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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The next president of the US will face various challenges that divide the nation, including a nuclear defense policy. The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy. Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal. The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those threats, along with China’s growing military might, US Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China. Thanks to those events and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people. And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China. The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation  The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5th, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.) At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21st, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities. Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow. Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable. The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it. In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.) Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5th, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them. The Three-Way Arms Race  Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable. Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states. Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike. Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China. As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program. The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China. “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal. Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation. The Need for Citizen Advocacy  For many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale. And one thing should be made clear: adding more weapons to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.” A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Since 1825, Bolivia has averaged a new government every 26 and a half months. A study by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, Political Science professors at the University of Kentucky, indicates that from 1950 to 2010, there were 23 coup d'état cases in the country. These include 11 successful actions, defined as those that allowed the insurgents to control power for at least a week. The decade in which Bolivia recorded the most coups was the 1970s, with some years experiencing two consecutive cases. Another study by The Washington Post reports that during the country's independent history, there have been over 190 attempts at coups and revolutionary processes. Bolivian historian Manuel Contreras attributes this situation to elements of internal politics, such as the absence of strong institutions and "an unprofessional military prone to this type of adventures". [1] Bolivia is currently facing multiple crises. The most prominent is in the political sphere, stemming from the division between President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales, who lead different factions of the Movement for Socialism–Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP) and are vying for the party’s nomination for the 2025 presidential elections. This fragmentation is also reflected in a conflict with the judiciary, due to rulings made by judges regarding Morales' potential presidential candidacy, among other decisions. Additionally, the country is experiencing significant economic deterioration due to a decrease in foreign currency reserves and fuel shortages, which are heightening social discontent. In this context, it was reported that there was an attempted coup on June 26. The rift between the MAS leaders weakens the institutional framework needed to respond to these various crises. This article briefly reviews all these elements. Background: resignation of former President Evo Morales Evo Morales governed for three terms, from 2006 to 2019. In 2016, a referendum was held to consult citizens about modifying Article 168 of the country's Constitution, which stipulates that the presidency is for five years, with the possibility of re-election only once consecutively. At that time, the "no" vote won, and the constitutional reform project was narrowly rejected. [2] In 2017, Evo Morales filed a challenge of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. The Court determined that Morales could run for a fourth consecutive presidential term in the 2019 elections, arguing that unlimited re-election is a right protected by the American Convention on Human Rights, which, it was claimed, takes precedence over the Bolivian Constitution. [3] On October 20, 2019, Bolivia held general elections. [4] Initially, the results pointed to a runoff between President Evo Morales and former President Carlos Mesa. During the vote count, the Preliminary Results Transmission System (TREP) was abruptly halted and resumed almost 24 hours later with a shift in the trend. [5] Subsequently, Morales was declared the winner in the first round by a narrow margin. [6] Almost simultaneously with the announcement of the new results by the president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Bolivia (TSE), María Eugenia Choque, dozens of police officers positioned themselves near the headquarters where the electoral authorities were receiving the tallies. Accusations of fraud and massive protests were followed, [7] demanding either a runoff or the annulment of the elections. [8] As mentioned, before Evo Morales' presidency, the military in Bolivia attempted several times to overthrow the government in power. During the MAS leader’s mandate, institutional relations were strengthened. Several measures were taken to transform the military mentality and bring it closer to the Bolivian people. In 2009, the Armed Forces adopted the wiphala, the indigenous flag. In 2016, a mandatory “anti-imperialist" school was established for military personnel aspiring to be promoted. Morales referred to himself as the "first private soldier president," increased the military budget from $114 million in 2001 to $483 million in 2018, and was the only democratic president to purchase large quantities of weapons and equipment. At the same time, Morales provoked resentment among the military by removing "neoliberal" commanders and prosecuting the chiefs who handed over missiles to the United States in 2005. Additionally, he imprisoned the officers responsible for the 2003 repression in El Alto, which resulted in the death of 67 protesters. These measures failed to change the "conservative spirit of the armed forces." [9] Over time, a rift was developed between the military and Morales. In late 2019, under the leadership of Williams Kalimán, members of the Army appeared on television asking for Morales' resignation, which led to his ousting. The former president initially rejected accusations of fraud from opposition groups and organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and denounced an attempted coup orchestrated by his political adversaries and sectors of the armed forces. [10] However, he agreed to call for new elections, but this was not enough to ease the tensions. [11] On November 10, 2019, Evo Morales resigned from his position. [12] He then left Bolivia, first for Mexico and later for Argentina, where he was granted political asylum. [13] As a result, the presidential line of succession was disrupted, with several key government figures resigning. In this context, Jeanine Áñez, who was the second vice president of the Senate, assumed the interim presidency on November 12, 2019. Her proclamation took place in a parliamentary session without a quorum, which sparked controversy and accusations of illegitimacy from Morales' party, MAS, and other sectors. In his view, Morales stated from Mexico that "the most insidious and nefarious coup in the history" of his country had been carried out. [14] Struggle among the leaders of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) In the 2020 elections, Luis Arce, former Minister of Finance under Morales, was elected, running as the MAS candidate. [15] Former President Evo Morales returned to Bolivia a year after leaving the country, a day after Arce assumed the leadership of the Andean state. Analysts say that the dispute between the two politicians began on the day of Arce's inauguration in November 2020. In his inaugural speech, Arce did not mention Morales. Political scientist Susana Bejarano says that the president "made a textbook mistake by not giving Morales a place [...]. Without having a role, Morales exerted pressure through his influence, and Arce responded" [16] In recent months, Morales has referred to Arce as "the worst president of the democratic era" and has also accused him of leading the country’s economy to deterioration. For Arce, Morales is his "main opponent," and his supporters accuse Morales of wanting to control the country. [17] In October 2023, Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca were expelled from MAS by the leadership aligned with Evo Morales due to their refusal to attend a congress held in Cochabamba. This clearly defined the two factions: the “Evista” faction, which supports Morales' leadership, and the "Arcista" (or renewal bloc) that did not recognize the expulsion of the president and Choquehuanca. [18] The Minister of Government, Eduardo del Castillo, a prominent figure in the Arcista sector, believes that Morales “conceives of MAS from the person rather than from social organizations.” On the other hand, Morales’ faction accuses the Arcistas of being close to the political right, trying to take over a social base that does not belong to them, and forgetting the revolutionary principles of the movement. [19] Recently, in May, the Arcistas organized a congress in the city of El Alto, where they elected Grover García as the new president of MAS in place of Morales, but the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) did not approve this conclave. Meanwhile, the Evistas attempted to hold their congress in Villa Tunari, in the Cochabamba region, Morales' political and union stronghold, but the TSE also did not recognize that meeting. This has temporarily left the MAS candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections in suspense. [20] Both groups have tried several times to hold national congresses to appoint a new leadership (and thus comply with the Electoral Law) and to select a presidential candidate. [21] However, the TSE has disqualified all the sessions and insists that both factions hold "a joint congress" to comply with the party's statutes. In September 2023, Morales announced his candidacy for the presidency, challenging Arce, who is expected to seek re-election. The former president has accused the government of trying to block his candidacy and has also threatened that there will be "upheaval" in Bolivia if he is disqualified. [22] The Bolivian Congress is bicameral; the Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 representatives, of which MAS holds 75 seats [23], and 24 of them are Arcistas. Meanwhile, the Senate is made up of 36 members [24], with 21 belonging to the MAS caucus, of which 7 are Arcistas. [25] The party also celebrated its 29th anniversary, albeit in a divided manner, with the Arcistas in La Paz and the Evistas in Santa Cruz. This struggle has extended to the Congress, where Arce lost the majority due to the MAS split. Political scientist Fernando Mayorga says that the fracture caused legislators close to Morales to move forward with agreements with the opposition to pass various laws, such as the suspension of the mandates of the Judicial branch magistrates, or to block others, such as the approval of external loans for public finances. [26] This situation has led the government to accuse Morales of provoking a "structural crisis scenario" to "shorten" Arce's mandate. The president has even stated that he is the target of a "soft coup" by Morales' followers. On the other hand, the former president accuses the government of incompetence and corruption [27] and has said that he has "ideological, programmatic, organizational, and even ethical differences" with Arce. He has also pointed out that there are no opportunities for reconciliation with the government because it has shifted to the right. [28] Confrontation with the Judiciary Part of the struggle between the former president and the current president involves the Judiciary, which Evo Morales considers aligned with Luis Arce. Bolivia is the only country in Latin America that elects its high judicial courts [29] by popular vote since 2009. That is how two elections have been held, in 2011 and 2017. [30] At the end of 2023, the term of the magistrates concluded; however, the lack of agreements within MAS (and with the opposition) to define the candidates has delayed the judicial election process. [31] The Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) also contributed to this delay by declaring some laws approved by Parliament to convene the judicial elections unconstitutional. For these reasons, the TCP decided to extend its mandate and that of the other judicial bodies to "avoid a power vacuum." In early June, during a joint session of the Senate and the Lower House, Evistas and opposition legislators approved a bill that suspends the magistrates of the high judicial courts, without the presence of Arcistas legislators. This meeting was convened by the president of the Senate, Andrónico Rodríguez, an ally of Morales. The TCP deemed this process illegal, as the senator did not have the backing to assume the role of president of the Assembly. [32] The Tribunal pointed out that the presidency of Congress is the responsibility of the country's vice president, David Choquehuanca, who, according to Rodríguez, was acting as interim president due to a trip by the country's president, Luis Arce. [33] The law also nullifies all the rulings that the magistrates approved in the last year. A source close to Vice President Choquehuanca stated that overturning these rulings would be "chaotic" and argued that it aims to provoke a political and social crisis. Meanwhile, other experts, such as the constitutionalist Israel Quino, believe that nullifying these legal acts is necessary for the country to "return to the rule of law." [34] At the end of 2023, the TCP issued a ruling nullifying indefinite re-election in the country, which disqualifies Morales from running in the 2025 elections. This decision overturns the 2017 ruling that allowed the former president to be re-elected that year. If the TCP is not renewed, this ruling cannot be reviewed. Supporters of the former president are demanding the resignation of the magistrates from the highest courts, alleging that the Judiciary "follows orders from the government." Meanwhile, Evo Morales accuses the government of sabotaging the judicial elections. After a series of road blockades by Morales' followers, President Arce issued a law in February aimed at holding the elections in September. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that it expects the Congress to issue the call for the elections. [35] The economic situation and social discontent in Bolivia Bolivia's economy grew at an annual rate of 4.7% from 2005 to 2019. The government channeled the profits from natural gas exports into social programs and salary increases, which helped reduce poverty from 60% in 2006 to 37.2% in 2019. [36] A new indigenous middle class also emerged. Gas production increased after Evo Morales' 2006 decree to nationalize hydrocarbons. Additionally, Bolivia has the world's largest lithium reserves, with 23 million metric tons (MT). Along with Chile and Argentina, these countries form the "Lithium Triangle," holding more than two-thirds of the world's reserves. However, Bolivia's production of this element is still very low (600 tons per year), presenting significant growth opportunities for the future. [37] Since the end of the raw materials boom in 2014, Bolivia relied on high public spending and domestic credit to sustain economic growth. Over time, these measures increased debt and reduced international reserves and accumulated fiscal savings. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened the situation. After it ended, the Bolivian economy recovered. However, the level of indebtedness, the decline in natural gas production, and modest international reserves have put pressure on the foreign exchange market, where a parallel exchange rate has emerged. [38] Natural gas production decreased from 56.6 million cubic meters per day (Mm³/d) in 2016, with oil revenue of $1.755 billion, to 31.9 Mm³/d in 2023, with an income of $2.048 billion, according to official information. Bolivia has seen low production in its oil and gas fields, requiring the import of gasoline and diesel, which are then sold at subsidized prices in the domestic market — a cost that is increasingly difficult to sustain. [39] “As a result of the decline in natural gas production, the amount of dollars coming into the country has decreased," says economist Jaime Dunn. According to the Central Bank reports, international reserves dropped from $15.122 billion in 2014 to $1.796 billion in April 2024 [40], attributed to the decline in revenue from gas sales to Brazil and Argentina and the lack of approval for new loans in the Congress. [41] The prices of basic goods have also increased. For months, long lines of people trying to obtain dollars have been observed, as well as the expansion of a parallel market for this currency. The shortage of dollars has impacted both importers and exporters. The most affected product has been fuel purchased from abroad. Bolivia imposed a subsidy on gasoline and diesel more than 15 years ago. Now, specialists warn the country doesn't have the dollars to buy them. This is a problem because Bolivia imports 56% of the gasoline and 86% of the diesel it consumes. Bolivian President Luis Arce has acknowledged that the situation is "pathetic." According to him, it is due to the "lack of a clear hydrocarbon policy in the country" in recent years. [42] To mitigate the situation, he ordered the militarization of the fuel supply system to prevent the smuggling of subsidized diesel to neighboring countries. [43] This combination of fuel and currency shortages has sparked protests from merchants and transporters in various cities across the country. Several sectors have taken to the streets to demand a solution to the rising costs of essential goods. [44] In 2023, there were almost 200 days of blockades. To address the situation, in February, Economy Minister Marcelo Montenegro announced a series of economic reforms, such as easing export restrictions and creating a diesel auction for large producers. However, these measures still seem insufficient. The tension generated by the situation has also affected Arce's popularity, which has dropped to 18% [46] according to polls. [45] Some social protest calls are attributed to supporters of Evo Morales, although these groups deny it. [47] To exacerbate these problems, the country has experienced droughts and high temperatures, which have damaged agricultural production and caused wildfires in the Bolivian Amazon. Lake Titicaca, among other bodies of water, has dropped to historically low levels. Residents of the El Alto neighborhood, in the heights of La Paz, only receive water sporadically during the day. [48] Reactions after the attempted coup In this context of political strife and economic deterioration, it was reported on June 26th that there was an attempted coup led by General Juan José Zúñiga, who has been dismissed and is now in prison. [49] The Minister of Government, Eduardo Del Castillo, stated that the insurrection had been planned for three weeks. The official indicated that the action resulted in 12 gunshot injuries and led to the arrest of about 20 military personnel and civilians. A new high command has also been appointed. Del Castillo emphasized that although the government had received information about previous attempts at destabilization and "soft coups," none had reached the scale of the reported events. [50] Analysts believe that Zúñiga appears to be an unhappy general with little support. [51] According to various journalistic reports, he was perceived as the "general of the people." [52] He was appointed as the General Commander of the Army in November 2022 and reaffirmed in January of this year by the president. Before that, he held the position of Chief of the General Staff. According to the Bolivian newspaper ‘El Deber’, Zúñiga was the closest military officer to Arce and was at odds with former President Evo Morales. [53] According to Army records, in 2020, Zúñiga ranked 48th out of 65 officers in the 1990 class. ‘El Deber’ notes that Zúñiga has close ties with mining and union sectors. However, throughout his career, he has faced accusations of misappropriation of public funds, for which he was sanctioned. In 2022, Zúñiga was mentioned by Evo Morales as the leader of an Army group that engaged in "permanent persecution" against political leaders like him. This elite faction, known as the ‘Pachajchos’, carried out military intelligence operations, [54] they had influence in the assignment of officers' posts, and played an important role in combating smuggling. [55] Following the brief insurrection, it is expected that the fracture between former President Evo Morales and President Luis Arce will deepen. On one hand, the government's version claims to have successfully quelled an attempted military coup in less than four hours. Retired Army Colonel Jorge Santistevan described Zúñiga as an amateur, leading an uprising without military consent, with improvised tactics and an empty speech. "This was an adventure, not a coup," stated analyst Omar Durán. [56] On the other hand, Evo Morales and opposition sectors describe the events as "a self-coup," "a political show," "an adventure," or "a parody" by Luis Arce Catacora, allegedly orchestrated with General Zúñiga and his supporters to victimize the president and boost his popularity. [57] This version aligns with what Zúñiga declared when he was arrested. In several posts on the social network "X", Morales has commented on the situation. He criticized the president's actions, called for a thorough investigation of the events, and even apologized to the international community for seeking their support in the face of the apparent coup (a narrative later adopted by Argentina). [58] Additionally, Evista Senator Luis Adolfo Flores argued that there was no police action to prevent the seizure of the plaza, for example, and he highlighted the "inaction" of the Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo. Another member of the Upper House, William Torrez, agreed that it was not a genuine coup. [59] Senate President Rodríguez posted on social media that "between the self-extended magistrates, a supposed coup or self-coup, the Bolivian people are sinking into uncertainty. This institutional disorder is leading the country to a situation of chaos and distrust." [60]. Luis Arce says that foreign interests are involved in the attempted coup, aiming to benefit from Bolivia's natural resources. He also claims that former President Evo Morales is willing to go to any lengths, even questioning the government's actions, in order to be a candidate for the 2025 elections. [61] On the other hand, the failed coup in Bolivia could worsen the current dollar shortage in the Andean country, said the global investment bank BancTrust & Co., based in London. "Although the coup apparently failed, the crisis will leave its mark. Political instability and the government's weakness will likely make it difficult for authorities and the private sector to access alternative sources of hard currency financing in the future, exacerbating the current crisis," BancTrust & Co. said in a commentary on the situation in Bolivia. [62] On the other hand, the rift between Arce and his mentor, Evo Morales, weakens Bolivian democracy, blocks any strategy against the economic crisis, keeps Congress paralyzed, and opens the door to ventures like that of General Zúñiga. Researcher Armando Ortuño warns that "the military coup was a symptom of political disorder. There is a weak government facing multiple crises." [63] Ortuño points out that in the short term, to address the political crisis, there must be some sort of agreement between Arce and Morales. [64] Jean Pierre Lavaud, a French sociologist, believes that the current major problem stems from "the internal struggle within MAS." [65] Another possible effect of this rift is that the opposition could win the next elections. [66] Additionally, Evo Morales' vice president, Álvaro García Linera, fears that this power struggle between the two leaders could strengthen the military. It will be problematic if Morales' supporters use the military to weaken the president, while the Evistas use them to contain the former president. García Linera argues that the military structure always has its own agenda and could pose a risk to national stability. Legal notice The article was created and published by the Gilberto Bosques Center for International Studies of the Senate of the Republic of Mexico (webpage https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/). The analysis and research do not represent the position of the Senate or its members. References [1] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo [2] Jaime Cárdenas Gracia, “Informe sobre el referéndum boliviano de 2016”, Boletín mexicano de derecho comparado, 50(148), 81-112, abril de 2017. consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-86332017000100081 [3] Jorge Sánchez Morales, “Elecciones generales en Bolivia, 2019. Una reflexión de derecho comparado”, Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, 2020. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.te.gob.mx/editorial_service/media/pdf/250320241450414990.pdf [4] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: Carlos Mesa acusa a Evo Morales de ser el "protagonista de un golpe de Estado" y llama a continuar las protestas”, BBC News Mundo, 23 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50161520 [5] BBC News Mundo, Elecciones en Bolivia: suspenden el recuento provisional de votos cuando todo apuntaba a una segunda vuelta entre Evo Morales y Carlos Mesa, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50119933 [6] BBC News Mundo, “Elecciones en Bolivia: el conteo preliminar sitúa a Evo Morales como virtual ganador sin necesidad de segunda vuelta y en medio de denuncias de fraude”, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50134370 [7] Swiss Info, “Claves sobre el polémico proceso por fraude electoral de 2019 en Bolivia”, 28 de julio de 2021. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024, en: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/claves-sobre-el-pol%C3%A9mico-proceso-por-fraude-electoral-de-2019-en-bolivia/46822282 [8] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: por qué hay cuestionamientos y denuncias de fraude sobre los resultados preliminares que sitúan a Evo Morales como ganador en primera vuelta”, BBC News Mundo, 22 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50146649 [9] Fernando Molina, “De Evo Morales a Luis Arce: las conspiraciones de los militares bolivianos contra el Movimiento al Socialismo”, El País, 28 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-29/de-evo-morales-a-luis-arce-las-conspiraciones-de-losmilitares-bolivianos-contra-el-movimiento-al-socialismo.html [10] Norberto Paredes, “Evo Morales: ¿hubo un golpe de Estado en Bolivia? BBC Mundo consultó a 6 expertos”, BBC, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50375002 [11] Fernando Molina, “Bolivia: ¿golpe o (contra)revolución?”, Nueva Sociedad, noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en:https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-golpe-ocontrarevolucion/?fbclid=IwAR0dIgxoErXdbi2oKUw8JGkYxTFfRlKZaJFGm9DlTN7b0zJ3VwNGXPWYli0 [12] Abraham Zamorano y Boris Miranda, “Evo Morales renuncia a la presidencia de Bolivia: 5 claves que explican por qué tuvo que dimitir el mandatario indígena”, BBC. News Mundo, 10 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50369434#:~:text=Evo%20Morales%20pas%C3%B3%20en%20menos,el%20que%20anunci%C3%B3%20su%20dimisi%C3%B3n. [13] BBC News Mundo, “Asilo a Evo Morales en México: las consecuencias para AMLO del paso del expresidente boliviano”, 14 de diciembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50790682 [14] Deutsche Welle, “Jeanine Áñez asume presidencia interina de Bolivia”, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/jeanine-%C3%A1%C3%B1ez-asume-presidencia-interina-de-bolivia/a-51219169 [15] BBC News Mundo, “Luis Arce, ganador de las elecciones en Bolivia, a la BBC: "Si Evo Morales quiere ayudarnos será muy bienvenido pero eso no quiere decir que él estará en el gobierno"”, 20 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticiasamerica-latina-54610692 [16] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales ensombrece el futuro de Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-07-01/la-fractura-entre-luis-arce-y-evo-morales-ensombrece-el-futuro-de-bolivia.html [17] EFE, “Momentos clave que llevaron a Bolivia a su actual crisis política y social”, El Universal, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/momentos-clave-que-llevaron-a-bolivia-a-su-actual-crisis-politica-y-social/ [18] Fernando Molina, “El partido de Evo Morales expulsa al presidente Luis Arce y agrava la guerra política en Bolivia”, El País, 5 de octubre de 2023. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-10-05/el-partido-de-evo-morales-expulsa-al-presidente-luis-arce-y-agravala-guerra-politica-en-bolivia.html [19] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [20] EFE, “Momentos clave…”, op. cit. [21] Fernando Molina, “Evo Morales anuncia que será candidato a la presidencia de Bolivia en medio de la guerra con Luis Arce”, El País, 24 de septiembre de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-09-24/evo-morales-anuncia-que-sera-candidato-a-lapresidencia-de-bolivia-en-medio-de-la-guerra-con-luis-arce.html [22] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves para entender la crisis política y económica detrás del intento de golpe de Estado denunciado por el presidente de Bolivia”, BBC, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c6p2r06lenjo [23] Cámara de Diputados de Bolivia, ”Composición de la Cámara de Diputados”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://diputados.gob.bo/diputados-home/ [24] Cámara de Senadores de Bolivia, ”Bancadas”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://web.senado.gob.bo/legislativa/bancadas [25] Marco Antonio Chuquimia, ”El 'evismo' es mayoría en el Senado: tiene la presidencia y la jefatura de bancada”, El Deber, 18 de octubre de 2023, consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/el-evismo-es-mayoria-en-el-senado-tiene-la-presidencia-y-la-jefatura-debancada_343939 [26] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce que la falta de diésel en Bolivia es “patética””, El País, 12 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/luis-arce-reconoce-que-la-falta-de-diesel-en-bolivia-es-patetica.html [27] Fernanda Paúl, op cit. [28] Sputnik, ”Evo Morales descarta reconciliación dentro del MAS”, Elpais.cr, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.elpais.cr/2024/03/12/evo-morales-descarta-reconciliacion-dentro-del-mas/ [29] Se eligen por voto popular los cargos del Consejo de la Magistratura, el Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y el Tribunal Agroambiental. Fernando Molina, “La elección popular de jueces en Bolivia se atasca en el Congreso”, El País, 30 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-08-31/la-eleccion-popular-de-jueces-en-bolivia-se-atasca-en-elcongreso.html [30] Idem. [31] Idem. [32] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-boliviano-suspende-a-losmagistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [33] Infobae, “El Congreso de Bolivia aprobó el cese del mandato de altos magistrados en una polémica sesión que comenzó a oscuras”, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/07/el-congreso-de-bolivia-aprobo-el-cesedel-mandato-de-altos-magistrados-en-una-polemica-sesion-que-comenzo-a-oscuras/ [34] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano…”, op. cit. suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-bolivianosuspende-a-los-magistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [35] Fernanda Hernández Orozco, “¿Cómo le ha ido a Bolivia con la elección directa de jueces?”, Expansión, 18 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://expansion.mx/mundo/2024/06/18/como-le-ha-ido-a-bolivia-con-la-eleccion-directa-de-jueces [36] Congressional Research Service, “Bolivia: An Overview, 16 de mayo de 2022”. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2022 en: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11325 [37] Ivan Castano, “Bolivia has the World's Largest Lithium Reserves. Is it Worth Investing In?”, 31 de julio de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/bolivia-has-the-worlds-largest-lithium-reserves-is-it-worth-investing-in [38] Banco Mundial, “El Banco Mundial en Bolivia”, 14 de abril de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bolivia/overview [39] Redacción Movant, “Bolivia: baja en la producción de gas y su impacto económico”, infobae, 12 de mayo de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/05/12/bolivia-baja-en-la-produccion-de-gas-y-su-impacto-economico/ [40] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op .cit. [41] France 24, “Bolivia cierra 2023 con las reservas internacionales más bajas en 17 años”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20240105-bolivia-cierra-2023-con-las-reservas-internacionales-m%C3%A1s-bajas-en-17- a%C3%B1os [42] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. o [43] Pablo Stefanoni, “Bolivia: claves de la asonada militar y sus coletazos”, Nueva Sociedad, junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-claves-de-la-asonada-militar-y-sus-coletazos/ [44] Deutsche Welle, “Militares controlan estaciones de combustible en Bolivia”, 13 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/militares-controlan-estaciones-de-combustible-en-bolivia/a-69348165 [45] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. [46] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce…”, op. cit. l [47] Fernando Molina, “Fracasa el intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia: detenido el general rebelde”, El País, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-26/el-presidente-de-bolivia-denuncia-movilizaciones-irregulares-del-ejercito.html [48] Ivan Ellis, “La caída de Bolivia en un profundo caos y sus implicaciones para la región”, Infobae, 25 de noviembre de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/11/25/la-caida-de-bolivia-en-un-profundo-caos-y-sus-implicaciones-para-laregion/ [49] Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, “Intento fallido de golpe de Estado en Bolivia”, Senado de México, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/analisisinvestigacion/contexto/fallido-golpe-bolivia/viewdocument [50] Infobae, “El Gobierno de Bolivia reveló que los militares planearon el golpe durante tres semanas”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/el-gobierno-de-bolivia-dijo-que-los-militares-planearon-el-golpe-durantetres-semanas-y-que-su-lider-ya-habia-sido-cesado/ [51] The Editors, “Daily Review: Bolivia’s Failed Coup Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg”, World Politics Review, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/daily-review-bolivia-coup-arce/ [52] Pablo Stefanoni, “Arcistas’ vs ‘evistas’: los riesgos de despertar monstruos en Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/arcistas-vs-evistas-los-riesgos-de-despertar-monstruos-en-bolivia.html [53] El Deber, “Toma del Palacio Quemado: Zúñiga, el militar más cercano al Presidente, sacó a la tropa militar, fue aprehendido y dijo que actuó por orden de Arce”, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/toma-del-palacio-quemado-zuniga-el-militarmas-cercano-al-presidente-saco-a-la-tropa-militar-fue-apr_374314 [54] BBC News Mundo, “Quién es Juan José Zúñiga, el general que lideró lo que el presidente de Bolivia calificó de "intento de golpe de Estado" y luego fue arrestado”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c035jg3j13ro [55] El Deber, “Los ‘Pachajchos’ son vistos como un grupo de poder en las Fuerzas Armadas”, 6 de noviembre de 2022. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/los-pachajchos-son-vistos-como-un-grupo-de-poder-en-las-fuerzas-armadas_302903 [56] Tuffí Aré Vásquez, “Golpe fallido, autogolpe, montaje o qué: los datos y las dudas en Bolivia al día siguiente del levantamiento militar”, Infobae, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/golpe-fallido-autogolpemontaje-o-que-los-datos-y-las-dudas-en-bolivia-al-dia-siguiente-del-levantamiento-militar/ [57] Idem. [58] Cuenta en “X” de Evo Morales, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://x.com/evoespueblo/status/1807496134119571492?s=48&t=RUbtGPN92qpBD2NHDoDKUg [59] El Día, “Federaciones del Trópico tildan de "show", "novela" y "autogolpe" lo ocurrido en plaza Murillo”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eldia.com.bo/2024-06-27/pais/federaciones-del-tropico-tildan-de-show-novela-y-autogolpe-lo-ocurrido-en-plazamurillo.html [60] Pablo Stefanoni, op. cit. [61] Federico Rivas Molina, “Luis Arce: “Evo Morales pone en duda el golpe militar fallido por sus aspiraciones políticas personales””, El País, 29 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/luis-arce-evo-morales-pone-en-duda-el-golpe-militar-fallidopor-sus-aspiraciones-politicas-personales.html [62] Daniel Salazar Castellanos, “Intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia podría agravar escasez de dólares, según banco de inversión”, Bloomberg en Línea, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bloomberglinea.com/2024/06/27/intento-de-fallido-golpe-de-estadoen-bolivia-podria-agravar-escasez-de-dolares-segun-banco-de-inversion/ [63] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [64] Idem. [65] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo 66Pablo Biderbost y Guillermo Boscán, “La historia turbulenta de Bolivia: más de 190 intentos de golpes y revoluciones”, The Conversation, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/la-historia-turbulenta-de-bolivia-mas-de-190-intentos-de-golpes-yrevoluciones-233495

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” Venezuelan election authorities proclaimed incumbent Nicolás Maduro victor in the 28 July presidential poll despite evidence brandished by the opposition showing its candidate won by a landslide. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Phil Gunson explains what the ensuing outcry means for Venezuela’s protracted crisis. What happened? Under enormous international attention, Venezuela held presidential elections on 28 July. The polls pitted unpopular incumbent Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013 after being anointed by late President Hugo Chávez as his successor, against a relatively unheralded opposition candidate, Edmundo González. González had established a commanding lead in pre-election opinion polls, in large part thanks to the endorsement of banned opposition leader María Corina Machado. Six hours after most polling stations closed, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Maduro victorious, but neither then nor in the days since has it provided any breakdown of the results by polling station or evidence to substantiate its announcement. Convinced that the election had been stolen, opposition supporters, many from working class communities, took to the streets the following day. They have been met with a violent response from state security services, which have made clear they will stand with the Maduro administration and unfurled a wave of targeted arrests. With Maduro digging in, the past few days’ turbulence could leave in its wake a weakened government, a galvanised but frustrated opposition, and a broad front of foreign governments all struggling to determine their next moves. How did we get here? Much of the controversy that swirled around the 2024 presidential campaign and election is a legacy of the domestic and international rancour that followed the previous, disputed presidential vote six years ago. In 2018, the prohibition of certain opposition candidates and parties – who mostly boycotted the poll – as well as a heavily tilted electoral playing field helped President Maduro secure a second term. But his victory was dismissed as illegitimate by the U.S., the European Union and many of Venezuela’s neighbours. The next year, over fifty countries opted instead to recognise Juan Guaidó, chair of the opposition-led parliament, as interim president. Washington imposed sweeping economic sanctions as successive opposition efforts sought to topple Maduro, only for the government to hold its ground through a wave of political repression, with the help of almost seamless backing from the military and support from Russia, Iran, Cuba and other states. At the same time, the Norwegian government facilitated sporadic rounds of talks between the government and opposition. Despite prolonged deadlock, these talks ultimately led to a breakthrough: the Barbados Agreement of October 2023 saw the Maduro government promise improved conditions for the 2024 election, while receiving in return (via parallel talks with President Joe Biden’s administration) conditional sanctions relief. The government’s concessions nevertheless came with strings attached. Although the authorities allowed the main opposition coalition, the Unitary Platform, to hold a primary election, they reaffirmed a ban on the runaway winner, Machado, holding elected office and blocked the candidacy of her chosen substitute, Corina Yoris. González, a 74-year-old retired diplomat, was the opposition’s third choice, but despite being an unknown with no previous political experience, he soon garnered massive support, touring the country with the hugely popular Machado. Ten candidates, backed by 38 political parties, eventually appeared on the official electronic ballot, many of them thinly veiled plants by the government, which intended them as a ploy to divide and confuse opposition voters and create the appearance of a diverse and competitive election. But the campaign rapidly took a shape that was not to the government’s liking – a two-horse race, in which reputable polling companies all gave González a massive lead, of up to 30 points and more, over Maduro. Most striking was the rapturous reception given to opposition campaign rallies in urban slums and agricultural states in the interior, which had until recently been the strongholds of chavismo – the political movement created by late president Chávez. “María Corina was here last week and filled the main street”, said an opposition supporter in the Andean state of Mérida. “Maduro came the next day and only filled half of it, despite all the buses from out of town”. The government did its best to impede the opposition’s rallies, banning Machado from traveling by air, cancelling public transport in the vicinity, digging up highways and setting up roadblocks ahead of them. It closed down radio stations, blocked websites and kept the opposition message largely out of the mass media. Millions of voters were disenfranchised. For the Venezuelan diaspora – estimated to number eight million migrants and refugees who have left the country over a decade of economic contraction and political tumult – arbitrary rules prevented them from registering to vote; at home, enrolment was marred by lack of information, as well as of time and opportunities to register. The National Electoral Council, dominated by a pro-government majority, failed even to adhere to its own election timetable, and overlooked or omitted a number of key steps. As in previous campaigns, the government abused its power by using state resources to bolster the Maduro campaign, while extorting contributions from private businesses and closing down those that gave any assistance to their adversary. With all signs nevertheless pointing to an opposition victory, many observers, including Crisis Group, foresaw that the Maduro administration would resort to even more extreme tactics to avoid losing power. But in the event, at least in the run-up to the election, it proved more restrained than expected. The government refrained from banning González’s candidacy or using its control of the Supreme Court to have the party ticket on which it was registered declared invalid. Ongoing talks between Washington and Caracas, as well as pressure from neighbouring and relatively friendly left-leaning governments in Brazil and Colombia, may possibly have dissuaded Maduro from adopting such draconian measures. Hopes that a low turnout among opposition voters alongside chavismo’s tried and tested methods of electoral mobilisation would again lead to victory may also have persuaded authorities not to act earlier. But none of this meant that the administration was prepared, when push came to shove, to give up power. What happened on election day? Election day itself was largely peaceful and voting took place normally, with only a minority of polling stations reporting irregularities. Exit polls and quick counts organised by the opposition indicated that Maduro was headed for defeat. But there were soon signs that the government might not be prepared to concede. As polls closed, opposition witnesses and election workers in voting precincts across the country reported that electoral authorities (at times supported by chavista operatives and members of the security forces), were trying to deny them copies of the vote tallies, called “actas”. These actas are printed out by each voting machine once polls close and constitute the physical corroboration of the electronic result that is sent to CNE headquarters and amalgamated into a final nationwide vote count. All participating political parties are entitled to them by law. Concerned about the implications, at 11pm, Unitary Platform coordinator Omar Barboza publicly called on the government not to “take a wrong step”. The hours after the polls closed (technically at 6pm, although many remained open later, even without people in line to vote) were tense, with both sides claiming to have won but with no official results from the electoral authorities. Shortly after midnight, CNE president Elvis Amoroso – a close ally of President Maduro – announced that, with 80 per cent of returns tallied, Maduro had obtained 51.2 per cent of the vote and that his lead of around 700,000 votes indicated an “irreversible” tendency. Machado and González then appeared before the cameras, with Machado saying, “We won, and everyone knows it”. The commission pronounced Maduro the election winner in a Monday morning event in Caracas. What evidence is there to suggest that the results may have been falsified? Both opposition and international suspicions of foul play have been heightened by the failure of guardrail systems to function as intended. In principle, the integrity of the vote should be protected by the actas, the paper tallies that each of the 30,026 voting machines produces once the polling station has closed. This safeguard was introduced under late president Chávez, and makes the Venezuelan system, according to electoral experts, one of the best in the world. Yet the CNE has so far failed to publish or distribute electronically the breakdown of voting by polling station and voting machine, despite Amoroso’s promises to do so. It also did not complete the post-voting audit of over half the machines, which the rules required it to. Its website, until the time of writing, was offline. Presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, a former member of the CNE board, said on 30 July that an electoral observer representing his campaign could attest that the results bulletin CNE head Amoroso read out on election night was not the one generated by the electronic voting system. Caracas has offered little by way of explanation for the apparent irregularities. The government has accused the opposition of hacking the system, saying that a cyberattack initiated in North Macedonia accounts for the delay in transmitting the results from voting machines (the North Macedonian government has said it has no evidence such an attack took place). But, regardless, the CNE has been unable to explain why problems with the electronic system would affect the tally sheets, which are printed before transmission, or why it cannot provide the actas it says it received on the evening after polls closed. Machado and the Unitary Platform, meanwhile, say they have managed to obtain over 80 per cent of the physical tallies through a network of observers, covering around 90 per cent of voting precincts. A day after the election they posted the breakdown of the vote, together with images of each acta, on a website that permits members of the public to consult them. The government immediately moved to block access to the site, which has not stopped thousands of Venezuelans reaching it through the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). Against this backdrop, the Carter Center, the only professional international observer mission for the polls allowed to produce a public assessment, stated on 31 July that the election “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic”. The Center cited the lopsided playing field during the campaign and said that, given the lack of access to the full tally, it could not “verify or corroborate the results of the election” declared by the CNE. How much post-election unrest has there been and what is the risk of further violence? The government’s announcement sparked unrest on 29 July, the day after the election, which saw spontaneous demonstrations against the Maduro government. Protesters burned tires, blocked highways and toppled several statues of Hugo Chávez. The demonstrations, which mainly drew inhabitants of poorer communities that used to be pro-government strongholds, were met with force by security forces and chavista para-police groups known as colectivos. At least twenty deaths have so far been reported along with over 1,000 arrests, according to the government and human rights organisations. Machado and González expressed solidarity with the demonstrators and called for restraint by government forces, but have not convened marches themselves. The opposition is no doubt conscious that since the first major anti-Maduro protest wave in 2014, the government has brutally quashed such demonstrations on numerous occasions, leading to over 250 people killed and thousands of arrests as unarmed protesters have clashed with riot squads from the police and National Guard. The government’s ferocious response to protests in 2017 provoked international outrage and paved the way for the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to open an investigation into possible commission of crimes against humanity. There is little to suggest that things would be easier for demonstrators this time. The armed forces high command has made clear that it will stand by Maduro. Military leaders were present at his investiture by the CNE as president-elect on Monday morning, and on the following day gave a press conference in combat fatigues to reiterate their “unconditional” backing for his government. On Tuesday, Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino published a statement accusing international “fascist structures” of trying to discredit the exemplary demonstration of civic duty by Venezuelans and reaffirming the military’s “loyalty” to Maduro. In an apparent effort to avoid violence, Machado and González opted to organise brief rallies (what they called “popular assemblies”) on 30 July; another nationwide gathering has been called for Saturday. Sources close to the opposition affirm they have also made efforts to talk directly to the government, but these have so far been rebuffed. This has left them struggling with the question of how simultaneously to sustain pressure on the authorities to revisit the results without eliciting an even more severe response, while holding together an opposition coalition that has traditionally squabbled over tactics and strategy. Meanwhile, arrests of leading opposition figures – including Freddy Superlano, the national coordinator of opposition party Voluntad Popular and a close ally of Machado – signal that Maduro is ready to crack down hard on the opposition. Jorge Rodríguez, Maduro’s right-hand man and head of the National Assembly, has called for Machado and González to be arrested and tried. Six members of Machado’s election team, who have spent months in the residence of the Argentine ambassador to avoid arrest, risked capture after the government ordered Argentine diplomats expelled. (Brazil then offered to represent Argentine interests in Venezuela as long as the embassy remained closed.) For now, Maduro seems to be abstaining from taking this step, although the government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services indicate that it is ready to tighten its authoritarian grip across the country, even at the cost of becoming a regional pariah. What should the outside world do? Countries in the region and further afield that have commented on the election have generally pressed for full transparency concerning the 28 July poll results, including publication of a complete breakdown of voting by polling station. The exception is countries with strong links to Maduro, including Russia, China, Cuba, Bolivia and Honduras, among others. Caracas has brooked no criticism. On the day after the election, after six Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay) bluntly declined to recognise Maduro’s victory without a detailed breakdown of the figures, Caracas ordered their diplomatic representatives expelled. (Panama had already ordered its diplomats out.) The government followed up by banning flights to and from Panama, the Dominican Republic and Peru, leaving Venezuelans feeling more isolated from the world once again. On Thursday, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement that “it is clear to the United States … that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes”. Top Venezuelan officials and government propagandists insist that the refusal of many countries to accept Maduro’s re-election is simply a rerun of the aftermath of the 2018 election, and that a right-wing conspiracy, led by the U.S., is using González’s supposed victory as a pretext for another bid to overthrow the Venezuelan government. Some key countries – in particular Brazil and Colombia (both neighbours of Venezuela), and with certain reservations, Mexico – have sought to cling precariously to what little hope remains for compromise, refraining from declaring outright that the result is a fraud while insisting on the need for transparency. But with the Maduro government seemingly bent on intensifying polarisation and dismissing all challenges to its version of events, the chances of reaching any kind of consensus on how to resolve the electoral dispute currently look remote. A session on 31 July of the Organization of American States failed to pass a resolution on the issue, with half the member states abstaining or declining to attend. (Venezuela, while formally a member, does not participate in the organisation.) Diplomatic efforts by Brazil as well as Colombia and the U.S. are reportedly ongoing, but face a key obstacle. If any moves to greater transparency in the vote count will put Maduro’s hold on power at risk (as increasingly seems to be the case), then he is highly unlikely to move in that direction. For now, he has put the matter of settling the dispute in the hands of the Supreme Court, which like the CNE is loyal to him and will simply endorse the result. Despite Maduro’s extreme prickliness, the risks that an unresolved election dispute will extend Venezuela’s political and economic crisis – at the expense of its people and the region – make it essential that Bogotá, Brasilia and Mexico City continue to press the Venezuelan government to prove the result in an independent and impartial forum, or be ready to agree an alternative route to some form of negotiated transition. What happens now? For now, Maduro’s plan appears to be to batten down the hatches and try to ride out the storm. In the past, he has been able to take advantage of outside pressure to rally his supporters and quell dissent within chavismo, claiming Caracas is resisting imperialist interventionism abetted by the forces of domestic “fascism”. This may well work again, at least over the short term. The ruling Socialist Party, or PSUV, and the armed forces have stood by him despite what appears to have been a brazen refusal to accept the verdict from the ballot box. Still, Maduro is likely to emerge from the process weakened, both at home and abroad. His candidacy was not universally popular among chavistas, and his failure to deliver a credible triumph at the polls or lay the basis for economic growth and social peace will have further eroded his standing. His reputation abroad, notably among more sympathetic governments in Latin America, is likely to suffer, and at some stage the country and senior officials might face additional U.S. and EU sanctions. It remains to be seen whether a president who has been unable so far to disprove opposition claims of election victory and who can apparently only promise deeper international isolation and a stagnant economy, will still command respect among the factions that make up the movement. As for the opposition, indignation as to the outcome is leavened by what they believe their candidate achieved, reportedly gaining four million votes more than Maduro – representing not only their first ever apparent victory over chavismo at this level, but the biggest margin of victory ever in a Venezuelan presidential election. They are, for now, much more united than they have been for several years. But that does not solve the bind they are in. Assuming Maduro clings to power, further dilemmas await them. Parliamentary and local elections are due to take place next year, but the government might be tempted to bring them forward. If it does, the opposition will face a quandary that has tormented it for much of chavismo’s 25 years in power: do they stick to the method of contesting elections, despite the government’s apparent disregard for the most basic rules of democracy, or do they boycott the polls, a tactic they have used in the past but which simply allowed the government to win by default? If they do spurn elections, it is unclear what other options the opposition might embrace beyond the campaigns of street protest and foreign sanctions that have thus far failed to dislodge the government, and in the case of sanctions, deepened the country’s humanitarian misery. Despite the opposition’s frustration at yet another election dispute following years of patient negotiations, it remains the case that a solution to Venezuela’s long-running political crisis – and a peaceful, gradual return to democratic governance – will require full-scale talks between the two sides. If the current crisis has any upside, it is the opportunity it could present to convince a majority on both sides that the moment for talks has now arrived. Opposition leaders, governments in the region, and multilateral bodies – above all the UN – should continue to press for a full accounting of the election results. But they should also use all the channels at their disposal to urge Maduro and senior officials to understand the electoral crisis as the latest episode of a debilitating dispute that, without a course correction, will simmer endlessly to the detriment of the Venezuelan people. They should insist that the government’s efforts over the last five years to restore its political legitimacy will come to naught without a comprehensive negotiation process aimed at defusing tensions, reestablishing representative politics and rekindling economic growth. As efforts by third countries to restart negotiations continue, the opposition and its allies should prepare themselves to discuss difficult issues if they do. These include inevitable demands from senior chavistas for robust guarantees to protect them from legal peril in the event that they leave high office. At the same time, they should avoid the temptation, always present when options seem limited or non-existent, to threaten coercive force or slap on more sanctions so as not to be seen to be “doing nothing”. The solution to Venezuela’s ills does not lie in piling more punishment on a population that is already suffering a humanitarian emergency, but instead using existing sanctions and the prospect of their lifting as an incentive for the government to compromise. Whether there will be an opening for meaningful talks any time soon is anyone’s guess. Right now, chavismo seems more girded for intransigence than negotiation and compromise. Hopes for a better outcome remain slender. Some voices in the opposition are advocating a face-saving deal for Maduro, in which he would step down in favor of a consensus candidate agreed to by both the government and opposition ahead of a fresh election. It is not a proposal that appears to have great prospects for success at this point in time. But at a deeply troubling moment for Venezuela, options for a way out of the hardening deadlock should be nurtured and sustained.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group”Tensions between China and the Philippines are increasing the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2024 – Spring Update, Crisis Group looks at how the EU can support regional diplomacy to mitigate maritime disputes. Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea and the dangers it would pose to global trade. Several countries are implicated in the set of complex sovereignty disputes in the sea, which stem from rival claims to various features and the maritime entitlements they generate, but recent incidents involving Beijing and Manila have triggered the greatest concern. The Philippines controls nine outposts in the Spratlys, a contested group of land and maritime features at the heart of the South China Sea. A submerged reef known as Second Thomas Shoal has become a dangerous flashpoint, with Chinese boats continually trying to block Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship housing a handful of soldiers that a former Philippine government purposely grounded in 1999 in a bid to assert sovereignty over the atoll. China, which also claims the shoal, first started interfering with these missions in 2014, but relations between the two countries in the maritime domain have never been as volatile as during the last seven months. Chinese boats have regularly rammed the Philippine supply vessels or doused them with water cannons, occasionally wounding the sailors on board. Manila has a Mutual Defence Treaty with Washington, making this burgeoning maritime dispute part of the geopolitical competition between the U.S and China. In effect, the South China Sea has become a zone where conflict risks are rife – and where Washington and Beijing could be drawn into direct confrontation. Considering these developments, the EU and its member states should: • Seek greater diplomatic engagement with both Beijing and Manila to keep tensions in check. They should also expand their diplomatic presence across South East Asia and, where relevant, establish reliable channels through which they could communicate with high-level authorities in China and other claimant states should disputes at sea escalate; • Work to promote respect for international law, particularly the law of the sea, as a source of neutral rules for dispute resolution and conflict prevention, for example by organising public events, roundtables and dialogues in Manila and elsewhere. While this measure may not bridge the divides between Manila and Beijing, it could at least help establish a level of mutual support and understanding among the other South China Sea claimant states; and • Strengthen coast guard cooperation with the Philippines, focusing on building capacity in areas such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. Troubled Waters The sovereignty disputes that underpin the tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea go back decades. But it was Beijing’s manoeuvres to take control of Mischief Reef (in the east of the Spratlys) from Manila in 1995 that altered the perceived balance of power between the two states and in the region, setting off the territorial dispute that has now taken a turn for the worse. China’s assertiveness in the sea has grown in the past few years, along with its military capabilities. The brewing territorial dispute made headlines in 2012 when Beijing in effect took control of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll 220km west of the Philippine mainland but within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), after a maritime altercation. The incident prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to file a case challenging China’s territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On 12 July 2016, the presiding arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of Manila, dismissing China’s claim to all the waters within its “nine-dash line”, which constitute almost the entire South China Sea. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. Beijing not only rejected the adjudication and the subsequent ruling, but it had also already undercut efforts to settle the dispute through legal channels by building and fortifying seven artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was winding its way through the system. This move fundamentally changed the status quo, enabling Beijing to post permanent garrisons in the area for the first time. By many accounts, China has thus ensured itself control of the sea in any situation below the threshold of armed conflict. A short lull in the maritime dispute appeared to follow. After coming to power in 2016, Aquino’s successor, Rodrigo Duterte, pursued a pragmatic policy toward Beijing. Duterte downplayed the tribunal’s decision and cast sovereignty issues aside, hoping to benefit from Beijing’s economic largesse in exchange. Yet his ambitious gambit did not pay off. Tensions at sea continued in the form of regular standoffs between the country’s coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fisherfolk struggled to reach their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the precious oil and gas reserves within its EEZ to which it is entitled under international law. In March 2021, Chinese ships massed around Whitsun Reef, an unoccupied feature in the sea, ringing alarm bells in Manila, where senior officials voiced public criticism of China’s behaviour for the first time in years. By the end of the Duterte administration, the Philippines had revived its ties with the U.S. and become more assertive still, filing several diplomatic protests with the Chinese government. Elected in 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Duterte’s successor, was initially disposed toward friendly relations with Beijing, but the relationship soured only a few months into his presidency. Although China remains the Philippines’ top trading partner, Marcos, Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping did not achieve the desired results: Beijing neither agreed to make major new investments nor curtailed its “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea, understood as coercive actions that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. These rebuffs have helped push Marcos, Jr. toward strengthening ties with Washington, and the Biden administration has, on several occasions, publicly committed that the countries’ Mutual Defence Treaty would be deemed triggered in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft or public vessels. In perhaps the most significant recent development, after a series of high-level visits by U.S. officials to Manila, the two countries agreed to scale up implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which gives U.S. troops rotational expanded access to Philippine military bases, and which China perceives as a provocation, especially given these bases’ proximity not just to the South China Sea but also to Taiwan. Manila has also received defence and diplomatic support from a host of other countries, particularly Japan and Australia. Despite the dispute it has with Vietnam over parts of the South China Sea, it has engaged, more quietly, with Hanoi, and acquired maritime defence equipment from India, thus expanding its circle of partners. Joint naval exercises with various countries have included large-scale ones with the U.S. in April, which involved the deployment of missiles that can reach targets almost 1,600km away – something that was sure to draw Beijing’s attention – and took place just after Manila wound up its first-ever trilateral presidential summit with Washington and Tokyo. In the meantime, the Marcos, Jr. administration has pursued what it calls a “transparency initiative”, publicising information about maritime incidents by inviting journalists to join its coast guard ships or posting video recordings of events almost as they are happening. Dramatic footage of Chinese vessels blocking, ramming or attacking its resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal with water cannons has generated widespread condemnation in the Philippines and abroad. Many consider these tactics to be bullying. For its part, and despite the 2016 ruling, Beijing asserts that Manila is intruding into its waters and maintains that it is demonstrating maximum restraint. China has also recently referred to a so-called gentleman’s agreement under former President Duterte that it says foresaw preserving a status quo in the South China Sea, with Manila ostensibly agreeing to supply only humanitarian goods and no construction materials to the BRP Sierra Madre; Manila denies that there was any such arrangement. Given the Philippines’ determination to continue resupplying its troops on the BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal will likely remain a flashpoint. Due to the constraints imposed at sea by the Chinese maritime militia and coast guard, Manila is starting to look into other means of provisioning its outpost, some of which are likely to irk Beijing even more, such as airdrops or closer U.S. naval escorts. In September 2023, a U.S. plane was in the shoal’s vicinity during a resupply mission, while a U.S. warship passed through waters nearby in December. But the shoal is not the only possible source of tension. Chinese vessels, both official and non-official, sail through many areas where Philippine fisherfolk traditionally work, while other features, such as Scarborough Shoal, are also points of friction. A large-scale encounter or accident at sea could be especially dangerous. Should a Filipino or Chinese national die during such a confrontation, it could stir nationalist sentiments in Manila and Beijing and heighten threat perceptions on both sides. In case of loss of life on the Philippine side, Manila would expect its U.S. ally to assist under the Mutual Defence Treaty, especially given the recent exchanges with Washington on that topic, although the U.S. has not said precisely how it would come to the Philippines’ aid. How such a dangerous situation would evolve depends in large part on Manila’s political decision to invoke the treaty and the choices Washington makes about how to fulfill its commitments. In principle, Beijing and Manila remain open to negotiations. But the bilateral consultative mechanism, a confidence-building measure designed in 2017 to manage maritime issues between the two countries, among other things, has generated no results of note. Meanwhile, efforts to create a Code of Conduct, which aims to reduce tensions at sea by setting up norms and rules between claimants and has been under discussion between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for over two decades, have stagnated. Why the Sea Matters The South China Sea is a vital waterway through which around one third of global shipping passes. Peace and stability in the sea are a prerequisite for safe trade and are demonstrably in the interest of the EU and its member states. At over 40 per cent, the share of the EU’s trade with the rest of the world transiting the sea is even higher than the global average. Instability in the area would deal a major blow to the European economy; even a slight disturbance of shipping routes could result in higher transport costs, shipping delays and acute product shortages. Should there be an escalation that pits China against the U.S. in a direct conflict, the consequences could be catastrophic and global. European positions toward South China Sea disputes have traditionally highlighted the importance of all parties respecting international law and the need for peaceful resolution, while being careful not to take sides. But over the last few years, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have driven a greater sense of urgency and something of a shift in European thinking. First, the EU and several of its member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies, designed to guide and promote cooperation with countries throughout the region. Secondly, Brussels has increased its diplomatic support for the Philippine position following maritime altercations, offering supportive statements in December 2023 and March 2024. Brussels and several European capitals now back Manila in regularly underlining the importance of UNCLOS and maritime law in the South China Sea context. Meanwhile, Europe’s presence in the region is growing, if slowly and in part symbolically. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific for the first time, while European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first trip to the Philippines by someone holding that office and an opportunity to express, at the highest level, the EU’s readiness to strengthen cooperation with the government in maritime security, among other areas. A German frigate entered the South China Sea in 2021, and French and Italian ships made port calls in Manila in 2023. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines agreed to resume negotiations over a free trade agreement, while a month later France announced talks regarding a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. While EU interest in the region is rising, European stances on the South China Sea are complex, with member states harbouring different views on maritime disputes in the region and, more broadly, on big-power competition. Some, such as France – which is the only EU member state to have overseas territories in the region (and which has significant EEZ interests there) – see themselves as having stakes higher than others and are keen to participate in the region’s discussions on security. Others, such as Greece and Hungary, are less concerned with maritime flare-ups so far away and tend to ascribe greater importance to maintaining good relations with Beijing. What the EU and Its Member States Can Do As the EU and its most powerful member states are drawn deeper into the South China Sea, they should raise their diplomatic game in the region – both to ensure awareness of mounting tensions and to look for ways to manage corresponding risks. As a practical matter, Brussels could leverage its status as an ASEAN Strategic Partner to seek more participation in that bloc’s security mechanisms and regional forums; the EU and member states could seek higher levels of engagement with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea on matters concerning the South China Sea; and Europe could post more diplomats to the region, including permanent defence attachés who speak the language of naval diplomacy. Of particular importance will be maintaining strong lines of communication with Beijing, where Europe is seen as still having some distance from the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which works to its diplomatic advantage. While to some extent this communication will be traditional bilateral statecraft, it may also mean looking for new opportunities and new channels for dialogue. For example, some member states could also seek to follow the precedent set by France and China in establishing a coordination and deconfliction mechanism between their militaries. Brussels should also continue raising the South China Sea in its engagement with Beijing as it did during the EU-China summit in 2023. Maintaining these channels will become both more difficult and more important if and when the EU and member states expand their operational presence in the region – for example, if they decide to establish a calibrated maritime presence in the South China Sea, as proposed by the EU envoy to the Indo-Pacific. Such a move is still deemed unlikely for now. As for public diplomacy, Brussels and EU member states should consider practical ways to promote principles of the law of the sea in the region, making the case that broader regional support for and adherence to these principles would provide neutral ground for peacefully avoiding and resolving disputes. While it is hard to see this approach appealing to Beijing, which has rebuffed the UNCLOS tribunal’s decision, there could still be benefits in forging closer cooperation among other claimant states. Convenings in Manila and other regional capitals could cover topics related to the continuing disputes but also to cross-cutting themes of regional interest such as fisheries. With negotiations over a regional Code of Conduct stuck, like-minded countries in the region could use these occasions to at least develop common positions on discrete issues that might be addressed by the Code or that could foster regional confidence-building in the South China Sea. Finally, in the realm of capacity building, European governments should continue to strengthen coast guard cooperation with South China Sea claimant states, helping them develop tools and protocols that might be used where appropriate to avoid confrontation and conflict. Since Aquino’s administration, Manila has tried to boost its coast guard capabilities. Given that many of the other claimant states’ vessels in the South China Sea are coast guard ships, and find themselves embroiled in maritime confrontations, a common approach on rules of engagement could help avoid misunderstandings at sea. Building on the EU’s integrated coast guard system, the EU could host or sponsor joint workshops to develop operating principles for the region’s law enforcement vessels and exchange best practices with Philippine authorities. Brussels could also fund agencies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen coast guard expertise on issues such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. European member states could also participate in joint activities with the Philippine and other ASEAN coast guards to strengthen fisheries control and maritime border protection and deter piracy or smuggling.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In March and April, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son’s nearly back-to-back visits to the U.S. and China highlighted Vietnam’s increasing penchant for delicate diplomacy with major powers amid the U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and Vietnam’s territorial tussles with China especially in the South China Sea (SCS), which Vietnam calls the East Sea. Much of the (perceived) disorder in the Indo-Pacific hails from the SCS, and one of Vietnam’s principal challenges is fostering order on its maritime borders. Therefore, Vietnam—historically distrustful of major powers—has been diversifying its relations by seeking security and defense ties with Indo-Pacific partners like the European Union (EU), India, and Japan, as well as with Russia, a country that poses an “existential threat” to the transatlantic allies. At the same time, Southeast Asia is battling disunity within the region for resolving disputes in the SCS, for instance. The regional multilateralism embodied by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems to lack teeth even as China ‘controls’ some of its members using its financial and economic heft. So clearly, efforts beyond Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” that deepen international solidarity are required. In a similar vein, Europe’s reluctant rapprochement with China in recent times amid the EU calling China a strategic challenge but continuing to look for economic engagement is reminiscent of Vietnam and much of Asia’s predicament vis-à-vis China. Moreover, like in Southeast Asia, not every member-country of the EU is embracing the Indo-Pacific construct, led by the U.S. Or even if a member does, like France or Germany, it does not spell the end of a productive relationship with China. Nonetheless, it is clear that the EU has started to take a greater interest in the growing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific, even as the disunity over the extent of the Indo-Pacific priorities, including China, is as apparent. In such a scenario, is it possible for the EU and Vietnam, and by extension ASEAN, to have greater convergence, if not congruence, in their policies? Revisiting Vietnam’s Lack of an Indo-Pacific Tilt The Indo-Pacific, the maritime space and littoral between the western Indian and Pacific Oceans, has become the world’s most geopolitically critical region. In this region, much of the focus and debate among the EU’s more proactive members, such as France, the Netherlands, and Germany, is in response to Chinese unilateralism, trade dependency, and unchecked Sino-U.S. contestation. Several of these EU members have come to understand each other’s positions on the Indo-Pacific. Gradually, there is a realization that it is not just about what the EU and its members seek to accomplish in the region but just as much the perspectives and priorities of key Indo-Pacific resident actors—and their views on European strategies and contributions. Vietnam is one such country that is worthy of greater European strategic attention. Vietnam is known for its “bamboo diplomacy”—a reference to the bamboo plant’s strong roots, sturdy stems, and flexible branches—balancing ties with the two big powers, the U.S. and China. In the words of Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, Vietnam’s foreign policy caters to “independence, self-reliance, peace, friendship and cooperation, and multilateralization and diversification of external relations and proactive international integration.” However, Hanoi has never officially and fully embraced the term “Indo-Pacific” nor the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific construct although it does recognize that some aspects of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific tenet advocated by the U.S. and its allies are compatible with its national interests. For instance, the order in the Asia-Pacific, a term that Hanoi prefers to use, should be rule-based. This speaks to one of Vietnam’s most important foreign policy priorities: finding peace and stability in the SCS disputes with China and other claimants. However, the order that Vietnam seeks is in more than just the security domain. The goal of development has been the highest priority since Doi Moi (renovation) in 1986. Economic growth is considered the backbone of national security and regime legitimacy. Hanoi’s development of foreign relations can be said to be grounded in its national development experience, with the stress on economic priority leading to national stability and international standing. Vietnam chooses to engage in the Indo-Pacific construct on its terms. Vietnam and EU Convergence On both economic and security fronts, Vietnam and the EU can find converged interests that align closer to each other. Even as Hanoi has not officially adopted the term “Indo-Pacific,” the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, if implemented well, could address both Vietnam’s economic and security needs. Despite its security and military power limitations in the Indo-Pacific, the EU can still play a crucial role in effectively addressing these needs, which are vital for the EU’s strategic interests as well. The two already have a Framework Participation Agreement. Vietnam is also part of the EU’s Enhancing Security In and With Asia (ESIWA) project, which covers crisis management and cyber security. This also aligns with the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, where Vietnam is considered a “solid” partner. Notably, both the EU and Vietnam face (potential) economic coercion from China. As China is now Vietnam’s largest trading partner, sudden trade restrictions hindering Vietnamese exports to China would dramatically hurt the Vietnamese economy. In this vein, Hanoi welcomed the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), hoping it would give opportunities to diversify its trading partners and thus mitigate the risks of economic coercion from China. On the other hand, the EU and its member-states are also trying to increase economic resilience by diversifying trading partners as they wrestle with economic overdependence on China. So, strategically, Brussels presents an excellent opportunity for Hanoi and vice versa. However, challenges remain. For example, all the EU member-states are still to ratify the Investment Protection Agreement signed along with the EVFTA. Even though this is usually a time-consuming procedure, the imperative to reap benefits as soon as possible has taken a setback amid a challenging geopolitical landscape. Nonetheless, the two sides are concerned about more than just traditional economic development; they are concerned about sustainable development and green transition. For instance, under the EU’s Global Gateway framework, the EU and Vietnam have signed the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), which looks to provide a multi-projects credit facility worth €500 million. This is supposed to be the EU’s primary focus in Vietnam now. Yet, Hanoi’s cautious approach for fear of falling into any potential debt trap could stymie smooth cooperation. Projects involving vast sums of money, such as the JETP, are also practically challenging to push at the moment as officials are afraid to be the targets of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaigns. Vietnam would also be keen for ASEAN and the EU as blocs to reinvigorate multilateralism and shore up security cooperation, particularly in the SCS disputes. ASEAN states, in general, are looking to the EU as a non-threatening balancing power to reduce the impact of the China-U.S. strategic competition. Among the potential areas of cooperation between the EU and Vietnam within the ASEAN are regional climate action measures, food security, digitalization, and tech innovation. The two sides must also use their partnership to realize an ASEAN-EU FTA. EU as a Security Balancer? The EU and Vietnam also share their commitment to upholding the rules-based order—an essential component of security cooperation because of the region’s strategic importance. However, improving communication and understanding of maritime incidents more effectively is challenging. The SCS territorial conflict is simmering, particularly between China and the Philippines. In 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) overwhelmingly ruled in favor of the Philippines, which China rejected. However, the ruling bolstered Vietnam’s claims, which were not openly welcomed by other ASEAN states besides the Philippines. In the absence of an agreement for a code of conduct (CoC) between China and ASEAN, which has been dragging on for years, China’s violations of international law in the SCS, including the latest against Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, have increased. Against this scenario, Vietnam and the Philippines have signed maritime security deals. At the same time, Vietnam would be reluctant to do anything more drastic, such as support the Philippines in its attempt to draft a “separate” CoC for fear of Chinese retaliation. While Vietnam is less discussed in major global media than the Philippines on the issue, Hanoi is actively using diplomatic means to internationalize the problem, bringing in more players to address complex territorial disputes to safeguard its sovereignty and promote regional peace. In this context, winning the support of the EU and its member-states would be strategically important for Vietnam. The Vietnamese side can facilitate this by providing foreign entities, including the EU, with more transparent and timely information when incidents occur. Naturally, using a media strategy like the Philippines might sensationalize the issue, which might be different from what Hanoi prefers as it walks a tightrope to balance its complex relations with China. However, Hanoi can at least offer foreign diplomats transparent and detailed information in a timely fashion to help them verify and assess the situation on the ground. This will speed up the EU’s and other potential like-minded states’ response to sea incidents and foster ways forward for more multilaterally agreeable forms of modus vivendi in the South China Sea. Ultimately, such a modus should serve China too. EU No Longer a Bystander The EU’s recent stance on the SCS issue has been its respect for a rule-based order and freedom of navigation, strong opposition to unilateral actions, and supporting the ASEAN-led “effective, substantive and legally binding” CoC while mentioning China but not singling it out. This is a change from the EU’s pre-Indo-Pacific embrace when it was a more divided, neutral house. The EU’s heavy dependence on maritime trade through the SCS mandates that the EU can no longer stand as a bystander. However, ASEAN claimant states, particularly Vietnam, would perhaps expect a sharper or clearer position, which the EU has indeed been moving toward. For example, in March 2024, the EU released a statement expressing concerns about the incidents involving “repeated dangerous maneuvers” by the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia in the SCS. This tilts to the U.S. line, even as the U.S. has been more vocal in directly criticizing China on the SCS, by calling China’s claims “completely unlawful” even before the current events. One could argue that despite the U.S. and its allies having been vocal, this has yet to lead to a concrete resolution of the conflict. However, if the EU cannot send clear signals on the issue, the division among like-minded countries will be seen as weak and exploitable in China’s eyes. Importantly, this is true not just for the SCS disputes but also for China’s coercive activities in general. Therefore, given the convergent non-confrontational, inclusivity-, and economic interests-oriented attitudes of both Vietnam and the EU toward the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific region, both sides are primed to embrace the other’s strategic outlook and up their game in the face of a challenging China and efforts to foster order.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Regarding Linda Thomas-Greenfield's visit to the Republic of Korea. At the end of last March (March 28th), due to Russia's veto and China's abstention in the UN Security Council, it did not extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee overseeing the implementation of punitive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This joint action by two of the global powers in the multilateral body has destabilized Washington, which angrily seeks an alternative that allows it to maintain its persecutory actions. Panel of Experts It is pertinent to detail that 18 years ago, under Resolution 1718 (2006), the Security Council established the Experts Group or Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee to oversee penalties imposed on the DPRK, which is comprised of eight specialists. In compliance with Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017), the Experts Group has, among other functions: 1. Assist the Sanctions Committee in executing its mandate, as outlined in paragraph 12 of Resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 25 of Resolution 1874 (2009); ● Gather, examine, and analyze information provided by Member States, relevant United Nations bodies, and other stakeholders regarding the implementation of measures, particularly focusing on instances of non-compliance; ● Formulate recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, or Member States could consider in order to enhance the implementation of measures; ● Submit a midterm report to the Committee and, following deliberations with it, present such report to the Security Council; ● Assist Member States in preparing and submitting national reports on the implementation of specific measures they have adopted to effectively implement the provisions of relevant resolutions; ● Support the Committee's efforts in further developing, improving, and drafting guidance notes for the implementation of resolutions. The members of the Panel of Experts are appointed by the General Secretary of the United Nations, upon the proposal of the referred Sanctions Committee. Members of the Panel of Experts have specialized expertise in areas such as nuclear issues, control of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, customs and export controls, non-proliferation policy, trade, finance and economics, air and maritime transportation, and missile and related technologies. The Security Council has urged all States to fully cooperate with the Panel of Experts, particularly by providing any information they possess regarding the implementation of measures. States are encouraged to respond to all requests promptly and comprehensively for information and to invite the Panel of Experts to conduct visits and investigate alleged violations of the sanction’s regime, including inspecting assets seized by national authorities. Its current mandate will expire on April 30, 2024, in compliance with paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2680 (2023). Russia’s veto Moscow defended its veto in the Security Council against the renewal of international sanctions monitoring on Pyongyang, stating that it reflects "its current interests." Russia, with its veto, and China, with its abstention, blocked the renewal of the Panel of Experts, and while the sanctions will remain in effect, these actions paralyze the scrutiny of the experts. Russia's so-called "current interests" sparked varied responses ranging from vehement criticism to concerns and speculation. Criticism focuses on Moscow's position undermining multilateral efforts to monitor measures implemented by Pyongyang that circumvent sanctions aimed at blocking its missile-nuclear development, which, according to critics, has implications for international security. Meanwhile, concerns are directed towards the alleged support that the DPRK receives from its regional allies, (Russia and China) for its missile-nuclear development, countries with marked ideological differences and high levels of conflict with the United States. Meanwhile, speculations refer to Moscow's motivations being linked to the support that Russia receives from Pyongyang in arms and ammunition needed for its military operation in Ukraine. Regardless of criticisms, concerns, and speculations, the reality is that we are witnessing the culmination of a gamble that Russia and China have been making in the Security Council for a long time, proposing various initiatives to ease rather than strengthen the sanctions regime and relax its implementation. Meanwhile, their respective governments have issued official statements blaming US hostility and its allies as the fundamental cause for the DPRK choosing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as the basis of its national defense and continuing to expand and perfect them. Russia's veto and China's abstention have led to the collapse of a structure that has long been in question for a long time, because it could not prevent violations of sanctions by an increasing number of UN Member States. Additionally, it represents a significant victory for the DPRK, which harbored deep animosity towards the Panel of Experts. Furthermore, it confirms the current state of Russo-North Korean and Sino-North Korean political-diplomatic relations in a context of various armed conflicts, both real and potential, that have been shaking the planet. Opposing positions in the General Assembly On April 12th, 2024, the UN General Assembly discussed Russia's veto. Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, argued that his country exercised the veto because UN sanctions against the DPRK have had no significant effect and have only caused a humanitarian crisis for the North Korean people. Meanwhile, China's alternate representative, Geng Shuang, stated that the Korean War has long ended, but the Cold War is still persisting. He reiterated his country's position that "there will be no resolution of the problems if the security concerns of all parties, including the DPRK, remain unaddressed," calling on all actors to work together to adopt a path to peace. He said that tensions are hindering these efforts, and that dialogue is needed, and the Security Council must play an active role. Using a typically Chinese allegory, he stated that "sanctions should not be carved in stone" and added that "harsh sanctions" against the DPRK have had a negative effect on the humanitarian situation in the country. Regarding Russia's new proposal, he expressed hope that Council members will work productively to extend the mandate of the panel of experts, a phrase that justifies China's abstention rather than a veto. The representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN, Hwang Joon Kook, condemned Russia's veto and criticized the military collaboration between Moscow and Pyongyang. He argued that it was vetoed because "Russia did not want the watchtower, the panel, to light its dark spot." He asserted that the Panel had included in its recent report that it had been investigating reports of the arms agreement between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, which constitute a clear violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile, Robert Wood, alternate representative of the United States, said: "...we need to uphold our obligations." He stated that, as the sponsor of the resolution to extend the work of the Panel of Experts, his delegation had sought a broad compromise and that China and Russia had had ample opportunities to discuss sanctions reform in the council. Instead, Russia gave to the Council members an ultimatum that sought one of two outcomes: to avoid sanctions against the DPRK or to silence the panel's investigations, including Moscow's acquisition of arms from Pyongyang for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russia's veto undermines the architecture of peace and security and deprives action on one of the Council's most pressing issues, that of peace on the Korean Peninsula. "Russia is already threatening to end the mandate of the UN Sanctions Committee that helps the Security Council monitor and take actions to deter threats to international peace and security (...) that is why it is crucial for all of us to raise our voices today in support of the non-proliferation regime, and opposition to the attempts to silence the information, we need to uphold our obligations." Meanwhile, the DPRK ambassador to the UN, Kim Song, said: "The DPRK greatly appreciates the veto by the Russian Federation..." and argued that the Council's sanctions on his country are a product of U.S. hostile policy. "If the DPRK's position of possessing nuclear weapons for self-defense is a threat to international peace and security, as claimed by the United States and its followers, we should first properly discuss why the United States is not considered a threat to international peace and security, even though it is the only country in the world to have used a nuclear weapon..." As can be seen, the contrasts in statements reflect the adversarial positions of the parties most directly involved in the issue. United States seeks for alternatives As expected, Washington immediately began plotting countermeasures in the face of the imminent dissolution of the Group that it had controlled for years. The United States representative to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, during her recent visit to the Republic of Korea, was tasked with addressing this issue, although no concrete proposals were heard. The agenda crafted for the U.S. Ambassador to the UN included several meetings, even with North Korean defectors, and culminated in a visit to the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, a moment she deemed opportune to express her concern that the DPRK could freely develop missiles without the oversight of the sanctions monitoring body. She stated that Washington is considering "out-of-the-box" options to monitor Pyongyang's compliance with sanctions. "All possibilities are on the table," and her government is "working closely with South Korea and Japan to seek creative and original ways to move forward" in this regard. At the same time, she urged Russia and China to reverse course, to stop rewarding the "misbehavior of the DPRK," and to protect it from sanctions, which allow it to carry out activities on its weapons programs. The diplomat called on Moscow and Beijing to reverse course and urge Pyongyang to choose diplomacy, come to the negotiating table, and engage in constructive dialogue. Considering all possibilities, she stated that it could be within the UN General Assembly, "entities outside of it." We see that Washington is exploring alternative ways to the Group of Experts to continue investigating Pyongyang's sanction violations. During the press conference, Ms. Thomas-Greenfield said, "I look forward to collaborating with both the Republic of Korea and Japan, but also with like-minded countries, to try to develop options both within and outside of the UN. The point here is that we cannot allow the work that the panel of experts was doing to lapse." The U.S. representative to the UN added that Russia and China, which abstained from voting in favor of the extension, will continue to try to block international efforts to maintain monitoring of UN sanctions against the DPRK. She criticized Russia for violating these sanctions with its purchases of North Korean arms and, also China for shielding the North, stating, "I don't expect them to cooperate or agree with any effort we make to find another path, but that won't stop us from finding that path in the future." Recently, Marcus Noland, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an expert on Korean affairs, has proposed: ● That the UN General Assembly plays a more significant role in maintaining pressure on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. This proposal emerged amid the debate over Russia's veto of a resolution to extend the mandate of the panel of experts monitoring sanctions on the DPRK. ● The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched on May 31st, 2003, during the George W. Bush era, represents a coalition outside the UN framework, composed of 112 members so far. It aims to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern. This initiative is part of the foundations of the global regime against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has maintained strong support as a presidential priority in each of the US’s administrations since its inception. It is known that Washington, in its attempt to ensure the diversification of tools to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, apparently, foreseeing the eventual deactivation of the Panel of Experts, is seeking to strengthen and expand the PSI. Its active role in this direction involves contributing with experts, diplomats, financiers, military personnel, customs officials, and police; organizing meetings, workshops, and exercises with other States supporting the PSI; and working with specific partner States to enhance their capacity to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ● Following the example of the United States and South Korea, who recently launched an Enhanced Disruption Working Group and jointly sanctioned six individuals and two entities based in Russia, China, and the United Arab Emirates for supporting the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction programs. According to the expert, in the absence of the Panel of Experts, these sanction’s activities can be expanded and could involve countries allied with the United States. ● Utilization of the Egmont Group, a state-led network of financial intelligence units with 174 members that shares information and collaborates on illicit financial activities. It does not have a mandate in the sanctions area, but that does not mean it cannot be granted one, and if so, the Group could assume an intensified role in monitoring North Korea's sanctions evasion in the financial sphere. The pronouncements of the US Ambassador to the UN at the DMZ suggest that the US State Department is paying attention to Marcus Noland's proposals, which, so far, are identified as the most precise ones that have emerged. However, for now, except for the UN General Assembly, which, due to its plurality, is not likely to be able to assume supervisory functions, the rest of the alternatives lack the authority of the UN as the Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee had. Some considerations As the DPRK strengthened its missile and nuclear capabilities, casting doubt on the effectiveness of the sanction’s regime and the performance of the Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts, this monitoring instrument of the Security Council appeared increasingly biased and uncompromising. Despite Washington and its top allies were intensifying their demands on the State Members to comply with the measures included in the resolutions, many governments avoided implementing the sanctions or did so only partially, in addition, they often failed to submit their reports. The calls from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee for all Member States to submit their national reports on the implementation of the resolutions comprising the sanction's regime were becoming more frequent, with representatives being reminded that these reports are mandatory. Of all the UN Member States, fewer and fewer delegations were submitting their reports, and some never did. To mitigate the apathy, the Committee held meetings with Regional Groups to ascertain the technical assistance and training needs of Member States for the effective implementation of Security Council resolutions at the national level. It became evident that the most determined to challenge the Panel of Experts were Russia and China, which in the multilateral arena deployed various initiatives to ease the sanctions regime and vetoed new resolutions, while at the same time, they relativized their application bilaterally. Everything seems to indicate that Moscow and Beijing were gauging the "loophole" through which to penetrate and cause the implosion of the Panel of Experts and saw the opportunity by vetoing its extension, which will take effect on April 30. We are witnessing exasperated actions from Washington and its top allies to at least attempt to maintain oversight to contain the nuclearization of the DPRK when they have been unable to do so through other means. However, at the same time, it is observed that the main powers in conflict with the United States are aligned with Pyongyang on various fronts, including the multilateral space, something that is strategically very favorable for all three parties. References Agustín Menéndez. Matando al mensajero: sobre Corea del Norte y las Naciones Unidas – Reporte Asia. Disponible en: https://reporteasia.com/opinion/2024/04/16/matando-mensajero-corea-del-norte-naciones-unidas/ Marcus Noland. Hobbling sanctions on North Korea: Russia and the demise of the UN’s Panel of Experts. Disponible en: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/hobbling-sanctions-north-korea-russia-and-demise-uns-panel-experts Chad O´Carroll. UN General Assembly could monitor North Korea Sanctions, Countries Suggest. Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/un-general-assembly-could-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-countries-suggest/ KBS WORLD. S. Korea Envoy: Russia Vetoed UN Panel Extension to Hide it´s ´Dark Spot´. Disponible en: https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=184836 UN News General Assembly debates Russia´s veto of DPR Korea sanction Panel. Disponible en: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431 Newsroom Infobae. La embajadora de EEUU ante la ONU visita la Zona Desmilitarizada entre las dos Coreas. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/04/16/la-embajadora-de-eeuu-ante-la-onu-visita-la-zona-desmilitarizada-entre-las-dos-coreas/ Ifang Bremer. US exploring alternatives to North Korea sanction panel in and out of UN: Envoy. Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/us-exploring-alternatives-to-north-korea-sanctions-panel-in-and-out-of-un-envoy/ Kim Tong Hyung. Envoy says US determined to monitor North Korea nukes, through UN or otherwise. Disponible en:https://apnews.com/article/us-north-korea-un-sanctions-monitoring-panel-experts-2064dd5d479a672711945f2c6aa6f1 United States Mission to the United Nations. Readout of Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield´s Meeting with Young North Korean Escapees in the-Republic-of-Korea. Disponible en: https://usun.usmission.gov/readout-of-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfields-meeting-with-young-north-korean-escapees-in-the-republic-of-korea/ Korea Times. US to seek ways to continue sanction monitoring on NK despite uncooperative Russia, China: Envoy. Disponible en: https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=372893 United Nations. Security Council Fail to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanction Committee on Democratic People´s Republic of Korea. Disponible en: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE. Proliferation Security Initiative. About the Proliferation Security Initiative. Disponible en: http://www.state.gov/proliferation-security-initiative EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS. Disponible en: https://egmontgroup.org/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Moscow and Beijing likely worked together to sow disinformation globally that was propagated locally by political parties in the lead-up to Solomon Islands’ national and provincial elections on 17 April 2024. Both countries’ propaganda systems accused the United States, without evidence, of using its foreign aid and networks across the country to interfere in voting and of preparing to foment riots and orchestrate regime change in response to an unsatisfactory election result. This campaign adds to a growing body of evidence showing that China’s and Russia’s ‘no limits’ partnership extends to coordinating their disinformation campaigns in the Indo-Pacific. The narratives haven’t gained widespread attention or media coverage in Solomon Islands. Australia, the United States and other Pacific partners should nonetheless be concerned, as Russia and China can be expected to learn from this campaign and will likely use the lessons to further improve their influence operations in the region. Individually, China and Russia are adept and expert at pushing disinformation to disrupt other nations but, by coordinating their efforts, they have a force-multiplier effect. The campaign consisted of an alleged ‘leaked’ letter, articles published on authoritarian state-controlled media outlets and a fringe journal publication, which were then shared and amplified on social media platforms. A fortnight before election day, an unknown author by the name of Richard Anderson published an explosive article in CovertAction Magazine alleging that the US was seeking regime change in Solomon Islands. The US-based magazine was co-founded in 1978 by the late Philip Agee, a former CIA officer who after his retirement became a vocal critic of the agency and of US policy and had reported links with Soviet and Cuban intelligence. The magazine was set up ‘on the initiative of the KGB’, the Soviet Union’s main intelligence agency, according to a book by KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin and British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew. Anderson had no previous history of writing for CovertAction Magazine. A week after that article was published, Russian state-controlled media agency Sputnik further fuelled the allegations, writing that the US was ‘plotting [an] electoral coup’. This article cited an anonymous source who had ‘intimate familiarity’ with the activities of USAID, the main United States foreign aid and international development agency. This mirrored how Anderson is described in his CovertAction Magazine bio, though Sputnik’s article did not explicitly mention him or his article. Sputnik’s claims were amplified four days later by the Chinese state-controlled tabloid newspaper the Global Times, which did directly reference Anderson’s article and has the potential to legitimise these narratives to an audience the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is actively targeting. During the same period, a poorly fabricated letter from an unconfirmed (and potentially non-existent) IFES project consultant was circulated among Solomon Islanders by an unknown source claiming that the US was seeking a ‘democratic transition by violent means in necessary circumstances.’ The text in this letter mirrored language used by Sputnik’s alleged anonymous source. Figure 1: Paragraph from Sputnik article (top) and a screenshot of the alleged IFES letter (bottom).     To be clear, there is no evidence that the US, or any other country, is supporting violent riots or interfering in Solomon Islands. Ann Marie Yastishock, US Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, has strongly refuted these allegations. This is not the first time the CCP-controlled media has spread disinformation in Solomon Islands or accused the US of seeking to instigate riots in the country. Following the 2021 Honiara riots, the CCP falsely accused Australia, the US and Taiwan of organising the riots, fomenting unrest and discrediting the relationship between Solomon Islands and China. In contrast, Russian media outlets also covered the 2021 Honiara riots but didn’t promote any explicit accusations of US or foreign interference. This time, China and Russia have been in lockstep. In the lead-up to the April elections, Russian state media was more direct and damning in its reporting with the release of Sputnik’s original article and in the subsequent coordination and dissemination of false narratives alongside Chinese state media. While Sputnik published only one follow-up article to the initial investigation, China’s Global Times was more prolific and varied, with six articles alleging US meddling in Solomon Islands. Of these six articles, four explicitly referenced Sputnik’s claims and two referenced US influence operations in more general terms. The indications of Russia-China propaganda coordination in this campaign were further supported by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) post on 19 April 2024 titled ‘The Hypocrisy and Facts of the United States Foreign Aid’. The post on their website claims the US is giving aid to Solomon Islands, among other countries, only because it sees it as a political threat. This was the first article ever published by the MFA to smear USAID. Moscow, however, has consistently campaigned against USAID since it ejected the US agency from Russia in 2012 for ‘meddling in politics’. Russian media has pushed a consistent narrative that the organisation is a US imperialist tool of regime change, accusing it of fomenting civil unrest and coup attempts as far afield as Belarus, Cuba, Georgia and Mexico. However, this latest attack against USAID appears to be the first where Russia’s narratives are working to the benefit of CCP interests. It’s been clear since at least 2018 that Russian and Chinese state media are converging on media narratives that serve their governments’ strategic and political interests. According to leaked documents from Russian state broadcaster VGTRK, Russian and Chinese propaganda entities also signed an agreement to ‘further cooperate in the field of information exchange, promoting objective, comprehensive and accurate coverage of the most important world events’. While previous ASPI research has demonstrated Russian and Chinese state-coordinated narratives on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the repeated re-airing of Sputnik’s conspiratorial claims of interference in Solomon Islands’ elections in Global Times articles indicates this propaganda cooperation is now a global initiative. There was also some evidence of amplification by inauthentic accounts on social media of these narratives, but they were limited and it is unclear whether they were state linked. For example, one X account with the handle @jv79628 shared the original Sputnik investigation. The account posts links almost exclusively from Sputnik, Global Times, Australian website Pearls and Irritations and videos with artificial intelligence-generated voices from the pro-CCP YouTube channel Chinese Revival, which may be linked to the Shadow Play network previously uncovered by ASPI. Other accounts sharing the original Sputnik report, such as @de22580171, pose as pro-Russian US citizens. They share articles mostly from Sputnik or Russia Today. At the time of publication of this report, Russia’s and China’s state media articles, and the accusations contained in them, have had minimal reach into online Pacific communities. In the public Solomon Islands Facebook groups ASPI viewed, online discourse remains more focussed on the emergence of new coalitions and the election of a new Prime Minister than on discussion of foreign influence or interference. According to Meta’s social monitoring tool, CrowdTangle, none of the articles from the Global Times have been shared in open and public Solomon Islands Facebook groups. However, Sputnik’s first article may have been more successful in reinforcing anti-Western sentiments in outgoing Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s O.U.R. Party, who are strong contenders to be part of the coalition that forms the next government. That article was posted on the O.U.R. Party Solomon Islands Facebook page, which is run by the party, on 10 April. It was reshared to several public Facebook groups in Solomon Islands, including news aggregation sites and local island forum pages. This is significant because it is the first time a news article has been posted on the O.U.R. Party Solomon Islands Facebook page, which typically shares positive images of the party’s activities and political campaigns. As of 1 May 2024, the post (below) has had over 180 interactions, which is higher than the average number of interactions a typical post has on this page. Figure 2: Screenshot of Sputnik article posted in O.U.R Party Solomon Islands Facebook page.     Sogavare, a founding member of the O.U.R. Party, has made similar remarks about ‘foreign forces’ previously. According to an article published in the Solomon Star, when US Ambassador Yastishock visited Solomon Islands in late March to present her letter of credentials to Governor-General John Oti, Sogavare claimed foreign forces were ‘intervening in the national general election’ and ‘may fund some political parties and plan to stage another riot during the election to disrupt the electoral process and undermine social stability’. Despite the low online interaction so far, the barrage of US regime change allegations lays the foundation for future narratives that may resurface if Solomon Islands experiences future unrest. Beijing and Moscow can be expected to learn from these disinformation efforts, leaving the US, Australia and their Pacific partners no room for complacency about the threat the regimes pose, nor the need for effective strategic communication. The Russian and Chinese governments are seeking to destabilise the Pacific’s information environment by using disinformation campaigns and influence operations to undermine traditional partnerships. In this digital age, leaders of governments and civil society across the region need to consistently confront and counter baseless lies pushed by authoritarian state media, such as accusations that the governments of Australia and the US are instigating riots. If they fail to do so, partnerships with, and trust in, democratic countries are at risk of deteriorating, which can reduce the development benefits provided to Pacific Island Countries by Western partners. Australia, the US, and other close Pacific partners, such as Japan, New Zealand and the European Union, must take a stronger stance against false and misleading information that is starting to circulate in the region as a result of authoritarian state-backed disinformation campaigns. These nations must also better support and encourage local media and governments to take further steps to identify and combat false information online. This includes providing more training packages and opportunities for dialogue on media-government communication procedures to tackle disinformation and misinformation. Countering the effects of disinformation requires ongoing efforts to call out false statements, educate the public, and build country-wide resilience in the information environment. Greater transparency and public awareness campaigns from the region’s partners can also help to ‘prebunk’—or anticipate and delegitimise—disinformation and alleviate concerns about malign activity.