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In a world connected by the flicker of screens and the hum of digital voices, the silence of the West on the Gaza war echoes louder than any bomb that shatters the night sky. It is a silence heavy with the weight of choices unmade and words unsaid, a stillness that cloaks the suffering of people in the guise of political neutrality and strategic interests. This quiet complicity whispers louder than a roar, raising questions about morality, humanity, and the real cost of silence in the face of injustice. The Gaza Strip, a narrow enclave hemmed in by borders and blockades, has long been a crucible of pain and resilience. It is a place where life and death coexist in precarious balance, where every breath is a defiance of the suffocating conditions imposed by a siege that has lasted for decades. Here, children play among the rubble, their laughter a brittle thread of hope that stands in stark contrast to the backdrop of destruction. Families cling to each other amid the darkness of power cuts, their stories woven into the fabric of a daily struggle for survival. The people of Gaza are not merely statistics or headlines; they are fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters whose lives are marked by an enduring quest for dignity amid dehumanizing conditions. And yet, the West remains curiously quiet. The silence is not a lack of awareness—news outlets beam images of devastated buildings, grieving families, and wounded children into living rooms around the globe. It is not a lack of information—diplomatic channels are flooded with reports of humanitarian crises, violations of international law, and calls for action from activists and organizations. No, this silence is something more deliberate, a calculated choice that reveals as much about those who wield power as it does about those who suffer under it. This silence is layered and complex, often justified under the banners of political pragmatism and national interests. Governments in the West, whether by default or design, often tiptoe around the issue, their diplomatic language carefully crafted to avoid outright condemnation or clear support. Statements of concern are issued, and calls for restraint are made, but these words often fall short of genuine action or meaningful intervention. They echo through the chambers of power, hollow and unfulfilled, a reminder of the chasm between rhetoric and reality. For many, this muted response is not just a political stance but a moral failing. To remain silent in the face of clear and ongoing human suffering is to be complicit in that suffering. It is to prioritize strategic alliances and geopolitical calculations over the lives of innocent civilians. It is to turn a blind eye to the cries of those who have lost everything, to the pleas of a mother searching through rubble for her child, to the desperate hope of a father clinging to the belief that tomorrow might bring a semblance of peace. It is to allow the narrative of one side to dominate, to let the story of the oppressor drown out the voices of the oppressed. The West's silence on Gaza is also a reflection of broader global dynamics, where power often trumps principle and where the lives of some are deemed more valuable than others. It highlights the uneven scales of justice and the selective application of human rights, where the suffering of one group can be overshadowed by the strategic importance of another. This silence feeds into a cycle of despair and resentment, where each day of inaction deepens the wounds and hardens the hearts of those who feel abandoned by the very international community that claims to stand for justice and human dignity. Yet, amid this silence, there is a quiet but persistent call for change. It comes from the streets of cities around the world, where ordinary people march and rally, refusing to be silent themselves. It comes from the voices of activists, journalists, and humanitarians who risk much to bear witness to the truth. It comes from the survivors in Gaza who, despite everything, continue to hope and dream of a life beyond the siege, a life where their voices are heard, and their humanity recognized. The challenge before the West is not simply to break its silence but to confront the deeper questions that this silence raises. What does it mean to stand by in the face of suffering? How do we reconcile our values with our actions, our words with our deeds? And most importantly, what kind of world do we wish to build — a world where justice is selectively applied and where silence is a shield for the comfortable, or a world where every life, no matter how distant or different, is treated with the dignity it deserves? The answer lies not in grandiose statements or symbolic gestures but in a genuine commitment to empathy, equity, and accountability. It lies in the courage to listen, to speak, and to act in ways that honor the shared humanity of us all. For in the end, it is not the bombs or the bullets that define our world, but the choices we make in the face of them. And in the silence of the West on Gaza, there is a choice yet to be made — a choice between complicity and courage, between indifference and action. It is a choice that will echo far beyond the borders of Gaza, reverberating through the conscience of a world that must decide what it truly stands for.

Islamabad has accused Kabul of drifting into an "India colony", a charge that was further sharpened following Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi's visit to New Delhi last year. Long-simmering tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have now spilled into open confrontation along the contested Durand Line. What was once a theatre of proxy maneuvering is, at least momentarily, being shaped by direct state-to-state hostility. On February 21, Pakistan launched airstrikes on alleged militant sanctuaries in Nangarhar, Paktika and Khost, claiming to target Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS-K elements. Kabul responded on February 26 with ground offensives against Pakistani positions across six provinces. Islamabad escalated further with "Operation Ghazab Lil Haq", striking targets in Kabul and Kandahar, as Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared that Pakistan's "cup of patience has overflowed". Casualty figures remain contested and unverifiable - Islamabad claims 274 Taliban fighters have been killed and 12 soldiers lost, while Kabul asserts 55 Pakistani soldiers are dead and 13 of its own fighters have been killed. Yet, beyond the numbers lies a more consequential reality: a structurally unstable frontier has entered a new and potentially dangerous phase. Durand And Its Discontente The crisis cannot be reduced to episodic violence. Its roots lie in the unresolved question of the Durand Line - the 2,600-kilometre boundary drawn in 1893, never formally recognised by successive Afghan governments. The line bisects Pashtun tribal lands, embedding a historical grievance into the geography of the modern state system. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Pakistan initially anticipated strategic dividends. It expected Kabul to curb the TTP, whose ideological affinities with the Afghan Taliban are well documented. Instead, TTP attacks intensified, with over 2,400 Pakistani security personnel reportedly killed in 2025 alone - the highest toll in a decade. Islamabad's frustration stems not merely from security losses but from the perception that its long-standing leverage over the Taliban has eroded. Recent attacks in Islamabad, Bajaur and Bannu - attributed by Pakistan to Afghan-based militants- served as immediate triggers. Ceasefire efforts mediated by regional actors in October 2025 collapsed amid persistent skirmishes. The Taliban's reluctance to confront the TTP reflects both shared Pashtun solidarities and a pragmatic fear of internal fragmentation, including defections to ISIS-K. Layered atop these tensions is a geopolitical recalibration. Islamabad has accused Kabul of drifting into an "India colony", a charge that was further sharpened following Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi's visit to New Delhi last year and a joint statement condemning regional terrorism. For Pakistan, this diplomatic thaw between Kabul and New Delhi represents not merely optics but a potential strategic encirclement. The recent escalation thus appears as much a coercive signal as a counterterrorism operation. Nobody Wins This War The immediate fallout is economic and humanitarian. Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on Pakistani ports for transit trade, while Pakistan derives revenue and strategic depth from its western corridor. Border closures risk paralysing economic activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Flagship connectivity projects - from the TAPI gas pipeline to broader Eurasian transport initiatives - face renewed uncertainty. China's investments in Pakistan, particularly under CPEC, could confront heightened security vulnerabilities if militancy spills over. The humanitarian dimension is equally stark. Civilian casualties, displacement and potential refugee flows compound Afghanistan's already dire socio-economic crisis. Prolonged instability could embolden Baloch separatists, invigorate ISIS-K, and fragment militant ecosystems further. For external stakeholders - China, Iran, Russia and Turkey - the escalation threatens to upset a precarious regional equilibrium. Yet, a full-scale conventional war remains unlikely. Afghanistan lacks airpower and conventional depth; Pakistan, for its part, cannot afford a protracted two-front contingency. The logic of escalation is, therefore, bounded by structural constraints, even if tactical brinkmanship persists. Where India Stands For India, the crisis is both opportunity and risk. New Delhi's public messaging has emphasised Afghanistan's sovereignty while criticising Pakistan for externalising its internal security failures. This aligns with India's calibrated outreach to the Taliban - focused on humanitarian assistance, trade facilitation and connectivity initiatives such as the Chabahar corridor. A distracted Pakistan may ease immediate pressure along India's western frontier and dilute Islamabad's regional manoeuvrability. However, instability in Afghanistan carries spillover risks: extremist mobilisation, threats to Indian development projects, and disruptions to connectivity ambitions linking India to Central Asia. Pakistan's escalation can plausibly be read as an attempt to deter Kabul's deepening engagement with New Delhi. Over time, sustained India-Taliban ties could narrow Pakistan's diplomatic options. No More Pretences The current crisis marks a qualitative shift - from deniable proxies to overt confrontation. Tactical de-escalation, possibly under regional mediation, appears probable. However, absent movement on core issues - the Durand Line dispute, TTP sanctuaries, and the broader contest for regional influence - the frontier will remain combustible. For Pakistan, the message from this latest flare-up is unmistakable: it can no longer afford the strategic ambivalence that has defined its Afghan policy for decades. Security dilemmas rooted in history and identity will not be resolved through episodic airstrikes, coercive signalling, or the habitual externalisation of internal failures. So long as Islamabad oscillates between tactical accommodation and punitive retaliation, it will remain trapped in a cycle of insecurity of its own making. If Pakistan seeks stability on its western frontier, it must fundamentally recalibrate its approach - abandoning the logic of selective militancy, investing in sustained political engagement with Kabul, and addressing the structural drivers of radicalisation within its own borders. Durable security will not emerge from managing proxies or manufacturing deterrence narratives, but from credible commitments and regional cooperation. The imperative, therefore, is not merely de-escalation, but introspection in Islamabad - without which no meaningful regional equilibrium can take root.

Türkiye is developing a conceptual framework and tangible initiatives to sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, including bilateral military cooperation, maritime capacity building, the development of interregional trade corridors, and diplomatic outreach. Turbulence in the global geopolitical landscape, which has been growing for about a decade, became widely visible across all levels of global governance at the beginning of 2026. Developments such as the release of the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), the capture and prosecution of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. officials, arguably the most sensational Davos summit in history, and the Munich Security Conference convening under the title ‘Under Destruction’, have collectively brought the debate on ‘power transition’ (which was previously only theoretical in international relations literature) into the realm of realpolitik. It is within this context of an accelerating multipolar order that the Munich Security Conference Report’s assessment assumes particular analytical significance: analysing the spheres of influence of regional powers in depth, and analysing the need for them to cooperate. As the report asserts, “The US administration generally seems to accept that the new order will be multipolar, recognising that other powers are entitled to their own regional spheres of dominance.” And indeed, Türkiye, as it appears, is poised to emerge as one of the countries that will grow increasingly dominant within its own region. Over the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant structural transformation, becoming increasingly anchored in a doctrine that might be characterised as ‘proactive geopolitical neutrality’. This approach has given Ankara the strategic flexibility to manoeuvre deftly between competing great and regional powers while projecting its influence far beyond its immediate geographical boundaries. This transformation has extended Türkiye’s strategic reach to Southeast Asia, drawing Ankara into the emerging geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Türkiye’s growing presence at the crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and South and Southeast Asia indicates a significant strategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific region. These engagements are deliberate attempts to expand Türkiye’s footprint along the Indo-Pacific maritime corridor, in pursuit of greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable global order. The Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea constitute the western gateway through which Indo-Pacific trade routes connect to European markets. From this perspective, Türkiye occupies a position of considerable strategic value. It does not merely border the Eastern Mediterranean or project military and diplomatic influence into the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa; it effectively functions as a frontier state to the Western Indo-Pacific. This geographic and strategic proximity means that Türkiye is closer to the Indo-Pacific region than many other external actors currently engaged with it. To fulfil this emerging role, Türkiye is developing the conceptual framework and tangible initiatives to sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. These efforts include bilateral military cooperation, maritime capacity building, development of interregional trade corridors and diplomatic outreach, all of which are aimed at bridging the gap between Ankara’s historical legacy and its ambitions as a rising Indo-Pacific actor. These strategic efforts are as follows: • The Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine: This represents more than a maritime boundary claim; it constitutes a conceptual reorientation of Turkish strategic culture toward sea-based strategic autonomy. By asserting sovereign interests across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and beyond, Ankara has effectively established a theoretical basis for projecting naval presence into waters that sit at the very core of Western Indo-Pacific geopolitics. In this sense, Mavi Vatan should be read not merely as a defensive posture, but as a maritime expression of Türkiye’s broader ambition to operate as a self-sufficient, extra-regional power. • Libya Agreement: The 2019 maritime delimitation agreement between Ankara and Libya’s internationally recognised government was a calculated geopolitical move, one that not only extended Türkiye’s jurisdictional reach across the Eastern Mediterranean but also effectively positioned Ankara as an indispensable player in the region. • Gulf Anchor: The Qatar-Türkiye Combined Joint Force Command represents a decisive foothold, granting Ankara both air and naval reach into the Persian Gulf and establishing Türkiye as a credible balancing force at one of the Indo-Pacific’s most strategically vital chokepoints. • Strategic Engagement in Horn of Africa: Türkiye’s military base in Mogadishu, its largest overseas installation, combined with security agreements, economic partnerships, and naval patrols within Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, has secured Ankara a rare operational foothold near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, placing Türkiye among a select few non-regional powers with genuine access to the Gulf of Aden and the maritime corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific. • Connectivity Gambit in Basra: As confidence in the Suez Canal as a reliable trade route between the Indo-Pacific region and Europe continues to deteriorate and become increasingly fragile, Türkiye is positioning itself as the strategic backbone of an alternative corridor, most notably through the ‘New Development Road’ project, which would connect the Persian Gulf to European markets via Iraqi and Turkish territory. By doing so, the New Development Road is, in essence, Ankara’s attempt to convert geographic centrality into economic and political leverage, offering Indo-Pacific partners a credible overland-maritime alternative at precisely the moment when the old route’s reliability is most in question. • Asia Anew: Launched in 2019, the Asia Anew Initiative codifies Türkiye’s decision to engage with the Indo-Pacific region on its own terms: a non-aligned, non-interventionist approach focused on economic, diplomatic, and cultural outreach. In a region increasingly characterised by rivalry between major powers, Ankara is establishing a unique identity as a partner that avoids geopolitical rivalry. Beyond its long-term strategic initiatives, it is increasingly evident that Türkiye has also been capitalising on recent regional developments to consolidate meaningful strategic gains. The Syrian crisis, which has long been one of Ankara’s most costly burdens with direct implications for domestic politics and the economy, has gradually shifted in Türkiye’s favour. Meanwhile, the UAE’s diminishing influence in Yemen has strengthened Saudi Arabia’s and Türkiye’s positions, effectively placing these two powers on a common strategic platform built on converging interests. Significantly, the first outcome of this realignment was the potential for a trilateral security pact among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. One process accelerated by these developments, as well as development in Somalia, is the potential establishment of a Turkish military base on Sudan’s Suakin Island. If realised, this would give Ankara a connected military presence stretching from Sudan through Qatar to Somalia, spanning some of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. At a time when the international order is moving towards a framework of regional spheres of influence in which regional powers are increasingly being allowed to shape their own regions, Türkiye finds itself with a rare strategic opportunity: to act as the playmaker between the wider Levant, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Western Indo-Pacific. Türkiye’s deepening partnerships with legitimate governments across the region are steadily expanding its operational footprint in the Western Indo-Pacific. In an era of accelerating global instability, Ankara is poised to emerge as an actor that both great powers and regional players will increasingly need to factor into their Indo-Pacific strategic calculus. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Over the last two weeks, the Israeli website +972 reported, “Six ‘game-changing’ recent cabinet decisions may push the occupation past a tipping point toward permanent Israeli rule.” Many think this will spell political disaster by ending all hope for a negotiated two-state solution. I suggest a different, and perhaps overly optimistic perspective. Maybe – just maybe – these new moves could spark a long-term process ending in a more democratic, egalitarian, and peaceful Israeli-Palestinian space. The current government of Benjamin Netanyahu has been heavily influenced by its ultra-nationalist cabinet members, including Finance Minister Bezalal Smotrich, who leads the political party “Religious Zionism,” and whose responsibilities include administering the Palestinian West Bank (known to his supporters as “Judea and Samaria”). Another key right-wing government figure is National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, head of the Israeli party, “Jewish Power,” who was handed control over the powerful national police. Under the influence of these and other right-wing coalition partners, the Netanyahu government – which won Israel’s national elections in late 2022 – wrote policy guidelines that committed itself to efforts aimed at ensuring the Jewish people’s full and exclusive rights over what they called the entire “Land of Israel.” These guidelines were interpreted by many as commitments to strengthening Israel’s legal and administrative hold over the West Bank in preparation for eventual annexation. In the last week or so, the government has passed new rules enhancing Israel’s ability to take over more West Bank land and tighten its administrative and legal grip over the area. These include: • Declassifying West Bank land ownership records, which would allow settler groups to place pressure on individual Palestinian owners to sell or abandon their property. • Striking down a Jordanian law, long applied to the West Bank, barring private land sales to foreigners, including Israelis. • Mandating a new land registration process, which might allow the government to register more West Bank property as “state land,” which could then be turned over to settlers, and opening the door to fraud during the registration process itself. • Eliminating the need for a special permit to register land sales, again expanding opportunities for skulduggery. • Expanding the Israeli military’s law enforcement role in the West Bank’s “A” and “B” zones, which are supposed to be under the control of the Palestinian Authority, to varying degrees. • Transferring control over some West Bank areas from Israeli military commanders to civilian agencies, normalizing their incorporation into the Israeli state. Until now, the West Bank has been legally defined as an object of “military rule,” although Israel’s civilian ministries have long crept into specific areas of jurisdiction. Taken together, according Ziv Stahl, director of the Israeli human rights organization, Yesh Din, these actions are accelerating processes of de facto West Bank annexation:l by Israel. “Legally speaking,” Stahl told +972, “I don’t know if we can still call it occupation. I think we have been shifting to a reality of annexation. It’s hard to determine where exactly the pivotal moment was, but the physical situation on the ground in the West Bank has completely changed in these three years of this government.” Many regard annexation as an absolutely disastrous political development that will permanently end all hope of a two-state solution. It is this solution, in turn, that is the desired outcome of most European states, the Palestinian Authority, most Arab countries, most UN members, and the US government. Under President Trump, of course, support for the two-state option has grown muddier; he hasn’t endorsed annexation, but hasn’t made any effort to promote the two-state idea either. Among some of Israel’s more moderate political parties – as well as left-of-center Jewish advocacy groups such as J Street or Peace Now – the idea of two separate, sovereign states is also sacrosanct. One would be for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, and another would be for Israeli Jews living in roughly 70% of Mandatory Palestine. For most international diplomats and many advocacy groups, the two-state option has long been regarded as the best possibility for long-term political stability, justice, and human rights for all. I’d like to offer a different perspective. If Israel were to annex the entire West Bank, the demographics of Israel’s official polity (as opposed to its hybrid ‘internationally recognized state plus militarily occupied Palestinian zones’) would include an additional three million Palestinians. This number includes some 2.8 million Palestinians living in the West Bank’s A and B zones (Palestinian Authority-controlled, in theory), and another 250,000 living in the West Bank’s C zones (controlled by the Israeli military). To these, add another roughly 1.6 million current Palestinian citizens of Israel, living chiefly in the country’s north, along with some 350,000 Palestinians who are permanent residents of Israel, living in East Jerusalem. This combined total of roughly 5 million Palestinians would represent just over 40% of the entire population under direct Israeli sovereignty, using today’s figures. It would not include the roughly 2.2 million Gazan Palestinians now living in utterly dire conditions. (I do not include them here because the Israeli cabinet’s new regulations do not refer to Gaza). Although only 1.6 million of these five million Palestinians currently have Israeli citizenship and the right to vote today in Israeli elections, there might be pressure, over time, to add more Palestinians living in sovereign Israeli territory to the voter rolls. Over the next few decades, newly enfranchised Palestinians could exert increasing influence on Israel’s legislature and governments. With a bit of luck, this pressure might eventually lead to a softening of Israel’s commitment to Jewish political, legal, and cultural supremacy, gradually leading to a more pluralistic and democratic space. Importantly, this could give desperate Palestinians a viable, non-violent alternative for shaping their political fate, relegating the Palestinian Authority’s moribund diplomatic efforts and the violence of Hamas and others to the back of the line. Several authors have discussed the possibility of a “one-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including a 2010 volume by American academic Virginia Tilley, and the more recent book by Sarah Leah Whitson and Michael Omer-Man. These analysts have identified a fifth option that is distinct from the four possibilities currently on the table for Israelis and Palestinians. These five options include: • The Israeli radical right’s current plan for Jewish annexation and eternal Palestinian subordination. • The two-state solution promoted by the international community and other mainstream actors ever since the Oslo Peace Accords. • A new set of proposals for a political consociation of “two sovereign peoples living in a single land,” promoted, among others, by the Palestinian-Israeli NGO, A Land for All; • The violent status quo, in which the Palestinian Authority continues to crumble, Palestinian militant groups occasionally strike Israelis, and Jewish settlers, backed by the Israeli army, wield violence against Palestinians. • The “one-state solution,” which involves the creation of a single, unified state from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea, in which all residents are lawful citizens, have the right to vote, are equal before the law, and share in the country’s internal and external defense. If Gaza were to be included in this single state, the new entity’s population would include roughly coequal ethnic populations, although divergent birth rates might, over time, lead to an Arab majority. If Gaza were to be excluded, Palestinians would make up just over 40% of the unified territory’s population, using contemporary numbers. If the Israeli cabinet’s recent annexation-enhancing efforts lead to the eventual annexation of the West Bank’s A, B, and C, this may prepare the ground for an eventual move towards political, cultural, and legal democratization. For West Bank Palestinians to become full-fledged voters would likely take years. It would require repeated cycles of social protest, and might include at least some violence from all sides. Still, the death toll could hardly rival today’s horrific conditions. The radical right is well aware of the one-state possibility. It has spoken of threading that needle by annexing only Area C. Although C includes the vast majority of the West Bank’s landmass, it has only a tiny fraction of the Palestinian population. C is also the zone where most Jewish colonies are currently situated. The radical Jewish right might try to devise a hybrid, “neither fully in, nor fully out” arrangement for Areas A and B, limiting the inclusion of millions of new Palestinians into their newly expanded Greater Israel. Still, the momentum for including all three West Bank areas into Israel’s sovereign territory would persist, both among settlers and Palestinians. A and B zones are small, isolated enclaves, and they will struggle to remain distinct from the C hinterland. The radical right and its associated settler movement, moreover, will continue to cast their eyes over A and B for religious, security, economic, and other reasons. Stripped of the “sea” of Area C, the “islands” of A and B could eventually be incorporated as well. In my optimistic reading, the Israeli radical right’s new turbo-charged efforts to annex more Palestinian land may include a silver lining, offering a more hopeful path forward. In the martial art of ju-jitsu, the weaker party seeks survival by using and redirecting their opponent’s strength. For almost a century, Palestinians have tried to blunt and even reverse the Jewish community’s encroachments by fighting fire with fire: guns, regional alliances, international diplomacy, and UN maneuvering. Those efforts have failed. Israel’s Jewish community is just too strong, too committed, too well-organized, and too capital-intensive. It cannot be overcome with the weapons that Palestinians and their dwindling circle of allies have at their disposal, or by economic boycotts, diplomacy, the International Criminal Court, or UN resolutions. International human rights reporting, after all, did nothing to prevent Gaza’s destruction, Hamas’ horrendous (if briefly successful) October 7 attack yielded nothing good, and the Oslo Peace Accords have, in the end, been spectacularly useless. The UN’s resolutions, moreover, have proved about as useless as everything else. Now, perhaps, the time has come to absorb and gradually metabolize the “blow” of West Bank annexation. Once Palestinians have been incorporated as subjects of the Israeli state, and not as mere objects of military occupation, they can try to transform their opponent’s kinetic energy into something new and more positive for both sides.

US president Donald Trump’s advisor on Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, announced in February 2026 that Washington and three Middle East states – Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (collectively known as the Quad) – were close to finalising a detailed initiative aimed at ending Sudan’s war. The plan resembled the roadmap shared by the Quad in September 2025. According to Boulos, the proposal had received preliminary approval from the two warring parties in the civil war: Sudan’s Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Civil war erupted in the country in mid-April 2023 over disputes surrounding military reform and the future configuration of Sudan’s political system. Since then, more than 14 million Sudanese have been displaced inside and outside the country. Tens of thousands have been killed and more than half of the population – around 21 million people – are facing acute hunger. Meanwhile, the battlefield has produced a de facto territorial split. The army and its allies remain entrenched in eastern, northern and central Sudan, including the capital, Khartoum. The RSF controls much of western Sudan, including all Darfur states. Active fighting is now largely concentrated in Kordofan, which lies between the two zones of control. The region represents 20% of Sudan’s territory, extends over roughly 390,000 square kilometres and has a population of around 8 million. Based on my research on Sudan’s political and conflict dynamics, I argue that the prospects for the Quad-led initiative remain limited in the short term, even if it could, over time, help pave the way for a ceasefire. Continued military escalation, deep mistrust between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary forces, and the army’s refusal to legitimise the RSF undermine prospects for de-escalation. Additionally, regional and international actors have yet to generate sufficient pressure for peace. Competing regional interests and continued external support for the warring parties reduce incentives for compromise. As a result, the most realistic outcome for now is a temporary humanitarian pause rather than a lasting political settlement. The obstacles The latest Quad framework has five main parts: 1. An immediate ceasefire 2. Unhindered humanitarian access 3. Civilian protection 4. The launch of a political process leading to civilian governance 5. A reconstruction pathway supported by a pledged US$1.5 billion. Media leaks suggest the proposal includes coordinated withdrawals by Sudanese warring parties from major cities. Under the proposal, the RSF would pull back from key positions in South Kordofan and around El-Obeid, the closest RSF-controlled area to Khartoum. Army units in the capital would, meanwhile, be replaced by local police as part of efforts to prepare urban centres for civilian governance. A UN-led mechanism would monitor the ceasefire and secure humanitarian corridors. Despite the seriousness of this proposal, developments on the ground indicate that neither side is ready to de-escalate. The biggest obstacles continue to be: 1. The army’s refusal to legitimise the RSF Within hours of the initiative’s announcement, army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan publicly reiterated that he would not accept any political or military role for the RSF. This stance aligns with reports that senior army figures objected to key provisions of the Quad proposal, particularly those allowing the RSF to retain local governance structures in areas under its control to facilitate aid delivery. For the army, recognising such arrangements would amount to legitimising the RSF as a political actor. 2. The army’s broader insistence that it alone should oversee any reform of Sudan’s military institutions This is the very issue that triggered the war in 2023. 3. Escalation on the battlefield Neither side appears to be preparing for withdrawals. On the contrary, recent weeks have seen escalating clashes and the opening of new fronts. For instance, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North, an RSF ally, has launched new attacks against army forces in Blue Nile state. At the same time, the army has succeeded in lifting sieges on key towns in South Kordofan that had been encircled by the RSF for nearly two years. This increasingly complex military map makes agreement on withdrawal zones exceptionally difficult. 4. Deep mistrust between the warring parties This mistrust derailed previous efforts. In May 2023, the US-Saudi mediated Jeddah agreement collapsed after both sides reneged on commitments to withdraw from civilian areas. 5. External actors are not yet incentivising peace Regional and international dynamics remain a major obstacle. This includes some of the Quad’s members, who publicly endorse a ceasefire even as battlefield realities suggest otherwise. These actors have repeatedly denied accusations of providing military support to one side or the other. As long as both Sudanese warring parties retain access to regional backing, there is little incentive to halt the fighting. Continued war allows them to compete over territory and extract resources while sidelining any meaningful civilian political alternative. Chances of breakthrough A breakthrough is possible. But it won’t happen quickly. A meaningful shift would require stronger international pressure. Washington appears to be moving gradually in this direction as part of a broader effort to consolidate western influence in Sudan while curbing rival regional and global actors. This is happening most notably amid concerns over Russia’s reported interest in establishing a naval facility in Port Sudan. A pillar of this approach is drying up the drivers of war, especially arms flows. In December 2025, the US Congress passed legislation expanding American intelligence engagement in Sudan to monitor and expose external actors fueling the conflict. The language of the bill suggests that all suppliers are potential targets. In this context, media leaks about external involvement in Sudan can be seen as a form of political pressure on arms suppliers. This places current providers in a difficult position: either align with Washington’s framework or risk confrontation with it. Regional actors may gradually follow suit if Washington demonstrates sustained resolve. Egypt, in particular, could pivot towards a ceasefire as the conflict edges closer to Blue Nile state near Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam, a core national security concern for Cairo. These dynamics could eventually restrict external military support to both Sudanese parties, narrowing their options and increasing the geopolitical cost of continued war. In this context, maintaining current suppliers of Russian, Chinese and Iranian weapons could provoke countermeasures by Washington and its allies, a costly gamble for both sides. Over time, this may push the army and the RSF towards negotiations, at least to secure a humanitarian ceasefire.

I. Introduction Oil prices are climbing amid signs that the US may plan to launch military strikes on Iran, raising questions about the potential economic fallout of heightened conflict in the Middle East. US President Trump has increased pressure on Iran, home to some of the world’s largest oil reserves, over the country’s disputed nuclear program. Open hostilities between the US and Iran could restrict global oil flows, raising US energy prices and driving up inflation, according to economists. While President Trump hasn‘t yet made a final decision about whether to strike Iran, top national security officials have told the president that the US military could be ready as soon as Saturday on February 21, 2026, sources familiar with the discussions have told CBS News. At the inaugural meeting for President Trump’s “Board of Peace” on Thursday, February 19, 2026, the president said that Iran has about 10 days to make a deal ending its nuclear program, or “bad things will happen.” [1] If the US carries out military strikes on Iran, it can create a lot of economic problems. This paper first examines the situations of US military build up around Iran and then explores the scenarios of oil supply disruption when the US carries out military strikes on Iran and its impact on global oil price. II. US Military Build-Up around Iran As US President Donald Trump considers a major military strike on Iran, US military has accelerated weeks-long buildup of military hardware in the Middle East. As Figure 1 shows, the arrival of the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, now off the coast of Oman, about 700km (430 miles) from Iran, represents the most dramatic shift in military positioning. As Figure 2 shows, the Abraham Lincoln, a nuclear-powered Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, together with three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers forms a carrier strike group, plus two destroyers capable of conducting long-range missile strikes and three specialist ships for combat near to the shore that are currently positioned at Bahrain naval station in the Gulf. Figure 1: US military presence around Iran (Congressional Research Service, Airframes.io, Flightradar24, Planet Labs PBC, Airbus Figure 2: The USS Abraham Lincoln Strike Group (source: Al Jazeera) In addition, the USS Abraham Lincoln strike group includes the carrier air wing of squadrons of F-35C Lightning II fighters, F/A-18E Super Hornet fighters, and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets. According to BBC, two other destroyers have also been seen in the eastern Mediterranean near the Souda Bay US base, and one more in the Red Sea. Moreover, the world’s largest warship is heading towards the Middle East. As Figure 3 shows, the USS Gerald R Ford passed through the Strait of Gibraltar towards the Mediterranean on February 20, 2026 and is expected to arrive off Israel’s coast and dock in Haifa, Israel on Friday, February 27, 2026. BBC confirmed the USS Mahan, one of the destroyers in the USS Gerald R Ford’s strike group, passed through the Strait. The Gerald R Ford had briefly broadcast its location off Morocco’s Atlantic coast on last Wednesday. [2] Figure 3: The USS Gerald R Ford Strike Group (source: Al Jazeera) The arrival of two of the 11 aircraft carriers operated by US Navy adds to what we know about the military build-up in the Middle East over the past few weeks. Both Abraham Lincoln and Gerald R Ford lead strike groups with several guided missile destroyer warships. They are operated by over 5,600 crews and carry dozens of aircraft. Moreover, according to intelligence analysts and military flight-tracking data, the US appears to have deployed more than 120 aircraft to the region within the past few days – the largest surge in US airpower in the Middle East since the Iraq war in 2003. BBC confirmed the movements of large numbers of US aircraft to both Middle Eastern and European airbases, including: [3] • E-3 Sentry command and surveillance aircraft designed to coordinate large-scale operations • F-22 and F-35 fighter jets • KC-46 and KC-135 refueling tankers used to support the long-range movement of other aircraft • C-5M strategic transport aircraft, the largest in the US Air Force, used for cargo and personnel • C-17A heavy-lift military transport aircraft used for delivering troops and cargo • Navy P-8A patrol and reconnaissance jets used for long-range anti-submarine warfare Recently, attention has focused on Diego Garcia, the joint US-UK military base in the Indian Ocean’s Chagos Islands, which is capable of hosting long-range US strategic bombers, including B-2 aircraft. As Figure 4 shows, the remote base has historically served as a launch point for major US air campaigns in the Middle East. It could be used for US military attacks against Iran. However, Diego Garcia is a British sovereign territory leased to the US, meaning that UK must approve its use for offensive operations. According to reports in UK media, Prime Minister Keir Starmer has indicated to President Trump that the US cannot use British airbases – including Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford in the UK, which is home to the US’s heavy bomber fleet in Europe – for strikes on Iran, as this would violate international law. Figure 4: Diego Garcia (source: TheCradleCo) III. Scenarios of oil supply disruption Crude oil prices have fluctuated in recent days along with media headlines about potential US military strikes on Iran, as a second round of talks between US and Iranian representatives concluded on February 17, 2026 without resolving underlying disputes. Although US and Iran held a third round of nuclear talks in Geneva on February 26, 2026, the chances of a deal that could avert a war remain unclear. As Figure 5 shows, international benchmark WTI crude oil prices climbed to $66.618 (USD/Bbl) on February 20 and $66.30 on February 25, 2026. Figure 5: Crude oil WTI prices, 2026 (source: Trading Economics) On the other hand, Brent crude oil futures rebounded 2% to above $70 per barrel on February 25, 2026, reversing earlier losses. Figure 6: Brent crude oil future, 2026 (source: Trading Economics) During Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025, joined by the US in Operation Midnight Hammer, Gulf oil exports avoided major disruption. As the Twelve-Day War transpired, Iran perceived that it was not facing an existential crisis, as its oil exports continued unimpeded, and Iran made no attempt to target Arab Gulf oil assets or shipping. Fast forward to today-the Islamic Republic of Iran faces unprecedented vulnerability following the blows inflicted by Israel, including the degradation of Hezbollah’s capabilities, and more recently, the biggest wave of anti-government protests in its 47-year history. Meanwhile, US president Trump is publicly escalating rhetoric by assembling significant military assets in the Gulf region, pressuring the Iranian regime to accept US demands, and personally threatening Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Therefore, if hostilities between Iran and the US or Israel, resume, Iran may indeed perceive an existential threat, bringing its counterthreat against regional oil supplies into play. Six oil-producing countries in the Middle East depend on unimpeded shipping access via the Strait of Hormuz to reach world oil markets, as Figure 7 shows. Their relative dependency on the strategic waterway is shown in Table 1 below. Figure 7: Map of the Strait of Hormuz (source: BOE report) According to Table 1, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar depend on the Strait of Hormuz 100 percent for the exports of their crude oil, while Iraq depends 97 percent and Saudi Arabia 89 percent. If there are problems with the Strait of Hormuz resulting from US-Iran conflicts, therefore, oil supply disruption could take place. Table 1: Middle East Gulf Oil Exporters’ Reliance on Strait of Hormuz   According to Clayton Seigle at CSIS, there are four oil supply disruption scenarios worth considering. [4] Scenario 1: Iran disrupts Arab Gulf oil shipping If the US strikes Iran, then Iran could disrupt oil shipping of Arab Gulf countries. This campaign would likely target Gulf export flows transiting the Strait of Hormuz, in which the outbound and inbound shipping lanes are only two miles wide. Iran could attempt to divert or seize control of oil tankers, or strike them outright using fast attack aircraft, anti-ship missiles, drones, or naval mines. Up to 18 million barrels per day-perhaps far less-of non-Iranian crude oil and refined petroleum products could be throttled or temporarily halted. This scenario might see several million barrels per day disrupted for a period of weeks until US naval forces could neutralize sea- and shore-based threats to energy cargo flows. Oil prices would initially spike with surging freight and insurance rates, and with some ship operators likely fleeing the region, further reducing export capacity. As traders assess the volume and duration of a physical disruption, crude oil prices could rise past $90 per barrel, pushing US retail gasoline prices well above $3 per gallon on a national average basis (some regions much higher). Fortunately, this chain of events is reversible; Iran could call off its disruptive activities at any time, or global forces could quell their attempts at interruption, enabling Gulf export volumes to rebound. Scenario 2: Iran directly attacks Arab Gulf oil facilities If the US strikes Iran, then Iran could directly attacks oil facilities in Arab Gulf countries. As Figure 8 shows, these attacks could include producing fields, gathering and processing nodes, or oil export terminals. Figure 8: Oil and Gas fields and Infrastructure in the Middle East (source: Javier Campos) In this scenario, a substantial portion of the 18 million barrels per day non-Iranian oil exports from the Gulf region, depending on which assets might be taken offline and for how long, could be at stake. Moreover, potentially millions more barrels per day in the affected countries’ domestic crude feedstocks and refined product supply would be at risk. This scenario could lead to a historically unprecedented oil price spike, potentially higher than the $130 per barrel that was touched in 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine. The oil supply at risk at that time was approximately 5 million barrels per day. Like Scenario 3, this case could see oil facilities heavily damaged or even destroyed, removing export capacity for a protracted period. This is true not only for onshore infrastructure, but also for offshore loading platforms, which constitute a critical bottleneck in export capacity. One example of this vulnerability is that Iraq’s entire Gulf export flow of 3.5 million barrels per day depends on offshore loading facilities very close to Iranian territorial waters. These offshore loading points may take considerable time to repair - an Ukrainian attack on a similar offshore loading platform at the Black Sea’s Caspian Pipeline Consortium on November 29, 2025 terminal knocked 500 thousand barrels per day - a third of the terminal’s output - offline for several months. Onshore facilities are also vulnerable but may be repaired faster, depending on the repair resources available. For instance, the September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq crude oil processing facility initially disrupted approximately 5 million barrels per day, but most of that volume was restored in less than two weeks after rapid repair efforts. Scenario 3: US or Israel directly attacks Iranian oil facilities If President Trump order the US military to attack Iran, then US (and with Israel) forces could attack not only Iranian military facilities, but also Iranian oil facilities. In this scenario, US naval and air forces would strike Kharg Island and its supply lines, offshore production platforms, and (less likely) Iran’s oil refineries. As Figure 9 shows, Iran’s export terminal at the Kharg Island accounts for nearly all of its 1.6 million barrels per day average export volume. Kharg could be taken offline in several ways, including destroying or disabling its ship loading equipment (pumps, hoses, and connecting hardware), damaging its oil storage tanks, or cutting off the flow of oil that reaches Kharg via subsea pipelines. Figure 9: Kharg Island (source: https://catalystias.org.in/english/Kharg-Island) Choke points for oil deliveries to the Kharg Island include the onshore Ghurreh booster station, the manifold station at Ganaveh, and the pipelines themselves. Not only are Iran’s 1.6 million barrels per day crude oil exports (if limited to Kharg) at stake, but also its additional 1.5 million barrels per day of domestic oil production (should platforms/fields be targeted) and its domestic supply of transportation fuels such as gasoline (if refineries are damaged). The oil price impacts would likely be greater than the $10–12 per barrel spike anticipated with scenario 1 for two reasons: (1) damage to or destruction of Iranian infrastructure could keep barrels off the oil market for a protracted period of time (potentially offset by activation of OPEC spare production capacity), and (2) anticipation of a further escalation by Iran with something like scenario 4 (described below). This track, therefore, might take oil prices above $100 per barrel. [5] Scenario 4: US or Israel Disrupts Iranian Crude Oil Shipments If President Trump order the US military to attack Iran, then US (and with Israel) forces could attack not only Iranian military facilities, but also Iranian oil facilities. This could take the form of blockading or seizing Kharg Island, the main facility for loading Iranian oil onto ships, and seizing oil tanker vessels transporting Iranian crude oil. This could disrupt up to 1.6 million barrels per day of Iranian crude oil exports, all of which go to China. However, since oil is a global, fungible commodity, a disruption anywhere influences prices everywhere. A loss of Iranian barrels might cause China to bid for substitute supplies, probably worth at least a $10–12 increase in the global price of crude oil. This scenario is reversible, meaning that the US or Israel could call off its campaign against Iranian shipments at any time with no permanent damage having been incurred and export volumes rebounding thereafter, like what was seen after the US quarantine on Venezuelan oil shipments. Insurance and war-risk premiums could keep prices elevated longer than any physical supply interruption. Limitation of Hormuz Bypass Potential Oil export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz handle only a fraction of daily Gulf exports. As Figure 10 shows, Saudi Aramco’s East-West Pipeline connects Saudi Arabia’s oil production centers in the Eastern Province with the Red Sea Yanbu Port. The pipeline could reroute some barrels from the Gulf to the Red Sea, but only in reduced volumes. The pipeline has a capacity of 5 million barrels per day. But it is already supplying Yanbu with close to 800 thousand barrels per day for export cargoes, and likely supplying six Saudi Aramco refineries in western and central Saudi Arabia with about 1.8 million barrels per day. That would leave only approximately 2.4 million barrels per day of spare capacity in the pipeline, compared to Saudi Arabia’s typical 6 million barrels per day from its Gulf terminals - enabling the rerouting of less than half of its Gulf exports. Figure 10: Saudi Aramco’s East-West pipeline (source: EIA) As Figure 11 shows, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may reroute about half of its 2 million barrels per day of Gulf exports via pipeline to its port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. The port of Fujairah already accounts for approximately one-third of the UAE’s total 3.2 million barrel per day export volume, implying that the remaining third (1 million barrels per day) might remain stranded in a Hormuz closure. Other Gulf oil-exporting countries—Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq (5.7 million barrels per day total volume)—have no Hormuz bypass capacity; likewise, there’s no other outlet for Qatar’s 10 billion cubic feet per day of LNG exports. Figure 11: UAE’s oil pipeline (source: EIA) Evaluation of the Scenarios US President Trump faces a dilemma in how to confront Iran without incurring an unwanted oil supply disruption and gasoline price spike. In Operation Midnight Hammer and in the operation to capture Venezuela president Nicholas Maduro, Trump selected military options with low risk of negative consequences (in terms of US casualties and energy price increases). But scenarios 1 and 2, described in this paper, afford Iran leverage that could deter Trump from undertaking a major military operation against Iran. This is because in scenarios 1 and 2, Iran could disrupt the supply and export of crude oil of Gulf countries. Meanwhile, Israel, which launched the Twelve-Day War against Iran in summer of 2025, remains a wildcard. [6] The US certainly has a large list of Iranian targets for kinetic action, many of which may not involve energy. Insofar as oil leverage may be used as part of a pressure campaign against Iran, it is likely to start with scenario 1 (US or US/ Israel, disrupts Iranian crude oil shipments), and Iran will face a dilemma about how to respond. If Iran pursues Scenario 1 (Iran disrupts Arab Gulf oil shipping), the US will seek to neutralize Iran’s naval and shore-based anti-ship capabilities, leaving Iran with only scenario 2 (Iran directly attacks Arab Gulf oil facilities) left to employ—one that could cause the US to carry out scenario 3 (US/Israel directly attack Iranian oil facilities)—and seek the regime’s outright defeat or destruction. Iran’s “use it or lose it” dilemma could provoke a miscalculation in Iran, resorting to scenario 2 (Iran directly attacks Arab Gulf oil facilities) as its last card to play to stave off defeat. IV. Conclusion This paper examined the scenarios of oil supply disruption when the US carries out military strikes on Iran. In doing so, this paper first showed US military build-up around Iran and then proposed 4 scenarios of oil supply disruption and evaluated them. The largest oil supply disruption and the resulting highest oil price surge are likely to happen in scenario 2 when Iran attacks oil facilities in the Gulf region and scenario 3 when the US attacks oil facilities in the Kharg Island of Iran. References [1] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-us-conflict-impact-on-oil-inflation/ [2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1d64p3q2d0o [3] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1d64p3q2d0o [4] https://www.csis.org/analysis/if-trump-strikes-iran-mapping-oil-disruption-scenarios [5] https://www.csis.org/analysis/if-trump-strikes-iran-mapping-oil-disruption-scenarios [6] https://www.csis.org/analysis/if-trump-strikes-iran-mapping-oil-disruption-scenarios

SECRETARY RUBIO: Well, thank you for allowing me to come. As you can imagine, last night we had the State of the Union; it was two hours, the speech, and then we got on a plane and came here. And when I told my colleagues I needed to come here to Saint Kitts and Nevis on a work trip, they were like, “Oh, sure, you’re going on a work trip.” (Laughter.) But in fact it is, with our important partners, allies, and friends from the region, and I want to thank you for giving me this small opportunity to share some time with you and to be a part of this gathering. I don’t know when the last time – you said 10 years ago was the last time all the members were together, or the last time a secretary of state joined you? MODERATOR: They told me 10 years ago. That is what I am told. SECRETARY RUBIO: I was hoping it had been some 30 years since a secretary of state came. (Laughter.) Anyway, I’m happy to be here. This is – in many ways, the Caribbean Basin is home for me, having grown up and lived almost the entirety of my life in Miami, and during my career in the United States Senate followed very carefully the issues that impact this region. And I am very happy to be in an administration that’s giving priority to the Western Hemisphere after largely being ignored for a very long time. There’s extraordinary opportunities. We share two things: We share common opportunities, and we share some common challenges. And that’s what we hope to confront. I want to start out by saying that I’m also happy to be part of an administration that is not constrained by outdated orthodoxy, outdated boilerplate platitudes about partnerships and the like. We are interested in rebuilding and constructing a new dynamic in this Western Hemisphere in which we partner with all of you on the issues we share in common. I won’t go long. I don’t want to go long, but I want to touch upon a few of those because I think they’re important and they impact the broader Americas. The first is the one I’ve shared with many of you individually and will share with you again now: We believe that perhaps the most urgent security threat in the region – that includes us, but obviously all of you – is the threat of these transnational criminal organizations, many of you – many of whom have funding and power that rival if not exceed that of many of the nation-states that they threaten. We recognize that it is an interlocked challenge that comes from a broader perspective. Number one, they’re obviously fueled by narcotrafficking and other illicit means. Oftentimes, those drugs and the proceeds from those drugs – those drugs are destined for the United States, but the proceeds from those drugs, the money they’re ultimately making, is being made in the streets of our country. This is a danger in the countries that they transit, and it’s ultimately a danger to the national security of the United States. We’ve also watched with alarm at the level of armament that these groups have. We recognize that many of these groups are buying weaponry from the United States, and that we are committed and continue to work very hard with our law enforcement agencies to shut that down. I hope you have seen, both in the case of Haiti but in other dynamics, that we have not shied away, not just from designating groups for what they are – these are terroristic organizations – but even individuals who are responsible for being supportive of them. We’ve also gone after them, and this is something that we have as a shared dynamic. We have a long history of working together on responding to these challenges, but I think our cooperation will have to grow even deeper and our commitment to it will have to grow even stronger because these groups grow stronger. I point you only to something not in the Caribbean Basin, but nonetheless indicative of what we’re – the challenges that we’re facing here, and that is the role that these drug cartels have established for themselves in Mexico. I’m not sure if you’ve seen some of the imagery of these groups after their leader was killed, but they’re out there with full military gear, military weaponry, armed transports – very dangerous. And it is something that we need to address collectively and together. The second thing is there are extraordinary opportunities for economic advancement, to work together on issues like energy. Energy is critical for the future; it’s critical for every economy in order to prosper. Many of the countries represented here today have energy resources that I know you seek to explore responsibly, safely, but in a way that generates wealth and prosperity for your people and your countries, and we want to be your partner in that regard. So that’s another area of – that hopefully we can cooperate on very closely together. And I would add to that that part of the dynamics there is some of the regional – some of the regional opportunities that are occurring. Irrespective of how some of you may have individually felt about our operations and our policy towards Venezuela, I will tell you this, and I will tell you this without any apology or without any apprehension: Venezuela is better off today than it was eight weeks ago. The progress being made there is substantial, and there’s a long ways to go. But the new interim authorities, led by Delcy Rodríguez, have done things that eight or nine weeks ago would have been unimaginable. They have released political prisoners; they have closed Helicoide, which is their most infamous prison of all. They are, for the first time in a long time, generating oil revenue that’s going to the benefit of their people, using those funds not just to make payroll for government services but to purchase medical equipment that’s necessary for their system. There’s a long ways to go, and we’re committed to making it work. We have opened – reopened our embassy in Caracas, where we have an excellent chargé who’s on the ground, along with other government officials, and we intend to continue to build on that. Now, we believe strongly – and I think all of you would share this view – that ultimately, in order for them to take the next step to truly develop that country and to truly benefit from that country’s riches for the benefit of their people, they will need the legitimacy of democratic – fair, democratic elections. But our initial priority in the aftermath of Maduro’s capture was to ensure that there wasn’t instability, that there wasn’t mass migration, that there wasn’t spillover violence, and we believe we have achieved that. Now we are in the process from going from that phase of stability to a phase of recovery. That country needs to recover from a lot of things, including deep, internal fractures, but also some dysfunction that existed in their economic systems. I say all this to you because ultimately we do believe that a prosperous, free Venezuela who’s governed by a legitimate government who has the interests of their people in mind could also be an extraordinary partner and asset to many of the countries represented here today in terms of energy needs and the like, and also one less source of instability in the region. So we expect to work very closely with all of you on that topic as well to the extent possible, and I think it’s related to the topic of security that I highlighted. The third point is just the broader stability of the region. We want the region to be seen. And I include the region of the southern United States, which we know is part of the Caribbean Basin. We want it to be a place that is attractive for inbound investment. Many of you have taken on the – and done a tremendous job of seeking to diversify your economies and continue to seek ways to diversify your economies. To the extent that there are opportunities for American businesses or American investors to be a part of that, we want to facilitate that. We want to be a part of making that happen. Here’s the bottom line: the stronger, the safer, the more prosperous, and the more secure that all of your counties are, the stronger, safer, more secure, and prosperous the United States is going to be. We view our security, our prosperity, our stability to be intricately tied to yours and we are going to evidence in the actions we’re prepared to take and in the priority that we want to give this our intent to follow through on it, which is why I’m here today, which is why I wanted to come here today and interact with all of you collectively and a few of you individually in the time that’s permitted to me. So I want to thank you for this opportunity to address you. I hope that my presence here today serves as a real-world demonstration of our commitment to being your partner, to – I don’t even want to call it resetting relations because it’s really not about a reset. I mean, we have longstanding ties to each of you bilaterally and all of you collectively, but reinvigorating our relationships because we have a lot in common to work on, both opportunities and challenges, and the United States is committed to doing that. And certainly over the next three years and I remain in this post, it will be personal priority to me. It will be one that I will be personally engaged in and it’s one that I hope to leave for my successor, whoever that may be, a very strong and stable relationship that they can continue to build upon as well. So I want to thank you for this opportunity to address you and to join you here today in this gathering. (Applause.)

Amid intensifying regional challenges and weakening multilateral systems, the trans-Tasman alliance must evolve from habit into a deliberately integrated, credible, and strategically agile instrument for regional stability. Each Anzac Day, Australia and New Zealand (NZ) commemorate a shared military history forged in fire. This year also marks the 75th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty, the trilateral pact that still underpins the trans-Tasman alliance. Today, that alliance confronts a new strategic test. The Indo-Pacific is entering a period of overlapping instability — climate disruption, intensifying strategic rivalry, and a fraying rules-based order — that is reshaping regional security. In this environment, the trans-Tasman partnership must become a deliberately integrated strategic instrument, and delay carries growing risk. A Region Under Strain As Rory Medcalf observes, the Indo-Pacific is both a place and an idea. It represents a connected maritime system stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. It is also a strategic framing of the world’s economic engine room and centre of gravity for growth. This prosperity rests on increasingly fragile foundations. Three pressures are converging. First, climate change is a present destabiliser. In our immediate neighbourhood, Pacific leaders consistently identify it as their primary security concern. Rising seas, extreme weather, and resource stress erode governance capacity and heighten vulnerability to external influence. Failure to align security engagement with climate priorities risks alienating partners and opening seams that revisionist actors can exploit. Second, strategic competition between the US and China has intensified. China’s military modernisation and coercive diplomacy reflect a determination to shape the regional order more closely to its interests. Meanwhile, political volatility in Washington has injected uncertainty into alliance structures that have underwritten stability for decades. As Hugh White has long cautioned, Australia cannot assume the permanence of US primacy. This competition plays out as an incremental erosion of a global balance that has long been favourable to Australia and NZ. Third, global institutions are faltering. Paralysis in multilateral forums such as the United Nations Security Council and the World Trade Organisation has reduced predictability for middle and smaller powers. Evelyn Gohreminds us that stability depends not only on power, but on shared understandings and restraint. When the global systems upholding those norms fray, stability relies more heavily on credible regional partnerships described by some as the “middle power moment”. For Australia and NZ, these pressures are immediate. The South-West Pacific, long viewed as strategically benign, is now a contested space. Chinese naval activity in the Tasman Sea has underscored how close major power manoeuvres now sit to Australasian waters. Geography alone is no longer a sufficient deterrent. Rethinking Deterrence Traditional “hub-and-spokes” alliance models are ill-suited to this complexity. Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific must be geometric rather than linear: a web of overlapping principles. For Australia and NZ, this geometry has three pillars. - Distributed denial: Dispersed, interoperable forces complicate adversary planning and raise the cost of coercion. Australia’s emerging “strategy of denial” and NZ’s forward Pacific presence are complementary. But complementarity only deters if it is visibly integrated. As John Blaxland observes, credibility is built through demonstrated coordination, not through parallel effort. - Institutional legitimacy as strategic capital: Political legitimacy is central to deterrence. A dense network of regional partnerships increases the diplomatic cost of coercion. Wellington’s Pacific relationships and emphasis on partnership, including principles derived from Te Tiriti o Waitangi, offer distinctive strengths that can amplify both nations’ regional engagement. - Economic-security integration. In the Indo-Pacific, trade, infrastructure, and maritime security are now deeply enmeshed in geopolitical strategy. Australia and NZ must seek regionally attuned strategies that acknowledge this economic-security entanglement to reinforce both resilience and credibility. Yet this geometry requires scaffolding. Without institutional depth, alignment remains rhetorical. The Complacency Risk The Australia–NZ relationship is uniquely close; “friends, family, and formal allies”, according to the Prime Ministers. Defence interoperability at the tactical level is strong. Intelligence sharing is deep. Cultural ties are dense. Yet, as Wallis and Powles observe, closeness can breed complacency. Strategic asymmetry is growing. Australia’s defence budget and warfighting focus, particularly under AUKUS, far outpace NZ’s more modest capability trajectory. Wellington increasingly aligns procurement and planning with Canberra, yet Australian strategy documents rarely reciprocate the emphasis. Australia’s Indo-Pacific outlook versus NZ’s Pacific-centric framing risks divergent threat perception without deliberate coordination. Also concerning is the “frozen middle” practitioners describe: the gap between high-level rhetoric and frontline integration. Tactical familiarity and political warmth cannot substitute for integrated campaigning, planning, processes, and aligned procurement. In crisis, ambiguity about roles, thresholds, and expectations could slow coordinated action precisely when speed is essential. From Sentiment to Structure If deeper integration is necessary, what should it look like? At the centre should be an Anzac Joint Operating Concept (AJOC): a shared framework guiding how both countries plan, operate, and adapt together across the security spectrum. Not a new treaty or bureaucracy, but a living operating system aligning campaign planning, capability development, digital interoperability, and joint assessments. An AJOC would be a dashboard and a compass. It would define shared strategic effects, establish pre-agreed coordination mechanisms for contingencies, align procurement timelines and training pipelines, and embed joint assessment functions to transform intelligence sharing into shared foresight. It converts complementarity into coherence, while preserving sovereign decision-making. Operational integration must also be matched by political architecture. Australia should align its national power with a National Security Strategy; NZ should anchor its defence capability planning more explicitly in a national military strategy. A biennial bilateral strategic review would institutionalise adaptation. A standing trans-Tasman security council (building on ANZMIN) could provide continuity across electoral cycles. Crucially, deeper integration must be anchored in Pacific legitimacy. A joint Anzac Pacific Strategy, aligned with regional priorities, would signal that trans-Tasman coordination strengthens, rather than sidelines, Pacific voices. A Moment of Opportunity Alliances are not static inheritances; they are instruments that evolve or atrophy. Seventy-five years after ANZUS, Australia and NZ face a different strategic landscape. Increasingly complex security challenges rise against a backdrop of fractured systems of resilience. Declining multilateralism empowers regional partnerships. The trans-Tasman alliance stands at a moment of opportunity. With deliberate institutional reform, clearer strategic alignment, and a shared operating framework, it can become one of the Indo-Pacific’s most credible middle-power anchors: regionally legitimate, operationally coherent, and strategically agile. Amidst a polycrisis, inertia carries a cost. Purposeful integration, by contrast, offers leverage. A stronger Anzac alliance is both achievable and timely; an investment in regional stability that reflects shared interests, shared values, and a shared future. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Abstract The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a 7,200-kilometre multi-modal network connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe, offering a shorter and cost-effective alternative to the Suez Canal. Established in 2000 and expanding with key infrastructure projects like the Rasht-Astara railway, the corridor aims to boost trade volumes significantly by 2030, facilitating faster, cheaper freight movement and enhancing Eurasian integration. Russia and Iran’s collaboration is central, enabling a sanctions-resilient trade route that counters Western dominance and supports economic growth in transit countries. The INSTC also offers environmental benefits, with lower greenhouse gas emissions compared to deep-sea shipping. Strategically, it diversifies Russia’s transport links, reduces dependency on vulnerable Western routes, and strengthens geopolitical ties within the BRICS framework. However, challenges such as infrastructure gaps, sanctions, and regional conflicts persist. For the EU, INSTC presents both opportunities for cheaper trade and risks to its geopolitical influence, necessitating strategic responses to maintain Eurasian connectivity and sanctions effectiveness. Key Words: International Trade, North, South, Europe, geopolitics Introduction The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a 7,200-kilometre multi-modal transportation network involving ships, railways, and roads designed to facilitate freight movement between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe.[1] Established in September 2000 under an agreement signed in St. Petersburg by India, Iran, and Russia, the corridor has since expanded to include additional members, including Belarus, Azerbaijan and several Central Asian countries. [2] Its primary aim is to enhance trade connectivity by linking major cities such as Mumbai, Tehran, Baku, and Moscow, and beyond, offering a shorter and more cost-effective alternative to traditional routes, including the Suez Canal. [3] Source: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-of-the-international-north-south-transport-corridor-instc/ In 2025, container traffic along the eastern route (via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) nearly doubled, supported by discounts of 15 - 80% on shipments, which have been extended through 2026. [4] A milestone occurred in November 2025 when a cargo train from north of Moscow delivered 62 containers to Iran via Central Asia, highlighting the route's viability for India-Central Asia trade. [5] Overall, INSTC freight volumes reached 26.9 million tons in 2024 (19% up from prior years), with rail handling over 12.9 million tons, and projections aim for 15 million tons annually by 2027. [6] The INSTC operates through several interconnected paths. Western Route: from India via sea to Iran's Bandar Abbas port, then by road or rail northward through Iran to Azerbaijan, and onward to Russia. Central Route: involves transit across the Caspian Sea from Iranian ports like Bandar Anzali to Russian ports such as Astrakhan. Eastern Route: connects via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for land-based links to Russia. This setup allows for efficient cargo transit, with railways playing a crucial role, including ongoing projects like the Rasht-Astara railway in Iran, to fully connect the network. [7] Suez and its geopolitical importance The Suez Canal stands as one of the world's most strategically vital maritime chokepoints, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and serving as a critical artery for global trade and energy security. Since its opening in 1869, the Suez Canal has fundamentally transformed global maritime trade patterns and geopolitical relationships. The canal provides the shortest maritime route between Europe and Asia, eliminating the need for the lengthy circumnavigation of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. This strategic positioning has made the canal a focal point of international competition and a critical infrastructure asset whose security is of profound importance to the global economy. [8] The Suez Canal's economic importance cannot be overstated. The waterway attracts approximately 12 - 15% of worldwide trade and about 30% of global container traffic, with more than $1 trillion in goods transiting annually. An average of fifty to sixty ships transit the canal daily, carrying an estimated $3 billion to $9 billion in cargo value. [9] This concentration of trade flow makes the canal a critical node in global supply chains, particularly for trade between Asia and Europe.[10] The canal's strategic role extends beyond general cargo. It handles roughly 9% of global seaborne oil flows (approximately 9.2 million barrels per day) and around 8% of liquefied natural gas volumes. [11] his energy dimension amplifies the canal's geopolitical significance, as disruptions can directly impact global energy markets and prices. [12] The 2021 blockage of the Suez Canal by the Ever Given container ship demonstrated the canal's vulnerability, disrupting global supply chains and highlighting the systemic risks posed by maritime chokepoints. [13] The Suez Canal has long been recognised as a strategic asset of paramount importance. Historical analysis reveals that control of the canal has been central to imperial and regional power projection, particularly during the British Empire's dominance, when the canal was viewed as the "jugular vein of empire". [14] The canal's strategic value was dramatically illustrated during the 1956 Suez Crisis and its closure from 1967 to 1975, events that reshaped regional geopolitics and demonstrated how canal access could be weaponized. [15] Contemporary security challenges continue to underscore the canal's strategic vulnerability. Recent geopolitical threats in the Red Sea, including attacks on commercial shipping, have raised concerns about the canal's security and the potential for regional conflicts to disrupt global trade. [16] These hybrid threats demonstrate how the canal remains a potential flashpoint where regional instability can have worldwide economic consequences. [17] In brief, for the time being, the Suez Canal remains an indispensable component of global maritime infrastructure, whose geopolitical significance extends far beyond its physical dimensions. Its role in facilitating international trade, energy transportation, and strategic mobility ensures that the canal's security and accessibility remain matters of vital international interest. As global trade patterns evolve and new challenges emerge, the canal's strategic importance continues to shape relationships among nations and influence the calculus of regional and global powers. Iran-Russia Collaboration. Can INSTC be a viable alternative to the Suez Canal? In December 2025, Iranian and Russian officials met in Tehran to expedite the corridor, focusing on removing administrative barriers and finalising legal frameworks. Key projects include the Rasht-Astara railway (expected completion by mid-2026) and upgrades to Iranian ports, such as Bandar Abbas. [18] Russia and Iran's collaboration is central to operationalising the INSTC, involving joint infrastructure development, financial investments, and policy coordination to address connectivity gaps. [19] It is against this backdrop that Russia has funded the 162-kilometre Rasht-Astara railway in Iran (with a 1.3 billion euro loan, targeted for completion by 2027), which resolves a critical missing link in the western route by connecting Azerbaijan's rail network to Iran's, enabling seamless transit from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. [20] Iran, in turn, has upgraded ports like Bandar Abbas and Chabahar (the latter through a 10-year agreement with India signed in May 2024, involving $2.1 billion in investments to expand capacity to 8.5 million tonnes), while Russia has modernised Caspian ports such as Astrakhan and Olya, along with highways like the M6 Caspian and M29 Caucasus. These investments — estimated at 35% of total corridor funding from Russia and 34% from Iran — focus on railway electrification, port expansions, and digital tools such as electronic waybills to streamline border procedures, thereby reducing export times and costs, which are currently 5 - 7 times higher than EU averages. Bilateral agreements, such as the 1992 Russia-Iran transport pact and recent multimodal logistics deals (e.g., between Russian Railways and India's CONCOR for coal shipments via INSTC in June 2024), further support asymmetric trade flows, with north-to-south machinery and chemicals dominating from Russia, and south-to-north foodstuffs from Iran. In terms of international trade, this partnership enhances the INSTC's viability by boosting freight potential to 14.6 - 24.7 million tonnes annually by 2030 (including 5.9 - 11.9 million tonnes containerised, or 325 - 662 thousand TEU), with grains accounting for 8.7 - 12.8 million tonnes primarily via the eastern route through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. For India, the corridor unlocks untapped export opportunities worth up to $180 billion (nine times current levels) to Russia and Central Asia, while Russia's pivot to southern markets (Gulf, India, Africa) has seen bilateral trade with India surge to over $30 billion in 2022, driven by hydrocarbons. Iran's role as a transit hub could generate transit revenues exceeding oil income, potentially increasing 20-fold from $1 billion to support economic growth amid high inflation (54.6% in 2023) and unemployment (9.7%). Synergies with other corridors like the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) add 127 - 246 thousand TEU in traffic, fostering Eurasian integration. Geopolitically, Russia-Iran ties make the INSTC a tool to counter Western domination by creating a sanctions-resilient route that avoids U.S.-influenced waterways, especially amid the Ukraine conflict and U.S. sanctions on both nations. This "pivot to the South" by Russia and Iran, and their positioning as a Eurasian bridge, reduce dependence on the Suez Canal, which handles vulnerable global trade, and promote diversified connectivity outside Western frameworks such as TRACECA. Challenges persist, including infrastructure overloads (e.g., 8.8 million tons transported in 2022 despite capacity constraints), uncoordinated policies, gauge differences and sanctions that affect insurance and port access, though exemptions for Chabahar help mitigate these. Overall, the collaboration not only addresses these hurdles through targeted investments and digital harmonisation but also positions the INSTC as a sustainable alternative, with environmental benefits such as 25% lower GHG emissions from rail shifts, comparable to those of deep-sea shipping. How does INSTC serve Russian security interests? In a recent analysis of the subject, Prokhor Tebin offers relevant observations examining the strategic importance of the INSTC within the framework of Russian national security amid intensifying great-power competition. The author argues that Russia’s security and economic resilience depend on developing a cohesive Eurasian transport network through a ‘whole-of-government’ approach that integrates various ministries, regional authorities, and foreign partners. This network includes robust domestic infrastructure and diversified international corridors, with the INSTC being a key route linking Russia to the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran. [21] According to Tebin, Russian national security is defined broadly, encompassing socio-economic development alongside defence. Robust transport infrastructure is vital for economic security, military mobilisation, and rapid crisis response, especially given Russia’s diminished strategic depth and growing threats on multiple borders, including NATO expansion to the west and instability in the south. Against this backdrop, the current overreliance on vulnerable Western transport arteries (the Baltic and Black Seas) underscores the need for alternative routes, such as the INSTC and the Northern Sea Route, to ensure resilience against potential blockades. Furthermore, Tebin stresses the importance of a networked transport system rather than isolated corridors, advocating for coordination via an interdepartmental group to optimise resource allocation and strategic prioritisation. While alternative regional projects exist, such as the Zangezur Corridor and Trans-Caspian routes, Russia should not oppose them outright but seek to enhance its own projects’ competitiveness and foster regional stability, as stable neighbours contribute to Russian security. Iran’s role in the INSTC is pivotal due to its geographic position and economic potential. Supporting Iran’s stability through the corridor reduces regional risks like mass migration and terrorism. The corridor also provides Russia with critical connectivity to the Global South and lessens dependency on NATO-controlled maritime routes. Ultimately, the INSTC, though currently limited in cargo volume, is strategically crucial for diversifying Russia’s transport links, enhancing military and economic security, and fostering Eurasian integration in a complex geopolitical environment characterised by long-term great-power rivalry. Other authors, Vinokurov, Ahunbaev and Zaboev stress the strategic importance and development potential of the INSTC, a multimodal transport network connecting northwestern Europe and the Nordic countries with Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Accordingly, INSTC serves as a crucial alternative to traditional east-west routes by offering faster delivery times, supporting Eurasian economic integration, and enhancing connectivity for landlocked countries in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), four of whose five members are landlocked. The above-mentioned authors estimate that by 2030, the aggregate freight traffic on the INSTC, including containerised and non-containerised goods, could reach 15 – 25 million tonnes, with container traffic potentially increasing twentyfold. The main commodities transported include food products, metals, machinery, textiles, and grain — the latter being the major non-containerised cargo. The corridor’s rail-based transport offers environmental advantages over road and air freight, emitting significantly fewer greenhouse gases. Despite its potential, INSTC faces several challenges: uncoordinated transport policies among member states, international sanctions (notably on Iran), infrastructure bottlenecks, legal and regulatory inconsistencies, border-crossing delays, and differing railway gauges. Overcoming these issues requires improved coordination, infrastructure investments, digitalisation, and streamlined customs and tariff policies. To sum up, fully operationalising the INSTC would transform it from a mere transport corridor into an economic development corridor, fostering regional connectivity, trade expansion, and sustainable growth across Eurasia. It would also help convert landlocked countries into “land-linked” ones, boosting their economic prospects and integrating them into global value chains. Consequently, it raises questions about the future of the EU as a geopolitical actor within the broader West-BRICS context. Possible consequences for the EU Geoeconomically, INSTC could have significant consequences, centred on trade diversion and supply-chain shifts. The corridor promises 30 – 40% reductions in transit time (e.g., 23 days versus 45 – 60 days via Suez) and costs, enabling faster India–Europe flows of pharmaceuticals, textiles, and machinery, as well as Russian energy and agricultural exports to South Asia. [22] Post-2022 Ukraine invasion, volumes have grown amid Russia’s pivot from European markets, with India–Russia trade surging to around US$50 billion. For the EU, this creates dual pressures: potential cost savings for importers accessing Indian goods or Central Asian resources, yet practical barriers from EU and US sanctions on Russia and Iran, which restrict participation and financing. EU ports and logistics hubs (e.g., Rotterdam) risk losing transit volumes as cargo reroutes through sanctioned territories, while the corridor competes with EU-supported alternatives like the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor. [23] The EU’s Global Gateway strategy (€300 billion investment framework) explicitly promotes diversified, sustainable connectivity, allocating funds to bypass Russia - and Iran-dependent routes. Cargo between the EU and India is projected to double by 2032 under the prospective FTA, underscoring the need for reliable non-INSTC pathways. Overall, the INSTC accelerates Eurasian trade reorientation away from Western-dominated chokepoints, modestly eroding EU leverage in global logistics while exposing vulnerabilities to disruptions in sanctioned segments. [24] Geopolitically, the INSTC bolsters a Russia–Iran–India axis within BRICS, serving as a sanctions-circumvention tool that undermines the effectiveness of Western measures. By enabling Russia to monetise its geography for access to the Global South and Iran to gain transit rents, it advances multipolar narratives that challenge EU influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. [25] For Europe, this reduces coercive leverage over Moscow — previously derived from transit dependence — and fragments the rules-based order the EU champions. It also counters EU efforts to deepen ties with India via transparent initiatives like IMEC, potentially tilting New Delhi’s connectivity choices toward sanctioned partners. Challenges include infrastructure gaps (e.g., rail gauge mismatches, Iranian sanctions-induced delays) and regional conflicts (Armenia – Azerbaijan), limiting scalability. Yet momentum persists through bilateral deals, such as Azerbaijan’s financing for Iran’s Rasht–Astara railway. [26] In conclusion, the INSTC presents the EU with limited opportunities for cheaper diversified trade but primarily poses geoeconomic risks of route competition and geopolitical challenges to sanctions efficacy and Eurasian influence. To mitigate, the EU should probably accelerate Global Gateway investments in the Middle Corridor and IMEC, harmonise sanctions enforcement, and engage India on value-aligned connectivity. Failure to do so could accelerate a shift toward BRICS-led corridors, diminishing the EU’s role in shaping 21st-century Eurasian trade architecture. References [1] International North–South Transport Corridor. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_North%E2%80%93South_Transport_Corridor [2] Cross-border Infrastructure International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). (n.d.). Asia Regional Integration Center. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://aric.adb.org/initiative/international-north-south-transport-corridor [3] Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.86617 [4] Aliyev, N. (2025, December 19). Russia’s Pivot to the Eastern Route: Balancing Azerbaijan with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? Iddle. https://ridl.io/russia-s-pivot-to-the-eastern-route-balancing-azerbaijan-with-kazakhstan-and-turkmenistan/ [5] Wani, A. (2025, November 27). INSTC Eastern Corridor: India’s Gateway to Central Asia. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/instc-eastern-corridor-india-s-gateway-to-central-asia [6] Bochkarev, D. (2025, November 27). The North–South Transport Corridor and Energy-Related Exports. Energy Intelligence. https://www.energyintel.com/0000019a-c479-d672-a9be-c77f8c740000 [7] International North–South Transport Corridor. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_North%E2%80%93South_Transport_Corridor [8] Helwa, R., & Al-Riffai, P. (2025, March 20). A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/ [9] Ibidem. [10] Ducruet, C. (2016). The polarization of global container flows by interoceanic canals: geographic coverage and network vulnerability. Maritime Policy & Management, 43(2), 242–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2015.1022612 [11] Helwa, R., & Al-Riffai, P. (2025, March 20). A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/ [12] Rodrigue, J.-P. (2005). Straits, Passages and Chokepoints A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution. Erudit, 48(135). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.7202/011797ar [13] Lee, J. M., & Wong, E. Y. (2021). Suez Canal blockage: an analysis of legal impact, risks and liabilities to the global supply chain. MATEC Web Conf., 339. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202133901019 [14] Morewood, S. (1992). Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy, 1919–1941. War & Society, 10(1), 81–107. https://doi.org/10.1179/072924792791198995 [15] Bhattacharya, S. S. (1982). Strategic Importance of the Suez Canal. Strategic Analysis, 5(12), 686–693. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700168209427575 [16] Kotait, A., & Ismail, A. (2025). Geopolitical Threats in the Red Sea: The Future of the Suez Canal amid Regional and International Challenges. EKB Journal Management System. https://doi.org/10.21608/jces.2025.435103 available here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393195669_Geopolitical_Threats_in_the_Red_Sea_The_Future_of_the_Suez_Canal_amid_Regional_and_International_Challenges [17] Lott, A. (2022). Hybrid Threats and the Law of the Sea Use of Force and Discriminatory Navigational Restrictions in Straits. Brill. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004509368 [18] Iran, Russia Push To Fast-Track North-South Trade Corridor. (2025, December 17). The Media Line. https://themedialine.org/headlines/iran-russia-push-to-fast-track-north-south-trade-corridor/#:~:text=Iran%20and%20Russia%20announced%20that%20they%20aim,Pushing%20the%20project%20into%20an%20operational%20phase [19] Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.86617 [20] Rawandi-Fadai, L. (2023, August 3). What North-South International Transport Corridor Means for Iran. RIAC Russian International. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-north-south-international-transport-corridor-means-for-iran/ [21] Tebin, P. Y. (2026). The International North–South Transport Corridor in Russian National Security Optics. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(1), 134–148. https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-134-148 Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.866171 [22] Fillingham, Z. (2024, September 10). Geopolitics of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-of-the-international-north-south-transport-corridor-instc/ [23] Kausch, K. (2026, February 11). Corridor Politics. Charting Europe’s de-risking route through Eurasia. G M F. https://www.gmfus.org/news/corridor-politics [24] Ghanem, D., & Sánchez-Cacicedo, A. (2024, June 18). From hype to horizon: what the EU needs to know to bring IMEC to life. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/hype-horizon-what-eu-needs-know-bring-imec-life [25] Kausch, K. (2026, February 11). Corridor Politics. Charting Europe’s de-risking route through Eurasia. G M F. https://www.gmfus.org/news/corridor-politics [26] Delivorias, A., & Falkenberg, D. (2024). India's connectivity initiatives: A multi-faceted strategy (EPRS Briefing No. PE 762.471). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/PE-762.471

I. Introduction As Figure 1 shows, Germany’s share of world GDP has declined from 6.99% in 1980 to 2.89% in 2025. Germany, which had been considered to be Europe’s economic powerhouse in previous decades, became the worst-performing major economy in 2023 with a 0.9% contraction, followed by another 0.5% contraction in 2024, leading to a recession. Several economists and business figures expressed concerns that Germany’s economic downturn could cause the country to reclaim its reputation as the “sick man of Europe” from the 1990s. [1] Economists argue that the German economy was in a permanent crisis mode, while the Handelsblatt Research Institute declared that it was in its “greatest crisis in post-war history” after projecting a third consecutive year of recession in 2025. [2]  Figure 1: Germany’s share of world GDP (based on PPP)  As Figure 2 shows, GDP in the United Kingdom in Q3 2025 was 5.2% above its pre-pandemic level of Q4 2019. This compares with Euro-zone GDP being 6.5% higher, with GDP in Germany up by 0.1% (the lowest among G7 economies). The United States has the highest GDP growth among G7 economies over this period at 13.3% (as of Q2 2025).  Figure 2: G7 nations’ GDP growth (source: OECD) With this information in background, this paper explores why the German economy has underperformed and fallen behind. This paper first describes the current economic situation of Germany and explains why the German economy has failed. II. Current economic situations of Germany The German economy has been sluggish. As Figure 3 shows, the average GDP growth rate in Germany during the 2013-2023 period was only 1.1%. And Germany experienced a 0.9% contraction in 2023 and a 0.5% contraction in 2024.  Figure 3: Average GDP growth rate in Germany, 2013-2024 In addition, as Figure 4 shows, the unemployment rate in Germany has recently increased following the Ukraine war. The unemployment rate dropped from 6.2% in January 2016 to 5% in January 2020, but then it rose following the Ukraine war in 2022. Unemployment rate increased from 5% in March 2022 to 5.6% in March 2023 and 6.3 % in December 2025.  Figure 4: Unemployment rate in Germany, 2016-2025 (source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit) Rising energy prices have been a main factor causing serious problems for the German economy. As Figure 5 shows, gasoline price in Germany has increased following the Ukraine war. Gasoline price in Germany averaged 1.73 USD/Liter from 1995 until 2025, but it reached an all-time high of 2.36 USD/Liter in May 2022. Gasoline price declined to 2.05 USD/Liter in December 2025, but it is still higher compared to the previous decade.  Figure 5: Gasoline price in Germany (source: Trading Economics) Moreover, fiscal imbalance has been a big problem for Germany. As Figure 6 shows, consolidated fiscal balance in Germany recorded a huge deficit in the 2020s. The deficit recorded $49,542 billion in January 2023 and $46,923 billion in September 2025, compared with an average of $13,425 billion from March 1991 to September 2025. Figure 6: Germany’s consolidated fiscal balance (source: CEIC Data) As a result, as Figure 7 shows, the German government’s debt as a % of GDP significantly increased in the 2020s. The German government’s debt reached an all-time high of 81% in December 2010 and then declined until 2019, but it started to increase from 2020. The German government’s debt as a % of GDP increased to 65.2% in October 2022.  Figure 7: Government debt in Germany: % of GDP (source: CEIC Data) Investment is a key to economic growth in every country. As Figure 8 shows, overall private investment in Germany has declined in the 2020s, particularly during the period of 2022-2024 after the Ukraine War. In addition, as Figure 9 shows, total government net investment in Germany has declined in the 2020s.  Figure 8: Private investment in Germany, 2010-2024 (Source: ECB, Eurostat, Destatis and European Commission calculations)  Figure 9: Government net investment in Germany, 2010-2024 (Source: ECB, Eurostat, Destatis and European Commission calculations) Reflecting Germany’s recent sluggish economy, as Figure 10 shows, the German manufacturing industry’s business expectation has been negative over the period of 2022-2025 after the Ukraine war.  Figure 10: German manufacturing industry’s business expectation III. Causes of the failure of German economy Why has the German economy failed? Germany’s economic decline can be attributed to multiple factors. The first factor is the energy crisis or energy policy in Germany. Economists cited Germany’s overreliance on cheap Russian gas as one of many primary factors for Germany’s economic stagnation. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Figure 11 shows, 56% of Russia’s gas exports went to Germany. This caused German industry and the broader economy to become dependent on cheap Russian energy.  Figure 11: Russia’s gas exports in 2021 Germany’s phasing out of its established network of nuclear power, a process initiated and led by the Greens and ultimately enforced by the second Merkel government, increased Germany’s dependency on Russian energy. The German government’s decision to phase out its nuclear power was influenced by the high-profile Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Until March 2011, Germany obtained one-quarter of its electricity from nuclear energy, using 17 reactors. The following gap after phasing out of its established network of nuclear power was primarily filled by Russian natural gas, inadvertently increasing dependency on Russian energy. Despite early leadership in renewable energy adoption, Germany’s transition has been hampered by antiquated bureaucratic obstacles, complicated and slow processes for approving projects for renewable energy, and local resistance to infrastructure projects, each discouraging further investment in renewable sectors. As of 2024, renewable sources accounted for just over 52% of the country’s electricity supply, insufficient to meet industrial demands. Germany’s dependency on Russian gas became a vulnerability following the Ukraine War in 2022. The abrupt disruption of Russian energy forced Germany to rapidly diversify its energy sources, leading to a 32.6% reduction in gas imports by 2023. The subsequent sanctions against Russia and supply disruptions led to a 32% increase in Germany’s energy prices, contributing to economic instability and decline. As Figure 12 shows, energy consumer price in Germany skyrocketed in the 2020s following the Ukraine War. Energy consumer price in Germany increased 32% in September 2022 compared to the previous year.  Figure 12: Energy consumer price in Germany (source: OECD) Although energy consumer price in Germany significantly dropped in 2024 and has stabilized afterwards, the damage to industrial competitiveness has been lasting. Energy-intensive industries such as chemicals and metals have shrunk, forcing businesses to either cut production or relocate abroad, thereby contributing to economic decline. The second factor related to the sluggish economy of Germany is the under-development of the tech industry in Germany. Some experts argued that Germany’s economic troubles were partly due to its slow adaptation to technological advancements and shifting to low-productivity sectors, contributing to declining productivity. [3] This issue is about Germany’s insufficient investment in new technologies (computers, artificial intelligence (AI), software, etc.) and the low level of spending on research and development (R&D), compared to other advanced countries such as the US. When we compare OECD countries, we see that these two components have a strong influence on productivity differences between countries. The econometric estimate leads to the following effects: a 1-point increase in the rate of investment in new technologies leads to a 0.8 point increase per year in productivity gains. In a similar way, a 1 point increase in GDP for R&D expenditure leads to a 0.9 point increase per year in productivity gains. [4] As Figure 13 shows, gross domestic spending on R&D as a % of GDP in Germany in 2023 was higher than in many EU countries, but lower than in its Western rivals such as the US, Israel, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland.  Figure 13: Gross domestic spending on R&D as a % of GDP, 2023 Moreover, weak investment in public infrastructure and digitalization has further weakened Germany’s IT sectors. As Figure 14 shows, Germany has long underinvested in public infrastructure, ranking near the bottom among advanced economies in public investment levels.  Figure 14: gross public investment in OECD countries, 2018-2022 (source: IMF) As a result, as Figure 15 shows, there are no German tech firms among the global top 10 most valuable unicorns. The US and China lead the category of global tech unicorns.  Figure 15: Global top 10 Unicorns (source: https://www.hurun.co.uk/hurun-global-unicorn-index-2025#:~:text=In%20contrast%20to%20the%20UK's,the%20US%20and%20China%2C%20including The third factor related to the sluggish economy of Germany is the demographics. As Figure 16 shows, the working-age population in Germany has declined, while old people over 65 have significantly increased.  Figure 16: Age group in Germany (source: UN, World Population Prospects & Financial Times) The IMF posited that the fundamental structural challenges for Germany are accelerating population aging. The country’s working-age population, which had been declining over the three decades, was projected to decline sharply as baby boomers retired. As Figure 17 shows, Germany’s working-age population growth is the lowest among G7 countries. This demographic shift in Germany is expected to decrease GDP per capita, further hinder productivity growth, and cause increased demand for healthcare, potentially forcing workers to go into healthcare away from other sectors.  Figure 17: Working-age population growth, G7 economies (source: IMF) Under this circumstance, shorter working hours increasingly constrain Germany’s labor supply, thereby reducing economic growth. As Figure 18 shows, employees in Germany work shorter hours on average than in any other OECD country.  Figure 18: Employees in Germany work shorter hours on average than in any other OECD country Another issue related to the demographics is the size of the welfare state in Germany. As Figure 19 shows, Germany’s public social spending has expanded and is now at record level. As Figure 20 shows, Germany spent around 30% of its GDP on welfare and social benefits in 2024, placing it among the largest welfare states in Europe, as well as in the world.  Figure 19: German social welfare spending is at record levels, excluding the Covid-19 pandemic (source: OECD, Financial Times)  Figure 20: Welfare and social spending as a % of GDP in 2024 (Source: Eurostat (2024) Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (1998) showed empirically that as the size of general government spending has almost doubled on average in OECD countries from 1960 to 1996, their real GDP growth rates have dropped by almost two thirds on average (see Figure 21). According to them, as public social spending goes up, GDP growth goes down.  Figure 21: High government spending reduces growth Moreover, any increase in welfare costs automatically leads to an increase in non-wage labor costs for employers. Under German law, employers are obliged to cover half of their employees’ insurance contributions. Since the end of the Covid-19 pandemic, as Figure 22 shows, non-wage labor costs have risen at a faster rate than total wages, eating into companies’ profits and reducing the room for wage increases, thereby lowering economic growth.  Figure 22: Costs other than wages have started to make up a greater share of employers’ labor spending (source: Bundesbank & Financial Times) The fourth factor related to the sluggish economy of Germany is exports. Exports have been a driving force for Germany for a long time, but the year-on-year (YoY) exports growth rate indicates a decline over the 2023-25 period after the Ukraine War, as Figure 23 shows.  Figure 23: Year-on-year (YoY) exports growth rate in Germany (source: MacroMicro) In addition, German export performance against global competitors has not been so good, as Figure 24 shows. It was so bad in the 2020s.  Figure 24: Germany’s export performance against global competitors (source: Deutsche Bank Research & OECD) IV. Conclusion This paper showed that the German economy has been in big trouble with sluggish economic growth. This paper explained that the failure of the German economy can be attributed to an energy crisis, as well as underdevelopment of tech industry, a shrinking working-age population and shortest working hours of employees, a large size of welfare state, and sluggish exports. References [1] Germany, which had been considered to be Europe’s economic powerhouse in prior decades, became the worst-performing global major economy in 2023 with a 0.9% contraction, followed by further 0.5% contraction in 2024 leading to recession. [2] Partington, Richard (15 January 2024). "Germany on track for two-year recession as economy shrinks in 2023". The Guardian. [3] Fletcher, Kevin; Kemp, Harri; Sher, Galen (27 March 2024). "Germany's Real Challenges are Aging, Underinvestment, and Too Much Red Tape". International Monetary Fund. [4] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-falling-behind-the-usa/