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1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/artificial-intelligence.html

The recently released Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has upended what had been the decades-long consensus about American foreign policy. Most notable in it is the Trump Administration’s prioritization of the Western Hemisphere as an American security concern, its deemphasis on defending America’s traditional European allies, its identification of China as far more of a threat than Russia, and its determination not to be drawn into conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. But while the 2025 Trump Administration National Security Strategy breaks with much of previous American foreign policy, the logic behind it is not something completely new. Even though the document makes no mention of him, the policy outlined in the NSS comports with what John Mearsheimer described in his influential book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, which was first published in 2001 and updated in 2014. In his book Mearsheimer declared that no nation has ever achieved global hegemony. According to Mearsheimer, America is the only country that has achieved predominant influence in its own region (the Western Hemisphere) and has also been able to prevent any other great power from dominating any other region. Mearsheimer wrote, “States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers” (2014 edition, p. 41). Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy has, whether knowingly or not, adopted these aims as well. It discusses the various regions of the world in the order of their priority for the Trump Administration: the Western Hemisphere first, followed by Asia (or Indo-Pacific), Europe, the Middle East, and lastly Africa. With regard to the Western Hemisphere, the NSS unambiguously calls for the restoration of “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” and states, “We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” This is very much in keeping with what Mearsheimer described as America being a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. As for the other four regions of the world, though, the Trump Administration seeks either to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant — or it doesn’t see this as a possibility that needs to be worried about. According to the NSS, the Middle East was a priority in the past because it was the world’s most important energy supplier and was a prime theater of superpower conflict. Now, however, there are other energy suppliers (including the U.S.) and superpower competition has been replaced by “great power jockeying” in which the U.S. retains “the most enviable position.” In other words: the Trump Administration does not see any other great power as able to become predominant in this region which is now less strategically important than it used to be anyway. Similarly, the NSS does not see any other great power as even seeking to become predominant in Africa. The NSS thus sees America’s main interests there as mainly commercial. By contrast, China is seen as a threat in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS, though, discusses Chinese threats in the economic and technological spheres before turning to the military one. A continued U.S. military presence in the region is seen as important for preventing Chinese predominance. But Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia are all enjoined by the NSS to increase their defense spending in order to counter this threat. The NSS also identifies “the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea” as a common threat that not only requires investment in U.S. military capabilities, “but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond.” Unlike the Middle East and Africa, then, the NSS does identify a rival great power as striving for predominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Countering it, though, is not seen as just being America’s responsibility, but also that of other powerful states in the region. The strangest section in the 2025 NSS is the one on Europe. While acknowledging that “many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat,” the NSS envisions America’s role as “managing European relations with Russia” both to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability” and “to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.” This is very different from the decades-long U.S. policy of seeing America’s role as defending democratic Europe against an expansionist Soviet Union in the past and Putin’s Russia more recently. Indeed, the NSS’s claim that the European Union undermines “political liberty and sovereignty” and its welcoming “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” (in other words, anti-EU right wing nationalist ones) suggests that it is not Russia which the Trump Administration sees as a rival, but the European Union. The 2025 NSS does call for a “strong Europe…to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” The NSS, though, seems to envision the European Union as either greater than or equal to Russia in threatening to dominate European nations. In his book, Mearsheimer did not envision the European Union as a potential great power rival to the U.S. Indeed, there isn’t even an entry for it in the book’s index. The way that the NSS envisions the world, though, comports with how Mearsheimer described America’s great power position: predominant in the Western Hemisphere and able to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant in any other region of the world. Mearsheimer, though, is a scholar who described the position in the world that he saw the U.S. as having achieved and which would seek to maintain. The 2025 NSS, by contrast, is a policy document laying out how the Trump Administration believes it can best maintain this position. And there is reason to doubt that it has done so realistically. Keeping non-Hemispheric great powers out of the Western Hemisphere will not be easy when there are governments there that want to cooperate with them. Further, devoting American resources to being predominant in Latin America when this will be resented and resisted could not only take away from America’s ability to prevent rival great powers from becoming predominant in other regions, but could counterproductively lead Latin American nations than have already done so to increase their cooperation with external great powers which the Trump Administration wants to avoid. Further, the Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce the influence of the European Union runs two risks: the first is that such an effort will succeed, but that the rise of anti-EU nationalist governments throughout the old continent results in a Europe less able to resist Russian manipulation and incursion. The second is that Trump Administration efforts to weaken the European Union backfire and result not only in a Europe united against American interference but unnecessarily emerging as a rival to the U.S. It would be ironic indeed if pursuing the NSS’s plan for upholding what Mearsheimer described as America’s ability to predominate over the Western Hemisphere combined with an ability to prevent any rival from predominating over any other region ended up undermining America’s ability to do either.

As international order evolves in the 21st century, strategic competition is increasingly shaped by technological frontiers and emerging domains of power. Unlike the unipolar moment following the Cold War, the contemporary landscape is defined by multipolarity, where major powers vie for influence across space, cyberspace, and biotechnology. Outer space has emerged not only as a frontier for exploration but also as a potential arena for resource acquisition and military projection, raising novel challenges for international law, security policy and cooperative governance. Examining interstellar phenomena in this context underscores the importance of preparedness, coordination, and risk management, even without assuming the presence of extraterrestrial intelligence, yet acknowledging the unprecedented nature of events that are pushing the boundaries of human observation. Humanity is gradually entering an era in which technological progress is reshaping our conception of cosmic exploration. As advancements in rocket propulsion, materials science, and observational astronomy accelerate, the prospect of humanity departing Earth towards other worlds becomes less a distant dream and more an inevitable chapter in our long-term evolution. The future of our species increasingly appears to be tied to the potential terraforming of new planets and celestial bodies, alongside the development of aerospace technologies capable of carrying us deeper into the cosmos. Within this transformative horizon, the Fermi paradox or the Dark Forest theory gains renewed relevance, challenging humanity to consider the existential filters that civilizations must surpass to survive, expand and potentially encounter other life forms. Yet, while such milestone may unfold centuries from now, the foundations of that future are being laid in the present. In the 21st century, specifically by the year 2026, humanity will become more capable of observing its immediate cosmic neighborhood. Modern telescopes and space-based observatories allow us to detect objects that for centuries have likely passed through our solar system unnoticed. Only within the brief span of our scientific maturation have we acquired the tools to identify interstellar objects, bodies originating beyond the solar system whose physical properties and trajectories challenge our existing frameworks. These objects, often catalogued as cometary in nature, possess characteristics that warrant careful study. Their unusual shapes, compositions, and velocities offer insights into environments beyond our interstellar cradle and, in some cases, raise questions about their natural origin or even the possibility of artificial extraterrestrial technology. As our detection capabilities improve, the arrival of each interstellar visitor represents not only a scientific opportunity but also a critical data point for understanding planetary security and defense. Consequently, their study urges nations to evolve towards a more serious and coordinated international framework capable of addressing the strategic, scientific, and existential implications of interstellar encounters. The emergence and Relevance of Interstellar Objects The scientific understanding of interstellar objects (ISOs) has evolved rapidly in recent years, propelled by technological advances and the unexpected discovery of bodies crossing the solar system on hyperbolic trajectories. Before 2017, the existence of such objects was largely theoretical, supported by models of planetary formation and stellar dynamics that predicted the ejection of debris during the early stages of planetary system evolution. These models implied that the Milky Way should contain vast populations of wandering fragments- comets, asteroids, and potentially more complex bodies such as extraterrestrial debris moving freely through interstellar space. Yet observational confirmation remained unattainable due to instrumental limitations. This changed with the detection of the first confirmed interstellar object, 1/Oumuamua, whose physical properties departed radically from known solar system bodies. Its non-gravitational acceleration, lack of a visible coma, and elongated shape challenged established models of cometary activity and asteroidal composition (Meech et al, 2017). The subsequent discovery of 2I/Borisov, a more conventionally cometary object, confirmed that the solar system is indeed exposed to material originating from other stellar environments (Jewitt & Luu, 2019). The contrast between both objects highlighted a key insight: ISOs are highly diverse, and their properties may reveal mechanisms and materials absent from our own planetary system. Advances in wide-field surveys, high-resolution instrumentation, and automated sky- monitoring systems have significantly expanded humanity´s capacity to detect and track ISOs. The increasing sensitivity of these tools marks a transition toward a new observational era in which interstellar detections may become more frequent. As a result, we are now able to observe the behavior of bodies entirely foreign to the solar system-objects whose trajectories, compositions, and signatures often defy established expectations and expose gaps in existing theoretical frameworks. This expanding observational capability not only advances scientific knowledge but also underscores the urgency of early warning detection. Because ISOs are typically identified within narrow observational windows, delayed characterization can lead to the loss of critical scientific and strategic information. Consequently, the growing presence of ISOs calls for enhanced global coordination, standardized protocols, and a more serious international approach to monitoring and interpreting near-Earth interstellar encounters. The Impact and Arrival of 3I/ATLAS The discovery of 3I/ATLAS, the third confirmed interstellar object entering our solar system, marks a significant milestone in modern astronomy. Unlike 1/Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov, whose observational windows were limited and partially constrained, 3I/ATLAS has provided a comparatively longer period for systematic study. Its hyperbolic trajectory, unusual photometric behavior, and non-standard luminosity variations have made it an object of exceptional scientific interest. While early observations suggest that while 3I/ATLAS shares key characteristics with known cometary bodies, its behavior reinforces broader findings that interstellar objects often display physical and dynamical properties that do not fit neatly within exiting taxonomies of solar system objects (Jewitt, 2023). The media response to 3I/ATLAS has been unprecedented. As with Oumuamua, the object rapidly became the subject of public fascination, sensational claims, and speculative narratives. News outlets, online forums, and social media ecosystems proliferated interpretations ranging from exotic physics to extraterrestrial probes. While much of this discourse lacks grounding in empirical evidence, its widespread circulation reflects a broader sociological trend: interstellar phenomena increasingly operate not only as a scientific event but also as catalysts for public, imagination, cultural anxiety, and geopolitical attention. As Kaku (2020) notes, humanity approaches a technological threshold where cosmic discovery intersects directly with public consciousness, provoking both curiosity and apprehension. From a scientific standpoint, researchers such as Loeb (2021) have emphasized that anomalous behavior in interstellar visitors should not be dismissed lightly. Although 3I/ATLAS currently appears consistent with a natural origin, its unique features-and the difficulty in categorizing ISOs-underscore the need for serious, methodical investigation. Loeb argues that humanity must abandon its complacency regarding the unknown nature of interstellar technologies or civilizations and instead adopt a posture of preparedness, open inquiry, and systematic risk assessment. In his view, phenomena like 3I/ATLAS are reminders that humanity is not isolated, and that contact-whether intentional or incidental—with non-human intelligence represents a real possibility with profound implications. The arrival of 3I/ATLAS has also highlighted the potential consequences of extraterrestrial technological encounters. Even in the absence of direct evidence of artificial origin, the mere ambiguity of such objects can trigger global destabilization through speculation, misinformation, or geopolitical competition. Historical examples such as the economic collapses of 1929 and 2008, the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the global tensions surrounding major wars demonstrate how uncertainty-especially when amplified by media-can generate widespread instability. In this context, an interstellar object exhibiting unexplained characteristics could easily become a flashpoint for international tension, economic turbulence, or strategic miscalculation. Thus, beyond its scientific significance, 3I/ATLAS has brought renewed attention to the vulnerabilities and responsibilities of a species becoming increasingly aware of its cosmic environment. The object serves as a practical reminder that humanity must develop not only more advanced observational systems but also coordinated international frameworks for managing unexpected astronomical events. As we confront the possibility of encountering technologies or life beyond Earth, the world must adopt a more mature, structured approach to detection, interpretation, and global communication. This moment sets the stage for next critical dimension of the discussion, the implications of interstellar objects for planetary security and defense, and the urgent need to assess humanity’s readiness for cosmic contingencies. Toward a Multiplanetary Security Architecture Planetary security has grown increasingly complex as scientific capabilities expand toward detecting and characterizing interstellar objects whose origins and physical attributes lie beyond conventional astrophysical categories. Within the United Nations framework, existing mechanisms-such as COPUOS, the International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN), and the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG) provide the foundational structure for global coordination on natural impact hazards (UN COPUOS, 2014). However, these institutions were established under assumptions limited to solar system derived natural threats, leaving them poorly equipped to address unknown interstellar phenomena. The Outer Space Treaty and subsequent conventions introduced broad principles on cooperation and peaceful use, but no anticipated scenarios involving technologically anomalous interstellar objects or potential artificial extraterrestrial artifacts, resulting in a significant global governance vacuum. These mechanisms are designed primarily for probabilistic, natural impact scenarios, not for interstellar objects exhibiting anomalous trajectories, non-gravitational accelerations or uncertain technological signatures. Recognizing this gap, recent scientific proposals-most notably those advanced by Loeb (2023)-have called for the development of a dedicated international coordination mechanism under the United Nations system for the study and assessment of interstellar objects. Rather than proposing a fixed institutional blueprint, these contributions emphasize the need for a structured platform capable of integrating scientific analysis, risk assessment, and transparent diplomatic communication in cases involving anomalous interstellar phenomena. Such proposals should be understood not as a definitive institutional prescription, but as forward as a definitive institutional prescription, but as forward-looking reference points for the type of governance architecture of international community must begin to contemplate. As humanity´s observational reach extends beyond the boundaries of the solar system; this governance gap becomes increasingly consequential. Interstellar objects introduce forms of uncertainty that existing planetary defense regimes-designed around predictable, solar system-derived threats were never Intended to manage, underscoring the need for flexible and adaptive legal frameworks capable of integrating scientific uncertainty into decision making processes. Within this emerging landscape, conceptual assessment tools have gained relevance as mechanisms to structure uncertainty rather than eliminate it. One illustrative example is the Interstellar Threat Assessment Scale (ITAS) proposed by Loeb (2024), which offers a simplified framework for evaluating interstellar detections based on observable characteristics rather than speculative intent. As its lower levels, the scale categorizes objects that behave consistently with natural interstellar debris, such as comet-like bodies exhibiting predictable physical and dynamic properties. Higher levels correspond to increasing degrees of anomaly-such as unexplained non-gravitational acceleration, unconventional trajectories, or geometries inconsistent with known natural formation processes. While the scale is not explicitly designed to identify extraterrestrial technology, it intentionally encompasses characteristics that fall outside established natural baselines. This design allows it to function across multiple scenarios, from rare or poorly understood natural phenomena to detections that may warrant closer scrutiny due to their atypical behavior. In this sense, the framework remains agnostic regarding origin, yet adaptable enough to support both conventional astrophysical analysis and precautionary assessments under conditions of elevated uncertainty. Importantly, it does not assert hostile intent or artificial origin, rather it operates as a risk-management tool that helps differentiate levels of scientific uncertainty and potential planetary relevance. Approached in this manner, such frameworks contribute to the evolution of international space governance by providing a shared analytical language for policymakers, scientific institutions, security agencies and statecraft-oriented decision-makers. By standardizing how uncertainty is assessed and communicated, they reduce fragmented national interpretations, limit reactive or militarized responses, and promote cooperative, evidence-based decisions. Decision-making under conditions of incomplete information. This process reflects a broader need for international space law to evolve dynamically. However, the governance of interstellar risk cannot rely solely on conceptual models or isolated scientific initiatives. It requires a genuinely planetary response that integrates the full spectrum of contemporary technological, institutional, and political capacities. International legislation governing outer space must be adaptive and evolutionary, capable of responding to emerging scientific realities. Artificial intelligence, real-time global surveillance networks, and autonomous detection algorithms must be incorporated into a unified planetary architecture capable of identifying and characterizing interstellar objects far earlier than current capabilities allow. Equally important is the sustained collaboration among major space agencies-including NASA, ESA, CNSA, ISRO, Roscosmos, and JAXA- alongside private actors such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and emerging aerospace enterprises, whose technological capabilities and rapid innovation cycles are increasingly central to space governance. Equally critical is great-power cooperation. From a realist perspective, the international system remains defined by competition, power asymmetries, and strategic mistrust. Yet planetary defense represents a rare domain in which shared existential vulnerability can partially override zero-sum logic. The detection of an anomalous interstellar object must never become a catalyst for geopolitical rivalry or strategic miscalculation, but rather an opportunity for transparent scientific collaborations and coordinated global response. In an international order strained by power competition, planetary security stands as one of the few areas where shared survival interests necessitate shared responsibility. Ultimately, interstellar objects compel humanity to transcend political fragmentation and adopt a forward- look global strategy. Building a resilient planetary security architecture requires the integration of scientific expertise, adaptive international governance, technological innovation, and coordinated commitment of state and private actor alike. Whether future interstellar encounters prove benign or reveal unprecedented anomalies, preparedness is not speculation, it is an essential step in the evolution of humanity´s role within the cosmos. References - Jewitt, D., & Seligman, D. Z. (2023). The interstellar interlopers. Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics, 61, 197–236. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-astro-071221-054221 - Jewitt, D., & Luu, J. (2019). Initial characterization of interstellar comet 2I/2019 Q4 (Borisov). The Astrophysical Journal Letters, 886(2), L29. https://doi.org/10.3847/2041-8213/ab530b - Kaku, M. (2018). The Future of Humanity: Terra­forming Mars, Interstellar Travel, Immortality, and Our Destiny Beyond Earth. Doubleday. https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/555722/the-future-of-humanity-by-michio-kaku/ - Loeb, A. (2021). Extraterrestrial: The first sign of intelligent life beyond Earth. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. https://openlibrary.org/books/OL31850155M/Extraterrestrial?utm_source=chatgpt.com - Loeb, A. (2024). The interstellar threat assessment scale. Medium. https://avi-loeb.medium.com/ - Meech, K. J., et al. (2017). A brief visit from a red and extremely elongated interstellar asteroid. Nature, 552, 378–381. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature25020 - United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS). (2014). Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its fifty-first session. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/stsc/2014/index.html