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1. Introduction to the conflict In the early 1920s Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), where the overwhelming majority of the population consisted of indigenous Armenians, was annexed to the Azerbaijan SSR. This ultimately led to Artsakh attempting to unite with Armenia in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union began to collapse. The region's Armenian people, facing anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan, decisively voted to declare their independence from the country. This led to the outbreak of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1988 between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan with support from Turkey. Following thousands of deaths and more than a million displaced people, the war ended in a ceasefire in 1994 with Turkey, a nation that still denies the Armenian Genocide, supporting Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Battles broke up again in 2016, and it concluded in a 44-day war in 2020 that led to Azerbaijan annexing a significant portion of the area along with seven neighboring districts. Figure 1: Nagorno-Karabakh on map. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) 2. Historical context Artsakh, in terms of geopolitics, has a long and complex history, dating several centuries back. Artsakh is celebrated for its strong Armenian cultural and religious identity. It has been a part of the Kingdom of Armenia since at least the 5th century BCE. Through several eras, including the semi-autonomous Armenian states, it remained an integral part of Armenian identity. Artsakh is directly related to Siunik and Utik, its bordering regions, linguistically and ethnographically. One of the earliest known Armenian dialects is the one spoken in Artsakh. In the 7th century AD, the grammarian Stephanos Siunetzi wrote the earliest account of it. (c. NKRUSA) In the early 1800s the Russian Empire annexed the Artsakh region which ended up bringing significant political and demographic changes. The term “Karabakh”, which is a Turkic version of the Persian name for the area, Bagh-e-Siah (meaning “Black Garden”), is frequently used to refer to Artsakh. This phrase is a portion of “Nagorno Karabakh”, which is a simplified version of the Soviet term “Autonomous Region of Mountainous [“Nagorniy” (Нагорный)] Karabakh,” which refers to the Armenian autonomy of Artsakh situated within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan of the USSR. (c. NKRUSA) This historical context is crucial in understanding the deep-seated nationalistic and cultural motivations behind the current conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The ancient and medieval Armenian presence in Artsakh is central to Armenia's historical claim to the region. 3. Causes of the conflict How is the Armenian Genocide of 1915 tied to this conflict and how does it play into the mutual disdain between Armenians and Azerbaijanis to this day? The majority of Armenians worldwide are the great-grandchildren and grandchildren of those who survived the 1915 Genocide, and they are witnessing another instance of history as Turkey and Azerbaijan repeatedly massacre and drive out Armenians from regions where they have lived for thousands of years. Furthermore, there is a clear link between the Young Turks' swiftly assembled republic of Azerbaijan in 1918 and the Ottoman Empire of 1915, which sought to establish a presence in the Caucasus. The Young Turks advocated a pan-Turkic philosophy that aims to unite all Turkic peoples from Turkey to Kazakhstan via Azerbaijan, forming a large empire. The president of Turkey at the moment is pro Pan-Turkism. (c. Rajat Ghai, 2023) Perhaps one of the most disrespectful and heartbreaking evidences of the anti-Armenian narrative is the renaming of one of the streets in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, in ‘honor’ of Enver Pasha, one of the main perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide, who was probably the most anti-Armenian official at the time. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Democratic Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan were established in 1918. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) became a disputed territory, with claims from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1923, following the formation of the Soviet Union, and Armenia-Azerbaijani wars over this disputed land, Joseph Stalin declared that Nagorno-Karabakh would become an autonomous region within the borders of Azerbaijan SSR. (c. Bulut, 2023). Despite being a part of Azerbaijan, the majority of the population and the cultural identity of the region remained Armenian. For decades, Azerbaijani forces have attempted to control Armenians and force them to recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty through massacres, blockades, and ultimatums. When the Armenians of Artsakh wanted to exercise their right to self-determination, they were confronted with pogroms in Azerbaijan that resulted in the cruel death of Armenians and the theft of their belongings. These pogroms had the intention of frightening Artsakh's Armenian population into leaving or submitting, despite the fact that they had lived there for centuries and had developed and continuously defended their national sovereignty, which was vital to Armenian history. “The first victims of Azerbaijan’s policy to suppress the will of the people of Artsakh were the Armenians of the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait located several hundred kilometers away from Artsakh.” (c. Bulut, 2023) As the Soviet Union started to fall apart in the late 1980s, tensions increased. Violent encounters between Armenians and Azerbaijanis resulted from the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh's desire for unification with Armenia. 4. Conflict dynamics The first Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994): After the USSR collapsed, Armenia and Azerbaijan launched a full-scale war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia finally took control of Nagorno-Karabakh and a number of its neighboring areas by 1994. The area remained in a state of frozen war despite the establishment of a ceasefire but no peace treaty was signed. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020): Six weeks of fighting ensued after reopening of hostilities in September 2020. Turkey and Israel provided major military assistance to Azerbaijan in order for it to retake control of portions of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas. A ceasefire mediated by Russia brought the war to an end in November 2020, changing the map significantly and deploying Russian peacekeepers. Nevertheless, the military aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenians hasn't stopped. Azerbaijan and its ally, Turkey, started blockading Artsakh and its citizens (est. 130,000) in December 12, 2022. The Republic of Armenia's former human rights defender, Arman Tatoyan, reported that Artsakh had been without electricity since January 9. There hadn't been any gas since March 21 and no humanitarian help (including food) since June 15. (c. Bulut, 2023) This blockade persisted despite an internationally recognized court order from February 22, 2023, which guarantees the unhindered flow of people, cars, and goods along the Lachin Corridor in both directions, and lasted for 9 months. The forced displacement of Armeanians (2023): Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians left the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in the last few days of September 2023 and fled into neighboring Armenia. As has been well documented, the mass escape occurred as a result of Azerbaijan subjecting the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh to a 24-hour period of intense bombing, preceded by a 10-month long blockade and forced starvation, all of which led to the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh to surrender. Before the occupation, indigenous Armenians had lived in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory for millennia. It is currently estimated by the UN that there are only 50 Armenians remaining. To this day, hundreds of Armenian cultural sites throughout Artsakh are at the risk of being destroyed or appropriated now that Azerbaijan has complete control over Artsakh or Nagorno-Karabakh. Some have already been destroyed or are currently being ‘restored’, as the Azerbaijani government refers to the erasure of their Armenian identity. “Despite the scale and severity of the damages, the erasure of Armenian cultural patrimony by Azerbaijan remains woefully under-reported, in large part due to the regime’s crackdown on independent journalists.” (Nayyar, 2024) 5. Armenia’s main allies Russia The core of Armenia and Russia's military cooperation has been their membership in the Joint CIS Air Defense System and the same military alliance (CSTO). However, due to the continuous tensions between Putin and Pashinyan, Russia appeared to be hesitant to publicly help Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020). Criticism of CSTO membership grew within Armenian political circles when the CSTO mission chose a rather uncertain stance in the conflict. Armen Grigoryan, the secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, even stated that he no longer saw any hope for the CSTO. Pashinyan said that Russian peacekeepers sent to uphold the cease-fire agreement were not doing their duties. He also stated that Armenia is attempting to broaden its security partnerships. (c. France 24, 2026) Armenia has withdrawn from a regional security agreement with Russia, stating that Moscow failed to support it in its conflict with Azerbaijan. In recent years, Armenia has taken steps to strengthen ties with the US and the EU while suspending its membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, there are still strong cultural, linguistic, and economic links to Russia; as is the case with every other former Soviet country. Iran In September 2022, the Iranian foreign minister emphasized that the Iran-Armenia border must not change amid the recurring border tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a meeting with Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in May 2024, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khameri highlighted Iran's opposition to any border changes in the South Caucasus. After the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2024, Armenia and Iran increased their military relations and discussed a potential $500 million arms deal. (c. Sayeh, 2025) 6. Azerbaijan’s main allies Turkey Azerbaijan's longtime ally Turkey sees Armenia as one of its primary regional enemies. That is evident in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement in 2023: “We support the steps taken by Azerbaijan – with whom we act together with the motto of one nation, two states – to defend its territorial integrity”. (c. Al Jazeera, 2023) In addition to military equipment, Turkish assistance takes the form of direct advisors, joint training, and perpetual diplomatic support. Turkey has previously supported Azerbaijan in all regional and global events. However, Turkey's position evolved to one that was more proactive, forceful, and involved by the beginning of the Second Karabakh War. (c. Villar, 2025) Israel Israel serves as Azerbaijan's primary supplier of advanced arms, including intelligence technologies, artillery systems, and Heron and Harop drones. These supplies were significant in the conflicts of 2016 and 2020, where Azerbaijani forces had technological advantage. In exchange, Israel receives intelligence cooperation regarding Iranian operations and general access to an area close to Iran. Additionally, about 40% of Israel's oil demands are met by hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan, making it an essential source for them. (c. Villar, 2025) Russia From 2022 to 2024, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were at their strongest. The Declaration on Allied Interaction was signed in February 2022, which enhanced relations between both countries. Azerbaijan's president Ilham Aliyev realized that in order to accomplish Azerbaijan's regional goals of gaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh without the Russian peacekeepers and opening the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, he needed to improve ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity was the most significant aspect of the Declaration for Baku. In 2024 Russian peacekeepers withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh entirely. (c. APRI Armenia, 2025) 7. Iran’s concerns Iran's territorial integrity is threatened by the Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation, according to Iran's political and military leaders. Citing remarks from Turkish and Azerbaijani officials as well as media that support the ‘liberation’ of so-called ‘Southern Azerbaijan’ – which refers to Iran's northwestern provinces with an Azerbaijani majority – the Iranian government has accused both countries of inciting “separatist movements” among Iran's Azerbaijani population. Iran's worries have been increased by what they call “historical distortion” in Azerbaijan's educational system, which promotes expansionist narratives to younger generations by speaking of a ‘Greater Azerbaijan’ that includes territory within Iran. (c. Villar, 2025) 8. EU’s response and involvement “I saw that governments would make grand statements about morality and do nothing. I saw that they would try to take advantage of the unrest in the Caucasus in order to further their own ideological agendas. I saw that it would be the people, my people, the Armenians of Artsakh, who would suffer.” (c. Arslan, 2023) While EU officials and lawmakers have expressed their ‘concerns’ and made vocal statements of sympathy with the people of Nagorno-Karabakh since December, none of the EU's member states or heads of state have attempted to advocate for involvement in Azerbaijan for the protection of the Nagorno-Karabakh population. According to French MEP François-Xavier Bellamy, the EU's decision on Nagorno-Karabakh is turning into a matter between the Parliament and the Commission. The Parliament has voted in favor of imposing sanctions on Azerbaijan, but the European Commission has chosen not to follow through. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, traveled to the city of Azerbaijan in July 2022 to announce the deal doubling Azerbaijan's gas imports into the EU. She said that the European Union made the decision to loosen its ties with Russia in favor of more dependable, trustworthy allies like Azerbaijan. She stated: “The European Union is committed to a secure, stable and prosperous South Caucasus”. Azerbaijan has a history of war crimes, violations of human rights, and is ranked very low on freedom indexes. It is also the biggest destabilizer in the South Caucasus. “Azerbaijan exported more than €21bn of gas to countries in the EU between January 2022 and the end of November 2023, according to Eurostat data obtained by openDemocracy. Armenia’s Human Rights Ombudsman’s office made more than 130 public statements warning of threats to ethnic Armenians caused by Azerbaijani military actions in the 18 months before the MoU was signed. Estonian MEP Marina Kaljurand, who heads the Parliament’s delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, told openDemocracy that the commission had “traded EU values for gas”.” (c. Martirosyan & Sargsyan, 2024) The hypocrisy of the European Union is astounding, as they are well aware of the ethnic cleansing that Azerbaijan intends to inflict on Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. The idea that the European Union is in decline because of its disregard for morality comes from the EU's decision to support authoritarian governments, such as Azerbaijan and Israel, that are determined to erase Armenians and Palestinians rather than advancing peace and justice. 9. Consequences Although a wave of refugees from the Karabakh war in 2020 was taken in by Armenia, the problem is far more serious. Yerevan is facing pressure not only from its citizens, but also Karabakh Armenians who are unsure of their future and are pulling together the pieces of an integration plan. Azerbaijan had made it clear by openly announcing their intent to annex the Armenian region of Syunik in order to establish an oil pipeline that would link its borders with Turkey, furthering their century-long plan of pan-Turkism. Anti-armenian sentiment has grown into a dominant ideology in Azerbaijan. It rejects any and all claims made by other ethnic groups and civilizations to their territories. It ignores the facts of history. Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, is frequently referred to as an Azerbaijani city by Azerbaijani academics and media. “Baku might want to capitalize on the depopulating of Nagorno-Karabakh with a swift military movement across Armenian territory to control access to Nakhchivan, an exclave region of Azerbaijan bordering Iran. But now that Armenia is poised to join the ICC, Azerbaijan’s political and military leaders would likely risk investigation by the ICC prosecutor of the crime of aggression. That may explain the Armenian Parliament’s rapid move to ratify the Rome Statute – to address not only the fate of ethnic Armenians but to deter any Azerbaijani aggression across its territory.” (c. Scheffer, 2023) 10. The Peace Deal and current situation Under US guidance, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a peace deal in the beginning of August 2025. The White House declared it historic, and Western media quickly reported that a decades-long dispute had finally been resolved as a result of U.S. President Donald Trump's intervention. But is that really the truth? The United States' involvement in the proposed Zangezur corridor has been criticized by Iran and Russia as an incursion. The peace agreement's failure to address the right of return for former ethnic Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh due to Azerbaijan's nine-month military siege and offensive has also drawn criticism from observers. While the agreement secures the road linking Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, it is crucial to note that it gives the United States the right to manage and develop the corridor for 99 years. The US would sublease the property to a consortium that would build rail, oil, gas, and fiber optic lines in addition to potentially transmitting electricity along the 43km corridor. This further proves that the true intention behind this initiative was to gain more control by reducing the influence of Russia and Iran in the region. After the parties decided on the agreement form, Azerbaijan stated that before Armenia would sign, it needed to meet two additional demands. First: Baku wanted the two nations to jointly petition the OSCE to abolish the Minsk Group. The issue over “Nagorno-Karabakh”, which Baku interprets as the period of Armenian control, is the focus of the Minsk Group's 1995 mission, which Azerbaijan finds objectionable. The two signed a letter requesting that the OSCE shut down the Minsk Group, fulfilling that demand. The second one was far more concerning, which is Azerbaijan's demand that Armenia change its constitution. Officials from Azerbaijan say they want peace, but only if Armenia gives up its territorial claims. They reject claims that the demand for a constitutional change is unreasonable. The power ultimately stays with Azerbaijan once again. The executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America, Aram Hamparian, stated that “normalizing ethnic cleansing is not peace” and believed that the agreement was based on the erasure of Nagorno-Karabakh, the abandonment of holy sites, the disregard for hostages, and the strengthening of Azerbaijani occupation. The signing of the peace deal left the majority of Armenians in dismay. The general consensus is that the Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan has betrayed the people of Armenia and Artsakh, and that there should be no peace without justice. 11. Conclusion Peace does not always mean that there is no military conflicts. Aliyev hasn't completely stopped using hostile language toward Armenia. Azerbaijani leaders are emphasizing more and more that the war has ended. However, the president enthusiastically promoted the idea of “Western Azerbaijan” at a speech he gave in November. The normalization effort continues amid the fact that state media and elites, including Aliyev, continue to use anti-Armenian rhetoric for home audiences. Approximately 200 square kilometers of internationally recognized Armenian land are still occupied by Azerbaijan, which they acquired during their offensives in 2022. It is essential for Armenia's future administration to seek justice. In order to foster lasting peace, the first step is recognizing history. The fact that even Adolf Hitler admitted the massacre in 1939 makes the demand for greater acknowledgment all the more urgent. The Armenian Genocide served as a model for what he was about to achieve in Poland: “I have placed my death-head formations in readiness – for the present only in the East – with orders to them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish derivation and language. Only thus shall we gain the living space (lebensraum) which we need. Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in 1943-1944 to refer to the deliberate annihilation of peoples. After hearing about the trial of Soghomon Tehlirian in 1921, who killed a major perpetrator of the Armenian Genocide, he started studying mass exterminations. The term was developed to describe the mass atrocities against Armenians in order to define the Holocaust. The word itself would not exist without the Armenian Genocide, and yet, it is officially recognized by just 35 nations. Not enough people are prepared to stand up for victims and potential victims; too many would be happy to complete what was begun in the 1910s and ignore the Armenian people in the name of Turkish nationalism. If there is another threat of genocidal intent against Armenia and its people, we cannot and we must not turn a blind eye. 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Prime Minister Keir Starmer gave a speech during the Munich Security Conference For many years, for most people in the United Kingdom, war has been remote. Something that concerns us deeply, but which happens far off. But now we feel the solidity of peace, the very ground of peace now softening under our feet. It is the job of leaders to be ahead of these seismic shifts. Yet that is against the grain of history. Time and again, leaders have looked the other way, only re-arming when disaster is upon them. This time, it must be different. Because all of the warning signs are there. Russia has proved its appetite for aggression, bringing terrible suffering to the Ukrainian people. Its hyper-threats extend across our continent, not just threatening our security, but tearing at our social order. Collaborating with populists to undermine our values. Using disinformation to sow division. Using cyber-attacks and sabotage to disrupt our lives and deepening the cost-of-living crisis. It is true that Russia has made a huge strategic blunder in Ukraine, and the Russian casualties number well over a million. But even as the war goes on, Russia is re-arming, reconstituting their armed forces, an industrial base. NATO has warned that Russia could be ready to use military force against the Alliance by the end of this decade. In the event of a peace deal in Ukraine, which we are all working hard to achieve, Russia’s re-armament would only accelerate. The wider danger to Europe would not end there. It would increase. So, we must answer this threat in full. At the outset, it is important to be prepared. We do not seek conflict. Our objective is lasting peace, a return to strategic stability, and the rule of law. And in the face of these threats, there is only one viable option. Now, to break the convention of a house of speeches, we are not at a crossroads. The road ahead is straight and it is clear. We must build our hard power, because that is the currency of the age. We must be able to deter aggression. And yes, if necessary, we must be ready to fight. To do whatever it takes to protect our people, our values, and our way of life. And as Europe, we must stand on our own two feet. And that means being bold. It means putting away petty politics and short-term concerns. It means acting together to build a stronger Europe and a more European NATO, underpinned by deeper links between the UK and the EU, across defence, industry, tech, politics, and the wider economy. Because these are the foundations on which our security and prosperity will rest. This is how we will build a better future for our continent. True to the vibrant, free, diverse societies that we represent, showing that people who look different to each other can live peacefully together. But this isn’t against the tenor of our times. Rather, it’s what makes us strong, as we’re prepared to defend it with everything that we have. And we are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore. Because we know that in a dangerous world, we would not take control by turning in. We would surrender. And I won’t let that happen. That’s why I devote time as Prime Minister to Britain’s leadership on the world stage. And that’s why I’m here today. Because I am clear, there is no British security without Europe, and no European security without Britain. That is the lesson of history and is today’s reality as well. So together we must rise to this moment. We must spend more, deliver more, and coordinate more. And crucially, we must do this with the United States. The US remains an indispensable power. Its contribution to European security over 80 years is unparalleled. And so is our gratitude. At the same time, we recognise that things are changing. The US National Security Strategy spells out that Europe must take primary responsibility for its own defence. That is the new law. Now, there have been a series of thoughtful interventions about what this means, including the argument that we’re at a moment of rupture. Now, I would agree that the world has changed fundamentally, and that we must find new ways to uphold our values and the rule of law. But in responding to that, we must not disregard everything that has sustained us for the last 80 years. That could be a moment of destruction. And instead, I believe, we must make this as a moment of creation. Instead of a moment of rupture, we must make it one of radical renewal. So, rather than pretending that we can simply replace all US capabilities, we should focus on diversifying and decreasing some dependencies. We should deliver generational investment that moves us from over-dependence to interdependence. I’m talking about a vision of European security and greater European autonomy. It does not herald US withdrawal, but answers the call for more burden-sharing in Europe and remake the ties that have served us so well. Because we know the value of our own power. The nature of our power is at the core of human decision. It achieved something that leaders have been trying to do for centuries. From Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna to Versailles. After centuries of conflict, the founders of NATO finally united our continents in peace and security. Our militaries, that once faced each other on the battlefield, now stand side-by-side, pledged to each other’s defence. It is a shield over our heads every single day. And whilst some on the extremes of our politics chip away at this alliance, we defend it. I am proud that my party fought for NATO’s creation. While our then Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called it a spiritual union of the West. And we’ve shown our fidelity to that idea, asserting each other’s sovereignty, as we did on Greenland. And crucially, coming to each other’s aid under Article 5. We fought together in Afghanistan, at terrible cost to many in my country and across many allied countries. And so, I say to all NATO members, our commitment to Article 5 is as profound now as ever. And be in no doubt, if called on, the UK would come to your aid today. Instead, we must move forward together to create a more European NATO. As I see it, Europe is a sleeping giant. Our economies dwarf Russia more than ten times over. We have huge defence capabilities, yet too often this adds up to less than the sum of its parts. Fragmented industrial planning and procurement have led to gaps in some areas, and massive duplication in others. Europe has over 20 types of frigate, and 10 types of fighter jet. We have over 10 types of main battle tanks, whilst the US has one. It’s wildly inefficient, and it harms our collective security. The US security umbrella has allowed these bad habits to develop. But now we must break them. And we have shown that we can coordinate in great effect, as was just set out. Supporting Ukraine in a way that Putin never really imagined. Creating the Coalition of the Willing, which now covers almost all of Europe, as well as Canada and our friends in the Asia-Pacific. And going further in our support, with the UK announcing over £500 million this week for more air defence for the Ukrainian people. To meet the wider threat, it is clear that we are going to have to spend more faster. And we have shown our collective intent in this regard as well. With the historic agreement to increase spending to 5% on security and defence. And we are prepared to explore innovative solutions. So, we are stepping up work with like-minded allies on options for a collective approach to defence financing, to help accelerate this vital investment. And as we increase spending, we must use it to its full potential. We must come together to integrate our capabilities on spending and procurement and build a joint European defence industry. I welcome the steps that we have taken so far, which could allow us to participate in the £90 billion Euro loan to Ukraine. I hope we can work together like this going forward. Because, look, the logic of defence is solidarity and collective effort, not market access. In a crisis, our citizens expect us to be ready. So, we need to deliver a step change in collaboration. And I am proud of the work we are already doing together. Delivering cutting-edge drones with Ukraine. Developing next-generation long-range missiles with Germany, Italy and France. Working with our JEF allies to protect our northern flank. Doubling our deployment of British commandos in the Arctic. Taking control of NATO’s Atlantic and Northern Command in Norfolk, Virginia. And transforming our Royal Navy by striking the biggest warship deal in British history with Norway. We are building a fleet of warships to hunt Russian submarines and protect undersea infrastructure. We want to replicate this level of collaboration with other allies across the High North and the Baltics. And I can announce today that the UK will deploy our Carrier Strike Group to the North Atlantic and the High North this year led by HMS Prince of Wales, operating alongside the US, Canada and other NATO allies in a powerful show of our commitment to Euro-Atlantic security. That is also why we are enhancing our nuclear cooperation with France. For decades the UK has been the only nuclear power in Europe to commit its deterrent to protect all NATO members. But now any adversary must know that in a crisis they could be confronted by our combined strength. It shows beyond doubt how vital it is that we work together. So, we must also look at what more we can do with the EU. We must go beyond the historic steps that we took at last year’s UK-EU summit to build the formidable productive power and innovative strength that we need. British companies already account for over a quarter of the continent’s defence industrial base. They are a job-creating, community-building machine employing around 239,000 people across the UK, including in Wales, where this month we’re launching the first of five regional defence-grade deals. We want to bring our leadership in defence, tech and AI together with Europe to multiply our strengths and build a shared industrial base across our continent which could turbocharge our defence production. That requires leadership. To drive greater coherence and coordination across Europe. That is what we’re doing with Germany and France in the E3, working closely with EU partners, particularly Italy and Poland as well as with Norway, Canada and Turkey. So, my message today is the United Kingdom is ready. We see the imperative. We see the urgency. We want to work together to lead a generational shift in defence industrial cooperation. Now this includes looking again at closer economic alignment. We are already aligned with the single market in some areas to drive down the prices of food and energy. We are trusted partners. And as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said this week, deeper economic integration is in all of our interests. So, we must look at where we can move closer to the single market in other sectors as well where that would work for both sides. The prize here is greater security. Stronger growth for the United Kingdom and the EU, which will fuel increased defence spending and the chance to place the UK at the centre of a wave of European industrial renewal. I understand the politics very well. It will mean trade-offs. But the status quo is not fit for purpose. And to me there is no question where the national interest lies. I will always fight for what’s best for my country. I started today talking about avoiding mistakes of the past like delaying action or fragmenting our efforts. But there is something else. In the 1930s, leaders were too slow to level with the public about the fundamental shift in mindset that was required. So, we must work harder today to build consent for the decisions we must take to keep us safe. Because if we don’t, the peddlers of easy answers are ready on the extremes of left and right and they will offer their solutions instead. It’s striking that the different ends of the spectrum share so much. Soft on Russia. Weak on NATO. If not outright opposed. And determined to sacrifice the relationship we need on the altar of their ideology. The future they offer is one of division and then capitulation. The lamps would go out across Europe once again. But we will not let that happen. If we believe in our values, in democracy, liberty and the rule of law. This is the moment to stand up and to fight for them. That is why we must work together. And show that by taking responsibility for our own security, we will help our people look forward. Not with fear, but with determination. And with hope. Thank you very much. Contenido bajo licencia Open Governement Licence v3.0 [https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/] UK Prime Minister’s Office. GOV.UK. Web.

Abstract This paper analyses the current challenges facing NATO and questions its future viability amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. It highlights the evolving U.S. stance, marked by a 2025 National Security Strategy that prioritises self-reliance for European allies and a reduced American military role in Europe, reflecting a broader "America First" approach. Russia's persistent opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine, fuels ongoing conflict and threatens regional stability. Germany's emerging leadership role in European security is explored, showcasing its increased defence commitments and strategic cultural shift from restraint to readiness. Turkey’s crucial geopolitical position and military capabilities underscore its significance within NATO despite recent tensions. The paper also discusses the Greenland dispute as a symbol of intra-Alliance tensions and as a challenge to collective defence principles under Article 5. Ultimately, the Ukraine war serves as a critical test for NATO, raising doubts about the Alliance’s coherence and effectiveness amid internal divisions and external threats. Key Words: NATO, Russia, US, Europe, Security Introduction Allegedly, Lord Ismay (Hastings Lionel Ismay), the first Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), famously claimed that NATO was set up for three major reasons: to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out (he meant the USSR) and to keep the Germans down.[1] Historians and international security experts generally agree that NATO has been a fundamental part of European security architecture, helping maintain peace on the European continent during the Cold War amid the great powers’ rivalry. Not only did the American presence on the European continent deter a possible Soviet invasion, but it also served as a pacifier regarding European military and political ambitions, especially German. As of today, "the Alliance" (as Nato is often referred to) seems to be edging towards the end of its coherence due to many internal and external reasons. This short paper will explore some of them, albeit the topic naturally requires a much longer and deeper approach. The Americans: still in? On December 9, 2025, Republican Congressman Thomas Massie of Kentucky introduced H.R. 6508, the NATO Act, which calls for the United States to withdraw from NATO. In his statement, following (consciously or not Lord Ismay) Massie states: “NATO is a Cold War relic. We should withdraw from NATO and use that money to defend our own country, not socialist countries. NATO was created to counter the Soviet Union, which collapsed over thirty years ago. Since then, U.S. participation has cost taxpayers trillions of dollars and continues to risk U.S. involvement in foreign wars. Our Constitution did not authorise permanent foreign entanglements, something our Founding Fathers explicitly warned us against. America should not be the world’s security blanket — especially when wealthy countries refuse to pay for their own defense.”[2] This is but a small ripple in a much bigger pool of water that hosts the U.S. concerns regarding their involvement in the European Security architecture. To cut a long story short, there seems to be a formidable force in U.S. politics advocating a "refocus" of US foreign policy doctrine and the consequent foreign policy and security strategies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the U.S. President has recently unveiled the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump administration indicates a shift away from the U.S. focus on Europe in foreign and security policy, emphasising greater self-reliance for European allies and prioritising other regions.[3] The NSS ranks global regions by priority, placing the Western Hemisphere first (elevated from fifth in the 2017 NSS), Asia second, and Europe third—a demotion from its previous second-place ranking. This reorientation aligns with an "America First" approach that emphasises burden-sharing, non-interventionism, and a narrower definition of U.S. national interests, thereby avoiding overextension in regions such as Europe. Key elements signalling a less focused approach to Europe include, among others, the encouragement of European self-defence. The strategy calls for Europe to assume primary responsibility for its own security as sovereign nations. It urges ending NATO's expansion and requires allies to meet a new 5% of GDP defence spending commitment (dubbed the "Hague Commitment"), far above the current 2% target, to ensure fair burden-sharing. Secondly, the NSS outlines a limited U.S. role in Europe. The U.S. involvement is framed as diplomatic support for stability (e.g. negotiating an end to the Ukraine war and fostering relations with Russia for reconstruction and strategic stability) rather than sustained military commitments. The document criticises Europe's economic decline, migration issues, and EU "transnationalism" that undermines sovereignty, but positions the U.S. as a helper only for aligned partners willing to open markets and combat hostile practices such as mercantilism. As far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, the NSS asserts U.S. preeminence through a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, focusing on migration control, supply chains, and denying adversarial influence through active military and economic measures (Central and South America and the Caribbean). This marks a departure from past NSS documents, which often centred on Europe due to NATO commitments and threats like Russia, toward a more transactional and restrained U.S. posture in the region.[4] With regards to that last point, the very latest National Defence Strategy of the U.S. confirms the direction away from Europe.[5] The strategy prioritises Europe taking primary responsibility for its own conventional defence, with critical but more limited support from the United States. This includes supporting Ukraine’s defence as primarily a European responsibility. Moreover, according to the document, Russia remains a persistent but manageable threat to NATO's eastern members. The Russians: already in? The ongoing war in Ukraine, which has lasted for 4 years now, has allowed the Russian army to make formidable advances in the field. Russian experts and military advisors are pushing for control of Odessa (I write about it here). It appears probable at this stage that the Russian Federation will want to control as much territory of Ukraine as possible and that the lack of effective diplomacy means that the outcome of the war will be settled on the battlefield rather than in the comfort of negotiation chambers. Regardless of the mainstream narratives constantly pushed by CNN or BBC, the Russians have not really changed their fundamental demand - that Ukraine should not be permitted to become a NATO member. Western societies and their political elites can, of course, feel moral outrage when confronted with such demands. The facts are, however, painfully simple. After the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany was agreed to and accepted by the then-Soviet Union, on the condition that NATO would not expand eastward. (I write about here). NATO did expand westward multiple times, however. From the Kremlin's perspective, Ukraine's possible membership in NATO is the last red line Russia cannot allow to be crossed. Put simply, Ukraine's geography makes it a strategic asset to NATO. Let us also remember that countries such as Turkey, Poland, all three Baltic states, and, recently, even Finland are already NATO members.[6] Importantly, Russian security and military experts see this as a fundamental threat to Moscow and its European environment. (Russia, after all, is also a European country). (The pivotal moment came at the April Bucharest Summit, where NATO leaders — despite opposition from France and Germany — declared that Ukraine (and Georgia) "will become members of NATO." This was not an immediate invitation but a promise of future membership once conditions were met, with the U.S. lobbying heavily for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Ukraine had formally requested a MAP in January 2008.)[7] Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/central-europe-map.htm According to the European Parliament, as early as back in 2014, Moscow identified several challenges as threats to its national security, with a particular focus on the West. First, it is the opposition to Russia's independent foreign policy. Russia perceives that its independent foreign and domestic policies are met with resistance from the United States and its allies, who seek to maintain their domination in world affairs and to "contain" Russia through political, economic, military, and informational pressure.[8] Second, Russia had always viewed the enlargement of NATO, the location of its military infrastructure close to Russian borders, NATO's "offensive capabilities," and the trend towards NATO acquiring global functions as direct challenges to its security Third, Russia was concerned about U.S. initiatives like the global antimissile system, Global Strike capabilities, and the militarisation of space, which it views as efforts to undermine its strategic deterrent. Fourth, Russia resented Western criticism of its policies in the post-Soviet countries, often described by Moscow as neo-imperialistic, and perceives NATO and the EU's enlargement and development of cooperative ties in the shared neighbourhood as expanding their spheres of influence at Russia's expense. Fifth, Moscow condemned efforts to provoke regime changes through means such as "colour revolutions," as it views these as attempts to destabilise its internal situation, supported at times by military force. This includes references to events in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004 and 2014 "Revolution of Dignity"), Kyrgyzstan (2005), and the Arab Spring (2010-2012). Sixth, the Kremlin perceived an increasing competition with the West, including rival systems of values and societal models, and it rejects the normative dimension of the EU's external action, which it sees as an attempt to impose its norms and values on Russia. Next, Russia faced economic sanctions, financial, trade, investment, and technological policies used by the West as instruments to address geopolitical problems and contain alternative centres of power, such as Russia. Finally, across its strategic documents, Russia consistently emphasised the West (including the EU) as its main challenger to its great-power ambitions and security. The latest National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation as approved by President Putin in July 2021 (still before the beginning of the War in Ukraine), NATO and Western European countries are perceived by Russia as sources of pressure and threats.[9] The Strategy states that attempts to exert pressure on Russia, its allies, and partners, including building up NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders and intensifying intelligence activities, contribute to increasing military dangers and threats to Russia. Moreover, there is mention of Western countries' desire to maintain hegemony, which is associated with the crisis of economic development models, rising disparities and social inequality, attempts to limit the role of states, and the exacerbation of political problems and inter-state contradictions. The document also notes that some states view Russia as a threat or even a military adversary, and that there are efforts to instigate disintegration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States to undermine Russia's ties with its traditional allies. Additionally, unfriendly actions by foreign countries, including Western states, are seen as attempts to exploit Russia's socio-economic problems to undermine internal unity and radicalise protest movements. Furthermore, information campaigns by foreign countries seek to form a hostile image of Russia, restrict the use of the Russian language, ban Russian media activities, and impose sanctions on Russian athletes. The document describes these as unjustified accusations and discrimination against Russian citizens and compatriots abroad. Overall, NATO and Western European countries are portrayed as pursuing policies aimed at containing Russia, undermining its sovereignty, and interfering in its internal affairs, which Russia views as threats to its national security and statehood. Now, as mentioned here, it seems that the outcome of the War in Ukraine is most likely to be decided on the battlefield and that the Russians will keep expanding their territory control, possibly even including Odessa, and that ultimately, they will want to keep as much Ukrainian territory under their direct or indirect control as possible. It is very unlikely at this stage that Ukraine will ever regain its territorial integrity (compared to pre-2014 status and Crimean operation). The Germans: up or what? In one of the recent publications (available here), I claimed that German leadership has, for some time now, promoted the idea of "special responsibility" for Europe and European security. To briefly recollect: "The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership’s vision regarding the European defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the EU's future at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four “revolutionary” ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the potential enlargement of the European Union to up to 35 states, a transition to majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy is urged. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the former German Chancellor asserts that Europeans are becoming more autonomous across all fields, assuming greater responsibility for their security, working more closely together, and standing even more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[10] Arguably, Germany's self-proclaimed special role stems from a re-evaluation of its strategic culture, moving from "restraint to readiness."[11] Post-reunification in 1990, Germany was reluctant to lead on security issues, preferring multilateralism through the EU and NATO while avoiding military assertiveness due to its Nazi past and a culture associating power with guilt rather than responsibility. However, events like the 2014 Crimea annexation and the 2022 Ukraine invasion forced a "profound transformation," with leaders arguing that Germany's previous "strategic ambiguity" is no longer viable in a world of revisionist threats.[12] Former Chancellor Scholz described this as a "mandate to act," not just a description of change, emphasising Germany's obligation to secure peace and foster EU solidarity. [13] Chancellor Merz has built on this, asserting that "everything else is subordinate to external security" and that Europe expects German leadership after years of underperformance.[14] German leaders generally justify this role through a combination of geopolitical, economic, and normative arguments, often tied to specific policy actions like defence spending hikes and institutional reforms. First, geopolitical necessity and threat response. Germany portrays itself as uniquely positioned to confront existential threats like Russian aggression, given its central location in Europe and proximity to conflict zones. Scholz argued that Germany must act as the "guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be," defending the international order against autocracies and serving as a bridge-builder in the EU. [15] Merz has emphasised the need to fill the void left by U.S. disinterest, stating that Germany faces a "dual shock" from Russian imperialism and American retrenchment, necessitating leadership to maintain transatlantic security. [16] This includes strengthening NATO's deterrence, with Germany committing to nuclear sharing and viewing alliance solidarity as part of its "reason of state."[17] Second, economic power and resource capacity. As Europe's largest economy, Germany justifies its role by leveraging its financial clout for defence investments, aiming to reach 3 - 3.5% of GDP by 2029 — surpassing NATO's 2% target and outpacing France and the UK.[18] Apparently, recently, Merz has relaxed the constitutional debt brake to fund €500 billion in infrastructure and defence, arguing this enables Germany to lead systemic renewal in European security without overburdening allies. [19] Leaders like Scholz and Merz frame this as a responsibility commensurate with Germany's potential, turning economic strength into security leadership rather than mere fiscal discipline.[20] Third, there is the question of perceived historical responsibility and the evolution of strategic culture. Drawing on Germany's past, its contemporary political leaders argue for a shift from "fence-sitting" to "pace-setting," redefining power as responsibility rather than aggression.[21] This includes overcoming "outdated beliefs" about post-Cold War peace and embracing a "geopolitical, security-driven master narrative." Scholz invoked Germany's duty to foster multilateral solutions and reject isolationism, while Merz highlights the need to reshape public perceptions of military force as a tool for stability. This narrative aligns with broader values such as defending democracy, human rights, and the rules-based order, positioning Germany as a defender of European unity.[22] What of Turkey? Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, joining primarily to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War, and it remains a pivotal ally due to its unique geopolitical position, military strength, and contributions to alliance objectives. As far as the country's location, Turkey straddles Europe and Asia, serving as NATO's southeastern anchor and controlling the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, which connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.[23] Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey regulates naval traffic through these waterways, effectively limiting Russian (and other non-Black Sea states') military movements — a role that's become even more critical amid Russia's actions in Ukraine and increased Black Sea presence.[24] This position also borders key regions like the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Iran), the Caucasus, and Europe, enabling NATO to project influence and address threats from multiple fronts, including countering Russian A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategies. In terms of military strength, Turkey boasts NATO's second-largest standing army, providing significant "military mass" for defending extended frontiers and sustaining operations where other allies might lack scale. [25] It hosts vital NATO assets, including the Incirlik Air Base (which stores around 50 U.S. nuclear weapons and supports Middle East operations), the Allied Land Command headquarters in İzmir, AWACS facilities at Konya, and a radar station in Kürecik for NATO's ballistic missile defence system. [26] These capabilities enhance the alliance's rapid response and deterrence in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Turkey has actively participated in numerous NATO operations, from sending 4,500 troops to the Korean War (which helped secure its NATO membership) to leading roles in Afghanistan (ISAF and Resolute Support), Iraq, the Balkans, and Mediterranean patrols like Operation Active Endeavour. More recently, it has supplied military aid to Ukraine, including Bayraktar TB2 drones that have proven effective against Russian forces, and co-led the Black Sea Grain Initiative to ensure global food security amid the ongoing war.[27] Turkey also collaborates on counterterrorism efforts against groups like ISIS and the PKK, and helps stabilise regions like the South Caucasus and Eastern Mediterranean. [28] Turkey's growing defence sector produces affordable, battle-tested equipment, such as drones and other systems, which offer NATO alternatives to more expensive Western options and enable rapid production for allies like Ukraine.[29] This industrial capacity strengthens the alliance's overall resilience and reduces dependency on single suppliers. Beyond military might, Turkey extends NATO's diplomatic reach through cultural, economic, and political ties in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia — areas where Western allies often face credibility gaps. It engages with challenging regimes to secure resources, energy deals, and counter Russian or Chinese influence, acting as a bridge for the alliance. However, recently Turkey's relations with NATO have faced strains — such as its purchase of Russian S-400 systems (leading to U.S. sanctions and F-35 exclusion), disputes with Greece over Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and delays in approving Finland and Sweden's memberships (resolved by 2024). It is fair to say that Turkey plays a strategically important role in European security, and its leadership effectively leverages this position against European partners. Given its geographic location and military potential, Ankara will largely influence NATO's future. Greenland Conundrum Perhaps the most intriguing in recent days is the U.S. President's claim regarding Greenland. As of January 27, 2026, tensions between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland have escalated due to renewed U.S. interest in expanding its strategic presence on the Arctic island. President Donald Trump has reportedly issued an ultimatum, pushing for greater control over parts of Greenland to bolster military bases and counter Russian influence in the region, including restrictions on drilling rights for Russia. This follows historical U.S. attempts, such as Trump's 2019 proposal to purchase Greenland outright, which was rebuffed by Denmark. Importantly, the U.S. already operates Pituffik Space Base in Greenland for early warning and missile defence, but the current demands aim to expand this amid Arctic geopolitical competition with Russia and China. Recent talks in Washington between U.S. and Danish officials have led to the formation of a working group aimed at a diplomatic resolution. However, interpretations differ: U.S. officials, including Ambassador Leavitt, frame it as facilitating a transfer or enhanced control, while Denmark emphasises disagreement and no sale. For example, a recent New York Times report indicates Denmark may grant the U.S. sovereignty over select land pockets for military bases, modelled after arrangements like those in Cyprus, to strengthen Arctic defences. [30] Greenland's Prime Minister has declared the island's sovereignty a "red line," rejecting any outright transfer.[31] Denmark has reportedly increased troop deployments to Greenland in response, insisting the territory is not for sale. To spice things up, Trump has questioned Denmark's legal claims, stirring further controversy.[32] This has arguably strained U.S. - EU relations, with Europe adopting a firmer stance against Trump's approach. As a NATO member and EU affiliate through Denmark, Greenland's status has prompted calls for allies to boost Arctic security.[33] Some European leaders worry this could force divestment from U.S. ties or heighten NATO divisions.[34] In an interesting twist, a number of European leaders issued strong rhetoric against Trump and his claims about Greenland. A Joint Statement from European Leaders declared in a collective rebuke: "Greenland belongs to its people. It is for Denmark and Greenland and them only to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland," […] "Security in the Arctic must therefore be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO allies including the United States, by upholding the principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. These are universal principles, and we will not stop defending them."[35] Herein lies the fundamental conundrum: the core of the security guaranteed by NATO (at least legally speaking) is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the so-called Casus Foederis.[36] The article 5 states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Originally conceived as a defensive military alliance, NATO was established to protect its member states from external threats, according to its founders. In the event that one member state turns against the others, the Alliance risks becoming ineffective, akin to the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, which served as a mechanism for exerting control over weaker states. Should such a scenario occur, the survival of NATO would be in jeopardy. Historical precedent suggests that oppressive institutions inevitably collapse over time. Conclusion It is imperative to acknowledge that NATO is currently engaged, albeit indirectly, in a conflict with Russia. This situation is significant as it serves as a test of NATO's capabilities. Presently, it appears that NATO is not prevailing. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert, as I have argued in my previous analysis (available here), that Russia is likely to achieve its primary objective: ensuring that Ukraine will not join NATO. Additionally, I expect Russia to retain its territorial acquisitions and, in some manner, exert influence over the political system that will emerge in Ukraine following the conflict. Several pertinent questions arise in this context. Will the eventual peace, following the conclusion of the conflict, be sustainable? Will it adequately consider the national interests of all parties involved? Will it offer a satisfactory compromise? Is there a probability of a resurgence of Cold War-like relations between Western European nations and Russia? In the event of a renewed Cold War scenario, will NATO continue to be perceived as an effective instrument? Furthermore, given the United States' strategic focus on the Far and Middle East, will it remain committed to participating in the European security framework through institutions such as NATO? References [1] NATO. (2026, January 15). A short history of NATO. NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/a-short-history-of-nato [2] Rep. Massie Introduces Bill to Remove the United States from NATO. (2025, December 9). Congressman Thomas Massie. https://massie.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395782 [3] United States of America. (2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America (November 2025). The White House. Washington. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf [4] Grieger, G. (2025, December). The 2025 US National Security Strategy. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://eprs.in.ep.europa.eu [5] Department of War. (2025). National Defense Strategy [Unclassified document]. U.S. Government. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF [6] See more at: https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-on-the-map [7] Pifer, S. (2024, August). Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO. American Diplomacy. https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2024/08/ukraines-long-path-toward-nato [8] Facon, I. (2017). Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine and their implications for the EU (Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/Lot6/11 EN). European Parliament. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/379ea707-e9dc-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en [9] President of the Russian Federation. (2021, July 2). National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Decree No. 400). Kremlin. [10] Sliwinski, K. (2025, June 16). Germany – the EU’s challenging leadership in challenging times. World and New World Journal. https://worldandnewworld.com/germany-eu-leadership/ [11] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? Germany Considers Conscription. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/from-restraint-to-readiness-germany-considers-conscription/ [12] Kandyuk, O. (2025, October 15). THE END OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY? GERMANY’S NEW ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. Ukraine Analytica. https://ukraine-analytica.org/the-end-of-strategic-ambiguity-germanys-new-role-in-european-security/ [13] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [14] Cliffe, J., & Puglierin, J. (2025, May 6). From fence-sitter to pace-setter: How Merz’s Germany can lead Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/from-fence-sitter-to-pace-setter-how-merzs-germany-can-lead-europe/ [15] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [16] Freytag von Loringhoven, A. (2025, December 16). Germany: Europe’s New Security Leader. Centre for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/germany-europes-new-security-leader/ [17] Dempsey, J. (2023, June 22). Judy Asks: Is Germany Getting Serious About Security and Defense? Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2023/06/judy-asks-is-germany-getting-serious-about-security-and-defense?lang=en [18] Koenig, N., & Schütte, L. (n.d.). Don’t Dodge Dilemmas Three Tests for German Leadership in European Defense. Munich Security Conference. Retrieved January 23, 2026, from https://securityconference.org/en/publications/analyses/dont-dodge-dilemmas-german-leadership-in-european-defense [19] Fuhrhop, P., & Kempin, R. (2025, December). New ambitions, old constraints: Germany’s role in shaping European defence. Berlin Perspectives, (08). Institut für Europäische Politik. https://www.iep-berlin.de [20] U.S. Department of State. (2024). Integrated Country Strategy: Germany (Approved May 25, 2022; Revised January 30, 2024). [Report]. https://placeholder-url-for-document.org [21] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? 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In the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico, the word “security” functions as a hinge: it can open doors to cooperation or abruptly shut down any attempt at understanding. The busiest border in the world, a deeply integrated economy, and a public health crisis in the United States associated with fentanyl consumption have, in recent years, shaped a scenario in which interests converge, but where historical mistrust, structural asymmetries, and unilateral temptations also accumulate. Although latent tension between the two countries has long existed, it was not until early January 2026 — specifically after the capture of Maduro by the United States — that this tension became more visible. In Mexico, concern grew over signals and U.S. military “movements” — real, perceived, or amplified by the media — which were interpreted not so much as immediate preparations for a U.S. intervention, but rather as political messages in a context in which political discourse in Washington once again flirts with a high-voltage idea: the possibility of sending troops, carrying out incursions, or executing armed actions on Mexican territory to combat Mexican drug trafficking cartels — recently classified as terrorist organizations in the United States. Many analysts share the view that the relevance of these episodes lies not solely in their operational dimension, but in their symbolic value within a broader strategy of diplomatic pressure. Three currents fueling interventionist temptation The idea of a U.S. intervention in Mexico has not emerged out of nowhere; in fact, it could be said that there are three simultaneous currents that feed this idea. The first is domestic, inherent to the internal situation of the United States. The fentanyl crisis has become one of the country’s main public health problems, with tens of thousands of deaths annually. This crisis has been used and translated by broad political sectors into a narrative of an external threat. Within this framework, Mexican cartels are portrayed as transnational actors comparable to terrorist organizations, which enables — at least discursively — the use of exceptional tools against them. Moreover, as several analyses published in U.S. media and echoed by the Mexican press point out, this narrative has a clear electoral utility, in which there is pressure to offer “visible” — or tangible — solutions with immediate impact, even when their strategic costs are high. All of this occurs within the context of the fight against drug trafficking. The second current is the Mexican reality. The persistence of high levels of violence and corruption within the institutional apparatus, the fragmentation of territorial control, and the uneven penetration of criminal networks at the local level feed the perception in Washington that Mexico is not doing “enough.” Mexican security policy has oscillated between attempts at territorial control, containment strategies, and the management of a chronic conflict that neither fully resolves nor fully escalates. From the outside, this ambiguity is often interpreted as incapacity or lack of will; from within, on the other hand, it is seen as a pragmatic adaptation to a long-term structural problem. The third current is historical and symbolic. For Mexico, any mention of a U.S. military intervention recalls records of past grievances such as the territorial loss of half of its territory in the nineteenth century, occupations, diplomatic pressures, and episodes of subordination. Therefore, even when bilateral cooperation is intense — and it is — the political margin to formalize or accept a foreign military presence on Mexican territory is virtually nonexistent. Analysts from the Mexican Council and CESPEM remind us and emphasize that the principle of non-intervention is not merely a doctrinal element of Mexican foreign policy, but a pillar of internal legitimacy. The real architecture of cooperation Despite media noise and the dramatization of the public debate, security cooperation between Mexico and the United States is broad, constant, and deeply integrated. For decades, both countries have collaborated in intelligence sharing, border control, judicial actions, the fight against money laundering, and operations against criminal networks, with mixed results. However, the format has recently changed: today, technical and discreet mechanisms are prioritized over large public plans. At the same time, intelligence sharing and operational cooperation are emphasized under clearly defined red lines regarding sovereignty. Even so, this architecture contains a central paradox. The more integrated the cooperation becomes, the more politically fragile it is, as it depends on trust between governments and on the ability of both to justify it before their increasingly polarized domestic audiences. This is why in Mexico, any perception of subordination can erode the government’s legitimacy; while in the United States, any sign of “softness” toward the cartels can turn into electoral ammunition. In January 2026, this dynamic became clearly evident with the transfer of 37 individuals linked to criminal organizations from Mexico to the United States, in a context in which more than 90 handovers had already been recorded in less than a year. Beyond its judicial impact, the gesture — although it had a clear political dimension, aimed at showing tangible “results” to reduce pressure from Washington and deactivate the temptation of unilateral actions — is fundamentally symbolic and masks a deeper dilemma for the Mexican government. From the Mexican perspective, the signal is ambivalent. On the one hand, it seeks to demonstrate that the state retains the capacity to act and can strike criminal structures without accepting foreign military tutelage. On the other hand, it implicitly acknowledges that the bilateral relationship operates under a regime of permanent evaluation, in which U.S. perceptions of Mexican effectiveness condition the level of political pressure and rhetoric. In other words, it is a form of conditional subordination. In the United States, by contrast, these gestures continue to be perceived as insufficient by influential political sectors. The reason is that the problem is measured through indicators that cannot be resolved through mass extraditions: the availability of synthetic drugs, overdose deaths, the industrial capacity of clandestine laboratories, territorial control of routes, or the flow of weapons to the south, among others. Given the influence of these sectors and the impact of the phenomenon on U.S. territory, the issue is often used as a domestic electoral weapon, frequently highlighting “visible” solutions — troops, drones, incursions — without considering their strategic costs. Drug trafficking, politics, and institutional corrosion Speaking about the involvement of drug trafficking in the Mexican state requires analytical precision. It is not a matter of a homogeneous capture of the “government” as a whole, but rather of a fragmented and layered phenomenon. What numerous reports and investigations have documented and repeatedly pointed out is a mosaic of local co-optations with consequences at the national and even international level: infiltrated municipal police forces, regional authorities pressured or bought off, clientelist networks financed with illicit resources, and, in high-impact cases, links to political actors that end up becoming sources of bilateral friction, among many other examples. At this stage of the relationship with the United States, the most explosive political issue is not only the existence of corruption, but the political use of that corruption as a lever of pressure. From Washington, it has been suggested that Mexico should go beyond operational arrests and target political figures with alleged ties to organized crime, even within the governing party — MORENA. However, for the Mexican administration, such a step would entail an extremely high internal cost and the risk of political destabilization, in addition to a potential contradiction of MORENA’s narrative legitimacy regarding its promises of honesty and transparency, which it has strongly defended since coming to power. Here lies one of the core dilemmas. When drug trafficking “invests” in politics, it does not seek only impunity; it seeks governance. Controlling strategic nodes — customs offices, ports, local prosecutors’ offices, police forces, mayoralties — makes it possible to manage violence in ways that are functional to the criminal business. In that context, cooperation with the United States becomes a double-edged sword. While it can contribute to dismantling criminal networks, it can also amplify the narrative of a “failed state,” either through the imposition of external agendas or through the exposure of institutional weaknesses. In turn, this perception, rooted in certain U.S. political sectors, often translates into the promotion of coercive responses or approaches. Figure 1: Mexico cartel map 2024. Source: Ioan Grillo. https://www.crashoutmedia.com/p/mexicos-cartel-map-2024 Military noise as diplomatic language Reports of recent, unusual, and amplified U.S. military activity related to Mexico —magnified by regional media and echoed within Mexico — have generated a climate of alarm that goes beyond the immediate plausibility of an intervention. In this environment, what matters is not whether an aircraft, a navigation notice, or a border deployment implies an imminent action, but rather the political message they convey, especially following U.S. military actions in the region and the simultaneous hardening of rhetoric against the cartels. In other words, the demonstration of capability — and the ambiguity surrounding intentions — is being used, or is functioning, as a way to force and extract concessions from Mexico: more cooperation, greater access to intelligence, more measurable results, and greater alignment. From this perspective, the pressure does not necessarily seek to cross the red line of intervention, but rather to come close enough to extract concessions. Consequently, the Mexican response has been repetitive and carefully calibrated: “cooperation yes, subordination no.” This framing, present in official statements and in analyses by national media, seeks to draw clear boundaries without breaking the relationship. It is a defensive — “negotiating” — strategy that acknowledges the asymmetry of power but attempts to contain it within institutional frameworks. The range of options and their strategic costs When people speak of an “invasion,” the term tends to polarize more than it explains. In the U.S. debate, however, this word is often more rhetorical than descriptive. In practice, the range of options circulating in the media is broad and, at times, dangerous, precisely because it is gradual: 1. Expansion of the presence of advisers and liaisons in command centers. This is what Mexico can accept with greater political ease if it remains under institutional control. 2. Joint operations with direct participation of U.S. forces (for example, accompaniment during raids). According to reports cited by the media, this is something the United States has sought and Mexico has consistently resisted. 3. “Surgical” unilateral actions (for example, drones or the deployment of special forces against laboratories or criminal leaders). This is militarily feasible but politically devastating. 4. Sustained intervention (what the public imagination calls an “invasion”). It is extremely costly and also difficult to justify legally and politically at present. Moreover, it would trigger a major bilateral crisis. From the above, the greatest strategic risk lies in the intermediate options. “Limited” incursions may appear efficient from Washington’s perspective, but in Mexico they would be interpreted as a direct violation of sovereignty, with effects ranging from nationalist cohesion to the rupture of bilateral cooperation and even incentives for criminal groups to present themselves as defenders of the territory. In such a scenario, a unilateral action by Washington could lead Mexico to restrict intelligence sharing, close operational channels, and turn the issue into a permanent dispute — precisely at a time when coordination is indispensable to strike at the logistical chains of drug trafficking. Sheinbaum’s position: sovereignty and calculated concessions President Claudia Sheinbaum has been clear in her repeated rejection of the entry of U.S. troops into Mexico. This stance appears time and again in reports and media coverage that emphasizes opposition to any intervention while supporting cooperation. Moreover, this position responds both to historical convictions and to calculations of internal stability. As previously mentioned, accepting a foreign military presence would entail a high political cost. At the same time, her government has sought to shield the bilateral relationship through visible actions: extraditions, seizures, port controls, and a discourse focused on results. Some media outlets, such as El País, report that Sheinbaum has defended these advances and insisted on “mutual respect and shared responsibility,” reminding that the United States must also address its domestic consumption and the trafficking of weapons from the United States. That last point — the trafficking of weapons — is crucial, as the U.S. firearms market fuels the firepower of cartels in Mexico. For Mexico, insisting on “shared responsibility” is not merely rhetoric or a moral argument; it is an attempt to rebalance the narrative and prevent the problem from being defined exclusively as an external threat originating in Mexico. Figure 2: Opioid-related and other drug poisoning deaths per 100,000 people in the USA. Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics via CDC Wonder Database. https://statehealthcompare.shadac.org/trend/197/opioidrelated-and-other-drug-poisoning-deaths-per-100000-people-by-drug-type#32/1/162,163,127,125,126,129,128/21,19,20,9,10,11,12,13,14,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,15,24,25,27,32,37,42,76/233 Figure 3: Illegal arms trafficking from US to Mexico The Trump factor and the U.S. political limit In discourse attributed to Trump and his inner circle, Mexico frequently appears as a space where the state is “dominated” by cartels and, therefore, where exceptional action would be justified. This framing appears both in press coverage and in political debate in the United States. However, even within the U.S., there are warnings about the “disaster” that bombing or intervening in Mexico would entail — not only because of the human impact, but also due to the geopolitical consequences of opening a conflict with a key trading partner and a neighbor with whom borders, migration, supply chains, and regional security are shared. Moreover, a military operation in Mexico is not comparable to an “overseas” action. Proximity means that any escalation would have immediate repercussions: border tensions, commercial disruption, migration waves, political radicalization in both countries, and incentives for criminal groups to respond with spectacular violence or low-intensity terrorism, precisely in an effort to break bilateral cooperation. Conclusion The United States and Mexico share a structural crisis — synthetic drugs, violence, weapons, migration — but they do not share the same narrative to explain it, nor the same tools to resolve it. Washington tends to frame it as an external threat requiring immediate action; Mexico, by contrast, tends to view it as an internal problem with a binational dimension that calls for cooperation without intervention. As long as these narratives remain unreconciled, the security relationship will continue to be tense, marked by cooperation and distrust at the same time. In 2026, the ghost of deploying troops to Mexico is not merely a military scenario: it is a negotiating tool, an identity symbol, and a test of political strength. The least costly path is not spectacular, but it is the only sustainable one: deep cooperation with clear limits, shared responsibility (drugs, weapons, money), institutional strengthening, and verifiable results that allow both governments to tell their societies they are acting without crossing lines that, once broken, could turn the border into a battlefield. It is also important to remember that drug trafficking is not a conventional army; it is an adaptive criminal economy. Striking one node can fragment and disperse violence. In Mexico, this dynamic has already been observed: the decapitation of leadership can generate succession wars and multiply victims, which is why strategy, risks, and strategic costs must be carefully considered. Ultimately, what is at stake is not only security, but legitimacy: who defines the problem, who imposes the solution, and who bears the political and human costs of carrying it out. Until that dispute is resolved, the bilateral relationship will remain a taut rope, stretched between mutual necessity and historical fear. Finally, an additional element that also weighs on the Mexico–United States relationship is the economic dimension, specifically the future of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). Its 2026 review has generated political and commercial uncertainty that intertwines with the security agenda, as U.S. pressure is not limited to drug trafficking but also extends to trade and regulatory compliance issues. This could affect Mexico’s economic stability and, consequently, its capacity to respond to the security crisis. The USMCA juncture comes precisely at a moment when bilateral relations — from trade to security cooperation — are under strain. Although a total rupture is unlikely due to deep regional interdependence, the agreement could remain in a limited or “zombie” state, with more frequent reviews and no significant renewals. In this context, defending agreements such as the USMCA becomes a strategic tool for Mexico, allowing it to balance sovereignty, cooperation, and pragmatism in the face of external pressure. References ABC7 Los Angeles. (20 de January de 2026). Crece inquietud en México ante movimientos militares de Estados Unidos. Obtenido de ABC7 Los Angeles: https://abc7.com/post/crece-inquietud-en-mexico-ante-movimientos-militares-de-estados-unidos/18433593/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Canchola Raygoza, D. L. (31 de Octubre de 2025). De AMLO a Sheinbaum: los desafíos que impone el fentanilo a la política exterior. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/sheinbaum-desafios-fentanilo-pol-ext?catid=9&Itemid=101 Carbajal, F. (16 de Enero de 2026). Desafíos actuales de la Seguridad Nacional en México. Obtenido de E Sol de México (OEM): https://oem.com.mx/elsoldemexico/analisis/desafios-actuales-de-la-seguridad-nacional-en-mexico-27693374?ref=consejomexicano.org Carreño Figueras, J. (13 de Enero de 2026). ¿Intervención? Posible, pero no probable II. Obtenido de El Heraldo de México: https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/13/intervencion-posible-pero-no-probable-ii-758570.html?ref=consejomexicano.org Carreño Figueras, J. (16 de Enero de 2026). EU-México: La presión como diplomacia. Obtenido de El Heraldo de México: https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/16/eu-mexico-la-presion-como-diplomacia-759598.html?ref=consejomexicano.org Carreño Figueras, J. (19 de Enero de 2026). EU-México: un momento preocupante. Obtenido de El Heraldo de México: https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/19/eu-mexico-un-momento-preocupante-760093.html?ref=consejomexicano.org Cázares Luquín, V. (12 de Diciembre de 2025). De la defensa a la acción: México y la reinterpretación del principio de no intervención. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/de-la-defensa-a-la-accion-principio-de-no-intervencion?catid=9&Itemid=101 Contreras, A. (21 de Enero de 2026). Avión militar de EUA llega a Toluca. ¿Cooperación o alerta? Obtenido de COMEXI: https://www.consejomexicano.org/avion-militar-de-eua-llega-a-toluca-cooperacion-o-alerta/ Corona, S. (24 de Enero de 2026). Sheinbaum marca límites ante amenazas de Trump sobre acciones contra el narco; "México negocia con EU, pero no se subordina". Obtenido de El Universal: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/sheinbaum-marca-limites-ante-amenazas-de-trump-sobre-acciones-contra-el-narco-mexico-negocia-con-eu-pero-no-se-subordina/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Díaz Santana, A. S. (23 de January de 2026). Intervención militar de EE. UU. en México: la duda ahora es cuándo y cómo se producirá. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/intervencion-militar-de-ee-uu-en-mexico-la-duda-ahora-es-cuando-y-como-se-producira-274088 Drusila Castro, L. (20 de Enero de 2026). México, ante las amenazas de Trump: “Donde pisa el ejército estadounidense no llega la paz”. Obtenido de El Salto: https://www.elsaltodiario.com/estados-unidos/donde-pisa-ejercito-estadounidense-no-llega-paz El Economista. (23 de Enero de 2026). Intervención militar de EU en México: La duda ahora es cuándo y cómo se producirá. Obtenido de yahoo! noticias: https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/intervenci%C3%B3n-militar-eu-m%C3%A9xico-duda-125025443.html Flores Delgado, I. (15 de Junio de 2025). Diplomacia en tiempos de incertidumbre: la política exterior de México frente a la imprevisibilidad del gobierno de Donald Trump. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/diplomacia-tiempos-incertidumbre-pol-ext-mx-imprevisibilidad-trump?catid=9&Itemid=101 France 24. (10 de Enero de 2026). México en la mira de Trump: demócratas alertan de un potencial "desastre" y Sheinbaum llama al diálogo. Obtenido de France 24: https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260110-m%C3%A9xico-en-la-mira-de-trump-dem%C3%B3cratas-alertan-un-potencial-desastre-y-sheinbaum-llama-al-di%C3%A1logo Garrido, V. M. (17 de Enero de 2026). Sheinbaum asegura que hay resultados concretos de seguridad ante la presión del Gobierno de Trump. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/mexico/2026-01-16/sheinbaum-asegura-que-hay-resultados-concretos-de-seguridad-ante-la-presion-del-gobierno-de-trump.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com Gil Olmo, J. (22 de Diciembre de 2025). Corrupción, el talón de Aquiles de Morena. Obtenido de Proceso: https://www.proceso.com.mx/opinion/2025/12/22/corrupcion-el-talon-de-aquiles-de-morena-365063.html Graham, T. (21 de January de 2026). Sheinbaum defends transfer of Mexican cartel members amid efforts to appease Trump. Obtenido de The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/21/sheinbaum-mexican-cartel-trump Gutiérrez Velázquez, M. F. (12 de Noviembre de 2025). Geopolítica global y la política exterior de México: entre dependencia y liderazgo regional. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/entre-dependencia-y-liderazgo-regional?catid=9&Itemid=101 Latinus_us. (26 de Enero de 2026). Mesa de Análisis con Loret: Dresser, Becerra, Silva-Herzog, Córdova y Aguilar Camín. Obtenido de YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tfd5MI3PbaM Macías Salgado, D. (17 de Diciembre de 2025). México entre Estados Unidos y América Latina: liderazgo regional en un sistema internacional complejo. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/mx-liderazgo-regional-en-un-sistema-internacional-complejo?catid=9&Itemid=101 Madhani, A. (5 de May de 2025). Trump blasts Mexico’s Sheinbaum for rejecting offer to send US troops into Mexico to fight cartels. Obtenido de AP: https://apnews.com/article/trump-sheinbaum-mexico-drug-cartels-c2113e74cfc122f8f5a9e162644a470f Noticias DW. (12 de Enero de 2026). EE.UU. y México buscan mayor cooperación contra narcotráfico. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/eeuu-y-m%C3%A9xico-buscan-mayor-cooperaci%C3%B3n-contra-narcotr%C3%A1fico/a-75468890 Olivera Eslava, M. A. (23 de Agosto de 2023). México y Estados Unidos: un frente común contra el Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación. Obtenido de Centro Mexicano de Relaciones Internacionales: https://cemeri.org/art/a-mexico-estados-unidos-cjng-it Pardo, D. (15 de Enero de 2026). "México es el más fuerte y el más débil ante Trump": la encrucijada de Claudia Sheinbaum tras la intervención de EE.UU. en Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/ce3enj4j8g5o Soriano, R. (21 de Enero de 2026). Trump usa las amenazas a México en seguridad para alardear de su poder ante su electorado. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/mexico/2026-01-21/trump-usa-las-amenazas-a-mexico-en-seguridad-para-alardear-de-su-poder-ante-su-electorado.html The New York Times. (15 de January de 2026). The U.S. Is Pressing Mexico to Allow U.S. Forces to Fight Cartels. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/15/world/americas/us-mexico-cartels.html Treader, V. (12 de Enero de 2026). Intervención en México: "Donald Trump está dispuesto a todo". Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/intervenci%C3%B3n-en-m%C3%A9xico-donald-trump-est%C3%A1-dispuesto-a-todo/a-75481087 Wagner, J. (20 de Enero de 2026). México responde a la presión de Trump y envía a 37 delincuentes a EE. UU. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2026/01/20/espanol/america-latina/mexico-envio-37-narco-trump.html

Good afternoon everyone, and thank you again for being here. I am very pleased to have hosted Chancellor Merz and his Ministers in Rome today for this intergovernmental summit between Italy and Germany – the second in just over two years, following the one we held in Berlin in November 2023. Among other things, this summit kicks off a particularly significant year for the bilateral relationship between our nations, with 2026 marking the 75th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin. This summit is also clearly being held at a particularly complex moment in time, which is forcing Europe to choose whether it intends to play a leading role in its own destiny, or have its destiny dictated to it. In our view, this phase requires clarity of mind, responsibility, courage and, above all, the intelligence required to transform crises into opportunities. I am personally convinced that, at this turning point in history, Italy and Germany have a special responsibility, by virtue of their history, influence and leadership. We are two great European nations, founders of the European Union and leading players in international dynamics. We are Europe’s two main manufacturing powers, with strongly interconnected production and industrial systems that are complementary in many ways. However, above all, we both share a common vision on some of the most strategic issues, and are in fact pursuing the same underlying goal: to build an authoritative Europe that is aware of its role in the world and is able to be competitive on the global stage, a Europe capable of strengthening its strategic autonomy with pragmatism, concreteness and common sense. Two years ago, in Berlin, we signed an Action Plan whose objective was to take our bilateral cooperation to a higher level and explore new areas for common growth. That is precisely what we have done over these years and months, as can be seen in the many examples of collaboration we have developed. I am thinking of the agreement on the security of gas supplies; the joint venture between Leonardo and Rheinmetall; the agreement for the integration of ITA Airways into the Lufthansa Group; and I could name many others. With today’s summit, we have decided to continue along this path and keep investing with conviction in our strengthened cooperation by setting ourselves even more ambitious goals. I believe I can now say that Italy and Germany are closer than ever, and I think this is good news, not only for our peoples, but also for Europe as a whole. For if two important nations are friends, allies, and solid from both an economic and an industrial point of view – as Italy and Germany are – and they decide to move in the same direction, with each contributing their own added value, then the conditions are in place to achieve excellent and significant results for our businesses, our workers, our citizens, and their families. Today, we have decided to strengthen our cooperation - cooperation in the truest sense of the word. As I have said before on several occasions: the etymology of words gives us back a picture and the underlying meaning of what we say. ‘Cooperation’ comes from the Latin ‘co-operari’, meaning ‘to work with’. Cooperation never involves an active and a passive role, someone who buys and someone who sells, for example. When there is true cooperation, something new is always born, with each party contributing their own added value. That is precisely what we are doing, and what we have done on this important day by adopting three very significant documents, in addition to the agreements you saw signed and exchanged earlier. The first is a cooperation protocol to expand our areas of collaboration, which updates the bilateral Action Plan we signed in 2023. I am thinking of agriculture, our plans to further strengthen our already solid industrial cooperation, cultural dialogue, and cooperation in the management of migration flows. Migration is one of the crucial challenges for our continent, on which there is full alignment with the German Chancellor. We both think the main challenge lies in defending the European Union’s external borders, fighting human trafficking, and working to ensure respect for legality in strengthening the return system, as well as in cooperating with the nations of origin and of transit, which Italy in particular (but not only Italy) is trying to develop through a new model of cooperation with the African continent. Clearly, our goal is to consolidate the change of approach which, thanks also to our governments, has taken hold and is becoming increasingly well established in Europe. Over the last years, this new approach has enabled us to guarantee a significant reduction in the number of irregular entries, illegal departures and landings. Italy also intends to pursue this commitment through innovative solutions, starting with the protocol with Albania we have been promoting. I want to tell Chancellor Merz that I am grateful for his decision to regularly participate in the informal working group of like-minded countries, which meets in the margins of European Council meetings to discuss precisely the issue of migration. The other very important matter on which Chancellor Merz and I agree is the need for a decisive step change in Europe regarding the competitiveness of our companies. It is now evident and clear to anyone with intellectual honesty that a certain ideological view of the green transition has ended up bringing our industries to their knees, giving Europe new and dangerous strategic dependencies, and without even managing to have a real impact in terms of protecting the environment and nature globally. We are convinced there is room to correct these mistakes and avoid our continent’s industrial decline, but, of course, courage is required. We want to accelerate on these issues, which is why we will be presenting our joint non-paper at the next informal meeting in Brussels on 12 February, where discussions will begin regarding the next European Council meeting in March - of particular importance precisely for matters regarding competitiveness. This joint non-paper is focused on a number of priorities which, in our view, cannot be postponed: simplifying and cutting EU red tape; strengthening the single market; relaunching the automotive industry based on technological neutrality; ensuring an ambitious trade policy based on shared rules and a level playing field. This is the second document we signed today, and it is a document which I consider to be very significant and which we intend to share with the European Commission and the President of the European Council as well as with all the other leaders who will be participating in these discussions. The third document we signed this morning on defence, security and resilience is equally as important. These are sectors in which Italy and Germany can count on industrial players of absolute excellence, which generate incredibly high added value. We want to strengthen our cooperation in this area, and we believe our production systems can make a significant contribution to building a solid European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, which for many years we have been calling for without ever really making any progress, and to act accordingly. To this end, I have informed Chancellor Merz of Italy’s decision to join the multilateral agreement on arms exports, which is already in place between Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. This is the reason why we held an important 2+2 meeting this morning between our Foreign and Defence Ministers, in order to coordinate our positions and also work even more closely together on the main international issues, starting with Ukraine and the Middle East. We have always been strongly aligned on both of these fronts too, and we will continue to do our part to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and to build a stable framework for security and prosperity in the Middle East. This morning, we also discussed how to enhance our cooperation in many other areas. I am thinking of energy interconnections and economic and infrastructure interconnections, which are increasingly crucial in this era. We are working together to support strategic initiatives that are in line with this goal, for example: the SoutH2 Corridor; Medlink; Elmed; and the IMEC, which is the corridor that will connect India, the Middle East and Europe, and in relation to which Italy and Germany are playing a key role in Europe. The work we have done, and have still yet to do, is very extensive. Today, Italy and Germany are not only confirming their partnership but are also deciding to strengthen it at all levels, by working side by side on challenges that are crucial for our time. I’ve read a number of comments over the last few hours, with some observers saying that 2026 will be “the year of Italy and Germany”. I can’t say whether this prediction corresponds to reality, but what I can say is that we intend to give it our all; we absolutely intend to do our part in order to consolidate a friendship that is strategic not only for our nations, but for Europe as a whole. Thank you again.

There is a major sticking point often overlooked in the ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia currently being held in Abu Dhabi. This relates to the fact that, as part of any agreement, Kyiv is being asked to give up the entire Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. If it does so, it will also be giving up the strategic positions that have prevented major advances by the Russian military for many months now. This is the significant line of defensive fortifications across the Donbas, known as the “Donbas line”. It’s Ukraine’s equivalent to the Maginot line of forts which were France’s main line of defence against Germany before the second world war. The “Anchorage formula” agreed by the US president, Donald Trump, and Russia president, Vladimir Putin, in Alaska late last year calls for Ukrainian forces to abandon the areas of western Donbas they currently hold. Washington is now talking up the idea of establishing a “free economic zone” or “de-militarised zone” which would cover the whole of the Donbas, including those portions currently occupied by Russian forces. This would mean Ukraine abandoning the Donbas line. The system integrates at least seven distinct defensive layers that any attacking force must penetrate sequentially to achieve effect. These include minefields, anti-tank ditches, anti-tank obstacles (“dragons’ teeth”), bunkers, trench lines and anti-drone defences. Such obstacles can either physically halt assaulting Russian forces or “canalise” them into swampy or otherwise impassible ground or into pre-arranged kill zones, wherein fires (mortar and artillery) can be used to destroy Russian formations. One of the most critical lines runs through the embattled town of Pokrovsk, which has been under constant Russian assault since early 2025. Lose Pokrovsk and the Ukrainians will then more than likely also lose the important city of Donetsk. Thus, Pokrovsk has been referred to as the “gateway to Donetsk”. The Donbas line took years to build and to perfect. It is very sophisticated. It would be a massive strategic blow for the Ukrainians if they were forced to give it up and pull back. In essence, the Russian demand that Ukrainian forces vacate the western Donbas can also be seen as a demand that they likewise give up, in the shape of this Donbas line, their one true means of protecting not only the western Donbas but also, arguably, the whole of the rest of Ukraine. Who can be trusted? If Kyiv were to accede to Russian demands and abandon the Donbas line, then this would only help bring about a lasting peace if, of course, trust could be placed in the Russians to keep their side of the bargain. They would need to cease all their assaults across Ukraine and themselves “de-militarise” the area of the eastern Donbas they currently control. But Putin has a history of reneging on deals. Anything agreed now by Kyiv in Abu Dhabi is likely, as respected Washington-based thinktank the Institute for the Study of War points out, to suffer the same fate. This seems to certainly be the view of many on the Ukrainian side. As Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, himself recently put it, “I don’t trust Putin”. He has good reason for doubting the Russian president’s bona fides. Russia was a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum alongside the US, UK and France by which those powers provided assurances for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Kyiv giving up its arsenal of nuclear weapons. This didn’t stop Russia invading. Nor did the two Minsk accords in 2014 and 2015 which aimed to stop the fighting between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military in the Donbas region. In the event of any peace deal being struck between Moscow and Kyiv, Ukraine’s western allies have offered what they are calling “robust security guarantees”. These would be provided by a “coalition of the willing” made up of more than 30 countries, mainly from within Europe. What’s on the table In terms of what these promises might actually mean, there is a proposal for a three-tier mechanism. A Russian breach of the ceasefire would initially trigger a diplomatic warning, as well as allowing Ukraine to respond militarily. The second tier would be provided by the coalition of the willing, primarily the UK and France, which plan to send troops to Ukraine as part of the deal, but also many EU members plus Norway, Iceland and Turkey. The third tier would be a military response from the US. But it’s been reported that the US has made its participation in any security guarantees contingent on the agreement of a ceasefire deal which gives Russia control of the “entire Donbas region in eastern Ukraine”. A further issue here is that Moscow is unlikely to agree to the presence of any Nato troops as official security guarantors. Moscow has said as much, insisting that any foreign troops in Ukraine would be a “legitimate target”. Would western governments forces really commit their troops into a situation where they might become targets – leading perhaps to a wider war? The whole idea of Ukraine abandoning its Donbas line is fraught with difficulties. For this is not just a question of Ukraine trading land for peace. It is more fundamentally a question of trading land and significant defensive lines for the promise of peace. The original version of the Maginot line did not save France in 1940. It was bypassed by German forces moving through Belgium to outflank the Maginot fortifications. The danger for Ukraine is that its own Maginot line could itself be bypassed if it accedes to Russian demands at the negotiating table in Abu Dhabi. Can Zelensky really give up the Donbas line that is protecting his entire country, and can he really rely on security guarantees from western states that may yet prove equivocal? As one Ukrainian official told Reuters recently, to give up remaining positions in the Donbas region would be “suicide”.

I. Introduction The European economy is in big trouble. Szu Ping Chan and Hans van Leeuwen, the economics editors of the Telegraph, a British daily newspaper, claim that the European Continent is stuck on a path of disastrous decline. [1] As Figure 1 shows, EU share of world GDP has continued to decline from 27% in 1990 to 17% in 2024.  Figure 1: EU share of World GDP (source: IMF) As a result, EU’s GDP in 2000 was six times larger than Chinese GDP, but EU’s GDP in 2025 is expected to reach the similar level of China’s GDP as Figure 2 shows. EU’s GDP in 2000 was $3 trillion smaller than US GDP, but EU’s GDP in 2025 is expected to be over $ 10 trillion smaller than US GDP.  Figure 2: EU, US, China, Japan GDP, 2000 & 2025 (source: Alcott Global) Moreover, the Ukraine war in 2022 brought more uncertainty to Europe by creating energy problems for the European economy. Europe’s reliance on external energy sources has been a long-standing issue. The energy crisis that began in 2021, fueled by the Ukraine war and climate change, has exposed how fragile the region’s energy infrastructure remains. Skyrocketing LNG prices, unreliable renewable energy production, and Russia’s strategic use of fossil fuels as leverage have left the European continent struggling with record-high energy costs. With this information in background, this paper explores why the European economy has under-performed and fallen behind. This paper first describes the current economic situation of Europe and explains why the European economy has failed. II. The Current Situation of European Economy Europe may be a great place to live with free health care, generous welfare, and great cities. However, when we compare the economy of three major economies, the US, Europe, and China, it is obvious that the European economy is in big trouble. Europe is being squeezed by the US and China. As Figure 3 shows, economic growth has been anemic across Europe. Germany has been its worst performer in recent years. The German economy is the same size today as it was in the fourth quarter of 2019. In other words, it has had five years of lost growth. But the rest of Europe has not fared much better. The French economy is only 4.1% larger than it was in the final quarter of 2019, while Italy’s economy is 5.6% bigger. (See Figure 3.) And while Spain’s GDP has increased by 6.6% since then, this has been helped greatly by an influx of immigration that meant that GDP per capita has increased by only 2.9% over the same period. By contrast, the US economy has grown by 11.4%.  Figure 3: Real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100) (Source: LSEG, Capital Economics) As Figure 4 shows, over the period 2020-2024, the EU’s total GDP growth was 12.2% compared to 23.4% for China, 15% for the US.  Figure 4: Growth, EU, US, China, and Japan, 2020-2024 As Figure 5 shows, the EU grew only 1.1% in 2024 compared to 2.8% for the US and 5.0% for China. Figure 5: GDP growth, EU, US, China, and Japan, 2024 Moreover, when we compare the economies of two Western rivals, the US and Europe, it is obvious that the EU has grown slower than the US, as Figure 6 shows.  Figure 6: US grow faster than EU countries, 2010-2024 (source: World Bank) As Figure 7 shows, Europe’s unemployment has been higher than the US.  Figure 7: EU unemployment is higher than US, 2000-2024 As Figure 8 shows, Europe’s LNG price has been higher than US price during the 2020-2024, and higher than Asian price immediately after Russia invaded Ukraine, thereby burdening the European economy.  Figure 8: LNG price, EU, US, Asia, January 2000-January 2024 Furthermore, when it comes to new engines of growth – big tech, AI, electric cars, Europe has slipped behind both the US and China. Europe is being squeezed by cheaper imports in China and better tech in America. III. Causes of the Failure of European Economy Why has the European economy failed? According to Neil Shearing, a chief economist of Capital Economics, Europe’s under-performance has been due in part to the effects of the energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as Figure 9 shows Europe’s skyrocketing gas prices. [2]  Figure 9: Natural gas prices, Europe, US, Japan, January 2021- end 2024 In addition, as Figure 10 shows, energy prices in the Euro area reached an all time high of 171.75 points in October of 2022 following the Ukraine war. It decreased to 145.49 points in November 2025, but it is still too high.  Figure 10: Energy price, Euro zone (source: Eurostat) As Table 1 shows, dependence on energy imports has shown divergent trends since 2000: The US has dramatically reduced its reliance on energy imports and become a net exporter, while the European Union has maintained a high level of energy dependence, and China’s dependence has generally increased along with its enormous economic growth. The US has undergone a remarkable transformation. Around 2005, US crude oil imports reached a peak at about 60% of their consumption. Thanks to the shale revolution and growing renewable energy use, US domestic production soared, and the US became a net energy exporter in 2019. By 2024, US energy imports made up only 17% of its energy demand. China’s rapid economic growth has driven a massive increase in energy demand. As a result, its dependence on energy imports has increased significantly since 2000. China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil. While China is also the leading investor in renewable energy, which meets a portion of its growing energy demand, the absolute need for fossil fuel imports to power its industrial sector remains high. In 2024, energy imports met around 25% of their total energy demand. Table 1: Dependence on Energy Imports, 2000–2025 As Figure 11 shows, the EU consistently shows high dependence on energy imports over the last three decades during the 1993-2024 period. The EU’s dependence on oil and gas imports have been much higher than the US and China. EU’s dependence on oil imports was over 90%, while EU’s gas import dependence reached over 90% in 2023 following the Ukraine war. While the EU has made progress in renewable energy, it remains heavily reliant on oil and gas imports, and has recently shifted its import sources from Russia to other partners such as the US and Norway. This high dependence on energy imports and energy crisis in Europe following the Ukraine war led to a deterioration in the region’s terms of trade that manifested itself in a large squeeze in real incomes and loss of competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, thereby lowering economic growth in Europe.  Figure 11: Dependence on energy imports, EU, US, and China, 1993-2024 In addition, European households have also become more reluctant to spend, thereby leading Europe to lower growth. The household saving rate in Europe is now three percentage points higher than it was before the Covid-19 pandemic in 2019, while the savings rate in the US is now lower than it was in 2019. (See Figure 12.) The tendency of Europeans to spend less leads to lower growth in Europe.  Figure 12: Euro-zone household savings rate (% of disposable income) However, the weakness of the European economy is fundamentally structural. There are several elements to this. The first key issue related to low growth in Europe is regulation in Europe that stifles competition and innovation. The EU has become increasingly protectionist, mainly through regulation. While convenient, this strategy proves counterproductive. It eliminates the incentives for creativity and efficiency. The Digital Services Act and increasingly narrow interpretations of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) were intended to rein in US tech giants, but have instead held Europe back in these same sectors. The AI Act and supply chain laws are similarly damaging. It is perhaps no surprise that the major disruptive and innovative firms of the past two decades have come from the US and China rather than from the Euro-zone countries. Robot taxis are a good example. One in three taxi rides in California is already in a robot taxi. The growth has been exponential and they are set to overtake ordinary taxis. The market opportunity is huge; they will be cheaper than paying a driver. In Texas, Tesla charges just a dollar a mile. They are safer too – 90% fewer accidents. And that means cheaper car insurance. They will save income, decrease emissions and reduce the need to buy an expensive car. It’s not just America; 2,000 self-driving cars have already been transporting millions across the big cities in China. But, for Europeans, the idea of a self-driving car, is still the stuff of science fiction. Or more accurately, something blocked by the European love of regulation, risk-aversion, and a powerful car lobby still stuck in the combustion engine era. [3] Another example is the tech industry. Europe is hampered by fragmented and excessive regulation. A US start-up can launch a product under a single regulatory framework and immediately access a market of more than 330 million consumers. The EU has a population of about 450 million but remains divided among 27 national regulatory regimes. An IMF analysis shows that internal market barriers in the EU act like a tariff of around 44% for goods and 110% for services – far higher than the tariff levels that the US imposes on most imports. [4] True, Europe has some successes such as Revolut, Klarna and Spotify, but these are dwarfed by the US giants of Meta, Google, Microsoft and Apple. Today, approximately half of the world’s 50 largest technology firms are American, while only four are European companies. [5] Over the past five decades, 241 US firms have grown from start-ups into massive unicorn companies. The EU’s response has been to seek to regulate the murky world of big tech surveillance, but in a way, the sledgehammer of GDPR regulation has done more to increase costs for local European business and tech startups as Figure 13 shows. While California alone has produced a quarter of the world’s tech unicorns, Germany-a similarly sized economy-has produced just 2% of high-value start-ups. Without urgent reform, Europe risks being sidelined in the global technological race.  Figure 13: GDPR regulation and EU & US Venture capital There is an old saying: the US invents, China imitates, and Europe regulates. Harsh, but an element of truth. Though the big change is that China no longer imitates, but produces goods much cheaper than in Europe. But Europe is still stuck in a regulatory mind-set. The result is that productivity growth in Europe - which is the key determinant of economic growth over the long run - is substantially lower, averaging 0.3% a year over the past decade compared to 1.6% a year in the US. The second issue is Europe’s insufficient investment in new technologies (computers, artificial intelligence (AI), software, etc.) and the low level of spending on research and development (R&D). When we compare OECD countries, we see that these two components have a strong influence on productivity differences between countries. The econometric estimate leads to the following effects: a 1- point increase in the rate of investment in new technologies leads to a 0.8 point increase per year in productivity gains. In a similar way, a 1-point increase in GDP for research and development (R&D) expenditure leads to a 0.9 point increase per year in productivity gains. [6] The fear is that Europe will be drawn into a vicious circle By 2022, investment in new technologies represented 5% of GDP in the US and 2.8% of GDP in the Euro zone. The EU’s efforts in advanced technologies, such as AI and cloud computing, far from match those of the US. The main instrument available to the EU, the European Innovation Council, had a budget of 256 million euros in 2024, while the US allocated more than 6 billion dollars for this purpose. The situation is repeated when looking at venture capital investment. In 2023, they invested about $8 billion in venture capital in AI in the EU, compared to $68 billion in the US and $15 billion in China. The few companies that create generative AI models in Europe, such as Aleph Alpha and Mistral, need large investments to avoid losing the race to US firms. However, European markets do not meet this need, pushing European firms to look outside for funding. [7] As a result, for example, the EU has been losing the open model contest as Figure 14 shows.  Figure 14: Cumulative downloads, 2023-25 (source: ATOM project, Hugging Face) Moreover, the EU falls behind the US and China in terms of R&D spending. R&D spending in 2022 amounted to 3.5% of GDP in the US and 2.3% of GDP in the Euro zone. What’s more, from 2007 on, as Figure 15 shows, R&D spending in the US and China increased significantly compared to that of the Euro zone. The lag in technological investment and R&D explains a large part of Europe’s lag behind the US in terms of labor productivity and GDP. [8]  Figure 15: Gross domestic spending on R&D, 2007-2023 The third issue related to lower growth in Europe is the size of welfare states in Europe. The size of welfare states differs markedly across OECD countries. European countries have the largest welfare states in the OECD and among the highest in the World. As Figure 16 shows, European welfare states are significantly larger than in the US, with EU countries allocating approximately 27% of GDP to social benefits in 2024, compared to roughly 19.8% in the US. Some European countries like Austria, Finland, and France spend over 30% of GDP on social benefits in 2024. While the US spends 7% of GDP on public provision of pensions, it is 16% in Italy and it is 13% in France.  Figure 16: Public social spending as a % of GDP in 2024, EU countries & US Big welfare states have a complex, debated impact on economic growth, with evidence showing they can both impede growth through higher taxes and reduced work incentives, or foster it by boosting education, stability, and innovation. However, there has recently been a groundswell of opinion among economists that the scale of the welfare state is one of the elements responsible for slower economic growth and that a retrenchment in the welfare state is necessary if growth will be revived in Europe. The welfare state is indicted with the charge of becoming a barrier to economic growth in Europe through higher taxes and reduced work incentives. As Figure 17 shows, the tax burden is higher in the EU than in the US for most taxpayers. The overall tax-to-GDP ratio for the EU averages approximately 44%. By contrast, the US ranks as one of the lowest among developed countries, with a tax-to-GDP ratio 35% in 2022 approximately 9% lower than the EU average.  Figure 17: Tax burden, EU and US, 2022 (source: OECD Government at a glance, 2023) Figure 18 shows the total tax wedge for average single workers in each member country of EU. Belgium, Germany, Austria, and France confiscate more than half of their workers’ pre-tax compensation. Compared to the EU member countries, workers in the US face the lowest average tax wedge. This distorts work incentives for Europeans and renders everyone in Europe poorer. [9] High taxes and less work incentives make EU citizens spend less than US citizens, thereby lowering economic growth in Europe as Figure 19 shows.  Figure 18: EU workers pay more taxes than US workers, 2022 (source: OECD Government at a glance, 2023)  Figure 19: Americans spend 70% more on EU citizens (Average individual consumption per capita, 2020; United States indexed to 100). (source: National Accounts of OECD countries) In fact, Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (1998) showed empirically that as the size of general government spending has almost doubled on average in OECD countries from 1960 to 1996, their real GDP growth rates have dropped by almost two thirds on average (see Figure 20). According to them, the worst economic performers were some Southern European countries that increased the size of the government the most.  Figure 20: Big government spending reduces growth. At the height of the Euro-zone crisis in 2012, German Chancellor Angela Merkel tried to make the case that Europe’s welfare states were too large, as Europe accounted for 7% of the global population, for a quarter of global GDP and for 50% of global social spending. The situation has not improved since then. On September 9, 2024, Draghi presented his report “The Future of European Competitiveness,” a 400-page document, to deal with Europe’s sluggish economy, but he kept untouched Europe’s over-sized welfare state, while he strongly called for reforms and investments to reinforce productivity growth. [10] The fourth issue is the Euro. The Euro has been a mixed blessing for Europe. It lowers transaction costs but highlights an unbalanced EU economy. Germany runs a large current account surplus, fringe economies like Portugal and Greece running deficits. But there is no scope for Germany to appreciate, weaker countries to devalue. One size fits all. But, this can have disastrous effects. The Euro Debt Crisis of 2012, led to high bond yields and a response of austerity, which contributed to weak growth in the last decade. Mario Draghi’s intervention reduced bond yields, but the European Central Bank has been criticized for a deflationary bias, and it has certainly struggled since the Covid-19 era, with growth in Europe much less. IV. Conclusion This paper showed that the European economy is in big trouble with lower growth. This paper explained that Europe’s economic under-performance & sluggish economy can be attributed to energy crisis and high saving, as well as over-regulation, large size of welfare state & high taxation, and lack of innovation & low investment in new technology and R&D. Referencias [1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/12/14/rising-fear–europe-really-is-doomed-and -taking-britain-down/ [2] https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/its-not-just-france-europe–faces-ongoing-decline- without-fundamental-reform-its-core [3] https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/its-not-just-france-europe–faces-ongoing-decline- without-fundamental-reform-its-core [4] https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-most-serious-problem-not-immigra tion-but-technological-backwardness-by-nouriel-roubini-2025-12 [5] https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-most-serious-problem-not-immigra tion-but-technological-backwardness-by-nouriel-roubini-2025-12 [6] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-falllling-behind-the-usa/ [7] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-fall ing-behind-the-usa/ [8] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-fall ing-behind-the-usa/ [9] https://mises.org/mises-wire/europes-economy-slows-its-welfare-state-grows [10] https://www.csis.org/analysis/draghi-report-strategy-reform-european-economic-model

Western countries are facing a critical inflection point in immigration governance, where outdated policy frameworks have struggled to balance humanitarian obligations, labor market needs, and social cohesion. Rising irregular migration, overstretched asylum systems, political polarization, and fragmented border management have collectively contributed to a perception of disorder rather than opportunity. Yet immigration, when governed strategically, remains a powerful driver of economic growth, demographic renewal, and innovation. A new immigration policy for the West must therefore move beyond reactive control and crisis management toward a coherent, development-oriented framework that is predictable, fair, and enforceable. By aligning migration pathways with labor demand, strengthening legal entry channels, restoring credibility to asylum systems, and embedding integration as a core policy objective, Western states can transform immigration from a source of chaos into a catalyst for sustainable development and social stability. Below, we will discuss different aspects of this New Immigration Policy. Policy of Each Western Country to do a complete Evaluation of its Economy A key aspect of the new immigration policy requires Western countries to conduct thorough, evidence-based evaluations of their economies, analyzing beyond fundamental indicators like GDP and unemployment. This includes examining sector-specific dynamics, productivity gaps, and labor needs in industries that rely heavily on labor mobility, such as healthcare and agriculture. The goal is to establish data-driven workforce strategies that fulfill actual economic demands, enhancing domestic labor utilization through education and training. Immigration is to complement, not replace, local workforce development. Only after optimizing domestic labor should countries assess immigrant labor needs, creating targeted and regulated immigration pathways to address specific labor shortages. This method links immigration to economic necessity, promoting business growth and public service sustainability while fostering long-term financial stability. Most Western immigration systems employ pre-entry screening mechanisms to manage security risks and improve labor market matching, though their scope and rigor vary significantly. Points-based systems in countries such as Australia and Canada illustrate how education, language proficiency, and occupational demand can be systematically incorporated into selection decisions. At the same time, overly rigid credential recognition frameworks have been shown to underutilize the skills of migrants, particularly in regulated professions. Security screening and health assessments similarly reflect a balance between risk prevention and administrative proportionality. Analytical evidence suggests that pre-entry screening is most effective in contributing to integration outcomes when it is transparent, interoperable across agencies, and complemented by post-arrival credential bridging and skills recognition. Screening, therefore, functions less as a gatekeeping tool than as an anticipatory governance mechanism that shapes downstream integration trajectories. Policy of doing complete thorough checks on Immigrants before coming Another core element of the new immigration policy is the implementation of a standardized pre-entry screening framework across Western countries. This framework includes comprehensive background checks, such as international criminal record verification, biometric identity authentication, and strict validation of educational and professional credentials to prevent fraud. Degree verification should occur directly with accredited institutions, while professional licenses need recognition by certified regulatory bodies. These measures aim to enhance national security, protect labor markets, and maintain the integrity of skilled migration systems. The policy also sets clear entry readiness standards centered on integration capacity and public welfare. This encompasses mandatory language proficiency benchmarks relevant to workplace and civic participation, comprehensive health screenings to safeguard public health, and assessments of employability and sectoral fit. Health evaluations focus on prevention and readiness, ensuring transparency regarding healthcare access upon arrival. Additional factors, such as verification of financial self-sufficiency and orientation training on laws and social norms, are suggested to minimize integration risks. By adopting thorough, fair, and transparent pre-arrival checks, Western nations can transition their immigration governance from a reactive stance to proactive planning, ensuring newcomers are equipped to contribute to economic growth and social stability from the outset. Comparative experience suggests that policy effectiveness depends less on the severity of stated rules than on the consistency and credibility of their implementation. For example, Australia’s offshore processing and maritime interception policies significantly reduced unauthorized arrivals, but also generated sustained legal and ethical debate regarding human rights compliance. In contrast, several European Union states have combined stricter border controls with expanded legal entry pathways, producing mixed outcomes where enforcement gaps continue to incentivize irregular entry. These cases indicate that the deterrence of irregular migration is most effective when enforcement is predictable, legally bounded, and accompanied by accessible lawful alternatives. From an analytical perspective, the key policy trade-off lies between institutional legitimacy and deterrence: overly permissive systems risk erosion of rule compliance. At the same time, excessively rigid approaches may provoke legal contestation and humanitarian backlash. Effective governance, therefore, requires calibrated enforcement embedded within a coherent legal framework for migration, rather than categorical prohibition alone. Policy of doing complete, thorough checks on Immigrants before coming A new immigration framework introduces a structured rotation-based labor migration system, allowing immigrants to be admitted on defined, time-bound contracts of typically one to two years based on prior economic assessments linked to specific sectors and employers. At the end of these contracts, migrants are expected to return to their countries, ensuring a controlled flow of labor that mitigates long-term settlement pressures and public service burdens. This system promotes fairness by broadening access to work opportunities, enabling more individuals to participate in legal labor migration, provided they meet eligibility criteria. To incentivize productivity and integration, the policy includes a performance-based extension mechanism, allowing immigrants with exceptional work performance, language acquisition, and favorable evaluations to qualify for contract renewals or longer-term status. This balanced approach reinforces immigration as a regulated, development-oriented partnership, offering opportunities without defaulting to permanence, thus alleviating concerns about demographic shifts in host societies. Temporary and rotational labor migration schemes have been widely adopted to address sector-specific labor shortages while limiting permanent settlement pressures. Programs such as Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s contract-based labor systems illustrate both the advantages and risks of rotation models. On one hand, time-bound contracts offer employers flexibility and allow governments to regulate inflow volumes with greater precision. On the other hand, weak labor protections and limited mobility rights have, in some cases, produced worker exploitation and reduced productivity. Comparative evidence suggests that rotation systems are most effective when combined with enforceable labor standards, transparent renewal criteria, and return incentives linked to skills transfer or development benefits in the countries of origin. Thus, rotational migration should be understood not as a control mechanism alone, but as a policy instrument whose outcomes depend on regulatory design and bilateral cooperation. Policy of No Free Welfare or No Free Money for Immigrants, Refugees, or Asylum seekers Another key aspect of the proposed immigration framework is the separation between labor migration and welfare entitlement. This policy enforces a “no free welfare, no free money” principle for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers during their initial stay, aiming to prevent welfare dependency and protect public systems. Welfare systems are intended as safety nets for citizens and long-term contributors; giving unrestricted access to newcomers could jeopardize their sustainability. The focus is on self-reliance through work, with immigrants admitted based on their employability and the labor market's demands. Limited conditional support may be provided to avert humanitarian crises, but not as a substitute for employment. For refugees and asylum seekers, prompt access to work is prioritized to reduce long-term dependence and restore dignity. Eligibility for broader social benefits may eventually be linked to stable employment and tax contributions. This approach aims to reframe immigration as a system based on effort and contribution, thereby enhancing social cohesion while safeguarding public resources. Access to welfare benefits for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers remains one of the most politically sensitive dimensions of immigration governance. Empirical evidence from countries such as Germany and Sweden suggests that early access to social assistance can help stabilize newcomers during their initial settlement. Still, it may also delay labor market integration if not accompanied by strong activation policies. Conversely, systems in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom are increasingly conditioning access to benefits on factors like employment participation, language acquisition, or residency duration. These models suggest that welfare design functions as a policy signal, shaping incentives for self-reliance and integration. Rather than adopting unconditional inclusion or total exclusion, comparative analysis indicates that welfare regimes should be conditional, striking a balance between humanitarian protection and fiscal responsibility. The analytical challenge lies in designing thresholds that prevent long-term dependency without undermining social cohesion or violating international protection norms. Policy of a Complete ban on illegal migration A strict commitment to the rule of law characterizes the proposed immigration framework, which enforces a ban on illegal entry and unlawful presence. Western countries would reject immigration and asylum claims resulting from immigration law violations, such as unauthorized border crossings and document fraud. This policy aims to uphold institutional credibility, as tolerance of illegality at entry undermines compliance and public trust. Furthermore, unchecked illegal migration is linked to transnational crime, with organized networks exploiting irregular routes for human trafficking, drug smuggling, forced labor, and more. A zero-tolerance approach towards illegal entry, coupled with robust enforcement and deportation, seeks to disrupt these criminal activities and prevent the exploitation of vulnerable populations. The policy requires swift removal procedures for individuals entering or remaining in the country illegally, ensuring that deportations observe due process and human rights standards while preventing procedural loopholes. Legal migration and asylum pathways are maintained and must be accessed lawfully, thereby reinforcing that opportunities are tied to compliance with the law. This ensures that order is restored, security is enhanced, and humanitarian provisions are protected for law-abiding individuals. Policy of a Complete ban on Ads or the use of Western women to entice people for Immigration The new immigration framework incorporates a complete ban on misleading advertising practices that exploit the objectification of Western women to attract migrants from developing nations. Such advertisements, often propagated via social media and unregulated agencies, misrepresent realities and take advantage of gender stereotypes, promoting social or romantic opportunities as migration pathways. These practices distort the fundamental purpose of immigration, which should be focused on lawful work, skills, or protection, while undermining women's dignity by treating them as marketing tools. The policy addresses the disproportionate targeting of uneducated, unemployed, and economically vulnerable populations, leading to false expectations and irregular migration attempts. Furthermore, these deceptive campaigns often involve fraudulent intermediaries, resulting in financial losses, legal risks for migrants, and inflows that do not align with labor market needs. To combat this issue, Western countries should establish specialized cyber-monitoring units to dismantle and prosecute deceptive practices, collaborating with digital platforms and regulators to eliminate illicit content and enforce penalties. Legal prohibitions against gender manipulation in migration advertising must be implemented to ensure that migration decisions are made in a manner that is legal, informed, and respectful of women’s dignity. Additionally, while Western nations often depend on migration to address declining fertility rates, studies suggest it is not a long-term solution for stabilizing dependency ratios. Countries like France and Hungary demonstrate that demographic sustainability is closely tied to labor market conditions, gender equality, and family policies, rather than relying solely on financial incentives. Immigration and demographic policies should be viewed as complementary, with a focus on balanced investments in family policy to mitigate migration pressures and foster social cohesion. Policy of exceptional facilities and rewards for Western women who become new mothers A new demographic and development strategy aims to incentivize Western women to have children in response to declining birth rates, aging populations, and shrinking workforces. Instead of relying solely on immigration, which has been the common compensatory mechanism, this policy reframes motherhood as a public good and essential for national sustainability. Women who give birth would benefit from a range of financial incentives, including income tax reductions, property tax waivers, preferential mortgage rates, and enhanced childcare and healthcare support. These measures aim to alleviate financial pressures that discourage childbearing. The policy emphasizes a cumulative support system were increased family size leads to greater long-term assistance, creating transparent incentives for family formation without pressure. This shift aims to reduce economic penalties associated with pregnancy and child-rearing, thus empowering women in their family decisions. Unlike short-term monetary bonuses, the sustained fiscal relief reflects a long-term commitment from the state, providing stability during challenging years of child-rearing. By focusing on boosting native birth rates, the policy also challenges the justification for mass immigration, advocating for a sustainable demographic policy that lessens dependency on foreign labor. Ultimately, this approach aims to harmonize labor supply with cultural continuity and fiscal sustainability, positioning immigration as a selective tool rather than a primary solution to demographic challenges. Several Western countries implicitly rely on immigration to offset declining fertility and population aging, yet comparative demographic research suggests that migration alone cannot fully stabilize dependency ratios in the long term. Countries such as France and Hungary have experimented with pro-natalist policies, offering fiscal incentives and childcare support to encourage family formation, with uneven but instructive results. Hungary represents a more explicitly pro-natalist budgetary model. The government has introduced lifetime income tax exemptions for women who have four or more children, subsidized housing loans for families, and preferential mortgage schemes for new parents. These cases demonstrate that demographic sustainability is influenced by labor market conditions, gender equality, housing affordability, and work–life balance, rather than financial incentives alone. From a policy framework perspective, immigration and demographic policy should be treated as complementary instruments rather than substitutes. Overreliance on continuous labor inflows may defer structural reforms, while balanced investment in family policy can moderate long-term migration pressures and enhance social cohesion. Policy of Citizenship Restriction and Long-Term Residency without Naturalization Some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, have adopted an immigration governance model that clearly differentiates between long-term residency and citizenship. This model grants renewable residence visas to foreign nationals while hindering access to birthright citizenship or naturalization, treating citizenship as a privilege linked to lineage and national identity. By doing so, these nations manage demographic control, depend on foreign labor for economic growth, and strengthen state authority over demographics and welfare, while lessening long-term fiscal obligations associated with pensions and social security. Thus, migration remains temporary, creating a significant divide between citizens and non-citizens. Although the model offers administrative clarity, it faces challenges such as limited rights for residents, restricted social integration, and reliance on employer-sponsored visas. GCC countries impose strict immigration regulations, contrasting with Western democracies that prioritize equality and human rights. In these Western contexts, conversations around birthright citizenship and naturalization are evolving, with some nations opting for conditional citizenship that requires stricter residency criteria while still permitting a naturalization process. This analysis highlights the diversity in policy approaches, ranging from permanent residency without automatic citizenship to merit-based naturalization. While the GCC's system focuses on demographic control rather than political inclusion, it serves as a valuable case study for Western nations examining migration management and its implications for nation-building. Recognizing the complex interactions between citizenship and residency is essential, as it transforms these concepts from automatic rights to strategically managed political assets. Policy of Privatizing Religion and Restricting Public Religious Expression Policies aimed at privatizing religion attempt to limit religious belief and practice to private settings while prohibiting public expressions such as symbols, prayers, or proselytization. Advocates argue this fosters civic neutrality and diminishes religious conflict in diverse societies. However, it raises significant legal and normative issues, particularly concerning international human rights, with Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights underlining the necessity of allowing public religious manifestations. Evidence suggests that broad prohibitions on religious expression may be counterproductive, as seen in judicial cases like S.A.S. v. France, emphasizing proportionality in legal restrictions. Experiences from France and Quebec show that secular governance can respect visible religious expressions without harming societal unity. Research indicates that strict state-imposed religious limitations may lead to social tensions instead of harmony. While proponents highlight the benefits of administrative simplicity and equality, excessive restrictions risk undermining individual freedoms and alienating minority religions, pushing expressions underground and possibly increasing conflict. Policies that anonymize religious identity to prevent political exploitation may also infringe on freedom of expression and personal identity. As such, privatization strategies must navigate a careful balance of equality, liberty, and social cohesion to avoid undermining the very stability and inclusiveness they aim to promote. Strategic Risks with Final Remarks Strategic immigration frameworks offer potential economic and social benefits but also pose significant risks that require proactive management. Key risks include institutional overreach due to inadequate administrative capacity, which may be mitigated through phased implementation and investment in digital infrastructure. Labor market distortions can arise from dependency on migrant labor, necessitating integration with broader labor reforms. Social polarization and political backlash may emerge from perceived exclusionary policies, which can be addressed via transparent communication and participatory design. Human rights concerns related to stricter enforcement require adherence to legal safeguards in policy development. Lastly, external spillovers affecting countries of origin highlight the need for equitable development-linked migration agreements. Overall, careful consideration of these risks and corresponding mitigation strategies is essential for effective immigration policy reform. In summary, the proposed new immigration policy for Western countries reframes migration as a disciplined, development-oriented system grounded in legality, economic realism, and social sustainability. By aligning immigration with verified labor needs, enforcing strict entry and conduct standards, eliminating welfare dependency, rejecting illegality and exploitation, and simultaneously investing in domestic demographic renewal, governments can restore public trust and policy coherence. Immigration is neither dismissed nor romanticized; it is regulated as a strategic instrument rather than a substitute for weak governance or demographic inaction. Implemented cohesively, this framework offers a credible pathway to end systemic chaos, strengthen national resilience, and ensure that both development and social stability are achieved on lawful and ethical foundations.

In the chilling expanse of the Arctic, where ice and ocean frame the edges of the known world, a geopolitical drama has quietly gathered momentum. The world’s strategic gaze is no longer fixed solely on the traditional theatres of diplomacy in Europe, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the High North — and particularly Greenland, the vast Arctic territory within the Kingdom of Denmark — has emerged as a critical arena where great-power competition, national security priorities, global trade dynamics, and climate change converge. This transformation did not occur overnight. For decades, military planners, geographers, and strategic thinkers recognized the Arctic’s latent importance. Yet only in recent years have those projections translated into urgent geopolitical reality. At the center of this shift stands the United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), unveiled in late 2025, which redefines American priorities in a world shaped by renewed great-power rivalry. While the strategy addresses multiple global theatres, its emphasis on territorial security, critical resources, strategic geography, and adversarial competition underscores why Greenland has moved from the periphery to the heart of international geopolitics. Greenland today sits at the intersection of U.S. homeland defense, NATO cohesion, Arctic militarization, global trade transformation, and the accelerating race for critical minerals. The tensions surrounding the island reveal not only disputes among allies but also deeper structural changes in the international system. This article argues that Greenland is no longer a remote outpost but a strategic fulcrum of the Arctic, whose future will shape the balance of power in the High North and beyond. In addition, it analyses the geopolitical and strategical concerns from the US over Greenland. America’s Strategic Recalibration in the 2025 National Security Strategy The NSS 2025 marks a clear departure from post-Cold War doctrines centered on expansive multilateralism and global institution-building. Instead, it reflects a return to strategic realism, prioritizing the protection of core national interests, territorial security, and the prevention of adversarial dominance in critical regions. The strategy defines the United States’ primary objective as “the continued survival and safety of the United States as an independent, sovereign republic,” coupled with maintaining decisive military, technological, and economic power. Although the Indo-Pacific remains central, the strategy elevates the Western Hemisphere and adjacent strategic regions, emphasizing the need to prevent hostile encroachment on areas vital to U.S. security and economic resilience. Supply chains, critical minerals, missile defense, and strategic geography feature prominently throughout the document. Within this framework, Greenland has transitioned from a peripheral Arctic territory to a linchpin of U.S. strategic defense and resource security. While the NSS does not outline a standalone Arctic doctrine, its underlying logic — securing access to essential materials, protecting strategic approaches to the homeland, and denying adversaries positional advantages — aligns directly with the intensifying focus on Greenland. Latest developments: US position over Greenland. As already mentioned, the release of the NSS 2025 made one thing clear: US foreign policy is now defined by an assertive approach towards the entire Western Hemisphere – where Greenland is part of –. Moreover, this implies that the US might claim the right to intervene in other countries’ domestic affairs in order to guarantee its strategic and corporate interests. Therefore, after Venezuela – in addition to its rhetoric towards Cuba and Mexico – Greenland has become a hot topic, due its geopolitical, economical and strategical position and of course as part of the US “national security” and interest. In early 2026, Greenland became the unlikely epicenter of a high-stakes geopolitical drama. The U.S., under President Donald Trump, signaled an unprecedented level of interest in the island, framing it as a critical node in Arctic security, homeland defense, and global strategic competition. The announcement of a “framework of a future deal” at the World Economic Forum in Davos marked the peak of months of tension, including the president’s prior rhetoric suggesting military action to assert U.S. control — a prospect that sent shockwaves across Europe and NATO. The pathway to this framework was turbulent. Earlier proposals from the Trump administration, dating back to his first term, had openly floated buying Greenland, citing both security imperatives and access to mineral wealth. While these overtures were dismissed by Denmark and Greenland, they set the stage for heightened U.S. scrutiny. Diplomatic meetings in January 2026, including a contentious session in Washington on January 14, ended with what officials described as a “fundamental disagreement” over sovereignty. By January 18, European allies and Denmark had issued a joint statement affirming that Greenlandic sovereignty belongs exclusively to the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland itself, while NATO and Danish troops deployed to the island to reassure Arctic security through “Operation Arctic Endurance.” Against this backdrop, Trump’s Davos announcement of a “framework” was simultaneously dramatic and deliberately vague. He described it as a long-term, “infinite” agreement designed to guarantee U.S. strategic goals, including the potential deployment of advanced missile defense systems—the so-called “Golden Dome”—and enhanced NATO involvement. The framework reportedly also aims to prevent Russian and Chinese investments in Greenland and may include increased U.S. access to the island’s mineral resources, though Greenlandic and Danish officials have made clear that no sovereignty transfer is under consideration. Crucially, no formal document has yet been produced, leaving many details unconfirmed and heightening uncertainty among allies. Greenland’s Geographic Centrality: The broader US security interest of the Island. Figure 1: Arctic states, counties and other administrative regions with capitals. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Credit for the border data: Runfola, D. et al. (2020) geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0231866. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231866e. Figure 2: Arctic Population Centers. Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. When viewed from a polar perspective, the Arctic is not a distant fringe but the shortest connective space between North America, Europe, and Eurasia. The Arctic as seen in Figure 1 is composed of several administrative areas, including Canada, Alaska (USA), Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Greenland (Denmark). The latter can be said to be located at the center between North America and Europe and Eurasia, underscoring its geopolitical importance. In other words, Greenland occupies the central Atlantic–Arctic axis, the shortest air and missile trajectories between Russia and North America and a pivotal position between the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Russian Arctic coast. This geography carries deep strategic implications and clarifies the logic behind US interest in the island. First, Greenland is part of the so-called GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a crucial corridor and central axis for monitoring naval and air activity in the North Atlantic-Arctic corridor. The GIUK Gap played an important role during the Second World War and the Cold War and nowadays it has become crucial in securing air and sea surveillance through radar stations, while securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) as well as supply lines making them uninterrupted between NATO’s European members and the USA. The GIUK Gap can assist in ensuring maritime visibility and assist anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in case of conflicts. The presence of Russian submarines in the Arctic is a central pillar of Russia’s military strategy and nuclear deterrence, making the region one of the most militarized maritime spaces in the world. Russia views the Arctic as both a strategic sanctuary and a launch platform. In consequence, its Northern Fleet – headquartered on the Kola Peninsula –, is the most powerful of Russia’s fleets and operates a large share of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as the Borei and Delta IV classes. These submarines carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and are designed to remain hidden under Arctic ice, ensuring a second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict. The ice cover, combined with Russia’s familiarity with Arctic waters, provides concealment and operational depth. In addition to SSBNs, Russia deploys nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the Arctic. These vessels conduct intelligence gathering, protect ballistic missile submarines, and pose threats to NATO naval forces and undersea infrastructure, including communication cables. Russian submarines regularly transit through key chokepoints such as the GIUK Gap, bringing them into strategic relevance for Greenland, Iceland, and NATO’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) posture. In addition, the Arctic also supports Russia’s broader bastion defense concept, which seeks to create heavily defended maritime zones where submarines can operate safely. Air defenses, surface ships, icebreakers, and coastal missile systems complement submarine operations. As climate change reduces sea ice and increases accessibility, Russian submarine activity in the Arctic is expected to remain intense, reinforcing the region’s importance for NATO surveillance, early warning systems, and transatlantic security — especially for locations like Greenland that sit astride critical Arctic–Atlantic routes. Second, Greenland’s high latitude makes it an ideal place for early detection of long-range missile launches. Russia has long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), if ever launched from Russia toward the United States, the total flight time would be roughly between 25 to 35 minutes – depending on the launch location and target. But because of the Earth’s curvature, the shortest path from Russia to the continental US goes over the Arctic which is why Greenland is so strategically important for early detection and missile-warning defense. In practical terms, US decision-makers would have only minutes to assess the threat and respond after a launch is detected, therefore Greenland is critical for US security. Establishments such as the U.S. Pituffik Space Base underscore how Greenland functions as a first line of surveillance against possible ballistic missile threats from the Eurasian landmass. Therefore, Greenland is indispensable to early-warning and missile-defense systems. Sensors, radars, and space-tracking infrastructure based on the island form a crucial layer of “U.S. homeland defense”. Finally, Greenland is the only large Arctic landmass under Western democratic control outside Eurasia. Russia dominates the Eurasian Arctic coastline, while Alaska and Canada anchor North America. Greenland bridges these spaces, serving as a keystone for transatlantic Arctic security. Its isolation does not diminish its importance; rather, it magnifies it. – making Greenland a linchpin of US homeland defense and NATO’s northern security architecture. Greenland and NATO: The Fragile Architecture of Arctic Security Figure 3: NATO’s and Russia’s militarization in the Arctic. Figure 3 exposes a stark asymmetry in Arctic militarization between NATO and Russia. Moscow maintains a dense, continuous network of military installations stretching from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. These bases support air defense, naval operations, missile forces, and surveillance, forming an integrated arc of control along Russia’s northern frontier. NATO’s Arctic posture, by contrast, is structurally different. Rather than territorial saturation, it relies on discrete strategic nodes, interoperability over mass, and coordination among multiple sovereign states. Within this fragmented architecture, Greenland constitutes NATO’s most critical node, functioning as the geographic and operational linchpin between North America and Northern Europe. Without Greenland, NATO’s Arctic posture would fracture into disconnected segments—North America on one side and Scandinavia on the other—with no central anchor to bind the alliance’s northern defenses. The United States already maintains a crucial presence on the island through the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in northwest Greenland. The installation is indispensable for early missile warning, space surveillance, and tracking adversary launches across the polar region. Complementary allied infrastructure, such as the UK’s logistical presence at Camp Viking in Norway, underscores NATO’s node-based approach rather than a strategy of continuous territorial control. It is precisely Greenland’s role as this irreplaceable strategic node that explains the sharp European response in 2025–2026 to U.S. rhetoric suggesting unilateral action or coercive pressure regarding the island. The deployment of European troops under Operation Arctic Endurance was not merely symbolic; it was a clear assertion that Greenland is a collective NATO concern, not a bilateral bargaining chip between Washington and Copenhagen. In this sense, the military logic of Arctic defense translated directly into alliance politics. Yet the episode also revealed the limits of U.S. power when confronting established allies. Danish and Greenlandic officials consistently emphasized that sovereignty constituted a non-negotiable “red line.” Greenland’s Prime Minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, framed the issue not as a local dispute but as one of global order, stressing that Greenland would align with Denmark, the EU, and NATO while retaining full control over its territory. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reinforced this position by confirming enhanced cooperation while deliberately refraining from endorsing any transfer of sovereignty—an illustration of the alliance’s careful balancing act between accommodating U.S. strategic priorities and preserving the credibility of its member states. When viewed in this broader context, the episode appears less as an attempt at dramatic territorial acquisition and more as an effort to formalize and modestly expand pre-existing arrangements. The 1951 U.S.–Denmark agreement already permitted permanent U.S. military presence, exclusive jurisdiction over defense areas, and broad operational freedom at installations such as Pituffik. The proposed framework likely reinforced these rights while adding provisions for expanded NATO participation and strategic safeguards against Russian or Chinese influence. From Washington’s perspective, the episode allowed the appearance of a strategic victory, even as sovereignty and political control remained firmly with Greenland and Denmark. Analytically, the Greenland case illustrates a central tension in contemporary U.S. foreign policy: the interplay between assertive unilateralism and the constraints of alliance politics. By elevating Greenland into a symbol of hemispheric and Arctic security, the United States signaled its willingness to test diplomatic norms using both the rhetoric of necessity and instruments of coercion, including threatened tariffs. Yet the ultimate outcome—an unratified verbal framework reinforcing existing agreements—demonstrates the limits of coercion within a multilateral system. In this sense, Greenland has become a lens through which to observe the evolving dynamics of great-power competition, alliance management, and Arctic geopolitics. Its strategic geography, resource potential, and political status converge to make the island central to 21st-century security calculations. The resulting “framework of a future deal” represents not a victory of acquisition but a negotiation of influence—one that codifies U.S. ambitions while respecting allied sovereignty, subtly reshaping the contours of Arctic security and transatlantic relations. Greenland’s Resources: Strategic Minerals in a Fragmenting World Beyond military geography, Greenland’s subsoil wealth significantly enhances its geopolitical importance. The island holds substantial deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), lithium, graphite, niobium, titanium, uranium and zinc. As it is well known these strategic materials are indispensable and critical for renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, advanced electronics, missile guidance and radar technologies and space and defense infrastructure. Last but not least there is also oil and gas, but the conditions and viability to extract them make them an economic challenge. In the context of the control of natural resources, the NSS 2025 repeatedly stresses the need to reduce U.S. dependence on adversarial supply chains — an implicit reference to China’s dominance in rare-earth processing. Therefore, US eyes are on Greenland, as it represents one of the few politically aligned alternatives with large-scale potential reserves – ironically not under Chinese or Russian influence, but under US “allies” control. Yet resource abundance does not automatically translate into strategic advantage. Mining in Greenland faces severe challenges: extreme climate conditions, environmental risks, limited infrastructure, and strong local opposition to environmentally destructive projects. As a result, Greenland’s mineral wealth is strategically valuable but politically sensitive. Its development requires local consent and long-term cooperation, not coercion — a fact often overlooked in external strategic calculations. The Arctic Trade Revolution: Melting Ice, Shifting Routes Figure 4: Arctic Seaways (Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage and Transpolar Sea Route). Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Climate change is transforming the Arctic faster than any other region on Earth. As sea ice recedes, new maritime routes are becoming seasonally viable, with potentially transformative consequences for global trade. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Arctic coast already reduces transit times between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, even though some parts are free of ice for some months per year. On the other hand, a future transpolar route, cutting directly across the Arctic Ocean, could bypass traditional chokepoints such as: The Suez Canal, The Panama Canal or The Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Greenland importance relies on its geographic position that places it adjacent to these emerging corridors. Potential roles for the island include: the search-and-rescue hubs, refueling and logistics points, maritime surveillance and communications infrastructure. This elevates Greenland from a military asset to a potential gatekeeper of future Arctic trade, linking regional security directly to global economic flows. Icebreakers and Power Projection: Mobility as Sovereignty Figure 5: Major Icebreakers and Ice-Capable Patrol Ships highlight a decisive but underappreciated imbalance. Source: generated with Chat GPT using Routers Nov 2022 data. The transit in the Arctic can be defined by the possibility to move freely without any inconvenience due its extreme conditions – or at least with the least inconveniences. In consequence major ice breakers and ice-capable patrol ships became very important assets for the countries in the region. In a simple comparison, Russia possesses more icebreakers than NATO combined, as shown in Figure 5, including nuclear-powered vessels capable of year-round Arctic operations. These ships are instruments of sovereignty, enabling continuous military presence, escort of commercial shipping, enforcement of Arctic regulations and rapid crisis responses. By contrast, the United States has long underinvested in icebreaking capacity. NATO relies on a patchwork of national fleets, with Finland and Sweden contributing significantly but still lagging behind Russia’s scale. The strategic implication is clear: Russia controls mobility while NATO controls nodes. In such an environment, fixed strategic anchors like Greenland become even more critical. Competing Arctic Visions Russia Russia views the Arctic as a core strategic and economic priority, central to its national identity, security, and long-term development. Its Arctic vision emphasizes sovereignty, military security, and the exploitation of vast natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons and minerals. Moscow sees the Northern Sea Route as a critical shipping corridor that can enhance Russia’s control over Arctic navigation and generate economic revenues. To support this vision, Russia has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, icebreaker fleets, and military modernization, positioning itself as the dominant Arctic power and framing the region as vital to its great-power status. The Arctic is not an extension of Russian power; it is central to it. Figure 6: Cargo volume in Russia’s Northern Sea Route (1933-2023) China China approaches the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” framing its vision around scientific research, economic opportunity, and global governance. Beijing emphasizes participation in Arctic affairs through international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and promotes cooperation rather than territorial claims. Its strategy emphasizes long-term access to resources, influence over Arctic governance norms, and participation in future trade routes. Its concept of a “Polar Silk Road” reflects an interest in future shipping routes, energy projects, and digital connectivity, linking the Arctic to China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative. Even though China presents its Arctic engagement as peaceful and mutually beneficial, while gradually expanding its strategic and economic footprint in the region, it also has interest in Greenland’s mining sector, for example, which has heightened concerns about strategic leverage rather than direct control. Figure 7: Map of China’s Polar Silk Road. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. United States The U.S. approach, as reflected in the NSS 2025, is reactive but intensifying. Greenland crystallizes American concerns about strategic vulnerability, supply-chain dependence, and alliance credibility. Yet pressure tactics risk undermining the very alliances that make Arctic stability possible. The United States views the Arctic as an increasingly important region for national security, environmental stewardship, and economic opportunities. At the same time, it recognizes the strategic implications of growing Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Arctic States The European Arctic states emphasize sustainability, human security, and regional cooperation as the foundation of their Arctic vision. Their policies prioritize environmental protection, responsible resource management, and the rights and livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, while balancing economic development in sectors such as fisheries, renewable energy, and limited resource extraction. These states strongly support multilateral governance through institutions like the Arctic Council and stress adherence to international law. Collectively, they view the Arctic as a region where stability, cooperation, and climate leadership are essential, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and accelerating environmental change. Canada Canada’s Arctic vision centers on sovereignty, Indigenous partnership, and sustainable development, reflecting the region’s importance to national identity and security. Ottawa emphasizes the protection of its northern territories and views the Northwest Passage as internal waters, while supporting a rules-based Arctic order. A core pillar of Canada’s approach is its collaboration with Indigenous peoples, recognizing their rights, knowledge, and role in governance and stewardship. Canada also prioritizes climate change adaptation, environmental protection, and responsible economic development, seeking to ensure that increased Arctic activity benefits northern communities while maintaining peace and stability in the region. India India’s Arctic vision is primarily science-driven and climate-focused, reflecting its broader emphasis on environmental security and multilateral cooperation. Through its Arctic research station, Himadri, and active participation in the Arctic Council as an observer, India seeks to understand the Arctic’s impact on global climate systems, particularly the Indian monsoon. New Delhi also recognizes the long-term economic and geopolitical significance of the Arctic but approaches the region cautiously, prioritizing sustainable development, international collaboration, and respect for Arctic states’ sovereignty. Strategic Futures: Cooperation or Fragmentation The future of Greenland and the Arctic more broadly will hinge on whether the region evolves toward structured cooperation or strategic fragmentation. In a cooperative scenario, Greenland becomes a stabilizing anchor within a renewed Arctic security framework, where the United States, Denmark, and NATO align their defense priorities with Greenlandic self-determination and environmental safeguards. Such an approach would emphasize multilateral governance, transparency in resource development, confidence-building military measures, and shared investment in infrastructure, search-and-rescue capabilities, and climate resilience. Cooperation would not eliminate competition, particularly with Russia and China, but it would establish rules, norms, and mechanisms to prevent escalation and miscalculation in an increasingly accessible Arctic. By contrast, a fragmented Arctic would be characterized by unilateral actions, coercive diplomacy, and the erosion of trust among allies. Pressure tactics aimed at securing access, influence, or control over Greenland could weaken NATO cohesion, fuel local resistance, and open political space for external actors to exploit divisions. In such a scenario, the Arctic risks becoming a patchwork of contested zones rather than a managed strategic commons. Therefore, fragmentation would increase the likelihood of militarization without coordination, resource development without legitimacy, and crisis dynamics without effective communication channels — conditions that historically precede instability rather than security. Conclusion Greenland’s elevation from a peripheral Arctic territory to a central object of U.S. strategic concern reflects a deeper transformation in American national security thinking. Under the logic of the National Security Strategy 2025, geography has reasserted itself as a core determinant of power. Greenland matters to Washington not because of symbolic territorial ambition, but because it sits at the intersection of missile warning, homeland defense, transatlantic security and critical resource resilience and control. From early-warning radars at Pituffik to the GIUK Gap’s role in anti-submarine warfare, the island functions as a forward shield for the United States rather than a distant outpost. In this sense, U.S. interest in Greenland is less about expansion and more about insulation — protecting the American homeland in an era of compressed warning times and renewed great-power rivalry. At the same time, the Greenland episode exposes the limits of unilateralism in a system still structured by alliances and sovereignty norms. While Washington’s strategic rationale is compelling, its use of coercive rhetoric and pressure tactics toward Denmark and Greenland revealed a misalignment between U.S. security imperatives and alliance diplomacy. The backlash from European allies and the reaffirmation of Greenlandic sovereignty demonstrated that even overwhelming military and economic power cannot easily override the political legitimacy of allied states. Ultimately, the United States secured no new sovereignty, only the likely reinforcement of pre-existing military arrangements — underscoring that influence in the Arctic must be negotiated, not imposed. From a U.S. perspective, Greenland thus represents both a strategic necessity and a diplomatic constraint. The island is indispensable to missile defense, space surveillance, and Arctic access, yet it remains politically autonomous and embedded within a NATO framework that demands consultation and restraint. This dual reality forces Washington to reconcile its desire for strategic certainty with the realities of alliance management. The “framework of a future deal” reflects this compromise: a mechanism to safeguard U.S. security interests while formally respecting Danish and Greenlandic control. The outcome illustrates that American power in the Arctic is real, but conditional — strongest when exercised through institutions rather than outside them. Looking ahead, Greenland will remain a focal point of U.S. Arctic strategy not because of dramatic territorial ambitions, but because it is irreplaceable. No alternative location offers the same combination of geographic centrality, political alignment, and strategic utility. As missile technologies advance, Arctic routes open, and resource competition intensifies, Greenland’s role in U.S. security planning will only grow. Yet the lesson of recent tensions is clear: securing Greenland’s strategic value requires partnership, legitimacy, and long-term engagement rather than pressure. In the final analysis, Greenland is not only a measure of American power, but a barometer of the Arctic’s future political order. The island sits at the intersection of U.S. homeland defense, European security, and the growing assertiveness of Russia in the High North, while also remaining a point of interest for external actors such as China or India. Europe views Greenland primarily as a stabilizing pillar within a rules-based Arctic governed through NATO coordination, international law, and multilateral institutions. Russia, by contrast, treats the Arctic as a strategic rear area and military bastion, where control, mobility, and deterrence dominate its vision of regional order. The United States is thus navigating between these competing logics — seeking to secure its own vital interests without fracturing alliance cohesion or accelerating Arctic militarization. Whether Greenland becomes a cornerstone of cooperative security or a flashpoint of strategic rivalry will depend less on geography, which is fixed, and more on political choices. In this sense, Greenland encapsulates the broader Arctic dilemma: a region where power, restraint, and cooperation must coexist if stability in the High North is to be preserved. Also, it is important to highlight Greenland’s voice – referring to sovereignty and identity. Usually under great-power maneuvering, Greenland’s own population has often been sidelined. Yet Greenland is not merely an object of strategy; it is a political community with a strong Indigenous identity, environmental concerns, and aspirations for greater autonomy. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind its constitutional status within the Kingdom of Denmark, their principle of self-determination and the political costs of alienating local consent. Alienating local consent would not only undermine legitimacy, but also weaken the long-term sustainability of any security arrangement. Finally, the Arctic transformation is no longer a distant projection but an unfolding reality. Climate change is accelerating the opening of Arctic Sea routes, reshaping patterns of trade, mobility, and access, and in doing so redefining how sovereignty and power are exercised in the High North. In this emerging environment, traditional markers of security such as missile defense and military presence will increasingly coexist with less conventional—but equally strategic—assets, including icebreakers, critical minerals, infrastructure, and regulatory authority over maritime corridors. The future balance of power in the Arctic will therefore depend not only on geography or military capability, but on the ability of states and alliances to adapt to a rapidly changing region where environmental transformation, economic opportunity, and strategic competition intersect. How the United States, its allies, and other Arctic stakeholders respond to this transformation will shape whether the Arctic evolves as a space of managed cooperation or intensifying rivalry. References Agneman, G. (2025, February 04). Trump wants Greenland – but here’s what the people of Greenland want. 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Abstract This is the second part of the analysis regarding the realist interpretation of the ongoing war in Ukraine. (The first part is available here). This paper examines the ongoing war in Ukraine through the lens of realism, challenging optimistic Western narratives and highlighting Russia's strategic gains despite extensive sanctions. Since 2022, the EU has imposed 19 sanctions packages targeting Russia's economy, yet Russia has adapted and continued military offensives across multiple fronts, making significant territorial advances, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. The strategic importance of Odessa, Ukraine's largest deep-water port, is underscored due to its economic, military, and geopolitical value, with Russian experts openly discussing its potential capture. The conflict has also driven modernisation in Russia's military-industrial complex, introducing advanced missile systems and hypersonic weapons that challenge NATO defences. Post-war territorial changes remain uncertain, with diplomatic options constrained by Ukraine's constitution and international law. European public opinion is divided on war readiness, reflecting broader societal hesitations. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Reality on the ground – the territorial losses and military developments Following the super optimistic narrative and the consequent groupthink, as evidenced in the first part of this paper, the EU has so far imposed no fewer than 19 sanctions packages.[1] The latest package adopted on October 23, 2025, focuses on intensifying pressure on Russia's war economy by targeting key sectors, including energy, finance, military capabilities, transportation, and professional services, while also enhancing anti-circumvention measures. [2] Source: Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en In the meantime, Russia seems to have accepted any adverse consequences of the sanctions and learned to live with them. Source: Grok – prompt: Latest macroeconomic indicators for the Russian Federation economy available at: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1998598998345814522 Militarily speaking, though, Russia (which is in fact fighting several NATO countries alongside Ukraine) seems to be not only advancing in the field. As of December 10, 2025, Russian forces have continued offensive operations across multiple fronts in eastern and southern Ukraine. These advances are part of a broader push amid ongoing heavy fighting, with Russian officials claiming momentum along the entire line of contact. Examples include: Pokrovsk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Kupiansk/Kharkiv Direction, Lyman Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Siversk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Zaporizhia/Southern Direction. On top of that, the media reports advances on multiple fronts, including Borova, Novopavlivka, and the eastern areas; the liberation of Rovnoye and Petropavlovka; the encirclement and liquidation of Ukrainian forces; and the fall of Dimitrov — widespread strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.[3] Source: Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ukraine_with_Cities.png Importantly, Russian experts and military advisors openly debate the possibility of seizing control of Odessa.[4] Let us make no mistake here. Odessa is strategically important. Economically, Odessa is Ukraine's largest and only deep-water port, handling around 65% of the country's sea-based imports and exports, which account for 70% of Ukraine's total trade.[5] For Russia, controlling or disrupting this port serves to cripple Ukraine's economy while bolstering Russia's own position in global markets. First: Ukraine is a major global grain exporter, and Odessa is central to shipping these commodities. Russian attacks on the port, such as those following the withdrawal from the U.N.-backed grain deal in 2023, aim to prevent Ukrainian shipments, allowing Russia to dominate markets in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Russia's Black Sea ports (e.g., Novorossiysk) handle its own $43 billion in annual grain exports, and undermining Odessa helps Russia create global reliance on its foodstuffs amid food insecurity.[6] Second, the port processes petroleum, natural gas, minerals, and even high-purity neon gas for semiconductors. Russia has targeted oil facilities near Odessa to disrupt fuel logistics, and control here would secure routes for Caspian Sea and Middle Eastern energy flows, aligning with Russia's strategy to diversify exports as hydrocarbon revenues decline.[7] Losing Odessa would be a "massive strategic blow" to Ukraine, akin to Britain losing Dover. Militarily, as a major Black Sea hub, Odessa enables Russia to project power and maintain dominance in the region. First, Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, can blockade Ukrainian coasts from Odessa, preventing resupplies and conducting amphibious operations — though these are high-risk due to Ukrainian defenses like mined waters.[8] The fleet supports expeditionary missions (e.g., the 2015 Syrian intervention) and hosts significant missile capabilities, with the capacity to deploy 80 long-range missiles in the area.[9] Second, even without full capture, Russia can harass shipping through mining or interdiction, extending tactics used in the Sea of Azov since 2014. This obstructs Ukrainian trade in the long term, potentially even in ceasefire scenarios, while facilitating Russian oil shipments (22% of which pass through the Black Sea).[10] Geopolitically, Odessa's location amplifies Russia's regional influence. First, capturing Odessa would create a land bridge to Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region in Moldova just 35 miles away, allowing Russia to intimidate Moldova and potentially expand conflict there.[11] This aligns with broader aims to control Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast, threatening neighbours like Romania.[12] Second, dominating the northern Black Sea coast from Odessa would weaken Ukraine's security, block NATO reinforcements, and provide Russia with leverage in negotiations. It's seen as more critical to Russia's objectives than other Ukrainian regions, such as Kharkiv. President Putin has indicated in fact that the coastal area "rightfully belongs to Russia" as war spoils.[13] Finally, Odessa was founded in 1794 by Russian Empress Catherine the Great on former Ottoman territory, and it became one of the Russian Empire's largest cities and ports.[14] Arguably, the harbour city has a large Russian-speaking population (Russians are the second-largest ethnic group in Odessa Oblast), and Kremlin officials assert it has "nothing in common with the Kiev regime," viewing it as inherently Russian.[15] More interestingly, it appears that the Russian Military Industrial Complex (MIC) has been using the war, as MICs always do, as a perfect opportunity to modernize its military equipment. Consequently, Russia has advanced missile systems that NATO countries find a real challenge. Examples include: - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) RS-28 Sarmat, Russia's newest heavy ICBM, operational since 2023, with a range exceeding 18,000 km (up to 35,000 km in sub-orbital flight), a payload of over 10 tons including up to 16 nuclear warheads or hypersonic glide vehicles, and advanced countermeasures against missile defenses.[16] It's considered the world's longest-range and most powerful ICBM in service. - Hypersonic Systems Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), deployed on ICBMs like the Sarmat, can reach speeds up to Mach 27 (about 20,700 mph), perform unpredictable manoeuvres at high altitudes, and generate immense kinetic energy (equivalent to over two megatons of TNT). It's designed to evade all known missile defence systems.[17] Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, an air-launched hypersonic missile with a range of over 2,000 km and speeds up to Mach 10. It can manoeuvre mid-flight, carry nuclear or conventional warheads, and has been used operationally in conflicts like Ukraine.[18] 3M22 Zircon, a scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missile reaching Mach 9, with a range of about 1,000 km. It's primarily anti-ship, launched from ships or submarines, and has demonstrated hits on maritime targets in exercises like Zapad 2025.[19] - Air and Missile Defence Systems S-500 Prometheus, an advanced surface-to-air missile system capable of intercepting targets at 600 km, tracking up to 300 simultaneously, and engaging hypersonic weapons, ICBMs, and stealth aircraft. It's integrated with multiple radars for resilience against jamming.[20] - Emerging or Experimental Systems 9M370 Burevestnik (SSC-X-09 Skyfall), a nuclear-powered cruise missile with theoretically unlimited range due to its onboard reactor. It underwent a successful test flight in October 2025 but remains in development, with concerns about safety and reliability.[21] Poseidon (Status-6), an unmanned, nuclear-powered underwater drone (torpedo-like) capable of carrying megaton-class warheads over intercontinental distances. It's designed for coastal targets and was tested alongside Burevestnik in 2025, though full operational status is unclear.[22] Oreshnik, a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with hypersonic capabilities, is evading Western defences. Russia plans deployments in Belarus by late 2025, enhancing strike options in Europe.[23] Last but not least, the media reports on a new, potentially game-changing technology: the TOS-1A Solntsepyok, a heavy multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) designed primarily to deliver thermobaric (fuel-air explosive) and incendiary munitions. It is mounted on a modified T-72 tank chassis for mobility and protection in combat zones, and it serves as a short-range area-denial weapon, often used to target fortified positions, infantry, and light armoured vehicles by creating massive blast waves and high temperatures.[24] Possible Territorial Changes after the War? As of early 2026, Russia continues to make territorial gains (capturing over 5,600 square kilometers, mainly in Donetsk Oblast). According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (a non-partisan, non-profit American think tank), German intelligence sources claim that “Germany expects Russia to target German energy and defence infrastructure early, given Germany’s role as a NATO hub for moving and sustaining forces and forecasts that Russia will see Germany as a priority target for long range missile strikes, armed drones, and special forces after an open armed attack on NATO’s eastern flank”[25] Consequently, according to ISW, Russia would likely be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many Western estimates, particularly in the event of a future ceasefire in Ukraine that would free up Russian forces and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute.   Against this backdrop, any post-war territorial options generally involve compromises due to military realities, though complete restoration of Ukraine's 2014 borders is seen as improbable without major shifts. These options are shaped by Ukraine's constitution (which prohibits ceding territory without a nationwide referendum or amendments), international law against forced border changes, and Russia's demands for recognition of annexed areas such as Crimea, the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk), Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.[26] Russia's battlefield advantages and confidence reduce incentives for concessions, while Ukraine seeks security guarantees (e.g., EU integration or European military presence) in exchange for any deals.[27] Below, the reader will find a summary of some of the options discussed by diplomats: Source: Grok - https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=2008833222403387754 In addition to territorial change options, any deal will most likely include non-territorial elements such as Ukraine's neutrality (no NATO), demilitarisation caps, the return of abducted children, and economic reintegration of Russia (e.g., sanctions relief). Experts warn that rushed agreements could lead to renewed conflict, emphasising sustainable security for Ukraine (e.g., European troops or arms build-up).[28] Outcomes in 2026 hinge on battlefield shifts, US pressure, and European unity, with diplomacy intensifying but no breakthroughs yet. Conclusion On 11 December, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in a speech in Germany that Russia is escalating its war campaign against Europe, not just Ukraine. “We must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured,” he said.[29] On the very same day, the EU made the bold move of indefinitely immobilising frozen Russian assets worth €210 billion; €185 billion held at Belgium’s Euroclear, and €25 billion held in banks across other member states. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen hailed the move that day, sending a strong signal to Russia that "as long as this brutal war of aggression continues, Russia's costs will continue to rise. […] This is a powerful message to Ukraine: We want to make sure that our brave neighbour becomes even stronger on the battlefield and at the negotiating table,” von der Leyen added. There is one problem that most EU leaders overlook. Namely, European societies are deeply divided, with large sections unwilling to go to war with Russia. Numerous polls evidence this. A recent ECFP Poll (June) was conducted by YouGov, Datapraxis, and Norstat across 12 countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, UK). It focused on readiness for potential war, including amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine and U.S. policy shifts. Key findings suggest: 50% overall support increasing defence spending (highest in Poland and Denmark at 70%); majorities in France (62%), Germany (53%), and Poland (51%) favour reintroducing mandatory military service; 59% support continuing military aid to Ukraine even without U.S. involvement; 54% back a European nuclear deterrent independent of the U.S. All of this seems to reflect acceptance of preparation for conflict, though not direct personal willingness to fight.[30] According to John Mearsheimer, a leading realist scholar, Russia's decision to invade Ukraine was primarily a rational response to the changing material realities of the international system, particularly the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), which Russia perceived as a direct threat to its core strategic interests and great power status. Mearsheimer contends that the anarchic international system compels states, especially great powers, to maximise their power to ensure survival. Thus, Russia acted to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Western stronghold on its border, viewing the West's policies as provocative and threatening to its security. This perspective emphasises the structural pressures and incentives created by anarchy and power competition, suggesting that the imperative drove Russia's actions to survive and maintain regional dominance amid Western encroachment.[31] Admittedly, Mearsheimer’s views are much criticised by Western scholars and media experts. And yet, with the recent actions of the United States against Venezuela (the kinetic attack against the state and the kidnapping of its president and his wife – all against the most sacred principles of international law), one wonders why the cold-blooded, objective analysis has been forgone in favour of wishful thinking. References [1] Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en [2] Fisch, E. J., Junck, R. D., Sève, M., Albrecht vom Kolke, M., Benson, J., Lainé, W., Mueller, P., Seidner, G., & Vianesi, G. (2025, November 12). EU Adopts 19th Russia Sanctions Package Alongside New Sanctions Being Imposed by US and UK. Skadden. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2025/11/eu-adopts-19th-sanctions-package [3] Grok: What are the latest advances of Russian troops in Ukraine? [4] Каминский, А. (2025, October 2). «СВО закончится взятием Одессы». НАТО готовит румын и французов. Что в планах у Минобороны России? RuNews24. https://runews24.ru/articles/02/10/2025/svo-zakonchitsya-vzyatiem-odessyi-nato-gotovit-rumyin-i-franczuzov-chto-v-planax-u-minoboronyi-rossii also Крылова, А. (2025, December 3). Названы сроки, в которые Российская армия сможет дойти до Одессы. Абзац. https://absatz.media/news/143321-nazvany-sroki-v-kotorye-rossijskaya-armiya-smozhet-dojti-do-odessy or Елистратов, А. (2025, November 20). Эксперт: русским нет смысла соглашаться на план Трампа, они и так дойдут до Одессы. Репортёр. https://topcor.ru/66186-jekspert-russkim-net-smysla-soglashatsja-na-plan-trampa-oni-i-tak-dojdut-do-odessy.html [5] Costea, C. A. (2022, March 25). The strategic importance of the port of Odessa. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://russianstudiesromania.eu/2022/03/25/the-strategic-importance-of-the-port-of-odessa/ [6] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [7] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [8] Ibidem. [9] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [10] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [11] Akage, A. (2022, May 20). Is Odessa Next? Putin Sees A Gateway To Moldova — And Chance For Revenge. Worldcrunch. https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/why-odessa-is-important/ [12] Boyse, M. (2024, March 21). Operation Odesa: Russia Wants the Entire Ukrainian Black Sea Coast. Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/operation-odesa-russia-wants-entire-ukrainian-black-sea-coast-matthew-boyse [13] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [14] Santora, M. (2023, July 19). Why Odesa Is So Important to Ukraine in the War With Russia. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/19/world/europe/odesa-ukraine-war-russia.html [15] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [16] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [17] Ibidem. [18] See more at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/ [19] Charpentreau, C. (2025, September 15). Russia uses Zapad 2025 for ‘hypersonic posturing’ with Zircon, Kinzhal drills. AeroTime. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/zapad-2025-russia-hypersonic-posture-zircon-kinzhal [20] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [21] Gwadera, Z. (2025, November 20). Russia’s Burevestnik and Poseidon tests. IISS. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/11/russias-burevestnik-and-poseidon-tests/ [22] Ibidem. [23] See more at: https://youtu.be/D22JNoLzj9E?si=BtZ3NMCs7KoUk7ue [24] See more at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/tos-1a.htm [25] Young, J., Harward, C., Simanovskyy, M., Mappes, G., Nasreddine, D., & Barros, G. (2026, January 6). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2026. Institute for the Study of War. https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/ [26] Yurchuk, V. (2025, August 12). Ceding land to Russia not only unpopular in Ukraine, but also illegal. PBS NEWS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ceding-land-to-russia-not-only-unpopular-in-ukraine-but-also-illegal [27] Harding, E. (2025, November 24). What Is the Strategy in the Ukraine-Russia Peace Negotiations? Centre for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-strategy-ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations [28] Wright, T. (2025, August 18). The Only Plausible Path to End the War in Ukraine. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/08/trump-ukraine-russia-peace/683907/ [29] Kiorri, E., & Cabanas, L. B. (2025, December 30). Would you fight for the EU’s borders? Take our poll. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/12/30/would-you-fight-for-the-eus-borders-take-our-poll?fbclid=IwT01FWAPFTrZleHRuA2FlbQIxMABzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAwzNTA2ODU1MzE3MjgAAR4KLt3FfIaCbSxjUO8ldmbDys6WPnLeZaNIpZuhAApKVUs073MB4vZj8DKbOA_aem_lLTRWqCcGPL3F9z5-SX65g [30] https://www.eureporter.co/world/2025/06/26/most-eu-citizens-are-ready-for-war-new-poll/ [31] Smith, N. R., & Dawson, G. (2022). Mearsheimer, realism, and the Ukraine war. Analyse & Kritik, 44(2), 175–200. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023