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The removal of a despised dictator brings a moment of euphoria for Syrians. But the future is uncertain as relations between rebel factions and external actors remain complicated.

Things only recently unimaginable are now happening in Syria. After 50 years of domination the Assad regime has been ousted, a transitional government has convened in Damascus, and Syrian refugees are approaching the border to enter—rather than leave—their homeland. Nonetheless, uncertainty lies ahead. Some harbour concerns about the intentions of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which spearheaded the march on Damascus and was once linked to al Qaeda.

The actions of external actors may also be difficult to predict. The Syrian civil war dragged on so long mainly due to foreign involvement as regional players supplied, funded, and urged on a diversity of militia and political groups. External intervention is likely to continue shaping events and political processes. Iran and Russia, Bashar al Assad’s main supporters, proved unable to prop his regime up any longer and after his demise will have less impact and influence. This means that Türkiye has become cemented as a central player in the affairs of its southern neighbour.

Türkiye: a key player in Syria

Türkiye has played a sizeable role in Syria since the outbreak of the war. Ankara demonstrated enormous generosity in hosting Syrian refugees, which only a month ago numbered around three million, but against which Turkish public opinion has gradually shifted. Very early in the conflict, Türkiye also began supporting anti-Assad political and military forces. Such was his confidence in an opposition victory that then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan remarked in 2012 that he would soon pray in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. This proved premature, but Türkiye continued to host and support a range of rebel militia, also allowing foreign fighters across its border. Some allege that in its eagerness to see the downfall of Assad, Türkiye turned a blind eye to some of the more unsavoury elements of the opposition, and at times even supported them. More recently, Ankara has shaped the Syrian National Army (SNA) into a force that pursues Turkish interests, and in 2020 it brokered the peace that allowed HTS to consolidate in Idlib, where it established its governance structure and began its march on Damascus.

Türkiye has also been involved in Syria due to its concerns about the political and military emergence of the Syrian Kurds. Early on in the war, Assad’s forces withdrew from northern Syria to fight off rebels closer to Damascus. Local Kurds stepped into the breach, declaring autonomy, and writing a constitution and establishing a governance structure that became the Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (AANES). Türkiye watched this with trepidation as it regards the administration and its military arm, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as extensions of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has long been in conflict with Ankara.

Complicating matters, the SDF became the boots-on-the-ground in the international campaign to defeat ISIS in Syria. This began after the United States supplied munitions and aid to Kurdish YPG and YPJ militias besieged in the Syrian town of Kobani in late 2014. Thereafter, with US support Kurdish militias rolled back ISIS, expanding their area of control. In doing so, they incorporated other rebel groups, Sunni Arab, Syriac, Armenian, and Yezidi, to become the SDF, but Türkiye continues to view the SDF as solely Kurdish and to classify it as a “terrorist” organisation due to its links with the PKK. The US maintains a military presence in northeast Syria, ostensibly to monitor ISIS, but also to forestall further Turkish encroachment. Ankara, for its part, rails against US support of the SDF.

A Turkish-Kurdish flashpoint?

Turkish-Kurdish dynamics now arise as one of the potential flashpoints in post-Assad Syria. Already things have turned sour. Even as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was urging opposition forces in Syria last week to remain united, SNA militias, backed by Turkish air power, were attacking SDF positions in Manbij, on the west bank of the Euphrates. Intense fighting was only brought to an end following a US-Turkish agreement to allow the withdrawal of Kurdish forces.

It has subsequently been reported that the SNA, again with Turkish backing, is advancing towards Kobani and the Tishreen Dam east of Aleppo. Türkiye would no doubt see the taking of Kobani as a major strategic victory. It would also likely be the death knell of any Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation, within Türkiye or elsewhere. It was in Kobani that Kurdish forces first came together to defeat ISIS, despite being on the verge of defeat, thus the city is of enormous symbolic importance to Kurds of all political stripes. If Türkiye, through its proxy the SNA, were to capture the city, it would create enormous resentment among Kurds throughout the region.

Ankara insists that the Kurdish-led administration in north-east Syria is a “terrorist organisation” that threatens Türkiye and is intent on secession from Syria. Kurds insist the very opposite, saying that AANES is a distinctly Syrian entity that opposed Assad but harbours no further territorial ambitions. External observers also note that, although not without faults, Kurdish control in northeast Syria established a relatively tolerant and distinctly multicultural order when the rest of Syria was wracked by sectarianism and violence.

Kurds fearful

Kurdish sources I have spoken with are fearful of what lies ahead and suspicious of Türkiye’s intentions in light of the SNA take over of Manbij and further attacks on SDF positions. Türkiye has previously entered northern Syria on three occasions to push SDF forces away from the border, and has continued to conduct air strikes against infrastructure. Türkiye now controls several pockets of territory in northern Syria. Yet in contrast to SDF units, Türkiye-supported Sunni Arab militias in these areas have been widely accused of human rights abuses against Kurds and others.

In these circumstances, diplomacy becomes paramount. Sinam Mohamad, a SDF representative in America, has sought assurances from Washington that the Kurds will not be abandoned. US President Joe Biden stated that US troops will remain in northeast Syria, yet Kurds are mindful of Donald Trump’s declaration that he will bring Americans home. They recall events in 2019 when Trump was outsmarted by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and allowed a Turkish incursion, resulting in numerous civilian deaths and the murder of Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf.

US-Turkish diplomatic channels are currently open, with Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in contact with Ankara and Secretary of State Antony Blinken travelling to Türkiye to discuss regional developments. Meanwhile the EU’s Ursula von Leyden has reported on “substantial exchanges” with Turkish officials. It is to be hoped that common ground can be established so that Syria’s newly found peace can be extended.

Türkiye undoubtedly has an important role to play in post-Assad Syria, but it remains to be seen if it can envision new realities that curtail hostilities between and create space for its Sunni Arab allies and the Kurdish-led administration in Syria’s northeast. If it were to do so, the benefits would ripple out across both sides of the border.