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Abstract The Ukraine war has reshaped the global geopolitical landscape, positioning Europe, America, Russia and China as key players on a new global chessboard. Europe is grappling with the dual challenge of ensuring regional security and managing the economic fallout from the conflict. America’s evolving global relationships are marked by a burden-shift with Europe, diplomatic efforts to further deter Russian aggression and a strategic rivalry with China. For Russia, the invasion of Ukraine is a bid to reassert its influence, but it faces severe international sanctions and military setbacks, constraining its strategic ambitions. And China is navigating a complex balancing act between supporting Russia and maintaining its economic ties with the West. This complex interplay of alliances and rivalries underscores the shifting dynamics of global power and the urgent need for diplomatic solutions to ensure stability and peace. Introduction On 27 March 2025 a Summit on Peace and Security for Ukraine was organised by President Emmanuel Macron in cooperation with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. It was held in Paris. This summit was part of an ongoing series of political and operational meetings that the UK and France have been organising alternately over several weeks, aimed at contributing to a sustainable and just peace in Ukraine. This particular summit saw the participation of 31 countries, including non-EU nations such as the UK, Norway, Canada and Iceland, as well as high-profile figures such as the NATO secretary general, the president of the European Commission and the president of the European Council. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also attended. The increased frequency of meetings among this wide-ranging ‘coalition of the willing’ is recognition, in Europe’s eyes, of the immediate need to establish and permanently guarantee security and peace in the long term for Ukraine. It is evident that the unconditional ceasefire that Ukraine had declared its readiness to enter into on 11 March in Saudi Arabia has since evolved into a proposal for a limited ceasefire with additional conditions and demands from Russia. Moscow is employing delaying tactics, and there is a growing realisation, even within the US, that Russia is not genuinely interested in ending the war. Europe’s novel security approach: ‘Peace through strength’ This fear of a prolonged conflict in Ukraine, and the perceived risk of war between Europe and Russia, has pushed the European Commission to propose a way forward in its Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 (European Commission 2025), which can be encapsulated by the motto ‘peace through strength’. This approach entails rapidly increasing military support for Ukraine, including the provision of more ammunition, artillery, air defence systems, drones and training. Additionally, it involves enhancing the capabilities of European countries by them investing more in their own defence, simplifying administrative processes and fostering better industrial cooperation, including with the Ukrainian defence industry. The European Commission has also outlined the financial instruments that have been established in record time to address these specific challenges. The primary objective of these financial instruments is to bolster European defence spending, with the EU targeting a total of €800 billion. This includes €150 billion in loans available to member states through a new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and up to €650 billion from national defence budgets, corresponding to an expenditure of 1.5% of GDP that can be excluded from national budgets by activating the ‘national escape clause’ of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. Additionally, private financing and funds from the European Investment Bank will be mobilised for investments in priority capabilities. Furthermore, the EU has identified several priority capabilities for investment. In the short term, joint EU purchases should focus on missiles and artillery systems. In the medium term, the goal is to develop large-scale EU systems in integrated air and missile defence, military mobility and strategic enablers. NATO standards will continue to serve as the foundation, and it is crucial that these standards are shared with the EU. Finally, ‘peace through strength’ also includes the further European integration of Ukraine, with Brussels clearly considering Ukraine the EU’s first line of defence. The Commission’s Joint White Paper and a parallel initiative launched by High Representative Kaja Kallas both aim to bolster military support for Kyiv and stress the importance of defence procurement both with and within Ukraine. Despite the commendable pace and scope of the numerous recent initiatives undertaken by the EU, it is imperative to recognise that these commitments must still be translated into tangible actions. The European Commission remains hopeful that the proposals delineated in the Joint White Paper can be actualised during the Polish Presidency, with the aim of reaching concrete decisions by the European Council meeting scheduled for 26–7 June. However, considering the ongoing deterioration of the European security landscape, it could be argued that this deadline lacks the requisite sense of urgency needed to address the pressing challenges ahead. European peace through strength—but not without the US While Europe is building its rise as a security, defence and military actor, there is a consensus among most EU member states that these efforts should not happen to the detriment of NATO and that there is a need to maintain solid US involvement in European security. Strength is not merely a matter of political initiatives but also of demonstrating a clear readiness to engage militarily. There must be a deterrent effect from military power, particularly in anticipation of potential new Russian offensives once Moscow rebuilds its troops and supplies during a future ceasefire or peace deal. And military power is exactly where Europe—willing or not—will still need to rely on the transatlantic partnership for a foreseeable while, due to its current overreliance on strategic US military and intelligence assets. Moreover, the new administration in Washington has manoeuvred fast to have a clear say on the future of European security. It is the US—not Europe—that is leading the diplomacy on a ceasefire or peace deal in Ukraine. And while Europe, in reaction, is focusing on shaping future security guarantees for Ukraine—or even pushing for boots on the ground through a ‘coalition of the willing’—both of these European endeavours hinge, first, on the success of US diplomacy to reach a deal with Russia; and second, on US logistical and intelligence support for the proposed troops on the ground. Without these, most of the ‘willing nations’ may withdraw their commitments. The situation is further complicated by the shortage of operational European troops: for instance, the UK has an expeditionary force, but relies heavily on its air and naval power; France has some units, but in insufficient numbers; and Germany’s contribution remains uncertain. In this context, a European plan to help Ukraine win and maintain peace should not compromise NATO’s resilience and should therefore be developed in close coordination with the alliance, particularly in terms of planning and interoperability. And as Europe is now spending on defence, it should do so while ensuring that its expenditures align with NATO capability objectives. Moreover, military strength is not the only domain in which Europe should continue to keep an eye on the US. Europe notably believes that it is imperative to increase pressure on Russia through sanctions. The EU is unequivocally clear that there can be no consideration of easing sanctions; on the contrary, some member states even advocate for intensifying them. The challenge for Europe, however, remains to emphatically convey this message to the Americans, as any decision by the US to ease sanctions—as requested by Russia—would undermine the most critical form of pressure against Russia. Some EU member states have already raised concerns about the future of European sanctions policy, highlighting the need for new methods to enforce sanctions, particularly if certain EU member states more friendly to Russia decide to obstruct them in the future. Putin’s patient game of chess Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin has clearly asserted a degree of dominance in the ongoing diplomatic negotiations. He has set preliminary conditions for a ceasefire, made a limited commitment regarding energy infrastructure and subsequently undermined the credibility of his own commitment with new attacks on Ukraine. Despite this, Putin’s demands concerning Western military supplies and intelligence-sharing reveal that Ukrainian attacks on Russian critical infrastructure are causing significant damage and irking the Russian president. Putin’s demands, including the reduction of Ukraine’s military capabilities, the transfer of entire Ukrainian regions to Russian control and the replacement of President Zelensky, are, naturally, unacceptable to Ukraine. These demands also pose the most significant risk to the West: if Russia were to succeed in installing a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv and controlling the Ukrainian military, it would alter the entire power and military balance in Eastern Europe. Should President Trump agree to this, it would likely cause a further deterioration in US–EU relations too. Achieving a middle-ground in any US–Russia agreement for Ukraine currently still poses a formidable challenge. Moscow therefore perceives that it has the momentum in its favour, despite Russia’s inability to achieve any strategic breakthroughs in Ukraine. The financial and human costs of this conflict for Moscow are substantial, while it is making minimal territorial gains. However, while Ukraine has successfully liberated 50% of the territory that was previously occupied by Russia, the Kremlin nevertheless still occupies approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory. Moscow has also likely observed in the US a desire to shift towards finding a consensus and a willingness to negotiate in a transactional manner. Moreover, the recent suspension of US intelligence and military support has already had immediate repercussions on Ukraine’s strength. It has weakened Ukraine’s ability to bring this war to a conclusion and could potentially lead to a temporary ceasefire that would de facto result in the creation of a ‘frozen conflict’—an outcome which Russia would not necessarily view unfavourably. A friendly US visit to Europe . . . On 3 and 4 April 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio participated for the first time in a NATO foreign ministerial meeting. Rubio’s visit to NATO headquarters was notably smoother and more amicable than the visit of his colleague at the Department of Defense, Pete Hegseth, for the defence ministerial meeting in February 2025. Rubio, a seasoned diplomat, adroitly conveyed the message that European allies must significantly increase their defence spending, advocating for allocations of up to 5% of their GDP. He acknowledged the difficulty of this demand but emphasised that it could be achieved incrementally, provided the allies concerned showed a clear and consistent direction of progress. In a similar vein, Rubio addressed the situation in Ukraine, commending the resilience and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian people. He articulated President Trump’s recognition that a military solution in Ukraine is unattainable for both Ukraine and Russia, necessitating a negotiated settlement. Rubio underscored that peace negotiations inherently require compromises from all parties involved. He acknowledged that Ukraine has already made significant concessions, whereas Russia has yet to reciprocate. According to Rubio, Russia is testing President Trump’s resolve, but he also acknowledged that Putin faces severe consequences if he does not promptly agree to a ceasefire, indicating that the timeline for such an agreement is measured in weeks, not months. Rubio concluded by asserting that a peace agreement would be unattainable without European involvement. Rubio also expressed broad support for the EU’s defence initiatives, including the EU Joint White Paper and the ReArm programme. He praised the EU’s efforts to encourage its member states to meet their NATO commitments and to strengthen the industrial base, provided that the non-EU defence industry, particularly American firms, is not unduly excluded. Despite the positive reception of Rubio’s visit to Europe and NATO, there remains an underlying uncertainty about whether other influential figures within President Trump’s Make America Great Again movement share Rubio’s views. The path to achieving a cohesive and effective alliance strategy is fraught with challenges, and it remains uncertain whether NATO will navigate these obstacles successfully and emerge intact. . . . but Washington’s priority is the Asia–Pacific region Above all, the NATO foreign ministerial meeting of early April showed again that the US felt fundamentally displeased with the Western approach to China over the past several decades. The prevailing assumption—that a capitalist and economically prosperous China would inevitably evolve to resemble Western democratic nations—was a misguided and overly optimistic expectation. This erroneous belief has permitted Beijing to engage in deceptive trade and military practices for the past 30 years without facing significant repercussions. Today the US is clearly concerned about the way China has strategically weaponised its industrial capabilities by seamlessly integrating its civilian and military sectors through a dual-use strategy that is particularly evident in critical economic and high-tech domains, such as artificial intelligence. By blurring the lines between civilian and military applications, China has been able to enhance its technological and industrial base, thereby posing a multifaceted challenge to global security. Moreover, for the US, the presence of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine serves as a stark indicator of the interconnected nature of the threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific and European regions. For Washington, the collaborative efforts of adversarial states such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea in Ukraine and other geopolitical theatres necessitate a similarly unified and strategic approach from democratic like-minded nations to strengthening their alliances and enhancing their collective security measures in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. Interconnected theatres of confrontation China’s alleged support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine and the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, and Russia and Iran, clearly illustrate the interconnectedness of security dynamics between Europe, the Asia–Pacific region and the Middle East. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine represents a pivotal moment for the stability of the international system, impacting not only Europe but also other parts of the world. Contrary to the characterisation of the conflict in Ukraine as merely a ‘European war’ a few years ago, the war there is now considered by the West to be a globalised conflict with profound international implications. This perspective is widely accepted among the NATO allies, which recognise the growing interconnection between the three theatres of conflict. This attitude is also increasingly reflected in the enhanced dialogue between NATO and the Indo–Pacific Four partners—Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea. This cooperation is today seen by allies as mutually beneficial and necessary. Beyond exchanges of intelligence, particularly on the challenges posed by China, support for Ukraine dominates the partnership, alongside the joint battle against hybrid threats, progress on cybersecurity and the strengthening of maritime security. It is widely expected that NATO allies will seek to further strengthen this cooperation at the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague. Among NATO members there is, furthermore, a growing consensus on the need to be firm with China. Allies agree on the necessity of sending a stronger message and taking determined and united actions in terms of deterrence, including at the hybrid and cyber levels, as well as on imposing sanctions against Chinese economic operators involved in China–Russia cooperation in Ukraine. While Russia remains the primary long-term threat to the NATO realm, there is recognition that China poses a significant problem that must be addressed in its full magnitude, particularly in the context of China–Russia cooperation. It is essential to act firmly and in a united way to increase the costs of cooperation with Moscow for Beijing while keeping open the necessary avenues of engagement. Any dissonance between Europe and the US on this issue might otherwise become the root cause of the next big crisis of trust in the transatlantic relationship. China versus a Russian–American rapprochement Russia is not fighting its Ukraine war alone. It is receiving help from allies including China, Iran and North Korea. Moreover, the war in Ukraine is not just about Ukraine’s future. It is also part of a larger global struggle, with Russia seeking position alongside China in a reconfigured world order that is more multipolar and less centred on the US. In this respect, China may be inclined to silently assist Russia in opposing a proposed ceasefire or peace plan for Ukraine put forward by President Trump. Beijing likely recognises that by resolving the conflict in Ukraine and fostering better relations with Russia, Trump’s ultimate objective is to reallocate US diplomatic, military and economic resources to address the growing global influence of China and its impact on US national interests. In this respect Putin appears keen to keep President Xi Jinping informed about American attempts at rapprochement and ongoing negotiations concerning Ukraine. Historically, the ‘good relations’ between China and Russia are relatively recent; the stability of this relationship is attributed to the resolution of their border disputes, their complementary economies and their non-interference in each other’s ideological systems. But Moscow treads carefully as it knows it is the junior partner in the relationship. Moreover, the prospect of an American–Russian rapprochement is not viewed by either Moscow or Beijing with any real sense of threat. Ultimately Russia’s offerings to the US are limited; it has also been asserted that any rapprochement would not have an effect on Moscow–Beijing relations, as Sino-Russian ties are not dependent on any third party. Furthermore, regarding the Ukraine war, China maintains that it is ‘not a party’ to the conflict (DPA 2024). China upholds the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine while acknowledging Russia’s legitimate security concerns. In the eyes of Beijing, these principles must be reconciled to end the war. Additionally, China opposes unilateral sanctions on Russia but, due to its significant trade ties with the EU and the US, it accepts the Russian sanctions and their secondary effects on the Chinese economy. The ongoing negotiations on Ukraine are perceived by China as creating crucial momentum for achieving peace through dialogue, which should not be an opportunity missed. The American initiative is seen as a continuation of previous efforts, including the Chinese Peace Plan for Ukraine of 2023, the Ukraine Peace Summit 2024 in Switzerland and the Sino-Brazilian Six-Point Plan, also in 2024 (Gov.br 2024). China calls for non-escalation and direct negotiations, noting the signs of the exhaustion of manpower and resources on both the Russian and the Ukrainian sides. Despite China’s apparently laconic stance vis-à-vis the relationship, an American–Russian rapprochement could cause some concerns for Beijing. Economically, Moscow is less relevant to Beijing than Washington or Brussels. However, Russia holds fundamental strategic value due to its extensive land border with China. In the event of an American–Chinese rivalry escalating into direct conflict, Russia could become a lifeline for Beijing, especially if accompanied by a successful American blockade. These potential risks and scenarios, which seem increasingly likely over time, may serve as a significant incentive for China to obstruct the warming of relations between Moscow and Washington. References DPA (2024). China is not a party to Ukraine war, Xi tells Scholz in Beijing. aNews, 16 April. https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2024/04/16/china-is-not-a-party-to-ukraine-war-xi-tells-scholz-in-beijing. Accessed 15 April 2025. European Commission. (2025). Joint White Paper for European defence readiness 2030. JOIN (2025) 120 final (19 March). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0120. Accessed 15 April 2025. Gov.br. (2024). Brazil and China present joint proposal for peace negotiations with the participation of Russia and Ukraine. 23 May. https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-china-present-joint-proposal-for-peace-negotiations-with-the-participation-of-russia-and-ukraine. Accessed 15 April 2025. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This paper focuses on the European Union as a military power. It starts with an introduction to SAFE – Security Action for Europe as a financial instrument designed to make the EU a formidable military power.The second part of the paper provides an account of debates regarding the nature of the EU (civilian, normative through ethical to military). Next, a brief historical account of European defence cooperation is presented.The central part of the analysis examines the key characteristics of the EU as a military power, which is marked by a gap between its declared motivations and the actual application of military and political means.The paper ends with the expression of scepticism regarding the role of SAFE in the future of European Security. Key Words: SAFE, Geopolitics, Security, Europe, Ukraine. Introduction SAFE (Security Action for Europe) is a financial instrument introduced by the European Commission to bolster defence capabilities across EU member states. Proposed in March 2025 as part of the broader ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, SAFE aims to provide up to €150 billion in loans by the end of the decade to support joint defence procurement and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).1 This initiative is driven by concerns over a potential Russian attack and growing uncertainty about long-term U.S. security commitments to Europe. To qualify for SAFE funding, 65% of a project’s value must originate from companies within the EU, the European Economic Area, or Ukraine.  Rationale behind SAFE The EU Council formally adopted SAFE on 27 May 2025. SAFE is part of the €800 billion ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, which also includes other pillars such as fiscal flexibility (national escape clauses), cohesion funds, and private capital mobilisation. It appears that several geopolitical and strategic factors drive the establishment of SAFE. Firstly, there is the case of ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine: The war, starting in February 2022, has exposed deficiencies in European defence capabilities and highlighted the need for rapid rearmament and increased self-reliance.2 The return of high-intensity warfare on European soil has prompted a reevaluation of defence priorities. Secondly, the shifting of the U.S. role. Concerns over reduced U.S. military support, particularly following political shifts in Washington.3 Thirdly, experts indicate the issue of capability gaps and industrial weaknesses. The EU has identified critical gaps in areas like air and missile defence, drones, and military mobility. The need to scale up production and reduce reliance on non-European suppliers has driven the creation of the SAFE initiative. Fourthly, support for Ukraine. SAFE includes provisions to integrate Ukraine’s defence industry, ensuring continued support for Kyiv amid uncertainties in global alliances.4 The evolving nature of EU power In recent history, it is Francois Duchene’s idea of “Civilian Power Europe” (CPE) that has dominated debates about the role of Europe and European institutions in the world.  Duchêne's concept of (CPE) refers to a particular role for Europe in the world that emphasises non-military means of influence and the promotion of international values. Duchêne's original idea, articulated in the early 1970s, suggested that Europe could play a distinctive role based on low politics, non-state actors, ideational influences, and international interdependence rather than traditional military power. The CPE concept highlights Europe's potential to exercise considerable non-military power, combining the power dimension akin to a "European Trading State" with a normative foreign policy perspective aimed at promoting values such as equality, justice, and concern for people with low incomes abroad.5 Fast forward to the 21st century, and Ian Manners proposes another equally influential concept – “normative power”. Ian Manners' main argument is that the European Union (EU) should be understood not only in terms of traditional conceptions of "civilian power" or "military power" but rather as a "normative power" in international relations. He contends that the EU's international role is fundamentally based on its ability to shape norms and define what is considered "normal" in world politics. This normative power stems from the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and constitutional basis, which predispose it to act normatively by promoting principles such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Manners argues that this normative dimension is crucial for understanding the EU's identity and influence internationally, as exemplified by the EU's active pursuit of the international abolition of the death penalty. He emphasises that the EU's power lies less in its military or economic capabilities and more in its capacity to diffuse norms and reshape international standards, making the concept of "normative power Europe" not a contradiction but a significant form of power in world politics.6  Shortly afterwards, Lisbeth Aggestam proposes yet another concept regarding the nature and role of the European Union in the world – “ethical power.” The concept of 'ethical power Europe' (EPE) in EU foreign policy represents a shift from focusing on what the EU 'is' to what it 'does. It articulates the EU's ambition to be a proactive global actor that not only serves as a positive role model but actively works to change the world in the direction of a "global common good." This involves the EU taking on new tasks in crisis management, peacekeeping, state-building, and reconstruction of failing states, complementing its existing roles in development aid and humanitarian assistance. The EU positions itself as a "force for good" and a peacebuilder in the world, justifying its acquisition of both civilian and military power capabilities in these terms.7 EPE encompasses both civilian and military power, as well as social and material power, thereby broadening the scope beyond earlier concepts, such as civilian power in Europe, as proposed by Duchene, and normative power, as emphasised by Manners, which primarily focused on civilian and normative influence. The EPE concept also reintroduces the international and national dimensions into the analysis of the EU's role, recognising the importance of member states' interests and acknowledging that material interests and ethical considerations often overlap. Importantly, EPE is not presented as an empirical reality but rather as a concept that opens new lines of critical reflection on the EU's role, motivations, and ethical dilemmas in foreign policy. It recognises the complexity of ethical foreign policy, given competing visions of order and justice in the world and the challenges of translating ethical ambitions into practice. The concept invites analysis of the ethical values the EU promotes, the relationship between ethics and interests, the just use of power (including military force), and the problems inherent in pursuing a consistent ethical foreign policy. Conversely, Karen Smith asserts that CPE is definitively dead, and the EU now finds itself somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power like most other international actors. Rather than debating whether the EU is a civilian power, the focus should be on critically analysing what the EU does and what it should do in international relations.8 According to Smith, the implications of the EU employing military means are significant and multifaceted.  Firstly, the EU's acquisition and use of military instruments challenge the notion that the EU remains a purely "civilian power." Clinging to the civilian power label stretches the term beyond its breaking point, as military means are fundamentally non-civilian in nature. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, often considered civilian activities, frequently involve military personnel and can evolve into military operations, thereby further blurring the distinction between civilian and military roles.  Secondly, by using military instruments—even as a "residual" tool to safeguard other means—the EU complicates the clear-cut distinction between civilian and military power. This leads to fuzzy interpretations about when the EU ceases to be a civilian power, making it difficult to establish a clear cut-off point or assess changes along the civilian-military spectrum.  Thirdly, employing military means signals a shift from a post-modern, law-based international identity toward a more traditional power politics approach. This militarization risks discrediting the EU's earlier vision of transforming international relations through law and civilian influence alone. The EU moves closer to a "Hobbesian" model where military force backs diplomacy, which may undermine its unique post-modern identity and soft power.  Fourthly, the use of military force raises complex questions about the EU’s ends and means, including the justifications for intervention, the legitimacy of coercion, and democratic control over foreign policy decisions.  Finally, the continued use of military means necessitates moving beyond simplistic categorisations of civilian power to a more nuanced analysis of what the EU does in international relations. The EU, like most actors, falls somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power, and its military capabilities must be critically assessed rather than dismissed or downplayed. With this in mind, let us look at the EU as a military actor. A brief history of European defence cooperation Signed on March 4, 1947, the Treaty of Dunkirk was a bilateral alliance between France and the United Kingdom, primarily aimed at preventing renewed German aggression following World War II. Effective from September 8, 1947, and set to expire in 1997, it was also seen as a pretext for defence against the USSR. It laid the foundation for formal European defence collaboration, emphasising mutual assistance and alliance.9 In 1948, the Treaty of Brussels expanded this framework, encompassing Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and established the Western Union. This alliance focused on defence, economic, cultural, and social collaboration. By 1955, following the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty, it evolved into the Western European Union (WEU), with Italy and West Germany joining, marking the establishment of a broader European defence structure. Parallel to these developments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established on April 4, 1949, by 12 countries, including the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations, to counter Soviet expansion. NATO's Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, has become a cornerstone of transatlantic security. During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against Soviet influence, with significant military and political cooperation among members. The WEU, while secondary to NATO, played a complementary role. In 1950, its defence structures were transferred to NATO, reducing its authority, but it remained active in fostering European defence collaboration. The WEU's social and cultural roles were transferred to the Council of Europe in 1960, with its focus shifting to security and defence.  The end of the Cold War in the 1990s prompted a shift towards greater European autonomy in defence. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), aiming to coordinate foreign policy and security. This was followed by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, which introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), enabling the EU to conduct military and civilian missions independently. The 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, prompted by the Kosovo War, endorsed a European security and defence policy, including the development of autonomous military forces. The 2002 Berlin Plus agreement allowed the EU access to NATO assets for peacekeeping, reflecting the close cooperation between the two organisations. The Petersberg Declaration of 1992, initially under the WEU, defined tasks such as humanitarian and rescue operations, which were later integrated into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 further strengthened EU defence capabilities, incorporating the WEU's mutual defence clause. This rendered the WEU superfluous, leading to its dissolution on 30 June 2011, with its functions being transferred to the EU. The European Union Institute for Security Studies and Satellite Centre, previously WEU entities, were integrated into the EU framework in 2002, marking a consolidation of defence.   *Generated with Grok and gamma.app (9 June, 2025). EU as a military actor As of mid-2025, the EU has approximately 3,500 military personnel and 1,300 civilian personnel deployed worldwide. Since the first CSDP missions and operations were launched in 2003, the EU has undertaken over 40 overseas operations, utilising both civilian and military missions in several countries across Europe, Africa, and Asia. As of today, there are 21 ongoing EU CSDP missions and operations, comprising 12 civilian, eight military, and one combined civilian and military initiative.10  According to the EU itself, “Their (Security and Defence Policy ((CSDP)) Missions) aim is to help prevent or resolve conflicts and crises, enhance the capacities of partner countries and, ultimately, protect the European Union and its citizens. EU decisions to deploy a mission or operation are typically made at the request of the partner country receiving assistance and/or based on a United Nations Security Council Resolution, always in full respect of international law. These decisions take into account the EU’s security interests, EU strategic efforts and regional engagement strategies. They are tailored to the local circumstances and to the tasks that need to be implemented”.11 Scholars researching the topic conclude that the political motivations behind EU military operations are complex, driven by a combination of national interests, strategic considerations, and internal EU dynamics. While the EU often justifies its operations with humanitarian rhetoric, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations. The influence of key member states, such as France and Germany, plays a significant role in shaping the EU's military agenda. However, the EU's ability to project influence is constrained by internal divisions and resource limitations. National Interests One of the most significant political motivations behind EU military operations is the pursuit of national interests by its member states. While the EU often presents a unified front, the decision to deploy military operations is heavily influenced by the interests of its most powerful members, particularly France and Germany. These states often use EU military operations as a means to advance their own strategic and economic interests while framing them as collective EU actions. For instance, France has been a key driver of several European Union (EU) military operations in Africa, such as the EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Critics argue that these operations were motivated by French geo-strategic and economic interests in the region rather than purely humanitarian concerns.12 Similarly, the EU's naval operation, Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia, was influenced by the interests of member states with significant maritime trade routes in the region.13  The dominance of national interests is further evident in the EU's decision-making process. Member states often prioritise their security and economic concerns over broader EU objectives, leading to inconsistencies in the deployment of military operations. For example, the EU's reluctance to intervene in the 2006 Lebanon war, despite initial plans for a military operation, was primarily due to divergent national interests among member states.14 Power Politics and Strategic Culture The EU's military operations are also shaped by power politics within the organisation. The distribution of power among member states plays a crucial role in determining the scope and nature of these operations. France, in particular, has historically played a key The EU often justifies its military operations with humanitarian rhetoric, emphasising the need to protect civilians, prevent human rights abuses, and promote stability in conflict zones. However, this rhetoric often masks more pragmatic strategic considerations. For instance, the EU's intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006 was officially framed as a humanitarian operation. However, it was also driven by the strategic interests of EU member states in the region's natural resources and political stability.15  Likewise, the EU's naval operation Sophia in the Mediterranean was initially justified as a humanitarian response to the migrant crisis. However, the operation also served strategic purposes, such as enhancing the EU's maritime security capabilities and addressing the political priorities of member states like Italy and France.16 The gap between humanitarian rhetoric and strategic reality is a recurring theme in European Union (EU) military operations. While humanitarian concerns may play a role in the initial justification for intervention, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations.17 Ukraine and EU’s Involvement Against Russia The EU has consistently condemned Russia's actions, viewing them as a violation of international law, and supports Ukraine's right to self-defence. This includes diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia and coordinate with partners like the US and NATO. Ukraine's EU candidacy, granted in June 2022, reflects long-term integration goals, though the process is expected to take years.18 So far, the EU has imposed 17 sanction packages by May 2025, targeting Russia's economy, military, and individuals, including measures against Belarus, Iran, and North Korea for supporting Russia. These aim to weaken Russia's war capabilities, with recent packages focusing on export bans and measures to prevent circumvention.19 The EU has committed €147.9 billion in aid, with €50.3 billion allocated for military support, €77 billion for financial and humanitarian assistance, and €17 billion for refugee support. This includes weapons, training, and emergency relief, as well as support for Ukrainian refugees under the Temporary Protection Mechanism. To counter the impacts of war, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from 40% in 2021 to 15% in 2023, thereby diversifying its energy sources. It also facilitates Ukrainian grain exports through solidarity lanes, addressing global food security.20 Now, as noble as it sounds and as much as it fits into the self-perception of Brussels’s elites (the EU being a force for good), the critics of the West's support of Ukraine make a couple of formidable points. Firstly, the longer the war continues, the more destroyed Ukraine becomes and the greater the number of Ukrainians killed. Secondly, the longer the war continues, the greater the likelihood of escalation, which poses a threat to the entire European continent. Thirdly, despite mainstream media reports, the Russian Federation appears to have adapted to operating effectively despite the sanctions, which may strengthen its economy in the short to medium term and, more importantly, bring it closer to cooperating with China and North Korea. Finally, since every war serves as a testing ground for new technologies, the Russians, especially the North Koreans and the Chinese, are gaining invaluable insight into the nature of modern warfare, which is often referred to as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  Conclusion To answer the question introduced at the beginning of this analysis, “Can SAFE make Europe safe?” the author of this piece remains sceptical, to say the least. It appears that despite some initial intentions to end the Ukrainian war as early as April 2022, it is the European elites, especially French, German and Polish, who stand for the prolongation, if not escalation, of the Ukrainian war, potentially at the expense of the security of the whole European continent and definitely at the expense of Ukrainians and their country.  References:  1. La Rocca, M. (2025, May 27). Defence, final go-ahead for the SAFE fund. Von der Leyen: “Exceptional measures for exceptional times.” Eunews. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/05/27/defence-final-go-ahead-for-the-safe-fund-von-der-leyen-exceptional-measures-for-exceptional-times/ 2. COUNCIL REGULATION establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European defence industry Instrument. (2025, March 19). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0122&qid=1749479407767 3. Tidey, A. (2025, May 21). Everything you need to know about SAFE, the EU’s €150bn defence instrument. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/21/everything-you-need-to-know-about-safe-the-eus-150bn-defence-instrument/4. Scazzieri, L. (2025, March 26). One step forward for Europe’s defence. Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/insights/one-step-forward-europes-defence 5. Orbie, J. (2006). Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates. Cooperation and Conflict, 41(1), 123-128. Sage Publications, Ltd. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450844256. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258.7. Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical power Europe? International Affairs, 84(1), 1-11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/251447118. Smith, K. E. (2005). Beyond the civilian power EU debate. Politique européenne, (17), 63-82. L'Harmattan. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450177509. The road to European defence cooperation. (1947). European Defence Agency. https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html10. European Union External Action, (2025, January 30). Missions and Operations. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#87694E11. EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS. (2025, April). https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EU-mission-and-operation_2025.pdf 12. See more at: Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781 and Olsen, G. R. (2009). The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe? International Peacekeeping, 16(2), 245–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685828 13. See more at: Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 and Riddervold, M. (2018). Why Not Fight Piracy Through NATO? Explaining the EU’s First Naval Mission: EU NAVFOR Atalanta (pp. 195–217). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66598-6_10 14. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg15. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg 16. Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 17. Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781   18. EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine-archive/19. Russia’s war against Ukraine. (n.d.). https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/topics/russia-s-war-against-ukraine/ 20. See more at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/where-does-the-eu-s-gas-come-from/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction The geopolitical upheavals of the 1990s directly affected the Baltic Sea region: the USSR collapsed, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, and Germany was reunited. The logic of the “end of history” introduced completely new principles of international order across the European continent. Trade, economic, and military-political cooperation were based on shared development goals and universal practices of international interaction. Rapidly growing trade, economic, cultural, educational, and investment ties in the Baltic region helped overcome the recent legacy of Cold War bloc confrontation. Regional organizations and formats of cooperation, even if they did not create a new “Baltic” identity (an idea proposed in the early 1990s), certainly established working mechanisms for joint regional projects. These initiatives were implemented by countries ready for mutually beneficial cooperation. However, these carefully built formats and projects proved fragile in the face of global challenges. The decline of global governance institutions and growing tensions between the collective West and a resurging Russia — economically, politically, and militarily — led to a global political crisis. The increasingly militarized Baltic Sea region became a logistical hub for strategic rivals — Russia and NATO / the EU. A Region of Cooperation In March 1992, at a conference of foreign ministers of the Baltic Sea countries and Norway, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was established. The main initiators of this idea were German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Danish counterpart Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. The creation of a common regional international organization marked the symbolic start of a phase of intensive interstate cooperation in the region, based on the principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and other CSCE documents. At the political level, CBSS member states declared their readiness to act together in the common interest. They confirmed their commitment to cooperation, including the peaceful resolution of regional disputes in a spirit of good neighborliness and partnership. The idea of building a system of regional organizations and initiatives under the CBSS political umbrella was seen as a more effective solution for regional development than relying on international organizations focused on global issues and the many military and humanitarian crises of the early 1990s. By the start of the 21st century, the Baltic region had a range of functioning projects and initiatives across various fields: from regulating the use of Baltic Sea biological resources to a joint online university (the Baltic University Programme), from a platform for marine spatial planning (Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea, VASAB) to festivals organized by the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC). One of the most important issues requiring practical cooperation between the EU and Russia was the development of the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. This semi-exclave (due to its access to the sea) is separated from mainland Russia by the territories of Poland and Lithuania — countries that declared their intention to join Euro-Atlantic institutions, which was seen as a confrontational move by Russia — and Belarus. The “Kaliningrad Puzzle” was about finding the best strategy between Russia and the EU to support the daily life and sustainable economic development of the Kaliningrad region after Poland and Lithuania joined NATO and the EU. This brought restrictions on the transit of passengers and goods, on trade and energy cooperation with neighboring countries, and on maintaining the military security of the region. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, there were only few scenarios discussed for resolving the "Kaliningrad Puzzle." One seemingly attractive idea was the concept of a “Hong Kong on the Baltic”, but it had no real prospects due to a lack of political will — both from neighboring countries and from the Russian central government. Moreover, the very idea of a demilitarized zone with open access for foreign investment and visitors, offering special conditions for business and governance, did not gain support at the federal level. It was removed from the agenda already during expert discussions. It is likely that this concept was viewed as a possible threat of “creeping separatism,” especially against the background of growing anti-federal sentiments in the region. Another concept discussed in parallel was that of a “land-based aircraft carrier.” This scenario involved limited trade and economic cooperation with neighboring countries, a significant reduction in cross-border passenger flow, and the strengthening of the region’s defensive (and in some proposals, offensive) military potential. This would mean creating an “island model” for the region's economy and energy system. From today’s perspective, it is clear that this unlikely scenario is exactly what has been implemented. In the 1990s, a research group led by Professor G. M. Fedorov of Kaliningrad University proposed the idea of “Kaliningrad as a region of cooperation between Russia and the EU.” It envisioned the region as a platform for building cooperation networks to enhance economic (a free or special economic zone), political (a venue for dialogue and negotiations), scientific and educational (development and internationalization of the university complex), and cultural (creation of a cultural cluster) ties with the EU. This could have helped establish a new model of international relations in the Baltic — a model of “EU–Russia cooperation in the region.” The proposal included a recommendation to legally define Kaliningrad’s development strategy at the federal level as a region of intensive interaction with the EU. This idea was perceived by both Russia and the EU more as a reflection of the spirit of the time than as a real plan of action. Implementation took place without formal legal support and with little political enthusiasm. Each side interpreted the idea of cooperation in its own way, based on its own interests — both open and hidden. When analyzing the implementation of the “region of cooperation” concept, it becomes clear that it was undermined by the efforts of Poland and the Baltic States, which, in the context of their Euro-Atlantic integration, worked to securitize nearly all forms of interaction with Russia. The accession of Poland and the Baltic States to the EU on May 1, 2004, had critical consequences for the regional landscape. The new EU members made “Eastern Policy” their foreign policy priority, aiming not only to offer expert assessments of the post-Soviet space but also to actively shape the EU’s policy toward Russia. This approach aligned with the Polish interpretation of the Giedroyc–Mieroszewski Doctrine, which argued that a long-term goal of Polish foreign policy should be the existence of post-Soviet states independent from Russian influence. Poland, the Baltic States, and later Germany saw the EU as the key moderator of the political and economic agenda in the Baltic Sea region. This was reflected in the development and adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. In the field of security, they relied on NATO while also building bilateral military ties with the United States and strengthening their own defense capacities. “Cool War” and a Region of Conflict Professor K. K. Khudoley from St. Petersburg State University describes the growing tensions between Russia and Western countries in the Baltic Sea region as a period of “Cool War.” This phase is marked by decreased predictability and manageability of international processes due to a major rift between Russia and other regional actors. In the Baltic region, the development of multilateral cooperation networks and accumulated experience of interregional engagement failed to act as “political shock absorbers.” Instead, regional cooperation dynamics were defined by Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU. At that time, neutral countries like Sweden and Finland started participating in limited military-political cooperation with NATO countries, raising doubts in Russia about the permanence of their non-aligned status. In this context, scholar Y. M. Zverev accurately noted that the idea of the Baltic as a region of cooperation with Western neighbors gradually collapsed. It was a result of accumulating contradictions and rising global tensions, eventually leading to near-complete breakdown of cooperation — except for dwindling trade relations. Russia’s formal exclusion in 2022 from regional cooperation formats was preceded by processes inside NATO and the EU, aimed at building alternative cooperation mechanisms and strengthening their political, economic, and military presence in the Baltic region. On August 12, 2008, during the five-day war in Georgia, Polish President Lech Kaczyński addressed a rally in Tbilisi, with the presidents of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine present. He voiced concern over what he saw as an existential threat from Russia: “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic States, and then possibly my own country, Poland.” From that point, Warsaw actively promoted its view of regional security within Euro-Atlantic structures, emphasizing rivalry with Moscow — despite growing trade and energy ties between Russia and various EU countries. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia took an active role in developing the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, promoting a vision of the Baltic as a zone of priority EU interests. In this framework, relations with Russia, Iceland, Belarus, and Norway were seen as external. The European Commission was viewed as the main source of political influence and funding for transforming the region and reducing Russia’s role in the regional agenda. The adoption of the Strategy in 2009 became a turning point, undermining the earlier idea of a “Sea of Cooperation.” EU member states in the region prioritized EU-centered mechanisms that effectively excluded Russia — even though special cooperation formats were formally included. It’s important to highlight that the dismantling of the “region of cooperation” logic and the move toward a conflict-driven “Cool War” scenario was mainly caused by external, non-regional factors: the erosion of the dominant world order, worsening tensions between NATO and Russia, and the acute phase of that conflict — the Ukraine crisis. The escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022 turned the situation in the Baltic into a conflict zone. Russia was removed from nearly all key cooperation frameworks — mechanisms that were originally created to absorb tensions, align interests, and prevent crises from becoming irreversible. On March 3, 2022, foreign ministers of all non-Russian member states of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs adopted a Declaration suspending Russia’s participation “until conditions allow for renewed cooperation based on fundamental principles of international law.” On May 17, 2022, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced the country’s withdrawal from the CBSS, describing the organization as a tool of anti-Russian policy. A similar fate befell the Northern Dimension — another highly effective and well-developed cooperation framework. It covered areas like the environment, nuclear safety, healthcare, energy, transport, trade, research, education, and culture. The Northern Dimension had real impact, including in global-scale nuclear safety. On March 8, 2022, the EU, Iceland, and Norway suspended all cooperation with Russia and Belarus under this program. Today, all foreign countries of the Baltic region support Ukraine and run national programs of political and military assistance. They also participate in NATO, EU, and “Baltic-format” initiatives. Poland has become a key logistics hub for delivering humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, while also building up its military infrastructure and increasing the size and capabilities of its armed forces. A key milestone was the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which confirmed the trend of militarization and strategic alignment of the region in favor of the U.S. and NATO. In NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Russia was declared “the most significant and direct threat” to the security of allies and the Euro-Atlantic area. Similar statements appeared in updated security strategies of Sweden and Finland. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, stated that after Sweden and Finland joined NATO, the non-nuclear status of the Baltic Sea was no longer relevant. Since 2022, the Baltic has turned into a region of rapid militarization, with NATO and Russia both increasing operational capabilities — especially along shared borders. For Finland, which shares a long border with Russia, joining NATO marked a major shift in its security policy. Previously, Finland maintained non-alignment, focusing on national defense and cooperation with Sweden while keeping stable relations with Russia. According to researcher S. V. Andreyev, the NATO debate in Finland started after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, but received little public support back then. However, Matti Pesu, senior researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, noted that although Finland had cooperated with NATO since the 1990s, the events of 2022 caused a decisive public shift: “The majority of Finns supported the decision.” In 2024, Finland’s military spending reached €6.8 billion (more than 2.4% of GDP). Sweden defines its role in NATO as a security guarantor in the Baltic region. Stockholm is developing military-technical cooperation with Finland and Norway, promoting the idea of a unified NATO operational command in Northern Europe (JFC Norfolk). Sweden is also interested in building joint defense capabilities with the Baltic States, Germany, and Poland. In Sweden’s strategic documents, Russia is identified as the main threat, “supported by other authoritarian states such as Iran and China.” On December 17, 2024, the Swedish parliament approved the national defense strategy for 2025–2030, which includes an increase in military spending from 122 billion kronor (2.2% of GDP) in 2024 to 186 billion kronor (2.6% of GDP) by 2030. To understand the scale of militarization, it is important to note that in 2024, NATO adopted its first-ever Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy — a comprehensive plan to modernize the Alliance’s digital infrastructure and capabilities. The public section of this document highlights the prioritization of cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and energy nodes. These priorities provide a basis for creating preventive response capabilities to threats — including scenarios involving damage or destruction of undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea in case of conflict escalation with Russia. The growth of NATO’s military presence in the region has led to new priorities in strategic planning, reflected in large-scale exercises held in 2023 and 2024. On April 29, 2025, Russian presidential aide and chairman of the Maritime Board, Nikolai Patrushev, stated that NATO was rehearsing offensive scenarios near Russia’s borders — including the seizure of the Kaliningrad region and blockade of shipping in the Baltic Sea. Some experts assess that the threat of a maritime blockade of Russia in the Baltic, long discussed by NATO politicians, is not only possible but realistic. A naval blockade of Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg would almost certainly be seen by Russia as a casus belli, with corresponding consequences. Conclusion As of June 2025, the Baltic Sea has effectively become a “region of cooperation without Russia”. Russia has been excluded from all functioning regional cooperation mechanisms, while the military, energy, and economic collaboration among the other regional states and extra-regional actors (such as the United States and France) has intensified. The rapid militarization of the region and the loss of its non-nuclear status are reinforcing a long-term trend toward confrontation. At the level of military planning, regional actors are openly preparing for scenarios of full-scale conflict, which increases tensions between Russia and NATO. The idea of such a conflict is no longer unthinkable — it has strategic foundations, and the leading players in the region are preparing for it. When assessing the likelihood of this scenario, it is important to understand that the current intensity of the Baltic conflict is shaped by the short-term agendas and interests of the countries involved. A degree of cautious optimism about the future of the Baltic region is based on the possibility that post-conflict agreements between Russia and extra-regional actors could become a key factor in shaping the future model of international relations in the region. Global political dynamics are capable of changing rapidly, potentially reversing current trends and creating a new political reality — overriding the inertia of existing military planning. In the Baltic, there remains a solid legacy of cooperative networks. Across the region, direct links between participants of political, academic, and civic projects — both bilateral and multilateral — have not disappeared. Countries in the region still share objective common interests, especially in areas such as environmental protection and economic cooperation. This historical experience serves as a source of moderate optimism: in the foreseeable future, relations in the Baltic may move from a state of “cool war” and confrontation to one of selective cooperation. A “cool peace” and selective cooperation would clearly be more aligned with Russia’s long-term interests in the Baltic region than a scenario of full-scale conflict. About the Author Igor I. Zhukovsky — PhD in Political Science, Senior Research Fellow at the Baltic Region Comprehensive Research Group, Center for Strategic Planning Studies, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. Sources Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. President of Russia. 27 October 2022. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695 (accessed: 30.06.2025). 1992 CBSS 1st Ministerial Session – Copenhagen Declaration. Council of the Baltic Sea States, 5–6 March 1992. URL: https://cbss.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/1992CBSS1stMinisterialSessionCommunique.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). Zhukovsky I. "Council of the Baltic Sea States: New Wine in Old Bottles?" Valdai Club. 19 September 2024. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sovetgosudarstvbaltiyskogomorya/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Joenniemi P., Dewar S., Fairlie L.D. The Kaliningrad Puzzle: A Russian Region Within the European Union. COPRI Working Papers, Vol. 6, 2000. Oldberg I. "The Emergence of a Regional Identity in the Kaliningrad Oblast." Cooperation and Conflict, 2000, Vol. 35, pp. 269–288. Khlopetsky A.P., Fedorov G.M. Kaliningrad Region as a Region of Cooperation: A Monograph. Kaliningrad: Yantarny Skaz, 2000. See also: "Eastern Policy of the EU" is understood as the Union's external policy toward its eastern neighbors. Polish foreign ministers R. Sikorski and A. Rotfeld have repeatedly emphasized the significance of the "Giedroyc–Mieroszewski Doctrine." Ofitserov-Belsky D.V. "Eastern Policy of Poland: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Aspects." Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 2023, No. 4(61), pp. 51–61. Khudoley K.K. "The 'Cool War' in the Baltic Sea Region: Consequences and Future Scenarios." Baltic Region, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 42–54. Zverev Yu.M. "Three Russian Regions on the Baltic Amidst Russia–West Confrontation." Baltic Region, 2023, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 24–41. Speech by Polish President Lech Kaczyński in Tbilisi, 12 August 2008. URL: https://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/archiwum/archiwumlechakaczynskiego/aktualnosci/rok2008/wizytaprezydentarpwgruzji,26753,archive (accessed: 30.06.2025). EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR, 2009) — its development experience was later applied to other EU macro-regional strategies. Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania “On the Baltic Sea Strategy”, 19 April 2007. URL: https://eseimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalActPrint/lt?documentId=TAIS.295996 (accessed: 30.06.2025). Zhukovsky I.I. "Some Issues in the Evolution of Modern International Relations in the Baltic Region." Baltic Region, 2024, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 145–160. Declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2022. Government of Poland. URL: https://www.gov.pl/web/finlandia/federacjarosyjskazawieszonawpracachradypanstwmorzabaltyckiego (accessed: 30.06.2025). Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on Withdrawal from the CBSS, 17 May 2022. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813674/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). See, for example, the term “NATO internal sea” — used by various politicians and experts in relation to the Baltic. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 9 June 2022. URL: https://www.act.nato.int/wpcontent/uploads/2023/05/290622strategicconcept.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). National Security Strategy. Government Offices of Sweden, 2024. URL: https://www.government.se/informationmaterial/2024/07/nationalsecuritystrategy/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Government Defence Report 2024. Ministry of Defense of Finland. URL: https://www.defmin.fi/en/themes/defence_policy_reports#1f47ed12 (accessed: 30.06.2025). "The Baltic May Lose Its Nuclear-Free Status." RIA Novosti. 14 April 2022. URL: https://ria.ru/20220414/baltika1783465933.html (accessed: 30.06.2025). In 2024, Poland allocated over 4% of GDP to military modernization — the highest share in NATO. Andreev S. "Finland: Two Years in NATO." RIAC. 28 April 2025. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analyticsandcomments/analytics/finlyandiyadvagodavnato/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Pesu M. “Logical, but Unexpected – Finland’s Road to NATO from a Close Perspective.” NATO Review, 30 August 2023. URL: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2023/08/30/logicznealenieoczekiwanedrogafinlandiidonatozbliskiejperspektywy/index.html (accessed: 30.06.2025). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024). NATO. URL: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617defexp2024en.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). Defence Resolution 2025–2030. Government Offices of Sweden. URL: https://www.government.se/governmentpolicy/totaldefence/defenceresolution202520302 (accessed: 30.06.2025). NATO’s Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy. NATO. URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_229801.htm (accessed: 30.06.2025). According to NATO, more than 11 undersea cables were damaged in the last 18 months, raising concerns about potential “grey zone” attacks. "Patrushev: NATO Rehearses Kaliningrad Seizure Scenarios in Military Drills." TASS. 29 April 2025. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/23809423 (accessed: 30.06.2025). Stryukovatyy V.V. "Russia's Geostrategic Position on the Baltic and the Threat of Maritime Blockade in Modern Conditions." Bulletin of the I. Kant Baltic Federal University. Series: Natural and Medical Sciences, 2024, No. 1, pp. 57–75.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Brexit has had numerous consequences, many of which were scarcely discussed in the lead-up to the 2016 referendum. The British Overseas Territories (BOTs) were not exempt from the repercussions following the decision to leave the European Union (EU). All BOTs maintained a formal relationship with the EU through the 2013 Overseas Association Decision, which provided a range of benefits—including economic and environmental cooperation, development assistance, policy dialogue, and the free movement of goods, services, and people. For Gibraltar, the end of free movement raised concerns about the future of its open border with Spain. Interim measures were introduced to maintain a ‘fluid’ border when the UK formally exited the EU in 2020. However, without a comprehensive agreement, there remained a real risk that the border would become much harder—especially with the EU’s upcoming implementation of the new Entry/Exit System (EES). Indeed, there were signs that managing the border was becoming increasingly difficult. For instance, Spanish authorities began to intensify checks on people crossing the border, resulting in long delays and queues. Approximately 15,000 people commute daily from Spain to Gibraltar for work, comprising over half of Gibraltar’s workforce. Additionally, waste disposal in Gibraltar was becoming more problematic, as much of it is transported across the border. Many older Gibraltarians recall the border closure between 1969 and 1982, a decision made by General Franco. Although Gibraltarians demonstrated flexibility and resilience in adapting to the closure, it caused significant short- to medium-term economic hardship and separated families and friends. Spanish workers also suffered during this period. The desire to protect the economies of both Gibraltar and Spain was therefore a key factor in the push to secure a post-Brexit agreement. Negotiations that began under the UK Conservative Government were protracted, with key obstacles including the precise role of Spanish officials conducting Schengen checks in Gibraltar and the status of Gibraltar Airport, which also serves as an RAF base. However, on 11 June 2025, an agreement was reached on the core aspects of a future treaty. The overarching goal is to enhance prosperity across the Gibraltar–Spain region by removing physical barriers and checks on people and goods, while safeguarding the Schengen Area, the EU Single Market, and the Customs Union. The hope is that the deal will provide legal certainty, stimulate economic growth, and strengthen cooperation between Gibraltar and Spain. More specifically, the agreement includes the following commitments: First, joint border checks at Gibraltar’s port and airport will replace controls at the Gibraltar–La Línea crossing, easing daily travel. Spain will conduct Schengen checks, while Gibraltar will maintain UK checks. One outcome of this will be that UK nationals visiting Gibraltar will be counted as part of the time-limited allowance (90 days) for short stays in the Schengen area. Second, a customs union between Gibraltar and the EU will eliminate goods checks and ensure tax alignment—particularly on tobacco—to prevent market distortions and support regional development. Third, guarantees on fair competition in areas such as labour, the environment, anti-money laundering, transport, and social security. The agreement also establishes a financial mechanism to support training, employment, and regional cohesion. On announcing the agreement, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy said: “Alongside the Government of Gibraltar, we have a reached an agreement which protects British sovereignty, supports Gibraltar’s economy and allows businesses to plan for the long-term once again”. He also took a swipe at the previous Conservative government: “This government inherited a situation from the last government which put Gibraltar’s economy and way of life under threat. Today’s breakthrough delivers a practical solution after years of uncertainty”. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Fabio Picardo, who played a central role in the negotiations, also welcomed the deal. While José Manuel Albares, the Spanish foreign affairs minister, said it would bring down “the last wall” on the continent. To her credit, Conservative Shadow Home Secretary, Priti Patel, did not dismiss the deal, but reserved judgement until full details were available. However, others on the right went to their usual default position. Former Tory Home Secretary Suella Braverman said: “We are absolutely furious about this deal. It’s another unbelievable and unimaginable betrayal”. Reform UK described the agreement as a “total surrender”, while Conservative Armed Forces spokesperson Mark Francois declared: “First Chagos, now Gibraltar—and next, probably the Falklands. Labour used to sing The Red Flag—now they just wave a big white one instead”. Previously, I have argued that this narrative—linking decisions about one BOT to others—is misleading and overlooks the important differences between them. Many Brexiteers’ opposition to this deal is a classic case of wanting to ‘have their cake and eat it.’ They voted for Brexit (which Gibraltar strongly opposed), demanded a hard Brexit, yet seem either unable or unwilling to acknowledge and address the problems it has caused. Without a pragmatic border deal, Gibraltar’s political and economic position—which the right claims to staunchly defend—would almost certainly have been hurt longer term. Right-wing voices in Spain are also opposed to the agreement, but they feel it concedes too much to the UK and Gibraltar. Interestingly, this is not the first instance in which a complex border issue has been successfully addressed between the UK and an EU member state. The Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, located on the southern coast of Cyprus, form a single BOT. These areas were retained by the UK following Cyprus’ independence and are home to a non-permanent British population as well as a permanent Cypriot community. Prior to Brexit, the border between the SBAs and the Republic of Cyprus was entirely open. Given the unique characteristics of the territory, it was essential to maintain this openness. To preserve the status quo, a specific Protocol was included in the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated under Prime Minister Boris Johnson. This Protocol ensures the continued application of EU law in key areas such as taxation, goods, agriculture, and fisheries within the SBAs, with enforcement carried out by the Republic of Cyprus. Although Gibraltar has been described as “the last piece of the EU exit jigsaw,” several Brexit-related issues concerning the BOTs remain unresolved and, hopefully, will soon be addressed. Perhaps the most pressing of these involves the Falkland Islands and its fisheries exports to the EU. At the time of Brexit, none of the BOTs were included in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement. While only a few BOTs engage in trade with the EU, the Falklands is a notable exception—particularly in its trade with Spain. Over the years, the Falklands has developed strong ties with Spanish fishing fleets and importers. As a result, more than 90% of the fish caught in its waters—primarily Loligo squid and various finfish—are exported to Spain. This industry is vital to the Falklands’ economy, contributing around 40% of the government’s annual revenue. It is also significant for Spain, which sources over 30% of its imported calamari from the Falklands. Before Brexit, Falklands fisheries exports entered the EU tariff-free. Now, they are subject to the EU’s common external tariff, which ranges from 6 to 18%, amounting to approximately €15 million annually—a substantial burden for a small economy. There is hope that, as part of a broader reset in UK-EU relations, the trade status of the BOTs can be improved. In a recent parliamentary response, David Lammy stated, “we are always seeking to reduce tariff burdens for our overseas territories, and we are in ongoing discussions with the European Union in particular”. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On 30 May 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore – Asia’s premier security summit – and his comments were unusually blunt. He warned that the West – Europe and the US – risk losing credibility over the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and unless these conflicts are resolved with integrity and consistency, the broader rules-based international order and Europe’s place in it will unravel. Macron’s concern wasn’t just about the tactical consequences of geopolitical instability, but something deeper: the symbolic and normative weight Europe claims to carry in global affairs. His comments mark a turning point, one that exposes the crisis of coherence at the heart of the European Union’s foreign policy – and the growing tension between the EU’s aspirational identity as a “normative power” and the harsh realities of a world governed by realpolitik. For over two decades, the EU has presented itself as a values-based actor, using diplomacy, development aid, legal harmonisation and multilateralism rather than coercion to wield influence. The concept of the EU as a “normative power” – famously coined by Ian Manners – is based on the idea that Europe seeks to shape global affairs by promoting norms such as human rights, democracy and international law. But the simultaneous occurrence of two deeply symbolic and contested wars – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s bombardment of Gaza – makes it increasingly hard for the EU to maintain this self-image without being accused of hypocrisy and selective morality. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the gap between Europe’s response to Ukraine and Gaza. In Ukraine, the EU has mounted one of the largest and most united responses in its history: military aid, sanctions, diplomatic isolation of Russia and open arms for Ukrainian refugees. In Gaza, the response has been fragmented, inconsistent and – by many accounts – morally ambiguous. Some European states like Ireland and Spain have called for recognition of Palestinian statehood and condemned Israeli actions, others have hesitated or doubled down on support for Israel in the name of counterterrorism and alliance politics. This has not gone unnoticed in the Global South, where Europe’s normative claims are increasingly seen as hollow, if not ridiculous. Macron’s talk of credibility reflects an elite awareness that Europe’s legitimacy is no longer taken for granted outside its borders. The credibility crisis he describes is not just about diplomacy – it’s about identity. If the EU says territorial integrity is sacred in Ukraine, how can it do nothing when the same principles are being flouted elsewhere? If the Union says human rights are universal, can it be silent – or ambiguous – on the civilian casualties in Gaza? These are not questions asked by foreign policy analysts; they are asked in international forums, in Asian capitals courted by Brussels and in the protests that fill European streets. The more the EU fails to match its words with its actions, the more its normative brand erodes. But there’s another layer to Macron’s intervention that needs to be looked at. His comments on “strategic autonomy” and not being caught in the crossfire of the US-China rivalry suggest Europe is dealing with more than just a credibility crisis. It’s facing a strategic choice that will redefine its global role: whether to double down on the postwar transatlantic compact or to chart a more independent course that allows it to mediate between blocs in a multipolar world. Macron’s consistent advocacy of strategic autonomy (however controversial) means he recognises the EU can’t outsource its geopolitical relevance to Washington indefinitely, especially with the return of Donald Trump to the White House. This dilemma is made worse by the structural weaknesses within the EU itself. The Union’s foreign policy is crippled by institutional fragmentation, national interests and a consensus-based decision-making process that often leads to lowest-common-denominator positions. While the EU was impressive in its initial unity on Ukraine, the Gaza crisis has shown the limits of that unity when values collide with political alliances or domestic political considerations. This is not just a crisis of perception but of capacity. Can the EU actually be a geopolitical player when its member states can’t even agree on what is legitimate force, occupation or humanitarian necessity? The illusion of normative power, then, is not just an external branding problem – it is an internal governance challenge. For Europe to maintain credibility abroad, it must first reconcile its internal contradictions. That means rethinking the balance between values and interests, between ideals and strategic imperatives. It may also require a degree of institutional boldness: deeper integration in foreign and security policy, a greater role for the High Representative, or a shift toward qualified majority voting in foreign affairs. At the same time, Europe must also acknowledge the changing global landscape in which it seeks to operate. In a world no longer dominated by Western hegemony, the EU’s normative influence depends not only on its coherence but on its ability to listen and engage with actors in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as equals rather than as recipients of European lectures. Macron’s call for a “positive new alliance” between Europe and Asia, one that resists domination by any superpower, hints at a potential path forward. But such an alliance will only be credible if Europe demonstrates that it is willing to apply its principles even when inconvenient—especially when those principles are tested not just by adversaries but by allies. In the end, Macron’s speech serves as a mirror held up to the European project itself. It reflects both its aspirations and its anxieties, its potential and its paradoxes. Whether Europe can move beyond this moment of crisis to forge a foreign policy that is both principled and strategic remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that credibility cannot be commanded—it must be earned. And in an era of increasing global scrutiny, that will require more than rhetoric. It will require resolve. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Arctic order historically, currently, and in the future reflects the world order. The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ is not valid and is a poor guide for policy. During Cold War bipolarity, the Arctic was divided between the Soviet Arctic and the Nordic and North American Arctic. US victory and Soviet defeat in the Cold War led to US unipolarity and hegemony which was the basis for a circumpolar (including Russia) liberal (as opposed to realist) Arctic order with organizations, such as the Arctic Council, International Arctic Science Committee, University of the Arctic, Barents and Bering regional cooperation, all on liberal topics such as science, environment, Indigenous rights, people-to-people cooperation.Footnote1 US unipolarity and hegemony are slipping away to world order characteristics of continued US unipolarity and hegemony, Sino-American bipolarity in economics and S&T and multipolarity illustrated by BRICS+. Sino-US competition and US-Russia conflict to the extent of proxy-war in Ukraine reflect these changes. The Arctic, which is de facto divided between the US-led NATO-Arctic and the Russian Arctic, where Russia reaches out to the BRICS+ in diplomacy, economics, and S&T, reflects these changes to world order. There is wishful thinking in the West of returning to post-Cold War US unipolar and hegemonic ‘liberal world order’ or ‘rules-based order’ and the circumpolar liberal Arctic order with it. This wish is probably unrealistic for global trends in demography, economics, S&T, legitimacy, etc. Significant conflict can be expected between the US/West and China and Russia on developments in world order, with the Global South standing by. The Arctic is likely to remain divided between the US-led NATO Arctic and the Russian Arctic seeking engagement with the BRICS+ world for the future with extremely limited cooperation and risk of spill-over from the Ukraine War and other US-Russia-China conflicts. The Arctic in international order There are two common, but invalid, narratives about the Arctic, which are poor guides for policy: First, ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, that the Arctic was apart from international politics and allowed for West-Russia cooperation unlike elsewhere, especially between the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Second, a presentist discourse, where international interests in the Arctic are seen as rising in the last 15 years, driven by climate change, the Russian flag planting on the seafloor of the North Pole in 2007, and the United States Geological Survey’s assessment of oil and gas resources in 2008, north of the Arctic Circle. Rather, the Arctic has for centuries closely mirrored the international system, whether multipolar with Western colonial empires before the World Wars, bipolar Cold War between the US and the USSR, post-Cold War US unipolarity and hegemony, or the current emerging Sino-American bipolarity and multipolarity. During 2014–2022, cooperation in the Arctic was not exceptional compared to US-Russia non-proliferation cooperation, most notably with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, or removing chemical weapons from Syria. There was extensive US-Europe-Russia and wider collaboration around the International Space Station. There was extensive energy trade and investment between Russia and Europe, most notably with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines under the Baltic Sea. The bipolar Cold War Arctic in the bipolar Cold War order Bipolarity with two superpowers standing out from all other great powers due to their demographic, economic, science and technology, military, and ideological weight and global claims, the US and the USSR, shaped the the Cold War order. Bipolar logic shaped the international order. John Mearsheimer explains well the structural logic of a nuclear-armed bipolar superpower security competition, and he points out how each superpower formed ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline them and mobilize their resources. These bounded orders were the West for the US with its institutions, and the East Bloc for the USSR.Footnote2 This bipolar logic was also clear in the Arctic, divided between the Nordic and North American Arctic of the West and the Soviet Arctic by the Iron Curtain in Europe and the Ice Curtain in the Bering Strait. Circumpolar Arctic cooperation was limited to the Polar Bear Treaty of 1973 between the USSR, Norway, Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, and the US, Norwegian Soviet joint fisheries management in the Barents Sea, and some Bering Strait cooperation. The Arctic was exceptionally militarized during the Cold War driven by the mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR, where the Arctic played a central role for geostrategic and technological reasons. The Arctic was the shortest flight path for bombers and missiles, and sea ice offered cover for nuclear ballistic submarines. This exceptional militarization of the Arctic harmed the human security of Arctic local and indigenous communities through forced displacement, security service surveillance, and pollution, including notable nuclear accidents, as the 1968 B52 bomber crash off Northwest Greenland with four H-bombs causing extensive radioactive contamination of much Soviet nuclear material in and around the Kola Peninsula, including sunken submarines with nuclear fuel or weapons on board.Footnote3 Circumpolar liberal Arctic order under US unipolarity The Cold War ended with US victory and Soviet defeat and dissolution, also caused by the US pressuring the USSR into a strategic nuclear arms race, that the Soviet economy could not support. US Navy operations near the Soviet Northern Fleet nuclear bastion around the Kola Peninsula were an important part of this pressure.Footnote4 The Arctic was also part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the USSR by reform and lowering external tension. Gorbachev called the Arctic as a zone of peace, environmental protection and scientific collaboration in his 1987 Murmansk speech, in contrast to being at the heart of a strategic nuclear arms race with the US, which the USSR could not sustain. Gorbachev’s reforms failed to avert the dissolution of the USSR and deep socio-economic, public health, and law and order crisis in Russian society during the 1990s. The Russian State withdrew to a significant extent from its Arctic, leaving military facilities and society behind. Sino-American bipolarity comes to the Arctic The relative distribution of comprehensive material and immaterial power of the strongest States shapes international order. States stay the predominant actors since the emergence of a state system, not denying powerful non-State actors historically and today. The US unipolarity after the Cold War was an exceptional time of international history and not the ‘End of History’ as believed by some quarters in the West (Fukuyama). History is returning to normal with the return of major centres of economic output and science and technology outside the West. Ironically, US unipolarity laid the foundation for the ‘Return of history’, rather than the ‘End of History’. Since the 1990s, the world experienced globalization with economic, science and technology, and cultural integration. The US as the sole superpower provided public goods and facilitated and coordinated many of these economic, scientific, and technological, and cultural flows. Globalization undermined US unipolarity, facilitating the faster relative growth of non-Western States. China’s export-oriented growth, returning it to its historical position as one of the world’s largest economies is the most important dimension for changes to world order. In parallel, other emerging markets have grown adding multipolar dimensions to international order. International Relations theory serves to think about how to respond to the return of China. About 20–25 years ago, Professor Joseph S. Nye (Harvard University) and Professor John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) articulated two major approaches with coherent theoretical and strategic visions for the Sino-American relationship. Nye, as a liberal institutionalist scholar and policymaker in the Bill Clinton Administration, presented a vision of ‘integrate, but hedge’. China integrated in the US-led world economy as member state of the World Trade Organization, while the US hedged against the rise of China by reinforcing its alliance with Japan.Footnote5 There were strong US and Western liberal expectations of Chinese economic growth and openness leading to political openness and reform. These expectations proved to be belied and ethnocentric. Mearsheimer, in line with his offensive realist theory, clearly outlined how the US had to keep China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia through a containment strategy.Footnote6 The US’ China strategy has shifted from the Nye perspective to the Mearsheimer perspective, while Mearsheimer himself is ostracized for his valid, but politically unacceptable, analysis of the Ukraine War. Mearsheimer explains how Sino-American bipolarity works with realist great power State security competition, and how competing great powers form their ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline and mobilize these.Footnote7 The US is shaping a NATO+ order of the NATO member states and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The US is increasingly engaging in trade and technology wars with China to slow down its growth rate, clearly denying its access to fundamental technologies of future knowledge-based economies. A realist focus on relative gains explains US policy to reduce China’s growth rate. China has a population more than three times that of the US with an absolute economy approaching the US economy. The US cannot allow China to catch up relatively with it, as that would imply a much larger Chinese economy than that of the US. Liberals (politically and theoretically) would ascribe the US policy to different domestic political systems, but the logic of anarchy points out how domestic political systems are of secondary concern, and empirically the US firmly bypassed and disciplined the previous Anglo-Saxon superpower, Britain. US-India relations can be expected to deteriorate with India’s socio-economic development, where India has a much younger population than China with great economic growth potential. China predicted the US abandoning its own open and globalized international economic policy out of concern for China’s relative rise to the US. China pursued a domestic and international economic policy much less dependent on US benevolence. In the domestic sphere, China pursued an economy based on domestic demand. Externally, China built up a parallel international economic and science and technology system with the Belt and Road Initiative with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other bodies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in security reflect parallel orders and institutions to the US-led Western institutions. Sino-American bipolarity also became clear in the Arctic about 10–15 years ago. China started to appear as a diplomatic, economic, science and technology actor in the Arctic. Western surprise and consternation to this development reflects the great difficulties many Westerners have in facing a world, where the Rest takes an interest in the West, and not only the West taking an interest in the Rest as during centuries of imperialism and colonialism. It should not be surprising that China as one of the world’s two largest national economies and science and technology systems (with the US) has interests in the Arctic, or anywhere else in the world. The US is globally present in politics, defence, diplomacy, economics, science and technology, culture, etc. The unfortunate Chinese term of ‘near-Arctic State’ to legitimize Chinese involvement in the Arctic drew much Western ridicule and opposition. In comparison, the US and the West seem to be ‘near-everywhere’ States. One place where the Sino-American bipolar logic appeared soon and clearly has been the Kingdom of Denmark with the North Atlantic and Arctic overseas autonomies of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US applies pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology, in line with Mearsheimer’s argument of a superpower building bounded orders to mobilize and discipline allies and clients in security competition with a competing great or superpower. The Faroe Islands are located between Iceland, Norway, and Scotland. They are centrally placed in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap controlling North-South access and blocking the Soviet-Russian Northern Fleet going south for NATO or the US and NATO navies going north for USSR/Russia. The Faroe Islands are becoming increasingly independent from Denmark. Huawei has long been a partner for the Faroese telecom company, which planned to continue with Huawei for 5G. This partnership came under increasing scrutiny from Danish and US sides. The Chinese ambassador to Copenhagen during a visit to the Faroe Islands linked the Faroe Islands choosing Huawei with prospects for a Sino-Faroese free trade agreement (the Faroe Islands are outside the EU and pursue an independent trade policy).Footnote8 The US ambassador to Copenhagen publicly spoke strongly against the Faroe Islands collaborating with Huawei for 5 G.Footnote9 Greenland is geographically North American (remember the Monroe Doctrine), crucial to US (North American) homeland defence, and pursuing independence from the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland and China have for some time eyed each other for investment and science and technology opportunities. Greenlandic independence primarily rests on economic independence from Denmark and human capital. The economic independence should be through, among other domains, mining, where China and Chinese companies were considered as very important likely investors. Copenhagen regarded Sino-Greenlandic mutual interest with great suspicion for a long time, which was evident from the report on Greenlandic mining from 2014.Footnote10 In 2014, the Royal Danish Navy abandoned Grønnedal, a small, remote old naval facility, established by the US during the Second World War, which was put up for sale. A Chinese mining company showed interest in the facility as a logistics hub for future operations in Greenland. The Danish government promptly took the facility off the market maintaining a token naval presence.Footnote11 Developing Greenlandic tourism requires upgrading the airport infrastructure, which is an enormous project for a nation of 57,000 on a 2 M km2 island. One of the finalists to an international tender was the China Construction Communication Company (4C), which might also have provided financing.Footnote12 The Danish government convinced the Greenlandic government to accept a Danish financing (with a Danish stake) of the renovated and new airports against choosing a Danish construction company.Footnote13 The Greenlandic government was reshaped over this intervention with a coalition party leaving in protest over accepting such Danish interference in Greenlandic affairs. In 2017, China publicly presented its interest in a research station in Greenland, including a satellite ground station, which the Government of Greenland might have been positive towards.Footnote14 This idea has never materialized, first probably delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but Denmark and the US would never accept a Chinese research station and/or satellite station in Greenland. The US government has made its pressure on the Danish government public, through former Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis.Footnote15 China and Iceland spearheaded Sino-Nordic Arctic research cooperation from the official visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to Iceland in 2012. In 2013, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center was founded, a virtual centre of Chinese and Nordic institutions hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai. CNARC has hosted an annual symposium between China and a Nordic country as well as researcher exchange. Today, Sweden has withdrawn from CNARC, and Denmark does not participate, as the participating Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen has been closed. PRIC and RANNÍS (The Icelandic Center for Research, equivalent to Research Council) held the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the China-Iceland Aurora Observatory, now China Iceland Arctic Observatory, at Kárhóll, Northeast Iceland, in June 2014, which I attended. The Observatory opened formally—although unfinished—in October 2018. This collaboration had been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and negligence from central authorities and research institutions in the capital, Reykjavik. Today, Iceland is under pressure from the US, including a recent visit by US Congressional staffers, to close CIAO.Footnote16 US-Russia Eastern European security competition divides the Arctic US-Russia security competition, especially in Eastern Europe, became increasingly clear from around 2007–2008. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he unsurprisingly denounced US unipolarity. Russia had rejected US unipolarity and called for multipolarity since the Primakov Doctrine of the 1990s calling for Russia, China, and India to balance the US. In spring 2008, at the initiative of the US—and with French and German reservations—the NATO Bucharest summit invited Georgia and Ukraine to become member states. In the autumn, fighting broke out between Georgia and Russian forces in the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia leading to Georgia’s defeat. In autumn 2013, the EU proposed an agreement to Ukraine, which forced Ukraine to choose between Russia and the EU. The Ukrainian President rejected the EU’s proposal, leading to popular protests met with government violence and eventually the President fleeing the country. Russia intervened annexing Crimea and supporting an insurgency in the Donbas.Footnote17 In December 2021, Russia proposed a treaty to the US blocking former Soviet Republics from joining NATO and rolling back NATO troops and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, which was rejected by the US and allies in January 2022. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had led to a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine. The West extends wide-ranging political, military, economic, and further support to Ukraine and tries to isolate Russia as much as possible. The Rest of the world follows Western policy of isolating Russia to a very limited extent. The Russian annexation of Crimea affected the Arctic in limited ways. The West stopped military dialogues with Russia in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum. The West imposed sanctions on Russian Arctic energy projects, as the US $27 billion Yamal LNG project, which initially had Russian Novatek (60 per cent), French Total (20 per cent), and China National Petroleum Cooperation (20 per cent) ownership. Sanctions forced Novatek to sell 9.9 per cent to the Chinese government’s Silk Road Fund and rely on Chinese bank funding. Russia responded to these sanctions with counter sanctions on Western food exports to Russia, which also affected some Arctic seafood export to Russia. Russia accepted Faroese salmon exports, which led to a boom in Faroese economy. In 2014, there was some protests in the Arctic Council from the Chair, Canada. Otherwise, Arctic Council and other scientific, people-to-people, cooperation continued between Russia and the seven other Arctic States. For Northern Norway, extensive regional cooperation in the Barents region continued. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to an almost complete Western cessation of Arctic collaboration with Russia. The other seven Arctic countries refused to collaborate with Russia in the Arctic Council, chaired by Russia 2021–2023. The Seven—now all NATO member states—Arctic Council member states have since backed down significantly. The Arctic Council was always more important to them than to Russia, suggesting that this Western brinkmanship was poorly thought through. There are extensive Western sanctions against the Russian economy, including against Russian Arctic energy projects, which were a key basis for developing the Russian Arctic. Russia had sought to develop a Europe-Russia-East Asia energy system with Russian Arctic oil and gas being exported both West to Europe and East to East Asia and with balanced Western and East Asian investments.Footnote18 The West has almost completely cut science and technology relations with Russia, also in the Arctic. The rare exceptions to continued Arctic science collaboration between West and Russia are for instance, the Norway-Russia Barents Sea Fisheries Commission because Norway also depends on this collaboration. The US continues more academic collaboration with Russia than European countries allow themselves; for instance, receiving Russian Fulbright professors. Norway pursued an extensive regional cooperation policy with Russia, Finland, and Sweden in the Barents Region since 1993 with much support for cross-border people-to-people exchange for youth, in education, academia, culture, environment, business development, and further. This collaboration built extensive insight, experience, networks, and access in Russia at North Norwegian institutions, as UiT The Arctic University of Norway, UNN The University Hospital of Northern Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute, the Arctic Frontiers Conference, businesses such as Akvaplan-Niva marine environmental consultancy, and in academia, civil society, education, and government. The border town of Kirkenes depended for about a third of its economic turnover on trade with Russia. These connections are now almost completely cut by Norwegian government policy. Russian society and politics did become much more closed and authoritarian during this period, but that was for internal political reasons and not directed against Norway. Personally, I had successful high-level academic cooperation with some of the key Russian academic institutions funded by Norwegian public funds until they were forbidden by Norwegian government policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. My last personal visit to Moscow was in December 2019, and I was planning to visit with a sizeable group of Norwegian faculty and PhD candidates in April 2020, postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid division of world order in a NATO+ and a BRICS++ world The world is separating into a NATO+ grouping of NATO countries and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, under clear US leadership, and the Rest. The Rest, I call BRICS++ for the BRICS+ grouping and many other countries. This separation is clear through demography, economy, and science and technology. Humanity is about 8 billion people, compared to the West, which is about 1 billion, making it a small minority. Humanity is expected to grow to 10 billion, where the West will remain at about 1 billion, a shrinking small minority. The dominance of the West has rested on economic development and science and technology, translated into military force, with a shrinking demographic share of the world economy, scientific and technological development and relative power shifts from the West to the Rest. Legitimacy and credibility divisions are also clearly visible between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ worlds concerning the war in Ukraine, where the West is astonished by its own isolation. To great surprise, the Rest of the world have not followed the West’s attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically and economically. This rejection of the West’s position was clear from the very first UN Security Council debate on the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russian veto and Chinese and Indian abstentions were not surprising, but the abstention by the United Arab Emirates was remarkable considering the close security and other partnerships between the GCC countries and the US and historically the UK. The speech during the debate on 21 February 2022, a few days prior, by the Kenyan ambassador to the Security Council, condemning Russia’s recognition of breakaway regions but reminding that other UNSC permanent members had also violated international law, showed the lack of Western credibility and legitimacy on the issue.Footnote19 Western credibility and legitimacy have eroded further by supporting Israel’s genocide in Gaza since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The Division of the Arctic in a NATO Arctic and Russian BRICS++ Arctic. The effects of world order on the Arctic are clear, applying the analytical lenses of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar traits of world order to the Arctic. The world is increasingly becoming Sino-American bipolar, where the US seeks to maintain unipolarity through a global containment strategy of China. This struggle is also evident in the Arctic; for instance, US pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US keeps up an ever-stronger anti-Chinese Arctic discourse from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s 2019 speech in Rovaniemi, Finland, to US Senator Lisa Murkowski at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik in 2024. Russia has opposed US unipolarity since the 1990s, seeking multipolarity. The conflict between US and Russian multipolarity ultimately escalated via the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the proxy war in Ukraine. This conflict has led to an almost complete division of the Arctic into NATO-Arctic (collaborating with the wider NATO+ world and further) and the Russian Arctic. Russia reaches out all it can diplomatically, economically, and in science and technology to the BRICS++ world, especially China and India. The Rest of the World seems restrained from pursuing Russian Arctic opportunities by the risk of US and Western secondary sanctions and other NATO Arctic pushbacks. Conclusion: looking forward for world and Arctic order The world is—as usual for international history—marked by the struggle over the world order among the strongest State actors. This struggle was forgotten especially by European observers during the post-Cold War era, with the illusion of End of History and confounding globalization and modernization with Westernization. Instead, we have had the Return of History and the return of historically very large non-Western economic, science and technology actors as China, followed by others. The current struggle over the world order also shapes the Arctic, as was historically clear, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War. The US is determined to prolong post-Cold War unipolar dominance expressed as ‘rules-based order’, where the US defines the rules, to whom, and when they apply. Europe has found an apparently comfortable and completely dependent position in this US-led order. The Rest of the World less so, with China and Russia explicitly rejecting this US-led order. The conflict over world order between the US and its bounded order in the NATO+ world in Europe, Oceania, and East Asia and the Rest of the World, can only be expected to escalate. The US must either stop Chinese economic, science and technology development (and later other peer competitors), or demographics, economy, science and technology will lead to a more bipolar and multipolar world. Europe by its dependence on the US is forced to follow this US strategy. The war in Ukraine can lead to a frozen conflict, where the overall Russia-West relationship remains highly conflictual, including in the Arctic. Ukrainian defeat or a negotiated settlement with a neutralized Ukraine and cessation of territory to Russia will also probably lead to a decadal severance of economic, science and technology, people-to-people ties between Russia and the West, including in the Arctic. A Russian defeat is unlikely because of difference in Russian and Ukrainian manpower and resources. China is unlikely to allow Russia to succumb to the US, which would put defeated Russia on China’s Northern frontier in China’s own conflict with the US. All in all, world order seems highly conflictual and with increased separation between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ world, which will only bring humanity more conflict and less economic development and growth, unlike the age of post-Cold War globalization. This division will be replicated in the Arctic. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen is Professor at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Views expressed are personal. Notes 1. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘Unipolarity and Order in the Arctic’. Nina Græger, Bertel Heurlin, Ole Wæver, Anders Wivel, (Eds.), Polarity in International Relations. Governance, Security and Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05505-8_16. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), 2019, pp. 7–50 at https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 3. George Lindsey, ‘Strategic Stability in the Arctic’, Adelphi Papers 241, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989. 4. Steven E. Miller, ‘The Return of the Strategic Arctic’, in The Arctic Yearbook, 2023 at https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf. 5. Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Challenge of China’, in Stephen Van Evera (Ed.) How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security, The Tobin Project, Cambridge, MA 2006 at https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Make_America_Safe_The_Challenge_Of_China.pdf. 6. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All’, The Australian, 18 November 2005 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Australian-November-18-2005.pdf. 7. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), pp. 7–50, 2019 athttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. 8. Thomas Foght, ‘Hemmelig lydoptagelse: Kina pressede Færøerne til at vælge Huawei’ [Secret Sound Recording: China Pressured the Faroe Islands to Choose Huawei]. Danmarks Radio, 2019 at https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/hemmelig-lydoptagelse-kina-pressede-faeroeerne-til-vaelge-huawei. 9. Adam Satariano, ‘At the Edge of the World, a New Battleground for the US and China’, New York Times, 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/technology/faroe-islands-huawei-china-us.html. 10. The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, ‘To the Benefit of Greenland’. Ilisimatusarfik-University of Greenland; University of Copenhagen, 2014 at https://vbn.aau.dk/ws/files/208241864/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf. 11. Martin Breum, ‘Analyse: Stoppede Danmarks statsminister kinesisk opkøb i Grønland?’ [Analysis: Did the Danish Prime Minister Stop Chinese Acquisition in Greenland?]. High North News, 2018 at https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/analyse-stoppede-danmarks-statsminister-kinesisk-opkob-i-gronland. 12. Teis Jensen, ‘Greenland shortlists Chinese company for airport construction despite Denmark’s concerns’, Reuters, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/greenland-shortlists-chinese-company-for-airport-construction-despite-denmarks-idUSKBN1H32XG/. 13. Statsministeriet, ‘Aftale mellem regeringen og Naalakkersuisut om dansk engagement i lufthavnsprojektet i Grønland og styrket erhvervssamarbejde mellem Danmark og Grønland’ [Agreement Between the [Danish] Government and Naalakkersuisut [Government of Greenland] on Danish Involvement in the Airport Project in Greenland and Enhanced Business Collaboration Between Denmark and Greenland] Statsministeriet. Formandens Departement, 2018 at https://www.stm.dk/media/8148/10-09-2018_aftale_mellem_regeringen_og_naalakkersuisut.pdf. 14. Martin Breum, ‘Kina vil bygge kontroversiel forskningsstation i Grønland’. [China Wants to Build Controversial Research Station in Greenland], 2017 at https://www.information.dk/udland/2017/10/kina-bygge-kontroversiel-forskningsstation-groenland. 15. Damian Paletta and Itkowitz Colby, ‘Trump Aides Look into US Purchasing Greenland after Directives from President’. The Washington Post, 2019 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/16/america-first-greenland-second-is-trumps-latest-white-house-directive/. 16. ‘Letter to Anthony Blinking and Lloyd Austin’, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, United States Congress, 2017 at https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf. 17. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2014 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf. 18. Mariia Kobzeva and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘European-Russian-Chinese Arctic Energy System’,in Xing Li (Ed) China-EU Relations in a New Era of Global Transformation, London: Routledge, London, 2021, 22p. 19. Martin Kimani, ‘Statement by Amb. Martin Kimani, during the Security Council Urgent Meeting on the Situation in Ukraine’, The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya, United Nations Security Council, February 2022 at https://www.un.int/kenya/sites/www.un.int/files/Kenya/kenya_statement_during_urgent_meeting_on_on_ukraine_21_february_2022_at_2100.pdf.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  On 7 April 2025, the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Dutch Clingendael Institute co-hosted the fourth edition of the Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable, which is becoming a major recurring event in the policy dialogue between Italy and the Netherlands. The meeting, co-organized by the two policy institutes, took place at the Italian School of Public Administration in Caserta (NA, Italy), bringing together a broad array of stakeholders including experts from academia, think tanks, ministries and civil society.1 This year’s roundtable focused on the critical intersections between industrial innovation, technological sovereignty and (open) strategic autonomy, underlining the urgent need to strengthen linkages between these domains within the broader European framework. Held under the Chatham House Rule and by invitation only, the event created a space for frank and forwardlooking exchanges on how both Italy and the Netherlands can safeguard their national interests while contributing constructively to the collective resilience and strategic capacity of the European Union. One of the most relevant outcomes of this edition was the joint endorsement of a proposal to develop a bilateral policy paper aimed at strengthening collaboration between the two countries, while also feeding into ongoing EU-level initiatives.  1. Increasing security and reducing dependencies The dialogue began with a reflection on the pressing geopolitical challenges facing the European Union. Participants broadly acknowledged that escalating tensions between the United States and China, including an increasingly protectionist American posture – as seen during and potentially following the Trump administration – pose risks for Europe’s role in the international order. The possibility of a global trade war, alongside the gradual withdrawal of the US from traditional multilateralism, is both a threat and a wake-up call for Europe. In the last months, the challenge has become particularly serious, as the US administration threatened multiple times to impose high tariffs on EU products. Rather than becoming collateral damage in this global rivalry, Europe should take active steps to strengthen its strategic positioning and develop a strategy to counter and deter coercion from third countries. This goal, the participants argued, requires avoiding marginalisation through enhanced internal cohesion, greater autonomy from external suppliers, and the ability to act collectively on the world stage. In this light, there was widespread agreement that bilateral relationships such as the one between Italy and the Netherlands can serve as essential building blocks in shaping Europe’s capacity to act with strategic clarity and operational effectiveness.  In the event of a global trade war, another source of instability could come from China. If the US markets shut its doors, China would be faced with an overproduction capacity, due to the misplacement of all the goods destined to the US economy. In this scenario, the only option for Beijing would be to flow the same commodities to Europe, thereby saturating the market and curbing EU competitiveness. This scenario must be avoided. The solution can be only a tough but necessary negotiation with the US to avoid a dramatic fragmentation of global trade. The EU should act reasonably and try to persuade Washington of the existing nexus between global trade, wealth and political stability. The negotiation should start from the assumption that the transatlantic trade with the United States is much smaller than trade within the European Union. As a consequence, all the EU member states have a practical convenience in standing together and speaking with Washington with one voice. The formal and exclusive competence that the Commission holds in the commercial field, granted by the EU Treaties, should be therefore supported politically at the highest levels. At the same time, the Commission and the member states should focus on: 1) developing bilateral agreements with like-minded countries worldwide which believe in open and fair trade; 2) removing non-tariff barriers inside the internal market to boost competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The second point is particularly important, as the Commission needs to make the bloc more resilient to external shocks through a set of instruments aimed at enhancing strategic autonomy in a framework of necessary global interdependence.  Indeed, the recipe to achieve this goal has been already identified in the Letta and Draghi reports, which offer sound analyses and strategic directions for European industrial and economic policy. Despite these clear guidelines, the participants’ consensus was that implementation today remains inconsistent due to poor coordination among member states and institutional inertia. It was argued that meaningful progress depends on increased financial support, forward-looking strategic planning and, crucially, the formation of coalitions among like-minded EU member states – especially when the broader EU framework falls short. A recurring theme throughout the discussion was Europe’s evolving role as a global actor; if the ambitions of the bloc go beyond playing the role of an excellent regulatory power, the EU must position itself as a mediator and real broker in a multipolar world. Italy and the Netherlands, with their strong institutional, industrial and diplomatic assets, are natural complimentary partners in this effort, and can help the EU agenda in many respects. One dimension obviously pivotal for both the Union and its member states is the future of our economies. In this regard, participants insisted on the need to place industrial policy at the very heart of Europe’s strategic agenda. The capacity to maintain economic leadership, social cohesion and democratic vitality depends in no small part rests on the continent’s ability to manufacture, innovate and compete. A number of shared structural challenges – most prominently energy affordability, demographic change and the digital transition – must be tackled through integrated strategies that involve both public and private actors. The traditional rigid separation between public sector policy and private investment is therefore outdated and counterproductive. Today’s complex challenges require unified action driven by shared objectives. The Italy–Netherlands partnership, in this context, was identified as a potential nucleus for a new wave of EU-wide strategic thinking. These two countries already hold considerable influence in different sectors and can use their complementary strengths to demonstrate the added value of bilateral cooperation for the entire EU. By jointly addressing pressing infrastructure needs, advancing cooperation on research and innovation, and fostering deeper market integration, Italy and the Netherlands could set a precedent for other mid-sized EU member states. The panel was concluded by a call to action: to jointly draft a detailed position paper, developed in direct dialogue with the European Commission, to define shared priorities and propose concrete initiatives. This policy paper would focus on key areas such as advanced technologies, green innovation, the energy transition and the pursuit of strategic autonomy – laying the foundations for a resilient and forward-looking Europe. Italy and the Netherlands, as major industrial powerhouses, can give a significant contribution, as they already did in the past. 2. Innovation and strategic sectors: Agriculture, defence and semiconductors The second part of the discussion focused on innovation as a cornerstone of European competitiveness. While there was strong recognition of the EU’s ambition in this domain, participants pointed to significant structural weaknesses, particularly underinvestment in research and development and fragmented policy implementation. The Chips Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act were cited as important legislative efforts, but whose success will depend on coherent action across all member states and the mobilisation of private capital and expertise. Among the strategic sectors identified for both countries, agriculture stood out as a particularly relevant case. Agriculture in fact embodies both industrial potential and the need for open strategic autonomy – especially in the context of international trade developments, such as those stemming from EU-Mercosur negotiations and US demands to open European agricultural markets. Italy and the Netherlands are major players in this field. According to Eurostat data, the Netherlands is one of the top three agricultural exporters in the EU, while Italy ranks among the leaders in high-quality agricultural production and is a world leader in agri-food machinery. These comparative advantages create space for deep, complementary cooperation. Participants stressed the need to build a joint framework focused on food quality, innovation testing and the harmonisation of production systems. The Netherlands was recognised for its leadership in digitalisation and agri-tech innovation, while Italy’s sophisticated machinery sector was seen as critical for enabling largescale adoption of new technologies. Importantly, agricultural innovation was also viewed as essential for climate adaptation. With the increasing scarcity of water and the shrinking availability of arable land, Europe’s food systems must evolve to remain viable and resilient. The digital transformation of agriculture, through the adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) and data-driven solutions, presents opportunities to increase productivity and sustainability. However, it also raises challenges, including the need to ensure equitable access to vital semiconductors in order to build digital infrastructure and to address skills gaps in digital literacy. Semiconductors in particular, the hardware backbone of all digital systems, were identified as a cross-cutting capability essential not only to agriculture but to broader industrial policy. For Italy and the Netherlands, enhancing national capacity in this field aligns with the strategic goal of technological sovereignty. Another core issue raised was the generational transition in agriculture. As rural populations age, the sector should be made more appealing to younger, highly educated individuals. This requires a cultural shift: reframing agriculture as a highvalue and socially meaningful profession. The traditional image of the isolated farmer must give way to a narrative that resonates with environmentally conscious youth who see value in returning to the land. However, this shift requires careful policy design to reconcile environmental goals with economic sustainability. Specific strategies were discussed for supporting small farms, which often lack access to advanced technology, and for incentivising large-scale producers to integrate sustainable practices. Italy’s prominence in agricultural machinery offers a further avenue for international engagement. Expanding innovation to developing countries through machinery exports and technical cooperation could support global food security while reinforcing Europe’s leadership. In closing, participants linked these reflections back to the broader topic of European security and defence. The defence industry and the cybersecurity domain face similar issues of dependency and vulnerability. Strategic autonomy in these sectors is not only about accessing raw materials but about entire supply chains – from design and production to deployment. Both Italy and the Netherlands are well-positioned to lead within a broader European effort to secure these strategic infrastructures. Conclusions The roundtable concluded by reaffirming the centrality of the economic dimension to the future of Europe. A clear and robust industrial strategy must return to the forefront of EU policymaking. In the absence of an effective industrial policy framework, too much responsibility remains at the national level, creating disparities and inefficiencies. Europe must shift from aspirational rhetoric to operational pragmatism, investing decisively in sectors that underpin its long-term resilience. The cooperation between the public and private sectors is essential. Both Italy and the Netherlands are undergoing parallel transitions – digital, environmental and demographic. These must be tackled simultaneously, as none can be deprioritised. Change will require acknowledgment of systemic constraints. Among the most urgent priorities is the cost of energy, which undermines industrial competitiveness across Europe. Italy is particularly affected due to its structural vulnerabilities, but this is a shared European challenge. Energy prices must be drastically reduced, and a fully functioning internal (energy) market must be established. Demographic decline poses a new challenge. Unlike previous decades, the EU must now envision growth in a context of population shrinkage. The only answer to this unprecedented challenge lays in innovation, accessible energy and a revitalised industrial base. Hence, the call for new models and economic frameworks capable of adapting to shrinking labour markets while maintaining living standards. Ultimately, the Van Wittell/Vanvitelli Roundtable highlighted that the EU should engage proactively the US to avoid a global trade crisis and forge alliances with like-minded and complementary world players. With the contribution of two important actors such as Italy and the Netherlands, the EU can find new pathways to open strategic autonomy and long-term prosperity. *Updated 23 May 2025 Report of the fourth edition of the Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable organised at the Italian School of Public Administration in Caserta on 7 April 2025 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Clingendael Institute. Paper produced in the framework of the project “Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable”. The project has benefited from the financial support of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Policy Planning Unit of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967, and the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation. The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. References 1 - A video of the closing remarks by Antonio Tajani, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Caspar Veldkamp, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, is available here: https://www.youtube.com/live/mqhfJfW-4s8.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The defining political shift of our era is the revolt of the lower middle class. Much more exposed than the better-off to the succession of crises in recent years—from the financial crisis to uncontrolled migration, from Covid-19 to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—the lower middle class is turning to the populist right and its promise of protection by closure. Unlike the US first-past-the-post system, the EU’s institutional framework emphasises compromise and cross-party cooperation and thus offers a critical buffer against this wave of disruption. But this is not enough to protect our post-1945 political order, which is based on parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and European integration, from both internal and external threats. The EU needs a bold agenda that focuses on competitiveness, growth, migration and defence, all of which are crucial to strengthening our continent. Introduction1 Once is an accident, twice the new normal. With his electoral success, Donald Trump is the new reality in the US, not just an aberration. Trump obviously understands his time better than anybody else, which ensured him his comeback as president of the US, elected by the people against seemingly overwhelming legal and political resistance. He is the new rule of the game, like it or not. The revolt of the lower middle classWhat is the new reality? The party political system in the US and Europe has been fundamentally transformed by the revolt of the lower middle class. Voter analyses in several European countries give a clear picture: in France, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally (Rassemblement National) represent the ‘défavorisés’ like no other party and have replaced in that function the traditional left. Le Pen is successful in the former Communist heartland and mining territory of northern France, where she also assured her own seat in parliament (Ipsos 2024). Similarly, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is electorally over-represented among workers and the unemployed and those with below average incomes and education (Moreau 2024a). And the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) rallies the workers too (Moreau 2024b). This should not come as a big surprise. Right-wing populist parties have been recognised in political science as unconventional workers’ parties for more than a decade (Rydgren 2013). And the transformation of the political space in Europe has been ongoing for more than a decade as well. European Parliament elections are an excellent monitor of the overall situation in Europe and the member states. The outcome of the 2024 European Parliament elections shows us a political space that is basically divided into three parts. One-third of the members now sit on the left, organised in the Green, Socialist and Left groups; a good third are in the centre, encompassing the Liberals and the Christian Democrat European People’s Party (EPP); and close to a third now belong to the populist and radical right (European Parliament 2024). In the US, Trump’s success was assured in 2016 through gains in the ‘rustbelt states’, formerly the Democrat Party’s heartland. In 2020 Joe Biden was able to narrowly turn the tide. With his credibility among workers—acquired over decades through close cooperation with the trade unions—he was able to achieve what presidential candidates from liberal New York and California, Hillary Clinton and Kamala Harris, could not. The Republican Party today is the Make America Great Again Party. It is the party of Donald Trump. The Republican Party of Ronald Reagan and George Bush does not exist anymore. The party that used to represent the highly skilled today represents and owes its electoral success to the lower-skilled working class. ‘National security Republicans’ have lost their political home. Why is the lower middle class revolting? The lower middle class can be identified as those whose economic situation is tense. In other words, they have no financial buffer and anything unexpected happening can push them over the edge. In the US, this group, known as those living ‘from paycheque to paycheque’, is considered to comprise 25% to 30% of the population. A single paycheque not arriving might force people belonging to this group to sell their car; several paycheques not arriving might oblige them to sell their house (Bank of America Institute 2024). Ever since the financial crisis that started in 2008, we have gone in Europe from crisis to crisis. The drawn-out financial crisis was followed by uncontrolled migration as a consequence of Russia’s bombardment of big cities in Syria, and this was followed by Covid-19 and then Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which caused major spikes in energy and food prices and another massive wave of migration. What we call a ‘crisis’ might equally be considered a lack in performance of the system overall and an indication of increasing loss of control. Russia is being aggressive militarily and in other ways because it believes it can do so and get away with it. External borders prove time and time again to be porous. After the Second World War, the German economy grew by an average of about 5% per year; but in the last five years, this has dropped to 0% and even into the negative. What can be weathered by the better-off is an existential challenge for the lower middle class. If you are not already on the housing ladder by luck of birth, it is increasingly difficult to get onto. The social elevator is stuttering. And while migration is perceived by the upper middle class as the promise of affordable personal services today and care in old age later, for the lower middle class it means competition for affordable housing and state services, and the risk of decreasing educational standards for children in their lower-income living areas. German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz (2020) describes the experience of the lower middle class as one of a double devaluation: economic and cultural. It is economic because formerly well-paid industrial workers are falling increasingly behind the new university-educated service class. And it is cultural because their system of traditional values is regarded as outdated and destined to be superseded. From a horizontal to a vertical understanding of the party political system The traditional horizontal classification of parties on a left to right axis is very misleading now. To understand what is happening, we need to replace the traditional horizontal classification with a vertical one based on social status, income and education. On the basis of the 2021 German federal election and data provided by the Bundestag (data no longer available online) and others (Focus online 2021), we can construct such a vertical system for Germany: 1. Greens and liberals represent younger voters, with a very good income in the case of the liberals and an average income, but outstanding level of education, when it comes to the greens, the new party of the Bildungsbürgertum (the very well-educated). These voters can together be considered the upper middle class and the most dynamic part of society.2. The traditional people’s parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, become more popular the older the cohort, with their popularity rocketing among those above 70 years old. The income levels of the voters of these parties are average, as is their education, and this voter base is shrinking. These parties represent the middle class.3. The Left (Die Linke) is over-represented among academics and the unemployed; its electorate has a below-average income. The extreme-right AfD is over-represented among workers, the unemployed and people of working age. The educational levels of these voters are low, and their household incomes are below average. The Left and the AfD both represent the lower middle class. The part of the lower middle class that is represented by the populist right is being promised protection by closure. Right-wing populism is therefore ‘social nationalism’. But it is not just about the programme. Bringing that new coalition of various social groups together is facilitated by charismatic leadership: Trump is a charismatic leader in the sense of Max Weber (1921); and he finds his European equivalents in the likes of Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orbán. Moreover, the dominance of social media over the traditional media has dramatically decreased the cost of political organisation and provided a chance for newcomers to establish themselves. Social media have also normalised hate, which was banned from the traditional media for very good reasons after the dramatic experiences of racism, National Socialism and Communism in the twentieth century. Political parties based on portraying political adversaries as enemies in the tradition of Carl Schmitt (2007) are profiting more than any other from these new tools. What differentiates Europe from the US? Party political competition in the US If we are observing a revolt of the lower middle class in both the US and Europe, why has the impact been so different up to now? In the US the first-past-the-post system forces everybody to integrate into one of the two major political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. Both parties therefore represent very large coalitions, which essentially serve an electoral purpose only and cannot be considered programme parties. The fight for content takes place mainly within, among the different caucuses organised in Congress. What you would find in the European Parliament in the EPP, the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Patriots and the Sovereigntists is, in the US, all assembled in one political family, the Republicans. Equally, what you would find in the liberal Renew group, the Socialists and Democrats, the Greens and the Left in Europe has to cohabit within the Democrat Party in the US. The Republican Party can be understood as a broad political coalition which has effectively fallen under the control and leadership of what in Europe might rather be considered the line of Viktor Orbán and the Patriots. The other tendencies are still there but marginalised. They can no longer determine the overall direction but might still be sufficiently strong in Congress to block decision-making or align with the other side when they regard policies as being against their core convictions, such as creating unsustainable debt levels, or on matters related to national security and defence.Europe and its national electoral systemsEuropean states are not immune either. The British, the French and the Hungarian electoral systems provide an oversized seat result for the relatively strongest party, and this increases the opportunities of the extremes. Brexit can be considered one outcome of this. The current political stalemate in France, where the extreme right and the extreme left are holding the system hostage, is another. In systems of pure proportional representation, by contrast, you need more than 50% of the votes for one party or a coalition of several parties to take effective political control. In a first-past-the-post system, as in the US, 20%–30% of the electorate is more than sufficient to take over one of the major political parties and, with that, to potentially run the country. Pure proportional systems therefore provide better protection against a right-wing or left-wing populist takeover. The EU political system On the federal level of the EU on the other hand, the incentives are there for cooperation across the political centre. Decisions in the Council need an oversized qualified majority; the election of a European Commission president by the European Parliament requires an absolute majority of the members elected to the house. These majorities can regularly be found only through cooperation across the aisle and by transcending the traditional left–right schism. The desire to hold important political offices in the EU, therefore, requires a willingness to compromise and forces political parties that are more on the right or on the left to look towards the centre. The final vote on the von der Leyen Commission was carried by a large cross-cutting alliance of the Christian Democrat EPP, the liberal Renew and the Socialists, complemented by the constructive right, centred on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and the constructive left, led by the German Greens. The more radical elements of both the European Conservatives and Reformists and Green groups voted against. The institutional system has a strong impact on the political culture in the EU, which is a culture of cooperation. The political system favours the creation of unity—as the condition for stability on a historically, geographically and culturally divided continent—and therefore the centre. The absence of permanent coalitions and the lack of fixed roles of majority and minority in the division of power in the EU create the opportunity to integrate those on the very right and the very left who are not opposed to the system as such and whose primary aim is not to destroy it: the constructive right and the constructive left. Contrary to the US, where the destructive and anti-system elements can dominate the rest of their respective coalitions, inside the EU that destructive right and left find themselves isolated unless they stop being the system opposition. That is why Ursula von der Leyen was well advised to integrate Raffaele Fitto from Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) as vice-president of the European Commission and, at the same time, to continue a constructive dialogue with the co-leader of the Green group Terry Reincke on the importance of climate change policies and actions to preserve the rule of law. Brothers of Italy had not only supported the new asylum pact, in contrast to Viktor Orbán, but had also supported Ukraine in a steadfast fashion, including in the vote to ensure Ukraine profits from the interest on Russian assets. Brothers of Italy is part of the constructive right, stabilising the political system of the EU. Is the EU therefore safe? The EU is a federal union of citizens and states and therefore dependent on support in each and every member state. It is only as strong as its weakest link. Even though, on average, support for EU institutions is close to historical highs and well above the support levels for national institutions, that is not enough (EU 2024). Before Brexit the EU’s weakest link in terms of overall support was the UK. Nowadays its weakest link is France, which is paralysed by the combination of a destructive right, on the one hand, and on the other, a destructive left which, in the form of France Unbowed (La France Insoumise), is holding the socialists and greens hostage. And both extremes are cooperating in the destabilisation of the state. That smells like Weimar. What needs to be done? An agenda for the next phase of European integration An agenda for strength In the worlds of Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, strength is the only thing that counts. Internationally and geopolitically, we are back in the world of nineteenth-century power politics. The rules of the game have changed, and the quicker we understand this the better. We are threatened at the same time from the inside and from the outside. From the inside, by the destructive nationalist populist right and left that are trying to hollow out the political order, established after 1945, based on parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and European integration. From the outside, by aggressive nationalist power politics. And more often than not, these two are connected. The seatbelts need to be fastened. Defending ourselves from threats both inside and outside has to start with the recognition that we are confronted with real issues, not just imagined ones. Hyper-inflation was real and is still stored in today’s price levels. The accumulated inflation during Joe Biden’s four-year term was above 20% (US Bureau of Labour Statistics n.d., author’s calculations), and it will not have been very different in Europe. Growth rates are very low, while debt is rising, and with it the difficulty of states to intervene in times of absolute need. Uncontrolled mass immigration happened. Our capacity to defend our continent is seriously compromised. International respect comes from strength, not from weakness. This is not a case for mass psychotherapy, but political action: the political agenda has to change. The European Parliament nowadays plays a key role in setting the agenda for the upcoming legislative term. Ursula von der Leyen had to negotiate with all the political forces of good will about the programme for the next five years to have any chance of being elected by an absolute majority of the members of the house. The need for the Commission president to negotiate the programme also changes the role of the European political foundations. The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies has contributed hundreds of precise policy proposals to the process of reflection in a document entitled The 7Ds for Sustainability. This text centres on defence, debt, digitalisation, demography, democracy, decarbonisation and de-risking globalisation in order to enrich the debate and help set a new agenda (Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies n.d.). The outcomes of the European elections matter, as they should. With the Greens and the Liberals having together lost more than 50 seats and the so-called progressive majority between the Liberals, Greens, Socialists and the far left having disappeared, European Commission priorities for this legislature have markedly changed. Competitiveness and security, comprising both defence and migration, including border protection, have become the top two priorities. This is underpinned by the different composition of the European Commission and the European Council. With half of the members of both institutions coming from the EPP and the EPP occupying the centre space in the European Parliament as well, concerns about competitiveness, migration and defence, critical to strengthening our continent, which is being challenged from both within and without, now have a stronger voice. An agenda for growth: implementing the Draghi report Like every other policy paper, the Letta and Draghi reports can and are being discussed in detail. But no one can dispute the competence of Mario Draghi in matters monetary and economic. The Draghi report will therefore provide a most important reference point. His report comprises six basic truths that will inspire the legislative proposals of the European Commission in this term, even more so as it was requested by the European Commission president herself. Draghi brings everybody face to face with his or her responsibilities. From my personal reading, his report can be summarised as follows: • Investment is the precondition for future growth. Europe is lagging behind in high-tech investment and has largely lost the new digital economy race. This can be identified as the key reason for the difference in per capita growth between the US and the EU. Mid-tech–based industry, such as the car industry, which provides our current economic backbone, is coming under increasing competitive pressure from China.• Without investment, annual productivity growth falls behind. Europe could maintain and improve its living standard by considerably increasing female and older-age participation in the workplace. Worsening demographics make that quantitative input increase more difficult.• The EU has to return to the strategy of scaling through the development of its own internal market, especially in the less-integrated areas of the service sector.• The Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union are critical to assisting high-tech investors in their efforts to scale beyond national boundaries. Given that high-tech means not only high return but also high risk, venture capital is necessary to accompany that growth.• We have regulated for risk and not for opportunity, as is typical for ageing societies. The regulatory burden has to be reduced.• Common public debt has to come in as a residual answer, dependent in volume on the progress in the above-mentioned areas. Consensus on common European debt could be achieved in the area of defence, which could be considered a European public good. Common European financing would also contribute to more equal burden sharing. An agenda for migration Migration is at the core of right-wing populist parties’ growth. It brings together social and cultural challenges: social challenges in the form of competition for scarce public services and support, and cultural ones in the form of a challenge to traditional constructions of national and cultural identity. Here society is falling apart. What is a promise of improved personal services for the upper middle class and the liberal and green parties representing them is, for the lower middle class, a threat of lower salaries and increased competition for state services, including education. Experiences during the negotiations to form the current Swedish and Finnish governments showed that a tough policy on migration was the one area where populist parties were not ready to adapt or compromise. Preliminary voting analysis from the European Parliament demonstrates that while right-wing populist parties show some diverging views on economics, they clearly differentiate themselves from other political forces on the cultural axis of the political divide (Welle and Frantescu 2025). We have experienced a radicalisation of our political space following the events of mass migration, both in the Mediterranean and following Russia’s aggression in Syria and Ukraine. Russia even actively tries to destabilise its neighbours by transporting refugees to their common borders or via Belarus. Denmark is the only country in the EU that has managed to reduce established right-wing populist parties back to single digits. It has done so by establishing a consensus in society on a tough migration policy that is being continued by its current Social Democrat–led government. At the same time, Denmark represents a country with one of the highest standards of societal development. ‘Going to Denmark’ is even a reference in international development policy. Danish migration policy will therefore need to be studied in more detail so as to understand how far it can provide guidance for the EU as a whole or not. Speedier implementation of the migration pact voted on in the European Parliament in April 2024 therefore has to be a prime priority. But it cannot be the last step. Integration capacity has to become critical to migration policy. An agenda for defence Those who cannot defend themselves are inviting their stronger neighbours to aggress them. A look at maps of Russia over the last 500 years shows us that Russia has expanded continuously at the expense of its weaker neighbours—from basically the city territory of Moscow to becoming the largest state on earth. The military submission of its neighbours is the Russian business model. The peaceful and voluntary integration of the European space, based on the rule of law, is the business model of the EU. These concepts are now geographically colliding. And the grey zone in between, at the very least, is now in danger of Russian aggression and occupation, as demonstrated in Ukraine, where Russia is trying to reintroduce the logic of nineteenth-century empire to the European continent. The US will focus its own efforts increasingly on Asia and the attempt to contain China. Europe will therefore have to provide the lion’s share of its own conventional defence. This can only be effectively organised by making use of the possibilities provided by the EU. The Martens Centre has provided a plan in 10 steps—the European Defence Pyramid—on how to achieve a viable European defence under changed geopolitical circumstances. Starting with more basic ideas at the beginning, it has now been outlined in considerable detail with the help of external experts in The 7Ds for Sustainability – Defence Extended (Ciolan and Welle 2024). Progress is already visible. The Martens Centre suggested the creation of the office of a European defence commissioner and a standing defence committee in the European Parliament. Both are now reality. The proposed increase in financial support for military mobility has now been achieved through the decision of the European Commission to allow the use of regional funds for this purpose. And the new defence commissioner has suggested the creation of an ‘EU DARPA’2 for military research, as developed in the concept papers. Living in dangerous times Europe is being simultaneously challenged internally and externally: internally by right-wing populist parties, which have now conquered nearly 30% of the political space; externally by Russia, which is trying to reintroduce the nineteenth-century rules of empire through military aggression with at least the benevolent acceptance of China. These challenges are not unrelated. Some of the populist parties on the right and left openly make the case for China and Russia. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has even been rewarded by China with massive investments and the status of an ‘all-weather partner’. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, we have been living in a world of cooperation. System competition between East and West was replaced by globalisation. System seemingly did not matter anymore. Production went wherever it was the cheapest. Communist China became the capitalists’ best friend in exchange for the transfer of superior technology. In analogy to Lenin, China sold the capitalists the rope with which to hang themselves. The price paradigm replaced the security paradigm. With China now so strong that it can and does challenge the US economically and politically for number-one status globally, and strongly on the rise militarily, this phase has ended. China is preparing for the military strangulation, if not occupation of Taiwan, as demonstrated by its ever more menacing sea exercises around the island every year. Russia waged a war against Ukraine only days after establishing a ‘no limits partnership’ with China, testing the global order established after 1945 when conquering and annexing the territory of a weaker neighbour was outlawed. The West is being challenged both in Asia and in Europe. To defend our European way of life we need to be strong economically and militarily. We need to close the rifts in our societies and constructively end the revolt of the lower middle class. System competition is back, and the security paradigm has replaced the price paradigm. Cite:  Welle, K. (2025). Donald Trump, the revolt of the lower middle class and the next phase of European integration. European View, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858251345566 Footnotes 1. This article is a revised version of an article that originally appeared on the website of the research centre Groupe d’études géopolitiques on 19 March 2025 with the title ‘Trump and the next phase of European integration’. See https://geopolitique.eu/en/2025/03/19/after-trump-the-next-phase-of-european-integration/. Used by permission.2. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is a US Department of Defense agency focused on developing breakthrough technologies for national security. References Bank of America Institute. (2024). Paycheck to paycheck: What, who, where, why? 22 October. https://institute.bankofamerica.Com/content/dam/economic-insights/paycheck-to-paycheck-lower-income-households.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2025.Ciolan I. M., Welle K., eds. (2024). The 7Ds for sustainability – Defence extended. https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/the-7ds-defence-extended/. Accessed 24 April 2025.EU. (2024). Standard Eurobarometer 102 – Autumn 2024. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3215. Accessed 24 April 2025.European Parliament. (2024). European Parliament 2024–2029. Constitutive session. https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/european-results/2024-2029/. Accessed 24 April 2025.Focus online. (2021). Wer wählte wie? Die Analyse. Frauen und Rentner lassen Union abstürzen, die Jungen bestimmen die Kanzlermacher. 27 September. https://www.focus.De/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl/analyse-der-bevoelkerungsgruppen-wer-waehlte-wie-akademiker-und-reiche-waehlen-gruen-renter-spd_id_24280744.html. Accessed 24 April 2025.Ipsos. (2024). Sociologie des électorats – Législatives 2024. 30 June. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-06/ipsos-talan-sociologie-electorats-legislatives-30-juin-rapport-complet.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2025.Moreau P. (2024a). AfD: The German far-right at a dead end. Fondapol, 6 November. https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/afd-the-german-far-right-at-a-dead-end/. Accessed 24 April 2025.Moreau P. (2024b). The FPÖ and the challenge of Europe: Ideological radicalism and electoral constraints in Austria. Fondapol, 29 October. https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/the-fpo-and-the-challenge-of-europe-ideological-radicalism-and-electoral-constraints-in-austria/. Accessed 24 April 2025.Reckwitz A. (2020). Society of singularities. Cambridge: Polity.Rydgren J., ed. (2013). Class politics and the radical right. London: Routledge.Schmitt C. (2007). The concept of the political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossrefUS Bureau of Labour Statistics. (n.d.). CPI inflation calculator. https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. Accessed 24 April 2025.Weber M. (2010). Politik als Beruf [Politics as a vocation], 11th edn. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.Welle K., Frantescu D. (2025). (Forthcoming study on voting behaviour in the European Parliament in the 2019–24 legislature).Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (n.d.). Publications: The 7Ds. https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/#the-7ds. Accessed 24 April 2025.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, following the military actions that began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The conflict is having devastating consequences, including widespread death and displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and a global energy crisis, also heightening geopolitical tensions (Kurapov et al., Citation2023). Pertiwi (Citation2024) contended that since the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union (EU) has adopted sanctions as the key policy response targeting Russia’s aggressive behaviour. These restrictive measures were applied by the EU in multiple rounds and packages and gradually became the cornerstone of the EU’s policy towards Russia. (p. 61) There is extant literature studying the direct consequences of the war, such as humanitarian crises, economic impacts and geopolitical instability. Numerous countries have experienced food shortages and rising prices due to disruptions in supply chains, worsened by the crisis in Ukraine and the closure of airspace (Hellegers, Citation2022). Concurrently, the war has caused an unprecedentedly volatile energy market, as many European countries were obliged to seek alternative energy sources to Russian imports, demanding more oil and natural gas from alternative suppliers (Liadze et al., Citation2022). The invasion has also fuelled inflation across the EU, not only affecting energy, which is essential in all the sectors of the economy but also other sectors like food, for example, as Ukraine is a major global grain producer (Ozili, Citation2024). The added value and main contribution of this paper is based on the use of grounded social scientific methods like the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS and the Ordered Probit, to analyse the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions against Russia, providing more nuanced insights on what factors are the most important to be in favour and against the sanctions. Thus, in particular, our study contributes to filling one of the important gaps mentioned by Pertiwi (Citation2024) in the analysis of the literature on the EU’s approach to sanctions on Russia. Concretely, our study fills in part the fifth gap in the analysis of causal mechanisms that examine the sanctions, including relevant actors like the EU citizens. Thus, we first provide an in-depth analysis of European citizens’ views on EU sanctions to weaken Russia and support Ukraine. And then, we analyse the main factors that affect the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia and in favour of Ukraine. The study includes data from 26,461 respondents across the 27 EU Member States, collected through the 98th Eurobarometer survey (Winter 2022–2023), which examined the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature review. Section 3 presents the dataset used, and the methodological approach. In Section 5, the results are presented, followed by Section 5, which offers a thorough discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising the main conclusions drawn from the study, identifying implications, limitations of the study, and potential directions for future research. Literature reviewAttitudes towards EU’s sanctions against Russia war in Ukraine Public sentiment for the EU is a complex phenomenon to study and needs to be approached from different angles, including identity, governance, security and the economy. How the public perceives the EU as a guardian of democratic values and good governance directly influences support for its policies, including sanctions on Russia. Boomgaarden et al. (Citation2011) argue that if the people believe that the EU is going to safeguard democratic principles, then they will identify sanctions as a proper means of safeguarding such principles. However, if there is a lack of trust in the EU to defend such values, there will be little support for such sanctions. The purpose of European identity is primarily to determine people’s views on the EU’s actions. Kende et al. (Citation2018) believe that European identity can have a profound impact on solidarity with common EU policies, such as sanctions. This would imply that the framing of a common European identity can become the most important factor in eliciting public consent for EU programmes, especially in the midst of geopolitical crises. Thus, public opinion on sanctions is also based on perceptions of the EU’s ability to act in the interests of citizens. According to McLean and Roblyer (Citation2016), if citizens perceive the EU as doing the best it can for its citizens, particularly in terms of economic stability and governance, they are more likely to support sanctions against Russia. However, if the EU is perceived as wasteful, or its policies are perceived as economically harmful, then the potential for support for sanctions will be low. This explains the need to ensure that EU action is consistent with shared perceptions of political effectiveness and economic benefit. The imposition of economic sanctions is one of the highest prioritised tools in the modern world, especially against threats to stability and security. The EU sanctions on Russia, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, have stimulated an immensely wide public discussion (Karlović et al., Citation2021). An important question is: What is the role of perceived security threats in shaping public opinion about these sanctions? It has been made known through investigation that subjective security risk strongly predicts public opinion regarding EU sanctions against Russia. Frye (Citation2019) argues that sanctions are not always supported but vary depending on how people view security threats. Public support is higher when sanctions are framed as protection against an external threat. When sanctions are perceived as a threat to national or economic security, they can generate opposition. The EU’s collective response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict also shows that public opinion on sanctions is shaped by both security interests and normative expectations of justice and self-determination (Bosse, Citation2024). This mutual influence can lead to mixed public responses, with some seeing sanctions as an ethical necessity, while others withdraw their support due to perceived economic and national security risks. The way EU sanctions are proposed and implemented also influences public opinion. According to Sjursen (Citation2015), citizens will be more supportive of sanctions if they see EU institutions as representative and transparent. Conversely, an image of bureaucratic distance or lack of public participation in decision-making can undermine trust and lead to opposition. Thus, in line with this background, we pose our first research question as follows: (1) How do European values and security threats influence the intensity of public support for EU sanctions against Russia?Socioeconomic factors in shaping attitudes towards EU sanctions Support for economic sanctions against Russia is widespread among the EU, varying according to socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics and political engagement. As Frye (Citation2017) has noted, economic prosperity is a key predictor of support for sanctions. Those who are financially ‘safe’ are more likely to support EU-imposed sanctions, as they are less directly affected by the economic burden. Previous studies have shown that those in more affluent income groups or with stable household finances are more likely to support foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, that represent broader European values, even if they are economically costly (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). This is consistent with the findings of Lepeu (Citation2025), which recognises that citizens who rate their own economic situation as ‘very good’ are far more likely to support sanctions than those facing financial hardship. On the other hand, citizens facing economic hardship are less likely to be sanction-supportive if they believe that sanctions will negatively impact inflation, increase unemployment or suppress national economic stability. Onderco (Citation2017) found that economic hardship is associated with higher scepticism towards foreign policy decisions that lack tangible personal benefits. This means that the economic price of sanctions is likely to disproportionately affect support among lower-income individuals. Generational differences also play a role in shaping public opinion on sanctions. Older individuals (over 55 years) are more supportive of EU sanctions, as they have a historical perspective on European security and are more politically engaged (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). On the other hand, younger people (15–34 years) have weaker support, possibly because they have different priorities, such as financial stability and employment, which could be considered more pressing than geopolitical concerns (Onderco, Citation2017). Alexandrescu (Citation2024) also suggests a new generational divide in attitudes towards coercive diplomacy, suggesting that efforts to build popular support for sanctions must consider young Europeans’ concerns and values about economic consequences and political transparency. Political interest is a second important predictor of support for EU sanctions. Politically knowledgeable and engaged citizens tend to be more supportive of EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). Thus, there is political ideology duality: left and centre-left voters support sanctions if they are anchored in a broader vision of upholding international law and human rights, while centre-right and populist voters are likely to be more sceptical if sanctions are perceived as infringing on national sovereignty (Onderco, Citation2017). As in the literature, the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions depends on several socioeconomic and demographic factors, our second research question builds on the following: (2) Do socioeconomic characteristics influence the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions against Russia?Dataset and methodology The dataset of the study is based on the Standard Eurobarometer 98.2 (EB98) survey Winter 2022–2023 which was conducted from 12 January to 6 February 2023 in 39 countries or territories. In the study, we only use the dataset from the 27 Member States of the EU, without considering the data from the other twelve additional countries included. The dataset was collected about a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, covering the following five topic areas identified by the European Commission (Citation2024): (1) The EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine; (2) the actions taken as a unified EU response to the invasion; (3) the consequences of the war in Ukraine; (4) the European security threat; and (5) the future EU actions in the wake of the war., and aims to analyse the solidarity of European citizens with the Ukrainian people. The sample size for each country was around 1000 respondents except for Malta with 503, making a total of 26,461 respondents. The endogenous variable of the study is obtained by applying the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS approach to the items of the survey included to measure the degree of support of the respondents towards the measures taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The following five items were included in the analysis: (1) financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine; (2) imposing economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals; (3) providing financial support to Ukraine; (4) providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war; and (5) welcoming into the EU people fleeing the war. The question introduction was the same for all the items: The EU has taken a series of actions as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these actions taken? The responses to the question for each item were given using a complete 5-point Likert scale, where: 1 = totally agree; 2 = tend to agree; 3 = do not know; 4 = tend to disagree; and 5 = totally disagree. The scale was reversed to enhance interpretability, ensuring that higher values are aligned with those citizens who expressed higher support for the measures taken by the EU. The analysis of the variables affecting the citizens’ support was based on the selection of 14 exogenous variables, including age, gender, political interest, perception of the situation in the country, employment personal perception, financial household perception, the labour market perception of the country, the provision of public services perception, the overall image of the EU, the perception of the threat posed by the Russian war in Ukraine to security in the EU and the country itself, the personal perception that standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, and the political orientation. More information about the exogenous variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The Ordered Probit model will provide interesting and nuanced results of whether some exogenous variables affect the support of the EU sanctions taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion. For example, for each of the variables included in the analysis, it will be possible to analyse to what extent some of the categories support more or less the sanctions. Similarly, it will be possible to determine if some of the variables have a significant effect on the level of support. Methodology Opinion surveys are affected by the subjective judgments of respondents, leading to potential inaccuracy in interpreting response categories (Disegna et al., Citation2018). For instance, ‘totally agree’ for one respondent could be equivalent to simply ‘tend to agree’ for another. For this reason, Fuzzy Set Logic methods are becoming very popular in social sciences to manage the uncertainty associated with survey responses effectively (Cantillo et al., Citation2021; Indelicato & Martín, Citation2024). The study uses the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS Approach to calculate the endogenous variable that measures the support (sup) of the respondents towards the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The method is grounded in the fuzzy set theory proposed by Zadeh (Citation1965), which was introduced for handling the inherent uncertainty and vagueness of information provided by answers to social surveys (Carlsson & Fullér, Citation2001; Disegna et al., Citation2018; Mamdani & Assilian, Citation1999). There are multiple fuzzy set representations that can be used to associate the categories of the answers given in the survey (Nguyen et al., Citation2005). In the study, we use the Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs), which are the most used fuzzy sets (Anand & Bharatraj, Citation2017; Wang, Citation2017). The final representation of the answers from the dataset is as follows: (1) totally disagree is represented by (0, 0, 30); (2) tend to disagree by (20, 30, 40); (3) do not know by (30, 50, 70); (4) tend to agree by (60, 70, 80); and (5) totally agree by (70, 100, 100). The hybrid nature of the method is based on the application of the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), which calculates the synthetic indicator (Hwang & Yoon, Citation1981). We omit the mathematical formulation of the method for simplicity and ease of exposition. Interested readers can consult many existing papers, such as (Cantillo et al., Citation2023; Indelicato et al., Citation2023; Martín et al., Citation2020; Martín & Indelicato, Citation2023). We will use sup which provides relative support for the sanctions on Russia taken by the EU after invading Ukraine, as the dependent variable for the econometric model. The variable will be categorised into five quintiles according to the ranking of the indicator in order to use an ordered probit model. The marginal effects of the results will be used to analyse the main determinants that explain the highest support of EU citizens. In the study, we use the Daly normalisation for all the categories that act as exogenous variables in the model. Thus, it is possible to determine the marginal effects of each category with respect to the sample-weighted average. We omit the discussion of the technicalities of the model and exogenous variables normalisation. Interested readers can consult Daly et al. (Citation2016), Greene and Hensher (Citation2010), Hensher et al. (Citation2015) and Martin and Roman (Citation2021). Results Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the exogenous variable that measures the support of EU individuals for the sanctions against Russia taken by the EU for the whole sample (panel a) and for those who totally agree and totally disagree with the EU imposing the sanctions to defend European values (panel b). The results indicate that a small number of respondents do not support the sanctions imposed by the EU at all, with 170 citizens giving a score of 1 to all survey items included in the scale. Conversely, a significant portion of the population holds a more neutral position, as shown by responses falling in the range of 0.3–0.6. Additionally, a substantial number of citizens – specifically, 6430 – express their strong support for the sanctions by responding with a score of 5 to all items.  Figure 1. Support kernel density. Panel (b) of the figure clearly distinguishes between the two categories of respondents. It shows that those who strongly support the defence of European values are more in favour of the sanctions compared to those who strongly oppose them. Similar figure patterns are obtained for the categories of those who have a positive or negative image of the EU, and for those who think that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is seen as an important threat to the security of the EU. Nevertheless, this will be further discussed with the results of the ordered probit model. Table 1 shows the main drivers to support or not the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The table is obtained from the marginal effects obtained from the ordered probit model, which is in the fifth quintile of the support distribution, and refers to the citizen group of the strong supporters (Table A3, in the appendix). It can be seen that the main drivers to support the sanctions are totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion, the EU is defending European values, having a very good or rather good image of the EU, totally agreeing that the EU security is under threat with the Russian invasion, and to have a very good financial situation in the household. All the coefficients are significant at 999 per thousand. The results of the ordered probit model, as well as the complete table of the marginal effects, can be consulted in the appendix. Table A2 shows that all the exogenous variables affect the support level except the area in which the respondent resides, so the support is transversal to whether the European lives in a rural, middle town or large town. It is also interesting to observe that all the threshold parameters of the ordered probit model result significant, i.e. the five different quintiles of the distribution can be allocated without the need to collapse some of the categories used in the estimation.  Table 1. Main drivers to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. Interestingly, the main drivers to be in the population segment of those who do not strongly support the EU sanctions are the opposite categories of supporting the sanctions: totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the defence of European values, totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the fact that the invasion of Ukraine is a security threat to the EU and having a very bad image of the EU. The coefficients of Table 1 have been extracted from Table A3, and need to be interpreted as follows: the coefficients are the marginal effects of the category to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. For example, the coefficient of 0.105 for individuals who totally agree that the EU is defending European values by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicates that this group has a 10.5 per cent higher likelihood of being strong supporters of EU sanctions compared to the average citizen in the overall sample. In a similar manner, the coefficient of −0.225 for the category of total disagreement indicates a 22.5 per cent lower probability of being a strong supporter. Other interesting results that can be seen in the complete marginal effects table (Table A3, in the appendix) are that the type of urbanisation where the respondent lives, namely rural village, small and mid-size town or large town, is the only variable of the twelve under analysis which does not have any significant effect on being a strong supporter of the sanctions. For the rest of the variables, there is always a category with more odds of being or not in the category of strong supporters. It is interesting to note that the younger generations (between 15 and 24 and between 25 and 34) are less likely to be in the category of strong supporters than those over 55, who are significantly more likely to be in this category. Similarly, those who have a strong political interest, have a good personal job situation, think that the economic situation of their country is rather good, are leftist or left-centre, think that the employment situation of the country is rather good, are males, or have a rather good financial situation have a higher probability of being in the category of strong supporters. Conclusions In a recent speech by Jens Stoltenberg, former Secretary General of NATO, the following assessment was made: In just a few weeks, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid. We will make important decisions. To continue to strengthen and adapt our Alliance to a new security reality and protect our people and our values. I look forward to the day when we can welcome both Finland and Sweden into our Alliance. This will make Finland and Sweden safer. NATO stronger. And the whole Euro-Atlantic area more secure. (NATO, Citation2022) Although NATO’s strategic decision affects the entire geopolitical landscape, public perceptions of EU sanctions need to be addressed through a more nuanced, evidence-based approach. Public opinion on sanctions is driven not only by security concerns but also by economic and political factors that underpin individual belief systems. To measure the determinants of support for such policies, this study applies both the fuzzy hybrid approach and the ordered probit model. The first method calculates the endogenous variable that measures the level of support of each respondent. The second method is used to find the main factors of a set of 14 exogenous variables or covariates that affect the support. Our results reveal that there are four important drivers to be a strong supporter of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022: (1) totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, (2) having a very good overall EU image, (3) totally agreeing that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to the security of the EU, and (4) having a very good household financial situation. Other factors, such as age, gender, or political orientation, among others, are less determinant in explaining the strong support category. The dataset for the study was obtained from the 98th Eurobarometer, covering winter 2022–2023, providing a solid foundation for the objectives pursued in the study. Our results imply that, at least in the salient category of being a strong supporter of the EU sanctions, European Parliamentarians and the political parties involved should promote a triad: the defence of European values (Anghel & Jones, Citation2023), a more integrated security defence system that will permit the EU to be more independent from NATO and US (Del Sarto Citation2016; Howorth Citation2018), and a solid campaign of improving the EU image, highlighting the benefits of being in the union (Elmatzoglou, Citation2020). The European values of human rights and dignity, as well as the principles of living in liberal democracies, should not be undermined by misinformation campaigns from autocratic regimes. The invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest security threat in Europe since the end of the Cold War, fostering a wave of fear and real politics about the necessity of increasing the military budget. Europeans have seen more closely how the lives of human beings are worth almost nothing when their homes are bombed, and they have to leave with just the bare minimum, stopping their daily lives and becoming refugees in countries that may not welcome them with open arms. There is a need for effective communication campaigns that change the focus from generic issues such as ‘Europeanness’ fostering a common national identity or sense of belonging to a pragmatic branding strategy that achieves a power actor in the new turbulent geopolitical battlefield. Recent developments, in the light of newly elected President Donald Trump’s views on NATO and US foreign aid, have added uncertainty to the EU’s strategic calculus on sanctions. Trump’s concerns about NATO’s burden-sharing and his ambivalent stance on continued US military aid to Ukraine have set off alarm bells among EU policymakers and underscored the need for a European security policy that is less dependent on US leadership (Sorgi, Citation2025). Thus, it is the time for a more than-less European Union mentality that decreases Euroscepticism, a time to strengthen public support for the EU. This shift requires an emphasis on the tangible benefits that EU membership brings to member states, including economic stability, enhanced security, and the promotion of shared values like democracy and human rights. By fostering greater awareness and understanding of the EU’s role in addressing cross-border challenges, citizens can better appreciate the advantages of unity over division. Engaging with local communities, encouraging open dialogues, and actively involving citizens in EU decision-making processes can further bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens, reinforcing a sense of belonging and shared purpose. This study has some limitations that can be addressed in future studies. First, the dataset is a point-in-time measure of public opinion, surveyed in the winter of 2022–2023. Due to the dynamic nature of the geopolitical environment, longitudinal studies are needed to examine how public support for EU sanctions may change over time in response to political, economic and military events. Second, other external factors can also be examined to gain a better picture of how other factors could shape people’s opinions. These range from cultural equivalence with Ukraine to geographical proximity to the war zone, exposure to social media narratives, and interaction with Ukrainian refugees. The role of media frames and disinformation campaigns in determining views on EU sanctions is another area that would require more work. Third, latent variables such as societal resilience, institutional trust, geopolitical affinity, and adherence to European values could provide a better understanding of the reasons for support or opposition to EU sanctions. Such variables could also explain the differences in public opinion between EU member states and between different demographic groups. Furthermore, as previous studies on public support (Onderco et al., Citation2023) have also shown, a comparative analysis with previous surveys, for example, in 2008 (Russia-Georgia war), 2014 (annexation of Crimea and Donbas war) with the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022–2023, could also be very useful. Although not directly compared in the current study, future research would benefit from a historical analysis component to explore the continuities and shifts in public opinion during these major geopolitical events and how they change in different EU countries. This would provide a better insight into how threat perceptions, economic concerns and EU identity evolve in response to Russian aggression and EU foreign policy initiatives. Supplemental Material Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2025.2476484. Additional informationFunding Dr Alessandro Indelicato research is funded by the research fellowship “Catalina Ruiz,” provided by the Consejo de Economía, Conocimiento y Empleo of the Gobierno de Canarias, the Agencia Canaria De Investigación Innovación Y Sociedad De La Información (ACIISI), and Fondo Social Europeo of the EU, through the Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain). Martín, J. C., & Indelicato, A. (2025). 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A new chapter in the EU-UK partnership Almost ten years ago, Prime Minister David Cameron called the Brexit referendum. In June 2016, a narrow majority (51.9%) of the British population voted to leave the EU. Cameron's resignation was followed by five prime ministers who had to deal with the consequences of this historic vote. On Monday, May 19, 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer, together with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President Antonio Costa, finally hosted the first official EU-UK summit after Brexit to announce a new strategic partnership between the UK and the EU. A "win-win" Starmer had already declared rapprochement with the EU to be a foreign policy priority when he took office. Now he has presented concrete results: After months of preparation, the EU and the UK signed a "Joint Declaration", a "Security and Defense Partnership" and a "Declaration of Intent on a Renewed Agenda for the UK and the EU". The scope of the agreement is indeed considerable. The depth of the agreements reached is currently the subject of debate in political and economic circles. For some, the cooperation goes too far, for others the results are too superficial. For Prime Minister Starmer, the result is clear: a "win-win" that puts the UK back on the world stage. In addition to defense policy cooperation, agreements were reached in the areas of veterinary standards, fishing rights, youth mobility and energy cooperation. The fact that a breakthrough was possible at all was not a matter of course: a number of points of contention that had strained relations between London and Brussels for years had to be resolved in advance. Despite ongoing differences - for example on fishing rights, the dynamic harmonization of standards and the free movement of young people - there was consensus on both sides on the need for close cooperation on defence policy. The core of the deal: defense cooperation At the heart of the new cooperation is the UK's participation in the EU's rearmament programs and initiatives. In the face of Russian aggression and growing transatlantic insecurity, the integration of the UK's military capabilities into European security and defense structures is a strategic necessity. The agreements enshrined in the new security and defense partnership include biannual foreign and security policy dialogues between the EU High Representative and UK Foreign and Defense Ministers. In addition, the High Representative will be able to invite the UK to high-level EU meetings, including the Council. An annual security and defense dialogue will accompany and further develop the implementation of the agreement. An important motivation on the part of London is undoubtedly its participation in the 159-billion-euro SAFE initiative, with which the EU aims to promote investment in the European Defense, Technology, and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Defense companies from third countries may cover a maximum of 35 percent of the contract value - unless their home country concludes a bilateral defense agreement with the EU as well as a separate technical agreement. The UK therefore needed the deal to take the first step towards overcoming these restrictions. Negotiations on the additional technical agreement are still ongoing, but according to Commission President von der Leyen, they should be concluded in just a few weeks. In return, London will accept a "pay-to-play" regulation. In addition to participation in SAFE, the signed security partnership also includes agreements on closer cooperation to improve military mobility, as well as the possibility of British troops participating in EU missions - particularly relevant should the USA withdraw from NATO initiatives. In view of the existential challenges facing the UK and the EU internationally, the defense agreement was indeed a clear "win-win". However, its conclusion was complicated by a number of unrelated issues in which conflicts of interest between EU member states and the UK at times even appeared to put the defense agreement at risk. Agricultural and food trade: obstacle and growth opportunity Prime Minister Starmer is under internal economic pressure. The consumer confidence index is at an all-time low, while inflation rose to 3.6% in April according to ONS forecasts - the highest level for two and a half years. The government expects a trade agreement with the EU in the area of agricultural and food products to lead to a noticeable reduction in food prices in British supermarkets and an increase in exports to the continent. However, PM Starmer ruled out a return to the single market or the customs union from the outset. He also wanted to avoid the impression that his "Brexit reset" could undermine the Brexit referendum vote. A sectoral deal in the area of veterinary standards, which relates to food safety, animal health and plant health regulations, was therefore a key objective for London. Specifically, the agreement aims to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for British agricultural and fisheries exports. Experts expect an increase in exports of up to 20 %. In return, the UK agreed to dynamic alignment with relevant EU regulations and promised contribution payments to co-finance work on the corresponding standardization. However, in order to make this veterinary deal possible, agreement had to be reached on the issue of fishing rights for European fishermen in British waters. Fishing rights: a risky compromise Some EU states, led by France, had made an extension of the current regulation, which grants European fishing boats access to British waters and would have expired next year, a condition for the unhindered access of British agricultural products to the European market. The EU wanted to prevent London from permanently benefiting from market facilitation without at the same time securing access for European fishermen. In the end, a compromise was reached: in return for an indefinite easing of British food exports, the UK would extend the existing fisheries regulation by twelve years. Although there is no temporal symmetry between the market facilitation for the British and the fishing rights of the Europeans, the current fishing regulation has been extended for significantly longer than the four years originally sought by London. Youth Mobility: postponed movement One particularly controversial point was the European desire for a comprehensive "Youth Mobility Scheme". Germany in particular pushed for a regulation that would make it easier for young people to live and work in the EU or the UK. A reduction in tuition fees for EU students at British universities was also under discussion. However, given the domestic political pressure from Reform UK, it would have been extremely risky for Prime Minister Keir Starmer to initiate even a partial return to European freedom of movement. In addition, the Prime Minister had only recently made an abrupt U-turn towards a more restrictive migration policy. It can be assumed that the negotiators did not include the term "youth mobility" in the final document, partly out of consideration for the Prime Minister's sensitive domestic political situation. Instead, the vaguely formulated will to work together towards a "balanced Youth Experience Scheme" with upper limits and a time limit was recorded. The domestic debate: the spirit of Brexit lives on While the powerful representatives of the British industry welcomed the agreements and arrangements between the UK and the EU in principle and refrained from making either euphoric or critical statements, the British fishing industry came out with particularly harsh criticism. Although the fishing industry's annual turnover is comparatively small - equivalent to that of the London department store Harrods - the issue of fishing rights in the UK has taken on totemic significance since the Brexit referendum and is intricately linked to the issue of national sovereignty. The Scottish Fishermen's Federation described the deal as "a horror show" and Scotland's First Minister, John Swinney, claimed that the UK government had abandoned the fishing industry with the deal. Nevertheless, even though these stakeholders are aware that the new agreement extends the current status quo, the UK government is providing additional funding to coastal towns and fishery products will now have easier access to the European market. For the opposition, the rapprochement with the EU is still a red rag. Kemi Badenoch, leader of the Conservatives, the architects of Brexit, railed that Keir Starmer saw nothing historic about the deal. "We want to talk about the future - but this agreement takes us back to the past. That's why we call it a capitulation." The United Kingdom was in danger of becoming a mere "rule recipient". The criticism from Brexit fanatic Nigel Farage was even harsher. The Reform UK leader described the compromise as a "betrayal" and a "sell-out of British interests". Both the Tories and Reform UK announced their intention to reverse the deal, which is not binding under international law if they win the next general election. After all, Nigel Farage had made a name for himself as a Brexit campaigner and the Tories had implemented a "hard" Brexit. Under Starmer's Conservative predecessors, the UK had broken away from the EU and laid claim to forging new partnerships worldwide. The slogan "Global Britain" was coined as a deliberate contrast to the old integration into the EU but fell short of the announcements and expectations in terms of implementation. Between Brexit reset and Global Britain Instead, it is Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer who is approaching this ambition and vision with concrete results. Since taking office, the PM has quickly finalized trade agreements that his predecessors were denied - with India, with the Trump administration and now with the EU. What others promised, he implemented. The latest agreement with the EU is his greatest foreign policy success to date. Europe and the UK share common values and security interests, and the EU remains the UK's most important trading partner. Whether the "win-win" deal will contribute to economic recovery in the short term remains to be seen. However, the domestic political urgency of tangible successes is undisputed. The door for a further deepening of cooperation has only just been opened with the agreements sealed in Lancaster House: the far-reaching "renewed agenda" will have to be filled with life in the coming months and years through further negotiations. Differences remain on key issues such as the internal market and the role of the Strasbourg Court of Justice. Although the successes of this summit mark the beginning of a new chapter, its text will not be written in itself. With the Brexit reset, Starmer is taking a calculated risk - he is betting that the path to Global Britain will lead via a "Brexit reset" of relations with the EU. Whether this approach will lead him to re-election as the first prime minister since David Cameron will depend on whether the reset also takes effect domestically.