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Defense & Security
K2 Black Panther - South Korean basic tank. Hyundai Rotem concern has offered the Polish army a K2 model adapted to its needs along with full technology transfer

The Development of South Korea’s Tanks and the Global Competitiveness of the K2 Black Panther

by World and New World Journal

1. Introduction Since the Korean War, South Korea had long relied on U.S.-made tanks, but in the 1970s it launched a full-scale domestic tank development program under the principle of self-reliant national defense. As a result, beginning with the K1 tank, the country gradually increased its localization rate, and today it has fielded the highly advanced K2 Black Panther, placing itself among the world’s leading tank powers. However, when compared to major tanks competing in the global defense market, a comprehensive analysis is still required not only in terms of performance, but also in cost-effectiveness and export competitiveness. This study examines the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and analyzes the performance of the K2 in comparison with other global competitors to highlight its export potential and strategic significance. 2. Early Background: The Korean War – Early 1970s During the Korean War 1950-1953, North Korean forces launched their invasion spearheaded by the Soviet Union’s best-selling tank, the T-34. In contrast, South Korea did not possess a single tank at the time. The power of the T-34 allowed the North Korean army to advance rapidly in the early stages of the war. However, the arrival of U.S. ground forces changed the situation. The M24 Chaffee light tank was the first to be deployed, followed by the M4 Sherman medium tank, the M26 Pershing heavy/medium tank, and the M46 Patton medium tank, all of which overwhelmed the North Korean forces. Thanks to this reinforcement, the Nakdong River defensive line was held, and the tide of the war shifted in favor of the UN forces. Additionally, by late 1950, the British Army had committed its renowned A41 Centurion tanks to the conflict. After the war, in 1959, South Korea received the M47 Patton tank from the United States as part of its allied support policy and broader equipment modernization program. After the war, South Korea relied on U.S. assistance until 1970 to accumulate experience in operating and maintaining tanks. In particular, in 1966, when the M48 Patton tanks were provided by the United States, South Korea also received a Technical Data Package (TDP), which included key technology transfers alongside major upgrades. Through this, South Korea acquired comprehensive expertise in armor casting and welding, production processes, precision manufacturing and assembly, as well as quality inspection and testing. This foundation became a crucial stepping stone for the subsequent development of the Korean tank industry. 3. Development of the K1 Indigenous Tank: 1970s–1980s Under President Park Chung-hee’s policy of self-reliant national defense, South Korea launched the Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) program in 1975 in cooperation with the United States. Following the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1978, full-scale development began. The design direction was set to base the new tank on the form and performance of the U.S. Army’s latest third-generation tank at the time, the M1 Abrams. Chrysler Defense (now GDLS), the manufacturer of the M1, participated in the project, while South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development and Hyundai Precision (now Hyundai Rotem) worked together to create a smaller, terrain-optimized “Little Abrams” for the Korean Peninsula. In April 1984, two prototypes were produced, and after passing a series of tests, mass production began in 1985. The production K1 tank was armed with a 105 mm rifled gun and equipped with a 1,200 horsepower German MTU-series diesel engine, built with General Dynamics technology. A key feature was the adoption of a hydropneumatic suspension system, allowing adjustable ground clearance suited for Korea’s mountainous terrain. The tank weighed 51.5 tons, carried a crew of four, and a total of 1,026 units were produced between 1985 and 1997. During its service, the upgraded K1A1 variant was developed, featuring a 120 mm smoothbore gun, improved fire-control systems, and enhanced armor protection. A total of 484 K1A1s were produced between 1996 and 2008. Subsequent modernized versions, the K1E1 and K1E2, have ensured that the K1 series continues to serve as a core component of the South Korean Army’s armored forces. 4. The K2 Black Panther: 2000s – Present Beginning in 1996, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces acquired 68 T-80U tanks from Russia as repayment for an economic cooperation loan. At the time, the T-80U was Russia’s latest main battle tank, and for South Korean engineers, who had previously only worked with U.S.-made tanks, it provided a valuable opportunity to gain direct experience with a new model. The lessons learned from operating the T-80U contributed significantly to the later development of the K2 tank. After the Ministry of National Defense announced its next-generation tank program in 1992, a system concept study was carried out in 1995, followed by exploratory development in 1998. In 2003, full-scale system development began. By 2007, three prototypes were unveiled for operational testing and evaluation, and mass production was initially scheduled to begin in 2012. However, issues arose during the development of the domestic powerpack (engine and transmission). These included an engine protection temperature setting error, which failed to safeguard the engine from overheating, and insufficient cooling fan speed in the transmission at maximum output, which led to inadequate cooling. Despite multiple redesigns, persistent problems in performance and reliability testing delayed deployment. As a result, the first production batch of 100 K2 tanks was equipped with Germany’s MTU engines and RENK transmissions instead of the domestic powerpack. These vehicles began delivery to the ROK Army in April 2014. By September 2014, the domestic engine had passed the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s evaluation, and the second batch of 106 tanks and the third batch of 54 tanks were produced with a “hybrid powerpack”—a Korean-made engine combined with a German transmission. Starting with the fourth production batch, SNT Dynamics’ domestic transmission was successfully integrated, completing full localization of the K2 powerpack. Unlike its predecessor, the K1, which had been developed under the leadership of General Dynamics and relied heavily on U.S. components, the K2 Black Panther is a fully indigenous South Korean tank. With domestically developed engines and transmissions, it achieved a high localization rate, giving South Korea independence from U.S. and German export restrictions and allowing greater freedom in operating and exporting its tanks. As South Korea’s most advanced tank, the K2 incorporates cutting-edge technologies that set it apart from its predecessors. These include a 120 mm smoothbore gun, an active protection system (APS), an autoloader, and stealth features, delivering superior mobility, protection, and firepower. Today, it stands as a core asset of the South Korean Army. Specifications (K2 Black Panther):Crew: 3Weight: 55 tonsEngine: Doosan Infracore DV-27K diesel engineTransmission: SNT Dynamics EST15K automatic transmissionMain Gun: Hyundai WIA 120 mm smoothbore CN08Fire Control System: South Korean domestic technologyArmor: Korean-developed composite armor  5. Timeline of South Korea’s Tank Development: From U.S. Aid to the K2 The introduction and development of tanks in the ROK Army have been organized in a chronological timeline with images. This timeline is designed to provide a clear overview of the entire progression — from U.S. aid tanks, to tanks acquired from Russia, and finally to the development of indigenous Korean tanks.   6. K2 vs. Regional Main Battle Tanks — Performance Comparison Tank performance can be compared across four key categories: Mobility, Firepower, Protection, and Sensors & C4I. MobilityComponents: engine & transmission (powerpack), suspension, roadwheels, sprockets, tracks, and fuel systems.Role: determines speed, acceleration, cross-country mobility, and operational range. Maintainability (ease of maintenance and access) is also included here. FirepowerComponents: main armament (gun) — barrel and mantlet, stabilization system, autoloading/manual loading systems, coaxial and anti-aircraft machine guns, ammunition stowage.Role: defines ability to defeat enemy armor and other targets, hit probability (integrated with the fire-control system), and ammunition variety (e.g., APFSDS, HE).ProtectionComponents: baseline composite/steel armor, explosive reactive armor (ERA), active protection systems (APS), smoke generation, fire suppression and NBC protection, and crew survivability compartments.Role: protects crew and systems from penetration, fragmentation, anti-tank weapons, and environmental threats.Sensors & C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)Components: fire-control system (FCS), thermal and night sights, laser rangefinder, communications suites, electronic warfare and laser warning receivers, and power-management systems.Role: responsible for target acquisition, firing accuracy, and networked combat — i.e., information sharing with friendly forces.Below is a comparison of the K2 and the region’s current main battle tanks.    The K2 Black Panther is regarded as a world-class main battle tank, demonstrating well-balanced excellence in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic systems compared to neighboring countries’ tanks. 7. South Korea’s Tank Export Outlook and Key CasesWhile exports of the K1 tank were restricted due to U.S. technology regulations, the K2 tank—developed with fully indigenous Korean technology—became eligible for overseas sales. In 2022, South Korea successfully signed a contract with Poland, and negotiations are currently underway with countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, signaling the expansion of Korean tanks into the global defense market. 7.1. Turkish Joint Development of the Altay Tank Based on the K2 (USD 540 million)In 2007, South Korea signed a design support and technology transfer contract with Turkey for the development of the Altay main battle tank. Under this agreement, South Korea transferred several core technologies derived from the K2 tank, including:- 120 mm CN08 smoothbore gun technology (Korean-produced main gun)Advanced armor and composite equipment design consultation and production support- Powerpack (engine + transmission) technology transfer and testing: the Altay successfully completed durability trials with the HD Hyundai Infracore engine and SNT Dynamics transmission The Altay is scheduled to enter full-scale mass production in 2025, with an initial production run of 250 units and a long-term goal of building up to 1,000 tanks. 7.2. K2 Export to Poland: First Batch of 180 Units (USD 3.4 billion), Second Batch of 180 Units (USD 6.5 billion) In 2022, the K2 tank was selected by Poland over strong competitors such as Germany’s Leopard 2A7 and the U.S. M1A2 Abrams. The key factors behind this successful export were as follows: - Rapid delivery and phased supply: South Korea demonstrated its ability to deliver tanks within a very short timeframe. Following the 2022 contract, the first batch of 10 units was delivered within the same year. By contrast, competitors faced production line bottlenecks, raising concerns over delivery delays. - Modern design with European upgrade potential: The K2 features a 120 mm 55-caliber smoothbore gun, an autoloader, an active protection system (APS), and hydropneumatic suspension—technologies equal to or in some cases more advanced than those found in Europe’s latest MBTs. Moreover, South Korea promised to develop a localized version, the K2PL, through joint development with Poland, tailored to Polish requirements. - Local production and technology transfer: South Korea offered local production of the K2PL, guaranteeing the participation of Polish defense industries, along with technology transfer, industrial cooperation, and the prospect of using Poland as a base for future exports. - Cost competitiveness: Despite being a state-of-the-art tank, the K2 is relatively more affordable than the M1A2 or Leopard 2A7. Maintenance and sustainment costs are also projected to be lower than those of European tanks, giving the K2 a strong reputation as a “cost-effective MBT” with excellent value for performance. - Tactical versatility and advanced systems: Equipped with an autoloader, hydropneumatic suspension, and advanced smart fire-control systems, the K2 offers outstanding adaptability across diverse operational environments, including mountainous terrain, urban warfare, and extreme cold.Through this deal, South Korea and Poland established a relationship that goes beyond a simple arms sale, building long-term defense industry partnership and mutual trust. Potential export destinations for the K2 include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Morocco, and India. 8. Comparison of Tanks from Export Competitor Nations South Korea’s K2 tank has attracted global attention for its outstanding performance, but the international tank market is already dominated by several major players.This chapter analyzes and compares the leading tanks that compete with the K2, while also examining each country’s export competitiveness.   The K2 Black Panther, while incorporating cutting-edge technologies, is lighter than many Western main battle tanks, resulting in relatively lower sustainment costs. It is therefore widely regarded as a cost-effective, well-balanced tank. The cost of a tank varies greatly depending on its design and configuration, but if we break down the production cost (manufacturing, components, and assembly) into four categories, the estimated shares are as follows:- Protection: 30–40%- Firepower: 20–30%- Mobility: 15–25%- Electronics & C4I: 15–25% The actual share, however, depends on specific factors. For example, the use of advanced armor materials (composite/uranium) or the inclusion of an Active Protection System (APS) significantly increases protection costs. Similarly, specialized gun and ammunition systems (such as a 120mm smoothbore, autoloader, or advanced munitions) raise firepower costs. Integration, testing, and safety features greatly affect electronics costs, while options like autoloaders, high-performance thermal sights, and networked systems can heavily influence the final balance. Other important factor is Lifecycle Perspective (Unit Cost vs. Total Life-Cycle Cost), which can be defined as below.- Procurement: About 20–30% of total life-cycle cost (highly variable)- Operations & Support (O&S): 60–70% — dominated by fuel, maintenance, spare parts, and maintenance personnel costs- Upgrades & Depreciation: 10–20% In other words, the long-term operation and maintenance costs take up a much larger share than the initial procurement cost of a tank.Below is a comparison table of modern main battle tank costs: unit acquisition cost, annual sustainment cost, and 30-year life-cycle cost (procurement + sustainment).*The sustainment cost for China’s Type 99A and Russia’s T-90M is an estimate.   9. Conclusion This study has systematically examined the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and verified the level of their advancement through performance comparisons with leading global competitors. In particular, the K2 has demonstrated balanced capabilities in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic command-and-control, supported by advanced technologies and a high degree of localization. At the same time, it offers superior cost-efficiency in sustainment and operational expenses compared to heavier Western MBTs. This makes the K2 not only a key asset for strengthening domestic defense, but also a competitive and cost-effective platform in the global arms market. Taken together, these findings suggest that South Korea’s tanks have progressed beyond being a mere symbol of self-reliant defense, and are now positioned to expand exports and build long-term strategic partnerships worldwide.

Energy & Economics
nuclear fusion reactor tokamak concept background, 3d rendering

Accelerating the realization of nuclear fusion: A clear milestone is needed

by Choongki Sung

A few days ago, the author visited Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS) near Boston, USA. CFS is one of the most highly watched fusion energy startups in the world, currently constructing SPARC, a next-generation experimental device utilizing high-temperature superconductor technology. The researchers I met there were filled with confidence that nuclear fusion commercialization would be possible soon, and their passion resonated deeply. At the same time, it raised concerns about what we are doing and whether we are falling behind. The reason the world is accelerating efforts to advance the commercialization of fusion power is clear. As the heat wave continues to exceed 30°C even in September, it shows that the climate crisis has become a part of our daily lives. At the same time, rapidly evolving generative artificial intelligence (AI) is signaling an unprecedented demand for electricity. Faced with the dual challenge of responding to the climate crisis and the surge in energy demand, there is an urgent need for a new energy source that can ensure stable supply while minimizing environmental impact. Recently, fusion energy has been gaining attention as a next-generation energy source that meets these conditions. Fusion energy is a clean energy source that emits no carbon, and it uses hydrogen isotopes as fuel, which are virtually inexhaustible. It is often called the 'ideal energy source' because it is not constrained by weather or geographical conditions. Although the technical difficulty has historically been so high that it was considered an 'endless challenge,' the situation has now changed. In 2022, the U.S. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (NIF) succeeded in achieving 'net energy gain'—producing more energy than was input—in a laser-driven fusion experiment, raising expectations for the realization of fusion power. Furthermore, the fact that over 50 private companies worldwide are now diving into technology development with the goal of early commercialization shows that nuclear fusion is no longer a distant dream. Major nations are already focusing their national capabilities by presenting phased goals and execution plans. The U.S. has established a public-private partnership-based national strategy to actively support the endeavors of startups like CFS. China is promoting the construction of a demonstration reactor called CFEDR and, as a precursor, plans to complete the BEST device, capable of burning plasma operation, by 2027. The U.K. is ramping up national preparations by constructing the STEP device with a target of 2040, while also putting in place the engineering technology research facilities and institutional framework to support it. South Korea also possesses research capabilities that are by no means lagging. The core technology accumulated through the construction and operation of KSTAR is world-class, and its experimental results are internationally recognized. The country's experience in operating nuclear power plants is also an asset for future fusion engineering technology development. However, since the establishment of the ‘Nuclear Fusion Energy Realization Acceleration Strategy' last year, no specific roadmaps and execution plans have been revealed publicly. It is necessary to recall that the clear path from KSTAR to ITER to DEMO in the past allowed us to dedicate ourselves to the construction and operation of KSTAR, enabling South Korea to join the ranks of advanced nuclear fusion nations. Major countries around the world are currently moving ahead rapidly, aiming for commercialization in the 2030s and 2040s. To avoid being left behind in this competition, South Korea must urgently formulate an innovative plan for constructing a fusion demonstration reactor, targeting a demonstration in the 2030s. Furthermore, key technologies and large-scale research infrastructure must be strategically secured. A clear goal is essential to ensure that research and investment do not lose direction. Once the execution plan is clearly defined, universities can lead the necessary research and train appropriate talent, and young researchers can envision a future for themselves. Nuclear fusion is a new energy source that can simultaneously solve the climate crisis and energy security issues. What we need is a specific plan to realize it and unwavering determination to execute it. If we make the right choices and preparations now, South Korea can leap forward as an energy powerhouse that future generations can trust and rely on.

Energy & Economics
Silhouette of a person holding a smartphone in front of the flag of The European Union (EU)

The European smartphone market: premium loyalty, Chinese competition, and tariff pressure

by World & New World Journal

SummaryApple and Samsung remain the dominant forces in the European smartphone market, but Chinese brands are moving up the ranks and capturing market share - especially in the mid-range and premium segments. Trade measures and new EU regulations (eco-design) as well as regional economic weaknesses will influence demand and pricing in 2025.  Source:  https://gs.statcounter.com/vendor-market-share/mobile/europe? A look at Apple in Europe Apple holds a unique position in Europe, as it focuses less on pure delivery volume and more on anchoring itself in the premium segment. About one in three active smartphones in Europe is an iPhone [1], a number that matters more than quarterly shipment fluctuations. Even as shipments in Europe fell by nine percent in mid-2025, Apple's large installed base and trade-in programs helped maintain momentum [2]. Germany is a telling case in point. Apple's market share here is just over thirty percent, due to a mix of price-sensitive Android buyers and a strong premium niche who opt for iPhones due to the stability of the ecosystem, resale value, and perceived better privacy [3]. Penetration is higher in the more affluent northern and western markets, from the Nordics to the UK, underlining why Apple's marketing and retail strategy is heavily focused on these regions. Loyalty binds these markets together: almost nine out of ten iPhone users stay with the brand when they upgrade [4]. Combined with the high resale value, this reinforces the benefits of ownership. The iPhone 17 offers subtle but strategic updates - more base storage, improved cameras, and a slimmer 'Air' edition - aimed at retaining existing users rather than shaking up the market [5]. Behind the scenes, Apple is also quietly shifting supply chains and expanding iPhone assembly in India to be less vulnerable to tariff shocks and geopolitical risks [6]. For Europe, this means more stable pricing in the medium term, even as the EU tightens its regulations on eco-design and repairability. In short, Apple's strength in Europe comes not from chasing every segment, but from cultivating a premium base that rarely deviates. This base is both its shield and its springboard as competitors aggressively push into the mid-range and even the premium segment.  Source: Shutterstock/Elvard project -  BSD City, Indonesia, August 21, 2025 Back of an orange iPhone 17 Pro and an orange Samsung S22 Ultra A look at Samsung in Europe Samsung continues to be a consistent powerhouse in the European smartphone market. Unlike Apple, which is firmly anchored in the premium segment, Samsung's influence extends across all segments. From the high-end Galaxy S/Ultra series to the growing range of foldable devices and the hugely popular mid-range Galaxy A devices, Samsung ensures that there is a flagship-quality option in every price segment. This range is one of the reasons why the company consistently is the largest smartphone supplier in Europe by volume, claiming around 36% of the European market in the second quarter of 2025 [2]. The Galaxy A series, which includes models such as the A16 5G and the A56, has played a special role in this. These mid-range devices offer a good balance of performance, camera quality, and affordability, making them particularly appealing to price-sensitive consumers. The A56 alone recorded a 12% increase in sales compared to its predecessor, despite a slight decline in Western European smartphone sales overall [7]. Samsung's appeal goes beyond hardware. Through close partnerships with carriers and retail chains, the company has a reach that few rivals can match, enabling promotions, bundles and financing offers that appeal to buyers from all demographics. Android's flexibility is another draw - customers who value customization, connectivity with non-Apple devices or advanced camera and display features often choose Samsung. Samsung's multi-tiered approach gives the company versatility and resilience. While Apple focuses on customer loyalty and premium margins, Samsung covers both the high-end and mid-range segments. Foldables and advanced mid-range devices are particularly popular in the tech-savvy cities of Europe, where buyers like to experiment with features and form factors. In short, Samsung's European approach is broad rather than exclusive - covering premium aspirations, mainstream demand, and everything in between. This ensures that the brand has a strong presence across all consumer segments, from students seeking reliable mid-range phones to professionals looking for innovative flagships. Other brands in Europe While Apple and Samsung dominate the European smartphone landscape, other brands are quietly reshaping the market. Chinese manufacturers, including Xiaomi, HONOR, realme, OPPO and OnePlus, have been steadily gaining ground, especially in the mid-range segment where value for money is most important. Some of these brands are even making inroads into the premium segment, experimenting with foldable devices and advanced camera features, trying to establish themselves as credible alternatives to the established giants. Their approach is a balanced mix of aggressive pricing to attract first-time buyers and selective launches at the high end to build prestige and brand awareness [8][1]. In the meantime, smaller vendors continue to carve out their niches. Google's Pixel phones, for example, appeal to consumers who value a clean Android experience, consistent software updates, and high-quality cameras. Motorola and Sony have a smaller but loyal following, often among buyers who value reliable hardware at a fair price. In Eastern Europe and emerging markets, brands such as Transsion have started to offer very affordable devices tailored to specific regional needs, further increasing consumer choice. These players are making the European smartphone market increasingly dynamic, offering consumers more choice - from advanced cameras to flexible Android software and competitive pricing. While Apple and Samsung continue to dominate the premium and mass market segments, other brands are steadily changing the perception of what a European smartphone can offer.  Source: Shutterstock/ICXd Thailand,Bangkok - August 27, Collection of popular mobile phone logo apple, huawei, samsung, nokia, realme, oneplus, lenovo, lava, sony, LG, Xiaomi, Motorola,oppo, vivo, ZTE Global problems with tariffs on smartphones The smartphone world is not just about innovation, but also about politics. In 2024-25, tariffs on Chinese goods made headlines. The US threatened to impose high tariffs on electronics, which could have driven up the prices of smartphones and laptops. Industry lobbying softened the blow: key categories such as smartphones were exempted from the strictest reciprocal tariffs, which could have mitigated a massive price shock, although uncertainty in global supply chains remains a major problem [9][10]. Europe, on the other hand, has avoided blunt tariffs on smartphones. Instead, manufacturers are navigating regulatory changes - eco-design requirements, repair standards, and trade barriers - that subtly increase costs. The result is less dramatic headlines, but no less tension for OEMs who are closely watching trade measures between the U.S. and China as they affect sourcing and assembly globally. Companies like Apple and Samsung are hedging against this uncertainty by diversifying their production. Apple has ramped up iPhone assembly in India, while other brands are spreading their production to Vietnam, Malaysia, and other countries. Impending tariffs and changing regulations may affect lead times and profit margins, even if European consumers are not yet feeling the direct impact [10]. Slower economic growth makes mid-price alternatives and competitive Chinese brands more attractive. Flagship smartphones, which often cost more than €1,500, raise the question of whether ultra-premium devices still fit into everyday life in times of rising living costs. Consumer preferences in Europe European smartphone buyers are not a monolith. Broadly speaking, the market is split into two camps. Premium buyers value ecosystem integration, software updates and build quality and opt for Apple and Samsung. Value-conscious buyers focus on value for money and are increasingly opting for brands such as Xiaomi, realme and HONOR. Financing options, carrier subsidies and trade-in programs often influence when and how customers upgrade [11]. Trust and perception also play a role - especially in Germany. Privacy concerns and political sentiment towards China weigh heavily. German consumers, both individuals and businesses, are wary of Chinese-made devices in sensitive areas, giving Apple and Samsung an advantage when it comes to security and brand awareness [12].  Source: Shutterstock/Anatoliy Cherkas Customer comparing various mobile phones in a tech store, selecting the ideal device tailored to her unique needs and preferences The upgrade rhythms differ depending on the ecosystem. iPhone owners show strong loyalty, while Android buyers - especially in mid-range segments - switch brands more frequently due to better features or price. This behavior explains the rapid growth of Chinese OEMs and mid-range models and illustrates how ecosystem and satisfaction lead to repeat purchases [13]. In short, European consumers weigh price, performance, ecosystem, and trust - factors that vary depending on whether the buyer is a premium enthusiast or a value seeker. This nuanced behavior influences how brands position devices, launch models and plan for long-term growth on the continent. iPhone 17 vs Galaxy S25 — Tech Comparison   Source: Shutterstock/Sashkin Modern lens of smartphone double camera structure. New features for a smartphone camera concept. 3d illustration Observations: Where Each Excels & Trade-Offs • Cameras: Samsung (especially Ultra) wins on sheer versatility (more lenses, higher MP, better telephoto) and possibly low-light/detail thanks to sensor size and AI noise reduction. iPhone 17 shines in video consistency, processing, and front-facing “Center Stage” improvements. • Display & Brightness: Both are strong; iPhone probably edges ahead in outdoor brightness/visibility with peak luminance claims; Samsung wins in display size options (Ultra, plus), scaling, and maybe smoother animations thanks to their hardware + adaptive refresh tech. • Battery & Charging: Samsung has larger batteries in its high-end models; iPhone balances good battery with durability and efficient hardware. Charging speeds might favor Samsung in some markets, but Apple now supports faster wired/wireless + MagSafe maintained. • Hardware / Performance: Samsung’s chipset leap shows up in raw power + AI task support. Apple’s A19 is very efficient, tightly integrated, often delivering real performance with lower power draw. Apple also tends to offer longer software support. • AI & OS: Samsung pushes more aggressively into “AI companion” territory, making more tasks on-device that used to require cloud. iPhone focuses on privacy, on-device intelligence, camera/AI tools, and a more closed ecosystem. Preference depends on how much a user values customization versus privacy and integration.What about European brands? In Europe, there are no longer many smartphone manufacturers that cover the entire spectrum. Most local activities focus on software, components, or niche manufacturers such as Fairphone, which emphasize sustainability, modular design and repairability. These brands appeal to consumers for whom ethics and environmental responsibility are more important than innovative technical specifications. Even large corporations such as VW and BMW are only tentatively dabbling in this area and have yet to launch devices for the mass market. The reality is that global giants such as Apple, Samsung and increasingly aggressive Chinese OEMs dominate the European smartphone market, while domestic brands occupy specialized niches [14]. Market outlook In the short term - i.e., over the next 12 months - smartphone shipments in Europe could stagnate or decline due to economic restraint, the rising cost of living and stricter EU eco-design regulations. The premium segment remains resilient: Apple, high-end Samsung models and top Chinese devices continue to appeal to buyers seeking quality, design, and ecosystem benefits. Chinese brands are steadily gaining traction in the mid-price segment, especially in markets that are less sensitive to country-of-origin concerns [2]. Looking ahead to the next 24 months, several forces will change the landscape. Supply chains will diversify, with more assembly in India and Southeast Asia reducing dependence on China. Competition will intensify with AI features, voice assistants, and foldable devices as brands differentiate beyond hardware. Regulatory pressure on repairability, durability and sustainability could increase prices or shift the perception of value towards software and services. Apple's service ecosystem could gain traction, while Samsung's breadth and Chinese OEMs' aggressive pricing ensure a dynamic market for European consumers [15].  Source: Shutterstock/Sayan Puangkham Timeline to 2026 – Business Growth and Future Strategy, A futuristic business timeline concept moving from 2020 to 2026. A hand points toward the glowing year 2026. Sources:[1] StatCounter, Mobile Vendor Market Share Europe, Aug 2025 https://gs.statcounter.com/vendor-market-share/mobile/europe [2] Canalys, Europe smartphone shipments Q2 2025 https://canalys.com/newsroom/europe-smartphone-market-q2-2025 [3] StatCounter, iOS share Germany 2025https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/germany [4] CIRP, iPhone loyalty and resale value 2024–25https://appleworld.today/2025/08/cirp-apple-loyalty-depends-on-carrier-loyalty/ [5] TechRadar/Macworld, iPhone 17 launch coverage, Sept 2025https://www.techradar.com/news/new-apple-event [6] Reuters, Apple expands India assembly, 2025 https://www.reuters.com/world/china/apple-aims-source-all-us-iphones-india-pivot-away-china-ft-reports-2025-04-25[7] SamMobile, Samsung mid-range phones success in Europe, https://www.sammobile.com/news/guess-which-samsung-mid-range-phone-is-a-massive-hit-in-europe/8] Financial Times, Chinese smartphone brands target Europe with mid-range and premium launches, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/a982abf2-9564-4a8c-b8df-9e614ecd2151[9] Reuters, U.S. exempts key electronics from severe tariffs after industry lobbying, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-exempts-electronics-tariffs-2025-06-15 [10] Avalara, Global tariff landscape and smartphone supply chain impact, 2025, https://www.avalara.com/blog/en/2025/05/global-tariff-impact-smartphones.html[11] Financial Times, European consumers split between premium and value smartphones, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/consumer-smartphone-trends-europe-2025 [12] Emerald Insight, Country of origin and consumer electronics perception in Europe, 2024, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/XXXXX/full/html [13] Backlinko, iOS vs Android loyalty in European smartphone users, 2025, https://backlinko.com/ios-android-loyalty[14] Patently Apple, European smartphone brands and market presence, 2025, https://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2025/02/european-smartphone-brands.html [15] Reuters, Smartphone industry outlook: supply chains, AI, and regulatory pressure, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/technology/smartphone-outlook-2025

Energy & Economics
Soon Saudi Women Driving Car, May 2018 From Inside Jeddah Motor Show.

Saudi women right to drive: statistics and economic impact

by World & New World Journal

Saudi Arabia had long banned women from driving, but now women can obtain driver’s licenses and drive. With this new change, Saudi women’s mobility and economic activities may expand. How are Saudi women reacting, and what are neighboring countries’ responses? Women’s fight By the mid-20th century, Saudi Arabia underwent a deep transformation, fueled by oil revenues. In consequence, new ministries and agencies emerged to manage economic development, while a new technocratic elite began to form, who later clashed with the conservative Wahhabi establishment. Strikes and nationalist movements exposed social inequalities, leading the monarchy to tighten control throughout the country. This period of modernization was thus marked by both progress and restrictions, such as the 1957 ban on women driving. [1] As the driving ban kept active, between 1990 and 2017 many different protests (groups of women driving), campaigns (“Teach me how to drive so I can protect myself” or #Women2Drive [2]) and movements against the driving ban surged. Important figures like Wajeha al-Huwaider [3], Loujain al-Hathloul [4] or Manal al-Shariff [5] (among others) defied the female driving ban in Saudi Arabia and by 2018, after many obstacles, their struggle culminated in victory. Announced by the end of 2017 and taking effect on June 24th, 2018, [6] the ban was lifted, and women were able to apply and issue driving licenses and drive in public. The move was part of the measures taken by the young Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in line with his vision and policy towards an economic and social change in the Kingdom. Statistics and impact of the measure The lift of the driving ban for women exceeded by far expectations, Saudi authorities were expecting about 2,000 women to have received licenses by the time the ban was lifted [7], but in just the first seven months, as many as 40,000 women issued driving licenses, according to Saudi Arabia traffic department. [8]. Then, according to a report from the General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT), after 19 months the numbers increased to 174,624. The report showed that 90% of the total driving licenses issued for Saudi women concentrated in Riyadh, Makkah and the Eastern Province [9]. PwC projected 3 million women would become new drivers in the Kingdom by 2020. (PwC, 2018) I Figure 1: Women’s driving licenses: expectation vs actuals One year after women were first allowed to drive, the She Drives KSA national research project surveyed nearly 30,000 people across Saudi Arabia in 2019. [10] Its aim was to understand the effects on households, travel behavior, sustainable development, and traffic safety. The main findings of this research are the next ones: Households and cars: The number of households with at least one licensed female driver jumped from 22% before the reform to nearly 64% after. Around one in four households bought a new car, and demand for parking — especially on-street — increased noticeably.  Figure 2: Households with license female driver Private drivers: Reliance on private chauffeurs fell sharply, from almost half of households (46%) to just over a quarter (27%). Most families linked this change directly to women driving themselves. Among those who still employ drivers, the majority are non-Saudis, mainly from India.  Figure 3: Reliance on private chauffeurs before and after the ban lift. Women and licenses: Nearly two-thirds of women surveyed now hold a license, though training often involves long waiting times. For many, the change has had real economic impact: about 16% reported a shift in their employment status, and more than 64% said their income had increased since they began driving. Training typically costs between 2,000 and 3,000 SAR.  Figure 4: Economic outcomes reported by women She Drives KSA. Travel behavior: Patterns of daily mobility have shifted. Far fewer women now ride as passengers in family cars, while many have taken the wheel themselves. Use of ride-hailing services has fallen by almost 17%. Women mainly drive to work, education, entertainment, and errands. Nearly three-quarters of licensed women drive frequently, and many also escort siblings, children, or parents. Most describe driving as making them feel more independent, confident, and proud. Car preferences: Most women with a license plan to buy their own car, with a clear preference for new vehicles. Safety, price, stability, and fuel efficiency are the most important criteria, while affordability remains the biggest obstacle. Attitudes: Men and women alike view women driving positively, though women are more likely to link it to empowerment and higher income. The majority in both groups reject the idea that women drivers add to pollution. Traffic safety: Women express greater confidence about safety than men. More than 70% disagree that women driving leads to more accidents. About 15% of female drivers reported having been in an accident, but almost all were minor, with no fatalities. Supportive policies: There is strong backing for measures to ease the transition, including more women’s driving schools, lower training costs, and better roads and parking facilities. Almost 90% of women, and around three-quarters of men, want training costs reduced.  Figure 5: Policy support: reduce women’s driving training costs. In simple words, after one year, women driving in Saudi Arabia has reduced reliance on private drivers, boosted car purchases, and contributed to women’s economic empowerment. While men are slightly more cautious on safety, the overall societal impact is viewed positively, and this positive impact seems to continue in the future. Economic transformation, opportunities and challenges for the Kingdom In economic terms the move was a step towards Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Vision 2030. In addition to a social openness of the Saudi society and the diversification of the Saudi economy away from oil. According to the Euro Group Consulting [11] the decision to lift the ban will have profound immediate and long-term effects on women’s mobility, independence and economic participation in the Kingdom. (Following the mentioned She Drives KSA report, the first results are already visible). In addition to a small and meaningful achievement in women’s rights and gender equality, letting women drive can be translated into an increase in the economic participation and the increase of the female workforce, which the Kingdom was expecting to increase from 22% to 30%. The target was achieved and exceeded earlier than expected, being 36% by 2021. [12] Economic inclusion has created new job opportunities in sales, marketing, field services, transportation, logistics, while also driving new businesses. This shift has been a cornerstone of the cultural and social transformation the Kingdom seeks to implement. (Euro Group Consulting, n.d) Recalling the PwC report [13], adding 3 million new female drivers creates immediate opportunities in several specific sectors. The demand for driving licenses and schools rose sharply, specifically those targeting women. Car sales were expected to increase, with a projected annual growth of 9% for 2025, compared to the previous 3%. The used car market and the car leasing are forecast to grow too. And motor insurance was also expected to expand to SAR 30 billion by 2020. Car manufacturers like Toyota and General Motors (Chevrolet and GMC brands), for example, found the move beneficial, as they implemented strategies to increase their sales as a “new niche” was born, but not only that, the sector became also an opportunity for the creation of new jobs. In addition, a Bloomberg Economics report indicated that the lift of the ban could add up $90 billion to Saudi Arabia by 2030. [14] The opportunities, however, are not for big companies only, women have seen an opportunity in terms of entrepreneurship, for example in women-only ride-hailing services or the case of Reema Juffali, who became the first Saudi woman racing driver, the first Saudi woman to hold a racing license and also the first Saudi woman to win an international motor race. Reema nowadays competes in the International GT Open with her own Saudi team, Theeba Motorsport [15] Women on the roads would impact social behavior, habits and patterns, especially in the consumer and leisure side. On the other hand, there are challenges for the longer-term, the obvious one is a better infrastructure, including roads, intersections and parking spaces. But also, in the economic spectrum challenges would appear. For example, insurance companies might increase their costs, due the uncertainty and lack of data related to women drivers and their behavior, while the car leasing market might be affected too. Countries reactions Internally the lift of the ban was welcomed and celebrated, the historical fight had achieved a great victory for the women. But the international community also reacted to the new measure. Donald Trump said it was a “positive step” towards promoting women’s rights. [16] On the same line Antonio Guterres posted a similar message in X. [17] OHCHR and UN experts “warmly welcome this historic development” [18] and went farer by stressing the need for a full gender equality in the Kingdom Amnesty International also welcomed the move and called for an end to all forms of discrimination against women [19]. International media highlighted the development and saw it as a potentially transformative reform, while others also questioned whether it was symbolic or really part of a deeper change. [20] Other institutions, like the International Bar Association or the Baker Institute pointed out the importance of the move toward greater freedom [21] as well as the consequences and impacts on transportation, labor market, health effects, etc., respectively. [22] Regional media reactions highlighted the reform and its importance in a conservative Muslim society. They showed relief and encouragement, as women in most of the countries in the region, like the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait or Jordan, could drive freely. [23] On the other hand, some religious scholars and clerics within Saudi and the region showed a more cautious line. (Middle East Policy Council). Final notes Overall, the decision to allow women to drive in Saudi Arabia is a big win for the women. At the same time, it has already created and impacted positively in terms of society and economy, especially in the automotive and labor sector. If the government can capture and get the best from this shift, including investment in infrastructure, regulatory adaptation and development of new services to meet the needs of women drivers and drivers in general, the Kingdom would enter a better era with a promising future. While data and the future look promising for the Kingdom, reactions internationally – while welcoming the move – also pointed to important topics to be improved and to put effort on them as soon as possible. The road ahead might not be that easy, even Saudi is trying to transform its image internationally, internally and due its ideology and foundation basis, challenges would be tough to achieve. References [1] Commins, D. (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. New York: I. B. Tauris[2] RTBF, R. (2011, May 23). Histoire du monde: le droit de conduire. Retrieved from RTBF Actus. https://www.rtbf.be/info/emissions/article_histoire-du-monde-le-droit-de-conduire?id=6150133[3] BBC News. (2008, March 11). Saudi women make video protest. Retrieved from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7159077.stm[4] Noman, M. (2014, December 03). #BBCtrending: Saudi woman driving blog ‘arrest’. Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-30316837[5] Independent. (2012, February 05). Saudi women in drive ban legal bid. Retrieved from Independent: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/saudi-women-in-drive-ban-legal-bid-6483456.html[6] ECDHR. (n.d.). What progress has been achieved for Saudi woman drivers? Retrieved from ECDHR: https://www.ecdhr.org/what-progress-has-been-achieved-for-saudi-women-drivers/[7] BBC. (2018, June 24). Saudi Arabia’s ban on women driving officially ends. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44576795[8] Matt, M. (2019, June 25). The journey to nowhere: Little hope for Saudi women since driving ban was lifted. Retrieved from abc News: https://abcnews.go.com/International/journey-hope-saudi-women-driving-ban-lifted/story?id=63667888[9] Saudi Gazette. (2020, March 08). Over 174,000 women driving licenses issued in 19 months. Retrieved from Saudi Gazette: https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/590574#:~:text=RIYADH%20%E2%80%94%20Ever%20since%20they%20were,the%20national%20and%20international%20levels[10] Kamargianni, N. B.–G. (2020). Impact of women driving cars on the sustainable development and traffic safety in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - Phase 2 Survey Results.[11] Euro Group Consulting. (n.d.). The road to change: Women driving and economic participation in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from Euro Group Consulting: https://eurogroupconsultingmea.com/the-road-to-change-women-driving-and-economic-participation-in-saudi-arabia/[12] Arab News. (2022, March 09). Saudi Arabia hits female labor force target almost 10 years early: Uber report. Retrieved from Arab News: https://arab.news/y5qum[13] PwC. (2018). Women driving the transformation of the KSA automotive market. PwC.[14] Pittaway, A. (2022, March 30). Four years of women drivers in Saudi, what has changed? Retrieved from Global Fleet: https://www.globalfleet.com/en/taxation-and-legislation/global/features/four-years-women-drivers-saudi-what-has-changed?a=API07&t%5B0%5D=Global%20Fleet%20Conference&curl=1[15] Theeba Motorsport. (2025). Reema Juffali (driver profile). Retrieved from Theeba Motorsport: https://www.theebamotorsport.com/drivers/reema-juffali[16] BBC. (2017, September 27). Saudi Arabia driving ban on women to be liftedRetrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41408195[17] Guterres, A. (2017, September 27). X. Retrieved from @antonioguterres: https://x.com/antonioguterres/status/912831976083771392[18] Office of the High Commissioner. (2017, September 28). End of Saudi driving ban for women should be just the first step - UN Experts. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/09/end-saudi-driving-ban-women-should-be-just-first-step-un-experts[19] Amnesty International. (2018, May 25). The driving ban and women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/the-driving-ban-and-rights-in-saudi-arabia/[20] Baker, A. (2018, June 28). Is the end of Saudi Arabia’s driving ban a rebrand or a revolution? Retrieved from Time: https://time.com/5324404/saudi-arabia-driving-ban-rebrand-or-revolution/[21] Kaur, C. (2018, June). Saudi Arabia lifts ban on driving for women after lengthy campaign. Retrieved from International Bar Association: https://www.ibanet.org/article/c8d82237-545d-4fca-ad14-3e56add4734b[22] Krane, J., & Farhan, M. (2018, June 13). Women driving in Saudi Arabia: Ban Lifted, what are the economic and health effects? Retrieved from Baker Institute for Public Policy: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/impact-lifting-saudi-arabias-ban-women-drivers[23] Middle East Policy. (n.d.). Saudi Arabia Debates Right of Women to Drive. Retrieved from Middle East Policy Council: https://mepc.org/commentaries/saudi-arabia-debates-right-women-drive/

Energy & Economics
Stuttgart, Germany - 10-01-2022: Person holding cellphone with logo of Saudi Arabian property developer NEOM Company on screen in front of webpage. Focus on phone display. Unmodified photo.

Neom: economic perspectives and its mobility pillar

by World & New World Journal

Saudi Vision 2030 First announced on April 25th, 2016, by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Vision 2030 became the roadmap and goals the Saudi government was expecting to achieve within the next 15 years. The Saudi Vision 2030 is a wide government program which aims to achieve and increase an economic diversification, including also a social and cultural transformation, all in line with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s vision of Saudi Arabia for the future. Presented as an “ambitious yet achievable blueprint” the Saudi Vision 2030 is based on three pillars: 1) The first one is to make Saudi Arabia the “heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds”; 2) Become a global investment powerhouse and 3) transform the Kingdom into a global hub connecting Asia, Europe and Africa. Moreover, Saudi Vision 2030 is centered in three specific themes, which includes specific objectives and goals to be achieved by 2030: 1) A vibrant society: focus on society - citizens and residents – by prioritizing physical, psychological and social wellbeing in order to create a society that can enjoy a high quality of life, a healthy lifestyle and an attractive living environment. 2) A thriving economy: create an environment that supports economic growth and job creation for Saudis, focusing on young, skilled and talented people, but also attracting the best global talents. The Kingdom is aiming to become a leading and competitive global economy, open to business and investments, and looking for innovations, diversifications and ensuring sustainability. 3) An ambitious nation: No matter the role – citizens, businesses, non-profit organizations - everyone contributes to the development of Saudi Arabia. This should be complemented with an effectively governed country. After 10 years from its inauguration, Saudi Vision 2030 has already been working on different projects and initiatives. Including tourism, heritage, medical, sports, cultural, environmental, energy and business, among other key projects, the Saudi Vision 2030 therefore has become a unique and ambitious long-term project for the Kingdom. NEOM A highlight from the Saudi Vision 2030 is NEOM, a futuristic and planned region located in the northwest part of the country, next to the Red Sea, which aims to be powered fully by renewable energy and led by the Public Investment Fund. The area considered for NEOM is 26,500 km2 and it includes industrial complexes, floating ports and a global trade hub (Oxagon), sustainable tourist and luxury resorts (Magna, Trojena and Sindalah) and a futuristic linear city (The Line), among others… Overall it is “gigaproject”, itself.  Figure 1: Map of NEOM region and its subprojects. Source: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc./Refugio Mariscal. https://www.britannica.com/place/Neom#/media/1/2270136/340484 NEOM pillars In line with the Saudi Vision 2030, NEOM also has defined 15 sectors as their pillars: biotech, design & construction, education and R&D, energy, entertainment & culture, financial services, food, health & well-being, manufacturing, media, mobility, sports, technology & digital, tourism and water. Mobility Focusing only on the mobility pillar, NEOM seeks to lead in innovation and integration of autonomous solutions in the mobility area, while creating smart and sustainable solutions (powered by renewable energy) to connect and provide a multi-modal regional mobility system. The proposed mobility system is important as it would be the link between people and the services provided in the region. Moreover, as a futuristic and smart project, it seeks to change the traditional car-centered approach into a shared, on-demand, intelligent and active approach, in which short walks, the use of bicycles, as well as shared and on-demand multi-modal public transportations would be prioritized, increasing health and people’s wellbeing. In addition, the Kingdom has used this opportunity to help it fight against climate change and global warming and achieve its 2030 and 2050 goals of reducing emission by 45% and reaching net zero emissions, respectively. Somehow mentioned already, the proposals and challenges include the promotion of low-carbon transport systems, green spaces and resilient infrastructure integrated into a seamless environment. Going a bit more in detail, the mobility plan in NEOM focuses on 6 main areas: rail mobility, urban mobility, roads and infrastructure, advanced air mobility, water mobility and digital mobility. Smart transportation systems and investments To manage the urban and intercity transportation efficiently and sustainably, NEOM is investing heavily in smart logistics, automation, and zero-emission mobility. Modern transport vehicles, integrated rail systems, and innovative water and air mobility solutions are central to this vision. Land Transportation and Logistics Autonomous Transfer Vehicles (ATVs) These are designed for high-capacity horizontal transport in large construction sites, warehouses, and port terminals. They reduce operator requirements with autonomous navigation supported by laser and ultrasonic sensors; they are managed centrally through remote control and fleet management software. With customizable dimensions, ATVs, save time, reduce costs, and integrate logistics data. Straddle Carrier Systems Used mainly in port terminals and storage areas (NEOM’s port area), these carries handle containers and heavy loads of 5 to 100 tons. They reach speeds of up to 80 m/min, have 360° turning capability, and operate with lithium batteries, optimizing high-frequency logistics operations. Electric Town Tractors and Platform Trucks Electric town tractors provide a silent, emission-free and cost-effective solution for NEOM’s urban logistics, with fast-charging technology, long range and a modular design. In addition, electric platform trucks support high-capacity internal logistics solutions in NEOM’s factories, construction sites and warehouses. Electric Cars and EV Industry Ceer, the first Saudi electric vehicle brand, will design, manufacture and sell sedans and SUVs, with a target market focus on the Kingdom and in the MENA region. In addition, companies like Lucid Group Inc. (focused on long-range and fast-charging electric cars) is building a factory with an expected peak production of 155,000 vehicles per year, encouraging, along with Ceer, to shift towards the EV, while promoting the development of EV infrastructures and zero-emissions environments. Companies like REDEX also support this shift by developing systems to monitor energy, EV integration, and green hydrogen production data. Shared and micro mobility Motorcycles, scooters and bicycles are gaining popularity in the Kingdom and companies like UAE-based Udrive has seen a potential market and has launched projects for shared mobility and vehicles rentals, aiming to grow this sector further in the Kingdom. Public Transport and Buses Following a 2024 MoU with Hyundai Motors, NEOM tested the Hyundai Universe Fuel Cell Bus in Trojena as a VIP service. This hydrogen-powered bus marks a milestone for zero-emission mobility. Supporting infrastructure is growing, with Enowa (NEOM’s energy and water subsidiary) installing the first hydrogen refueling station in the area.  Figure 2: Hyundai’s Fuel Cell Bus Diagram. Source: Hyundai UNIVERSE Fuel Cell. https://ecv.hyundai.com/global/en/products/universe-fuel-cell-fcev Rail Transportation SYSTRA has led NEOM’s integrated electric rail project since 2021, conducting feasibility studies, technology benchmark and pre-design. The system includes: - The Spine: a $1.5 billion, 75 km backbone with high-speed, metro and freight lines. It features 14 viaducts, 7 roads, 9 overpasses, and 152 culverts, connecting The Line, Nea, City Station, Neom Bay Mansions, Neom Bay Airport, and Oxagon. It is designed to minimize environmental impact and connect the region. - Industrial City Connector: metro and freight lines serving NEOM’s industrial zone. - Tourism: a funicular line in the touristic mountainous area. Future solutions like the Hyperloop are also under consideration.  Figure 3: Oxagon’s development area. Source: NEOM. https://www.neom.com/en-us/regions/oxagon Water Transportation System IDOM is designing a sustainable waterborne transportation system along NEOM’s 650 km of coastline and islands. This system will ensure safe, high-quality, and accessible services for all users. Additionally, REGENT plans to establish a regional R&D and training hub in NEOM to develop its flagship electric Seaglider vessel for passenger transport, tourism, and other uses.  Figure 4: REGENT Seaglider. Source: Regent. https://www.regentcraft.com/seagliders/viceroy Air Mobility NEOM is partnering with Volocopter (investment of 175 million EUR) to develop eVTOL air taxis and emergency response vehicles. An initial fleet of 15 aircraft has been launched, with testing of an unmanned traffic management (UTM) system underway. Future plans include connecting NEOM cities with eVTOLs.  Figure 5: Volocopeter VoloCity (prototype). Source: Electric VTOL News / Volocopter. https://evtol.news/volocopter-volocity/ Principles and Green Infrastructure Across all modes, NEOM emphasizes on-demand and connected services, active and micro mobility, electric and zero-emission vehicles powered by renewable energy, and autonomous public transport. Green infrastructure initiatives include over 160 EV charging points, mobile solar charging, systems, and shared EV and micromobility program, as well as the mentioned hydrogen station. NEOM is collaborating with Pony.ai to develop autonomous vehicles and introduce the first robotaxis in Saudi Arabia, supported by a $100 million investment. Oxagon, Trojena and The Line Subprojects Oxagon, Trojena and The Line are part of NEOM, and they will rely on, promote and develop certain mobility strategies according to their proper characteristics, these are as follow: - Oxagon: it is a purpose-built coastal city, located on the Red Sea. It aims to become a hub that works under a circular economy with efficient, sustainable and profitable gains, the port city will rely on embedded robotics, automatization, AI and IoT. Due to its characteristics, therefore, the city transportation links must ensure connectivity (within and outside the city) and it will be integrating transport corridors, as well as a well designed sustainable mass transit system for the industrial area itself. - Trojena: calling to become a world-class center for winter sports and adventures Trojena is moving into the inclusion of Advanced Air Mobility, autonomous electric pods, a funicular and an urban ropeway, balancing the adventurous experience with a car-free and natural environment. - The Line: A futuristic city fueled only by renewable energy, which will prioritize people and nature, enhancing the urban living conditions and the urban sustainability. The idea behind The Line is to prioritize health and wellbeing over transportation and infrastructure. It would be home to up to 9 million people, who would live in an urban-nature environment, with ideal climate all-year-round and with 5 min-walk access to all facilities and 20 min maximum commuting times. A city without cars but connected with other systems such as a high-speed transit system, an ART (autonomous rapid transit), a PRT (premium rapid transit), shuttles, pods, bicycles, scooters and elevators.  Figure 6: The Line living and architectural concept. Countries reactions and current situation When the Saudi Vision 2030 was launched many countries reacted positively, including the UAE, Bahrain and the US, while others like China or India showed some pragmatic interest. Still, reactions could be said to be positive overall. Diversification, trade, economic alliances and opportunities, investments, cooperation, jobs creation and openness to the world seemed to be positive points. Nonetheless, there were certain concerns regardless the society and the economy of the country (specifically the financial viability for the “gigaprojects” involved) Now, after 9 years from being launched, Saudi Vision 2030 still seems a far and ambitious vision difficult to achieve, considering that 2030 is 5 years from now, yet it is possible to see that there is advance and a plan that has been paved already. At different levels, there has been an improvement, and more is coming. In recent years, the Kingdom has been in the eyes of the world due to its ambitious plans and on-site constructions have already started, it will be a matter of time to see the results. On the other hand, in terms of innovation and R&D, there has been a boost in different strategic areas, and money seems to be flowing into the Kingdom. Clear examples are shown in the mobility area where companies like REGENT, Volocopter and Pony.ai have invested huge amounts of money, have established and have worked together within the future transportation for the NEOM region and the country itself. In the same line, Ceer, the first Saudi automotive brand, is aiming to impact not only in the region but in the whole region. Conclusión NEOM’s mobility pillar is more than a transport strategy – it is a testbed for new technologies, from hydrogen buses to seagliders and eVTOLs. If successful, it will not only modernize Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure but also position the Kingdom as a global leader in sustainable and innovative mobility. Still, challenges remain: large-scale financing, infrastructure delivery, and societal adaptation. For now, we will have to wait some years until we can see radical or real changes, after all, Saudi Arabia seems to be working hard and in line with its Saudi Vision 2030. Referenceshttps://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/features/2016/04/26/Full-text-of-Saudi-Arabia-s-Vision-2030 (Consulted 11/09/2025)https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/explore/projects/neom (Consulted 11/09/2025)https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/explore/projects/the-line (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.volocopter.com/en (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.regentcraft.com/seagliders/viceroy (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://ceermotors.com/about-us/ (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2016/04/26/Global-reactions-to-Saudi-Vision-2030-announcement (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://boltflight.com/saudi-arabias-jaw-dropping-reputation-surge-how-vision-2030-is-transforming-the-kingdom-into-a-global-powerhouse/ (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/our-investments/giga-projects/neom/ (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.fada.com.tr/en/blogs/en-the-role-of-smart-transportation-systems-in-saudi-arabia-s-neom-project/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.idom.com/en/project/water-mobility-strategy-design-water-mobility-project-management-office-pmo-for-neom/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.idom.com/en/new/defining-the-water-public-transport-system-of-the-future/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.htwo.hyundai.com/en/worldwide/press-releases/article/Hyundai_Motor_Group_Pioneers_Hydrogen_Mobility_in_NEOM_to_Drive_Sustainable_Transport (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://futuretransport-news.com/saudi-arabia-hyundai-trials-hydrogen-bus-in-neoms-mountainous-terrain/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.constructionweeksaudi.com/news/neom-hyundai-hydrogen-bus (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://redex.eco/news/redex-signs-mou-with-neoms-mobility-sector-to-support-its-sustainable-transport-ambitions/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.systra.com/uk/project/neom-oxagon-creating-an-integrated-transport-system-for-a-city-of-the-future/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.leapforward.onegiantleap.com/the-future-of-mobility-is-here/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://lucidmotors.com/?ref=leapforward.onegiantleap.com (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2369040 (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.urbantransportnews.com/news/unveiling-the-spine-project-a-deep-dive-into-railway-construction-tunnelling-at-neom (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)

Defense & Security
Flags of Ukraine and the European Union on flagpoles near the office of the President of Ukraine. Kyiv

Assessment of the Limitations of the EU's guarantees regarding Ukraine's security and territorial integrity

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This analysis critically examines the European Union's security guarantees for Ukraine as of 2025, amid ongoing conflict and geopolitical tensions. Despite ambitious diplomatic efforts and increased defence spending, the EU faces significant economic and military challenges that undermine its capacity to ensure Ukraine's security and territorial integrity.Economically, the EU struggles with sluggish growth, structural inefficiencies, high public debt, and trade deficits, particularly with China, limiting resources for sustained military investment. Militarily, the EU's fragmented forces and reliance on NATO contrast sharply with Russia's extensive, war-driven military production and strategic nuclear capabilities.The war in Ukraine demonstrates the increasing prominence of drones and missiles, areas where the EU lags behind both Ukraine and Russia in production scale and innovation. Furthermore, the shifting global order towards multipolarity and the strategic alignment of Russia and China further constrain the EU's role as a formidable security actor beyond its borders. Key Words: EU, Ukraine, Security, Guarantees Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement on September 5, 2025, warning that any foreign troops deployed to Ukraine — particularly in the context of the "coalition of the willing" led by France and the UK — would be considered legitimate targets for Russian forces. This was in direct response to a summit in Paris on September 4, where 26 countries pledged to contribute to a potential postwar security force for Ukraine, which could involve deploying troops on the ground, at sea, or in the air to deter future aggression after a ceasefire. Putin's exact words, as reported from his appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, included: "Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction."[i] He further emphasised that even post-ceasefire, he saw no need for such forces if a long-term peace is achieved, adding, "If decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop."[ii] The "coalition of the willing" refers to a group of primarily European and Commonwealth nations, co-chaired by France and Britain, formed in early 2025 to provide security guarantees for Ukraine amid ongoing peace efforts led by US President Donald Trump. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Putin's stance, calling the presence of any foreign or NATO forces near Russia's border a threat and unacceptable.[iii] While Putin did not explicitly name the "coalition of the willing" in his quoted remarks, the timing and context—immediately following the Paris summit announcements—make it clear his warning targets their proposed deployments.[iv] As bold as President Putin's statement is, the EU has been making lots of noise in recent months regarding European guarantees for the future of Ukrainian security and its territorial integrity. This analysis aims to provide a "hard-eyed" assessment of the formidability of these claims, following a previous piece that analysed European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine's territorial integrity, published here: An analysis of European Diplomatic Efforts to Support Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity. Challenges and Opportunities. EU Economic Stance and Prospects As of 2025, the European Union's economy remains sluggish, troubled by structural inefficiencies and mounting external pressures. Arguably, the EU bloc is increasingly uncompetitive on the global stage. Despite some stabilisation in inflation and resilient labour markets, the overall trajectory suggests a region struggling to keep pace with the United States and China, with GDP growth forecasts hovering around a dismal 1% — well below the global average of 3.2%. This underperformance is not a temporary hiccup but a symptom of deep-rooted issues, including overregulation, demographic decline, and dependency on volatile external factors.[v] Critics argue that the EU's adherence to rigid "globalist" policies, such as burdensome environmental regulations and fragmented fiscal strategies, has stifled innovation and exacerbated trade imbalances, leading to a €305.8 billion deficit with China in 2024 alone. It is pretty probable that without radical reforms, the EU risks sliding into prolonged stagnation or even collapse, as high energy costs erode competitiveness in export markets. State of the Union (2025,10 September ) openly admits that "In the trade of goods, the EU has long had a trade deficit with China. The deficit amounted to €305.8 billion in 2024, surpassing the €297 billion deficit of 2023, but lower than the record trade deficit of €397.3 billion reached in 2022. In terms of volume, the deficit increased from 34.8 million tons in 2023 to 44.5 million tons in 2024. In the period 2015-2024, the deficit quadrupled in volume, while it doubled in value.China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and its biggest for imports. EU exports to China amounted to €213.3 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €519 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 0.3% and 4.6% respectively. In 2024, EU imports of manufactured goods accounted for 96.7% of total imports from China, with primary goods comprising just 3%. The most important manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (55%), followed by other manufactured goods (34%), and chemicals (8%). In 2024, EU exports of manufactured goods constituted 86.9% of total exports to China, with primary goods making up 11.5%. The most exported manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (51%), followed by other manufactured goods (20%), and chemicals (17%).[vi] The EU's core metrics reveal an economy that is stable but uninspiring, to put it mildly, with persistent disparities across member states that undermine cohesion.   *Created by Grok – prompt: critical evaluation of the EU economic situation as of 2025. These figures highlight internal fractures: Southern Europe (e.g., Spain at 2.6%) outperforms the core (Germany at 0%), but overall, the bloc's growth is "stuck in first gear," with services stagnant and manufacturing barely registering. Household savings are rebuilding, but consumer confidence remains low amid trade disruptions and geopolitical noise. At its core, the EU suffers from endemic structural flaws that no amount of monetary tinkering can fix. An ageing population—projected to strain fiscal sustainability—exacerbates labour shortages and boosts welfare costs, while policies to increase participation among older workers and women remain inadequate.[vii] Productivity has lagged behind that of the US and Asia for over 15 years, hindered by fragmented regulations that impede innovation in AI and biotech.[viii] The much-touted Green Deal, while environmentally ambitious, imposes extreme costs on industries, with 44% of firms reporting trade disruptions from China (mostly dumping). Energy dependency, exposed by the Ukraine war, has led to sky-high costs that "erode competitiveness," pushing the EU toward deindustrialisation. Critics decry the EU as a "technocratic regime" where national sovereignty is eroded by Brussel’s alleged blackmail tactics, rendering parliaments mere puppets and stifling bold reforms. The EU's economy is dangerously exposed to global headwinds, with risks tilted firmly downward.[ix] Escalating US-China trade tensions, including potential Trump-era tariffs, threaten exports (over 50% of GDP), particularly in the automotive and machinery sectors.[x] Geopolitical conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East disrupt supply chains and energy prices, while climate events add further volatility.[xi] The loss of the "peace dividend" forces a diversion of resources to defence, inflating costs and deterring investment. Capital outflows to a faster-growing US, driven by tax cuts, compound the issue, leaving Europe starved of investment. Politically, instability, such as France's government collapse over budget cuts (€44 billion), signals deeper fractures, risking social unrest and further eroding confidence.[xii] The analysis above only scratches the surface. To have a better picture, one should also look at current and projected budget deficits and public debts. For example, according to the EU-27, the total public debt was approximately €14.2 trillion in Q1 2025.[xiii] As for budget deficits, the aggregate EU-27 deficit stood at -2.9% of GDP in Q1 2025, according to Eurostat. [xiv] Looking forward, the situation does not seem to look much better. The prospects for public debt and budget deficits in the EU-27 over the next 5 to 10 years are characterised by gradual upward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios due to persistent deficits, ageing populations, increased defence spending, and potential shocks like higher interest rates or geopolitical tensions. Based on the latest forecasts from the European Commission (Spring 2025), IMF (April 2025 World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor), and other analyses as of September 2025, debt levels are expected to stabilise or edge higher in the short term (2025–2026), with longer-term sustainability risks emerging from megatrends like climate adaptation and demographic shifts. No comprehensive projections extend fully to 2035, but medium-term analyses (up to 2030) suggest debt could rise to 85–90% of GDP for the EU aggregate if fiscal consolidation is uneven. Deficits are projected to hover around -3% of GDP, testing the Maastricht 3% limit, with calls for prudent policies to avoid unsustainable paths.[xv] It is against this backdrop that the SAFE investments, of which I have written here, here, here and here will have to be somehow balanced against other public policies, including immigration, education, public healthcare or housing. The picture does not look good for the EU, to put it mildly. Current European Military Capabilities as Compared to Russia The EU The European Union's military and defence capabilities remain fragmented, relying on the collective forces of its 27 member states rather than a unified army. As of 2025, the EU and the UK boast approximately 1.4 million[xvi] active personnel, over 7,000 tanks, 1,300 combat aircraft, and a naval fleet including 18 submarines and multiple aircraft carriers, primarily from France and Italy. Combined defence spending has risen to approximately 2% of GDP, totalling €343 billion as of 2024, but gaps persist in strategic enablers, such as air defence, munitions, and cyber capabilities.[xvii] The EU's strengths include industrial bases in countries such as Germany and France, which support exports and innovation in areas like drones and AI. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) facilitate missions, while PESCO fosters joint projects. Recent initiatives, such as the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan, aim to mobilise €800 billion for investments, including €150 billion via the SAFE loan instrument, targeting two million artillery rounds in 2025, enhanced drone systems, and military mobility.[xviii] The EU's major weaknesses include a heavy reliance on NATO, particularly on US troops, with estimates suggesting that Europe needs an additional 300,000 soldiers and €250 billion annually to achieve independence. This includes addressing shortfalls in tanks (1,400 needed), artillery, and shells (one million for sustained combat). Challenges include political divisions, with Hungary blocking aid, and supply chain vulnerabilities amid climate threats.[xix] Overall, while progress toward a "European pillar" in NATO accelerates, achieving full strategic autonomy by 2030 hinges on member states' commitment to joint procurement and increased spending. The Russian Federation Russia's military capabilities in 2025 are formidable yet strained by the ongoing Ukraine war, with approximately 1.1 million active personnel, including 600,000 deployed near Ukraine.[xx] According to the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Russia's Defence spending reached 15.5 trillion roubles ($150 billion), or 7.2% of GDP, up 3.4% in real terms from 2024, funding war efforts and modernisation. Inventory includes roughly 5,000 tanks (after refurbishing Soviet stocks amid 3,000+ losses), 1,000 combat aircraft (down from pre-war due to 250 losses), and a navy with one aircraft carrier, 60 submarines, and 800 vessels total, emphasising submarine advancements.[xxi] Russia's strengths seem to lie in strategic nuclear forces (1,550 deployed warheads, up to 2,000 non-strategic), electronic warfare, drone production (over 100 daily), and global power projection via naval deployments. Adaptations include glide bombs and unmanned systems, enabling incremental gains in Ukraine despite 750,000 - 790,000 casualties.[xxii] According to experts, Russia's weaknesses include degraded conventional forces against NATO, stagnation in innovation, sanctions-driven dependencies on China/Iran/North Korea, labour shortages, and rising costs that hamper the development of advanced technology.[xxiii] Reforms prioritise nuclear deterrence, robotics, and force enlargement, but demographic/economic constraints may limit rebuilding over a decade. Overall, Russia sustains attrition warfare but faces sustainability challenges for broader threats.[xxiv] The Realities of the Current Wars – the case of the war in Ukraine The war in Ukraine is surprisingly static in a sense in which the First World War was static. We can observe numerous troops fighting a 21st-century version of a trench war, at least to an extent where the front lines seem pretty much fixed. Technological aspects of the Ukrainian war are, however, decidedly different from a hundred years ago. The war in Ukraine is marked by an extensive use of drones. The analysis of available data from the military, UN reports, and media, up to mid-2025, indicates that the weapons causing the highest number of casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war are primarily drones and artillery systems. These two account for most of both military and civilian losses, with a notable shift toward drones in recent years. Total casualties exceed 1.2 million (primarily military, including killed and wounded), though exact figures are estimates due to underreporting and classification issues.   *Generated by Grok. Prompt: What weapons cause the most significant number of casualties in the Ukrainian war? Multiple Sources. Please see below.[xxv] According to publicly available data, military casualties dominate, with around 1.2 million total for Russia and Ukraine combined.[xxvi] As for civilians, the estimates indicate around 50 thousand casualties, mostly from wide-area explosives.[xxvii] Can the EU be a Formidable Military Power of Tomorrow? The existing intel indicates that the drones are responsible for 70 to 80% of battlefield casualties. Exact numbers are naturally difficult to come by, but experts estimate that the total usage of drones likely exceeds production slightly due to imports/donations. Having said that, the production is probably the best indicator. Consequently, the cumulative totals since 2022 exceed 10 million, with 2025 projected to add 7-9 million drones to the battlefield.[xxviii] If this trajectory continues, it means that the future wars will increasingly be fought with drones and missiles, probably operated by AI systems. So how about the EU? The EU production is small-scale and high-value, with countries like France (Parrot SA, Thales) and Germany (Flyability) among the global top 10 manufacturers. No specific unit numbers, but the EU lags in mass production, urging scaling to millions annually for defence. The current output is likely in the tens to hundreds of thousands, primarily focused on (ISR) – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.[xxix] Tellingly, "Defence Data 2024-2025" from the European Defence Agency (EDA) does not even explicitly mention drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At best, the document alludes to the substantial increase in defence investment, procurement, and R&D in the EU Member States in the future, strongly suggesting that unmanned systems, including drones, are part of ongoing and future defence capability developments.[xxx] Interestingly, it is Ukraine that outpaces the EU in its own domestic production of drones. According to the Global Drone Industry 2025 Market Report, Ukraine produced over 2 million drones domestically in 2024 and, per President Zelensky in early 2025, has the capacity to build 4 million drones annually.[xxxi] Among other interesting information, one finds: 1. The global drone market was valued at about $73 billion in 2024 and is forecast to reach $163+ billion by 2030, with a 14%+ CAGR in the latter 2020s2. Military and defence end-use accounted for about 60% of the total drone market value in 2024.3. DJI (Chinese producer) held an estimated 70%+ share of the global drone market by 2024. One of the most promising developments in this respect appears to be the Eurodrone, officially known as the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS), a twin-turboprop unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions. It is being developed collaboratively by Airbus (leading the project), Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo, under the management of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), to meet the needs of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The program aims to provide a sovereign European capability that's affordable, operationally relevant, and certified for flight in non-segregated airspace, thereby reducing reliance on non-European systems, such as the U.S.-made Reaper drone.[xxxii] As of 2025, it's in the development phase, with the prototype assembly underway and a maiden flight targeted for mid-2027, followed by initial deliveries around 2029-2030. As such, it is still more of a project rather than any real formidable capability.   Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/20005/total-forecast-purchases-of-weaponized-military-drones/   Source: https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis Apart from drones and UAVs, it is missiles that feature prominently in the modern battlefield. Here, the EU's production capabilities seem equally modest. EU production has indeed tripled overall since 2022, driven by the war. Still, it remains defensive-oriented, with slower scale-up due to component shortages (e.g., rocket motors) and a reliance on U.S. partners. Offensive long-range strike capabilities are limited, with focus on air-defence interceptors under initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI).[xxxiii] Key systems include U.S.-made Patriot (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) and European Aster 30 (via MBDA's Eurosam). Global Patriot production is 850 – 880 annually, but Europe receives only 400 – 500. Aster output is 190 – 225 in 2025, nearly all for Europe. Combined, EU availability is 600 – 700 interceptors per year. Under a 2:1 targeting ratio (multiple interceptors per incoming missile), this equates to defending against 235 – 299 ballistic missiles annually. Projections aim for 1,130 by 2027 and 1,470 by 2029, with licensed production in Germany (e.g., Rheinmetall).[xxxiv] Recent analyses indicate Russia has significantly boosted its missile manufacturing since 2022, shifting to a wartime economy with 24/7 operations and foreign inputs (e.g., from North Korea and Iran). Estimates for 2025 suggest an annual output in the thousands, far outpacing pre-war levels, though exact figures are classified and reliant on external intelligence.[xxxv] As for ballistic missiles, Russia's Production of short- and medium-range systems such as the 9M723 (Iskander-M) and Kh-47M2 (Kinzhal) has surged. Pre-war estimates pegged 9M723 at around 72 units per year, but by June 2025, this had risen to at least 720 annually, with monthly output at 60 – 70 units. Kinzhal production stands at 10 – 15 per month (120 – 180 annually). Combined, these yield 840 – 1,020 ballistic missiles per year, marking a 66% increase over the past year and a 15–40% jump in Iskander output alone during the first half of 2025. Regarding cruise missiles, Russia's output has similarly expanded, with the Kh-101 rising from 56 pre-war to over 700 annually. Total land-attack cruise missiles (including 3M-14 Kalibr, Kh-59, and P-800 Oniks adaptations) could reach up to 2,000 per year. Stocks are estimated at 300 – 600 units currently, with projections for 5,000 by 2035. All in all, most experts point to a significant "missile gap" favouring Russia, where its 840 – 1,020 annual ballistic missiles alone exceed the EU's defensive capacity (e.g., intercepting only 300 ballistic threats per year). Russia's total missile/drone output dwarfs EU efforts. However, that is not all; one should also examine the usage and development of AI and AI-driven and operated military systems. This limited analysis does not allow an in-depth look into the matter. I have written about it here, claiming that the current war in Ukraine is also a huge lab for testing AI and AI-driven military systems. Apparently, the "AI arms race" gives Russia's wartime AI applications (e.g., drone swarms) a practical edge, potentially outpacing the EU's ethical focus by 2–3 times in deployment speed. Russia's budget allocations (5–15%) exceed the EU's EDF share (4–8%), but EU venture surges (500% growth) and NATO ties provide qualitative advantages in reliable, regulated AI. Gaps include Russia's hands-on war experience versus the EU's potential lag, with calls for international law bans and more substantial EU investments to counter the risks of escalation. Optimistically, Europe's rearmament ($865 billion) could close the divide by 2030, but analysts warn of vulnerabilities without faster AI scaling.[xxxvi] Last but not least, similar arguments can be made about the munition production capabilities. To cut a long story short, the answer to the question presented in the title of this section has to be rather negative. For example, even NATO officials, including Secretary General Mark Rutte, claimed Russia produces three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO in a year," implying 9 – 12 million annually, or even 20.5 million for a 12 times advantage. However, analysts critique these as exaggerated, noting Russia's industrial limits make figures above 4 – 6 million unfeasible without full mobilisation. External supplies bolster output: North Korea delivered ~7 million rounds by mid-2025. Russia's $1.1 trillion rearmament plan through 2036 supports long-term growth, but 2025 estimates hover at 3 – 4 million new/refurbished shells.[xxxvii] The New World Order - Incoming!!! Importantly, if the EU were to offer security and territorial integrity guarantees to Ukraine outside NATO, it would not face Russia alone. It would, or should I instead say will, face Russia and China cooperating and supporting each other, with other members of BRICS, remaining negatively neutral, that is, informally supporting Russia. I suggest that, especially a European reader, carry out a little experiment. I propose that they take any map of the world that is printed in China and locate Europe. When looking at the map, the reader is advised to compare the sizes of the territories of the EU countries with those of Russia (and China combined). Apart from that the reader is advised to compare the GDP output of the EU as Against that of Russia and China, their GDP structures, the international trade vectors, structures and volumes, the number of people, natural resources (rare earths as well as gas and coal, the number and strength of TNCs (Trans-National Companies) with headquarters in Asia and Europe. In other words, carry out a simple geopolitical comparison. To say that the EU does not look impressive as compared to Russia and China is to say nothing. When carrying out such a comparison, the observer should swiftly realise that the EU is a small region in the upper left-hand corner of the map and that its relevance and importance regarding most, if not all, of the indicators mentioned above is diminishing. The fact of the matter is that we are witnessing an absolute overhaul of the international system towards a multipolar model with the centre of gravity away from the collective west. There does not seem to be much room for Berlin, Paris or Brussels for that matter to operate as a formidable security agent outside Europe perimeter not only by the virtue of the lack of capabilities and military tools but perhaps most importantly by the lack of international recognition by the three Great powers (USA., China and Russia) and global actors such as BRICS. References[i] Soldatkin, V. (2025, September 5). Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be fair targets. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-any-western-troops-ukraine-would-be-fair-targets-2025-09-05/[ii] Walker, S. (2025, September 5). Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘legitimate targets’, Putin says. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/05/western-troops-ukraine-legitimate-targets-vladimir-putin-says[iii] Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘targets’ for Russian forces: Putin. (2025, September 5). 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Brugel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed[xvii] European Commission, EU defence in numbers. European Council, Council of the European Union. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/[xviii] European Commission, Acting on defence to protect Europeans. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en[xix] Mejino-Lopez, J., & Wolff, G. B. (2025). Boosting the European Defence Industry in a Hostile World. Interconomics, 60(1), 34–39. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/boosting-the-european-defence-industry-in-a-hostile-world.html[xx] Carlough, M., & Harris, B. (n.d.). Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries. 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New Eurasian Strategies Centre. https://nestcentre.org/military-lessons/[xxv] Adams, P. (2025, July 18). Kill Russian soldiers, win points: Is Ukraine’s new drone scheme gamifying war? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80p9k1r1dlo, Drones become most common cause of death for civilians in Ukraine war, UN says. (2025, February 11). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-become-most-common-cause-death-civilians-ukraine-war-un-says-2025-02-11/, Grey, S., Shiffman, J., & Martell, A. (2024, July 19). Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/, Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians. (2025, August 1). Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://aoav.org.uk/2025/ukraine-casualty-monitor/, Court, E. (2025, February 13). What is the death toll of Russia’s war in Ukraine? Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://kyivindependent.com/a-very-bloody-war-what-is-the-death-toll-of-russias-war-in-ukraine/[xxvi] The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, July 16, 2025. (n.d.). Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-16-2025[xxvii] Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to July 31, 2025. (2022, February 24). STATISTA. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/[xxviii] A Perspective on Russia, Facon, S. (n.d.). A Perspective on Russia. Centre for New American Security. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-russia/ See also: The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond. (2025, May 28). Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond and Reeves, T. (2025, May 28). JUST IN: Russia Expands Drone Capabilities as Ukraine Conflict Continues. National Defence. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/28/as-russia-ukraine-war-continues-so-does-drone-innovation[xxix] Top 10 Drone Manufacturing Countries in 2025: Global Leaders, Trends, and Analysis. (2025, July 19). QUASA. https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis[xxx] European Defence Agency. (2025). Defence Data 2024-2025. European Defence Agency. https://www.eda.europa.eu[xxxi] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (2025, July 16). Tech Space 2.0. https://ts2.tech/en/global-drone-industry-2025-market-report/[xxxii] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (n.d.). EUROPEAN MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – MALE RPAS (EURODRONE). Retrieved September 15, 2025, from https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/european-medium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-male-rpas-eurodrone/[xxxiii] Casimiro, C. (2025, August 14). European Defense Production Triples Since Russia-Ukraine War: Report. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/european-defense-production-tripled/[xxxiv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, July 6). Europe’s Missile Gap: How Russia Outcompetes Europe in the Conventional Missile Domain. MIssile Matters - with Fabian Hoffmann. https://missilematters.substack.com/p/europes-missile-gap-how-russia-outcompetes[xxxv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, September 8). Denial Won’t Do: Europe Needs a Punishment-Based Conventional Counterstrike Strategy. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/denial-wont-do-europe-needs-a-punishment-based-conventional-counterstrike-strategy/[xxxvi] Zysk, K. (2023, November 20). Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence AI in a Time of War. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war and Cohen, J. (2025, June 30). The Future of European Defense. Goldman Sachs. https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense[xxxvii] Lehalau, Y. (2025, July 25). Is Russia Outpacing NATO In Weapons Production? Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nato-weapons-production-us-germany/33482927.html

Energy & Economics
map of Latin America with purple, blue and black colors, artificial intelligence background artificial intelligence robots surrounding with hands the map of Latin America. Futuristic and three-dimensional style This content was generated by an Artificial

The crossroads of AI in the LAC region

by Carlos Arturo Covarrubias Gutiérrez

The shadow of artificial intelligence looms over the world; depending on the region, it takes the shape of a Chinese dragon or of Miss Manifest Destiny. But AI is among us, little by little taking up space, absorbing ideas without asking, constantly feeding itself in an endless cycle that, whether we accept it or not, undoubtedly consumes the Earth’s energy. While it is an ambiguous promise to affirm that the wave of AI will eventually end, the reality is that it is here, not only consuming but also spreading information that, as we know, is mostly the equivalent of junk content and misinformation — though at a scale greater than anyone would have foreseen. At the same time, it is managing to change the globalizing culture of the internet, transforming the feelings, tastes, and aversions of future generations. It is therefore imperative in these current times to think about what steps the LAC region (Latin America and the Caribbean) should or should not take in the face of the unbridled advance of AI. It is on the basis of this vital point for the future and destiny of LAC that the present reflection is made. It is crucial to delve into some of the opportunities that currently exist in the region for the development, implementation, and transformation of artificial intelligence in Latin America and the Caribbean. As we know, the region is home to enormous wealth, opportunities, and human capital — both labor and intellectual — that, if necessary, it can provide both momentum and renewal to the idea of artificial intelligence from the so-called peripheral countries, in this case, Latin America and the Caribbean. As an example, we can point to Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile (the lithium triangle) (Obaya, 2021), countries in which key raw materials such as lithium and copper give them a crucial role in the future goals of the countries where the main AI companies and corporations originate. This can bring both opportunities and future technological, economic, and social dependencies. That is why the region must learn to manage its resources to its advantage through active regional networks, with ethical and participatory governance, as well as a strong and structured digital diplomacy with a collective voice. But above all, with technological ethics combined with a rationality-based regulatory framework prepared to address humanitarian, social, environmental, and business needs in a harmonious way — also encouraging sociocultural communities to participate actively, considering the natural life cycle of the norms which could, as a likely outcome, eventually form part of a new international regulatory framework. This would be especially necessary given the shortcomings of the international community in addressing issues of constant innovation and impact. In the framework of AI’s evolution and development, this may not be too complicated due to the inherent characteristics of this technology — a technology that will end up being so embedded in daily human life that it will be difficult not to be part of it without being left behind, especially considering the undeniable commercial, social, planetary, and geopolitical relevance represented by dominance over the AI market. And this is without even mentioning the possible arrival of generative AI, which would raise even more issues and concerns. It is also significantly important to understand some of the advances and initiatives being planned or deployed in the LAC region, such as Mexico’s collaboration with Nvidia to develop a Mexican AI language (Mota, 2025). Another example is AI4D, an initiative of Canada’s IDRC, along with other foreign strategic partners (Artificial Intelligence for Development, n.d.). This initiative promotes inclusive, ethical, and human-centered AI, aiming to include itself in different regions of the Global South. Among some of the cases that demonstrate the enormous potential of this initiative are the CENIA in Chile (Centro Nacional de Investigación en Inteligencia Artificial, CENIA, n.d.) and BID Lab in LAC (BID Lab, n.d.), both of which foster comprehensive technological development in the region. While all of the above sounds like a real opportunity to foster the development of a region historically lagging in many social, economic, and technological matters, we must also document our pessimism. That is, we must keep in mind some of the key challenges that, depending on where we put the pin on the map, reveal a diversity of problems that could alter the course of many of these opportunities and initiatives. Among some of the relevant issues are corruption, political instability, technical and economic gaps in LAC—as in other regions of the Global South—criminal networks that in some cases are categorized as terrorist, and others. It is also very important to consider the potential future use of artificial intelligence as automated and systematic instruments of repression by authoritarian governments; its implementation within the criminal organizations of the region; the use of LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems) (Perrin, 2025); or the creation of new easily producible drugs that could cause regional destabilization. In this last regard, the events in Nepal cast a shadowy expectation of the collusion of digital platforms and the use of AI for strategic and recolonizing purposes in service of capital and platforms — without the need for the pretext of drugs or terrorism. In addition, it is important to consider the historical scars of exploitation, abuse, and oppression in the LAC region by foreign forces. Therefore, it is not only important but imperative for the interests of the region to work within a framework of equality and not subordination to the current and future interests of the companies and nations that will focus on the region, which undoubtedly possesses geostrategic strength. Thus, the international rhetoric of the nations forming part of LAC must change or transform in order to put the interests of the region first, to make the most of the wave of artificial intelligence with strategy and geopolitical thought. This is not to mention some of the challenges that as a region we will have to face, such as the fragmentation of regional institutions in LAC, the lack of coordination, and the absence of a unified regional agenda outlining the steps to be taken as a region toward AI implementation, innovation, education, and ethical use — as well as the influence of global powerbrokers, namely digital platforms, in their capacity to remove and install governments in the Global South. The challenge, as can be seen, is enormous. However, the context of the new tripolar world order fuels positive expectations for LAC’s integration in a position of strength to act with national and regional aims that benefit the majority. References Artificial Intelligence for Development. (s.f.). Ai4D.ai. Recuperado el 17 de septiembre de 2025, de https://www.ai4d.aiBID Lab. (s.f.). BID Lab. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Recuperado el 17 de febrero de 2025, de https://bidlab.org/esCentro Nacional de Investigación en Inteligencia Artificial – CENIA. (s.f.). Investigación UC. Recuperado el 17 de febrero de 2025, de https://investigacion.uc.cl/centros-de-excelencia/centro-nacional-de-investigacion-en-inteligencia-artificial-ceniaMota, C. (2025, julio 31). La estrategia de Nvidia en México. El Heraldo de México. https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2025/7/31/la-estrategia-de-nvidia-en-mexico-719056.htmlObaya, M. (2021). Una mirada estratégica sobre el triángulo del litio. Buenos Aires: Fundar.Perrin, B. (2025, enero 24). Lethal autonomous weapons systems & international law: Growing momentum towards a new international treaty. ASIL Insights, 29(1). https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/1

Defense & Security
Mersin Turkey - 23.06.2021: Yavuz Drillship on the mediterranean sea. Drillships of Turkey which is search and drill for natural gas and oils.

Mavi Vatan: The turkish strategy for Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea

by Jessica Martínez Pluma

In February 2019, the Turkish Naval Force carried out a large-scale military exercise in the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to test the operation of the new weapons and naval systems acquired by the country over the last decade. At first, this event did not generate adverse reactions from the international community, but six months later alarm bells rang when, during a speech by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at Turkey’s National Defense University, a map was publicly displayed showing what the Republic of Turkey considered to be its sovereign maritime domains. This later became associated with a concept known as Mavi Vatan. Proposed by Admiral Cihat Yaycı and developed by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Mavi Vatan or the Blue Homeland Doctrine is a project and geostrategic representation of Turkey with the intention of claiming the state’s supposed jurisdiction over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. It demonstrates Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the limits established by international law—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)—and upholds its right to the legitimate defense of sovereignty over what it asserts are its maritime domains: 462,000 km² comprising its territorial waters, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and its continental shelf (Denizeau, A., 2021).  Figure 1: Map of ‘Mavi Vatan’ or the Blue Homeland Doctrine publicly displayed during President Erdoğan’s speech at Turkey’s National Defense University (August 2019). Source: Wikimedia Commons ‘Mavi Vatan’ not only represents a historical claim regarding the events of 2004, when the Republic of Cyprus became an official member of the European Union and established its own maritime borders as a state, which, under the framework of international law, pushed the Republic of Turkey into a narrow strip of sea in which to operate. At the same time, Mavi Vatan emerged as a solution to the growing security challenges that have arisen in the last decade of the 21st century, challenges that have threatened not only the integrity of the state itself but also all those elements that guarantee its survival in the international arena; in this case, Turkey’s access to energy resources. With projections that the Republic of Turkey will reach 90 million inhabitants by 2030 (Martín, L; n.d.), the Turkish state is aware of the increasing energy demands needed to adequately meet the needs of a rapidly growing population. To satisfy that demand, it is compelled to seek optimal sources of income to achieve this purpose. In response—and knowing of the large hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in recent years (Zeballos Rivero, M., 2024)—Turkey has turned to Mavi Vatan as a solution. If successfully implemented, it would allow Turkey to establish an area for the exploration and exploitation of resources lying beneath these waters to cover its urgent energy needs. The problem? Turkey is not the only interested party. Countries such as Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt, sharing coastlines with the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, are also engaged in heated disputes over legitimate access to these energy resources. However, the most pressing rivalry remains between Turkey and Cyprus, who, having relatively greater capacities to extract energy resources, have been at the forefront of an active dispute to claim sovereignty over these hydrocarbons.  Figure 2: Map of the EEZs of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and also of Mavi Vatan. Source: Emmanouilidis, C. (2020, August 31). Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. European Data Journalist Network. https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/es/cp_data_news/tensiones-en-el-mediterraneo-oriental/ On the one hand, there is the Cyprus–Egypt–European Union alliance, which has agreed upon and mutually recognized the maritime boundaries corresponding to each of them in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, while clearly omitting the possible sovereignty claims of other countries in the disputed area (s.autor, 2024). On the other hand, there are Turkey’s individual efforts, which, in its quest to gain access to hydrocarbon resources in the sea in question, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2019 with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to establish an EEZ stretching from Turkey’s southern coast to the northwestern area of the North African country. This agreement granted the Turks rights to hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the zone (s.autor, 2024). Although the agreement was suspended in 2021, Turkey has continued to promote ongoing exploration expeditions in the region, which have even extended to Somali waters, with whom it already has agreements in this field. The firm actions taken by states in the region demonstrate that, beyond being an ambition for access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the dispute actually represents an active risk to stability and security in the region. Firstly, from the energy dimension: given the importance of energy resources for human development, the continuation of hostilities among the involved states prevents the establishment of cooperative mechanisms that would allow all parties to benefit from the issue. Instead, it risks generating a zero-sum game in which only the strongest state would emerge victorious while the others remain vulnerable to an imminent energy crisis, thereby putting thousands of human lives at risk. Secondly, from the military dimension, there is the latent possibility that an armed conflict could erupt at any moment in the Eastern Mediterranean over immediate access to the contested resources. Without underestimating the military capabilities of the other countries involved, it is important to highlight the case of Turkey, which in recent years has significantly expanded its military capacities as part of the reformulation of its Foreign Policy. This has allowed Turkey to position itself as the ninth-strongest military power in the world (Global Fire Power, 2025) and the second-largest army within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the opposite side lies Cyprus, which, although it does not possess the same military capabilities as the Republic of Turkey, does benefit from the direct support of the European Union, which, if necessary, could easily respond to potential acts of aggression in a military conflict in the region. Both sides of the dispute—Turkey and the European Union along with Cyprus—truly have sufficient resources to escalate the conflict if they so desire, but they have not done so for reasons that remain unclear. For now, the situation remains uncertain. Beyond warnings or complaints from some states and/or international organizations, there has been no decisive action to put an immediate end to the conflict, since, in reality, no large-scale crisis has yet warranted such a response. However, it is important not to underestimate the phenomenon: the fact that it has not yet generated a major impact does not mean it could not do so one day, especially considering the great capacities the involved states have both to act and to respond to possible aggression. Historically, disputes over energy resources have generated unprecedented wars that have cost thousands of lives—for example, the Gulf War in 1991. It is therefore necessary to continue monitoring such situations to prevent them from escalating into conflicts as violent as those of the past. Thus, diplomatic channels between all parties to the conflict must be pursued, with the aim of generating cooperative solutions that foster peace and prosperity among nations, rather than new problems. ReferencesDenizeau, A. (abril, 2021) “Mavi Vatan, the ‘Blue Homeland’: The Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey”, Études de l’Ifri, Ifri.E. (2019, 30 diciembre) La lucha por los recursos en el Mediterráneo Oriental. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/la-lucha-por-los-recursos-en-el-mediterr%C3%A1neo-oriental-/1685950Global Fire Power (2025). 2025 Military Strength Ranking. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.phpJager, J.; Norris, A. (2021, 27 septiembre). The Mavi Vatan Doctrine and Blue Homeland Anthem: A Look At Turkey’s Maritime Worldview. Center for International Maritime Security. https://cimsec.org/the-mavi-vatan-doctrine-and-blue-homeland-anthem-a-look-at-turkeys-maritime-worldview/Kaya Ulger, I. (2020, 14 octubre) Turquía continúa defendiendo su “patria azul”. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/turqu%C3%ADa-contin%C3%BAa-defendiendo-su-patria-azul-/2005458Mason, S. (2020, 20 septiembre). Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy - War on the Rocks. War On The Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/Martín, L. (s. f.).   ‘Mavi Vatam’: la doctrina turca de la ‘patria azul‘. Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/-mavi-vatam-la-doctrina-turca-de-la-patria-azul-3Menjón, D. M. (2021, 7 octubre). Dossier Geopolítico Especial: Teoría de la “Patria Azul”. Turquía se proyecta sobre el mar (de la energía). Hermes Kalamos. https://www.hermes-kalamos.eu/dossier-geopolitico-especial-teoria-de-la-patria-azul-turquia-se-proyecta-sobre-el-mar-de-la-energia/S. a. (2024, 10 abril) Cihat Yayci: Libia es un socio estratégico y un aliado para proteger y promover la seguridad de Turquía. OtraLecturA https://otralectura.com/2024/03/15/cihat-yayci-libia-es-un-socio-estrategico-y-un-aliado-para-proteger-y-promover-la-seguridad-de-turquia/S.a. (s. f.). Mavi Vatan-2019 Tatbikatının Ardından Enerji-Politik Ağırlıklı Bir Değerlendirme. Euronewsport İş dünyasından haberler. https://euronewsport.com/mavi-vatan-2019-tatbikatinin-ardindan-enerji-politik-agirlikli-bir-degerlendirme/Zeballos Rivero, M. (2023, 22 marzo). Creciente tensión entre Turquía y Grecia por reservas de gas en el Mediterráneo. Global Affairs And Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/creciente-tension-entre-turquia-y-grecia-por-reservas-de-gas-en-el-mediterraneo 

Diplomacy
India vs Pakistan conflict concept background with flags and map in the backdrop. Political, war, trade, India pakistan sports

Comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's foreign policy through a postcolonial lens

by Sana Mumtaz

The 1947 partition of British India gave rise to two sovereign states, India and Pakistan, that inherited similar colonial legacies but developed starkly divergent foreign policy paths. These differences were not purely strategic but were rooted in how each state interpreted its postcolonial condition. While India adopted a policy of non-alignment to protect its sovereignty in a bipolar world, Pakistan aligned itself early with Western powers, prioritizing security over autonomy. These choices, driven by internal insecurities, historical trauma, and leadership visions, shaped their global engagements for decades. This paper argues that the postcolonial experiences of both countries profoundly influenced their foreign policies, with India pursuing strategic autonomy and soft power projection, while Pakistan adopted dependency-based alignments driven by survival instincts and regional insecurity. Post-colonialism and Foreign Policy Identity Post colonialism refers to the condition of states that have emerged from the yoke of colonial rule and are navigating their way toward independent identity formation, both domestically and globally. It is a political, cultural, and psychological process that involves reasserting autonomy after years of subjugation (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). For India, postcolonial diplomacy was a tool to construct an independent identity distinct from the former colonizers and the Cold War superpowers. Nehru's advocacy for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s was deeply rooted in India’s postcolonial ethos of resisting domination, militarism, and Western dependency (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan’s postcolonial trajectory was markedly different. The trauma of partition, including widespread violence and the loss of territory, fostered an intense sense of vulnerability. Lacking economic strength and surrounded by perceived hostilities particularly India Pakistan's leadership quickly sought external patrons, viewing alignment as essential for its survival. In 1954, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and later the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), receiving substantial U.S. aid in return (Ahmar, 2024). This early dependence on Western powers shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy as one centered on external security guarantees rather than autonomous diplomacy. India’s Evolving Foreign Policy India's foreign policy evolved in three broad phases: 1. Idealist non-alignment (1947–1971)2. Pragmatic balancing (1971–1991)3. Multi-alignment with strategic autonomy (1991–present). In its early years, India sought to play a moral leadership role among decolonized nations, promoting peace, non-intervention, and South-South cooperation. Nehru’s role in establishing the NAM in 1961 underscored India's desire to remain outside Cold War binaries and carve a distinct place for itself on the world stage (Taneja, 2019). However, India’s 1962 border war with China revealed the limitations of idealism. This military defeat prompted a rethinking of foreign policy, leading to closer ties with the Soviet Union. By 1971, India had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signaling a partial alignment to protect regional interests, especially as it supported Bangladesh’s liberation (Ahmar, 2024). India’s economic liberalization in 1991 was a turning point. With its economy opening to global markets, foreign policy began prioritizing trade, investment, and strategic partnerships. India launched the “Look East” policy, now rebranded “Act East,” to deepen ties with ASEAN and East Asian powers. Simultaneously, India cultivated strong relations with the United States, particularly in defense, nuclear cooperation, and technology transfer (IRJSSH, 2024). Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has expanded its global footprint further by participating in multilateral platforms like the QUAD, BRICS, G20, and the SCO. It has also invested in soft power diplomacy, promoting yoga, Bollywood, and higher education as cultural exports. India’s campaign for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its 2023 G20 presidency signal its aspiration to emerge as a major global player. Pakistan’s Security-Oriented Diplomacy Unlike India’s autonomy-focused policy, Pakistan’s foreign policy has remained anchored in strategic partnerships, primarily driven by regional security anxieties. Its early Cold War alliances with the U.S. brought military and economic support, including weapons, aid, and development funding. However, these benefits came at the cost of diplomatic flexibility. Pakistan became part of the American containment strategy rather than a voice for postcolonial solidarity (Ahmar, 2024). During the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted to diversify foreign ties by engaging China and Islamic states. Yet, Pakistan remained entangled in great-power politics. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked another watershed moment: Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S.-backed resistance, supplying weapons and training to the mujahideen. While this brought short-term geopolitical relevance and aid, it also sowed the seeds of extremist militancy that later destabilized the region (The Guardian, 2025). In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan again aligned with the U.S. as a key ally in the War on Terror, receiving billions in aid. However, mistrust over counterterrorism commitments led to strained relations. More recently, Pakistan has deepened ties with China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion-dollar initiative under the Belt and Road Initiative. CPEC has transformed infrastructure and energy access but raised concerns about rising debt and reduced strategic independence (Financial Times, 2025). Simultaneously, Pakistan has relied heavily on Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE for financial bailouts. However, the country’s emphasis on Islamic solidarity has not always translated into diplomatic support—especially on the Kashmir issue—where economic interests increasingly override religious or ideological ties (Economic Times, 2025). Comparative Analysis Although born from the same colonial womb, India and Pakistan followed radically different paths in foreign relations. India’s strategic approach has evolved from Nehruvian idealism to Modi’s pragmatic multi-alignment, allowing it to maintain relationships with the U.S., Russia, and China simultaneously. It has strengthened its global standing through economic diplomacy and soft power, investing in trade, culture, and multilateralism (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan, meanwhile, has remained stuck in a pattern of dependency, cycling through major power patrons to meet its security and economic needs. Its alliances have often been transactional and security-driven, resulting in short-term gains but long-term vulnerabilities. This reliance on external support has constrained Pakistan’s ability to assert an independent foreign policy agenda (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). India’s soft power and diaspora networks have significantly enhanced its global image, while Pakistan’s foreign relations have been more narrowly focused and reactive. Moreover, India’s diversified diplomatic strategy has helped it gain global influence despite regional tensions. Pakistan’s narrower diplomatic focus has limited its ability to pivot globally beyond its traditional allies. Conclusion India and Pakistan’s foreign policies reflect not just their immediate strategic calculations but also how each internalized its postcolonial legacy. India transformed its colonial trauma into a quest for autonomy and leadership among the Global South. Its foreign policy matured from idealism to realism, culminating in strategic flexibility and global engagement. Pakistan’s path, however, was shaped by existential insecurity, leading to a foreign policy centered on alliances for survival. This comparative lens reveals the long-term consequences of early postcolonial choices. India’s foreign policy has grown more self-reliant and global, while Pakistan remains vulnerable to dependency, volatility, and limited diplomatic bandwidth. Understanding these divergent trajectories is crucial for comprehending the subcontinent’s enduring tensions and each state’s future on the global stage. Bibliography Ahmar, M. (2024). Post-Independence Compulsions and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. Pakistan Horizon.Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2016). Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches (2nd ed.). Taylor & Francis.Cvetanovska, D., Nurgaliyeva, L., & Saidov, A. (2016). India–Pakistan Relations from Foreign Policy Perspective. Journal of Political Studies, 23(1), 45–59.Economic Times. (2025). Why countries still support Pakistan despite terrorFinancial Times. (2025). Pakistan’s strongman courts the US while drawing closer to China.IRJSSH. (2024). Comparison of foreign policy of Pakistan and India during 1947 to 2023. International Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3(1), 861–871.Taneja, K. (2019). India’s Grand Strategy: From Nonalignment to Multi-Alignment. Oxford University Press.The Guardian. (2025). Thawing of relations between Pakistan and the US.

Defense & Security
Bricked wall with stop terrorism sign

Causes of women involement in terrorism

by Eraj Farooqui

AbstractThis paper explores the complex factors that contribute to women's participation in terrorism, a subject that has attracted more scholarly interest, particularly in the wake of 9/11. The discipline is nonetheless politicised and divided despite a great deal of study, which is frequently made worse by a lack of primary data. Women, who are typically thought of as quiet and non-violent, have taken on important roles in terrorist groups, especially during the 1990s, where they have participated in high-profile attacks and leadership roles. The study identifies the main factors: political, religious, personal, and gender equality—that motivate women's participation. Examples show how different organisations differ in that some encourage women to participate actively, while others limit their positions. The study also examines how terrorism has changed over time, with a particular emphasis on its gendered aspects, and assesses how contemporary organisations such as the Islamic State have reshaped the roles of women in terrorist networks. Finally, by illuminating the ideological, cultural, and societal factors that lead to women's radicalisation and involvement, this research offers an in-depth examination of the relationship between gender and terrorism.Keywords:  Terrorism , Women , Political , Religion , Personal , Gender-equality Introduction The reasons behind female terrorism have been extensively studied and debated by numerous academics. Even though there is a wealth of study, a substantial portion of it is contradictory or incomplete. Frequently, the highly politicised word of terrorism has led to contradictory claims in the research. To understand why individuals resort to women terrorism, scholars highlight political, religious, social, and personal causes. In our culture, women were seen as housewives and peaceful members of society, and terrorist groups were controlled by men. Research on women and terrorism can be done on a variety of subjects; however, this paper will mostly focus on the causes of why women participate in terrorism. After 9/11 the academic research on scholarly papers on terrorism have increased by 300% since 9/11.[1] The connection between terrorism and gender is often overlooked due to governments' reluctance to reveal the primary causes and the reluctance to provide reliable data. Researchers often avoid original sources for security reasons. A 2009 review by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor found a reluctance to describe events, excessive narrative analysis, and reliance on secondary sources. [2] The word "terror" comes from the Latin verb "terrere" which means to frighten. It was originally used by the Romans in 105 B.C. to characterise the terror that engulfed Rome during the attack by the Cibri tribe. During the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, Maximilien Robespierre incited fear among the people.[3]The word "terrorist" was used by Edmund Burkey in the Regicide Peace letter. With the end of Reign of Terror, the word ‘terrorism’ gained popularity.[4] Terrorism, a deliberate use of force or intimidation, is a significant issue in the 21st century, often driven by ideological, religious, or political factors. However, the term "terrorism" has no widely recognised definition. There are four distinct stages of modern terrorism. The first wave of terrorism began in Russia and spread to Western Europe and the United States, using revolutionary and anarchist beliefs.[5]  The final wave is founded on religious beliefs that the world is currently dealing with. This wave started in 1979 when Iran underwent an Islamic revolution. Because of gender norms, terrorists are frequently perceived as masculine attackers. Women are perceived as powerless, passive, and victims during times of conflict, but it is important to remember that if they participate in terrorism, they may pose a greater threat than men.[6]And since 1990, women have gained prominence in terrorist organisations, assuming leadership positions and taking part in more brutal assaults. More media attention is given to female attackers, and people are more curious about the motivations behind their actions. Additionally, terrorist organisations are recruiting more women as a result of this. Although they have historically been involved in terrorist organisations, women's numbers have been small. As an example, the number of female suicide attackers has surged from eight in the 1980s to well over 100 since 2000, indicating a growth in the involvement of women in terrorist actions.[7]  On the other hand as per Bloom’s report over 257 suicide attacks were carried out by female bombers between 1985 and 2010, accounting for 25% of all terrorist incidents. Since 2002, the proportion of female bombers in several nations has surpassed 50%.[8]The first known incidence of female political violence happened in 1878, when Zasulich shot Fedor Trepov, the governor of Saint Petersburg. David Rapoport identified this as one of the four waves of modern terrorism.[9] Weinberg and Eubank claim that women have primarily assumed leadership positions in left-wing revolutionary bands while being assigned to inferior positions in right-wing organisations. They mostly perform supporting and auxiliary functions for numerous religious institutions. [10]Gender, Palestinian Women, and Terrorism: Women's Liberation or Oppression? was written by Anat Berko and Edna Erez. stated that during his questioning, he discovered that many Palestinian men did not approve of women participating in suicide bombings because they saw them as inferior to men.[11] After doing study with a local terrorist organisation, Jacques and Taylor chose 30 male and female suicide bombers. He finished by studying the fact that males prefer to join terrorist organisations for religious and nationalistic reasons, but female suicide terrorists are motivated by personal ones. Mia Bloom’s book the Bombshell: Women and Terrorism examines the motivations of women who participate in terrorism,[12] with an emphasis on relationships, respect, revenge, and redemption. According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[13]The main reason women join the LTTE is to fight for gender equality; they participate in every aspect of the group and do so to avoid being discriminated against and repressed by the male-dominated society.  The following studies will provide an academic perspective on the causes of women's involvement in terrorism. The main focus will be on four causes: political, religious, personal, and gender equality, as well as a list of important terror occurrences conducted by female terrorists as a result of some key ideological beliefs. Religious Cause: Religious convictions have been the foundation of many terrorist organisations throughout history. The Crusaders can be categorised as a terrorist group. Although the Crusaders' main objective was to propagate Christianity, they also committed heinous acts of terrorism. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the fourth wave of contemporary terrorism, and David Rapport claims that it was the first instance of religious terrorism in the modern era. Religious terrorism's core principle is the promotion of violence in the name of furthering religious beliefs. For example, Al-Qaeda and ISIS promote an Islamic caliphate globally.[14] However, attempting to do so by using cruel and aggressive methods. Islam and terrorism have become more associated since 9/11, as terrorist organisations have posed a serious threat to Western ideologies and societal influences.[15] Gonzalez-Perez notes that suicide bombers frequently use the idea of martyrdom and benefits in the afterlife to lure people into justifying their acts.[16] Women are also part of religious terrorist organisations but there are two argument over women involvement in jihadi group. As explaind by Muhammad Khayr Haykal in his book Al-Jihad wa al-qital fi al-siyasah al-shar'iyyah. 1. Women were seen as having a responsibility in raising money for Jihadis, caring for children, and providing medical treatment.[17] 2.    The Islamic state should set up training facilities for women to learn how to wield weapons and combat techniques, according to Islamic legal expert Muhammad Khayr Haykal. According to him, all Muslims should be held accountable for jihad if it turns into fard ‘ayn, and women must be prepared for this possibility in order to perform their duty. This strategy permits the practice of female jihadism in martyrdom missions and on the battlefield.[18] Role of women in Al-Qaeda According to Robet Pape in his book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.[19]Highlights that male terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda oppose women's participation in terrorism. However the Tamil Tigers used twenty-three female attackers, the Palestinians used six, the Lebanese used six, the Chechens used fourteen, and the PKK used ten. Consequently, he concluded that Islamic fundamentalists oppose female fighters.[20] However, after the rise of the Islamic state, which encourages women to join their organisation and accept arms, the Pape argument is no longer regarded as legitimate. For example, some 200 women joined the Islamic State in Syria in 2014 after migrating from Western nations. Additionally, they more than doubled their numbers in 2015, reaching over 550 women.[21] This suggests that the Islamic State may assign women a direct role, such as suicide bombing, in a way that is different from that of many other jihadist organisations, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  In Al-Qaeda the women played a secondary role for.e.g: Al Qaeda also benefited strategically from the assistance that women provided. For instance, the female terrorists of Al Qaeda were strongly using the internet to try to convince men to join the worldwide Jihad. Some males are inclined to join these groups because they feel ashamed of their masculinity as a result of these communication strategies.[22]Women's roles in jihadist organisations are valued in that they bear children and raise them to be potential recruits for terrorist organisations. Usama Bin Laden thanked women by saying: "You have inspired and encouraged [men] to join jihad, and you have raised all the men who fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, and you are the ones who produced the squadron of heroic men who carried out the raids in New York and Washington."[23] On the other hand Ayman al-Zawahiri's wife, Umayma al-Zawahiri, also urged her "Muslim sisters" to raise their kids on the love of jihad in God's way and "to induce their brothers, husbands, and sons to protect Muslims' lands and properties. To support (male) jihadists with prayers and financial support. [24] Al Khansa'a was one of the authors of the online magazine that inspired Muslim sisters with her articles; while she did not advocate for women to fight in combat, she did counsel them to stay in shape and exercise so they would be prepared for jihad.[25] Al-Qaeda Iraq's founder and Al-Qaeda member Abu Musab al Zarqawi urged Iraqi women to join the military. In Talafa, Iraq, a US military recruiting centre was the target of the first female suicide bomber. According to the announcement made by al Qaeda in Iraq on its website, "A blessed sister carried out a brave strike defending her beliefs. May God include our sister among the group of martyrs.’’[26]According to Mia Bloom the attack was carried out under the alias "ghost group" because it was still forbidden for Al Qaeda Central to collaborate with women on suicide bombings.[27] The identities of male suicide bombers are mentioned by AQI members, but the names of female suicide bombers are never mentioned. As a result, it is challenging to determine the purpose or driving force for their membership in terrorist organisations. Despite the lack of data regarding female suicide bombers, certain enquiries and interviews provide us with comparable reasons why they chose to join AQI as female terrorists. After losing a loved one, women join terrorist organisations in order to kill the offender and get revenge for the deaths of their husbands and brothers. Furthermore, AQI members urged young females to die as martyrs, claiming that they would immediately enter heaven and be the prophet Muhammad's neighbours.[28] Al-Qaeda is therefore mostly a male organisation that discourages women from engaging in violent activities. Women's roles are limited to becoming teachers, fund-raisers, social media advocates, and moms of potential jihadists. Role of women in Islamic State(IS) Islamic State was founded in 1999. The Islamic State had the greatest number of foreign terrorist fighters in history, making it a unique terrorist organisation. About 41,490 foreign nationals from 8 nations joined the Islamic State with the goal of restoring the caliphate. Of the foreign terrorist fighters, about 4761 (13%) were female. Following Eastern Europe (44%), Western Europe (42%), the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand (36%), and other regions, Eastern Asia had the greatest percentage (70%) of women connected with the Islamic State.[29] The biggest motivation for joining an Islamic terrorist organisation is religion. Women typically played a supporting role in Islamic terrorist organisations prior to the rise of the Islamic State. However, the role of women in these organisations has grown stronger after the fall of Al-Qaeda and the rise of Islamic State in the Middle East. Muriel Dagauque, a Muslim woman who converted to Islam and was married to a Muslim man, was one of the Islamic State suicide bombers. She moved to Iraq with her spouse from Europe in order to become a martyr, and on November 9, 2005, she bombed herself.[30] Many jihadist suicide bombers are comforted by the assurance that they will be sitting next to God (Allah), experiencing only joy and no agony, before the first drop of their blood ever hits the earth.[31]Women joined the Islamic State mostly for religious reasons. Umm Layth, also known as Aqsa Mahmood, was a 21 year old Scottish university student who travelled to Syria to take part in Islamic State terrorist activities. Mahmood expressed her opinions on jihad with the following sentences.: "If not you, then your grandkids or their grandchildren. But do not worry, our cubs will eventually shed your blood. This Islamic dominion will become well-known and dreaded all over the world. Choose a side; this is a fight against Islam. You may either support them or support us.''[32] Role of women Chechnya Terrorism: Islam is the predominant religion in Chechnya, and Wahhabist terror ideology is linked to Chechen terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism.[33]The Wahhabi sect appears to have spread to the Chechen territories through other terror cells in the Middle East, such as al Qaeda.[34] This ideology which glorifies martyrdom and promotes jihad in order to establish a worldwide Muslim caliphate is a rationale for carrying out acts of retaliation and acting on behalf of a national separatist movement.[35] Chechen women, due to their Islamic influence, often wear black and traditional Muslim clothing, such as a head scarf or jilbab, which allows them to conceal weapons and bombs, as seen in the Dulbrov theatre incident.[36] Religion is one factor that contributes to women joining terrorist organisations, but it is not the only one; other factors also play a role. Political Cause According to Gus Martin, terrorism can occur under a variety of circumstances when there is political repression. First, the group is resentful of the injustices they perceive in society. The group also believes that their social dissent is insignificant. Last but not least, the group believes that there are problems with the system that can be fixed, which leads them to confront the conflict.[37] Despite the widespread belief that women do not participate in political violence, women have been planning attacks and taking part in political violence since 1800.[38] Violence is a tactic used by women who are dissatisfied with the government, have their opinions ignored, and are under-represented in organisational structures With anarchist and revolutionary beliefs, anarchism was the beginning point of the first wave of contemporary terrorism, which swept from Western Europe to America. Nonetheless, women's political motive persisted until the second wave of terrorism, when nationalism emerged as the primary driver of women's participation in terrorism.[39] However, they were only allowed to serve as scouts and messengers during the second wave of terrorism. David Rapoport claims that because women once again assumed leadership roles, there are some similarities between the first and second waves.[40] Vera Zasulich shot the governor of St. Petersburg; she said that she had a political purpose for doing so because the governor was well-known for his Polish insurrection and had ordered to execute political prisoner Arkhip Bogolyubov. This infuriated the revolutionary forces, and six people made the decision to kill the governor, but Zasulich was the first to take the initiative. This was the beginning of the first wave of terrorism. Despite the fact that women participated in political violence, her case is notable as the first instance of female political violence in the modern era or the first to be acknowledged. [41] Russian university students founded the group, which specifically targeted political figures. Vera Figner and Gesia Gelfman, Sofia Perovskaya, and three ladies from Narodnaya Volya had a key role in the March 13, 1881, assassination of Russian Emperor Alexander II in St. Petersburg.[42] The reason behind this act was that Tsar Alexander II released his renowned Emancipation Manifesto in 1861 after the Russian intellectuals struggled to achieve their demands. This was intended to end the peasantry's enslavement and, if feasible, bring about a new, more liberal era. Perovskaya and other disappointed reformers decided to accelerate change as it became evident that this new age was a false dawn. As a result, hundreds of revolutionaries left St Petersburg in 1874 to tour the Russian countryside and read pamphlets to the peasants about socialism, nihilism, and anarchism in an attempt to educate them for the day when they would destroy the Tsar.[43] In 1954 the Algerian muslim formed a group called National Liberation Front. Their major goal was to achieve independence from the colonial power France. FLN rose to prominence thanks to its female members, Zohra Drif, Dajmila Bouhard, and Samia Lakhdar. They were able to cross the French checkpoint and leave bombs in various locations, and as a result, three people died in an explosion on September 3, 1956, and several others were injured.[44]This movement occurred at the time of second wave of contemporary terrorism which was based on the idea of nationalism and anticolonialism. As per reports between 1970 and 1984, 451 Italian women joined terrorist organisations and then engaged in political violence. The bulk of these women had degrees and performed identical duties to those of male terrorists, they found, with 35% of them being students, 23% being clerks, secretaries, nurses, technicians, and 20% being instructors. A paramilitary group called Red Brigade was established in 1970 and was engaged in terrorist activities around the nation. Because it supported Italy's withdrawal from NATO and dominated the Marixist-Leninist worldview. Known for its kidnapping and murderous activities, Red Brigades also killed former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and abducted James L. Dozier, a senior US officer at NATO. Barbara Balzerian had murdered him. Many female members of the Red Brigades participated in the group's violent assaults, and Margherita Cagol (Mara), one of the Red Brigade's co-founders and one of the first victim in an armed conflict with the police, became a symbol of the left-wing movement.[45]The most violent communist organisation throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the Red Army Faction which engaged in ideologically motivated terrorism in West Germany. Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin, co-founders, protested consumerism by burning a department store in Frankfurt in 1968.[46] A major problem is the Chechen people's desire for independence from Russia, which is driven by their nationalist and separatist beliefs. In the lengthy history of the Chechen Republic, Russians, have been the target of several violent attacks. Since June 7, 2000, Khava Barayeva and Luisa Magomadova stormed the temporary headquarters of an elite OMON (Russian Special Forces) squad in Alkhan Yurt, Chechnya, sparking the start of Chechnya's "Black Widows" movement. With two fatalities and five injuries, the incident brought attention to the group's notorious actions.[47]According to the report, women were responsible for 47% of all terrorist incidents and 81% of suicide attacks in the Chechen region between 2000 and 2005.[48] For more than 30 years, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) battled the Sri Lankan central government, mostly because of the Tamil minority's ethnic oppression. Their goal was to establish their own nation in Sri Lanka's north and east.[49] The use of female suicide bombers and the LTTE's high proportion of female members were well-known. The proportion of female LTTE members varied between 20 and 30 percent, with some estimates reaching as high as 50 percent in certain years.[50]According to LTTE theorist Anton Balasingham's wife, Adele Ann, a Tamil woman's decision to join the group was a sign to society that she was dissatisfied with the status quo and had the ability to rebel against authority.[51]To sum up, female revolutionaries have contested the idea that they are less capable of committing acts of terrorism or have less political clout, and. Additionally, nationalism and revolution are the main goals of the majority of terrorist organisations that are focused on women. Personal reason Personal causes, such as revenge, family instability, rape, personal tragedy, and revenge, are important motivations for the individual to join terrorism. Women are more likely to cite these as their original motivation in joining terrorist organizations than men. Mia Bloom, Jaques and Taylor, and Robert Pape have all proposed that the reasons behind female terrorists are different from those of male terrorists. According to them, the emotions of female terrorists such as family problems, discontent, and the desire to commit suicide are what motivate them. These motivations are further divided by Bloom into four categories: respect, relationship, revenge, and redemption. [52] 1. Women who experience sexual assault, including rape, may retaliate violently; some may even choose suicide bombing as a last resort. After women were raped in Iraq, Samira Ahmad Jassim, dubbed the "mother" of suicide bombers, was accused of encouraging rape victims to commit honour suicide and conducting 28 suicide attacks, according to the Die Welt article..[53] 2. During the Chechen War, Russian soldiers sexually assaulted many Chechen women. According to estimates from Doctors Without Borders, 85 percent of Chechen women experienced sexual assault at the hands of law enforcement and military during the Chechen War. Journalist Svetlana Makunina claims that after being drugged and raped, Chechen women were left with no choice but to commit suicide bombing.On the evening of May 21, 1991, LTTE suicide bomber Dhanu killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu. She clarified that she took this action after being gang-raped by Indian peacekeeping troops. 3. Another crucial element that encourages women to join terrorist groups is relationships. Family members and relatives, who are important in the recruitment process, could function as a conduit between the terror group and women. Sidney Jones claims that while some women freely choose to wed male terrorists, others are coerced by their relatives.[54] Many women join ISIS for a variety of reasons, including a desire to contribute to the caliphate, a desire for friendship with like-minded individuals, or direct pressure by family members and acquaintances.[55] For e.g., Shamima Begum was influenced by her friend Sharmena to join IS. Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers stated that instead of acting on their own initiative, female Palestinian suicide bombers are “at the mercy of, or in love with, their handlers.”[56] (women join terrorist organisations because they are forced by male) 4. Guillermo Galdos, and “Eliana Gonzales,” points out that male influence is not an essential prerequisite for recruiting women into violent organizations. In order to join revolutionary movements, women have reported willingly leaving their boyfriends, husbands, and kids. The oldest woman in Columbia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Eliana Gonzales Acosta, for instance, abandoned her husband, sister, and daughter to join the group.[57] 5. Many people who have been directly impacted by the acts of another group resort to terrorism. The revenge theory is the name given to this. An individual is more inclined to engage in terrorism if they have lost a friend or loved one to a terrorist organisation or the military.[58] Additionally, according to Jacques and Taylor, revenge influences people's decision to join terrorist groups.[59] In literature and art, the stereotype that women are more revengeful than males is mirrored. According to William Cosgrove's The Mourning Bride, "Heaven is furious, like love turned to hate, and Hell is furious, like a woman scorned.”[60]Russian negotiator suggests the difference between men and women is that “[Chechen women] are ‘zombified’ by their own sorrow and grief.[61] The Russian and international press called Chechen women bombers "Black Widows" as it was revealed that many were acting in retribution for the deaths of their husbands, kids, and brothers.[62]Since the takeover of the Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002, nineteen female bombers have appeared in black mourning garments with bombs attached to their bodies. They held 850 people hostage for two and a half days. Until Russian forces imposed persecution on the people and executed the terrorist. While these motivations were not limited to revenge or family difficulties, they were also gender specific. There are more men killed in these battles, resulting in an imbalance of women battling for retribution. Furthermore, women constitute the majority of rape victims in these communities, which motivates them to join. Gender Equality: According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[63]FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, was established to combat societal inequality and provide women with opportunities for advancement. Despite being predominantly dominated by women, the organization offers women's rights, sexual freedom, and opportunities for advancement in a patriarchal society.[64] FARC recruits in rural areas, where women often have fewer opportunities, highlighting the organization's societal focus on women's rights.[65]A woman who had spent many years of her life in the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army) was interviewed by Anne Phillips in 2012.[66]For the numerous reasons mentioned above, this woman, code-named "Athena," joined the FARC before turning thirteen. She explains why she joined this group  as it provides gender equality. She had economic reasons because she was from a rural area and lacked access to economic and educational opportunities. Women in Colombia's rural communities face a lack of opportunities, which leads to prostitution. Many women turn to the FARC as a viable alternative to prostitution. The FARC gives women a stable income. Women turn to the FARC because they are guaranteed food and other requirements. They are given the same opportunities as males and are able to support themselves. Also, by women joining terrorist organizations they are challenging gender stereotypes in their societies. O’Rourke says that women dislike these gender norms and rise out against them in opposition of the stereotyped female in their culture.[67]The LTTE gives women the same incentive to advance gender equality. According to LTTE women, they felt liberated and empowered within the organisation. By establishing sexual limitations and providing equal training chances, the LTTE established an environment that was equal for men and women. Women held leadership roles inside the LTTE and believed they were on par with the men themselves. Often, women join these groups to either learn about or escape gender inequality. CONCLUSION: The primary goal of this article was to examine the primary motivator for women to join terrorist organisations. For more than a century, women have been participating in terrorist activities, but only in recent decades have studies of terrorism examined female terrorists. Political, religious, personal, and gender equality are some of the motivations for women to join terrorist groups and participate in liberation movements. Since the 19th century, women have joined a variety of terrorist organisations; some conduct these horrible deeds to defend their beliefs or territory. Religion is another reason these women wish to sacrifice themselves in the name of Islam. They act in this way because they believe that, despite their crimes, they will be admitted to heaven if they commit murder for Islam. Women's terrorist operations might occasionally be motivated by personal issues. Although forced marriage, family issues, rape, the death of a loved one, and defiance of the patriarchal society are some of the main causes, other traumas could also influence their choices. However, each of the four factors has a major impact on women's decision to participate in terrorism. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, for example, are heavily influenced by religion. The Tamil Tigers and FARC, on the other hand, are primarily driven by personal motives and gender equality. Furthermore, the political cause of Red Brigade and the National Liberation Front has been their main source of motivation. "Personal, political, and religious motivations are the main cause behind women's involvement in terrorism," claim Cunningham and Bloom. In order to curb terrorists' actions in the modern world, it is critical to comprehend their objectives and the reason behind their organisation. Furthermore, since many highly educated women have joined terrorist organisations, we cannot claim that education may have a major influence. There is extremely little research on gender and terrorism, particularly on women's participation in terrorist actions. To determine the primary reason women, participate in terrorism, we must conduct additional research in this field. Due to the fact that the information offered is highly generalised. What steps should the government take to prevent women from joining terrorist organisations? What other variables might encourage women to join terrorist organisations? Researchers from all social science fields should conduct some research on these pressing concerns as political scientists alone are unable to provide these answers. Bibliography[1] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[2] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[3] Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism, 1st ed. 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(SAGE Publications, Inc, 2024), 60.[38] Maha Butt, “Feminist IR Theory and Terrorism,” International Affairs Forum, accessed December 16, 2024, https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=0&ContentID=9152#:~:text=Analyzing%20terrorism%20from%20a%20feminist's,female%20terrorists%20as%20'women%20terrorists..[39] David Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.[40] Elena Gapova, “Gender Equality vs. Difference and What Post-Socialism Can Teach Us,” Womens Studies International Forum 59 (November 1, 2016).[41] “Vera Zasulich,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vera_Zasulich#cite_note-5.[42]Elena Gapova, “Gender Equality vs. Difference and What Post-Socialism Can Teach Us,” Womens Studies International Forum 59 (November 1, 2016).[43] James Crossland, “The Women Who Ended an Emperor,” History Workshop, last modified April 21, 2021, https://www.mybib.com/#/projects/39m8D0/citations/new/webpage.[44] Zeynep Bayar, “The Role of Women in Terrorism,” City University of New York (CUNY) , accessed December 15, 2024, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4346&context=gc_etds.[45] Ruth Glynn , Approaching Women, Terror, and Trauma in Cultural Perspective, 2013.[46] “Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof,” Encyclopedia.com, accessed January 2, 2025, https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/andreas-baader-and-ulrike-meinhof.[47] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists,” The Institute for National Security Studies, last modified August 2006, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Female-Suicide-Bombers-63-80.pdf.[48] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (September 22, 2006).[49]Peng Wang, “Women in the LTTE: Birds of Freedom or Cogs in the Wheel?,” Journal of Politics and Law 4, no. 1 (2011).[50] Karla J. Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 3 (May 2003).[51]“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/srilanka/terroristoutfits/ltte.htm.[52] Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[53]Mia Bloom, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism,” Gender Studies 28, no. 1–2 (June 1, 2011).[54] Sidney Jones, “Inherited Jihadism: Like Father, like Son,” International Crisis Group, last modified July 4, 2007, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/inherited-jihadism-father-son.[55] Daniel Milton and Brian Dodwell, “Jihadi Brides? Examining a Female Guesthouse Registry from the Islamic State’s Caliphate,” Combating Terrorism Center 11, no. 5 (May 2018).[56]Edward E. Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions,” International Interaction 12, no. 1 (January 9, 2008).[57]“GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[58]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 710.[59]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 322[60] “GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[61]Ibid.,63[62] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (September 22, 2006).[63]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[64]Natalia Herrera and Douglas Porch, “‘Like Going to a Fiesta’ – the Role of Female Fighters in Colombia’s FARC-EP,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (January 26, 2009).[65]Mia Kazman, “Women of the FARC,” William J.Perry Center, accessed December 23, 2024, https://wjpcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Women-of-the-FARC.pdf[66]Christine Balling, “Why Women Turn to the FARC -- and How the FARC Turns on Them,” Foreign Affairs, last modified June 1, 2012, accessed December 23, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2012-06-01/fighting-mad.[67]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 702