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A new flare-up of the intra-Syrian conflict may lead to serious transformations of the balance of power in the Middle East.

Interests of foreign actors in the Syrian crisis

The Middle East remains one of the key regions where the interests of major actors and their policy priorities are concentrated. At the same time, the continuous mosaic of many internal contradictions in the region (between and within countries) is an attractive environment for the involvement of external players.

In this sense, Syria retains a complex of internal and external contradictions, including interethnic and religious differences, interstate and economic differences.

Since 1963, the ruling force in Syria has been the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party and after the coup in 1970, power in the country passed to the al-Assad family clan. The Syrian president is delegated a wide range of powers and until 2011 a country-wide state of emergency prohibited other political parties. Monopolisation of power and internal repression provided the ruling forces with relative stability in the administration of Syria before the beginning of regional changes and the formation of new transit corridors.

The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the country’s descent into chaos, while the positions of the United States, Britain and Israel strengthened, generated new impulses of intra-Syrian contradictions. The Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights since 1967 perpetuates the ‘neither peace nor war’ situation between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Syria maintains friendly ties with Iran and, until recently, was the main corridor for Iranian arms supplies to the Shi’a Hezbollah organisation in Lebanon. The transit of oil through the north-western Kurdish-populated territories retains the potential for new disagreements with neighbouring Türkiye, where the logistics infrastructure is progressing. Meanwhile, the Kurdish issue is still a threat for internal separatism and the problem of border tension in Syrian-Turkish relations.

The intra-Syrian conflict, unresolved since 2011, has given rise to a foreign presence in the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR). First of all, these forces are the United States, Türkiye, Russia and Iran. At the same time, the United States and Türkiye are considered occupiers by Damascus; Russia and Iran are considered friendly countries and allies. Thanks to the military assistance of Russia and Iran, by 2020 it was possible to establish a ‘fragile peace’ in Syria and suppress radical anti-government forces (i.e. various Islamic terrorist groups that spun off from ISIS* (organisation banned in Russia) and ethnic organisations).

In Syria, the USA and Israel were betting on the anti-Assad Kurdish opposition and military structures, promising them new forms of autonomy. US military aid to the Kurds perpetuates the threat to the territorial integrity of Syria and neighbouring Türkiye. Nevertheless, in 2019 the Trump administration betrayed the interests of the Kurds in favour of Türkiye. 

Goals of Türkiye

Türkiye has several goals in Syria: 1) to prevent the formation of a Kurdish autonomy and localise the threat of Kurdish separatism within Anatolia; 2) to establish a 30km security zone along the border with SAR in the north-western territories of Syria with a change in the ethnic composition of the population in favour of Turkomans and Sunnis; 3) to take control of transit communications of oil trade in north-western Syria; 4) to implement the provisions of the doctrines of neo-Ottomanism and neo-pan-Turanism in the Syrian part of the Middle East; 5) to construct a gas pipeline from Qatar through Syria and Türkiye to Europe. In this regard, Ankara skilfully supports and uses pro-Turkish proxy forces in SAR, particularly the radical Sunni organisation Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS, organisation banned in Russia) and the Turkoman Syrian National Army* (SNA, organisation banned in Russia).

Russia supports the legitimate Syrian authorities, i.e. President Bashar al-Assad, and, since 2015, upon the official request of Damascus, has been providing military and political assistance to combat international terrorism and ensure peace in the region. Moscow has received two key military bases in Syria: a naval base in Tartus and an air base in Hmeimim. The Russian presence in Syria changes the balance of global forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and is an important means of achieving regional security. Given the ongoing war in Ukraine, the opening of a second front against Russia in Syria is a consequence of the anti-Russian policy of NATO countries and their partners in the region. 

Iranian ambitions

Iran maintains allied relations with the Assad regime, uses the territory of SAR to support Shi’a proxy forces both in Syria itself and in neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq, poses a threat to Israel and blocks the transit of Qatari gas to Türkiye and Europe. It was previously possible to change the situation on the battlefield and establish relative peace in SAR largely due to Iranian military support in partnership with the Russian Aerospace Forces.

Qatar and Iraq should also be mentioned among the external forces interested in the ‘Syrian solitaire’. Qatar is planning to lay a gas pipeline through Syria to Türkiye and Europe, which in many ways detonated the large-scale Syrian crisis due to the negative reaction to this project by Bashar al-Assad. In turn, Iraq is not interested in the fall of the Assad regime and the implementation of Qatar and Türkiye’s plans for a gas and oil transit project.

Why can the Syrian crisis turn into a large-scale regional conflict?

Existing contradictions have once again resulted in an outbreak of military escalation in Syria. As is known, Türkiye denies any involvement in the catalysis of a military conflict via the use of HTS* and SNA* (organisations banned in Russia). This has repeatedly been noted publicly by Turkish officials (from ministers to the president). In such a situation, who will publicly take responsibility for a conflict that threatens to transform from a local (intra-Syrian) into a regional (international) conflict involving a number of players?

Some features of the dynamics of events in the Middle East should be highlighted: in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Gaza Strip and in southern Lebanon, Qatar turned out to be one of the active mediators between the parties and the venue of the relevant negotiations. Doha maintains rather productive ties with Tel Aviv, Washington and Ankara. However, Qatar is not a partner of Syria and is unhappy with Assad’s decision vis-à-vis the gas pipeline project through SAR. In this disposition, it is impossible to exclude some interest and involvement (for example financial) of Qatar in initiating a military conflict with the government forces of Damascus with the participation of pro-Turkish proxy forces.

Perhaps that is why Recep Erdogan cannot independently stop the offensive of HTS* and SNA* (organisations banned in Russia). The weakening or the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime is in the interests of Qatar, Israel, the United States and Türkiye, but time will tell whether Ankara will receive the desired promises or find itself in a situation of subordination to the interests of Israel and the United States vis-à-vis the Kurdish threat.

In all cases, the Assad regime has shown itself to be the weak side of the conflict, as over the past four years after the signing of the well-known Russian-Turkish truce in Syria in March, 2020, Damascus has not taken advantage of the peaceful respite to train an effective army and intelligence services. Granting asylum to the remaining Hezbollah forces in Syria will certainly put that country at risk of a military conflict with Israel.

Iran has transferred additional IRGC forces, the Shi’a Hashd al-Sha’abi group from Iraq and the Ansar Allah Houthi group from Yemen to Syria. Given the statement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about Tehran’s readiness to provide the necessary military assistance at the request of Damascus, the possibility of Iranian entry into the Syrian conflict is not excluded.

Baghdad has also expressed its support for Damascus, as evidenced by telephone conversations between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani and Bashar al-Assad and Recep Erdogan. Baghdad fears that pro-Turkish forces may reach the border with Iraq.

The United States and Israel demand that Damascus break its military alliance with Iran and Russia. The opinion that Syria, being interested in lifting sanctions and receiving foreign investment, recently conducted closed negotiations in the UAE with the United States indicates possible forms of pressure on Assad in terms of achieving the desired result for Washington. As is known, current sanctions end on December 20 and any easing of them will be related to the position of Damascus and the state of affairs at the front.

The stakes of losses from the fall of the Assad regime are too high. Therefore, Iran believes that the lack of compromise and peace within the framework of the Astana process will lead to a large regional war, in which none of the participants will benefit.