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The democratic collapse of Nicaragua has created the ideal conditions for China to consolidate a model of cooperation based on political control, trade dependence, and resource extraction. Throughout 2025, Nicaragua’s co-presidency under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has accelerated the consolidation of an authoritarian family state. Constitutional reforms in January eliminated the separation of powers, subordinating the judicial, legislative, and electoral branches to the executive, while subsequent legislation extended political terms and enabled the regime to weaponize electoral institutions against political opponents. Since 2018, the Ortega-Murillo government has imprisoned, exiled, or stripped citizenship from hundreds of critics and dismantled thousands of civil society organizations, hollowing out independent checks on power. These legal and institutional changes have transformed Nicaragua from a weakened democracy into a closed authoritarian system, heightening the risk of systematic human rights abuses and creating permissive conditions for opaque foreign economic engagement — particularly China — in strategic commercial and mineral sectors. Starting December 2021, President Ortega broke ties with Taiwan, establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, marking this “new era” by opening a Chinese embassy in Managua the same month. This decision followed weeks of the Organization of American States (OAS), United States, and European Union (EU) condemning the 2021 elections as illegitimate due to the months of repression and incarceration of 39 people, including civil society leaders and presidential candidates by President Ortega. Beijing took the opportunity to enter Managua seeking to ease the sense of intensifying international isolation for Ortega’s regime. As of 2023, Managua’s total exports to Beijing were valued at an estimated $27.3 million yet increased by almost 300 percent in 2024 to $82.1 million. Also in 2024, Beijing was the second largest exporter to Nicaragua, making up 14 percent of total imports, at $1.65 billion. Recently Beijing and Nicaragua have held over $1 billion trade deficit, acting as a lifeline of the regime’s desperate survival strategy with China as a primary benefactor. As Western pressure builds, Beijing provides capital, infrastructure, trade, and opportunities for the Ortega-Murillo regime through the commercial and mineral sector. Nicaragua has directly aided in the expansion of China’s economic development in the region and passed multiple pieces of legislation to pave a simple road for Beijing. For example, on October 30th, 2025, Nicaragua’s National Assembly unanimously passed a Special Economic Zone (ZEE) directly tying China’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively boosting influence through infrastructure and trade. The ZEE includes many perks for Beijing operations in Nicaragua, such as full exemptions from income tax, dividends, import duties for up to a decade, targeted industrial sectors for manufacturing, agroindustry, tech, and exports. The head of the ZEEs will be President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo with a renewed promise of jobs, poverty alleviation, and technology transfers. The President’s son heading the ZEEs reflects Nicaragua’s foreign policy focus on becoming a Pacific-Caribbean trade bridge. Moreover, since 2021, the Ortega-Murillo regime has quietly granted an estimated 300,000 hectares of land, or almost 2.36 percent of Nicaragua’s national territory to four PRC affiliated mining companies: Zhon Fu Development, Nicaragua XinXin Linze Mineria Group, Thomas Metal, and Brother Metal. These companies do not contain a track record in Nicaragua, connected to a known Chinese entity, or even have a website. Yet, they are conveniently tailored by the Ortega-Murillo regime as Nicaragua allows opaque shell companies with no track record to operate in critical infrastructure sectors. To aid Beijing’s mineral campaign, the Ortega-Murillo regime has been revoking concession rights and granting those same stripped mining concessions to these opaque Chinese affiliated shell entities. In 2022, the Sandinista National Assembly reformed Law 387 to allow concession transfers without public bidding, weaken social oversight mechanisms, and concentrate decision-making for the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This “reform” allows Nicaragua exclusive control over flipping ownership on mining concessions without warning. Separate from mining, Beijing has been manipulating Nicaragua’s commercial sector reliant on Chinas exports to Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaraguan merchants claim to face “unfair competition” as their sales dwindle, due to the explosion of Chinese nationals operating in the region. Chinese businesses have frozen the Nicaraguan market through selling inexpensive products easily accessed by Chinese nationals under the low-tariff agreements between Ortega-Murillo and Beijing. Reports reflect that China’s strategy is to exploit import benefits provided by the Nicaraguan government, allowing Chinese nationals to sell goods at “rock-bottom prices”. This strategy has allowed Beijing to completely undermine Nicaraguan businesses and take over the market. In May 2024, the Confidential reported Chinese businesses have slashed 70 percent of local merchant sales. Moreover, this increase of Chinese businesses by Chinese nationals directly translates to the growth of imports from the PRC, influencing a further expansion of the already tremendous trade deficit. This inability to produce goods appealing to Beijing markets will perpetuate further trends of high imports and minimal exports by Nicaragua, granting the opportunity for Beijing to fully influence the export capacity under the Ortega-Murillo regime. Nicaragua has rapidly stepped forward to ban media by prohibiting Bibles, newspapers, magazines, books, drones, and cameras from entering the country. This came without an official decree by the government but has still been enforced by immigration and customs at border crossings. Since 2018, 61 media outlets have been closed or confiscated with over 2,300 recorded violations by journalists, forcing 300 journalists into exile from Nicaragua. Globally, the world must continue to investigate and report the egregious human rights violations conducted by this family dictatorship. Their goal of alienating their civil populace to generate wealth for themselves and Beijing through illicit and shadowy economic efforts must face legal hearings to benefit the people of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s corrupted government continuing to weaken the foundations of their democratic institutions to favor Chinese ownership of commercial and industrial zones will freeze Nicaraguan exports in favor of dependence on Chinese imports.

Rarely in the history of the European Union has it faced challenges comparable to the ones it faces today. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has been on the rise. Its membership has expanded quantitatively and qualitatively. Pan-European institutions and European law have been strengthened. Diplomacy and security policy have been taking shape. The EU has gradually become more like a confederation or a federation. However, it has lacked the centralized security structures to truly become a full-fledged state or even a super-state — primarily the armed forces. The EU has remained a junior partner of NATO and part of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, where the US has played a leading role. However, the question of the EU's strategic autonomy has gradually departed from purely theoretical considerations. While maintaining its role as an economic giant, Brussels has long remained a political dwarf. The Ukraine conflict has become a powerful political stimulus for expanding political opportunities, although the preconditions for such a dynamic existed earlier. Similar incentives are emerging in other areas as well. The European Union has been forced to provide immediate answers to the eternal question of "what to do," playing on several chessboards at once. What to do with the United States? A year ago, such a question would have rarely occurred to anyone. Brussels and Washington were closely aligned on the issue of containing Russia. There was also common ground on the issue of growing competition with China. The level of economic ties remained high. Military-political integration has been revived. NATO has welcomed two new EU members — Finland and Sweden. Surprises were expected from Donald Trump. But the experience of his first term still served as an indicator of their predictability. Moreover, the European allies themselves had been moving toward Trump's demands during his previous term — increased defense spending, energy purchases from the US, a rejection of Russian raw materials and so on. However, the US president has exceeded expectations, disconcerting the EU on several fronts. These include a special position on Ukraine, territorial ambitions for Greenland (formally part of Denmark, a member of the EU and NATO), a trade war affecting EU countries, criticism of the Old World in doctrinal documents and speeches by senior officials, as well as an overt policy of force. A close ally and key guarantor of security has transformed, in a matter of months, into a cold, calculating, and unpredictable player. The EU's actions regarding the American issue have so far revealed a wait-and-see tactic. In the medium term, the plan is to "outlast" Trump. His term will expire in three years. With that, a shift in foreign policy can be expected from the new administration. That is, if the Democrats come to power. In the short term, the plan is to avoid angering the American leader, to play on his personality traits (praising his achievements, avoiding criticism), to concede on certain issues, or to present as concessions what is inevitable. These include arms and energy purchases from the US and a trade balance adjustment in Washington's favour. The Greenland issue could be resolved using the same logic. The US military has de facto controlled the island for decades. Moreover, the United States formally remains an ally of Denmark and other EU countries. Why not concede? Especially if the procedure is carried out democratically. Of course, the Danish king or prime minister is unlikely to be kidnapped by American special forces, and they are unlikely to face charges in a US federal court. But Denmark risks being outvoted in the democratic process. The EU's perception of Donald Trump could be compared to the perception of the Russian Emperor Paul I among the Russian aristocracy and nobility. Paul was renowned for his eccentricity and was extremely unpopular. He fell victim to an inevitable conspiracy by his inner circle. But the expectation that problems with the United States will be resolved after a change of leadership, similar to the case in Russian history, rests on a fragile foundation. Unlike the Russian emperor, who became a lone figure on the throne, the American president is backed by a vibrant and young team, widespread support, and a consistent ideology. Donald Trump's departure is unlikely to resolve the EU's American problem. Moreover, his young successors could cling to their ally with an even tighter grip. What to do with Russia? In EU political rhetoric, Russia occupies the position of its most important and dangerous adversary. This approach took hold after February 2022, but had been brewing since the events in Crimea in 2014. Compared to the United States, maintaining a confrontational approach to Russia in a semantic sense is easier, as the identity structures of both sides already contain established, centuries-old patterns of mutual perception as a "significant other." (Neumann, I. (1999) Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation. University of Minnesota Press.) Regarding the United States, such patterns have either not yet been developed or have been lost. The EU's approach to Russia over the past four years has been characterized by a fairly active policy of containment. This includes the consistent severing of trade and economic ties, even at the cost of economic damage to itself; large-scale military and political support for Ukraine; remilitarization and the restoration of the military-industrial complex; and attempts to influence third countries in their trade with Russia, not to mention information and ideological warfare. The problem for the EU is that the results have largely been negative. Yes, Brussels is doing its part to keep Ukraine afloat. Yes, Russia has suffered economic damage. Yes, defense spending is rising and the military-industrial complex is slowly recovering. Yes, third countries are wary of secondary sanctions. Yes, the information machine is working. But Russia hasn't gone anywhere. Its economy has been reoriented towards other areas, and its market for EU companies has been lost. Hostilities with Ukraine continue. Russia's military-industrial complex has been deployed, and its nuclear potential makes any Yugoslavia – or Libya-style solutions futile. Russia has its own financial and informational network, which has become more difficult, or significantly more difficult to influence. The good news for the European Union is that Moscow is unlikely to be planning military expansion against the EU countries themselves. War with them makes neither political nor practical sense for Russia, although the issue of responding to hypothetical military aggression by NATO or individual member states against Russia is likely to be addressed. Moscow cannot harm the Union with trade wars, and it simply lacks the desire to seriously fight for public opinion support. Ultra-conservative forces may at first glance seem convenient for Russia. But experience shows that conservatives and populists in power are hardly helpful in close foreign policy circles. Poland is a paragon of traditional values, but it is at the forefront of Russia's adversaries. In other words, Russia is a convenient foe. It can be fought through Ukraine and pinned on it the answer to the question of "who is to blame?" But at the same time, doing all this is relatively safe for the Europeans. The tactic toward Russia is loud and wait-and-see. Loud in terms of rhetoric. Wait-and-see in the hope that the Russian side will not withstand and collapse. Fortunately, there are many who support the theory of Russia's imminent decline. The problem for the EU is that not only Donald Trump, but also Vladimir Putin differs from the aforementioned Emperor Paul I. While Brussels hopes for the fatal blow with the snuffbox, Russia lives its own life. Apparently, Washington was the first to realize this. What shall be done with Ukraine? The answer to the Ukraine question is also seemingly simple: support Kiev by all means possible. In the short term, the practical policy here is more or less clear: continue financial and military support for Ukraine in order to restore it and prevent military defeat. In the medium term, there is greater uncertainty. The key issue is resources. The confiscation of Russian sovereign assets is still theoretically possible. But even if Brussels bears the full costs of such confiscation, it will not fundamentally solve the problem. The EU faces the prospect of becoming the main donor to a large and warring state with a very specific political system. The benefits of its integration into the EU are ambiguous. Furthermore, the problem of security guarantees and the material backing of such guarantees remains. Unlike the US, the EU is unlikely to be able to demand that Kiev repay its debts through enslaving agreements and then quickly distance itself from the problem. Regarding the Ukrainian issue, the EU may try to leave things as they are, while simultaneously awaiting a change of power in the US and potential problems in Russia. Brussels apparently has sufficient resources to keep Kiev afloat for a couple of years. The EU is likely prepared to accept further material losses for the sake of political principles, just as it did when it severed economic ties with Russia. At the same time, an agreement on Ukraine would also be in the EU's interests. Yes, Kiev is losing territory, but Ukraine remains a fairly large state. It will inevitably remain within the EU's political and economic orbit. An end to hostilities with a ceasefire along the line of contact would likely be more acceptable to the EU than the large-scale, legally binding agreement Moscow is insisting on. If US policy changes and problems escalate in Russia, a ceasefire would be more convenient for a new round of the Ukraine conflict. However, experience shows that even such agreements can be violated, so a binding agreement in itself is not a major problem for Brussels. It is important for the EU that Ukrainian losses in the negotiations are minimized, and that security guarantees do not expose the EU to the threat of military escalation directly with Russia. In answering the question of what to do with Ukraine, the EU will likely have to acknowledge the "realities on the ground." If the US continues to distance itself from the Ukraine issue, and the Russian army continues to advance, delaying such recognition will increasingly devalue Brussels's course. However, a willingness to adhere to this course at any cost cannot be ruled out. What to do with China? Compared to the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, China hardly poses a pressing problem for the EU. China remains a major trading partner and market. Secondary sanctions against Chinese companies for their cooperation with Russia have not yet led to complications. On the Taiwan issue, the EU has avoided taking a leading role in anti-China mobilization. Attempts by individual member states (such as Lithuania) to assert themselves on the Taiwan issue have not found much support in Brussels, and Chinese sanctions have further dampened their efforts. The EU has generally supported the long-standing US policy of curbing China's global economic projects and Beijing's high-tech capabilities. But in reality, there is no rush to undermine the foundation of economic cooperation with China in the western part of Eurasia. Within China itself, there is a countermovement. They don't generalize the US and EU into a single West and, apparently, proceed from the idea that the interests of Washington and Brussels differ. This means that relations with the EU are not identical to relations with the US. The complexities of transatlantic relations are likely to contribute to a situational rapprochement between the EU and China. In the political sphere, this is unlikely to be excessive, but rivalry is still a long way off. Anti-Chinese voices in the EU are likely to become quieter in the near future, despite Beijing's active cooperation with Moscow. China, with its predictable political course in the current turbulent conditions, is becoming an attractive partner for the EU. There are no immediate threats from it, but the benefits are more than sufficient. It's possible that Donald Trump will pressure the EU to adopt a more coordinated course toward China. Brussels could use such demands as a trump card. However, EU diplomacy will be unable to influence Russian-Chinese relations, and the conflict with Russia will be secondary in answering the question "what to do with China." What to do with the EU? It appears that the issue of internal transformation, taking into account external challenges, remains paramount for the EU. The logic of relations with China allows for no changes for now. However, here too, the prospect of intense competition over technological security remains under the rug. This will likely require more stringent regulatory measures. Political consolidation was required in relations with Ukraine, and it has the potential to gain more ground if necessary, seeking additional reserves. In relations with Russia, even clearer demands for increased levels of control have come to the fore. The change in the procedure for applying sanctions against Russia's sovereign assets is symptomatic. Now, it will be more difficult for individual countries, such as Hungary or Slovakia, to use their veto power in EU Council votes with regards to this issue. Finally, the US maneuvers raise a fundamental question: how do Europeans ensure their own security? For now, NATO remains an ironclad structure. But NATO's mere existence is unlikely to block deeper defense cooperation within the EU. Brussels has incentives to play a more significant role in NATO, and in the long run, the alliance itself could become a US-EU pair, rather than a conglomerate of European allies centered on the US. Resolving security issues will inevitably require the EU to become increasingly centralized and directive in its decisions, and thus, to reduce the effective sovereignty of its member states. The big question is whether the EU itself and its member states are ready for such a scenario, especially given the disparity in their potential and capabilities. Could the Franco-German tandem, for example, serve as the framework for such centralization? Does Brussels have the resources and legitimacy to align member states around a unified and firm political line? Is Greece, for example, ready, and what is Estonia ready for? Will it be possible to controllingly package their approaches into a single policy line where defense and specific military risks, including the risk of a clash with a nuclear power, are at stake, not just in words but in deeds? To simplify the question even further, is the European Union ready to devolve from a confederation/federation into a de facto empire? The unification of disparate states for military-political purposes will sooner or later raise the question of an imperial component, despite the seeming impossibility of such a development, if judged through the eyes of the post-Cold War era. Moreover, beyond the US, Russia, Ukraine, and China, there are other areas of common policy. Such a structural evolution could have a far greater impact on relations with other centers of power than situational issues. "What to do with the EU" could become a fundamental question for other participants in international relations.

As the US powers ahead with its plans to recover Latin America’s ‘oil El Dorado’, we explore Venezuela’s environmental and geopolitical outlook. “Uninvestable”. That was the verdict on Venezuelan oil delivered by Exxon’s CEO, Darren Woods, earlier this month. He was speaking at the White House with the US president Donald Trump and representatives from 17 oil companies. Nevertheless, following the extraction of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, Trump plans to revive the country’s flailing industry. He says a USD 100 billion investment will be geared towards resurrecting the “oil El Dorado” of the 1990s. He has takers. After Woods’ White House comments, the US energy secretary Chris Wright said the US oil and gas company Chevron, the UK’s Shell, Spain’s Repsol and Italy’s Eni were all willing to “immediately increase” investment in Venezuela. He added that a dozen other companies were also interested, while dismissing the doubts expressed by Exxon and ConocoPhillips. Any company following Trump to the country will have to deal with uncertainty – and the estimated USD 1 billion cost of the failed nationalizations enacted by Venezuela’s former president, Hugo Chávez. According to Venezuela’s Centre for the Dissemination of Economic Information (Cedice), the government expropriated several thousand between 1999 and 2019. Independent experts estimate the bill for success will reach USD 180 billion – nearly double that announced by Trump. On the other hand, some companies will be encouraged by successful gas operations in Venezuela. For example, the Perla (Cardón IV) field, which covers the entire domestic demand for gas and is operated by Repsol. And Chevron has been able to continue operating in the country, despite a barrage of economic sanctions initiated by the US under Trump in 2017. Demands and first legal changes Trump has claimed the US could be making money from Venezuelan oil in 18 months. Venezuelan oil experts say this will require a fiscal and contractual framework that does not exist today, and a decade of “arduous democratic work”. The economist José Manuel Puente estimates it will require an investment of USD 180 billion and 15 years of institutional work. Patrick Pouyanné, CEO of the French oil company TotalEnergies, thinks similarly. Without a legal framework that guarantees rights, he says, it would be too expensive and slow to return to production of three million barrels a day. Last week, Venezuela’s interim government responded by announcing that the acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, will send a new Hydrocarbons Law to the national assembly, as well as another for streamlining procedures. The interim government’s strategy is to further “production sharing contracts”. These would allow foreign companies to recover their investments by selling a portion of the extracted crude oil. However, interested foreign oil companies are pushing for greater changes. Reuters has reported that they are seeking to reduce the tax burden by returning to a royalty payment model. They also want the right to sell the majority of the oil, by gaining access to export infrastructure. This infrastructure, currently dilapidated and faulty, includes thousands of kilometers of oil and gas pipelines, 16 shipping terminals, 153 gas compression plants and six large oil refineries. The economy responds Following the capture of Maduro, the Caracas stock market benefitted from a 124% rise, accompanied by a fall in the black market exchange rate. This has been attributed to news that the first sale of Venezuelan oil through the US will generate USD 330 million. This will go to five private Venezuelan banks through the Central Bank of Venezuela. To facilitate this, Rodríguez has announced the creation of two sovereign funds. One will raise the salaries of public employees; the other will address Venezuela’s frequently deficient public services. The minimum wage in Venezuela is VES 130 (USD 0.38) per month. In May 2025, Maduro decreed a “minimum comprehensive indexed income” for public workers of USD 160 per month. This was to be issued through special bonds paid in Venezuelan bolívars at the official exchange rate. In the private sector, the average income was USD 237 per month at the beginning of 2025. The interim government has announced a host of other changes, including the modification of eight legal codes. For her part, the acting president has announced reforms to laws on electricity services and industrial intellectual property. She has also made reference to legislation on agreed prices and socio-economic rights, which aim to maintain a mixed economic model that combines openness with state involvement. Whether these reforms will bring the stability US oil companies need to safely (and profitably) operate remains to be seen. Logistics and corruption Venezuelan oil is plentiful, but it is also of poor quality. The estimated 300 billion barrels in the reserves of the Orinoco belt – the largest oil deposit in the world – consist of heavy and extra-heavy crude oil. These are the most difficult to extract, transport and refine. This has raised doubts among experts, who point to the need for maritime insurance, as well as the risks attached to the poor condition of the country’s pipelines and other facilities. Whether this oil will be refined in Venezuela or shipped to refineries in the United States is another uncertainty. As Patrick Galey, head of fossil fuel investigations for the climate justice campaign group Global Witness, wrote earlier this month: “You would have to be forced at gun point to try to make money from [Venezuelan oil].” Then there are security concerns. Despite Trump’s promise of protection for oil companies, his administration has advised its citizens to leave the country over Chavista militia kidnap fears. The administration is considering the use of private companies to secure oil facilities. It is still difficult to know whether a transition to democracy is possible and when elections can be held. As things stand, Venezuela continues to be run by the same government that has accumulated dozens of corruption cases. For example, a scandal implicating executives of PDVSA (Venezuela’s state oil company) in illegal activities related to cryptocurrencies led to USD 16 billion in losses. Meanwhile, a railway network funded using billions of dollars worth of Chinese investment has never been completed. The role of China Venezuela has played a key role in the story of Chinese investment in South America, becoming its biggest debtor. Following the actions of the US government, Venezuela finds itself once again split between superpowers. Venezuelan imports account for just 3% of China’s total crude oil purchases, according to an analysis published this month by the Center on Global Energy Policy – a think-tank based at Columbia University in the US. But the analysis also highlights the importance of these imports to China’s “teapot refineries”, which specialize in processing unconventional crude oil. Venezuela’s debt to China is estimated to be between $10 billion and $19 billion. This is being paid off slowly with crude oil shipments, prompting Chinese officials to approach their Venezuelan and US counterparts to try and obtain payment guarantees. Some analysts have suggested that a stabilizing of Venezuela’s economic situation and a lifting of US sanctions could actually increase the chances of Chinese development banks recouping their investments. The environmental issue, pending The full environmental impacts of a Venezuelan oil recovery are unclear. While it would not involve exploitation in new protected areas or Indigenous territories, significant concerns remain. These include the tens of millions of dollars’ worth of methane gas that leaks from damaged pipelines, as reported by Bloomberg Green. And more methane gas is lost through flaring, for which Venezuela ranks fifth worldwide. Some onlookers have suggested that greater transparency and better technology could improve this situation. This view is not shared by Juan Carlos Sánchez, co-winner of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his work as an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change author. Sánchez, who also worked at PDVSA for 21 years, told Dialogue Earth he does not foresee a positive environmental scenario: Trump promotes climate denialism, while the track records of oil companies operating in other Latin American countries are littered with environmental damage. “In my experience, when oil companies decide to cut costs to increase profits, the budgets that are most affected are environmental projects,” said Sánchez. Moreover, he adds, Venezuela lags considerably in terms of institutional frameworks regarding climate change. “Only a Venezuelan government that is genuinely interested in environmental issues and policies will be able to demand environmental safeguards in the future.” References Business Insider. (2026, January 22). Exxon CEO calls Venezuela ‘uninvestable’ during meeting with Trump. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com El País. (2026, January 22). Trump insta a las petroleras a invertir 100.000 millones de dólares en Venezuela para controlar la industria. El País. https://elpais.com Swissinfo.ch. (2026, January 22). EEUU asegura que Chevron, Shell y Repsol “elevarán de inmediato” su inversión en Venezuela. Swissinfo.ch. https://www.swissinfo.ch Yahoo Finanzas. (2026, January 22). Venezuela tendrá que pagar a Exxon menos de 1.000 mln dlrs por nacionalización de activos. Yahoo Finanzas. https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com PaisdePropietarios.org. (2026). ”Exprópiese”: la política expropiatoria del “Socialismo del Siglo XXI”. PaisdePropietarios.org. https://paisdepropietarios.org Repsol. (2026). Perla (Cardón IV) field details. Repsol. https://www.repsol.com Euronews. (2026, January 22). ¿Por qué Chevron sigue operando en Venezuela pese a las sanciones de Estados Unidos?. Euronews. https://es.euronews.com elDiario.es. (2026, January 22). Estados Unidos necesitará más de una década para resucitar El Dorado petrolero de Venezuela. ElDiario.es. https://www.eldiario.es El Colombiano. (2026, January 22). ”Recuperar la producción petrolera en Venezuela tomaría 15 años y hasta US$180.000 millones”, José Manuel Puente, economista venezolano. El Colombiano. https://www.elcolombiano.com Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela. (2026). Hydrocarbons Law draft. https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve Petroguía. (2026). Production sharing contracts overview. https://www.petroguia.com Reuters. (2026). Companies seek reduced tax burden, export access [Headline varies]. https://www.reuters.com Cedice. (2026). Venezuela oil and gas pipeline infrastructure details. https://cedice.org.ve Scribd. (2026). Map of Venezuelan oil refineries and facilities. https://es.scribd.com Bloomberg. (2026). Caracas stock market reaction and data. https://www.bloomberg.com Sumarium.info. (2026). First oil sale through U.S. channels data. https://sumarium.info Banca y Negocios. (2026). 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The United States has employed different geopolitical strategies to maintain its status as a dominant power vis-à-vis rival countries such as China and to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Since his return to the White House, President Donald Trump has announced tariff increases on 60 countries, issued ultimatums to Russia to end the War in Ukraine, and recently intervened in Venezuela by capturing Nicolás Maduro. In this way, a rise in the use of hard power by the United States can be observed, aimed at forcing other countries to behave in a particular manner in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. The foreign policy process of a state is the most important means through which it formulates and implements the policies that determine its interactions with other actors in the international system. Hans Morgenthau (1949) argued that self-preservation is the primary duty of a nation; in this regard, the choice of foreign policy objectives and means is predetermined in two ways: by the goals to be pursued and by the power available to achieve them. For his part, Joseph Nye (1999) argued that a state’s interests are not revealed solely through power or security considerations, since they also include economic concerns. Thus, countries also focus on economic relations, which may entail interdependence effects among states. Consequently, both national security and economic well-being are important to states’ interests. Within this framework, it is possible to discern the geopolitical landscape that the United States is developing through its foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that they would not allow the Western Hemisphere to become a base of operations for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States. “This is our hemisphere,” he affirmed, “and President Trump will not allow our security to be threatened” (The White House, 2026). This warning, together with the National Security Strategy and the recent intervention in Venezuela, represents a new form of the Monroe Doctrine. In his address to Congress in 1823, President James Monroe articulated the United States’ policy regarding the new political order that was developing in the Americas and Europe’s role in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe administration warned the European imperial powers not to interfere in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states. In this way, it sought to increase U.S. influence and trade throughout the southern region (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Likewise, the Trump administration’s geopolitical objective is to consolidate its hemisphere of influence in the face of rival powers, primarily China. Marco Rubio indicated that it is important to secure the national interest in the region and stated: “we have seen how our adversaries are exploiting and extracting resources from Africa. They are not going to do it in the Western Hemisphere” (The White House, 2026). In addition to Latin America, the United States has sought to increase its presence in Africa to counterbalance China. China’s main foreign policy strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the aim of strengthening global connectivity through infrastructure initiatives such as roads, ports, and railways. As a result, China’s economic and political influence expanded by linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. By early 2025, more than 150 countries had joined the BRI, representing approximately 75% of the world’s population and more than half of global GDP. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported that the cumulative value of BRI investments and construction contracts has exceeded one trillion dollars across all participating countries (Ulubel, 2025). In Africa, one example of Belt and Road infrastructure is the Mombasa–Nairobi railway in Kenya, which was financed by Chinese banks under the framework of the agreements. As a result, more than 2 million passengers and around 6 million tons of goods are transported annually, allowing transportation costs to be reduced by 40%. In addition, the expansion of the line toward Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan is planned, with the aim of integrating the economies of East Africa into a common railway system (Ulubel, 2025). Figure 1 illustrates the countries that have partnered with the Belt and Road Initiative, by year of accession. The geographic areas where China is consolidating its presence can be observed, especially on the African continent. Source: Lew et al., 2021, p. 14. The Belt and Road Initiative, with the support of state-owned banks and Chinese companies, is displacing U.S. exports and challenging American firms in BRI countries. Consequently, the United States has increasingly moved closer to African countries to counter China’s influence. Recently, the House of Representatives voted to continue trade programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which protect and strengthen U.S. strategic, economic, and national security interests, including access to critical minerals found outside the country. In this way, AGOA seeks to challenge the economic coercion and exploitation of African nations by China and Russia (Ways & Means, 2026). This approach has also been pursued during the foreign policy of former President Joe Biden. In 2022, the Secretary of State of the Biden administration, Antony Blinken, launched the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which reinforced the view that African countries are geostrategic actors and key partners on urgent issues, ranging from promoting an open and stable international system to shaping the technological and economic future (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In this context, Blinken stated: “Africa is a major geopolitical force. It has shaped our past, it is shaping our present, and it will shape our future” (US Africa Media Hub, 2022). In 2022, Blinken indicated that even as President Putin’s war continues, they remained focused on the most serious and long-term challenge to the international order: the People’s Republic of China. This is because it is the only country with both the intention to reshape the international order and has the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Consequently, Blinken stated: “China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition. It is the second-largest economy, with world-class cities and public transportation networks. It is home to some of the world’s largest technological companies and seeks to dominate the technologies and industries of the future. It has rapidly modernized its military and aims to become a top tier fighting force. And it has announced its ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power” (Blinken, 2022). Consequently, the United States has sought to consolidate its bilateral relations in regions where China has a greater presence. However, U.S. power in the international system relies on the strength of the dollar. The petrodollar system helps sustain the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. In 1974, Saudi Arabia and other regional oil suppliers agreed to accept only dollars for the sale of oil in exchange for military aid and equipment from the U.S. In addition, the Saudis invested the surpluses from that production in U.S. Treasury bonds, thereby financing U.S. spending (Wong, 2016). This process, commonly called “petrodollar recycling,” is beneficial for the parties involved: oil-producing countries have a reliable destination to invest the income from their exports, while the United States ensures a source of financing to cover its fiscal deficit. Consequently, countries seeking to purchase oil must do so using U.S. dollars, which drives demand for this currency in international markets (Grant, 2018). Since that time, the oil market has been trading in dollars, increasing demand for the currency. The predominance of the dollar as the world’s reference currency gives the United States enormous geopolitical influence, with the ability to impose sanctions on countries it considers adversaries, freeze dollar-denominated assets, or exclude a country from the international financial system, paralyzing its foreign trade or complicating the import of raw materials priced in that currency, such as oil. This mechanism represents one of the foundations of U.S. power and allows it to maintain its status as a hegemonic power. However, if oil trade were to begin taking place in another currency, it would affect the dominant position of the United States. Within this framework, the United States has prevented rival countries from attempting to displace the supremacy of the dollar, such as the members of BRICS. This bloc has sought to reduce dependence on the dollar by using local currencies for trade. One example is the BRICS Pay initiative, a cross-border digital payment system being developed by the BRICS countries. This means that trade among its members could be settled directly in reais, rubles, rupees, yuan, or rand, with the system managing conversion, clearing, and settlement without routing transactions through the U.S. dollar. The initiative is part of a broader strategic effort to reduce dollar dependence, strengthen financial sovereignty, and create alternative global payment infrastructures outside systems controlled by the West (BRICS, 2026). With the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank, there has been speculation that they could launch a common currency as a strategy for de-dollarization. Given this possibility, many market operators advocate for the currency to be digital, backed by gold or other resource assets. If the project materializes, the implications for the international monetary system and financial markets would be significant (Lissovolik, 2024). The United States was aware of this possibility. When the BRICS 2025 summit was held, Trump stated that the bloc is not a serious threat, but that they are attempting to destroy the dollar so that another country could take control. “If we lose the dollar as the global standard,” he declared, “it would be like losing a great world war; we would no longer be the same country. We will not allow that to happen” (Messerly et al., 2025). Later, on his Truth Social account, he wrote: “Any country that aligns with the BRICS’ anti-American policies will receive an additional 10% tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy” (Reuters, 2025). Although there is still no BRICS currency, the United States has anticipated its potential effects. Dollar supremacy also gives the U.S. the power to sanction or economically isolate certain countries, such as Russia in 2022. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom agreed to exclude several Russian banks from the international payment messaging system SWIFT. This decision was one of the most forceful sanctions within a set of measures aimed at economically isolating Russia and, consequently, weakening its financial system, with the goal of pressuring Vladimir Putin’s government to end its military operations in Ukraine (Pérez, 2022). Therefore, Russia has conducted its commercial transactions in another currency, such as the Chinese yuan. In this context, the growing weight of the Chinese currency in financial markets could erode the primacy of the dollar, a trend that began to concern Washington. In this scenario, Venezuela announced in 2017 that the country was prepared to sell oil to China and receive payments in yuan, thus making international agreements using a currency other than the dollar (Valladares & Medina, 2017). In 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (Pdvsa) announced that PetroChina International Corp purchased one million barrels of Venezuelan crude, a transaction carried out in digital yuan through the Shanghai International Energy Exchange. In this way, a trend is marked toward abandoning the dollar as the currency for transactions in the energy market (CIIP, 2023). When the United States intervened in Venezuela this year and captured Nicolás Maduro, it was not only seeking oil but also preventing the displacement of the petrodollar system. As a result, this operation directly affects China, since part of Venezuela’s oil exports to China is used to pay debts, estimated between 10 and 12 billion dollars. The U.S. intervention endangered the flow of discounted Venezuelan oil to China’s teapot refineries and will likely affect the role of Chinese oil companies in Venezuela’s upstream business. The Trump administration has declared that all Venezuelan oil will now flow through legitimate and authorized channels, in accordance with U.S. law and national security. This strategy seeks to prevent any influence over natural resources in the region. Consequently, the U.S. president’s approach of directing all oil flows from Venezuela will negatively impact China, Venezuela’s largest oil customer and a major creditor (Downs & Palacio, 2026). However, it is not only rival countries that have been affected by the U.S. attempt to maintain its hegemony; its allies and strategic partners have also been impacted. In January 2025, Trump posted an image of the map of Canada with the U.S. flag, hinting at a possible annexation. On other occasions, Trump referred to his neighbor as the 51st state. In February of that year, the White House announced an additional 25% tariff on Canadian imports and a 10% tariff on its energy resources (The White House, 2025). As a result, Prime Minister Mark Carney negotiated trade agreements with China, allowing for a mutual reduction of tariffs (Yousif, 2026). On the other hand, Trump generated tensions within NATO when he threatened to annex Greenland by force and warned those who did not support him of increased tariffs. He later declined both measures and assured that a framework agreement had been reached (Holland & Hunnicutt, 2026). Nevertheless, the political damage was already done. Trump’s plan for territorial expansion destroyed an important post-World War II norm: that borders cannot be redrawn by force of arms. Mark Carney stated at this year’s Davos Forum that “great powers have begun using economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, and financial infrastructure as coercion.” In this way, he indicated that the world order is “in the middle of a rupture, not a transition” (World Economic Forum, 2026). Consequently, the United States, as a hegemonic power, has acted unilaterally, disregarding the rule-based world order, and has even accelerated its breakdown. Therefore, from this background, it can be concluded that the United States has developed geopolitical strategies to remain a global power vis-à-vis rival countries, primarily China. Two strategies can be discerned. First, the U.S. emphasizes national security by securing the Western Hemisphere, reviving the Monroe Doctrine. Second, economic interdependence is intensified through the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, preventing financial alternatives. Moreover, the attention the United States has directed toward Africa responds to the intention to balance China’s growing influence in the region gained through the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, it can be observed that the Trump administration has set aside soft power (attraction and persuasion) and has relied on hard power mechanisms, such as military threats to annex Greenland, ultimatums to Russia, intervention in Venezuela, and economic sanctions and tariff increases on countries that do not comply with its directives. These measures demonstrate that the United States has lost its capacity for attraction and has had to resort to threats to influence the behavior of other states. In summary, the frequent use of hard power shows that the status of the United States as the leading power has begun to decline, and it is striving to maintain its global hegemony by force, regardless of the consequences for the international order. References Blinken, A. (2022). The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ BRICS. (2026). 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Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/davos/determined-seize-greenland-trump-faces-tough-reception-davos-2026-01-21/ Lew, J., Roughead, G., Hillman, J. y Sacks, D. (2021). Task Force Report N° 79: China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States. Council on Foreign Relations. Lissovolik, Y. (2024). Changing the Global Monetary and Financial Architecture: The Role of BRICS-Plus. BRICS Journal of Economics, 5(1). https://brics-econ.arphahub.com/issue/4634/ Messerly, M., Hawkins, A. and Bazail-Eimil, E. (2025). ‘The president is pissed’: Trump's Brazil tariff threat is part of a bigger geopolitical dispute. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/10/trumps-brics-fueled-anger-sparked-50-percent-tariff-threat-on-brazil-00447814 Morgenthau, H. (1949). The Primacy of the National Interest. The American Scholar, 18(2), 207–212. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41205156 Nye, J. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, 78(4), 22–35. https://doi.org/10.2307/20049361 Office of the Historian. (s. f.). Monroe Doctrine, 1823. Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe Pérez, C. (2022). What Does Russia’s Removal From SWIFT Mean For the Future of Global Commerce? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/swift-sanctions-ukraine-russia-nato-putin-war-global-finance/ Reuters. (2025). Trump says alignment with BRICS' 'anti-American policies' to invite additional 10% tariffs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-alignment-with-brics-anti-american-policies-invite-additional-10-2025-07-07/ The White House. (2025). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/ The White House. (2026). RUBIO: This Is Our Hemisphere — and President Trump Will Not Allow Our Security to be Threatened. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/rubio-this-is-our-hemisphere-and-president-trump-will-not-allow-our-security-to-be-threatened/ Ulubel, Y. (2025). 12 years, over 150 countries: Inside the Belt and Road Initiative's global legacy. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202509/17/WS68ca22caa3108622abca13d4.html US Africa Media Hub. (2022). [@USAfricaMediaHub]. X. https://x.com/AfricaMediaHub/status/1604782790029049858 U.S. Department of State. (2022). Travel to Cambodia, the Philippines, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, August 2-12, 2022. U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-travel/travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda-august-2-11-2022/ Valladares, D. y Medina, J. (2017). Venezuela venderá petróleo a China en yuanes. 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I. Introduction The European economy is in big trouble. Szu Ping Chan and Hans van Leeuwen, the economics editors of the Telegraph, a British daily newspaper, claim that the European Continent is stuck on a path of disastrous decline. [1] As Figure 1 shows, EU share of world GDP has continued to decline from 27% in 1990 to 17% in 2024.  Figure 1: EU share of World GDP (source: IMF) As a result, EU’s GDP in 2000 was six times larger than Chinese GDP, but EU’s GDP in 2025 is expected to reach the similar level of China’s GDP as Figure 2 shows. EU’s GDP in 2000 was $3 trillion smaller than US GDP, but EU’s GDP in 2025 is expected to be over $ 10 trillion smaller than US GDP.  Figure 2: EU, US, China, Japan GDP, 2000 & 2025 (source: Alcott Global) Moreover, the Ukraine war in 2022 brought more uncertainty to Europe by creating energy problems for the European economy. Europe’s reliance on external energy sources has been a long-standing issue. The energy crisis that began in 2021, fueled by the Ukraine war and climate change, has exposed how fragile the region’s energy infrastructure remains. Skyrocketing LNG prices, unreliable renewable energy production, and Russia’s strategic use of fossil fuels as leverage have left the European continent struggling with record-high energy costs. With this information in background, this paper explores why the European economy has under-performed and fallen behind. This paper first describes the current economic situation of Europe and explains why the European economy has failed. II. The Current Situation of European Economy Europe may be a great place to live with free health care, generous welfare, and great cities. However, when we compare the economy of three major economies, the US, Europe, and China, it is obvious that the European economy is in big trouble. Europe is being squeezed by the US and China. As Figure 3 shows, economic growth has been anemic across Europe. Germany has been its worst performer in recent years. The German economy is the same size today as it was in the fourth quarter of 2019. In other words, it has had five years of lost growth. But the rest of Europe has not fared much better. The French economy is only 4.1% larger than it was in the final quarter of 2019, while Italy’s economy is 5.6% bigger. (See Figure 3.) And while Spain’s GDP has increased by 6.6% since then, this has been helped greatly by an influx of immigration that meant that GDP per capita has increased by only 2.9% over the same period. By contrast, the US economy has grown by 11.4%.  Figure 3: Real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100) (Source: LSEG, Capital Economics) As Figure 4 shows, over the period 2020-2024, the EU’s total GDP growth was 12.2% compared to 23.4% for China, 15% for the US.  Figure 4: Growth, EU, US, China, and Japan, 2020-2024 As Figure 5 shows, the EU grew only 1.1% in 2024 compared to 2.8% for the US and 5.0% for China. Figure 5: GDP growth, EU, US, China, and Japan, 2024 Moreover, when we compare the economies of two Western rivals, the US and Europe, it is obvious that the EU has grown slower than the US, as Figure 6 shows.  Figure 6: US grow faster than EU countries, 2010-2024 (source: World Bank) As Figure 7 shows, Europe’s unemployment has been higher than the US.  Figure 7: EU unemployment is higher than US, 2000-2024 As Figure 8 shows, Europe’s LNG price has been higher than US price during the 2020-2024, and higher than Asian price immediately after Russia invaded Ukraine, thereby burdening the European economy.  Figure 8: LNG price, EU, US, Asia, January 2000-January 2024 Furthermore, when it comes to new engines of growth – big tech, AI, electric cars, Europe has slipped behind both the US and China. Europe is being squeezed by cheaper imports in China and better tech in America. III. Causes of the Failure of European Economy Why has the European economy failed? According to Neil Shearing, a chief economist of Capital Economics, Europe’s under-performance has been due in part to the effects of the energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as Figure 9 shows Europe’s skyrocketing gas prices. [2]  Figure 9: Natural gas prices, Europe, US, Japan, January 2021- end 2024 In addition, as Figure 10 shows, energy prices in the Euro area reached an all time high of 171.75 points in October of 2022 following the Ukraine war. It decreased to 145.49 points in November 2025, but it is still too high.  Figure 10: Energy price, Euro zone (source: Eurostat) As Table 1 shows, dependence on energy imports has shown divergent trends since 2000: The US has dramatically reduced its reliance on energy imports and become a net exporter, while the European Union has maintained a high level of energy dependence, and China’s dependence has generally increased along with its enormous economic growth. The US has undergone a remarkable transformation. Around 2005, US crude oil imports reached a peak at about 60% of their consumption. Thanks to the shale revolution and growing renewable energy use, US domestic production soared, and the US became a net energy exporter in 2019. By 2024, US energy imports made up only 17% of its energy demand. China’s rapid economic growth has driven a massive increase in energy demand. As a result, its dependence on energy imports has increased significantly since 2000. China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil. While China is also the leading investor in renewable energy, which meets a portion of its growing energy demand, the absolute need for fossil fuel imports to power its industrial sector remains high. In 2024, energy imports met around 25% of their total energy demand. Table 1: Dependence on Energy Imports, 2000–2025 As Figure 11 shows, the EU consistently shows high dependence on energy imports over the last three decades during the 1993-2024 period. The EU’s dependence on oil and gas imports have been much higher than the US and China. EU’s dependence on oil imports was over 90%, while EU’s gas import dependence reached over 90% in 2023 following the Ukraine war. While the EU has made progress in renewable energy, it remains heavily reliant on oil and gas imports, and has recently shifted its import sources from Russia to other partners such as the US and Norway. This high dependence on energy imports and energy crisis in Europe following the Ukraine war led to a deterioration in the region’s terms of trade that manifested itself in a large squeeze in real incomes and loss of competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, thereby lowering economic growth in Europe.  Figure 11: Dependence on energy imports, EU, US, and China, 1993-2024 In addition, European households have also become more reluctant to spend, thereby leading Europe to lower growth. The household saving rate in Europe is now three percentage points higher than it was before the Covid-19 pandemic in 2019, while the savings rate in the US is now lower than it was in 2019. (See Figure 12.) The tendency of Europeans to spend less leads to lower growth in Europe.  Figure 12: Euro-zone household savings rate (% of disposable income) However, the weakness of the European economy is fundamentally structural. There are several elements to this. The first key issue related to low growth in Europe is regulation in Europe that stifles competition and innovation. The EU has become increasingly protectionist, mainly through regulation. While convenient, this strategy proves counterproductive. It eliminates the incentives for creativity and efficiency. The Digital Services Act and increasingly narrow interpretations of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) were intended to rein in US tech giants, but have instead held Europe back in these same sectors. The AI Act and supply chain laws are similarly damaging. It is perhaps no surprise that the major disruptive and innovative firms of the past two decades have come from the US and China rather than from the Euro-zone countries. Robot taxis are a good example. One in three taxi rides in California is already in a robot taxi. The growth has been exponential and they are set to overtake ordinary taxis. The market opportunity is huge; they will be cheaper than paying a driver. In Texas, Tesla charges just a dollar a mile. They are safer too – 90% fewer accidents. And that means cheaper car insurance. They will save income, decrease emissions and reduce the need to buy an expensive car. It’s not just America; 2,000 self-driving cars have already been transporting millions across the big cities in China. But, for Europeans, the idea of a self-driving car, is still the stuff of science fiction. Or more accurately, something blocked by the European love of regulation, risk-aversion, and a powerful car lobby still stuck in the combustion engine era. [3] Another example is the tech industry. Europe is hampered by fragmented and excessive regulation. A US start-up can launch a product under a single regulatory framework and immediately access a market of more than 330 million consumers. The EU has a population of about 450 million but remains divided among 27 national regulatory regimes. An IMF analysis shows that internal market barriers in the EU act like a tariff of around 44% for goods and 110% for services – far higher than the tariff levels that the US imposes on most imports. [4] True, Europe has some successes such as Revolut, Klarna and Spotify, but these are dwarfed by the US giants of Meta, Google, Microsoft and Apple. Today, approximately half of the world’s 50 largest technology firms are American, while only four are European companies. [5] Over the past five decades, 241 US firms have grown from start-ups into massive unicorn companies. The EU’s response has been to seek to regulate the murky world of big tech surveillance, but in a way, the sledgehammer of GDPR regulation has done more to increase costs for local European business and tech startups as Figure 13 shows. While California alone has produced a quarter of the world’s tech unicorns, Germany-a similarly sized economy-has produced just 2% of high-value start-ups. Without urgent reform, Europe risks being sidelined in the global technological race.  Figure 13: GDPR regulation and EU & US Venture capital There is an old saying: the US invents, China imitates, and Europe regulates. Harsh, but an element of truth. Though the big change is that China no longer imitates, but produces goods much cheaper than in Europe. But Europe is still stuck in a regulatory mind-set. The result is that productivity growth in Europe - which is the key determinant of economic growth over the long run - is substantially lower, averaging 0.3% a year over the past decade compared to 1.6% a year in the US. The second issue is Europe’s insufficient investment in new technologies (computers, artificial intelligence (AI), software, etc.) and the low level of spending on research and development (R&D). When we compare OECD countries, we see that these two components have a strong influence on productivity differences between countries. The econometric estimate leads to the following effects: a 1- point increase in the rate of investment in new technologies leads to a 0.8 point increase per year in productivity gains. In a similar way, a 1-point increase in GDP for research and development (R&D) expenditure leads to a 0.9 point increase per year in productivity gains. [6] The fear is that Europe will be drawn into a vicious circle By 2022, investment in new technologies represented 5% of GDP in the US and 2.8% of GDP in the Euro zone. The EU’s efforts in advanced technologies, such as AI and cloud computing, far from match those of the US. The main instrument available to the EU, the European Innovation Council, had a budget of 256 million euros in 2024, while the US allocated more than 6 billion dollars for this purpose. The situation is repeated when looking at venture capital investment. In 2023, they invested about $8 billion in venture capital in AI in the EU, compared to $68 billion in the US and $15 billion in China. The few companies that create generative AI models in Europe, such as Aleph Alpha and Mistral, need large investments to avoid losing the race to US firms. However, European markets do not meet this need, pushing European firms to look outside for funding. [7] As a result, for example, the EU has been losing the open model contest as Figure 14 shows.  Figure 14: Cumulative downloads, 2023-25 (source: ATOM project, Hugging Face) Moreover, the EU falls behind the US and China in terms of R&D spending. R&D spending in 2022 amounted to 3.5% of GDP in the US and 2.3% of GDP in the Euro zone. What’s more, from 2007 on, as Figure 15 shows, R&D spending in the US and China increased significantly compared to that of the Euro zone. The lag in technological investment and R&D explains a large part of Europe’s lag behind the US in terms of labor productivity and GDP. [8]  Figure 15: Gross domestic spending on R&D, 2007-2023 The third issue related to lower growth in Europe is the size of welfare states in Europe. The size of welfare states differs markedly across OECD countries. European countries have the largest welfare states in the OECD and among the highest in the World. As Figure 16 shows, European welfare states are significantly larger than in the US, with EU countries allocating approximately 27% of GDP to social benefits in 2024, compared to roughly 19.8% in the US. Some European countries like Austria, Finland, and France spend over 30% of GDP on social benefits in 2024. While the US spends 7% of GDP on public provision of pensions, it is 16% in Italy and it is 13% in France.  Figure 16: Public social spending as a % of GDP in 2024, EU countries & US Big welfare states have a complex, debated impact on economic growth, with evidence showing they can both impede growth through higher taxes and reduced work incentives, or foster it by boosting education, stability, and innovation. However, there has recently been a groundswell of opinion among economists that the scale of the welfare state is one of the elements responsible for slower economic growth and that a retrenchment in the welfare state is necessary if growth will be revived in Europe. The welfare state is indicted with the charge of becoming a barrier to economic growth in Europe through higher taxes and reduced work incentives. As Figure 17 shows, the tax burden is higher in the EU than in the US for most taxpayers. The overall tax-to-GDP ratio for the EU averages approximately 44%. By contrast, the US ranks as one of the lowest among developed countries, with a tax-to-GDP ratio 35% in 2022 approximately 9% lower than the EU average.  Figure 17: Tax burden, EU and US, 2022 (source: OECD Government at a glance, 2023) Figure 18 shows the total tax wedge for average single workers in each member country of EU. Belgium, Germany, Austria, and France confiscate more than half of their workers’ pre-tax compensation. Compared to the EU member countries, workers in the US face the lowest average tax wedge. This distorts work incentives for Europeans and renders everyone in Europe poorer. [9] High taxes and less work incentives make EU citizens spend less than US citizens, thereby lowering economic growth in Europe as Figure 19 shows.  Figure 18: EU workers pay more taxes than US workers, 2022 (source: OECD Government at a glance, 2023)  Figure 19: Americans spend 70% more on EU citizens (Average individual consumption per capita, 2020; United States indexed to 100). (source: National Accounts of OECD countries) In fact, Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (1998) showed empirically that as the size of general government spending has almost doubled on average in OECD countries from 1960 to 1996, their real GDP growth rates have dropped by almost two thirds on average (see Figure 20). According to them, the worst economic performers were some Southern European countries that increased the size of the government the most.  Figure 20: Big government spending reduces growth. At the height of the Euro-zone crisis in 2012, German Chancellor Angela Merkel tried to make the case that Europe’s welfare states were too large, as Europe accounted for 7% of the global population, for a quarter of global GDP and for 50% of global social spending. The situation has not improved since then. On September 9, 2024, Draghi presented his report “The Future of European Competitiveness,” a 400-page document, to deal with Europe’s sluggish economy, but he kept untouched Europe’s over-sized welfare state, while he strongly called for reforms and investments to reinforce productivity growth. [10] The fourth issue is the Euro. The Euro has been a mixed blessing for Europe. It lowers transaction costs but highlights an unbalanced EU economy. Germany runs a large current account surplus, fringe economies like Portugal and Greece running deficits. But there is no scope for Germany to appreciate, weaker countries to devalue. One size fits all. But, this can have disastrous effects. The Euro Debt Crisis of 2012, led to high bond yields and a response of austerity, which contributed to weak growth in the last decade. Mario Draghi’s intervention reduced bond yields, but the European Central Bank has been criticized for a deflationary bias, and it has certainly struggled since the Covid-19 era, with growth in Europe much less. IV. Conclusion This paper showed that the European economy is in big trouble with lower growth. This paper explained that Europe’s economic under-performance & sluggish economy can be attributed to energy crisis and high saving, as well as over-regulation, large size of welfare state & high taxation, and lack of innovation & low investment in new technology and R&D. Referencias [1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/12/14/rising-fear–europe-really-is-doomed-and -taking-britain-down/ [2] https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/its-not-just-france-europe–faces-ongoing-decline- without-fundamental-reform-its-core [3] https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/its-not-just-france-europe–faces-ongoing-decline- without-fundamental-reform-its-core [4] https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-most-serious-problem-not-immigra tion-but-technological-backwardness-by-nouriel-roubini-2025-12 [5] https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-most-serious-problem-not-immigra tion-but-technological-backwardness-by-nouriel-roubini-2025-12 [6] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-falllling-behind-the-usa/ [7] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-fall ing-behind-the-usa/ [8] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-fall ing-behind-the-usa/ [9] https://mises.org/mises-wire/europes-economy-slows-its-welfare-state-grows [10] https://www.csis.org/analysis/draghi-report-strategy-reform-european-economic-model

In August 2024, Bangladesh witnessed a seismic political upheaval when mass student-led protests forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country after 15 years in power. What began as demonstrations against a controversial government job quota system quickly evolved into a movement against authoritarianism, corruption and human rights abuses. As protests intensified and security forces responded with deadly force, killing hundreds of demonstrators, Hasina’s grip on power collapsed. Sheikh Hasina fled to India in August 2024 after mass protests toppled her government. While thousands of families in Bangladesh were still searching for their disappeared loved ones. The interim government, led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, has since established the International Crimes Tribunal to investigate crimes committed during Hasina’s Tenure. In a landmark decision, the tribunal sentenced her to death in absentia for crimes against humanity. Bangladesh has formally requested her extradition from India, setting the stage for a diplomatic standoff. The case has become a test of whether regional powers prioritize justice for victims or political convenience. India’s decision on Hasina’s extradition will determine whether the South Asia region moves towards accountability for state crimes or continues protecting fallen autocrats, and New Delhi must recognize that genuine regional stability comes not from shielding allies who have committed atrocities, but from supporting the democratic transitions their own people have fought for. South Asia has a long history of leaders escaping accountability by fleeing across borders, creating a culture of immunity and reinforcing a free pass to everyone. Whether it be Gotabaya Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, who fled during the economic crisis in 2022 or Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, who left in 2021 as the Taliban took control of Kabul. The pattern is recurrent, destabilizing regional stability of South Asian countries. Nonetheless, the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh has issued death sentences based on documented evidence against Sheikh Hasina. India could break this cycle without simply handing Hasina over. A conditional extradition can be sought out, one that ensures fair trial standards, and would address both countries’ concerns. India could request the assistance of international observers from the UN or the Commonwealth monitoring the proceedings, ensuring the trial meets global standards. New Delhi could also negotiate for the death penalty to be commuted to life imprisonment, a condition many European countries insist on before extradition. Political scientist Ali Riaz, who has extensively studied Bangladesh’s democratic transitions, argues that “accountability isn’t about revenge, it’s about building institutions strong enough to prevent future abuses.” His research on transitional justice shows that countries which address past crimes, even imperfectly, create more stable democracies than those that sweep them under the rug. Another point to note is that India positions itself as the world’s largest democracy and a champion of human rights, yet protecting Hasina undermines these claims. India has been vocal about human rights abuses in Pakistan and Myanmar. Yet when its ally commits similar crimes, India provides sanctuary. Many predict that India would not extradite Sheikh Hasina due to vested interests. Many Bangladeshis have gone on to adopt anti-India sentiments, creating resentment in many people's hearts. India could address this issue by allowing an independent judicial review of the extradition request rather than making it purely political. Currently, extradition cases in India go through the courts. However, the final decision rests with the executive, it could mean that the government blocks extradition for political reasons. In Hasina’s case, India could publicly commit to letting its own judiciary evaluate the evidence without political interference, then abide by whatever the courts decide. This approach has been seen recently. In January of 2025, the UK Supreme Court ruled on an extradition request involving former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s associates, allowing the judicial process to run its course rather than the government making a unilateral decision. Late Legal Counsel to the World Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, stated famously that this “Depoliticized what could have been a diplomatic crisis” between Britain and Pakistan. India could follow a similar path. Furthermore, another point of view is that refusing extradition undermines Bangladesh’s fragile democratic transition and could push the country toward instability. The new government needs to deliver justice to maintain legitimacy. If India protects Hasina, it could further fuel conspiracy theories about Indian interference. Creating an anti-India sentiment, potentially pushing Bangladesh towards China or Pakistan for a new regional alliance. Historically, when people feel that justice is denied, they lose faith in democratic institutions. Political Scientist Ali Riaz’s research shows that countries that failed to address past crimes, for instance, Pakistan after military rule or Sri Lanka post-civil war, continue to face cycles of authoritarianism within the nation. If extradition proves too complicated diplomatically, India could support an alternative that still delivers justice. It could push for a truth and accountability commission. This model has worked in countries emerging from authoritarian rule, such as South Africa used it after apartheid, and Peru established one after Alberto Fujimori’s dictatorship. The focus shifts from punishment to documentation, as well as acknowledgement and institutional reform. Under this arrangement, Hasina would provide testimony, either in person or through live transmission from India to Bangladesh’s commission. She would have to answer questions about disappearances, extrajudicial killings and other alleged abuses. Victims' families would finally get acknowledgement and answers to their losses. Priscilla Hayner, a Human rights activist, in her research shows that truth commissions can help societies move forward when criminal trials become politically impossible. It is a way for the Victims’ families to finally be heard and acknowledged. India’s strategic interests in Bangladesh, trade routes, security cooperation and connectivity projects depend on maintaining trust with whoever governs in Dhaka. The interim government under Muhammad Yunus has recently gained popular legitimacy and international credibility. Starting this relationship but dismissing their primary demand for accountability will have consequences that outlast any short-term benefit of sheltering Hasina. Real regional stability does not come from protecting fallen leaders; it comes from supporting the democratic processes that brought new governments to power and from promoting solidarity. India understood this principle when it brought new governments to power. India understood this principle when it supported democratic movements elsewhere. Bangladesh deserves the same consideration. The extradition question is ultimately about India's foreign policy and whether it's guided by consistent principles or convenient exceptions.

Western countries are facing a critical inflection point in immigration governance, where outdated policy frameworks have struggled to balance humanitarian obligations, labor market needs, and social cohesion. Rising irregular migration, overstretched asylum systems, political polarization, and fragmented border management have collectively contributed to a perception of disorder rather than opportunity. Yet immigration, when governed strategically, remains a powerful driver of economic growth, demographic renewal, and innovation. A new immigration policy for the West must therefore move beyond reactive control and crisis management toward a coherent, development-oriented framework that is predictable, fair, and enforceable. By aligning migration pathways with labor demand, strengthening legal entry channels, restoring credibility to asylum systems, and embedding integration as a core policy objective, Western states can transform immigration from a source of chaos into a catalyst for sustainable development and social stability. Below, we will discuss different aspects of this New Immigration Policy. Policy of Each Western Country to do a complete Evaluation of its Economy A key aspect of the new immigration policy requires Western countries to conduct thorough, evidence-based evaluations of their economies, analyzing beyond fundamental indicators like GDP and unemployment. This includes examining sector-specific dynamics, productivity gaps, and labor needs in industries that rely heavily on labor mobility, such as healthcare and agriculture. The goal is to establish data-driven workforce strategies that fulfill actual economic demands, enhancing domestic labor utilization through education and training. Immigration is to complement, not replace, local workforce development. Only after optimizing domestic labor should countries assess immigrant labor needs, creating targeted and regulated immigration pathways to address specific labor shortages. This method links immigration to economic necessity, promoting business growth and public service sustainability while fostering long-term financial stability. Most Western immigration systems employ pre-entry screening mechanisms to manage security risks and improve labor market matching, though their scope and rigor vary significantly. Points-based systems in countries such as Australia and Canada illustrate how education, language proficiency, and occupational demand can be systematically incorporated into selection decisions. At the same time, overly rigid credential recognition frameworks have been shown to underutilize the skills of migrants, particularly in regulated professions. Security screening and health assessments similarly reflect a balance between risk prevention and administrative proportionality. Analytical evidence suggests that pre-entry screening is most effective in contributing to integration outcomes when it is transparent, interoperable across agencies, and complemented by post-arrival credential bridging and skills recognition. Screening, therefore, functions less as a gatekeeping tool than as an anticipatory governance mechanism that shapes downstream integration trajectories. Policy of doing complete thorough checks on Immigrants before coming Another core element of the new immigration policy is the implementation of a standardized pre-entry screening framework across Western countries. This framework includes comprehensive background checks, such as international criminal record verification, biometric identity authentication, and strict validation of educational and professional credentials to prevent fraud. Degree verification should occur directly with accredited institutions, while professional licenses need recognition by certified regulatory bodies. These measures aim to enhance national security, protect labor markets, and maintain the integrity of skilled migration systems. The policy also sets clear entry readiness standards centered on integration capacity and public welfare. This encompasses mandatory language proficiency benchmarks relevant to workplace and civic participation, comprehensive health screenings to safeguard public health, and assessments of employability and sectoral fit. Health evaluations focus on prevention and readiness, ensuring transparency regarding healthcare access upon arrival. Additional factors, such as verification of financial self-sufficiency and orientation training on laws and social norms, are suggested to minimize integration risks. By adopting thorough, fair, and transparent pre-arrival checks, Western nations can transition their immigration governance from a reactive stance to proactive planning, ensuring newcomers are equipped to contribute to economic growth and social stability from the outset. Comparative experience suggests that policy effectiveness depends less on the severity of stated rules than on the consistency and credibility of their implementation. For example, Australia’s offshore processing and maritime interception policies significantly reduced unauthorized arrivals, but also generated sustained legal and ethical debate regarding human rights compliance. In contrast, several European Union states have combined stricter border controls with expanded legal entry pathways, producing mixed outcomes where enforcement gaps continue to incentivize irregular entry. These cases indicate that the deterrence of irregular migration is most effective when enforcement is predictable, legally bounded, and accompanied by accessible lawful alternatives. From an analytical perspective, the key policy trade-off lies between institutional legitimacy and deterrence: overly permissive systems risk erosion of rule compliance. At the same time, excessively rigid approaches may provoke legal contestation and humanitarian backlash. Effective governance, therefore, requires calibrated enforcement embedded within a coherent legal framework for migration, rather than categorical prohibition alone. Policy of doing complete, thorough checks on Immigrants before coming A new immigration framework introduces a structured rotation-based labor migration system, allowing immigrants to be admitted on defined, time-bound contracts of typically one to two years based on prior economic assessments linked to specific sectors and employers. At the end of these contracts, migrants are expected to return to their countries, ensuring a controlled flow of labor that mitigates long-term settlement pressures and public service burdens. This system promotes fairness by broadening access to work opportunities, enabling more individuals to participate in legal labor migration, provided they meet eligibility criteria. To incentivize productivity and integration, the policy includes a performance-based extension mechanism, allowing immigrants with exceptional work performance, language acquisition, and favorable evaluations to qualify for contract renewals or longer-term status. This balanced approach reinforces immigration as a regulated, development-oriented partnership, offering opportunities without defaulting to permanence, thus alleviating concerns about demographic shifts in host societies. Temporary and rotational labor migration schemes have been widely adopted to address sector-specific labor shortages while limiting permanent settlement pressures. Programs such as Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s contract-based labor systems illustrate both the advantages and risks of rotation models. On one hand, time-bound contracts offer employers flexibility and allow governments to regulate inflow volumes with greater precision. On the other hand, weak labor protections and limited mobility rights have, in some cases, produced worker exploitation and reduced productivity. Comparative evidence suggests that rotation systems are most effective when combined with enforceable labor standards, transparent renewal criteria, and return incentives linked to skills transfer or development benefits in the countries of origin. Thus, rotational migration should be understood not as a control mechanism alone, but as a policy instrument whose outcomes depend on regulatory design and bilateral cooperation. Policy of No Free Welfare or No Free Money for Immigrants, Refugees, or Asylum seekers Another key aspect of the proposed immigration framework is the separation between labor migration and welfare entitlement. This policy enforces a “no free welfare, no free money” principle for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers during their initial stay, aiming to prevent welfare dependency and protect public systems. Welfare systems are intended as safety nets for citizens and long-term contributors; giving unrestricted access to newcomers could jeopardize their sustainability. The focus is on self-reliance through work, with immigrants admitted based on their employability and the labor market's demands. Limited conditional support may be provided to avert humanitarian crises, but not as a substitute for employment. For refugees and asylum seekers, prompt access to work is prioritized to reduce long-term dependence and restore dignity. Eligibility for broader social benefits may eventually be linked to stable employment and tax contributions. This approach aims to reframe immigration as a system based on effort and contribution, thereby enhancing social cohesion while safeguarding public resources. Access to welfare benefits for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers remains one of the most politically sensitive dimensions of immigration governance. Empirical evidence from countries such as Germany and Sweden suggests that early access to social assistance can help stabilize newcomers during their initial settlement. Still, it may also delay labor market integration if not accompanied by strong activation policies. Conversely, systems in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom are increasingly conditioning access to benefits on factors like employment participation, language acquisition, or residency duration. These models suggest that welfare design functions as a policy signal, shaping incentives for self-reliance and integration. Rather than adopting unconditional inclusion or total exclusion, comparative analysis indicates that welfare regimes should be conditional, striking a balance between humanitarian protection and fiscal responsibility. The analytical challenge lies in designing thresholds that prevent long-term dependency without undermining social cohesion or violating international protection norms. Policy of a Complete ban on illegal migration A strict commitment to the rule of law characterizes the proposed immigration framework, which enforces a ban on illegal entry and unlawful presence. Western countries would reject immigration and asylum claims resulting from immigration law violations, such as unauthorized border crossings and document fraud. This policy aims to uphold institutional credibility, as tolerance of illegality at entry undermines compliance and public trust. Furthermore, unchecked illegal migration is linked to transnational crime, with organized networks exploiting irregular routes for human trafficking, drug smuggling, forced labor, and more. A zero-tolerance approach towards illegal entry, coupled with robust enforcement and deportation, seeks to disrupt these criminal activities and prevent the exploitation of vulnerable populations. The policy requires swift removal procedures for individuals entering or remaining in the country illegally, ensuring that deportations observe due process and human rights standards while preventing procedural loopholes. Legal migration and asylum pathways are maintained and must be accessed lawfully, thereby reinforcing that opportunities are tied to compliance with the law. This ensures that order is restored, security is enhanced, and humanitarian provisions are protected for law-abiding individuals. Policy of a Complete ban on Ads or the use of Western women to entice people for Immigration The new immigration framework incorporates a complete ban on misleading advertising practices that exploit the objectification of Western women to attract migrants from developing nations. Such advertisements, often propagated via social media and unregulated agencies, misrepresent realities and take advantage of gender stereotypes, promoting social or romantic opportunities as migration pathways. These practices distort the fundamental purpose of immigration, which should be focused on lawful work, skills, or protection, while undermining women's dignity by treating them as marketing tools. The policy addresses the disproportionate targeting of uneducated, unemployed, and economically vulnerable populations, leading to false expectations and irregular migration attempts. Furthermore, these deceptive campaigns often involve fraudulent intermediaries, resulting in financial losses, legal risks for migrants, and inflows that do not align with labor market needs. To combat this issue, Western countries should establish specialized cyber-monitoring units to dismantle and prosecute deceptive practices, collaborating with digital platforms and regulators to eliminate illicit content and enforce penalties. Legal prohibitions against gender manipulation in migration advertising must be implemented to ensure that migration decisions are made in a manner that is legal, informed, and respectful of women’s dignity. Additionally, while Western nations often depend on migration to address declining fertility rates, studies suggest it is not a long-term solution for stabilizing dependency ratios. Countries like France and Hungary demonstrate that demographic sustainability is closely tied to labor market conditions, gender equality, and family policies, rather than relying solely on financial incentives. Immigration and demographic policies should be viewed as complementary, with a focus on balanced investments in family policy to mitigate migration pressures and foster social cohesion. Policy of exceptional facilities and rewards for Western women who become new mothers A new demographic and development strategy aims to incentivize Western women to have children in response to declining birth rates, aging populations, and shrinking workforces. Instead of relying solely on immigration, which has been the common compensatory mechanism, this policy reframes motherhood as a public good and essential for national sustainability. Women who give birth would benefit from a range of financial incentives, including income tax reductions, property tax waivers, preferential mortgage rates, and enhanced childcare and healthcare support. These measures aim to alleviate financial pressures that discourage childbearing. The policy emphasizes a cumulative support system were increased family size leads to greater long-term assistance, creating transparent incentives for family formation without pressure. This shift aims to reduce economic penalties associated with pregnancy and child-rearing, thus empowering women in their family decisions. Unlike short-term monetary bonuses, the sustained fiscal relief reflects a long-term commitment from the state, providing stability during challenging years of child-rearing. By focusing on boosting native birth rates, the policy also challenges the justification for mass immigration, advocating for a sustainable demographic policy that lessens dependency on foreign labor. Ultimately, this approach aims to harmonize labor supply with cultural continuity and fiscal sustainability, positioning immigration as a selective tool rather than a primary solution to demographic challenges. Several Western countries implicitly rely on immigration to offset declining fertility and population aging, yet comparative demographic research suggests that migration alone cannot fully stabilize dependency ratios in the long term. Countries such as France and Hungary have experimented with pro-natalist policies, offering fiscal incentives and childcare support to encourage family formation, with uneven but instructive results. Hungary represents a more explicitly pro-natalist budgetary model. The government has introduced lifetime income tax exemptions for women who have four or more children, subsidized housing loans for families, and preferential mortgage schemes for new parents. These cases demonstrate that demographic sustainability is influenced by labor market conditions, gender equality, housing affordability, and work–life balance, rather than financial incentives alone. From a policy framework perspective, immigration and demographic policy should be treated as complementary instruments rather than substitutes. Overreliance on continuous labor inflows may defer structural reforms, while balanced investment in family policy can moderate long-term migration pressures and enhance social cohesion. Policy of Citizenship Restriction and Long-Term Residency without Naturalization Some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, have adopted an immigration governance model that clearly differentiates between long-term residency and citizenship. This model grants renewable residence visas to foreign nationals while hindering access to birthright citizenship or naturalization, treating citizenship as a privilege linked to lineage and national identity. By doing so, these nations manage demographic control, depend on foreign labor for economic growth, and strengthen state authority over demographics and welfare, while lessening long-term fiscal obligations associated with pensions and social security. Thus, migration remains temporary, creating a significant divide between citizens and non-citizens. Although the model offers administrative clarity, it faces challenges such as limited rights for residents, restricted social integration, and reliance on employer-sponsored visas. GCC countries impose strict immigration regulations, contrasting with Western democracies that prioritize equality and human rights. In these Western contexts, conversations around birthright citizenship and naturalization are evolving, with some nations opting for conditional citizenship that requires stricter residency criteria while still permitting a naturalization process. This analysis highlights the diversity in policy approaches, ranging from permanent residency without automatic citizenship to merit-based naturalization. While the GCC's system focuses on demographic control rather than political inclusion, it serves as a valuable case study for Western nations examining migration management and its implications for nation-building. Recognizing the complex interactions between citizenship and residency is essential, as it transforms these concepts from automatic rights to strategically managed political assets. Policy of Privatizing Religion and Restricting Public Religious Expression Policies aimed at privatizing religion attempt to limit religious belief and practice to private settings while prohibiting public expressions such as symbols, prayers, or proselytization. Advocates argue this fosters civic neutrality and diminishes religious conflict in diverse societies. However, it raises significant legal and normative issues, particularly concerning international human rights, with Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights underlining the necessity of allowing public religious manifestations. Evidence suggests that broad prohibitions on religious expression may be counterproductive, as seen in judicial cases like S.A.S. v. France, emphasizing proportionality in legal restrictions. Experiences from France and Quebec show that secular governance can respect visible religious expressions without harming societal unity. Research indicates that strict state-imposed religious limitations may lead to social tensions instead of harmony. While proponents highlight the benefits of administrative simplicity and equality, excessive restrictions risk undermining individual freedoms and alienating minority religions, pushing expressions underground and possibly increasing conflict. Policies that anonymize religious identity to prevent political exploitation may also infringe on freedom of expression and personal identity. As such, privatization strategies must navigate a careful balance of equality, liberty, and social cohesion to avoid undermining the very stability and inclusiveness they aim to promote. Strategic Risks with Final Remarks Strategic immigration frameworks offer potential economic and social benefits but also pose significant risks that require proactive management. Key risks include institutional overreach due to inadequate administrative capacity, which may be mitigated through phased implementation and investment in digital infrastructure. Labor market distortions can arise from dependency on migrant labor, necessitating integration with broader labor reforms. Social polarization and political backlash may emerge from perceived exclusionary policies, which can be addressed via transparent communication and participatory design. Human rights concerns related to stricter enforcement require adherence to legal safeguards in policy development. Lastly, external spillovers affecting countries of origin highlight the need for equitable development-linked migration agreements. Overall, careful consideration of these risks and corresponding mitigation strategies is essential for effective immigration policy reform. In summary, the proposed new immigration policy for Western countries reframes migration as a disciplined, development-oriented system grounded in legality, economic realism, and social sustainability. By aligning immigration with verified labor needs, enforcing strict entry and conduct standards, eliminating welfare dependency, rejecting illegality and exploitation, and simultaneously investing in domestic demographic renewal, governments can restore public trust and policy coherence. Immigration is neither dismissed nor romanticized; it is regulated as a strategic instrument rather than a substitute for weak governance or demographic inaction. Implemented cohesively, this framework offers a credible pathway to end systemic chaos, strengthen national resilience, and ensure that both development and social stability are achieved on lawful and ethical foundations.

In the chilling expanse of the Arctic, where ice and ocean frame the edges of the known world, a geopolitical drama has quietly gathered momentum. The world’s strategic gaze is no longer fixed solely on the traditional theatres of diplomacy in Europe, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the High North — and particularly Greenland, the vast Arctic territory within the Kingdom of Denmark — has emerged as a critical arena where great-power competition, national security priorities, global trade dynamics, and climate change converge. This transformation did not occur overnight. For decades, military planners, geographers, and strategic thinkers recognized the Arctic’s latent importance. Yet only in recent years have those projections translated into urgent geopolitical reality. At the center of this shift stands the United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), unveiled in late 2025, which redefines American priorities in a world shaped by renewed great-power rivalry. While the strategy addresses multiple global theatres, its emphasis on territorial security, critical resources, strategic geography, and adversarial competition underscores why Greenland has moved from the periphery to the heart of international geopolitics. Greenland today sits at the intersection of U.S. homeland defense, NATO cohesion, Arctic militarization, global trade transformation, and the accelerating race for critical minerals. The tensions surrounding the island reveal not only disputes among allies but also deeper structural changes in the international system. This article argues that Greenland is no longer a remote outpost but a strategic fulcrum of the Arctic, whose future will shape the balance of power in the High North and beyond. America’s Strategic Recalibration in the 2025 National Security Strategy The NSS 2025 marks a clear departure from post-Cold War doctrines centered on expansive multilateralism and global institution-building. Instead, it reflects a return to strategic realism, prioritizing the protection of core national interests, territorial security, and the prevention of adversarial dominance in critical regions. The strategy defines the United States’ primary objective as “the continued survival and safety of the United States as an independent, sovereign republic,” coupled with maintaining decisive military, technological, and economic power. Although the Indo-Pacific remains central, the strategy elevates the Western Hemisphere and adjacent strategic regions, emphasizing the need to prevent hostile encroachment on areas vital to U.S. security and economic resilience. Supply chains, critical minerals, missile defense, and strategic geography feature prominently throughout the document. Within this framework, Greenland has transitioned from a peripheral Arctic territory to a linchpin of U.S. strategic defense and resource security. While the NSS does not outline a standalone Arctic doctrine, its underlying logic — securing access to essential materials, protecting strategic approaches to the homeland, and denying adversaries positional advantages — aligns directly with the intensifying focus on Greenland. Latest developments: US position over Greenland. As already mentioned, the release of the NSS 2025 made one thing clear: US foreign policy is now defined by an assertive approach towards the entire Western Hemisphere – where Greenland is part of –. Moreover, this implies that the US might claim the right to intervene in other countries’ domestic affairs in order to guarantee its strategic and corporate interests. Therefore, after Venezuela – in addition to its rhetoric towards Cuba and Mexico – Greenland has become a hot topic, due its geopolitical, economical and strategical position and of course as part of the US “national security” and interest. The interest from the US over Greenland is not new, during Trump’s first administration an attempt to buy Greenland occurred and even at the beginning of his second administration there were comments to obtain the island. Next are presented the developments that occurred until January 22nd: - The US-Greenland-NATO crisis escalated when Trump’s desire to have Greenland either “by hook or by crook” sparked the global debate, while Europeans, Greenlanders and Danish rejected his ideas and showed support for Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark itself. - A later diplomatic meeting between Danish, Greenlandic and US officials in Washington ended up in a “fundamental disagreement” over the sovereignty of the island on January 14th. - A joint statement of several European countries supporting the idea that “Greenland belongs to its people, and only Denmark and Greenland can decide on matters concerning their relations” was released on January 18th. - Launch of “Operation Arctic Endurance” and the initial deployment of a small number of troops from the European allies plus Danish soldiers. By January 18th there were over 100 troops in Nuuk and another 100 in Kangerlussuaq. (numbers could be increased in a short time). - Worries within Europe and the NATO allies. In addition, China urged the US to stop using the so-called “China threat” as a pretext for pursuing its own interest. - General concern for Greenlanders and several protest in Denmark, and Greenland against the US actions. - The imposition of 10% tariffs from the US over Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Finland, the UK and the Netherlands that would increase by 25% on June 1st if there is no deal reached. After Trump’s speech in the World Economic Forum, he confirmed that tariffs threats were off the table as there was a “framework of a future deal” for Greenland. In summary, in January 2026, Washington’s posture toward Greenland has sharpened into a high-profile mix of strategic urgency and political brinkmanship, framed publicly as an Arctic and homeland-security imperative. Recent reporting describes President Donald Trump repeatedly arguing the U.S. “needs” Greenland for security, while also signaling limits on how far he would go — saying at the World Economic Forum in Davos that he would not use military force to acquire it. At the same time, the episode has clearly strained allied politics: coverage indicates Denmark has insisted Greenland’s sovereignty is not negotiable even as the U.S. debate escalated, and Greenland’s own authorities have taken the moment seriously enough to urge practical preparedness at home. The most concrete “near-term” direction emerging in January 2026 is not annexation but a NATO – and alliance-linked security bargain. Multiple outlets report Trump backing away from threatened tariffs after announcing a “framework” tied to future Arctic security cooperation with NATO leadership — suggesting the administration is trying to convert its Greenland pressure campaign into expanded defense access, posture, or burden-sharing rather than an immediate territorial transfer. Even where details remain vague, the logic is consistent: Greenland’s geography — especially its role in Arctic air/sea lanes and missile-warning architecture — makes it a leverage point for U.S. deterrence and homeland defense planning, and U.S. officials appear to be testing what they can gain diplomatically inside the alliance system when outright sovereignty change is off the table. This posture also lines up with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which elevates the Western Hemisphere as the top priority region and argues the U.S. will “deny non-Hemispheric competitors” the ability to “own or control strategically vital assets” in the hemisphere, while calling for readjusting military presence and “establishing or expanding access in strategically important locations.” While the NSS text excerpt does not name Greenland in the lines above, its framework — reasserting hemispheric primacy, blocking external footholds, and expanding access — maps neatly onto a Greenland approach that treats the island as a critical node in Arctic security competition and infrastructure control. European Parliament analysis likewise characterizes the NSS as a “pivot” toward a Monroe Doctrine–style sphere-of-interest logic in the Western Hemisphere, reinforcing the idea that Greenland is being handled less as a narrow Denmark dispute and more as part of a broader hemispheric strategy. Greenland’s Geographic Centrality: The broader US security interest of the Island. Figure 1: Arctic states, counties and other administrative regions with capitals. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Credit for the border data: Runfola, D. et al. (2020) geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0231866. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231866e. Figure 2: Arctic Population Centers. Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. When viewed from a polar perspective, the Arctic is not a distant fringe but the shortest connective space between North America, Europe, and Eurasia. The Arctic as seen in Figure 1 is composed of several administrative areas, including Canada, Alaska (USA), Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Greenland (Denmark). The latter can be said to be located at the center between North America and Europe and Eurasia, underscoring its geopolitical importance. In other words, Greenland occupies the central Atlantic–Arctic axis, the shortest air and missile trajectories between Russia and North America and a pivotal position between the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Russian Arctic coast. This geography carries deep strategic implications. First, Greenland is part of the so-called GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a crucial corridor for monitoring naval and air activity in the North Atlantic. The GIUK Gap played an important role during the Second World War and the Cold War and nowadays it has become crucial in securing air and sea surveillance through radar stations, while securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) as well as supply lines making them uninterrupted between NATO’s European members and the USA. The GIUK Gap can assist in ensuring maritime visibility and assist anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in case of conflicts. The presence of Russian submarines in the Arctic is a central pillar of Russia’s military strategy and nuclear deterrence, making the region one of the most militarized maritime spaces in the world. Russia views the Arctic as both a strategic sanctuary and a launch platform. In consequence, its Northern Fleet – headquartered on the Kola Peninsula –, is the most powerful of Russia’s fleets and operates a large share of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as the Borei and Delta IV classes. These submarines carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and are designed to remain hidden under Arctic ice, ensuring a second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict. The ice cover, combined with Russia’s familiarity with Arctic waters, provides concealment and operational depth. In addition to SSBNs, Russia deploys nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the Arctic. These vessels conduct intelligence gathering, protect ballistic missile submarines, and pose threats to NATO naval forces and undersea infrastructure, including communication cables. Russian submarines regularly transit through key chokepoints such as the GIUK Gap, bringing them into strategic relevance for Greenland, Iceland, and NATO’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) posture. In addition, the Arctic also supports Russia’s broader bastion defense concept, which seeks to create heavily defended maritime zones where submarines can operate safely. Air defenses, surface ships, icebreakers, and coastal missile systems complement submarine operations. As climate change reduces sea ice and increases accessibility, Russian submarine activity in the Arctic is expected to remain intense, reinforcing the region’s importance for NATO surveillance, early warning systems, and transatlantic security — especially for locations like Greenland that sit astride critical Arctic–Atlantic routes. Second, Greenland’s high latitude makes it an ideal place for early detection of long-range missile launches. Russia has long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), if ever launched from Russia toward the United States, the total flight time would be roughly between 25 to 35 minutes – depending on the launch location and target. But because of the Earth’s curvature, the shortest path from Russia to the continental US goes over the Arctic which is why Greenland is so strategically important for early detection and missile defense. In practical terms, US decision-makers would have only minutes to assess the threat and respond after a launch is detected. Establishments such as the U.S. Pituffik Space Base underscore how Greenland functions as a first line of surveillance against possible ballistic missile threats from the Eurasian landmass. Therefore, Greenland is indispensable to early-warning and missile-defense systems. Sensors, radars, and space-tracking infrastructure based on the island form a crucial layer of “U.S. homeland defense”. Finally, Greenland is the only large Arctic landmass under Western democratic control outside Eurasia. Russia dominates the Eurasian Arctic coastline, while Alaska and Canada anchor North America. Greenland bridges these spaces, serving as a keystone for transatlantic Arctic security. Its isolation does not diminish its importance; rather, it magnifies it. – making Greenland a linchpin of US homeland defense and NATO’s northern security architecture. Greenland and NATO: The Fragile Architecture of Arctic Security Figure 3: NATO’s and Russia’s militarization in the Arctic. Figure 3 exposes a stark asymmetry in the Arctic militarization between NATO and Russian. The latter maintains a dense, continuous network of military bases stretching from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. These installations support air defense, naval operations, missile forces, and surveillance — forming an integrated arc of control along Russia’s northern frontier. On the other hand, NATO’s Arctic posture is fundamentally different. It relies on discrete strategic nodes rather than territorial saturation, interoperability over mass and coordination among multiple sovereign states. Within this fragmented architecture, Greenland is NATO’s most critical node. Nonetheless, the US has presence in Greenland, specifically with the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), which is located in northwest Greenland. This base – as mentioned before – is indispensable for early missile warning, space surveillance and tracking adversary launches across the polar region. While the UK has presence in Norway in the logistic Camp Viking site. Without Greenland, NATO’s Arctic posture would fracture into disconnected segments — North America on one side, Scandinavia on the other — with no central anchor. This reality explains the sharp European response in 2025–2026 to U.S. rhetoric suggesting unilateral action or coercive pressure regarding Greenland. The deployment of European troops under Operation Arctic Endurance was not merely symbolic; it was an assertion that Greenland is a collective NATO concern, not a bilateral bargaining chip. Greenland’s Resources: Strategic Minerals in a Fragmenting World Beyond military geography, Greenland’s subsoil wealth significantly enhances its geopolitical importance. The island holds substantial deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), lithium, graphite, niobium, titanium, uranium and zinc. As it is well known these strategic materials are indispensable and critical for renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, advanced electronics, missile guidance and radar technologies and space and defense infrastructure. Last but not least there is also oil and gas, but the conditions and viability to extract them make them an economic challenge. In the context of the control of natural resources, the NSS 2025 repeatedly stresses the need to reduce U.S. dependence on adversarial supply chains — an implicit reference to China’s dominance in rare-earth processing. Therefore, US eyes are on Greenland, as it represents one of the few politically aligned alternatives with large-scale potential reserves – ironically not under Chinese or Russian influence, but under US “allies” control. Yet resource abundance does not automatically translate into strategic advantage. Mining in Greenland faces severe challenges: extreme climate conditions, environmental risks, limited infrastructure, and strong local opposition to environmentally destructive projects. As a result, Greenland’s mineral wealth is strategically valuable but politically sensitive. Its development requires local consent and long-term cooperation, not coercion — a fact often overlooked in external strategic calculations. The Arctic Trade Revolution: Melting Ice, Shifting Routes Figure 4: Arctic Seaways (Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage and Transpolar Sea Route). Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Climate change is transforming the Arctic faster than any other region on Earth. As sea ice recedes, new maritime routes are becoming seasonally viable, with potentially transformative consequences for global trade. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Arctic coast already reduces transit times between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, even though some parts are free of ice for some months per year. On the other hand, a future transpolar route, cutting directly across the Arctic Ocean, could bypass traditional chokepoints such as: The Suez Canal, The Panama Canal or The Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Greenland importance relies on its geographic position that places it adjacent to these emerging corridors. Potential roles for the island include: the search-and-rescue hubs, refueling and logistics points, maritime surveillance and communications infrastructure. This elevates Greenland from a military asset to a potential gatekeeper of future Arctic trade, linking regional security directly to global economic flows. Icebreakers and Power Projection: Mobility as Sovereignty Figure 5: Major Icebreakers and Ice-Capable Patrol Ships highlight a decisive but underappreciated imbalance. Source: generated with Chat GPT using Routers Nov 2022 data. The transit in the Arctic can be defined by the possibility to move freely without any inconvenience due its extreme conditions – or at least with the least inconveniences. In consequence major ice breakers and ice-capable patrol ships became very important assets for the countries in the region. In a simple comparison, Russia possesses more icebreakers than NATO combined, as shown in Figure 5, including nuclear-powered vessels capable of year-round Arctic operations. These ships are instruments of sovereignty, enabling continuous military presence, escort of commercial shipping, enforcement of Arctic regulations and rapid crisis responses. By contrast, the United States has long underinvested in icebreaking capacity. NATO relies on a patchwork of national fleets, with Finland and Sweden contributing significantly but still lagging behind Russia’s scale. The strategic implication is clear: Russia controls mobility while NATO controls nodes. In such an environment, fixed strategic anchors like Greenland become even more critical. Competing Arctic Visions Russia Russia views the Arctic as a core strategic and economic priority, central to its national identity, security, and long-term development. Its Arctic vision emphasizes sovereignty, military security, and the exploitation of vast natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons and minerals. Moscow sees the Northern Sea Route as a critical shipping corridor that can enhance Russia’s control over Arctic navigation and generate economic revenues. To support this vision, Russia has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, icebreaker fleets, and military modernization, positioning itself as the dominant Arctic power and framing the region as vital to its great-power status. The Arctic is not an extension of Russian power; it is central to it. Figure 6: Cargo volume in Russia’s Northern Sea Route (1933-2023) China China approaches the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” framing its vision around scientific research, economic opportunity, and global governance. Beijing emphasizes participation in Arctic affairs through international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and promotes cooperation rather than territorial claims. Its strategy emphasizes long-term access to resources, influence over Arctic governance norms, and participation in future trade routes. Its concept of a “Polar Silk Road” reflects an interest in future shipping routes, energy projects, and digital connectivity, linking the Arctic to China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative. Even though China presents its Arctic engagement as peaceful and mutually beneficial, while gradually expanding its strategic and economic footprint in the region, it also has interest in Greenland’s mining sector, for example, which has heightened concerns about strategic leverage rather than direct control. Figure 7: Map of China’s Polar Silk Road. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. United States The U.S. approach, as reflected in the NSS 2025, is reactive but intensifying. Greenland crystallizes American concerns about strategic vulnerability, supply-chain dependence, and alliance credibility. Yet pressure tactics risk undermining the very alliances that make Arctic stability possible. The United States views the Arctic as an increasingly important region for national security, environmental stewardship, and economic opportunities. At the same time, it recognizes the strategic implications of growing Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Arctic States The European Arctic states emphasize sustainability, human security, and regional cooperation as the foundation of their Arctic vision. Their policies prioritize environmental protection, responsible resource management, and the rights and livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, while balancing economic development in sectors such as fisheries, renewable energy, and limited resource extraction. These states strongly support multilateral governance through institutions like the Arctic Council and stress adherence to international law. Collectively, they view the Arctic as a region where stability, cooperation, and climate leadership are essential, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and accelerating environmental change. Canada Canada’s Arctic vision centers on sovereignty, Indigenous partnership, and sustainable development, reflecting the region’s importance to national identity and security. Ottawa emphasizes the protection of its northern territories and views the Northwest Passage as internal waters, while supporting a rules-based Arctic order. A core pillar of Canada’s approach is its collaboration with Indigenous peoples, recognizing their rights, knowledge, and role in governance and stewardship. Canada also prioritizes climate change adaptation, environmental protection, and responsible economic development, seeking to ensure that increased Arctic activity benefits northern communities while maintaining peace and stability in the region. India India’s Arctic vision is primarily science-driven and climate-focused, reflecting its broader emphasis on environmental security and multilateral cooperation. Through its Arctic research station, Himadri, and active participation in the Arctic Council as an observer, India seeks to understand the Arctic’s impact on global climate systems, particularly the Indian monsoon. New Delhi also recognizes the long-term economic and geopolitical significance of the Arctic but approaches the region cautiously, prioritizing sustainable development, international collaboration, and respect for Arctic states’ sovereignty. Strategic Futures: Cooperation or Fragmentation The future of Greenland and the Arctic more broadly will hinge on whether the region evolves toward structured cooperation or strategic fragmentation. In a cooperative scenario, Greenland becomes a stabilizing anchor within a renewed Arctic security framework, where the United States, Denmark, and NATO align their defense priorities with Greenlandic self-determination and environmental safeguards. Such an approach would emphasize multilateral governance, transparency in resource development, confidence-building military measures, and shared investment in infrastructure, search-and-rescue capabilities, and climate resilience. Cooperation would not eliminate competition, particularly with Russia and China, but it would establish rules, norms, and mechanisms to prevent escalation and miscalculation in an increasingly accessible Arctic. By contrast, a fragmented Arctic would be characterized by unilateral actions, coercive diplomacy, and the erosion of trust among allies. Pressure tactics aimed at securing access, influence, or control over Greenland could weaken NATO cohesion, fuel local resistance, and open political space for external actors to exploit divisions. In such a scenario, the Arctic risks becoming a patchwork of contested zones rather than a managed strategic commons. Therefore, fragmentation would increase the likelihood of militarization without coordination, resource development without legitimacy, and crisis dynamics without effective communication channels — conditions that historically precede instability rather than security. Conclusion Greenland’s transformation from a remote Arctic territory into a strategic fulcrum reflects deeper shifts in the international system. The United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 captures a world defined by renewed great-power rivalry, supply-chain vulnerability, and the reassertion of geography as destiny. In this context, Greenland sits at the intersection of homeland defense, NATO credibility, critical resource security, and emerging Arctic trade routes. Its importance is not a product of any single factor, but of the convergence of military, economic, and environmental dynamics reshaping the High North. Yet Greenland’s strategic value does not grant external powers unlimited leverage. Geography may confer importance, but legitimacy, consent, and alliance cohesion determine whether that importance translates into durable influence. Attempts to treat Greenland as a transactional asset risk undermining NATO unity, destabilizing Arctic governance, and alienating the very population whose cooperation is essential for security and development. The Arctic’s future must not be decided solely by military deployments or mineral deposits, but by the political relationships that sustain them. Ultimately, Greenland illustrates the central paradox of the new Arctic geopolitics: the region’s growing accessibility increases both opportunity and risk. Stability will depend not on dominance, but on restraint, not on unilateralism, but on partnership. Whether the Arctic becomes a zone of managed competition or strategic fragmentation will shape not only the balance of power in the High North, but the credibility of international order adapting to a rapidly changing world. Also, it is important to highlight Greenland’s voice – referring to sovereignty and identity. Usually under great-power maneuvering, Greenland’s own population has often been sidelined. Yet Greenland is not merely an object of strategy; it is a political community with a strong Indigenous identity, environmental concerns, and aspirations for greater autonomy. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind its constitutional status within the Kingdom of Denmark, their principle of self-determination and the political costs of alienating local consent. Paradoxically, the more external powers push, the more Greenlandic society resists — complicating both security arrangements and resource development. Finally, the Arctic is not only Greenland, the US or the NATO, there are other authors involved, Russia for instance appears as the main one, while, China and India are increasing their interests in the region Moreover, climate change seems to be game changer as new Arctic seaways gain importance in terms of trade and mobility, which in consequence are and will redefine sovereignty. 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Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/why-greenlands-vast-natural-resources-wont-necessarily-translate-into-huge-profits-273137 Soufi Burridge, T., Gardiner, C., & Pereira, I. (2026, January 16). France, other NATO countries send troops to Greenland for exercises after meeting with Vance and Rubio. Retrieved from ABC News: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/france-nato-countries-send-troops-greenland-exercises-after/story?id=129241103 Talmazan, Y. (2026, January 15). European troops arrive in Greenland as Trump throws another curveball. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/world/greenland/european-troops-arrive-greenland-trump-throws-curveball-rcna254166 Tanno, S., & Waldenberg, S. (2026, Enero 10). Trump dice que Estados Unidos tomará Groenlandia "por las malas" sino puede hacerlo por las buenas. Retrieved from CNN Español: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/10/eeuu/trump-groenlandia-malas-trax Testoni, M. (2026, January 16). US-Greenland negotiations have hit a wall. Here are three ways the crisis could end. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/us-greenland-negotiations-have-hit-a-wall-here-are-three-ways-the-crisis-could-end-273629 tg24. (2026, January 16). Groenlandia, scattata la missione "Arctic Endurance": cosa sapere. Retrieved from tg24: https://tg24.sky.it/mondo/2026/01/16/groenlandia-arctic-endurance-esercitazione-militare The White House. (2025, November). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Retrieved from The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Abstract This is the second part of the analysis regarding the realist interpretation of the ongoing war in Ukraine. (The first part is available here). This paper examines the ongoing war in Ukraine through the lens of realism, challenging optimistic Western narratives and highlighting Russia's strategic gains despite extensive sanctions. Since 2022, the EU has imposed 19 sanctions packages targeting Russia's economy, yet Russia has adapted and continued military offensives across multiple fronts, making significant territorial advances, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. The strategic importance of Odessa, Ukraine's largest deep-water port, is underscored due to its economic, military, and geopolitical value, with Russian experts openly discussing its potential capture. The conflict has also driven modernisation in Russia's military-industrial complex, introducing advanced missile systems and hypersonic weapons that challenge NATO defences. Post-war territorial changes remain uncertain, with diplomatic options constrained by Ukraine's constitution and international law. European public opinion is divided on war readiness, reflecting broader societal hesitations. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Reality on the ground – the territorial losses and military developments Following the super optimistic narrative and the consequent groupthink, as evidenced in the first part of this paper, the EU has so far imposed no fewer than 19 sanctions packages.[1] The latest package adopted on October 23, 2025, focuses on intensifying pressure on Russia's war economy by targeting key sectors, including energy, finance, military capabilities, transportation, and professional services, while also enhancing anti-circumvention measures. [2] Source: Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en In the meantime, Russia seems to have accepted any adverse consequences of the sanctions and learned to live with them. Source: Grok – prompt: Latest macroeconomic indicators for the Russian Federation economy available at: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1998598998345814522 Militarily speaking, though, Russia (which is in fact fighting several NATO countries alongside Ukraine) seems to be not only advancing in the field. As of December 10, 2025, Russian forces have continued offensive operations across multiple fronts in eastern and southern Ukraine. These advances are part of a broader push amid ongoing heavy fighting, with Russian officials claiming momentum along the entire line of contact. Examples include: Pokrovsk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Kupiansk/Kharkiv Direction, Lyman Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Siversk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Zaporizhia/Southern Direction. On top of that, the media reports advances on multiple fronts, including Borova, Novopavlivka, and the eastern areas; the liberation of Rovnoye and Petropavlovka; the encirclement and liquidation of Ukrainian forces; and the fall of Dimitrov — widespread strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.[3] Source: Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ukraine_with_Cities.png Importantly, Russian experts and military advisors openly debate the possibility of seizing control of Odessa.[4] Let us make no mistake here. Odessa is strategically important. Economically, Odessa is Ukraine's largest and only deep-water port, handling around 65% of the country's sea-based imports and exports, which account for 70% of Ukraine's total trade.[5] For Russia, controlling or disrupting this port serves to cripple Ukraine's economy while bolstering Russia's own position in global markets. First: Ukraine is a major global grain exporter, and Odessa is central to shipping these commodities. Russian attacks on the port, such as those following the withdrawal from the U.N.-backed grain deal in 2023, aim to prevent Ukrainian shipments, allowing Russia to dominate markets in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Russia's Black Sea ports (e.g., Novorossiysk) handle its own $43 billion in annual grain exports, and undermining Odessa helps Russia create global reliance on its foodstuffs amid food insecurity.[6] Second, the port processes petroleum, natural gas, minerals, and even high-purity neon gas for semiconductors. Russia has targeted oil facilities near Odessa to disrupt fuel logistics, and control here would secure routes for Caspian Sea and Middle Eastern energy flows, aligning with Russia's strategy to diversify exports as hydrocarbon revenues decline.[7] Losing Odessa would be a "massive strategic blow" to Ukraine, akin to Britain losing Dover. Militarily, as a major Black Sea hub, Odessa enables Russia to project power and maintain dominance in the region. First, Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, can blockade Ukrainian coasts from Odessa, preventing resupplies and conducting amphibious operations — though these are high-risk due to Ukrainian defenses like mined waters.[8] The fleet supports expeditionary missions (e.g., the 2015 Syrian intervention) and hosts significant missile capabilities, with the capacity to deploy 80 long-range missiles in the area.[9] Second, even without full capture, Russia can harass shipping through mining or interdiction, extending tactics used in the Sea of Azov since 2014. This obstructs Ukrainian trade in the long term, potentially even in ceasefire scenarios, while facilitating Russian oil shipments (22% of which pass through the Black Sea).[10] Geopolitically, Odessa's location amplifies Russia's regional influence. First, capturing Odessa would create a land bridge to Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region in Moldova just 35 miles away, allowing Russia to intimidate Moldova and potentially expand conflict there.[11] This aligns with broader aims to control Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast, threatening neighbours like Romania.[12] Second, dominating the northern Black Sea coast from Odessa would weaken Ukraine's security, block NATO reinforcements, and provide Russia with leverage in negotiations. It's seen as more critical to Russia's objectives than other Ukrainian regions, such as Kharkiv. President Putin has indicated in fact that the coastal area "rightfully belongs to Russia" as war spoils.[13] Finally, Odessa was founded in 1794 by Russian Empress Catherine the Great on former Ottoman territory, and it became one of the Russian Empire's largest cities and ports.[14] Arguably, the harbour city has a large Russian-speaking population (Russians are the second-largest ethnic group in Odessa Oblast), and Kremlin officials assert it has "nothing in common with the Kiev regime," viewing it as inherently Russian.[15] More interestingly, it appears that the Russian Military Industrial Complex (MIC) has been using the war, as MICs always do, as a perfect opportunity to modernize its military equipment. Consequently, Russia has advanced missile systems that NATO countries find a real challenge. Examples include: - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) RS-28 Sarmat, Russia's newest heavy ICBM, operational since 2023, with a range exceeding 18,000 km (up to 35,000 km in sub-orbital flight), a payload of over 10 tons including up to 16 nuclear warheads or hypersonic glide vehicles, and advanced countermeasures against missile defenses.[16] It's considered the world's longest-range and most powerful ICBM in service. - Hypersonic Systems Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), deployed on ICBMs like the Sarmat, can reach speeds up to Mach 27 (about 20,700 mph), perform unpredictable manoeuvres at high altitudes, and generate immense kinetic energy (equivalent to over two megatons of TNT). It's designed to evade all known missile defence systems.[17] Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, an air-launched hypersonic missile with a range of over 2,000 km and speeds up to Mach 10. It can manoeuvre mid-flight, carry nuclear or conventional warheads, and has been used operationally in conflicts like Ukraine.[18] 3M22 Zircon, a scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missile reaching Mach 9, with a range of about 1,000 km. It's primarily anti-ship, launched from ships or submarines, and has demonstrated hits on maritime targets in exercises like Zapad 2025.[19] - Air and Missile Defence Systems S-500 Prometheus, an advanced surface-to-air missile system capable of intercepting targets at 600 km, tracking up to 300 simultaneously, and engaging hypersonic weapons, ICBMs, and stealth aircraft. It's integrated with multiple radars for resilience against jamming.[20] - Emerging or Experimental Systems 9M370 Burevestnik (SSC-X-09 Skyfall), a nuclear-powered cruise missile with theoretically unlimited range due to its onboard reactor. It underwent a successful test flight in October 2025 but remains in development, with concerns about safety and reliability.[21] Poseidon (Status-6), an unmanned, nuclear-powered underwater drone (torpedo-like) capable of carrying megaton-class warheads over intercontinental distances. It's designed for coastal targets and was tested alongside Burevestnik in 2025, though full operational status is unclear.[22] Oreshnik, a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with hypersonic capabilities, is evading Western defences. Russia plans deployments in Belarus by late 2025, enhancing strike options in Europe.[23] Last but not least, the media reports on a new, potentially game-changing technology: the TOS-1A Solntsepyok, a heavy multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) designed primarily to deliver thermobaric (fuel-air explosive) and incendiary munitions. It is mounted on a modified T-72 tank chassis for mobility and protection in combat zones, and it serves as a short-range area-denial weapon, often used to target fortified positions, infantry, and light armoured vehicles by creating massive blast waves and high temperatures.[24] Possible Territorial Changes after the War? As of early 2026, Russia continues to make territorial gains (capturing over 5,600 square kilometers, mainly in Donetsk Oblast). According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (a non-partisan, non-profit American think tank), German intelligence sources claim that “Germany expects Russia to target German energy and defence infrastructure early, given Germany’s role as a NATO hub for moving and sustaining forces and forecasts that Russia will see Germany as a priority target for long range missile strikes, armed drones, and special forces after an open armed attack on NATO’s eastern flank”[25] Consequently, according to ISW, Russia would likely be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many Western estimates, particularly in the event of a future ceasefire in Ukraine that would free up Russian forces and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute.   Against this backdrop, any post-war territorial options generally involve compromises due to military realities, though complete restoration of Ukraine's 2014 borders is seen as improbable without major shifts. These options are shaped by Ukraine's constitution (which prohibits ceding territory without a nationwide referendum or amendments), international law against forced border changes, and Russia's demands for recognition of annexed areas such as Crimea, the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk), Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.[26] Russia's battlefield advantages and confidence reduce incentives for concessions, while Ukraine seeks security guarantees (e.g., EU integration or European military presence) in exchange for any deals.[27] Below, the reader will find a summary of some of the options discussed by diplomats: Source: Grok - https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=2008833222403387754 In addition to territorial change options, any deal will most likely include non-territorial elements such as Ukraine's neutrality (no NATO), demilitarisation caps, the return of abducted children, and economic reintegration of Russia (e.g., sanctions relief). Experts warn that rushed agreements could lead to renewed conflict, emphasising sustainable security for Ukraine (e.g., European troops or arms build-up).[28] Outcomes in 2026 hinge on battlefield shifts, US pressure, and European unity, with diplomacy intensifying but no breakthroughs yet. Conclusion On 11 December, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in a speech in Germany that Russia is escalating its war campaign against Europe, not just Ukraine. “We must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured,” he said.[29] On the very same day, the EU made the bold move of indefinitely immobilising frozen Russian assets worth €210 billion; €185 billion held at Belgium’s Euroclear, and €25 billion held in banks across other member states. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen hailed the move that day, sending a strong signal to Russia that "as long as this brutal war of aggression continues, Russia's costs will continue to rise. […] This is a powerful message to Ukraine: We want to make sure that our brave neighbour becomes even stronger on the battlefield and at the negotiating table,” von der Leyen added. There is one problem that most EU leaders overlook. Namely, European societies are deeply divided, with large sections unwilling to go to war with Russia. Numerous polls evidence this. A recent ECFP Poll (June) was conducted by YouGov, Datapraxis, and Norstat across 12 countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, UK). It focused on readiness for potential war, including amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine and U.S. policy shifts. Key findings suggest: 50% overall support increasing defence spending (highest in Poland and Denmark at 70%); majorities in France (62%), Germany (53%), and Poland (51%) favour reintroducing mandatory military service; 59% support continuing military aid to Ukraine even without U.S. involvement; 54% back a European nuclear deterrent independent of the U.S. All of this seems to reflect acceptance of preparation for conflict, though not direct personal willingness to fight.[30] According to John Mearsheimer, a leading realist scholar, Russia's decision to invade Ukraine was primarily a rational response to the changing material realities of the international system, particularly the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), which Russia perceived as a direct threat to its core strategic interests and great power status. Mearsheimer contends that the anarchic international system compels states, especially great powers, to maximise their power to ensure survival. Thus, Russia acted to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Western stronghold on its border, viewing the West's policies as provocative and threatening to its security. This perspective emphasises the structural pressures and incentives created by anarchy and power competition, suggesting that the imperative drove Russia's actions to survive and maintain regional dominance amid Western encroachment.[31] Admittedly, Mearsheimer’s views are much criticised by Western scholars and media experts. And yet, with the recent actions of the United States against Venezuela (the kinetic attack against the state and the kidnapping of its president and his wife – all against the most sacred principles of international law), one wonders why the cold-blooded, objective analysis has been forgone in favour of wishful thinking. References [1] Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en [2] Fisch, E. J., Junck, R. D., Sève, M., Albrecht vom Kolke, M., Benson, J., Lainé, W., Mueller, P., Seidner, G., & Vianesi, G. (2025, November 12). EU Adopts 19th Russia Sanctions Package Alongside New Sanctions Being Imposed by US and UK. Skadden. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2025/11/eu-adopts-19th-sanctions-package [3] Grok: What are the latest advances of Russian troops in Ukraine? [4] Каминский, А. (2025, October 2). «СВО закончится взятием Одессы». НАТО готовит румын и французов. Что в планах у Минобороны России? RuNews24. https://runews24.ru/articles/02/10/2025/svo-zakonchitsya-vzyatiem-odessyi-nato-gotovit-rumyin-i-franczuzov-chto-v-planax-u-minoboronyi-rossii also Крылова, А. (2025, December 3). Названы сроки, в которые Российская армия сможет дойти до Одессы. Абзац. https://absatz.media/news/143321-nazvany-sroki-v-kotorye-rossijskaya-armiya-smozhet-dojti-do-odessy or Елистратов, А. (2025, November 20). Эксперт: русским нет смысла соглашаться на план Трампа, они и так дойдут до Одессы. Репортёр. https://topcor.ru/66186-jekspert-russkim-net-smysla-soglashatsja-na-plan-trampa-oni-i-tak-dojdut-do-odessy.html [5] Costea, C. A. (2022, March 25). The strategic importance of the port of Odessa. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://russianstudiesromania.eu/2022/03/25/the-strategic-importance-of-the-port-of-odessa/ [6] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [7] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [8] Ibidem. [9] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [10] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [11] Akage, A. (2022, May 20). Is Odessa Next? Putin Sees A Gateway To Moldova — And Chance For Revenge. Worldcrunch. https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/why-odessa-is-important/ [12] Boyse, M. (2024, March 21). Operation Odesa: Russia Wants the Entire Ukrainian Black Sea Coast. Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/operation-odesa-russia-wants-entire-ukrainian-black-sea-coast-matthew-boyse [13] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [14] Santora, M. (2023, July 19). Why Odesa Is So Important to Ukraine in the War With Russia. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/19/world/europe/odesa-ukraine-war-russia.html [15] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [16] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [17] Ibidem. [18] See more at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/ [19] Charpentreau, C. (2025, September 15). Russia uses Zapad 2025 for ‘hypersonic posturing’ with Zircon, Kinzhal drills. AeroTime. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/zapad-2025-russia-hypersonic-posture-zircon-kinzhal [20] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [21] Gwadera, Z. (2025, November 20). Russia’s Burevestnik and Poseidon tests. IISS. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/11/russias-burevestnik-and-poseidon-tests/ [22] Ibidem. [23] See more at: https://youtu.be/D22JNoLzj9E?si=BtZ3NMCs7KoUk7ue [24] See more at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/tos-1a.htm [25] Young, J., Harward, C., Simanovskyy, M., Mappes, G., Nasreddine, D., & Barros, G. (2026, January 6). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2026. Institute for the Study of War. https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/ [26] Yurchuk, V. (2025, August 12). Ceding land to Russia not only unpopular in Ukraine, but also illegal. PBS NEWS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ceding-land-to-russia-not-only-unpopular-in-ukraine-but-also-illegal [27] Harding, E. (2025, November 24). What Is the Strategy in the Ukraine-Russia Peace Negotiations? Centre for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-strategy-ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations [28] Wright, T. (2025, August 18). The Only Plausible Path to End the War in Ukraine. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/08/trump-ukraine-russia-peace/683907/ [29] Kiorri, E., & Cabanas, L. B. (2025, December 30). Would you fight for the EU’s borders? Take our poll. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/12/30/would-you-fight-for-the-eus-borders-take-our-poll?fbclid=IwT01FWAPFTrZleHRuA2FlbQIxMABzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAwzNTA2ODU1MzE3MjgAAR4KLt3FfIaCbSxjUO8ldmbDys6WPnLeZaNIpZuhAApKVUs073MB4vZj8DKbOA_aem_lLTRWqCcGPL3F9z5-SX65g [30] https://www.eureporter.co/world/2025/06/26/most-eu-citizens-are-ready-for-war-new-poll/ [31] Smith, N. R., & Dawson, G. (2022). Mearsheimer, realism, and the Ukraine war. Analyse & Kritik, 44(2), 175–200. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023

After years of blockages and renegotiations, the European Union approved the agreement with Mercosur, yet the decisive battle — the ratification — has only just begun. On January 9, 2026, the Council of the European Union (EU) approved the long-awaited trade agreement with Mercosur. This decision contrasts with what happened just a month earlier, when the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had to cancel her planned trip to Brazil to sign the instrument, as she had failed to secure the Council’s green light. Now, the signing will take place in Paraguay on January 17. How did we get here, and what lies ahead? What happened: Overcoming internal resistance The basis of the so-called Interim Trade Agreement (ITA), the commercial pillar of the deal, dates back to the “agreement in principle” announced in June 2019 by the leaders of both blocs. That announcement quickly led to the formation of a powerful opposition coalition in Europe, which ultimately brought the approval and ratification process to a standstill. This coalition coalesced around two main components: a traditional one, made up of European agricultural producers, and an emerging one, composed of civil society organizations focused on environmental protection. In a short time, the world changed and, for reasons predominantly associated with the new global geopolitical context, the Commission resumed its efforts to finalize this agreement. To do so, it needed to neutralize the aforementioned opposition coalition, which, taken together, had the capacity to block it — either through national governments in the Council or through their political representatives in the European Parliament. The Commission’s strategy was to deactivate the environmental component of the coalition. To that end, beginning in 2023 it embarked on a renegotiation with Mercosur, particularly with Brazil, aimed at increasing the binding environmental commitments included in the agreement. In exchange, it was willing to forgo some of the market access gains achieved in the 2019 arrangement. On the basis of this trade-off, both blocs announced a new agreement in December 2024. While environmentally based opposition declined markedly after this announcement, agriculturally based opposition persisted. And, as expected, it found a channel for representation in countries with strong agricultural communities. Thus, the governments of France, Poland, and Ireland expressed their opposition to the agreement and sought to build a blocking minority to prevent its approval in the Council. Because this required at least four countries representing at least 35% of the EU population, the opposing countries needed new allies. Along the way, they found an unexpected partner, given its historical support for the agreement: Giorgia Meloni’s Italy. From December 2024 onward, the Italian government sent ambiguous signals, alternating between rejection and conditional support. But when the time came for approval in December 2025, the Italian government did not cast its vote, and as a result the signing could not be finalized. However, Italy’s position turned out to be transactional. After the failure in early December, the Commission negotiated with the Italian government a series of side payments in exchange for its favorable vote, the most significant of which was an advance on agricultural subsidies provided for under the Common Agricultural Policy. In parallel, the European institutions approved a specific mechanism to activate the bilateral safeguards set out in the text of the agreement, which provides for the automatic launch of investigations for a range of sensitive agricultural products if domestic prices or exports from Mercosur fall or rise by 8%, respectively. It should be noted that these safeguards complement the fact that the opening offered by the EU for these sensitive goods is partial, via quotas, which in itself already limits the scope of liberalization in this sector. And although this set of concessions was not sufficient to appease agricultural opposition — leading France, Poland, Ireland, Austria, and Hungary to vote against it (with Belgium abstaining) — the agreement was ultimately approved by a qualified majority in the Council. What comes next: The challenge of ratification Following approval, the ratification stage of the ITA shifts political action to the European Parliament and to the national parliaments of the Mercosur countries. In the former, the emergence of a new battle between supporters and opponents is highly likely. The two largest political groups in the European Parliament — the Popular Party (center-right) and the Social Democrats (center-left), which together underpin the governing coalition in the EU — have already announced their support. However, driven by opposition from agricultural producers, it is to be expected that a significant share of Members of the European Parliament from countries such as France, Poland, and Ireland, among others, will vote in line with their country’s opposing position rather than that of their political group. Thus, while the baseline scenario is one in which there is a majority in favor of ratification, it will certainly be a narrow one, meaning that marginal shifts in position could end up tipping the balance one way or the other. In parallel, there will be efforts by some Members of the European Parliament to refer the agreement to the Court of Justice of the EU, with the formal objective of determining the instrument’s compatibility with European law. Indirectly, these efforts aim to delay the ratification process and buy time to build an opposing majority. There is no certainty that initiatives of this kind will succeed, but in any case, they will be an additional factor to monitor in the coming months. In the Mercosur countries, by contrast, a less contentious parliamentary process is expected in principle. Those who could theoretically be negatively affected in distributive terms—namely, different segments of the manufacturing industry — have supported the agreement (in Brazil) or at least have not actively opposed it (in Argentina). Moreover, in 2019 the Mercosur countries agreed on provisional bilateral entry into force as each member of the bloc, together with the EU, ratifies the agreement. In addition to effectively loosening the adoption of preferential agreements with third parties, this measure is intended to encourage ratification in each national parliament. As each Mercosur member ratifies, the cost of remaining outside preferential access to the European market increases. In short, ratification is the next and final step before the agreement enters into force. As of 2019, the focus will remain predominantly on what may happen in the EU.