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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The outcome of the G20 leaders' summit held in Rio de Janeiro undoubtedly marks a series of victories for Brazilian foreign policy and also for the international community if we understand what is considered a success in terms of global governance. Firstly, the G20 summit declaration is a major achievement for Brazilian diplomacy, as it brings together twenty countries around agendas that not all of them support (such as human rights). Reaching this consensus required a year of intense negotiations to reach the final result. Brazil obtained support on the main themes it proposed: hunger and poverty, always off the radar of rich countries; sustainability; the bioeconomy , reaching the first multilateral treaty on the subject. Another consensus was the taxation of the super-rich , an issue that touches on the issues of inequality between countries and tax havens. Reaching the support of the G20 members around these proposals represented the reconstruction of the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy, which had been mocked during the Bolsonaro government, and crowned Brazil's return as a relevant country in the international community after years of self-inflicted isolation. Two other points that went unnoticed by some analyses is that the G20 summit allowed dialogue with Venezuela to return to normal, avoiding enormous damage to the Brazilian government and preserving good relations with the tumultuous neighboring country. And what can we say about the turbulent presence of the newest representative of the Latin American extreme right, Argentine President Javier Milei, who until the last moment tried to undo the consensus reached and was skillfully circumvented by Brazilian diplomacy? Returning to the proposals made by the presidency and supported by the other members of the group, are they “more of the same”, “undefined”, that do not change at the international level, as some analysts and part of the press said yesterday? Understanding the nature of international forums such as the G20 may answer this question. Outlined in 1999 and formalized in 2008, the G20 was created to bring together finance ministers and central bank governors from the twenty largest economies on the planet to discuss the financial crises of those periods. The crises of the 1990s, in particular, brought a new factor: it was the first time that economic problems in developing countries affected the central economies. It was therefore necessary to expand the discussions beyond the restricted Group of Seven (G7), a group of rich countries created in 1975, and to bring emerging economies to the negotiating table. Over the years, the G20 began to discuss other topics besides finance, and today sustainability is at the center of the work. The G20 emerged as an informal group with a flexible structure, dependent on a rotating presidency among its members to organize summits and working groups. In addition, it does not have a constitutive treaty and does not have the capacity to impose standards. When reading this brief description, most people wonder why a forum of this kind should exist if it “serves no purpose.” But informality and flexibility are a demand of the member countries that voluntarily chose to participate. These are the characteristics that allow ministers and other representatives of countries with divergent interests, such as the United States and Russia, to discuss issues that affect humanity, such as the eradication of hunger or climate change, for almost a year. The concrete actions that we so desperately need will depend on the efforts of each country and the corresponding pressure from their civil societies. The commitments exist, and now it is necessary to demand their implementation. Imagining a world without any kind of coordination is difficult because we have lived under the weak governance of the United Nations (UN) since the end of the Second World War, which, by the way, will be 80 years old in 2025. The memories of an international system under constant threat of global wars and in which common problems were not even discussed are a pale memory and, perhaps for this reason, so many people disdain the advances of international forums such as the G20. There are political forces today that oppose these alliances and the minimum level of global governance that we have managed to achieve, as Milei’s criticisms in his speech at the leaders’ meeting made clear. In line with the thinking of other far-right politicians, the Argentine president called global governance a “corset” that suffocates countries that think differently. It is contradictory that international regimes are criticized for restricting the freedom of States while at the same time being accused of being weak and ineffective, which demonstrates empty criticisms that serve only to encourage their supporters against imaginary enemies. Leaders like Donald Trump and Miley defend the “every man for himself” rule in international relations. This idea is gaining more and more followers among the people, a situation that makes declarations like the one by the G20, which defends basic principles of human rights and sustainability, an important manifesto for those who still defend an international order based on rules and cooperation. The Brazilian presidency has achieved important achievements for our foreign policy and also for the international order that it seeks to preserve.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском If there is a central theme to this year, it is the world getting accustomed to the lack of predetermined scenarios. Discussions focusing on the international order are fading; the former order no longer functions, and there is no knowledge of what the new one, if it ever materializes, will look like. When the authors of an annual Valdai report suggested1 several years ago that order, as we know it, was unlikely to ever emerge, their hypothesis drew restrained comments at best. How can we do without order?  However, the habit of living in a structured international system was formed recently by historical standards. Unregulated international relations have marked political history. These relations took shape in the process of interaction between the countries and quickly changed. What we now habitually call a multipolar or a polycentric world is reminiscent, in its form, of a return to an environment last seen before the Great War that broke out in the early 20th century. However, such parallels are misleading because international relations today are structured in a whole different manner.  First, despite stark differences, the world remains an integral and interconnected place. Conflicts do not sever ties but warp them, quite badly at times.  Second, compared to the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, or even 1945 when the most robust so far known global order was established, the number of significant players influencing international processes has increased by order of magnitude. That includes more than just major countries.  Previous approaches to establishing the global balance through peaceful or military means are no longer effective, and the countries have yet to see innovative tools make their way to their arsenals. We will be compelled to make do with what we have and accommodate this toolset to deal with the changed circumstances. This will require everyone to re-interpret the ongoing developments and to forgo the stereotypes that defined our perspectives in the previous era. In last year’s report,2 we suggested that the impossibility of structuring international relations around a hierarchy-based approach would be a hallmark of the coming era. The ensuing events showed that things have indeed taken this course.   Avert an all-out cold war.  In 1945, when the international order that we view to this day as exemplary was emerging, writer and essayist George Orwell made a disappointing conclusion in his essay You and the Atomic Bomb3 to the effect that the formidable military capabilities of the countries with massive nuclear arsenals made perpetual cold war unavoidable. This goes beyond confrontation between them and includes − an even more consequential factor − their confrontation with other countries that do not possess weapons of mass destruction. In the hierarchy of international priorities, the relations between the great nuclear powers will always top other kinds of relations, and their conflict will prevent a system of cooperation, global or regional, from ever being created and will only allow creating a system of competition instead. All initiatives put forth by these powers bear the imprint of their relations with those who match them in destructive capabilities. Thus, international politics appeared to him doomed to a perpetual state of not a war, but “peace that is no peace.”  So far, the fate of global stability has indeed been falling prey to differences among the most powerful countries, such as the United States, Russia, and China. But does this provide enough ground to believe we should “bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of?”4 Especially so since, even amidst intense confrontation, the world is not splitting into rivalling blocs as it did in the past century. The bloc system experience, like that of the Western community, is not replicated despite its perceived success. This suggests that binding alliances marked by ideology and stern discipline are an exception than the rule. There is no indication that other countries are seeking to form alliances like the West in terms of like-mindedness.  New rules emerge from shifts in the balance of power and, if we take the modern-day world, the fact that small groups of countries are no longer able to tell the rest of the international community what to do. The drive for independence relying on mutual respect that we see in most countries around the world has become the structural foundation underlying an emerging regional and international order. Today’s situation is ironic. On the one hand, a profound shift is unfolding on the international stage. It is greater in size and depth than the previous one that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand, these changes are not revolutionary by nature. They are not leading to collapse and evanescence, but rather to transformation of the erstwhile rules and norms. Truth be told, no one is really interested in seeing a radical scenario play out. The current and anticipated international escalation looks less like a premeditated strategy and more like an outcome of hare-brained actions or a lack of alternative ideas. The key point is that there is no going back, and what lies ahead will look nothing like recapitulation of the past.  There is a demand for stabilizing mechanisms that would not only expand existing capabilities of the countries, but also function as safeguards against the woefully tragic scenarios, such as those playing out around Ukraine and in the Middle East. The search for such mechanisms will be most widespread in Eurasia, which is the world’s largest continent in terms of its territory and population. This is where the most favorable prerequisites for that have developed. Eurasia’s connection to the rest of the world is so deep that Eurasian processes will have a decisive impact on the other parts of the planet and on approaches to addressing crucial security and sustainability issues, such as food, energy, and the environment. Development of each means security for everyone From the particular to the general  Building a Eurasian system of security cooperation, both as an ideal and a practical project, runs into numerous obstacles. Yet it is possible within this vast expanse, if the goals of each nation’s development can be prioritized over the factors that drive conflict and competition. In Greater Eurasia, conflicts impact only peripheral areas and do not go deep inside the territory, which means that preserving stability through leveraging new forms of security coordination appears quite achievable.  Global events of the past three years clearly show that individual countries’ push to pursue diverse paths of development and to avoid confinement within specific blocs is stronger than the inertia of division along ideological or even strategic lines. Even at the peak of the ideological and military rivalry in the latter half of the 20th century, many “third world” countries chose not to align with either side of the binary universe, even though the two opposing blocs formed the core of international politics. This reluctance has become even more natural now that rivalries have lost their structured character, and the ideology-driven attempts to divide the world into democracies and autocracies are artificial to the point where they fail to hold up to the international real-world test.  With varying degrees of confidence and assertiveness, most countries are upholding their right to their unique place in global affairs, aiming to determine their own paths to achieve their development and security goals. Modern history provides examples of cooperative initiatives aimed at shared prosperity, of which ASEAN is the best known one. Such cooperation is grounded in ruling out diktat in political matters and expanding practical interactions to address each country’s unique needs. These principles offer a starting point for reflections on what regional security might look like in the modern world. Collectively, regional security systems form a foundation of universal security.  Eurasia’s security is inseparable from global security, which makes it particularly special.  First, the security of Russia and China directly depends on their respective relations with the United States. This is a crucial element of international politics that defines its content. Accordingly, the strategic ambitions of the United States have a direct impact on Eurasian security. Furthermore, the western edge of Eurasia − Europe − remains part of the collective West and pursues its group interests.  Europe’s future is a crucial factor which will affect international politics in the decades to come. Even though the era of Europe as the global center is ending, it remains an attractive partner for achieving development goals in other regions due to its economic power and technological capacities. The 2022−2024 events reinforced transatlantic ties and diminished Europe’s agency in international affairs, as the latter continued to follow unwaveringly in the wake of US politics. However, given the pace and scale of global changes, this situation may not last forever. The key Eurasian powers are operating on the premise that the positioning of Europe can shift in the coming years in the wake of the international system transformations, potentially drawing some European countries into embracing broader Eurasian projects. Second, the security of a group of Eurasian countries also makes up part of the collective security. Many of these countries find key financial, technological, and cultural resources for their development outside of Eurasia. They also play important roles in international politics and have influence on numerous developments around the world. Their global importance and involvement in the highest level “great game” ensure that they have a stake in maintaining peace in Eurasia. This helps explain the relative stability within Eurasia’s borders and supports the efforts to establish common security platforms in Eurasia. Notably, not a single major military conflict involving Eurasian countries has ever broken out after WWII (the western edge is an exception due to the European “zero-sum game” approach that has dominated that part of the world for centuries).  The historical paths and itineraries across Eurasia and around it, which predate the Age of Discovery and European colonization, are being revitalized as the global political and economic system continues to diversify. Ironically, the punitive economic measures imposed by the United States and its allies on Russia help develop alternative global trade networks, promote economic flexibility and the search for alternative solutions.  Third, Eurasia objectively covers a sizable portion of habitable land and is home to multiple civilizations and dozens of countries that accommodate 70 percent of the world’s population. It is no coincidence that this region intrigued classical geopolitical theorists who saw Eurasia’s Heartland as the center of global processes.  Eurasian security is inseparable from global security, and its specific principles, mechanisms for country-to-country cooperation, and institutional forms can hardly be defined specifically for just one region. Eurasia is complex in terms of country-to-country relations, but holds vast potential, given its quest for a sustainable interrelations system and absence of obsolete institutions. It has the potential to develop alternatives to the principles and institutional forms of European security,5 which cannot be universal due to Europe’s unique cultural and historical background. The Helsinki framework, which created the Conference and then the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was Europe’s most significant achievement in establishing security for all. However, the OSCE was unable to adapt to the new balance of power following the 1946–1990 Cold War, which spawned ongoing major military and political crisis in Europe.  From the general to the particular  Eurasia is a region that may give birth to a new concept of international security. This potential is supported by, on the one hand, its inseparability from global security and development issues and, on the other hand, by the countries’ interest in a stable environment that is free from existential threats. Eurasia’s position in the global economy does not require nations to unite solely to reap the benefits of unification, as is the case with the Western countries. However, the creation of well-defined geopolitical and civilizational barriers is unlikely in Eurasia. The continent’s vastly different experiences in new international trends may eventually provide a foundation for global transformation.  Factors that underlie Eurasian security are the following:  Recognition of the continent’s spatial integrity and the impossibility of drawing dividing lines there.  Acknowledgment of shared interests and collective leadership.  Political equality of all countries of the region, regardless of their size or potential. There are no revolutionary or revisionist countries in Eurasia that feel compelled to export their political systems (exporting socio-political models as the Soviet Union or the United States did) to survive. Radical ideas come not from the countries, but from transborder extremist groups. Containing and eliminating them is a common objective.  The Eurasian regional security system aims to address issues separately from global security concerns which are, according to Orwell, dominated by relations between major nuclear powers, and to enhance the region’s resilience to external challenges, which implies resilience of each country. Defence against external threats and preventing internal conflict from getting worse are achieved through multilateral cooperation rather than rigid bloc discipline. A practical objective at hand is to identify external threats that will not force Eurasian countries into picking sides in an Orwellian Cold War with the involvement of nuclear powers.  A shared understanding that independent countries form the basis of order helps articulate the core principle of mutual renunciation of any moves that may violate the region’s integrity and equality of the countries in that region. The core value lies in unconditional respect for each other’s socio-political systems and firm rejection of the efforts to change them. This approach may seem self-evident and is in stark contrast with the practices used in the 1990s–2010s when forceful transformation of sovereign countries with active external involvement up to military intervention was cast as a standard approach by Western political leaders.  Sovereign equality enables justice, a concept that, while subjective, is central to international politics. Future international order will center on ensuring just relations, even if past institutions, which were designed to smooth power imbalances, get dismantled. The more the future rules can guarantee fairness, the more effective they will be at preventing armed conflicts. The collective goal is to uphold justice regarding the core interests and values of all Eurasian nations. Not like in Europe  It is unrealistic to expect that the next stage will somehow replicate the circumstances which were typical of Europe in the past centuries or decades. Speaking of future regional security, it is essential to break free from traditional patterns of perception and all-too-familiar solutions. Unlike Europe where the interests of Russia and the West overlap, Eurasia lacks a common fundamental challenge that could be resolved by establishing a Helsinki-like model of collective regional security. In this case, there will be no opposing great powers or blocs, whose balance will prioritize interests. In Eurasia, there are no second-grade countries or second-grade interests, because even the largest countries are incapable of imposing their own rules on any other country.  As we have seen, the balance of power underlying the European system cannot be considered a solution simply because major Eurasian countries do not compete in issues that are critical to their survival. In other words, the balance of power and influence between Russia, China, and India − even if tensions arise occasionally − does not affect their chances of survival or their chances to achieve their development goals. The differences implicating major Eurasian powers do exist, but they manifest on a global level of international politics. They are not of paramount importance in Eurasia, which is critically important when it comes to cooperation. Power and its emotions  Even though Eurasia’s make-up is unique, and it is an integral part of the international system, it is not detached from the international context and historical patterns. After a period of high regulation and reliance on institutions (this order of things was established in 1945), international relations have reverted to the “original settings.” Power remains a key category, and the use (or the threat of use) of power is back in demand. Moreover, the emotions and personal qualities of leaders, combined with national strategic cultures, now shape interactions among major powers even more than the established order, norms, and rules that date back to the era of the bipolar face-off, which persisted throughout the transitional period.  Fear and anger are two emotions that matter in international affairs. In addition to existing circumstances, they are identified in each case by a nation’s historical experience. Fear, ranging from apprehension to anxiety and dread, is one primary driver behind the countries’ behaviour.6 Anger, spanning from irritation and resentment to rage, also drives international relations and manifests itself in acts of retribution and violence that include terrorism. Fear and anger often drive not only political leaders, but entire societies as well. These emotions impact the way security is arranged and understood.  Occasionally, countries are observing the evolution of international processes from a position of force and the position of force-derived emotions, such as tranquility and firmness. The sense of power is a vital driving force in relations among leading military powers. The basic emotions such as fear and anger, as well as tranquility rooted in the sense of one’s own superior strength once again, as in previous historical eras, determine the choice between two key strategies: annihilation and positional strategy.7  The annihilation strategy invariably relies on significant superiority in assets and military force, initiative-taking moves, and swift overpowering of an opponent. By contrast, the positional strategy concedes the initiative and allows the advancing party to act. It relies on the importance of concentrating and gradually building the resources up. Anyone employing this strategy avoids decisive battles for as long as they can and engages only when they believe they cannot lose. Typically, time favors those who employ positional strategy.  Traditionally, most Eurasian countries prioritize the positional strategy. Classical Eurasian military thought is captured, for example, in the Chinese treatise The Art of War, which outlines the principles of positional strategy: “Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans, the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces, the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the fi eld.”8 In Russia, patience and willingness to endure lengthy confrontations have always been part of the military and political tradition, which manifested itself, for example, in the tactic of medieval Moscow princes or the generals of the 1812 Patriotic War.  These speculations are related to the ongoing international developments. Amid profound shifts in the balance of power, the United States, striving to maintain its hegemony, increasingly chooses offensive and provocative policies. This policy is not rooted in quiet confidence in its own strength but stems from anger and frustration at being challenged by its antagonists and resentment aimed at the internal opposition that underestimates the scale of this challenge. In addition to anger, there is fear and anxiety that the unfolding trends could lead to a scenario that is unfamiliar and unsettling for the United States where the balance of power will shift towards East.  The clash of emotions is a hallmark of the post-institutional world. 9 A different conference  Eurasia lacks conditions where any power can become dominant. This does not mean, however, that rivalry is out of the question here. Each power pursues its own interests, and balances of power will form over time and with difficulty. However, Eurasia’s advantage lies in the fact that − with few exceptions − there are no long-standing or deeply rooted conflicts between the countries overfilled with fear or anger. Major Eurasian powers do not have an objective need to be at feud with each other to achieve their vital goals. Vast and rich expanses of land can accommodate diverse cultures, civilizations, and foreign policy priorities. This is why Eurasia can reach a balance relying on a patient positional strategy rooted in quiet confidence, firmness, and mutual interest.  The Eurasian collective security system cannot rely on the principles of a military alliance with clear-cut obligations. Bloc discipline or a rigid institutional structure are ruled out as well. As mentioned above, the model established in Europe in the 1970s as part of the pan-European process cannot be used, either. However, the concept of a “conference on security and cooperation,” which emerged back in the day, fits the Eurasian space well as a mechanism for ongoing multilateral consultations involving interaction on all issues. The key difference from Europe is that the CSCE/ OSCE was originally created to defi ne spheres of influence in Europe and later morphed into a tool to maintain Atlantic monopoly. Neither is a viable option in Eurasia. An equal distribution of responsibility for stability and security among Eurasian powers is based on forgoing any nation’s dominance.  The principles of polycentricity, first outlined in the 1997 Russia China Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order,10 include non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for mutual interests, equality, and a commitment to a collective approach to addressing security issues, such as demilitarization of shared borders or provision of security guarantees to small and medium-sized buffer countries located between major powers. These principles are now taking on a multilateral dimension. The Eurasian security cannot rely on a closed architecture. It is embodied not in a single international organization, but rather in a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements and diverse associations that collectively cover all (not just military and political) aspects of collective security. Downsizing the presence of external forces, which leverage fears and anger of small and medium-sized countries to stir up tensions in Eurasia, and mitigating chances for their intervention is an important goal. The security system will focus on resolving all major conflicts with the involvement of regional actors.  The mutual nuclear deterrence between major powers makes achieving absolute political goals an unviable proposition. Now is the time for relative victories; achieving an absolute victory is out of the question. All major conflicts that we observe in Eurasia, such as between Russia and the West, the United States and China, India and Pakistan, and Iran and Israel, to name a few, are rooted in positional confrontations, where a strategy of annihilation is fraught with high risks and is largely unproductive. The architecture of Eurasian security in its military and political and force-based aspect will rely precisely on the sense of quiet confidence in one’s strength and the general drift of international relations. Security and advantages  Modern-day international security is a complex construct that transcends the military and political framework. Just like competition embraces all spheres of activity, including culture and the economy, so too does security with its compound nature. Common sense suggests that economic cooperation creates a foundation for confrontation-free political relations. However, things tend to be more complicated in the real world.  The Russia-EU economic relations were remarkably strong. Even in 2022, trade amounted to $258.6 billion.11 The EU was Russia’s key trading partner and the primary market for its energy. Deeper integration, such as allowing Russian companies to own EU pipeline asset shares, or shares in individual companies, such as Opel, was held back for political reasons long before Ukraine crisis broke out in 2014.12 High trade volumes did nothing to prevent degradation, and the political dialogue collapsed. Russia-Ukraine relations were likewise marked by elevated levels of mutual dependency even after 2014. In 2021, trade amounted to $12.2 billion, which did not alleviate, but rather exacerbated political differences. A peaceful matter about exclusivity of economic relations with Europe dating back to the early 2010s led to an onset of a deep crisis that ended in an armed conflict. The highest level of economic interdependence between China and the United States (with trade hitting $690 billion in 2023)13 goes hand in hand with an escalation of political competition and Washington’s attempts to throw a wrench in China’s technological growth, including by way of imposing restrictive measures.14 Conversely, complex political relations between China and India are unfolding amid trade numbers in excess of $100 billion.15  Examples of the non-linear relationship between the economy and international politics, particularly in matters of security, abound. Economic benefits may create enabling conditions for political cooperation but cannot shield countries against confrontation when it comes to fundamental security issues. Politicization and ways to fight it.  The modern-day world economy is highly globalized in terms of finance and trade. Globalization has significantly brought down costs, streamlined supply chains, and integrated multiple economies into technological and value-added chains, thus promoting their growth and modernization. The US dollar has become a convenient tool for making international payments and creating reserves, while technological platforms have brought countries together into a single economic organism. However, the “vital organs” of the global networks in the form of financial, technological, and communication hubs have remained under the jurisdiction of Western, primarily US, state bodies. The United States is losing credibility, because it takes advantage of economic interdependency networks for political gains, yet there are no full-fledged alternative solutions in sight.16 With the US dollar dominating the international scene, disconnecting individual companies or individuals from payments in dollars can result in heavy economic damage. According to SWIFT, the US dollar accounts for 48.03 percent of transactions handled by this international payments network, while the share of euro has plummeted to 23.2 percent.17 Blocking financial sanctions feature prominently in the US toolset, and are widely used by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries as well. Russia has become a primary target for such measures, although individuals from Iran, North Korea, China, and even US allies and partners like Türkiye or the UAE are also on the receiving end of these sanctions, albeit to a lesser extent. Trade and technological ties have become hot-button political issues as well. Sanctions on Russia include sweeping bans on exports and imports. US legislation imposes export control compliance on countries that use US-made technologies, manufacturing equipment, and software. Import restrictions cover Russian petroleum, refined products, gold, diamonds, steel, and other products. Export controls regarding China, especially in electronics and telecommunications, are tightening. Chinese electronic services are banned in the United States and some companies face contract restrictions in Western countries. Iran is under a total exports and imports ban, with even stricter bans imposed on North Korea. Even EU companies are forced to comply with the US export controls to avoid secondary sanctions.  Transport and digital infrastructure are affected as well. Tools include setting price thresholds for transporting Russian oil, sanctions for sizable transactions with Iran’s oil sector, and restrictions on the use of maritime space and airspace, ports, airports, gateways, and other infrastructure facilities. Sanctioned individuals are cut off from access to what are now customary services, such as email, audio, and video file aggregators, not to mention more applied online solutions in the sphere of engineering and other technical areas.  The targeted countries do provide a response. Russia and China have incorporated instruments to block financial sanctions into their legislation. Russia has imposed a ban on exports of manufacturing equipment and has implemented extraordinary measures against economic agents from unfriendly countries. China is implementing a “dual circulation” system in strategic economic areas and investing in developing its own technology. Iran and even more so North Korea have long lived under partial or near-total autarky. The US allies are pondering diversification of financial assets. Back to market  The above developments have become quite widespread and continue to expand. They transfer the cutthroat zero-sum-game-like military and political competition to the economy. It cancels market principles that are based on mutual advantages. With the economic ties and interdependence networks weaponized, severing such ties or at least diversifying them appears a sensible response. Even if such steps are deficient from a market perspective, they are inevitable as a means of mitigating security risks.  Diversifying financial settlements implies using currencies other than the US dollar. National currencies partially address this issue. Using the renminbi in trade with China is a rational choice given the availability of a vast Chinese market. However, difficulties with investing rupees arise when it comes to Russia-India trade. Even more challenges arise from trade with less developed or more specialized economic systems. Strategically, a more universal mechanism is needed that could be used by several major economies, a BRICS mechanism.  The quest for ways to diversify payments is ongoing but expecting to see a “BRICS currency” emerge any time soon is premature for technical reasons, among other considerations. A better path is not to introduce an alternative reserve “anti-dollar,” but to create diverse bilateral or multilateral settlement arrangements that can bypass the US financial service monopoly. Russia is at the forefront of these efforts given its economy size and the number of sanctions imposed on it.  The same applies to creating innovative technological chains and domestic production capacities, as well as looking for alternative suppliers of manufactured goods and technologies. More recently, we had the chance to witness critical vulnerabilities when it comes to using products that include Western-made components. The domestically made substitutes can be less effective and more expensive but are unparalleled in terms of security. Amid bans and restrictions, such alternatives provide a solution, as does searching for replacements in other markets. Today, we see new chains pop up in places where they could hardly be expected to exist just a few years ago, especially when it comes to Russia-China relations. The US stick policy has defeated its purpose when economic agents around the globe became more ingenious and improved their economic flexibility. The infrastructure constraints have spurred the emergence or scaling of various phenomena, including “shadow” tanker fleets, alternative insurance systems, exchanges, communication, and online communication services.  Large transport projects in Eurasia are back on the agenda. Progress can be clearly seen in the North-South corridor. Moving such initiatives forward and creating a single system across the Eurasian region is a challenge, since Eurasian countries vary among themselves and maintain different relations with the United States and the Western countries. Significant economic disparities are also a factor to be reckoned with. More likely, such a system might incorporate a multitude of decentralized bilateral and multilateral formats and include financial tools for transactions between individual countries, as well as settlement systems for international associations such as BRICS, technological projects in niche areas, and targeted infrastructure solutions. However, the number of such innovations will inevitably give rise to qualitative changes.  The Eurasian economy will inevitably move away from the nets of West-centric interdependence which are being used as weapons. There is no need to forget them, but there is a need for backup tools as safeguards against arbitrary politicization. Eurasian economic security can be a flexible and decentralized set of mechanisms to reduce “dependence on interdependence.” While this may seem strange now, Eurasia could indeed become a flagship in global processes for returning to a much more market-based system of economic ties. Trust without coercion  Peaceful and productive relations between countries, whether bilateral or multilateral, can only be built on trust, which holds equally true for the prospects of development and matters of security.  What underlies trust in international relations? The Western answer to this question emphasizes cultural and ideological homogeneity, with the North Atlantic Alliance as a product of this approach. Modern Western countries display a strict bloc (self-)discipline about key international issues, which can be seen in their voting as one at the UN General Assembly and the G20, as well as their unified policies. Those who break the ranks, if any, are quickly put back in their place. On the face of it, this approach presents a competitive advantage in a multipolar world, which is further proof of internal strength. However, it lacks flexibility and is marked by ideology-driven dogmatism, which is an irritant for the non-Western world.  The World Majority countries18 (a term used in Russia to refer to non-Western Global South and Global East countries) do not have to follow bloc discipline. In the face of acute geopolitical conflicts that seek to split the modern world, this can be perceived as weakness, which fact is occasionally exploited by our Western counterparts, for example, on the G20 platform. However, this phenomenon should be approached differently: as a striving of various countries to achieve ultimate flexibility, which will allow them not to limit their options and to attract every development resource within their reach.  An important question arises in this regard, though: how can relationships be built within a diversified community torn by numerous contradictions? The tradition of independent cooperation among non-Western countries spans decades, and is rooted in the 1955 Bandung Conference, where the countries then categorized as part of the Third World or the Non-Aligned Movement proclaimed shared goals and objectives. The declaration affirmed a commitment to the common cause of resisting Western colonialism and imperialism, recognized the equality of all participants regardless of differences between them, and promoted shared interests in the name of development. Later, ASEAN adopted a similar set of principles, which has now made its way to BRICS and the SCO platforms.  Similar processes are observed in Africa as well. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was based on shared values and objectives facing African countries, such as opposing colonialism and neo-colonialism. Statements by the OAU founding figures come to mind. Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, had the following to say: “Only with unity can we be sure that Africa really governs Africa.”19 In his opening remarks at the 1963 summit in Addis Ababa, where the OAU was founded, Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie I also emphasized the importance of unity and setting aside individual differences to achieve solidarity: “Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about means we discuss alternative paths to the same objectives; we engage in debates about techniques and tactics. But when semantics are stripped away, there is little argument among us. We are determined to create a union of Africans.”20 This keynote address also highlighted the direct link between Africa and Asia: “We stand united with our Asian friends and brothers. Africa shares with Asia a common background of colonialism, of exploitation, of discrimination, of oppression. At Bandung, African and Asian states dedicated themselves to the liberation of their two continents from foreign domination and affirmed the right of all nations to develop in their own way, free of any external interference. The Bandung Declaration and the principles enunciated at that Conference remain today valid for us all.”21.     Much has changed since the Bandung and Addis Ababa conferences, and the world has changed out of recognition as well. Yet, the principles and goals declared there have not only remained relevant, but are now getting a second wind, especially because they imply mutual trust. As we sum up the experiences of Asian and African countries, we can pinpoint several principles that have been tested and approved by political practices in the non-Western world.  First: Recognizing a common goal, which unites different countries, and advancing towards it is an undeniable priority of their policies.  Second: Recognizing that differences should not hold back progress towards common goals.  Third: Acknowledging the fact that differences will not vanish. Each country has its unique specifics and a path to follow. Trust implies tolerance for differences and trade-offs to make sure differences do not lead to conflict.  Fourth: Flexible institutional and procedural mechanisms. The combination of trust and acknowledgment of differences takes rigid institutional frameworks and restrictions off the list of priorities. Coexistence and intertwining of different structures with various formats of membership and commitments thus becomes the practical outcome. Fifth: Gradual internal consolidation fostering the necessary conditions.  Sixth: Strengthening trust-based solidarity among the World Majority countries.  Seventh: Commitment to seeking local solutions to regional problems and addressing global issues as a sum of regional approaches to ensure that individual countries’ right to development is not hostage to new global constraints.  This path is longer and more complex than conventional bloc discipline, but, in an increasingly diverse world, it may be the only viable path, as fewer countries out there are willing to align in a single column. Is agreeing on the world order principles possible?  The post-World War II era brought forth new, never used approaches to structuring the international political and economic system. The achievements of the then created institutions are undeniable, yet no product is everlasting. The ongoing profound transformation of the global landscape calls for an effort to deeply rethink the accumulated experience rather than discard it. The events of the second quarter of the 21st century will not draw a line under the previous world structure but will pave the way to enhance and to adapt it to new realities. After all, the ideals that guided the architects of the post-war world remain in force and align with the global trends.  An open world space that ensures the rights to peaceful development, prosperity, and self-realization for all nations and countries is a shared goal in today’s world. In fact, we are now much closer to this goal than we were eighty years ago when the post-war order was being discussed. Back then, much of the world was still under colonial rule, and major powers were entrenched in systemic ideological confrontation. Today, neither of these conditions exists, though remnants of the past are still there. Addressing these remnants should be part of the efforts to create a renewed world architecture.  The emergence of new global organizations is highly unlikely. However, at the level of large regions, unilateral efforts will be insufficient, and the push for more stable forms of cooperation is likely to prevail. Currently, new constructs of that kind − the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Organization of Turkic States, and the Belt and Road Initiative − are being tested in Eurasia. All these initiatives, as well as any existing or future ones, are experimental in nature. Time will tell how effective and functional they really are. In the future, universal regional platforms might be able to encompass different cooperation institutions in specific areas whose objectives will not conflict with one another.  In the middle of the 20th century, the world was built from the top down, from the peak of the hierarchical pyramid down to its base. The new system will not be that consistent, but it will be far more democratic. It is being built from the bottom up and relies on self-organization and cooperation between countries within individual regions, where they must jointly address pressing, practical issues. If humanity avoids making the mistakes that will set it back as was the case in the past, then practical interaction at the regional level will give rise to a new system that will capture the planet’s complexity and diversity and be able to transform these qualities from obstacles on the way to development into a foundation for growth. References 1: Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, Ivan Timofeev. Living in a Crumbling World. Valdai Club Annual Report. October 15, 2018. URL: https://valdaiclub. com/a/reports/living-in-a-crumbling-world/  2: Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, Ivan Timofeev. Maturity Certificate, or the Order That Never Was. Valdai Club Annual Report. October 2, 2023. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/maturity-certifi cate-or-the-order-that-never-was/ 3: Orwell G. You and the Atomic Bomb // Tribune, October 19, 1945.  4: William Shakespeare, Hamlet. 5: For four hundred years, the latter has served as a global security system: the Westphalian rules of the game, the balance of power, and Metternich’s rule, which holds that international security is achieved when one country considers the security concerns of another country as its own. 6: Pace M., Bilgic A. Studying Emotions in Security and Diplomacy: Where We Are Now and Challenges Ahead // Political Psychology. 2019. Vol. 40. No. 6. Pp. 1407–1417. Lebow R.N. Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations // International Affairs. 2006. Vol. 82. No. 3. Pp. 431–448. 7: Стратегия в трудах военных классиков. Edited and commented by A. Svechin. Moscow, 1924; Carr A., Walsh B. The Fabian Strategy: How to Trade Space for Time // Comparative Strategy. 2022. Vol. 41. No. 1. Pp. 78–96.  8: From the treatise The Art of War commonly attributed to the legendary military commander and strategist Sun Tzu (6th-5th century BC).  9: Dominique Moisi. The Clash of Emotions. January 31, 2007. URL: https://www.ifri.org/en/external-articles/ clash-emotions 10: Russia-China Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order. URL: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902155?ysclid=m27d9a94wj720511004 11: Товарооборот между Россией и ЕС оказался максимальным за восемь лет. March 7, 2023. URL: https://www. rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/6406ceed9a7947b3912b3c98?ysclid=m0l0zgm3hl844648897  12: Беликов Д., Егикян С. Magna и Сбербанк прокатили мимо Opel. November 5, 2009. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1268884?ysclid=m0l145995v673478546 13: Козлов А. Объем торговли США и Китая обновил исторический рекорд. February 10, 2023. URL: https:// www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2023/02/10/962429-obem-torgovli-ssha-i-kitaya-obnovil-rekord  14: Тимофеев И.Н. Политика санкций США против Китая: сравнительный анализ //Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2023.Т.67, №11. p. 70–79.  15: СМИ: Китай стал главным торговым партнером Индии в 2023–2024 финансовом году May 13, 2024. URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/20778213  16: See more about the phenomenon of weaponising interdependence in: Farrell H. and Newman A. Weaponized Interdependence. What Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion // International Security. 2019. Vol. 44, No 1. P. 42–79. 17: Доля доллара в расчетах через систему SWIFT достигла рекордного уровня в 48%. September 28, 2023.URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6239234?ysclid=m0l1mzg1fu656162416 18: The World Majority and Its Interests. Valdai Club report, ed. by Timofei Bordachev. October 10, 24, URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/the-world-majority-and-its-interests/   19: Quotable Quotes of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere / collected from speeches and writings by Christopher C. Liundi. Dar es Salaam: Mkukina Nyota Publishers. 2022. P. 68. 20: Important Utterances of H.I.M. Emperor Haile Selassie I. 1963-1972. Addis Ababa: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information. 1972. P. 352.  21: Ibid. P. 361–362.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The BRICS group emerged at the beginning of the current century as one of the important economies in the international system based on the hegemony of Western powers led by the United States of America. With the emergence of this group, political and economic writings have diversified, trying to explain the extent of this group's ability to compete globally facing the Western powers to rise to the top of the hegemony pyramid on the one hand, and the role of this group and its political and strategic influence in confronting economic, political and security challenges on the other hand. With the holding of the sixteenth presidential summit of the group in the Russian city of Kazan during the period 22 - 24 October 2024 under the slogan "Strengthening multilateralism for development, security and fair worlds" and with the participation of the group’s members and a number of other countries and representatives of international and UN organizations, many theories of international relations have tried to provide explanations for the emergence and rise of this group, including the Power Transition Theory. From this perspective, this study comes to investigate the BRICS group by relying on the interpretation of the Power Transition Theory as one of the most important theories of international relations that can contribute to developing interpretations of this group. KeywordsBRICS, International Relations Theories, Power Transition Theory, Kazan Summit Introduction Since the establishment of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in September 2006, and its first summit meeting in 2009, and with the accession of South Africa in 2011 to become an entity that includes the fastest growing economies in the world, and its name became the "BRICS Group", the group has appeared on the horizon as a diplomatic and financial alliance that is increasingly important for development in many countries, and it has also appeared as an attempt to escape Western control at the economic level. Despite the differences between the BRICS countries in terms of geographical affiliation, economic disparity and their levels of production, and ethnic, religious and linguistic disparity, they have succeeded in finding a formula for agreement among themselves and finding global geostrategic influence. In this context, it is easy to notice the serious and ambitious endeavor of the countries of this group to formulate a new international system within the framework of the important radical changes that the world is witnessing. The countries currently under the group's banner: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, present themselves as an alternative to the existing international financial and political entities. The countries of the group are trying to present themselves as representatives of the countries of the South and as "the alternative model to G7". From this perspective, the BRICS group has received great attention from a wide sector of researchers and scholars in various science fields despite the recent history of this group. Accordingly, this study attempts, by relying on the statements and assumptions of the Power Transition Theory, to determine the nature of this group. Can BRICS achieve success in shaping a new global order? The problem of the study This study believes that understanding of the BRICS group does not only require applied analysis, but also requires theoretical understanding, as theoretical thinking helps to avoid the limitations of purely empirical interpretation of the nature, mechanisms & perspectives of the BRICS countries' development. Accordingly, this study focuses on interpreting the theory of power transition for the rise of the BRICS group, and its position in the international system facing the Western powers led by the United States. How does this theory view this group through its propositions and assumptions, by answering the following questions: Are the BRICS countries just another institution for international cooperation that fits the structure of the existing international system, or is it a radically different way of international relations that could seriously change current global politics? What are the motives of the BRICS countries? Can the BRICS group become an alternative to the hegemony of Western powers that has been formalized in the current system of international institutions and systems? Will this institution provide fundamentally new conditions that may lead to the development of international cooperation in contrast to the power policies pursued by the United States and its allies? Can the BRICS countries be considered as a new mechanism for global governance, or are they nothing more than a temporary/short-lived international governmental arrangement? Accordingly, through the previous questions, this study examines a main question that revolves around how to interpret the Power Transition Theory for the BRICS group. First, Power Transition Theory Despite the many writings that have addressed the future of global hegemony in light of the remarkable rise of the role of the BRICS group, these writings have not paid much attention to placing the issue of the impact of the power transition process on the future of that hegemony within its theoretical framework, which is a framework that may shed useful light on the nature of the challenges imposed on the Great Power as it exercises its hegemony. Here, the study discusses this theory and its ability to explain the rise of the BRICS countries and its potential to bring about changes in the current international system. This is done by addressing the concept of power transition, its indicators, and its application to the BRICS group. (1) The concept of power transition Organski proposed the Power Transition Theory in an attempt to analyze global politics by presenting a hierarchical system of powers or states in light of the proportions of power resources and the possibility of war. Thus, he describes a hierarchical system through which all states are known according to the relative power distribution. The distribution of power varies between units, so at the top comes the group of Dominant Nations in which power is concentrated, and thus they are at the top of the pyramid, and thus they control the largest proportion of resources in it, but they are not considered the dominant power, because they cannot control the behavior of other powerful actors on their own, but they maintain their position as a dominant power by ensuring the preponderance of power in their favor in the face of the potential competing power, as well as their ability to manage global politics according to the rules that help ensure the profit of their allies [1].   This, and in the next tranche of the pyramid of power, come those countries called "Great Powers", which are the major countries that are not as powerful as to dominate global politics, but they have the capabilities that make them a potential competitor to the dominant power. This group of great powers is generally satisfied to remain in its position as long as there is an alliance with it and with the dominant or hegemonic power. However, in many cases, a number of these great power countries are not satisfied to remain in the same tranche following the hegemonic power, and therefore seek and try to make a change in its current international status (Kai, J. (2017)). Accordingly, the concept of a great and not satisfied power - according to Organiski's description - is the group of countries that have grown to their maximum power after the current international system has been completely entrenched, and they have not - therefore - had a share or a portion in establishing this current international system, the benefits of which have already been distributed. In addition, the dominant power and its supporters are generally unwilling to grant newcomer countries more than a small fraction of the advantages they derive from the status quo, and thus these newcomers seek to establish a new position for themselves on the international stage, these countries are noted to be growing rapidly in power and are expected to continue to grow, which gives them reason to believe that they can compete with - and sometimes surpass - the dominant nation in terms of power. Also, one of the characteristics of this category of great powers is that they do not accept the marginalization of the international stage, especially if their pursuit of hegemony and dominance will contribute to granting them greater benefits and privileges [2]. In this, and at the third and lowest stage of the pyramid of international power comes this group of countries called "middle powers", which are considered relatively strong countries in specific geographical regions, but they do not have the ability to challenge the dominant nation or the structure of the international system as a whole. At the base of the pyramid of power comes this group of states called "small powers" and colonies. Accordingly, the concept of "Power Transition" refers to "the loss of a hegemonic country’s leadership position in the international system to another newcomer whose power is rapidly growing." Thus, this newcomer seeks to reach a position of hegemony. In order for a power transition to occur, the rising country must possess power components that are greater than those of the dominant country, or at least equal to them, and thus the rising country must work to narrow the gap between its national capabilities and the capabilities of the hegemonic country. (2) Applying the Power Transition Theory to the BRICS groupThe power transition theory (PTT) is considered the most popular theoretical approach to studying the BRICS group among Western scholars. PTT is based on a number of assumptions, including: that changes in the balance of power in world politics occur systematically, and that disputes and wars are usually the result of the increasing influence of countries competing with the hegemonic powers. In this regard, all countries are divided into two groups: those that support the status quo, and "revisionists", which are the group of emerging countries that are dissatisfied with the status quo. Powerful and influential countries, such as the United States, enjoy the advantages of the existing world order and fall into the status quo category, while countries that are dissatisfied with their status and role in the international relations system are considered revisionists. According to PTT, the latter favor radical changes in the current international order. In this sense, Russia and China are the main candidates for revisionist powers, while PTT supporters view Brazil, India and South Africa as countries with “moderate” revisionist ambitions (mostly regional in nature, although Brazil and India have some global aspirations such as their intention to become permanent members of the UN Security Council). In the following, the study examines the application of traditional and non-traditional indicators of the power transition theory to the BRICS group. A- Indicators of military power transition for Russia and ChinaAs for Russia, it has succeeded in modernizing its military force and doubling its military spending through huge oil revenues, which has placed the Russian army in the second place globally among the 138 most powerful armies in the world after the United States army [3]. Moreover, Russia’s military spending is expected to increase in light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, and in March 2021, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute issued a report on arms exports for 2020, in which it confirmed the growth of the American, French and German arms exports against a decline in Russian-Chinese arms exports, but the report expects the arms boom for 2020, especially in the wake of the billions of dollars in military aid provided by Europe to Kiev. The Russian Ukrainian war highlighted the inevitability of increasing military spending, which is directly proportional to the growth of the arms market. As for China, its defense budget has been revealed, especially in light of the escalation of external threats to suppress and contain it, as it will increase by 7.2% during 2023 in order to support and develop its military capabilities, bringing total military spending to $225 billion, according to the draft budget report issued by the annual meeting of the National People's Congress of China, making this increase the fastest in China's history since 2019 in light of the escalation of tensions with the United States of America. B - Indicators of the transition of the economic power of Russia and ChinaThe economic development that Russia witnessed during the Putin era represented a pivotal point for political decision independence, which was clearly evident in the Russian national security strategy, and in Russia's approach in dealing with the challenges it faced on the international stage. Russia's domestic production in 2020 amounted to about $1.67 trillion, ranking second among the world's strongest economies (4), and it also ranks third in oil production with an estimated 12.1% of global production, in addition to being the second largest producer of natural gas with 17%. Despite the economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia following its war with Ukraine, the Russian economy remains able to bounce back and remains one of the major powers on the international stage. As for the Chinese economy, it recorded higher-than-expected growth in the first quarter of 2023, reaching 4.5% year-on-year, supported by policymakers’ moves to boost growth after lifting strict anti-Covid-19 restrictions in January 2023. Retail sales in the first two months of the year jumped 3.5% compared to 2022, a turnaround from the 1.8% year-on-year decline recorded in January 2023. This consumption will lead the economic recovery at a time when weak global demand is weighing on China’s exports. Infrastructure investment also increased by 9% year-on-year in early 2023, driven by government spending aimed at supporting the economy (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2023). According to PTT, today’s Russia is a typical revisionist country that creates many problems for the United States and its allies. Especially the threats it poses to countries friendly to the United States, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden. The problem is also exacerbated because of Russia’s cooperation with “rogue countries,” such as Syria, Iran and North Korea. While revisionist powers – Russia and China – are seen as a source of destabilization of the international system and their activities are automatically associated with negative consequences, the behavior of hegemonic or dominant countries (status quo) is considered positive because they perform protective functions within the above system. C- Indicators of power transition for Brazil, India, and South AfricaAs for explaining the “moderate” revisionist policies of Brazil, India, and South Africa as middle powers, it is primarily through their ambitions to play the role of “regional hegemony” in South America, South Asia, and Africa, respectively. However, unlike Brazil and South Africa, which do not have “hot” conflicts with their neighbors and mainly use their soft power arsenal to achieve hegemonic positions in their areas of influence, India faces more serious security challenges, including territorial disputes with China and Pakistan – and sometimes – military confrontation with the latter. It should be noted that the policies of individual BRICS countries are assessed differently. A number of PTT advocates see BRICS as a tool that allows some of its members to secure their status as great powers and balance the West at the regional and global levels. However, another group of PTT adherents see the international position of the BRICS countries differently: while Brazil and China are seen as rising powers, Russia and South Africa are seen as declining powers due to their economic problems. However, in response to the challenges posed by China and Russia, a group of push-and-talk advocates have proposed various types of containment policies, yet not all PTT theorists see the BRICS countries as revisionist powers. Some even see Putin’s policy in Ukraine as a status quo strategy aimed at securing Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space and counterbalancing NATO’s eastward expansion [5]. These analysts believe that the same (status quo) motivations drive Beijing and Moscow’s behavior at the global level. For example, Beijing and Moscow are quite skeptical about reforming the United Nations, preferring to preserve its structure and powers. As for the rest of the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, South Africa), on the contrary, they express their interest in reforming the UN in the hope that their status in the Security Council in particular and in the UN system in general will be raised. The advocates group of BRICS countries’ behaviour of PTT theorists who interpret the status quo believe that many of the problems with the BRICS countries stem from the fact that they have not been equally integrated into the international security system that emerged in the post-Cold War era. That is, Western countries led by the United States and Europe have crossed some of the “red lines” set by Russia in the post-Soviet space. For example, the armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 was a clear manifestation of this Western policy 1. The Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 with a crisis and is still ongoing, is another example. When the Kiev authorities that came to power after the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime publicly declared their intention to join the European Union and NATO, Moscow reintegrated Crimea into Russia and supported pro-Russian rebels in Donbass (southeastern part of Ukraine). From the point of view of this group, Russia's policy is determined not only by its geopolitical interests but also by its geographic & economic interests, in particular, there is a constant competition between two integration projects - Russian and EU - in the post-Soviet space: the Eurasian Economic Union led by Moscow and the Eastern Partnership program led by the EU [6]. Supporters of this point of view believe that it is better to cooperate than to confront Russia. The same approach has been proposed in relation to other BRICS countries including, for example, the Chinese "Belt and Road" initiative or the "New Silk Road" initiative.  D- Soft power in BRICS countries’ policies as an unconventional indicator in the concept of power transitionWithin the framework of the principles and assumptions of the liberal perspective that help understand international relations, dating back to John Stuart Mill, Giuseppe Mazzini, Woodrow Wilson and John Maynard Keynes, as well as to the perceptions of Immanuel Kant in the 18th century, neoliberal IR theorists believe that the BRICS group can be better explained through the concept of soft power, and they emphasize that in contrast to the Cold War era, when many countries preferred to rely on hard (military) power, soft power tools have become more effective nowadays. Neoliberals note that the soft power strategy is attractive to the BRICS countries for a number of reasons: First, it can help them overcome their negative image in the international stage, an image that resulted from their systematic involvement in a series of international conflicts (Russia versus Georgia and Ukraine; China versus its neighbors in the South China Sea; India versus Pakistan, South Africa versus Angola and Namibia). Second, the soft power arsenal can also be useful in diversifying the BRICS countries’ methods of geopolitical and geoeconomic expansion and making these methods more effective. It is worth noting some specific details in the BRICS countries’ interpretation of the concept of soft power. First, the BRICS countries interpret soft power differently from its initial meaning given by Joseph Nye, who defined soft power as the power of attraction. In fact, however, the soft power policies of the BRICS countries (especially Russia and China) are often dominated by pragmatic interests rather than being attractive to other countries. For this reason, these soft power strategies do not always consider the preferences of international partners. In Nye’s view, this is often unacceptable to the BRICS partners and may provoke a hostile reaction to their soft power initiatives [7]. Moreover, several studies have found that the BRICS countries’ reading of the concept of soft power is much broader than Nye’s. While Nye believes that a country’s soft power depends primarily on three resources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies that should be attractive to foreign partners, BRICS theorists believe in the need to include the problem of soft power in everything that cannot be attributed to the security (military) agenda. That is, for BRICS countries, the concept of soft power is synonymous with the concept of soft (non-military) security, which includes not only diplomatic, social, and cultural components - according to Nye - but also other elements, such as economic and/or financial power. In contrast, this belief is unacceptable to Nye, who believed that economic and financial tools can be tools of coercion and push rather than attraction. Moreover, for BRICS theorists, soft power is a comprehensive concept that covers other closely related concepts: public diplomacy, peoples’ diplomacy, the humanitarian dimension of politics, and NGO diplomacy. Among the soft power tools, economic and financial tools, cultural cooperation, ethnic diaspora, educational and religious institutions are the preferred methods of the BRICS countries. In this context, the BRICS countries have created special bodies to implement soft power: the Chinese Confucius Institutes, the Russian Rossotrudnichestvo (agency for cooperation with citizens abroad), the “Russian World”, the Gorchakov and Andrei Pervozvani foundations, among others. It is worth noting here that in the BRICS countries, the governments of the countries play a major role in controlling and directing soft power policy, which makes it less flexible and effective.  In general, it can be said that the BRICS countries use soft power in their own way, trying to avoid imitating the Western experience and going beyond Nye’s interpretation - which can be described as narrow - of the concept of soft power. Policymakers and experts/academia in these countries have not yet developed a clear terminology regarding soft power and this negatively affects both the theoretical understanding of this political tool and its effectiveness. At the same time, the BRICS countries have enormous soft power potential that can enhance their international positions if used properly. This is what the BRICS countries have demonstrated in the successful use of their soft power arsenal through: China’s economic, financial and cultural expansion in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. Beijing’s “Belt and Road” initiative; the rather successful Russian integration projects in the post-Soviet space (the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization). From the perspective of what was mentioned before, it can be argued that, although there are several advantages put forward by the power transition theory, it has many shortcomings. This theory was most applicable in the Cold War period, when two superpowers were interested in preserving the status quo due to the risk of mutual destruction in the event of a nuclear war. The current system of international relations, including its structure, is still in its formative stage, and in this context, the PTT can explain little about the behavior of the BRICS countries. Moreover, the PTT does not take into account the existence of a third type of countries - reformers who do not fully agree with the current system of international relations but prefer not to radically change the “rules of the game”. Instead, they try to adapt these rules to the dynamic changes in the world system in order to make them more fair and comfortable for all members of the international community. Often, these countries do not act as revisionists but it prefers the status quo by demanding that the "rules of the game" and international legal standards be observed. For example, the BRICS countries strongly oppose any attempts to revise the UN Charter regarding the use of military force and the principles of inviolability of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states (in contrast to the Western doctrine of “humanitarian intervention”). It is clear from the above that if PTT supporters want this theory to better fit current realities and retain its explanatory power, they need to revise the classification of states they use and supplement it with a new (“reformist”) type of authority. Second: The Kazan Summit and its dynamics and interactionsDuring the period 22-24 October 2024, the Russian city of Kazan hosted the sixteen Presidential Summit under the slogan "Strengthening Multilateralism for Fair Global Development and Security", with the participation of members of the bloc and several other countries and representatives of international and UN organizations. This summit witnessed several dynamics and events, which can be summarized in the following elements: 1. Continuing requests to join the group: The group represented about 36.7% of the global economy in 2024, which is more than the share of the G7 countries, which amounted to 30% in 2023. In this context, many countries expressed their desire to join, most notably Turkey, which submitted an official request to join in September 2024, while countries such as Azerbaijan and Belarus also applied to join the group.  2. Wide participation by heads of state: 38 countries participated in the BRICS summit held in the Russian city of Kazan, and most of the participation was at the level of leaders and heads of state; The participations came mainly from the heads of the bloc’s member states, namely His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, in addition to the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Antonio Guterres, and the participation of some the head of the heads of states that showed interest in the bloc, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and, Vietnamese Minister Pham Minh Chinh. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia participated with a high-level delegation headed by Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, as an invited country to join the group, and not as a full member as is the case for countries that have recently joined at the beginning of 2024. 3. Focus on international issues: The main focus of that summit's agenda was focused on the governance of the global system and its institutions, especially financial institutions that have begun to harm developing countries and tend to achieve the interests of Western powers alone; and the severe damage caused by Western sanctions to the economy and their conflict with the values of globalization, in addition to addressing raging international and regional issues such as the war in Ukraine and the Middle East. Views were also exchanged on cooperation between the BRICS countries on the international stage, including with regard to resolving ongoing regional conflicts. The agenda included discussing the conclusions of the previous summit in Johannesburg, especially deepening financial cooperation within the group, and discussing expanding the scope of the group and including new members in light of more than 30 countries expressing the desire to join. 4. Holding several meetings on the sidelines of the summit: Several meetings were held on the sidelines of the summit between the participants, perhaps the most prominent of which was a direct meeting between the Chinese president and his Indian counterpart for the first time. This came shortly after the two countries reached an agreement on conducting patrols on the disputed border in the Himalayas, after four years of military confrontation that led to an escalation of tensions between the two countries. As the host president, Putin also held bilateral meetings with all participating member states, as well as heads of invited states such as: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, and Bolivian President Luis Arce. 5. Moscow presented cooperative proposals: These included the creation of an online information exchange mechanism to resolve disputes related to e-commerce; with the aim of creating a proactive framework before litigation; an initiative to establish a BRICS Investment Arbitration Center; and the development of an agreement to settle investment disputes, it also proposed the establishment of a BRICS grain exchange, which would help discover fair and predictable prices for products and raw materials; to ensure food security and protect national markets from harmful external interference, speculation, and attempts to create artificial food shortages. That summit concluded with several outcomes and results, and the Kazan Declaration was formulated as the final statement of the summit. The most prominent of these outcomes were: 1. Financial and monetary cooperation: by moving forward towards establishing an independent infrastructure to regulate the settlement of cross-border payments and financial transactions (BRICS Clear), with the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (ICM) focusing on facilitating and expanding innovative financial practices and methods for projects and programs, including finding acceptable mechanisms for financing in local currencies. With the study of establishing a unified transportation platform to ensure multi-modal logistics services between the countries of the association, and welcoming the establishment of a new investment platform that uses the infrastructure of the New Development Bank. 2. Reforming the governance of the global system: by endorsing the call launched by the G20 during Brazil’s presidency of the group regarding reforming global governance, while endorsing dialogues and partnerships that enhance cooperation with the African continent, such as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum Summit, the India-Africa Forum Summit, and the Russia-Africa Summit, while working to build on the outcomes of the second Johannesburg Declaration of 2023, and supporting the call for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council; with the aim of making it more democratic, representative, effective and efficient, and increasing the representation of developing countries in the membership of the Council so that it can respond appropriately to prevailing global challenges, and support the legitimate aspirations of emerging and developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America.  3. Stance regarding Palestinian events: The bloc stressed the urgent importance of launching a comprehensive political process to address the entire Middle East problem, stop the violence, provide vital assistance to those affected, and work to establish a two-state solution and correct the historical injustice that the Palestinian people suffered from, and which is the only guarantee for establishing peace in the Middle East, while supporting Palestine's accession to the bloc as a member state.  4. Strengthening nuclear security: The bloc countries call for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and for the Middle East region to be free of nuclear weapons, while stressing the need for all parties to renew the Iranian nuclear agreement. Support for the initiative to establish a center for research and vaccines development was also announced, as well as continuing to develop the integrated early warning system for the BRICS group to prevent the risks of diseases and epidemics. 5. Regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war: The bloc members stressed the importance of resorting to a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian crisis and resorting to dialogue. The summit, its dynamics and its outcomes carry many implications and may have some repercussions, which can be explained as follows: 1. Russian flexibility and vitality: The success of Russian diplomacy and the Kremlin in hosting this summit at this time and mobilizing broad international participation, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations, represents a challenge to Western efforts to represent Putin as an isolated leader under Western sanctions and threatened with arrest, under the ruling of the International Criminal Court; as Russia has proven the flexibility and vitality of its regional and international partnerships as a system that enjoys international acceptance and trust. 2. The balance of Turkish foreign policy: Perhaps Turkish participation has provoked many reactions; given that it has the largest army in the ranks of NATO, which is hostile to Russia, this comes as an extension of its balanced approach in its foreign policy in order to diversify alliances while maintaining relations with the West, and it also reflects Turkish discontent with European policy regarding Ankara's membership in the European Union, and Turkey's joining the BRICS group would achieve strategic gains for the group; this will give it a balanced character instead of viewing the group as anti-Western, and this will achieve gains for Turkey, which will benefit from the flexibility of its relationship with both the East and the West. 3. Establishing a unified currency: The symbolism that Putin used during the summit regarding a unified currency for the bloc was not accepted by some of the bloc’s members themselves, who fear identifying with the Russian-Chinese orientation at the expense of their interests and their relationship with the West, most notably India and Brazil. There is a degree of exaggeration in imagining the possibility of eliminating the dollar’s position in the global system and moving towards removing it from the global economy. 4. Resolving the balance of power: We cannot ignore what is reflected in the interest of the countries of the South in participating in the activities of the BRICS summit, as well as the emerging international powers, and what it represents in terms of a trend among those countries to express their desire to change the balance of power in the global system based on Western hegemony, and to express dissatisfaction with the prevailing system, which reflects the interest in the efforts of China and Russia to direct the international community against the Western system due to its double standards, especially after the fragility of the international community organizations entrusted with implementing the rules of international law regarding the war in the Middle East became clear, in addition to their exposure of the flaws in the rules of international trade, and the frameworks of economic sanctions that harm the economies of the countries of the South in favor of the West.  In estimation, the importance of the development represented by the BRICS group and what it reflects in terms of a rapid transformation in the global system cannot be overlooked, within the framework of what it includes in terms of economy, markets, natural and industrial resources, and a huge human mass, but exaggerating the impact of the group's movements deviates from reality, especially considering that the group carries within it many contradictions that prevent the group from moving effectively, and in light of the divergence of the interests and goals of its members themselves, which can be inferred from the nature of the outcomes of the presidential summit, which are limited to announcements and visions regarding general cooperative projects without the existence of timetables and realistic implementation plans for many of them; the effectiveness of the group remains questionable. Third: Economic cooperation between the BRICS countriesData indicate that the ratio of the BRICS countries' GDP to the global GDP is witnessing a continuous increase during the period (2000-2023) to the point that it surpassed the G7 countries for the first time in 2020, as the BRICS share reached 31.02% for the G7 countries.   It is notable that the GDP rate of BRICS countries has witnessed declines during the mentioned period (2000-2024), and this decline can be explained by a number of reasons, including: the global financial crisis of 2009, the economic conditions experienced by a number of BRICS countries such as: Brazil 2015, represented by a high budget deficit and high inflation rates, Russia 2014, the decline in South Africa's GDP due to the collapse of raw material prices, and the decline in the GDP growth rate of the group's countries due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the global economy. As for the trade exchange volume, it witnessed a growth of 95.2% during the period from 2010-2022, recording about $10.52 trillion in 2022 compared to $5.39 trillion in 2010 [9]. On the side of foreign direct investment flows, according to UNCTAD data, we find that foreign direct investment flows to the BRICS group more than quadrupled during the period from 2001 to 2021, recording about $355 billion in 2021 compared to about $84 billion in 2001. In addition, the share of these flows in total global flows reached about 22% in 2021, compared to about 11% in 2001 [10]. UNCTAD data also indicate an increase in foreign direct investment among the group’s countries to reach about $167 billion in 2020, compared to about $27 billion in 2010, and China played a pivotal role in this increase by being the largest investor and recipient of investments within the BRICS group. On the other hand, Brazil and India witnessed strong growth among the group’s countries, while Russian growth declined and South Africa's foreign direct investment balance declined [11]. ConclusionThere are many theories of international relations that have tried to explain the emergence and development of the BRICS group, one of these theories is the power transition theory. The power transition theory has several analytical advantages that explain the rise of the BRICS group, but one of its biggest shortcomings is its greater applicability to the conditions of the Cold War era, where the status quo was maintained and there was fear of a nuclear war. However, the current international system is completely different, as it is in a new birth phase that hinders the power transition theory in explaining the behavior of the BRICS countries. This necessitates the interest of researchers and academics in several theories of international relations that explain the BRICS group, such as the peaceful coexistence theory, the state theory, and the global regionalism theory. In addition, supporters of the power transition theory should review the classification of countries they use to classify countries, and they should establish another type, which is reformist countries, as stated in the study. The concept of soft power as defined by Joseph Nye is completely different from that used by the BRICS group, as the group adheres to a pragmatic and practical approach to using soft power directed at promoting and protecting national interests rather than considering the preferences of international partners. The BRICS member states apply different methods in their pursuit of status - from mobility and competition strategies - to different types of policies. The BRICS group is one of the most important global economic groups that is characterized by a large number of advantages that qualify it to play a vital role in bringing about changes in the global economy due to the diversity of its member economies: Among these advantages are: - The growing economic weight of the group as a result of its association with the economies of emerging countries, which contributes to improving its ranking within the economies of the G20 countries. - The vital role played by the group in global food security through the occupation of Russia, Brazil, and India as the largest producers and exporters of wheat, soybeans, and rice - respectively - - It has adopted several important initiatives to promote and encourage investment within the group, especially with the increasing concern about the conditions of the global economy and the challenges associated with tensions on the international stage. - The BRICS countries are interested in establishing alternative development financial mechanisms to those of the West, such as: the New Development Bank (NDB), and the establishment of a Contingency Reserve Fund (CRA). - Establishing the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2025, which defines the path for the group’s development and sets the framework for cooperation between its members in accordance with current economic trends and conditions. References 1. تعتبر الحرب الروسية الجورجية التي اندلعت في أغسطس 2008 أحد الأدلة على بدء سعي روسيا للسيطرة واستعادة نفوذها السابق سواء إقليميا أو عالمياً، حيث أن تلك الحرب مثلت لموسكو فرصة كبيرة لتحقيق نصالحها عبر استعادة نفوذها في جورجيا من جهة، وإيصال رسالة للغرب وللدول السوفيتية السابقة التي تحاول الخروج من دائرة النفوذ السوفيتي بأنها قادرة على حماية مصالحها ونفوذها ولا يمكن الاستهانة بقوتها وقدرتها العسكرية والتعامل معها كدولة كبرى لها دور فاعل ومؤثر.لمزيد من التفاصيل حول الحرب الروسية- الجورجية 2008، أنظر: عودة،جهاد (2017)، الحرب الروسية- الجورجية: استعادة النفوذ الروسي في جورجيا، المجلة العلمية للبحوث والدراسات التجارية، المجلد ،31 العدد .1  [1] Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. [2] A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Pp. xii, 292. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1980 [3] Stockholm international Peace2020 ، [4] Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020 [5] Samuel Charap & Keith Darden, Russia and Ukraine, Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 56, 2014, Issue 2. [6] Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas, Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 41, 2015. [7] Joseph S.Nye, JR, The Limits of Chinese Soft Power, The World’s Opinion Page, Jul 10, 2015. [8] http://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/#:~:text=By%202023%2C%20the%20difference%20had,held%20by%20the%20G7%20countries[9] World Development Indicators Database. [10] UNCTAD. 2023. BRICS Investment Report [11] UNCTAD. 2023. BRICS Investment Report

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While the IPCC warns that we should reach the emissions peak this year, greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere will grow by 0.8%, according to the annual report from the Global Carbon Project presented this Wednesday at COP29. A cold shower in the middle of the Climate Summit, or rather, a scorching one. The independent organization Global Carbon Project (GCP), specialized in quantifying greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel combustion, has released its latest research. The 2024 edition of the Global Carbon Budget projects, with just over a month and a half left in the year, total annual emissions from fossil fuels to reach 37.4 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). This represents a 0.8% increase compared to 2023 — with a possible error range from a 0.3% decrease to a 1.9% increase — marking a new unprecedented record at the worst possible moment. In the crucial year in which, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), humanity should reach its emissions peak if it wants any chance of avoiding a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C, not only has a new historical high been reached, but there is also "no signal" that the world has reached the peak of emissions from fossil industries, warn the team behind the research presented this Wednesday. As Professor Pierre Friedlingstein from the University of Exeter’s Global Systems Institute, who coordinated the study, laments, "we still don’t see any signs that fossil fuel burning has peaked." The figures are actually more concerning, as the emissions from the "changes in land use" —which include deforestation caused by humans and their agroindustry — will add 4.2 billion tons of CO2 (GtCO2). This means that we will emit 41.6 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere, one billion more than last year, a period that was already a record. More coal, more oil, and more gas amid the acceleration of the climate crisis Despite significant progress in decarbonization, emissions from the three main fossil fuels will increase in 2024. The GCP’s projection is that coal emissions will rise by 0.2%, with coal responsible for 41% of emissions from fossil fuels; oil emissions will increase by 0.9%, with oil burning accounting for 32% of emissions; and gas emissions will grow by 2.4%, contributing 21% of total fossil fuel emissions. On the other hand, emissions from the cement industry, which account for 4% of global emissions, will decrease by 2.8% in 2024, mainly due to a reduction in the EU, although they will increase in China, the United States, and India, according to the research. By economic poles, while the EU — responsible for 7% of global emissions — will reduce its emissions by 3.8% this year, the United States, accounting for 13% of the total annual emissions, will only reduce them by 0.6%. China, the leading polluting power, with 32% of global annual emissions, is projected to increase its emissions by 0.2%, although the projected range suggests it could end the year with a slight decrease. Another emission hub, India, which produces 8% of greenhouse gases, will increase its emissions by 4.6% in 2024. In the rest of the world, where 38% of global emissions are produced, the forecast is an increase of 1.1%. The GCP highlights the growing importance of aviation and maritime transport in the emissions inventory: their emissions are expected to increase by 7.8%, although they remain below their 2019 level. An unprecedented concentration of gases in human history The report, conducted by researchers from over 80 institutions worldwide, including the universities of Exeter and East Anglia (UK), Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich (Germany), and the CICERO Center for International Climate Research (Norway), provides an overview of emissions over the past decade. While they mention a certain stagnation in the past decade regarding the total greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere, the reality is that emissions continue to rise, and the previous decade (2004-2013) saw strong emission growth, with an annual increase of around 2%. Such figures mean that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere continues to rise. Just two weeks ago, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) warned of a new record for greenhouse gas concentrations last year: an annual average of 420 parts per million (ppm) for CO2. In addition, surface concentrations of 1,935 parts per billion (ppb) of methane (CH4) and 336.9 ppb of nitrous oxide (N2O) were recorded. These represent increases of 151%, 265%, and 125%, respectively, compared to pre-industrial levels. "During 2023, CO2 emissions caused by massive wildfires and a possible reduction in carbon absorption by forests, combined with persistently high CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels for human and industrial activities, drove the observed increase in concentrations," stated the WMO Annual Bulletin on Greenhouse Gases. Never in human history has the atmosphere been so laden with these gases, which have been released at an unprecedented speed: in twenty years, CO2 concentrations have increased by 11.4%. It is expected that atmospheric CO2 levels will reach 422.5 parts per million in 2024, 2.8 ppm higher than in 2023 and 52% above pre-industrial levels. Half-full glass However, at GCP, there is room for hope amid all the discouraging figures. "Despite another increase in global emissions this year, the latest data shows evidence of widespread climate action, with the growing penetration of renewable energy and electric vehicles displacing fossil fuels, and the decrease in deforestation emissions in recent decades, now confirmed for the first time," says Corinne Le Quéré, Research Professor at the Royal Society in the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia. In the same vein, Dr. Glen Peters from the CICERO Center in Oslo points out that "there are many signs of positive progress at the country level, and a sense that a peak in global fossil CO2 emissions is imminent." A total of 22 countries, accounting for a combined 23% of global fossil CO2 emissions, have reduced their emissions in the 2014-2023 decade. Furthermore, countries within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in the group of wealthier nations, increased their emission reduction rates in the last decade compared to the previous one, from 0.9% to 1.4%. In the non-OECD group (excluding China), emissions growth decreased from 4.9% in the 2004-2013 decade to 1.8% in 2014-2023. However, Peters warns that "the global peak remains elusive" and emphasizes that "climate action is a collective issue, and while gradual emission reductions are occurring in some countries, increases continue in others." Another positive note is that, globally, emissions from the change in land use have decreased by 20% in the last decade, although they are expected to increase in 2024 under this category. While permanent CO2 removal through reforestation and afforestation (new forests) is offsetting emissions, it is only compensating for about half of the emissions from permanent deforestation. The GCP also issues a direct message to proponents of techno-optimism: "Current levels of technology-based carbon dioxide removal (excluding nature-based methods such as reforestation) account for only about one-millionth of the CO2 emitted by fossil fuels," they emphasize.This article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. 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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Western missteps in Africa are creating an opening for Russia to deepen its influence. Recent protests against International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed austerity measures have rocked several African states. Kenya, a long-time partner of the United States and a key contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti, experienced violent clashes between government security forces and anti-austerity protestors over tax hikes in a controversial finance bill. Simultaneously, many protesters saw Kenyan engagement in Haiti as footing the bill for American security interests while ordinary Kenyans struggled to make ends meet. Soon after, similar protests against IMF measures spread to Nigeria. Analysts and locals are concerned that spreading protests may threaten stability across Africa. Citizens of other countries continue to voice their displeasure with the political and economic status quo through protest (in Mozambique) and at the ballot box (in Botswana). IMF loans come with significant stipulations, including reforms to financial systems and governance. Critics of these conditions frequently malign the IMF as a violator of sovereignty. Changes to economic and governing models, combined with high debts and economic stress, increase the costs of everyday products and diminish purchasing power across the continent. To many ordinary citizens, the West is benefiting from the fruit of African resources while hindering Africans’ access to the global economy. Publics in these countries demand alternatives to IMF funding, protesting governments to oppose IMF-imposed austerity. Youth, an increasingly important demographic, are especially active. Many of these young people are college-educated but fail to secure adequately paid employment in skilled industries. The informal economy is growing but increasingly separated from formal and international economies. IMF austerity measures are driving the continent to economic crisis and protest that may have lasting effects anathema to US foreign policy and the liberal international order. Some already see China as a viable alternative, although public opinion of Chinese influence is mixed. Elsewhere, faded Cold War memories make Russia a relatively unknown economic and political alternative. So, while recent Western actions in Africa have put long term relationships at risk, Russia is slowly increasing its influence on the continent. In fact, the Kremlin has already taken action and is engaged in the politics surrounding the various debt crises in African nations. African countries owe debts to multiple international actors, including Russia. However, Moscow has forgiven debts owed by many of these countries, coupling debt relief with additional economic benefits, including an influx of grains and energy resources. It has also deepened defense cooperation with several African countries. This cooperation often includes contracts for weapons sales and the deployment of irregular military units, including the Wagner Group. Diplomatic actions such as the above have led some protestors to see Russia as a viable alternative to IMF funding and partnerships with the US and Europe. In a visual representation of this phenomenon, protestors have been seen waving Russian flags at mass gatherings across Africa. Russia appears to receive the greatest support in the Sahel, where governments have failed to curb political instability and deliver on economic development promises. Publics in the region were already angry with the continued postcolonial military presence of France, and Russia took advantage. Mass publics are not the only actors seeking alternatives, ruling elites also see Russia as an attractive partner. Russian defense cooperation and the presence of irregular forces bolster these regimes in the face of increasing civilian protests over poor governance or human rights. Still, Russia has not yet made the gains it could. The war in Ukraine is hurting Africans and contributing to economic stress as global grain prices have skyrocketed. Some perceive Russia as exacerbating the problems of failed governance through its use of Wagner Group formations to back corrupt officials, protect corporate interests, and bolster unpopular governments. Russian interest in the region is also less significant than in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or the Arctic, where Russia has more proximate strategic, economic, and political goals. Rather than rushing in, Russia’s economic presence in Africa is slowly advancing Moscow’s goals on the international stage. When Russia sought to undermine financial, technological, and energy sanctions from the West as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, it turned to Africa to find new consumers for food products, energy, and arms. Already, in the wake of the invasion, only half of the continent voted to condemn Russia. Such voting patterns at the UN indicate greater support for Russia in Africa than in other regions around the world, even if distrust of Russia remains high in some parts of the continent. Forecasted crises could increase Russian influence on the continent as well. Shocks generated by the African debt crisis could become a proximate cause for geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts. Rapid demographic changes and disastrous climate events (e.g., droughts and floods) exacerbate existing economic and migratory challenges. Since the tentacles of Russian economic and security influence, as well as misinformation, are already present in Africa, such future crises could pull multiple African states further into Russian orbit, and away from Western countries and institutions. Further alignment of African states with Russia would have several drawbacks. Russia would discourage democratization and use security assistance to bolster dictators across the continent. Environmentally sustainable development is also likely to be hampered. Russia may increase the extraction of natural resources in environmentally damaging ways. Additionally, Russian energy exports will be oil and gas, eroding the already significant investment and progress in green energy development many African political economies have made. As Western missteps create openings for Russia to gain a foothold in Africa, they also set the stage for other global powers to capitalize on the vacuum. Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa also contributed to debt burdens, but unlike Western approaches tied to IMF austerity measures, China is recalibrating its strategy. By shifting to smaller projects with lower debt exposure and promoting green energy development overseas, China positions itself as a more appealing partner. This strategy not only bolsters China’s domestic solar and EV industries but also enhances its soft power by responding to local economic needs. Moreover, as Western policy blunders alienate African publics and governments, both Russia’s and China’s influence may grow. Russia’s gains in the region could indirectly strengthen China’s position by fostering broader skepticism of Western-led systems, aligning African leaders more closely with Beijing’s geopolitical goals, including its stance on Taiwan. Africa is a burgeoning continent. One in four humans will be African by 2050. If the US and Europe pass on opportunities to engage with a continent of emerging green development powers and an increasingly educated demographic bulge, Western policies will undermine their own power and influence in the international order. Russia’s quiet increase in trade and security assistance offers an established alternative. Meaning ultimately, both Russia and China, may play the long game, gaining incremental support from a region of one billion people at a time. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/]

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The meeting held on 6 December in Auckland, the second session of the “2+2 Format” established earlier this year, involving the foreign and defence ministers of both Australia and New Zealand, marked an important milestone in the rapidly advancing development of all aspects of bilateral relations. The Foreign Policy of New Zealand’s Conservative Government This process has become particularly evident since the conservative National Party government assumed power in New Zealand at the beginning of 2023. A few clarifications are warranted in this context. Firstly, the current government, led by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and representing the NPNZ (New Zealand National Party), officially took office in January 2023. However, it initially functioned as a caretaker government, succeeding the Labour administration under Jacinda Ardern, who had resigned prematurely. This interim status lasted until November 2023, when it shed the “caretaker” label following the general election held the previous month. It is worth noting that the NPNZ-led coalition’s victory was far from decisive, necessitating complex negotiations with a minor party to retain power. Secondly, it would be inaccurate to suggest that New Zealand entirely disregarded the foreign policy concerns of other Anglophone nations in past decades, including under Labour governments. For instance, Wellington has consistently remained a member of the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence-sharing cooperative among five Anglo-Saxon countries. However, until the conservative government came to power, New Zealand appeared to make every effort to ensure that the significant deterioration in international relations, which began at the end of the previous decade, had no adverse effect on its relations with China. Nevertheless, the global restructuring process initiated in the second half of 2019 (notably marked by the Skripal affair) inevitably impacted New Zealand, particularly given its location in the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the focal point of the current phase of the “Great Game”. Bilateral Engagements in Relations with Australia New Zealand’s involvement in the aforementioned global restructuring is primarily occurring within the surrounding region of the vast Indo-Pacific area. Naturally, the country’s leadership has prioritised its relations with Australia, its closest partner in every respect. Within two months of shedding its “caretaker” status, New Zealand’s government, alongside its Australian counterparts, inaugurated the “2+2 Format” platform for foreign and defence ministers. The first session of this format took place on 1 February of this year in Melbourne. The mere existence of such a platform underscores the particularly close and trusting relationship between the two nations. However, the intention for closer bilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues was signalled six months earlier, during the first session of a separate “2+2 Format” involving finance and environment ministers, held in Wellington on 8 June 2023. This platform was subsequently convened for the second time on 30 July 2024 in Brisbane, Australia. Both sessions concluded with a “Joint Statement”. From the perspective of the evolving Indo-Pacific situation, special attention should be given to the second session of the defence and foreign policy “2+2 Format”, held on 6 December in Auckland. The key points of the document adopted at the session can be reviewed here. Notably, the title of the first chapter, “The Australia-New Zealand Alliance”, stands out. This chapter opens with an acknowledgment of the “natural, neighbourly, and formalised” bond between the two nations. The final element of this statement is confirmed by a significant reference to the ANZUS trilateral military-political treaty (involving the United States), which was adopted back in 1951, during the height of the Cold War. It is worth noting that until the signing of the document under discussion in Auckland, the very existence of ANZUS was likely remembered by few. This is not surprising, as for decades, international treaty reference guides consistently noted that, although ANZUS had not been formally dissolved, the United States and New Zealand had long ceased to maintain an alliance in practice. This situation stems from New Zealand’s 1984 declaration as a nuclear-free country, which resulted in the closure of its ports to American vessels with nuclear propulsion systems, even if they did not necessarily carry nuclear weapons at the time. By contrast, Japan, despite a similar “three non-nuclear principles” policy, has never taken such a step. Following the 1984 decision, which effectively marked the withdrawal of one participant from this tripartite alliance, the remaining two members restructured it to suit new conditions. However, with the end of the Cold War, even its bilateral format barely showed signs of activity. This continued until the latter half of the previous decade, a period when the world seemingly turned upside down. During this time, the Australian government, led by the conservative coalition under Scott Morrison, adopted a policy of sharply intensifying military-political ties with allies. This course has been largely upheld by the current Labour government under Anthony Albanese, which has also accelerated the development of comprehensive relations with its new ally, Japan. Canberra is also closely monitoring another key regional player: India. In summary, a particularly noteworthy development occurred on 6 December of this year in Auckland, New Zealand, when viewed from the perspective of assessing the evolving situation in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). New Zealand Increases Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region The meeting held on that day fits into the broader trend of New Zealand’s comprehensive engagement in the region, following Australia’s example. Indeed, the main aspects of this trend are mentioned in the final document adopted in Auckland. During his visit to Australia in August of this year, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced his country’s intention to join the AUKUS pact (Australia-United Kingdom-United States), specifically its “Pillar II,” which focuses on the development of cutting-edge military technologies. The “Pillar I” of AUKUS, by contrast, deals with the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Japan and the Republic of Korea are also potential candidates to join AUKUS Pillar II. However, due to internal turmoil in South Korea, Japan currently remains the more likely candidate. Incidentally, in June of this year, Christopher Luxon made a three-day visit to Japan. A government communiqué regarding the trip and his discussions with then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted the shared intention to develop various aspects of bilateral relations. This clearly signals a shift in New Zealand’s trajectory away from the popular (and to some extent accurate) stereotype of the country as a sleepy geopolitical backwater that also enjoys economic prosperity. This image has seemingly been satisfactory for New Zealanders until now. However, the geopolitical storms raging worldwide have inevitably reached even this distant nation. As New Zealand becomes increasingly involved in global disputes, it faces the prospect of previously unfamiliar challenges arriving on its shores. Finally, it is essential to note that the above developments weigh heavily on the negative side of the scale when assessing the current situation in the IPR. This does not mean, however, that there are no positive counterweights, albeit fewer in number. These positive elements suggest that the main players (at least for now) maintain control over the unfolding dynamics in the region. This is no small achievement in a world order that appears to be in upheaval.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Paris Agreement will be ten years old in 2025. It is a good opportunity, then, to reassess the feasibility of its long-term goals and understand what they mean for the current and for the next generations. In a very optimistic scenario, if the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved, the climate crisis will have been solved by the end of the 21st century. In the meantime, though, the crisis will worsen, as temperature overshoot is very likely to occur by the middle of the century. During the overshoot period, our planet’s average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, which is the threshold proposed by the Paris Agreement. At the end of the overshoot period, which could last from one to several decades, the temperature will begin to fall until it eventually stabilises at 1.5°C at the turn of the century (IPCC 2023, 1810). Expectedly, the success of the Paris Agreement would greatly benefit the “post-overshoot generation”, namely the generation that will live in the first half of the 22nd century. But to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement, the generation that will live in the overshoot period – the “overshoot generation” – will have to remove an enormous amount of GHG (Greenhouse Gases) from the atmosphere. For now, though, it is unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies will be available at a scale that might enable the overshoot generation to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. To aggravate the problem, the overshoot generation will also probably have to rely on as-yet untested geoengineering technologies to promote their own survival. As we can see, conflicting interests of three different generations are at stake here, namely: (1) the interests of the current generation, (2) those of the overshoot generation, and (3) the interests of the post-overshoot generation. Given the unequal distribution of power across generations (Gardiner 2011, 36), it is likely that the current generation will tend to further their own interest to the detriment of the overshoot generation, even if, in the end, the climate policies enforced by the current generation do indeed fulfil the interests of the post-overshoot generation. The best possible world is one in which the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved. Yet, depending on the choices that we make today, the best possible world could also mean the worst possible world that human beings will ever have met on our planet. That will be the fate of the overshoot generation, squeezed between the self-serving policies of the current generation and the climate hopes of the post-overshoot generation. The implications for international relations are momentous, as we intend to show in this article. Possible pathways The Paris Agreement did not establish a concrete deadline for the achievement of the goals set out in Article 2, namely: Maintain the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and make efforts to limit this temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. The scientific community generally understands that the Paris Agreement aims at climate stabilization at the end of the 21st century. There are two main reasons for this. The first is a constraint imposed by our planet’s climate system. The second is a constraint imposed by agreed upon principles of justice. As for the first reason, we have to bear in mind that an immediate reduction of GHG emissions would not be followed by an immediate decline of global temperature (Dessler 2016, 91). Even if all countries decided to eliminate their respective emissions today, the global temperature would continue to rise for several decades, until it begins to recede and stabilises at the turn of the century. As for the second reason, the Paris Agreement assumed that developing countries could not immediately reduce their own emissions without compromising their own development and the prospect of eradicating poverty. Thus, the Paris Agreement also established in Article 4 that each country could continue to emit GHG until their respective emissions peaked as soon as possible. After peaking, emissions should be rapidly reduced. Thus, the attempt to achieve the goals set out in Article 2 well before the end of the 21st century might turn out to prove inconsistent with the reality of our planet’s climate system and unfair towards developing countries. The problem, however, is that the Paris Agreement did not establish a specific pathway for the achievement of its long-term goals (Figure 1). There is, indeed, a multitude of pathways, but many (if not most) of them involve an overshoot period (Geden and Löschel 2017, 881; Schleussner et al. 2016). And as there are “different interpretations for limiting global warming to 1.5°C”, there emerges the question, then, as to which interpretation could do justice to the conflicting claims of the three different generations considered as a whole, namely the claims of the current generation, those of the overshoot generation, and the claims of the post-overshoot generation (Figure 2). There has been much discussion now on the concept of a “just transition”. But this debate has focused entirely on the claims that the members of the current generation can raise against each other, and not on claims that could be raised – or presumed – across the three generations referred to above. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Glossary from 2023, for instance, contains a specific entry on this topic: “Just transitions. A set of principles, processes and practices that aim to ensure that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind in the transition from a high-carbon to a low carbon economy” (IPCC 2023, 1806). The IPCC entry ends with some considerations regarding past generations: “Just transitions may embody the redressing of past harms and perceived injustices”. Interestingly, though, the entry says nothing about the normative implications of a just transition for future generations. A 2023 United Nations document defines the concept of just transition along similar lines (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 3, 12–13). But, again, it understands “just transition” in terms of claims that stakeholders within the current generation, whether at national or international level, can raise against each other. As for the international level, the United Nations document makes the following statement concerning the concept of just transition as applied to international relations: “As countries pick up the pace of their climate change mitigation strategies, it is critical that developed countries do not transfer the burden of the transition onto developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 8). The problem, however, is that, as a matter of justice, it is equally critical that the current generation does not transfer the burden of the transition onto the overshoot generation, even if that burden, in the end, turns out to benefit the post-overshoot generation. Such an unequal distribution of burdens across three generations would certainly conflict with the requirements of intergenerational justice (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70; Meyer 2021). Overshoot generation and retroactive mitigation One might perhaps argue that no extra burden is being imposed on the overshoot generation, for the current generation is already having to face challenges that the overshoot generation, supposedly, will not have to face. The overshoot generation, one might suggest, will inherit from the current generation all the benefits resulting from the energy transition, but without having to bear the costs that the transition imposes on the current generation. The idea here is that by the middle of this century global emissions will have already peaked and will be declining at an accelerated pace, towards stabilisation at 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level at the end of this century. Thus, the overshoot generation can arguably reap the benefits of green energy, as long as the current generation remains free, at least for the time being, to emit GHG further, which is necessary to finance the human and technological development that the overshoot generation will need later. This claim, however, overlooks a crucial fact about the climate crisis – a fact that has not been given due attention in the public debate on climate policies. In a very optimistic scenario, the overshoot generation will not have the burden of reducing their own emissions because they will be able to rely on carbon-free energy. The problem, however, is that the overshoot generation will still have to retroactively mitigate the emissions of previous generations – including, of course, the emissions of the current generation. We call this process “retroactive mitigation”, for what is at stake here is not reduction and phasing out of one’s own emissions, but the removal of massive amounts of GHG, which previous generations failed to mitigate in the past. In a 2014 report, the IPCC realised that simply reducing GHG emissions would no longer be enough to preclude irreversible climate change. Removal of GHG would also be necessary (IPCC 2014, 12). The IPCC called attention to yet another problem: it was unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies, including DAC (Direct Air Capture), could be deployed on a global scale in time to avoid a climate disaster. In a 2018 report, the IPCC was even less confident about the future development and scaling-up of CCS technologies (IPCC 2018, 136). To make matters worse, two further factors must be taken into consideration. (1) Recent studies show that there are practically no pathways left for the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals without the massive deployment of CCS (Smith et al. 2023). And (2) it has become increasingly probable that the overshoot generation will also have to deploy geoengineering technologies to cope with ever more frequent heatwaves (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70). It could perhaps be argued that afforestation and preservation of existing forests could be used instead of CCS technologies. However, the amount of land and water that would be necessary for the creation of new forests is probably larger than the amount of land and water available. Moreover, the attempt to create new forests on such a large scale might compromise the water and food security that the overshoot generation will need to promote their own climate adaptation (Shue 2017, 205). It is also necessary to take into account the amount of time new forests need to grow, not to mention the risk of fire. In this case, forests stop absorbing GHG and become GHG emitters themselves (Gatti et al. 2021). Implications for international relations In the aftermath of the Second World War, human being’s capacity to trigger catastrophic events at a global scale became increasingly apparent. As Garrett Hardin aptly put the problem in 1974: “No generation has viewed the problem of the survival of the human species as seriously as we have” (Hardin 1974b, 561). But while even realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and John Herz argued for international cooperation in the face of global threats, Hardin himself advanced what he called the “lifeboat ethics”. According to Hardin, instead of engaging in international cooperation, richer states should behave like lifeboats and resist the temptation to help individuals from poorer states to cope with environmental disasters or famines. This, he argued, might undermine richer states’ capacity to secure their own survival (Hardin 1974a; 1974b). In his The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival from 1977, Hardin resumes his criticism of international cooperation to alleviate the plight of poorer states: We will do little good in the international sphere until we recognize that the greatest need of a poor country is not material: call it psychological, moral, spiritual, or what you will. The basic issue is starkly raised in a story of personal heroism that unfolded in South America a few years ago (Hardin 1977, 64). Hardin goes on to recall the 1972 Andes plane crash, turned into a feature film in 2023. Hardin suggests that the passengers who had survived the crash would not have taken the initiative to save their own lives had they not heard on the radio that the search efforts to rescue them had been called off. Hardin’s conclusion is this: “This true story, I submit, bears a close resemblance to the moral situation of poor countries. The greatest gift we can give them is the knowledge that they are on their own” (Hardin 1977, 65). Hardin, of course, does not take into consideration the extent to which richer states themselves may be responsible for the plight of poorer states. Hardin’s self-help approach to international relations is in line with political realism. But when major realist thinkers themselves addressed the question of human survival, around the same time Hardin advocated his lifeboat ethics, they came to entirely different conclusions. Authors such as Morgenthau and Herz realized that nation-states had become unable to protect their own citizens in the face of global catastrophes triggered by the depletion of the environment or the outbreak of a nuclear war. As Morgenthau put the problem in 1966: “No nation state is capable of protecting its citizens and their way of life against an all-out atomic attack. Its safety rests solely in preventing such an attack from taking place” (Morgenthau 1966, 9). In a 1976 article on the emergence of the atomic age, Herz made a similar point: “Nuclear penetrability had rendered the traditional nation-state obsolete because it could no longer fulfill its primary function, that of protection” (Herz 1976a, 101). Both Morgenthau and Herz argued for international cooperation – or perhaps even the dissolution of the system of states (Morgenthau 1978, 539) – as the better strategy to avert global catastrophic risks (Herz 1976a, 110; 1976b, 47). Herz later also theorized about the concept of “ecological threat” and argued for the development of a new interdisciplinary field, which he aptly named “survival studies” (Herz 2003; Seidel 2003; Laszlo and Seidel 2006, 2–3; Graham 2008; Stevens 2020). During the overshoot period, as heatwaves and other climate-related extreme events become more severe and frequent, people in poorer countries are likely to suffer the most. Mass migrations are likely to occur on an unprecedented scale (Vince 2022). Given the current popularity of anti-migration measures both in the United States and Europe, it is imaginable, then, that the lifeboat ethics will strike a chord with future conservative governments. That would be an error, for the assumption that governments will be protecting their own citizens by way of making their borders impenetrable to climate migrants is misleading. The “ecological threat” cannot be held back by higher walls. Lifeboat ethics will make everyone worse-off. Back in the 1960s, Martin Luther King may not have had climate change or mass migration in mind, but his words strike us as even more poignant now: “We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now” (as quoted by former American President Barack Obama). There is only one boat, carrying three generations of hopeful passengers with equal legitimate claims to a better climate. It is a long journey. Let us not allow our only boat to go down. Final remarks The scenario in which the overshoot generation will have to live is not an encouraging one, but it is even less inhospitable than the scenario that the post-overshoot generation will have to face if the goals of the Paris Agreement are not met. It is up to the current generation to make sure that the overshoot period is as short as possible, and that the overshoot generation will not only be in a position to adapt to unprecedented climate scenarios in the history of human civilization, but also fulfil hopes of the post-overshoot generation. Figures Figure 1: Pathways compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement (IPCC 2018, 62). FIGURE01  Figure 2: Pathways that would limit global warming to 1.5°C (IPCC 2018, 160).   Acknowledgements Marcelo de Araujo thanks Prof. Darrel Moellendorf for the invitation and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for the financial support. Support for this research has also been provided by the CNPq (The National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and FAPERJ (Carlos Chagas Filho Research Support Foundation). An earlier draft of this article was presented at the University of Graz, Austria, Section for Moral and Political Philosophy, in 2024, with thanks to Prof. Lukas Meyer for the invitation. Pedro Fior Mota de Andrade benefited from financial supported provided by CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development). References Dessler, Andrew Emory. 2016. Introduction to Modern Climate Change. Second edition. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Gardiner, Stephen. 2011. A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gatti, Luciana V., Luana S. Basso, John B. Miller, Manuel Gloor, Lucas Gatti Domingues, Henrique L. G. Cassol, Graciela Tejada, et al. 2021. ‘Amazonia as a Carbon Source Linked to Deforestation and Climate Change’. Nature 595 (7867): 388–93. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03629-6. Geden, Oliver, and Andreas Löschel. 2017. ‘Define Limits for Temperature Overshoot Targets’. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”