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Energy & Economics

Latin American Prospects for BRICS

Inscription BRICS 2024, Kazan, Russia on a blue background. Official blue logo signage of the BRICS summit 2024 Russia in Kazan. Russia, Kazan, October 26, 2024

Image Source : Shutterstock

by Tatiana Vorotnikova

First Published in: Nov.22,2024

Dec.23, 2024

The BRICS Summit held in Kazan October 22–24, 2024, highlighted several defining developments regarding Latin American countries that will play a significant role in the continent's political and economic evolution soon. With the inclusion of two regional states as associate members of the bloc, Latin American presence in the pool of developing nations striving to expand their influence in shaping a new world order is set to increase.

 

Bolivia and Cuba joined BRICS as partners alongside 11 other countries: Algeria, Belarus, Vietnam, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Together with the core BRICS countries and new members who joined the bloc a year earlier, they form a fundamentally new framework for international cooperation, where the diversity of participants creates a platform for a polyphonic dialogue.

 

While the general outline of their interests aligns, each country has its own priorities and expectations from its participation in BRICS.

 

Interests of Bolivia

 

The multinational state of Bolivia is developing a left-oriented economic model, in which fundamental importance is given to the social redistribution of state revenues, received mainly from the exploitation of the country's resource potential. Bolivia has significant hydrocarbon reserves, primarily natural gas, as well as the largest lithium reserves on the planet, the volume of which is estimated at more than 21 million tons. While the export of Bolivian hydrocarbons (mainly to neighboring Brazil and Argentina) remains a traditional source of budget revenues, the lithium industry has relatively recently become a priority for the country's foreign economic activity. The nationalization of lithium in 2008 marked the beginning of efforts to develop deposits. However, for a number of reasons, including difficulties in attracting investment, the lack of a technological base, and resistance from indigenous populations and local environmental organizations, full-scale exploitation of the deposits—aside from some pilot projects—was never realized. Only in 2021, two Chinese and a Russian company, Uranium One Group, which is part of the management circuit of the State Corporation Rosatom, received a tender for development.

 

By joining BRICS as a partner, La Paz hopes to strengthen its position as a supplier of lithium raw materials to the global market. Given the scale of national reserves of this metal, the Bolivian government is interested in expanding the number of international investors. La Paz is ready to engage with its partners in other fields, such as energy resources and food production. BRICS countries already occupy leading positions in Bolivia's foreign economic relations. Firstly, we are talking about Brazil ($3.5 billion), China ($3.5 billion), and India (about $2 billion), which imports large volumes of Bolivian gold. In addition to trade, China is actively investing in Bolivian infrastructure and technology projects.

 

The significance of collaboration with Russia continues to increase. The lithium agreement is part of a broader strategy between the two governments to encourage investment in key sectors. On the sidelines of the Kazan summit, Presidents Luis Arce Catacora and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin held a bilateral meeting to discuss joint nuclear technologies (a unique high-mountain Nuclear Research and Technology Center (NRTC) for the peaceful use of nuclear energy has been established in Bolivia, built by Russian specialists), along with cooperation in education, lithium contracts, and other agendas that align the interests of the two countries. Additionally, La Paz and Moscow share common principles for shaping a global order and advocate for the creation of a multipolar world.

 

At the same time, it is important to consider Bolivia's complex domestic political situation and the conditions under which the country will approach the 2025 general elections. The dispute over the presidential candidacy threatens to completely dismantle the political project that has been unfolding in the country since 2006. Social divisions and economic crises are fostering a deep sense of uncertainty and pessimism within Bolivian society regarding the country's development prospects.

 

BRICS could present a new opportunity for economic breakthroughs, provided the current course is maintained after the elections. However, it is also possible that with the rise of opposition forces, Bolivia might follow the path of Argentina, which, as is known, withdrew from joining the bloc after a change of power.

 

Cuban Expectations

 

For Cuba, international support from BRICS countries represents a chance to overcome the prolonged and multifaceted crisis that the island cannot resolve on its own. Havana sees its main goals as countering unilateral American restrictive measures and seeking alternative sources of financing.  

 

Cuba maintains trade relations with all BRICS countries, though their share in Cuba’s total trade turnover remains relatively small. China holds a leading position, accounting for approximately 13% of Cuban foreign trade. The most significant growth in trade turnover occurred between 2005 and 2015, but in recent years, Cuban-Chinese relations have seen a decline. In 2018, Cuba joined China's Belt and Road Initiative, but it has yet to yield substantial results.  

 

Latin American countries account for a third of Cuba's foreign trade, with Brazil representing only 3.2%. The expansion of trade and economic ties with Russia has led to an increase in trade turnover to 7%. Thus, enhancing the intensity of external economic relations remains one of Cuba’s primary objectives.

 

At the same time, the primary obstacle to achieving this remains the U.S. economic embargo, which Cuba consistently urges the international community to oppose. While there was a thaw in bilateral relations during Barack Obama's presidency, with mutual efforts to find compromises on key issues, neither side is willing to fully abandon its positions.  

 

It should also not be assumed that Havana’s rapprochement with BRICS signals a complete abandonment of efforts to establish constructive engagement with Washington. The United States will continue to be a focal point for Cuban attention. However, given the new dynamics in the White House following the recent elections, it will be challenging for Havana to maintain the current status quo and avoid heightened pressure that could follow from the hegemon.

 

Contradictions Between Venezuela and Brazil 

 

One of the countries that shares Cuba's aspirations is Venezuela, which is under severe Western sanctions and grappling with a deep economic crisis. Caracas primarily relies on support from Russia and China. However, Venezuela's relationships with other BRICS members are far more complex.  

 

For instance, Venezuelan-Indian ties are primarily based on India's demand for oil from the Bolivarian Republic. Under pressure from U.S. sanctions, India ceased purchasing “black gold” from Caracas in 2019 but remains open to resuming cooperation if restrictions are eased.  

 

At the same time, Delhi provides no political support to the Venezuelan government, and the prospect of expanding ties in other areas appears unlikely.

 

The veto on Venezuela's inclusion in the BRICS group of partners, driven by Brazil’s position, exposed deep contradictions within the region and intensified divisions among representatives of the left wing of Latin America's political spectrum. The fact that Brazil—the only country representing the region within BRICS—became the obstacle for Venezuela caused significant backlash and sharp rejection from Caracas.

 

For Nicolás Maduro and his administration, potential membership in BRICS represents a key foreign policy objective. Maduro's close ties with Russia and strong relations with some Asian and African nations suggested high chances of acceptance. Furthermore, Venezuela maintains robust connections with several BRICS members, including Iran and China, with which it signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in 2023 (similar agreements exist between Beijing and only Russia, Belarus, and Pakistan).

 

Until recently, no open opposition to Venezuela's accession to BRICS had been observed.

 

Venezuela and Brazil have a history of strained diplomatic relations, which were severed in 2019 after then-Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president. Ties were restored only in 2023 with the return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to Brazil’s presidency. However, relations began to deteriorate again after Venezuela’s presidential elections in July 2024, in which Nicolás Maduro was declared the winner. The election results remain unrecognized by many countries, including Brazil, which officially called for the release of electoral protocols and withheld recognition of the Venezuelan government’s legitimacy.

 

The growing rift between the two nations was exacerbated by Brazil’s veto on Venezuela’s inclusion in BRICS, leading to a sharp response from Caracas. In addition to issuing strong statements against Brazil, Maduro recalled his ambassador for consultations.

 

Given that Brazil is set to chair BRICS in 2025, the current tensions have significantly diminished Venezuela’s chances of membership until relations with Brasília are restored. Considering the steadfastness and consistency of Itamaraty in implementing its foreign policy, this issue is likely to be postponed indefinitely.

 

Brazil’s Aspirations  

 

As of today, Brazil remains the only Latin American country represented in BRICS as a full-fledged member. It plays a key role on the global stage in advancing the Global South's agenda.  

 

A central figure in this process is Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who, during his two presidential terms (2003–2006, 2007–2011), pursued an active policy of fostering closer ties with developing nations in Asia and Africa. His commitment to a multilateral approach in foreign policy reflects Brazil’s national tradition of positioning itself as a regional power with global ambitions.

 

The rotation of BRICS chairmanship, coupled with the extension of Dilma Rousseff's tenure as head of the New Development Bank, appears to enhance Brazil’s prospects for expanding its role within the group and globally. In a challenging domestic political landscape, where the government faces significant opposition from a large segment of society, international achievements will be crucial for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.  

 

While Brazil struggles to consolidate its Latin American neighbors and act as a driver of regional integration, its current diplomacy has shifted focus to global initiatives. Participation in international affairs is an integral part of Brazil's national identity. Its historical tradition of engaging in multilateral forums as a regional leader, combined with its accumulated diplomatic expertise, has positioned Brazil as a significant actor on the world stage. This allows the country to wield influence far exceeding that of a developing nation burdened by substantial internal socio-economic challenges and lacking the military capabilities of great powers.

 

Brazil’s vision for a world based on international rules, where every nation has a voice, reflects its aspiration to advance a fairer global order. Through BRICS, Brazil seeks to promote this ideal, leveraging the group’s potential to amplify its influence on the global stage.

 

External Factors

 

Several other Latin American countries, such as Honduras, Nicaragua (both submitted applications ahead of the 2024 Kazan summit), and Colombia, have expressed their desire to join the bloc. This demonstrates a broad interest and intent to deepen cooperation within the Global South paradigm.  

 

Additionally, Argentina's accession to BRICS, which was renounced by President Javier Milei, is likely to remain on the agenda and may be revisited in the future. Considering that an invitation from BRICS was extended and Argentina's political landscape is subject to radical shifts, the prospect of joining the bloc could materialize if pro-BRICS forces return to power in Buenos Aires.

 

Finally, U.S. policy toward the region under Donald Trump’s administration will play a significant role in shaping the participation of Latin American countries in BRICS. While Trump’s cabinet is not yet fully formed and clear policy directions have not been outlined, various speculations are fueling uncertainty and raising expectations among different groups, without providing a clear picture.

 

What is evident, however, is that Latin American countries once again find themselves needing to react to steps taken by the northern hegemon. Attempts to establish independent policies, undertaken over recent decades by many governments in the region, primarily leftist ones, have yet to yield the desired results or become an established reality.

 

As a result, how these nations shape their foreign policies, including in other areas, will, to a certain extent, depend on Washington’s influence. In this context, BRICS, not only for newcomers like Cuba and Bolivia, could serve as a point of leverage to reduce dependence on the United States and create alternative paths for their foreign economic and political engagement.

 

In a world of global uncertainty, Latin American countries are seeking effective mechanisms to advance and strengthen their positions. 

 

Forms of international cooperation, like those provided by the BRICS format, are emerging as essential tools in this effort. This collaboration holds the potential to be both mutually enriching and highly beneficial.

First published in :

Russian International Affairs Council, RIAC

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Tatiana Vorotnikova

PhD in Political Science, Academic Secretary at the Institute of Latin American Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) expert

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