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Abstract: The Sahel is the most attractive strip of Africa for terrorist groups to establish themselves in. As a result of the fragility of the area and the limited resources to deal with armed gangs, more and more terrorist groups are emerging and coexisting in the area. This paper aims to briefly analyse the multiplicity of terrorist groups and the relationship between them, focusing essentially on one question: is the rise of Salafi attacks that make the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism caused by all terrorist groups acting together to achieve their aims, or is each acting independently? Keywords:Sahel - Terrorism - Jihadism - Terrorist groups - Cooperation - Competition. The Sahel: Africa’s Perfect Stage for Terrorists?  The Sahel is defined as the large strip that runs from west to east across Africa, between the Sahara Desert and the tropical zone of Sub-Saharan Africa1; in fact, Sahel derives from an Arabic word meaning ‘shore’, thus forming the southern shore of the great Sahara Desert. Although this area covers a dozen countries, due to the existence of a greater number of similarities between certain states in the area, reference is usually made to five specific countries when talking about the Sahel, specifically those that formed the G5 Sahel group between February 2014 and November 2023, with the aim of trying to find a joint and concerted solution to the instability in the area.  Indeed, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania share similarities given their historical and political past, to a greater extent than the rest of the Sahelian countries, and all of them are subject to strong instability. Within this general instability, it should be noted that in the case of the first three countries mentioned above, they share the so-called ‘triple border’, an area where 80% of the attacks recorded in the Sahel are concentrated2.  The countries have the common legacy of the mostly French colonisation process, sometimes, and more in the framework of current narratives, it is held responsible for having generated great instability in their political institutions and in the economy of the states3. And, faced with the challenge of having to develop democratic and stable political regimes, the reality is that these have mostly failed, especially in the countries that make up this triple frontier, which have been subject to multiple coups between 2020 and 2023, generating a powerful feeling of instability, especially towards the most vulnerable population4 who always suffer the consequences of political and social instability.  In addition, they are very poor countries; in the Human Development Index these countries are among the 10 poorest of those evaluated worldwide5, and to which must be added the negative effects of climate change, which has a direct impact on food insecurity, health problems and the quality of life of civilians6, and have a life expectancy of around 53 and 65 years.7 As these are countries with limited security along with an overflowing population growth, with the population doubling every twenty years, since 65% are under 25 years old sytems and bodies8 - since they are fed by the taxes collected - they are not very effective and security can only be provided in some parts of these countries, which leads to a growing feeling of distrust and frustration on the part of the population towards them and towards the government, so that the ‘social contract’, the obligation to respect the rules and laws of a state in exchange for receiving a series of services - the basic and primordial one being security - is not fulfilled in large parts of the Sahel. Faced with this situation, jihadist groups sometimes present themselves as an alternative capable of offering certain services to cover these needs neglected by governments9. In such complex and hopeless conditions, where the feeling of abandonment and the instinct for survival grow, being part of a terrorist group - or an organised crime group - is often seen by many young people as almost the only work alternative, often the only viable choice.10 .. or emigration. While the term ‘jihad’ generates debate and there is no clear consensus on its meaning and personal implication, in the literal sense it means “struggle” and for radicals it is used as ‘holy war’, which justifies terrorist attacks11, largely obviating the meaning of ‘inner struggle’ that any believer must sustain in the face of life's temptations in order to be a good believer. But, in the common wisdom, jihad comes to be understood as holy war. And with the intention of imposing a comprehensive vision of Islam, jihadists try to recruit and indoctrinate young Africans, offering them a sense of protection from other armed groups - in short, a sense of security - as well as a sense of identity and hope12, filling the vacuum that would otherwise be filled by a developed nation-state. Thus, jihadism is growing rampantly in the Sahel, where conditions are favourable for its development. Thus, in 2024, most of the global deaths related to terrorism occurred in the Sahel, an area where this figure has increased tenfold since 2015.13 Complexity of terrorist groups in the Sahel. In this scenario, which is very favourable to the emergence and growth of terrorist groups, there are multiple groups that continue to multiply their attacks qualitatively and quantitatively throughout the region, although it is feasible to point to the existence of ‘two large conglomerates of terrorist groups of jihadist aetiology’14. The two groups that dominate the geopolitical landscape in the Sahel are, on the one hand, ‘Jama'at Nusrat al islam wa ak Muslimeen’ (JNIM), an Al Qaeda affiliate - the Arabic transliteration of its initials would correspond to ‘Support Group for Islam and Muslims’ - and, on the other hand, the ‘Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’ (EIGS or ISIS), which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS)15. To these two branches belong various groups such as Ansar Eddine, which acts under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda, as well as Macina or Al-Mourabitoun. In fact, JNIM is composed of an alliance between four terrorist groups that follow Al-Qaeda's line. Among them, three of those mentioned above are part of these Sahara Brigades that are grouped under the name of JNIM16, and represented by the slogan: ‘One banner, one group, one emir’, which makes clear the idea of unity among them. And under the aegis of ISIS or EIGS (Islamic State), the largest active terrorist group is Boko Haram, although other active groups, such as Junud al-Khilafa, also follow the same line. What we understand by the oath of allegiance or loyalty comes from the practice of bay'ah and is one of the traditional procedures required to formalise terrorists' alliances with the respective organisations.17. This act of adherence to a group would be beneficial for both the one that lends allegiance and the one that receives it, being a way of projecting itself globally and going further in its expansion in the search for the constitution of a caliphate, while at the same time giving more power and a new status to the group that pledges allegiance. This procedure, which has been playing an increasingly significant role for the two Jihadist branches mentioned above, changed the terrorist landscape, given that until then they were only sympathetic to al-Qaeda, but several groups began to opt to join the Islamic State, a fact that reinforces the concept of the two dominant branches of global Jihadism. Al Qaeda was the first reference group to establish the Islamist terrorist phenomenon in the Sahel. In 2007, the first terrorist organisation in the geographical area of the Sahel was renamed Al Qaeda because of the power that this global denomination reflected18. Later, the Islamic State created the ‘Agency of Distinct Provinces’ in 2014, which allowed the group to plan an African strategy19. And this shift towards the Sahel coincides with the year of the fall of Mosul in Iraq, a city in which the Islamic State had proclaimed its caliphate three years earlier and which in 2014 had been liberated by an international coalition from Jihadist hegemony, drastically reducing the presence of members of the terrorist group. And the growth of these groups in this strip of Africa, in the Sahel, highlights both the vulnerabilities that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are trying to exploit to achieve their objectives and the fact that the loss of control of a territory does not mean the end of the Jihadist struggle.20, in search of alternative spaces.  Coexistence of Terrorist Groups in the Sahel: Allies for a Common Cause?  Thus, several terrorist groups coexist in the Sahel, all sharing the same Salafist ideology and the common goal of returning to the original Islamic community by establishing a caliphate21. One example is the 2018 campaign to isolate Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, which was coordinated by both major groups to gain control of that territory—demonstrating that, under certain circumstances, the two major groups can cooperate to achieve jihadist objectives22.  Analyzing the actions and attacks carried out by each group shows that each faction has more or less presence in specific areas, and in several of them, different Salafi groups coexist. In fact, in the so-called “tri-border area”—the region most affected by these attacks—the two main jihadist branches operate side by side23. However, according to findings by the International Observatory for the Study of Terrorism in February 2025, JNIM (an Al-Qaeda affiliate) was the sole perpetrator of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and the main actor behind those in Mali. In contrast, in Niger, it is the Islamic State that has caused the highest number of casualties24. And although JNIM has been active in the Sahel longer than ISGS, which is reflected in the wide area they operate in, ISGS is responsible for more victims due to the intensity of its attacks. Because these groups often overlap in the same localities and carry out separate and uncoordinated operations, it is clear that they mostly act independently, leaving behind evidence of distinct attacks. Even though it may seem logical to assume they would act jointly toward their shared goal, this is not usually the case.  The motivation for terrorist groups to form alliances can depend on international political-military pressure and the policies of local regimes.25 Additionally, personal relationships between leaders and members of these terrorist groups can significantly influence the connections between factions. These relationships, often complex, can be explained by the fact that many of the terrorist groups currently active in the Sahel were born out of internal tensions within larger factions, including differing views on how jihad should be carried out.26 Such tensions sometimes result in splinter groups—some maintaining ties, while others become rivals. One example is the close relationship between Amadou Koufa, founder of Macina (now part of JNIM), and Iyad ag Ghali, leader of Ansar Dine and head of JNIM. Similarly, in August 2018, the UN Group of Experts identified Abdallah Ag Albakaye, a Tuareg emir of JNIM, as coordinating actions between JNIM and ISGS in the Gao region of Mali.27  These coordinated actions were possible for a time when both Salafi groups carried out attacks together without competing or issuing dual claims of responsibility. These attacks were officially announced by only one of the groups, although later reports revealed that fighters from both branches were involved—for instance, the May 2019 ambush in Niger in which around 30 Nigerien soldiers were killed. Regarding this attack, a JNIM commander confirmed that the fighters were split between the two groups28.  Such fluid personal relationships gave rise to the so-called “Sahelian exception,” which referred to the unusually cordial relations between rival leaders and the absence of conflict between the two factions. But this is not always the case.  Competition for jihadist dominance in the Sahel?  While Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have come to show connections in certain attacks, the style and tone of each group differs. The controversies and disputes that can be observed between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are essentially two-fold: religious and political.  A phenomenon that was already occurring in previous years in parts of the Middle East, but is becoming increasingly common in the Sahel, is precisely this fragmentation and splintering of terrorist groups, which leads to clashes and disputes. In February 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for an explosive attack in Mali, which EIGS claimed a year later; identical claims of attacks in the same territories are coming to light between 2019 and 202029. But what is significant is what happened in Mali in 2020, when a clash between terrorist groups took place due to the crossing of Al Qaeda-dominated territory by terrorists under the aegis of the Islamic State, a clash that was made official in a letter from the ‘number two’ of the EIGS affiliate to the JNIM30.  Despite this, and despite this and other clashes, it was not until May 2020 that both JNIM and EIGS openly acknowledged the armed disputes between them, and did so in an ‘official’ manner, in the weekly Al Naba newsletter31, a publication of the ISIS jihadist gang, which specifically mentions clashes in the area of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali known as the triple frontier.  Later in 2022, the EIGS celebrated the addition of 11 new Al Qaeda members, news announced by the EIGS in a tone of supremacy and describing Al Qaeda fighters as sinners and infidels to God.32. And, on the part of the other groups, similar patterns are followed.  Therefore, it is feasible to point out that, on the one hand, tensions are generated due to clashes in the same territory and the desire to dominate it, and that despite having the same objective of imposing the caliphate, the motivation to control each region by a particular group is important, so much so as to fight against ‘apparent partners’, which reflects a clash over territorial ambitions.  On the other hand, there is also a certain religious and ideological fragmentation, a certain vision of Islam, which is what each group tries to impose, and this is of utmost importance, given that all this is framed in a ‘holy war’, so that the religious approach is a very important dimension in explaining these clashes. Both jihadist branches are based on the theory of takfirism, a doctrine that the Islamic State accuses al-Qaeda of not applying properly and vice versa33. As a result, both terrorist groups have blamed each other for deviating from the path of jihad; indeed, earlier this year the ISIS released a propaganda video mentioning JNIM as ‘impure’ for not applying Shariah34.  For this reason, and despite this common goal of creating an Islamic caliphate, since 2020 attacks between the two groups have not ceased and they have actively worked to increase the degree of territorial control exercised by each group, as a way of gaining supremacy in the region. Thus, in April 2020, JNIM had to withdraw from part of northern Burkina Faso due to pressure from the EIGS35, which is also gradually, and to a greater extent, taking root in the southern part of Niger, forcing JNIM to leave the area36.  Since then, there has been constant fighting between the groups in several regions of the Sahel, with the aim of consolidating and imposing themselves as the dominant reference point for jihad37… and those who suffer the results of this fighting end up being the civilians in these areas where government action is almost non-existent. Conclusion  The Sahel has become the epicentre of Islamic terrorism in which multiple terrorist groups from the two main branches coexist, as both JNIM and EIGS have been able to see the potential that this vast geographical area offers them due to the weakness of the region's states, especially in terms of security, to oppose these terrorist groups. And it is this vacuum that terrorist groups - and also organised crime groups - are trying to fill, presenting themselves as almost the only alternative life - apart from emigration - for many young people, which is why these groups are growing in power and degree of territorial control. While the common goal of all jihadist groups is to establish a caliphate, and despite the existence of a period of peaceful coexistence between the two main branches of jihadist terrorism, differences over both religious issues and simple power struggles are yet another source of conflict in this tortured part of Africa and the world. And, in addition to the chaos and suffering generated in the region, being the epicentre of global jihadism in a global world does not only have a regional impact. It has, and increasingly so, a global impact. References 1 MONTER, Jara “El mapa político del Sahel”, El Orden Mundial, 7 de febrero de 2025. https://elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/mapa-politico-sahel/  2 DEPARTAMENTO DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, “Terrorismo en el Sahel Occidental”, 16 de julio de 2021. https://www.dsn.gob.es/en/node/15446  3 ALLIANCE SAHEL, “Décryptage des causes et déterminants de la crise au Sahel: quels enjeux pour les partenaires au développement”, 12 de diciembre de 2023. https://www.alliance-sahel.org/seminaire-decryptage-causes-determinants-crise-sahel/#:~:text=La%20région%20du%20Sahel%20fait,augmentent%20la%20vulnérabilité%20des%20populations  4 FONDS MONÉTAIRE INTERNATIONAL, “La compléxité des défis au Sahel”, septiembre de 2024. https://www.imf.org/fr/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/09/the-sahels-intertwined-challenges-yabi   5 Datos de country economy (Human Development Index), 2024. https://countryeconomy.com/hdi/niger  6SÁNCHEZ HERRÁEZ Pedro, “Sahel: ¡tormenta perfecta de amplitud e intensidad creciente!!, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2021. https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2077188/Capítulo+8+Sahel+tormenta+perfecta+de+amplitud+e+intensidad+creciente.pdf/d4bc511b-75ef-6c12-aaeb-f9b51e72a765?t=1731579352666  7 SOLER David, “La esperanza de vida en África”, África Mundi, 26 de marzo de 2022. https://www.africamundi.es/p/la-esperanza-de-vida-en-africa  8 IFAD, “Afrontar los retos del desarrollo sostenible en el Sahel”. https://www.ifad.org/es/africa-occidental-y-central/sahel  9 BALLESTEROS MARTÍN Miguel Ángel, “Análisis geopolítico del Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, octubre de 2015. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5270491  10 SÁNCHES HERRÁEZ Pedro, “El Sahel: ¿también epicentro de la reconfiguración global?, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 18 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/el_sahel_tambien_epicentro_de_la_reconfiguracion_global  11 SANJUÁN MARTÍNEZ Casimiro, “El terrorismo yihadista. El yihadismo en el Sahel amenaza a Europa”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de noviembre de 2020. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2020/DIEEEO140_2020CASSAN_yihadSahel.pdf   12 DEPARTAMENTO DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, “El terrorismo en el Sahel”, 12 de mayo de 2021. https://www.dsn.gob.es/en/node/14943  13 OBSERVATORIO INTERNACIONAL DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE TERRORISMO, “Anuario del terrorismo yihadista 2024”. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/ES-ANUARIO-OIET-2024.pdf  14 MARTÍN SERRANO Lucas, “Daesh vs Al Qaeda. La lucha por la supremacía a las puertas de Europa”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 11 de julio de 2016. D https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5998290  15 FUENTE COBO Ignacio, “Radiografía de la amenaza yihadista en el Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel   16 ECSAHARAUI, “Estos son los grupos terroristas que operan en el Sahel”, 22 de septiembre de 2024. https://ecsaharaui.com/09/2024/estos-son-los-grupos-terroristas-que-operan-en-el-sahel/  17 IGUALADA Carlos y YAGÚE Javier, “El uso de la bay’ah por los principales grupos salafí-yihadistas”, OIET, 13 de octubre de 2021. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/actividades/el-uso-de-la-bayah-por-los-principales-grupos-salafi-yihadistas/  18 HERRERO Rubén y MACHÍN Nieva, “El eje Magreb-Sahel: La amenaza del terrorismo”, Revista UNISCI, octubre de 2015. https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-74789/UNISCIDP39-8RUBEN-NIEVA.pdf  19 ORIENTXXI, “Estado Islámico, diez años de expansión en el continente africano”, 24 de marzo de 2023. https://orientxxi.info/magazine/estado-islamico-diez-anos-de-expansion-en-el-continente-africano,6325   20 BBC NEWS MUNDO, “Caída de Mosul: cómo Estado Islámico se está transformando ante la pérdida de su territorio”, 10 de julio de 2017. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-40407044  21 THOMAS Dominique, “État islamique vs Al-Qaïda: autopsie d’une lutte fratricide”, Politique Étrangère, 2016. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2016-1?lang=fr&tab=sommaire  22 PÉREZ Carlota, “Al Qaeda y Daesh: rivales en Oriente Medio y aliados en el Sahel”, ATALAYAR, 29 de junio de 2018. https://www.atalayar.com/articulo/politica/al-qaeda-y-daesh-rivales-en-oriente-medio-y-aliados-en-el-sahel/20200224202755144652.html  23 BEAUDOUX Clara, “Qui sont les groupes islamistes qui opèrent en Afrique de l’Ouest?”, Fance Info, 20 de febrero de 2013. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/qui-sont-les-groupes-islamistes-qui-operent-en-afrique-de-l-ouest_1645959.html  24 AGUILERA Ana, “Actividad yihadista en el norte de África y el Sahel”, OIET, 26 de marzo de 2025. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/yihadismo-en-el-magreb-y-el-sahel-2025/actividad-yihadista-en-el-norte-de-africa-y-el-sahel-febrero-2025/   25 FUMAGALLI Giuseppe, “Terrorismo in Africa; le complicità dei regimi autoritari”, Instituto per gli studi di política internazionale, 5 de abril de 2016. https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/terrorismo-africa-le-complicita-dei-regimi-autoritari-14927  26 DE LEÓN COBO Beatriz, “La estrategia glocal de los grupos yihadistas del Sahel”, OIET, 15 de enero de 2021. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/actividades/la-estrategia-glocal-de-los-grupos-yihadistas-del-sahel/#_ftn5  27 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, “Letter dated 8 august from the Panel of Experts etablished pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali adressed to the President of the Security Council”, 8 de agosto de 2018, p.20.https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_581.pdf  28 ALJAZEERA, “ISIL claims attack on Niger soldiers as death toll rises to 28”, 16 de mayo de 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/16/isil-claims-attack-on-niger-soldiers-as-death-toll-rises-to-28   29 POST X, Menastream, “#Burkina faso: #JNIM claimed Thursday’s atttack against the police station in Manila…”, 27 de enero de 2019. https://x.com/MENASTREAM/status/1089648251291254784  30 EL IMPARCIAL, “Al Qaeda y Daesh se enfrenan en un conflicto armado inédito en el Sahel”, miércoles 9 de abril de 2025. https://www.elimparcial.es/noticia/212597/mundo/al-qaeda-y-daesh-se-enfrenan-en-un-conflicto-armado-indito-en-el-sahel.html  31 NSAIVIA Héni y WEISS Caleb, “The end of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the Global Conlict between the Islamic State and al-Qaìda finally came to West Africa”, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Julio de 2020. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-end-of-the-sahelian-anomaly-how-the-global-conflict-between-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida-finally-came-to-west-africa/  32 OBSERVATORIO DE AL AZHAR, “Daesh celebra la incorporación de 11 miembros de Al Qaeda… una muestra más de las diferencias entre ambas organizaciones terroristas”, miércoles 3 de agosto de 2022. https://www.azhar.eg/observer-es/details/ArtMID/1201/ArticleID/63847/Daesh-celebra-la-incorporaci243n-de-11-miembros-de-Al-Qaeda…-una-muestra-m225s-de-las-diferencias-entre-ambas-organizaciones-terroristas  33 THOMAS Dominique, “État islamique vs Al-Qaïda: autopsie d’une lutte fratricide”, Politique Étrangère, 2016. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2016-1-page-95?lang=fr  34 AGUILERA Ana, “Actividad yihadista en el norte de África y el Sahel, febrero 2025”, OIET, 26 de marzo de 2025. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/yihadismo-en-el-magreb-y-el-sahel-2025/actividad-yihadista-en-el-norte-de-africa-y-el-sahel-febrero-2025/  35 SUMMERS Marta, “Enfrentamientos entre JNIM y EIGS. Cambios en el equilibrio terrorista del Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 6 de julio de 2020. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2020/DIEEEO98_2020MARSUM_Sahel.pdf  36 MARSTON Barry, “Analysis: High jihadist activity in Africa’s Sahel continues”, BBC, 9 de noviembre de 2023. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c204qwhm   37 FUENTE COBO Ignacio, “Radiografía de la amenaza yihadista en el Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel  

Abstract The Ukraine war has reshaped the global geopolitical landscape, positioning Europe, America, Russia and China as key players on a new global chessboard. Europe is grappling with the dual challenge of ensuring regional security and managing the economic fallout from the conflict. America’s evolving global relationships are marked by a burden-shift with Europe, diplomatic efforts to further deter Russian aggression and a strategic rivalry with China. For Russia, the invasion of Ukraine is a bid to reassert its influence, but it faces severe international sanctions and military setbacks, constraining its strategic ambitions. And China is navigating a complex balancing act between supporting Russia and maintaining its economic ties with the West. This complex interplay of alliances and rivalries underscores the shifting dynamics of global power and the urgent need for diplomatic solutions to ensure stability and peace. Introduction On 27 March 2025 a Summit on Peace and Security for Ukraine was organised by President Emmanuel Macron in cooperation with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. It was held in Paris. This summit was part of an ongoing series of political and operational meetings that the UK and France have been organising alternately over several weeks, aimed at contributing to a sustainable and just peace in Ukraine. This particular summit saw the participation of 31 countries, including non-EU nations such as the UK, Norway, Canada and Iceland, as well as high-profile figures such as the NATO secretary general, the president of the European Commission and the president of the European Council. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also attended. The increased frequency of meetings among this wide-ranging ‘coalition of the willing’ is recognition, in Europe’s eyes, of the immediate need to establish and permanently guarantee security and peace in the long term for Ukraine. It is evident that the unconditional ceasefire that Ukraine had declared its readiness to enter into on 11 March in Saudi Arabia has since evolved into a proposal for a limited ceasefire with additional conditions and demands from Russia. Moscow is employing delaying tactics, and there is a growing realisation, even within the US, that Russia is not genuinely interested in ending the war. Europe’s novel security approach: ‘Peace through strength’ This fear of a prolonged conflict in Ukraine, and the perceived risk of war between Europe and Russia, has pushed the European Commission to propose a way forward in its Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 (European Commission 2025), which can be encapsulated by the motto ‘peace through strength’. This approach entails rapidly increasing military support for Ukraine, including the provision of more ammunition, artillery, air defence systems, drones and training. Additionally, it involves enhancing the capabilities of European countries by them investing more in their own defence, simplifying administrative processes and fostering better industrial cooperation, including with the Ukrainian defence industry. The European Commission has also outlined the financial instruments that have been established in record time to address these specific challenges. The primary objective of these financial instruments is to bolster European defence spending, with the EU targeting a total of €800 billion. This includes €150 billion in loans available to member states through a new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and up to €650 billion from national defence budgets, corresponding to an expenditure of 1.5% of GDP that can be excluded from national budgets by activating the ‘national escape clause’ of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. Additionally, private financing and funds from the European Investment Bank will be mobilised for investments in priority capabilities. Furthermore, the EU has identified several priority capabilities for investment. In the short term, joint EU purchases should focus on missiles and artillery systems. In the medium term, the goal is to develop large-scale EU systems in integrated air and missile defence, military mobility and strategic enablers. NATO standards will continue to serve as the foundation, and it is crucial that these standards are shared with the EU. Finally, ‘peace through strength’ also includes the further European integration of Ukraine, with Brussels clearly considering Ukraine the EU’s first line of defence. The Commission’s Joint White Paper and a parallel initiative launched by High Representative Kaja Kallas both aim to bolster military support for Kyiv and stress the importance of defence procurement both with and within Ukraine. Despite the commendable pace and scope of the numerous recent initiatives undertaken by the EU, it is imperative to recognise that these commitments must still be translated into tangible actions. The European Commission remains hopeful that the proposals delineated in the Joint White Paper can be actualised during the Polish Presidency, with the aim of reaching concrete decisions by the European Council meeting scheduled for 26–7 June. However, considering the ongoing deterioration of the European security landscape, it could be argued that this deadline lacks the requisite sense of urgency needed to address the pressing challenges ahead. European peace through strength—but not without the US While Europe is building its rise as a security, defence and military actor, there is a consensus among most EU member states that these efforts should not happen to the detriment of NATO and that there is a need to maintain solid US involvement in European security. Strength is not merely a matter of political initiatives but also of demonstrating a clear readiness to engage militarily. There must be a deterrent effect from military power, particularly in anticipation of potential new Russian offensives once Moscow rebuilds its troops and supplies during a future ceasefire or peace deal. And military power is exactly where Europe—willing or not—will still need to rely on the transatlantic partnership for a foreseeable while, due to its current overreliance on strategic US military and intelligence assets. Moreover, the new administration in Washington has manoeuvred fast to have a clear say on the future of European security. It is the US—not Europe—that is leading the diplomacy on a ceasefire or peace deal in Ukraine. And while Europe, in reaction, is focusing on shaping future security guarantees for Ukraine—or even pushing for boots on the ground through a ‘coalition of the willing’—both of these European endeavours hinge, first, on the success of US diplomacy to reach a deal with Russia; and second, on US logistical and intelligence support for the proposed troops on the ground. Without these, most of the ‘willing nations’ may withdraw their commitments. The situation is further complicated by the shortage of operational European troops: for instance, the UK has an expeditionary force, but relies heavily on its air and naval power; France has some units, but in insufficient numbers; and Germany’s contribution remains uncertain. In this context, a European plan to help Ukraine win and maintain peace should not compromise NATO’s resilience and should therefore be developed in close coordination with the alliance, particularly in terms of planning and interoperability. And as Europe is now spending on defence, it should do so while ensuring that its expenditures align with NATO capability objectives. Moreover, military strength is not the only domain in which Europe should continue to keep an eye on the US. Europe notably believes that it is imperative to increase pressure on Russia through sanctions. The EU is unequivocally clear that there can be no consideration of easing sanctions; on the contrary, some member states even advocate for intensifying them. The challenge for Europe, however, remains to emphatically convey this message to the Americans, as any decision by the US to ease sanctions—as requested by Russia—would undermine the most critical form of pressure against Russia. Some EU member states have already raised concerns about the future of European sanctions policy, highlighting the need for new methods to enforce sanctions, particularly if certain EU member states more friendly to Russia decide to obstruct them in the future. Putin’s patient game of chess Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin has clearly asserted a degree of dominance in the ongoing diplomatic negotiations. He has set preliminary conditions for a ceasefire, made a limited commitment regarding energy infrastructure and subsequently undermined the credibility of his own commitment with new attacks on Ukraine. Despite this, Putin’s demands concerning Western military supplies and intelligence-sharing reveal that Ukrainian attacks on Russian critical infrastructure are causing significant damage and irking the Russian president. Putin’s demands, including the reduction of Ukraine’s military capabilities, the transfer of entire Ukrainian regions to Russian control and the replacement of President Zelensky, are, naturally, unacceptable to Ukraine. These demands also pose the most significant risk to the West: if Russia were to succeed in installing a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv and controlling the Ukrainian military, it would alter the entire power and military balance in Eastern Europe. Should President Trump agree to this, it would likely cause a further deterioration in US–EU relations too. Achieving a middle-ground in any US–Russia agreement for Ukraine currently still poses a formidable challenge. Moscow therefore perceives that it has the momentum in its favour, despite Russia’s inability to achieve any strategic breakthroughs in Ukraine. The financial and human costs of this conflict for Moscow are substantial, while it is making minimal territorial gains. However, while Ukraine has successfully liberated 50% of the territory that was previously occupied by Russia, the Kremlin nevertheless still occupies approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory. Moscow has also likely observed in the US a desire to shift towards finding a consensus and a willingness to negotiate in a transactional manner. Moreover, the recent suspension of US intelligence and military support has already had immediate repercussions on Ukraine’s strength. It has weakened Ukraine’s ability to bring this war to a conclusion and could potentially lead to a temporary ceasefire that would de facto result in the creation of a ‘frozen conflict’—an outcome which Russia would not necessarily view unfavourably. A friendly US visit to Europe . . . On 3 and 4 April 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio participated for the first time in a NATO foreign ministerial meeting. Rubio’s visit to NATO headquarters was notably smoother and more amicable than the visit of his colleague at the Department of Defense, Pete Hegseth, for the defence ministerial meeting in February 2025. Rubio, a seasoned diplomat, adroitly conveyed the message that European allies must significantly increase their defence spending, advocating for allocations of up to 5% of their GDP. He acknowledged the difficulty of this demand but emphasised that it could be achieved incrementally, provided the allies concerned showed a clear and consistent direction of progress. In a similar vein, Rubio addressed the situation in Ukraine, commending the resilience and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian people. He articulated President Trump’s recognition that a military solution in Ukraine is unattainable for both Ukraine and Russia, necessitating a negotiated settlement. Rubio underscored that peace negotiations inherently require compromises from all parties involved. He acknowledged that Ukraine has already made significant concessions, whereas Russia has yet to reciprocate. According to Rubio, Russia is testing President Trump’s resolve, but he also acknowledged that Putin faces severe consequences if he does not promptly agree to a ceasefire, indicating that the timeline for such an agreement is measured in weeks, not months. Rubio concluded by asserting that a peace agreement would be unattainable without European involvement. Rubio also expressed broad support for the EU’s defence initiatives, including the EU Joint White Paper and the ReArm programme. He praised the EU’s efforts to encourage its member states to meet their NATO commitments and to strengthen the industrial base, provided that the non-EU defence industry, particularly American firms, is not unduly excluded. Despite the positive reception of Rubio’s visit to Europe and NATO, there remains an underlying uncertainty about whether other influential figures within President Trump’s Make America Great Again movement share Rubio’s views. The path to achieving a cohesive and effective alliance strategy is fraught with challenges, and it remains uncertain whether NATO will navigate these obstacles successfully and emerge intact. . . . but Washington’s priority is the Asia–Pacific region Above all, the NATO foreign ministerial meeting of early April showed again that the US felt fundamentally displeased with the Western approach to China over the past several decades. The prevailing assumption—that a capitalist and economically prosperous China would inevitably evolve to resemble Western democratic nations—was a misguided and overly optimistic expectation. This erroneous belief has permitted Beijing to engage in deceptive trade and military practices for the past 30 years without facing significant repercussions. Today the US is clearly concerned about the way China has strategically weaponised its industrial capabilities by seamlessly integrating its civilian and military sectors through a dual-use strategy that is particularly evident in critical economic and high-tech domains, such as artificial intelligence. By blurring the lines between civilian and military applications, China has been able to enhance its technological and industrial base, thereby posing a multifaceted challenge to global security. Moreover, for the US, the presence of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine serves as a stark indicator of the interconnected nature of the threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific and European regions. For Washington, the collaborative efforts of adversarial states such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea in Ukraine and other geopolitical theatres necessitate a similarly unified and strategic approach from democratic like-minded nations to strengthening their alliances and enhancing their collective security measures in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. Interconnected theatres of confrontation China’s alleged support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine and the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, and Russia and Iran, clearly illustrate the interconnectedness of security dynamics between Europe, the Asia–Pacific region and the Middle East. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine represents a pivotal moment for the stability of the international system, impacting not only Europe but also other parts of the world. Contrary to the characterisation of the conflict in Ukraine as merely a ‘European war’ a few years ago, the war there is now considered by the West to be a globalised conflict with profound international implications. This perspective is widely accepted among the NATO allies, which recognise the growing interconnection between the three theatres of conflict. This attitude is also increasingly reflected in the enhanced dialogue between NATO and the Indo–Pacific Four partners—Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea. This cooperation is today seen by allies as mutually beneficial and necessary. Beyond exchanges of intelligence, particularly on the challenges posed by China, support for Ukraine dominates the partnership, alongside the joint battle against hybrid threats, progress on cybersecurity and the strengthening of maritime security. It is widely expected that NATO allies will seek to further strengthen this cooperation at the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague. Among NATO members there is, furthermore, a growing consensus on the need to be firm with China. Allies agree on the necessity of sending a stronger message and taking determined and united actions in terms of deterrence, including at the hybrid and cyber levels, as well as on imposing sanctions against Chinese economic operators involved in China–Russia cooperation in Ukraine. While Russia remains the primary long-term threat to the NATO realm, there is recognition that China poses a significant problem that must be addressed in its full magnitude, particularly in the context of China–Russia cooperation. It is essential to act firmly and in a united way to increase the costs of cooperation with Moscow for Beijing while keeping open the necessary avenues of engagement. Any dissonance between Europe and the US on this issue might otherwise become the root cause of the next big crisis of trust in the transatlantic relationship. China versus a Russian–American rapprochement Russia is not fighting its Ukraine war alone. It is receiving help from allies including China, Iran and North Korea. Moreover, the war in Ukraine is not just about Ukraine’s future. It is also part of a larger global struggle, with Russia seeking position alongside China in a reconfigured world order that is more multipolar and less centred on the US. In this respect, China may be inclined to silently assist Russia in opposing a proposed ceasefire or peace plan for Ukraine put forward by President Trump. Beijing likely recognises that by resolving the conflict in Ukraine and fostering better relations with Russia, Trump’s ultimate objective is to reallocate US diplomatic, military and economic resources to address the growing global influence of China and its impact on US national interests. In this respect Putin appears keen to keep President Xi Jinping informed about American attempts at rapprochement and ongoing negotiations concerning Ukraine. Historically, the ‘good relations’ between China and Russia are relatively recent; the stability of this relationship is attributed to the resolution of their border disputes, their complementary economies and their non-interference in each other’s ideological systems. But Moscow treads carefully as it knows it is the junior partner in the relationship. Moreover, the prospect of an American–Russian rapprochement is not viewed by either Moscow or Beijing with any real sense of threat. Ultimately Russia’s offerings to the US are limited; it has also been asserted that any rapprochement would not have an effect on Moscow–Beijing relations, as Sino-Russian ties are not dependent on any third party. Furthermore, regarding the Ukraine war, China maintains that it is ‘not a party’ to the conflict (DPA 2024). China upholds the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine while acknowledging Russia’s legitimate security concerns. In the eyes of Beijing, these principles must be reconciled to end the war. Additionally, China opposes unilateral sanctions on Russia but, due to its significant trade ties with the EU and the US, it accepts the Russian sanctions and their secondary effects on the Chinese economy. The ongoing negotiations on Ukraine are perceived by China as creating crucial momentum for achieving peace through dialogue, which should not be an opportunity missed. The American initiative is seen as a continuation of previous efforts, including the Chinese Peace Plan for Ukraine of 2023, the Ukraine Peace Summit 2024 in Switzerland and the Sino-Brazilian Six-Point Plan, also in 2024 (Gov.br 2024). China calls for non-escalation and direct negotiations, noting the signs of the exhaustion of manpower and resources on both the Russian and the Ukrainian sides. Despite China’s apparently laconic stance vis-à-vis the relationship, an American–Russian rapprochement could cause some concerns for Beijing. Economically, Moscow is less relevant to Beijing than Washington or Brussels. However, Russia holds fundamental strategic value due to its extensive land border with China. In the event of an American–Chinese rivalry escalating into direct conflict, Russia could become a lifeline for Beijing, especially if accompanied by a successful American blockade. These potential risks and scenarios, which seem increasingly likely over time, may serve as a significant incentive for China to obstruct the warming of relations between Moscow and Washington. References DPA (2024). China is not a party to Ukraine war, Xi tells Scholz in Beijing. aNews, 16 April. https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2024/04/16/china-is-not-a-party-to-ukraine-war-xi-tells-scholz-in-beijing. Accessed 15 April 2025. European Commission. (2025). Joint White Paper for European defence readiness 2030. JOIN (2025) 120 final (19 March). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0120. Accessed 15 April 2025. Gov.br. (2024). Brazil and China present joint proposal for peace negotiations with the participation of Russia and Ukraine. 23 May. https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-china-present-joint-proposal-for-peace-negotiations-with-the-participation-of-russia-and-ukraine. Accessed 15 April 2025. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This paper focuses on the European Union as a military power. It starts with an introduction to SAFE – Security Action for Europe as a financial instrument designed to make the EU a formidable military power.The second part of the paper provides an account of debates regarding the nature of the EU (civilian, normative through ethical to military). Next, a brief historical account of European defence cooperation is presented.The central part of the analysis examines the key characteristics of the EU as a military power, which is marked by a gap between its declared motivations and the actual application of military and political means.The paper ends with the expression of scepticism regarding the role of SAFE in the future of European Security. Key Words: SAFE, Geopolitics, Security, Europe, Ukraine. Introduction SAFE (Security Action for Europe) is a financial instrument introduced by the European Commission to bolster defence capabilities across EU member states. Proposed in March 2025 as part of the broader ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, SAFE aims to provide up to €150 billion in loans by the end of the decade to support joint defence procurement and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).1 This initiative is driven by concerns over a potential Russian attack and growing uncertainty about long-term U.S. security commitments to Europe. To qualify for SAFE funding, 65% of a project’s value must originate from companies within the EU, the European Economic Area, or Ukraine.  Rationale behind SAFE The EU Council formally adopted SAFE on 27 May 2025. SAFE is part of the €800 billion ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, which also includes other pillars such as fiscal flexibility (national escape clauses), cohesion funds, and private capital mobilisation. It appears that several geopolitical and strategic factors drive the establishment of SAFE. Firstly, there is the case of ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine: The war, starting in February 2022, has exposed deficiencies in European defence capabilities and highlighted the need for rapid rearmament and increased self-reliance.2 The return of high-intensity warfare on European soil has prompted a reevaluation of defence priorities. Secondly, the shifting of the U.S. role. Concerns over reduced U.S. military support, particularly following political shifts in Washington.3 Thirdly, experts indicate the issue of capability gaps and industrial weaknesses. The EU has identified critical gaps in areas like air and missile defence, drones, and military mobility. The need to scale up production and reduce reliance on non-European suppliers has driven the creation of the SAFE initiative. Fourthly, support for Ukraine. SAFE includes provisions to integrate Ukraine’s defence industry, ensuring continued support for Kyiv amid uncertainties in global alliances.4 The evolving nature of EU power In recent history, it is Francois Duchene’s idea of “Civilian Power Europe” (CPE) that has dominated debates about the role of Europe and European institutions in the world.  Duchêne's concept of (CPE) refers to a particular role for Europe in the world that emphasises non-military means of influence and the promotion of international values. Duchêne's original idea, articulated in the early 1970s, suggested that Europe could play a distinctive role based on low politics, non-state actors, ideational influences, and international interdependence rather than traditional military power. The CPE concept highlights Europe's potential to exercise considerable non-military power, combining the power dimension akin to a "European Trading State" with a normative foreign policy perspective aimed at promoting values such as equality, justice, and concern for people with low incomes abroad.5 Fast forward to the 21st century, and Ian Manners proposes another equally influential concept – “normative power”. Ian Manners' main argument is that the European Union (EU) should be understood not only in terms of traditional conceptions of "civilian power" or "military power" but rather as a "normative power" in international relations. He contends that the EU's international role is fundamentally based on its ability to shape norms and define what is considered "normal" in world politics. This normative power stems from the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and constitutional basis, which predispose it to act normatively by promoting principles such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Manners argues that this normative dimension is crucial for understanding the EU's identity and influence internationally, as exemplified by the EU's active pursuit of the international abolition of the death penalty. He emphasises that the EU's power lies less in its military or economic capabilities and more in its capacity to diffuse norms and reshape international standards, making the concept of "normative power Europe" not a contradiction but a significant form of power in world politics.6  Shortly afterwards, Lisbeth Aggestam proposes yet another concept regarding the nature and role of the European Union in the world – “ethical power.” The concept of 'ethical power Europe' (EPE) in EU foreign policy represents a shift from focusing on what the EU 'is' to what it 'does. It articulates the EU's ambition to be a proactive global actor that not only serves as a positive role model but actively works to change the world in the direction of a "global common good." This involves the EU taking on new tasks in crisis management, peacekeeping, state-building, and reconstruction of failing states, complementing its existing roles in development aid and humanitarian assistance. The EU positions itself as a "force for good" and a peacebuilder in the world, justifying its acquisition of both civilian and military power capabilities in these terms.7 EPE encompasses both civilian and military power, as well as social and material power, thereby broadening the scope beyond earlier concepts, such as civilian power in Europe, as proposed by Duchene, and normative power, as emphasised by Manners, which primarily focused on civilian and normative influence. The EPE concept also reintroduces the international and national dimensions into the analysis of the EU's role, recognising the importance of member states' interests and acknowledging that material interests and ethical considerations often overlap. Importantly, EPE is not presented as an empirical reality but rather as a concept that opens new lines of critical reflection on the EU's role, motivations, and ethical dilemmas in foreign policy. It recognises the complexity of ethical foreign policy, given competing visions of order and justice in the world and the challenges of translating ethical ambitions into practice. The concept invites analysis of the ethical values the EU promotes, the relationship between ethics and interests, the just use of power (including military force), and the problems inherent in pursuing a consistent ethical foreign policy. Conversely, Karen Smith asserts that CPE is definitively dead, and the EU now finds itself somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power like most other international actors. Rather than debating whether the EU is a civilian power, the focus should be on critically analysing what the EU does and what it should do in international relations.8 According to Smith, the implications of the EU employing military means are significant and multifaceted.  Firstly, the EU's acquisition and use of military instruments challenge the notion that the EU remains a purely "civilian power." Clinging to the civilian power label stretches the term beyond its breaking point, as military means are fundamentally non-civilian in nature. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, often considered civilian activities, frequently involve military personnel and can evolve into military operations, thereby further blurring the distinction between civilian and military roles.  Secondly, by using military instruments—even as a "residual" tool to safeguard other means—the EU complicates the clear-cut distinction between civilian and military power. This leads to fuzzy interpretations about when the EU ceases to be a civilian power, making it difficult to establish a clear cut-off point or assess changes along the civilian-military spectrum.  Thirdly, employing military means signals a shift from a post-modern, law-based international identity toward a more traditional power politics approach. This militarization risks discrediting the EU's earlier vision of transforming international relations through law and civilian influence alone. The EU moves closer to a "Hobbesian" model where military force backs diplomacy, which may undermine its unique post-modern identity and soft power.  Fourthly, the use of military force raises complex questions about the EU’s ends and means, including the justifications for intervention, the legitimacy of coercion, and democratic control over foreign policy decisions.  Finally, the continued use of military means necessitates moving beyond simplistic categorisations of civilian power to a more nuanced analysis of what the EU does in international relations. The EU, like most actors, falls somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power, and its military capabilities must be critically assessed rather than dismissed or downplayed. With this in mind, let us look at the EU as a military actor. A brief history of European defence cooperation Signed on March 4, 1947, the Treaty of Dunkirk was a bilateral alliance between France and the United Kingdom, primarily aimed at preventing renewed German aggression following World War II. Effective from September 8, 1947, and set to expire in 1997, it was also seen as a pretext for defence against the USSR. It laid the foundation for formal European defence collaboration, emphasising mutual assistance and alliance.9 In 1948, the Treaty of Brussels expanded this framework, encompassing Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and established the Western Union. This alliance focused on defence, economic, cultural, and social collaboration. By 1955, following the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty, it evolved into the Western European Union (WEU), with Italy and West Germany joining, marking the establishment of a broader European defence structure. Parallel to these developments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established on April 4, 1949, by 12 countries, including the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations, to counter Soviet expansion. NATO's Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, has become a cornerstone of transatlantic security. During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against Soviet influence, with significant military and political cooperation among members. The WEU, while secondary to NATO, played a complementary role. In 1950, its defence structures were transferred to NATO, reducing its authority, but it remained active in fostering European defence collaboration. The WEU's social and cultural roles were transferred to the Council of Europe in 1960, with its focus shifting to security and defence.  The end of the Cold War in the 1990s prompted a shift towards greater European autonomy in defence. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), aiming to coordinate foreign policy and security. This was followed by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, which introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), enabling the EU to conduct military and civilian missions independently. The 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, prompted by the Kosovo War, endorsed a European security and defence policy, including the development of autonomous military forces. The 2002 Berlin Plus agreement allowed the EU access to NATO assets for peacekeeping, reflecting the close cooperation between the two organisations. The Petersberg Declaration of 1992, initially under the WEU, defined tasks such as humanitarian and rescue operations, which were later integrated into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 further strengthened EU defence capabilities, incorporating the WEU's mutual defence clause. This rendered the WEU superfluous, leading to its dissolution on 30 June 2011, with its functions being transferred to the EU. The European Union Institute for Security Studies and Satellite Centre, previously WEU entities, were integrated into the EU framework in 2002, marking a consolidation of defence.   *Generated with Grok and gamma.app (9 June, 2025). EU as a military actor As of mid-2025, the EU has approximately 3,500 military personnel and 1,300 civilian personnel deployed worldwide. Since the first CSDP missions and operations were launched in 2003, the EU has undertaken over 40 overseas operations, utilising both civilian and military missions in several countries across Europe, Africa, and Asia. As of today, there are 21 ongoing EU CSDP missions and operations, comprising 12 civilian, eight military, and one combined civilian and military initiative.10  According to the EU itself, “Their (Security and Defence Policy ((CSDP)) Missions) aim is to help prevent or resolve conflicts and crises, enhance the capacities of partner countries and, ultimately, protect the European Union and its citizens. EU decisions to deploy a mission or operation are typically made at the request of the partner country receiving assistance and/or based on a United Nations Security Council Resolution, always in full respect of international law. These decisions take into account the EU’s security interests, EU strategic efforts and regional engagement strategies. They are tailored to the local circumstances and to the tasks that need to be implemented”.11 Scholars researching the topic conclude that the political motivations behind EU military operations are complex, driven by a combination of national interests, strategic considerations, and internal EU dynamics. While the EU often justifies its operations with humanitarian rhetoric, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations. The influence of key member states, such as France and Germany, plays a significant role in shaping the EU's military agenda. However, the EU's ability to project influence is constrained by internal divisions and resource limitations. National Interests One of the most significant political motivations behind EU military operations is the pursuit of national interests by its member states. While the EU often presents a unified front, the decision to deploy military operations is heavily influenced by the interests of its most powerful members, particularly France and Germany. These states often use EU military operations as a means to advance their own strategic and economic interests while framing them as collective EU actions. For instance, France has been a key driver of several European Union (EU) military operations in Africa, such as the EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Critics argue that these operations were motivated by French geo-strategic and economic interests in the region rather than purely humanitarian concerns.12 Similarly, the EU's naval operation, Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia, was influenced by the interests of member states with significant maritime trade routes in the region.13  The dominance of national interests is further evident in the EU's decision-making process. Member states often prioritise their security and economic concerns over broader EU objectives, leading to inconsistencies in the deployment of military operations. For example, the EU's reluctance to intervene in the 2006 Lebanon war, despite initial plans for a military operation, was primarily due to divergent national interests among member states.14 Power Politics and Strategic Culture The EU's military operations are also shaped by power politics within the organisation. The distribution of power among member states plays a crucial role in determining the scope and nature of these operations. France, in particular, has historically played a key The EU often justifies its military operations with humanitarian rhetoric, emphasising the need to protect civilians, prevent human rights abuses, and promote stability in conflict zones. However, this rhetoric often masks more pragmatic strategic considerations. For instance, the EU's intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006 was officially framed as a humanitarian operation. However, it was also driven by the strategic interests of EU member states in the region's natural resources and political stability.15  Likewise, the EU's naval operation Sophia in the Mediterranean was initially justified as a humanitarian response to the migrant crisis. However, the operation also served strategic purposes, such as enhancing the EU's maritime security capabilities and addressing the political priorities of member states like Italy and France.16 The gap between humanitarian rhetoric and strategic reality is a recurring theme in European Union (EU) military operations. While humanitarian concerns may play a role in the initial justification for intervention, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations.17 Ukraine and EU’s Involvement Against Russia The EU has consistently condemned Russia's actions, viewing them as a violation of international law, and supports Ukraine's right to self-defence. This includes diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia and coordinate with partners like the US and NATO. Ukraine's EU candidacy, granted in June 2022, reflects long-term integration goals, though the process is expected to take years.18 So far, the EU has imposed 17 sanction packages by May 2025, targeting Russia's economy, military, and individuals, including measures against Belarus, Iran, and North Korea for supporting Russia. These aim to weaken Russia's war capabilities, with recent packages focusing on export bans and measures to prevent circumvention.19 The EU has committed €147.9 billion in aid, with €50.3 billion allocated for military support, €77 billion for financial and humanitarian assistance, and €17 billion for refugee support. This includes weapons, training, and emergency relief, as well as support for Ukrainian refugees under the Temporary Protection Mechanism. To counter the impacts of war, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from 40% in 2021 to 15% in 2023, thereby diversifying its energy sources. It also facilitates Ukrainian grain exports through solidarity lanes, addressing global food security.20 Now, as noble as it sounds and as much as it fits into the self-perception of Brussels’s elites (the EU being a force for good), the critics of the West's support of Ukraine make a couple of formidable points. Firstly, the longer the war continues, the more destroyed Ukraine becomes and the greater the number of Ukrainians killed. Secondly, the longer the war continues, the greater the likelihood of escalation, which poses a threat to the entire European continent. Thirdly, despite mainstream media reports, the Russian Federation appears to have adapted to operating effectively despite the sanctions, which may strengthen its economy in the short to medium term and, more importantly, bring it closer to cooperating with China and North Korea. Finally, since every war serves as a testing ground for new technologies, the Russians, especially the North Koreans and the Chinese, are gaining invaluable insight into the nature of modern warfare, which is often referred to as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  Conclusion To answer the question introduced at the beginning of this analysis, “Can SAFE make Europe safe?” the author of this piece remains sceptical, to say the least. It appears that despite some initial intentions to end the Ukrainian war as early as April 2022, it is the European elites, especially French, German and Polish, who stand for the prolongation, if not escalation, of the Ukrainian war, potentially at the expense of the security of the whole European continent and definitely at the expense of Ukrainians and their country.  References:  1. La Rocca, M. (2025, May 27). Defence, final go-ahead for the SAFE fund. Von der Leyen: “Exceptional measures for exceptional times.” Eunews. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/05/27/defence-final-go-ahead-for-the-safe-fund-von-der-leyen-exceptional-measures-for-exceptional-times/ 2. COUNCIL REGULATION establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European defence industry Instrument. (2025, March 19). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0122&qid=1749479407767 3. Tidey, A. (2025, May 21). Everything you need to know about SAFE, the EU’s €150bn defence instrument. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/21/everything-you-need-to-know-about-safe-the-eus-150bn-defence-instrument/4. Scazzieri, L. (2025, March 26). One step forward for Europe’s defence. Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/insights/one-step-forward-europes-defence 5. Orbie, J. (2006). Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates. Cooperation and Conflict, 41(1), 123-128. Sage Publications, Ltd. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450844256. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258.7. Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical power Europe? International Affairs, 84(1), 1-11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/251447118. Smith, K. E. (2005). Beyond the civilian power EU debate. Politique européenne, (17), 63-82. L'Harmattan. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450177509. The road to European defence cooperation. (1947). European Defence Agency. https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html10. European Union External Action, (2025, January 30). Missions and Operations. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#87694E11. EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS. (2025, April). https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EU-mission-and-operation_2025.pdf 12. See more at: Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781 and Olsen, G. R. (2009). The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe? International Peacekeeping, 16(2), 245–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685828 13. See more at: Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 and Riddervold, M. (2018). Why Not Fight Piracy Through NATO? Explaining the EU’s First Naval Mission: EU NAVFOR Atalanta (pp. 195–217). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66598-6_10 14. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg15. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg 16. Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 17. Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781   18. EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine-archive/19. Russia’s war against Ukraine. (n.d.). https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/topics/russia-s-war-against-ukraine/ 20. See more at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/where-does-the-eu-s-gas-come-from/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract Cyberspace has become a crucial area for the governance and sovereignty of states, especially in the case of China which has developed a comprehensive digital governance strategy. The Chinese government prioritized the construction of a technological infrastructure including Artificial Intelligence and Cloud Computing to strengthen its control over Cyberspace and ensure National Security. Introduction The term cyberspace was coined by writer William Gibson in his science fiction novel “Neuromancer” (1984), in which he described it as a consensual virtual reality. Since then, the concept has transcended fiction to become a tangible domain. Cyberspace can be defined as a digital environment created by the global interconnection of computer systems, networks, and devices, where information flows and human interactions take place virtually. It has undergone significant evolution since its inception. In the 1980s and 1990s, it was mainly limited to academic and military networks in the United States, such as ARPANET. With the arrival of the Internet, cyberspace expanded rapidly, incorporating millions of users and giving rise to new forms of communication such as email and online forums. The gradual proliferation of mobile devices and social networks has transformed cyberspace into an omnipresent and integral part of everyday life. In terms of communication and connectivity, it revolutionized the way people communicate by eliminating geographical and temporal barriers. Cryptocurrencies and Fintech [1] are examples of how cyberspace has transformed the economy, creating new opportunities. Regarding its interconnection with culture and entertainment, the digitalization of culture has given rise to new forms of creation and consumption such as music and video streaming, online gaming, and digital art. Cyberspace: A Strategic Domain Cyberspace has become a strategic battlefield for the hemisphere. In China, cyberspace is seen as an essential component of national security and economic development. The Chinese government has implemented strict policies to regulate cyberspace, including the Great Firewall of China, which controls the flow of information and protects digital infrastructure. In the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), promoting the information technology sector, increasing internet accessibility, and encouraging the use of digital technologies were established as national priorities. At the Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2002, information was recognized as essential for the growth of comprehensive national power; consequently, in 2005, the National Strategy 2006–2020 for Information Development was published. Regarding the treatment, study, and control of cyberspace, the People’s Liberation Army has always granted crucial importance to information and its technical infrastructure for collection, protection, and distribution, given its duty to safeguard national interests. This is demonstrated by an article written by then-Colonel Wang Baocun in the “PLA Daily” in April 1998: “The opportunity created by the new military revolution is once-in-a-lifetime. Our army enjoys many favorable conditions for informatization. Our country has achieved rapid informatization and has the potential energy to extend this work to the military. An important feature of the current Military Revolution is that local informatization begins earlier and develops faster than in the armed forces and is more technologically advanced. After generating sufficient potential energy, the work will extend to the military and trigger a massive military transformation.” (Expósito, 2022) While for most of the so-called West, and thus also for the United States, there are five domains — land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace — Chinese specialists conceive of cyberspace as the interaction of two distinct realms: the electromagnetic spectrum and informatization. In recent decades, China has emerged as a global power in the scientific and technological sphere, consolidating its position through a comprehensive strategy that links the development of science with the expansion of cyberspace. Since the implementation of the "Made in China 2025" Plan, the government has prioritized technological innovation as the engine of development, focusing on areas such as AI, big data, and cybersecurity, positioning China as a leader in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Launched in 2015, this is an industrial strategy that aims to transform China into a high-tech manufacturing power. The goal is to reduce dependency on foreign technologies and promote local innovation in key sectors such as robotics, AI, electric vehicles, and biotechnology. The Internet of Things (IoT) is an essential component that complements it, enabling the creation of smart factories and more efficient supply chains. “Internet Plus”, also launched in 2015, promotes the integration of the internet with traditional sectors such as agriculture, logistics, and financial services. It seeks to drive the digitalization of the economy and promote the use of emerging technologies like IoT, big data, and cloud computing. The Internet of Things (IoT) is fundamental to Internet Plus, as it facilitates connectivity between devices and systems, enabling the creation of interconnected digital ecosystems. The proliferation of connected devices allows the IoT to support the development of advanced communication platforms such as WeChat and Alipay, which integrate multiple services into a single application. The relationship between these initiatives lies in the fact that IoT acts as a bridge between “Made in China 2025” and “Internet Plus”, enabling the convergence of advanced manufacturing and the digitalization of the economy. On one hand, “Made in China 2025” uses the Internet of Things to modernize industry and improve productivity. On the other hand, “Internet Plus” leverages IoT to create new data-driven services and business models. This synergy has allowed China to position itself as a global leader in technological innovation. The relationship between science and cyberspace has been strengthened thanks to massive investment in research and development (R&D). The country has allocated significant resources to training talent in STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and has established centers of excellence in technological innovation, which have enabled the development of AI algorithms applied in sectors such as medicine, logistics, and defense. On the international stage, the People’s Republic of China has adopted a cooperative approach, actively participating in international cybersecurity organizations and promoting initiatives such as the Digital Silk Road, which aims to foster technological development in other nations. The future of the relationship between science and Chinese cyberspace is marked by emerging trends that promise to further transform society. The adoption of technologies such as 5G and Blockchain [2] is redefining how people interact with the digital world. At the same time, as the Asian nation faces the challenge of balancing technological growth with sustainability and social equity, it is developing cyber power strategy as one of the fundamental pillars of its government policy. This strategy is understood as the need to build a robust digital infrastructure that advances quantum technology, A), and their derivatives, aiming for the greatest possible development of all areas involved in the defense of cyberspace. China has positioned itself as a global leader in AI, with companies like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent at the forefront of research. In the field of big data, it has leveraged its vast population and the proliferation of connected devices to collect and analyze massive amounts of information, improving efficiency in sectors such as transportation and urban planning. Cyberspace is vulnerable to threats such as cyberattacks, digital espionage, and cyber warfare. In response to these risks, quantum computing offers tools to strengthen cybersecurity. In today’s digital era, quantum computing and cyberspace have become two foundational pillars for technological development and national security. China, as one of the global powers in technological innovation, has invested significantly in both areas, recognizing their potential to transform the economy, defense, and society. Quantum Computing: A New Technological Paradigm Quantum computing represents a revolutionary leap in information processing capabilities. Unlike classical computers, which use bits to represent data as 0 or 1, quantum computers employ qubits, which can exist in multiple states simultaneously thanks to the phenomenon of quantum superposition. This allows for solving complex problems in a very short time, unlike traditional computers, which would require much longer periods. China is increasing its role as a global leader in the research and development of quantum computing. In 2020, the country achieved a historic milestone by demonstrating quantum supremacy with its Jiuzhang computer, capable of performing calculations in minutes that would take the most advanced supercomputers thousands of years. Not only China has placed itself at the forefront of quantum technology, but it also has carried deep implications for cyberspace. Regarding its advancements in this area, China has achieved significant milestones, such as the development of long-distance communication networks — one example being the Beijing–Shanghai backbone network [3]. The link between these elements is manifested in several key areas: 1. Quantum Cryptography and Cybersecurity One of the most significant impacts of quantum computing on cyberspace is its ability to revolutionize cryptography. Quantum algorithms have the potential to break current encryption systems, which form the basis of online security. This poses a threat to critical infrastructure, financial transactions, and secure communications. In response to this challenge, China has invested in the development of quantum cryptography, particularly in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). In 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, “Micius”, which demonstrated the feasibility of secure long-distance quantum communication. This advancement lays the foundation for a global communication network immune to traditional cyberattacks. 2. Artificial Intelligence and Data Analysis Quantum computing has the potential to accelerate the development of AI and the analysis of large volumes of data. In cyberspace, this translates to greater capacity to detect patterns, predict threats, and optimize networks. The People’s Republic of China, already a leader in AI, has the potential to use quantum computing to strengthen its dominance in cyberspace, both nationally and internationally. Quantum networks enable the transmission of information with unprecedented security levels, reinforcing China’s leadership by strengthening its position in cyberspace and promoting its technological standards internationally. Quantum computing also offers strategic advantages. It could be used to develop more sophisticated cyberweapons capable of disabling enemy systems. It also holds the potential to enhance cyber defense, protecting critical infrastructure from attacks. China has integrated quantum computing into its national defense strategy, recognizing its importance in maintaining superiority in cyberspace. 3. Challenges and Ethical Considerations The global technological race among powers such as the United States is one of the key variables in this challenge and could exacerbate geopolitical tensions. There are ethical concerns about the use of quantum computing in cyberspace. The power of this technology has already been used for malicious purposes such as espionage, cyberattacks, or information manipulation, especially by powers adverse to China. As quantum technology advances, there is growing integration between its components and cyberspace, driving innovation in fields such as secure communication, artificial intelligence, and national defense. China's success in these areas will have global implications, redefining the future of technology and security in this century, toward essential economic, political, and social development goals. China has recognized the importance of cyberspace as a modern battlefield and has developed regulations and strategies to protect its interests in this domain, establishing laws that require companies and organizations to implement strong security measures and report cybersecurity incidents. In this regard, the transformative potential of quantum computing for national defense and security is acknowledged. Quantum technology has been applied to conflict simulation and the analysis of complex scenarios in the military sphere. The rapid development of the IoT presents challenges. The interconnection of devices creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited through cyberattacks on power grids, transportation systems, and more, which could have devastating consequences. China recognized these risks and implemented measures to strengthen cybersecurity. In 2017, the government enacted the Cybersecurity Law, which establishes strict requirements for data protection and network security. On the communication front, authorities have made efforts to promote not only the country’s technological capabilities, but also elements of Chinese culture. Platforms such as TikTok (known domestically as Douyin) have gained global popularity, becoming vehicles to counter negative narratives in Western media. This approach has resonated in other countries, especially in the so-called Global South, with which China has established strategic technological partnerships. 4. Cyberspace and Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Cyber sovereignty refers to the notion that each nation has the right and responsibility to exercise control over its cyberspace, protecting its digital infrastructure, regulating the flow of information, and defending its national interests in the digital realm. For China, this concept is fundamental to its Internet governance approach and aligns with a vision of a regulated and secure Internet. In summary, cyber sovereignty is defined as a condition in which the state has authority over cyberspace within its borders, including the ability to regulate Internet access, control online content, and protect digital infrastructure. It is based on the premise that cyberspace is a strategic domain that must be managed to ensure national security, social stability, and economic development. Its key principles include: State control: The Chinese government exercises strict control over Internet infrastructure and online content.National security: The protection of cyberspace is considered an extension of national defense.Content regulation: Measures are implemented to filter information deemed harmful or contrary to state interests.Technological autonomy: China seeks to reduce dependence on foreign technologies and promote the development of local solutions. Legal and Political Framework The Cybersecurity Law (2017) establishes regulations for data protection, infrastructure security, and online content regulation. Regarding the practical applications of China’s cyber sovereignty, one key element is the ability to exercise surveillance, i.e., the use of advanced technologies to monitor and control the flow of information. Promotion of local platforms: Encouragement of Chinese alternatives to global services (e.g., WeChat instead of WhatsApp, Baidu instead of Google).Development of technological standards: Creation of domestic standards for technologies like 5G and the Internet of Things, aiming to reduce dependence on international norms. International Implications Alternative governance model: China promotes its cyber sovereignty approach as an alternative to the Western model of an open and free Internet.Global influence: Through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, China offers other countries the opportunity to adopt its model of digital governance and technologies.International tensions: Disputes with other countries over the control of critical technologies and influence in global cyberspace.Balance between security and innovation: Strict control may limit creativity and entrepreneurship in the tech sector. Cyber sovereignty is a key link in China’s digital strategy, reflecting its state control and national security approach to cyberspace. This concept has enabled the Asian nation to develop a unique model of digital governance, characterized by regulation, promotion of local technologies, and projection of global influence. Internet Governance China has adopted a unique approach to Internet governance, based on the principle of national sovereignty. Unlike the open Internet model promoted by the United States, the Asian country advocates a model in which each nation has the right to regulate and control its own Internet infrastructure. This approach is reflected, among other aspects, in the adoption of policies that restrict access to foreign websites, to protect content aligned with national interests. China has also promoted international initiatives to establish digital governance norms that support its vision of cyber sovereignty. One example is the “Code of Conduct for International Information Security”, presented to the United Nations (UN), which advocates for the respect of national sovereignty in cyberspace and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In response to perceived threats from the United States and other powers, China has strengthened its cyber defense capabilities. One of the most significant initiatives has been the creation of a unit within the People’s Liberation Army specializing in cyber operations. China has denounced the surveillance activities of the United States National Security Agency (NSA). The rivalry driven by the U.S. stems from China’s accelerated development in network technologies and the rise of companies like Huawei, global leaders in technology. The Asian country has sought to counter U.S. influence in cyberspace through strategic alliances with other nations while pursuing diplomatic and technological balance. It has collaborated with Russia on joint cybersecurity policies and has promoted its vision of Internet governance in international forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The U.S. aggressiveness in the digital realm, aimed at countering China’s rise, could lead to a fragmentation of information technology, particularly in terms of data transmission, where different regions might adopt contradictory standards and regulations. This scenario, known as the “Balkanization of the Internet,” would bring negative consequences for innovation and international cooperation. For this reason, China strives — through its domestic policies and within international forums — to maintain a balance in the use of global cyberspace and in the effective approach to managing digital technologies. While some politicians and academics (Friedberg, Pillsbury) argue that China’s economic and military power will lead to an irrational use of cyberspace, others (Shambaugh, Steinfeld) maintain that China is increasingly integrated into international institutions and the global economy. They also emphasize the Chinese government's growing and sustained concern for international stability. Chinese authorities have had the opportunity to assert that, aside from the United States' aggressive stance, there are common interests between both nations regarding the defense of cyberspace and cybersecurity. For both countries, maintaining cybersecurity is vital for stability and social development. Their strategic approaches are based on serving their national interests, which is why both governments present their respective cyberspace strategies as models to emulate. Both, China and the United States, consider that strategic information must be handled with great care to ensure the proper functioning of public administration and national security. China supports the U.S. perspective on a cybersecurity governance model based on a multistakeholder approach, involving government, private, civil, and military actors in the implementation and execution of responsibilities. Certain reactionary sectors in the United States have worked to prevent possibilities for mutual understanding. In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice launched the “China Initiative”, aimed at countering what was perceived as economic espionage and intellectual property theft, allegedly carried out primarily by U.S. citizens of Chinese descent. This initiative had several geopolitical consequences: Tension in U.S.–China relations: Considered a discriminatory measure, seen as an attempt solely to contain China's economic and technological rise.Impact on bilateral cooperation: It increased distrust, negatively affecting areas of collaboration such as trade, investment, and joint work in science and technology.Concerns about civil rights: It was criticized by human rights groups and academics for targeting Americans of Chinese descent, creating an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship among Chinese-origin researchers and scholars. In some cases, this led to the loss of international collaborations. In 2021, President Joe Biden’s administration announced the end of the initiative, acknowledging its inappropriateness and the criticism it had drawn. However, in 2023, new accusations emerged involving Chinese nationals, allegedly responsible for flying "spy balloons" over U.S. military installations. A defamatory campaign sought to fuel Sinophobia, and media outlets once again contributed to this narrative. While the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied involvement, in the United States, the president convened the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and mobilized several strategic components, including the U.S. Cyber Command (US CyberCom). Several U.S. intelligence analysts, including Christopher Johnson, admitted that the United States conducts espionage against China. The wave of Sinophobia was intended to justify to the public the U.S. efforts to obtain vital information about China’s strategic interests, especially those linked to digital transformation and cyberspace. In 2024, the U.S. government announced that by 2025 it would double tariffs on Chinese semiconductors, while continuing to accuse Beijing of forcing technology transfers and stealing intellectual property. Final Considerations Cyberspace and digital governance are part of a broader war rooted in the cultural dimension of contemporary hegemonic power, which is heightened by the existing links between media and culture and their influence on relationships of domination. A Cold War persists in the form of a battle for individuals' minds, underscoring its ideological nature (Expósito, 2022). With the advance in science, psychological warfare has evolved, largely due to the development of new information and communication technologies. Faced with strong U.S. interference, psychological warfare is closely linked to the justification for dominating cyberspace, interpreted also as political warfare — understood as crisis diplomacy, war of nerves, or dramatic intimidation diplomacy. Through these strategies, the United States seeks to counter China’s remarkable progress in commercial economic development, particularly in the technological sphere. To support these efforts, the U.S. intelligence directorate hires public relations consultants responsible for conducting complex psychological operations in the informational and media domain. One of their main tasks is to validate and frame information production for propaganda purposes, where military communication strategies and tactics are intertwined with and become part of media operations, in which media outlets function as oligopolistic enterprises. According to U.S. intelligence agencies, information is treated as a content-seeking tool used to persuade public opinion, regardless of its truthfulness (for example, the repeated accusations of alleged Chinese spies operating within the United States). Communication is viewed as a vehicle for promoting the communicator’s interests — in other words, an effective way to ensure that a message, with a purely propagandistic purpose, aligns with political interests, serving the agenda of the executive branch and transnational media corporations in the United States, while also considering the specific interests of the State Department and the Department of Defense. With a “prepackaged” message, cyberspace — a concept not yet fully understood by the average citizen — is presented as a stimulus for the development of various cyberspace-related programs in the U.S., such as Cicada, Tripwire, among others. As a result, the People’s Republic of China becomes the subject of a U.S. social experiment, through which this subject — often portrayed through manipulated or falsified narratives — facilitates the enrichment of the aforementioned large transnational media corporations, one of the methods employed by the United States to maintain its hegemony. U.S. authorities, working in tandem with the corporate sector, continue to advocate — so far without the expected success — for the transition of network informatization to the multi-domain sphere, extending from Earth to space and cyberspace. This transition requires a close interconnection of all elements involved, and corresponding training of technical and logistical personnel. The restrictions imposed by the United States on China’s semiconductor industry are clearly aimed at obstructing China’s technological development, as the Asian nation still depends, to some extent, on certain components manufactured in the U.S. or by its allies. Accordingly, the restrictions enforced through the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act limit China’s access to advanced chip manufacturing technologies, such as Extreme Ultraviolet Lithography (EUVL) equipment, essential for producing next-generation semiconductors. It is important to note that chips and Chinese cyberspace are closely interrelated, as chips are fundamental components of the technological infrastructure that sustains cyberspace. In short, they are the technological foundation that enables the operation, expansion, and security of Chinese cyberspace, and their development is strategic for China’s autonomy and competitiveness in the global digital arena. The link between the communication sphere and cyberspace in the People’s Republic of China reflects its development model and its governance vision, aimed at promoting social cohesion. Through the use of advanced technologies and the implementation of policies, China has managed to maintain a high level of control over its digital environment, thereby promoting its national interests. China’s security and defense strategy in relation to cyberspace reflects its aspiration to become a global digital power. By adopting an approach based on national sovereignty, China seeks to protect its interests and counter threats posed by the United States and other powers. In an increasingly interconnected world, it is essential that nations find ways to cooperate in the field of cybersecurity, by establishing standards and norms that promote stability and trust in cyberspace. As one of the leading digital powers, China maintains its commitment to playing a crucial role in balancing the international order. The relationship between quantum computing, cyberspace, and China’s military security and defense regulations is complex and multifaceted. Quantum computing has the potential to revolutionize how information is processed and how security is ensured. China has been a pioneer in integrating quantum computing into its security and defense strategies, which has important implications for global security. The “Internet Plus” initiative served as a key catalyst for China's digital transformation, positioning the country as a global leader in technological innovation. By highlighting the close interdependence between cyberspace and quantum computing, it becomes evident how emerging technologies are transforming the world. China has demonstrated a strong commitment to the development of quantum computing, recognizing its potential to strengthen its position in cyberspace and its global implications that will reshape the future of technology and security in the 21st century. For years now, cyberspace has become part of the obscure content used in propaganda spread by what is referred to as the mainstream press. It is used not only as a critical domain to be protected for the sake of national sovereignty and security, but also as a media spectacle, a staged platform in which the press is employed to convey messages desired by the political and economic executives of countries such as the United States. In such cases, in addition to the legitimate need to protect cyberspace as an intrinsic component of political and social stability, it is also used as a justification for massive financial allocations, supposedly in the name of national integrity, which in reality flow into the coffers of the Military-Industrial Complex. Notes [1] A company that uses technology to offer financial services in an innovative, efficient, and accessible way. The term comes from the combination of the words “finance” and “technology.”[2] Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that allows information to be stored securely, transparently, and in a decentralized manner. It consists of a chain of blocks linked together, where each block contains a set of verified transactions or data. These blocks are connected through cryptographic techniques.[3] An important high-speed rail line in China that connects the cities of Beijing and Shanghai. Known as the High-Speed Railway, it is one of the busiest and most strategic routes. It was inaugurated on June 30, 2011 and covers an approximate distance of 1,318 km. References Expósito, J. (2022, enero 19). China en el ciberespacio. Revista Ejércitos. http://www.ejercitos.comFriedberg, A. L. (2011). A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. Nueva York: W.W. Norton.Lewis, J. A. (2022). Chinas Cyber Strategy: A Comprehensive Analysis. Center for Strategic and International Studies. En www.centerforstrategicstudiesMinisterio de Defensa Nacional de la República Popular China (2023). Libro Blanco de Defensa Nacional. Beijing: Editorial del Pueblo.Patiño Orozco, G. A. (2021). Una comparativa de los esquemas de ciberseguridad de China y Estados Unidos. OASIS, 34, pp. 107-126. https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n34.07Perera Pena, E. “El llamado globo chino y algunas de sus derivaciones estratégicas”. En Revista Cuadernos de Nuestra América. CIPI. La Habana. Cuba. ISSN: 2959-9849.Pillsbury, M. (2015). The Hundred Year Marathon. Chinas Secret Strategy to Replace Americas as the Global Superpower. Nueva York: Henry Holt.Segal, A. (2020). The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Manueuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age. New York. Public Affairs.Shambaugh, D. (2013). China Goes Global. The Partial Power. Nueva York: Columbia University Press.Spanish.news.cn 16.3.2023. Libro Blanco. China explora activamente nuevos modelos de “ciberjusticia”. En: www.spanish.xinhunet.comSteinfeld, E. S. (2017). Teams of Rivals: China, the United States, and the Race to Develop Technologies for a Sustainable Future. In J. DeLisle, and A. Goldstein, Chinas Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century (pp.91-121). Washington: Brookings Institution Press.Zhang, L. (2021). Chinas Quantum Supremacy. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. Cuadernos de Nuestra América. No. 014 | Nueva Época 2025, Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI). Under CC BY-NC 4.0 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A leaked phone call, renewed clashes, and political brinkmanship have transformed a long-standing border dispute into a test of the Thai PM’s leadership, Cambodia’s assertiveness, and ASEAN’s credibility as a mediator in conflicts. Thailand finds itself in the eye of a growing political and diplomatic storm. What began as a deadly border clash in late May—with the killing of a Cambodian soldier in the contested Chong Bok region—has rapidly escalated into a full-blown national crisis culminating in a Thai Constitutional Court asking Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra to step down on 1 July. The skirmish reignited deep-rooted tensions over unresolved territorial claims and historical rivalries, but a leaked phone call lit the fuse. On 18 June, Cambodian Senate President and former Prime Minister Hun Sen released a 17-minute, 6-second phone call with Thai PM Paetongtarn on social media—unfiltered and explosive. The recording, confirmed as authentic by Paetongtarn after a public apology, included remarks that appeared critical of Thai military leadership and referenced her Cambodian counterpart as ‘uncle’, sparking outrage and shaking the foundations of her fragile coalition. The political fallout was immediate as the Bhumjaithai Party, a key coalition partner with 69 seats, pulled out the same day, triggering a government crisis. Calls for fresh elections erupted, protests spread nationwide, and ethics complaints flooded. Senate President Mongkol Surasajja responded by filing a petition with the Constitutional Court, questioning the PM's fitness to govern and requesting her removal due to alleged ethical misconduct and constitutional violations. In a firmer move on 24 June, Thailand sealed all land border crossings with Cambodia, allowing only students, medical cases, and urgent humanitarian travel. All other movements—tourism, trade, and casual transit—have been suspended indefinitely. Still, Paetongtarn has refused to back down. Calling for national unity and holding on to sovereignty, she remained defiant. She called the leak by the Cambodian counterpart a breach of diplomatic etiquette and trust, prompting Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Ministry to hand a letter of protest to the Cambodian ambassador. In a firmer move on 24 June, Thailand sealed all land border crossings with Cambodia, allowing only students, medical cases, and urgent humanitarian travel. All other movements—tourism, trade, and casual transit—have been suspended indefinitely. The crisis deepened further on 1 July, with Thailand’s Constitutional Court ordering Paetongtarn to step aside for up to 15 days while it examines the mounting allegations against her. Deputy Prime Minister Suriya Jungrungruangkit has been appointed to serve in an acting capacity during this period. With tensions simmering at home and diplomacy fraying abroad, understanding the evolving dynamics between Thailand and Cambodia and their implications is essential at this juncture. Historical Background of Border Tensions  Historically, Thailand and Cambodia have shared a dispute over a small section of the 817 km land boundary, particularly concerning the area around the Preah Vihear Temple,  which the Thais call Phra Viharn. The dispute's origins can be traced back to the 20th century under French colonial rule, when Thailand (then Siam) signed a border treaty demarcating the northern frontiers between the two. In the years leading up to 1953, when Cambodia gained independence from France, the region changed hands many times. After its independence, Thai troops occupied the region in 1954. In response, Cambodia brought the dispute before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which, in 1962, ruled in favour of Cambodia. However, Thailand did not accept the ICJ’s judgment, challenging the interpretation of the 1907 map presented as evidence. Thailand specifically maintained that it had never officially recognised the 1907 map, even though it had been used over an extended period, and asserted that the ICJ’s judgment applied solely to the immediate temple grounds, not the broader border region. In 2013, at the request of the Cambodian government, the ICJ reiterated its 1962 judgement, highlighting Cambodia’s sovereignty over the entire temple complex and urging Thailand to withdraw its troops from the area. The dispute gained renewed attention when Cambodia sought to register Preah Vihar as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2008, and again in 2011 when about 40 people were killed after troops on both sides exchanged fire.  The boundary issue has resurfaced repeatedly at various points, leading to routine diplomatic breakdowns between the countries. For instance, in 2008 and 2011, Cambodia and Thailand were at loggerheads over the border issue. The dispute gained renewed attention when Cambodia sought to register Preah Vihar as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2008, and again in 2011 when about 40 people were killed after troops on both sides exchanged fire.  Present-day Calculations   While the phone call has been a flashpoint of contention, raising questions about Thai governance, it was framed by the Thai PM as a negotiation tactic driven by a deep-seated desire to see peace prevail. However, sidestepping official diplomatic channels has made her vulnerable to political backlash and damaged her reputation. Unlike formal state visits or official talks, private conversations lack diplomatic protections, leave no official record, and offer no framework for managing the fallout. Once exposed, they can quickly be turned into tools for political attack. That is precisely what ensued. Facing mounting criticism, Paetongtarn has shifted from a conciliatory approach to firmer action. Casinos in Phnom Penh and other Cambodian border towns, which form a significant part of the country's tourism industry and attract Thai visitors, are now under scrutiny. On 23 June, citing national security concerns, Thailand announced a ban on the movement of vehicles, tourists, and traders through land border checkpoints across seven provinces bordering Cambodia. Paetongtarn also announced her government’s intention to collaborate with international partners and regional bodies to combat cybercrime networks in Southeast Asia. Earlier this year, Thailand took action against Myanmar-based scam centres by cutting electricity, internet, and gas supplies to border towns where online scam operations were based. A similar approach is now being extended to Cambodia, with essential cross-border supplies to suspected scam hubs set to be blocked. To stabilise the fragile coalition, the government has initiated a cabinet reshuffle to redistribute key ministerial roles and restore political balance. Compounding this political turbulence are anti-government protesters and royalists who have been holding demonstrations, asking for the resignation of the PM. The crisis has thus become more than a bilateral dispute. It is now a test of Thailand's coalition stability, the prime minister's credibility, and the balance between civilian and military relations. While diplomatic channels remain open, Thailand's capacity to navigate the crisis will continue to be constrained by its domestic political fragility. The crisis has thus become more than a bilateral dispute. It is now a test of Thailand's coalition stability, the prime minister's credibility, and the balance between civilian and military relations. On the other hand, Cambodia has reciprocated with various measures, such as taking legal recourse, reciprocating through political actions, and showing a strong military posture. Cambodia has again approached the ICJ, claiming a sovereign right over the temple's territorial areas, despite Thailand's request to resolve the issue bilaterally. Speaking on the issue, Hun Sen said that “our position to go to the ICJ has not changed”, declaring his intent to resolve the dispute over the Ta Moan Thom, Ta Moan Tauch, Ta Krabei temples and the emerald triangle area through the ICJ. This is an attempt by Cambodia to draw attention to the legal dimension of the dispute, highlighting Thailand’s unwillingness to accept ICJ judgements and its alleged violation of international law. Furthermore, while visiting the frontlines, Cambodian PM Hun Manet (also the son of Hun Sen) inspected the situation and called for ‘resolving border disputes peacefully.’ However, Hun Sen took a stronger position, instructing the military to dig trenches and prepare for both defensive and offensive operations. He has also escalated the confrontation into the political arena, reportedly threatening to “expose” former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, signalling his capacity to destabilise Thailand’s domestic politics. Apart from this, the country has stopped imports of oil, gas, fruits and vegetables from Thailand, and has stopped using the Thai internet services. The Cambodian Foreign Minister has also advised citizens to avoid travelling to Thailand. This border episode presents Cambodian PM Hun Manet with an opportunity to consolidate his domestic political support. The decision to pursue the dispute at the ICJ aligns with this political strategy, as do Hun Sen’s more assertive political tactics.  Implications of the Border Tensions  The resurgence of border tensions between Thailand and Cambodia has significant bilateral and regional implications. Bilaterally, the crisis has strained diplomatic relations and disrupted essential cross-border trade, harming vulnerable border communities. For Thailand, this comes during political instability, where internal coalition politics and tensions between military and civilian actors shape foreign policy. The controversy may erode regional confidence in Thailand's diplomatic posture, particularly its ability to manage neighbourly ties with ASEAN constructively. While the upcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in July may address this issue, the prospects for diplomatic intervention remain uncertain. For Cambodia, while the government has shown diplomatic restraint and a willingness to engage through the Joint Boundary Commission, it has also responded forcefully by halting Thai imports and asserting its sovereignty. The move to potentially internationalise the dispute through the ICJ may further test ASEAN's non-interventionist norms. Regionally, the tensions challenge ASEAN's capacity for conflict resolution and border management, especially as its centrality is often undermined by its consensus-driven inaction and a non-interventionist outlook. The crisis underscores the bloc's limitations in de-escalating intra-regional disputes. While the upcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in July may address this issue, the prospects for diplomatic intervention remain uncertain. With no formal ASEAN mediation, unresolved historical disputes continue to overshadow cross-border cooperation in Southeast Asia. As infrastructure connectivity and regional integration deepen, such tensions reveal the fragility of ties when nationalism, strategic missteps, and domestic politics converge. Whether Thailand and Cambodia can prevent this flare-up from turning into a renewed phase of prolonged conflict depends on the durability of their diplomatic mechanisms—and their political will to prioritise dialogue over posturing.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction The geopolitical upheavals of the 1990s directly affected the Baltic Sea region: the USSR collapsed, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, and Germany was reunited. The logic of the “end of history” introduced completely new principles of international order across the European continent. Trade, economic, and military-political cooperation were based on shared development goals and universal practices of international interaction. Rapidly growing trade, economic, cultural, educational, and investment ties in the Baltic region helped overcome the recent legacy of Cold War bloc confrontation. Regional organizations and formats of cooperation, even if they did not create a new “Baltic” identity (an idea proposed in the early 1990s), certainly established working mechanisms for joint regional projects. These initiatives were implemented by countries ready for mutually beneficial cooperation. However, these carefully built formats and projects proved fragile in the face of global challenges. The decline of global governance institutions and growing tensions between the collective West and a resurging Russia — economically, politically, and militarily — led to a global political crisis. The increasingly militarized Baltic Sea region became a logistical hub for strategic rivals — Russia and NATO / the EU. A Region of Cooperation In March 1992, at a conference of foreign ministers of the Baltic Sea countries and Norway, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was established. The main initiators of this idea were German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Danish counterpart Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. The creation of a common regional international organization marked the symbolic start of a phase of intensive interstate cooperation in the region, based on the principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and other CSCE documents. At the political level, CBSS member states declared their readiness to act together in the common interest. They confirmed their commitment to cooperation, including the peaceful resolution of regional disputes in a spirit of good neighborliness and partnership. The idea of building a system of regional organizations and initiatives under the CBSS political umbrella was seen as a more effective solution for regional development than relying on international organizations focused on global issues and the many military and humanitarian crises of the early 1990s. By the start of the 21st century, the Baltic region had a range of functioning projects and initiatives across various fields: from regulating the use of Baltic Sea biological resources to a joint online university (the Baltic University Programme), from a platform for marine spatial planning (Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea, VASAB) to festivals organized by the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC). One of the most important issues requiring practical cooperation between the EU and Russia was the development of the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. This semi-exclave (due to its access to the sea) is separated from mainland Russia by the territories of Poland and Lithuania — countries that declared their intention to join Euro-Atlantic institutions, which was seen as a confrontational move by Russia — and Belarus. The “Kaliningrad Puzzle” was about finding the best strategy between Russia and the EU to support the daily life and sustainable economic development of the Kaliningrad region after Poland and Lithuania joined NATO and the EU. This brought restrictions on the transit of passengers and goods, on trade and energy cooperation with neighboring countries, and on maintaining the military security of the region. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, there were only few scenarios discussed for resolving the "Kaliningrad Puzzle." One seemingly attractive idea was the concept of a “Hong Kong on the Baltic”, but it had no real prospects due to a lack of political will — both from neighboring countries and from the Russian central government. Moreover, the very idea of a demilitarized zone with open access for foreign investment and visitors, offering special conditions for business and governance, did not gain support at the federal level. It was removed from the agenda already during expert discussions. It is likely that this concept was viewed as a possible threat of “creeping separatism,” especially against the background of growing anti-federal sentiments in the region. Another concept discussed in parallel was that of a “land-based aircraft carrier.” This scenario involved limited trade and economic cooperation with neighboring countries, a significant reduction in cross-border passenger flow, and the strengthening of the region’s defensive (and in some proposals, offensive) military potential. This would mean creating an “island model” for the region's economy and energy system. From today’s perspective, it is clear that this unlikely scenario is exactly what has been implemented. In the 1990s, a research group led by Professor G. M. Fedorov of Kaliningrad University proposed the idea of “Kaliningrad as a region of cooperation between Russia and the EU.” It envisioned the region as a platform for building cooperation networks to enhance economic (a free or special economic zone), political (a venue for dialogue and negotiations), scientific and educational (development and internationalization of the university complex), and cultural (creation of a cultural cluster) ties with the EU. This could have helped establish a new model of international relations in the Baltic — a model of “EU–Russia cooperation in the region.” The proposal included a recommendation to legally define Kaliningrad’s development strategy at the federal level as a region of intensive interaction with the EU. This idea was perceived by both Russia and the EU more as a reflection of the spirit of the time than as a real plan of action. Implementation took place without formal legal support and with little political enthusiasm. Each side interpreted the idea of cooperation in its own way, based on its own interests — both open and hidden. When analyzing the implementation of the “region of cooperation” concept, it becomes clear that it was undermined by the efforts of Poland and the Baltic States, which, in the context of their Euro-Atlantic integration, worked to securitize nearly all forms of interaction with Russia. The accession of Poland and the Baltic States to the EU on May 1, 2004, had critical consequences for the regional landscape. The new EU members made “Eastern Policy” their foreign policy priority, aiming not only to offer expert assessments of the post-Soviet space but also to actively shape the EU’s policy toward Russia. This approach aligned with the Polish interpretation of the Giedroyc–Mieroszewski Doctrine, which argued that a long-term goal of Polish foreign policy should be the existence of post-Soviet states independent from Russian influence. Poland, the Baltic States, and later Germany saw the EU as the key moderator of the political and economic agenda in the Baltic Sea region. This was reflected in the development and adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. In the field of security, they relied on NATO while also building bilateral military ties with the United States and strengthening their own defense capacities. “Cool War” and a Region of Conflict Professor K. K. Khudoley from St. Petersburg State University describes the growing tensions between Russia and Western countries in the Baltic Sea region as a period of “Cool War.” This phase is marked by decreased predictability and manageability of international processes due to a major rift between Russia and other regional actors. In the Baltic region, the development of multilateral cooperation networks and accumulated experience of interregional engagement failed to act as “political shock absorbers.” Instead, regional cooperation dynamics were defined by Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU. At that time, neutral countries like Sweden and Finland started participating in limited military-political cooperation with NATO countries, raising doubts in Russia about the permanence of their non-aligned status. In this context, scholar Y. M. Zverev accurately noted that the idea of the Baltic as a region of cooperation with Western neighbors gradually collapsed. It was a result of accumulating contradictions and rising global tensions, eventually leading to near-complete breakdown of cooperation — except for dwindling trade relations. Russia’s formal exclusion in 2022 from regional cooperation formats was preceded by processes inside NATO and the EU, aimed at building alternative cooperation mechanisms and strengthening their political, economic, and military presence in the Baltic region. On August 12, 2008, during the five-day war in Georgia, Polish President Lech Kaczyński addressed a rally in Tbilisi, with the presidents of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine present. He voiced concern over what he saw as an existential threat from Russia: “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic States, and then possibly my own country, Poland.” From that point, Warsaw actively promoted its view of regional security within Euro-Atlantic structures, emphasizing rivalry with Moscow — despite growing trade and energy ties between Russia and various EU countries. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia took an active role in developing the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, promoting a vision of the Baltic as a zone of priority EU interests. In this framework, relations with Russia, Iceland, Belarus, and Norway were seen as external. The European Commission was viewed as the main source of political influence and funding for transforming the region and reducing Russia’s role in the regional agenda. The adoption of the Strategy in 2009 became a turning point, undermining the earlier idea of a “Sea of Cooperation.” EU member states in the region prioritized EU-centered mechanisms that effectively excluded Russia — even though special cooperation formats were formally included. It’s important to highlight that the dismantling of the “region of cooperation” logic and the move toward a conflict-driven “Cool War” scenario was mainly caused by external, non-regional factors: the erosion of the dominant world order, worsening tensions between NATO and Russia, and the acute phase of that conflict — the Ukraine crisis. The escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022 turned the situation in the Baltic into a conflict zone. Russia was removed from nearly all key cooperation frameworks — mechanisms that were originally created to absorb tensions, align interests, and prevent crises from becoming irreversible. On March 3, 2022, foreign ministers of all non-Russian member states of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs adopted a Declaration suspending Russia’s participation “until conditions allow for renewed cooperation based on fundamental principles of international law.” On May 17, 2022, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced the country’s withdrawal from the CBSS, describing the organization as a tool of anti-Russian policy. A similar fate befell the Northern Dimension — another highly effective and well-developed cooperation framework. It covered areas like the environment, nuclear safety, healthcare, energy, transport, trade, research, education, and culture. The Northern Dimension had real impact, including in global-scale nuclear safety. On March 8, 2022, the EU, Iceland, and Norway suspended all cooperation with Russia and Belarus under this program. Today, all foreign countries of the Baltic region support Ukraine and run national programs of political and military assistance. They also participate in NATO, EU, and “Baltic-format” initiatives. Poland has become a key logistics hub for delivering humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, while also building up its military infrastructure and increasing the size and capabilities of its armed forces. A key milestone was the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which confirmed the trend of militarization and strategic alignment of the region in favor of the U.S. and NATO. In NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Russia was declared “the most significant and direct threat” to the security of allies and the Euro-Atlantic area. Similar statements appeared in updated security strategies of Sweden and Finland. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, stated that after Sweden and Finland joined NATO, the non-nuclear status of the Baltic Sea was no longer relevant. Since 2022, the Baltic has turned into a region of rapid militarization, with NATO and Russia both increasing operational capabilities — especially along shared borders. For Finland, which shares a long border with Russia, joining NATO marked a major shift in its security policy. Previously, Finland maintained non-alignment, focusing on national defense and cooperation with Sweden while keeping stable relations with Russia. According to researcher S. V. Andreyev, the NATO debate in Finland started after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, but received little public support back then. However, Matti Pesu, senior researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, noted that although Finland had cooperated with NATO since the 1990s, the events of 2022 caused a decisive public shift: “The majority of Finns supported the decision.” In 2024, Finland’s military spending reached €6.8 billion (more than 2.4% of GDP). Sweden defines its role in NATO as a security guarantor in the Baltic region. Stockholm is developing military-technical cooperation with Finland and Norway, promoting the idea of a unified NATO operational command in Northern Europe (JFC Norfolk). Sweden is also interested in building joint defense capabilities with the Baltic States, Germany, and Poland. In Sweden’s strategic documents, Russia is identified as the main threat, “supported by other authoritarian states such as Iran and China.” On December 17, 2024, the Swedish parliament approved the national defense strategy for 2025–2030, which includes an increase in military spending from 122 billion kronor (2.2% of GDP) in 2024 to 186 billion kronor (2.6% of GDP) by 2030. To understand the scale of militarization, it is important to note that in 2024, NATO adopted its first-ever Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy — a comprehensive plan to modernize the Alliance’s digital infrastructure and capabilities. The public section of this document highlights the prioritization of cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and energy nodes. These priorities provide a basis for creating preventive response capabilities to threats — including scenarios involving damage or destruction of undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea in case of conflict escalation with Russia. The growth of NATO’s military presence in the region has led to new priorities in strategic planning, reflected in large-scale exercises held in 2023 and 2024. On April 29, 2025, Russian presidential aide and chairman of the Maritime Board, Nikolai Patrushev, stated that NATO was rehearsing offensive scenarios near Russia’s borders — including the seizure of the Kaliningrad region and blockade of shipping in the Baltic Sea. Some experts assess that the threat of a maritime blockade of Russia in the Baltic, long discussed by NATO politicians, is not only possible but realistic. A naval blockade of Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg would almost certainly be seen by Russia as a casus belli, with corresponding consequences. Conclusion As of June 2025, the Baltic Sea has effectively become a “region of cooperation without Russia”. Russia has been excluded from all functioning regional cooperation mechanisms, while the military, energy, and economic collaboration among the other regional states and extra-regional actors (such as the United States and France) has intensified. The rapid militarization of the region and the loss of its non-nuclear status are reinforcing a long-term trend toward confrontation. At the level of military planning, regional actors are openly preparing for scenarios of full-scale conflict, which increases tensions between Russia and NATO. The idea of such a conflict is no longer unthinkable — it has strategic foundations, and the leading players in the region are preparing for it. When assessing the likelihood of this scenario, it is important to understand that the current intensity of the Baltic conflict is shaped by the short-term agendas and interests of the countries involved. A degree of cautious optimism about the future of the Baltic region is based on the possibility that post-conflict agreements between Russia and extra-regional actors could become a key factor in shaping the future model of international relations in the region. Global political dynamics are capable of changing rapidly, potentially reversing current trends and creating a new political reality — overriding the inertia of existing military planning. In the Baltic, there remains a solid legacy of cooperative networks. Across the region, direct links between participants of political, academic, and civic projects — both bilateral and multilateral — have not disappeared. Countries in the region still share objective common interests, especially in areas such as environmental protection and economic cooperation. This historical experience serves as a source of moderate optimism: in the foreseeable future, relations in the Baltic may move from a state of “cool war” and confrontation to one of selective cooperation. A “cool peace” and selective cooperation would clearly be more aligned with Russia’s long-term interests in the Baltic region than a scenario of full-scale conflict. About the Author Igor I. Zhukovsky — PhD in Political Science, Senior Research Fellow at the Baltic Region Comprehensive Research Group, Center for Strategic Planning Studies, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. Sources Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. President of Russia. 27 October 2022. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695 (accessed: 30.06.2025). 1992 CBSS 1st Ministerial Session – Copenhagen Declaration. Council of the Baltic Sea States, 5–6 March 1992. URL: https://cbss.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/1992CBSS1stMinisterialSessionCommunique.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). Zhukovsky I. "Council of the Baltic Sea States: New Wine in Old Bottles?" Valdai Club. 19 September 2024. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sovetgosudarstvbaltiyskogomorya/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Joenniemi P., Dewar S., Fairlie L.D. The Kaliningrad Puzzle: A Russian Region Within the European Union. COPRI Working Papers, Vol. 6, 2000. Oldberg I. "The Emergence of a Regional Identity in the Kaliningrad Oblast." Cooperation and Conflict, 2000, Vol. 35, pp. 269–288. Khlopetsky A.P., Fedorov G.M. Kaliningrad Region as a Region of Cooperation: A Monograph. Kaliningrad: Yantarny Skaz, 2000. See also: "Eastern Policy of the EU" is understood as the Union's external policy toward its eastern neighbors. Polish foreign ministers R. Sikorski and A. Rotfeld have repeatedly emphasized the significance of the "Giedroyc–Mieroszewski Doctrine." Ofitserov-Belsky D.V. "Eastern Policy of Poland: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Aspects." Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 2023, No. 4(61), pp. 51–61. Khudoley K.K. "The 'Cool War' in the Baltic Sea Region: Consequences and Future Scenarios." Baltic Region, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 42–54. Zverev Yu.M. "Three Russian Regions on the Baltic Amidst Russia–West Confrontation." Baltic Region, 2023, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 24–41. Speech by Polish President Lech Kaczyński in Tbilisi, 12 August 2008. URL: https://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/archiwum/archiwumlechakaczynskiego/aktualnosci/rok2008/wizytaprezydentarpwgruzji,26753,archive (accessed: 30.06.2025). EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR, 2009) — its development experience was later applied to other EU macro-regional strategies. Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania “On the Baltic Sea Strategy”, 19 April 2007. URL: https://eseimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalActPrint/lt?documentId=TAIS.295996 (accessed: 30.06.2025). Zhukovsky I.I. "Some Issues in the Evolution of Modern International Relations in the Baltic Region." Baltic Region, 2024, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 145–160. Declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2022. Government of Poland. URL: https://www.gov.pl/web/finlandia/federacjarosyjskazawieszonawpracachradypanstwmorzabaltyckiego (accessed: 30.06.2025). Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on Withdrawal from the CBSS, 17 May 2022. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813674/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). See, for example, the term “NATO internal sea” — used by various politicians and experts in relation to the Baltic. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 9 June 2022. URL: https://www.act.nato.int/wpcontent/uploads/2023/05/290622strategicconcept.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). National Security Strategy. Government Offices of Sweden, 2024. URL: https://www.government.se/informationmaterial/2024/07/nationalsecuritystrategy/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Government Defence Report 2024. Ministry of Defense of Finland. URL: https://www.defmin.fi/en/themes/defence_policy_reports#1f47ed12 (accessed: 30.06.2025). "The Baltic May Lose Its Nuclear-Free Status." RIA Novosti. 14 April 2022. URL: https://ria.ru/20220414/baltika1783465933.html (accessed: 30.06.2025). In 2024, Poland allocated over 4% of GDP to military modernization — the highest share in NATO. Andreev S. "Finland: Two Years in NATO." RIAC. 28 April 2025. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Strategically located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, the Gaza Strip is a crucially important enclave in the Levant. Its proximity to Israel and Egypt places it in an area of high strategic sensitivity, and it is deeply involved in the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Territorial disputes, rooted in sovereignty claims, overlap with the involvement of international actors with different economic and strategic interests.This territory, which is no more than 12 kilometers wide and a little more than 40 kilometers long, has been the scene of a confrontation between the State of Israel and the political, military and social organization Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, Islamic Resistance Movement) for the last two years. In this war scenario, three main actors can be mentioned. On the one hand, the State of Israel, created in 1948, which has a great military and technological capacity thanks to the help of the United States. Israel distinguishes that Hamas is a permanent threat to the Israelis, hence its policy of land, naval and maritime blockade, arguing that it must defend itself from the aggressions of this group which has repeatedly launched missiles in this century. Secondly, Hamas, an organization created in 1987 during the first Intifada (rebellion or uprising), which exercises control of the Gaza Strip and leads the resistance to the State of Israel seeking the creation of a Palestinian State. Hamas' capabilities range from military development with the launching of missiles, to public administration and social work in the area. Third, the United States is an external actor in the region, but one that wields considerable influence, for while it sees itself as an arbiter in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, it has done little more than deploy over the decades military, political and financial support for the State of Israel. The choice of the period of analysis from 2023 to early 2025 is due to the succession of events in the area that have demanded specific attention, since the military escalation has denoted a more radical change in the posture of the main actors. Given this situation, the central research question is the following: How have the power dynamics between Israel, Hamas and the United States manifested themselves in the Gaza Strip during the period 2023-2025, and what have been the main implications of their actions. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the interactions between these three main actors from 2023 to early 2025. Israel, founded in 1948 and with great military and technological power thanks to U.S. support. Hamas, established in 1987, controls the Gaza Strip and leads the resistance, seeking the creation of a Palestinian state that does not recognize Israel. The United States, while presenting itself as an arbiter, has historically provided substantial military, political and financial support to Israel. The October 7, 2023 Hamas's attack, "Operation Al-Aqsa Storm," provoked the Israeli "Iron Swords" counteroffensive. This response included heavy aerial and ground bombardment throughout Gaza, causing widespread destruction and a severe humanitarian crisis. Israel seeks to dismantle Hamas' military capability, eliminate its leadership and release hostages, in addition to the establishment of a security zone. The U.S. position under the administrations of Joseph Biden and Donald Trump has been supportive of Israel, justifying its right to defend itself. However, concerns about civilian casualties and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza have led to calls for "humanitarian pauses." The "cease-fire" that is announced from time to time has not served to definitively stop the fighting; on the contrary, after its termination, the Israeli Defense Forces continue to gain ground. The fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip has been imposed since 2007, and its level of intensity has varied over the years, but what has not changed is the justification for it, which is related to security issues, to prevent the entry of arms and supplies that could be used by Hamas to attack Israeli territory. According to the State of Israel, the air, naval and land blockade is a fundamental part of its defense to protect its people from rockets launched from the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the Hamas takeover came after Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement, a Palestinian political and military organization founded in the late 1950s, and a leading member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO) lost the 2006 parliamentary elections, and Hamas fighters fought against them. Both parties claim to represent the Palestinians. The battle won by Hamas meant the dissolution of the existing unity government and the division of the Palestinian territories: West Bank for Fatah and the Gaza Strip for Hamas. Hamas' stated goal is the creation of a Palestinian state occupying the entire territory of Palestine, which means non-recognition of the State of Israel. The region has been characterized by rocket fire from Gaza into Israel and Israeli military incursions into Gaza, all within the framework of the Israeli naval, land and sea blockade, although Hamas rearmament has continued due to tunnels linking Gaza to Egypt. Background to the escalation of Violence The escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in 2023, has been a process of accumulation of facts between both parties for decades. One of them has been the stalemate of the Peace Process that has promoted a radicalization of the parties' positions encouraging armed struggle. Secondly, the increasing expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, considered illegal by a large part of the international community, which causes, on the one hand, the fragmentation of Palestinian sovereignty in the territory due to the inability to establish a related communication infrastructure between Palestinian lands, and on the other hand, resentment towards the Israeli occupation, which manifests itself in an armed resistance that is seen as the only solution in the absence of a political settlement. Thirdly, the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places (Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock and other mosques), where there are restrictions on entering the mosque area by Israeli security. This is seen as a violation of religious rights. Jerusalem is claimed to be the capital of the future Palestinian state. Israel denies this because it declared it as the eternal and indivisible capital in 1980 through a law passed by the Knesset (Assembly).Fourthly, the blockade of the Gaza Strip with the resulting humanitarian crisis has generated a lot of poverty, high unemployment, limited access to basic services such as water, electricity and health, which has increased the radicalization of the population.Fifth, the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, some of whom have no open criminal cases, whereby hunger strikes and the conditions in which they live are a cause for protest by Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Finally, the competition between Hamas and Fatah, one in Gaza and the other in the West Bank, only encourages violence to see who represents the Palestinians more, i.e., to settle the representation of the Palestinian people, thereby increasing attacks on Israel, which in turn responds militarily: "Israeli forces need to wrest territorial control from Hamas to demonstrate to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank that they do not guarantee their security from Israel, just as Hamas's assault has called into question Israeli confidence in its Armed Forces" (Arteaga, 2023, 3). Israel may not need to occupy the entire Gaza Strip, but what it needs is to "dismantle as much of Hamas' military prestige as it can to challenge its Palestinian leadership, otherwise Hamas will increase its ability to influence the rest of the factions in Gaza and the West Bank to the detriment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)" (ibidem). Hamas attack on Israel in 2023 During 2023, incidents in the Jerusalem area in front of mosques increased, prompting Israeli security forces to intervene, with Palestinians considering it an attack on all Muslims. Simultaneously, Israeli attacks on the West Bank increased to dismantle cells considered terrorists hiding in refugee camps or villages. Israeli settlers living in the West Bank also attacked Palestinian communities, causing damage and casualties. Israeli targeted assassinations of militants in Gaza or the West Bank, leading to hunger strikes in prisons and rebellions by the Palestinian population, should be placed in this context.Faced with this situation, on October 7, 2023, Hamas developed the operation "Al-Aqsa Storm" which involved the infiltration and coordination of fighters using paragliders, attacking Israeli security posts and using boats to infiltrate Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip. The attacks were carried out on villages, military bases, including a music festival, resulting in an estimated death toll of more than 1,200 Israelis and 250 prisoners of whom more than 50 remain in Hamas hands. The release of the hostages has been a strategy to obtain the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Israel's response The Israeli counter-offensive, called "Iron Swords", included intensive aerial bombardments against Hamas military targets in the Gaza Strip, but affected thousands of Palestinian civilians who were killed or wounded and their homes destroyed. The Israelis mobilized reservists for an all-out offensive against the entire Gaza Strip to completely eliminate Hamas, while imposing a total blockade on the supply of water, food, medicine and fuel, increasing the already humanitarian crisis. The destruction reached Hamas military infrastructure and civilian infrastructure such as public buildings, through ground and naval artillery and aerial bombardment. The Israeli ground incursions reached the entire Gaza Strip, because they are aimed at dismantling Hamas' military capacity, tunnels, missile launcher bases, supply sites, arsenals, etcetera. They also aim to dismantle Hamas by eliminating its leaders and the militants responsible for the offensive, to rescue the Israeli hostages, and to establish a future security zone to prevent further Palestinian attacks. Israel has been criticized for the disproportionate response of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to the Hamas attack, the failure to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to plan the attacks in such a way as to avoid civilian casualties. Israel has responded that Hamas uses the civilian population as a shield, and that the territory is densely populated so that war casualties could not be avoided, however, despite having the advantage in war material, so far it has not been enough to defeat Hamas militarily. Guerrilla warfare is the tactic employed by Hamas and that has been a complication for Israel, as it had been for the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Hamas blends in among civilians making it even more difficult to locate its fighters, while the Israeli response causes collateral damage among civilians and what little infrastructure is left standing after nearly two years of conflict: "Gaza's demographic characteristics as a 'soft' factor are an advantage against Israel's 'hard' capabilities, where Hamas operatives can intrude into the population to set up ambushes against IDF armored columns" (Trujillo Borrego, 2025, 16). The government of Benjamin Netanyahu gained a great deal of public support for the military operation, however, the rising number of casualties along with the destruction caused in Gaza, brought down support. The families of the hostages are urging the government to enter into negotiations with Hamas to get them back, which clashes with the government's objectives. The mobilization of the reservists, together with the prolongation of the war, has generated social and economic problems, questioning the Netanyahu government, and also the intelligence agencies that were surprised by the preparation and the surprise of the Hamas attack. The position of the United States Historically, the United States has supported Israel economically, politically and militarily based on strategic and geopolitical interests. The Israeli lobby in the US Congress, the veto to UN Security Council Resolutions and the presidential statements, have strengthened the bond between both countries: "Israel remains the main recipient of US aid, an aid that has allowed it to transform its Armed Forces and maintain the "qualitative military edge" (QME) against its neighbors. It has always been guaranteed by the US Congress and has had the support of both major parties, in part thanks to the promotion at the domestic level of organizations in defense of Israel since the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (García Encina, 2023, 3). The US justification during the administration of President Joseph Biden (2021-2025), was that Israel had the right to defend itself by condemning Hamas in solidarity with its traditional ally. Support was maintained until the US administration began to worry about civilian casualties and the humanitarian crisis. Hence the calls for a "humanitarian pause" and a "cease-fire" for the hostage exchange. The position of current US President Donald Trump has been one of absolute support for Israel. While he has stated that "a lot of people are starving" and that "bad things are happening", his relationship with the Israeli Prime Minister has not changed despite mentioning that humanitarian aid is needed. In that sense, he has stated that Hamas has to be completely disarmed in order for the Gaza Strip to be a territory without weapons. Also, one of his proposals is that the United States take control of Gaza and relocate Palestinians to other countries because it is a pile of rubble, violating international law by the principle of self-determination of peoples and determining a forced displacement of Palestinians: “Despite its support for a two-state solution, the lack of effective pressure on Israel and the focus on Israeli security over justice for Palestinians have hindered significant progress toward peace. U.S. policy in the region has oscillated between attempts at mediation and unconditional support for Israel, making it impossible for the U.S. to act as an impartial mediator.” (Donoso, 2025, pp. 27–28) However, Trump has hinted at Israel's unwillingness to negotiate an end to the war, and has expressed that hunger should not be used as a weapon. In addition, he has lifted sanctions against a historical enemy of Israel, Syria, whose president Ahmed al-Sharaa, was linked to Al Qaeda, although he now belongs to another group called Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) (Organization or Life for the Liberation of the Levant). Israel has opposed the lifting of sanctions and has bombed Syria. Trump’s tour of the Middle East this past May demonstrated that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken a back seat due to the intransigence of both Hamas and Israel. For this reason, the U.S. president—who did not visit Israel—traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, seeking to invest in the oil sector and encouraging those countries to invest in the United States or purchase American products. For example, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy $142 billion worth of military equipment, including missiles, communication systems, and more. The total deal amounts to $600 billion, covering trade, investments, and arms purchases. Meanwhile, in contrast to the U.S. position of keeping control over the Gaza Strip, there is another initiative led by regional countries such as the United Arab Emirates to invest in Gaza’s reconstruction—without relocating Gazan residents to other countries in the region. Final Considerations The Gaza Strip, a narrow territory located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, stands as an epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Surrounded by Israel and Egypt, it represents a strategic geographic point in the region, and has witnessed violence, blockades and a complex interplay between local, regional and international actors, with Israel, Hamas and the United States playing crucial roles. Israel has exerted overwhelming influence with ground and aerial bombardments throughout the Strip to not only eliminate Hamas, but also to secure the release of the hostages. Although at the beginning Israeli society supported this campaign, the cost in lives is being negatively evaluated, in addition to the call for reservists. This call-up has damaged the Israeli economy by extracting more than 300,000 reservists, affecting the labor force in different sectors of the economy. Israel, supported by the United States, has so far declared that it will not end the operation until the elimination of Hamas, the latest [Hamas] has demonstrated a great defensive and organizational capacity, which has been beneficial to the international community that has begun to criticize the Israeli attack due to the high cost in Palestinian victims and the precarious situation of the Gazans. According to the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip, more than 50,000 Gazans had been killed and more than 100,000 wounded as of March this year, but Israel contradicts these figures, while not allowing impartial observers and journalists into the area. In addition, more than 70% of the infrastructure and homes have been destroyed by Israeli air, land and naval bombardments. This has been compounded by the collapse of industrial production, rising inflation due to food and manufactured goods shortages, and an increase in both overall                 and youth unemployment—factors that further fuel resentment toward those considered responsible, namely the Israelis. Likewise, both exports (such as scrap metal, tropical fruits, and olive oil) and imports (especially food) have declined as a result of the conflict. The United States supported Israel's position from the beginning, but President Trump is now calling for the opening of a humanitarian corridor for the residents of Gaza. While Israel has managed to dismantle most of Hamas’ operational infrastructure, it has not succeeded in defeating the organization, nor in freeing all the hostages, and now is facing mounting international condemnation and accusations of war crimes. At the same time, Israel's public spending has increased significantly, primarily due to military operations, while the country's economic development and employment rates have fluctuated over the past two years. Naturally, the Palestinian economy has suffered far more than Israel’s.The escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis since 2023 is the result of a series of long-standing events and processes. Rocket attacks from Gaza, assaults by Israeli settlers on Palestinians in the West Bank, Israeli responses to missile fire, incidents near the mosques in East Jerusalem, the deplorable health conditions in Gaza due to the Israeli blockade, and the destruction of Gazan infrastructure have all prolonged the conflict and deepened tensions. In short, the intransigence of both parties—along with unwavering U.S. support for Israel and diplomatic efforts that have so far failed—has prolonged the conflict, preventing the achievement of a fair and lasting political solution for both sides. This has caused a high number of civilian casualties in Gaza, where a collapsing health system struggles to respond and food is scarce. At the same time, Palestinians living in the West Bank continue to suffer from attacks and displacement by Israeli settlers expanding their areas of control. Bibliography Arteaga, F. (2023). The war between Hamas and Israel: long and hard. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The relationship between the United States and Israel has been described as one of the most enduring and strategic alliances in modern politics. Beyond shared cultural ties and democratic values, this alliance has been heavily sustained by the systematic influence of pro-Israel state and lobbying groups within U.S political institutions. In this context, the Israeli lobby, most notably represented by organizations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has played a central role in shaping key foreign policy decisions, from military aid assistance to diplomatic recognition of Israeli interests on the international stage (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).  While the presence of interest groups is a common feature of the U.S. democratic system, the Israeli lobby stands out due significant presence and impact on Middle East policy and America diplomacy. As some critics argue, this influence has at times, led to the subordination of U.S. strategic interest in favor of Israeli priorities (Pappé,2017). This article analyzes how the Israeli lobby operates, the mechanisms it employs, and the broader implications it holds for the independence of U.S. foreign policy. Mechanisms of Influence on U.S Foreign Policy         The Israeli state and lobby employs a wide array of tools to influence U.S foreign policy, combining financial, institutional, and narrative-based strategies. One of the most impactful methods is political funding. Pro-Israel Political Action Committees (PACs) have historically directed campaign contributions to congressional candidates who demonstrate unwavering support for Israel, in 2020 there a significant contribution of $30 million to federal campaigns. (OpenSecrest,2021). Lobbying efforts also extend to direct engagement with policy makers. AIPAC, for instance, organizes annual conferences that attract top U.S. officials, including presidents and congress members. Through strategic lobbying, the Israeli lobby has been instrumental in passing measures such as the US-Israel Strategic Partnership Act and ensuring continued military aid exceeding $3.8 billion annually (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).  While often presented as an independent force acting within the American political landscape, the Israeli lobby maintains close ties with the Israeli government, which allows it to act as a semi- official conduit for its foreign policy objectives. One clear example of his coordination was evident during the Obama administration’s negotiations of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). During the Obama administration, to finalize the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress in 2015 without the White House´s approval. This unprecedented move coordinated with Republican congressional leaders highlighted how the Israeli lobby facilitated direct access to U.S. political institutions, effectively bypassing executive authority (Beauchamp, 2015).     Over decades, Israeli influence within U.S foreign policy decision making has moved beyond traditional lobbying, a structural element in how Washington approaches the Middle East. What initially began as advocacy in cultural and strategic alignment has gradually evolved into a form of embedded influence that often shapes policy trajectories before they reach public debate. In recent years, the influence has been reinforced by Israel´s growing military modernization and significant victories against their enemies such as Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. These developments and Israeli momentum have not only bolstered Israel´s image as a capable regional power but also fueled a more assertive posture in its foreign relations. The confidence generated by these military gains has translated into hardened political positions and intensified pressure on allies, particularly the United States.                  These examples illustrate that the Israeli state and lobby does not operate in isolation but often reflects, channels, and amplifies the geopolitical agenda of the Israeli state. This dynamic complicates the notion of national interest within the U.S. foreign policy, especially when lobbying efforts coincide with foreign governmental objectives. From Influence to Entrapment: The U.S.- Israeli Alliance in the Iran Conflict               Despite initial promises of restraint under the renewed “America First” vision, the current U.S. administration finds itself increasingly entangled in a regional conflict it once sought to avoid. Under President Trump´s second term, American foreign policy was publicly framed around non-intervention, prioritizing domestic renewal over costly military initiatives and strategic assertiveness, which have steadily eroded Washington’s space for independent decision making.               Israel´s sustained rhetorical pressure and military assertiveness have shaped U.S. involvement in the ongoing war with Iran. Drawing on a momentum strengthened by recent strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Israeli leadership has framed Tehran as an imminent existential threat, pressuring Washington to intensify its military posture. As Froman (2024) observes, “Israel´s actions have fundamentally reshaped the security landscape of the Middle East.”  This situation highlights a concerning shift in how the United States is managing its foreign policy in the Middle East. Rather than settling the pace or leading diplomatically, Washington is now largely responding to events already set in motion by Israel. This reflects the long-standing nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship. America leaders now find themselves caught in a conflict they did not start but now must lead. With Iran already responding militarily and tensions rising across the region, the risk of a wider war is growing quickly. This mirrors past U.S experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where limited interventions turned into long, costly wars. As Israel continues to act from its position of strength, the U.S. faces danger of a new war.             With the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the sidelining of multilateral diplomacy, there is little room left for negotiation. Institutions such as the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been largely absent in terms of more action, also the intervention of the members of the security council of the United Nations, reflecting how hard power dynamics have overtaken diplomatic engagement. In this vacuum, the Israeli security narrative has become dominant. A War of Choice or a Path to Diplomacy The ongoing conflict has triggered a significant reconfiguration of the Middle East´s power structure. For now, Israel, strategically supported by the United States, has asserted its military and political dominance. Iran, weakened by the degradation of its proxy network and recent strikes on three nuclear facilities, finds itself momentarily contained. This alignment places the U.S.-Israel axis in a position of regional superiority.   However, this superiority could be temporary. If Iran succeeds in eventually acquiring a nuclear weapon, the balance may shift again, this time not through conventional power, but through nuclear deterrence. As seen during the cold war, deterrence is not about battlefield victory but about creating unacceptable costs for aggression.  A nuclear-armed Iran would no longer need to outmatch Israel or the U.S. militarily. This is precisely why diplomacy must be reviewed not as appeasement, but as a tool to prevent irreversible escalation. As Vaez (2025) states, “Washington and its partners should not give up on diplomacy with Iran not because it's not easy, but because it is the only sustainable way to prevent further escalation.” The current moments offer a fleeting opportunity: one where military success has bought time for diplomacy to reassert itself. Among the most urgent priorities               is re-engaging in serious negotiations surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), not simply to contain Iran´s nuclear ambitions, but to rebuild a broader framework of strategic dialogue. Failing to seize that opportunity could lock the region into a new war, one shaped not by diplomacy.             References:Beauchamp, Z. (2015, March 3). Why Netanyahu’s speech to Congress is one of the most controversial in history. Vox.  https://www.vox.com/2015/3/3/8142663/netanyahu-speech-congressMearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.OpenSecrets. (2021). Pro-Israel PACs contributions to candidates, 2019–2020. Center for Responsive Politics.             https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/industry-detail/Q05/2020Pappé, I. (2017). Ten Myths About Israel. Verso Books.Vaez, A. (2025, June 16). Don’t Give Up on Diplomacy With Iran. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/dont-give-diplomacy-iran

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском After 12 days of war, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran that would bring to an end the most dramatic, direct conflict between the two nations in decades. Israel and Iran both agreed to adhere to the ceasefire, though they said they would respond with force to any breach. If the ceasefire holds – a big if – the key question will be whether this signals the start of lasting peace, or merely a brief pause before renewed conflict. As contemporary war studies show, peace tends to endure under one of two conditions: either the total defeat of one side, or the establishment of mutual deterrence. This means both parties refrain from aggression because the expected costs of retaliation far outweigh any potential gains. What did each side gain? The war has marked a turning point for Israel in its decades-long confrontation with Iran. For the first time, Israel successfully brought a prolonged battle to Iranian soil, shifting the conflict from confrontations with Iranian-backed proxy militant groups to direct strikes on Iran itself. This was made possible largely due to Israel’s success over the past two years in weakening Iran’s regional proxy network, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Syria. Over the past two weeks, Israel has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s military and scientific elite, killing several high-ranking commanders and nuclear scientists. The civilian toll was also high. Additionally, Israel achieved a major strategic objective by pulling the United States directly into the conflict. In coordination with Israel, the US launched strikes on three of Iran’s primary nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. Despite these gains, Israel has not accomplished all of its stated goals. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had voiced support for regime change, urging Iranians to rise up against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s government, but the senior leadership in Iran remains intact. Additionally, Israel has not fully eliminated Iran’s missile program. (Iran continued striking to the last minute before the ceasefire.) And Tehran did not acquiesce to Trump’s pre-war demand to end uranium enrichment. Although Iran was caught off-guard by Israel’s attacks — particularly as it was engaged in nuclear negotiations with the US — it responded by launching hundreds of missiles towards Israel. While many were intercepted, a significant number penetrated Israeli air defences, causing widespread destruction in major cities, dozens of fatalities and hundreds of injuries. Iran has demonstrated its capacity to strike back, though Israel has succeeded in destroying many of its air defence systems, some ballistic missile assets (including missile launchers) and multiple energy facilities. Since the beginning of the assault, Iranian officials have repeatedly called for a halt to resume negotiations. Under such intense pressure, Iran has realised it would not benefit from a prolonged war of attrition with Israel — especially as both nations face mounting costs and the risk of depleting their military stockpiles if the war continues. As theories of victory suggest, success in war is defined not only by the damage inflicted, but by achieving core strategic goals and weakening the enemy’s will and capacity to resist. While Israel claims to have achieved the bulk of its objectives, the extent of the damage to Iran’s nuclear program is not fully known, nor is its capacity to continue enriching uranium. Both sides could remain locked in a volatile standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, with the conflict potentially reigniting whenever either side perceives a strategic opportunity. Sticking point over Iran’s nuclear program Iran faces even greater challenges when it emerges from the war. With a heavy toll on its leadership and nuclear infrastructure, Tehran will likely prioritise rebuilding its deterrence capability. That includes acquiring new advanced air defence systems — potentially from China — and restoring key components of its missile and nuclear programs. (Some experts say Iran has not used some of its most powerful missiles to maintain this deterrence.) Iranian officials have claimed they safeguarded more than 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium before the attacks. This stockpile could theoretically be converted into nine to ten nuclear warheads if further enriched to 90%. Trump declared Iran’s nuclear capacity had been “totally obliterated”, whereas Rafael Grossi, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog chief, said damage to Iran’s facilities was “very significant”. However, analysts have argued Iran will still have a depth of technical knowledge accumulated over decades. Depending on the extent of the damage to its underground facilities, Iran could be capable of restoring and even accelerating its program in a relatively short time frame. And the chances of reviving negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program appear slimmer than ever. What might future deterrence look like? The war has fundamentally reshaped how both Iran and Israel perceive deterrence — and how they plan to secure it going forward. For Iran, the conflict has reinforced the belief that its survival is at stake. With regime change openly discussed during the war, Iran’s leaders appear more convinced than ever that true deterrence requires two key pillars: nuclear weapons capability, and deeper strategic alignment with China and Russia. As a result, Iran is expected to move rapidly to restore and advance its nuclear program, potentially moving towards actual weaponisation — a step it had long avoided, officially. At the same time, Tehran is likely to accelerate military and economic cooperation with Beijing and Moscow to hedge against isolation. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasised this close engagement with Russia during a visit to Moscow this week, particularly on nuclear matters. Israel, meanwhile, sees deterrence as requiring constant vigilance and a credible threat of overwhelming retaliation. In the absence of diplomatic breakthroughs, Israel may adopt a policy of immediate preemptive strikes on Iranian facilities or leadership figures if it detects any new escalation — particularly related to Iran’s nuclear program. In this context, the current ceasefire already appears fragile. Without comprehensive negotiations that address the core issues — namely, Iran’s nuclear capabilities — the pause in hostilities may prove temporary. Mutual deterrence may prevent a more protracted war for now, but the balance remains precarious and could collapse with little warning.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From 2017 to 2021, the administration of Donald Trump radically changed U.S. space policy by focusing on military dominance, integrating the commercial sector, and abandoning previous restrictions on the militarization of space. New doctrinal documents were adopted, the United States Space Force was created, and the United States Space Command was reestablished. The emphasis shifted toward the development of offensive capabilities, cybersecurity, and public-private partnerships. During his second presidential term (2025–2029), Donald Trump initiated large-scale defense projects — in particular, the “Golden Dome of America” — and expanded the involvement of private companies in their development. This policy increases international tensions, provokes an arms race in space, and draws criticism for undermining international agreements and fragmenting the legal framework. Architecture of the New Space Order: Doctrinal Principles of the 2017–2021 Administration The national security space policy of the United States is formed both through presidential directives and on the basis of legislative acts. Presidential directives remain in force until they are revised by the next president. Thus, today the U.S. operates under a set of directives issued by Presidents George W. Bush (2001–2009), Barack Obama (2009–2017), Donald Trump (2017–2021), and Joe Biden (2021–2025). During his first presidential term, Donald Trump signed an updated National Space Policy, seven Space Policy Directives (SPDs), five space-related executive orders, two strategies, two reports, and one National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM). His “space policy” was aimed at “reviving the proud legacy of American leadership in space,” including in the field of national security, accelerating the exploration of the Moon and Mars, and developing the commercial sector. It was based on a number of firm beliefs: America must remain the leading power in space in both scientific and commercial areas; space is a strategically important domain for protecting U.S. interests; space should become a driver of the country’s economic development; and achieving these goals would be supported by cooperation with private companies and international partners. “We are a nation of pioneers. We are the people who crossed an ocean, settled a vast continent, inhabited a boundless wilderness, and then looked to the stars. That is our history and that is our destiny,” declared Donald Trump. These beliefs were embodied in a number of doctrinal documents. The Presidential Memorandum “Space Policy Directive-1” (SPD-1) in December 2017 became one of the first steps in Donald Trump’s space policy. The document set a course for the exploration and use of lunar resources, as well as preparation for missions to Mars. In order to carry out such costly projects, the memorandum emphasized cooperation with commercial entities and international partners. In the area of national security, Donald Trump formulated the principle that the United States must maintain “peace through strength” in outer space. In the 2018 “Nuclear Posture Review” approved by him, the goal was set to modernize space-based intelligence and communication systems to strengthen nuclear deterrence. In the “National Defense Strategy” adopted in the same year, the focus was on investments in resilience and the restoration of production capabilities necessary to enhance the country’s space potential. In December 2018, the “National Security Strategy” was published, in which space was defined as a zone of confrontation, marking a more rigid approach compared to Barack Obama’s position, who merely acknowledged threats from adversaries. This document, along with the “National Space Strategy,” emphasized the strategic importance of space and the need to ensure peace in it through the demonstration of strength. In the new 2018 National Space Strategy, the administration focused on creating a more resilient space architecture, enhancing deterrence capabilities, and ensuring security in space. In 2018, under the pretext of a threat in space from China and Russia, the Trump administration initiated the creation of the United States Space Force, which in December 2019 became the sixth branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. Under Donald Trump, the United States Space Command (SPACECOM) was restored as an independent combatant command. SPACECOM, which existed as a separate military branch from 1985 to 2002, was dissolved during the reorganization following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The president restored it by using his executive powers. Today, the command is responsible for integrating the space capabilities of all military services (management of satellite communication, intelligence, navigation, and missile warning systems), developing doctrines and tactics for warfare in space, and ensuring U.S. superiority in this strategic domain. In the updated 2018 Missile Defense Strategy, special attention was given to the creation of a multi-layered system of space sensors and satellites for tracking hypersonic and ballistic threats — in particular, the satellite system “Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Layer,” which provides continuous monitoring of potential threats and data transmission. Additionally, the Trump administration initiated a transition from large satellite systems to a more resilient and distributed architecture — the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR). Another presidential initiative was to accelerate the development of a “persistent monitoring layer” within the “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,” which includes hundreds of satellites capable of tracking enemy missiles at all stages of flight. The administration actively promoted a public-private partnership model. SPD-2, issued in 2018, aimed to simplify the regulation of commercial space activities, including the licensing of launches and satellite operations. NASA’s budget was also oriented toward supporting private companies through contracts and partnership proposals. In September 2020, the administration of Donald Trump approved Space Policy Directive SPD-5, which became the first national document establishing cybersecurity standards for space systems. It outlined principles for protecting space assets and infrastructure from cyber threats, including the design and operation of systems based on a risk-oriented approach and the introduction of engineering solutions that account for cybersecurity threats. The directive emphasized cooperation between government agencies and commercial companies, and called on space system operators to develop cyber protection plans, including measures to counter unauthorized access, secure command and telemetry systems, prevent jamming and spoofing, and manage risks in the supply chain. The Trump administration aimed to strengthen international alliances in the space sector. One of its projects was the Artemis Accords, signed on October 13, 2020, which set standards for the exploration of the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies, including the registration of objects, sharing of scientific data, and ensuring the safety of space missions. A total of 53 countries joined the agreement. According to independent researcher Irina Isakova, the ultimate goal of the Artemis Accords was to attract technologies and form a new space community willing to operate under American rules. A notable departure from the policies of previous U.S. administrations was the rejection of multilateral initiatives to limit the militarization of space. The view of outer space as a new domain of warfare contradicted the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Nevertheless, the United States refused to participate in discussions on new international agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space — in particular, proposals from Russia and China to ban the placement of weapons in space and to prevent their first use. Instead, the Trump administration focused on the development of offensive orbital systems, including satellites capable of disabling enemy spacecraft. This approach increased tensions on the international stage and drew criticism from other countries. “Peace Through Strength”: An Analysis of Space Initiatives (2017–2021) During his first presidential term, Donald Trump’s administration introduced new initiatives aimed at strengthening U.S. leadership in space, supporting the private sector, and ensuring national security. However, the implementation of these ambitious goals left a mixed legacy for the next administration. The use of the term “space superiority” provoked a negative response from the international community. The White House’s drive toward the militarization of space weakened the U.S. position on the diplomatic stage — the American view of space as a “warfighting domain” raised concerns that U.S. policy was provoking a space arms race. Declarations of a desire to strengthen international cooperation often contradicted the administration’s actual actions, leading to disagreements with allies and complicating the implementation of joint plans to protect satellites or develop norms of behavior in space. Doctrinal documents (such as the Defense Space Strategy) lacked a clear connection between goals and the means to achieve them. Unlike the more detailed strategies of previous administrations, Trump’s strategy offered only general recommendations. The initiative to create the Space Force turned out to be quite costly and led to excessive bureaucratization. Some initiatives faced budget constraints or delays due to technological unpreparedness, while cuts to Earth science programs caused concern among scientists. Overall, the stated goals of peaceful space exploration, aggressive rhetoric, and the actions of Trump’s administration undermined trust in the United States on the international stage. Evolution of Approaches in the Second Term (2025–2029) According to American analysts and former government officials, in its doctrinal approach to defense space policy, the Trump 2.0 administration will focus on offensive capabilities and the integration of commercial service providers into Pentagon projects. The main obstacle for the president’s space projects will be the issue of funding. One of Donald Trump’s key initiatives during his first presidency was the promotion of the idea to form a National Space Guard (NSG) as a reserve component to support the United States Space Force. At the time, the idea did not receive support. In March 2025, a bill to establish the NSG was introduced to Congress. One of its authors, Senator Mike Crapo, stated that “Guard members and reservists are often highly specialized and trained individuals entrusted to counter serious threats posed by global actors such as China and Russia.” On January 27, 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to create the “Iron Dome of America”, which includes land-, air-, sea-, and space-based components, including orbital interceptor missiles. Just one month later, the ambitious initiative was renamed Golden Dome for America. The system is intended to protect the entire country from all types of missile threats. The general provisions of the order closely resemble the Strategic Defense Initiative plan of President Ronald Reagan from the 1980s. Creation of a dense system for intercepting and striking enemy missiles during the launch phase and even before launch;Deployment in outer space of intercept systems equipped with lasers to destroy enemy nuclear weapons;Deployment of interceptors in various orbits;Construction/deployment of a global ground-based infrastructure;Protection of critical assets and infrastructure within the framework of the extended deterrence concept;Modernization of battlefield air defense systems to protect military formations on the ground;Establishment of a complete and self-contained production cycle for all components of the “shield” exclusively within the United States, ensuring the security of the defense industry and logistics for the production of upgraded and advanced interceptors and tracking systems. In addition to the obvious analogy with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the current program also reflects the evolution of military technologies — the use of hypersonic sensors (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Layer) and satellite networks like Next-Gen OPIR, which provide continuous monitoring. It is assumed that the system will be entirely produced in the United States. However, Kari Bingen, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security during the first Trump administration and now a fellow at CSIS, believes that the new administration will strive for close cooperation with Israel in the space domain. Although the technical and financial scale of the project raises skepticism among experts, the Golden Dome for America program may lead to greater involvement of private companies in the development and production of missile defense system components, stimulate the U.S. defense-industrial base, and ultimately contribute to a revision of the national defense strategy aimed at winning the arms race and achieving strategic invulnerability. At the same time, according to the December 2024 report “Government Space Programs: A Comprehensive Review of Government Space Strategies, Activities, and Budgets through 2033” by NovaSpace, 59% of global government funding for space programs comes from the U.S. budget, but Washington remains dissatisfied with the current funding level. The White House is betting on encouraging the involvement of private capital and foreign partners in space programs. A discussion held during the Small Satellite Symposium on February 5, 2025, in California highlighted strong competition for government contracts between legacy space program contractors (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, L3Harris, Raytheon Technologies, Boeing’s Millennium, General Dynamics) and several new consortium groups (Palantir Technologies and Anduril Industries, OpenAI and SpaceX). In the space sector, the United States holds not only strong technological and financial advantages but also significant competitive capacity. Trump’s 2.0 team includes many prominent figures with professional or commercial interests in space: Elon Musk, owner of SpaceX and Tesla; Jared Isaacman, NASA Administrator, CEO of Shift4 Payments and Draken International (which trained U.S. Air Force pilots); Steve Feinberg, candidate for Deputy Secretary of Defense and founder of Cerberus Capital Management; Tom Krause, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Director of Cloud Software Group; Jeff Bezos, advisor to space coordination councils and founder of Blue Origin, among others. The recent conflict between Donald Trump and Elon Musk, despite its public resonance, has not had a systemic impact on the administration’s strategy regarding the private sector. NASA officially stated its intent to continue implementing the president’s space priorities, using the full range of industrial partners. Any potential tactical slowdowns caused by corporate conflicts are offset by strong competition and diversification of contractors. NASA’s flagship program, the Artemis Accords, may undergo a shift in priorities. Its outspoken critic, Elon Musk, has consistently argued that the U.S. should abandon lunar exploration and focus on Mars. There remains a possibility that the Space Launch System (SLS) — the super-heavy launch vehicle for crewed missions beyond Earth orbit — may be canceled or significantly altered. Key roles could shift to private companies such as SpaceX or Blue Origin, with Elon Musk’s SpaceX Starship becoming the cornerstone of Martian ambitions. This is evidenced by budget cuts and job reductions: Boeing, the primary SLS contractor, has already announced potential layoffs. The future of the Artemis Accords will depend on decisions by the Trump administration, the influence of the private sector, and Congressional support. Invitation to a Space Arms Race The doctrinal approaches of the current U.S. president’s administration are transforming space into a full-fledged theater of military operations, where the United States seeks to establish dominance through a combination of military, commercial, and regulatory tools. During his first presidential term, Donald Trump laid the institutional groundwork for this strategy; in his second term, he is launching a qualitatively new phase of militarization. The 2018 National Space Strategy, with its emphasis on building a large-scale space architecture, marks a shift to the concept of “space as a warfighting domain.” The Golden Dome program effectively abandons the principle of “stability through vulnerability” and revives the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which in the 1980s undermined nuclear deterrence stability and triggered a new round of confrontation. The Artemis program contributes to the fragmentation of the legal framework and undermines the regime established by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Trump’s “space” agenda is expected to further militarize the civilian sector of the economy, draw U.S. allies around the world into military space projects, and intensify global competition over frequencies, orbits, and cybersecurity standards. Such policies by the Trump administration have dangerous consequences for international security, including the escalation of the space arms race, the risk of space-based conflicts, and the provocation of nuclear arsenal expansion — especially by China. The New Space Landscape and Future Challenges Donald Trump’s administration has radically revised the U.S. approach to outer space, turning it from a domain of international cooperation into a stage of strategic rivalry. The creation of the U.S. Space Force, the launch of the Golden Dome program, and the promotion of the Artemis Accords represent a clear trajectory toward military-technological dominance, supported by public-private partnerships. These steps have sparked not only a wave of technological advancement but also increased international tension — including criticism from Russia and China, which advocate for banning the militarization of orbital space, as well as major disagreements over the interpretation of space law. The Trump era will leave behind a dual legacy: on one hand, accelerated innovation and commercialization; on the other, risks of legal fragmentation and the escalation of an arms race. Under Donald Trump, space is becoming an integral part of U.S. defense strategy. The future of humanity in space will depend on whether the White House administration can balance its desire to deter space competitors with a willingness to preserve dialogue — otherwise, near-Earth space risks turning into the “new front of a cold war.” Sources: V.P. Kozin. U.S. Space Forces: Their Key Missions and Future Potentials. Moscow: Sabashnikov Publishing House, 2022. 444 pages. ISBN: 978-5-82420-184-0.