Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end at some point, but when it will end as well as what the policy preferences of his successors might be are uncertain. It would be in the interests of the United States and Europe to signal on what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Russian leadership. Vladimir Putin has been the ruler of Russia since the turn of the century. He may remain in power through 2036, as the 2020 revision of the Russian constitution allows him to, or perhaps even longer. Then again, he may be ousted suddenly and surprisingly any day now, as the recent Wagner mutiny and the apparent lack of effective opposition to it within the Russian security services and public suggest is possible. Maybe he will decide not to run for re-election in 2024, though this does not seem likely. Sooner or later, though, Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end. What is not at all certain, of course, is who will replace him and what sort of foreign policy the new leader will pursue. It would appear, though, that there are only a few possibilities. One is that Putin will be succeeded by someone just like him who will continue Moscow’s hostile policies toward Ukraine and the West in general. Another is that Putin will be replaced by someone within his circle that decides Moscow needs to cut its losses in Ukraine and rebuild good relations with the West both to revive Russia’s economy and to hedge against an increasingly powerful China. While this might seem unlikely, Russian and Soviet history are replete with examples of new autocratic leaders dramatically reversing key aspects of their predecessor’s policies. Yet another post-Putin possibility is an authoritarian leader who wants to cut Moscow’s losses in Ukraine but who sees the survival of both autocratic rule and even Russia’s territorial integrity as best served through increasing reliance on Chinese support and guidance. It is also possible that Putin’s rule will end as a result of the rise of democratic forces which want Russia to become part of the West and cooperate or join the EU or even NATO. For this scenario to occur, there would have to be a dramatic change of heart within the Russian security services about what is in Russia’s and their own interests. While this seems highly unlikely, there have been examples in other where military-backed autocratic rule gave way to democracy. Finally, whether Putin’s successor is autocratic or democratic, he or (much less likely) she may simply be weak as a result of having to deal with a compounding internal crisis resulting from Putin’s policies, including popular discontent over Russian casualties in Ukraine, economic decline, and secessionism in non-Russian or even Russian regions of the Russian Federation. What Can Europe and the United States Do? Russia’s post-Putin leadership and its policy preferences, whatever they may be, will have an enormous impact on Europe and the United States as well as other countries and regions of the world. But while obviously they hope to see Putin succeeded by a new leader who will end the war, withdraw from Ukraine, and improve Moscow’s ties with the West, Europe and the United States will have very little ability, if any, to affect the post-Putin transition — especially if the person who succeeds  him comes from within his inner circle. Putin has sought to rally Russian public support for his war in Ukraine through claiming that the West wants to bring about the breakup of Russia. Whether Putin himself actually believes this, there appears to be no possibility of changing his mind about the West being his implacable enemy. The United States and Europe, though, would do well to signal to whoever might succeed Putin that this is not the case. Specifically, Washington and Brussels should make clear how they would like to relate to post-Putin Russia. Such messaging should include the following points: Just as the United States and Europe support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, they also support the territorial integrity of Russia. The West has no interest in seeing the breakup of Russia. The United States and Europe will lift their economic sanctions on Russia (including those on Moscow’s exports of oil and gas) in response to Russian withdrawals from Ukrainian territory. The more occupied territory that Russia returns to Ukraine, the more Western economic sanctions against Russia will be lifted. While Europe and the United States would like to see Russia become a Western-style democracy, they acknowledge that whether it does so or not is an internal matter which Russians alone will determine. The United States and Europe are prepared to have normal relations with any type of Russian government — democratic or autocratic — which is willing to behave non-threateningly toward the West, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. While they respect the Russian government’s desire to continue cooperating closely with China, Western governments want Moscow to know that the United States, NATO, and the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (US, Japan, India, Australia) are willing to discuss common security concerns about China (which many Russians besides Putin have had) if and when the new Russian leadership wishes to discuss them. The articulation of these messages by the United States, Europe, and, regarding the last point, Quad governments, will not magically lead the Russian people, much less Putin’s inner circle, to oust Putin and embrace the West. Indeed, it is possible that a Putin loyalist successor will spurn them. But if the United States and Europe do not signal under what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Putin leadership, then Washington and Brussels may reduce the chances that a post-Putin leadership will be willing to cooperate with the West.

Ukraine was the major topic discussed at the NATO summit in Vilnius, the Alliance capital closest to Kyiv. President Zelensky’s call for a clear timetable for his country’s membership dominated the political debate. Less attention was given to the topic with the biggest impact on the Allies: the radically changed requirements for NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. The Vilnius summit has blessed the new defense plans, for which the member states “commit the necessary forces, capabilities and resources”. What does this imply for the NATO countries? This article analyzes the consequences of the new NATO requirements, broken down into four themes: budgets, force structure and capability requirements, readiness, and military presence on the Eastern Flank.   In 2014, at its Wales summit, NATO Allies committed to spending 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense no later than 2024. The forecast is that 19 of the 29 European NATO Allies will have realized the 2% target in 2024. As Iceland has no armed forces, the total number can be lowered to 28. It implies that approximately one third of the European Allies do not live up to the Wales commitment ten years on. Even worse, some Allies have already announced that they will not realize the target even by 2030. The Vilnius language – the 2% GDP target is “a minimum” from now on – stands in stark contrast to these facts. BUDGETS - MONEY SPENT ON DEFENSE The input issue – money spent on defense – continues to present a divided NATO, composed of three categories of Allies: First, the underspenders that will not spend 2% GDP on defense in 2024 and in the years immediately following. The list includes smaller countries such as Croatia, Slovenia and Luxembourg. However, on the minus 2% list one can also find – from North to South – Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Denmark has set the aim of reaching the 2% target by 2030 and Belgium even later, by 2035. Second, the correct spenders: Allies that have taken measures to achieve the 2% target in 2024, thus fulfilling the Wales target. However, they will face the challenge of living up to a minimum of 2% after 2024. This applies to Germany, the Netherlands and others, who have not made firm commitments to live up to the Vilnius “minimum” target of 2% GDP. The third category is the overspenders, comprising Allies spending more than 2% now or in the future. This group includes the countries close to Russia – the Baltic states and Poland – but also major Allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The champion is no longer the US (3.49%) as Poland will spend 3.9% GDP on defense in 2023.  Due to the mix of underspenders, correct spenders and overspenders, the overall European average will rise to almost 2.05% in 2024, but it is clear that the burden within Europe is not equally divided among all Allies. This sends the wrong signal to Russia and it undermines the European aim to become self-reliant for its security and defense. Furthermore, there is the issue of ensuring sustained investment over the long term. For restructuring the armed forces and realizing defense equipment procurement plans, more time is needed than the duration of an average government Atlantisch perspectief 21 term (4-5 years). A change of government after elections may lead to redrafting the defense budget and defense plans, in particular when economic circumstances are deteriorating as was the case in 2010 and in the years that followed. For defense investment, predictability and continuity are required. The solution is to agree on a long-term national defense investment fund for a period of up to at least 10 years. Naturally, parliaments would have a final say in the annual approval of the budget within the overall financial framework of a long-term defense investment fund. From the perspective of adapting and modernizing the armed forces of the NATO Allies, such a long-term financial commitment – connected to the defense plans and acquisition programs – should be connected to the political debate on the 2% minimum spending target. Such sustained and guaranteed financial input is absolutely required to achieve the output, based on the NATO requirements. FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS Although NATO’s three core tasks of deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security remain in place, the Vilnius summit communiqué puts the first task “at the heart of the Alliance.” Based on SACEUR’s requirements, “the planning for our collective defense will be fully coherent with the planning for our forces, posture management, capabilities, and command and control.” The Allies will have to “deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defense, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer competitors.” Region-specific plans will be developed for three areas: Northern Europe (from the Arctic to the Gulf of Finland); Central Europe (from the Baltic states to the Alps) and Southern Europe (from the Black Sea to the whole of the Mediterranean). In terms of command & control (C2), Northern Europe will be covered by the Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Norfolk (Virginia, US), Central Europe by the JFC in Brunssum (the Netherlands), and Southern Europe by the JFC in Naples (Italy).  For the NATO countries bordering Russia, this might not entail a great deal of change. The Baltic states and Poland have consistently campaigned for strengthening the Alliance’s force posture for collective defense with an emphasis on high-end warfighting capacities. Their own defense planning and force structures have already been tailor-made for that purpose, and investment is mainly channeled towards modernizing heavy land forces. However, for Allies in Western Europe NATO’s new force structure and capability requirements may lead to amending their defense planning, including taking into account regional plans. For example, the UK-NL Landing Force that has been training for years in Northern Norway, might also be deployed to Finland or Sweden. The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), led by the UK, could become an earmarked early-entry force for the Northern Flank. In that case, it might require a more fixed composition of the JEF. In Central Europe, even more emphasis will be placed on strengthening land forces for high-intensity warfighting. Germany and Poland are two key European force providers. Other Allies – such as the Netherlands – will have to deliver dedicated contributions. From now on, NATO plans will ask for brigades, divisions, and army corps instead of the tailor-made task forces that were deployed to Afghanistan and elsewhere. Combined arms will be required instead of infantry-heavy forces for crisis management. More robustness and more firepower, less highly mobile and lightly armed troops are the new characteristics.  Jointness and networked operations in all domains (sea, land, air, cyber, and space) are 21st century necessities, requiring high-technology capacities in the digital area and in space, in particular to ensure redundant communications for information-steered, networked operations. The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capacities need to be enhanced and modernized, encompassing all layers of air defense – the importance of which has been shown in the war in Ukraine. Long-range firing delivered by rocket artillery, cruise missiles and other systems will become the norm of the ‘need to have’ for armed forces. This capability also requires a better and more robust C2 architecture and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare (EW) systems, and other sensors for target acquisition. The Vilnius communiqué refers to continuing “to invest more in advanced and interoperable capabilities across all domains, placing particular emphasis on combat capable, predominantly heavy, high-end forces and capabilities.” This sounds like an evolution, but for many Allies it implies a revolution in defense planning and investment or, in the words of the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, “unparalleled integration of NATO and national military planning”. READINESS The new NATO Force Model (NFM) was already agreed upon at the Madrid summit in July 2022. According to the NFM, Allies “are delivering a larger pool of dedicated combat-capable forces, including forces at high readiness, improving our military responsiveness, and harnessing regional expertise and geographic proximity.” In the past, the Alliance had the NATO Response Force (NRF) at high readiness (at 5-30-day notice-to-move (NTM)) with the first elements of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at very short NTM (within 48 hours). The 40,000-military-strong NRF will be replaced by the Allied Reaction Force (ARF), that can provide a quickly deployable NATO response option to threats or crises wherever they occur. Completely new are the tier 1-3 high readiness forces: over 100,000 in tier 1 with a NTM of up to 10 days; around 200,000 in tier 2 (NTM 10-30 days) and at least 500,000 in tier 3 (30-180 days NTM). With these new readiness requirements the number of forces that Allies will have at readiness levels up to 30 days has increased by almost a factor of 10. For the NRF, NATO Allies were making available, on rotation, companies, battalions, battle groups and comparable air and naval units. In the NFM, brigades and divisions, full squadrons and naval task groups will have to be ready to deploy within short timeframes depending on the allocation to tier 1 to 3. This will pose enormous challenges to Allies, not only in terms of personnel but equally in operationally ready-to-deploy equipment, enablers (such as transport capacities), and all necessary logistical support. Ammunition stocks will have to be built up to higher NATO norms. Military mobility requirements – all legal arrangements, infrastructure adjustments, transport means, available staging areas and so forth – need to be fulfilled. Naturally, all of this cannot be arranged overnight. It will take at least five to ten years to transform and modernize the Allied forces to fulfil these far-reaching military requirements. The NFM may look simple on paper, but it is the most challenging NATO demand since the end of the Cold War. PRESENCE ON THE EASTERN FLANK Decisions to reinforce NATO’s military enhanced Forward Presence were already taken at the Madrid summit with the following two most important elements: (i) the deployment of battlegroups in four additional Allied countries (Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria), and (ii) scaling up the NATO battle groups to brigade-size formations where and when required. At the time, the UK, Canada and Germany announced that their battle groups in respectively Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be scaled up to brigades. The additional troops were not to be stationed permanently in the three Baltic states. Brigade headquarters would be established and the equipment for these brigades would be prepositioned in those countries. The model envisaged that troops would be transferred from their home bases in times of crisis or for exercises. Two weeks before the Vilnius summit, the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that his country would station a ‘robust brigade’ with 4,000 troops in Lithuania. Without openly saying so, Pistorius presented a change to the concept announced by Germany the year before. Not only will the brigade headquarters and the equipment be permanently present in Lithuania, the military personnel of a combat brigade are to be located forward as well. On the eve of the Vilnius summit, the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that his country’s military presence in Latvia would be increased to around 2,200 troops.  The Baltic states have pressed strongly for the permanent presence of brigade-sized NATO forces on their soil. NATO itself has met its need by replacing the concept of ‘deterrence by punishment’ by ‘deterrence by denial’ – meaning that every inch of NATO territory has to be defended. The Baltic states have argued that the existing multinational battle groups – suitable for acting as a ‘trip wire’ in case of a Russian attack, but not being able to defend their territory until reinforcements arrive – are no longer suitable for that purpose. Lacking strategic depth, ‘deterrence by denial’ requires the permanent presence of combat-ready NATO forces, at least of brigade size along with the national army units of the three Baltic states.  The same requirement would logically apply to the other five countries that house NATO battle groups. Infrastructure to house the troops and preposition the equipment of the NATO combat brigades will have to be built, which will take time and money. Training areas might have to be expanded. Transferring from ‘trip wire’ battle groups to combat brigades also raises the question of what to do with the smaller contributions – often of company size – from other NATO countries. For example, so far the Dutch contribution to the battle group in Lithuania has consisted of rotating companies – often of different compositions (air mobile, light infantry, mechanized). When Germany transforms its battle group to a combat brigade, Berlin might call on the Netherlands army to contribute a mechanized battalion or combat support (such as artillery). In that case, the issue of prepositioning equipment and permanently stationing troops in Lithuania also becomes a defense-planning topic for the Netherlands with financial and other consequences. THE WAY AHEAD NATO summits come and go. Next year, Heads of State and Government will meet in Washington, D.C. for the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. In November 2024, American citizens will elect a new president. The years of strong commitment by the US to supporting Ukraine and NATO may turn into years of retreat, should a Republican president enter the White House. European Allies will be even more pressed to step up their defense efforts than in the current situation. But even should the Democrats win the presidential election, the European NATO countries will face serious challenges in implementing the decisions of the Vilnius summit. In view of the primary focus of the US on the Pacific/East Asia, the pressure on Europe to become more self-reliant is here to stay. Defense budget growth has to be sustained over the long term. Investment in combat-ready forces and logistics including larger ammunition stocks needs to be stepped up, which also requires industrial production to be ramped up. More military personnel will have to be on stand-by readiness, and a larger number of troops have to be deployed to the Eastern Flank. Equipment needs to be prepositioned in the area. NATO’s regional plans will direct national defense planning, investment, training and exercises. They will also channel multinational cooperation, clustering countries located on the Northern, Central-Eastern and Southern European Flanks with those Allies earmarking their forces for the collective defense task in those respective regions.  The consequences of NATO’s Vilnius summit have yet to sink in within national political circles. The Alliance’s military authorities and diplomats have delivered an ambitious agenda for “modernising NATO for a new era of collective defence”. All presidents and prime ministers of the Allied countries have committed themselves to implementing the Vilnius decisions. History shows that words are not always followed by deeds, such as in the case of achieving the NATO 2% target. The Russian aggression against Ukraine – violating the principles and norms of the international order – should be more than a wake-up call. Europe now needs to stay awake and invest in its defense to fulfil NATO’s requirements as well as to become more self-reliant for its own security.

With the possibility of a second Trump presidency looming, it is high time to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans Lest anyone had missed the point, Donald Trump has now provided helpful clarification of his attitude towards America’s NATO allies – and specifically those that fail to spend the benchmark 2 per cent of their GDP on defence. If elected he would, he declared at a campaign rally, “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to underspending NATO allies. Reacting to a storm of protest from European leaders, he was happy to repeat himself: “Look, if they’re not going to pay, we’re not going to protect. OK?”. Nowadays, it is less easy for complacent Europeans to shrug off such observations as typical Trumpisms. They have evidence that Trump redux would be likely to apply his malevolent instincts much more efficiently than he did in his chaotic first term as president. And the chances of him having the opportunity to do so are increasingly likely: he has now steamrollered the opposition in the early Republican primaries, and is ahead of Joe Biden in the polls. No one can any longer ignore the real possibility that in less than a year’s time the occupant of the White House could toss the whole responsibility for keeping Ukraine in the fight against Russia into European laps, whilst insisting that from here on in they see to their own defence. It would therefore hardly be premature if Europeans began to explore how each other views the situation; to make contingency plans; and even to take some precautionary steps. The two key challenges are obvious. The first is how to get more weapons, and especially ammunition and air-defence missiles, to Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion, Europeans have done better at this than might have been expected – but they have not done as well as the need now demands, and not nearly enough to support Ukraine if the United States withdraws its aid. The EU, and especially the European Commission, have played a prominent role here, providing financial incentives for member states to donate from their own stocks and to expand production facilities. But talk of moving European defence industries onto a war footing has yet to be realised; and although the commission will shortly unveil proposals for an ambitious European defence industrial strategy, this can only succeed if member states evince more enthusiasm for collective action than they have so far shown. Only three months ago France, Germany, Italy, and Spain jointly warned the commission to stay off their turf and respect national “prerogatives” on defence. The second key challenge that Europeans should be facing up to is how they would defend themselves without US backing against a Russia that had – the possibility can no longer be discounted – imposed a humiliating ‘peace’ on Ukraine. The “dormant NATO” plans being proposed by right-wing US think-tanks foresee a wholesale withdrawal of US ground forces from Europe. But Europeans have huge psychological difficulties in bringing themselves to discuss the US as they would any other foreign power, even in situations where their own strategic interests are manifestly different from those of the superpower. NATO’s disastrous involvement in Afghanistan, for instance, would never have dragged on for so many fruitless years had not its European members studiously avoided any collective discussion of a campaign which each saw exclusively through the prism of its own bilateral relations with the US. Compounding these challenges is the fact that there is no institutional setting in which Europeans could confer. Their task is, in effect, to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans, but this can hardly be discussed in NATO. That organisation, after all, is where European militaries gather to be told what to do by Americans, but the current US administration can scarcely be expected to lead a discussion premised on its own defeat in the November presidential election. The EU has neither locus nor credibility in military operational matters. The reality is that, if a strategy for defending Europe without the Americans is to emerge, this can only be on an ‘intergovernmental’ basis – through bilateral and minilateral discussion amongst Europe’s main defence players. At the alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit, NATO doubled down on its strategy of forward defence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has demonstrated that we are in a technological era in which defensive systems have the advantage over the traditional means of attack. Destroying massed Russian armour turned out to be relatively easy; getting Russians out now that they have dug themselves in is the devil’s own job. So in Madrid allies resolved to reinforce NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” – boosting in-place forces in eastern and central Europe. But predictably, Europeans have been happy to leave this largely to the Americans, who reinforced their presence in Europe with an additional 20,000 troops. The challenge for European chiefs of staff and defence planners now is to work out how, if the need arises, to substitute for US in-place forces in the frontline states; what capabilities and defensive infrastructure will be needed to halt any assault at the borders; and how to organise the communications and data networks necessary to form an effective system that ties together disparate sensors and missile, drone, and artillery assets. Such planning is now an urgent requirement, not just as a matter of military preparedness, but for psychological reasons. Europe’s frontline states have long felt their western European allies lack not only US military credibility, but also a serious understanding of the scale of Putin’s threat. Europeans will only hang together under a second Trump presidency if they are ready to trust each other, and specifically if the most vulnerable states see a real prospect of western European states putting many more of their bodies on the line as in-place forces. The last couple of years, in which predominantly eastern European states have agreed to purchase an astonishing $120 billion of weapons from American contractors, suggests a fatal tendency to believe that maybe Trump can be propitiated by such largesse. Fortunately, the return of Donald Tusk as Poland’s prime minister has substantially increased the odds of Europeans hanging together even in a Trump 2.0 scenario. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland (the Weimar Triangle) have just met to discuss strengthening Europe’s efforts. If, as expected, the British Labour party returns to government later this year, then the United Kingdom would be an obvious addition to this group. Indeed, a necessary one: it is hard to envisage a credible European defence of the continent that did not clutch in Europe’s second nuclear power. Keir Starmer has made clear his ambition to restore defence ties severed by Brexit. There is no time to waste: the prime minister-in-waiting could usefully make an early trip to Paris to initiate conversations with the UK’s closest continental ally.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In March and April, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son’s nearly back-to-back visits to the U.S. and China highlighted Vietnam’s increasing penchant for delicate diplomacy with major powers amid the U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and Vietnam’s territorial tussles with China especially in the South China Sea (SCS), which Vietnam calls the East Sea. Much of the (perceived) disorder in the Indo-Pacific hails from the SCS, and one of Vietnam’s principal challenges is fostering order on its maritime borders. Therefore, Vietnam—historically distrustful of major powers—has been diversifying its relations by seeking security and defense ties with Indo-Pacific partners like the European Union (EU), India, and Japan, as well as with Russia, a country that poses an “existential threat” to the transatlantic allies. At the same time, Southeast Asia is battling disunity within the region for resolving disputes in the SCS, for instance. The regional multilateralism embodied by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems to lack teeth even as China ‘controls’ some of its members using its financial and economic heft. So clearly, efforts beyond Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” that deepen international solidarity are required. In a similar vein, Europe’s reluctant rapprochement with China in recent times amid the EU calling China a strategic challenge but continuing to look for economic engagement is reminiscent of Vietnam and much of Asia’s predicament vis-à-vis China. Moreover, like in Southeast Asia, not every member-country of the EU is embracing the Indo-Pacific construct, led by the U.S. Or even if a member does, like France or Germany, it does not spell the end of a productive relationship with China. Nonetheless, it is clear that the EU has started to take a greater interest in the growing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific, even as the disunity over the extent of the Indo-Pacific priorities, including China, is as apparent. In such a scenario, is it possible for the EU and Vietnam, and by extension ASEAN, to have greater convergence, if not congruence, in their policies? Revisiting Vietnam’s Lack of an Indo-Pacific Tilt The Indo-Pacific, the maritime space and littoral between the western Indian and Pacific Oceans, has become the world’s most geopolitically critical region. In this region, much of the focus and debate among the EU’s more proactive members, such as France, the Netherlands, and Germany, is in response to Chinese unilateralism, trade dependency, and unchecked Sino-U.S. contestation. Several of these EU members have come to understand each other’s positions on the Indo-Pacific. Gradually, there is a realization that it is not just about what the EU and its members seek to accomplish in the region but just as much the perspectives and priorities of key Indo-Pacific resident actors—and their views on European strategies and contributions. Vietnam is one such country that is worthy of greater European strategic attention. Vietnam is known for its “bamboo diplomacy”—a reference to the bamboo plant’s strong roots, sturdy stems, and flexible branches—balancing ties with the two big powers, the U.S. and China. In the words of Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, Vietnam’s foreign policy caters to “independence, self-reliance, peace, friendship and cooperation, and multilateralization and diversification of external relations and proactive international integration.” However, Hanoi has never officially and fully embraced the term “Indo-Pacific” nor the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific construct although it does recognize that some aspects of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific tenet advocated by the U.S. and its allies are compatible with its national interests. For instance, the order in the Asia-Pacific, a term that Hanoi prefers to use, should be rule-based. This speaks to one of Vietnam’s most important foreign policy priorities: finding peace and stability in the SCS disputes with China and other claimants. However, the order that Vietnam seeks is in more than just the security domain. The goal of development has been the highest priority since Doi Moi (renovation) in 1986. Economic growth is considered the backbone of national security and regime legitimacy. Hanoi’s development of foreign relations can be said to be grounded in its national development experience, with the stress on economic priority leading to national stability and international standing. Vietnam chooses to engage in the Indo-Pacific construct on its terms. Vietnam and EU Convergence On both economic and security fronts, Vietnam and the EU can find converged interests that align closer to each other. Even as Hanoi has not officially adopted the term “Indo-Pacific,” the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, if implemented well, could address both Vietnam’s economic and security needs. Despite its security and military power limitations in the Indo-Pacific, the EU can still play a crucial role in effectively addressing these needs, which are vital for the EU’s strategic interests as well. The two already have a Framework Participation Agreement. Vietnam is also part of the EU’s Enhancing Security In and With Asia (ESIWA) project, which covers crisis management and cyber security. This also aligns with the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, where Vietnam is considered a “solid” partner. Notably, both the EU and Vietnam face (potential) economic coercion from China. As China is now Vietnam’s largest trading partner, sudden trade restrictions hindering Vietnamese exports to China would dramatically hurt the Vietnamese economy. In this vein, Hanoi welcomed the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), hoping it would give opportunities to diversify its trading partners and thus mitigate the risks of economic coercion from China. On the other hand, the EU and its member-states are also trying to increase economic resilience by diversifying trading partners as they wrestle with economic overdependence on China. So, strategically, Brussels presents an excellent opportunity for Hanoi and vice versa. However, challenges remain. For example, all the EU member-states are still to ratify the Investment Protection Agreement signed along with the EVFTA. Even though this is usually a time-consuming procedure, the imperative to reap benefits as soon as possible has taken a setback amid a challenging geopolitical landscape. Nonetheless, the two sides are concerned about more than just traditional economic development; they are concerned about sustainable development and green transition. For instance, under the EU’s Global Gateway framework, the EU and Vietnam have signed the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), which looks to provide a multi-projects credit facility worth €500 million. This is supposed to be the EU’s primary focus in Vietnam now. Yet, Hanoi’s cautious approach for fear of falling into any potential debt trap could stymie smooth cooperation. Projects involving vast sums of money, such as the JETP, are also practically challenging to push at the moment as officials are afraid to be the targets of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaigns. Vietnam would also be keen for ASEAN and the EU as blocs to reinvigorate multilateralism and shore up security cooperation, particularly in the SCS disputes. ASEAN states, in general, are looking to the EU as a non-threatening balancing power to reduce the impact of the China-U.S. strategic competition. Among the potential areas of cooperation between the EU and Vietnam within the ASEAN are regional climate action measures, food security, digitalization, and tech innovation. The two sides must also use their partnership to realize an ASEAN-EU FTA. EU as a Security Balancer? The EU and Vietnam also share their commitment to upholding the rules-based order—an essential component of security cooperation because of the region’s strategic importance. However, improving communication and understanding of maritime incidents more effectively is challenging. The SCS territorial conflict is simmering, particularly between China and the Philippines. In 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) overwhelmingly ruled in favor of the Philippines, which China rejected. However, the ruling bolstered Vietnam’s claims, which were not openly welcomed by other ASEAN states besides the Philippines. In the absence of an agreement for a code of conduct (CoC) between China and ASEAN, which has been dragging on for years, China’s violations of international law in the SCS, including the latest against Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, have increased. Against this scenario, Vietnam and the Philippines have signed maritime security deals. At the same time, Vietnam would be reluctant to do anything more drastic, such as support the Philippines in its attempt to draft a “separate” CoC for fear of Chinese retaliation. While Vietnam is less discussed in major global media than the Philippines on the issue, Hanoi is actively using diplomatic means to internationalize the problem, bringing in more players to address complex territorial disputes to safeguard its sovereignty and promote regional peace. In this context, winning the support of the EU and its member-states would be strategically important for Vietnam. The Vietnamese side can facilitate this by providing foreign entities, including the EU, with more transparent and timely information when incidents occur. Naturally, using a media strategy like the Philippines might sensationalize the issue, which might be different from what Hanoi prefers as it walks a tightrope to balance its complex relations with China. However, Hanoi can at least offer foreign diplomats transparent and detailed information in a timely fashion to help them verify and assess the situation on the ground. This will speed up the EU’s and other potential like-minded states’ response to sea incidents and foster ways forward for more multilaterally agreeable forms of modus vivendi in the South China Sea. Ultimately, such a modus should serve China too. EU No Longer a Bystander The EU’s recent stance on the SCS issue has been its respect for a rule-based order and freedom of navigation, strong opposition to unilateral actions, and supporting the ASEAN-led “effective, substantive and legally binding” CoC while mentioning China but not singling it out. This is a change from the EU’s pre-Indo-Pacific embrace when it was a more divided, neutral house. The EU’s heavy dependence on maritime trade through the SCS mandates that the EU can no longer stand as a bystander. However, ASEAN claimant states, particularly Vietnam, would perhaps expect a sharper or clearer position, which the EU has indeed been moving toward. For example, in March 2024, the EU released a statement expressing concerns about the incidents involving “repeated dangerous maneuvers” by the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia in the SCS. This tilts to the U.S. line, even as the U.S. has been more vocal in directly criticizing China on the SCS, by calling China’s claims “completely unlawful” even before the current events. One could argue that despite the U.S. and its allies having been vocal, this has yet to lead to a concrete resolution of the conflict. However, if the EU cannot send clear signals on the issue, the division among like-minded countries will be seen as weak and exploitable in China’s eyes. Importantly, this is true not just for the SCS disputes but also for China’s coercive activities in general. Therefore, given the convergent non-confrontational, inclusivity-, and economic interests-oriented attitudes of both Vietnam and the EU toward the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific region, both sides are primed to embrace the other’s strategic outlook and up their game in the face of a challenging China and efforts to foster order.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group”Tensions between China and the Philippines are increasing the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2024 – Spring Update, Crisis Group looks at how the EU can support regional diplomacy to mitigate maritime disputes. Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea and the dangers it would pose to global trade. Several countries are implicated in the set of complex sovereignty disputes in the sea, which stem from rival claims to various features and the maritime entitlements they generate, but recent incidents involving Beijing and Manila have triggered the greatest concern. The Philippines controls nine outposts in the Spratlys, a contested group of land and maritime features at the heart of the South China Sea. A submerged reef known as Second Thomas Shoal has become a dangerous flashpoint, with Chinese boats continually trying to block Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship housing a handful of soldiers that a former Philippine government purposely grounded in 1999 in a bid to assert sovereignty over the atoll. China, which also claims the shoal, first started interfering with these missions in 2014, but relations between the two countries in the maritime domain have never been as volatile as during the last seven months. Chinese boats have regularly rammed the Philippine supply vessels or doused them with water cannons, occasionally wounding the sailors on board. Manila has a Mutual Defence Treaty with Washington, making this burgeoning maritime dispute part of the geopolitical competition between the U.S and China. In effect, the South China Sea has become a zone where conflict risks are rife – and where Washington and Beijing could be drawn into direct confrontation. Considering these developments, the EU and its member states should: • Seek greater diplomatic engagement with both Beijing and Manila to keep tensions in check. They should also expand their diplomatic presence across South East Asia and, where relevant, establish reliable channels through which they could communicate with high-level authorities in China and other claimant states should disputes at sea escalate; • Work to promote respect for international law, particularly the law of the sea, as a source of neutral rules for dispute resolution and conflict prevention, for example by organising public events, roundtables and dialogues in Manila and elsewhere. While this measure may not bridge the divides between Manila and Beijing, it could at least help establish a level of mutual support and understanding among the other South China Sea claimant states; and • Strengthen coast guard cooperation with the Philippines, focusing on building capacity in areas such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. Troubled Waters The sovereignty disputes that underpin the tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea go back decades. But it was Beijing’s manoeuvres to take control of Mischief Reef (in the east of the Spratlys) from Manila in 1995 that altered the perceived balance of power between the two states and in the region, setting off the territorial dispute that has now taken a turn for the worse. China’s assertiveness in the sea has grown in the past few years, along with its military capabilities. The brewing territorial dispute made headlines in 2012 when Beijing in effect took control of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll 220km west of the Philippine mainland but within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), after a maritime altercation. The incident prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to file a case challenging China’s territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On 12 July 2016, the presiding arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of Manila, dismissing China’s claim to all the waters within its “nine-dash line”, which constitute almost the entire South China Sea. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. Beijing not only rejected the adjudication and the subsequent ruling, but it had also already undercut efforts to settle the dispute through legal channels by building and fortifying seven artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was winding its way through the system. This move fundamentally changed the status quo, enabling Beijing to post permanent garrisons in the area for the first time. By many accounts, China has thus ensured itself control of the sea in any situation below the threshold of armed conflict. A short lull in the maritime dispute appeared to follow. After coming to power in 2016, Aquino’s successor, Rodrigo Duterte, pursued a pragmatic policy toward Beijing. Duterte downplayed the tribunal’s decision and cast sovereignty issues aside, hoping to benefit from Beijing’s economic largesse in exchange. Yet his ambitious gambit did not pay off. Tensions at sea continued in the form of regular standoffs between the country’s coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fisherfolk struggled to reach their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the precious oil and gas reserves within its EEZ to which it is entitled under international law. In March 2021, Chinese ships massed around Whitsun Reef, an unoccupied feature in the sea, ringing alarm bells in Manila, where senior officials voiced public criticism of China’s behaviour for the first time in years. By the end of the Duterte administration, the Philippines had revived its ties with the U.S. and become more assertive still, filing several diplomatic protests with the Chinese government. Elected in 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Duterte’s successor, was initially disposed toward friendly relations with Beijing, but the relationship soured only a few months into his presidency. Although China remains the Philippines’ top trading partner, Marcos, Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping did not achieve the desired results: Beijing neither agreed to make major new investments nor curtailed its “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea, understood as coercive actions that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. These rebuffs have helped push Marcos, Jr. toward strengthening ties with Washington, and the Biden administration has, on several occasions, publicly committed that the countries’ Mutual Defence Treaty would be deemed triggered in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft or public vessels. In perhaps the most significant recent development, after a series of high-level visits by U.S. officials to Manila, the two countries agreed to scale up implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which gives U.S. troops rotational expanded access to Philippine military bases, and which China perceives as a provocation, especially given these bases’ proximity not just to the South China Sea but also to Taiwan. Manila has also received defence and diplomatic support from a host of other countries, particularly Japan and Australia. Despite the dispute it has with Vietnam over parts of the South China Sea, it has engaged, more quietly, with Hanoi, and acquired maritime defence equipment from India, thus expanding its circle of partners. Joint naval exercises with various countries have included large-scale ones with the U.S. in April, which involved the deployment of missiles that can reach targets almost 1,600km away – something that was sure to draw Beijing’s attention – and took place just after Manila wound up its first-ever trilateral presidential summit with Washington and Tokyo. In the meantime, the Marcos, Jr. administration has pursued what it calls a “transparency initiative”, publicising information about maritime incidents by inviting journalists to join its coast guard ships or posting video recordings of events almost as they are happening. Dramatic footage of Chinese vessels blocking, ramming or attacking its resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal with water cannons has generated widespread condemnation in the Philippines and abroad. Many consider these tactics to be bullying. For its part, and despite the 2016 ruling, Beijing asserts that Manila is intruding into its waters and maintains that it is demonstrating maximum restraint. China has also recently referred to a so-called gentleman’s agreement under former President Duterte that it says foresaw preserving a status quo in the South China Sea, with Manila ostensibly agreeing to supply only humanitarian goods and no construction materials to the BRP Sierra Madre; Manila denies that there was any such arrangement. Given the Philippines’ determination to continue resupplying its troops on the BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal will likely remain a flashpoint. Due to the constraints imposed at sea by the Chinese maritime militia and coast guard, Manila is starting to look into other means of provisioning its outpost, some of which are likely to irk Beijing even more, such as airdrops or closer U.S. naval escorts. In September 2023, a U.S. plane was in the shoal’s vicinity during a resupply mission, while a U.S. warship passed through waters nearby in December. But the shoal is not the only possible source of tension. Chinese vessels, both official and non-official, sail through many areas where Philippine fisherfolk traditionally work, while other features, such as Scarborough Shoal, are also points of friction. A large-scale encounter or accident at sea could be especially dangerous. Should a Filipino or Chinese national die during such a confrontation, it could stir nationalist sentiments in Manila and Beijing and heighten threat perceptions on both sides. In case of loss of life on the Philippine side, Manila would expect its U.S. ally to assist under the Mutual Defence Treaty, especially given the recent exchanges with Washington on that topic, although the U.S. has not said precisely how it would come to the Philippines’ aid. How such a dangerous situation would evolve depends in large part on Manila’s political decision to invoke the treaty and the choices Washington makes about how to fulfill its commitments. In principle, Beijing and Manila remain open to negotiations. But the bilateral consultative mechanism, a confidence-building measure designed in 2017 to manage maritime issues between the two countries, among other things, has generated no results of note. Meanwhile, efforts to create a Code of Conduct, which aims to reduce tensions at sea by setting up norms and rules between claimants and has been under discussion between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for over two decades, have stagnated. Why the Sea Matters The South China Sea is a vital waterway through which around one third of global shipping passes. Peace and stability in the sea are a prerequisite for safe trade and are demonstrably in the interest of the EU and its member states. At over 40 per cent, the share of the EU’s trade with the rest of the world transiting the sea is even higher than the global average. Instability in the area would deal a major blow to the European economy; even a slight disturbance of shipping routes could result in higher transport costs, shipping delays and acute product shortages. Should there be an escalation that pits China against the U.S. in a direct conflict, the consequences could be catastrophic and global. European positions toward South China Sea disputes have traditionally highlighted the importance of all parties respecting international law and the need for peaceful resolution, while being careful not to take sides. But over the last few years, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have driven a greater sense of urgency and something of a shift in European thinking. First, the EU and several of its member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies, designed to guide and promote cooperation with countries throughout the region. Secondly, Brussels has increased its diplomatic support for the Philippine position following maritime altercations, offering supportive statements in December 2023 and March 2024. Brussels and several European capitals now back Manila in regularly underlining the importance of UNCLOS and maritime law in the South China Sea context. Meanwhile, Europe’s presence in the region is growing, if slowly and in part symbolically. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific for the first time, while European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first trip to the Philippines by someone holding that office and an opportunity to express, at the highest level, the EU’s readiness to strengthen cooperation with the government in maritime security, among other areas. A German frigate entered the South China Sea in 2021, and French and Italian ships made port calls in Manila in 2023. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines agreed to resume negotiations over a free trade agreement, while a month later France announced talks regarding a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. While EU interest in the region is rising, European stances on the South China Sea are complex, with member states harbouring different views on maritime disputes in the region and, more broadly, on big-power competition. Some, such as France – which is the only EU member state to have overseas territories in the region (and which has significant EEZ interests there) – see themselves as having stakes higher than others and are keen to participate in the region’s discussions on security. Others, such as Greece and Hungary, are less concerned with maritime flare-ups so far away and tend to ascribe greater importance to maintaining good relations with Beijing. What the EU and Its Member States Can Do As the EU and its most powerful member states are drawn deeper into the South China Sea, they should raise their diplomatic game in the region – both to ensure awareness of mounting tensions and to look for ways to manage corresponding risks. As a practical matter, Brussels could leverage its status as an ASEAN Strategic Partner to seek more participation in that bloc’s security mechanisms and regional forums; the EU and member states could seek higher levels of engagement with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea on matters concerning the South China Sea; and Europe could post more diplomats to the region, including permanent defence attachés who speak the language of naval diplomacy. Of particular importance will be maintaining strong lines of communication with Beijing, where Europe is seen as still having some distance from the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which works to its diplomatic advantage. While to some extent this communication will be traditional bilateral statecraft, it may also mean looking for new opportunities and new channels for dialogue. For example, some member states could also seek to follow the precedent set by France and China in establishing a coordination and deconfliction mechanism between their militaries. Brussels should also continue raising the South China Sea in its engagement with Beijing as it did during the EU-China summit in 2023. Maintaining these channels will become both more difficult and more important if and when the EU and member states expand their operational presence in the region – for example, if they decide to establish a calibrated maritime presence in the South China Sea, as proposed by the EU envoy to the Indo-Pacific. Such a move is still deemed unlikely for now. As for public diplomacy, Brussels and EU member states should consider practical ways to promote principles of the law of the sea in the region, making the case that broader regional support for and adherence to these principles would provide neutral ground for peacefully avoiding and resolving disputes. While it is hard to see this approach appealing to Beijing, which has rebuffed the UNCLOS tribunal’s decision, there could still be benefits in forging closer cooperation among other claimant states. Convenings in Manila and other regional capitals could cover topics related to the continuing disputes but also to cross-cutting themes of regional interest such as fisheries. With negotiations over a regional Code of Conduct stuck, like-minded countries in the region could use these occasions to at least develop common positions on discrete issues that might be addressed by the Code or that could foster regional confidence-building in the South China Sea. Finally, in the realm of capacity building, European governments should continue to strengthen coast guard cooperation with South China Sea claimant states, helping them develop tools and protocols that might be used where appropriate to avoid confrontation and conflict. Since Aquino’s administration, Manila has tried to boost its coast guard capabilities. Given that many of the other claimant states’ vessels in the South China Sea are coast guard ships, and find themselves embroiled in maritime confrontations, a common approach on rules of engagement could help avoid misunderstandings at sea. Building on the EU’s integrated coast guard system, the EU could host or sponsor joint workshops to develop operating principles for the region’s law enforcement vessels and exchange best practices with Philippine authorities. Brussels could also fund agencies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen coast guard expertise on issues such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. European member states could also participate in joint activities with the Philippine and other ASEAN coast guards to strengthen fisheries control and maritime border protection and deter piracy or smuggling.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The changes which officially made to the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence on November 19, 2024, served as a signal from Russia to the West in response to the first use of U.S. and British-made tactical missiles on Russian territory.  Judging by Russia's actions, the adjustment of its nuclear policy is part of a plan for retaliatory escalation steps, which was prepared some time ago when the United States came close to deciding on the use of its missile weapons deep within Russian territory. We are at the beginning of a dangerous escalation spiral, which could potentially lead to a conventional conflict between Russia and the United States, followed by a nuclear conflict. The immediate task of the Doctrine is to clarify the essence of future Russian signals to the adversary, ensuring their proper interpretation. At the same time, several innovations introduced in this document could have far-reaching consequences for the containment strategies of all world states. Emerging Challenges First and foremost, the changes in the doctrine are driven by the technological revolution that has occurred in military affairs over the past few decades. This revolution has effectively erased the distinction between what was once considered conventional military-technical or military cooperation and direct involvement in warfare. The core of this revolution is that the information and technological aspects of modern warfare now play a decisive role in shaping the course of combat operations. Superiority in technical intelligence, command and control systems, and information processing can provide a decisive advantage on the battlefield and transform the capabilities of weapons systems that might previously have been considered obsolete. A great power providing its partner with real-time intelligence, space communications infrastructure, and command and control and data processing software, all while requiring continuous technical support, provides the ability to fully control and direct the activities of a junior ally. Before the digital age, the recipient of even the most sophisticated weapons could use them as they saw fit, without anyone knowing, at least as long as they had the capacity to maintain them. Real-time intelligence assistance was nearly impossible: satellite images on analog media, typically only usable at the strategic command level, could be transmitted to an ally. Now, Ukraine’s American backers have the ability to blind the Ukrainian Armed Forces and paralyze the Ukrainian command and control system with a single click: all long-range strikes, including those carried out by drones assembled by Ukraine, are planned jointly, and none are carried out without American approval. Thus, any external power that provides significant assistance to a warring party, connected with the use of modern systems of satellite and electronic intelligence, information processing and control, is a full-fledged participant in the war. Consequently, retaliatory strikes against its troops and territory are fully justified. Technical changes are combined with political ones. The progress of the American model of globalization, which continued until recently, led to the coming to power in a number of countries of real "citizens of the world", claiming to enter the global elite and detached from national interests. Such states, under the leadership of a globalist elite accumulating their capital abroad, are capable of making colossal human and economic sacrifices, significant territorial losses in order to implement political directives imposed on them from outside. The durability of such regimes can be significant due to the powerful propaganda apparatus created with American assistance, as well as the systematic use of mass repressions, extrajudicial killings, torture, etc. sanctioned by the United States. Georgia during the reign of Saakashvili and modern Ukraine are classic examples of modern American proxies following this path. This model of relations is much more dangerous than the American alliances of the Cold War, when junior partners of the United States had almost complete freedom in domestic policy and tried to follow their national egoistic interests. Solutions There is no doubt that Russia has the right to strike American reconnaissance and communication satellites, as well as reconnaissance aircraft and drones involved in providing information support for the activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The only question is the feasibility of this step in achieving the goals of the Special Military Operation (SMO). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously stated, in particular, that Western satellites involved in supporting military operations could be legitimate targets for a Russian strike. The updated "Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence" extend this logic to the sphere of nuclear deterrence. The "Basic Principles" specifies that aggression against Russia and/or its allies by a non-nuclear state, carried out with the support of a nuclear state, is considered as their joint attack. Other changes concern possible scenarios for the future use of service "kamikaze states" like Ukraine by the enemy against Russia. This is the receipt of reliable information about a massive launch (take-off) of air attack weapons of all types (from drones to missiles) and their crossing the Russian border. The US can quickly give its proxy a huge capability to strike deep into Russia with drones and missiles; even if Russia completely destroys the immediate aggressor with a retaliatory strike, it will suffer heavy losses, and the US will remain the winner. Therefore, the US should be the target of a retaliatory strike on par with the immediate aggressor. Given the widespread proliferation of long-range attack drones around the world, and the US policy of transferring intermediate- and shorter-range cruise missiles to its junior allies, this condition should potentially create a new framework for future local conflicts. Given that the ability of France and the UK to produce long-range weapons without extensive use of US technology is largely lost, any massive long-range strike against sensitive forces inside Russia, delivered with Western weapons and/or big data, should result in a strike against the US. At this point, since American and European long-range strikes on Russia have already been carried out, Russia probably has no choice but to transfer to one or two countries the weapons or technology that will allow them to reliably deliver payloads to North America and Western Europe: the Americans and Europeans must pay. But how widespread such a practice will be in the future is one of the important questions of the post-war world order. In the course of the current conflict, the question of strikes on American targets will probably arise with the further expansion of the practice of American proxy strikes deep into Russian territory. Another change related to the response to threats of possible conflicts in the coming years was the specification of the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the event of non-nuclear aggression against Russia. If earlier the condition for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons was defined extremely vaguely as "aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened", now we are talking about a "critical threat to the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity" of Russia and Belarus. As the experience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in the Kursk region showed, the United States can send its proxies to carry out operations that lead to an advance into Russia by tens of kilometers. In the future, each such operation should be considered as an attack by the United States on Russia. The Problem of Defining Criteria The issue of "proxy states" or "kamikaze states," which can be rapidly rearmed and thrown into battle under external control, will continue to increase. This will be driven by the development of military capabilities (particularly those involving artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms, and weapon systems, etc.) in combination with the refinement of methods for societal control. Russia is not the only one that will have to deal with this problem. In the long term, there will be a difficulty of developing criteria for the level of "support" by a nuclear state for a non-nuclear country, at which the actions of the junior partner become their joint aggression.  Probably, we can talk about finding a combination of political, economic and military-technical conditions, at which the "junior partner" can no longer be considered as a separate participant in international relations. In this case, the responsibility for any significant attacks from it on Russian or Belarusian territory should be borne by the patron state. Such criteria must be logical and transparent, and their development and announcement probably need to be done in advance. Perhaps such a practice will gain some currency in the future unstable world as a way to protect the national territories of great powers from attack, narrowing the potential for the use of "service states".