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Defense & Security
Indonesia and Pakistan, two crossed flags isolated on white background. 3d image

Civil-Military Relations in Transition: Learning from Indonesia’s Democratic Reform to Curtail Pakistan’s Military Dominance in Politics and the South Asia Region.

by Muhammad Younus , Halimah Abdul Manaf , Dyah Mutiarin

We explore a crucial comparative study between Indonesia and Pakistan, which have long histories of military intervention in politics. Written by Muhammad Younus and colleagues, it seeks to answer a pressing question: How can Pakistan reduce military dominance in its politics by learning from Indonesia’s democratic reform? The work's central theme is the struggle between military power and civilian supremacy. By analyzing Indonesia’s successful democratization after Suharto’s fall in 1998 and comparing it with Pakistan’s repeated cycles of military rule, the authors highlight institutional, political, and social reforms that can help Pakistan overcome entrenched interventionism. Military Rule in Pakistan: Historical Roots and Persistence Let's trace Pakistan’s persistent military dominance to its security-centric founding context. From independence in 1947, Pakistan faced border conflicts with India and a fragile political leadership that left a power vacuum. The deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan deprived Pakistan of strong civilian leaders, allowing the military to step in as guardian of national survival. Other factors reinforced this role: Border insecurities – the wars with India (1947–48, 1965, 1971, and later crises) created a perception that only the army could guarantee sovereignty.Geopolitics of the Cold War – Pakistan’s strategic location drew U.S. and Western support, channeling resources to the military rather than civilian governance.Weak political institutions – fragmented elites and fragile parties enabled military takeovers in 1958, 1977, and 1999. Economic and business roles of the military – Pakistan’s military developed vast commercial interests, strengthening its autonomy from civilian governments. As a result, Pakistan has spent nearly half its history under direct military rule, with civilian governments often overshadowed by the so-called establishment or deep state. This hybrid arrangement has created enduring instability and undermined democratic consolidation. Indonesia’s Trajectory: From Military Authoritarianism to Reformasi In contrast, Indonesia experienced a different but comparable pattern of military dominance. After independence in 1945, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) played a founding role in defending sovereignty. Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957–65), the military expanded its influence, but during Suharto’s New Order (1967–1998), the military became fully entrenched in politics, bureaucracy, and business. The military’s “dual function” doctrine allowed officers to control defense and governance. Civil liberties were suppressed, and military-backed elites monopolized power. However, Suharto’s collapse in 1998 amid economic crisis and mass protests triggered the Reformasi era, which brought sweeping democratic reforms: Military representatives were removed from parliament. The TNI was separated from the police and confined to defense roles. Civil society and student movements mobilized to keep the military in check. Successive civilian governments gradually asserted constitutional authority. While challenges remain, Indonesia is now regarded as one of the most successful cases of democratic transition in Southeast Asia. Comparative Themes Between Indonesia and Pakistan We identify multiple comparative themes that connect and contrast Indonesia and Pakistan. These themes highlight similarities in their historical trajectories and expose the structural differences that explain why Indonesia successfully reduced military intervention while Pakistan continues to struggle. - Muslim-Majority Identity and Political Legitimacy Both Indonesia and Pakistan are Muslim-majority states, and Islam plays a central role in legitimizing governance. In Pakistan, Islam was a founding ideology: the creation of Pakistan in 1947 was justified as a homeland for South Asian Muslims. As a result, the military often presents itself as the guardian of Pakistan’s Islamic identity and territorial integrity, using religion to strengthen its political authority. For instance, General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime (1977–1988) fused Islamization with military rule, giving the armed forces a dual role as defenders of both faith and nation. Islam also permeates social and political life in Indonesia, but its role in legitimizing military dominance has weakened. Despite being the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, Indonesia developed a more pluralist political identity under Pancasila ideology, which emphasized unity and diversity. This pluralism limited the military’s ability to monopolize religious legitimacy. Thus, while both militaries operated in religious societies, Pakistan’s military more successfully embedded itself as a religious-political actor than Indonesia’s TNI. - Colonial Legacies and Institutional Development Colonial experiences profoundly shaped state institutions. Indonesia’s 350 years under Dutch rule created a centralized but rigid bureaucracy, while Pakistan’s British colonial legacy emphasized indirect rule through local elites. In Indonesia, the Dutch left behind weak political institutions but a militarized control structure, which the TNI easily adopted after independence. In Pakistan, the British institutional legacy emphasized bureaucracy and military professionalism, but weak democratic roots allowed the army to dominate once independence brought political instability. Both states inherited fragile democratic institutions at independence. Still, Indonesia’s authoritarian consolidation under Suharto created a long, stable period of military dominance, whereas Pakistan experienced repeated coups and oscillations between military and civilian governments. - Military Dictatorships and Modes of Authoritarianism Both countries experienced prolonged military dominance, but the nature of their authoritarianism differed. In Indonesia, Suharto’s New Order (1967–1998) created a centralized, corporatist system where the military had constitutional political space under the “dual function” doctrine. Under a stable authoritarian order, the TNI occupied bureaucratic, political, and business roles. Citizens experienced repression, but the system provided economic growth and relative stability until the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis triggered a collapse. In Pakistan, military rule has been more fragmented and cyclical. Generals Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf seized power through coups, justifying intervention as necessary to restore stability. However, no institution was as stable as Suharto's system. Instead, Pakistan alternated between weak civilian governments and recurring military takeovers. The instability prevented the military from being permanently curtailed, as civilian institutions remained fragile. - Geopolitics and the Cold War Indonesia and Pakistan were strategically significant during the Cold War, but their alignments diverged. Pakistan aligned closely with the United States, joining alliances like SEATO and CENTO. As a frontline state against communism and later against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military received significant financial and military aid. This external support strengthened the army as an autonomous actor, independent of civilian oversight. Indonesia, under Sukarno, initially pursued non-alignment and even leaned toward the socialist blocs. But after the failed 1965 coup attributed to communists, Suharto realigned Indonesia with the West, becoming a key anti-communist ally. Unlike Pakistan, however, Indonesia’s external support did not give the TNI unchecked autonomy in the long run. When Suharto fell, the international community supported democratic reform, not military dominance. Thus, while both militaries were empowered by Cold War geopolitics, Pakistan’s international patronage entrenched military supremacy, whereas Indonesia’s geopolitical reorientation facilitated eventual reform. - Demography and Population Pressure Both Indonesia and Pakistan are densely populated developing countries. High population growth, urbanization, and inequality have strained governance. In Indonesia, the population pressure was partly managed through economic growth under Suharto and decentralization after democratization, though inequality and corruption remain challenges. In Pakistan, population growth and poor governance deepened social unrest. Military regimes often justified intervention by claiming that civilian governments failed to manage these pressures. Population dynamics thus fueled instability in both countries, but Indonesia’s reformist elites turned these pressures into momentum for democratization, while Pakistan’s elites often relied on military backing instead. Civil Society and Public Attitudes Civil society is a critical difference. In Indonesia, students, NGOs, and media mobilized strongly during the 1997–98 crisis. Their sustained activism ensured that reforms were not reversed after Suharto’s fall. Public opinion strongly supports civilian supremacy, and the memory of military abuses under Suharto reinforces this sentiment. In Pakistan, civil society is weaker and fragmented. While lawyers’ movements and urban middle-class activism have occasionally resisted authoritarianism (e.g., the Lawyers’ Movement of 2007–09), civil society has not been consistently able to constrain the establishment. However, recent shifts show rising criticism of military interference, suggesting potential for change. Public Mindsets: Shifts in Perceptions Another contribution of this analysis is the changing public attitudes in both countries. In Pakistan, regime changes (such as Imran Khan’s ouster) have shifted from individualistic to collective voting behavior, where people increasingly prioritize national over personal benefits. A shift from state-centric to people-centric perspectives, demanding governance that serves citizens rather than the state or establishment. Growing criticism of military involvement in politics is unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. Stronger participation in elections, with citizens using the ballot to challenge establishment influence. Calls for a new social contract, clarifying the responsibilities of political and military institutions. In Indonesia, public opinion strongly favors civilian leadership and views the military’s role as limited to national defense. While some sectors still favor military involvement in anti-corruption efforts, the dominant sentiment is democratic and reformist. Additional Regional Perspectives: Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand While this study focuses on Indonesia and Pakistan, a broader South and Southeast Asian perspective reveals that civil–military contestation is not unique to these two countries. Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand provide parallel yet distinct experiences of military intervention in politics, enriching the comparative landscape. Bangladesh Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has struggled with repeated military interventions. Coups in 1975 and 1982 entrenched the army as a dominant political actor, often presenting itself as the guardian of national stability. Like Pakistan, the military developed political parties and cultivated influence even during civilian rule. However, unlike Indonesia’s post-1998 trajectory, Bangladesh has oscillated between civilian governments led by rival parties (Awami League and BNP) and military-backed caretaker administrations. The persistence of confrontational party politics provides fertile ground for military influence, similar to Pakistan’s fragile democracy. Myanmar Myanmar represents one of the most entrenched military-dominated systems in the region. Since the 1962 coup, the Tatmadaw institutionalized military supremacy under the guise of “discipline-flourishing democracy.” Even during the 2011–2020 hybrid transition, the constitution reserved parliamentary seats and key ministries for the military, limiting civilian authority. The 2021 coup confirmed the Tatmadaw’s unwillingness to cede real power. Compared to Indonesia’s Reformasi and Pakistan’s hybrid arrangements, Myanmar illustrates a worst-case scenario: the military refuses reform and resists domestic and international pressure. Thailand Thailand’s modern political history is punctuated by repeated coups (more than a dozen since 1932). The Thai military often positions itself as the arbiter of political conflict, stepping in during crises and withdrawing after resetting political rules. The 2014 coup, followed by the 2017 constitution, institutionalized military oversight of civilian politics. Unlike Pakistan’s Islam-centered legitimacy or Indonesia’s nationalist developmentalism, Thailand’s military has leaned on monarchy-centered legitimacy and nationalism to justify interventions. Despite periods of electoral democracy, the military’s entrenched influence makes Thailand comparable to Pakistan in terms of cyclical authoritarianism, but distinct from Indonesia’s relatively consolidated democratic transition. Recommendations for Pakistan and Other South Asian Countries We draw from Indonesia’s reform success to propose recommendations for Pakistan. These can be grouped into political leadership, institutional reform, military restructuring, and civil society engagement. Strengthen Civilian Leadership and Authority Pakistan’s repeated political crises stem partly from weak leadership and fragmented parties. To emulate Indonesia, Pakistan’s leaders must: Assert authority over military appointments, ensuring that promotions and postings reflect professional criteria rather than political manipulation. Demonstrate unity among parties by agreeing not to invite or legitimize military intervention against rivals. In Indonesia, elite consensus was critical to sidelining the TNI. Build legitimacy through governance performance, reducing the military’s justification for intervention. Reduce the Military’s Commercial Empire The Pakistan Army runs one of the world’s largest military-business complexes (e.g., Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust). This gives the military financial independence and political clout. We recommend: Gradual divestment of military-run businesses to civilian authorities. Transparent auditing of military-owned enterprises. Laws restricting the army’s involvement in commercial ventures. Indonesia pursued similar reforms by curbing TNI’s business interests after 1998, a move Pakistan could replicate. Pursue Constitutional and Institutional Reforms Civilian supremacy must be enshrined legally. Key steps include: Amending the constitution to clarify the military’s defense-only role. Strengthening parliamentary committees on defense and national security to provide oversight. Enhancing judicial independence to protect civilians from military overreach. Indonesia’s constitutional amendments and reforms limiting TNI’s legislative seats offer a model. Professionalize the Military A professional military is less likely to interfere in politics. Recommendations include: Reforming military training curricula to emphasize apolitical professionalism. Enhancing civilian expertise in defense policy, reducing dependence on military decision-making. Encouraging cross-branch appointments to reduce the Army’s dominance over other services (Navy, Air Force). Empower Civil Society and Media Civil society pressure was a decisive factor in Indonesia’s Reformasi. For Pakistan: NGOs, lawyers, students, and independent media must be supported to demand transparency and accountability. Educational reforms should foster democratic values, encouraging citizens to resist authoritarianism. Digital platforms should be used to strengthen civic activism and counter establishment narratives. Encourage Civil-Military Dialogue and Trust-Building Instead of open confrontation, Pakistan must create structured spaces for civilian-military dialogue. These should: Clarify roles and responsibilities. Build trust so the military sees its institutional strength as linked to democratic stability. Encourage joint decision-making on security issues within constitutional limits. International Support for Reform Indonesia benefited from international backing after Suharto’s fall. Similarly, Pakistan’s reform agenda would require: External partners emphasizing democratic reforms in aid and cooperation. Regional diplomacy reduces Pakistan’s security anxieties, often fueling military dominance. Conclusion Civil-Military Relations in Transition is both a scholarly contribution and a practical guide. Juxtaposing Indonesia’s reformist success with Pakistan’s struggles shows that military interventionism is not inevitable but can be curtailed through leadership, reform, and public mobilization. For Pakistan, the Indonesian example offers hope and caution: reforms require political consensus, a strong civil society, and an unwavering commitment to democratic norms. Without these, cycles of intervention may persist. With them, however, Pakistan could achieve the same democratic consolidation that Indonesia has pursued since 1998. The article emphasizes that sustainable democracy rests on civilian supremacy, institutional reform, and citizen empowerment. Only by embedding these principles can Pakistan move toward stable, democratic governance and curtail the political role of its military establishment. 

Defense & Security
9th September 2025. Kathmandu, Nepal. Gen Z moment destruction in the parliament of Nepal, protest against corrupted Nepalese government and the banned of social media.

How hardships and hashtags combined to fuel Nepal’s violent response to social media ban

by Nir Kshetri

Days of unrest in Nepal have resulted in the ousting of a deeply unpopular government and the deaths of at least 50 people. The Gen Z-led protests – so-called due to the predominance of young Nepalese among the demonstrators – appeared to have quieted down with the appointment on Sept. 12, 2025, of a new interim leader and early elections. But the protests leave behind dozens of burned government offices, destroyed business centers and financial losses estimated in the billions of dollars. The experience has also underscored the importance of social media in Nepal, as well as the consequences of government attempts to control the flow of online information. I study the economic, social and political impacts of social media and other emerging technologies. Being based in Kathmandu, I have watched firsthand as what began as a protest over a short-lived ban on social media snowballed into something far greater, leading to the toppling of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli. Indeed, social media has played a crucial role in this ongoing turmoil in two ways. First, the government’s decision on Sept. 4 to ban social platforms served as the immediate catalyst to the unrest. It provoked anger among a generation for whom digital spaces are central not only to communication, identity and political expression, but also to education and economic opportunities. And second, the pervasive use of these platforms primed the nation’s youth for this moment of protest. It heightened Gen Z’s awareness of the country’s entrenched social, economic and political problems. By sharing stories of corruption, privilege and inequality, social media not only informed but also galvanized Nepal’s youth, motivating collective mobilization against the country’s systemic injustice. The role of social media As with many other nations, social media is central to daily life and commerce in Nepal, a landlocked nation of 30 million people situated between two Asian giants: China and India.   As of January 2025, just short of half the population had social media accounts. This includes some 13.5 million active Facebook users, 3.6 million Instagram users, 1.5 million LinkedIn users and 466,100 X users. Indeed, social media platforms drive roughly 80% of total online traffic in the country and serve as vital channels for business and communication. Many users in Nepal depend on these platforms to run and promote their businesses. As such, the government’s decision to block 26 social media platforms sparked immediate concern among the Nepalese public. The move wasn’t completely out of the blue. Nepal’s government has long been concerned over the growth of social media platforms. In November 2023, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology introduced new social media regulations, requiring platforms to register with the government, set up a local contact point, appoint a grievance officer and designate an oversight official. Platforms were also obliged to cooperate in criminal investigations, remove illegal content and comply with Nepali law. The Nepalese government, citing concerns over fake accounts, hate speech, disinformation and fraud, said the measures were to ensure accountability and make operators responsible for content on their platforms. Then, in January 2025, the government introduced a Social Media Bill that placed further requirements on social media platforms. Censorship concerns Regardless of their intent, these government measures sparked immediate civil liberties concerns. Critics and rights groups argued that both the ban and the bill function as tools for censorship, threatening freedom of expression, press freedom and fundamental rights. Ncell, Nepal’s second-largest telecommunications service provider, noted that shutting down all platforms at once was, in any case, technically difficult and warned that the move would severely impact business. Small business owners, who rely on social media to promote and sell their products, were especially worried with a busy festive season looming. The ban also had significant implications for education. Many students rely on social media platforms to access online classes, research materials and collaborative learning tools. More generally, the Nepalese public criticized the government’s measures disproportionate impact on ordinary users. As such, this deep reliance on social media by Nepalese society turned the ban into a flashpoint for public dissent. The rise of #NepoKids Even before the protests began on Sept. 8, the pervasive use of social media, along with exposure to content showcasing inequality and elite privilege, had heightened Gen Z’s awareness of Nepal’s entrenched social, economic and political problems. A few weeks before the protests began, the hashtags #NepoBaby and #NepoKids began trending, fueled by viral videos of politicians’ lavish lifestyles. The content drew attention to the country’s inequality by contrasting the lives of the children of the country’s elite – with designer clothing and foreign vacations – with images of Nepali migrant workers returning home in coffins from dangerous jobs abroad. The hashtag campaigns gained traction on TikTok and Reddit, leading to calls for asset investigations, anti-corruption reforms and even transferring the assets of the wealthy to public ownership. One particularly notable viral video featured the son of a provincial government minister posing in front of a tree made from boxes of luxury labels including Louis Vuitton, Cartier and Gucci. Such posts served to further fuel public outrage over perceived elite privilege. The immediacy and interactivity of social media platforms amplified the outrage, encouraging group mobilization. In this way, social media acted both as a magnifier and accelerator, linking perceived injustice to on-the-ground activism and shaping how the movement unfolded even before the Sept. 8 protests began. A deeper story of hardship and corruption Yet a social media campaign is nothing without a root cause to shine a light on. Economic insecurity and political corruption have for years left many of Nepal’s youth frustrated, setting the stage for today’s protest movement. While the overall unemployment rate in 2024 was 11%, the youth unemployment rate stood significantly higher at 21%. But these figures only scratch the surface of Nepal’s deep economic problems, which include pervasive vulnerable employment – informal and insecure work that is prone to poor conditions and pay – and limited opportunities that constrain long-term productivity. Between 2010 and 2018, fewer than half of new entrants into the workforce secured formal, stable jobs; the remainder were primarily engaged in informal or precarious work, which often lacked consistent income, benefits or legal protections. Most available positions are informal, poorly compensated and offer little stability or room for career growth. All told, children born in Nepal today face a grim economic reality. By age 18, they are likely to achieve only about 51% of their productivity potential – that is, the maximum economic output they could reach if they had full access to quality health, nutrition and education. Meanwhile, corruption is widespread. In 2024, Nepal ranked 107th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with 84% of people perceiving government corruption to be a major problem. An upshot of corruption is the growing influence of Nepal’s politically connected business elite, who shape laws and regulations to benefit themselves. In the process, they secure tax breaks, inflate budgets and create monopolies that block competition. This capture of public policy by an entrenched elite stifles economic growth, crowds out genuine entrepreneurs and exacerbates inequality, while basic public services remain inadequate. Combined, these economic and political pressures created fertile ground for social mobilization. While persistent hardships helped fuel the rise of the #Nepokids movement, it was social media that gave voice to Nepali youths’ frustration. When the government attempted to silence them through a ban on social media platforms, it proved to be a step too far.

Diplomacy
President of Russia Vladimir Putin meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2025)

Why Xi, Putin and Kim on One Stage Matters

by Roie Yellinek

Beijing’s Victory Day parade in Tiananmen Square was designed to dazzle: ranks of uniformed troops, formations of aircraft, and an arsenal of new systems meant to underscore China’s rapid military modernization. But the most consequential image was not a missile or a stealth jet. It was a tableau of three leaders—Xi Jinping at the center, flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un—watching the spectacle together. The scene, widely broadcast and photographed, turned a commemorative event into a geopolitical marker. It was less a snapshot than a signal: the public normalization of a deepening alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea, at a moment when Western democracies are struggling to sustain cohesion on core strategic questions. The parade itself offered the familiar mixture of hardware and narrative. Coverage highlighted the unveiling or public confirmation of advanced systems across domains: upgraded intercontinental missiles, new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, long-range bombers, early warning aircraft, and a broad stable of unmanned platforms, including undersea vehicles and “loyal wingman” drones. Chinese media presented these developments as evidence of a “world-class” People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moving beyond legacy constraints and into truly multi-domain operations, with information, space, and cyber now integrated alongside land, sea, and air. Independent reporting catalogued the breadth of systems and emphasized a narrative of credible deterrence and strategic depth rather than mere choreography. Yet the more instructive message was political. The presence of Putin and Kim, alongside other leaders, was not a mere ceremonial occurrence. Each leader arrived with clear incentives to be seen at Xi’s side, and each gained by lending visual weight to Beijing’s story. For Moscow, the image reinforced the claim that Russia is not isolated, that it retains powerful partners and is embedded in a wider non-Western coalition. For Pyongyang, the moment was even more significant: an opportunity to step out of diplomatic isolation and be recognized publicly as a member of a consequential strategic grouping. For Beijing, hosting both leaders signaled that China can convene and coordinate—projecting status, reassuring sympathetic governments, and unsettling adversaries by hinting at a tighter web of cooperation among U.S. rivals. The convergence behind the optics has been building for years, and could have happened only on Chinese soil. China and Russia have expanded their coordination across energy, defense, and diplomatic, even as they preserve maneuvering room on sensitive issues. North Korea’s accelerating exchanges with Russia, alongside growing political warmth with Beijing, provide a third leg to this emerging tripod. None of this amounts to a formal alliance with mutual defense obligations. But it does resemble a strategic alignment held together by shared interests: resisting a U.S.-led order, blunting sanctions pressure, reducing vulnerability to Western technology restrictions, and demonstrating that alternatives exist to dollar-centric finance and Western supply chains. The choreography on the rostrum did not create this alignment; it made it more legible and clear. Memory politics is a key component of that legibility. Beijing’s decision to anchor the parade in the commemoration of victory over Japan allows contemporary power projection to be cloaked in a unifying moral narrative. China increasingly leverages World War II memory in diplomacy—shaping a “memory war” that reframes the post-1945 order and what is seen from China as its rightful place within it. Russia’s long-standing use of the “Great Patriotic War” plays a parallel role, justifying current policies through selective historical continuity. North Korea’s revolutionary mythology fits easily into this narrative architecture. By standing together at an anniversary of anti-fascist victory, the three leaders signaled an ideational convergence that complements their material cooperation: a claim to moral legitimacy as guardians of an alternative international vision. The military dimension of the parade, while not the core of this argument, still matters. Displays of a maturing triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched systems, and an air-launched nuclear component—aim to convey survivable second-strike capacity. The public presentation of hypersonic and anti-ship systems is meant to complicate adversary planning in the Western Pacific. The range of unmanned platforms suggests an intent to saturate domains with relatively low-cost, attritable assets, improving persistence and compressing the sensor-to-shooter loop. It is prudent to treat parades cautiously: not all showcased systems are fully operational or fielded at scale, and performance claims are difficult to validate. But as an indicator, the breadth and integration of platforms reflect a planning culture committed to joint operations and “intelligentized” warfare, where AI-enabled targeting and decision support are not theoretical ambitions but programmatic priorities What, then, does the image of Xi–Putin–Kim actually change? First, it clarifies expectations. Observers no longer need to infer the trajectory of this triangular relationship from scattered bilateral overtures. The three leaders have chosen to make their alignment visible. Visibility creates deterrent value, raising the perceived costs of coercing any one member, and it can also facilitate practical cooperation: intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination at the UN and other fora, synchronized signaling during regional crises, and mutually reinforcing sanctions-evasion practices. Second, it complicates Western planning. Even if Beijing keeps caution around direct military assistance in Europe or the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic top-cover, economic buffering, and technology flows short of lethal aid can still alter the correlation of forces over time. Finally, it resonates across the Global South. Many governments seek strategic autonomy and resist being forced into binary choices. The parade’s optics supplied a ready-made narrative for those who argue that the international system is already multipolar and that non-Western coalitions can deliver security and development without Western tutelage. The contrast with Western coordination was strikingly evident. In the transatlantic community, support for Ukraine remains substantial; however, debates about resource levels, war aims, and timelines have intensified. In the Indo-Pacific, there is a growing alignment on deterring coercion in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; however, national economic interests and differing risk tolerances result in uneven policies toward China. Across Europe and North America, electoral politics continue to inject volatility into foreign policy, complicating efforts to sustain long-term, bipartisan strategies. None of these frictions amounts to collapse, and there are genuine Western successes in coalition-building—from NATO enlargement to evolving minilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific. However, an analytically honest reading of the moment acknowledges that the authoritarian trio in Beijing has projected a unity of purpose that Western capitals currently struggle to match consistently. Three implications follow. The first is narrative competition. If Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang can turn a commemorative event into a global story about legitimacy and resilience, they will continue to use history as a strategic resource. The appropriate Western response is not to cede the narrative field but to invest in historically grounded, forward-looking messaging that explains the link between rules-based order and practical benefits—trade reliability, crisis management, and sovereignty protection—for diverse audiences. The second is coalition maintenance. Western policymakers will need to prioritize “coalition hygiene”: aligning export controls and investment screening where it matters most; building redundancy into critical supply chains; closing divergences in sanctions enforcement; and coordinating messaging so that tactical differences do not obscure strategic alignment. This requires political discipline more than new institutions. The third is theater integration. As the Beijing image suggested a cross-regional understanding among three adversarial capitals, allied planning must better account for cross-theater linkages—how actions in Europe affect deterrence in Asia, and vice versa—and ensure that resource allocations and industrial policies reflect genuinely global prioritization. It is important not to overstate. The emerging alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea is asymmetric and interest-based, not a tightly binding alliance. Beijing’s global economic integration imposes constraints that Moscow and Pyongyang do not share. Russia and North Korea each bring liabilities that China will manage carefully. Frictions—over technology, pricing, and regional equities—will persist. But the threshold crossed in Beijing is nonetheless meaningful. These governments judged that the benefits of public proximity now outweigh the costs. That judgment, once made, is difficult to reverse quickly; it tends to generate its own momentum through bureaucratic follow-through and sunk reputational costs. One image cannot rewrite the balance of power. It can, however, crystallize a trend and concentrate minds. The sight of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing together did exactly that. It captured an authoritarian convergence rooted in shared grievances and converging strategies, and it highlighted the challenge facing democracies that wish to preserve an open and stable order: maintaining the patience, unity, and policy discipline to act together. The test for the West is less whether it recognizes the signal—most capitals do—than whether it can convert recognition into sustained, collective action. If Beijing’s parade was a demonstration of choreography and intent, the appropriate answer is not a counter-parade, but the quieter work of alignment: aligning narratives with interests, interests with instruments, and instruments with partners. That work is not glamorous. It is, however, what turns a photo into policy.

Energy & Economics
At Singapore 2023 075

A Post-Humanist Perspective of Singapore's Ecomodernist Leadership

by Sasha Maher , Rhiannon Lloyd , Lydia Martin

Abstract Green growth has become doxa in the political economic governance of climate change. This is despite the lack of empirical evidence of its success and concerns that it reifies a business-as-usual dynamic. The question arises: why have practices of ‘green leadership’ maintained a hegemonic hold on how nation states respond to climate change? This provocation examines this question through an analysis of Singapore's policy ambition to become Asia's climate services leader. It draws on post-humanism to suggest that the form of ecomodernist leadership exhibited by Singapore not only perpetuates the status quo but (re)affirms the problematic anthropocentrism underpinning their approach. We demonstrate this through analysis of recent policy, media and private sector documents. Finally, we argue that a focus on Singapore matters because of its influence in the region and networked position globally. Introduction Singapore has emerged as a leader of green growth since gaining independence from Malaysia in 1965. Governed by the People's Action Party (PAP) since 1959, the city-state has pursued a developmental strategy focused on economic growth and wealth accumulation, despite its lack of natural resources. This strategy encompassed value-added manufacturing, high-tech research and financial services, propelling Singapore from a modest per capita GDP in 1965 of USD $516 to a substantial figure of USD $82,807 in 2022 (World Bank, 2022). However, this rapid development brought with it cumulative environmental challenges, including high Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, air pollution, ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss (Goh, 2001). In response, Singapore reframed these issues as economic opportunities, effectively folding an ecomodernist or green growth approach into its development agenda (Dent, 2018; Hamilton-Hart 2006, 2022). This shift was significantly influenced by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's first Prime Minister, whose vision of a ‘Garden City’ involved a massive, ongoing tree-planting initiative. This initiative was not just an ecological project but a strategic move to attract foreign investment by showcasing Singapore as a modern, liveable city, thereby aligning nature conservation with economic development (Schneider-Mayerson, 2017). Building on Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's leadership, Singapore has continued to adopt ecomodernist policies, promoting concepts such as sustainability as essential for maintaining its competitive edge in the global arena. The state's stance on climate change illustrates this approach: initially seen as a threat and often couched as an enemy in official discourse, climate change has been transformed into an opportunity for growth. This perspective is epitomised in the annual three-day Ecosperity conference, an elite gathering emphasising the synergy between ecological sustainability and economic prosperity. However, this green growth approach has faced criticism for prioritising human needs over ecological integrity (Dent, 2018; Schneider-Mayerson, 2017; Wong, 2012), suggesting that Singapore's model of ‘green’ leadership may not be sufficient for addressing the root causes of climate change and other environmental challenges. We are similarly concerned at Singapore's leadership stance towards climate change. The latest rendition of this is its ambition to become Asia's climate finance ‘leader’ and a hub of carbon trading. Not only does Singapore's green growth approach narrowly cast complex environmental issues as technical problems requiring technical solutions but it renders nature as an object to be used for human development. This anthropocentrism negates non-human agency, instrumentalises nature and limits the radical change necessary as others have noted (Böhm and Sullivan, 2021; Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2021; Nyberg and Wright, 2023). In the following provocation, we draw on post-humanist critique of anthropocentrism to give a brief overview of green growth (Braidotti, 2013, 2019; Calás and Smircich, 2023). Second, we outline Singapore's emissions profile and latest policy response. We then surface three themes which are indicative of how Singapore's green leadership frames nature as non-agentic and subservient to humans. These themes are: ‘nature as risk producer’, ‘nature as instrument’ and ‘nature's demise as opportunity’. Anthropocentrism and Green Growth The discourse on greening capitalism emerged in the mid-2000s as initiatives by the United Nations Environmental Program, OECD and World Bank. At the Rio + 20 Conference these three organisations released publications promoting green growth with titles that evoked mutual compatibility such as Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development and Toward a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication. Subsequently, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change enshrined green growth in the 2015 Paris Agreement in Article 10, paragraph 5, ‘Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth’ (United Nations UNFCCC, 2015: 27). Since then, the prevalence of green growth ideas has accelerated and diffused globally, taken up by states supranational organisations and non-states actors. It has remained a key policy theme at influential climate governance fora. For example, at the recent Green Swan 2023 conference, keynote Sir Nicolas Stern confidently declared that ‘there's no conflict between action on climate change and economic growth. Actually, it's the opposite. Action on climate change will drive economic growth’. Omitted from Sterns's assertion is recognition of the ‘coupling’ effect whereby economic growth has also led to the exploitation of non-humans and a concomitant climate crisis. Green growth approaches view nature as the means to create economic development as measured by GDP. The key assumption is that ‘the environment’ and humans as consumers or workers (see Mildenberger 2020) will both equally benefit through this process of instrumentalisation. The method to achieve the ‘decoupling’ of emissions (or ecological destruction) from GDP is via the application of technologies, investment, markets and innovation. Implementation of these methods will ostensibly redirect capital and production towards the efficient use of resources without disrupting consumption patterns and minimising ‘harm’ to nature. Nature in this framing is characterised as both threatening to humans (‘risk producer’) and simultaneously vulnerable (‘object at risk’). In either case, human beings are presupposed as the agents who will restore the orderliness of life; an orderliness where humans are the dominating species (Ruuska, Heikkurinen and Wilen, 2020) and the state of vulnerability is erased (Schwartz, 2019). At its core green growth is founded on the notion of efficiency gains, but as others (Hickel, 2021; Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Jackson, 2021) have noted, empirically there is no evidence that relative or absolute decoupling will arrest and restore the planet nor reduce carbon emissions permanently to levels that could keep global warming below 1.5 degrees. Efficiency has limitations and at some point, input is required to continue to grow which makes ongoing decoupling in the long-term unsustainable. This calls for an urgent rethinking of policy and the opening up of alternative possibilities such as degrowth or post-growth (Jackson, 2021). However, shifting the paradigm away from wealth accumulation and material prosperity would alter production and consumption patterns. As Hickel and Kallis (2019) remark, this type of transformation would not be politically expedient: ‘The assumption is that it is not politically acceptable to question economic growth and that no nation would voluntary limit growth in the name of the climate or environment; therefore, green growth must be true, since the alternative is disaster’ (2019: 484). Green growth may not only be implausible but it also dangerously reifies dualistic thought-structures that universalises and positions humankind as the privileged, superior species, a tendency which has underpinned the exploitative and extractive relationship between humans and nature that has driven climate change. It also ferments a ‘politics of resignation’ in which citizens tacitly accept harmful externalities (Benson and Kirsch, 2010). In line with post-humanist thought, we perceive nature through a relational lens. From this perspective, ‘nature’ is not a separate entity that exists apart from and below ‘culture’ (e.g., humans, organisations and nation states). Rather nature is understood to be a dynamic, open-ended and interactive ‘living system’ that encompasses all forms of life and matter (Braidotti, 2016). This relational framing of nature is positive in that it attributes agency and vitality to all life and not exclusively to humans and their doings (Braidotti, 2013). In short, more-than-human natures such as the ‘natural environment or ‘atmosphere’ are not tractable or deadened backgrounds for human action but are creative forces that shape life, including our own. In taking this ontological position, post-humanism surfaces and critiques anthropocentric assumptions evident in culture and society (Braidotti, 2013), providing a unique standpoint from which to deconstruct and challenge green growth. Singapore the Green City-StateEmissions Profile Singapore's GHG emissions for 2021 totalled 53 MtCO2e (National Climate Change Secretariat, 2021). In 2000, emissions were 38 MtCO2e and continues to increase over time. These emissions cover direct or primary emissions (Scope 1, 2): energy (39.2%), industry (44.4%), transport (14.2%), building (0.9%), households (0.4%), waste and water (0.6%) and others (0.2%). Secondary or indirect emissions (Scope 3) created within the energy sector from Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) at 94% are mostly in industry (16.6%), buildings (12.6%), household (6.6%) and transport (2.2%). Industry emissions amount to over 60% of Singapore's total emissions of which 75% are from the combustion of fossil fuels by the refining and petrochemicals sector (Tan, 2019). Singapore ranks 27th out of 142 countries in terms of emissions per capita but excluded from official statistics are the emissions from bunkering/marine fuels sales which was 148 MtCO2e in 2020 (The International Council of Clean Transportation, 2022). The rationale for the exclusion is that the UNFCC does not require GHG inventories to include emissions from shipping nor aviation. In 2021 Singapore set a new National Determined Commitment target of limiting GHG emissions in 2030 to 60 MtCO2e from 65 MtCO2e. It also brought forward its emission peak year to sometime ‘before 2030’ and confirmed its target to reach net zero emissions ‘as soon as viable in the second half of the century’ (National Climate Change Secretariat, 2022). Singapore's main mitigation actions were outlined in its long-term low-emission development strategy. These comprise three areas: (a) to transform industry, economy and society; (b) to draw on carbon capture, utilisation and storage and low-carbon fuels; and (c) international collaboration to build carbon markets, carbon storage and regional electricity grids. A key policy lever is Singapore's progressive carbon tax rate which covers 43% of emissions according to Climate Action Tracker (2022). The rate was increased from $5 SGD/tCO2e in 2019 to $25/tCO2e in 2024 and will reach $50–80/tCO2e by 2030. Carbon tax-liable companies are permitted to use carbon credits to offset up to 5% of emissions. However, these credits can only be obtained via the Singapore government's International Carbon Credit Framework under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement and not the voluntary carbon market. The tax works on multiple fronts: it drives demand to create a carbon market, derisks companies to increase investor confidence and incentivises decarbonisation efforts in Singapore and in credit producing host countries. Singapore's other mitigation efforts consist of energy efficiency and resource optimisation across industry, households, buildings, waste management and public transport. Green Finance Leader Singapore is positioning itself as Asia's hub for carbon trading. The government outlines this in its most recent master plan for addressing climate change: Singapore Green Plan 2030 (SGP). Launched in 2020, SGP 2030 aims to centre the city-state as a regional ‘leader’ in climate action and sustainable development, aligning with global commitments such as the UN's 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. The plan represents a collective effort across five key ministries, guided by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change. It focuses on five pillars: City in Nature, Sustainable Living, Energy Reset, Green Economy and Resilient Future, striving for efficient resource use, low-carbon energy adoption and innovation-driven change. Key initiatives include enhancing green spaces, promoting water conservation, expanding clean public transport and mandating clean energy vehicles by 2030. The Green Economy pillar of the SGP is particularly significant, framing environmental challenges as opportunities for economic growth. This involves incentivising carbon capture technologies and establishing Singapore as a carbon services and trading hub through the Green Finance Action Plan 2022 (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2022). The plan aims to create a robust green financial ecosystem, making Singapore a global centre for green finance. This includes developing markets for sustainable economic solutions, such as green bonds and insurance products. A study commissioned by the government in 2021 highlighted Singapore's potential to become a carbon trading hub, estimating its value between USD 1.8 billion to USD 5.6 billion by 2050 (Carvalho et al., 2021). As part of its green leadership plan Singapore is also entering into strategic partnerships under Article 6.2 with ‘carbon-rich’, developing countries. It has signed agreements with Vietnam, Bhutan, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Rwanda, Costa Rica, Ghana, Senegal, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Chile, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kenya, Mongolia, Morocco, Peru and Sri Lanka. It also recently signed a Green Economy Agreement with Australia with the aim to generate demand and facilitate the trading of Australian carbon credits. The aim of these Article 6.2 agreements is to facilitate the trading of Internationally Transferrable Mitigation Outcomes or carbon credits which are generated from the reduction of emissions in one country (e.g., PNG) which is then bought by a second country (e.g., Singapore, New Zealand). However, Singapore's interest extends to the role these partnerships play in helping to establish a trading market in Singapore. In its agreements, Singapore asserts that ‘when completed carbon tax liable companies in Singapore will be able to purchase carbon credits from eligible projects to offset up to 5% of their taxable emission’ (National Climate Change Secretariat, 2023). Article 6.2 partnerships not only help reduce costs for Singapore companies but bring to market a portfolio of credit sellers for trading on Singapore's new trading platform, Climate Impact X. Ecomodernist Themes of Nature A post-humanist perspective on Singapore's ambition to transform into a climate leader surfaces three ecomodernist or green growth themes. These themes are: ‘nature as risk producer’, ‘nature as instrument’ and ‘nature's demise as opportunity’. Across these themes, it is implied that humans take priority and should utilise nature to achieve economic growth. A conventional approach would ignore this dualism and support the instrumentalisation of nature without awareness nor concern that this thought-structure plays a key part in producing climate change. In official organisational documents and speeches regarding Singapore's ambitions to create a global carbon trading hub, Singapore is presented as a model city and a vanguard in terms of environmental actions. Reference is also frequently made to the ‘founding father’, and visionary environmental leader, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Nature as Risk Producer Politicians, officials and industry often, if not always, portray climate change as the result of nature being ‘out of place’ and consequently hostile towards the vulnerable nation-state (Douglas, 1966; Ruuska et al., 2020). For example, below is an extract from the SGP which sets up the catastrophic framing, and two quotes from Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong followed by Grace Fu Minister for Sustainability and the Environment at the COP28: Climate change is an existential threat of our times. It has brought rising sea levels and extreme weather patterns…Singapore, as a low-lying island state, is particularly vulnerable. Our weather is getting warmer, rainstorms heavier, and dry spells more pronounced (Singapore Government). Singapore [is] a low-lying, alternative-energy disadvantaged island-state. We therefore appreciate the inherent challenges in climate transitions. However, we believe that new technologies, new financing models and new markets offer us hope (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2023). Singapore is a small city-state, lacking in renewable energy. We are a low-lying island that is acutely vulnerable to the threat of rising sea levels. We are an urbanised city near the equator, susceptible to rising temperatures (Ministry of Sustainability and the Environment Singapore, 2023). The narrative that nature is a risk producer is a form of spatial anthropocentrism in which Earth and beyond are considered the rightful and exclusive spaces for humans (Ruuska et al., 2020). If nature was tame and in its proper docile place, then humans would not be at risk. The reasonable response to this logic is to put nature back in its place by constructing hard engineering solutions, such as sea walls and defending infrastructure that deliver services to humans (e.g., water, electricity, transport, telecommunication), alongside the use of soft solutions to absorb the costs of rebuilding, for example, via flood insurance. Nature as Green Growth Tool The case of Singapore demonstrates that the objectification of nature is a prerequisite to instrumentalisation. Our second theme – nature as a green growth tool – is evident in Singapore's continuation of its long-standing Garden City strategy: nature to be altered to ensure the material prosperity of the populace and thus maintain PAP's political legitimacy (Barnard and Heng, 2014; Hamilton-Hart, 2006, 2022; Schneider-Mayerson, 2017). For example, in the SGP, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is quoted as follows: Over 100 years ago, this was a mudflat, swamp. Today, this is a modern city. Ten years from now, this will be a metropolis. Never fear (Singapore Government). The SGP then follows this quote from Prime Minister Lee by stating that,…Having advanced from mudflats, to metropolis, we will turn our metropolis into a global city of sustainability (Singapore Government). Today, Singapore is a City in a Garden, and is one of the greenest cities in the world. We set aside large nature reserves, with about a third of our island covered by trees. We knew public cleanliness and hygiene were important to prevent diseases in our hot and humid urban environment and took tough measures to enforce them (Singapore Government). There is a direct link made between using nature as a tool and nation building. As a consequence of this argument, any opposition to Singapore's ‘global’ ambitions could be viewed as a threat to the state, unpatriotic and regressive. The use of nature as instrument for green growth is most stark under the Green Economy pillar. Nature's Demise as Opportunity The third theme evident in Singapore's attempts to position itself as a ‘green leader’ also concerns the instrumentalisation of nature but takes it a step further, with nature's destruction as a result of anthropogenic climate change being presented as a means to stimulate economic development. In the SGP, four of the pillars focus on efficiency and optimising production and consumption of natural resources. However, the Green Economy pillar not only seeks to capitalise on nature but intends to prosper from its demise. The discourse on the climate crisis is rewoven as a narrative about ‘seizing’ opportunities from the climate crisis and the ensuring there is pressure on states and corporates to act. Similar to disaster capitalism, the impacts of climate change are a new business venture for Singapore to advance its developmentalist approach. Below are instances of this discourse: As the world transits to a low-carbon future, there are many exciting new opportunities in the green economy. For instance, the increasing demand for green financing and carbon services will create good jobs and new opportunities for our enterprises (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2022). Singapore's Green Plan aims to harness sustainability as ‘a new engine of growth’ …Under the plan, the Singaporean government will lead and drive all economic actors to make the transition toward more sustainable economic models, including establishing the country as a hub for green finance, carbon trading and sustainability consultancy (Wangkiat, 2021). We must seek out new areas of cooperation. This will allow us to deepen collaboration while also strengthening our relevance as a global business hub. Sustainability is one area where there are interesting opportunities for growth and strong potential for international collaboration. Green financing, carbon services, and trading are some examples of the new industries that we can look forward to in the green economy (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2023). Singapore is unequivocal in highlighting the competitive advantage that the climate crisis holds for the state. This intensification of the instrumentalism of its Garden City strategy serves not only to commodify but also to financialise climate change. As Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman (2021: 1320) remark, ‘The Anthropocene is not a story of unintended consequences but is a direct result of a political economy that privileges wealth accumulation at the expense of environmental destruction’. The growth imperative inherent in capitalism relies on the appropriation of nature's ‘resources’ at a low-cost despite ecological consequences. Capitalism seeks to exploit ‘cheap’ resources, including land, labour and energy. This pursuit of cheap inputs is founded on the ontological separation between humans and nature, and the devaluing of nature and some humans compared to others. Capitalism unleashes ‘a “metabolic rift” in the relationship between humans and the earth, resulting in an environmental crisis that now threatens the very basis of life on the planet’ (Wright et al., 2018: p. 459; see also Foster, 2012; Nyberg et al., 2022). Conclusion The three themes explored above underscore how Singapore continues to conceptualise nature as ‘other’. The current understanding of ‘green leader’ and what is legitimate and required in order to be considered ‘green’ maintains a primarily economically centred political agenda. This ‘ecomodernist leadership’ regime is preoccupied by quantitative measures of a known and knowable nature. In short, being ‘green’ requires the improvement of these numbers in directions agreed as beneficial to both the economic and environmental systems they reflect and relate to. Such instrumentalism provides one means towards green futures, but we would argue that this dangerously reifies the dualistic exploitative relations that underpin climate change (e.g., Moore, 2016). Green growth and other notions of ‘greening’ (e.g., Green Economy, Green Finance) do not alter the problematic of anthropocentrism but rather propagate and support a Promethean logic (Dryzek, 2022). So, although Singapore's portion of global emissions is small at 0.1%, we would suggest that Singapore's contribution to climate change extends beyond this number due to its green leadership stance and practices. However, in this respect, Singapore is not alone, various influential multinational institutions, civil society, private sector and state actors such as Australia and New Zealand could also be viewed as holding additional responsibilities. Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ReferencesBarnard TP, Heng C (2014) A city in a garden. In: Barnard TP (ed) Nature contained: Environmental histories of Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press, 281–306.Benson P, Kirsch S (2010) Capitalism and the politics of resignation. Current Anthropology 51(4): 459–486.Böhm S, Sullivan S (2021) Introduction. In: Climate crisis? What climate crisis? Negotiating climate change in crisis. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 1–3.Braidotti R (2013) Posthuman humanities. 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Nature, history, and the crisis of capitalism. Oakland: PM Press.National Climate Change Secretariat (2021) Singapore's Emissions Profile [Online]. https://www.nccs.gov.sg/singapores-climate-action/singapores-climate-targets/singapore-emissions-profile/ (accessed 4 May 2024).National Climate Change Secretariat (2022) Singapore's Long-Term Low-Emissions Development Strategy [Online]. https://www.nccs.gov.sg/media/publications/singapores-long-term-low-emissions-development-strategy/ (accessed 4 May 2024).National Climate Change Secretariat (2023) Singapore and Paraguay Substantively Conclude Negotiations on Implementation Agreement [Online]. https://www.nccs.gov.sg/media/press-releases/singapore-and-paraguay-substantively-conclude-negotations-on-ia/ (accessed 4 May 2024).Nyberg D, Wright C (2023) Organising Responses to Climate Change: The Politics of Mitigation, Adaptation and Suffering. 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Diplomacy
President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping together at SCO Summit

India’s strategic reset in Tianjin

by Harsh V. Pant , Atul Kumar

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin turned out to be the largest gathering in the institution’s history, convening 20 foreign leaders and 10 heads of international organisations, including United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. More than a display of institutional breadth, the summit served as a stage for geopolitical signalling, most visibly through the joint presence of the leaders of China, India, and Russia. Their highly choreographed meetings were designed for maximum optics and deployed as deliberate instruments of international messaging, reflecting the emergence of a multipolar world. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the summit provided an opportunity to engage closely with both India and China while demonstrating that Moscow is not bereft of partners. Chinese President Xi Jinping aimed to use the occasion to burnish his credentials as the architect of an emergent political and economic order. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, conveyed a distinct and calculated message — that Indian foreign policy is rebalancing its strategic relations with the world’s major powers and restoring its posture to the centre. In doing so, New Delhi is translating its long-proclaimed doctrine of multi-alignment into practice, positioning itself as a pivotal actor in an increasingly multipolar system. Strategic Leverage  Since the end of the Cold War, Indian foreign policy has been adjusting by building its ties with the West in general and the US in particular. To illustrate in just one domain, New Delhi has purchased an array of advanced US systems, including C-17 and C-130 strategic airlift aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol planes, Chinook, Apache, and MH-60R helicopters, F404/414 engines, and MQ-9 drones, transactions that together totalled $24 billion between 2000 and 2024. This surge in US acquisitions has coincided with a marked decline in Russian influence: Moscow’s share of India’s arms imports fell from 76 per cent during 2009–2013 to just 36 per cent over the past five years. India’s pivot toward the US, and its rapid defence and economic diversification have kept Beijing on edge. During the Cold War, China extracted substantial strategic and economic benefits while playing a swing-state role between Washington and Moscow. Today, Chinese observers worry that India may play a similar role as its vaunted strategic autonomy has given way to a de facto US alignment, visible in defence procurement, economic cooperation, and a network of mini-laterals aimed at constraining Beijing. However, this narrative has softened somewhat after President Trump imposed a 50 per cent tariff on Indian exports, introducing a note of friction into the US-India equation. Against this backdrop, New Delhi and Beijing, cautiously engaging since the 2024 Kazan Summit, have stepped up their rapprochement efforts. At their bilateral meeting in Tianjin, both sides signalled a clear desire to restore stability and predictability: The focus on peace along the border and rebuilding mutual trust was unmistakable. Mr Xi emphasised strengthened communication, expanded exchanges, and multilateral cooperation, all aimed at returning bilateral relations to a pre-2020 baseline. Mr Modi, visiting China after seven years, framed a peaceful border as essential to the smooth development of the broader relationship. He also ensured that counterterrorism remained front and centre at the SCO, with the final Tianjin Declaration explicitly and emphatically condemning the Pahalgam terror attack in India. Structural Tension Vs Strategic Triangulation Beneath the polished optics, the India-China standoff remains unresolved. Around 60,000 troops on each side still face off along the Line of Actual Control, and Tianjin offered no concrete road map for demobilisation or border delimitation. Disputes over Pakistan, Tibet, and Taiwan persist, a reminder that diplomacy cannot paper over deep strategic fissures. Strategic triangulation adds another layer of complexity. Both capitals have long leveraged ties with third powers to boost bargaining power and extract economic or diplomatic advantage. Beijing seeks a show of unity with India against Washington’s tariffs but remains wary: If New Delhi secures a better deal, alignment with the US is always on the table. Institutionally, the SCO continues to lag behind Brics in global visibility, yet its operational significance is rising. China’s trade with SCO members hit $512.4 billion in 2024, doubling the 2018 level. Therefore, Mr Xi’s advocacy for a “new type of international relations”, coupled with initiatives such as the SCO Development Bank and multilateral cooperation in energy, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy, reflects a strategic calculus: to insulate Beijing from the volatility of Washington while steering the engines of future economic growth. Ultimately, the India-China meeting in Tianjin exemplified a nuanced balancing act: cooperation where feasible, vigilance where imperative, and a stark reminder that even as optics improve, the underlying geopolitical chessboard remains fiercely contested. Conclusion Mr Modi’s Tianjin visit and his meeting with Mr Xi signalled New Delhi’s growing international leverage. The summit remains low on concrete agreements, but it revitalised efforts to normalise ties and restart Chinese investment in India. Therefore, visa restrictions are loosening, direct flights are set to resume, and barriers to Chinese exports of fertiliser, machinery, and rare earths are gradually falling. Beneath the diplomatic optics, however, structural competition between India and China persists. Nevertheless, New Delhi is carefully striving to avoid overreliance on Washington, resisting a return to single-nation dependency. The India-China-Russia camaraderie on display in Tianjin sends a deliberate signal: Indian foreign policy will not be shy to reclaim its centrist, multi-aligned stance, leveraging strategic autonomy to navigate a complex, multipolar world. This commentary originally appeared in Business Standard.

Energy & Economics
Glass world bank building. Financial concept. Golden inscription bank. Banking. 3D render.

Closing the global financing gap in social protection: A World Bank perspective

by Iffath Sharif

Universal social protection coverage is off-track Time and time again we see the importance of universal social protection. It is a first line of defense to avoid deepening poverty in crises and helps overcome systemic poverty by empowering people to become economically self-reliant and invest in themselves and their children. Still over 3.4 billion people live without social protection coverage (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2021)1 and most of them live in low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs). Social protection spending relative to gross domestic product (GDP) is 4.5 times lower in LICs than in high-income countries, with little change from a decade ago. Moreover, globally, only about 25% of financing goes for the poorest 20% of the population (Tesliuc et al., 2025). Low coverage and stagnant financing stand in stark contrast to increasing risks that disproportionately affect people living in poverty, including from climate change and growing conflict and fragility. For uncovered households, the impact of any single shock can mean having to skip meals, sell off valuable assets, and pull children out of school, all with lifelong impacts. To accelerate progress against these challenges, the World Bank has set an ambitious new target to extend social protection coverage to an additional half a billion extremely poor and vulnerable people by 2030. Achieving this goal will require collective action to address the global fiscal deficit in social protection spending. Financing reform to double down on our social protection coverage Reaching half a billion people with social protection will entail continuing to work with over 70 governments, leveraging our knowledge and learning through building new evidence, facilitating cross-country peer-to-peer exchange, and close collaboration with development partners. There will also be a need to make meaningful use of the World Bank’s existing social protection financing of US$29 billion to continue investments in digital delivery systems to make spending in social protection more efficient. Such foundational investments can help to leverage labor market and fiscal reforms and complementary financing to reach our goal. Five specific actions could increase social protection financing to reach more people. Improve effectiveness of current social protection spending A top priority is to ensure that existing social protection budget resources are spent effectively. We must redouble efforts to ensure that resources reach those who need them most, and investing in delivery systems that improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of services. There is strong potential for existing social protection funding to make substantial gains against poverty. For emerging and developing economies (EDEs) with extreme poverty headcount below 10%, improved pro-poor targeting of existing social assistance budgets could virtually eliminate extreme poverty in these countries. And even in LICs and LMICs with extreme poverty rates from 20% to 80%, existing budgets could significantly decrease the total income shortfalls of the poorest 20% of the population. As of 2022, the income shortfall of the extreme poor in EDEs was estimated at US$163 billion (in USD 2017 purchasing power parity [PPP]). Improving the efficiency of existing social assistance spending to technically and politically feasible levels could reduce this shortfall to US$120 billion (Tesliuc et al., 2025). With increasing fiscal constraints, prioritizing high return investment is more important now than ever. Government-led Economic Inclusion (EI) programs are one such option, with long-run benefits that significantly outweigh initial costs. Niger’s EI program demonstrated a benefit-cost ratio of 127% 18 months after implementation, while in Zambia, the program costs break even with their returns in just 12 months. Assuming sustained impacts, both Niger and Zambia show positive returns on investment, at 73% and 36%, respectively (Bossuroy et al., 2022; Botea et al., 2023). How benefits reach people matters too. Digitalization of delivery systems, for example, can improve the efficiency of existing spending. In Liberia, the cash transfer program struggled with physical cash payments that took around 17 days on average and cost nearly US$8 per transfer. Now, the introduction of mobile payment has reduced delivery costs to US$2.5 per transfer and reduced the timeframe for delivery of missed payments substantially (Tesliuc et al., 2025). Prioritize progressive spending, and realize climate benefits in the process Globally, generalized subsidies on fossil fuels, agriculture, and fisheries exceed US$7 trillion (roughly 8% of global GDP); they are regressive, inefficient, expensive, and environmentally unsound (Arze del Granado et al., 2012; Damania et al., 2023). In the Middle East and North Africa, those subsidies are over five times higher than spending on cash transfers and twice as high as social assistance (Ridao-Cano et al., 2023). Redirecting inefficient fuel subsidies to social protection using dynamic and digital social registries could lead to more effective and better-targeted benefits. This also has the advantage of discouraging fossil fuel usage, thereby contributing to national and global climate goals. Egypt showcases the potential impacts of successful subsidy reform. One year after beginning to phase out fuel subsidies, the government used the resources saved to double the health budget, increase education spending by 30%, and launch a new national cash transfer program. The cash transfer program, Takaful and Karama, now reaches almost 20% of the population with targeted and effective assistance (El Enbaby et al., 2022). Continued investment in digital systems by Egypt helped to scale up this support, ensuring that those in need receive resources and services directly while minimizing wasteful expenditure on fuel subsidies. Increase the domestic tax base for social protection spending When efficiency gains and reallocation are insufficient, countries can enact appropriate tax reforms to increase domestic revenues toward adequate social protection coverage. Policy recommendations include broadening the tax base through appropriate tax reforms including a thorough fiscal incidence analysis, enhancing the progressiveness and effectiveness of the tax system, and supporting domestic revenue mobilization (World Bank, 2022). Bolivia, Botswana, Mongolia, and Zambia increased their revenue base with new taxes on natural resources that were earmarked for social protection and Brazil did likewise with a tax on financial transactions (Bierbaum and Schmitt, 2022). Efforts to increase domestic resources to broaden social protection coverage also require ringfencing progressive public spending. Social protection programs often face fierce competition across different government priorities for limited resources. Fiscal reforms therefore must come with the political will to prioritize social protection budget allocations. Citizen engagement can help: with support from United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and ILO, Mozambique adopted Social Action Budget Briefs to monitor social protection budget allocations against national strategic objectives (Bierbaum and Schmitt, 2022). Demonstrate impact to leverage climate financing Already the World Bank has investments of almost US$21 billion across 91 social protection programs with activities that help poor people respond better to the risks of climate change. We must continue to demonstrate how social protection supports poor and vulnerable people in adapting to climate change. In Ethiopia, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) public works activities have reduced surface run-off, increased water infiltration, raised groundwater levels, enhanced spring yields, and increased stream base flows and vegetation coverage. Furthermore, by leveraging economic inclusion activities, the PSNP program has led to positive environmental impacts and promoted livelihood diversification and enhanced productivity, thereby decreasing people’s vulnerability to climate change. And we must continue to build the evidence that pre-emptive social protection investments and strengthening social protection systems are the best response to future shocks and crises – improving outcomes for people and the effectiveness of financing. In Pakistan, the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), the country’s largest government-led cash transfer program, was scaled-up to provide 2.8 million families with roughly US$100 within a week of the 2022 floods. Rapid action was possible by leveraging information from the disaster risk management authorities linked to the geocoded data in the national social registry. Leverage partnerships for more effective collective action For LICs and fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)-affected countries in particular, international support will continue to play an important role to complement efficiency gains and domestic spending. High fragmentation in donor financing calls for increased coordination in aid delivery (Watkins et al., 2024). By 2030, an estimated 59% of poor people worldwide will be concentrated in FCV-affected countries (World Bank, 2024) and humanitarian interventions play a critical role in saving lives in these settings. However, the lack of predictability and sustainability often misses opportunities to build resilience, human capital, and productivity effectively. Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen, among others, offer encouraging examples of collaboration in supporting and working through existing country systems (Al-Ahmadi and De Silva, 2018). In Somalia, humanitarian financing dwarfs development aid: US$1.1 billion and US$869 million, respectively, in 2018. The Somalia Baxnaano Program aims to align humanitarian and development efforts by supporting national social protection systems. Through partnership with the government, the British Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Bank, the program reached 181,000 households with cash transfers in 2021 and provided 100,000 households with emergency transfers in response to concurrent shocks in 2020 (Al-Ahmadi and Zampaglione, 2022). Countries at all income levels will benefit from promoting a larger role for the private and financial sectors to increase available financing. One option we are exploring in that context is the potential of innovative financing mechanisms, such as impact bonds, sovereign wealth funds, debt swaps, and Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) (Watkins et al., 2024). Coordination on the knowledge agenda will be crucial to make the most effective use of available resources. We must leverage, share, and coordinate analysis, evidence, data, technical assistance, and implementation support across national stakeholders and international partners. It is critical that we work together to build the evidence base for effective social protection at the global, national, regional, and local levels, scaling up what works, and reforming what does not. Financing reform for shared prosperity There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the massive social protection financing challenge. We need to carefully analyze how to make the best use of scarce social protection resources, whether at the global, national, or local level. We also need to leverage more resources – both domestically and through partners and the private sector – to invest in social protection responses to the permacrises that we face, with climate and fragility high among these challenges. Partnerships, knowledge sharing, and collaboration are key to learning, scaling up and expanding what works and improving what does not. Overall, strengthening and expanding social protection systems are critical as we work together to end extreme poverty on a livable planet. FootnotesDisclaimer The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the governments they represent.1. The estimated population of the 144 World Bank client countries is 6.8 billion.ReferencesAl-Ahmadi AA, De Silva S (2018) Delivering social protection in the midst of conflict and crisis: The case of Yemen. Social protection and jobs discussion paper, no. 1801. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30608License:CCBY3.0IGOAl-Ahmadi AA, Zampaglione G (2022) From protracted humanitarian relief to state-led social safety net system: Somalia Baxnaano Program. Social protection and jobs discussion paper, no. 2201. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36864License:CCBY3.0IGOArze del Granado FJ, Coady D, Gillingham R (2012) The unequal benefits of fuel subsidies: A review of evidence for developing countries. World Development 40(11): 2234–2248.Bierbaum M, Schmitt V (2022) Investing more in universal social protection. Filling the financing gap through domestic resource mobilization and international support and coordination. Working paper no. 44. International Labour Organization (ILO). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/publications/investing-more-universal-social-protection-filling-financing-gap-throughBossuroy T, Goldstein M, Karimou B, et al. (2022) Tackling psychosocial and capital constraints to alleviate poverty. Nature 605: 291–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04647-8Botea I, Brudevold-Newman A, Goldstein M, et al. (2023) Supporting women’s livelihoods at scale: Evidence from a nationwide multi-faceted program. SSRN scholarly paper. Rochester NY. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4560552Damania R, Balseca VE, De Fontaubert C, et al. (2023) Detox Development: Repurposing Environmentally Harmful Subsidies (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099061523102097591/P1753450ec9e820830aba2067262dab24bfEl Enbaby H, Elsabbagh D, Gilligan D, et al. (2022) Impact evaluation report: Egypt’s Takaful cash transfer program. IFPRI ENA regional working paper no. 40. Available at: https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/136395/filename/136607.pdfInternational Labour Organization (ILO) (2021) World Social Protection Report 2020-22. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/more-4-billion-people-still-lack-any-social-protection-ilo-report-findsRidao-Cano C, Moosa D, Pallares-Miralles M, et al. (2023) Built to Include: Reimagining Social Protection in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/40227Tesliuc ED, Rodriguez A, Claudia P, Rigolini J (2025) State of Social Protection Report 2025: The 2-Billion-Person Challenge. Washington D.C.: World Bank Group.Watkins K, Nwajiaku-Dahou K, Kovach H (2024) Financing the fight against poverty and hunger – Mobilising resources for a Sustainable Development Goal reset. ODI report, ODI, London, 24 July.World Bank (2022) Charting a Course Towards Universal Social Protection: Resilience, Equity, and Opportunity for All. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/38031World Bank (2024) The Great Reversal: Prospects, Risks, and Policies in International Development Association (IDA) Countries. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

Defense & Security
LNG plant based on gravity type with a gas carrier. The Arctic LNG-2 project. Utrennoye deposit, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region, Russia. 3d rendering

Securing the ‘great white shield’? Climate change, Arctic security and the geopolitics of solar geoengineering

by Nikolaj Kornbech , Olaf Corry , Duncan McLaren

Abstract The Arctic has been identified by scientists as a relatively promising venue for controversial ‘solar geoengineering’ – technical schemes to reflect more sunlight to counteract global warming. Yet contemporary regional security dynamics and the relative (in)significance of climate concerns among the key Arctic states suggest a different conclusion. By systematically juxtaposing recently published schemes for Arctic geoengineering with Arctic security strategies published by the littoral Arctic states and China, we reveal and detail two conflicting security imaginaries. Geoengineering schemes scientifically securitise (and seek to maintain) the Arctic’s ‘great white shield’ to protect ‘global’ humanity against climate tipping points and invoke a past era of Arctic ‘exceptionality’ to suggest greater political feasibility for research interventions here. Meanwhile, state security imaginaries understand the contemporary Arctic as an increasingly contested region of considerable geopolitical peril and economic opportunity as temperatures rise. Alongside the entangled history of science with geopolitics in the region, this suggests that geoengineering schemes in the Arctic are unlikely to follow scientific visions, and unless co-opted into competitive, extractivist state security imaginaries, may prove entirely infeasible. Moreover, if the Arctic is the ‘best-case’ for geoengineering politics, this places a huge question mark over the feasibility of other, more global prospects. Introduction ‘The Arctic region plays a key role in the global climate system acting as a carbon sink and a virtual mirror’ (Carnegie Climate Governance Initiative (C2G), 2021: 1) – thus reads a typical introduction to the rationale for solar geoengineering (SG) in the Arctic. To most, SG – any large-scale intervention that seeks to counteract anthropogenic global warming by reflecting sunlight – is still an obscure idea. However, it is quickly gaining traction among some groups of climate scientists, entrepreneurs and even some governments as climate impacts provoke an ever-increasing sense of alarm and urgency. Debates concerning potential governance of SG routinely acknowledge its potential international governance challenges, but have tended to leave security dimensions mostly unexamined (but see Nightingale and Cairns, 2014), usually by framing the challenge primarily in terms of coordinating efforts and dealing with potentially unwanted side effects (Corry et al., forthcoming). While climate change itself is often understood as a potential security threat, it has not yet motivated exceptional or decisive state action, but rather seems to produce a series of routine practices through which ‘climate change is rendered governable as an issue of human security’ (Oels, 2012: 201). Geoengineering could potentially change this situation. The potentially high-leverage, transboundary nature of large-scale SG has led to suggestions that it would involve disagreements over the methods and intensity of interventions (Ricke et al., 2013) and could lead to international conflicts, not least from uni- or ‘mini’-lateral deployment (Lockyer and Symons, 2019). In addition, with its potential to make climatic changes and catastrophes attributable to (or able to be blamed on) the direct and intentional actions of states, SG could also make the rest of climate politics a more conflictual field (Corry, 2017b). Other scholars have examined geoengineering itself through a human security frame – recently developed as ‘ecological security’ with ecosystems as the main referent object (McDonald, 2023), where the insecurity arising from climate change is seen to go beyond the particularity of state interests. This casts geoengineering as a potential ecological security measure, or even as a potentially ‘just’ one, if it would protect groups otherwise vulnerable to climate threats (Floyd, 2023). However, the entanglement of geoengineering, even if framed as an ‘ecological security’ measure, with national and international security dynamics, would remain a distinct risk, in similar ways to how humanitarian aid and development have become entangled with, and for some historically inseparable from, security (Duffield, 2007). In this article, we seek to move beyond theoretical speculation about the International Relations of geoengineering abstracted from historical or regional security dynamics, using a case study of the Arctic to investigate how geoengineering might (not) enter this political space and to derive conclusions of broader relevance to the international debate. We make use of the empirical richness revealed by schemes for Arctic geoengineering to identify how security imaginaries – ‘map[s] of social space’ (Pretorius, 2008: 112) reflecting common understandings and expectations about security – are already implicit in scientific and technical visions of geoengineering. We contrast these scientific security imaginaries with current state security imaginaries that play a dominant role in the anticipation of Arctic futures more generally. As we will show, scientific security imaginaries consider the Arctic as a best case for geoengineering in terms of political feasibility. This allows for analytical inference based on critical case selection (Flyvbjerg, 2006): if even in the Arctic these scientific security imaginaries have little compatibility with current state security imaginaries, geoengineering faces major obstacles of political feasibility in other regions and globally, unless deployed in pursuit of security rather than global environmental protection. Many different ideas for SG have been explored as ways to cool the Arctic. These include marine cloud brightening (MCB): spraying salts from sea vessels to make marine clouds more reflective (Latham et al., 2014) or covering ocean or ice surfaces with reflective materials (Field et al., 2018). Related ideas involve using wind power to pump water onto ice to help thicken it (Desch et al., 2017), underwater ‘curtains’ to protect ice from warmer water streams (Moore et al., 2018) or reintroducing large animals to graze and trample so that dark boreal forest is replaced by reflective snow-cover, protecting permafrost (Beer et al., 2020).1 The technique of stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) – spraying reflective aerosols like sulphur or calcite into the stratosphere – is also included as an option by some organisations working with Arctic geoengineering2 or explored in simulations or other research (Jackson et al., 2015; Lane et al., 2007; Robock et al., 2008). In practice, however, aerosols distributed in or near the Arctic would likely spread over much of the Northern hemisphere, and model studies of Arctic-targeted SAI generally conclude that is it not a desirable option due to particularly severe negative side effects outside the Arctic (Duffey et al., 2023). While geoengineering scientists seek to distance their work from geopolitical concerns (Svensson and Pasgaard, 2019), scientific research in the Arctic – even that involving cooperation between Cold War adversaries – has long been deeply entangled with state security objectives and military interests (Doel et al., 2014; Goossen, 2020). Similarly, weather modification schemes have a history of (largely failed) entanglement with military purposes (Fleming, 2010), while climate modelling evolved partly through and with military scenario-making (Edwards, 2010). Climate modelling occupies a more civilian location in multilateral institutions now but still shares its particular way of seeing the climate – as a space of geophysical flows – with a military gaze (Allan, 2017). More importantly, the interrelated environmental, economic and geopolitical interests in opening up the Arctic that are emerging with global warming make for a particular set of contradictions and tensions in the region that we argue will be much more likely than global environmental concerns to determine what role (if any) geoengineering could or would play. Arctic SG ideas are emerging largely oblivious to this context, which is understandable, but makes for an interesting comparative analysis that, as will we show, raises questions concerning the overall feasibility of SG in the Arctic, especially deployment of it in line with scientific imaginaries. Since scientific literature tends to be central to governance-oriented assessments of SG (e.g. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2021), a mismatch between assumptions has potentially serious policy implications, not least in terms of overall feasibility, which in turn augments risks of such schemes failing and contributing to mitigation deterrence (when they were hoped or planned for, delaying emissions reductions (McLaren, 2016)). Attention to the geopolitical complexities of Arctic geoengineering could prevent scientific work being translated into policy prescriptions in unintended ways or having unexpected effects – if the complexities can be foregrounded when interpreting such work and be considered in designing future research. Approach We analyse both Arctic geoengineering schemes and state strategies for the Arctic as security imaginaries. This concept draws on Charles Taylor’s (2004) notion of the social imaginary, ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ (p. 23). Imaginaries, in this sense, are worldviews – sets of assumptions that may or may not correspond to social reality but affect it in significant and material ways. They are not simply subjective constructions to be weighed against some objective reality, but (often competing) ways of constructing and institutionalising the world. Following Pretorius (2008), a security imaginary is then ‘that part of the social imaginary as “a map of social space” that is specific to society’s common understanding and expectations about security and makes practices related to security possible’ (p. 112). Regrettably, social imaginaries are often theorised through ‘internalism’: as if a society is determined by factors originating within that society alone (Rosenberg, 2016).3 This makes it difficult to explain why different societies often have similar security imaginaries. By breaking with internalism, national imaginaries can be understood as inherently international in the sense that they are deeply affected by coexistence with other societies. For Pretorius (2008), ‘the security imaginary is . . . open to influence from perceptions, beliefs and understandings of other societies about security’ due to ‘trans-societal exchanges’ such as travel (p. 112). But in a deeper way, the mere existence of multiple societies is fundamental to the whole idea of (national) security (Rosenberg, 2016). In addition, if the Arctic is considered a ‘regional security complex’ (Lanteigne, 2016) such that the security imaginary of societies in a region ‘cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved independently of each other’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 44), then relations between societies become constitutive, even, of security imaginaries of that region. Scientific communities – in this case geoengineering researchers – can produce a different ‘map of social space’ from national ones, since the groups (in one version ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992)) producing these are not necessarily national, and use different tools and concepts than national security communities. At the same time, scientists are rarely unaffected by their backgrounds, and their technical and conceptual tools for producing such a ‘map’ reflect traces from state priorities and international structures, including colonial legacies (Mahony and Hulme, 2018). State and scientific security imaginaries are thus distinct but not separate, and as we shall see, they can clash or draw upon each other, often implicitly. The security imaginary concept captures three important characteristics of our empirical materials. First, geoengineering ideas and state security strategies are performative (rather than purely descriptive) in their anticipation of (Arctic) futures (Anderson, 2010). Second, they are based on understandings of social order which merge factual and normative claims – what is and what should be (Taylor, 2004). Third, they construct threats and necessary responses in terms of the security of that social order, irrespective of whether those threats are of a military nature or otherwise (e.g. a climatic threat); in other words, they can securitise a variety of referent objects (Buzan et al., 1998). In investigating scientific and state security imaginaries, we focus on the difference in the construction of two objects: climate and the international order. We ask: how is the ‘Arctic climate’ articulated and made legible in relation to the planetary climate and other factors, and further, how is the Arctic climate problematised and related to concerns of desirable or undesirable futures? What political, economic and international infrastructures are presumed? In sum, what threatens and what defends Arctic and international order? To explore the security imaginaries of Arctic geoengineering, we gathered materials that construct Arctic futures through searches in the peer-reviewed literature with the search terms ‘Arctic’ and ‘geoengineering’ using , as well as search hits on the term ‘Arctic’ in the archive of the Climate Engineering Newsletter run by the Kiel Earth Institute,4 which also covers grey literature and press coverage on the topic.5 We manually excluded texts exclusively focused on carbon removal forms of geoengineering, except those with positive effects on the surface albedo. For the state security imaginaries of the Arctic, we consulted policy documents and other official government publications looking for the most recent policy statement in each of the littoral states: Canada, the United States, Russia, Norway and Denmark (which controls the security and foreign policy of Greenland) concerning their respective Arctic security strategy.6 Public documents are often used as data in security studies as testaments to state preferences or intentions, despite the often performative character of such documents. Such documents generally attempt to portray the institutions that produce them as competent and coherent – and of value to particular external audiences. As such they are potentially unreliable as sources for underlying intentions, levels of capacity and commitment behind policy goals. However, as documents set out to perform a future which is seen as desirable – either by the authors themselves or the audiences they appeal to – they are a useful guide to the underlying assumptions of social and international order guiding Arctic security politics – the state security imaginaries, in other words. We therefore study them for their performative content, with particular emphasis on the intended audiences and messages (Coffey, 2014). Similarly, geoengineering publications also perform a material and political Arctic future to advance scientific or research agendas, and we therefore analyse the underlying imaginary of their desired futures, without prejudice to the climatological or technical feasibility of the envisioned schemes. However, as the imaginaries of many researchers typically invoke global benefits from Arctic geoengineering, in particular through preventing tipping events, it bears mentioning that recent literature questions these benefits. Research indicates that that some techniques (ice restoration in particular) would have limited impacts on the global climate (Van Wijngaarden et al., 2024; Webster and Warren, 2022; Zampieri and Goessling, 2019), and a recent comprehensive review finds only limited support for the claim that Arctic sea ice is a tipping element in the climate system (Lenton et al., 2023: 58–60, 66–68). Even so, it should not be assumed that scientific considerations alone will drive decisions to geoengineer the Arctic, and the growing interest in these ideas makes it important to examine their political imaginaries. Finally, we must acknowledge the highly consequential difference in the power to securitise between the actors which produce the imaginaries. The state apparatuses producing the state security imaginaries are more aligned with, and therefore more likely to influence, actors with the power to securitise (Floyd, 2021). We read both sets of imaginaries in this light. The ‘great white shield’: scientific security imaginaries In geoengineering studies and policy papers, the Arctic is foremost understood as a part of the global climate system (Corry, 2017a), with focus placed on potential tipping points in terms of alarming above-average warming, the sea ice albedo feedback and the potential release of methane and carbon dioxide from thawing permafrost or undersea clathrates. These may push the Earth into feedback cycles of further warming. The Arctic is therefore seen as a ‘great white shield’ for the global climate, but a fragile one: ‘the weakest link in the chain of climate protection’ (Zaelke, 2019: 241). Many of those advocating exploration of Arctic geoengineering argue that emissions cannot be reduced in time to prevent tipping points. One paper contends that cryospheric tipping points ‘are essentially too late to address by standard political processes [for climate management]’ (Moore et al., 2021: 109). This pessimistic assessment spawns a complementary opposite: hopes that geoengineering might prove especially feasible and desirable in the Arctic, with associated aspirations for near-term experimentation and potential deployment. One researcher coined the term ‘Arctic Premium’, arguing that the particular climatic characteristics of the region will enable ‘a dividend for regionally based climate interventions that could be less expensive, more effective and achieve faster results than if they were targeted over the whole earth’ (Littlemore, 2021: 2) – the Arctic imagined as an effective and relatively accessible lever for operating on the global climate system as a whole.7 While regional benefits such as the preservation of ice-dependent Indigenous ways of life are sometimes mentioned (Moore et al., 2021: 110), this tends to occur when regional benefits align with what are understood as global climatic interests. This instrumental attitude can also be seen in proposals that, echoing some of the early literature on SG (Lane et al., 2007; Robock et al., 2008), see the Arctic as a testing ground. These include ‘SCoPEx’, which would have tested SAI equipment over Indigenous Sámi land, and the suggested use of the Sermeq Kujalleq glacier in Greenland – Inuit territory – as a prototype for more substantial glacial geoengineering in the Antarctic. The Sermeq Kujalleq proposal is justified on the basis of ‘fewer global environmental impacts’, despite the considerable amount of local socio-environmental impacts and acknowledgement that ‘the reactions of local people would be mixed’ (Moore et al., 2018: 304). In a quote that sums up the assessment of most researchers Bodansky and Hunt (2020) argue that ‘as bad as Arctic melting is for the Arctic itself, its global effects are more concerning’ (p. 601). The concern with global effects infuses scientific security imaginaries with urgency. The ostensible ‘speed’ (Zaelke, 2019: 244) of SG is contrasted with the slowness of politics, emissions reductions and large-scale carbon removal.8 In many cases, such invocations of urgency lead to claims that geoengineering is necessary: that ‘excluding polar ice restoration could make the 1.5° C goal impossible to achieve’ (Field et al., 2018: 883) or that ‘more and more people see geoengineering as a necessity more than an option, making it a matter of when rather than if’ (Barclay, 2021: 4). One proposal notes that ‘these are expensive propositions, but within the means of governments to carry out on a scale comparable to the Manhattan Project’ (Desch et al., 2017: 121); others also specify funding by rich states as the way to move forward on research and deployment (Moore et al., 2021). The urgent threat of Arctic climate change is seen as a job for decisive state action, and thus, it is argued to be salient in so far as it appears as a universal threat to state interests. At the same time, the causes of climate change are downplayed and depoliticised across the literature. Attributing climate change to emissions from ‘human societies’ (Beer et al., 2020: 1), the literature frames out the vastly unequal responsibility for climate change and the social and economic dynamics driving historical and continued emissions.9 One policy paper neglects social causes of climate change altogether, contrasting geoengineering only to ‘conventional mitigation policies’ (Bodansky and Hunt, 2020: 597) and ‘decarbonisation of the global economy’ (p. 616). In this way, Arctic climate change is constructed as a global security threat, seen as stemming from the ‘tight couplings within global systems, processes, and networks’ (Miller, 2015: 278) rather than the actions of any specific group of humans, and as a threat to global ‘human security’ and therefore not subject to the division and distrust of international politics. In this, the imaginary resembles much liberal environmentalism in International Relations, characterised by a ‘global cosmopolitanism’ which does not seriously engage with inequalities of power and intersocietal difference (Chandler et al., 2018: 200). This imaginary is probably adopted to construct scenarios for technical research, since it fits neatly with modelling tools that produce visions of geoengineering in purely technical Earth system terms. But the liberal imaginary also shapes assessments of political feasibility and could impinge on the technical design of geoengineering schemes, including in ways that can be hard to unpick when the research enters the political sphere. Most publications entirely omit considerations of state security, including some papers that focus on governance (Bodansky and Hunt, 2020; Moore et al., 2021). The mentions of security that do exist are brief and vague: C2G (2021) notes that ‘evidence suggests potential security issues may arise’ (p. 2) in the case of SAI. Another paper notes as an example of ‘geo-political . . . friction’ that ‘Arctic regions such as Russia, Alaska and the Canadian Yukon would be providing a global public good . . . which would add a major new dimension to international relations’ (Macias-Fauria et al., 2020: 10), suggesting that geoengineering can be adequately grasped through rationalist decision frameworks where global public goods offer non-rival and universal benefits, which is disputed (Gardiner, 2013). In the research, the omission of geopolitics is justified by relegating it as a problem which only concerns the ostensibly more controversial techniques such as SAI deployed globally. There is a hope that ‘Arctic interventions pose less of a governance challenge than global climate interventions’ (Bodansky and Hunt, 2020: 609). This rests on the twin claim that the physical effects of Arctic interventions will be more limited and therefore less risky and that the Arctic’s political environment is more conducive to geoengineering than the ‘global’ polity as a whole. In terms of physical effects, many Arctic interventions are argued to be ‘low-risk’ (Barclay, 2021: 4) due to fewer and less severe environmental side effects. What Zaelke (2019) calls ‘soft geoengineering’ (p. 243) approaches are presented as ‘more natural’ (Littlemore, 2021: 2) than the most commonly considered SG techniques such as SAI or MCB which involve physical and chemical manipulation of the atmosphere.10 In particular, efforts to restore sea ice without atmospheric interventions are promoted highlighting the ostensibly more ‘natural’ character of their intervention (Field et al., 2018: 899). ‘Unlike other [SG] methods, thickening sea ice is attractive because it merely enhances a naturally ongoing process in the Arctic’, claims one proponent (Desch et al., 2017: 112). Efforts at ecological intervention in ecosystems to halt permafrost thaw are also described as ‘a return to a more “natural state”’ (Moore et al., 2021: 111). ‘Soft’ geoengineering concepts are in many cases linked to discourses of conservation, with the sometimes-explicit expectation that this will make them more benign and less politically controversial: ‘Since it is rooted in the preservation of the existing state rather than introducing new and undeniably controversial elements into the atmosphere, it likely presents easier governance challenges’ (Moore et al., 2021: 116). Such distinctions between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ interventions may well facilitate cooperation around some methods, but notions of ‘natural’ are also situated, making distinctions inevitably difficult to maintain in practice. While aiming to preserve select parts of the Arctic environment (such as land ice, sea ice or permafrost), geoengineering interventions will likely also introduce significant changes and risks to Arctic ecosystems (Miller et al., 2020; Van Wijngaarden et al., 2024).11 In this way, ostensibly ‘natural’ Arctic interventions would lead to unprecedented anthropogenic – and for others therefore ‘unnatural’ – impacts on ecosystems in the Arctic and possibly beyond, since remote impacts are plausible but not yet well understood.12 This reveals an imaginary prevalent among proponents of Arctic geoengineering, where a distinct construction of ‘natural’ emerges to bridge aspirations of technical manipulation of the climate with what scientists see as palatable to (or believe to be) social ideals of ‘nature’. In addition, the adjectives used to describe ‘soft’ geoengineering – ‘targeted’ (Moore et al., 2021: 108), ‘localized’ (Latham et al., 2014: 3), ‘reversible’ (Barclay, 2021: 4) and ‘intelligent’ (Field et al., 2018: 900), all point to an imaginary where aspirations towards the ‘natural’ are combined with expectations of fine-grained, scientifically calibrated control. As Zaelke (2019) explicitly suggests, ‘in other words, we have control over soft geoengineering’ (p. 243) – the ‘we’ here left ambiguous. The idea of having a relatively large degree of control originates in restraint vis-a-vis ‘global’ SG, in that it recognises large risks from attempting to control the global climate system as such. But this sense of fine-grained control may also encourage more Promethean dreams of a ‘designer climate’ (Oomen, 2021), as speculation over future possibilities of ‘fine-tun[ing] the flows of heat, air and water’ using localised MCB indicates (Latham et al., 2014: 10). In terms of the Arctic’s political environment, discourse on the feasibility of geoengineering reveals further elements of a liberal imaginary, relying on (existing or imagined) international law and institutions, distributive justice and consequentialist ethics (Baiman, 2021; Barclay, 2021), a focus on cost minimisation (Desch et al., 2017; Field et al., 2018) and market-based approaches such as payments for ecological services (Moore et al., 2021) or carbon credits (Macias-Fauria et al., 2020) in the implementation of geoengineering schemes. Taken together, such measures rather well resemble a ‘liberal cosmopolitan framework through the advocacy of managerialism rather than transformation; the top-down coercive approach of international law; and use of abstract modernist political categories’ (Chandler et al., 2018: 190). Distributive notions of justice and consequentialist ethics are arguably also at the root of claims that local populations in the Arctic, including its Indigenous peoples, may be uniquely receptive to geoengineering schemes. While many advocate public engagement (Desch et al., 2017; Macias-Fauria et al., 2020) and stress that ‘Northern people who use and depend upon the existing landscape need a strong voice’ (Littlemore, 2021: 3), there is a general expectation that such engagement will not be prohibitively conflictual. One policy scholar suggested that ‘given that Northern people are already seeing the effects of climate change, the North may be a place for a more pragmatic, constructive, and legitimate deliberative discussion on Arctic interventions’ (Ted Parson, quoted in Littlemore, 2021: 5). Other researchers have concluded that using SAI would conserve ‘indigenous habits and lifestyles’ in the Arctic (Chen et al., 2020: 1) as a direct consequence of reducing permafrost thaw. These assumptions were strained by the SCoPEx controversy, where the Sámi Council strongly opposed the experiment planned in their territory (Cooper, 2023). Equally, Arctic populations (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) have varied interests that cannot be assumed to be oriented to preventing or reversing Arctic climatic change, some seeing new opportunities for economic development and potentially political independence in the case of Greenland (Jacobsen, 2020). Political feasibility of geoengineering plans is often assessed through legal analyses that weigh up specific techniques and target environments in relation to existing treaties and other legal regimes (Barclay, 2021; Bodansky and Hunt, 2020). Some place hope in techniques such as permafrost/glacier preservation that may be deployed within the bounds of a single nation’s territory, which would, in their view, sidestep the need for international governance altogether: ‘for example, Russian and Canadian policies could change the carbon released from thawing permafrost. Similarly, Greenland’s ice sheet would be the primary responsibility of the Greenlanders’ (Moore et al., 2021: 109). While such techniques might be localised in effect, and only intended to slow climate feedback effects such as the rate of ice loss, inclusion of such measures in market credit schemes, as attempted by the Real Ice project,13 could prove controversial and under some conditions undermine any SG-based climate effect (Fearnehough et al., 2020: Chapter 3). For cross-border geoengineering schemes, the Arctic Council14 is in some cases highlighted as a favourable site for governance (Desch et al., 2017). One paper calls it an ‘obvious institution’ for international governance of Arctic geoengineering in general, contending that ‘because of its relatively small size, the Arctic Council has been a relatively effective forum to develop regional policies relating to the Arctic’ (Bodansky and Hunt, 2020: 610). However, in a later article, one of the authors described the Arctic Council as ‘an informal institution that lacks any regulatory powers and shows no signs of being up to the task of taking significant action’ on Arctic climate change (Bodansky and Pomerance, 2021: 2). Moore et al. (2021) similarly contend that ‘the Arctic Council is not a true international organization with rule-making power’ (p. 113). Yet Moore et al. (2021) still argue the Arctic is a politically tractable space for geoengineering due to the low number of states that would need to come to an agreement – in contrast to global SG which ‘would ideally need at least near-global consensus’ (p. 109). This reveals an important complexity in the concept of globality that permeates the geoengineering imaginaries. While the Arctic, as we showed above, is instrumentalised for a global community – operated on to mitigate climatic effects across the planet – it is also differentiated from ‘global interventions’ that take the global Earth system as their direct object of intervention (Bodansky and Hunt, 2020: 597). As Moore et al. (2021) state explicitly, ‘targeted geoengineering is done on regional scales but aims to conserve the various parts of the global climate and earth system’ (p. 109). The politically salient objects are imagined to be the methods of intervention, spatially bounded in the Arctic region while the intended global climatic effects are in effect rendered unproblematic and therefore without need for governance. Arguably this reflects a common assumption that governance is only relevant in the case of ‘adverse or unintended effects’ (Barclay, 2021: 5) – the intended effect of albedo modification implicitly understood as an unambiguous global public good. On a technical level, this assumption is questionable – since remote consequences of Arctic geoengineering are not yet well understood. But more crucially, the assumption projects exactly those liberal rationalist norms which are argued to be especially present in the Arctic on to the wider geopolitical context. The specific imaginary constructed to justify regional geoengineering interventions as politically feasible while still being part of a global solution to climate change cannot work without a general liberal imaginary of international politics. Otherwise, the global effects of regional interventions would threaten to undo the validity of the ‘regional feasibility’ argument. Arctic state security imaginaries The history of scientific research in the Arctic reveals the liberal security imaginaries underlying Arctic geoengineering to be a relatively recent phenomenon. Doel et al. (2014) describe the intertwinement of 20th-century Arctic research projects and three broad state goals, shared to varying degrees by all littoral states: national security, exploitation of natural resources and extension of territorial sovereignty to disputed areas. When intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic nuclear missiles were introduced from the late 1950s, the Arctic became a ‘buffer zone’ between the Cold War powers, experiencing a continuous period with low military activity and absence of conflict that likely paved a way for increased cooperation after the Cold War, with Mikhail Gorbachev famously declaring the Arctic a ‘zone of peace’ (Gjørv and Hodgson, 2019: 2). The Arctic came to be seen as an ‘exceptional’ region in the post-Cold War period, where institutionalised multilateral cooperation on regional issues, particularly environmental and scientific activities, could blossom (Lackenbauer and Dean, 2020). In this section, we examine recent state strategies and developments in the Arctic to assess the contours of the current leading security imaginary among Arctic states. The key characteristic of Arctic exceptionalism is that geopolitical conflicts and tensions from outside the Arctic are excluded from affecting cooperation on internal Arctic issues and that, as a corollary, specifically ‘Arctic issues’ are compartmentalised: ‘Actors . . . can talk about everything except contentious issues, not least military security’ (Gjørv and Hodgson, 2019: 3, original emphasis). However, this compartmentalisation is hard to find in recent state assessments. The US emphasised in 2019 that ‘The Arctic remains vulnerable to “strategic spillover” from tensions, competition, or conflict arising in these other regions’ (United States Department of Defense (USDOD), 2019: 6). In 2020, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of ‘a new security-political dynamic in the region. Disagreements and conflicts originating in other areas of the world are also being expressed in the Arctic’ (Kofod, 2020: 1).15 For the four North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in the Arctic littoral, such concerns were obviously directed at the only non-NATO state: Russia (even before the invasion of Ukraine). Denmark expressed concern over ‘the Russian build-up of military capabilities’ (Kofod, 2020: 2); Norway stated that ‘Russian build-up of forces and military modernisation can challenge the security of Norway and allied countries directly’ (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RMFA), 2020: 23) and cited the Russian annexation of Crimea as a key moment in increased tensions and deteriorating optimism regarding peaceful cooperation in the Arctic (RMFA, 2020: 10). Russia, for its part, described ‘military buildup by foreign states in the Arctic and an increase of the potential for conflict in the region’ as a ‘challenge’ (Office of the President of the Russian Federation (OPRF), 2020: 5). Among the NATO states, these assessments have for several years been accompanied by a call for deeper military cooperation. Denmark has pledged to ‘support NATO’s role in the Arctic and the North Atlantic’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2022: 23), a change from previous strategy documents which stressed that ‘enforcement of the realm’s sovereignty is fundamentally the responsibility of the realm’s authorities’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 2011: 20). Canada aims to ‘increase surveillance and monitoring of the broader Arctic region’ in collaboration with the United States, Denmark and Norway (Government of Canada, 2019: 77), while Norway in 2021 negotiated a deal with the United States to allow it access to two Arctic military installations – the Ramsund Naval Base and the Evenes Airfield. Trust has only deteriorated further since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. All Arctic Council member states except Russia announced they would suspend participation in council meetings because of the invasion, subsequently announcing a ‘limited resumption’ of projects without Russian participation (Global Affairs Canada, 2022). The recent US Arctic strategy describes ‘increasing strategic competition in the Arctic . . . exacerbated by Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine’ (The White House, 2022: 3) and claimed that ‘Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has rendered government-to-government cooperation with Russia in the Arctic virtually impossible at present’ (The White House, 2022: 14). Russia interprets Arctic politics on similar terms; the Arctic ambassador has stated that the Finnish and Swedish bids to join NATO ‘will of course lead to certain adjustments in the development of high altitude [sic] cooperation’ (quoted in Staalesen, 2022). This dynamic of de-exceptionalisation, where the Arctic is increasingly reintegrated into great power politics, is the contemporary context in which the littoral states interpret the region’s present and future climatic changes. The state goals associated with early and mid-20th century Arctic science are reappearing as a background for envisioning the impact of climate change. Of the three goals identified by Doel et al. (2014), assertion over disputed territories is arguably of lesser importance today. All states have indicated a willingness to settle territorial continental shelf disputes via international law, and such statements are generally accepted by commentators as genuine (Østhagen, 2018). But the goals of military national security and extraction of natural resources are growing in salience, and changing in character, as the ice melts and the permafrost thaws. In contrast to the geoengineering literature, climate change is rarely addressed as a primary threat in state policies but described in more restricted terms. Adaptation problems from ‘sea-ice loss, permafrost thaw and land erosion’ (Government of Canada, 2019: 63) are emphasised, and both Canada (Government of Canada, 2019: 18) and Norway (RMFA, 2020: 14) describe climate change as a cultural threat to Indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, the task of emission reductions does not figure as a specifically Arctic objective (e.g. RMFA, 2020: 14). In this way, climate change figures less as a problem that must urgently be dealt with and more as an unavoidable condition of Arctic politics. In the context of military security objectives, climate change is understood primarily as a driver of increased navigability and accessibility of the Arctic. The US Navy anticipates an increasingly ice-free ‘blue Arctic’, where ‘peace and prosperity will be increasingly challenged by Russia and China, whose interests and values differ dramatically from ours’ (United States Department of the Navy, 2021: 2). Cold War-era interpretations of the Arctic’s geographical significance are being reinvigorated: Canada stresses the importance of maintaining air and missile capabilities in its Arctic region due to its location along the shortest path from Russian to US territory (Government of Canada, 2019: 77). And as the region becomes more accessible, it rises in strategic importance. The US Department of Defense presents the Arctic as ‘a potential corridor – between the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and the U.S. homeland – for expanded strategic competitions’ (USDOD, 2019: 6) and stresses that ‘maintaining freedoms of navigation and overflight are critical to ensuring that . . . U.S. forces retain the global mobility guaranteed under international law’ (USDOD, 2019: 13). The increased accessibility of the Arctic also brings new hopes of further use of the region’s natural resources as a vehicle for economic growth (Keil, 2014). Such goals have become intertwined with development discourses and policies that focus on lack of modern infrastructure, low employment and population decline and, in this way, align the economic objectives of faraway capitals with local concerns. Canada aims to ‘close the gaps and divides that exist between this region, particularly in relation to its Indigenous peoples, and the rest of the country’ (Government of Canada, 2019: 36) and presents these gaps in a consumerist national imaginary where being ‘full participants in Canadian society’ means having ‘access to the same services, opportunities and standards of living as those enjoyed by other Canadians’ (Government of Canada, 2019: 36). The Russian government frames its Arctic policy goals in terms of avoiding a dystopia of a depopulated region lacking economic growth, and such fears are directly presented in security terms: ‘population decline’ and ‘insufficient development’ of infrastructure and business are named ‘primary threats to national security’ (OPRF, 2020: 4–5). In Norway, Northern depopulation is presented as a key concern to be addressed through investment in public education and business infrastructure (RMFA, 2020: 11). The emphasis in such ‘development’ is on natural resources such as fossil fuels and rare earth minerals, trans-Arctic shipping routes and tourism. Russia is particularly clear in its focus on fossil fuels; ‘increasing oil and gas extraction rates, advancing oil refining, and producing liquefied natural gas and gas-chemical products’ are considered ‘primary objectives for the economic development of the Arctic zone’ (OPRF, 2020: 7). The development of the Northern Sea Route as a ‘competitive national transportation passage in the world market’ is named a ‘primary’ Russian national interest (OPRF, 2020: 4). Other states also emphasise ‘new economic opportunities, for example in the form of new maritime routes and extraction of natural resources’ (Kofod, 2020: 1). In some states, the role of fossil fuels in extractive ambitions is arguably receding. In its previous Arctic strategy, the US anticipated the Arctic’s role in ‘future United States energy security’ through its ‘proved and potential oil and gas natural resources that will likely continue to provide valuable supplies to meet U.S. energy needs’ (The White House, 2013: 7). Now, ‘the Arctic’s significant deposits of in-demand minerals essential to key technology supply chains’ (The White House, 2022: 6) have ostensibly replaced fossil fuels as the main extractive interest. Yet such shifts leave intact visions of major extractive operations dependent on (or facilitated by) a warming Arctic. More generally, there is an assumption of compatibility between interests in extractivism and economic growth and climate and environmental policies. Imagined futures contain ‘safe and environmentally-responsible shipping’ (Government of Canada, 2019: 49), ‘the sustainable use of natural resources’ (OPRF, 2020: 9) and ‘sustainable tourism’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 2011: 24). Technological innovation is, unsurprisingly, anticipated as the main way to realise the sustainability of these activities. In contrast to this assumed compatibility with environmental objectives, the economic opportunities are portrayed as in need of protection against interests from other states. The US expresses commitment to protect ‘freedom of navigation’ in the Arctic against perceived Russian threats, alleging that Russia ‘is attempting to constrain freedom of navigation through its excessive maritime claims along the Northern Sea Route’ (The White House, 2022: 6). As described above, this interest in freedom of navigation is partly military, but also acts to protect an economic order. The US argues for ‘a shared interest in a peaceful and stable region that allows the Arctic nations to realise the potential benefits of greater access to the region’s resources’ (USDOD, 2019: 4), underpinned by US military power. Russia, for its part, has named ‘actions by foreign states and (or) international organizations to obstruct the Russian Federation’s legitimate economic or other activities in the Arctic’ a ‘primary challenge to national security’ (OPRF, 2020: 5). Here, China is also constructed by Western states as an economic security threat. While under the President Biden, the US threat perception in the Arctic appears to have shifted to an almost exclusive focus on Russia (The White House, 2022); the prior Trump administration indicated strong concerns that ‘China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic’ (USDOD, 2019: 6), a sentiment shared by Denmark and Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2022: 23; RMFA, 2020: 11). China is certainly explicit about its ambitions in the Arctic, which it portrays as an increasingly ‘global’ space. It argues that due to the changing environment and increased accessibility, ‘the Arctic situation now goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States or regional nature’, and the stress on ‘global implications’ is used to justify China’s identification as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ and ‘important stakeholder in Arctic affairs’ (english.gov.cn, 2018). Yet contrary to the impression given by Western states, Chinese material and institutional visions for the future are strikingly similar to those of the littoral states: development of shipping routes, materials extraction and tourism under promises of sustainable development and governed by international law (english.gov.cn, 2018). Hence, the mistrust expressed by other states does not concern explicit differences in visions of Arctic futures. Rather, the imaginary of economic development is securitised along the lines of geopolitical blocs, with economic cooperation across these blocs rendered problematic. Implications for the security politics of solar geoengineering Our analysis has revealed stark differences between scientific security imaginaries in the geoengineering literature and the security imaginaries of Arctic states. First, climate change is constructed as a concern in different ways. In the scientific imaginaries, climate change, and especially the prospect of Arctic tipping points, are front and centre. The Arctic is primarily interpreted through its climate-restorative potential, as imagined through computational Earth system models that imagine futures of controlled Arctic climates – and by extension, controlled global climates. By contrast, state imaginaries of the Arctic are not oriented towards preventing climate change but anticipate a mixture of desirable and undesirable outcomes from rising temperatures, which are seen as an inevitable background for the region’s future. Responses to climate change – such as increased demand for rare earth minerals – are becoming issues of concern and questions of security, more so than climate change itself (cf. McLaren and Corry, 2023), which stands as an unquestioned precondition for other strategic decisions. Whether the Arctic should be a venue of increased activity is not in doubt. This stands in sharp contrast to ideas of geoengineering which presuppose that hindering accessibility in the region for economic and military purposes, for example, by restoring sea ice, would be acceptable to all states involved. Second, the scientific security imaginaries exhibit a liberal institutionalist understanding of international politics and rely on a view of the Arctic as a global commons to be leveraged for the needs of an ostensible global humanity. In this, imaginaries of Arctic geoengineering do not differ from their planet-scaled counterparts (McLaren and Corry, 2021), except perhaps in the immediacy of imagined experimentation and deployment. Yet the Arctic case contains a unique contradictory claim. Geoengineering in the Arctic is justified partly by claims that it would be more politically tractable, drawing on discourses of Arctic exceptionalism that see it as a special region where inter-state cooperation on common interests can be shielded from exterior geopolitical dynamics and conflicts. But while the envisaged methods of geoengineering are bounded in the Arctic, they still aim to achieve global climatic effects.16 Prospective geoengineers thus make two further assumptions: that effects outside the Arctic are overall benign and/or that governance is only relevant in the case of unfavourable effects. The latter relies on a liberal rationalist imaginary of world politics, where costs and benefits are readily identified and acted upon, coordinated by institutions if required, undermining the initial presumption that the Arctic can be shielded from global conflictual geopolitics. Especially with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this idea of Arctic exceptionalism is also increasingly obsolete – the Arctic is undergoing de-exceptionalisation, as indicated by the de facto collapse of the flagship of Arctic multilateralism, the Arctic Council. Schemes that envision deployment of Arctic geoengineering as market-driven are also likely to be less immune to geopolitical obstacles than their developers imagine. Such interventions assume an international order governed by multilateral institutions including markets for carbon removals or ‘cooling credits’. But even for those states which subscribe to similar liberal aspirations, this order is subject to uncertainty, in the Arctic and elsewhere, and is consequently understood as something which must be secured. The mistrust from Western states about China’s interests in the Arctic, although ostensibly similar and compatible with Western aspirations of Arctic futures, highlights the current and increasing uncertainty over the future of such a Western-dominated liberal economic order. Taken together, these differences reveal a deep disjuncture between the security imaginaries of Arctic geoengineering and state strategies. Given the relative strength of state security actors and institutions compared to environmental ones, the political feasibility of Arctic geoengineering appears to preclude a purely environmental logic driving development and/or deployment. It raises the question of which rationales and scenarios would become subject to modification – or disappear completely – to take account of economic, geopolitical, security and other aims. In this light, it is notable that there is one point of convergence between the state and scientific security imaginaries: technological solutionism. States might conceivably adopt geoengineering to partly mitigate Arctic warming (or ice degradation) while still leaving the environment accessible enough for increased resource extraction, transcontinental shipping and tourism. However, such a scenario – a form of mitigation deterrence (McLaren, 2016) – is hardly an expression of the scientific security imaginary, which, having securitised Arctic tipping points as a threat to a global humanity, sees the protection and restoration of the Arctic climate as the overarching priority. Furthermore, far from prospective geoengineers’ expectations that envision the interventions as supported by local and Indigenous populations, this scenario would further instrumentalise the Arctic to the ends of interests outside the region, which clearly amounts to a continuation and intensification of the neo-colonialism that characterises many parts of the Arctic to this day (Greaves, 2016). As clearly indicated by Sámi-led opposition to SCoPEx and opposition to the Arctic Ice Project led by Arctic Indigenous organisations,17 many Arctic Indigenous persons consider SG incompatible with their understandings of sustainability. As a case study, the Arctic provides more general lessons for SG and security. The region has attracted the attention of geoengineering researchers in part because they understand it as a political best case, and the legacy of multilateralism and science diplomacy in the region might seem to support such an assessment. However, even in a such a best case, the underlying imaginaries of geoengineering clash directly with the political ambitions of the states which would need to support, if not implement, the geoengineering interventions. In other words, SG is unlikely to be implemented for the purposes envisioned in scientific circles, in the Arctic context or elsewhere, least of all in the kind of globally ‘optimal’ manner envisaged in computer model experiments. Should further climatological research reveal SG to be technically feasible and climatically desirable – a question not yet settled – the technology would enter the quagmire of an increasingly competitive and conflictual planetary geopolitics and would need to be integrated with state policies that, for the moment, show no signs of adopting climate change as a primary issue. Our conclusions also have implications for McDonald’s (2023) contemplation of geoengineering albeit only ‘in the service of ecological security: a concern with the resilience of ecosystems themselves’ (p. 566). While McDonald acknowledges the problem of finding political purchase for making nature itself the object of security, he does not explore in detail the particular form geoengineering would take as a security measure. Here, we have studied the work of researchers and others who, arguably, invoke ecological security through appeals to necessity or emergency with Arctic ecosystems as the referent object. Through their work to develop geoengineering from general principles into workable interventions (i.e. which technique would be used, how it would be designed, who would be deploying it and where and with what purpose), they appeal to particular understandings of international security. This demonstrates how even attempts to make nature itself the referent object of security in practice depends on understandings about human societies – here theorised as imaginaries. Importantly, these scientific security imaginaries do not appear to align with state security imaginaries. In drawing our conclusions, we do not suggest that state imaginaries alone will determine the future of Arctic geoengineering. We afford them more power relative to the scientific imaginaries, since the former are backed by considerably more institutional, material and discursive power. But imaginaries are dynamic entities subject to change in unpredictable ways. There are prior examples of scientific cooperation between nations under geopolitical strife, including in the Arctic during the Cold War (Bertelsen, 2020), and a scenario where technical cooperation on SG leads to ‘spillover effects’ inducing restorative and sustainable forms of peacebuilding has been suggested as a hypothesis to be investigated (Buck, 2022). Still, there is also a long and consistent history of science being a proxy for and entangled with geopolitics and economics in the region (Doel et al., 2014; Goossen, 2020), and our analysis of Arctic de-exceptionalisation suggests that ‘geoengineering peacebuilding’ is getting increasingly unlikely as tensions continue to rise. A different vein of uncertainty concerns the internal contradictions of state security imaginaries – between the willingness to seize new opportunities for resource extraction and shipping, and other policy goals of environmental protection and national security. How these contradictions are managed, and which aspects are ultimately prioritised, will play a key role in forming the future of the Arctic (cf. Albert and Vasilache, 2018) and in deciding the opportunities for and political desirability of geoengineering interventions. Therefore, while analysing imaginaries can only take us so far in anticipating the security implications of SG, they provide an important foundation for conceptualising the very problems at stake in this anticipation. As climate impacts intensify and the incentives for geoengineering deployment increase – whether as a technocratic ‘climate policy option’ (Irvine and Keith, 2021), as a way of defending empire (Surprise, 2020) or “fossil fuel-dependent ‘ways of life’” (McLaren and Corry, 2023: 1), the imaginaries outlined in this article will be increasingly likely to collide, in the Arctic and elsewhere. AcknowledgmentsThe research for this article was part of the International Security Politics and Climate Engineering (ISPACE) project hosted at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. The authors thank the three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions and are grateful for comments given to an initial presentation of the research idea at the International Congress of Arctic Social Sciences (ICASS X) in June 2021. N.K. thanks the Copenhagen Center for Disaster Research for hosting him while conducting the analysis for this article in 2022.FundingThe author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was carried out with funding from the Independent Research Fund Denmark (Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond).Footnotes1. The latter approaches may also be categorised as ‘nature-based solutions’ or adaptation. In this sense, they are hybrid measures, and we include them here because they also directly or indirectly affect the radiation balance.2. See Centre for Climate Repair. Available at: https://www.climaterepair.cam.ac.uk/refreeze (accessed 5 March 2024).3. For an influential example of internalism, see Jasanoff (2015).4. Now, the ‘carbondioxide-removal.eu’ newsletter. Available at: https://carbondioxide-removal.eu/news/ (accessed 1 August 2023).5. Searches were conducted in the spring of 2022.6. We later chose to include China’s Arctic policy for important additional context.7. In terms of technical effectiveness, some estimates in fact suggest interventions in the Arctic may be less effective than at lower latitudes (Duffey et al., 2023).8. For the latter, see Desch et al. (2017).9. There are some limited exceptions (Baiman, 2021; Moore et al., 2021).10. Although many invocations of soft geoengineering explicitly exclude SAI and MCB, arguments that employ the core distinction between global, risky approaches and more targeted benign ones have also been used to justify Arctic-specific MCB, due to the ‘vastly reduced levels of seeding’ making negative side effects ‘vastly reduced or eliminated’ (Latham et al., 2014: 9). The former UK Chief Scientific Advisor David King has also recently referred to MCB as ‘a biomimicry system’ (The Current, 2022). While much rarer, arguments about reduced side effects have also been applied to Arctic-targeted SAI (Lee et al., 2021).11. Van Wijngaarden et al.’s full review of environmental risks is found in their supplemental compendium (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10602506).12. We thank an anonymous reviewer for the insight on remote impacts. In the extreme case, strong Arctic cooling without proportional cooling of the Antarctic would create a change in hemispheric heat balance which would most likely shift the Intertropical Convergence Zone southwards, leading to severe decreases in rainfall across the Sahel, parts of the Amazon and Northern India; however, this risk is usually discussed as an outcome of SAI specifically, due to its higher cooling potential (Duffey et al., 2023).13. 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Diplomacy
Kim and Trump shaking hands at the red carpet during the DPRK–USA Singapore Summit 2018

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Trump 2.0: Another cycle with new attributes?

by Jesús de los Ángeles Aise Sotolongo

Abstract Never before had a sitting U.S. president managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, nor had any leader from Pyongyang sat face-to-face with a sitting U.S. president during their term as Kim Jong Un did. With Trump’s potential return, could there be another cycle of rapprochement? This paper seeks to address this question. The failure of the previous negotiating cycle, the DPRK’s advances in deterrence, and shifts in peninsular, regional, and global circumstances suggest that both leaders might bring new attributes to their interactions, potentially yielding surprising outcomes Introduction Except for a few moments of rapprochement, since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), U.S. administrations have maneuvered with various forms and methods to destabilize its political and economic system. And since Pyongyang decided to develop nuclear weapons, Washington has labeled them illegal, demanding that they be abandoned, sponsoring United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, and implementing strict unilateral penalties. Meanwhile, successive DPRK leaders have persevered in a military doctrine based on the development of nuclear deterrence to guarantee national defense and security. Nevertheless, an unprecedented moment that broke with that persistent circumstance took place during Donald Trump’s previous term, when the relationship shifted from “fire and fury” to successive summits with Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019, in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom. The exchange of insults — Trump calling Kim “little rocket man” and Kim referring to Trump as a “dotard” — mutated into their approaching one another as “pen pals.” This surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK temporarily, though without the expected results, loosened the “Korean Gordian knot.” No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, and in history, no North Korean leader had ever stood face-to-face, on equal footing, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did. Former President Barack Obama delivered several appealing speeches, but he seemed weak to many countries in East Asia, including U.S. allies and partners. For eight years, he did nothing about North Korea, calling it “strategic patience.” This eroded deterrence and allowed Pyongyang to advance its weapons and nuclear programs (Kausikan, 2025). For his part, at the beginning of his term, Joe Biden announced a “new strategy” toward the DPRK that never materialized; he pleaded for dialogue with Kim Jong Un while simultaneously increasing war threats; he grouped China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea into an ideological category that resurrected the Bush-era notion of the “axis of evil.” Biden’s simplistic binary categorization was not a policy. It ignored the differences in how these four countries define their interests, the degree of integration into the global economy, and the scope of their ambitions. These differences should be the starting point for U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea (Kausikan, 2025). The purpose of this article is to examine the circumstances, obstacles, and expectations for a new cycle of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang with Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Development This second term of President Donald Trump, more transactional and less predictable, seems to be raising expectations of reducing confrontational stress on the Korean Peninsula, and everything indicates that it brings with it a modification of Washington’s policy toward the DPRK. This is conditioned by the following radical changes in strategic circumstances compared to his previous term: DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have undergone new and sophisticated advances. The DPRK has broken all ties and symbols of its relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as its “principal and unchanging enemy.” Declaring that it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the Korean People’s Army to accelerate preparations to “occupy, subdue, and completely reclaim” South Korea. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two Kim Jong Un–Vladimir Putin summits, and Kim’s reference to Putin as his “closest comrade,” have shown the very high level of understanding and commitment between the parties. This is reflected in the DPRK’s unrestricted support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures, which includes a “mutual military assistance” clause. Meanwhile, Russia supports the DPRK diplomatically and economically, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports — essentially oil, raw materials, and food — as well as providing assistance in various fields. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis has been taking shape among China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies describe it as a “new axis.” Within this interconnection, the DPRK holds important advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. The removal of President Yoon Suk Yeol over his irresponsible Martial Law is reinforcing the possibility of a new government led by the Democratic Party, with Lee Jae Myung as the clear favorite and, as of today, more likely to win. [1] This would open the door to a revival of North–South détente reminiscent of the Moon Jae In era. Trump’s foreign policy objectives are based on his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) vision — now reinforced — which prioritizes U.S. strategic and economic interests over traditional alliance commitments (e.g., South Korea and Japan). At least these six factors seem to be significantly influencing Donald Trump’s decision to return to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. While the DPRK occupies a relatively lower position on Trump’s list of priorities (with China and the Russia–Ukraine conflict taking precedence), and dialogue does not appear imminent, he has made it clear that he would like to reconnect with Kim Jong Un, seems willing to reopen negotiations, and is evaluating and discussing possible avenues of interaction that could lay the groundwork for a potential summit. It is said that Washington has been holding discreet conversations with Pyongyang, consulting external experts, and considering options to potentially restart dialogue. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un — clearly more assertive and militarily more powerful in Washington’s eyes — has not publicly shown any willingness to renew his earlier offers related to denuclearization. In his own words: “the DPRK’s nuclearization is non-negotiable,” and he continues to exert pressure by showcasing the country’s missile–nuclear power. This has been illustrated unequivocally and consistently when Kim Jong Un visited nuclear material production facilities and the Nuclear Weapons Institute (NWI) in September 2024 and January 2025. For the DPRK, survival is an existential matter, and Pyongyang considers its nuclear–missile programs absolutely indispensable to secure it; there is nothing we can see that would persuade or force it to renounce them, as that would imply regime change. Everything indicates that the U.S. president is aware that his counterpart has not yet overcome the discouragement caused by the failure of the previous negotiation process, and for that reason, he is sending increasingly precise messages about the possibility of renewed talks, while boasting of his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. At the same time, however, Pyongyang continues to issue contradictory signals of distrust toward Washington, in response to the confrontational attitude and the increasingly close military and intelligence ties with the DPRK’s immediate neighbors. It is worth noting that, this past February, the U.S. sent a nuclear submarine and several B-1B bombers to South Korea; U.S. military forces carried out multiple war exercises, including live-fire drills along the Demilitarized Zone, as well as heavy bombing maneuvers and even space force operations. In March, a large-scale scheduled exercise took place—70 percent larger than the one held the previous year. Nevertheless, it appears that by the end of 2024 the DPRK leadership decided to create a certain margin of diplomatic maneuver in anticipation of the incoming Trump administration. The coverage given to Trump’s inauguration on January 22 marked a shift from Pyongyang’s initial decision to remain silent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections in November. Moreover, this information was published in media outlets aimed at both domestic and international audiences, suggesting that North Korea has begun preparing its people for a new approach to Trump, when appropriate. Despite the steady flow of official statements and media commentary criticizing the United States, anti-American rhetoric has become somewhat less intense. Notably, the use of the expression “U.S. imperialists” has significantly decreased since then. This is also true of Kim’s public statements, which are considered the most authoritative in North Korea. For example, Kim’s speech at the Ministry of Defence on February 8 was the harshest and most detailed on the United States since his speech at a national defence exhibition in November 2024. However, unlike in many of his previous speeches at defence-related venues or events, he did not use derogatory terms such as “U.S. imperialists.” In fact, the last reported use by Kim of the term “U.S. imperialists” was in his defence exhibition speech last November. While there has been a rise in criticism of the United States since early February, as demonstrated by a series of “KCNA commentaries,” the broader trend since December still holds. The media have refrained from mentioning Trump by name, even when criticizing U.S. statements or actions. When issuing criticism, they have only referred to “the new U.S. administration,” “the current administration,” or the “U.S. ruler.” KCNA’s commentary on February 12 regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, blamed the “current U.S. administration” for the plan to take control of Gaza, omitting Trump’s name. All these articles were published in outlets aimed at domestic audiences, likely because they addressed foreign policy issues not directly relevant to North Korea. In contrast, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticism of Rubio’s statement about the “rogue state” was only published on external websites and not disseminated to the domestic audience. This allowed Pyongyang to register its rejection of the statement to external audiences while controlling the narrative about the Trump administration at home. Pyongyang also appears to be creating diplomatic space by attempting to influence Washington’s thinking while it awaits the new Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea. Its Ministry of Defence stated that the United States was “openly ignoring the DPRK’s security concerns” in reference to a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine that entered a South Korean port — an unusually direct accusation that the United States “ignores” its security concerns. If we consider the reverse side of this message (do not ignore North Korea’s security concerns), it is in fact a call from Pyongyang to the new administration to take its “security concerns” into account in its policy toward North Korea (Minyoung Lee, 2025). We can therefore see some Trumpist signals that could prove attractive to Pyongyang’s leadership: Repeated references by the U.S. president, describing the DPRK as a “nuclear power,” a concept recently reinforced when he qualified it as a “great nuclear power.” It is noteworthy that very recently U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio used the expression “nuclear-armed state” to refer to the DPRK, implicitly admitting Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons. This comment suggests that the U.S. is unofficially considering the DPRK as a nuclear-armed nation, just as it does with India, Pakistan, and Israel. There are signs of a strategic shift aimed at overcoming deadlock and building trust by moving from denuclearization as the priority toward nuclear security. In other words, instead of demanding denuclearization, the focus would be on improving the safety of nuclear facilities — such as preventing accidents, leaks, or proliferation risks to third countries — through active bilateral technical cooperation that aligns reciprocal interests. The decisions that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, when the U.S. classified South Korea as a “sensitive country,” as well as the so-called “strategic flexibility” that “modifies the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” It is true that many officials in the Trump administration continue to officially reiterate their commitment to the DPRK’s denuclearization. However, statements by the U.S. president and his Secretary of State suggest that they recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, generating a dual reaction: on one hand, surprise at an abrupt shift in policy toward the DPRK’s nuclearization, and on the other, uncertainty about what would happen to the security concerns of its allies — South Korea and Japan — as well as those of the U.S. itself. It should be noted that Trump stated — no less than in front of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — that he intended to re-establish relations with Kim Jong Un, that “he would do it,” that he has “…an excellent relationship with Kim Jong Un and we’ll see what happens.” And he declared: “But without a doubt, it is a nuclear power.” In that same setting, Trump also mentioned that India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, effectively recognizing them as de facto nuclear-armed states, adding that Kim Jong Un “possesses numerous nuclear weapons” and that “others possess them as well.” Therefore, the statements by Trump and Rubio that tacitly recognize the DPRK as a “nuclear power” indicate a shift in Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang. It seems that interactions between the DPRK and the U.S. are moving toward a turning point: from denuclearization as the priority to nuclear security — a strategic change in U.S. policy aimed at overcoming deadlock and establishing trust, as a preliminary step toward a possible peace treaty. The repeated reference by U.S. President Donald Trump to the DPRK as a nuclear power could be an effort to draw Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, since North Korea seeks de facto recognition by the U.S. as a nuclear-armed state. Trump seems to be maintaining the perspective that the next negotiation should focus on reducing threats rather than denuclearization, despite his stated pursuit of “complete denuclearization.” Everything suggests that Trump is emphasizing the evident reality of Pyongyang’s progress in its nuclear program. It can also be considered that Trump’s remarks may imply that, as a result of the failure of his summit efforts to reach an agreement with Kim Jong Un to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, he may now be encouraging the consideration of an alternative strategy. However, Pyongyang is publicly and incessantly rejecting Trump’s attempts to restart dialogue; this stance has much to do with the recent history of U.S. negotiations and the president’s insufficient reciprocity to the concrete measures proposed by Kim Jong Un. In addition to the above, it is worth highlighting the latest developments that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, which could, to some extent, influence a shift in Pyongyang’s perception and lead it to accept talks with Washington. We refer to the classification of South Korea as a “sensitive country” and the idea of “modifying the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) designated South Korea as a “sensitive country,” a classification that significantly restricts collaboration in areas of advanced technology, including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, quantum science, and advanced computing. This measure, which took effect on April 15, subjects South Korean researchers to stricter controls for collaborating or participating in research at DOE facilities or research centers and marks the first time South Korea has received such a designation from the U.S. government. In this regard, the “sensitive country” classification is based on unilateral criteria such as national security, nuclear non-proliferation, regional instability, threats to economic security, and alleged support for terrorism. This list, maintained by the DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) along with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), already included countries such as India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. Additionally, North Korea and Iran are designated as “state sponsors of terrorism,” while China and Russia are considered “countries of concern.” Such a designation suggests that the U.S. has growing concerns about the increasing voices among South Korean academics, politicians, and citizens who support the development of domestic nuclear weapons. Recent surveys reveal that popular support for nuclear armament has reached between 60% and 70%, apparently stemming from the belief that South Korea must take a bold defensive measure against North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. Although some who favor this idea believe that President Donald Trump’s skeptical view of alliances — focused on reducing the financial burden of protecting U.S. allies — might allow Seoul to develop nuclear weapons and thus reduce Washington’s responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula, the likelihood of this happening remains slim. However, the debate will not disappear in the short term due to growing skepticism about the so-called U.S. “extended deterrence,” which relies only on the deployment of strategic assets in the South of the peninsula. In the meantime, the DPRK is very likely to feel satisfied, as it sees its long-standing desire fulfilled: to witness cracks in the Washington–Seoul alliance. Another decision that would benefit the DPRK under the so-called “strategic flexibility” is the projection that the Trump administration may deploy U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, following the circulation of a purported Pentagon memorandum detailing its objective of deterring China from occupying Taiwan. As is well known, the primary mission of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea is to deter threats from the DPRK. Should this decision materialize, their mission would then shift to countering China, considered a key component of the current administration’s foreign policy. This would create a security vacuum for Seoul and further strain its relations with Beijing. In such a circumstance, the Trump administration could pressure South Korea to handle conventional military actions from the DPRK independently, with the U.S. intervening only in the case of nuclear threats. Therefore, the best option for Seoul is to significantly strengthen its defensive capabilities, preparing for a scenario in which U.S. troops are not involved in a conventional war with the DPRK. The notion of “strategic flexibility” for the USFK reflects a shift in the main mission of U.S. forces abroad, moving from the defense of nations through their permanent presence to rapid deployment in other parts of the world where conflicts arise. As expected, unease is growing in Seoul in the face of Pyongyang’s increasing assertiveness, while the latter shows greater defiance. First, due to the possibility that Trump’s second administration may divert part of the USFK’s resources to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which would leave South Korea more vulnerable. Second, because South Korea is currently in open political turmoil over the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol, and everything seems to indicate that the so-called South Korean democracy has failed to demonstrate itself as reliable in the eyes of Trump and his team. It is worth mentioning what Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University, stated in his most recent book, titled “Why American Diplomacy Fails”. The expert describes North Korea’s nuclear problem as an illustrative failure of U.S. diplomacy. His remarks are eloquent when he says: “In my conversations with members of the Trump administration during my trip to America, I had the impression that they firmly feel that Korea [South Korea] has been getting a free ride [on U.S. security] for far too long. South Korea’s excessive dependence on the United States could have serious consequences. The Korean government needs to develop autonomous strategic thinking. It needs to explore creative contingency plans for the worst-case scenario of a U.S. absence from the Korean peninsula.” We can see that Trump’s return is testing diplomatic limits and fueling a key question: Will Trump’s return to the White House open another cycle of engagement with Kim Jong Un, but with new attributes? The U.S. president always highlights his good personal relationship with the DPRK leader, something that, undoubtedly, could have a positive effect. But, as of today, Pyongyang seems to lack incentives to negotiate with Washington for four essential reasons: Military, it has achieved significant advances in its conventional weapons programs, strategic missiles, and nuclear arms, which provide it with a high deterrent capability. Economically, even under heavy sanctions, it is experiencing moments of economic expansion, it has made progress in import substitution, its local industry is reviving, and infrastructure construction is in full development. This makes negotiating the lifting of sanctions, in general and with Washington in particular, less urgent for Pyongyang. Its willingness to take political risks in exchange for economic benefits has clearly diminished. Geostrategically, its military alliance with Russia may generate new revenues, transfers of military technology, practical experience in modern warfare, and weaken the international sanctions regime. Geopolitically, the world is entering a period of dynamic geopolitical realignment that could eventually result in a multipolar order. The DPRK seems well positioned due to its ties with two key actors in the multipolarization process: Russia and China. At the same time, it observes the disruption of the traditional alliance structure with the United States and sees Washington distancing itself from its main allies, who are also DPRK’s adversaries in East Asia. Therefore, it appears willing to watch the evolution of events and their outcome. Donald Trump has stated that his administration has opened a line of communication with the DPRK and considered that, at some point, “something will probably happen,” emphasizing: “There is communication. I have a very good relationship with Kim Jong Un… I get along wonderfully with him… I think it is very important. It is a ‘great nuclear nation,’ and he is a ‘very smart guy.’ I got to know him very well… We will probably do something at some point.” It cannot be ruled out in this analysis that the DPRK is doubly leveraged. On one hand, with stable trade with China; on the other, with Russia’s reciprocity for its declared and materially sustained support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Therefore, additional incentives directly linked to DPRK’s comprehensive security must emerge. If the U.S. were to formally recognize the DPRK as a “de facto nuclear power,” which would represent a radical change in U.S. strategy, the prospect of future negotiations focused on threat reduction rather than denuclearization would open up. Despite Trump’s flattering words and the expectations they raise, it is not clear whether the U.S. president would be able to secure internal consensus within his administration to make such a decision without major obstacles, and, at the same time, manage to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership around him. Conclusions The viability of negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK under Trump’s new government remains uncertain, but it is possible that Trump will pursue a new “diplomatic victory” — similar to his 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong Un — through an alternative strategy that bilaterally satisfies Pyongyang’s aspiration to be recognized as a de facto nuclear state. However, it is unlikely that the international community would accept the U.S. unilaterally recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a vote by the UN Security Council would be required, where the United Kingdom and France would surely veto it; and if it were brought to the General Assembly as a resolution, the number of opposing votes would probably be a majority. It is worth noting that the DPRK is doubly leveraged: it has stable trade with China and reciprocity from Russia for its material support, in addition to enjoying the diplomatic backing of both powers. Given its persistent distrust of Washington, it is to be expected that Pyongyang will maintain its close coordination with Beijing and Moscow and use it to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Washington. Thus, for the time being, it is not clear whether the U.S. president will be able to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership surrounding him. Notes[1] Lee Jae Myung was elected as president of the Republic of Korea after the June 3rd, 2025 elections. References Aise Sotolongo, J. (2025). Return of Donald Trump: Continuity or change with the DPRK? World and New World Journal. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4082Chan-kyong, P. (2025, 12 de marzo). Kim Jong Un seeks negotiating leverage over Trump's new nuclear demands, analysts say. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3296722/kim-jong-un-seeks-negotiating-leverage-over-trump-new-nuclear-demands-analystsChung-in, M. (2025, 15 de febrero). It's time Korea prepares itself for a peninsula without the US, expert advises. The Korea Herald. https://m.koreaherald.com/article/10455463Depetris, D. R. (2025, 9 de abril). Kim Jong Un is watching Trump's Ukraine diplomacy with interest. 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2025/04/kim-jong-un-iswatching-trump-ukranie-diplomacy-with-interestEFE. (2025a, 10 de enero). Pionyang dice que sus armas nucleares no son moneda de cambio para negociar. Swissinfo. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/pionyangdice-que-sus-armas-nucleares-no-son-moneda-decambio-para-negociar/88844909EFE. (2025b, 22 de marzo). Washington, Seúl y Tokio reafirman su compromiso para desnuclearizar a Corea del Norte. Swissinfo. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/washington%2C-se%C3%BAl-y-tokio-reafirman-su-compromiso-para-desnuclearizar-a-corea-del-norte/88881832EM Redacción. (2025, 12 de marzo). Estados Unidos califica a Corea del Sur como un "país sensible", limitando la cooperación en tecnología avanzada. Escenario Mundial. https://www.escenariomundial.com/2025/03/12/estados-unidos-califica-a-corea-del-sur-como-un-pais-sensible-limitando-la-cooperacion-en-tecnologia-avanzada/KBS WORLD. (2025, 5 de febrero). Seúl y Washington acuerdan limitar el término "desnuclearización" a Corea del Norte y no a toda la península. http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=s&Seq_Code=92262Kipiahov, O. (2025, 9 de febrero). Rossiian vstrechaiut s ulybkami posol RF v KNDR rasskazal kak zhivet severnaia koreia. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. https://rg.ru/2025/02/09/rossiian-vstrechaiut-s-ulybkami-posol-rf-v-kndr-rasskazal-kak-zhivet-severnaia-koreia.htmlKYODO NEWS. (2025, 18 de marzo). China eyes teaming up with Japan, South Korea to denuclearize N. Korea. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/03/c5e26b7d5347-htmlLankov, A. (2025, 9 de febrero). Trump’s North Korea nuclear diplomacy: Between bad and worse. Asialink Diplomacy. https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/diplomacy/article/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-between-bab-and-worse/McCartney, M. (2025, 17 de abril). Trump plans to disarm North Korea, but Kim wants more nuclear weapons. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/us-north-korea-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-2022678Minyoung Lee, R. (2025, 25 de abril). North Korea leaving maneuvering room with the US while preparing for long-term confrontation. 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2025/04/noth-koreas-acknowledgement-of-war-participation/Reddy, S. (2025, 9 de febrero). Russian envoy to DPRK says Moscow welcomes talks between US and North Korea. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/russian-envoy-to-dprk-says-moscow-welcomestalks-between-us-and-north-korea/Sneider, D. (2025, 3 de abril). Is North Korea the next target of Trump’s search for a deal? Keia. https://wwwkeia.org/2025/04/north-korea-the-netx-target-oftrmps-search-for-a-deal/Sputnik. (2025, 31 de marzo). Trump valora su relación con líder norcoreano Kim Jong Un y planea un eventual contacto. El País CR. https://www.elpais.cr/2025/03/31/trump-valora-su-relacion-con-lidernorcoreano-kim-jong-un-y-planea-un-eventual-contacto/YONHAP. (2025, 8 de marzo). Trump appears to use 'nuclear power' label to lure N. Korea to dialogue: US expert. The Korea Times. https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=394200

Energy & Economics
Global business connection concept. Double exposure world map on capital financial city and trading graph background. Elements of this image furnished by NASA

Liaison countries as foreign trade bridge builders in the geo-economic turnaround

by Eva Willer

Introduction Geopolitical tensions are making global trade increasingly difficult. In order to reduce the associated risk of default, companies are shifting their trade relations to trading partners that are politically similar to them. In the course of the beginnings of geo-economic fragmentation, politically and economically like-minded countries are also gaining in importance for German and European decision-makers. Liaison countries1 in particular can form a counterforce to the trend towards polarization in foreign trade - especially between the USA and China: they are characterized by a pronounced economic and trade policy openness that overrides differences between geopolitical or ideological camps. Consequently, the question arises: How can relevant connecting countries for Germany and Europe be identified? What opportunities and risks do closer trade relations with these countries offer in order to strengthen foreign trade resilience in geopolitically uncertain times?  With a high degree of openness - defined as the sum of imports and exports in relation to gross domestic product - of over 80 percent2 , the German economy is strongly integrated into global trade. Accordingly, the disruptive effect of geo-economic fragmentation on the German economy would be above average. The defensive strategy to strengthen Germany's economic security by pushing for trade policy independence would only reinforce geo-economic fragmentation. Against the backdrop of comparatively high economic vulnerability, it is necessary to focus on those potential partner countries with which German and European foreign trade could be developed and expanded even under the condition of increasing fragmentation.  Geoeconomic Fragmentation  The term "geo-economic fragmentation" is used to describe the politically motivated reorganization of global goods and financial flows, in which strategic, economic and political interests primarily determine the choice of countries of origin and destination for trade flows.3 In the scenario of geo-economic fragmentation, the result would be the formation of a bloc within the global community of states, which would fundamentally change the regulatory structure of global economic networking. In this case, trade and investment would probably concentrate from a previously diverse range of economic partner countries - prior to the formation of the bloc - on those countries that now - since the formation of the bloc - belong to the same bloc.  The likelihood of this scenario occurring and leading to an increased fragmentation of the global economic order has increased again in the recent past. For example, Donald Trump's second term as US president is causing increasing geopolitical uncertainty worldwide.  Statements on the concrete form of a possible demarcation of potential blocs are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. However, the division of a large part of the global economy into a "US bloc" and a "China bloc" is a conceivable scenario for which German politics and business should prepare.  Data already shows that, at a global level, foreign trade openness has decreased in the recent past. Data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) illustrates the increasing hurdles in global trade in goods. While 3.1% of global imports were still affected by tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade in 2016 - including under WTO rules - this figure rose to 11.8% in 2024 over the following years.4 This development goes hand in hand with a noticeable loss of importance and enforcement of the WTO since the 2010s, which previously played a central role as the guardian of the rules-based global economic order.  Studies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have already found indications of an incipient geo-economic fragmentation along potential bloc borders. It shows that trade in goods and foreign direct investment between countries that would belong to the opposing camp in the event of a bloc formation declined on average in 2022 and 2023 - in contrast to foreign trade between countries that are geopolitically close.5  In this initial phase of geo-economic fragmentation, liaison countries are beginning to establish themselves as a counterforce, holding the fragmenting global community of states together with new trade and investment routes.  Identification of liaison countries Specifically, liaison countries have the following characteristics: a pronounced openness to foreign trade in the form of a high foreign trade quota and low tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, as well as pronounced economic relations with partner countries from different geopolitical camps. The geopolitical orientation of countries can be examined using data on voting behavior within the United Nations.6 This involves analyzing whether a country can be assigned to the US or Chinese camp - or whether there is no pronounced proximity and therefore political neutrality or "non-alignment" in the sense of ideological independence. The data-based identification of connecting countries is relatively new. Empirical analyses are also limited to connecting countries in the context of US-Chinese foreign trade - specifically US imports from China. In this case, the characteristics of a connecting country can be broken down into (1) "non-alignment" - i.e. a geopolitical distance to both a Western and an Eastern bloc - as well as (2) an increase in imports and foreign investment from China and (3) a simultaneous increase in exports to the United States. In a narrower sense, this is an evasive reaction to trade restrictions, i.e. circumventing trade. If the foreign trade indicators - specifically the trade and investment data relating to the US and China - of "non-aligned" countries for the period from 2017 to 2020 show corresponding characteristic-related changes compared to previous years, these can be identified as countries connecting the US and China.  The analysis of trade data shows that the value of direct exports from China to the USA fell during Donald Trump's first term in office. At the same time, both Chinese exports to some of the "non-aligned" countries and exports from these countries to the USA have increased significantly. These countries have presumably stepped in as a link on the export route from China to the US after the previously direct trade flow was interrupted by trade barriers and had to find a new route. Companies producing in China are therefore likely to have sought new, indirect ways to maintain access to the US sales market.  A certain statistical inaccuracy in the foreign trade data makes it difficult to draw a definitive conclusion in this context. It should be noted: No single commodity can be tracked across national borders in trade data collection. Whether the additional goods imported from China actually found their way to the United States can only be assumed approximately. However, if the trade flows are aggregated, a clearer picture emerges and the circumvention trade via selected connecting countries - including Vietnam and Mexico - becomes visible.  Data on foreign direct investment rounds off the analysis.7 "Non-aligned" countries in which an increase in Chinese investment can be seen between 2016 and 2020 in addition to trade flows can be identified as connecting countries. Here, too, available data suggests that the companies concerned either exported their goods to the United States via a stopover or even outsourced parts of their production destined for the US market to connecting countries. Five connecting countries between the US and China Based on the 2017-2020 study period, various connecting countries can be empirically identified that were used to indirectly maintain access to the US market. In terms of foreign trade volume, the economically most important connecting countries include Mexico, Vietnam, Poland, Morocco and Indonesia.8 All five countries are characterized by the fact that both their exports of goods to the US and their imports of goods from China increased significantly between 2017 and 2020. In addition, greenfield investments (foreign direct investment to set up a new production facility) have risen significantly compared to the period before 2017.  However, the five countries show different priorities in their development, which differentiate them in their role as connecting countries between the USA and China. In Vietnam, exports to the USA in particular have risen sharply. China has been the most important procurement market for Vietnamese companies for years. Poland, Mexico and Indonesia are characterized as connecting countries primarily by the significant increase in imports from China. Morocco, in turn, was able to attract more Chinese foreign investment in particular. Greenfield investments have almost tripled here since 2017. However, Poland - a rather surprising candidate for the role of liaison country, as it is intuitively assigned to the US-oriented bloc - is positioned fairly centrally between the US and China according to the analysis of voting behavior within the United Nations9. In addition, Poland qualifies primarily due to the sharp rise in greenfield investments from China, primarily in the expansion of domestic battery production.10  It cannot be concluded from the previous studies on the USA and China whether German companies are also circumventing trade barriers from the USA via the countries identified. As the trade policy conflicts between the US and China differ significantly from those between the EU and China, there has been a lack of comparable empirical data to analyze connecting countries in the EU context. Opportunities and challenges As the German economy is strongly oriented towards foreign trade and is closely networked with both the USA and China, German companies play a particularly exposed role in the area of tension between the USA and China. Increased economic exchange with potential connecting countries would offer German companies an opportunity to mitigate the expected shock of a geopolitical bloc. They could at least maintain international trade to a certain extent and thus secure some of the endangered sales and procurement markets. On the other hand, there are also costs associated with expanding foreign trade relations with potential connecting countries. The greater complexity also increases the risk in the value chains. Companies that position themselves wisely within this trade-off buy themselves valuable time in the event of a shock to reorganize themselves against the backdrop of changed foreign trade conditions.  From the perspective of foreign trade policy, it is also possible to examine the extent to which stronger foreign trade cooperation with (potential) connecting countries could have advantages. The trade-off between resilience and complexity must then be assessed at a macroeconomic level, beyond individual company interests. In order to make it easier for companies to connect to potential connecting countries and to create appropriate framework conditions, German and European policy can build on existing comprehensive strategies at national and European level. Both the China Strategy11 and the National Security Strategy12 focus foreign policy on connecting countries as part of a stronger economic and political risk diversification. There is also a similar framework at European level with the EU's Strategic Compass13 . Following on from this, the German government could create targeted incentives to open up new markets in liaison countries, which would diversify critical supply chains and reduce one-sided dependencies.  At the same time, connecting countries pose a challenge. These can be used to circumvent foreign trade measures such as sanctions if flows of goods can find alternative routes via connecting countries more easily than before.  In order to realize opportunities and overcome challenges, close cooperation between science, politics and companies is required. This first requires the identification of a selection of potential connecting countries through scientifically sound analysis. This creates the basis for the subsequent steps in which European and German policymakers work closely with companies to create attractive framework conditions for trade with potential connecting countries - for example through bilateral trade agreements.  Attractive foreign trade framework conditions can create the necessary incentive to actually expand trade relations with potential connecting countries. Companies need to weigh up individual cases and make forward-looking decisions: To what extent is there a risk of a loss of production triggered by geopolitical conflicts? And how much would the complexity of the value chain increase if more potential connecting countries were included? Ultimately, the actual choice of preferred sales and procurement markets lies with the individual companies. LicenseThis work is licensed under CC BY 4.0 References1. Verbindungsländer werden im Sinne von Connectors verstanden, vgl. Gita Gopinath/Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas/Andrea F Presbitero/Petia Topalova, Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?, Washington, D.C.: IMF, April 2024 (IMF Working Paper) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-ColdWar-547357/>. 2. Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), Außenwirtschaft. 2025, <https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Wirtschaft/Globalisierungsindikatoren/aussenwirtschaft.html#246 078/>.  3. Shekahar Aiyar/Franziska Ohnsorge, Geoeconomic Fragmentation and ‚Connector’ Countries, Online verfügbar unter:  <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/121726/1/MPRA_paper_121726.pdf>.4. WTO, WTO Trade Monitoring Report, Genf, November 2024, <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/factsheet_dec24_e.pdf/>. 5. Gita Gopinath/Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas/Andrea F Presbitero/Petia Topalova, Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?, Washington, D.C.: IMF, April 2024 (IMF Working Paper) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-ColdWar-547357/>.  6. Michael A. Bailey/Anton Strezhnev/Erik Voeten, »Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data«, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (2017) 2, S. 430-456, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002715595700/>.7. Gita Gopinath/Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas/Andrea F Presbitero/Petia Topalova, Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?, Washington, D.C.: IMF, April 2024 (IMF Working Paper) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-ColdWar-547357/>. War-547357. 8. Enda Curran/Shawn Donnan/Maeva Cousin, »These Five Countries are Key Economic ‚Connectors‘ in a Fragmenting World«, in Bloomberg (online), 1.11.2023, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-1102/vietnam-poland-mexico-morocco-benefit-from-us-china-tensions/>.9. Michael A. Bailey/Anton Strezhnev/Erik Voeten, »Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data«, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (2017) 2, S. 430-456, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002715595700/>.  10. Enda Curran/Shawn Donnan/Maeva Cousin, »These Five Countries are Key Economic ‚Connectors‘ in a Fragmenting World«, in Bloomberg (online), 1.11.2023, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202311-02/vietnam-poland-mexico-morocco-benefit-from-us-china-tensions/>.11. Auswärtiges Amt, China‐Strategie der Bundesregierung, Berlin, Juli 2023, <https://www.auswaertigesamt.de/resource/blob/2608578/810fdade376b1467f20bdb697b2acd58/china-strategie-data.pdf/>.  12. Auswärtiges Amt, Integrierte Sicherheit für Deutschland: Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, Berlin, Juni 2023, <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5636374/38287252c5442b786ac5d0036ebb237b/nationalesicherheitsstrategie-data.pdf/>.  13. Rat der Europäischen Union, Ein Strategischer Kompass für Sicherheit und Verteidigung, Brüssel, März 2022, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/de/pdf/>.

Diplomacy
Indian Arctic Himadri station

Leveraging India’s Arctic Observer Status: Scientific Diplomacy as a Lever for Climate, Resource and Security Advancement

by Sneh Kotak

Introduction The Arctic region, located above 66.5° N latitude and spanning approximately 14.5 million square kilometers, includes the Arctic Ocean, surrounding seas, and the northern territories of eight Arctic states -Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.1 With melting ice opening critical maritime routes like the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and unlocking access to vital resources, global interest in the region has intensified. Governance remains limited to Arctic states within the Arctic Council, while non-Arctic countries like India hold observer status without voting rights. India, despite its geographical distance, holds a strategic interest in the Arctic for scientific collaboration, climate research, and access to critical minerals. As a permanent observer since 2013, it has established the Himadri Research Station in Svalbard (78°55′N, 11°56′E) and the IndARC observatory in the Kongsfjorden fjord. Yet its influence is constrained by structural limitations and increasing competition from China, which actively seeks Arctic access through its Polar Silk Road. This paper argues that scientific diplomacy can serve as a key lever for India to deepen engagement, enhance its strategic presence, and align Arctic access with its broader energy and climate security goals. Strategic Importance The Arctic is no longer a distant, frozen periphery of global landmass, it has become a contention of resource politics, climate urgency and military escalation. Once defined by remoteness, the region today hosts an intensifying convergence of climate disruption, mineral access and geostrategic rivalry. As Arctic ice recedes at unprecedented rates, the region is unlocking new navigational routes and exposing valuable reserves of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements and copper2 which are resources crucial to the global green energy transition. Indian Involvement and Presence India’s official interest in the Arctic began with its first expedition in 2007 and has since matured with the establishment of the Himadri research station (2008),3 IndARC Observatory (2014)4  and a series of bilateral research collaborations. India’s Arctic Policy, released in 2022, formalized its intent to participate in scientific, economic and environmental cooperation across six thematic pillars: research, environmental protection, resource exploration, logistics, governance and capacity building. Despite these efforts, India’s observer status in the Arctic Council grants no voting rights and limited influence over policy formation. This structural limitation is exacerbated by the growing strategic assertiveness of China and Russia. Both nations have expanded dual-use infrastructure in the Arctic, including China’s self-declared “Near- Arctic State”5 status and Russia’s militarization of its northern flank. For India, this presents both challenges and opportunities. The Arctic’s emerging importance intersects with India’s national priorities in vital areas, such as:a) Securing climate-relevant data to understand and mitigate monsoon and GLOF (Glacial Lake Outburst Floods) patterns.b) Accessing critical minerals for its 2070 net-zero emissions goal and green industrialization.6 Strategic Importance of the Arctic for India The Arctic’s geo-environmental dynamics have profound consequences for India. The increased melting of the Greenland and Arctic ice sheets contributes to the rise in sea levels and fluctuations in monsoon variability through changing planetary wave patterns.7 The Himadri station in Ny-Alesund and IndArc mooring offer India unique insight into these processes, feeding long-range weather forecasting models via NCPOR-ISRO pipelines. On the diplomatic front, as the only Global South climate observer, India’s data-sharing from Arctic observatories strengthens its credibility within forums such as the Arctic Council’s Environment Protection Working Group and the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON). Unlocking shipping corridors like NSR and CVMC could reduce Europe’s shipping time from Asia by approx. 40-50%, generating economic dividends. India’s Navy and Merchant Marine benefit from Arctic route familiarity, while India’s global positioning is enhanced through maritime cooperation. This demonstrates the importance of the Arctic for climate, economy and diplomacy. Navigating the shifting maritime architecture may redefine global trade through corridors like NSR and the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor (CVMC).8 Indian Policy and Strategic Gaps India’s Arctic engagement is still relatively nascent in terms of international literature but is growing in strategic significance. The most foundational contributions include policy reviews by India’s Ministry of Earth Sciences (2022), Arctic Council science reports and multilateral white papers by think tanks and scholars. a) Scientific Infrastructure and Diplomacy – India’s Arctic science program, anchored by Himadri and IndARC, has contributed valuable data on atmospheric variability, Arctic monsoon linkages and glacial melting. According to Krishnan et al (2021)9 India’s participation in the Ny-Alesund Science Managers Committee has facilitated cross-national collaboration with Norway, Germany and the UK. The use of ISRO satellites to monitor climate interactions also reflects a techno-diplomatic layer of soft power. b) Policy and Strategic Gaps – India’s 2022 Arctic Policy was a milestone, but scholars critique its technocratic tone and lack of geopolitical urgency. Verma (2023)10 notes that the policy’s six pillars are too operational and overlook the need for a dedicated strategic or security component. With rising militarization of the Arctic by Russia and China, and NATO’s increased surveillance operations, India risks being a passive observer if strategy remains science-focused only. c) Moreover, India’s Arctic policy has yet to align with its Act East or Indo-Pacific strategies, thereby missing synergies in maritime infrastructure and regional partnerships Chaudhury (2025)11  d) Critical Minerals and Strategic Supply Chains – India’s net-zero targets by 2070 and the Green Hydrogen Mission depend on sustainable access to lithium, cobalt and REEs. However, nearly 90% of India’s lithium and cobalt are sourced via Chinese refineries (ICWA 2024).12 The Arctic, particularly Greenland, Canada and Russia holds untapped reserves. India’s MoUs with Chile and Australia represent important steps, but lack continuity in Arctic-focused supply diplomacy. e) Rising Security Competition – Russia’s reactivation of Soviet-era bases, introduction of hypersonic missile systems and increasing joint exercises with China in Arctic waters have altered the balance of power. According to the CSIS (2023), this militarization, while defensive in tone, is designed to deter NATO and non-Arctic encroachments. China, on the other hand, has institutionalized its Arctic ambitions via the Polar Silk Road, icebreaker fleets and joint resource ventures with Russia. Since India lacks comparable Arctic military presence or deep water capacity, a militarized response is not deemed appropriate.13 Instead, turning to diplomacy offers a non-threatening influential strategy, especially among neutral Arctic actors like Norway and Iceland. f) Moreover, India’s GLOF technology can be showcased in forums such as the Arctic Climate Change Forum and NATO’s emerging climate nodes, blending humanitarian outreach with scientific cooperation. This positions India as an active partner in Arctic climate resilience. Mineral Diplomacy and Green-Energy Autonomy India’s green energy ambitions hinge on reliable supplies of lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare-earth elements critical to battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) and renewable storage solutions. The 2023 National Critical Mineral Mission diagnoses India’s near total dependence on Chinese supply chains. To break this dependency, strategic focus has shifted to geologically stable Arctic reserves in Greenland, Canada and Siberia. However, access to these mineral reserves demands more than diplomatic prowess, it requires project level cooperation built on scientific triads. India-Greenland MoUs should exist to propose joint surveys for these minerals with the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources.14 SWOT Analysis An integrated SWOT analysis allows for a realistic assessment of India’s Arctic trajectory:   Recommendations Based on the preceding analysis, the following recommendations integrate scientific diplomacy, climate technology and strategic logistics to boost India’s Arctic influence. 1. Establish an Indian Arctic-Earth Diplomacy Corps: Hosted jointly by the MEA and the MoES, IAEDC should comprise scientists, diplomats, oceanographers and military linguists specialized in Arctic affairs. They will lead institutional relations and field missions. 2. Expand Scientific Infrastructure: Upgrade Himadri Station into a multilateral research hub by inviting partner scientists and enabling joint projects. Additionally, post a mobile Arctic-Himalaya GLOF Expedition Team, designed by IIT Roorkee-NCPOR, 16 to Arctic communities for pilot data assimilation. India could also launch open-access Arctic climate data portal harmonized with ISRO satellites to promote transparency and scientific collaboration. 3. Launch the Green Minerals Research Alliance: With NITI Aayog approval, form an R&D network with Greenland Institute of Natural Resources and Norwegian or Canadian universities to explore joint technology solutions for sustainable mineral extraction. 4. Develop Maritime-Climate Corridors: Repurpose CVMC agreements to include climate-monitoring science hubs and shared logistics facilities across Arctic ports during summer navigation seasons. 5. Engage in Climate Security Exercises: Participate in or lead Arctic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercises, deploying India’s unique Himalayan HADR expertise to Arctic conditions. 6. Strengthen institutional capacity: Add an Arctic Mandate Cell to NITI Aayog/DMEO for integrated policy planning across relevant ministries. Additionally, begin an Annual India-Arctic Science Summit, facilitating policy dialogue, mineral-science collaboration, sharing climate technology and youth and student fellowships based mostly on Arctic research and education.  Conclusion and Scope for Further Research India’s Arctic observer status offers a unique but limited opening. By wielding scientific diplomacy as a central instrument, India can convert passive Arctic presence into strategic influence without seeking voting rights or military buildup. The science-driven strategy empowers India to: 1. Conduct climate resilient modeling and synchronization for both Himalayan and Arctic regions.2. Secure mineral access gradually through transparent and partner-driven resource diplomacy.3. Enrich maritime connectivity via CVMC/NSR corridors supported by joint data sharing.4. Preserve strategic autonomy while aligning climate and development objectives with global governance standards. Through case studies of GLOF modeling, joint mineral exploration and maritime climate corridors, India can operationalize sustainable soft power influence. These initiatives reinforce India’s green ambitions and help disconnect critical and military-driven inputs from dominant actors like China.Future research could examine legal frameworks underpinning India’s non-Arctic science based rights, economic evaluations of Indian-built ice class vessels and evaluation systems for policy success metrics in Arctic diplomacy. Overall, by framing Arctic engagement as an extension of climate-resilient and demilitarized diplomacy, India emerges as a critical stakeholder in polar governance which is determined by climate science, research, data exchange, transparency as well as mutually beneficial diplomatic relations with Arctic council members and observer members. References 1.    Arctic Portal. “Arctic Circle.” Arctic Portal Maps. https://arcticportal.org/maps/download/arctic-definitions/2418-arctic-circle 2.    Ollila, Mirkka Elisa. “The Triangle of Extraction in the Kola Peninsula.” The Arctic Institute, October 1, 2024. Accessed June 18, 2025. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/triangle-extraction-kola-peninsula/ 3.    National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research. “Himadri Station.” NCPOR – Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. Accessed June 18, 2025. https://ncpor.res.in/app/webroot/pages/view/340-himadri-station 4.    National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research. “IndARC.” NCPOR – Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. https://ncpor.res.in/arctics/display/398-indarc 5.    Merkle, David. “The Self‑Proclaimed Near‑Arctic State.” International Reports (Auslandsinformationen),Konrad‑Adenauer‑Stiftung. https://www.kas.de/en/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/der‑selbsternannte‑fast‑arktisstaa 6.    Ministry of Science & Technology, Government of India. “India Is Committed to Achieve the Net Zero Emissions Target by 2070 as Announced by PM Modi, Says Dr. Jitendra Singh.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, September 28, 2023.  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1961797 7.    Association of American Universities. “Ice Sheet Surface Melt Is Accelerating in Greenland and Slowing in Antarctica.” Featured Research Topics, Association of American Universities, May 26,  2025. https://www.aau.edu/research-scholarship/featured-research-topics/ice-sheet-surface-melt-accelerating-greenland-and 8. Korea Centre (Mahatma Gandhi University). “The Arctic and Northern Sea Route: A New Frontier for India–South Korea Cooperation.” Korea Centre, April 7, 2025. https://koreacentre.org/2025/04/07/the-arctic-and-northern-sea-route-a-new-frontier-for-india-south-korea-cooperation/ 9.    Krishnan, K.P., and S. Venkatachalam. “Chapter 2 – India’s Scientific Endeavors in the Arctic with Special Reference to Climate Change: The Past Decade and Future Perspectives.” In Understanding Present and Past Arctic Environments: An Integrated Approach from Climate Change Perspectives, 15–29. 2021. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780128228692000062 10. Kumar, Ashish, and Sudheer Singh Verma. “The Arctic Region: National Interests and Policies of India and China.” January 2023. PDF. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ashish-Kumar-591/publication/388222280_The_Arctic_Region_National_Interests_and_Policies  of_India_and_China/links/678fca07ec3ae3435a733a47/The-Arctic-Region-National-Interests-and-Policies-of-India-and-China.pdf 11. Observatory of Regional Transformations (ORF). “From Look East to Act East: Mapping India’s Southeast Asia Engagement.” Observer Research Foundation, 2025. Accessed June 19, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/research/from-look-east-to-act-east-mapping-india-s-southeast-asian-engagement 12. Indian Council of World Affairs. “From Look East to Act East: Mapping India’s Southeast Asia Engagement.” ICWA. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10458&lid=6669 13. Osho, Zerin, and Eoin Jackson. “The Polar Tiger: Why India Must Be Included in the New U.S. Arctic Defense Strategy.” High North News, November 28, 2023. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/polar-tiger-why-india-must-be-included-new-us-arctic-defense-strategy 14. Greenland Institute of Natural Resources. Frontpage. Nuuk, Greenland. https://natur.gl/ 15. ThePrint, What Are Indian Researchers Doing in the Arctic Circle? YouTube video, 2:26, published https://youtu.be/WsZO0ZCTSyI?si=ysLbBnkAiqYzIlMp 16. Centre of Excellence in Disaster Mitigation & Management, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee. Home. https://iitr.ac.in/Centres/Centre%20of%20Excellence%20in%20Disaster%20Mitigation%20and%20Management/Home.html