Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Abstract This paper examines the evolving concept of European Union Strategic Autonomy (EU-SA) within the context of contemporary geopolitical challenges, with a particular focus on EU-Russia and EU-China relations. EU-SA reflects the EU's aspiration to act independently in foreign policy, security, defence, and economic affairs, moving from a rule-taker to a rule-maker in global politics. The study outlines the historical development of EU-SA from 2013 to the present, highlighting key milestones such as the Strategic Compass and the impact of the Ukraine War, which accelerated efforts toward defence collaboration, energy independence, and economic resilience. It explores the transatlantic dynamics, noting growing uncertainties in the U.S. commitment to NATO and the resulting push for a more autonomous European defence posture. Additionally, it addresses the complex EU-China relationship, marked by both cooperation and competition, as well as the strained EU-Russia ties amid ongoing conflict. The paper concludes by questioning the economic feasibility and political risks of deeper EU strategic autonomy, especially regarding security centralisation and Germany's leadership role. Key Words: EU, Strategic Autonomy, Security, Geopolitics, U.S, China, Russia Introduction At the 2025 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit in The Hague, member states (Allies) committed to investing 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually in core defence requirements and defence- and security-related spending by 2035. They will allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually, based on the agreed-upon definition of NATO defence expenditure, by 2035 to resource core defence requirements and meet the NATO Capability Targets. Allies agreed to submit annual plans that show a credible, incremental path to achieving this goal.[1] At the same time, Spain secured a special compromise, committing to meet core requirements with just 2.1% of GDP, making it the only exception to the broader 5% target. Previously, in 2014, NATO Heads of State and Government had agreed to commit 2% of their national GDP to defence spending, to help ensure the Alliance's continued military readiness. This decision was taken in response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, and amid broader instability in the Middle East. The 2014 Defence Investment Pledge was built on an earlier commitment to meeting this 2% of GDP guideline, agreed in 2006 by NATO Defence Ministers. In light of the increase in defence spending, given that 23 out of 32 NATO Allies are EU member states, the idea of European Union strategic autonomy (EU-SA) comes to mind. This paper will explore the issue of EU-SA with a specific reference to EU-Russia and EU-China relations.[2] A Brief History of EU Strategic Autonomy European Union strategic autonomy is an evolving concept that reflects its ambition to act independently in strategically important policy areas, including foreign policy, security, defence, and economic relations. Strong strategic autonomy, according to Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza and Volker Perthes, means being able to set, modify and enforce international rules, as opposed to (unwillingly) obeying rules set by others. The opposite of strategic autonomy is being a rule-taker, subject to strategic decisions made by others, such as the United States, China, or Russia.[3] The concept was first prominently discussed in the context of defence in 2013 and has since expanded to encompass a broader range of policy areas. Historically speaking, one can identify numerous phases during which EU-SA evolved. - 2013-2016: During this period, EU-SA focused on security and defence, with initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund, aiming to strengthen the EU's defence capabilities.[4]  - 2017-2019: During this period, the EU-SA shifted its focus to defending European interests in a hostile geopolitical environment, influenced by events such as Brexit, the Trump presidency, and China's growing assertiveness.- 2020: The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted economic vulnerabilities, prompting a focus on mitigating dependence on foreign supply chains, particularly in critical sectors like health and technology.- Since 2021: The scope widened to virtually all EU policy areas, including digital, energy, and values, with terminology evolving to include "open strategic autonomy," "strategic sovereignty," "capacity to act," and "resilience".- 2022: The Ukraine War and Accelerated Implementation. Russia's invasion of Ukraine catalysed concrete actions toward EU-SA, notably in defence, energy independence, and economic resilience. The European Council's Versailles Declaration (March 2022) expressed strong political will to increase EU-SA, calling for collaborative investments in defence, phasing out dependency on Russian energy, and reducing reliance on critical raw materials, semiconductors, health, digital technologies, and food imports.[5] - The Strategic Compass for security and defence policy (endorsed March 2022) outlines a roadmap to 2030, emphasising strengthened EU defence capacities. Among others, it includes: o   Establishment of a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises.o   Ready to deploy 200 fully equipped Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments.[6]o   Conducting regular live exercises on land and at sea.o   Enhanced military mobility.o   Reinforcement of the EU's civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process, acting more robustly and ensuring greater financial solidarity.o   Making full use of the European Peace Facility to support partners.[7] According to the EU itself, the EU-SA is not a zero-sum game, but rather a sliding scale between complete autonomy and full dependency, with different results for different policy areas. What is more, when compared to the famous Maslow's hierarchy of needs (European Parliament briefing's language), the EU is not only perceived as an economic power, but it is also seen as a normative power. Therefore, the EU is recognised for its core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Ultimately, Maslow's “self-actualisation” could mean the achievement of an EU in which citizens recognise their European identity and which has realised its full autonomous policy potential.[8]   As if this is not enough, the same source introduces the concept of the 360° strategic autonomy wheel, which reportedly illustrates policy areas in which the EU aims for greater strategic autonomy, as well as the connections between them. Mutual influence between policy areas can happen across the wheel, but is particularly strong in adjacent areas. Military action, for example, can cause migration, health is linked to food quality, energy policy influences the climate, and misinformation undermines democracy. The wheel can help to understand links, set priorities and view potential conflicts. More autonomy in the digital green economy will, for example, require vast quantities of “rare earth” materials, making the EU more (instead of less) dependent on imports. Reductions in energy consumption achieved through the digitalisation of the economy (for example, by reducing transport) will be partly offset by the increase in energy consumption by electronic devices and data centres.   Global Context The significance of EU-SA lies in ensuring the EU's political survival and global influence in a multipolar world where its relative power is diminishing. The EU's long-term economic outlook is bleak: its share of global GDP, now at 17% (at current prices), could nearly halve by 2050. According to the World Economic Forum, this economic backsliding not only threatens Europe's ability to fund its social model but also risks weighing on the bloc's global influence, leaving it even more dependent on the U.S. and China.[9] Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the conflictual nature of economic interdependence, as reliance on foreign supply chains for critical goods exposed vulnerabilities. Soft power has become an instrument of hard power, necessitating autonomy in trade, finance, and investment.  The U.S.'s strategic pivot to Asia, the exclusion of Europe in conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria (termed Astanisation[10], which favours Russia and Turkey), the sidelining of the EU in EU-Russia negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine, and China's state-led economic model have all pushed the EU towards the sidelines. Transatlantic divide Security is a critical dimension, with significant uncertainty surrounding the U.S. commitment to NATO under the Trump administration. Reports indicate Trump has questioned NATO's Article 5 guarantees, with actions like withdrawing military personnel from a Ukraine aid hub in Poland on April 8, 2025, and proposing to stand down 10,000 light infantry troops in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states by 2025.[11] This has led to fears of a "NATO-minus" scenario, where the EU must fill security gaps without full U.S. backing. In response, the EU is pushing for greater strategic autonomy in defence. Initiatives like ReArm EU are mentioned, with calls for the EU to develop a stand-alone, integrated military capacity to stabilise the global economy. As Jean-Pierre Maulny, Deputy Director of the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), adequately observes "The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe's conventional security, as U.S. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to provide security guarantees to Ukraine and risk completely discrediting themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have demonstrated that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe's security. Alternatively, they could provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the financial burden that would impact the European Union's long-term competitiveness. In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), Europeans should take on Europe's security fully. This would mean taking control of NATO. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation".[12] Economically, there are several issues that contemporary demand addresses, but the most pressing is, of course, the Tariffs. The U.S. and European Union are running out of time to strike a deal on trade tariffs. Negotiations have been slow since both the U.S. and EU temporarily cut duties on each other until July 9. If an agreement is not achieved by then, full reciprocal import tariffs of 50% on EU goods, and the bloc's wide-spanning countermeasures are set to come into effect.[13] According to Almut Möller, Director for European and Global Affairs and head of the Europe in the World programme (European Policy Centre), "for the first time in decades, Europeans can no longer rely on a benign partner on the other side of the Atlantic, leaving them dangerously exposed and acutely vulnerable, including on the very foundations of liberal democracy. Until recently, the U.S. dominated a world order that provided a favourable environment for the EU to extend its membership, further develop, and leverage its strengths, particularly as a trading power, without having to worry much about geopolitics. Suddenly, liberal Europe looks very lonely, and is struggling to keep up with a world of change".[14] Other problems arguably include digital regulation and data protection, antitrust policy and digital taxation, fiscal policy and social protection, geopolitical rivalries, China's rise, and competition and trade policy. EU–China conundrum Both the EU and the U.S. are concerned about China's growing economic and technological influence, but they have differing approaches to addressing this challenge. The EU has sought to maintain a balance between cooperation and competition with China, while the U.S. has adopted a more confrontational approach.[15] These differences have led to tensions in areas such as trade policy and technology regulation. For example, the EU has been critical of the U.S.'s unilateral approach to addressing China's trade practices, while the U.S. has accused the EU of being too lenient towards China. These disagreements have made it difficult to achieve a coordinated transatlantic response to China's rise.[16] According to German experts, the balance of power between China and the EU and its member states is developing increasingly asymmetrically to Europe's disadvantage. Only in trade policy – and partially in investment – can the EU maintain its position in a manner respected by China.[17] Europe holds significant importance for China across various dimensions: economically, as its top supplier and second-largest export destination; technologically, as a source of advanced technology; institutionally, as a model to emulate; politically, to advance its objectives concerning other nations, particularly the United States; and selectively, as a collaborator in areas like global health and regional stabilisation. Unlike Russia and the United States, China perceives a vital interest in the EU's continued existence and unity within a multipolar world; yet, it employs a "divide and rule" strategy. China selectively rewards or penalises individual EU countries based on their political and economic significance and their compliance with China's expectations on key issues. These issues include arms sales to Taiwan, meetings with the Tibetan Dalai Lama, and positions on the Uighurs, human rights in China, and the South China Sea. China engages with Europe on multiple levels — political, economic, technological, cultural, and academic — using various political channels (such as strategic partnerships with the EU and individual EU member states), dialogue formats (like the 16+1 format with sixteen Central and Eastern European countries), and high-level bilateral intergovernmental consultations with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. China's hopes that the European Union would emerge as an independent and comprehensive player in global politics, serving as a counterbalance to the United States, have diminished. However, China would be supportive of any European efforts towards achieving strategic autonomy, provided it does not translate into a confrontational approach towards China itself. In contrast, Europe's political priorities—such as ensuring peace and stability in East Asia, China's role in global stability, development, environmental issues, climate change, and non-proliferation, as well as improving human rights in China — are often considered secondary and are not actively pursued by all EU member states. Europe lacks a unified and assertive foreign policy stance regarding the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China for dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. There is also an absence of a clear position on China's authoritarian vision of order. Even in trade and investment disputes, Europe struggles to establish a unified approach to resolving these issues. The EU member states are too diverse in terms of size, profiles, and interests in their dealings with China: Economically, there is a divide between countries that are appealing industrial and technological partners for China and those that compete for favour in Beijing. Some nations have a clear interest in global governance. Additionally, the United Kingdom and France maintain their respective military presences in the Asia region. In this context, ReArm EU and its financial instrument SAFE (analysed here https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=5384 ) have the potential to provide the EU with meaningful strategic autonomy and invite genuine geopolitical actorness. EU–Russia conundrum Since Donald Trump took office as the U.S. president, the coordination of transatlantic policies regarding Russia has largely disintegrated. The White House's openness to a comprehensive "deal" with Russian President Vladimir Putin contrasts with Congress's attempts to limit Trump's foreign policy options with Russia, resulting in the marginalisation of coordination with European allies. This situation is further complicated by Washington's increasing reliance on extraterritorial sanctions, a trend that began before Trump's presidency. Consequently, according to European foreign and security experts, Europe must achieve greater strategic autonomy in its dealings with Russia. However, this relationship is particularly strained by significant conflicts of interest. Russia's invasion of Ukraine significantly disrupted the previously peaceful and liberal democratic relations among European nations. Putin's "special military operation" compelled the EU to introduce seventeen (so far) escalating economic sanction packages aimed at undermining the Russian economy and ultimately limiting Russia's capacity to continue the war. In a gesture of solidarity with Ukraine, the EU has also allocated billions of euros to both EU member states and Ukraine to avert a humanitarian disaster and ensure the provision of essential needs for Ukrainians fleeing the conflict.[18] After three and a half years from the outset of the war, Russia continues to pose a complex challenge that the EU and European nations cannot address independently in the foreseeable future. If the U.S. security guarantee weakens before Europe can bolster its own capabilities, the EU could face new vulnerabilities that Russia might exploit along its external borders, such as in the Baltic states, and elsewhere. Currently, the EU and its member states lack sufficient means to deter Russia from pursuing its interests aggressively and recklessly in the shared neighbourhood.[19] Critics, on the other hand, argue that calls for EU strategic autonomy, particularly the creation of a European Army and a significant increase in military spending, are a double-edged sword. First, the primary official rationale is that the EU must prepare itself for a possible attack on EU member states by Russia. The legacy media are full of European leaders claiming that Russia will sooner or later attack Europe.[20] Yet, this claim is not substantiated with much evidence. The proponents of the European army completely disregard numerous doubts surrounding the 2013/2014 "Euromaidan" and the role of the CIA in the events.[21] Second, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 's estimations, the total number of conflict-related casualties in Ukraine from April 14, 2014, to December 31, 2021, stood at 51,000 – 54,000. These numbers are broken down as follows: 14,200 - 14,400 killed (at least 3,404 civilians, estimated 4,400 Ukrainian forces, and estimated 6,500 members of armed groups), and 37,000 - 39,000 injured (7,000 – 9,000 civilians, 13,800 – 14,200 Ukrainian forces and 15,800 - 16,200 members of armed groups).[22] In short, the situation was chaotic, with many casualties among civilians. Third, it was allegedly Europeans who torpedoed a first chance of peace negotiations as early as April 2014 in Istanbul.[23] Fourth, many European leaders seem to be utterly oblivious to the fact that the prolongation of the war adds to the destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainian society, deaths and emigration. Last but not least, given the fact that it is Germany that calls for both the European Army and the federalisation of Europe (with some assistance from France), one should be extra careful given the role of Germans during the WWII and the fact that neither has there been any official peace treaty with Germany nor have they recompensated countries such as Poland. Conclusion Strategic autonomy may be a necessity for Europe, given the dynamics of transatlantic relationships. The questions, however, that have to be pondered (and it does not seem that anyone in the legacy media or mainstream academia is ready to ask them) are numerous. Who will pay for that? Can Europeans afford such expenses under the current economic circumstances, and even worse economic prospects? Is the centralisation of security and military a Pandora's box? Should Europeans allow Germany (of all EU member states) to take special responsibility for this project? Isn't the pro-war rhetoric of Western political leaders making relations with Russia even more tense and dangerous, in other words, leading to escalation? History has solemnly proven that when left to their own devices, the Europeans inevitably create disastrous conflicts that have lasting consequences for generations. The American pivot to Asia and the consequent withdrawal from Europe may therefore have tragic ramifications for the European continent. References[1] Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment. (2025, June 27). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm[2] NATO and the EU have 23 members in common: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. See more at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-nato-cooperation/#0[3] Lippert, B., von Ondarza, N., & Perthes, V. (2019, March). European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests. Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut für Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/ doi:10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e263[4] Damen, M. (2022, July). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity (EU Strategic Autonomy Monitor). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu[5] Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Versailles Declaration. (2022, March 10–11). Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut Fur Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf[6] See more at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en[7] See more at: https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en[8] Damen, M. (2022, July). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity (EU Strategic Autonomy Monitor). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu[9] Open but Secure:  Europe’s Path to Strategic Interdependence. INSIGHT REPORT. (2025). World Economic Forum. https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Open_but_Secure_Europe%E2%80%99s_Path_to_Strategic_Interdependence_2025.pdf[10] In reference to the Astana format on Syria) which leads to the exclusion of Europe from the settlement of regional conflicts in favour of Russia and Turkey. See more: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en[11] Tilles, D. (2025, April 8). US to withdraw military from Ukraine aid hub in Poland. Notes from Poland. https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/04/08/us-to-withdraw-military-from-ukraine-aid-hub-in-poland/[12] Maulny, J.-P. (2025, February 13). United States – Europe: Our Paths Are Splitting. The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS). https://www.iris-france.org/en/united-states-europe-our-paths-are-splitting/[13] Kiderlin, S. (2025, June 18). These are the sticking points holding up a U.S.-EU trade deal. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/18/these-are-the-sticking-points-holding-up-a-us-eu-trade-deal.html#:~:text=The%20EU%20and%20US%20flags,Poland%20on%20March%206%2C%202025.&text=Afp%20%7C%20Getty%20Images-,The%20U.S.%20and%20European%20Union%20are%20running%20out%20of%20time,($1.93%20trillion)%20in%202024?[14] Möller, A. (2025, February 26). Europe in the World in 2025: Navigating a perilous world with realism and ambition. European Policy Centre. https://www.epc.eu/publication/Europe-in-the-World-in-2025-Navigating-a-perilous-world-with-realism-625da4/#:~:text=2025%20will%20be%20a%20year,with%20a%20world%20of%20change[15] Bradford, A. (2023). When Rights, Markets, and Security Collide (pp. 221–254). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197649268.003.0007[16] Portanskiy, A. (2023). UE - US: new barriers to trade. Современная Европа. https://doi.org/10.31857/s020170832304006x[17] Lippert, B., von Ondarza, N., & Perthes, V. (2019, March). European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests. Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut für Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/ doi:10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e263 [18] Klüver, L. (2025, April 18). Putin’s War on Ukraine: What can the EU actually do? European Careers Association. https://ecamaastricht.org/blueandyellow-knowyourunion/putins-war-on-ukraine-what-can-the-eu-actually-do#:~:text=Similarly%2C%20the%20Strategic%20Compass%2C%20the%20most%20recent,its%20interests%20and%20promote%20its%20values%20internationally.[19] Lippert, B., von Ondarza, N., & Perthes, V. (2019, March). European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests. Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut für Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/ doi:10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e263 [20] ochecová, K. (2025, February 11). Russia could start a major war in Europe within 5 years, Danish intelligence warns. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-war-threat-europe-within-5-years-danish-intelligence-ddis-warns/[21] Katchanovski, I. (2024). The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine The Mass Killing that Changed the World. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-67121-0[22] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, January 27). Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine: December 2021 update. United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. https://ohchr.org[23] Johnson, J. (2022, May 6). Boris Johnson Pressured Zelenskyy to Ditch Peace Talks With Russia: Ukrainian Paper. Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/05/06/boris-johnson-pressured-zelenskyy-ditch-peace-talks-russia-ukrainian-paper

Abstract The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order moving towards multipolarity. The return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine raises serious questions about US involvement in the transatlantic alliance. President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect both that his administration is unwilling to engage productively with the EU and that it distrusts multilateral forums, preferring bilateral, nation-to-nation contacts. This article seeks to bring clarity to the future US–EU relationship by identifying some of the points of contention and offering a perspective on how the transatlantic partnership can move forward constructively. KeywordsTransatlantic relations, EU–US relations, Trump administration, EU, Bilateral relations, Multipolar world order Introduction Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a new axis of power is taking form, led by Russia and China and supported by North Korea, Iran and Belarus. This shift brings a profound transformation within the global balance of power and is a direct threat to the liberal international world order. In the midst of this geopolitical recalibration, the return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine poses serious questions about US engagement with the transatlantic alliance. There are growing worries about the US’s willingness to continue to honour its Article 5 commitments within NATO and maintain an active role in the collective defence of Europe, but also about the role of the US as a supporter of Ukraine and the liberal multilateral rule-based system. State of play in the EU–US partnership During the first Trump administration, at the state funeral of former US president George H. W. Bush, the EU’s ambassador to the US, David O’Sullivan, was asked to stand at the back of the line-up to pay his respects, breaking diplomatic protocol (Knigge 2019). He politely acquiesced, but in the days that followed it came to light that during the first Trump administration, the US Department of State had downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU in the second half of 2018 without informing the EU Delegation in Washington (Smith 2019). Beyond the failure to communicate this important diplomatic status change, which was not well received in Brussels, and in addition to the protocol issue of having a long-serving foreign ambassador downgraded on the spot at a state funeral, this sent a clear message: the Trump administration does not respect the EU, and nor does it view the Union as an interlocutor. On many occasions during his first administration, Trump’s officials clashed with the EU. In a major foreign policy speech in Brussels, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly questioned the continued value of the EU and urged European countries to reassert their national sovereignty (Pompeo 2018). As the second Trump administration begins its work with unprecedented vigour, so far the EU has hardly featured as a consideration for the president or his top officials. At the time of writing, the nominated US ambassador to the EU, Andrew Puzder, has not yet testified (Singh and Jones 2025). In his early remarks as secretary of state, Marco Rubio has hardly mentioned the EU at all. On 29 January, the first call between High Representative Kaja Kallas and Rubio took place, alleviating some concerns about the distinct lack of US–EU dialogue taking place due to the change in administration (Liboreiro 2025). However, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, the new US administration went beyond the usual call for European allies to spend more on defence. Vice-President JD Vance drove home the seismic shift underway in the US commitment to European defence and upended decades of policy (Quinville 2025). Moreover, on the European side, the attempts by some members of the Trump administration to support far-right candidates in Europe (as done by Elon Musk and Vance in Germany and Romania) bring a new level of discomfort and mistrust, as it looks like parts of the administration and Trump’s brand of conservatism, colloquially known as ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA), want to export their domestic cultural wars to Europe, thus attacking the core shared value of the transatlantic partnership: liberal democracy. A divorce or just a rough patch in transatlantic relations? Over the past seven decades, successful cooperation between the US and European institutions has helped to build the liberal multilateral world order and to uphold the UN Charter by promoting global stability and prosperity. With a combined population of nearly 800 million people, the US and the EU have the most integrated economic cooperation in the world, accounting for 43% of global GDP and 30% of global trade in goods and services (European Council 2025). President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect the Trump administration’s unwillingness to engage productively with the EU and its distrust of multilateral forums, and hence its preference for bilateral, nation-to-nation contact. The administration’s growing distrust of the EU also reflects the changing public perception of the EU among segments of the American public, such that 29% of Republicans view the EU as ‘unfriendly’ or ‘hostile’, up from 17% last year, and negative perceptions of Europe among Democrats are also slowly rising (The Economist 2025). This represents an inward turn in American society as politics becomes increasingly polarised. On the other hand, favourable attitudes among Europeans towards the US have fallen below 50%, with only around a third of Germans (32%) and the French (34%) having a positive view of the current American administration, with the least favourable views being held in Denmark, where only 20% approve (Britton 2025). Less than 100 days into his second term, at the time of writing, Trump has already broken long-standing norms and practices in US–European relations. Vance’s critical discourse at the Munich Security Conference, which harshly attacked European values, brought a major departure from traditional diplomatic language. The US vote alongside Russia and North Korea, and against traditional allies, on a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and calling for the return of occupied territory to Kyiv further deepened concerns (Landale and Jackson 2025). Additional actions, such as the controversial Oval Office meeting between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the temporary suspension of intelligence and military assistance to Ukraine, the exclusion of Europeans from Ukrainian peace negotiations, and the disproportionate and unjustified tariffs on the EU have heightened European anxiety. These moves have raised fears of a possible end to the transatlantic partnership and a wider US retreat from global leadership. For most Europeans, the second Trump administration appears to be strategically prepared, driven not only by revenge in domestic politics, but also by a sense of retribution in foreign policy. But while distrust has never been higher, it would be a mistake to take the path of severing the relations between the US and the EU. The Euro-Atlantic partnership has suffered similar lows in the past, from vastly different perspectives on the US invasion of Iraq, the Obama administration’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. Points of tension and contentionTech On tech regulation, storm clouds are already gathering as Trump has lashed out at the EU for regulating big tech companies (Doan and Stolton 2025). During the transition, the new Trump administration has been noted for the active participation of several tech CEOs. This was most evidently on display during Trump’s inauguration, which saw the likes of Mark Zuckerberg (Meta), Jeff Bezos (Amazon) and Elon Musk (Tesla), as well as other billionaires from around the world (including TikTok’s CEO) gather to welcome in the new administration (Kelly 2025). These tech CEO supporters, not usually as prominently on display in American politics, are flocking to the new administration, which has pledged massive tax cuts for billionaires, the promotion and deregulation of cryptocurrencies, and the removal of restrictions on free speech and fact-checking (Samuel 2025). The EU’s attempts to regulate big tech companies under this new administration will be even more difficult, given their close proximity to and influence on the second Trump presidency. Energy Another likely area of divergence between the US and the EU is in their approaches to energy policy and climate policy. Trump has pledged to ‘drill baby drill’, promising to fund more fossil fuel extraction and curbing green and renewable projects. He has openly called climate change a hoax and ended US participation in the Paris Climate Agreement. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states continue to invest heavily in renewables, with clean energy sources accounting for 70% of the bloc’s electricity demand in 2024 (Vetter 2025). The US, already trailing in wind power and investment in renewables, now risks falling irrevocably behind most of the developing world in clean energy production. Trump might find less of a market for fossil fuels in the EU as a result of its heavy investment in renewables, instead having to turn to other markets. Trade and tariffs On the campaign trail, Trump vowed that as president he would impose tariffs on everyone from China to neighbours, Mexico and Canada, to allies such as the EU. Although the initial tariffs placed on Mexico and Canada were swiftly lifted, a new wave of tariffs of 25% on foreign steel and aluminium was announced on 11 February. This move mirrors that of his first administration (Wiseman 2025). The EU was swift to respond, announcing a slew of counter-measures targeting iconic US products such as jeans, bourbon, peanut butter, whiskey and motorcycles. European steel companies could see as much as 3.7 million tons of steel exports lost as a result of US-imposed tariffs. Together, as noted above, the US and the EU account for about 30% of global trade, with deeply intertwined production and supply chains. However, this does not appear to be part of the Trump administration’s reasoning behind its decision to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs of 20% on almost all other EU products as part of its Liberation Day plan. The proposed tariffs could affect around 70% of EU exports to the US, worth around €532 billion ($585 billion) in 2024, with potential tariffs on copper, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and timber still on the cards (Blenkinsop 2025). As the trade wars begin again, US–EU trade and economic relations will undoubtedly face difficult times over the next four years and risk undermining or limiting cooperation in other areas as a result. Responding to Trump’s announcement, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, astutely summed up: ‘The global economy will massively suffer. Uncertainty will spiral and trigger the rise of further protectionism. The consequences will be dire for millions of people around the globe’ (European Commission 2025). The EU, in addition to planning and implementing counter-measures to Trump’s tariffs, has to walk a difficult tightrope to maintain its investment ties (Casert 2025). The Arctic Trump’s approach to the Arctic in the days leading up to the transition and in his first three months, most notably his refusal to promise not to invade Greenland by force, if deemed necessary (Kayali 2025), sparked widespread condemnation from European leaders. Trump raised the idea of purchasing Greenland from Denmark in 2019 during his first term, and reasserted his intention to acquire the vast island, rich with rare earth minerals, on a fiery phone call with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. In response, the Danish premier garnered support among European heads of state. However, Trump’s focus on Greenland could have profound implications for the balance of power in the Arctic region. Although the Arctic is increasingly discussed in geopolitical terms, in part due to Russia’s and China’s interests in new shipping routes, it remains a zone of peace. The implications of potential NATO infighting over Greenland, and the possibility that this could accelerate Greenland’s independence, could work to China’s or Russia’s advantage and risk disrupting the balance of power in the Arctic region that has allowed peace to prevail. Defence spending The Trump administration’s renewed push for European NATO allies to spend at least 5% of their GDP on defence has reignited tensions over transatlantic burden-sharing. During his first visit to a NATO defence ministers’ meeting, US Secretary of Defense Hegseth made it clear that the US no longer sees an indefinite American presence in Europe as guaranteed (Erling 2025). While these pressures reflect Washington’s frustration over decades of unequal defence spending, they also risk undermining alliance cohesion by demanding an unrealistic increase in European defence budgets. Most European states have already significantly increased their military spending, jointly spending €326 billion on defence in 2024, an increase of 30% since 2021 (European Defence Agency 2024). And the European Commission’s recently launched ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 initiative proposes an additional €800 billion to help EU member states fill their defence gaps and increase their military production and capacity (Gomez 2025). However, calling for a sudden escalation to 5% of GDP overlooks the political, economic and social constraints within Europe and could provoke backlash rather than cooperation. A more realistic target of 3% to 3.5% of GDP offers a more balanced and politically realistic path, consistent with strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and could be discussed as a new NATO defence commitment at the upcoming Hague Summit this summer. EU defence market The EU is developing its European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in response to the challenging new security and geopolitical reality. A key focus within the plan is strengthening the European internal market for defence, which remains heavily underdeveloped and dependent on non-EU suppliers, notably the US, which accounts for more than half of the EU’s defence procurement. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, launched in 2024 by the European Commission, proposes some ambitious objectives: by 2030, at least 50% of member states’ defence acquisitions should go to the European defence industry, rising to 60% by 2035, and 40% of these procurements should be through collaborative projects (European Commission 2024). Nevertheless, this strategy is not without challenges, as some EU member states, particularly the Eastern European countries, still favour US suppliers and see buying American defence systems as a way to foster security ties with Washington. The return of Trump, along with signs of US disengagement from Europe, has led to a renewed debate within the EU about reducing reliance on American defence capabilities and investing more in equipment ‘Made in Europe’. At the same time, the evolving US position has complicated transatlantic defence industrial cooperation. While Rubio has recently stressed the importance of continued American participation in European defence procurement, the latest EU proposals to prioritise the European defence industry have raised concern in Washington (Cook and Croucher 2025). Any move to limit access for American defence companies might provoke a political backlash, even as European leaders become increasingly worried about the credibility of the US defence commitments. Recent events such as the politicisation of US military aid to Ukraine and the unpredictability of future armament deliverables have further shaken European confidence. But despite the growing uncertainty, EU countries should remain interested in cooperation with the US, not exclusion. The challenge now is to strike a balance: to build a more autonomous and resilient European defence market while maintaining a constructive and cooperative relationship with the US. Ukraine peace negotiations The peace negotiations for Ukraine are becoming a major point of divergence between the US administration under Trump and its European allies. Trump’s main goal is to quickly end the conflict in Ukraine and position himself as a successful deal maker on the global stage. So far, his administration has shown a willingness to make significant concessions to Russia, often unilaterally and without securing reciprocal commitments from Moscow. This approach might be part of a broader strategy that includes weakening Russia’s alliance with China, securing American access to Ukrainian rare earth resources and continuing a larger US strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific (Mills 2025). So far, this conciliatory ‘deal making’ has caused anxiety among European leaders, who fear that a hasty or unbalanced peace agreement might lead to a forced Ukrainian capitulation and would undermine long-term European security and stability. Therefore, European countries are insisting on being part of the discussions on defining what a just, long-standing and sustainable peace should look like, a peace that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty and deters further Russian aggression on the country or continent. In parallel, European countries are formulating their own vision for a lasting peace, independent of American leadership. Recent discussions and meetings led by the UK and France are proposing a ‘coalition of the willing’ that would send 10,000 to 30,000 troops to Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire (O’Sullivan and Khatsenkova 2025). But current plans face significant obstacles: disagreements among European states over troop commitments and mandate, fears of escalation in a direct conflict with Russia and a lack of critical defence enablers that only the US can provide. While countries such as the UK, France and Sweden are considering ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine, Eastern European states, notably Poland, remain reluctant, preferring to commit to logistical roles rather than direct engagement. Moreover, European allies are seeking explicit US backstop support (logistical, intelligence and political) to enhance the credibility of the deterrence of these peacekeeping forces against future Russian aggression. The way in which the Ukraine peace negotiations unfold could be a source of further tension between the US and European partners in the months and years to come. A way forward The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order migrating towards multipolarity. A possible way forward in Euro-Atlantic relations is to adopt a pragmatic approach that preserves cooperation where possible while accepting a more interest-based partnership. Paradoxically, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China’s global rise, this may offer a new avenue for transatlantic rapprochement. Both the US and the EU increasingly recognise the need to address China’s more assertive economic and geopolitical behaviour, and both see the growing socio-political and security threats from the rise of this axis of upheaval formed of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. For Europeans, navigating this increasingly unstable geopolitical landscape will require clarity, political maturity and a greater sense of strategic responsibility. The EU must continue to invest in its strategic autonomy—not to disengage from the US, but to become a more equal and reliable transatlantic partner. The coming months will be vital in charting a new course for transatlantic cooperation, one that emphasises increased European defence investment, a coordinated approach to the Russian and Chinese threats, the need for a deeper EU–NATO cooperation, a responsible resolution to the war in Ukraine, and a more balanced EU–US partnership. As such, European leaders will need to make a concerted effort to build bridges with the Trump administration by focusing on areas of convergence and mutual strategic interest. What lies ahead is a period of repositioning, a reordering of the transatlantic relationship from one rooted primarily in shared norms, values and principles towards a more pragmatic and transactional partnership based on common interests and careful management of differences. While challenging, this transformation could lead to a more resilient and mature transatlantic alliance, shaped by partners on an equal footing, capable of adapting to the demands of an unstable and unpredictable multipolar world order. ReferencesBlenkinsop P. (2025). EU seeks unity in first strike back at Trump tariffs. Reuters, 7 April. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-seeks-unity-first-strike-back-trump-tariffs-2025-04-06/. Accessed 7 April 2025.Britton H. (2025). European favourability of the USA falls following the return of Donald Trump. YouGov, 4 March. https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/51719-european-favourability-of-the-usa-falls-following-the-return-of-donald-trump. Accessed 8 March 2025.Casert R. (2025). EU vows countermeasures to US tariffs. Bourbon, jeans, peanut butter, motorcycles are easy targets. The Associated Press, 11 February. https://apnews.com/article/eu-us-tariffs-trump-trade-war-leyen-0b23d25d30428eb288b79bfda4fa25e9. Accessed 16 February 2025.Cook E., Croucher S. (2025). Europe’s plan to ditch US weapons spooks Trump administration: Report. Newsweek, 2 April. https://www.newsweek.com/europes-plan-ditch-us-weapons-spooks-pentagon-report-2054087. Accessed 2 April 2025.Doan L., Stolton S. (2025). Trump blasts EU regulators for targeting Apple, Google, Meta. Bloomberg, 23 January. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-23/trump-blasts-eu-regulators-for-targeting-apple-google-meta. Accessed 5 February 2025.Erling B. (2025). Hegseth tells Europe to spend on defence as US presence may not last forever. Reuters, 14 February. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hegseth-tells-europe-spend-defence-us-presence-continent-may-not-be-forever-2025-02-14/. Accessed 17 February 2025.European Commission. (2024). The European Defence Industrial Strategy at a glance. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en. Accessed 5 March 2025.European Commission. (2025). Statement by President von der Leyen on the announcement of universal tariffs by the US. 3 April. https://ec.europa.Eu/commission/presscorner/detail/mt/statement_25_964. Accessed 7 April 2025.European Council. (2025). EU relations with the United States. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/united-states/. Accessed 25 March 2025.European Defence Agency. (2024). EU defence spending hits new records in 2023, 2024. 4 December. https://eda.europa.Eu/news-and-events/news/2024/12/04/eu-defence-spending-hits-new-records-in-2023-2024#. Accessed 22 January 2025.Gomez J. (2025). Readiness 2030: How is Europe planning to rearm and can it afford it? Euronews, 26 March. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/26/readiness-2030-how-is-europe-planning-to-rearm-and-can-it-afford-it. Accessed 27 March 2025.Kayali L. (2025). Trump doesn’t rule out military intervention in Greenland—again. Politico Europe, 30 March. https://www.politico.eu/article/usa-donald-trump-military-intervention-greenland-again-denmark/. Accessed 30 March 2025.Kelly S. (2025). Trump’s inauguration billionaires, CEOs: Ambani, Zuckerberg, Bezos attend church, ceremony. Reuters, 21 January. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-inauguration-billionaires-ceos-ambani-zuckerberg-bezos-attend-church-2025-01-20/. Accessed 12 February 2025.Knigge M. (2019). Washington downgrades EU mission to US. Deutsche Welle, 1 August. https://www.dw.com/en/trump-administration-downgrades-eu-mission-to-us/a-46990608?maca=en-Twitter-sharing. Accessed 14 January 2025.Landale J., Jackson P. (2025). US sides with Russia in UN resolutions on Ukraine. BBC, 25 February. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7435pnle0go. Accessed 27 February 2025.Liboreiro J. (2025). In first call, Kaja Kallas and Marco Rubio agree to keep ‘maximum pressure’ on Russia. Euronews, 29 January. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/01/29/in-first-call-kaja-kallas-and-marco-rubio-agree-to-keep-maximum-pressure-on-russia. Accessed 3 February 2025.Mills C. (2025). Ukraine and Russia: A shift in US policy. House of Commons Library UK Parliament, 3 April. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10218/. Accessed 3 April 2025.O’Sullivan D., Khatsenkova S. (2025). French President Macron announces plan for ‘reassurance force’ in Ukraine. Euronews, 27 March. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/27/coalition-of-the-willing-meets-in-paris-to-strengthen-support-for-ukraine. Accessed 27 March 2025.Pompeo M. R. (2018). ‘Restoring the role of the nation-state in the liberal international order’. Speech made to the members of the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, 4 December 2018. U.S. Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/restoring-the-role-of-the-nation-state-in-the-liberal-international-order-2/. Accessed 20 January 2025.Quinville R. S. (2025). Making sense of the Munich Security Conference. Wilson Center, 18 February. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/making-sense-munich-security-conference. Accessed 22 February 2025.Samuel S. (2025). The broligarchs have a vision for the new Trump term. It’s darker than you think. Vox, 20 January. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/395646/trump-inauguration-broligarchs-musk-zuckerberg-bezos-thiel. Accessed 7 February 2025.Singh K., Jones R. P. (2025). Trump nominates former CKE Restaurants CEO Puzder as US ambassador to EU. Reuters, 23 January. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-nominates-former-cke-restaurants-ceo-puzder-us-ambassador-eu-2025-01-23/. Accessed 1 February 2025.Smith K. E. (2019). The Trump administration downgraded the E.U.’s diplomatic status in Washington. That’s going to hurt. The Washington Post, 8 January. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/08/the-trump-administration-is-downgrading-the-e-u-s-diplomatic-status-in-washington-thats-going-to-hurt/. Accessed 17 January 2025.The Economist. (2025). Schooled by Trump, Americans are learning to dislike their allies. 31 March. https://www.economist.Com/graphic-detail/2025/03/31/schooled-by-trump-americans-are-learning-to-dislike-their-allies. Accessed 1 April 2025.Vetter D. (2025). As Trump dumps clean energy, fossil fuels lose their grip on Europe. Forbes, 23 January. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrvetter/2025/01/23/as-trump-dumps-clean-energy-fossil-fuels-lose-their-grip-on-europe/. Accessed 13 February 2025.Wiseman P. (2025). Trump once again slaps taxes on foreign steel, aluminum, a move that proved costly in his first term. The Associated Press, 10 February. https://apnews.com/article/trump-tariffs-steel-aluminum-jobs-mexico-canada-89815eeb12ff28b83f5b855ca44f1820. Accessed 15 February 2025.Corresponding author(s):Ionela Maria Ciolan, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue du Commerce 20, 1000 Brussels Belgium. Email: iciolan@martenscentre.eu

Economic relations between Russia and China remain high. Beijing has become Moscow's most important trading partner, and in the context of Western sanctions, it has also become an alternative source of industrial and consumer goods, as well as the largest market for Russian energy and other raw materials. At the same time, external political factors may have a growing influence on Russian-Chinese economic relations. These include the trade war between China and the United States, a possible escalation of US sanctions against Russia, and the expansion of secondary sanctions by the European Union against Chinese companies. The trade war, in the form of increased import duties on imported goods, has become one of the calling cards of Donald Trump's second term in office. The executive order he issued on April 2, 2025, provided a detailed conceptual justification for such a policy. The main goal is the reindustrialisation of the United States through the return or transfer of industrial production to the territory of the US, as well as an equalization of the trade balance with foreign countries. The basic part of Trump's order concerned all countries throughout the world and assumes a tariff increase of 10%. It goes on to determine individual duties on the goods of more than 70 countries, with its own sets for each. China became one of the few countries which decided to mirror the tariff increases. This led to a short-lived and explosive exchange of increases in duties. While it was suspended by negotiations between the two countries in Geneva, it was not removed from the agenda. In the US trade war “against the whole world”, China remains a key target. This is determined by the high level of the US trade deficit in relations with China, which has persisted for more than 40 years. Apparently, it remained comfortable for the US until China made a noticeable leap in the field of industrial and technological development. Such a leap allowed China to gradually overcome its peripheral place in the global economy, displace American and other foreign goods from the domestic market, and occupy niches in foreign markets. Despite the critically important role of American components, patents and technological solutions in a number of industries, China has managed to reduce its dependence on them. The growing industrial and technological power of the PRC is becoming a a political problem for the US. It was clearly identified during the first term of Trump's presidency. Even then, the US pursued a course toward the technological containment of China. Despite the temporary respite in the trade war, US pressure on China will remain. The tariff policy may be supplemented by restrictive new measures (sanctions) in the field of telecommunications and other industries. During the new term of Donald Trump's presidency, the politicisation of issues that the Biden administration avoided putting at the forefront of US-Chinese relations began again. These include the problem of Hong Kong autonomy and the issue of ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Both issues received a high level of politicisation during Trump's first term. The US-China trade war has so far had little effect on Russian-Chinese relations. The increase in US tariffs has had virtually no effect on Russia. Russia is already facing a significant number of restrictive measures, and the volume of trade with the United States has been reduced to near zero since the start of Moscow’s Special Military Operation in 2022. However, Russia may feel the effects of the trade war. For example, the United States may require China to purchase American energy resources as a measure to correct the trade balance. Obviously, such a measure is unlikely to solve the imbalance. However, it has the potential to affect the volume of Russian oil supplies to China in one way or another. In addition, the trade war as a whole may affect oil prices downwards, which is also disadvantageous for Russia. On the other hand, Russia is a reliable supplier of energy resources for China, which will not politicise them. Even in the context of new aggravations of the trade war, China is unlikely to refuse Russian supplies. Another factor is US sanctions against Russia. After the start of Russian-American negotiations on Ukraine in 2025, Washington avoided using new sanctions, although all previously adopted restrictive measures and their legal mechanisms are in force. However, Donald Trump failed to carry out a diplomatic blitzkrieg and achieve a quick settlement. The negotiations have dragged on and may continue for a long time. If they fail, the United States is ready to escalate sanctions again. Existing legal mechanisms allow, for example, for an increase in the list of blocked persons, including in relation to Chinese companies cooperating with Russia. This practice was widely used by the Biden administration. It was Chinese companies that became the key target of US secondary sanctions targeting Russia. They fell under blocking financial sanctions for deliveries of industrial goods, electronics and other equipment to Russia. However, there was not a single large company among them. We were talking about small manufacturing companies or intermediary firms. At the same time, the Biden administration managed to significantly complicate payments between Russia and China through the threat of secondary sanctions. US Presidential Executive Order 14114 of December 22, 2023 threatened blocking sanctions against foreign financial institutions carrying out transactions in favour of the Russian military-industrial complex. In practice, such sanctions against Chinese financial institutions were practically not applied, except for the blocking of several Chinese payment agents in January 2025. However, the very threat of secondary sanctions forced Chinese banks to exercise a high level of caution in transactions with Russia. This problem has not yet been fully resolved. New legal mechanisms in the field of sanctions, which are being worked on in the United States, may also affect Russian-Chinese relations. We are talking about the bill introduced by US Senator Lindsey Graham and several other senators and members of congress. Their bill assumes that in the event of failure of negotiations with Russia on Ukraine, the US executive branch will receive the authority to impose 500% duties on countries purchasing Russian raw materials, including oil. China may be among them. This threat should hardly be exaggerated for now. The passage of the bill is not predetermined. Even if it is signed into law, the application of 500% tariffs against China will be an extremely difficult matter. Recent rounds of the trade war have shown that China is ready for retaliatory measures. However, the emergence of such a norm will in any case increase the risks for business and may negatively affect Russian suppliers of raw materials. Another factor is EU sanctions policy. Unlike the US, the EU continues to escalate sanctions against Russia despite the negotiations on Ukraine. Brussels is expanding the practice of secondary sanctions, which also affect Chinese companies. In the context of a deepening economic partnership between China and the EU, this factor seems significant. However, in reality, it will play a peripheral role. The EU's practice of secondary sanctions is still significantly more limited than the American one. It does not affect any significant Chinese companies. Problems may be created by the expansion of EU bans on the provision of financial messaging services for Russian banks—this will affect their relations with Chinese counterparties. But such bans stimulate the acceleration of the use of the Chinese CIPS payment system by Russians, which has the functionality of transmitting financial messages. Compared to the US, the EU policy factor remains secondary. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.

Abstract The international system is currently undergoing a process of reconfiguration that is having an impact on all areas of global development. In this process of reordering power relations, there is a tendency to move towards multipolarity, leaving behind the unipolar coalition established after the Second World War. In this context, several emerging powers are gaining increasing international power, which has led to changes in the hierarchy of power on the international geopolitical chessboard. Such is the case of the People's Republic of China, which has established itself not only as a power of great impact and relevance in the Asian region, but also in the entire international system. Namely, the management of the government and the Party in terms of innovation, industrialization, informatization, productivity, expansion and internationalization of its economic model, positions this country as the most dynamic center of the international economy. Evidencing that alternative models to the capitalist system are possible and viable, which strengthens the trend towards a systemic transition and multipolarity in the International System Introduction In the last two decades, a set of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and conflicts have become evident, with significant implications extending throughout the International System. As a result, we are currently experiencing a convulsion of the established order, giving way to a process of new global reconfigurations. In this context, several researchers and academics such as Jorge Casals, Leyde Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián Schulz, among others, have noted that these conditions have led to a crisis and hegemonic transition process, with a trend toward multipolarity in which the Asia-Pacific region is gaining increasing relevance. This article, titled "The International Reconfiguration’s Process Towards Multipolarity: The Role of China as an Emerging Power," is dedicated to analyzing the position of this country within the current international reconfiguration of power. Accordingly, the first section will systematize some essential guidelines to understand the current crisis and the decline of the hegemonic order established in the post-World War II period. The second section will address China's positioning amid the international reconfiguration of power. In this regard, it is important to note that China's rapid rise highlights how development management aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals can lead to a shift in the paradigm of international relations, as well as power reconfigurations that challenge the current balance of forces. Thus, it can be affirmed that China's rise constitutes a decisive element within the current trend toward multipolarity. DevelopmentNew International Order: Approaches to the Multipolar Reconfiguration of the International System The current international context is marked by a process of crisis. This crisis reflects the fact that the world order no longer aligns with the correlation of forces that gave rise to it during the post-World War II period. It is not a circumstantial crisis, but rather the interlinking of various interconnected crises that span across all sectors of life. That is to say, the effects of one crisis often become the causes of another, involving economic, political, social, cultural, ethical, moral, technological, commercial, and environmental components. In other words, it is a structural and systemic crisis—one that cannot be resolved unless a similarly systemic transformation occurs. To gain greater clarity, it is important to consider that the consolidation of the capitalist system brought about the process of globalization. This, in turn, introduced large-scale production and technological development capable of increasing output. This process, along with other characteristics of the system, has exponentially accelerated social inequalities between developed and developing countries. It has also led to strategic tensions over the control of resources, raw materials, and inputs, resulting in geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, the capitalist system has imposed an extremely high environmental cost, demonstrating that it is exceeding both its own limits and those of the planet. Specifically, in its constant pursuit of profit and maximization of gains, negative environmental impacts are not factored into cost-benefit analyses, leading to widespread environmental degradation. Among other harms caused by the system, we observe a decline in investment rates, an increase in public debt, loss of autonomy in monetary policy, rising unemployment levels, reductions in real wages, and growing inequality, among others. In short, capitalism has become an unsustainable system whose primary concern is profit generation—something that is currently entirely incompatible with environmental preservation and the responsible use of natural resources. Therefore, it can be affirmed that some of its most alarming effects include: vast amounts of currency without backing, increasingly concentrated in fewer hands; acceleration of capital concentration in the West; rising military expenditures; and environmental pollution and destruction (Casals, J., 2023). On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify that, for a particular state to be considered hegemonic, it must not only exert its influence predominantly within the system of international relations; its hegemonic role must also be linked to the founding and establishment of a universally accepted concept of world order. That is, the majority of other states must recognize it as such and identify with the model promoted by the hegemon. Therefore, it is not merely a matter of a hierarchical order among states, but rather the adoption of a dominant model of production that involves those states. As a result, certain mechanisms or general rules of conduct are established for the participating states. For this reason, a hegemonic crisis involving the dominant actor in the system of international relations leads to a crisis in the social, economic, political, and institutional structures upon which that actor’s dominance was built. In light of these elements, we currently observe a set of powers within the International System that are vying to establish a new distribution of power—one that moves away from the unipolar coalition led by the United States following World War II. From this perspective, Juan Sebastián Schulz asserts: “A hegemonic crisis occurs when the existing hegemonic state lacks either the means or the will to continue steering the interstate system in a direction broadly perceived as favorable—not only for its own power, but also for the collective power of the dominant groups within the system.” (Schulz, J. S., 2022) As a result, strategic alliances have been formed and new power groups have emerged that influence international relations.These blocs are precisely what the new polarity is forming around, increasingly reinforcing the trend toward multipolarity. This is a system in which hegemonic influence is not determined by a single power, but by two, three, or more. In this regard, Juan Sebastián Schulz further notes that a process of insubordination is becoming evident, particularly in the Western peripheries. As a consequence, several countries have begun to criticize the configuration of the contemporary world order, initiating efforts to organize and propose alternative models (Schulz, J. S., 2022). This reveals the emergence of a new kind of power hierarchy, generating a global order in which a diversity of forces and actors prevails. In this context, China has experienced rapid growth, thereby contributing to the trend toward multipolarity. While this does not imply that the United States will cease to be one of the central powers in the system of international relations—given its considerable global influence—it is evident that there is a noticeable decline in the dominance it held during the unipolar era that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This process of intersystemic transition unfolds in various phases. First, there is an observable economic transition marked by a shift in the center of gravity of the global economy toward emerging and developing economies. This shift is accompanied by a necessary technological transition, characterized by a new struggle—this time to lead the technological revolution. These changes, in turn, must be supported by a political transition. Currently, countries from the Global South have gained increasing prominence on the international stage [1]. From this foundation, a geopolitical transition is also underway, where the center of gravity and decision-making—once concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon West—is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, a cultural or civilizational transition is taking place, wherein the previously dominant value system is giving way to the rise of a new worldview. Based on this, the phases of the transition process can be outlined as follows: Existence of a stable order that brings together the majority of nation-states in the International System. - A crisis of legitimacy begins to affect the established global order. - A deconcentration and delegitimization of power emerges, impacting the hegemonic power. - An arms race and formation of alliances ensue in an attempt to preserve the hierarchical order by any means. This leads to a widespread crisis and the rise and emergence of new actors. - A necessary resolution of the international crisis. - Renewal of the system. (Schulz, J. S., 2022) In light of the above, it can be stated that a “new international order” is taking shape. Its manifestations are multifaceted, such as: - The rise of movements and associations of states that serve as alternatives to the neoliberal order. - Emerging powers like China and Russia are gaining strength in various sectors of the international geopolitical arena. - Russia's confrontation with NATO in the context of the conflict with Ukraine. - Sanctions imposed by the United States on various NATO and European Union countries have strengthened the BRICS nations. - The incorporation of new members into BRICS can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the economic and political dominance of the United States and the European Union. - The expansion of anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal integration mechanisms that promote South-South cooperation, such as the G-77 + China group. - The financial sanctions imposed by the West on Russia in the context of the Ukraine conflict have sparked a debate about the viability of the international monetary system and the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. - China and Russia conduct transactions in yuan and sell oil in this currency to Iran, Venezuela, and Gulf countries. China has increased its economic and political influence in the world, which can be seen as a challenge to U.S. hegemony. Its leadership within BRICS and its growing role in the global economy may be indicators of a shift in the balance of power. All these developments reflect a growing awareness within the International System of States regarding the importance of international cooperation to address global challenges such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and food security. They also serve as indicators that a transformation is underway in the way countries interact with each other, resulting in a shift in the economic, political, and strategic center of gravity. In this context, the United States has unleashed a global hybrid war as a desperate attempt to defend and maintain its hegemonic position, which once appeared unshakable in the postwar world. To this end, it has targeted China, as the latter represents its main threat in the economic and scientific-technological order. From this perspective, tensions between the United States and China have significantly deteriorated since the Republican administration of President Donald Trump. Beginning in 2017, his policy took on an aggressive stance toward China, manifesting through a trade war and economic attacks aimed at preserving U.S. global hegemony. This demonstrates that, in response to a process of decline already underway, nationalist and protectionist efforts intensified in the U.S., with policies targeting some of the emerging pillars of the crisis-ridden world order—China being a primary example. Under the administration of Joseph Biden, the focus shifted toward competition, emphasizing the commitment to protect U.S. sovereignty from potential Chinese threats. A significant shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan became evident with the approval of arms sales to Taiwan in August 2023, which escalated tensions in the region (Collective of Authors). Furthermore, in recent years, the United States has increasingly worked to generate geopolitical and geoeconomic motivations aimed at fostering tensions between China and Russia, potentially sparking conflict between the two. It has strengthened alliances with neighboring countries of these powers—most notably Taiwan and Ukraine—which has triggered concerns and tensions in both nations. A containment policy has also been deployed, including the imposition of trade barriers and tariffs on Chinese products; restricting Chinese companies’ access to U.S. technology and markets; and promoting the diversification of supply chains to reduce dependence on China. Nevertheless, the ongoing sanctions and restrictions have only served to reaffirm the shared survival interests of both powers, strengthening corporate ties and relations between them. These actions also reflect the growing concern among U.S. power groups over the decline of their hegemonic dominance. The Emergence of China and Its Role in the Transition Toward Multipolarity In a previous article titled "The Synergy Between Economy and Environment in China Through the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals," (‘La sinergia entre economía y medio ambiente en China mediante la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible’) the process of socioeconomic transformations experienced in the People's Republic of China over the past decade was discussed. These transformations have been primarily aimed at revitalizing the nation in preparation for its centenary in 2049. This strategy is rooted in aligning the Centenary Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set for 2030, under the leadership of the Communist Party and the momentum driven by President Xi Jinping. The results of this strategy have had an impact not only on the Asian Giant itself—now a decisive actor in the Asian region—but also on the international order as a whole. As a result, China has emerged as a powerful rising power, with promising prospects for further elevating its development standards. This is backed by sustained GDP growth, averaging between 6% and 8% annually, indicating a robust economy. In addition, China holds vast foreign exchange reserves, granting it economic stability and the capacity to withstand potential external shocks. It also invests heavily in modern infrastructure and cutting-edge sectors such as artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and renewable energy—all of which enhance its competitiveness and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainable growth (Lagarde, CH). Nonetheless, China has also had to confront significant challenges in its gradual and progressive approach to the desired development model. Among these is the environmental cost associated with its rapid economic growth. For instance, China still experiences high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, along with air, water, and soil pollution. In response, measures have been implemented such as the establishment of a national monitoring network and the replacement of coal heating systems in Beijing. Efforts have also been made to purify water resources polluted by industrial processes, and imports of solid waste have been reduced to help decontaminate soils affected by industrial and agricultural activities (González, R., 2023). In general, the development of renewable energy and a circular economy model is being promoted to enable a gradual transition toward a green economy, grounded in the concept of an ecological civilization. For this reason, China’s new era is committed to scientific and technological innovation as a means of driving economic growth that is both sustainable and capable of ensuring a higher quality of life for its population. This, in turn, leads gradually toward a new model of political leadership and economic management. In this regard, Jin Keyu, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), has stated that “trillions of dollars of investment are needed for the global green transition, and China is going to play an essential role in that transformation” (Feingold, S., 2024). Based on the aforementioned elements, various authors such as Dr. C. Charles Pennaforte, Dr. C. Juan Sebastián Schulz, Dr. C. Eduardo Regalado Florido, among others, have indicated that the millenary nation represents a threat to the hegemony held by the United States since World War II. Consequently, it is recognized that a process of hegemonic crisis and transition is currently underway, with the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the center of gravity of the global power, thereby contributing to the multipolar transformation of the International System. The authors of “Is China Changing the World?” argue that “market socialism with “Chinese characteristics” must gradually and more clearly diverge from capitalism if it is to embody a genuinely alternative path for all of humanity.” In pursuit of this goal, China bases its policy of peaceful coexistence on five fundamental principles:Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, regardless of a country's size, power, or wealth. Mutual non-aggression Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, acknowledging that each nation has the right to freely choose its own social system and path of development. Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence. (Herrera, R.; Long, Z.; and Andréani, T., 2023) The rise of China as a major international power under these principles has been consolidating since 2012 under the leadership of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC), gaining particular momentum from 2020 to the present. Thus, China has not only become the leading power within the Asian regional balance but has also expanded its presence across Europe, Africa, and Latin America—primarily through loans, investments, and multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa and the China-CELAC Forum in Latin America. In addition, China has positioned itself as a leader in several sectors, and it is projected that its economy may surpass that of the United States, increasing its Gross Domestic Product (Rodríguez, L., 2022). It has also undergone a process of opening up, energizing both its international trade and its overall foreign relations, all under the control of the Government and the Party. This, combined with its rise and development initiatives, has made China a focal point of interest for many countries within the International System seeking to jointly advance projects based on cooperation, the principle of shared advantage, and multilateralism. In this regard, the white paper "China and the World in the New Era," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2019, states: “The world is moving rapidly toward multipolarity, diverse models of modern development, and collaboration in global governance. It is now impossible for a single country or bloc of countries to dominate world affairs. Stability, peace, and development have become the common aspirations of the international community.” (People’s Republic of China, 2019. Quoted in Schulz, J. S., 2022) Undoubtedly, this rise has become a source of concern for U.S. power groups, which have increasingly applied geostrategic pressure. Notably, the United States has strengthened military alliances with India, Japan, and Australia in an effort to encircle China and attempt to control or obstruct its maritime routes—this also being a manifestation of the intensification of the imperialist arms race. Nonetheless, China has maintained its development strategy and, as part of it, has strengthened its diplomatic network and its relations with multiple countries across all world regions. For all these reasons, China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. Notably, it went from representing 4% of global GDP in 1960 to 16% in 2020—undeniable evidence of rapid economic growth. Moreover, it has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and also the leading importer, establishing itself as a major industrial power. In this regard, United Nations data reveal that China leads global industrial production, accounting for 30% of the total. This figure surpasses other industrial powers such as the United States (16%), Japan (7%), Germany (5.7%), and South Korea (3.2%) (Schulz, J. S., 2022). In addition, China has remained the world’s leading manufacturing power for approximately 15 consecutive years, according to statements from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology at the beginning of this year. This sector alone has contributed over 40% to overall growth. Likewise, in 2024, China experienced a significant increase in foreign investment, reflecting its interest in strengthening international cooperation for development. Efforts are also underway for urban renewal in 2024, with around 60,000 projects being implemented across various cities. These initiatives are primarily aimed at transforming underdeveloped neighborhoods and creating smarter urban areas (Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in the People's Republic of China, 2025). In this regard, the following graphs illustrate the value of China’s international trade during the 2016–2024 period, highlighting a strong presence of exports compared to imports. A second chart shows China's global export share, where it holds a dominant position.   Thus, China has risen as a center of power in the international system, with leadership not only in the economic domain but also in science and technology. At the same time, it has promoted a series of investments and a process of internationalizing its national currency. Accordingly, the Asian Giant offers an alternative model of development—one that is more comprehensive and sustainable—allowing it to propel the new phase of Chinese development. This phase aims not only to fulfill the dream of national rejuvenation but also to ensure the survival of its unique political, economic, and social model. Nevertheless, the significant challenges of sustaining growth cannot be overlooked. From this perspective, experts believe that new avenues of growth will be necessary for China to maintain the trajectory it has been experiencing. Specifically, the country must continue expanding its industrial sector while strengthening areas such as artificial intelligence, digital financial services, and green technologies (Feingold, S., 2024). It is also important to highlight the projected continuity and leadership of the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping identified as a key figure in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in China, in conjunction with the socioeconomic transformation strategy toward the 2049 centenary. This has been pursued through the defense of multilateralism, economic openness, and international integration and cooperation in support of global development. Conclusions In light of the above, a decline in U.S. hegemony can be observed, even though this process is not linear—nor is it certain whether any single power or coalition has come to occupy a hegemonic position. What is clear, however, is the existence of a trend toward multipolarity, driven by emerging powers and the strategic ties they are establishing. This is giving rise to a non-hegemonic reconfiguration of power blocs, which are building a multilateral and multipolar institutional framework. It can also be affirmed that China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. This has been supported by its growth strategy focused on industrialization, digitalization, innovation, productivity, expansion, and internationalization of its development model—while maintaining a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability. A range of key initiatives and development projects have been implemented to support the country's rise, consolidating its role in the multipolar reconfiguration of the International System. All of this has been essential in driving China’s new phase of development and contributing to the broader process of multipolar transformation. Undoubtedly, China’s rapid ascent represents a significant challenge to the International System, as it reflects a shift in international relations and a transformation in the distribution and hierarchy of global power. Notes [1] It is important to clarify that the so-called Global South should not be equated with the Third World, as the distinction between the First and Third Worlds is primarily based on economic and technological differences, which do not align with the current circumstances of the International System of States. In contrast, the term Global South emerges from a new geopolitical perspective that arose in the post–Cold War context, driven by the need to promote South-South cooperation. Moreover, it does not refer to a geographically defined region, as it includes nations from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific.Revista Política Internacional | Volumen VII Nro. 2 abril-junio de 2025. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15103898This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). The opinions and contents of the published documents are solely the responsibility of their authors.ReferencesCasals, J. (2023). “El Nuevo orden global: amenazas y oportunidades”. Cuadernos de Nuestra América. Nueva época. No.5. RNPS: 2529.Colectivo de autores. “Crisis de hegemonía y ascenso de China. Seis tendencias para una transición”. Tricontinental. Instituto Tricontinental de Investigacion social. Buenoos Aires. Libro digital, PDF, Archivo Digital: descarga y online.Embajada de la República de Cuba en la República Popular China. (2025). Boletín informativo China-22 de enero de 2025. Oficina de Información y Análisis. Embajada de Cuba en República Popular China. Redacción y envío desde info3@embacuba.cn.Feingold, S. (2024). "¿Hacia dónde va la economía china?". World Economic Forum. Recuperado de: https://es.weforum.org/stories/2024/07/hacia-dondeva-la-economia-de-china/García-Herrero, A. (2024). "10 puntos y 18 gráficos sobre la política económica de Xi Jinping tras el tercer pleno". El Grand Continent. Recuperado de: https:// legrandcontinent.eu/es/2024/09/19/esta-china-estancada-10-puntos-y-18-graficos-sobre-la-politicaeconomica-de-xi-jinping-tras-el-tercer-pleno/González, R. (2023). " Medio ambiente en China: Impactos y respuestas del Partido y el Gobierno". CIPI. Recuperado de: www.cipi.cu/medio-ambiente- en-china-impactos-y-respuestas-del-partido-y-gobierno/Lagarde, CH. "Impulsar el crecimiento económico y adaptarse al cambio". Fondo Monetario Internacional. Discursos. Recuperado de: https://www.imf.org/ es/News/Articles/2016/09/27/AM16-SP09282016- Boosting-Growth-Adjusting-to-ChangePereira, CM (2022): “La reemergencia de China frente a la globalización neoliberal y el desafío de la conformación de un mundo multipolar”. Cuadernos de Nuestra America. Nueva Época. No. 05. RNPS: 2529.Schulz, J S. (2022). “Crisis sistémica del orden mundial, transición hegemónica y nuevos actores en el escenario global”. Cuadernos de Nuestra América. Nueva Época. No.03. RNPS: 2529. Bibliografía consultadaAmbrós, I. (2021). “ El Partido Comunista y los desafíos internos de China en el siglo XX”. Recuperado de: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/cuadernos/ CE_212/Cap_1_El_Partido_C omunista_y_los_desafios_internos.pdfBanco Mundial (BM). (2023). Recuperado de: https:// datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP. KD?locations=CNBBC News Mundo. (2021). "Cómo consiguió China erradicar la pobreza extrema (y las dudas que despierta ese triunfal anuncio del gobierno de Xi". Recuperado de: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-56205219Boy, M. (2020). “ Crisis económica y medio ambiente: ¿cómo promover un desarrollo sustentable?”. Recuperado de: https://culturacolectiva.com/opinion/crisis-economica-y-medio-ambiente- mariana-boy-columna-opinion/García, A. (2021). “La globalización neoliberal en crisis”. Recuperado de http://www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/2021/08/30/la-globalizacion-neoliberal-en- crisisGonzález, R. (2020). “El Quinto Pleno del XIX Comité Central del Partido Comunista abre una nueva etapa para China” en “Transiciones del Siglo XXI y China: China y perspectivas post pandemia II”. Libro digital.Herrera, R; Long, Z y Andréani, T. (2023). “¿Está China transformando el mundo?”. Revista Política Internacional. Volumen V. Nro. 1 enero-marzo de 2023.ISSN 2707-7330.Liu, X. y González G. (2021) “El XIV Plan Quinquenal 2021- 2025: reto para el nuevo modelo de desarrollo económico de China”. México y la Cuenca del Pacífico. Vol 10, núm. 30. Recuperado de https://www.scielo.org. mx/pdf/mcp/v10n30/2007-5308-mcp-10-30-57.pdfOtero, M (2022). “La prosperidad común y la circulación dual: el nuevo modelo de desarrollo de China”. Recuperado de: https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-prosperidad-comun-y-lacirculacion-dual-el-nuevo-modelo-de-desarrollo-de-china/Regalado, E. y Molina, E. (Coord.) (2021). “China y sus relaciones internacionales”. Asociación Venezolana de Estudios sobre China (AVECH) / CEAA / ULA – Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI, Cuba), Libro digital.Rodríguez, L. (2022). “Configuración multipolar del sistema internacional del siglo XXI”. Revista Política Internacional. Volumen IV Nro. 1 enero-marzo de 2022. ISSN 2707-7330.Weiss, A. (2024). "La frágil fortaleza económica de Estados Unidos". The Economist. Recuperado de: https:// www.lavanguardia.com/dinero/20240212/9516764/ economia-eeuu- fortaleza-fragil-ia-bolsa-mercados. htmlYang, W. (2015). "La Planificación y Recomendaciones del XIII Plan Quinquenal". Recuperado de: https:// politica-china.org/wp- content/uploads/6sei-yangweimin-ES.pdf .

Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May, ever larger Russian air strikes have been documented against Ukrainian cities with devastating consequences for civilians, including in the country’s capital, Kyiv. Amid small and costly but steady gains along the almost 1,000km long frontline, Russia reportedly took full control of the Ukrainian region of Luhansk, part of which it had already occupied before the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And according to Dutch and German intelligence reports, some of Russia’s gains on the battlefield are enabled by the widespread use of chemical weapons. It was therefore something of a relief that Nato’s summit in The Hague produced a short joint declaration on June 25 in which Russia was clearly named as a “long-term threat … to Euro-Atlantic security”. Member states restated “their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”. While the summit declaration made no mention of future Nato membership for Ukraine, the fact that US president Donald Trump agreed to these two statements was widely seen as a success. Yet, within a week of the summit, Washington paused the delivery of critical weapons to Ukraine, including Patriot air defence missiles and long-range precision-strike rockets. The move was ostensibly in response to depleting US stockpiles. This despite the Pentagon’s own analysis, which suggested that the shipment – authorised by the former US president Joe Biden last year – posed no risk to US ammunition supplies. This was bad news for Ukraine. The halt in supplies weakens Kyiv’s ability to protect its large population centres and critical infrastructure against intensifying Russian airstrikes. It also puts limits on Ukraine’s ability to target Russian supply lines and logistics hubs behind the frontlines that have been enabling ground advances. Despite protests from Ukraine and an offer from Germany to buy Patriot missiles from the US for Ukraine, Trump has been in no rush to reverse the decision by the Pentagon.   Another phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on July 3, failed to change Trump’s mind, even though he acknowledged his disappointment with the clear lack of willingness by the Kremlin to stop the fighting. What’s more, within hours of the call between the two presidents, Moscow launched the largest drone attack of the war against Kyiv. A day later, Trump spoke with Zelensky. And while the call between them was apparently productive, neither side gave any indication that US weapons shipments to Ukraine would resume quickly. Trump previously paused arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March, 2025 after his acrimonious encounter with Zelensky in the Oval Office. But the US president reversed course after certain concessions had been agreed – whether that was an agreement by Ukraine to an unconditional ceasefire or a deal on the country’s minerals. It is not clear with the current disruption whether Trump is after yet more concessions from Ukraine. The timing is ominous, coming after what had appeared to be a productive Nato summit with a unified stance on Russia’s war of aggression. And it preceded Trump’s call with Putin. This could be read as a signal that Trump was still keen to accommodate at least some of the Russian president’s demands in exchange for the necessary concessions from the Kremlin to agree, finally, the ceasefire that Trump had once envisaged he could achieve in 24 hours. If this is indeed the case, the fact that Trump continues to misread the Russian position is deeply worrying. The Kremlin has clearly drawn its red lines on what it is after in any peace deal with Ukraine. These demands – virtually unchanged since the beginning of the war – include a lifting of sanctions against Russia and no Nato membership for Ukraine, while also insisting that Kyiv must accept limits on its future military forces and recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the Ukrainian mainland. This will not change as a result of US concessions to Russia but only through pressure on Putin. And Trump has so far been unwilling to apply pressure in a concrete and meaningful way beyond the occasional hints to the press or on social media. Coalition of the willing It is equally clear that Russia’s maximalist demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. With little doubt that the US can no longer be relied upon to back the European and Ukrainian position, Kyiv and Europe need to accelerate their own defence efforts. A European coalition of the willing to do just that is slowly taking shape. It straddles the once more rigid boundaries of EU and Nato membership and non-membership, involving countries such as Moldova, Norway and the UK. and including non-European allies including Canada, Japan and South Korea. The European commission’s white paper on European defence is an obvious indication that the threat from Russia and the needs of Ukraine are being taken seriously and, crucially, acted upon. It mobilises some €800 billion (£690 billion) in defence spending and will enable deeper integration of the Ukrainian defence sector with that of the European Union. At the national level, key European allies, in particular Germany, have also committed to increased defence spending and stepped up their forward deployment of forces closer to the borders with Russia. US equivocation will not mean that Ukraine is now on the brink of losing the war against Russia. Nor will Europe discovering its spine on defence put Kyiv immediately in a position to defeat Moscow’s aggression. After decades of relying on the US and neglecting their own defence capabilities, these recent European efforts are a first step in the right direction. They will not turn Europe into a military heavyweight overnight. But they will buy time to do so.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Strategically located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, the Gaza Strip is a crucially important enclave in the Levant. Its proximity to Israel and Egypt places it in an area of high strategic sensitivity, and it is deeply involved in the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Territorial disputes, rooted in sovereignty claims, overlap with the involvement of international actors with different economic and strategic interests.This territory, which is no more than 12 kilometers wide and a little more than 40 kilometers long, has been the scene of a confrontation between the State of Israel and the political, military and social organization Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, Islamic Resistance Movement) for the last two years. In this war scenario, three main actors can be mentioned. On the one hand, the State of Israel, created in 1948, which has a great military and technological capacity thanks to the help of the United States. Israel distinguishes that Hamas is a permanent threat to the Israelis, hence its policy of land, naval and maritime blockade, arguing that it must defend itself from the aggressions of this group which has repeatedly launched missiles in this century. Secondly, Hamas, an organization created in 1987 during the first Intifada (rebellion or uprising), which exercises control of the Gaza Strip and leads the resistance to the State of Israel seeking the creation of a Palestinian State. Hamas' capabilities range from military development with the launching of missiles, to public administration and social work in the area. Third, the United States is an external actor in the region, but one that wields considerable influence, for while it sees itself as an arbiter in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, it has done little more than deploy over the decades military, political and financial support for the State of Israel. The choice of the period of analysis from 2023 to early 2025 is due to the succession of events in the area that have demanded specific attention, since the military escalation has denoted a more radical change in the posture of the main actors. Given this situation, the central research question is the following: How have the power dynamics between Israel, Hamas and the United States manifested themselves in the Gaza Strip during the period 2023-2025, and what have been the main implications of their actions. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the interactions between these three main actors from 2023 to early 2025. Israel, founded in 1948 and with great military and technological power thanks to U.S. support. Hamas, established in 1987, controls the Gaza Strip and leads the resistance, seeking the creation of a Palestinian state that does not recognize Israel. The United States, while presenting itself as an arbiter, has historically provided substantial military, political and financial support to Israel. The October 7, 2023 Hamas's attack, "Operation Al-Aqsa Storm," provoked the Israeli "Iron Swords" counteroffensive. This response included heavy aerial and ground bombardment throughout Gaza, causing widespread destruction and a severe humanitarian crisis. Israel seeks to dismantle Hamas' military capability, eliminate its leadership and release hostages, in addition to the establishment of a security zone. The U.S. position under the administrations of Joseph Biden and Donald Trump has been supportive of Israel, justifying its right to defend itself. However, concerns about civilian casualties and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza have led to calls for "humanitarian pauses." The "cease-fire" that is announced from time to time has not served to definitively stop the fighting; on the contrary, after its termination, the Israeli Defense Forces continue to gain ground. The fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip has been imposed since 2007, and its level of intensity has varied over the years, but what has not changed is the justification for it, which is related to security issues, to prevent the entry of arms and supplies that could be used by Hamas to attack Israeli territory. According to the State of Israel, the air, naval and land blockade is a fundamental part of its defense to protect its people from rockets launched from the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the Hamas takeover came after Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement, a Palestinian political and military organization founded in the late 1950s, and a leading member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO) lost the 2006 parliamentary elections, and Hamas fighters fought against them. Both parties claim to represent the Palestinians. The battle won by Hamas meant the dissolution of the existing unity government and the division of the Palestinian territories: West Bank for Fatah and the Gaza Strip for Hamas. Hamas' stated goal is the creation of a Palestinian state occupying the entire territory of Palestine, which means non-recognition of the State of Israel. The region has been characterized by rocket fire from Gaza into Israel and Israeli military incursions into Gaza, all within the framework of the Israeli naval, land and sea blockade, although Hamas rearmament has continued due to tunnels linking Gaza to Egypt. Background to the escalation of Violence The escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in 2023, has been a process of accumulation of facts between both parties for decades. One of them has been the stalemate of the Peace Process that has promoted a radicalization of the parties' positions encouraging armed struggle. Secondly, the increasing expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, considered illegal by a large part of the international community, which causes, on the one hand, the fragmentation of Palestinian sovereignty in the territory due to the inability to establish a related communication infrastructure between Palestinian lands, and on the other hand, resentment towards the Israeli occupation, which manifests itself in an armed resistance that is seen as the only solution in the absence of a political settlement. Thirdly, the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places (Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock and other mosques), where there are restrictions on entering the mosque area by Israeli security. This is seen as a violation of religious rights. Jerusalem is claimed to be the capital of the future Palestinian state. Israel denies this because it declared it as the eternal and indivisible capital in 1980 through a law passed by the Knesset (Assembly).Fourthly, the blockade of the Gaza Strip with the resulting humanitarian crisis has generated a lot of poverty, high unemployment, limited access to basic services such as water, electricity and health, which has increased the radicalization of the population.Fifth, the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, some of whom have no open criminal cases, whereby hunger strikes and the conditions in which they live are a cause for protest by Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Finally, the competition between Hamas and Fatah, one in Gaza and the other in the West Bank, only encourages violence to see who represents the Palestinians more, i.e., to settle the representation of the Palestinian people, thereby increasing attacks on Israel, which in turn responds militarily: "Israeli forces need to wrest territorial control from Hamas to demonstrate to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank that they do not guarantee their security from Israel, just as Hamas's assault has called into question Israeli confidence in its Armed Forces" (Arteaga, 2023, 3). Israel may not need to occupy the entire Gaza Strip, but what it needs is to "dismantle as much of Hamas' military prestige as it can to challenge its Palestinian leadership, otherwise Hamas will increase its ability to influence the rest of the factions in Gaza and the West Bank to the detriment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)" (ibidem). Hamas attack on Israel in 2023 During 2023, incidents in the Jerusalem area in front of mosques increased, prompting Israeli security forces to intervene, with Palestinians considering it an attack on all Muslims. Simultaneously, Israeli attacks on the West Bank increased to dismantle cells considered terrorists hiding in refugee camps or villages. Israeli settlers living in the West Bank also attacked Palestinian communities, causing damage and casualties. Israeli targeted assassinations of militants in Gaza or the West Bank, leading to hunger strikes in prisons and rebellions by the Palestinian population, should be placed in this context.Faced with this situation, on October 7, 2023, Hamas developed the operation "Al-Aqsa Storm" which involved the infiltration and coordination of fighters using paragliders, attacking Israeli security posts and using boats to infiltrate Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip. The attacks were carried out on villages, military bases, including a music festival, resulting in an estimated death toll of more than 1,200 Israelis and 250 prisoners of whom more than 50 remain in Hamas hands. The release of the hostages has been a strategy to obtain the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Israel's response The Israeli counter-offensive, called "Iron Swords", included intensive aerial bombardments against Hamas military targets in the Gaza Strip, but affected thousands of Palestinian civilians who were killed or wounded and their homes destroyed. The Israelis mobilized reservists for an all-out offensive against the entire Gaza Strip to completely eliminate Hamas, while imposing a total blockade on the supply of water, food, medicine and fuel, increasing the already humanitarian crisis. The destruction reached Hamas military infrastructure and civilian infrastructure such as public buildings, through ground and naval artillery and aerial bombardment. The Israeli ground incursions reached the entire Gaza Strip, because they are aimed at dismantling Hamas' military capacity, tunnels, missile launcher bases, supply sites, arsenals, etcetera. They also aim to dismantle Hamas by eliminating its leaders and the militants responsible for the offensive, to rescue the Israeli hostages, and to establish a future security zone to prevent further Palestinian attacks. Israel has been criticized for the disproportionate response of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to the Hamas attack, the failure to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to plan the attacks in such a way as to avoid civilian casualties. Israel has responded that Hamas uses the civilian population as a shield, and that the territory is densely populated so that war casualties could not be avoided, however, despite having the advantage in war material, so far it has not been enough to defeat Hamas militarily. Guerrilla warfare is the tactic employed by Hamas and that has been a complication for Israel, as it had been for the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Hamas blends in among civilians making it even more difficult to locate its fighters, while the Israeli response causes collateral damage among civilians and what little infrastructure is left standing after nearly two years of conflict: "Gaza's demographic characteristics as a 'soft' factor are an advantage against Israel's 'hard' capabilities, where Hamas operatives can intrude into the population to set up ambushes against IDF armored columns" (Trujillo Borrego, 2025, 16). The government of Benjamin Netanyahu gained a great deal of public support for the military operation, however, the rising number of casualties along with the destruction caused in Gaza, brought down support. The families of the hostages are urging the government to enter into negotiations with Hamas to get them back, which clashes with the government's objectives. The mobilization of the reservists, together with the prolongation of the war, has generated social and economic problems, questioning the Netanyahu government, and also the intelligence agencies that were surprised by the preparation and the surprise of the Hamas attack. The position of the United States Historically, the United States has supported Israel economically, politically and militarily based on strategic and geopolitical interests. The Israeli lobby in the US Congress, the veto to UN Security Council Resolutions and the presidential statements, have strengthened the bond between both countries: "Israel remains the main recipient of US aid, an aid that has allowed it to transform its Armed Forces and maintain the "qualitative military edge" (QME) against its neighbors. It has always been guaranteed by the US Congress and has had the support of both major parties, in part thanks to the promotion at the domestic level of organizations in defense of Israel since the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (García Encina, 2023, 3). The US justification during the administration of President Joseph Biden (2021-2025), was that Israel had the right to defend itself by condemning Hamas in solidarity with its traditional ally. Support was maintained until the US administration began to worry about civilian casualties and the humanitarian crisis. Hence the calls for a "humanitarian pause" and a "cease-fire" for the hostage exchange. The position of current US President Donald Trump has been one of absolute support for Israel. While he has stated that "a lot of people are starving" and that "bad things are happening", his relationship with the Israeli Prime Minister has not changed despite mentioning that humanitarian aid is needed. In that sense, he has stated that Hamas has to be completely disarmed in order for the Gaza Strip to be a territory without weapons. Also, one of his proposals is that the United States take control of Gaza and relocate Palestinians to other countries because it is a pile of rubble, violating international law by the principle of self-determination of peoples and determining a forced displacement of Palestinians: “Despite its support for a two-state solution, the lack of effective pressure on Israel and the focus on Israeli security over justice for Palestinians have hindered significant progress toward peace. U.S. policy in the region has oscillated between attempts at mediation and unconditional support for Israel, making it impossible for the U.S. to act as an impartial mediator.” (Donoso, 2025, pp. 27–28) However, Trump has hinted at Israel's unwillingness to negotiate an end to the war, and has expressed that hunger should not be used as a weapon. In addition, he has lifted sanctions against a historical enemy of Israel, Syria, whose president Ahmed al-Sharaa, was linked to Al Qaeda, although he now belongs to another group called Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) (Organization or Life for the Liberation of the Levant). Israel has opposed the lifting of sanctions and has bombed Syria. Trump’s tour of the Middle East this past May demonstrated that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken a back seat due to the intransigence of both Hamas and Israel. For this reason, the U.S. president—who did not visit Israel—traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, seeking to invest in the oil sector and encouraging those countries to invest in the United States or purchase American products. For example, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy $142 billion worth of military equipment, including missiles, communication systems, and more. The total deal amounts to $600 billion, covering trade, investments, and arms purchases. Meanwhile, in contrast to the U.S. position of keeping control over the Gaza Strip, there is another initiative led by regional countries such as the United Arab Emirates to invest in Gaza’s reconstruction—without relocating Gazan residents to other countries in the region. Final Considerations The Gaza Strip, a narrow territory located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, stands as an epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Surrounded by Israel and Egypt, it represents a strategic geographic point in the region, and has witnessed violence, blockades and a complex interplay between local, regional and international actors, with Israel, Hamas and the United States playing crucial roles. Israel has exerted overwhelming influence with ground and aerial bombardments throughout the Strip to not only eliminate Hamas, but also to secure the release of the hostages. Although at the beginning Israeli society supported this campaign, the cost in lives is being negatively evaluated, in addition to the call for reservists. This call-up has damaged the Israeli economy by extracting more than 300,000 reservists, affecting the labor force in different sectors of the economy. Israel, supported by the United States, has so far declared that it will not end the operation until the elimination of Hamas, the latest [Hamas] has demonstrated a great defensive and organizational capacity, which has been beneficial to the international community that has begun to criticize the Israeli attack due to the high cost in Palestinian victims and the precarious situation of the Gazans. According to the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip, more than 50,000 Gazans had been killed and more than 100,000 wounded as of March this year, but Israel contradicts these figures, while not allowing impartial observers and journalists into the area. In addition, more than 70% of the infrastructure and homes have been destroyed by Israeli air, land and naval bombardments. This has been compounded by the collapse of industrial production, rising inflation due to food and manufactured goods shortages, and an increase in both overall                 and youth unemployment—factors that further fuel resentment toward those considered responsible, namely the Israelis. Likewise, both exports (such as scrap metal, tropical fruits, and olive oil) and imports (especially food) have declined as a result of the conflict. The United States supported Israel's position from the beginning, but President Trump is now calling for the opening of a humanitarian corridor for the residents of Gaza. While Israel has managed to dismantle most of Hamas’ operational infrastructure, it has not succeeded in defeating the organization, nor in freeing all the hostages, and now is facing mounting international condemnation and accusations of war crimes. At the same time, Israel's public spending has increased significantly, primarily due to military operations, while the country's economic development and employment rates have fluctuated over the past two years. Naturally, the Palestinian economy has suffered far more than Israel’s.The escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis since 2023 is the result of a series of long-standing events and processes. Rocket attacks from Gaza, assaults by Israeli settlers on Palestinians in the West Bank, Israeli responses to missile fire, incidents near the mosques in East Jerusalem, the deplorable health conditions in Gaza due to the Israeli blockade, and the destruction of Gazan infrastructure have all prolonged the conflict and deepened tensions. In short, the intransigence of both parties—along with unwavering U.S. support for Israel and diplomatic efforts that have so far failed—has prolonged the conflict, preventing the achievement of a fair and lasting political solution for both sides. This has caused a high number of civilian casualties in Gaza, where a collapsing health system struggles to respond and food is scarce. At the same time, Palestinians living in the West Bank continue to suffer from attacks and displacement by Israeli settlers expanding their areas of control. Bibliography Arteaga, F. (2023). The war between Hamas and Israel: long and hard. Real Instituto Elcano, pp. 1-5. https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/la-guerra-entre-hamas-e-israel-larga-y-dura.pdfBBC News World (2020). West Bank: 6 questions to understand the situation and Israel's plans to annex part of this Palestinian territory. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-53142850BBC News World (2021). Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 6 maps showing how the Palestinian territory has changed over the past decades. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-54162476BBC News World (2025). "Bullets raining down on us like a deluge": Israel attacks southern Gaza and already over 50,000 dead. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c0l1r6xdl9koBBC News World (2025). The history of the Gaza Strip, the former territory of the Ottoman Empire destroyed by Israel and from which Trump wants to evict Palestinians. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c06r7nlr84koDonoso, C. (2025). The United States: a partial and weak mediator in the Israel-Hamas conflict. In, Velasco, C. M. Á., Saint-Pierre, H. L., Mei, E., Borrego, E. T., Donoso, C., & Botta, P. Central theme: Reflections on a year of conflict: Israel and Palestine in the spotlight. Instituto de Altos Estudios del Estado, Paralelo Cero, Estudios estratégicos, geopolíticos y de seguridad, n° 8, pp. 23-30. https://editorial.iaen.edu.ec/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2025/01/PARALELO-0-Boletin-8-Final-1.pdfDoucet, L. (2025). What is the $53 billion plan for Gaza presented by Arab countries. BBC News World. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c5yx07841v9oGarcía Encina, C. (2023). USA and Israel: the strength of a relationship. Real Instituto Elcano, pp. 1-9. https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/eeuu-e-israel-la-fortaleza-de-una-relacion.pdfGoldman, A., Bergman, R., Kingsley, P., Koplewitz, G., (2024). Israel's subway war against Hamas tunnels in Gaza. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/the-new-york-times/2024/01/17/la-guerra-subterranea-de-israel-contra-los-tuneles-de-hamas-en-gaza/Gómez Díaz, L. (2023). Hamas and Fatah, rivals with different visions of Israel and the future of the Palestinians. Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española. https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20231020/hamas-fatah-rivales-politicos-palestinos-israel-diferencias/2458571.shtml.Hamdar, M., Razek, H. (2023). The aerial operation Hamas used to infiltrate Israel undetected. BBC News Arabic. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cv20n56p5ynoInfobae. (2025). With the flag flying in Damascus after 13 years the U.S. embassy in Syria was reopened. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/05/29/reabrieron-la-residencia-del-embajador-de-estados-unidos-en-damasco-mientras-washington-repara-los-lazos-con-siria/Infobae. (2025). Donald Trump spoke about the situation in the Gaza Strip: Many people are starving. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/05/16/donald-trump-hablo-sobre-la-situacion-en-la-franja-de-gaza-mucha-gente-esta-muriendo-de-hambre/Knickmeyer, E. (2025). Trump's Mideast trip highlights deals and diplomacy, but shuts up on human rights. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/espanol/eeuu/articulo/2025-05-16/viaje-de-trump-a-oriente-medio-destaca-por-acuerdos-y-diplomacia-pero-calla-sobre-derechos-humanosMerino, A. (2023). The map of the Israeli blockade of Gaza or how to make a territory uninhabitable. https://elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/mapa-bloqueo-israeli-gaza-territorio-inhabitable/United Nations (2024). Gaza crimes, pollution deaths, Haiti...Wednesday's news. News United Nations. https://news.un.org/es/story/2024/06/1530656Radio France Internationale (2025). Hamas releases three hostages and defies Trump's Gaza plan. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c06r7nlr84koSaul, J., Farrell, S. (2023). The complex network of Hamas tunnels facing the Israeli army in Gaza. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/10/26/la-compleja-red-de-tuneles-de-hamas-de-cientos-de-kilometros-de-largo-a-la-que-se-enfrenta-el-ejercito-israeli-en-gaza/Seddon, S., Palumbo, D. (2023). How Hamas staged a blitz attack on Israel that no one thought possible. BBC News World. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c25we958pwqoTrujillo Borrego, E. (2025). The implicit goals of Israel in its war operations in the Gaza Strip. In, Velasco, C. M. Á., Saint-Pierre, H. L., Mei, E., Borrego, E. T., Donoso, C., & Botta, P. Central theme: Reflections on a year of conflict: Israel and Palestine in the crosshairs. Instituto de Altos Estudios del Estado, Paralelo Cero, Estudios estratégicos, geopolíticos y de seguridad, no. 8, pp. 13-22. https://editorial.iaen.edu.ec/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2025/01/PARALELO-0-Boletin-8-Final-1.pdf

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The relationship between the United States and Israel has been described as one of the most enduring and strategic alliances in modern politics. Beyond shared cultural ties and democratic values, this alliance has been heavily sustained by the systematic influence of pro-Israel state and lobbying groups within U.S political institutions. In this context, the Israeli lobby, most notably represented by organizations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has played a central role in shaping key foreign policy decisions, from military aid assistance to diplomatic recognition of Israeli interests on the international stage (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).  While the presence of interest groups is a common feature of the U.S. democratic system, the Israeli lobby stands out due significant presence and impact on Middle East policy and America diplomacy. As some critics argue, this influence has at times, led to the subordination of U.S. strategic interest in favor of Israeli priorities (Pappé,2017). This article analyzes how the Israeli lobby operates, the mechanisms it employs, and the broader implications it holds for the independence of U.S. foreign policy. Mechanisms of Influence on U.S Foreign Policy         The Israeli state and lobby employs a wide array of tools to influence U.S foreign policy, combining financial, institutional, and narrative-based strategies. One of the most impactful methods is political funding. Pro-Israel Political Action Committees (PACs) have historically directed campaign contributions to congressional candidates who demonstrate unwavering support for Israel, in 2020 there a significant contribution of $30 million to federal campaigns. (OpenSecrest,2021). Lobbying efforts also extend to direct engagement with policy makers. AIPAC, for instance, organizes annual conferences that attract top U.S. officials, including presidents and congress members. Through strategic lobbying, the Israeli lobby has been instrumental in passing measures such as the US-Israel Strategic Partnership Act and ensuring continued military aid exceeding $3.8 billion annually (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).  While often presented as an independent force acting within the American political landscape, the Israeli lobby maintains close ties with the Israeli government, which allows it to act as a semi- official conduit for its foreign policy objectives. One clear example of his coordination was evident during the Obama administration’s negotiations of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). During the Obama administration, to finalize the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress in 2015 without the White House´s approval. This unprecedented move coordinated with Republican congressional leaders highlighted how the Israeli lobby facilitated direct access to U.S. political institutions, effectively bypassing executive authority (Beauchamp, 2015).     Over decades, Israeli influence within U.S foreign policy decision making has moved beyond traditional lobbying, a structural element in how Washington approaches the Middle East. What initially began as advocacy in cultural and strategic alignment has gradually evolved into a form of embedded influence that often shapes policy trajectories before they reach public debate. In recent years, the influence has been reinforced by Israel´s growing military modernization and significant victories against their enemies such as Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. These developments and Israeli momentum have not only bolstered Israel´s image as a capable regional power but also fueled a more assertive posture in its foreign relations. The confidence generated by these military gains has translated into hardened political positions and intensified pressure on allies, particularly the United States.                  These examples illustrate that the Israeli state and lobby does not operate in isolation but often reflects, channels, and amplifies the geopolitical agenda of the Israeli state. This dynamic complicates the notion of national interest within the U.S. foreign policy, especially when lobbying efforts coincide with foreign governmental objectives. From Influence to Entrapment: The U.S.- Israeli Alliance in the Iran Conflict               Despite initial promises of restraint under the renewed “America First” vision, the current U.S. administration finds itself increasingly entangled in a regional conflict it once sought to avoid. Under President Trump´s second term, American foreign policy was publicly framed around non-intervention, prioritizing domestic renewal over costly military initiatives and strategic assertiveness, which have steadily eroded Washington’s space for independent decision making.               Israel´s sustained rhetorical pressure and military assertiveness have shaped U.S. involvement in the ongoing war with Iran. Drawing on a momentum strengthened by recent strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Israeli leadership has framed Tehran as an imminent existential threat, pressuring Washington to intensify its military posture. As Froman (2024) observes, “Israel´s actions have fundamentally reshaped the security landscape of the Middle East.”  This situation highlights a concerning shift in how the United States is managing its foreign policy in the Middle East. Rather than settling the pace or leading diplomatically, Washington is now largely responding to events already set in motion by Israel. This reflects the long-standing nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship. America leaders now find themselves caught in a conflict they did not start but now must lead. With Iran already responding militarily and tensions rising across the region, the risk of a wider war is growing quickly. This mirrors past U.S experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where limited interventions turned into long, costly wars. As Israel continues to act from its position of strength, the U.S. faces danger of a new war.             With the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the sidelining of multilateral diplomacy, there is little room left for negotiation. Institutions such as the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been largely absent in terms of more action, also the intervention of the members of the security council of the United Nations, reflecting how hard power dynamics have overtaken diplomatic engagement. In this vacuum, the Israeli security narrative has become dominant. A War of Choice or a Path to Diplomacy The ongoing conflict has triggered a significant reconfiguration of the Middle East´s power structure. For now, Israel, strategically supported by the United States, has asserted its military and political dominance. Iran, weakened by the degradation of its proxy network and recent strikes on three nuclear facilities, finds itself momentarily contained. This alignment places the U.S.-Israel axis in a position of regional superiority.   However, this superiority could be temporary. If Iran succeeds in eventually acquiring a nuclear weapon, the balance may shift again, this time not through conventional power, but through nuclear deterrence. As seen during the cold war, deterrence is not about battlefield victory but about creating unacceptable costs for aggression.  A nuclear-armed Iran would no longer need to outmatch Israel or the U.S. militarily. This is precisely why diplomacy must be reviewed not as appeasement, but as a tool to prevent irreversible escalation. As Vaez (2025) states, “Washington and its partners should not give up on diplomacy with Iran not because it's not easy, but because it is the only sustainable way to prevent further escalation.” The current moments offer a fleeting opportunity: one where military success has bought time for diplomacy to reassert itself. Among the most urgent priorities               is re-engaging in serious negotiations surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), not simply to contain Iran´s nuclear ambitions, but to rebuild a broader framework of strategic dialogue. Failing to seize that opportunity could lock the region into a new war, one shaped not by diplomacy.             References:Beauchamp, Z. (2015, March 3). Why Netanyahu’s speech to Congress is one of the most controversial in history. Vox.  https://www.vox.com/2015/3/3/8142663/netanyahu-speech-congressMearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.OpenSecrets. (2021). Pro-Israel PACs contributions to candidates, 2019–2020. Center for Responsive Politics.             https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/industry-detail/Q05/2020Pappé, I. (2017). Ten Myths About Israel. Verso Books.Vaez, A. (2025, June 16). Don’t Give Up on Diplomacy With Iran. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/dont-give-diplomacy-iran

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The global development initiative proposed by China aims to promote global sustainable development and has received support from many Latin American countries. At present, green cooperation between China and Latin America has achieved positive results in multiple fields such as clean energy, green agriculture, and green transportation. Latin American countries can become important partners for China to promote the Global Development Initiatives. However, in terms of green cooperation, China and Latin America also face some challenges. Both sides must strengthen consensus and achieve coordinated development in various fields. Sustainable Development and the Global Development Initiative The current international situation is turbulent and constantly changing, with a global economy that remains stagnant, while challenges such as geopolitical conflicts, climate change, and the food crisis are becoming increasingly intertwined and exacerbated. In this context, all countries around the world face the important task of promoting sustainable development and maintaining healthy economic and social growth. On September 21, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping officially launched the Global Development Initiative at the United Nations, outlining a path toward a new stage of global development that is balanced, coordinated, and inclusive (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2021). The Global Development Initiative is aligned with the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and places climate change and sustainable development as key areas of cooperation, emphasizing the idea of harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature. Its goal is to promote stronger, more sustainable, and healthier global development, and to build a global community for development. The 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are a fundamental part of the Global South and, in general, place great importance on sustainable development, which has allowed them to achieve notable successes in the field of sustainable cooperation. In a context of great power competition and ongoing regional conflicts, the strengthening of sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries presents numerous opportunities, creating ample space to jointly advance in sustainable development. The concept of a sustainable economy evolved from the idea of sustainable development, with harmony between humanity and nature at its core and the goal of achieving long-term sustainability. This approach maintains that economic growth is not an unlimited or uncontrolled process but rather must be conditioned by the ecological environment’s capacities and the resource carrying capacity. The concept of a sustainable economy emerged in the late 1980s when British environmental economist David Pearce introduced it in his work “Blueprint for a Green Economy”, published in 1989. However, it was not until the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, that the sustainable economy began to receive greater attention and became a central concept in global development strategies. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a sustainable economy is driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, improve energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. A sustainable economy has always promoted development goals that integrate economic, social, and environmental aspects. This respect for the environment and nature is closely linked to traditional Chinese worldviews. Since ancient times, the Chinese have developed ideas about following the laws of nature and protecting the ecological environment. In the classical text “Yi Zhou Shu Ju Pian”, it is recorded: "During the three months of spring, no axes are used in the mountains and forests, to allow plants to grow; during the three months of summer, no nets are placed in rivers and lakes." These ideas have been a fundamental part of the spiritual thought and culture of the Chinese people for over five thousand years, and through them, they have envisioned humanity and nature as an organic and indivisible whole. They represent the basic understanding of the relationship between humans and nature in ancient Chinese agricultural society, where coexistence and mutual promotion between people and the ecological environment reflected a dialectical relationship of unity. These ideas, full of deep wisdom, constitute an essential component of China’s rich cultural tradition. Consensus Base for Green Cooperation In 2021, the Global Development Initiative, aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, established eight key areas of cooperation: poverty reduction, food security, industrialization, connectivity, pandemic response, development financing, climate change, and the digital economy. It also proposed key principles such as “prioritizing development,” “people-centered focus,” “universal inclusion,” “innovation-driven efforts,” “harmony between humanity and nature,” and “action-oriented approaches.” Latin American countries also place great importance on sustainable development and share numerous points of consensus with China on these principles. Currently, several countries in the region, including Peru and Colombia, have joined the “Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative.” This shared commitment to sustainable development between China and Latin America provides an important foundation for advancing sustainable cooperation. Particularly, China and Latin American countries have broad consensus in the following areas: 1. Prioritizing national development. Both China and many Latin American countries are developing nations and consider the promotion of sustainable development a crucial goal. President Xi Jinping emphasized in the report presented at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC): “The fundamental fact that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism has not changed; our international status as the largest developing country in the world has not changed.” (Xi, 2017) China’s fundamental national situation determines that its main task is to advance along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and to focus its efforts on socialist construction. The Global Development Initiative also highlights “prioritizing development” as one of its core pillars. Latin America, for its part, faces the challenge of progressing in development. Although it was one of the regions in the Global South to achieve national independence and begin economic development relatively early, some Latin American countries have experienced stagnation in their economic transformation and have not managed to overcome the so-called “middle-income trap.” Affected by factors such as low global economic growth, fiscal constraints, and limited policy space, Latin America’s economy has shown a weak recovery in recent years, with some countries facing serious inflation and debt problems. Therefore, promoting sustainable development has become a top priority for governments in the region. In 2016, Latin American countries promoted the creation of the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, as a regional mechanism for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (ECLAC, 2016). By the end of 2023, six successful conferences had been held, and the Latin America and the Caribbean Sustainable Development Report had been published annually to assess the region’s progress in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 2. Addressing welfare issues as a central task Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Party’s central leadership, led by Xi Jinping, has promoted a people-centered development approach, insisting that everything should be done for the people and depend on the people, always placing them in the highest position. During the centennial celebration of the CPC’s founding, General Secretary Xi emphasized: “To learn from history and forge the future, we must unite and lead the Chinese people in a tireless struggle for a better life.” In contrast, Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world. The unequal distribution of wealth, along with gender and racial discrimination, are persistent issues that have been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic slowdown. According to data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2023 the region’s poverty rate was 29.1%, and extreme poverty was 11.4%, both slightly higher than in 2022 (29% and 11.2%, respectively) (France24, 2023). As a response, many Latin American governments — such as those in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Cuba — have incorporated attention to welfare issues and improving their citizens’ quality of life as key pillars in their public policy agendas. 3. Embracing inclusion and shared benefits as a guiding principle Following the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a trend toward multipolarity and continued economic globalization. However, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of protectionism in various forms, accompanied by a rise in unilateralism and hegemonic policies. These “deglobalization” practices not only fail to resolve internal problems, but also disrupt global supply chains, hinder healthy economic development, and harm the interests of countries. In response, developing nations such as China and Latin American countries advocate for multipolar development and oppose unilateralism and power politics. In December 2023, China’s Central Conference on Foreign Affairs Work emphasized the importance of inclusive and mutually beneficial economic globalization. Similarly, Latin America has maintained a diversified foreign policy and has worked toward building a new, fair, and equitable international political and economic order. Amid rising tensions among major powers, most Latin American countries have chosen not to take sides, maintaining a non-aligned policy. Moreover, countries in Latin America are increasingly focused on inclusive development both within their nations and across the region, striving to address internal development imbalances. In 2010, the Andean Development Corporation (predecessor to the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean) released the “Latin America Vision Plan 2040”, which highlighted the need to strengthen economic inclusion in order to achieve truly sustainable growth (CAF, 2010). In January 2023, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in Argentina approved the “Buenos Aires Declaration,” which stressed the importance of promoting inclusive development in the region and fostering inclusive dialogue with other regions (CELAC, 2023). 4. Embracing innovation as a key driver Marx pointed out that “science is also part of the productive forces” and that “the development of fixed capital shows the extent to which the general knowledge of society has become a direct productive force.” In 1988, at the National Science Conference, Deng Xiaoping declared, “science and technology are the primary productive forces.” Since the 18th CPC Congress, China has firmly pursued innovation-led development. It launched the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, issued the Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2021–2035), and rolled out the Technological Innovation Blueprint under the 14th Five-Year Plan. Thanks to this framework, China has made significant progress in accelerating emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, quantum communication, and blockchain. Latin American countries are also intensifying their focus on technological innovation. In 2023, CELAC’s Buenos Aires Declaration underscored the importance of innovation for enhancing regional competitiveness and job quality, while encouraging scientific exchanges among nations and subregional organizations. Furthermore, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, committed to increasing investment in technological development. To that end, he announced at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change an investment of approximately 21 billion reais (around 4.28 billion U.S. dollars) in sustainable economy, innovative technologies, and low-carbon economy. In the 2023 Global Innovation Index, Brazil ranked 49th out of 132 countries, improving by five positions compared to the previous year. The President of Chile, Gabriel Boric, pledged to increase public funding for research and to finance the work of universities and research institutions. In 2019, the Colombian government established the “International Mission of Wise People,” a body composed of 46 national and international academic experts to promote production diversification and automation, with the goal of doubling the share of manufacturing and agriculture in the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2030. The current president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, has committed to transforming the country into a “knowledge society” and to continuing this initiative. 5. Making harmony between humans and nature a central goal Developing countries — including China and Latin American nations — prioritize climate issues and actively contribute to global climate governance. Since ancient China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, philosophical schools such as Confucianism and Taoism had already proposed concepts about the “unity between Heaven and humankind.” Similarly, Indigenous cultures in Latin America also share related cultural traditions. The Quechua peoples of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia promote the concept of “’Buen Vivir’” (“Good Living”), which emphasizes harmony between human society and nature. The Aymara of Peru and Bolivia, the Guaraní of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia, the Shuar of Ecuador, and the Mapuche of Chile all have similar philosophical expressions. So far in the 21st century, China and Latin American countries have intensified their focus on sustainable development. In August 2005, during a visit to Anji in China’s Zhejiang Province, Xi Jinping, then Secretary of the Communist Party of China in Zhejiang, put forward the principle that “lucid waters and lush mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver,” highlighting the idea that economic growth should not be achieved at the expense of the environment. China’s Global Development Initiative includes climate change and sustainable development as key cooperation areas, aiming for stronger, healthier global progress. Simultaneously, Latin American countries value sustainability highly. Ten nations in the region have officially submitted carbon-neutrality timelines and developed emissions-reduction plans. Several governments have taken significant measures to accelerate energy transition, restore ecosystems, and enhance international cooperation. Notably, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have made substantial strides in renewable energy: in Q1 2023, more than 90 % of Brazil’s energy came from renewables — the highest level since 2011. Progress of Green Cooperation between China and Latin America 1. High-level design for sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries has been continuously strengthenedAs comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America progresses, sustainable collaboration has also become integrated into the strategic high-level planning. At the third Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in 2021, the "Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas between China and CELAC Member States (2022–2024)" was adopted. This plan emphasizes the continuation of cooperation in areas such as renewable energy, new energy, civil nuclear energy, energy technology equipment, electric vehicles and their components, as well as energy-related geological and mineral resources. It also outlines the expansion of cooperation in emerging industries related to clean energy resources, support for technology transfer between companies, and the respect and protection of the natural environment. Joint declarations between China and countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina on establishing and deepening comprehensive strategic partnerships mention strengthening cooperation in areas such as climate change and clean energy. During the sixth meeting of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation in May 2022, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Brazilian Ministry of Economy agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment Cooperation for Sustainable Development, aimed at promoting investment in clean and low-carbon technologies in both countries. In April 2023, during Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's visit to China, the two countries issued the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change” and signed several cooperation agreements related to the sustainable economy. For example, Article 3 mentions “expanding cooperation in new fields such as environmental protection, combating climate change, the low-carbon economy, and the digital economy,” while Article 10 notes the aim to “strengthen cooperation on environmental protection, climate change, and biodiversity loss, promote sustainable development, and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.” In the same month, the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change,” the “Memorandum of Understanding on Research and Innovation Cooperation between the Ministries of Science and Technology of China and Brazil,” and the “Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment and Industrial Cooperation between China and Brazil” identified key areas of future cooperation, including sustainable infrastructure, the development of sustainable industries, renewable energy, electric vehicles, sustainable technological innovation, and green financing. 2. Clean energy cooperation has deepened The development and use of clean energy are essential means for achieving green development. In recent years, clean energy cooperation between China and Latin America has shown the following main characteristics. The scope of clean energy cooperation is becoming increasingly broad. Currently, cooperation between China and Latin America in the fields of clean energy — such as hydropower, solar energy, wind power, nuclear energy, biomass energy, and lithium batteries — has reached a certain level of breadth and depth. At the same time, both sides have also initiated cooperation efforts in emerging areas such as green hydrogen and smart energy storage. China is constantly diversifying its target countries and modes of investment in clean energy in Latin America. In 2015, China began increasing its investment in the renewable energy sector in the region. Between 2005 and 2020, China’s main investment targets in renewable energy in Latin America included countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia. Investments in projects, mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investments have gone hand in hand. 3. Green cooperation in the transportation sector has yielded outstanding results. Chinese companies continue to cooperate with Latin American countries in the field of public transportation infrastructure and electric vehicles, promoting the low-carbon development of the transport sector in Latin America. First, cooperation in public transportation infrastructure is advancing. In recent years, Chinese companies have actively participated in the construction of public infrastructure such as railways, roads, and bridges in Latin American countries, aiming to promote interconnectivity and green travel across the region. Bogotá Metro Line 1, in the capital of Colombia, currently under construction with Chinese investment, is to date the largest public-private partnership (PPP) project in individual transportation infrastructure in Latin America. Second, trade in electric vehicles is developing rapidly. China’s electric vehicle industry has extensive experience in large-scale production and a relatively complete industrial supply chain, making it a new growth area in China–Latin America trade. Electric buses and cars from independent Chinese brands such as BYD, JAC, and Dongfeng are favored in Latin America due to their good quality and low price. Third, cooperation in battery and tram production is also improving. China and Latin America have also begun bold attempts in green capacity cooperation within the manufacturing sector. Currently, BYD is carrying out a range of production activities in Brazil, including the assembly of bus chassis and the production of photovoltaic modules and batteries. 4. Green agricultural cooperation is on the rise. Latin America has vast and fertile land, and agricultural cooperation is an important component of China–Latin America trade. In recent years, Chinese companies have paid increasing attention to using advanced technologies to strengthen environmental protection and actively promote the green transformation of agricultural cooperation. COFCO (‘China National Cereal, Oil & Foodstuff Corporation’) and its Brazilian partners conducted risk assessments of more than 1,700 soybean suppliers in the Amazon and Cerrado ecological zones, and mapped over 1.1 million hectares of soybean fields using remote sensing satellites, which has raised farmers' awareness of sustainable development. By the end of 2021, COFCO had achieved 100% traceability for all direct soybean purchases in Matopiba, a major soybean-producing region in Brazil. At the same time, China and several Latin American countries are promoting cooperation in green agricultural research and development. The Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Sciences has established cooperative relationships with nine Latin American countries, including Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, and Costa Rica. It has achieved progress in exchange and cooperation in areas such as the innovative use and protection of germplasm resources, efficient transformation and comprehensive utilization of biomass energy, green pest and disease prevention and control technologies, and efficient cultivation techniques. 5. Cooperation on green financing plays an important bridging role. The Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and the China-United Nations Peace and Development Fund are key financial platforms through which China supports project cooperation under the Global Development Initiative. In addition to the above-mentioned platforms, current green financial instruments between China and Latin America include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the China–Latin America Cooperation Fund, the China–Latin America Development Finance Cooperation Mechanism, and subsidies provided by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently, all three financing projects of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Brazil are related to the green economy. Challenges facing Sino–Latin American green cooperation Although green cooperation between China and Latin America has gradually achieved results and presents many development opportunities, the risks and challenges of cooperation should not be ignored. Most Latin Americans expect that foreign cooperation will promote social well-being, eliminate poverty, and reduce inequality in their countries. They place great importance on the social benefits of projects and pay close attention to the environmental impact of projects on local ecosystems. Currently, the process of extracting lithium from brine places high demands on water resources and carries the risk of air and water pollution. As a result, lithium mining has also faced opposition from Indigenous communities in some Latin American countries. In 2023, Indigenous peoples from Argentina’s Jujuy Province staged several protests against the exploitation of a lithium mine (Reventós, 2023). To reduce pollution in lithium extraction, further scientific and technological research is needed. The integration of Chinese companies into Latin America also faces many obstacles. The official languages of most Latin American countries are Spanish and Portuguese, which are deeply influenced by European and U.S. cultures. In addition to geographical distance, there is limited mutual understanding between the peoples of China and Latin America, and transportation and logistics costs are high. Most Chinese companies lack personnel fluent in Spanish or Portuguese and familiar with local laws and regulations. Currently, the U.S. government continues to view China as a strategic competitor. Latin America has also become a battleground for strategic competition between China and the United States. The U.S. has increasingly turned its attention to China’s cooperation with Latin American countries. In 2019, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs published an article stating that “China’s green investment in Latin America cannot offset local environmental damage” (Cote-Muñoz, 2019). In general, green cooperation between China and Latin America will face a more complex environment in the future. Final considerations In recent years, China has put forward the Global Development Initiative to promote international cooperation for sustainable development. Latin America, one of the regions with the most developing countries in the world, actively promotes the implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda and has a solid green economic foundation. In this sense, the region can be an important partner for China in achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda and building a shared future for humanity. China must continue to build consensus on development priorities with Latin American countries, plan key areas of cooperation according to their conditions and needs, promote connections between governments, businesses, universities, and media in China and Latin America, and jointly advance the green cooperation to a new level. China and Latin America have achieved multidisciplinary coverage in green cooperation. It is necessary to further improve the quality of cooperation in the future and achieve coordinated development across various sectors. For example, in the long term, the development of renewable energy will require greater energy storage capacity and wider electric grid coverage. Additionally, Chinese companies need to integrate more into local societies and generate greater social benefits while ensuring economic returns. They can strengthen cooperation with Latin American companies in order to quickly become familiar with local laws, regulations, and market conditions. Furthermore, more research — including environmental assessments and social consultations — should be conducted before launching projects. References CAF (2010). "Corporación Andina de Fomento, Visión para América Latina 2040 Hacia una sociedad más incluyente y próspera". https://scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/496/latinamerica_2040_summary_esp.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=yCELAC (2023). "Declaración de Buenos Aires". https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/prensa/declaracion_ de_buenos_aires_-_version_final.pdf CEPAL (2016). "El Foro de los Países de América Latina y el Caribe sobre el Desarrollo Sostenible y el Seguimiento Regional de la Agenda 2030". https://www.cepal.org/es/temas/agenda-2030-desarrollo-sostenible/ foro-paises-america-latina-caribe-desarrollo-sostenible-seguimiento-regional-la-agenda-2030Cote-Muñoz, N. (2019). "China's Green Investments Won't Undo Its Environmental Damage to Latin America". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-green-investments-wont-undo-its-environmental-damage-latin-americaFrance24 (2023). "Tasa de pobreza se mantiene en 29 % en América Latina en 2023". https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20231125-tasa-de-pobreza-se-mantiene-en-29-en-am%C3%A9rica-latina-en-2023-dice-cepalMinistry of Foreign Affairs of China (2021). "Global Development Initiative-Building on 2030 SDGs for Stronger, Greener and Healthier Global Development". https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/GDI_140002/wj/202406/ P020240606606193448267.pdfReventós, B. y N. Fabre (2023). "Los grupos indígenas en Argentina que se oponen a la extracción del litio". BBC. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cevzgv0elp9o Cuadernos de Nuestra América. No. 014 | Nueva Época 2025, Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI). Under CC BY-NC 4.0

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From 2017 to 2021, the administration of Donald Trump radically changed U.S. space policy by focusing on military dominance, integrating the commercial sector, and abandoning previous restrictions on the militarization of space. New doctrinal documents were adopted, the United States Space Force was created, and the United States Space Command was reestablished. The emphasis shifted toward the development of offensive capabilities, cybersecurity, and public-private partnerships. During his second presidential term (2025–2029), Donald Trump initiated large-scale defense projects — in particular, the “Golden Dome of America” — and expanded the involvement of private companies in their development. This policy increases international tensions, provokes an arms race in space, and draws criticism for undermining international agreements and fragmenting the legal framework. Architecture of the New Space Order: Doctrinal Principles of the 2017–2021 Administration The national security space policy of the United States is formed both through presidential directives and on the basis of legislative acts. Presidential directives remain in force until they are revised by the next president. Thus, today the U.S. operates under a set of directives issued by Presidents George W. Bush (2001–2009), Barack Obama (2009–2017), Donald Trump (2017–2021), and Joe Biden (2021–2025). During his first presidential term, Donald Trump signed an updated National Space Policy, seven Space Policy Directives (SPDs), five space-related executive orders, two strategies, two reports, and one National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM). His “space policy” was aimed at “reviving the proud legacy of American leadership in space,” including in the field of national security, accelerating the exploration of the Moon and Mars, and developing the commercial sector. It was based on a number of firm beliefs: America must remain the leading power in space in both scientific and commercial areas; space is a strategically important domain for protecting U.S. interests; space should become a driver of the country’s economic development; and achieving these goals would be supported by cooperation with private companies and international partners. “We are a nation of pioneers. We are the people who crossed an ocean, settled a vast continent, inhabited a boundless wilderness, and then looked to the stars. That is our history and that is our destiny,” declared Donald Trump. These beliefs were embodied in a number of doctrinal documents. The Presidential Memorandum “Space Policy Directive-1” (SPD-1) in December 2017 became one of the first steps in Donald Trump’s space policy. The document set a course for the exploration and use of lunar resources, as well as preparation for missions to Mars. In order to carry out such costly projects, the memorandum emphasized cooperation with commercial entities and international partners. In the area of national security, Donald Trump formulated the principle that the United States must maintain “peace through strength” in outer space. In the 2018 “Nuclear Posture Review” approved by him, the goal was set to modernize space-based intelligence and communication systems to strengthen nuclear deterrence. In the “National Defense Strategy” adopted in the same year, the focus was on investments in resilience and the restoration of production capabilities necessary to enhance the country’s space potential. In December 2018, the “National Security Strategy” was published, in which space was defined as a zone of confrontation, marking a more rigid approach compared to Barack Obama’s position, who merely acknowledged threats from adversaries. This document, along with the “National Space Strategy,” emphasized the strategic importance of space and the need to ensure peace in it through the demonstration of strength. In the new 2018 National Space Strategy, the administration focused on creating a more resilient space architecture, enhancing deterrence capabilities, and ensuring security in space. In 2018, under the pretext of a threat in space from China and Russia, the Trump administration initiated the creation of the United States Space Force, which in December 2019 became the sixth branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. Under Donald Trump, the United States Space Command (SPACECOM) was restored as an independent combatant command. SPACECOM, which existed as a separate military branch from 1985 to 2002, was dissolved during the reorganization following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The president restored it by using his executive powers. Today, the command is responsible for integrating the space capabilities of all military services (management of satellite communication, intelligence, navigation, and missile warning systems), developing doctrines and tactics for warfare in space, and ensuring U.S. superiority in this strategic domain. In the updated 2018 Missile Defense Strategy, special attention was given to the creation of a multi-layered system of space sensors and satellites for tracking hypersonic and ballistic threats — in particular, the satellite system “Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Layer,” which provides continuous monitoring of potential threats and data transmission. Additionally, the Trump administration initiated a transition from large satellite systems to a more resilient and distributed architecture — the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR). Another presidential initiative was to accelerate the development of a “persistent monitoring layer” within the “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,” which includes hundreds of satellites capable of tracking enemy missiles at all stages of flight. The administration actively promoted a public-private partnership model. SPD-2, issued in 2018, aimed to simplify the regulation of commercial space activities, including the licensing of launches and satellite operations. NASA’s budget was also oriented toward supporting private companies through contracts and partnership proposals. In September 2020, the administration of Donald Trump approved Space Policy Directive SPD-5, which became the first national document establishing cybersecurity standards for space systems. It outlined principles for protecting space assets and infrastructure from cyber threats, including the design and operation of systems based on a risk-oriented approach and the introduction of engineering solutions that account for cybersecurity threats. The directive emphasized cooperation between government agencies and commercial companies, and called on space system operators to develop cyber protection plans, including measures to counter unauthorized access, secure command and telemetry systems, prevent jamming and spoofing, and manage risks in the supply chain. The Trump administration aimed to strengthen international alliances in the space sector. One of its projects was the Artemis Accords, signed on October 13, 2020, which set standards for the exploration of the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies, including the registration of objects, sharing of scientific data, and ensuring the safety of space missions. A total of 53 countries joined the agreement. According to independent researcher Irina Isakova, the ultimate goal of the Artemis Accords was to attract technologies and form a new space community willing to operate under American rules. A notable departure from the policies of previous U.S. administrations was the rejection of multilateral initiatives to limit the militarization of space. The view of outer space as a new domain of warfare contradicted the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Nevertheless, the United States refused to participate in discussions on new international agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space — in particular, proposals from Russia and China to ban the placement of weapons in space and to prevent their first use. Instead, the Trump administration focused on the development of offensive orbital systems, including satellites capable of disabling enemy spacecraft. This approach increased tensions on the international stage and drew criticism from other countries. “Peace Through Strength”: An Analysis of Space Initiatives (2017–2021) During his first presidential term, Donald Trump’s administration introduced new initiatives aimed at strengthening U.S. leadership in space, supporting the private sector, and ensuring national security. However, the implementation of these ambitious goals left a mixed legacy for the next administration. The use of the term “space superiority” provoked a negative response from the international community. The White House’s drive toward the militarization of space weakened the U.S. position on the diplomatic stage — the American view of space as a “warfighting domain” raised concerns that U.S. policy was provoking a space arms race. Declarations of a desire to strengthen international cooperation often contradicted the administration’s actual actions, leading to disagreements with allies and complicating the implementation of joint plans to protect satellites or develop norms of behavior in space. Doctrinal documents (such as the Defense Space Strategy) lacked a clear connection between goals and the means to achieve them. Unlike the more detailed strategies of previous administrations, Trump’s strategy offered only general recommendations. The initiative to create the Space Force turned out to be quite costly and led to excessive bureaucratization. Some initiatives faced budget constraints or delays due to technological unpreparedness, while cuts to Earth science programs caused concern among scientists. Overall, the stated goals of peaceful space exploration, aggressive rhetoric, and the actions of Trump’s administration undermined trust in the United States on the international stage. Evolution of Approaches in the Second Term (2025–2029) According to American analysts and former government officials, in its doctrinal approach to defense space policy, the Trump 2.0 administration will focus on offensive capabilities and the integration of commercial service providers into Pentagon projects. The main obstacle for the president’s space projects will be the issue of funding. One of Donald Trump’s key initiatives during his first presidency was the promotion of the idea to form a National Space Guard (NSG) as a reserve component to support the United States Space Force. At the time, the idea did not receive support. In March 2025, a bill to establish the NSG was introduced to Congress. One of its authors, Senator Mike Crapo, stated that “Guard members and reservists are often highly specialized and trained individuals entrusted to counter serious threats posed by global actors such as China and Russia.” On January 27, 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to create the “Iron Dome of America”, which includes land-, air-, sea-, and space-based components, including orbital interceptor missiles. Just one month later, the ambitious initiative was renamed Golden Dome for America. The system is intended to protect the entire country from all types of missile threats. The general provisions of the order closely resemble the Strategic Defense Initiative plan of President Ronald Reagan from the 1980s. Creation of a dense system for intercepting and striking enemy missiles during the launch phase and even before launch;Deployment in outer space of intercept systems equipped with lasers to destroy enemy nuclear weapons;Deployment of interceptors in various orbits;Construction/deployment of a global ground-based infrastructure;Protection of critical assets and infrastructure within the framework of the extended deterrence concept;Modernization of battlefield air defense systems to protect military formations on the ground;Establishment of a complete and self-contained production cycle for all components of the “shield” exclusively within the United States, ensuring the security of the defense industry and logistics for the production of upgraded and advanced interceptors and tracking systems. In addition to the obvious analogy with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the current program also reflects the evolution of military technologies — the use of hypersonic sensors (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Layer) and satellite networks like Next-Gen OPIR, which provide continuous monitoring. It is assumed that the system will be entirely produced in the United States. However, Kari Bingen, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security during the first Trump administration and now a fellow at CSIS, believes that the new administration will strive for close cooperation with Israel in the space domain. Although the technical and financial scale of the project raises skepticism among experts, the Golden Dome for America program may lead to greater involvement of private companies in the development and production of missile defense system components, stimulate the U.S. defense-industrial base, and ultimately contribute to a revision of the national defense strategy aimed at winning the arms race and achieving strategic invulnerability. At the same time, according to the December 2024 report “Government Space Programs: A Comprehensive Review of Government Space Strategies, Activities, and Budgets through 2033” by NovaSpace, 59% of global government funding for space programs comes from the U.S. budget, but Washington remains dissatisfied with the current funding level. The White House is betting on encouraging the involvement of private capital and foreign partners in space programs. A discussion held during the Small Satellite Symposium on February 5, 2025, in California highlighted strong competition for government contracts between legacy space program contractors (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, L3Harris, Raytheon Technologies, Boeing’s Millennium, General Dynamics) and several new consortium groups (Palantir Technologies and Anduril Industries, OpenAI and SpaceX). In the space sector, the United States holds not only strong technological and financial advantages but also significant competitive capacity. Trump’s 2.0 team includes many prominent figures with professional or commercial interests in space: Elon Musk, owner of SpaceX and Tesla; Jared Isaacman, NASA Administrator, CEO of Shift4 Payments and Draken International (which trained U.S. Air Force pilots); Steve Feinberg, candidate for Deputy Secretary of Defense and founder of Cerberus Capital Management; Tom Krause, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Director of Cloud Software Group; Jeff Bezos, advisor to space coordination councils and founder of Blue Origin, among others. The recent conflict between Donald Trump and Elon Musk, despite its public resonance, has not had a systemic impact on the administration’s strategy regarding the private sector. NASA officially stated its intent to continue implementing the president’s space priorities, using the full range of industrial partners. Any potential tactical slowdowns caused by corporate conflicts are offset by strong competition and diversification of contractors. NASA’s flagship program, the Artemis Accords, may undergo a shift in priorities. Its outspoken critic, Elon Musk, has consistently argued that the U.S. should abandon lunar exploration and focus on Mars. There remains a possibility that the Space Launch System (SLS) — the super-heavy launch vehicle for crewed missions beyond Earth orbit — may be canceled or significantly altered. Key roles could shift to private companies such as SpaceX or Blue Origin, with Elon Musk’s SpaceX Starship becoming the cornerstone of Martian ambitions. This is evidenced by budget cuts and job reductions: Boeing, the primary SLS contractor, has already announced potential layoffs. The future of the Artemis Accords will depend on decisions by the Trump administration, the influence of the private sector, and Congressional support. Invitation to a Space Arms Race The doctrinal approaches of the current U.S. president’s administration are transforming space into a full-fledged theater of military operations, where the United States seeks to establish dominance through a combination of military, commercial, and regulatory tools. During his first presidential term, Donald Trump laid the institutional groundwork for this strategy; in his second term, he is launching a qualitatively new phase of militarization. The 2018 National Space Strategy, with its emphasis on building a large-scale space architecture, marks a shift to the concept of “space as a warfighting domain.” The Golden Dome program effectively abandons the principle of “stability through vulnerability” and revives the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which in the 1980s undermined nuclear deterrence stability and triggered a new round of confrontation. The Artemis program contributes to the fragmentation of the legal framework and undermines the regime established by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Trump’s “space” agenda is expected to further militarize the civilian sector of the economy, draw U.S. allies around the world into military space projects, and intensify global competition over frequencies, orbits, and cybersecurity standards. Such policies by the Trump administration have dangerous consequences for international security, including the escalation of the space arms race, the risk of space-based conflicts, and the provocation of nuclear arsenal expansion — especially by China. The New Space Landscape and Future Challenges Donald Trump’s administration has radically revised the U.S. approach to outer space, turning it from a domain of international cooperation into a stage of strategic rivalry. The creation of the U.S. Space Force, the launch of the Golden Dome program, and the promotion of the Artemis Accords represent a clear trajectory toward military-technological dominance, supported by public-private partnerships. These steps have sparked not only a wave of technological advancement but also increased international tension — including criticism from Russia and China, which advocate for banning the militarization of orbital space, as well as major disagreements over the interpretation of space law. The Trump era will leave behind a dual legacy: on one hand, accelerated innovation and commercialization; on the other, risks of legal fragmentation and the escalation of an arms race. Under Donald Trump, space is becoming an integral part of U.S. defense strategy. The future of humanity in space will depend on whether the White House administration can balance its desire to deter space competitors with a willingness to preserve dialogue — otherwise, near-Earth space risks turning into the “new front of a cold war.” Sources: V.P. Kozin. U.S. Space Forces: Their Key Missions and Future Potentials. Moscow: Sabashnikov Publishing House, 2022. 444 pages. ISBN: 978-5-82420-184-0. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This article analyses the shifts in security and defence policies across the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and disentangles political and geopolitical strains in the U.S.-Gulf relationship from practical measures to boost cooperation and deepen interoperability. In examining the trajectory of security and defence relationships, the article assesses the stability and durability of the underlying components of U.S.-Gulf partnerships in a time of rapid change. The article begins a section that details how and why the perception of U.S. disengagement has evolved, despite ongoing reliance on facilities such as Al-Udeid in Qatar for forward basing arrangements, before a second section examines regional responses to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, and the Israeli war in Gaza that erupted in 2023. A third section explores the ‘nuts and bolts’ of security and defence relationships and considers issues such as U.S. arms sales and Department of Defense programs, such as Red Sands in Saudi Arabia and the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Bahrain, as ways to boost cooperation in the face of political tension and stiff competition. As U.S. troop levels have ebbed and flowed, a final section considers whether a more flexible approach to security relationships is sustainable in a far more transactional era of international power and politics. Little more than 6 months separated the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 from the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[1] The manner by which the U.S. was seen by many observers to abandon the Afghan government in the face of a resurgent Taliban cast doubt among partner nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as to the reliability and ‘staying power’ of the U.S. in the region, and rekindled memories of the withdrawal of American support for Hosni Mubarak in Egypt as the Arab uprisings began in early 2011.[2] Kabul appeared to be another blow to a U.S.-led regional order that was already being questioned by officials in the Gulf States even as they contributed to its weakening by diversifying their own political, economic, and, to a lesser extent, security and defence relationships. For many in leadership positions in the Gulf States, the fall of Kabul appeared to be one more step in a process of U.S. disengagement which they perceived to be one-directional and to take place across successive presidencies as different as Obama was to Trump and Trump was to Biden.[3] Whereas the withdrawal from Afghanistan witnessed the U.S. acting unilaterally to secure its own interests, narrowly defined and without seeming to take account of those of its partners and allies, the build-up of tension in Ukraine saw the Biden administration engage intensively with allies and partners in the runup to and aftermath of the Russian invasion. U.S. intelligence and information-sharing, which were seen to have erred badly in Afghanistan in 2021, was a high-profile and very visible policy over Ukraine in 2022, and restored a measure of credibility, especially among NATO allies.[4] However, in the Gulf States, the policy response to Ukraine did not deliver a ‘dividend’ in terms of restoring faith in the U.S. as a trustworthy partner, as GCC states pursued hedging strategies and further diversified their range of security partnerships, albeit in divergent ways. The war in Gaza, which erupted after the Hamas-led incursion into southern Israel on October 7, 2023, generated additional questions about the durability of an increasingly fragile regional order.[5] And yet, the ‘nuts and bolts’ of security and defence ties between the U.S. and Gulf States have continued to evolve, albeit in a looser and more transactional form that at any time since the structure of U.S. primacy in the region took shape in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Examples of diverging trajectories include the United Arab Emirates becoming a safe haven for Russian capital and business, regional responses to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and the resilience of Saudi-Iranian ties even as hopes for Saudi-Israeli normalization faded. In October 2024, the decision of the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, to receive Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, just as the Biden administration was weighing its support for a retaliatory Israeli attack on Iran, demonstrated how perceptions of regional interests were moving apart.[6] It is this ‘puzzle’ of divergence in the political and security tracks of U.S.-Gulf relations that is the focus of analysis, as ties have simultaneously become more fragile yet also shown resilient adaptability. This article examines the changing trajectories of U.S.-Gulf security relationships and moves beyond the focus, often seen in American policy discourse, on U.S. demands for ‘burden-sharing’ among regional partners, which redoubled in the first and second Trump presidencies. Instead, the article examines the ways in which the Gulf States are developing a more transactional approach to U.S. partnerships, resulting in a more flexible model of cooperation. This is consistent with broader shifts from a U.S.-dominated regional order toward the internationalization of regional security structures, as policy preferences (on all sides) have gradually diverged. While there is no monolithic approach to ‘the Gulf’, by and large there is a trend toward states no longer being willing to rely solely on U.S. guarantees, borne out of events in the 2010s, and to developing a more diversified portfolio of security and defence partnerships, again at different speeds across different countries, and with no uniformity on the choice of external partner. At the same time, several Gulf States, notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar have emerged as assertive regional and international actors, and new forms of partnership have evolved. There are four sections to this article, which begins with an examination of how and why the perception in the Gulf States of U.S. disengagement has evolved, despite ongoing reliance on facilities such as Al-Udeid in Qatar for forward basing arrangements. A second section examines regional responses to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, and the conflict in Gaza which began in October 2023. The third section explores the ‘nuts and bolts’ of security and defence relationships and considers issues such as U.S. arms sales and Department of Defense programs, such as Red Sands in Saudi Arabia and the recently concluded Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Bahrain, as ways to boost practical security cooperation in the face of political tension and stiff competition. As U.S. troop levels have ebbed and flowed, the concluding section considers whether and how a more flexible approach to security relationships is sustainable in a more transactional era of power and politics. Gulf States’ Perceptions of U.S. Disengagement A belief held by many policymakers in the Gulf States, that the U.S. is less engaged and/or less reliable and predictable in its approach to regional affairs, has taken root over the decade and a half which has elapsed since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010–11. To be sure, this belief is rooted in an idealized view of U.S.-Gulf relations which has, over the three decades since the Gulf War in 1991, been based on extremely visible and large-scale force deployments in the region, especially during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were not typical of long-term trends.[7] Nevertheless, this perception has lasted across consecutive presidential administrations and has become more deeply entrenched precisely because a pattern has been seen to develop across such different presidencies as Obama to Trump to Biden, and as U.S. troop levels in the region were inexorably drawn down.[8] While there was no regionwide consensus or monolithic view of the U.S. in the Gulf, and no one single incident which sparked a reassessment, attitudes evolved in response to a series of policy decisions which unfolded over the space of a decade. The effect has been to strengthen a process of diversification of Gulf States’ security and defence relationships to avoid over-reliance on any single partner in a world of growing multipolarity and strategic options.[9] Deciding where to begin with the many issues which caused degrees of concern in Gulf capitals at U.S. policymaking intent is a little like asking the proverbial question about how long a piece of string might be. For example, the second term of the George W. Bush administration saw frictions develop between the U.S. and GCC states, notably Saudi Arabia, over the mishandling of the occupation of post-Saddam Iraq and the sense of anger in Gulf capitals that Iran appeared to be the primary geopolitical beneficiary.[10] This caused significant mistrust in Riyadh at U.S. policy intent (and outcomes) in Iraq and the region.[11] It was in the Obama administration, however, that the perception of drift began to develop, including in relation to the so-called ‘pivot to Asia’ in the late-2000s which Gulf leaders (erroneously) saw as a shift in U.S. focus away from the Middle East, rather than post-Cold War Europe.[12] However, it was the withdrawal of political support from the embattled Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, in February 2011, which caused shock and bitterness in Gulf capitals, who saw the move as a betrayal of a longstanding U.S. partner.[13] The Obama administration’s response to the Arab uprisings (which, in the case of unrest in GCC states, was far more muted and reflective of U.S. interests in the stability of its regional partners) was followed by the disclosure in November 2013 that American and Iranian officials had been meeting secretly in Oman for over a year, and by the subsequent negotiations between the P5 + 1 and Iran for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to address the Iranian nuclear file in 2015. Both negotiations cut out the GCC states and added to concerns at the direction of U.S. policymaking in the region.[14] Partly in response to concerns that the JCPOA focused too narrowly on only one aspect of Iran’s regional activity and did not address other issues, Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened militarily in Yemen in March 2015 to push back the advance of Houthi rebels they believed were in receipt of direct Iranian assistance.[15] An interview given by Obama to The Atlantic magazine in 2016 sealed the breakdown in working relations as officials reacted with fury to a comment about ‘free riders’ which they perceived to be directed at them rather than, as was the case, against the British and French governments over their intervention in Libya in 2011.[16] Genuine displeasure, as well as a degree of bewilderment, at the direction of certain aspects of the Obama administration’s policies toward the Middle East contributed to the early embrace of the Trump presidency by officials in several Gulf capitals, including Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as well as Manama.[17] In June 2017, Trump initially endorsed the Saudi-Emirati-Bahraini (as well as Egyptian) move to isolate Qatar, in a decision which caused shockwaves in Doha as well as in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. The sight of a sitting president seemingly abandoning a U.S. partner, albeit only temporarily, raised powerful questions about the reliability and durability of the Gulf States’ most important external relationship.[18] Two years later, it was the Saudis’ and Emiratis’ turn to call into question the partnership with the U.S. as the Trump administration chose not to respond to a series of attacks, generally although never formally attributed to Iran or to Iranian proxy groups, on energy and maritime targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[19] In September 2019, 2 days after a missile and drone attack on Saudi oil facilities temporarily knocked out half the Kingdom’s oil production, Trump noted pointedly ‘That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us’ and added that ‘I’m somebody that would like not to have war’.[20] Political decisions by successive presidential administrations therefore injected doubt as to the value or even the existence of security guarantees which were believed by many observers of regional affairs to form the bedrock of contemporary U.S.-Gulf relations.[21] The impact became clear when tensions between the United States and Iran soared in the aftermath of the killing of Qassim Soleimani in an American drone strike in Baghdad in January 2020, when regional officials in GCC states called for de-escalation.[22] President Biden sought to restore U.S. credibility when he reasserted ‘the U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia defend its territory as it faces attacks from Iranian-aligned groups’ after he took office in 2021.[23] However, poor relations between Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, stemming from comments Biden made in a campaign debate in 2019, proved insurmountable, with MBS going so far as to reply ‘Simply, I do not care’, when asked in 2022 what he thought of Biden’s opinion of him.[24] Regional Responses to Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Gaza In August 2021, the disorganized and seemingly unilateral nature of the final U.S. withdrawal from Kabul provided yet another indication, in the eyes of already sceptical policy analysts and officials in GCC states, of the potentially capricious nature of American interests. While there was a broad consensus that the ‘forever wars’ launched in the 2000s could not continue indefinitely, the manner by which the Biden administration conducted its final drawdown reinforced the concerns listed above about the durability of U.S. commitments to regional partners, and as elements of the political right and left coalesced around support for policies of restraint and isolationism.[25] The sight of the Afghan air force rendered inoperable after the withdrawal of American training and maintenance, and the flight of Ashraf Ghani, the U.S.-backed President, to the UAE, were indicators of the vulnerability of over-reliance on single security partners, however powerful.[26] Less than six months later, the strenuous attempts made by the Biden administration to work with allies and partners to coordinate policy in early 2022 as Russian forces massed on the border with Ukraine, and then to push back against Moscow after the full-scale invasion commenced on February 24, ought to have repaired some of the damage caused by the optics around the chaos in Kabul in 2021. Specific measures included the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Eastern Europe as well as the sharing of intelligence designed to deter Vladimir Putin from moving into Ukraine.[27] Qatar, which was accorded Major Non-NATO Ally Status by the Biden administration in January 2022, in part a recognition of its assistance to U.S. and international humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan during and after the withdrawal, also sought to play a balancing role in gas markets as Emir Tamim visited Biden in the White House and hosted Russian energy officials in Doha.[28] Europe’s pivot away from Russia restated the Gulf States’ centrality in global energy security considerations, while the rise in oil and gas prices in late-2011 and for most of 2022 also returned GCC states’ budgets to surplus after years of deficits following the oil price crash of 2014.[29] However, the ‘coming together’ effect noticeable in the U.S.-European (and NATO) response to Russia-Ukraine in 2022 did not appear to mollify strained relationships in the Gulf; if anything, the responses to the invasion made the different trajectories which had taken shape in prior years all the more visible. Like much of the Global South, the Gulf States did not take sides in the Russia-Ukraine war. Policymakers in GCC capitals did not share the view of their counterparts in Washington and Europe that the collective defence of Ukraine was ‘an international order defining event, a generational moment in which international alliances and norms are being reshaped’.[30] Regional leaders refused to get drawn into a new era of bloc rivalry and, unlike the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, did not deem Russia’s aggression against Ukraine to pose a direct threat to their political or security interests, in common with counterparts across much of the ‘Global South’.[31] A variation in stances toward the February 2022 invasion and subsequent developments nevertheless fell along a spectrum that ranged from Qatar aligning most closely with Ukraine (and the U.S. position) and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE leaning more closely toward Russia, with Kuwait and Oman falling somewhat in-between. These variations in position mirrored those during the GCC rift between 2017 and 2020, and indicate that, for the Qatari leadership, the sight of a larger power threatening (and ultimately invading) a smaller neighbour carried resonance, so soon after the blockade era when Doha faced pressure from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. However, while Qatari leaders announced a pause in new investments in Russia, existing links with Moscow remained unchanged, and the Qatar Investment Authority became the largest non-Russian shareholder in Rosneft after BP announced it would terminate its own relationship with the state-owned giant.[32] The UAE position was complicated by the fact that the country had just taken up a rotating two-year seat on the United Nations Security Council for 2022–23. This forced the UAE to take positions even if the Emirati choice was to abstain on two Security Council votes in February 2022 which condemned the Russian invasion and called for an emergency session of the United General Assembly – abstentions which caused considerable friction with the U.S.[33] Policy responses in and after 2022 reinforced perceptions of drift in relations between the U.S. and key Gulf partners. Both Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi and Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh spoke on several occasions with President Putin and appeared to rebuff entreaties by President Biden during the opening weeks of the war.[34] Positions taken on Russia-Ukraine in 2022 illustrated how tensions that built up over a period of years beforehand became manifest in the regional reactions. After the imposition of additional U.S., European Union, and British sanctions on Russian entities in 2022, the UAE (and Dubai in particular) emerged as a welcoming haven for Russian capital and business elites, several of whom appeared to obtain Emirati citizenship.[35] Many of the sanctioned Russian companies continued to do business with counterparts in the Gulf States with few evident consequences, creating gaps in the moves to isolate the Putin regime. In 2023, Mohammed bin Saleh Al-Sada, the former Minister of State for Energy in Qatar from 2011 to 2018, was elected Chairman of the Board of Rosneft, in a private capacity but demonstrative of the limited reach of Western appeals to reduce Gulf ties with sanctioned entities in Russia.[36] The case of oil prices illustrated how the Gulf States assertively put their own interests forward even if they were seen to clash with the interests of partners such as the U.S. There is nothing untoward about this, as states routinely pursue national interests based on a pragmatic calculation of internal and external interests. However, in the context of the emphasis placed by the Biden administration and its European allies on the defence of Ukraine in the name of an international rules-based order, the sight of their closest partners in the Middle East not joining with anything like the same strength of approach sent visible signals of policy divergence over Ukraine. European and American leaders, including Boris Johnson and Joe Biden, visited Saudi Arabia in the spring and summer of 2022 to make the case for an increase in Saudi (and OPEC/OPEC+) output in order to bring down oil prices which had surged.[37] Moreover, the acrimonious aftermath of President Biden’s visit to Jeddah and meeting with Mohammed bin Salman in July 2022, and the coordinated Saudi-Russian oil output cut in October 2022, demonstrated the divergence of interests, especially as officials in D.C. and Riyadh traded barbs over whether (or not) the Saudi decision to cut output, or the Biden administration’s request to increase production, were politically motivated.[38] Following the outbreak of the war in Gaza after the Hamas-led attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, the legitimacy of aspects of the system of international order came under growing scrutiny by critics who contrasted U.S. responses to developments in Ukraine as opposed to Gaza. Images of Palestinian suffering caused anger across the Middle East as well as much of the Global South, including in the Gulf States, and made it politically difficult for officials to ignore, with the Saudi leadership, in particular, reassessing the terms of any normalization agreement with Israel.[39] Discrepancies in labelling acts committed by Russian and Israeli forces (in Ukraine and Gaza, respectively) as ‘war crimes’, and about whether to engage with the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, brought accusations of double standards and hypocrisy, and weakened the credibility of the international order in the eyes of many in the non-Western world.[40] While Gaza did not prove a breaking-point in U.S.-Gulf relations, it did bring to the surface the different trajectories in security and defence interests and priorities. Statements by leaders in Gulf capitals hardened as the bombardment of Gaza continued, with even Mohammed bin Salman going as far as to condemn ‘the collective genocide committed by Israel against the brotherly Palestinian people’ at an Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh in November 2024.[41] These remarks came just 14 months after the Crown Prince told Fox News in September 2023 that ‘every day, we get closer’ to a Saudi-Israeli breakthrough that, he predicted, would be ‘the biggest historical deal since the end of the Cold War’.[42] Officials in Oman went further in the use of harsh language to condemn Israeli actions which at times bordered on tacit support for Hamas, and was reflective of and rooted in an upsurge of anger among Omani citizens, hitherto one of the most politically quiescent commentariats in the region.[43] Leaders in all GCC states had to acknowledge the domestic backlash against the destruction of Gaza, a balancing act made more delicate in Bahrain and the UAE, the two Gulf signatories to the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020.[44] An additional consideration for policymakers in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Doha, in particular, was an interest in ‘de-risking’ potential regional volatility as focus turned to large-scale developmental, energy, and infrastructure projects, including those associated with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.[45] ‘Nuts and Bolts’ of Evolving Security and Defence Relationships In the face of the political and geopolitical tensions noted above, U.S. security relationships and defence partnerships with the Gulf States have evolved. A decade of change since 2015 has illustrated that ties tend to work better on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis rather than as part of a grand strategic framework. An example of the latter was the launch of a U.S.-GCC Strategic Partnership in 2015, at a summit at Camp David between Gulf leaders (only two of whom attended) and President Obama, and the creation of five working groups to cover cooperation in counterterrorism, missile defence, military preparedness and training, critical defence capabilities, and cyber security.[46] Both the working groups and the strategic partnership fell into abeyance during the Trump administration, and were superseded by U.S. efforts to form a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) with GCC states plus Egypt and Jordan. MESA failed to gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the intra-GCC rift over Qatar, a failure of parties to agree on the scope and scale of the issues to be covered by the initiative, and Egypt’s withdrawal in 2019.[47] The U.S.-GCC working groups reconvened in February 2023, nearly a year into the Russia-Ukraine war, for their first meeting in years, against the backdrop of the supply of Iranian armed drones to Russia and the provision of Russian defence assistance to Iran. The fact that Iranian weapons systems were being tested on the battlefield in Ukraine and in operational and combat settings against civilian and infrastructure targets highlighted how a secondary impact of the Russia-Ukraine war could impact on U.S.-GCC interests.[48] U.S. and Gulf States’ navies then participated in a major 18-day International Maritime Exercise in February and March 2023 co-led by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the U.S. and directed from the Maritime Security Centre in Oman. Held under the auspices of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, more than 7000 personnel and 35 ships from over 50 countries and organizations took part in exercises in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf.[49] Perhaps uncoincidentally, Russia and China joined Iran in a joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman the same month, illustrating how, in the ‘nuts and bolts’ of security and defence relationships, the GCC still chose to side with the U.S.[50] A host of new initiatives since 2020 suggest that new security partnerships between the U.S. and individual Gulf States are evolving on bespoke bilateral and issue-specific lines. CENTCOM has worked closely with Saudi officials to develop the Red Sands Integrated Experimentation Centre as a regional testing facility in Saudi Arabia to boost cooperation against the shared threat from missile and drone attacks from Iran and regional proxies.[51] Joint exercises involving U.S. and Saudi forces have tested systems to destroy and disable unmanned aerial systems of the type that breached Saudi air defences during the ballistic missile and drone strikes on oil infrastructure facilities in September 2019.[52] U.S. officials also play an integral role in Saudi Arabia’s defence transformation plan with Department of Defense personnel assisting their Saudi counterparts with overhauling human-capital development, joint staff development, intelligence reorganization and force sustainment, and the development of a National Defence College. The U.S. role in capacity-building is a step up from the hitherto-largely scattered interventions tied to the foreign military sales process rather than in support of any deeper or underlying policy objective.[53] Another example of renewed U.S. commitment to security ties with a Gulf partner was the signing in September 2023 of a Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) with Bahrain. Announced during a visit to Washington, D.C. by Bahrain’s Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and described as ‘the most advanced formal security agreement the United States has with any country in the region’, C-SIPA will expand defence and security cooperation as well as trade and investment ties through collaborative measures across the security spectrum, albeit without a mutual defence guarantee.[54] Although many of the specific security-related initiatives are classified, C-SIPA may build upon the recent spate of U.S. strategic dialogues with Gulf partners, which began with Qatar in 2017 and now encompass every GCC state on a bilateral (rather than collective) basis. How C-SIPA unfolds will likely be studied carefully in other Gulf capitals, especially Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which have long demanded enhanced U.S. defence guarantees, most recently in relation to any U.S.-brokered agreement to normalize with Israel (in the Saudi case) and in the desire for ‘codified’ U.S. security commitments (for the UAE).[55] Officials in the UAE have chosen a different approach which reflects the confidence of Emirati policymakers that the country is an influential ‘middle power’ capable of holding its own on an inter-regional and increasingly global stage. This was evident in the signing of the Abraham Accord with Israel in September 2020 in which the text of the agreement signed by the UAE was far more substantive than those signed by Morocco, Bahrain, and Sudan, and included reference to a ‘Strategic Agenda for the Middle East’ that was unique to the Emirati-Israeli accord.[56] The strategic and security-focused aspects of the UAE-Israel agreement enabled the normalization process to survive periodic frictions in the political relationship, as security and defence relations took centre-stage in the new initiatives and joint ventures announced by both parties, and neither the UAE nor Bahrain has withdrawn from the Accords although other states have not joined.[57] Both Israel and the UAE, as small states with significant hard power capabilities, have operationalized formal cooperation in the security and defence realm, including a first joint military exercise in the Red Sea in November 2021 which was coordinated by the U.S. Fifth Fleet (stationed in Bahrain), which ‘set a precedent for collective policing at sea to counter weapons-smuggling and threats posed by pirates and the Iranian navy’.[58] In February 2023, a venture between EDGE, an Emirati defence consortium and Israel Aerospace Industries unveiled their first jointly created unmanned naval vessel, for use in surveillance, reconnaissance, and mine detection, during the annual Naval Defence and Maritime Security Exhibition in Abu Dhabi.[59] Sharing of intelligence, reportedly concerning Hezbollah and the Houthi movement in Yemen, also took place, including in the aftermath of three missile and drone strikes on Abu Dhabi in January 2022.[60] Emirati policymakers have continued to engage with the U.S. and other regional and international partners in a series of more focused ‘mini-lateral’ fora, including the 12U2 (with India, Israel, and the U.S.), the Negev Forum (with the U.S. and other Arab states which have normalized relations with Israel), the Somalia Quint (with the U.S., the U.K., Qatar, and Turkey), and the Yemen Quartet (with the U.S., the U.K., and Saudi Arabia).[61] Such issue-based tie-ups outside formal institutions provide opportunities for middle powers such as the UAE to engage with specific partners and have become key elements in the UAE’s evolving approach to regional and foreign affairs, especially in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, areas of increasing focus both for the Gulf States (for economic and energy reasons) and the U.S. (connected to power competition and strategic rivalry with China).[62] How the U.S. and its partners in the Gulf balance (or fail to balance) the competing and sometimes diverging interests vis-à-vis China (and, to an extent, Russia) will go some way toward defining the next phase of political relationships that may still impinge on defence and security ties, as seen in the furore over a possible Chinese naval facility in Abu Dhabi that contributed in part to significant tensions in the bilateral U.S.-UAE relationship in 2021.[63] Shifting Toward a Transactional Approach It may be that the future of relationships between the U.S. and the Gulf States will be based around a set of transactional principles that do not commit or bind the parties to long-term arrangements and represent a more fluid approach to regional affairs. A stronger but narrower technocratic focus on shared areas of interest could help to insulate U.S.-Gulf relationships from the types of political pressures and uncertainties which have generated the perception of drift. However, ‘taking politics out’ of the equation may not be easy to do in practice and could add to layers of mutual misunderstandings or grievance, as with the U.S. pressure on the UAE over its relations with China and Russia, or on Saudi Arabia not to join the expanded BRICS + grouping in 2023 (which the UAE joined but the Saudis have yet to do).[64] Several developments since 2023 provide indications as to how a new configuration of interests could function in a genuinely multipolar landscape. The Saudi-Iran agreement in March 2023 to restore diplomatic relations, which was announced in (and by) China, could be a harbinger of what a more variegated relationship might look like, with greater flexibility to rethink and reorient interests and policies. The Beijing deal appeared to take U.S. officials by surprise, and came in the midst of Beltway speculation about the prospect of Saudi normalization with Israel rather than with Iran.[65] While Saudi and Iranian officials had engaged in multiple prior rounds of talks, beginning in 2021 and facilitated by Iraq and Oman, the decision to obtain Chinese endorsement of the deal was as symbolic as it was significant.[66] China has diplomatic relations with Teheran and Riyadh as well as energy and economic ties in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and thus could play a balancing role in ways the U.S. simply cannot. Moreover, at a time of rising tension between Iran and the U.S. and Israel, the Chinese backing for the Saudi deal signalled the desire of Beijing and its two regional partners for diplomacy and not conflict.[67] As the Gulf has seen a regional de-escalation of tension since 2021, officials in Gulf States have leveraged what influence they have to contribute to security in different ways. These include mediation, whether in regional conflicts (by Oman and Qatar) or in aspects of the Russia-Ukraine war (by Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Oman’s Foreign Minister since 2020 has been Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi, for whom a characteristic of Omani foreign policy has long been that ‘we try to make use of our intermediate position between larger powers to reduce the potential for conflict in our neighbourhood’.[68] Omani officials have kept open indirect channels of dialogue between the U.S. and Iran and also between Saudi and Houthi officials as they continue to seek to reach agreement in Yemen.[69] Qatari mediators engaged intensively with U.S. and Egyptian counterparts to secure the release of hostages taken by Hamas in October 2023, in return for a pause in Israeli military operations in Gaza, and reached a fragile three-stage ceasefire agreement in January 2025, one day before the Biden administration gave way to the second Trump presidency.[70] The close Qatari-U.S. coordination over Gaza built upon the confidence in Qatari mediation abilities generated by their role in facilitating and supporting the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul in 2021.[71] Saudi and Emirati officials engaged differently as they sought to leverage their relationships both with the U.S. and Russia to facilitate prisoner exchanges and contribute to confidence-building measures to mitigate the impact of the war in Ukraine. The occasional releases of prisoners may only have amounted to pinpricks in the course of the most serious conflict in Europe since the Second World War, but they illustrate that, for all the political tensions over the Gulf States’ reluctance to be drawn into picking sides in any great power competition, the ability to maintain diverse contacts and balance different relationships is conducive to diplomatic initiatives in a polarized world. The subsequent Saudi centrality to the process of U.S.-Russian re-engagement in Trump’s second term illustrated the Kingdom’s desire to have a seat at the table and burnish its credibility as a diplomatic facilitator, possibly with potential future Iran-U.S. talks in mind, especially after Saudi and Emirati displeasure at being cut out of the JCPOA negotiations in 2015.[72] Attacks on maritime targets in the Red Sea by Houthi militants in Yemen have nevertheless highlighted the delicate balancing act facing Gulf States as the deadliest war between Israelis and Palestinians since 1948 threatens the rapprochement that had marked the conduct of regional politics across the Middle East prior to October 7, 2023. Memories of Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi cities and infrastructure targets (between 2015 and 2022) and against Abu Dhabi (in 2022) remain fresh. Especially as Vision 2030 passed its halfway point (having been launched by Mohammed bin Salman in 2016) and the ‘giga-projects’ along Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coastline move into the construction and delivery phase, ‘de-risking’ has become a priority for the Saudi leadership as they seek to attract foreign investors and visitors.[73] Officials remain mindful of the optics that went around the world during the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix in March 2022 when the annual Formula One race in Jeddah took place against the backdrop of thick black smoke billowing from a nearby oil storage facility struck by the Houthis the day before.[74] Policy responses to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea which began in November 2023 and triggered a multinational response in January 2024 indicated the careful balancing act at play in the Gulf, especially for Saudi Arabia, given the location of projects such as Neom on the Red Sea coastline. Bahrain was the only GCC state to be named as a participant in Operation Prosperity Guardian, the multi-country coalition which was formed in December 2023 to respond to the maritime attacks. However, Bahrain did not take part in the kinetic ship- and air-based operations and it was notable that the airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen did not involve U.S. or British forces based in the Gulf.[75] Instead, the strikes were launched from bases in Cyprus, the U.K., and the U.S., thereby minimizing the risks to the Gulf States from any blowback either from the Houthis or Iran. Operation Prosperity Guardian may therefore be a harbinger of a more flexible approach to U.S.-GCC relations in which security and defence cooperation continues on a technocratic basis even as there is greater elasticity, and, at times, degrees of divergence in (geo)political interests.[76] The return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office in January 2025, as the first president in 130 years to serve a non-consecutive second term, suggests that U.S. decision-making, in both domestic and foreign policy, will continue along highly transactional, unpredictable, and volatile lines. A move toward a ‘post-American’ order, regionally in the Middle East and in the structure of international politics, is likely to further reshape perceptions and policies. As the Gulf States are neither allies (in the formal sense) nor adversaries of the United States, they occupy a middle ground which may shield them from swings in U.S. policymaking toward these categories of states. It is probable that the assertion of Gulf States’ interests in engaging with Iran, as well as with China and Russia will deepen the divergence of trajectories with the U.S. and increase the likelihood that ties will reframe around a looser and more transactional-based approach. The Gaza war may not have led to a rupture with the U.S., or with Israel, but, coming in parallel with the war in Ukraine, it has intensified the repositioning of the Gulf States in a rapidly changing system of international power. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Footnotes 1. References in this paper to the Russian invasion of Ukraine refer to the full-scale invasion which was launched by Russian forces on February 24, 2022, rather than the invasion and subsequent Russian occupation of areas of eastern Ukraine and the Crimea in 2014. 2. David Kilcullen and Greg Mills, The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Co., 2021), 222–24; Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 94. 3. Tobias Borck, Seeking Stability Amidst Disorder: The Foreign Policies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, 2010–20 (London: Hurst & Co., 2023), 193. 4. Huw Dylan and Thomas Maguire, ‘Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War’, Survival 64/4 (September 2022), 34. 5. John Raine, ‘Ukraine versus Gaza’, Survival, 66/1 (February/March 2024), 173–74. 6. Ben Hubbard, ‘Iranian Official Heads to Saudi Arabia as Israel Postpones U.S. Meeting’, New York Times, October 9, 2024. 7. Dania Thafer and David Des Roches, The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States: Trends and Implications (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 1–7. 8. Bilal Saab, ‘After Hub-and-Spoke: US Hegemony in a New Gulf Security Order’, Atlantic CouncilReport, 2016, 4 9. Tobias Borck, Seeking Stability Amidst Disorder: The Foreign Policies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE andQatar, 2010-20 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 18; Khalifa Al-Suwaidi, The UAE After theArab Spring: Strategy for Survival (London: I.B. Tauris, 2023), 120. 10. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era(London: Hurst & Co., 2011), 40. 11. Katherine Harvey, A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: The Saudi Struggle for Iraq (London: Hurst & Co., 2021),144–45. 12. David Roberts, Security Politics in the Gulf Monarchies: Continuity amid Change (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2023), 158. 13. Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2012), 166–67. 14. William Burns, The Back Channel: American Diplomacy in a Disordered World (London: Hurst & Co.,2019), 361–62; Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York:Public Affairs, 2016), 226–28. 15. Thomas Juneau, ‘Iran’s Policy Towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest In-vestment’, International Affairs 92/3 (May 2016), 658. 16. Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, March 10, 2016; Turki al-Faisal Al Saud, ‘Mr.Obama, We Are Not ‘Free Riders’, Arab News, March 14, 2016. 17. Mehran Kamrava, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2018), 71. 18. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis (London: Hurst & Co., 2020), 77–78. 19. By contrast, the Trump administration did respond on two occasions when U.S. assets were targeted, firstin June 2019 after a U.S. drone was shot down over the Gulf and then in December 2019 after anAmerican contractor was killed in a missile strike on a base in Iraq. 20. Steve Holland and Rania El Gamal, ‘Trump Says He Does Not Want War After Attack on Saudi OilFacilities’, Reuters, September 16, 2019. 21. David Roberts, ‘For Decades, Gulf Leaders Counted on U.S. Protection. Here’s What Changed’,Washington Post, January 30, 2020. 22. Tamara Abueish, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Vice Defense Minister Discusses De-escalation with Esper’, AlArabiya English, January 7, 2020. 23. Anon., ‘Biden Raises Yemen, Human Rights in Call with Saudi King Salman’, Al Jazeera, February 25, 2021. 24. Emile Hokayem, ‘Fraught Relations: Saudi Ambitions and American Anger’, Survival 64/6 (November 2023), 9. 25. David Deudney and John Ikenberry, ‘Misplaced Restraint: The Quincy Coalition Versus Liberal Internationalism’, Survival, 63(4), 2021, 9; Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol, and Jason Sclar,‘When Political Mega-Donors Join Forces: How the Koch Network and the Democracy Alliance In-fluence Organized US Politics on the Right and Left’, Studies in American Political Development, 32(2),2018, 128. 26. Marika Theros, ‘Knowledge, Power and the Failure of US Peacemaking in Afghanistan 2018–21’,International Affairs, 99(3), 2023, 1249–50. 27. Trine Flockhart, ‘NATO in the Multi-Order World’, International Affairs 100/2 (March 2024), 473. 28. David Ottaway, ‘U.S. Calls for Help – Again – From the Tiny Arab Emirate of Qatar’, Wilson Center,February 2, 2022. 29. Li-Chen Sim, ‘The Gulf States: Beneficiaries of the Russia-Europe Energy War?’, Middle East Institute,January 12, 2023. 30. Marc Lynch, ‘Saudi Oil Cuts and American International Order’, Abu Aardvark’s MENA Academy(Substack), October 9, 2022. 31. Chris Alden, ‘The Global South and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’, LSE Public Policy Review, 3(1),2023, 2–4. 32. Hazar Kilani, ‘Qatar Investment Authority Holding Onto its Russian Assets for Now’, Doha News,March 2, 2022. 33. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘The GCC and the Russia-Ukraine Crisis’, Arab Center Washington, March 22, 2022. 34. Dion Nissenbaum, Stephen Kalin, and David Cloud, ‘Saudi, Emirati Leaders Decline Calls withPresident Biden during Ukraine Crisis’, Wall St Journal, March 8, 2022. 35. Natalia Savelyeva, ‘Understanding the Russian Exodus to Dubai Following the Ukraine Invasion’, TheRussia Program, George Washington University, May 8, 2024. 36. Anon., ‘Rosneft Elects Qatari Ex-Minister as New Chairman’, Energy Intelligence, July 5, 2023. 37. Mark Colchester, Summer Said, and Stephen Kalin, ‘Boris Johnson Visits U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, SeekingMore Oil’, Wall St Journal, March 16, 2022. 38. Alex Marquardt, Natasha Bertrand, and Phil Mattingly, ‘Inside the White House’s Failed Effort toDissuade OPEC from Cutting Oil Production to Avoid a “Total Disaster”’, CNN, October 5, 2022;Anders Hagstrom, ‘Saudis Say Biden Admin Requested Oil Production Cut to Come After Midterms’,Fox News, October 13, 2022. 39. Elham Fakhro, The Abraham Accords: The Gulf States, Israel, and the Limits of Normalization (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2024), 220. 40. Stacie Goddard, ‘Legitimation and Hypocrisy in Gaza: Implications for the LIO’, in Marc Lynch (ed.),Debating American Primacy in the Middle East, POMEPS Studies 54, 2024, 47. 41. Mostafa Salem, ‘Saudi Crown Prince Accuses Israel of Committing “Collective Genocide” in Gaza’,CNN, November 13, 2024. 42. Peter Aitken, ‘Bret Baier Interviews Saudi Prince: Israel Peace, 9/11 Ties, Iran Nuke Fears’, Fox News,September 20, 2023. 43. Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Gaza War Undermines Oman’s Role as Bridge in a Conflict-Ridden Middle East’,Stimson Commentary, August 26, 2024. 44. Dania Thafer, ‘Palestinian Statehood Tops GCC Security Agenda as Diplomatic Struggles Persist’,Middle East Council on Global Affairs, October 7, 2024. 45. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Saudi Plans to “De-Risk” Region Have Taken a Hit with Gaza Violence – butHitting Pause on Normalization with Israel Will Buy Kingdom Time’, The Conversation, October 18, 2023. 46. Anon., ‘Fact Sheet: Implementation of the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Partnership’, TheWhite House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 21, 2016. 47. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘What Next for the Middle East Strategic Alliance?’, Arab Digest, October 29, 2020. 48. Barak Ravid, ‘Senior U.S. Delegation in Saudi Arabia for Talks with GCC’, Axios, February 15, 2023. 49. Anon., ‘US Leads Gulf Partners in 18-day Naval Exercise’, Gulf States Newsletter, 47/1166, March 23,2023, 11. 50. Anon., ‘China and Russia Join Iranian Exercise at Sea’, Gulf States Newsletter, 47/1166, March 23,2023, 10. 51. Melissa Horvath, ‘Is Red Sands the Future of Middle East Defence Cooperation?’, Middle East Institute,October 4, 2022. 52. Anon., ‘U.S. and Saudi Arabia Conduct Combined Counter-UAS Exercise’, U.S. Central Command press release, September 14, 2023. 53. Bilal Saab, ‘The Other Saudi Transformation’, Middle East Policy 29/2 (Summer 2022), 27–28. 54. Kristian Alexander and Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Biden’s Realpolitik Approach: Analyzing the C-SIPAAgreement with Bahrain’, Gulf International Forum, October 29, 2023. 55. William Roebuck, ‘Bahrain Sets the Pace for Enhanced Gulf Security Cooperation with the UnitedStates’, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, September 27, 2023; Anon., ‘The UK’s Accession to the Bahrain-US Security Agreement’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Comment,February 2025. 56. Sanam Vakil and Neil Quilliam, ‘The Abraham Accords and Israel-UAE Normalization: Shaping a NewMiddle East’, Chatham House Research Paper, March 2023, 5. 57. UAE officials expressed their reservations about Netanyahu’s perceived attempts to leverage the normalization agreement in his 2021 campaign by downplaying suggestions of a visit by Netanyahu asPrime Minister to the UAE, and again after Netanyahu returned to office and announced that his first foreign visit would be to the UAE, choosing instead to receive other Israeli political leaders rather thanNetanyahu himself. 58. Vakil and Quilliam, ‘The Abraham Accords and Israel-UAE Normalization: Shaping a New MiddleEast’, (March 2023), 29. 59. Anon., ‘UAE, Israel Unveil Joint Naval Vessel as Military Ties Grow’, AFP, February 20, 2023. 60. Jean-Loup Samaan, ‘The Shift That Wasn’t: Misreading the UAE’s New “Zero-Problem” Policy’,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sada blog, February 8, 2022. 61. Nickolay Mladenov, ‘Minilateralism: A Concept That is Changing the World Order’, The WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, April 14, 2023. 62. Husain Haqqani and Narayanappa Janardhan, ‘The Minilateral Era’, Foreign Policy, January 10, 2023. 63. Gordon Lubold and Warren Strobel, ‘Secret Chinese Port in Persian Gulf Rattles U.S. Relations withU.A.E.’, Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2021; Warren Strobel, ‘U.A.E. Shut Down China FacilityUnder U.S. Pressure, Emirates Says’, Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2021; John Hudson, EllenNakashima, and Liz Sly, ‘Buildup Resumed at Suspected Chinese Military Site in UAE, Leak Says’,Washington Post, April 26, 2023. 64. Sam Fleming, Henry Foy, Felicia Schwartz, James Politi, and Simeon Kerr, ‘West Presses UAE to ClampDown on Suspected Russia Sanctions Busting’, Financial Times, March 1, 2023. 65. Dion Nissenbaum, Dov Lieber, and Stephen Kalin, ‘Saudi Arabia Seeks Pledges, Nuclear Help for Peacewith Israel’, Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2023; Michael Crowley, Vivian Nereim, and Patrick Kingsley,‘Saudi Arabia Offers its Price to Normalize Relations with Israel’, New York Times, March 9, 2023. 66. Anon., ‘Great Expectations: The Future of Iranian-Saudi D´etente’, International Crisis Group, June13, 2024. 67. Amrita Jash, ‘Saudi-Iran Deal: A Test Case of China’s Role as an International Mediator’, GeorgetownJournal of International Affairs, June 23, 2023. 68. Badr bin Hamad Al Bu Said, ‘“Small States” Diplomacy in the Age of Globalization: An OmaniPerspective’, in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationshipwith Europe (London: Routledge, 2005), 258. 69. Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Oman Keeps Trying to Dial Down Tensions in the Middle East’, Stimson Centre,February 2, 2024. 70. Samy Magdy, Adam Geller, and Aamer Madhani, ‘To Secure Gaza Ceasefire, Dealmakers OvercameEnemies’ Deep Distrust’, Associated Press, January 22, 2025. 71. Mirdef Alqashouti, ‘Qatar Mediation: From Soft Diplomacy to Foreign Policy’, in Mahjoob Zweiri andFarah Al Qawasmi (eds.), Contemporary Qatar: Examining State and Society (Singapore: Springer,2023), 73. 72. Diana Galeeva, ‘Saudi Arabia as a Global Mediator: From the Ukraine to Gaza War’, Menara Magazine,March 24, 2025. 73. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Saudi-Israeli Normalization and the Hamas Attack’, Arab Center Wash-ington, October 11, 2023. 74. Ben Church, ‘F1 Organizers Insist Saudi Arabian Grand Prix Will Go Ahead Despite Houthi Attack onNearby Oil Facility’, CNN, March 26, 2022. 75. Ahdeya Ahmed Al-Sayed, ‘Better Late than Never: Bahrain’s Attitude Towards the Red Sea DefenseCoalition’, The Washington Institute, Fikra Forum, December 29, 2023. 76. Nikolay Kozhanov, ‘Why Gulf Arab States Are Not Intervening in the Red Sea’, Amwaj Media, February27, 2024.