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Abstract The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a 7,200-kilometre multi-modal network connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe, offering a shorter and cost-effective alternative to the Suez Canal. Established in 2000 and expanding with key infrastructure projects like the Rasht-Astara railway, the corridor aims to boost trade volumes significantly by 2030, facilitating faster, cheaper freight movement and enhancing Eurasian integration. Russia and Iran’s collaboration is central, enabling a sanctions-resilient trade route that counters Western dominance and supports economic growth in transit countries. The INSTC also offers environmental benefits, with lower greenhouse gas emissions compared to deep-sea shipping. Strategically, it diversifies Russia’s transport links, reduces dependency on vulnerable Western routes, and strengthens geopolitical ties within the BRICS framework. However, challenges such as infrastructure gaps, sanctions, and regional conflicts persist. For the EU, INSTC presents both opportunities for cheaper trade and risks to its geopolitical influence, necessitating strategic responses to maintain Eurasian connectivity and sanctions effectiveness. Key Words: International Trade, North, South, Europe, geopolitics Introduction The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a 7,200-kilometre multi-modal transportation network involving ships, railways, and roads designed to facilitate freight movement between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe.[1] Established in September 2000 under an agreement signed in St. Petersburg by India, Iran, and Russia, the corridor has since expanded to include additional members, including Belarus, Azerbaijan and several Central Asian countries. [2] Its primary aim is to enhance trade connectivity by linking major cities such as Mumbai, Tehran, Baku, and Moscow, and beyond, offering a shorter and more cost-effective alternative to traditional routes, including the Suez Canal. [3] Source: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-of-the-international-north-south-transport-corridor-instc/ In 2025, container traffic along the eastern route (via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) nearly doubled, supported by discounts of 15 - 80% on shipments, which have been extended through 2026. [4] A milestone occurred in November 2025 when a cargo train from north of Moscow delivered 62 containers to Iran via Central Asia, highlighting the route's viability for India-Central Asia trade. [5] Overall, INSTC freight volumes reached 26.9 million tons in 2024 (19% up from prior years), with rail handling over 12.9 million tons, and projections aim for 15 million tons annually by 2027. [6] The INSTC operates through several interconnected paths. Western Route: from India via sea to Iran's Bandar Abbas port, then by road or rail northward through Iran to Azerbaijan, and onward to Russia. Central Route: involves transit across the Caspian Sea from Iranian ports like Bandar Anzali to Russian ports such as Astrakhan. Eastern Route: connects via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for land-based links to Russia. This setup allows for efficient cargo transit, with railways playing a crucial role, including ongoing projects like the Rasht-Astara railway in Iran, to fully connect the network. [7] Suez and its geopolitical importance The Suez Canal stands as one of the world's most strategically vital maritime chokepoints, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and serving as a critical artery for global trade and energy security. Since its opening in 1869, the Suez Canal has fundamentally transformed global maritime trade patterns and geopolitical relationships. The canal provides the shortest maritime route between Europe and Asia, eliminating the need for the lengthy circumnavigation of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. This strategic positioning has made the canal a focal point of international competition and a critical infrastructure asset whose security is of profound importance to the global economy. [8] The Suez Canal's economic importance cannot be overstated. The waterway attracts approximately 12 - 15% of worldwide trade and about 30% of global container traffic, with more than $1 trillion in goods transiting annually. An average of fifty to sixty ships transit the canal daily, carrying an estimated $3 billion to $9 billion in cargo value. [9] This concentration of trade flow makes the canal a critical node in global supply chains, particularly for trade between Asia and Europe.[10] The canal's strategic role extends beyond general cargo. It handles roughly 9% of global seaborne oil flows (approximately 9.2 million barrels per day) and around 8% of liquefied natural gas volumes. [11] his energy dimension amplifies the canal's geopolitical significance, as disruptions can directly impact global energy markets and prices. [12] The 2021 blockage of the Suez Canal by the Ever Given container ship demonstrated the canal's vulnerability, disrupting global supply chains and highlighting the systemic risks posed by maritime chokepoints. [13] The Suez Canal has long been recognised as a strategic asset of paramount importance. Historical analysis reveals that control of the canal has been central to imperial and regional power projection, particularly during the British Empire's dominance, when the canal was viewed as the "jugular vein of empire". [14] The canal's strategic value was dramatically illustrated during the 1956 Suez Crisis and its closure from 1967 to 1975, events that reshaped regional geopolitics and demonstrated how canal access could be weaponized. [15] Contemporary security challenges continue to underscore the canal's strategic vulnerability. Recent geopolitical threats in the Red Sea, including attacks on commercial shipping, have raised concerns about the canal's security and the potential for regional conflicts to disrupt global trade. [16] These hybrid threats demonstrate how the canal remains a potential flashpoint where regional instability can have worldwide economic consequences. [17] In brief, for the time being, the Suez Canal remains an indispensable component of global maritime infrastructure, whose geopolitical significance extends far beyond its physical dimensions. Its role in facilitating international trade, energy transportation, and strategic mobility ensures that the canal's security and accessibility remain matters of vital international interest. As global trade patterns evolve and new challenges emerge, the canal's strategic importance continues to shape relationships among nations and influence the calculus of regional and global powers. Iran-Russia Collaboration. Can INSTC be a viable alternative to the Suez Canal? In December 2025, Iranian and Russian officials met in Tehran to expedite the corridor, focusing on removing administrative barriers and finalising legal frameworks. Key projects include the Rasht-Astara railway (expected completion by mid-2026) and upgrades to Iranian ports, such as Bandar Abbas. [18] Russia and Iran's collaboration is central to operationalising the INSTC, involving joint infrastructure development, financial investments, and policy coordination to address connectivity gaps. [19] It is against this backdrop that Russia has funded the 162-kilometre Rasht-Astara railway in Iran (with a 1.3 billion euro loan, targeted for completion by 2027), which resolves a critical missing link in the western route by connecting Azerbaijan's rail network to Iran's, enabling seamless transit from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. [20] Iran, in turn, has upgraded ports like Bandar Abbas and Chabahar (the latter through a 10-year agreement with India signed in May 2024, involving $2.1 billion in investments to expand capacity to 8.5 million tonnes), while Russia has modernised Caspian ports such as Astrakhan and Olya, along with highways like the M6 Caspian and M29 Caucasus. These investments — estimated at 35% of total corridor funding from Russia and 34% from Iran — focus on railway electrification, port expansions, and digital tools such as electronic waybills to streamline border procedures, thereby reducing export times and costs, which are currently 5 - 7 times higher than EU averages. Bilateral agreements, such as the 1992 Russia-Iran transport pact and recent multimodal logistics deals (e.g., between Russian Railways and India's CONCOR for coal shipments via INSTC in June 2024), further support asymmetric trade flows, with north-to-south machinery and chemicals dominating from Russia, and south-to-north foodstuffs from Iran. In terms of international trade, this partnership enhances the INSTC's viability by boosting freight potential to 14.6 - 24.7 million tonnes annually by 2030 (including 5.9 - 11.9 million tonnes containerised, or 325 - 662 thousand TEU), with grains accounting for 8.7 - 12.8 million tonnes primarily via the eastern route through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. For India, the corridor unlocks untapped export opportunities worth up to $180 billion (nine times current levels) to Russia and Central Asia, while Russia's pivot to southern markets (Gulf, India, Africa) has seen bilateral trade with India surge to over $30 billion in 2022, driven by hydrocarbons. Iran's role as a transit hub could generate transit revenues exceeding oil income, potentially increasing 20-fold from $1 billion to support economic growth amid high inflation (54.6% in 2023) and unemployment (9.7%). Synergies with other corridors like the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) add 127 - 246 thousand TEU in traffic, fostering Eurasian integration. Geopolitically, Russia-Iran ties make the INSTC a tool to counter Western domination by creating a sanctions-resilient route that avoids U.S.-influenced waterways, especially amid the Ukraine conflict and U.S. sanctions on both nations. This "pivot to the South" by Russia and Iran, and their positioning as a Eurasian bridge, reduce dependence on the Suez Canal, which handles vulnerable global trade, and promote diversified connectivity outside Western frameworks such as TRACECA. Challenges persist, including infrastructure overloads (e.g., 8.8 million tons transported in 2022 despite capacity constraints), uncoordinated policies, gauge differences and sanctions that affect insurance and port access, though exemptions for Chabahar help mitigate these. Overall, the collaboration not only addresses these hurdles through targeted investments and digital harmonisation but also positions the INSTC as a sustainable alternative, with environmental benefits such as 25% lower GHG emissions from rail shifts, comparable to those of deep-sea shipping. How does INSTC serve Russian security interests? In a recent analysis of the subject, Prokhor Tebin offers relevant observations examining the strategic importance of the INSTC within the framework of Russian national security amid intensifying great-power competition. The author argues that Russia’s security and economic resilience depend on developing a cohesive Eurasian transport network through a ‘whole-of-government’ approach that integrates various ministries, regional authorities, and foreign partners. This network includes robust domestic infrastructure and diversified international corridors, with the INSTC being a key route linking Russia to the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran. [21] According to Tebin, Russian national security is defined broadly, encompassing socio-economic development alongside defence. Robust transport infrastructure is vital for economic security, military mobilisation, and rapid crisis response, especially given Russia’s diminished strategic depth and growing threats on multiple borders, including NATO expansion to the west and instability in the south. Against this backdrop, the current overreliance on vulnerable Western transport arteries (the Baltic and Black Seas) underscores the need for alternative routes, such as the INSTC and the Northern Sea Route, to ensure resilience against potential blockades. Furthermore, Tebin stresses the importance of a networked transport system rather than isolated corridors, advocating for coordination via an interdepartmental group to optimise resource allocation and strategic prioritisation. While alternative regional projects exist, such as the Zangezur Corridor and Trans-Caspian routes, Russia should not oppose them outright but seek to enhance its own projects’ competitiveness and foster regional stability, as stable neighbours contribute to Russian security. Iran’s role in the INSTC is pivotal due to its geographic position and economic potential. Supporting Iran’s stability through the corridor reduces regional risks like mass migration and terrorism. The corridor also provides Russia with critical connectivity to the Global South and lessens dependency on NATO-controlled maritime routes. Ultimately, the INSTC, though currently limited in cargo volume, is strategically crucial for diversifying Russia’s transport links, enhancing military and economic security, and fostering Eurasian integration in a complex geopolitical environment characterised by long-term great-power rivalry. Other authors, Vinokurov, Ahunbaev and Zaboev stress the strategic importance and development potential of the INSTC, a multimodal transport network connecting northwestern Europe and the Nordic countries with Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Accordingly, INSTC serves as a crucial alternative to traditional east-west routes by offering faster delivery times, supporting Eurasian economic integration, and enhancing connectivity for landlocked countries in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), four of whose five members are landlocked. The above-mentioned authors estimate that by 2030, the aggregate freight traffic on the INSTC, including containerised and non-containerised goods, could reach 15 – 25 million tonnes, with container traffic potentially increasing twentyfold. The main commodities transported include food products, metals, machinery, textiles, and grain — the latter being the major non-containerised cargo. The corridor’s rail-based transport offers environmental advantages over road and air freight, emitting significantly fewer greenhouse gases. Despite its potential, INSTC faces several challenges: uncoordinated transport policies among member states, international sanctions (notably on Iran), infrastructure bottlenecks, legal and regulatory inconsistencies, border-crossing delays, and differing railway gauges. Overcoming these issues requires improved coordination, infrastructure investments, digitalisation, and streamlined customs and tariff policies. To sum up, fully operationalising the INSTC would transform it from a mere transport corridor into an economic development corridor, fostering regional connectivity, trade expansion, and sustainable growth across Eurasia. It would also help convert landlocked countries into “land-linked” ones, boosting their economic prospects and integrating them into global value chains. Consequently, it raises questions about the future of the EU as a geopolitical actor within the broader West-BRICS context. Possible consequences for the EU Geoeconomically, INSTC could have significant consequences, centred on trade diversion and supply-chain shifts. The corridor promises 30 – 40% reductions in transit time (e.g., 23 days versus 45 – 60 days via Suez) and costs, enabling faster India–Europe flows of pharmaceuticals, textiles, and machinery, as well as Russian energy and agricultural exports to South Asia. [22] Post-2022 Ukraine invasion, volumes have grown amid Russia’s pivot from European markets, with India–Russia trade surging to around US$50 billion. For the EU, this creates dual pressures: potential cost savings for importers accessing Indian goods or Central Asian resources, yet practical barriers from EU and US sanctions on Russia and Iran, which restrict participation and financing. EU ports and logistics hubs (e.g., Rotterdam) risk losing transit volumes as cargo reroutes through sanctioned territories, while the corridor competes with EU-supported alternatives like the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor. [23] The EU’s Global Gateway strategy (€300 billion investment framework) explicitly promotes diversified, sustainable connectivity, allocating funds to bypass Russia - and Iran-dependent routes. Cargo between the EU and India is projected to double by 2032 under the prospective FTA, underscoring the need for reliable non-INSTC pathways. Overall, the INSTC accelerates Eurasian trade reorientation away from Western-dominated chokepoints, modestly eroding EU leverage in global logistics while exposing vulnerabilities to disruptions in sanctioned segments. [24] Geopolitically, the INSTC bolsters a Russia–Iran–India axis within BRICS, serving as a sanctions-circumvention tool that undermines the effectiveness of Western measures. By enabling Russia to monetise its geography for access to the Global South and Iran to gain transit rents, it advances multipolar narratives that challenge EU influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. [25] For Europe, this reduces coercive leverage over Moscow — previously derived from transit dependence — and fragments the rules-based order the EU champions. It also counters EU efforts to deepen ties with India via transparent initiatives like IMEC, potentially tilting New Delhi’s connectivity choices toward sanctioned partners. Challenges include infrastructure gaps (e.g., rail gauge mismatches, Iranian sanctions-induced delays) and regional conflicts (Armenia – Azerbaijan), limiting scalability. Yet momentum persists through bilateral deals, such as Azerbaijan’s financing for Iran’s Rasht–Astara railway. [26] In conclusion, the INSTC presents the EU with limited opportunities for cheaper diversified trade but primarily poses geoeconomic risks of route competition and geopolitical challenges to sanctions efficacy and Eurasian influence. To mitigate, the EU should probably accelerate Global Gateway investments in the Middle Corridor and IMEC, harmonise sanctions enforcement, and engage India on value-aligned connectivity. Failure to do so could accelerate a shift toward BRICS-led corridors, diminishing the EU’s role in shaping 21st-century Eurasian trade architecture. References [1] International North–South Transport Corridor. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_North%E2%80%93South_Transport_Corridor [2] Cross-border Infrastructure International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). (n.d.). Asia Regional Integration Center. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://aric.adb.org/initiative/international-north-south-transport-corridor [3] Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.86617 [4] Aliyev, N. (2025, December 19). Russia’s Pivot to the Eastern Route: Balancing Azerbaijan with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? Iddle. https://ridl.io/russia-s-pivot-to-the-eastern-route-balancing-azerbaijan-with-kazakhstan-and-turkmenistan/ [5] Wani, A. (2025, November 27). INSTC Eastern Corridor: India’s Gateway to Central Asia. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/instc-eastern-corridor-india-s-gateway-to-central-asia [6] Bochkarev, D. (2025, November 27). The North–South Transport Corridor and Energy-Related Exports. Energy Intelligence. https://www.energyintel.com/0000019a-c479-d672-a9be-c77f8c740000 [7] International North–South Transport Corridor. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_North%E2%80%93South_Transport_Corridor [8] Helwa, R., & Al-Riffai, P. (2025, March 20). A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/ [9] Ibidem. [10] Ducruet, C. (2016). The polarization of global container flows by interoceanic canals: geographic coverage and network vulnerability. Maritime Policy & Management, 43(2), 242–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2015.1022612 [11] Helwa, R., & Al-Riffai, P. (2025, March 20). A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/ [12] Rodrigue, J.-P. (2005). Straits, Passages and Chokepoints A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution. Erudit, 48(135). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.7202/011797ar [13] Lee, J. M., & Wong, E. Y. (2021). Suez Canal blockage: an analysis of legal impact, risks and liabilities to the global supply chain. MATEC Web Conf., 339. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202133901019 [14] Morewood, S. (1992). Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy, 1919–1941. War & Society, 10(1), 81–107. https://doi.org/10.1179/072924792791198995 [15] Bhattacharya, S. S. (1982). Strategic Importance of the Suez Canal. Strategic Analysis, 5(12), 686–693. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700168209427575 [16] Kotait, A., & Ismail, A. (2025). Geopolitical Threats in the Red Sea: The Future of the Suez Canal amid Regional and International Challenges. EKB Journal Management System. https://doi.org/10.21608/jces.2025.435103 available here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393195669_Geopolitical_Threats_in_the_Red_Sea_The_Future_of_the_Suez_Canal_amid_Regional_and_International_Challenges [17] Lott, A. (2022). Hybrid Threats and the Law of the Sea Use of Force and Discriminatory Navigational Restrictions in Straits. Brill. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004509368 [18] Iran, Russia Push To Fast-Track North-South Trade Corridor. (2025, December 17). The Media Line. https://themedialine.org/headlines/iran-russia-push-to-fast-track-north-south-trade-corridor/#:~:text=Iran%20and%20Russia%20announced%20that%20they%20aim,Pushing%20the%20project%20into%20an%20operational%20phase [19] Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.86617 [20] Rawandi-Fadai, L. (2023, August 3). What North-South International Transport Corridor Means for Iran. RIAC Russian International. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-north-south-international-transport-corridor-means-for-iran/ [21] Tebin, P. Y. (2026). The International North–South Transport Corridor in Russian National Security Optics. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(1), 134–148. https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-134-148 Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.866171 [22] Fillingham, Z. (2024, September 10). Geopolitics of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-of-the-international-north-south-transport-corridor-instc/ [23] Kausch, K. (2026, February 11). Corridor Politics. Charting Europe’s de-risking route through Eurasia. G M F. https://www.gmfus.org/news/corridor-politics [24] Ghanem, D., & Sánchez-Cacicedo, A. (2024, June 18). From hype to horizon: what the EU needs to know to bring IMEC to life. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/hype-horizon-what-eu-needs-know-bring-imec-life [25] Kausch, K. (2026, February 11). Corridor Politics. Charting Europe’s de-risking route through Eurasia. G M F. https://www.gmfus.org/news/corridor-politics [26] Delivorias, A., & Falkenberg, D. (2024). India's connectivity initiatives: A multi-faceted strategy (EPRS Briefing No. PE 762.471). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/PE-762.471

China's engagement in overseas renewables grew once again, though not as much as in oil and gas Last year, Chinese companies’ “engagement” in 150 countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reached its highest level since the BRI was launched 12 years ago. The value of construction deals involving Chinese companies reached USD 128 billion, up 81% on 2024. While investments totalled USD 85 billion, up 62%. The unprecedented boom has been revealed by annual data from the Griffith Asia Institute, an Australian think-tank, and the Green Finance and Development Center, a think-tank hosted in Fudan University, Shanghai. “I did not foresee last year that 2025 would be such a strong year [for BRI engagement],” said report author Christoph Nedopil Wang during an online launch. “Engagement” refers to both investments by Chinese companies, implying an ownership stake in a project, and the value of construction contracts awarded to them for engineering services. The striking upsurge comes after years of government-directed messaging, and analyst predictions, that the initiative would focus more on “small and beautiful” projects, rather than the mega projects pursued in its early years. “Small yet beautiful should be seen as a bygone,” Nedopil Wang said, noting both the total value of construction and investment deals, and the growth in average project value. Last year also saw notable shifts in the targets for Chinese companies’ activities around the world. Their engagement in renewable-energy projects grew in 2025 but not as rapidly as in oil and gas projects, which will concern many. Rapid growth in engagement in mining, and in the technology and manufacturing sector, demonstrates the evolution of the BRI since it began in 2013. Finally, Africa became the top destination for Chinese companies’ overseas engagement. The end of ‘small and beautiful’? Last year saw a marked rebound in the size of projects. The average value of investments reached USD 939 million, up from USD 672 million in 2024 and three times higher than deal sizes five years ago, during the BRI’s Covid contraction. The average value of construction deals reached USD 964 million, up from USD 496 million the previous year. Nedopil Wang says this indicates the end of “small and beautiful” BRI projects, a term promoted by the Chinese government in response to financial headwinds and the environmental and social problems which arose in the first five years of the initiative. Chinese government discourse has certainly not dropped the emphasis, however. On 27 January, People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, stated that “more than 700 aid projects, including … small and beautiful livelihood projects” were delivered overseas in 2025. Booming renewables – and fossil fuels Energy was once again the top sector for engagement in Belt and Road countries, accounting for about 43% of the total. Total engagement in energy sectors reached USD 93.9 billion, the highest ever recorded. However, while just a few years ago renewable-energy projects accounted for nearly half of total energy projects overseas, in 2025 renewables made up just 21%, while fossil fuels accounted for over 75%. Nedopil Wang sees risks in the boom in oil and gas engagement. “I see a rapid rise of oil and gas engagement as an environmental risk due to the associated climate emissions. They also become an economic risk under declining fossil-fuel-demand scenarios driven by electrification of mobility and scaling of green electricity,” which would lead to lower oil and gas demand, respectively, he said. The dominance of oil and gas projects also implies an emphasis on energy extraction, rather than generation. According to the report’s breakdown, the value of investments and contracts in extractive projects amounted to USD 51.4 billion, while generation accounted for USD 25.8 billion. That said, Chinese companies’ engagement in oil and gas projects is primarily via construction contracts rather than equity ownership. This may minimise some of the economic risks Nedopil Wang identifies. When it comes to renewable projects, while these make up a smaller proportion of total energy engagement in 2025, they have seen a marked increase in real terms. Last year saw engagement worth USD 21.4 billion, up from USD 12.3 billion in 2024. “2025 was both the greenest and the brownest year” for the BRI, Nedopil Wang said during the report launch. Renewables, by their nature, also contribute to generation rather than extraction. Last year saw projects worth 23.8 GW of solar, wind and hydro generation capacity, compared to around 15 GW in 2024. “I do not immediately read the surge as a return to fossil-fuel expansion,” notes Fikayo Akeredolu, senior research associate in climate policy and justice at the University of Bristol. She points out that while oil and gas projects accounted for a large proportion of the value of construction contracts in 2025, foreign direct investment from China is supporting renewables. Meanwhile, at least in Africa, lending from China’s government-backed policy banks is backing power-transmission projects. The lending data comes from the recently updated Chinese Loans to Africa database, published by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center. “[We see] a segmentation of instruments, rather than a reversal of China’s energy-transition stance,” Akeredolu says. Moving up value chains Another key sector of growth in 2025 was technology and manufacturing, referring to both traditional manufacturing activities and high-tech areas such as solar PV and batteries. Its growth demonstrates the evolution of the BRI over the last 12 years, from a focus on infrastructure to an increasing interest in developing manufacturing bases overseas. The sector saw 27% year-on-year growth in engagement and has been growing steadily since 2023. Engagement in green tech like solar PV and batteries dropped slightly compared to 2024, however. “The growing role of tech and manufacturing highlights China’s growing ability to build and manage factories (and in particular high-tech-related factories) across the world,” Nedopil Wang said. “While the original BRI engagement was concentrated in infrastructure, the new BRI is seeing the expansion of China’s manufacturing base to overseas markets.” Metals and mining also saw strong engagement in 2025, a record high of USD 32.6 billion. This was dominated by construction contracts for two mega projects in aluminum and steel in Kazakhstan, worth USD 19.5 billion together. However, other regions also saw major deals, the African continent in particular. Interestingly, data from the report shows a higher proportion of engagement in processing rather than extractive mining facilities. Processing of mined minerals and metals is seen by many resource-rich countries as a key strategy for moving up value chains, particularly in green technologies. For now, however, it is unclear if the data represents a trend or simply a one-off. In contrast, transportation infrastructure is in decline, with only USD 13.3 billion, the least since the BRI began life being touted primarily as a global connectivity project. Nedopil Wang suggests this may be connected to problems securing finance for traditional infrastructure projects, including the fall in lending from China’s development finance banks. Africa rising In 2025, the largest market for Chinese companies’ engagements along the BRI was Africa. The Belt and Road partners on the continent saw USD 61.2 billion worth of engagement, a 283% expansion compared to 2024, according to the report. The majority of that engagement was in the form of construction contracts, rather than investment. Nedopil Wang indicates this may have to do with Chinese companies seeking ways to avoid US tariffs. Akeredolu from the University of Bristol points to “Africa’s growing role in resource security amid global supply-chain fragmentation” as another reason shaping the boom in Chinese engagement in African economies. “Whether this is good news for African governments depends on bargaining power,” says Akeredolu. “Where states can secure local content, downstream value addition, or revenue-sharing, opportunities exist. Where engagement is limited to turnkey construction without equity or technology transfer, the developmental upside is thinner.”

1. The Strategic Importance of Space Development: A Measure of National Competitiveness Space has evolved beyond being a domain of scientific exploration to become a crucial strategic asset that determines a nation's survival and prosperity. Whereas the space race during the Cold War was primarily a "pride competition" to showcase ideological superiority, space development in the 21st century has become a practical battlefield for controlling economic, security, and technological dominance. First, the importance of space in national security and military aspects. Modern warfare is fundamentally an "information war." Real-time surveillance through reconnaissance satellites, precision strike capabilities using GPS, and high-speed satellite communication networks form the backbone of contemporary military power. Nations that fail to secure space assets risk becoming "blind" in terms of information, which can lead to critical gaps in their defense capabilities. The global trend of establishing "space forces" is a direct result of space becoming firmly established as the 4th battlefield, after land, sea, and air. Second, the economic value and creation of new industries. With the onset of the "New Space" era, the private sector-led space industry is growing explosively. Building a global internet network using small satellite constellations, space tourism, and the manufacturing of ultra-precise semiconductors or new drugs in space are generating enormous value. Moreover, rare resources like rare earth elements and helium-3 found on the Moon or asteroids are seen as the final hope for solving Earth's resource depletion issues. Nations that secure these resources will likely control the future global economy. Third, the spillover effect on science and technology. Space development involves overcoming extreme environmental challenges, and the technologies developed — such as rocket propulsion, advanced materials engineering, artificial intelligence, and robotics — spill over into civilian industries, revolutionizing daily life. Technologies like water purifiers, microwaves, and cordless vacuum cleaners were all originally spin-offs from space exploration. In this way, investment in space development serves as a lever to elevate a nation's overall technological level. Lastly, international status and diplomatic influence. Countries that possess independent launch vehicle technology and satellite operations capabilities gain strong influence in the international arena. Space development requires significant capital and highly advanced technologies, and nations that succeed in this field acquire symbolic capital as "technological powerhouses." This helps them play a leading role in international cooperation frameworks and enhances national pride. In conclusion, space development is not merely a future investment but an essential national strategy to protect current security and secure future resources. As the saying goes, "He who controls space, controls the Earth," pioneering the path to space is a mission for sustainable national development in this era. 2. The History of South Korea's Space Development. South Korea’s Space Development History: A Record of Challenges from Nothing to Something South Korea's journey in space development began later than that of many advanced nations, yet it has grown at an extraordinarily rapid pace — so much so that it is hard to find a parallel in the world. From laying the foundation in the early 1990s, South Korea has risen to become one of the top seven space-faring nations in just about 30 years. This journey marks the transformation from a "follower" to a "leader" in space development. 2.1. South Korea's Satellites The journey began in August 1992 with the launch of Arirang-1, South Korea’s first satellite. Built in collaboration with a British university, this small satellite was the first "eye" South Korea sent into space, making the country the 22nd nation in the world to have a satellite in orbit. Throughout the 1990s, South Korea focused on domestically producing satellite bodies and payload technology, notably through the Arirang series and multipurpose satellites, laying the foundation for the country’s space technology. Figure 1. Timeline of South Korea's Satellites (Source: Namu Wiki) 2.2. South Korea's Launch Vehicles The development of launch vehicles began in earnest in the 2000s. In 2002, South Korea successfully launched its first liquid-propelled scientific rocket, KSR-III, which helped the country accumulate crucial rocket engine technology. This laid the groundwork for the construction of the Naro Space Center in 2009, the heart of South Korea's space development. However, the road to self-sufficiency in launch vehicles was challenging. The Naro rocket (KSLV-I), developed in cooperation with Russia, faced two failed launches, a painful setback. Despite these failures, South Korea achieved a historic milestone with the successful launch of Naro-3 in January 2013, sending a domestically built satellite into space for the first time. The success of Naro-3 became a springboard for the development of South Korea’s indigenous launch vehicle, the Nuri rocket (KSLV-II). Unlike the Naro rocket, which used Russian engines, the Nuri rocket had to be entirely designed, built, tested, and operated with South Korean technology — a monumental challenge. After an incomplete success in its first launch in 2021, South Korea achieved full success with the second launch of Nuri in June 2022. With this achievement, South Korea became the seventh country in the world to launch a practical satellite weighing over 1 ton using a domestically developed launch vehicle. The country's progress continues at an even faster pace. In August 2022, South Korea launched the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO), the country’s first lunar orbiter, which successfully entered lunar orbit. This marks South Korea's first step beyond low Earth orbit and into deep space exploration. Additionally, South Korea’s Space Agency (KASA), responsible for overseeing space development, officially opened in May 2024 in Sacheon, Gyeongsangnam-do, aligning the country's space policies with specialized expertise and consistency. Currently, South Korea is following an ambitious “Space Economy Roadmap”, which includes plans to launch a lunar lander in 2032 and a Mars exploration mission by 2045. Moving past the phase of technology imitation, South Korea is now advancing its capabilities in cutting-edge reconnaissance satellites, small satellite constellations, and high-performance next generation launch vehicles, positioning itself as a leading player in the global exploration of humanity’s new frontiers. Here is the Timeline of South Korea’s Launch Vehicles (Source: Wikipedia). Note: KSR: Korea Sounding Rocket (Korean Scientific Observation Rocket). KSLV: Korea Space Launch Vehicle (Korean Space Launch Vehicle: I represents the Naro series, II represents the Nuri series) • 1377: During the 3rd year of King Uwang of the Goryeo Dynasty, Choi Mu-seon created the first Korean rocket, called "Juhwa" (走火), later known as "Shingijeon". • 1451: The 1st year of King Munjong of the Joseon Dynasty, Munjonghwacha (a fire-wheeled vehicle, a type of rocket). • 1958 January: Inha University establishes a Department of Weapons Engineering. • 1958: The Ministry of Defense establishes a rocket research organization at the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). • 1959 July: ADD successfully launches a two-stage rocket (67th rocket) and a three-stage rocket (556th rocket) from the coastal area of Gojan-dong, Incheon. • 1960 November 15: Inha University develops the IITO-1A rocket. • 1960 November 19: Inha University develops the IITO-2A rocket. • 1960 November 19: Test launch of the IITO-1A and IITO-2A rockets from the waters off Songdo, Incheon, at 3:50 PM. • 1961: ADD disbanded. • 1962 April: Inha University establishes the Inha Rocket Research Society. • 1964 May: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the IITO-1A from the coast of Gojan-dong, Incheon. • 1964 October: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the IIT-3A rocket, which fails. • 1964 December: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the two-stage rocket IITA-4MR. • 1964 December: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the largest three-stage rocket, IITA-7CR, using a solid propellant from Japan. • 1970: Air Force Academy's Park Gui-yong and Jo Ok-chan's team launch the AXR-55 rocket with asphalt propellant, supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology. • 1971: Air Force Academy launches the AXR-73 rocket with asphalt propellant. • 1972: ADD begins rocket research. • 1972 December: Air Force Academy launches the AXR-300 rocket, with a total of three launches. • 1978: ADD develops the domestic medium-range ballistic missile, Baekgom, modeled after the U.S. Nike Hercules. • 1986: Inha University begins the development of the IS-X rocket series under the Inha Rocket Research Society. • 1987: The Space Science Institute of the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASI) is established to start developing scientific rockets. • 1988 February: Inha University launches IS-001 and IS-002 rockets. • 1988: Scientific rocket development project is selected as a specific research task by the Ministry of Science and Technology. • 1988 December: Inha Rocket Research Society presents the IS-X research report. • 1989 October: The Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) is established. • 1993 June: KARI launches the solid rocket KSR-I (KSR-420) from the Anheung Test Site on the west coast. • 1993 September: KARI successfully launches KSR-I (KSR-420) for the second time from Anheung Test Site. • 1995: South Korea develops its first pressurized liquid-fueled rocket engine with a thrust of 13 tons. • 1996: South Korea establishes its Mid- and Long-Term National Space Development Plan, aiming to achieve the capability to launch low-earth orbit satellites independently by 2010. • 1997 July 9: KARI launches the two-stage solid scientific rocket KSR-II. • 1998: The 5th Science and Technology Ministers' Meeting approved the modification of the national space development plan, shortening the goal for independent satellite launches to 2005. • 2000: The second revision of the space development plan is approved, setting goals for securing small satellite launch vehicle technology by 2005, 1-ton practical satellite launch technology by 2010, and 1.5-ton practical satellite launch technology by 2015. • 2002: KARI launches South Korea's first liquid-propelled scientific rocket, KSR-III. • 2004: South Korea and Russia sign a space technology cooperation agreement. • 2006: South Korea and Russia sign a space technology protection agreement. • 2008: KARI develops a 30-ton rocket engine, completing prototype development and partial testing of the turbo pump-gas generator system. • 2008: KARI begins the development of a 75-ton rocket engine. • 2008: The Naro Space Center is completed. • 2009 August 25: KARI attempts the first launch of Naro-1 (KSLV-I), South Korea's first satellite launch vehicle. The launch fails due to fairing separation issues. • 2010 June 10: KARI attempts the second launch of Naro-2. The rocket explodes during flight, resulting in failure. • 2013 January 30: KARI successfully launches the Naro-3, sending the Naro Scientific Satellite into orbit and achieving successful communication. • 2015 July 30: South Korea announces the successful completion of the first phase of the Korean launch vehicle development program. • 2018 November 28: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) test vehicle. • 2018: South Korea successfully launches the Arirang 2 satellite. • 2021 October 21: South Korea attempts the first launch of the Nuri rocket. The launch fails. • 2022 June 21: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri rocket (KSLV-II) for the second time. • 2023 May 25: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) for the third time. • 2025 November 27: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) for the fourth time. Upcoming Launches: • 2026: The 5th launch of the Nuri rocket. • 2027: The 6th launch of the Nuri rocket. • 2030: Development of the next generation launch vehicle. • 2035: Development of a large geostationary launch vehicle. Figure 2. South Korea’s Space Development Progress Plan 3. Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) Technical Characteristics: The Core Mechanisms of the Korean Launch Vehicle The Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) is the first space launch vehicle to be entirely developed using South Korea's independent technology, from design and production to testing and launch operations. This achievement is not just about launching a rocket; it represents a significant technological milestone in securing sovereign control over the "transportation vehicle" to space, marking immense technical value. The most critical technological achievement of the Nuri Rocket is the indigenous development of the 75-ton liquid rocket engine. The Nuri Rocket consists of three stages: the first stage contains four 75-ton engines clustered together to form a 300-ton engine; the second stage uses one 75-ton engine; and the third stage carries one 7-ton engine. The 75-ton engines, in particular, represent a complex technological achievement, as they must reliably burn extremely cold oxidizers at -183°C and high-pressure fuel — technologies that demand advanced precision. The Key Technical Features: 1. Engine Clustering Technology: The first stage of the Nuri Rocket uses four 75-ton engines arranged in a cluster. These engines must operate as though they were a single engine, requiring precise synchronization. To prevent combustion imbalances or vibrations between the engines, advanced synchronization technology has been applied. This ensures that the rocket achieves stable thrust. Even the slightest error in one of the four engines would cause the rocket to deviate from its flight path, making this clustering technology a central achievement of Nuri. 2. Lightweight Structure and Large-Scale Component Manufacturing: For efficient launch, the rocket structure needs to be both strong and as lightweight as possible. The fuel tanks of the Nuri Rocket are made with walls as thin as 2mm to 3mm, showcasing an advanced level of manufacturing. The large aluminum sheets used for the tanks are precisely welded, and high-pressure resistance is ensured through spinning and specialized welding techniques. These methods represent cutting-edge manufacturing capabilities in the aerospace field. 3. Cryogenic and High-Temperature Environment Control: The Nuri Rocket has to manage two extreme conditions simultaneously — cryogenic temperatures to store liquid oxidizers and high temperatures reaching thousands of degrees Celsius during engine combustion. To handle these conditions, specialized thermal insulation and heat-resistant materials are used. Additionally, the rocket's gimbaling system, which controls the angle of the engines to adjust the direction of flight, is designed to function perfectly even under high acceleration and in vacuum conditions. 4. Indigenous Flight Control and Guidance Software: The brain of the Nuri Rocket is its flight control computer, which automatically calculates and adjusts the trajectory from launch to orbit insertion. With algorithms developed entirely using domestic technology, this computer can precisely place satellites into their intended orbits without external assistance. This capability is crucial for national security, as it involves the precise and autonomous control of satellite launches. 5. Satellite Separation and Deployment Technology: As demonstrated during the third launch of Nuri, the ability to deploy multiple satellites at specific time intervals without causing collisions is a highly precise mechanism. This technology is essential for building large-scale satellite constellations in the future, laying the groundwork for future advancements in space. Overall, the Nuri Rocket's design and development represent a comprehensive mastery of advanced space technologies and mark South Korea’s leap into the forefront of space exploration. 4. Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) Launch Achievements: Milestones in Expanding South Korea’s Space Territory The successful launch of Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II), South Korea’s domestically developed launch vehicle, is not just the achievement of putting a rocket into orbit; it represents a significant accomplishment in terms of national prestige and technological self-reliance. Through three major launches, South Korea has firmly joined the ranks of "space powers." The most notable achievement is South Korea's entry into the "Top 7 Space Powers." With the success of the Nuri Rocket, South Korea became the 7th country (after Russia, the U.S., Europe, China, Japan, and India) capable of independently launching a 1-ton or heavier practical satellite into low Earth orbit. This means South Korea has secured complete sovereignty over its "transportation vehicle" for space exploration and development, enabling the country to launch satellites at its desired time without relying on other countries. Examining the step-by-step launch achievements reveals a clear progression: 1st Launch (October 2021): South Korea successfully launched a satellite simulator to a target altitude of 700 km, proving the performance of the engine in flight. Although the rocket failed to reach orbit due to an early shutdown of the third-stage engine, the launch confirmed that most of the challenges in developing large liquid rockets had been overcome. 2nd Launch (June 2022): South Korea successfully deployed the performance verification satellite into its designated orbit. This moment proved the reliability of the launch vehicle, entirely built with 100% domestic technology, to the world. 3rd Launch (May 2023): The third launch successfully carried out a "real-world mission," deploying eight operational satellites, including Next-Generation Small Satellite 2. Notably, the technology to separate multiple satellites sequentially was successfully demonstrated, proving the launch vehicle’s operational capabilities. Industrial Achievements: The development of Nuri involved over 300 domestic companies. This collaboration allowed private companies to accumulate expertise in component design, assembly, and testing for large-scale scientific projects. This shift in expertise has accelerated the transition from Old Space (government-led space programs) to New Space (private-sector-led space ventures). Companies like Hanwha Aerospace have emerged, marking the start of a full-fledged aerospace industry ecosystem. National Security and Diplomatic Achievements: The technology behind launch vehicles has significant overlap with that of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Therefore, the success of Nuri symbolizes South Korea’s strong national deterrence and technological stature. Additionally, owning an independent launch vehicle has enhanced South Korea’s negotiating power in international space collaborations, such as the Artemis Program, enabling the country to participate as an equal partner in global space exploration initiatives. Public Sentiment and National Pride: Finally, Nuri has instilled a sense of pride and hope among the South Korean people. The journey from nothing to becoming a space power in 30 years has ignited a sense of ambition and a spirit of challenge in the younger generation. The ongoing 4th to 6th launch series will further increase the reliability of the rocket, laying a strong foundation for South Korea’s expanding space economy. Future missions, including the lunar lander launch, will help to further broaden South Korea's space economic territory. In conclusion, the successful launches of Nuri Rocket not only establish South Korea as a key player in space exploration but also highlight its technological self-sufficiency and the evolving space industry, setting the stage for continued advancements in space exploration. 5. Economic Competitiveness and Commercialization of the Space Industry: New Growth Drivers in the 'New Space' Era In the past, space development was seen as a massive budget expenditure aimed at enhancing national prestige. However, we have now entered the era of the ‘Space Economy’, which generates tremendous added value. Particularly, the commercialization strategy led by private companies is fundamentally reshaping the space industry’s paradigm. First, Revolutionary Reductions in Launch Costs Have Opened the Doors to Commercialization: The "reusable rocket" technology introduced by SpaceX has lowered launch costs to a fraction of what they once were — about one-tenth of previous levels. Building on the success of the Nuri Rocket, South Korea is also working to enhance its economic competitiveness through the development of next generation launch vehicles. As launch costs decrease, more companies will be able to venture into space, leading to the diversification of commercial services in the space sector. Second, Miniature Satellite Constellations Are Opening New Markets for Commercial Services: Instead of a single large satellite, hundreds or thousands of small satellites in low Earth orbit are now being launched to create global, ultra-high-speed internet networks, as seen with the Starlink model. This approach targets underserved areas like remote islands, airplanes, and ships, generating significant revenue. South Korean companies such as Hanwha Systems and KAI are actively entering the satellite communications and Earth observation data markets to enhance their commercial competitiveness. Third, Space Resource Mining and Manufacturing Offer New Opportunities: Resources like helium-3 (a potential energy source) on the Moon, and rare minerals from asteroids, are expected to be at the heart of future resource wars. Additionally, In-space Manufacturing in zero-gravity environments allows us to produce ultra-pure fiber optics, large single-crystal semiconductors, and 3D-printed bioengineered organs — products that are impossible to create on Earth. These high-value products promise to offset transportation costs and generate substantial commercial profits. Fourth, Spin-offs and Technology Transfer to the Private Sector: The technology developed for the Nuri Rocket being transferred to integrated companies (such as Hanwha Aerospace) is an example of how public-sector-led technologies can be turned into commercial business ventures. By increasing domestic production rates and establishing mass production systems, South Korea can enter global supply chains, generating economic success through exports of launch vehicle components and subsystems to the international market. Finally, the Rise of the Space Tourism and Services Market: Private space travel, led by companies such as Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic, is already creating a premium market with ticket prices in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. This trend goes beyond mere tourism and is driving the growth of related industries, including space hotels, space funerals, and space insurance. In conclusion, the commercialization of the space industry goes beyond technological perfection and depends on the ‘sustainability of profit models’. South Korea, building on the technological foundation established by the Nuri Rocket’s success, must combine private creativity and capital to develop economic strategies aimed at increasing its share in the global space market. Space has now transitioned from being merely a domain of exploration to a highly competitive business arena. 6. Next-Generation Launch Vehicle Plans South Korea's next-generation launch vehicle (commonly referred to as KSLV-III) plan can be summarized in one sentence: "After Nuri (1.5-ton class), develop a larger launch vehicle capable of sending a lunar lander into space with a focus on the private sector, and aim to launch a lunar mission (lander) in the early 2030s." Key Goals: • Development of a Next-Generation Launch Vehicle aimed at launching a lunar lander. • Nuri Rocket will undergo repeated launches and technology transfer to the private sector by 2027, after which the focus will shift to the next generation launch vehicle. Timeline (Overview): • The goal is to have the first launch of the next-generation vehicle by 2030. • The next generation launch vehicle for the lunar lander mission is expected to be ready by 2033. o Different documents may refer to these milestones as "first launch in 2030" and "lunar lander mission launch in 2033," but it’s generally understood as a staged process from initial flight testing to lunar mission deployment. Propulsion System (Direction): • The development emphasizes private sector leadership and public-private cooperation, enhancing the "industry-led" approach compared to the previous Nuri system. What About Reusability? • Officially, reusable launch vehicles haven’t been confirmed yet. However, discussions in space policy and industry circles often mention reusability as part of the next-generation vehicle's advancement, reflecting a trend toward incorporating modern launch technologies. Development Strategy: • The next generation launch vehicle is set to transition from Nuri (1.5-ton class) to larger launch vehicles capable of handling lunar lander missions. • The government and KARI (Korea Aerospace Research Institute) plan to achieve initial flight by 2030, with a lunar mission (lander launch) targeted for 2033. o The process will follow a step-by-step roadmap, from initial testing to deployment for lunar missions. Key Focus: • The development approach is shifting from state-driven initiatives to private sector-driven and public-private partnership models, aiming to expand industrial capabilities. • Reusability and other advanced technologies will likely be incorporated into the development process but are not yet finalized as the primary technical path. They remain a consideration under the broader goal of next generation launch vehicle refinement. Conclusion: South Korea's next generation launch vehicle plan is centered on industrialization and operational experience accumulated from the Nuri rocket. The long-term goal is to achieve lunar lander missions in the early 2030s, marked by larger, more advanced rockets, and a shift toward a private-sector-led space industry.

The price of gold has risen to over US$5,000 (£3,662) an ounce for the first time ever, after doubling in value over the course of a very strong 2025 for the precious metal. The usual explanation for such strong rises is that gold is considered a safe bet for investors when other options look a little shaky. High inflation for example, when cash quickly loses value, is often linked to gold price rises. Trade wars and actual wars usually have a similar effect. A common view then, is that gold performs well in moments of instability. But the research I was involved with suggests that gold prices are not simply a reaction to short-term economic events. Instead, they are a response to something deeper, reflecting an overall level of confidence in how economic systems are managed over time. During recent periods of sustained economic stability in the west, gold prices have remained largely flat. The steady growth, moderate inflation and predictable policy of the early 1990s and 2000s for example, were not good times for gold. And rather than responding to every economic peak or dip, the thing that really pushes gold prices up is instability in what’s known as “monetary credibility”. In other words, when there are doubts about whether central banks and governments will be able to maintain discipline over inflation, public debt and currency value over the coming decades. At times like this gold becomes more desirable. This helps explain why gold can continue to rise even as inflation falls, as has happened recently in several big economies, including the US and parts of Europe. And although recent weakness in the dollar and political uncertainty in the US have probably added momentum to gold’s rise, these factors amplify a deeper shift in confidence rather than explain it on their own. Our findings suggest that no single set of macroeconomic variables (like inflation, interest rates and stock prices) consistently explains gold prices across developed and emerging economies. They matter sometimes, but not always. So simple narratives (whether they’re about inflation, or trade wars or the weakening of the US dollar) are not enough to account for today’s gold market. Inflation alone cannot explain why gold prices remain elevated even as headline price pressures have eased. What gold tells us about the world There is more evidence for this in the fact that, according to the World Gold Council, central banks have been buying gold at the fastest pace in decades, particularly since 2022. This has continued even as inflation has fallen in many countries, again suggesting that these decisions are driven by longer term considerations rather than short term price movements. The decisions of central banks reflect concerns about resilience, diversification and trust. And to those banks, gold’s appeal lies squarely in the fact that it carries relatively little risk. It is not issued by a government like fiat currencies. It cannot be created at will like paper money. And it does not depend on the credibility of any single institution. So, in a world of high public debt, geopolitical fragmentation and increasing pressure on central bank independence, gold offers stability and insurance. And its price rises when confidence in the rules governing money becomes uncertain. That uncertainty can persist even when growth resumes or inflation falls. Seen in this light, gold’s recent surge does not signal a kneejerk panic or imminent collapse. Instead, it reflects a reassessment of long-term monetary confidence at a time when governments face difficult trade-offs between debt sustainability, political pressures and price stability. With its current high value, gold is not predicting a specific crisis. Nor does it provide a clear forecast for inflation. But it is revealing something important about the current moment. Markets appear less certain that the frameworks governing money, debt and policy will remain unchanged. That does not mean those systems have failed, but it does suggest their credibility is no longer taken for granted in the way it has been in the past. Gold does not predict the future. But it does offer a window into how confident markets are about the foundations of the world’s economics system.

In Latin America, corruption is not an anomaly of the democratic system, but rather a structural cog that weakens it, fuels populism, and perpetuates inequality. Corruption is a constant in most Latin American countries. Regardless of ideology and party alternation, corruption has remained persistent across much of the region and, in many cases, has even increased. Between 2014 and 2024, only five countries in the region—Uruguay, Costa Rica, Colombia, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic—registered an improvement in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In Paraguay the index shows no variation, while in the remaining 14 countries the perception of corruption increased. Large-scale abuse of power by senior government officials, the public bureaucracy, and major private corporations contributes to undermining citizens’ trust in their representatives and in democratic institutions as a whole. How corruption is expressed Corruption in Latin America takes multiple forms and manifests itself at different levels of political, economic, and social life. In its most visible and highest-impact expression are large corruption schemes involving top state authorities and major private companies. Cases such as that of the construction firm Odebrecht, whose illicit practices spread to several countries in the region and came to light between 2014 and 2016, revealed the existence of transnational networks of bribery and illegal political financing. Similarly, scandals such as the “Mensalão” and Operation “Lava Jato” in Brazil exposed the depth of these schemes and their ability to cut across governments and political parties, seriously compromising the credibility of democratic institutions. One of the most sensitive areas in which this dynamic is expressed is the financing of electoral campaigns. The lack of clear regulations, transparency, and effective oversight has turned political financing into a privileged gateway for corruption. As a result, electoral processes tend to produce governments constrained by private interests that, once in power, seek to recoup their investment through legislative favors, budgetary allocations, or regulatory decisions, thereby weakening democratic representation. However, corruption is not limited to these major scandals. It also manifests itself in everyday practices that directly affect the relationship between citizens and the state. The payment of bribes to access public services, expedite procedures, or exercise rights that should be universally guaranteed contributes to normalizing illegality and steadily erodes trust in public institutions. At the same time, corruption in Latin America transcends the state sphere and extends into the private sector. Tax evasion, consumer fraud, and other fraudulent practices are frequent and generate serious social costs. In addition, the advance of drug trafficking has deepened these dynamics, promoting corruption at different levels of the state and society and reinforcing a vicious circle that undermines legality and institutional legitimacy. Delegitimization of democracy Although corruption is not exclusive to the political sphere, when it involves politicians, members of governments, or public officials, its impact on the loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions among the population is greater. The persistence of high levels of corruption in the state is an indicator of significant failures in control mechanisms among state institutions—that is, in so-called inter-institutional accountability, a fundamental dimension for the proper functioning of liberal representative democracy. Without oversight bodies and institutions with effective capacity to investigate and punish corruption, the quality of democracy is seriously affected. The fragility or inefficiency of oversight institutions and bodies is also reflected in insufficient sanctions, delays in institutional timelines for applying the corresponding penalties, and, in many cases, their complete absence. This undoubtedly contributes to a sense of impunity and serves as an incentive for the repetition of corrupt practices. The persistence of corruption, and the difficulties in imposing exemplary and effective punishment on those responsible, has influenced the loss of citizens’ trust in traditional political parties and leaderships, and even in the democratic system itself, boosting electoral support for populist parties and leaders. At the beginning of the century these had a left-wing profile (the so-called twenty-first-century socialism), but today they assume a clear far-right profile. These are movements and leaders critical not only of traditional political elites but also, to varying degrees, of traditional democratic institutions—especially institutions of political oversight and accountability, such as the judiciary, prosecutors’ offices, and audit bodies, among others. These populist parties and leaders come to power, in most cases, with promises to put an end to the corruption inherited from “traditional politics.” Nevertheless, once in government they tend to dismantle or co-opt oversight bodies and institutions. Examples of this were the governments of Morales in Bolivia, or the government of former president Bolsonaro in Brazil. The latter dismantled the existing network of anti-corruption bodies because, according to him, there was no corruption in his government. With the co-optation or limitation of oversight institutions and bodies, populist governments face fewer obstacles to engaging in corrupt practices. And in the context of an eroded democratic regime, institutions find it more difficult to punish those responsible. The correlation between corruption and inequality Societies marked by social and economic inequality are more vulnerable to corruption, and at the same time corruption increases those very inequalities. It is no coincidence that Latin America is considered the most unequal region in the world: according to Oxfam’s report for Latin America and the Caribbean Wealth Unchecked, Democracy at Risk. Why Latin America and the Caribbean Need a New Fiscal Pact, the top 1% of the population concentrates around 45% of regional wealth, in a context of persistently high levels of corruption. Corruption deepens inequality because it gives the corrupt greater capacity to influence government decisions and changes in legislation for their own benefit. This leads to democracies captured by particular interests and with less efficient outcomes for the population as a whole, which in turn contributes to weakening trust in democracy as a system capable of meeting, at least in basic terms, citizens’ needs and expectations. The other side of this phenomenon is the case of Uruguay. The Latin American country with the lowest perception of corruption, according to Transparency International, is also the one with the lowest level of inequality in the region and the only full democracy in Latin America, according to The Economist index. It is also, together with Argentina, one of the two countries with the highest support for democracy in the region: 70% of Uruguayans express support for democracy, compared with a regional average of 52%, according to Latinobarómetro. The corollary seems clear, though undoubtedly difficult to implement: reducing corruption requires strengthening oversight institutions and bodies, accompanied by a reduction in social inequality.

On 3 January 2026, the US carried out a surprise military operation in Venezuela, capturing President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. The US has made little effort to cloak its operation in either solidarist language, such as appeals to democracy promotion, human rights, or liberal peacebuilding – or in pluralist rhetoric emphasizing the preservation of international order. Instead, Washington has presented the action in largely instrumental and strategic terms, signalling a willingness to sidestep both dominant justificatory traditions within international society. While Maduro and Flores are charged with narco-terrorism conspiracy and cocaine importation conspiracy, international debates focus on the future of Venezuela’s oil (Poque González 2026). On 7 January administration officials said the US plans to effectively assume control over the sale of Venezuela’s oil “indefinitely” (Sherman 2026) and President Donald Trump confirmed that he expected the US to run Venezuela, insisting that the country’s interim government was “giving us everything that we feel is necessary” (Sanger et al. 2026). Attention is fixed not only on Washington’s plans for Venezuela’s oil sector and control over its export revenues, but also on the replies from Moscow and Beijing, Maduro’s chief foreign backers and heavyweight players in energy politics. Consequently, this article asks two questions. First, to what extent does American control of Venezuelan oil threaten China’s and Russia’s energy interests? Second, what does the resulting US–China–Russia triangle imply for how energy security itself is being redefined? A constructivist perspective, recognizes that oil is an idea—valuable not only because it burns but because control over it symbolizes power and authority (Kuteleva 2021). Thus, when the US claims the right to supervise Venezuelan oil revenues, it is not only increasing leverage over barrels, but asserting the authority to define legitimate energy exchange itself. In this context, while the material threat is limited for China and already largely sunk for Russia, the symbolic, institutional and political threat is profound. A straightforward constructivist interpretation of the US–China–Russia triangle centres on status. China had cultivated Venezuela as an “all-weather strategic partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025b) and major debtor, only to watch Maduro captured days after senior Chinese officials visited Caracas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025a). In constructivist terms, this is an obvious status injury: China appeared present but powerless. China’s energy diplomacy had functioned as proof of its global influence, and the nullification of China’s energy ties with Venezuela by US force undermines China’s narrative as a protective patron for the Global South. Beijing accused Washington of “hegemonic thinking” (Liu and Chen 2026), “bullying” (Global Times 2026a), and violating Venezuelan sovereignty and “the rights of the Venezuelan people” (Global Times 2026b). This strong pluralist language is not incidental—it is a bid to reclaim moral authority and redefine the event as norm-breaking rather than capability-revealing. Similarly, Russia’s involvement in Venezuela was never purely economic. Moscow saw the alliance with Venezuela as a way to advance its anti-American agenda and to signal that it could cultivate allies in Washington’s traditional backyard (Boersner Herrera and Haluani 2023; Gratius 2022; Herbst and Marczak 2019). It used Venezuela as leverage against the US, subsidised the regime during periods of domestic recession, and framed support as proof of great-power reliability. As senior Russian executives put it, “economic considerations took a back seat to political goals of taking swipes at the US” (Seddon and Stognei 2026). US control of Venezuelan oil thus removes a symbolic platform on which Russia enacted its identity as an energy superpower and geopolitical spoiler. While Russia continues loud sovereignty talk, its demonstrated incapacity to protect partners pushes it toward opportunistic bargaining (“concert” deals, see Lemke 2023) rather than overt defense of UN-pluralist restraint. As such, Dmitry Medvedev (2026) bluntly claimed that the US special military operation in Venezuela all but justifies Russia’s own actions in Ukraine. Venezuela is not a core supplier for China in volumetric terms. In 2025, Venezuelan exports to China averaged roughly 395,000 barrels per day—about 4% of China’s seaborne crude imports, according to Kpler data cited by the FT (Leahy and Moore 2026). China has diversified routes, strategic reserves covering at least 96 days of imports, and strong purchasing power in global markets (Downs 2025). Hence, from a narrow supply perspective, the loss of Venezuelan oil is manageable. That said, around one-fifth of China’s crude imports come from suppliers under US or western sanctions, primarily Iran, Venezuela and Russia, much of it disguised via transshipment near Malaysia (Downs 2025). Independent “teapot” refiners (Downs 2017)—who account for about a quarter of China’s refining capacity—are structurally dependent on this discounted, politically risky oil. Consequently, Trump’s seizure of Maduro alarmed China not mainly because of Venezuela itself, but because it demonstrated Washington’s capacity to escalate from sanctions to physical control of an energy sector, and thus potentially to Iran. Here, constructivism reveals the problem: “sanctioned oil” is not simply cheaper crude; it is a political category—oil marked as illegitimate by a dominant legal-financial order. The US move signals that this stigma can be converted into coercive authority, turning commercial vulnerability into geopolitical dependence. This reclassification transforms Chinese domestic actors into security subjects. “Teapot” refiners are no longer just businesses; they become strategic vulnerabilities whose survival depends on US tolerance. Analysis warn that a cutoff of Iranian oil could force many to shut down entirely (Leahy and Moore 2026). In this context, US control of Venezuelan oil reshapes Chinese energy security discourse from one of diversification and market access to one of hierarchy and exposure to political permission. Russia’s oil interests in Venezuela were largely written down years earlier. In 2020, Rosneft had sold most formal assets after pouring around $800m into loans and projects that produced little return (The Economist 2020). Much of the remaining exposure consisted of debts and shadow ownership arrangements. More important is the damage to Russia’s sanctions-evasion architecture. Russia had become the leading marketer of Venezuelan oil by trading crude as debt repayment and using banks partly owned by sanctioned Russian institutions, creating what the 2019 Atlantic Council report described as “a counter financial system to the one dominated by the West” (Herbst and Marczak 2019). The recent reporting on the US tracking a tanker linked to Venezuela, Russia and Iran illustrates how this counter-order is being contested operationally (Sheppard et al. 2026). The vessel sailed under false flags, was sanctioned for carrying Iranian oil, later re-registered under Russian jurisdiction, and became vulnerable to boarding under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea because it was “without nationality.” Such episodes show that energy security is increasingly constituted by maritime law, insurance rules, and surveillance practices. US control over Venezuelan oil expands this regime of enforcement, making Russia’s informal trading networks less viable. A constructivist approach suggests that American control of Venezuelan oil is best understood not as a supply shock, but as an act of social stratification in the international system. Energy markets have always been hierarchical, but the hierarchy was largely implicit: reserve currencies, shipping insurance, futures exchanges, and contract law already privileged Western institutions. What is new is the explicit performance of hierarchy—the public demonstration that a great power can redefine ownership, legality, and access through coercion and administrative authority. This produces a stratified energy order: First, rule-makers – states whose legal systems, sanctions regimes, and corporate actors define what counts as legitimate oil (primarily the US and its allies). Second, rule-takers – states whose energy security depends on access to these institutions (most importers). And third, rule-evaders – states forced into informal networks (Russia, Iran, Venezuela) whose energy becomes socially “tainted.” China occupies an unstable middle category: economically powerful but institutionally dependent. Venezuela’s takeover publicly signals that material power is insufficient without normative control over legality. Referencias Boersner Herrera, Adriana, and Makram Haluani. 2023. ‘Domestic and International Factors of the Contemporary Russo–Venezuelan Bilateral Relationship’. Latin American Policy 14 (3): 366–87. Downs, Erica. 2017. The Rise of China’s Independent Refineries. Geopolitics. Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/rise-chinas-independent-refineries/. Downs, Erica. 2025. China’s Oil Demand, Imports and Supply Security. Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/chinas-oil-demand-imports-and-supply-security/. Global Times. 2026a. ‘China Condemns US Demands for Venezuela to Partner Exclusively on Oil Production as “Bullying,” Breaches of Intl Law: FM – Global Times’. Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352547.shtml. Global Times. 2026b. ‘China’s Legitimate Rights and Interests in Venezuela Must Be Safeguarded, Chinese FM Responds to Claim about US to Sell Venezuelan Sanctioned Oil – Global Times’. Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352555.shtml. Gratius, Susanne. 2022. ‘The West against the Rest? Democracy versus Autocracy Promotion in Venezuela’. Bulletin of Latin American Research 41 (1): 141–58. Herbst, John E., and Jason Marczak. 2019. Russia’s Intervention in Venezuela: What’s at Stake? Policy Brief. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/. Kuteleva, Anna. 2021. China’s Energy Security and Relations with Petrostates: Oil as an Idea. Routledge. Leahy, Joe, and Malcolm Moore. 2026. ‘Donald Trump’s Venezuela Action Raises Threat for China’s Oil Supplies’. Oil. Financial Times, January 8. https://www.ft.com/content/f64826fa-5c36-4fb3-8621-ee0b9d9a1ff5. Lemke, Tobias. 2023. ‘International Relations and the 19th Century Concert System’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Liu, Xin, and Qingqing Chen. 2026. ‘US Reportedly Sets Demands for Venezuela to Pump More Oil; Experts Say “Anti-Drug” Claims a Pretext, Exposing Neo-Colonialism – Global Times’. The Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352544.shtml. Medvedev, Dmitry. 2026. ‘Год начался бурно’. Telegram, January 9. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/626. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. 2025a. ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on January 5, 2026’. January 5. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202601/t20260105_11806736.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. 2025b. ‘Xi Jinping Meets with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros’. May 10. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250513_11619919.html. Poque González, Axel Bastián. 2026. ‘Energy Security and the Revival of US Hard Power in Latin America’. E-International Relations, January 12. https://www.e-ir.info/2026/01/12/energy-security-and-the-revival-of-us-hard-power-in-latin-america/. Sanger, David E., Tyler Pager, Karie Rogers, and Zolan Kanno-Youngs. 2026. ‘Trump Says U.S. Oversight of Venezuela Could Last for Years’. U.S. The New York Times, January 8. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/trump-interview-venezuela.html. Seddon, Max, and Anastasia Stognei. 2026. ‘How Russia’s Venezuelan Oil Gambit Went Awry’. Venezuela. Financial Times, January 9. https://www.ft.com/content/e09a6030-325f-4be5-ace3-4d70121071cb. Sheppard, David, Chris Cook, and Jude Webber. 2026. ‘US Tracking Oil Tanker off UK Coast Linked to Venezuela, Russia and Iran’. Shipping. Financial Times, January 6. https://www.ft.com/content/a699169a-983a-4472-ab23-54bceb9dd2bd. The Economist. 2020. ‘Why Putin’s Favourite Oil Firm Dumped Its Venezuelan Assets’. The Economist, April 2. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/02/why-putins-favourite-oil-firm-dumped-its-venezuelan-assets.

Thank you dear Prime Minister Modi, for welcoming us on this special occasion. We were privileged yesterday to be your Chief Guests for the Republic Day celebrations, such an impressive display of India’s capabilities and diversity. Today is a historic moment. We are opening a new chapter in our relations – on trade, on security, on people to people ties. I am the President of the European Council, but I am also an overseas Indian citizen. Then, as you can imagine, for me, it has a special meaning. I am very proud of my roots in Goa, where my father’s family came from. The connection between Europe and India is something personal to me. Also, because we conclude today our trade negotiations, we relaunched at the Leaders’ meeting that I had the pleasure to host, in May 2021, in my previous capacity. Our summit sends a clear message to the world: at a time when the global order is being fundamentally reshaped, the European Union and India stand together as strategic and reliable partners. Today, we are taking our partnership to the next level. As the two largest democracies in the world, we are working hand in hand: • to deliver concrete benefits for our citizens; and • to shape a resilient global order that underpins peace and stability, economic growth, and sustainable development. I would like to share three messages. First: the European Union and India must work together towards our shared prosperity and security. India is the world's fastest-growing major economy. Trade has flowed between our two continents for centuries. Trade is a crucial geopolitical stabilizer. And a fundamental source of economic growth. Trade agreements reinforce rules-based economic order and promote shared prosperity. That’s why today’s Free Trade Agreement is of historic importance. One of the most ambitious agreements ever concluded. Creating a market of two billion people. In a multipolar world, the European Union and India are working together to grow spheres of shared prosperity. But prosperity does not exist without security: • strengthening our cooperation to better protect our citizens and our shared interests; • working together to counter the full range of security threats we face, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and around the world; • reaching a new level of strategic trust between us. That is the significance of our agreement on a Security and Defence Partnership. The first such overarching defence and security framework between India and the European Union. And the first step towards even more ambitious cooperation in the future. This brings me to my second message: as the world's largest democracies and champions of multilateralism, the European Union and India share the responsibility of upholding international law, with the United Nations Charter at its core. Earlier this morning, we had the opportunity to pay tribute to Mahatma Gandhi. And I reflected upon his words which still hold true today: “Peace will not come out of a clash of arms but out of justice lived and done by unarmed nations in the face of odds.” Our summit reaffirmed our commitment to supporting efforts towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine. One that fully respects Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a key moment. We are supporting all efforts to reach a just and sustainable peace. Ukraine has shown its readiness, including at the cost of difficult compromises. I know, dear Prime Minister, that we can count on you to help create the conditions for peace, through dialogue and diplomacy. And this is my final message: together we must show leadership on global issues. Cooperation between the European Union and India will help shape a more balanced, resilient, and inclusive global order. Just two examples: I am proud of the commitments we are making for greater cooperation on clean energy, green transition, and climate resilience. And our collaboration through the Global Gateway and on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is decisive for global connectivity. By implementing the ambitious Joint Comprehensive Strategic Agenda towards 2030, we will align our priorities with concrete actions for the next five years: delivering real benefits to our citizens. Today, we have tangible progress and set an example of cooperative leadership on global issues. With: • our Free Trade Agreement; • our Security and Defence Partnership; and • our Joint Strategic Agenda for 2030. These outcomes are a crucial milestone on a longer path. We look forward to continuing the journey. Together, as always. Thank you very much. Press statement by President António Costa following the EU–India Summit, 27 January 2026. © European Union / Council of the EU. Reproduced with permission; original meaning preserved.

The democratic collapse of Nicaragua has created the ideal conditions for China to consolidate a model of cooperation based on political control, trade dependence, and resource extraction. Throughout 2025, Nicaragua’s co-presidency under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has accelerated the consolidation of an authoritarian family state. Constitutional reforms in January eliminated the separation of powers, subordinating the judicial, legislative, and electoral branches to the executive, while subsequent legislation extended political terms and enabled the regime to weaponize electoral institutions against political opponents. Since 2018, the Ortega-Murillo government has imprisoned, exiled, or stripped citizenship from hundreds of critics and dismantled thousands of civil society organizations, hollowing out independent checks on power. These legal and institutional changes have transformed Nicaragua from a weakened democracy into a closed authoritarian system, heightening the risk of systematic human rights abuses and creating permissive conditions for opaque foreign economic engagement — particularly China — in strategic commercial and mineral sectors. Starting December 2021, President Ortega broke ties with Taiwan, establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, marking this “new era” by opening a Chinese embassy in Managua the same month. This decision followed weeks of the Organization of American States (OAS), United States, and European Union (EU) condemning the 2021 elections as illegitimate due to the months of repression and incarceration of 39 people, including civil society leaders and presidential candidates by President Ortega. Beijing took the opportunity to enter Managua seeking to ease the sense of intensifying international isolation for Ortega’s regime. As of 2023, Managua’s total exports to Beijing were valued at an estimated $27.3 million yet increased by almost 300 percent in 2024 to $82.1 million. Also in 2024, Beijing was the second largest exporter to Nicaragua, making up 14 percent of total imports, at $1.65 billion. Recently Beijing and Nicaragua have held over $1 billion trade deficit, acting as a lifeline of the regime’s desperate survival strategy with China as a primary benefactor. As Western pressure builds, Beijing provides capital, infrastructure, trade, and opportunities for the Ortega-Murillo regime through the commercial and mineral sector. Nicaragua has directly aided in the expansion of China’s economic development in the region and passed multiple pieces of legislation to pave a simple road for Beijing. For example, on October 30th, 2025, Nicaragua’s National Assembly unanimously passed a Special Economic Zone (ZEE) directly tying China’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively boosting influence through infrastructure and trade. The ZEE includes many perks for Beijing operations in Nicaragua, such as full exemptions from income tax, dividends, import duties for up to a decade, targeted industrial sectors for manufacturing, agroindustry, tech, and exports. The head of the ZEEs will be President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo with a renewed promise of jobs, poverty alleviation, and technology transfers. The President’s son heading the ZEEs reflects Nicaragua’s foreign policy focus on becoming a Pacific-Caribbean trade bridge. Moreover, since 2021, the Ortega-Murillo regime has quietly granted an estimated 300,000 hectares of land, or almost 2.36 percent of Nicaragua’s national territory to four PRC affiliated mining companies: Zhon Fu Development, Nicaragua XinXin Linze Mineria Group, Thomas Metal, and Brother Metal. These companies do not contain a track record in Nicaragua, connected to a known Chinese entity, or even have a website. Yet, they are conveniently tailored by the Ortega-Murillo regime as Nicaragua allows opaque shell companies with no track record to operate in critical infrastructure sectors. To aid Beijing’s mineral campaign, the Ortega-Murillo regime has been revoking concession rights and granting those same stripped mining concessions to these opaque Chinese affiliated shell entities. In 2022, the Sandinista National Assembly reformed Law 387 to allow concession transfers without public bidding, weaken social oversight mechanisms, and concentrate decision-making for the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This “reform” allows Nicaragua exclusive control over flipping ownership on mining concessions without warning. Separate from mining, Beijing has been manipulating Nicaragua’s commercial sector reliant on Chinas exports to Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaraguan merchants claim to face “unfair competition” as their sales dwindle, due to the explosion of Chinese nationals operating in the region. Chinese businesses have frozen the Nicaraguan market through selling inexpensive products easily accessed by Chinese nationals under the low-tariff agreements between Ortega-Murillo and Beijing. Reports reflect that China’s strategy is to exploit import benefits provided by the Nicaraguan government, allowing Chinese nationals to sell goods at “rock-bottom prices”. This strategy has allowed Beijing to completely undermine Nicaraguan businesses and take over the market. In May 2024, the Confidential reported Chinese businesses have slashed 70 percent of local merchant sales. Moreover, this increase of Chinese businesses by Chinese nationals directly translates to the growth of imports from the PRC, influencing a further expansion of the already tremendous trade deficit. This inability to produce goods appealing to Beijing markets will perpetuate further trends of high imports and minimal exports by Nicaragua, granting the opportunity for Beijing to fully influence the export capacity under the Ortega-Murillo regime. Nicaragua has rapidly stepped forward to ban media by prohibiting Bibles, newspapers, magazines, books, drones, and cameras from entering the country. This came without an official decree by the government but has still been enforced by immigration and customs at border crossings. Since 2018, 61 media outlets have been closed or confiscated with over 2,300 recorded violations by journalists, forcing 300 journalists into exile from Nicaragua. Globally, the world must continue to investigate and report the egregious human rights violations conducted by this family dictatorship. Their goal of alienating their civil populace to generate wealth for themselves and Beijing through illicit and shadowy economic efforts must face legal hearings to benefit the people of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s corrupted government continuing to weaken the foundations of their democratic institutions to favor Chinese ownership of commercial and industrial zones will freeze Nicaraguan exports in favor of dependence on Chinese imports.

As the US powers ahead with its plans to recover Latin America’s ‘oil El Dorado’, we explore Venezuela’s environmental and geopolitical outlook. “Uninvestable”. That was the verdict on Venezuelan oil delivered by Exxon’s CEO, Darren Woods, earlier this month. He was speaking at the White House with the US president Donald Trump and representatives from 17 oil companies. Nevertheless, following the extraction of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, Trump plans to revive the country’s flailing industry. He says a USD 100 billion investment will be geared towards resurrecting the “oil El Dorado” of the 1990s. He has takers. After Woods’ White House comments, the US energy secretary Chris Wright said the US oil and gas company Chevron, the UK’s Shell, Spain’s Repsol and Italy’s Eni were all willing to “immediately increase” investment in Venezuela. He added that a dozen other companies were also interested, while dismissing the doubts expressed by Exxon and ConocoPhillips. Any company following Trump to the country will have to deal with uncertainty – and the estimated USD 1 billion cost of the failed nationalizations enacted by Venezuela’s former president, Hugo Chávez. According to Venezuela’s Centre for the Dissemination of Economic Information (Cedice), the government expropriated several thousand between 1999 and 2019. Independent experts estimate the bill for success will reach USD 180 billion – nearly double that announced by Trump. On the other hand, some companies will be encouraged by successful gas operations in Venezuela. For example, the Perla (Cardón IV) field, which covers the entire domestic demand for gas and is operated by Repsol. And Chevron has been able to continue operating in the country, despite a barrage of economic sanctions initiated by the US under Trump in 2017. Demands and first legal changes Trump has claimed the US could be making money from Venezuelan oil in 18 months. Venezuelan oil experts say this will require a fiscal and contractual framework that does not exist today, and a decade of “arduous democratic work”. The economist José Manuel Puente estimates it will require an investment of USD 180 billion and 15 years of institutional work. Patrick Pouyanné, CEO of the French oil company TotalEnergies, thinks similarly. Without a legal framework that guarantees rights, he says, it would be too expensive and slow to return to production of three million barrels a day. Last week, Venezuela’s interim government responded by announcing that the acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, will send a new Hydrocarbons Law to the national assembly, as well as another for streamlining procedures. The interim government’s strategy is to further “production sharing contracts”. These would allow foreign companies to recover their investments by selling a portion of the extracted crude oil. However, interested foreign oil companies are pushing for greater changes. Reuters has reported that they are seeking to reduce the tax burden by returning to a royalty payment model. They also want the right to sell the majority of the oil, by gaining access to export infrastructure. This infrastructure, currently dilapidated and faulty, includes thousands of kilometers of oil and gas pipelines, 16 shipping terminals, 153 gas compression plants and six large oil refineries. The economy responds Following the capture of Maduro, the Caracas stock market benefitted from a 124% rise, accompanied by a fall in the black market exchange rate. This has been attributed to news that the first sale of Venezuelan oil through the US will generate USD 330 million. This will go to five private Venezuelan banks through the Central Bank of Venezuela. To facilitate this, Rodríguez has announced the creation of two sovereign funds. One will raise the salaries of public employees; the other will address Venezuela’s frequently deficient public services. The minimum wage in Venezuela is VES 130 (USD 0.38) per month. In May 2025, Maduro decreed a “minimum comprehensive indexed income” for public workers of USD 160 per month. This was to be issued through special bonds paid in Venezuelan bolívars at the official exchange rate. In the private sector, the average income was USD 237 per month at the beginning of 2025. The interim government has announced a host of other changes, including the modification of eight legal codes. For her part, the acting president has announced reforms to laws on electricity services and industrial intellectual property. She has also made reference to legislation on agreed prices and socio-economic rights, which aim to maintain a mixed economic model that combines openness with state involvement. Whether these reforms will bring the stability US oil companies need to safely (and profitably) operate remains to be seen. Logistics and corruption Venezuelan oil is plentiful, but it is also of poor quality. The estimated 300 billion barrels in the reserves of the Orinoco belt – the largest oil deposit in the world – consist of heavy and extra-heavy crude oil. These are the most difficult to extract, transport and refine. This has raised doubts among experts, who point to the need for maritime insurance, as well as the risks attached to the poor condition of the country’s pipelines and other facilities. Whether this oil will be refined in Venezuela or shipped to refineries in the United States is another uncertainty. As Patrick Galey, head of fossil fuel investigations for the climate justice campaign group Global Witness, wrote earlier this month: “You would have to be forced at gun point to try to make money from [Venezuelan oil].” Then there are security concerns. Despite Trump’s promise of protection for oil companies, his administration has advised its citizens to leave the country over Chavista militia kidnap fears. The administration is considering the use of private companies to secure oil facilities. It is still difficult to know whether a transition to democracy is possible and when elections can be held. As things stand, Venezuela continues to be run by the same government that has accumulated dozens of corruption cases. For example, a scandal implicating executives of PDVSA (Venezuela’s state oil company) in illegal activities related to cryptocurrencies led to USD 16 billion in losses. Meanwhile, a railway network funded using billions of dollars worth of Chinese investment has never been completed. The role of China Venezuela has played a key role in the story of Chinese investment in South America, becoming its biggest debtor. Following the actions of the US government, Venezuela finds itself once again split between superpowers. Venezuelan imports account for just 3% of China’s total crude oil purchases, according to an analysis published this month by the Center on Global Energy Policy – a think-tank based at Columbia University in the US. But the analysis also highlights the importance of these imports to China’s “teapot refineries”, which specialize in processing unconventional crude oil. Venezuela’s debt to China is estimated to be between $10 billion and $19 billion. This is being paid off slowly with crude oil shipments, prompting Chinese officials to approach their Venezuelan and US counterparts to try and obtain payment guarantees. Some analysts have suggested that a stabilizing of Venezuela’s economic situation and a lifting of US sanctions could actually increase the chances of Chinese development banks recouping their investments. The environmental issue, pending The full environmental impacts of a Venezuelan oil recovery are unclear. While it would not involve exploitation in new protected areas or Indigenous territories, significant concerns remain. These include the tens of millions of dollars’ worth of methane gas that leaks from damaged pipelines, as reported by Bloomberg Green. And more methane gas is lost through flaring, for which Venezuela ranks fifth worldwide. Some onlookers have suggested that greater transparency and better technology could improve this situation. This view is not shared by Juan Carlos Sánchez, co-winner of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his work as an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change author. Sánchez, who also worked at PDVSA for 21 years, told Dialogue Earth he does not foresee a positive environmental scenario: Trump promotes climate denialism, while the track records of oil companies operating in other Latin American countries are littered with environmental damage. “In my experience, when oil companies decide to cut costs to increase profits, the budgets that are most affected are environmental projects,” said Sánchez. Moreover, he adds, Venezuela lags considerably in terms of institutional frameworks regarding climate change. “Only a Venezuelan government that is genuinely interested in environmental issues and policies will be able to demand environmental safeguards in the future.” References Business Insider. (2026, January 22). Exxon CEO calls Venezuela ‘uninvestable’ during meeting with Trump. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com El País. (2026, January 22). Trump insta a las petroleras a invertir 100.000 millones de dólares en Venezuela para controlar la industria. El País. https://elpais.com Swissinfo.ch. (2026, January 22). EEUU asegura que Chevron, Shell y Repsol “elevarán de inmediato” su inversión en Venezuela. Swissinfo.ch. https://www.swissinfo.ch Yahoo Finanzas. (2026, January 22). Venezuela tendrá que pagar a Exxon menos de 1.000 mln dlrs por nacionalización de activos. Yahoo Finanzas. https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com PaisdePropietarios.org. (2026). ”Exprópiese”: la política expropiatoria del “Socialismo del Siglo XXI”. PaisdePropietarios.org. https://paisdepropietarios.org Repsol. (2026). Perla (Cardón IV) field details. Repsol. https://www.repsol.com Euronews. (2026, January 22). ¿Por qué Chevron sigue operando en Venezuela pese a las sanciones de Estados Unidos?. Euronews. https://es.euronews.com elDiario.es. (2026, January 22). Estados Unidos necesitará más de una década para resucitar El Dorado petrolero de Venezuela. ElDiario.es. https://www.eldiario.es El Colombiano. (2026, January 22). ”Recuperar la producción petrolera en Venezuela tomaría 15 años y hasta US$180.000 millones”, José Manuel Puente, economista venezolano. El Colombiano. https://www.elcolombiano.com Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela. (2026). Hydrocarbons Law draft. https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve Petroguía. (2026). Production sharing contracts overview. https://www.petroguia.com Reuters. (2026). Companies seek reduced tax burden, export access [Headline varies]. https://www.reuters.com Cedice. (2026). Venezuela oil and gas pipeline infrastructure details. https://cedice.org.ve Scribd. (2026). Map of Venezuelan oil refineries and facilities. https://es.scribd.com Bloomberg. (2026). Caracas stock market reaction and data. https://www.bloomberg.com Sumarium.info. (2026). First oil sale through U.S. channels data. https://sumarium.info Banca y Negocios. (2026). Average private sector income data. https://www.bancaynegocios.com Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. (2026). Venezuelan migrant photo and context. Flickr. https://www.flickr.com Globovisión. (2026). Legal code modifications announcement. https://www.globovision.com Bitácora Económica. (2026). Electricity services reform reference. https://bitacoraeconomica.com Cuatrof.net. (2026). Socio economic rights legislation reference. https://cuatrof.net Infobae.com. (2026). Refinery uncertainty and U.S. oil imports. https://www.infobae.com LinkedIn. (2026). Patrick Galey quote on Venezuelan oil risks. https://www.linkedin.com La Razón. (2026). Kidnap fears among Chavista militia detail. https://www.larazon.es CNN Español. (2026). Private security company oil protection reference. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com Transparencia Venezuela. (2026). PDVSA corruption cases and figures. https://transparenciave.org El Clip. (2026). 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In August 2024, Bangladesh witnessed a seismic political upheaval when mass student-led protests forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country after 15 years in power. What began as demonstrations against a controversial government job quota system quickly evolved into a movement against authoritarianism, corruption and human rights abuses. As protests intensified and security forces responded with deadly force, killing hundreds of demonstrators, Hasina’s grip on power collapsed. Sheikh Hasina fled to India in August 2024 after mass protests toppled her government. While thousands of families in Bangladesh were still searching for their disappeared loved ones. The interim government, led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, has since established the International Crimes Tribunal to investigate crimes committed during Hasina’s Tenure. In a landmark decision, the tribunal sentenced her to death in absentia for crimes against humanity. Bangladesh has formally requested her extradition from India, setting the stage for a diplomatic standoff. The case has become a test of whether regional powers prioritize justice for victims or political convenience. India’s decision on Hasina’s extradition will determine whether the South Asia region moves towards accountability for state crimes or continues protecting fallen autocrats, and New Delhi must recognize that genuine regional stability comes not from shielding allies who have committed atrocities, but from supporting the democratic transitions their own people have fought for. South Asia has a long history of leaders escaping accountability by fleeing across borders, creating a culture of immunity and reinforcing a free pass to everyone. Whether it be Gotabaya Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, who fled during the economic crisis in 2022 or Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, who left in 2021 as the Taliban took control of Kabul. The pattern is recurrent, destabilizing regional stability of South Asian countries. Nonetheless, the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh has issued death sentences based on documented evidence against Sheikh Hasina. India could break this cycle without simply handing Hasina over. A conditional extradition can be sought out, one that ensures fair trial standards, and would address both countries’ concerns. India could request the assistance of international observers from the UN or the Commonwealth monitoring the proceedings, ensuring the trial meets global standards. New Delhi could also negotiate for the death penalty to be commuted to life imprisonment, a condition many European countries insist on before extradition. Political scientist Ali Riaz, who has extensively studied Bangladesh’s democratic transitions, argues that “accountability isn’t about revenge, it’s about building institutions strong enough to prevent future abuses.” His research on transitional justice shows that countries which address past crimes, even imperfectly, create more stable democracies than those that sweep them under the rug. Another point to note is that India positions itself as the world’s largest democracy and a champion of human rights, yet protecting Hasina undermines these claims. India has been vocal about human rights abuses in Pakistan and Myanmar. Yet when its ally commits similar crimes, India provides sanctuary. Many predict that India would not extradite Sheikh Hasina due to vested interests. Many Bangladeshis have gone on to adopt anti-India sentiments, creating resentment in many people's hearts. India could address this issue by allowing an independent judicial review of the extradition request rather than making it purely political. Currently, extradition cases in India go through the courts. However, the final decision rests with the executive, it could mean that the government blocks extradition for political reasons. In Hasina’s case, India could publicly commit to letting its own judiciary evaluate the evidence without political interference, then abide by whatever the courts decide. This approach has been seen recently. In January of 2025, the UK Supreme Court ruled on an extradition request involving former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s associates, allowing the judicial process to run its course rather than the government making a unilateral decision. Late Legal Counsel to the World Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, stated famously that this “Depoliticized what could have been a diplomatic crisis” between Britain and Pakistan. India could follow a similar path. Furthermore, another point of view is that refusing extradition undermines Bangladesh’s fragile democratic transition and could push the country toward instability. The new government needs to deliver justice to maintain legitimacy. If India protects Hasina, it could further fuel conspiracy theories about Indian interference. Creating an anti-India sentiment, potentially pushing Bangladesh towards China or Pakistan for a new regional alliance. Historically, when people feel that justice is denied, they lose faith in democratic institutions. Political Scientist Ali Riaz’s research shows that countries that failed to address past crimes, for instance, Pakistan after military rule or Sri Lanka post-civil war, continue to face cycles of authoritarianism within the nation. If extradition proves too complicated diplomatically, India could support an alternative that still delivers justice. It could push for a truth and accountability commission. This model has worked in countries emerging from authoritarian rule, such as South Africa used it after apartheid, and Peru established one after Alberto Fujimori’s dictatorship. The focus shifts from punishment to documentation, as well as acknowledgement and institutional reform. Under this arrangement, Hasina would provide testimony, either in person or through live transmission from India to Bangladesh’s commission. She would have to answer questions about disappearances, extrajudicial killings and other alleged abuses. Victims' families would finally get acknowledgement and answers to their losses. Priscilla Hayner, a Human rights activist, in her research shows that truth commissions can help societies move forward when criminal trials become politically impossible. It is a way for the Victims’ families to finally be heard and acknowledged. India’s strategic interests in Bangladesh, trade routes, security cooperation and connectivity projects depend on maintaining trust with whoever governs in Dhaka. The interim government under Muhammad Yunus has recently gained popular legitimacy and international credibility. Starting this relationship but dismissing their primary demand for accountability will have consequences that outlast any short-term benefit of sheltering Hasina. Real regional stability does not come from protecting fallen leaders; it comes from supporting the democratic processes that brought new governments to power and from promoting solidarity. India understood this principle when it brought new governments to power. India understood this principle when it supported democratic movements elsewhere. Bangladesh deserves the same consideration. The extradition question is ultimately about India's foreign policy and whether it's guided by consistent principles or convenient exceptions.