confront the growing Chinese influence in Asia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has claimed that he could end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of taking office. He now calls for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and the beginning of negotiations. However, history shows that what cannot be achieved on the battlefield is unlikely to be obtained at the negotiating table. Immediate ceasefire of the Ukraine war could be a double-edged sword for the United States under the current circumstances. Russia occupies significant Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and parts of Zaporizhzhia, amounting to approximately 18% of Ukraine’s territory. Ukraine has made incursions into the Russian regions of Belgorod and Bryansk, only amounting to less than 1% of Russia’s total territory. How can both sides achieve their goals at the negotiating table?  Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg suggests ending the war by halting weapon supplies to Ukraine if it refuses to engage in peace talks — and increasing weapon deliveries to Ukraine if Russia fails to do the same. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire deal with Russia, proposing that the status of occupied territories could be addressed diplomatically at a later stage. This reflects Ukraine’s constrained position under various pressures. Russia is open to a peace talk but is unlikely to make a huge compromise with Ukraine. Despite NATO’s extensive support, sufficient military resources such as ammunition and air defense systems have not been provided to enable Ukraine to effectively counter Russian advances and produce decisive outcomes in strategic offensives due to unclear strategic objectives and effective implementation measures.   Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies have not crippled the Russian economy as intended; instead, the Russian economy grew by 3.1% in the third quarter of 2024, and its national debt remains at 14.6% of GDP—approximately the same level as when the war began in 2022.  In 2023, Russia spent $160 billion on military needs, accounting for about 40% of its budget. For 2025, Russia has already allocated 13.5 trillion rubles (over $145 billion) for national defense, representing 32.5% of the budget. With support from North Korea, Iran, China, and other countries, Russia is likely to sustain its efforts on Ukrainian soil. In contrast, Ukraine is unlikely to achieve a decisive victory in the short term. If its allies continue with the current strategy while reducing financial aid, Ukraine risks depleting its resources and prolonging the conflict into an unpredictable stalemate, potentially leaving it at a disadvantage during negotiations. Without doubt, an immediate ceasefire could help stop further casualties and bring some much-needed relief to the people affected by the conflict. It can also ease the immediate burden of supporting Ukraine militarily and financially, freeing resources for domestic priorities and addressing other international challenges, particularly countering China’s challenges. However, an immediate ceasefire according to the current battlefield map could also benefit U.S. rivals—authoritarian regimes. First, it would solidify Russia’s control over occupied territories, allowing Moscow to claim a partial victory and bolster domestic support. Such an outcome rewards territorial aggression and undermines international norms. Second, it could weaken the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, signaling to adversaries that aggression can succeed if sustained long enough. European allies might interpret a ceasefire as a sign of wavering U.S. resolve, leading to fractures within NATO and weakening transatlantic unity. Allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, may question the reliability of U.S. security commitments in the region. Third, China has been closely watching the West’s response to the Ukraine crisis, focusing on the cohesion of alliances, the impact of sanctions, and the dynamics of military support. An immediate freeze of the war would demonstrate limited Western resolve and suggest that territorial aggression can yield lasting gains. This reinforces Beijing’s belief that the international community would hesitate to intervene militarily in Taiwan and encourages China to change the status quo over the Taiwan Strait, believing it can manage economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. Fourth, an immediate ceasefire does not guarantee long-term peace. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement leaves underlying issues unaddressed, and it merely postpones hostilities, making the prospect of sustainable peace elusive. Historically, frozen conflicts like those in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Moldova’s Transnistria have fostered prolonged instability, enabling aggressors to consolidate control over occupied territories and exert leverage over affected states. The lesson from Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea demonstrates that tolerating an aggressor only encourages further expansion of their ambitions. Instead of an immediate ceasefire agreement, it is necessary to further support Ukraine in reclaiming its territory by changing the current strategy before reaching any cease-fire deal. Historical patterns show that successful territorial recaptures often require asserting military strength before engaging in peace talks. A cease-fire without the necessary restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty risks legitimizing Russia’s invasion. A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could not only enhance Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations but also serve as a powerful deterrent against future territorial ambitions by other authoritarian regimes globally. The United States will not compromise American national interests when mediating a cease-fire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. However, it will be an extremely challenging task for any American president to broker a peace deal at this time because a deal should uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and internationally recognized borders, align with U.S. support for a rules-based international order, and ensure a balance between both parties instead of rewarding Russian aggression. It should strengthen U.S.-European relations rather than undermine allied unity, adhere to longstanding U.S. foreign policy principles rather than prioritize political gains, and enhance the U.S.’s reputation as a reliable global leader. Otherwise, immediately freezing the war could potentially harm U.S. national interests in the long term and directly encourage the ambitions of aggressors worldwide. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]