Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

The further strengthening of ties between the US and the Philippines is indicative of the breadth and scope of maritime security arrangements in the region.Only four months into the year and 2023 has already been very busy in terms of United States (US) engagement in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in East Asia and the South China Sea. During Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s recent visit to the US, alongside reaffirming the continuation of the broader ambit of bilateral partnership, the two countries established ‘ground rules’ on US-Philippine defence cooperation on 3 May. The US and the Philippines have a long-standing treaty partnership that dates back to the post-World War II era. The treaty partnership began with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1951, which established a framework for military cooperation and mutual defence between the two countries, making Manila the oldest ally of Washington in the region. Beijing, quite expectedly, has expressed its disapproval of this new development characterising it as Washington’s attempt at drawing Southeast Asian nations into a small clique to contain China. Beijing’s usual reaction whenever the US conducts outreach in the region comprises various versions of the narrative that Washington is forcing countries to sacrifice their sovereign identities by becoming pawns in the latter’s efforts to destabilise the region and turn countries against China. Mao Ning, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed that the South China Sea is not a hunting ground for countries outside of it. Meanwhile, the state-run foreign-language news channel, CGTN, warned against President Marcos’s ‘dangerous courtship.’ The reinforced scope of the US-Philippines defence partnership Interestingly, in addition to reiterating US commitments as Manila’s treaty partner and referencing the strong need for maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, the joint statement noted that the two sides “affirm the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” as an indispensable element of global peace and security. Defence ties between the US and the Philippines have indeed expanded to include, first the South China Sea and now, the Taiwan Strait. What this indicates is a steady consolidation of security frameworks in the region that would form bulwarks against Beijing’s repeated and expanding overtures into the South China Sea and pressures on Taiwan. Given that the Taiwan Strait lies at a distance of only 800 miles from Manila, it is not surprising that the security of the Strait has been included under the expanded purview of Washington and Manila’s treaty partnership. Under the basic framework of the MDT, the US and the Philippines agreed to come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack by an external aggressor. The MDT has been an important part of the US-Philippines relationship, providing a basis for close military cooperation and joint training exercises. The US has provided military aid and assistance to the Philippines, helping to modernise its armed forces and improve its capabilities in areas such as maritime security and counterterrorism. Despite episodic friction over issues such as human rights and the rule of law, the US-Philippines treaty partnership remains an important part of both countries’ foreign policy agendas. As the geopolitical landscape in Asia continues to evolve, the US-Philippines treaty partnership will likely remain an important pillar of stability and cooperation in the region. Now, the partnership includes a broadening of “information sharing on the principal threats and challenges” to the peace and security of the US and the Philippines. The upgraded ‘ironclad’ alliance commitments also make room for the inclusion of new sites which could contribute to the enhancement of Manila’s maritime security and modernisation efforts under the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. It also creates a greater space for US involvement in the improvement of local and shared capacities in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. What this means for the Indo-Pacific President Marcos’s visit comes close on the heels of South Korean President Yoon’s visit to Washington which resulted in the latter agreeing to send an Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine to Seoul to strengthen deterrence against Pyongyang’s recent nuclear flexing. Earlier in April, Manila allowed Washington access to four additional military bases for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment and building of facilities such as runways, fuel storage, and military housing. Access to these new locations is significant as two of them—Isabela and Cagayan—are positioned facing Taiwan while the Palawan base is in proximity to the Spratly Islands—a source of a long-standing dispute between China and the Philippines. The two countries have agreed to resume joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea and Manila is also assessing a trilateral security pact involving Japan. In mid-April, before President Marcos’s visit, the two countries participated in their largest-ever joint military drills, Exercise Balikatan, in the South China Sea. China is decidedly furious at the pace and scope of these new developments. Undoubtedly, steps like these are strategic and oriented towards boosting the defence postures of ‘like-minded’ countries in the region. But despite Beijing’s strong censure, these measures are indicative of the breadth and scope of maritime security arrangements in the region being on the course to be further strengthened.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping was unanimously “reelected” for another five-year term at the Two Sessions, and the Chinese government approved significant changes in the party-state structure to counter the US-led West’s dominance and promote economic and technological self-sufficiency. At the same time, China is engaging in diplomatic activism in the Middle East and elsewhere, forcing Israel to reconsider regional dynamics and prepare for a protracted state of “struggle” between the two superpowers.  In March 2023, Chinese leader Xi Jinping marked several highly successful events. Internally, he was “reelected” for a third term as President, and externally, he brokered a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran – without any American involvement. These two developments coincided with the Two Sessions, China’s annual parliament meeting, where Xi passed far-reaching reforms aimed at increasing China’s economic and technological self-reliance in the face of Western adversaries. Judging by his remarks, it appears that under Xi China will continue its proactive foreign policy directed against the US-led global order. This in turn will test Israel’s ability to continue to maintain a balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis the two superpowers. Israel must now account for China’s growing influence in diplomatic and security theaters in the Middle East, as well as Beijing’s closer relations with Iran and Russia. To ensure its own security and economic interests, it must reconsider the regional dynamic while engaging in dialogue with the relevant actors. Finally, the escalation of tensions between the superpowers forces Jerusalem to prepare for extreme scenarios, most notably war in the Taiwan Strait. After a decade as president, Xi Jinping was unanimously reelected by the Chinese parliament for another five-year term. The vote – in which Xi was the sole candidate – was held as part of the annual Two Sessions, the Chinese legislature’s most important political gathering. The main event usually takes place over a seven-day period in March, when approximately 3,000 delegates from the National People’s Congress (NPC) – the legislative body – and some 2,000 delegates from the top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), convene in Beijing. In the course of the gathering, the Premier delivers a work report, while the delegates pass legislation, make amendments to the country’s constitution, and approve appointments in various state bodies. This year’s events were especially significant because they occurred immediately following the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in October 2022. At that gathering, which takes place every five years, Xi was also appointed to a third term as general secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Since the 1980s, every five years, the CCP has introduced widespread reforms in the structure of the party-state. Previous reforms included changes to the balance of power between the Party and the state in ways that conformed to the incoming leadership's priorities and vision, as well as domestic and foreign developments. This year, the NPC approved significant changes in the party-state structure, continuing the trend in which the CCP under Xi has been "swallowing up" the government, with the lines between the two becoming increasingly blurred. These changes reflect Xi's belief that only a strong and centralized party can deal with domestic and foreign challenges, particularly the United States, China's main strategic rival. Indeed, during a heavily-publicized meeting at the start of the Two Sessions between Xi and representatives of the Chinese business sector, the Chinese leader stunned the audience by launching a direct attack against Washington, which he blamed for "the unprecedented severe challenges" that China is facing, and for trying to "contain, blockade, and suppress" China. What made his remarks particularly noteworthy was that despite rising tensions between the superpowers in recent years, Xi avoided explicitly naming and shaming the United States, instead allowing Chinese diplomats to spar with Western hawks. As a matter of fact, an examination of Xi’s writings reveals that even early in his political life, he saw the West, and the United States in particular, through a Cold War prism. However, it was the trade war waged by the Trump administration, which later escalated into a comprehensive technological and geopolitical war, that reinforced for him the need for economic and technological independence. The Biden administration went even further in its efforts to prevent China from gaining access to critical technology, and unlike its predecessor, has been successful in securing allies’ support. The Chinese countermeasures can be found in its most recent reforms, which included increasing the powers of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) through the establishment of a new decision making body, the Central Science and Technology Commission, which is likely to be headed by Xi himself. Some of the ministry's specialized functions were transferred to relevant government ministries as part of the restructuring. The changes will allow the ministry to focus on macro-management of competition in innovation and to foster local development of basic research, core technologies, and a solution to the problem of the "bottleneck" imposed by the West, such as restrictions on China's import of microchips and airplane engines. In addition, a new institution, the National Data Bureau, will be tasked with managing digital resources, under the auspices of the Chinese government’s top macroeconomic management agency, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). This year's reforms likewise highlighted China's financial sector, with the establishment of the new National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA) and expanded powers for the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It was also decided to cut 5 percent of the central government and party workforce. Beyond the economic rivalry with the United States, the ramifications of the war in Ukraine, and COVID-19 restrictions, Beijing faces a host of internal challenges: a skyrocketing debt-to-GDP ratio (at the end of 2022, it stood at 273 percent), a declining population, a real estate bubble, natural resource pollution, a slowdown in imports and exports, high savings levels among households, and income inequality. If the rivalry with the United States intensifies – for example, if China were to invade Taiwan – Beijing would have to anticipate the imposition of additional sanctions, similar to those that Russia has been struggling with for the past year. Yet until such time as the situation vis-à-vis the United States reaches a critical stage, if at all, and against the backdrop of increasing concern in the international business community about the direction China is heading under Xi, Beijing is attempting to project to the world “business as usual.” At the conclusion of the Two Sessions, the incoming prime minister, Li Qiang, appeared to be smiling as he told foreign reporters that the United States and China must cooperate, because “there are no winners in a conflict.” He also promised that he would ensure a competitive, market-oriented, and fair environment that would protect the rights of Chinese and foreign businesses. However, here too the Party’s “invisible hand” was evident when he added that “the role of the new government is to execute and implement the important decisions and plans laid out by the CPC Central Committee.” The new appointments of other senior positions reflected the same ambivalence that Li expressed in his remarks. On the one hand, the Congress decided to extend the terms of 24 of the 26 ministers and national commissions, among them the head of the China’s central bank, Yi Gang, and Finance Minister Liu Kun, even though they had reached retirement age. One of the two new appointees, on the other hand, is Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, who has been sanctioned by the US since 2018 for purchasing Russian weapons. Unlike his predecessors, who had battle experience, Li is an aerospace engineer in training. He was the former director of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) space and cyber programs, as well as the deputy commander of the PLA's Strategic Support Force, which was in charge of China's space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. Aside from the obvious defiance toward the US, his appointment demonstrates the importance that China places on modernizing China's military technology, given the ever-increasing restrictions imposed on technological imports to China. Self-sufficiency should not be confused with isolationism. The agreement brokered by Beijing between Saudi Arabia and Iran on March 10 – while  the Two Sessions were in session – was the clearest indication that China intends to maintain its active foreign policy. Granted, China pushed through an open door, given the conflicting parties’ inherent need for an agreement to focus on their economies, and only time will tell whether the agreement will hold; nonetheless, this was the first time that Beijing has led any kind of mediation effort, let alone successfully, and the United States was not even in the room. In doing so, China has demonstrated that it can use its dominant economic and commercial position to advance diplomatic and security objectives, ostensibly as an "alternative" to the United States. China’s global ambitions are not limited to the Middle East. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as stated in the government's work report, will celebrate its tenth anniversary in October. What began as a central-southeast Asian initiative has evolved into a global network of "silk roads" emanating from China and extending into space, with hundreds of massive infrastructure projects worth over $1 trillion in 146 countries. The BRI has had to deal with a number of implementation and funding challenges over the years, so it has been scaled back. At the same time, Chinese officials emphasize that it will remain a focal point of Beijing's foreign policy, with the emphasis shifting to smaller but more strategic projects such as bolstering global supply chains and cooperating in the digital domain, as well as healthcare, public policy, renewable energy, and people-to-people and diplomatic ties. Xi has unveiled other ambitious projects in recent years, most notably the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which is tasked with promoting the United Nations' goals for sustainable development, and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). At the conclusion of the Two Sessions, Xi announced the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), the details of which remain unknown. As with the BRI, any success story that can be classified as development or security will be attributed to them, even if it occurred years before these initiatives. This is what happened with the Saudi-Iranian agreement or the Chinese peace initiative to end the Ukrainian war, both of which Beijing hailed as shining examples of the GSI in action. In practice, these initiatives reflect Beijing's desire to reshape the global order to reflect its interests and values, while undermining the United States-led West's dominance in its spheres of influence. For example, Xi described the GCI as "a new form of human civilization" that "shatters the myth that modernization is equal to Westernization. The bottom line is that the Two Sessions and the extension of Xi’s term of office indicate that China will continue to push itself to the forefront of the international stage. The next five years will be defined by a stronger push for self-sufficiency, financial stability, and technological advancement. At the same time, China will not close itself off to the rest of the world. On the contrary, China will not back down from "a struggle" against what Xi refers to as the West's and the United States' "attempts to blackmail, contain, and blockade" it. This spirit was evident during the first press conference given by China's new foreign minister, Qin Gang, who warned that "if the United States does not hit the brakes, but continues to speed down the wrong path...there will surely be conflict and confrontation." While Western doors are closing in on China, Beijing will continue to see Israel as a backdoor for securing core technologies that will help it achieve self-reliance, rendering Israel obsolete in the long run. This is evident in the recent influx of Chinese commercial delegations to Israel, following Beijing's lifting of travel restrictions. Simultaneously, the US-Israel Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology, launched during President Joe Biden's July visit to Jerusalem, will examine Israeli-Chinese cooperation, particularly in the less regulated hi-tech sector and academia. The agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as Xi's recent visit to Russia, during which the parties agreed to "increase contacts over security issues in the Persian Gulf," indicates that China's diplomatic activism in the Middle East will only grow. The evolving situation in which China and the US both play key roles in regional geopolitics – against the backdrop of increased competition between the two countries and the war in Ukraine – forces Israel to reconsider regional dynamics. In order to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear power in peaceful means, Jerusalem must deepen its dialogue with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and its Arab partners in the Negev Forum on regional security and economic interests. Finally, if a conflict between China and the United States is truly "inevitable," Israel must prepare for the worst-case scenario, in which two superpowers go to war in the Taiwan Strait, and consider the implications for its relations with Beijing.

With relations at an all-time low, punitive actions targeting China have become politically popular, even if they have no analytical basis. Five years ago, then president Donald Trump launched a tariff-fueled trade war with China designed to reduce the bilateral trade deficit. His successor, President Joe Biden, then added a decoupling focus by restricting high-tech exports and curtailing professional and financial links. Both wanted to reduce imports of manufactured goods and bring home more jobs. How should one judge the effectiveness of their policies? Back then, and even more so today, the logic of Trump’s fixation on trade deficits made little sense. But security concerns have now become the rationale for reducing America’s trade relations with China and undercutting China’s growth potential. Against these yardsticks, the results are mixed but on balance unconvincing, given the costs in the form of inflationary pressures, repressed export growth, and a projected decline in global output. But U.S. politicians from both parties strongly support these restrictive measures because the costs are not obvious to their constituents, while the benefits from appearing to be tough on China resonate well with voters. RISING TRADE DEFICITS The recent U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that the politically sensitive U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China was larger in 2022 than when Trump became president, while America’s overall trade deficit hit an all-time high of $1.18 trillion. This reinforces the views of nearly all the economists surveyed at the launching of Trump’s trade war: that the tariffs would not reduce U.S. trade deficits and the costs would be paid largely by Americans. For the Trump administration, the wild card was the “phase one” purchase agreement, which called for an increase of $200 billion in China’s imports from the United States. But state-to-state purchase agreements have no logical basis when global trade is largely shaped by the market-driven decisions of firms and consumers and subject to unpredictable events such as the coronavirus pandemic. Economic principles tell us that how much a country saves and spends determines its trade balance. The combination of Trump’s large tax cuts and Biden’s huge expenditure initiatives has led to soaring budget deficits, which are mirrored in record trade deficits. All this has little to do with China. Yet the Biden administration still insists that China honor the purchase agreement and links the removal of tariffs to its fulfillment. Asking China to honor an agreement that made no sense to begin with as a condition for dropping another equally ineffective policy defies logic. TRADE DIVERSIFICATION BUT INCREASING IMPORT DEPENDENCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES But this focus on bilateral trade numbers overlooks the sharp decline in China’s share of trade with the United States. Whereas China accounted for 47 percent of the U.S. trade deficit in 2017, it accounted for only 32 percent last year, with most of this decline offset by the increasing shares of other East Asian economies. Europe’s share of America’s overall trade deficit also declined from 21 percent to 18 percent. Only Canada and Mexico, via the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), were able to increase their share from 11 to 18 percent. More insights can be gleaned from looking at the components of trade. Although the value of U.S. imports from China was essentially the same in 2022 as it was in 2017, total U.S. imports increased by about $900 billion during this period. As a result, China’s share of the total, made up largely of manufactured goods, fell from 22 to 17 percent. This decline, however, did not reduce America’s dependency on imports of manufactured goods. The share of imports relative to overall expenditures on manufactured goods rose steadily to 34 percent in 2022 from 23 percent two decades ago. The decline in China’s share of U.S. imports of manufactured goods was more than offset by imports from other countries, notably Mexico and Vietnam. These two developing countries, more than others, were able to import heavily from the United States based on their locational advantages and free trade agreements. Vietnam and China share a border and are linked by the ASEAN-China trade agreement, while Mexico and the United States also share a border and are linked by the USMCA trade agreement. Less noticed, however, is the behind-the-scenes role that China plays in supplying the components and materials for these other countries’ exports to the United States. Most of Vietnam’s increased exports were in product lines where U.S. imports from China fell, such as computer accessories and telecommunication equipment. China’s exports to Vietnam have more than doubled since 2017, and its trade surplus nearly tripled by 2022. China’s exports to Mexico increased by nearly 30 percent last year, on top of a 50 percent increase in 2021. China may be exporting less to the United States directly, but it is now indirectly exporting more. This explains why China’s share of global manufacturing production has continued to increase from 26 percent in 2017 to 31 percent in 2021. As for U.S. exports, the total averaged about $1.5 trillion from 2017 to 2020 but then jumped to $1.9 trillion in 2022. But this increase was not in manufactured goods but in exports of energy products and chemicals to Europe, spurred by the Ukraine crisis. The trade war did little to expand U.S. exports to China, the share of which fell from 8.4 percent in 2017 to 7.5 percent in 2022. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DECOUPLING According to one study, U.S. firms were handicapped by tariff-related higher costs of their imported inputs, and coupled with China’s retaliatory tariffs, this resulted in U.S. exports to China being 23 percent lower than they would have been in the absence of the trade war. The consequence is that America’s trade war policies generated very little growth in exports of manufactured products, despite the priority given to those policies by both the Trump and Biden administrations. If the purpose of the U.S. punitive actions toward China was to weaken China economically, there is no clear evidence of that happening. By developing alternative export markets and tapping pandemic-driven demand in the West for manufactured goods, China pushed its share of global exports to record levels in recent years. Meanwhile, China’s imports as a share of its GDP have been declining steadily, from a high of 28 percent in the early 2000s to 17 percent in 2022. One could argue that the world has become more dependent on China in trade while China has become less dependent on the world. The benefits of decoupling—if any—should be weighed against the costs imposed on U.S. consumers and producers and damage done to the export competitiveness of U.S. firms. To counter such tendencies, the Biden administration is promoting domestic manufacturing with subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act. Such actions can be justified for strategic reasons, but the rationale is weakened by protectionist Buy America conditions. U.S. policymakers often counter by pointing to China’s use of subsidies to promote strategic industries, but Chinese firms were keen to import key technologies and components to ensure that their products were globally competitive on cost and performance grounds. The recent semiconductor and other U.S. restrictions on China’s access to high-tech products are also problematic because these products are “dual use,” with a much larger commercial market relative to military applications. Such restrictions hurt the many U.S. firms that derive significant revenues from selling to China and may contravene World Trade Organization guidelines. The costs of trade-related distortionary policies can be substantial. One oft-cited study estimates that taxpayers end up paying about $250,000 for each job saved in typical Buy America programs. At a broader level, a recent International Monetary Fund study estimates that a combination of U.S. trade and technological decoupling measures could reduce global GDP by some 7 to 12 percent. Ultimately, the problem lies in the lack of clarity on U.S. policy objectives. What does it mean to undercut China, and how will the United States know if it has succeeded? With U.S.-China relations at an all-time low, punitive actions targeting China have become politically popular, even if they have no analytical basis. The reality is that the United States and China have no choice but to continue trading with each other. But with security overriding commercial considerations, the economic interdependence built up over decades is now being reversed, leaving everyone worse off.

​Although the dollar continues to be the dominant global currency, Russia and China could dent this dominance. In the aftermath of global financial exclusion, Russia has had to make some strategic adaptations. The West’s sanctions had crippling consequences, and the Kremlin scrambled to find alternatives. In light of these developments, China became an important ally, and the Yuan—its currency—has taken on a more prominent role. It is telling that in Russia, the yuan has surpassed the United States Dollar (USD) in trading volume, a feat achieved a year after the Ukraine conflict, which triggered a series of sanctions against Moscow. As Russia and China band together, one wonders what other shifts will take place and how they will shape the future. Change is afoot, and the Russian market bears witness. The month of February saw a watershed moment as the yuan surged past the dollar in monthly trading volume for the first time. The momentum continued into March as the gap between the two currencies widened, showcasing the growing sway of the yuan. It’s an impressive feat, considering that the yuan’s trading volume on the Russian market was once quite insignificant. The winds of change blew through Russia’s financial system as the year progressed. Additional sanctions had taken their toll on the few remaining banks that still held power to make cross-border transactions in the currencies of countries that had been deemed “unfriendly” by the Kremlin. One such bank was Raiffeisen Bank International AG, whose Russian branch played a significant role in facilitating international payments within the country. However, the lender found itself under the watchful eye of both European and US authorities, which only added to the pressure. These events spurred the Kremlin and Russian companies to shift their foreign-trade transactions to currencies of countries that had not imposed sanctions. Converging coalitions The bond between Russia and China is growing stronger, with both nations seeking to bolster their positions on the global stage. Their alliance has spread across various spheres: military, economic, and political. With relations between Russia and the West crumbling, China has emerged as a key partner for Russia, providing it with the necessary support to counter economic and political pressure. On the other hand, China is keen on expanding its global reach, especially in the Eurasian region, and sees Russia as an important ally in this regard. President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Moscow and his pledge to expand cooperation are likely to take this partnership to greater heights. Trade and investment ties are set to grow stronger, with both nations seeking to reduce their dependence on Western economies. Russia’s focus on infrastructure development and mega projects is also likely to benefit from China’s expertise in these areas. Energy is another significant area of collaboration, with Russia being a leading exporter of oil and gas and China being the world’s largest importer of these resources. Technology is also an essential domain, with both countries investing heavily in research and development to remain competitive in the global economy. While the alliance between Russia and China will likely have far-reaching geopolitical consequences, it is a complicated relationship with both nations pursuing their interests, even as they work towards common goals. As a result of Western sanctions, Russia has shifted its foreign trade transactions away from the dollar and euro to currencies of non-restricted countries. By doing so, the Kremlin and Russian companies hope to decrease their dependence on the Western financial system and explore new avenues for conducting their trade and economic activities. This shift in strategy reflects Russia’s determination to maintain its economic stability despite restrictions on its access to the global financial system. It also underlines the growing importance of alternative currencies in global trade as countries strive to minimise the impact of sanctions and safeguard their economic interests. Structural overhauls The Russian Finance Ministry was not immune to the winds of change either. Earlier this year, it made the switch from the dollar to the yuan for its market operations. It even went a step further by devising a new structure for the national wealth fund, earmarking 60 percent of its assets for the yuan. The Bank of Russia joined the chorus, urging its people and businesses to consider moving their assets to the rouble or other currencies considered “friendly.” This would help mitigate the risk of having their funds blocked or frozen. As the world undergoes a seismic geopolitical shift, it seems Russia is moving in tandem, searching for ways to secure its economic future. However, the dollar still reigns supreme in the Russian market. Even with all the changes taking place, it remains the most widely used currency, ceding its throne only occasionally to the yuan. This underscores the enduring dominance of the dollar, which has played a significant role in Russia’s financial landscape for years. However, as the world continues to evolve, one wonders how long it can hold on to its crown.

It is not in Vietnam’s national interest to be overly dependent on China or the United States. Hanoi is expected to continue to press ahead with efforts to build on its ties with the two major powers as part of its multi-directional foreign policy. There are, however, limits to both approaches.  There is a natural tendency to regard Vietnam as drawing closer to either the United States or China whenever high-level exchanges take place between Vietnam and either great power. When Nguyen Phu Trong visited China in October 2022 on his first overseas trip as the re-elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, some observers suggested that Vietnam may draw closer to China or even that Vietnam shares a special relationship with China. Similarly, when Nguyen Phu Trong became Vietnam’s first general secretary to travel to the United States on a high-profile visit in July 2015, some pundits were quick to see this as ushering in a new era of ties which would eventually pave the way for a strategic partnership. Seven years on, however, the two countries are still in the same comprehensive partnership that they established in 2013. It is important to set the aforementioned high-level bilateral visits in context. To be sure, Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to China in October 2022 was a breakthrough of sorts. It marked a departure from previous trips by either a newly-elected or re-elected general secretary. Traditionally, the first overseas stop would invariably have been Laos. Moreover, 13 agreements were signed during the visit to China in many areas ranging from party affairs, supply chains, trade and customs matters, to food safety, culture and tourism cooperation. This figure may look impressive, but it is less than the 19 agreements signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Vietnam in November 2017 and the 15 agreements concluded when Nguyen Phu Trong made an official trip to China in January 2017. It should be noted too that such agreements are usually in functional areas of cooperation — the same areas are often disrupted when ties deteriorate. More importantly, Trong’s visit does not necessarily signal an upgrade in bilateral ties with China. It should be regarded as reciprocating what Xi did when the latter chose Vietnam as the first country to visit in 2017 after his re-election as general secretary at the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October of the same year. In fact, Trong had earlier made a promise to Xi that he would make China his first overseas stop if he were re-elected Vietnam’s general secretary at the 13th Vietnam Communist Party Congress in January 2021. It appears that Trong has fulfilled this promise with his October 2022 visit to China. The outcomes of high-level bilateral exchanges between Vietnam and the United States should also not be over-hyped. There are generally two main drivers of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. The first driver is the benefits that would accrue to the two countries arising from their cooperation. The second driver is the two countries’ common threat perception of China. At times, however, Vietnam finds itself in an unenviable position of having to dispel the perception that it is drawing closer to China. Not long after Trong’s China visit, Vietnam made it a point to announce that it would cooperate closely with the United States to prepare for a telephone conversation between Trong and U.S. President Joseph Biden. It added that the two countries would arrange a high-level visit at a suitable time and when conditions allow. In essence, Vietnam’s latest overtures towards Washington are less about drawing closer to the U.S. but about managing perceptions that it is inclining too close to China. There is a standing invitation for Trong to visit the United States. This invitation was extended by U.S. President Donald Trump to Trong when the former visited Hanoi for the second U.S.-North Korea Summit in February 2019. Based on our understanding, Trong was reportedly keen to go to America, and preparations were already underway for such a visit to take place in July 2019. Unexpectedly, Trong suffered a stroke in April 2019 and the visit to the United States had to be postponed. Before Trump’s invitation, as mentioned above, Trong had already made history when he became Vietnam’s first general secretary to visit the United States in 2015. It is unlikely that Trong can make a trip to the United States given his current state of health. When Trong travelled to China in October 2022, public footage of the visit showed him in frail health. He had difficulty walking, although he was mentally alert. A trip to the United States would be a different proposition altogether and most probably exert a tremendous strain on Trong’s well-being. The next event to watch out for would be a possible high-level visit by President Biden to Vietnam in 2023 to mark the 10th anniversary of their comprehensive partnership. Biden’s predecessor Trump made two visits to Vietnam, once in November 2017 to attend the APEC Leaders’ Meeting and the second in February 2019 for the Trump-Kim Summit. A visit by Biden would boost Washington’s efforts to strengthen ties with Hanoi as well as buttress America’s efforts to engage the region with Vietnam as a key partner in light of a more aggressive and assertive China. There is a suggestion that the two countries may upgrade their ties to a strategic partnership during Biden’s visit. Even if this upgrade were to occur, we can expect limits to Vietnam’s relationship with the United States in view of their differences on human rights and, more importantly, in their political systems and the values that underpin them. Whatever the outcome of such high-level visits, Vietnam can be expected to stay the course to build on its ties with both the United States and China as part of its multi-directional foreign policy. The country’s history is replete with lessons on the perils of big power domination and being overly dependent on any single big power. It appears that Trong and the country’s top leadership have taken these lessons to heart.

In the event of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, Manila’s defense treaty with the United States will give it little room to manoeuvre. President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.’s recent visit to China underscores his intent to have a constructive relationship with China, and a balanced and diversified Philippine foreign policy. But as Sino-US relations deteriorate and United States President Joseph Biden veers towards strategic clarity to defend Taiwan amid heightened cross-Strait tensions, the risk of getting entangled in a Sino-US conflict over Taiwan has become a major policy issue for Manila.  All Philippine presidents have strictly adhered to the One-China policy which is enshrined in the Joint Communique on normalisation of Sino-Philippine ties in 1975. Even President Benigno Aquino III, who arguably pursued the most critical China policy in 2010-2016, toed the line on the One-China policy and repatriated wanted Taiwanese nationals to Beijing in 2011. Manila’s adherence to the One-China policy was reaffirmed by Marcos Jr. after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year.  In the event of a Sino-U.S. conflict over Taiwan, the legal status of Manila’s commitment to the One-China policy would be tested against its obligations under the 1951 Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The treaty highlights the “sense of unity,” “common determination” and “collective defense” against an “external armed attack” and “potential aggressor”, but it is ambiguous about the specific geographic scope of its application in the Pacific. While the Philippines sees the utility of the MDT primarily for a South China Sea contingency, the U.S. can invoke Article IV of the MDT in a Taiwan conflict. The article states that each party deems that “an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.”  With respect to “constitutional processes”, the 1987 Philippine Constitution gives the Congress the power to declare “the existence of a state of war”; only under such conditions or another national emergency, would the President be authorised by law to wield the necessary powers “to carry out a declared national policy.” As such, congressional intervention would be an important variable that needs to be closely watched. Manila can also mitigate entrapment risks by exercising its sovereign authority on where and how the U.S. military could access and use its facilities. The preamble to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) states that “US access to and use of facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines and with full respect for the Philippine Constitution and Philippine laws.” Yet, history has shown how the Philippines could be involved in a war over Taiwan even in the absence of a U.S. formal invocation of the MDT. Manila could send boots on the ground and/or provide logistical access for U.S. military operations. This was the case in the Korean War, Vietnam War, and U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Put differently, Manila is caught in a bind. On one hand, it fears Washington’s abandonment in the event of a South China Sea conflict with China. Manila has repeatedly demanded clarity and immediacy in U.S. alliance commitments. To this end, Manila concluded the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the 2014 EDCA with Washington to secure U.S. military presence in the region and security guarantees. On the other hand, the Philippine security establishment increasingly fears entrapment, where the country’s military is drawn into a Sino-US conflict over Taiwan. This reality became evident following former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. In September 2021, the Philippine ambassador to America said that the U.S. can use Philippine bases in a Taiwan conflict if it is important for the Philippines’ security. The condition, however, remains open-ended and is contingent on many indeterminate factors.  At the moment, the risks of entrapment are increasing, at least from the operational perspective. Since its coming to power, the Marcos Jr. administration has taken steps to bolster security ties with Washington. Both countries have agreed to explore joint patrols in the South China Sea, and accelerate the implementation of the EDCA through infrastructure enhancement at various locations. Both allies are looking at adding more sites for American military access, including in the northern province of Cagayan near Taiwan, to facilitate faster response to crisis situations. They have also agreed to double the number of troops involved in joint exercises and plan to sharply increase the number of bilateral defence activities in 2023. Given the timing of these initiatives, Beijing would likely see these Philippine moves as siding with America to undermine its One-China principle and enable U.S. military prepositioning for war-time contingencies. Should the Philippines provide basing access in a cross-strait conflict, Manila would certainly face Chinese sanctions. China could also play hardball in the South China Sea and its ballistic missiles could target countries facilitating U.S. combat operations. But if tensions in the South China Sea escalate and coincide with tensions in Taiwan, there will be a greater incentive for Manila to strategically align with Washington and accommodate U.S. military hardware.  How the Philippines should respond to a Taiwan contingency is not simply a legal question but a critical national security concern. There are around 200,000 overseas Filipino workers in Taiwan; repatriating them during an armed confrontation over Taiwan would be an enormous undertaking. This will be compounded by a massive human migration of Taiwanese nationals.  Even if Manila manages to sidestep the risks associated with entrapment in a Taiwan Strait conflict, it cannot escape the geopolitical ramifications of such a historic event. Should China successfully reunify Taiwan by force, China could inch closer to the northern Philippines and it will be easier for China to break through the First Island Chain. China’s takeover of Taiwan would also augment its power projection capability in the South China Sea. This would consequently impact Philippine maritime and security interests. Given the Philippines’ geographic proximity to Taiwan, its status as a U.S. defence treaty ally and its stakes in the South China Sea, there will be complications in Manila’s desire to be neutral in a Taiwan contingency.