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Abstract This paper departs from an assumption derived from Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory: Germany is a de facto leader of European integration processes and the European Union as an institution.The first part of the analysis explores priorities and their corresponding challenges for the new German CDU-led cabinet. It examines issues around the ongoing war in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and outstanding questions about German-China cooperation.The second part looks at the recently proposed Security and Defence Union (SDU) project and its various challenges.In conclusion, it is suggested that Germany will likely dominate future defence efforts, the actual shape of which will also be determined by other players such as the US, Russia, China, Iran, Israel, India or Turkey.Key Words: Germany, Foreign Policy, EU, Geopolitics Introduction According to the Federal Election Commission, the German election on February 23 saw a record-breaking voter turnout of 82.5%. That's an increase from 76.6% in 2021 and the highest voter participation since unification in 1990.  With vote counting finished, preliminary results show that the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, and its sister Christian Social Union (CSU) won the election with 28.6% of the vote. (As of the writing of this paper, the coalition negotiations are in progress, and the new Merz-Lead government will likely be formed by Easter this Year).  Before we analyse the challenges ahead of Merz's Government, let us briefly note that Friedrich Merz belongs to the so-called 'Davos Crowd'. He regularly attends the World Economic Forum Meetings. Before fully dedicating himself to politics, Merz worked as a corporate lawyer and held a significant position at BlackRock, a leading global investment management firm. He served as the head of the supervisory board of BlackRock's German branch, a role that has drawn scrutiny due to BlackRock's CEO, Larry Fink, being a key figure at the WEF. By his critics, Merz is seen as a 'globalist puppet' who is likely to promote Agenda 2030-related policies and the Klaus Schwab Great Reset initiative at the expense of German citizens.   Challenges ahead of Germany and its new political leadership Under the new CDU-led Government, Germany will face significant international challenges in supporting Ukraine, managing US relations, and balancing China ties. - The war in Ukraine The ongoing war in Ukraine is a pressing issue, requiring Germany to sustain its support for Ukraine while managing its own energy security and economic interests. This involves coordinating with other EU and NATO members, which could be challenging given potential fatigue and differing national priorities.  The ongoing war in Ukraine, initiated by Russia's invasion in 2022, remains a critical challenge for Germany. The new CDU-led Government must sustain this support amidst potential fatigue and economic pressures. It goes without saying that the war has disrupted energy supplies, with Germany suspending the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and facing higher energy costs. The CDU, under Merz, has advocated for a strong stance against Russia. Still, challenges include maintaining EU unity, especially with some member states favouring dialogue with Moscow, and managing domestic economic impacts, such as inflation and cost-of-living pressures. This support towards sustained support to sanctions against Russia seems necessary, but it may strain Germany's resources and require coordination with NATO and EU partners. - Navigating Transatlantic Relations Germany's relationship with the United States, mainly through NATO, is vital for its security and economic interests. Even before the Trump election, German experts were ready to address the incoming challenges.  Trump's opposition to previous policies, such as climate commitments and trade agreements, has led to tensions. Traditionally aligned with the US, the CDU knew the need to balance cooperation on security issues, such as defence spending, with potential trade and climate policy disagreements. This challenge is compounded by the need to prepare for a world where Germany must pay more for its security, especially given the war in Ukraine.  Today, Germans are painfully aware that the relations with the United States are crucial, especially given that Trump's presidency has already led to tensions over trade and security policies. Germany seems willing to balance cooperation with the US while asserting its interests and those of the EU. This will be complicated due to conflicting interests regarding trade and the economy. Trump is expected to continue his protectionist policies, imposing tariffs on German goods like cars to address the trade deficit. This will likely lead to retaliatory measures from Germany and the EU, straining economic ties.  In fact, the European Commission already declared it would impose "countermeasures" from April 1 in response to US tariffs of 25 per cent on steel and aluminium imports.   Regarding defence and security - Trump will likely pressure Germany to increase defence spending, possibly threatening to reduce US troops in Germany, as he did in his first term by announcing a withdrawal of 12,000 troops (later reversed by Biden). This could push Germany to enhance its defence capabilities and meet NATO targets.  As for climate change and energy - Trump's scepticism towards climate agreements, such as the Paris Accord, will likely continue, clashing with Germany's leadership in renewable energy and its goal to phase out coal by 2038 at the latest.   Finally, there is the question of foreign policy, especially Russia and Ukraine - Trump's potential alignment with Russia could complicate Germany's position, particularly given its significant support for Ukraine. Reports suggest Trump might cut Ukraine out of negotiations with Russia, forcing Germany to take a more independent stance.   - Balancing Economic Relations with China Germany's economic ties with China are significant, with China being a primary export market and investment partner. However, the new German Government faces the challenge of addressing security and human rights concerns, such as intellectual property theft and China's assertive foreign policy. The CDU-lead coalition may push for greater diversification of supply chains and stricter regulations, as suggested by recent analyses.   This balancing act is crucial, as economic dependence on China could limit Germany's ability to take a firm stance on delicate issues regarding human rights. The challenge is maintaining economic benefits while mitigating risks, potentially through EU-level coordination and bilateral agreements, which could create diplomatic pressures and affect Germany's global trade position. Economic ties and the challenge of de-risking. Germany has deep economic ties with China, with significant trade and investment flows, particularly in the automotive and manufacturing sectors. However, the new government will face the challenge of reducing economic dependence, as outlined in the CDU's election platform, which calls for "reducing reliance on China".  This is driven by concerns over supply chain vulnerabilities, as seen in the CDU's criticism of previous decisions like allowing a Chinese state-owned company to invest in Hamburg's port.  The challenge lies in implementing de-risking strategies without triggering economic repercussions, such as reduced exports or investment pullbacks. Recent statements from Merz, such as warning German firms about the "great risk" of investing in China, indicate a stricter stance. Still, experts question whether this rhetoric will translate into firm policy, given the economic interests at stake.   Security concerns and strategic competition are at the forefront - Friedrich Merz recently grouped China with Russia, North Korea, and Iran in an "axis of autocracies," highlighting perceived threats to German and European security.  The CDU's position paper, adopted around Easter 2023, states that the idea of peace through economic cooperation "has failed with regard to Russia, but increasingly also China," signalling a shift toward a more security-focused approach.  This includes addressing issues like technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and cybersecurity, which could strain bilateral relations. The challenge is strengthening defence and economic security measures without escalating tensions, particularly as China's military capabilities grow. Merz's focus on European strategic autonomy, especially in light of US policy shifts under Donald Trump, may lead to increased cooperation with EU partners in China. Human rights and values-based diplomacy are important for the incoming CDU-led government. Therefore, it is likely to take a firmer stance on human rights issues, reflecting the CDU's emphasis on preserving the rule-based international order.  Merz has consistently called China "an increasing threat to [German] security," suggesting a values-based approach that could lead to diplomatic tensions.  The challenge is maintaining constructive engagement while addressing these issues, especially as China has offered a "stable, constructive partnership" post-election, seeking to inject "new vitality" into China-EU relations. Balancing economic interests with values-based diplomacy will be a key test for Merz's government.  As for the coordination with EU partners, Germany's China policy should probably align with the EU's broader strategy, which has shifted toward de-risking under the European Commission. This requires coordination with other member states, some of whom may prioritise economic ties over security concerns, creating potential friction. The challenge is to ensure a united EU front, particularly in trade negotiations and investment screening, where Germany's leadership will be crucial. Merz's advocacy for improved coordination with major European allies such as France and Poland suggests focusing on EU unity. However, coalition dynamics, potentially involving the dovish Social Democrats, could dilute this approach.  Compared to Angela Merkel's pragmatic approach and Olaf Scholz's cautious stance, Merz's leadership is expected to mark a "Zeitenwende" or turning point, with a more critical and security-focused China policy.  However, the extent of change depends on coalition dynamics, with potential partners like the SPD possibly moderating his approach, creating tension between rhetoric and policy implementation. The EU as a security actor This section of the paper outlines the significant challenges ahead for the EU, considering Germany's influence and the broader geopolitical landscape, especially regarding the future EU defence cooperation and its potential relations with NATO. According to German experts and policymakers, The EU must maintain unity in supporting Ukraine amid Russia's ongoing invasion. Under the CDU, Germany will most likely continue its policy in this regard, providing military aid and economic support. According to the Federal Foreign Office, the German Government has, since the start of the war, made available around 43.62 billion euros in bilateral support for Ukraine (as of 31 December 2024); this aid includes the critical area of air defence, a substantial winter assistance programme and energy assistance, help for those who have fled Ukraine, humanitarian aid, mine clearance operations and assistance with efforts to investigate and document war crimes. Furthermore, Ukraine and Germany signed a bilateral agreement on security cooperation on 16 February 2024.  European Army The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership's vision regarding the Europen defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four 'revolutionary' ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to potentially 35 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.   The German leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's 'special responsibility' for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government's 'special responsibility' for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity.   In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the 'best equipped armed force' in Europe.  Former Chancellor Scholz would, however, make it an open claim at times: "As the most populous nation with the greatest economic power and a country in the centre of the continent, our army must become the cornerstone of conventional defence in Europe, the best-equipped force".  The re-entrance of Trump into global politics only reinvigorated German calls for stronger defence cooperation. Amid a drive to shore up support for Ukraine after Donald Trump halted US military aid and intelligence sharing, European leaders held emergency talks in Brussels (6 March 2025). They agreed (Hungary did not support the document) on a massive increase in defence spending. According to the European Council's Conclusions, the European Commission is to propose a new EU instrument to provide Member States with loans backed by the EU budget of up to EUR 150 billion.  Apart from that, the document mentions several other instruments that are supposed to enhance Europe's defence capabilities: additional funding sources, new EU instrument for loans, support from the European Investment Bank (EIB), mobilising private financing, priority areas for defence capabilities (air and missile defence; artillery systems, including deep precision strike capabilities; missiles and ammunition; drones and anti-drone systems; strategic enablers, including in relation to space and critical infrastructure protection; military mobility; cyber; artificial intelligence and electronic warfare), joint procurement and standardisation, simplification of legal frameworks and finally coordination with NATO. Overall, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, presented a plan worth EUR 800 billion to increase European defence spending against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Will it be enough to create actual European defence capabilities, finally? Time will show. Europeans have been talking about common European defence for decades. So far, most of their achievements fall short of lofty political declarations.  Consequently, on March 19 this year, the European Commission unveiled the Joint White Paper for European Defence 2030.  (White papers are policy documents produced by the Governments that set out their proposals for future legislation.) Accordingly, the 22-page-long document consists of numerous 'bold' ideas to advance European defence cooperation toward a European Army. The key threats to European Security include correspondingly: military aggression from Russia, strategic competition (there is increasing strategic competition in Europe's wider neighbourhood, from the Arctic to the Baltic to the Middle East and North Africa), transnational challenges (issues such as rapid technological change, migration, and climate change are seen as serious stressors on political and economic systems), actions of authoritarian states (countries like China are asserting their influence in Europe and its economy, posing a strategic challenge due to their authoritarian governance style), hybrid threats (these include cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the weaponisation of migration. The document notes that these threats are interconnected and increasingly prevalent), geopolitical rivalries (ongoing geopolitical tensions in various regions, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, are highlighted as contributing to instability that directly affects Europe) and last but not least instability from neighboring Regions (proximity to conflict zones, especially in North Africa and the Middle East, leads to spillover effects such as migration and economic insecurity).  Notably, at the very beginning of the document, the EC makes an unequivocal statement: "The future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole. Since 2022, we have seen a full-scale, high-intensity war on the borders of the European Union with hundreds of thousands of casualties, mass population displacement, huge economic costs and deliberate destruction of vital energy systems and cultural heritage. The outcome of that war will be a determinative factor in our collective future for decades ahead". The document proposes several measures to support Ukraine amid its ongoing conflict, mainly through a "Porcupine strategy" to enhance Ukraine's defence and security capacity. The "Porcupine strategy" includes elements such as:  Increased Military Assistance - The EU and its Member States should significantly step up military and other assistance to Ukraine (providing large-calibre artillery ammunition with a target of delivering a minimum of 2 million rounds per year, supplying air defence systems, missiles (including deep precision strikes), and drones, supporting Ukraine's procurement of drones and further developing its production capacity through joint ventures with European industries and training and equipping Ukrainian brigades and supporting the regeneration of battalions). Direct Support to Ukraine's Defense Industry (the document emphasises the importance of directly supporting Ukraine's defence industry (encouraging EU Member States to procure directly from Ukraine's defence industry for donations to Ukraine and utilising EU loans to boost Ukraine's defence industry spending, estimated to reach around EUR 35 billion in productive capacity by 2025). Enhanced Military Mobility (the EU aims to improve military mobility corridors extending into Ukraine, facilitating smoother deliveries of military assistance and enhancing interoperability). Access to EU Space Assets (Ukraine should have enhanced access to EU space-based governmental services, which would aid in its defence capabilities). Coordination of Military Support (the EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell will coordinate military support for Ukraine, enhancing collaboration with NATO and other partners). Integration of Ukraine into EU Defense Initiatives (the document proposes integrating Ukraine's defence industry into EU initiatives and encouraging its participation in collaborative defence projects. Conclusion A 'Security and Defence Union' (SDU) has been recently proposed as a new institutional form of military cooperation among EU Members.  It is suggested that the SDU includes the UK, and given the special attention paid to Ukraine in the White Paper, it is logical to surmise that it (Ukraine) will also be a de facto member. The devil lies in details, however, and so financially speaking, Europeans have to address numerous challenges. For example, the European Defence Fund (EDF) details Euro 8 billion over 7 years (approx. Euro 1.12 billion/year), supports R&D, and has committed Euro 5.4 billion since May 2021.        Meeting these ambitious goals will be especially challenging given the funding constraints (EU instruments like EDF and EDIP have limited impact; EDIP at €750 million/year is less than 1% of €90 billion 2024 procurement, needs €9 billion/year for 10% impact), capability and industry gaps (post-Cold War cuts left significant gaps, needing €160 billion by 2018 if 2008 levels maintained, €1.1 trillion if all spent 2% GDP 2006-2020), political and partnership issues (US scepticism, especially under second Trump administration, makes EU states cautious), policy integration (balancing security and economic priorities).  Against this backdrop, Germany claims to rise to the occasion and take the leading role, passing a new defence budget, referred to by media as 'bazooka'.  A massive increase in military spending is paralleled by another military aid package to Ukraine (The €3 billion package approved by the Bundestag Budget Committee comes on top of the €4 billion in military aid to Ukraine already planned in the 2025 budget).  Where does it leave NATO? 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Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise to power in 2002, one might ask whether we can speak of an Erdoğan Doctrine in Turkish foreign policy. The answer is no. Unlike classical doctrines that follow a consistent ideological or strategic framework, Erdoğan’s approach to both domestic and international politics is marked by pragmatic opportunism, transactional maneuvering, and tactical adaptability. His foreign policy does not stem from a fixed set of principles but rather from a fluid, recalibrated strategy designed to ensure political survival, power consolidation, and economic self-preservation. Yet, despite this adaptability, Erdoğan has consistently instrumentalized Islamism, Ottoman nostalgia, and Turkish nationalism as mobilizing forces, shaping both Turkey’s domestic landscape and its global positioning. These ideological currents serve not as doctrinal foundations but as strategic tools, deployed selectively to consolidate power and justify an increasingly interventionist and authoritarian foreign policy. Rather than an Erdoğan Doctrine, what we observe is a dynamic political strategy, one that shifts according to regional and global realities, balancing ideological rhetoric with realpolitik pragmatism. Erdoğan’s political trajectory has been characterized by extreme opportunism. Early in his tenure, he presented himself as a pro-Western democrat, championing Turkey’s EU membership and economic liberalization. However, as his grip on power consolidated, he shifted towards authoritarian populism, discrediting Western institutions and embracing an anti-Western, neo-Ottomanist discourse. His ability to manipulate ideological positions for strategic gain suggests that Erdoğan’s doctrine is less about consistent principles and more about sustaining power through ideological fluidity. This transactional nature extends to foreign policy, where Erdoğan has engaged in contradictory alliances. Turkey has simultaneously sought stronger ties with Russia while maintaining a position in NATO, balancing relations with Iran while confronting it in Syria, and denouncing Western imperialism while leveraging economic ties with the EU. The 2016 failed coup attempt marked a pivotal moment, after which Erdoğan’s rhetoric became deeply anti-Western, securitizing foreign policy as an extension of domestic political struggles. One of the defining characteristics of the Erdoğan strategy is the obliteration of the traditional boundary between domestic and foreign policy. In Erdoğan’s Turkey, foreign policy decisions are primarily driven by domestic political calculations rather than long-term strategic considerations. Military operations in Syria and Libya were framed as nationalist victories, consolidating Erdoğan’s support base while deflecting attention from economic crises. Political rivals and dissidents are routinely accused of being Western puppets or linked to foreign conspiracies, reinforcing anti-Western nationalism. Erdoğan actively uses the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a political tool, portraying himself as the protector of Muslims abroad and positioning Turkey as the leader of a global Islamic movement. This lack of distinction between internal and external affairs means that every foreign policy move is designed for domestic legitimacy. Military interventions, diplomatic crises, and economic policies are all packaged for domestic consumption to maintain Erdoğan’s image as a leader defying Western hegemony. Erdoğan has strategically invoked Islamist rhetoric and Ottoman nostalgia to mask domestic corruption, repression, and economic mismanagement. His use of Islamism is highly pragmatic rather than ideological. While Erdoğan once promoted a pro-business, moderate Islamist stance, he has increasingly aligned with more radical Islamic groups to rally conservative voters. Neo-Ottomanist narratives have been used to justify interventions in the Middle East and Africa, portraying Turkey as the rightful heir to regional leadership. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has become an ideological tool for Erdoğan, framing his rule as divinely sanctioned while attacking secular and Western influences. Erdoğan’s economic policies reflect the same transactional nature. He has oscillated between free-market policies to attract Western investment and state-led crony capitalism to consolidate his own economic elite. However, his militarization of foreign policy has created deep economic vulnerabilities. Erdoğan’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 missiles resulted in U.S. sanctions and exclusion from the F-35 program, exacerbating Turkey’s economic downturn.  Aggressive gas exploration efforts isolated Turkey from the EU and regional actors, worsening trade relations. While Erdoğan has relied on Qatari financial support, recent Gulf rapprochements have left Turkey geopolitically and economically vulnerable. Turkey’s economic dependence on Western markets and capital contradicts Erdoğan’s anti-Western rhetoric, further proving that his doctrine is driven by short-term political survival rather than a coherent strategic vision. Rather than a structured geopolitical vision, the Erdoğan strategy is best understood as a political survival mechanism that combines: Extreme pragmatism and transactionalism, shifting alliances and ideological positions as needed; the fusion of domestic and foreign policy, where foreign affairs are a continuation of domestic power struggles; the instrumentalization of Islamism and Ottoman nostalgia, masking authoritarianism and economic decline; short-term opportunism at the cost of long-term strategy, leading to Turkey’s increasing diplomatic and economic isolation. Erdoğan’s rule has been marked by ad-hoc decisions, contradictions, and reactive policies that serve his immediate political needs rather than a grand vision for Turkey’s future. This transactional-opportunism makes the Erdoğan Doctrine an impossibility—while he projects an image of Islamic, nationalist leadership, his foreign policy is dictated by opportunism, insecurity, and personal political survival. The consequences of this approach are a weakened economy, diplomatic isolation, and an increasingly authoritarian state, making the long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s model highly uncertain.  Another major characteristic of Erdoğan’s strategy is the securitization of domestic and foreign policy. Since Erdoğan ascended to the presidency in 2014, and particularly after the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant transformations. These changes are marked by a growing reliance on securitization—the framing of domestic and international challenges as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures. Erdoğan’s approach has been shaped by three key factors: Islamist ideology, Ottoman nostalgia, and the deep-seated trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres. These factors have driven Turkey into high-risk foreign policy ventures, many of which have backfired, leading to strategic isolation, economic instability, and declining influence on the global stage. Erdoğan’s political strategy has been centered on constructing an image of perpetual threat to the Turkish state and nation. This approach is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of betrayal and encirclement—most prominently symbolized by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which sought to partition Anatolia and subject it to foreign control. This “Sèvres Syndrome” has been instrumentalized to justify an aggressive foreign policy, military interventions, and an increasingly authoritarian domestic stance.  Erdoğan has fused Turkish nationalism with political Islam, portraying Turkey as both the heir to the Ottoman Empire and the champion of Sunni Muslims. This synthesis has fueled a revisionist foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. However, these ambitions have often led Turkey into conflicts with former allies and regional powers, undermining its strategic position. Erdoğan’s foreign policy, shaped by securitization, Islamist nostalgia, and historical trauma, has backfired spectacularly in multiple arenas. While he has sought to redefine Turkey as a great power, his tactics have instead led to growing regional isolation, economic instability, and internal discontent. The failure to balance nationalist rhetoric with pragmatic diplomacy has left Turkey more vulnerable than ever—caught between Western skepticism, Russian opportunism, and Middle Eastern volatility. Unless Erdoğan recalibrates his approach, Turkey risks further decline in both regional and global affairs. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdoğan came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation, shifting from a Western-oriented, EU-focused trajectory to a more assertive, independent, and, increasingly, anti-Western stance. While initially adopting a “thin populist” approach that emphasized regional engagement, neo-Ottomanist rhetoric, and Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and West, the AKP’s foreign policy has evolved into a “thick populist” approach dominated by a strong anti-Western narrative. This transformation was solidified after the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and, even more so, after the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, which the Turkish government blamed on the West-backed Gülen Movement. The growing securitization of Western powers and the increasing emphasis on Turkey’s Islamic and civilizational identity have led to an overt de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Erdoğan’s securitization of foreign policy has manifested in several high-risk ventures that have largely failed to achieve their intended objectives: Turkey’s military interventions in Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring) were aimed at eradicating the Kurdish YPG, which Ankara views as an extension of the PKK.  However, this policy has led to severe tensions with the United States, which has supported the YPG as a key ally against ISIS. The result is a diplomatic impasse that has weakened Turkey’s influence in Syria while increasing its military entanglements. Turkey’s intervention in Libya, backing the Government of National Accord (GNA) against Khalifa Haftar, was an extension of Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. While it temporarily secured Turkish energy and maritime interests, it alienated Egypt, the UAE, France, and Greece, leading to counteralliances that have restricted Turkish maneuverability.  Erdoğan’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system was framed as a move for strategic autonomy but resulted in sanctions from the United States and exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet program. While this was meant to demonstrate Turkey’s independence, it has made the country increasingly reliant on Moscow, further complicating relations with NATO. Erdoğan’s aggressive posture has damaged Turkey’s relations with Western allies, leading to economic consequences, loss of diplomatic leverage, and isolation in Europe. Erdoğan’s confrontational approach—such as threatening to flood Europe with refugees—has eroded trust and reinforced perceptions of Turkey as an unpredictable and transactional partner. Erdoğan’s security-driven foreign policy has had dire economic consequences. The Turkish lira has suffered dramatic depreciation, foreign investment has declined, and inflation has soared. The Turkish public, initially supportive of Erdoğan’s assertiveness, is increasingly disillusioned as economic hardship worsens. Erdoğan’s securitization of policy has created short-term political gains but long-term strategic vulnerabilities. No one takes Turkey as a credible ally. His nationalist-Islamist rhetoric has been effective in consolidating domestic support, especially among conservative and nationalist voters, but it has also deepened Turkey’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Finally, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has been anti-Western.  A key driver of Erdoğan’s anti-Western foreign policy has been the gradual populist transformation of the AKP and consolidation of his power by purging other prominent personalities within the party.  Initially, under the leadership of Erdoğan, the party adopted a moderate, reformist discourse that prioritized EU membership, economic liberalization, and cooperation with Western allies. However, over time, populist tendencies became dominant, with Erdoğan increasingly portraying himself as the true representative of the “real” Turkish people against both domestic and international elites. Populist foreign policy, as seen in Turkey and elsewhere, follows a binary logic that pits “the virtuous people” against “the corrupt elite.” In the Turkish context, this binary has been extended to the international arena, with the West—Europe and the United States—constructed as the foreign equivalent of the corrupt elite, standing in opposition to Turkey’s rightful role as a global power.  The early years of AKP rule were marked by a pragmatic approach that balanced Turkey’s Western orientation with a regionalist vision. This period saw active engagement with the EU, NATO, and the U.S., while at the same time expanding relations with the Middle East, Balkans, and Africa under Ahmet Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” doctrine. During this era, anti-Western rhetoric was limited, and Turkey’s regional activism was framed as complementary to, rather than a rejection of, its Western ties. Following the Gezi Park protests and, more dramatically, the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan’s rhetoric became openly hostile toward the West. Western governments were accused of plotting against Turkey, harboring terrorists, and undermining Turkey’s sovereignty. Erdoğan framed his leadership as a struggle against an imperialist West determined to prevent Turkey’s rise. As he declared in 2019, “Turkey is now a country whose agenda is not determined [by others] but who determines her own agenda.” Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy became an extension of Erdoğan’s domestic populist struggle, where anti-Westernism served as both an ideological tool and a strategy for political survival. Another major factor behind Turkey’s anti-Western turn is the fusion of Islamist and nationalist discourses, which have become the defining ideological pillars of Erdoğan’s foreign policy. This ideological shift is best understood through the contrast between Kemalism and Neo-Ottomanism. Traditionally, Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by Westernization, secularism, and nationalism. The country’s founding ideology sought integration with Europe, NATO membership, and alignment with the U.S. in the Cold War. However, Kemalist elites were also skeptical of foreign entanglements, leading to a cautious and isolationist diplomacy. Neo-Ottomanism and the “New Turkey” Vision of Erdoğan is anti-Western, Islamists, and serves for Erdoğan’s regime survival rather than national interest of the country. Under Erdoğan, a revisionist historical narrative emerged, portraying the Ottoman Empire as a great civilization that was undermined by Western colonialism and internal betrayals. In this vision, modern Turkey is the rightful heir of the Ottoman legacy and should reclaim its leadership role in the Islamic world. Erdoğan has repeatedly invoked the trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920)—which proposed partitioning Turkey—as evidence that the West continues to conspire against Turkish sovereignty.  This ideological framework has shaped Turkey’s new foreign policy identity, positioning it as a leader of the Muslim world rather than a subordinate member of the Western alliance. As Erdoğan’s government became more authoritarian and Islamist, relations with the EU steadily deteriorated. The post-2016 crackdown on opposition figures, journalists, and academics led to increasing criticism from European leaders, reinforcing Erdoğan’s narrative that the EU is hypocritical, biased, and Islamophobic. While Turkey officially remains an EU candidate country, Erdoğan has openly questioned the sincerity of European leaders, arguing that the EU is a “Christian club” that will never accept a Muslim-majority country.  Erdoğan’s government has rejected Western liberal values, reversing democratic reforms and undermining the independence of judicial institutions, the media, and civil society. As a result, Turkey has moved closer to authoritarian models seen in Russia, China, and the Gulf states. Erdoğan’s anti-Western and de-Europeanized foreign policy is not just a reaction to specific diplomatic disputes—it is a structural transformation rooted in populism, ideology, and strategic recalibration. By casting the West as Turkey’s primary “other,” Erdoğan has crafted a nationalist-Islamist narrative that legitimizes his power, mobilizes his base, and redefines Turkey’s role in the world.  While this approach has granted Turkey short-term strategic flexibility, it has also left it increasingly isolated, economically vulnerable, and diplomatically constrained. The long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s foreign policy remains uncertain, especially as domestic economic troubles and shifting global dynamics continue to reshape Turkey’s geopolitical landscape. One of the key arguments in understanding Turkey’s foreign policy shift is the interaction between domestic authoritarianism and international behavior. Unlike traditional middle powers, which pursue stability, Turkey’s domestic political dynamics—specifically Erdoğan’s populist authoritarian rule—have fueled its unusual, risk-prone foreign policy choices. Erdoğan has increasingly used foreign policy as a tool for domestic political survival, framing Turkey as a besieged nation fighting Western imperialists. Opposition parties are often accused of being aligned with “foreign agents” or Western powers, further deepening polarization. Nationalist rhetoric has been amplified during military operations, boosting public support for interventions in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Whether French or European, the strategy of nuclear deterrence is governed by one absolute rule: it is not an end in itself, but means to an end, so that we cannot put the atomic cart before the political horse. To avoid getting bogged down for the umpteenth time in futile discussions about a European nuclear deterrent, let's recall the fundamental principles of this strategy. Deterrence is a mode of operation with a negative goal as old as war itself. Aimed at preventing an adversary's offensive intentions, it has been used with varying degrees of success due to its random nature. It is based on the calculation of probabilities. Usually, if an aggressor takes the risk of transgressing deterrence based on conventional forces and its venture goes wrong, the aggressor has gambled and lost, suffering at worst the humiliation of defeat. With nuclear weapons, deterrence now takes on a whole new dimension, since the probability of nuclear retaliation entails the risk of an exorbitant loss, said to be unbearable, exceeding the value of what is at stake. The strategy of nuclear deterrence is not peace. It cannot prevent limited regional conflicts or suppress terrorist action. It can only be applied in the event of a massive attack of any kind against the vital interests of the country under attack. This “perimeter of vitality” does not have to be precisely defined, but is left to the discretion of the Head of State, so as to create uncertainty for the would-be aggressor. The strategy of nuclear deterrence is based on five identified principles, theorized in France by Generals Gallois [1] and Poirier. [2] Principle of credibility: nuclear deterrence requires the creation and demonstration of technical capabilities. This was the role of the tests suspended indefinitely in 1994 and prohibited by treaty (CTBT). Principle of permanence: the SDN is ensured by the Head of State, who is the sole decision-maker, with 24-hour access to electronic codes and means of transmission to strategic air forces on standby and submarines on patrol. Principle of uncertainty: “the deterrent effect results from the combination of certainty and uncertainty in the mental field of a would-be aggressor: certainty as to the existence of an unacceptable risk... uncertainty as to the exact conditions of application of the model in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.” Principle of sufficiency: for a medium-sized power like France, in terms of quantity and quality, neither too much nor too sophisticated. During the Cold War, this was known as “deterrence of the weak by the strong” (the strong being the Soviet Union, which French leaders wisely never named explicitly). To avoid embarking on a ruinous arms race, two conditions need to be met: A. An invulnerable nuclear force capable of retaliating in the event of aggression (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines - SNLE - are permanently undetectable). It is essential to provide redundancy in the event of human or technical failure. B. Ability to penetrate enemy defenses. There is no such thing as 100% interception. The damage remains tolerable if the explosive charges are conventional, but if they are nuclear, the problem changes completely. An SSBN salvo sends 96 charges that can “vitrify” potentially as many targets. No defense system would be able to intercept them, no matter how much progress is made. All the more so as these warheads are surrounded by decoys, maneuverable (change of trajectory) and stealthy (low radar signature). This lasting superiority of aggression over protection means that the SDN is the only response. Principle of proportionality: the amount of “unbearable” destruction is related to the value of what is at stake. In this case, is the invasion and conquest of France worth the annihilation of one or more of the aggressor's vital centers?  So what should be the target? “Anticité” (men) or antiforces (weapons)? Progress in precision has made it possible to target smaller areas with greater precision. The official line is that France is no longer targeting cities, but rather the command centers of nuclear forces and political decision-making centers. However, such targets are rarely located in the heart of deserts, but have the bad taste of being buried deep in the middle of densely populated areas. The creation of a European strategic nuclear deterrent will therefore have to go along with all these principles. How and with what facilities? The stakes for the aggressor would change dimension. From the vital interests of France alone, we would move on to those of all the member states of the European Union, or at the very least, of those who would agree to join us. The calculation of proportionality would be affected, with ipso facto repercussions on the principle of sufficiency. Given its flexibility and visibility, should the air component be expanded? Should the number of nuclear weapons be increased? Should territorial positioning be extended, where and how far? Could France extend its nuclear deterrent to cover the interests of its European partners?  The nuclear “umbrella” declared by U.S. leaders since Kennedy's Defense Secretary McNamara has often been the subject of skepticism about its credibility, starting with General de Gaulle. Donald Trump openly exposes the eminently selfish nature of nuclear weapons. Who can still believe today that this President and his successors would sacrifice New York for Warsaw, Berlin or Paris? A fortiori, are the citizens of the countries of Europe prepared to make their existence dependent on the decision of the French President alone? Who could believe that he would sacrifice Paris for Tallinn? In truth, if the allies (European and Asian) thought they could rely on the commitment of the United States, it was because of the growing strength of American conventional forces capable of effectively opposing non-nuclear aggression. Any comparison with the USA is therefore absurd. Together, do the EU states have 11 aircraft carriers? 14 strategic nuclear submarines? Do their navies lock up world trade routes? Do they control Space? The little European frog won't reach the enormity of the American ox. But would this be necessary if their governments were to make an objective assessment of the real threat, free from ideological prejudices and corporatist interests? Let's move on to the crux of deterrence: the cost of “burden-sharing”, NATO's constant worry. Are states like Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland prepared to pay for the construction of a so-called European nuclear deterrent, without having access to the ultimate decision? Money is also time. A single multi-state nuclear strategy cannot be improvised overnight. Are we forgetting that some EU members do not perceive Russia as a threat; that others, like Austria, are leaders in favor of a ban on nuclear weapons? Last but not least, where would the post-Brexit United Kingdom fit into this scheme? Even if the will is strong and widely shared, the political, financial and technical development of a nuclear deterrent involving a number of European states will take time, on the order of several years. What will the Russian Federation look like, and how will US-China competition have evolved in five to ten years' time? Peacetime declarations (Franco-German, Franco-British) often express only grand illusions or pious hopes that cost nothing. The true ally is seen at the foot of the war, when egoistic realism reclaims its icy rights.  Yet for the past twenty years, in every crisis (financial, migratory, health - Covid- and military - Ukraine-), the EU has shown itself to be unprepared, slow to react and, above all, divided. The creation of a credible NED is therefore in flagrant contradiction with the very existence of the EU in its current form and operation. We need to return to the foundations of the Community project. Those countries of Europe which share a rigorously identical conception of their global situation, to the point of merging their vital interests, will have to agree on a lasting political framework defining common goals, in a sort of Charter; to equip themselves accordingly with a military alliance such as a European Defense Society for as long as deemed necessary; to guarantee themselves by a European Intelligence Community. Whether French or European, the strategy of nuclear deterrence is subject to one absolute rule: it is not an end in itself, but means to an end, so that we cannot put the atomic cart before the political horse. Copyrights for his picture : Copyright Mars 2025-Géré/Diploweb.com Marie-France Géré

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On 8 December 2024, the streets of Damascus erupted in a mix of jubilation and uncertainty as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist militia with roots as an al-Qaeda offshoot, toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime after a stunning 11-day offensive. Overnight, Syria’s transitional government, led by HTS commander Ahmed al-Sharaa, emerged from the ashes of a decades-long dictatorship. Within days, Turkey reopened its embassy, Saudi Arabia offered a diplomatic relationship, and the U.S. lifted al-Sharaa’s $10 million bounty after a meeting. By December 2024, Qatar and France recognized this authority, while Russia, Britain, and Iraq showed openness. Yet, this swift acceptance of an unelected, terrorist-rooted regime—akin to the Taliban’s 2021 takeover— undermines established norms. It sidelines democracy, excuses HTS’s violent past, and frays a rules-based order as states favor strategy over law. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 and HTS’s rapid rise in Syria highlight a troubling trend: military control trumps democratic legitimacy and accountability. This pattern, driven by inconsistent global recognition standards, risks emboldening extremist factions—such as the Islamic State in Iraq, Al Qaeda in Yemen, and Lebanon’s Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-Islam, Hurras al-Din, and Jund al-Sham—to pursue similar strategies, further destabilizing a region already scarred by sectarian conflict. The rise of HTS has shown that states prioritize strategic interests over legal values. Turkey, a long-time supporter of the Syrian opposition, acted swiftly: on December 12, 2024, intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin visited Damascus, pledging support for stabilization efforts. Two days later, its embassy reopened, affirming prior ties. Saudi Arabia, countering Iran, followed: on January 24, 2025, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan met al-Sharaa in Damascus; a week later, on February 2, al-Sharaa’s Riyadh visit—his first as leader—sealed a diplomatic win. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s warm welcome signaled Arab recognition. Qatar recognized the transitional government and dispatched a delegation to Damascus on December 12. France endorsed HTS through envoy Jean-François Guillaume’s mid-December talks. The U.S. opted for de facto engagement, lifting al-Sharaa’s bounty after a December meeting. On February 12, Russia’s Vladimir Putin held a constructive call with al-Sharaa, moving to delist HTS as a terrorist group. Iraq invited al-Sharaa to a May 2025 Arab Summit, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi welcomed him to a March 4 Cairo summit, where he met Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and urged Israel’s withdrawal from southern Syria. The UN’s Geir Pedersen, meeting al-Sharaa in December, pushed for inclusivity under Resolution 2254. The Taliban’s slower path to acceptance contrasts sharply. Since seizing Afghanistan in 2021, it has ruled without elections or a constitution, lacking de jure recognition by February 2025 despite ties with China, Russia, and Pakistan. Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey keep pragmatic links, while Saudi Arabia reopened its Kabul embassy in December 2024. The U.S., via Qatar and UN channels, prioritizes humanitarian needs over legitimacy. Its exclusionary rule—banning women’s education, sidelining minorities—defies norms, hindering broader acceptance. HTS has gained quicker goodwill. Al-Sharaa’s inclusivity pledges, invitations to ex-Ba’athists like Farouk al-Sharaa, and prisoner releases suggest moderation. Unlike the Taliban’s gender apartheid, HTS avoids barring women from public life—though its stance is untested. Assad’s fall, marked by war crimes, casts HTS as a liberator. Yet, the world overlooks HTS’s dark past, swapping Assad’s autocracy for an unproven group. The vulnerability of parts of Asia and the Middle East to terrorist groups seizing power raises concerns that this could become a repeatable strategy. The constitutive theory, tying legitimacy to recognition, falters as HTS gains de facto and formal backing. If brute force proves sufficient for recognition, groups like ISKP in Afghanistan or AQAP in Yemen may seek to replicate this model. Hurras al-Din in Idlib, Jaish al-Adl on Iran’s border, or the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan could exploit vacuums. Syria risks losing oil fields to ISIS; Iraq’s fault lines invite resurgence; Yemen aids AQAP; Lebanon tempts jihadists; and Iran faces border threats. In Yemen, where Houthis battle a crumbling south, AQAP could seize on HTS’s success, potentially making Aden a jihadist hub. Lebanon, reeling from Hezbollah’s 2023-24 clash with Israel and economic collapse, invites Sunni extremists to exploit rifts—Arsal, a militant border town, could be next. Iraq’s rural areas, stalked by ISIS cells, risk resurgence if Baghdad weakens. These nations, scarred by proxy wars and failed governance, face greater threats as HTS’s model hints territorial conquest can win tolerance, if not legitimacy. The recognition of Syria’s HTS-led government could galvanize terrorist groups within, sparking crises as they emulate territorial takeover for acceptance. The unrest in Jaramana, a Damascus suburb, shows this: Syria sent forces after a militia linked to Assad’s regime killed an officer at a checkpoint, defying surrender. Lieutenant Colonel Hussam al-Tahan told SANA it targets illegal groups, but the clash—amid Israel’s Druze defense claim—reveals how militias, emboldened by HTS, could exploit weak authority. Hurras al-Din and Islamic State might seize territory, worsening chaos post-Assad.  This danger has erupted in Syria’s Alawite coastal strongholds, where security forces clashed with pro-Assad gunmen in Latakia and Tartous in early March 2025, leaving over 130 dead, per the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of HTS has fueled such unrest, inviting rival factions to seize territory and seek similar recognition. Israel, claiming to protect minorities, and Iran, potentially backing the Alawites, exploit this chaos—pushing Syria toward partition and creating a fractured state where power supersedes law. For global powers, HTS’s recognition poses a strategic quandary. Iran lost Assad—a major blow in the region. The U.S. and allies, vocal on democracy, weigh their anti-Iran stance against an unelected jihadist regime. This gain could falter if HTS turns radical or if Russia and China exploit the playbook, making the Middle East a proxy chessboard. The strategy—“take territory, wait for acceptance”—worked for the Taliban’s 20-year efforts and HTS’s rapid strike. Without stringent conditions, states risk legitimizing power without elections. Al-Sharaa’s claim on December 30 that elections might take four years met no pushback from the U.S. or Europe—a silence signaling stability over democracy, but at what cost? This precedent erodes core values of international relations, including democracy, accountability, and human rights. HTS’s unelected rule, like the Taliban’s, skirts these norms. De facto engagement—embassies, trade, talks—grants resources without treaty adherence. Their past atrocities—HTS’s civilian attacks, the Taliban’s Al Qaeda ties—go unaddressed, their intentions untested by enforceable promises. Trade with third parties, like China’s mineral deals in Afghanistan or Turkey’s ventures in Syria, risks fueling corruption—Afghanistan’s opium trade now accounts for 90% of the world’s heroin supply, thriving in a governance vacuum. The rush to recognize HTS reflects a realist scramble: Turkey secures its border, Saudi Arabia counters Iran, the U.S. and Israel weaken Tehran’s proxies—without troops. This low-cost, high-impact model could tempt wider use. States might back ISIS in Iraq or AQAP in Yemen to reshape the region. Turkey’s HTS success hinges on moderation; elsewhere, it risks chaos. The lack of a global standard—each state acting independently—undermines international law’s predictability. UN guidelines tying recognition to elections could align legitimacy without rigidity. For now, HTS fills Assad’s vacuum, but at a cost: A Middle East where terrorists become politicians, eroding democracy in a fragile region. Stability today risks a wildfire tomorrow—unless this game is rethought.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This departs from an assumption that the EU is an outstanding example of liberal institutionalism. It has been very successful in providing lasting peace for Europeans who are now facing a series of existential challenges.The central hypothesis of this paper is that if these challenges are not addressed effectively, the EU may not survive in the long term.The first part of the analysis explores five external challenges that affected the macroeconomic and political environments of the EU in the third decade of the 21st century.The second part of the analysis signals five internal and more profound challenges the EU must face if it wants to continue in any viable form.The author concludes that the future of the world order and, by extension, the environment of the EU will most likely be decided by three great powers: the US, China, and Russia. Keywords: EU, Great Powers, World Order, US, China, Russia Introduction 2024 is exactly 20 years since the so-called ‘Big Bang enlargement’, which is why the author of this paper takes the liberty of looking at the future of the European Union (EU). The EU is, according to voluminous literature, the best working example of Liberal Institutionalism, which at its very core is about prescribing peace and security. Yet, the EU project seems derailed in the last few years and is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. This lack of internal cohesion is arguably based on several political phenomena: overregulation, ideologisation, and bureaucratisation being the proverbial tip of the iceberg. This paper examines the EU's economic and political environment and then lists five most pressing challenges it must face to survive as an institution. British citizens have already shown the first ‘red card.’ Core external challenges - the macroeconomic and political environments To say that the contemporary world is complex is to state an obvious truism. However, five phenomena should be outlined here as significant variables regarding the EU’s environment. Firstly and most fundamentally, the changes in the international political economy and corresponding structural changes that undermine states’ positions. What we are witnessing is the emergence of non less than the New World Order, which not only challenges the so-called traditional great powers by shifting the centre of gravity to the East but, perhaps most importantly, challenges the position of state actors as ‘shakers and movers’ of the international system. The Great Reset and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are phenomenal examples of the challenges ahead. Secondly, the ongoing war in Ukraine. Apart from obvious regional European relevance, it should also be analysed globally. Russian invasion threatens principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. If allowed and left unchecked, it encourages other acts of aggression, and in doing so, it confirms a worrying trend according to which the so-called great powers stand above international law. The war draws attention to Ukraine's strategic importance as a large European country. In that sense, the outcome of the conflict will shape the balance of power on the continent. It tests the Western alliance and its response to such challenges. Moreover, it bears global economic consequences—Ukraine & Russia are significant exporters of grain, energy, and raw materials. Prolonged conflict involving these two risks, long-term inflation and food/fuel shortages abroad, is equivalent to the global spread of instability. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict bears an uncanny resemblance to a proxy war between the East and the West competition. An argument could be made that it can be seen as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, where Russia’s victory strengthens authoritarianism abroad. Finally, let us not forget the nuclear aspects of the conflict. A risk of direct Western involvement would raise the threat of nuclear escalation. The outcome could influence nonproliferation norms for security assurance. Thirdly, and partly as a response to the above two phenomena, there comes the question of German leadership/vision of the future of the EU. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two stand out among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[1] Fourthly, and again in significant part as a response to the first two phenomena, we are witnessing unprecedented resistance among large sections of European societies. In particular, the now openly verbalised and physically demonstrated dissatisfaction mainly, but not exclusively by the farmers, to the seemingly inevitable plan for the green transition as heralded by the ‘Fit-for-55’. It is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 [2]. This ambitious initiative includes actions in fourteen areas, from the reform of the EU’s emissions trading system through reducing emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste to regulation on methane emissions reduction. Effectively, this means that EU farmers will have to accept an unprecedented and unequal burden. On top of that, there is a question of Ukrainian farming products that enter the European market in equally unprecedented quantities. This prompts many farmers to demonstrate their objections towards their governments and the European Commission by blocking capital cities and transportation arteries across the block. The protests are massive in their character, with thousands upon thousands across most EU member states. Political elites in Europe probably had not expected this and possibly have not experienced such a level of dissatisfaction and resistance towards their policies since the creation of the European Union. Farmers have been aided by other professional groups, from truckers to taxi drivers and even ordinary citizens. Notably, the protests are a bottom-up initiative, though they have also drawn the attention of right-wing parties.[3] Last but not least, there is the question of massive immigration to the EU from outside Europe and consequent challenges to social cohesion in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. As of the writing of this paper (2025), more and more members of the societies of Western EU countries challenge the official narrative of their governments based on the assumption that massive immigration is primarily positive for the economies and that large numbers of non-Europeans pose no threat to the quality of life and security of ordinary citizens (the phenomenon referred to earlier by the author of this paper as ‘a-securitisation’ – Sliwinski, 2016).[4] Worse still, the differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the EU, namely Hungary under Victor Orban, pose a formidable challenge to the immigration policy of the entire EU and, consequently, the future of the EU's integrity. It is not unimaginable at this stage to fathom a day when Hungary, like Britain before, decides to leave the EU,[5] pressured by Brussels and Berlin to accept thousands of immigrants from the Middle East or Africa. Slovakia could follow suit. Core internal challenges – the weakness from within Many of these problems were accidentally quite openly expressed by J. D. Vance, US Vice President, during his speech at the latest Munich Security Conference (February 14th, 2025). Vance did not spare strong criticism directed at European elites and, in a typical ‘American fashion’, called a spade a spade. His criticism of the EU included six general points: retreat from democratic values, censorship and limitations on the freedom of speech, limitations of religious liberties, lack of election integrity, uncontrolled mass migration, and the general unwillingness of the political elites to engage with views other than those of the left and even tendency to suppress dissent.[6] - Centralisation (Federalisation) Today, the EU continues to centralise, particularly in response to challenges like the economic crisis COVID-19, taking on more fiscal policy, health, and security responsibilities. This trend is evident in recent proposals, such as the European Commission’s role in determining budgetary paths, but it faces resistance from member states concerned about losing sovereignty. Historically, the EU has been moving to a federation through recent treaty revisions: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). According to Alberto Mingardi from the GIS, there is a so-called ‘creeping power grab’ phenomenon.  “It assumes that Brussels should become more powerful while Rome, Berlin and Paris less so. [...] europhiles tend to look for opportunities that might allow them to give carte blanche to Brussels, albeit beginning with apparently limited endeavours. Hence, the EU is supposed to grow through crises, and thanks to crises, whatever the problem or issue, it could foster a slice of national sovereignty that can be cut and brought up to a higher level. Behind this, there is an overarching belief in the higher efficiency of centralisation, which is perhaps the true landmark of modern politics. Politicians trust themselves more than the taxpayers; they seek a single control room, and the more it controls, the better. This approach fits well with a protectionist outlook of economics, which sees Europe (‘fortress Europe’, as some say) as one trading bloc set to countervail others (the US, China).”[7] The centralisation (federalisation) logic rests heavily on the arguments presented by legalism. On the one hand, it derives from the strict and literal reading of regulations. On the other, it implies that no sphere of life should be left unregulated. Consequently, overregulation has become a characteristic feature of the European Union.[8] Additionally, the overregulation leads to the often cited democratic deficit,[9] exemplified by the fact that the majority of European legislation that EU member states are obliged to follow is proposed by nonelected technocrats working for the European Commission. - Demographic Decline and Social Welfare An ageing population and falling birth rates threaten the EU’s long-term economic stability and social welfare systems. With a shrinking workforce, funding pensions, healthcare, and social services is increasingly difficult, particularly in weaker economies. This demographic shift also amplifies labour shortages, prompting debates over immigration as a solution—yet one that risks further political backlash as it will inevitably affect European identity. According to available data, Europe is the only continent projected to experience population decline until 2070, with the EU's working-age population (20–64 years) expected to decrease by around 20%. Concurrently, the share of older individuals (65 years or older) will be the second highest globally among large economies. This demographic shift poses significant challenges, potentially undermining the EU's economic and social model, exacerbating existing disparities, and creating political divisions among Member States if not adequately addressed.[10] According to Eurostat, The natural population change (difference between live births and deaths) has been negative since 2012. This is primarily due to the ageing population described in this publication and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2022.[11] - Economic Competitiveness and Growth After the so-called Big Bang Enlargement, all available data suggests that the gap between the EU and the US with regards to GDP output has been steadily growing, that is to say, that the US economy, which recently has been experiencing huge problems, still has been developing faster than the EU.[12] Contemporary the EU is grappling with stagnating economic growth and a loss of competitiveness compared to global powers like the United States and China. High regulatory burdens, internal market fragmentation, and insufficient investment in innovation and technology hinder its ability to keep pace. The growing threat of US tariffs under a second Trump administration will only likely exacerbate these issues, disrupting supply chains and increasing costs. Additionally, the EU’s energy dependence—highlighted by the shift away from Russian gas after the Ukraine invasion—has driven up costs, further straining industries and economies, particularly in countries like Germany.[13] - Weakness as an international actor Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to pose a significant security challenge. The conflict has exposed the EU’s reliance on NATO and the US for defence while increasing pressure to bolster its own military capabilities—sometimes referred to as a ‘European Defence Union’. Tensions with China, particularly over trade and technology, and uncertainty about US commitment to transatlantic alliances add to the geopolitical strain. The EU must also address hybrid threats (e.g., cyberattacks, disinformation) targeting critical sectors like energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. In light of this, Americans are already calling for much more input from the European members of NATO regarding their defence budgets (5% of GDP).[14] This will most likely reinvigorate calls for creating a European Army,[15] which no doubt will be dominated by Germany and France. German domination will be met with considerable unease by some Central and Eastern European Countries (members of the EU). At the same time as the recent meeting, Ryiad shows the US is not even treating the EU as a partner worthy of a place at the negotiating table.[16]When pressed by the likes of Trump and charged with not sharing a fair part of their own security costs, European political leaders invoke the notion of Europe as a normative power. Supposedly, though weak militarily, the EU and its members are a beacon of values such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In his seminal publications, Iaan Manners, argued that the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and legal constitution enable it to promote norms that go beyond state-centric concerns, particularly in areas such as human rights and the abolition of the death penalty. Manners claims that the EU's ability to define what is considered 'normal' in world politics is a significant aspect of its power, and this normative approach is crucial for understanding the EU's role in shaping international relations.[17] As nice as it sounds, it does not seem to bear much weight in the practice of international security in recent decades. It is the EU, in fact, as an institution and the political leadership of France, Germany, and the European Commissioner, who stand accused now of contradicting all of the above-mentioned values. The latest visit by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to Kiev, and her strong support for the continuation of war against Russia is a case in point.[18]   - Ideologisation 'Europeanism' has become an ideology shared among intellectual, political, judicatory, societal,  and even dominant economic elites that influence or shape the European Union as an institution and its major policies. As an ideology, 'Europeanism' is a somewhat exotic mixture of various seemingly incoherent trends that give the current European Union its intriguing characteristics. On the one hand, economically, one can easily identify numerous elements of neoliberalism, especially regarding the financial aspects of European integration. Likewise, arguments used by the major proponents of European integration vis-à-vis the USA, China, or Japan are of neoliberal character. At the same time, regarding international trade in agricultural products, intellectual property, or internal (single market) competition (freedom of labour), one quickly spots distinct elements of protectionism and overregulation. Finally, regarding philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, 'Europeanism' seems to focus mainly on the progressive agenda and a particular ‘obsession’ with climate change revocation. Conclusion As the Munich Security Conference confirmed, EU political elites are way out of touch with reality and a rapidly changing world. Their proverbial Europocentrism is based on, among others, self-precepted moral high grounds, a history of economic and political domination and exploitation, and an undiscerning belief in bureaucratic, if not technocratic, policy-making and regulation of every sphere of life and institutionalism. Their weakness is probably most accurately depicted by the reaction of the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Christoph Heusgen, who broke down during his closing remarks, unable to finish his speech.[19] He was patted on the back and given a hug. (This reaction must have undoubtedly caused bewilderment, if not pity, in Washinton, Beijing, and Moscow.) The original integration goals have little to do with today’s Eureaucrats’ obsessions with saving the planet or pushing for Diversity, Equality, and Inclusivity (DEI). With the election of Donald Trump, the world of the ‘Davos Men’ seems to be stalled. Interestingly, the EU is now one of the last standing actors to represent the ideology of globalism, with its tenets based on neoliberalism - unlimited free trade and the capturing role of international transnational companies. The rest of the world, including the US, seems to be moving in the opposite direction – the world driven by state actors. The world order, therefore, is likely to be directed by strong and nationally based governments from no, possibly the US, China and Russia – a ‘Concert of Powers’ of sorts. References ________________________________________[1] The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752[2] “Fit for 55”, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/[3] Tanno, Sophie and Liakos, Chris. “Farmers’ protests have erupted across Europe. Here’s why.” CNN, World, Europe. Last modified February 10, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/europe/europe-farmers-protests-explainer-intl/index.html[4] Sliwinski, Krzysztof. “‘A-Securitization’ of Immigration Policy - the Case of European Union.” Asia–Pacific Journal of EU Studies 14, no. 1: 25 -56.[5] Körömi, Csongor. “Hungary reveals plan to send asylum-seekers to Brussels.” Politico August 22. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-asylum-plan-brussels-migration-refugees-gergely-gulyas/[6] Pangambam, S. “Full Transcript: VP JD Vance. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference”. The SIngju Post. https://singjupost.com/full-transcript-vp-jd-vance-remarks-at-the-munich-security-conference/?singlepage=1[7] Mingardi, Alberto, “The EU’s future: Like Switzerland or more like Italy?”GIS, May 20, 2022. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-future/ see also: Dunleavy, P., and G. Kirchgässner. “Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis.” Edited by P. Moser, G. Schneider, and G. Kirchgässner. Decision Rules in the European Union, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62792-9_7.[8] Van Malleghem, Pieter-Augustijn. “Legalism and the European Union’s Rule of Law Crisis.” European Law Open 3, no. 1 (2024): 50–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2024.5.[9] Neuhold, C. Democratic Deficit in the European Union, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.1141.[10] Zalai, Csaba. “Too Little Too Late?” Európai Tükör 27, no. 1 (December 13, 2024): 169–93. https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2024.1.9.[11] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/demography-2024#population-change[12] See more at: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/wld/world/gdp-gross-domestic-product[13] See more at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-outlook-2025-the-impact-of-a-new-US-presidency?utm_campaign=MA00001133&utm_medium=paid-search&utm_source=eiu-google&utm_content=&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8fW9BhC8ARIsACwHqYqwk_M8I--YkZ_fiDS6leiOiRLjPXlG63SHjKwQZgP2kaovx_sc4qIaAkGYEALw_wcB[14] See more at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/trump-says-nato-members-should-spend-5-of-gdp-on-defence/ and https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tells-allies-spend-5-percent-gdp-defense-nato/[15] See more at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgl27x74wpo[16] See more at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-russia-meeting-improving-relations-ukraine-war/[17] Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.[18] See more at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/24/ursula-von-der-leyen-arrives-in-kyiv-with-35-billion-in-fresh-aid-for-weapons[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhNy0u5-ijY

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has been an ever-present vexation in Western political discourse since its full extent was first revealed in 2002. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Security Council, United States of America, European Union, and Israel have employed an ever-widening and steadily-strengthening combination of negotiations, sanctions, and threats in attempts to rein in Iran’s atomic ambitions. Yet, and the severe impact of international actions upon on their nation’s economy notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic’s leaders have not been persuaded to limit the scope of nuclear activities or grant the IAEA enhanced oversight of the program.[1] Not always placed within the context of the Islamic Republic’s actions is that Iran’s nuclear quest began in 1973 while Iran was a Cold War ally of the US. The seeds had been sown more than a decade earlier, when the Tehran Research Reactor was provided by Washington in 1959. Then, as now, it seems Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons capability in tandem with and under the guise of a civilian nuclear program.[2] Much like the ayatollahs today, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi denied such intentions – claiming Iran was only pursuing nuclear energy in accordance with its rights as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). So, re-examining motivations and developments from before the Islamic Revolution can cast light upon contemporary events despite differences between the two Iranian regimes. The Shah’s Intensions During the 1970s just as now, Iran’s quest to become a nuclear power was rooted at least partially in the regional dynamics of its location between South Asia and the Middle East. The shah envisioned his nuclear program as a response to atomic efforts by India, Pakistan, and Israel. He even hinted in June 1974 that the national security of Iran may be best served by possessing a nuclear deterrent: “If in this region each little country tries to arm itself with armaments that are precarious, even elementary, but nuclear, then perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand it do the same.” The shah did add, to placate his international allies, “But I would find that completely ridiculous.”[3] Nonetheless, other nations were suspicious based on imperial Iran’s growing appetite for sophisticated weapons and the shah’s harkening back to the nation’s historical hegemony. So the possibility of Iran harboring nuclear weapons ambitions came sharply into international focus when the shah asserted that possibility to a French journalist in June 1974. Asked if Iran would one day possess a nuclear weapon like India had just one month previously, the shah declared: “Without any doubt, and sooner than one would think.”[4] Nuclear weapons require sophisticated targeting and delivery systems. At the present, with years of sanctions in place, the regular Iranian Navy and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) counterpart have been forced to innovate, rather successfully, in domestically enhancing maritime nuclear warfare capabilities.[5] In January 1975, however, the shah sought to purchase such nuclear-capable technology. Seeking to push through a deal for nuclear submarines from France, Iranian negotiators even claimed the administration in Washington had “been hinting that the U. S. might sell them.” US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger learned of this from French Presidential Secretary General Pierre Brousalette. Understandably concerned, Kissinger responded pointedly and repeatedly that the Iranian claim was “inconceivable … I’m 99.9% sure.”[6] Purchasing nuclear submarines would violate the multi-billion dollar US-Iran arms agreement forged in May 1972 when President Richard Nixon allowed the shah to purchase any weapons he wished from the US short of nuclear weapons and associated technology. Another warning sign was spotted in May 1975 when the shah sought to purchase six battalions of Lance surface-to-surface missiles from Washington. The US administration under President Gerald Ford worked through Secretary of State Kissinger to discourage Iran’s plan because “DOD [Department of Defense] does not consider the Lance a cost-effective weapon when used with a conventional warhead. Congressional critics of our arms sales to Iran would tend to link Iran’s purchase of the Lance with its nuclear development plans.”[7] Again, the parallel with modern day developments as the IRGC produces and seek to purchase missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads should not be overlooked.[8] Offers and Counter-Offers Undeterred by mounting international concern over his nuclear program, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi even proposed acquiring six to eight reactors from American suppliers plus more from French and German companies. His stated aim was to meet domestic energy requirements through atomic fission thereby reserving Iran’s petrochemical wealth for export to energy-hungry foreigners. At first glance, the proposal seemed like a win-win situation for everyone. Moreover, as the US government’s production of enriched nuclear fuel began reaching full capacity and plans were made to assemble a private sector consortium to add further capacity, the shah offered to purchase a 30 percent stake. The gesture was significant, as other interested parties had proven reluctant to commit significant funds. Iran eventually loaned US $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission and was slated to acquire a 10 percent stake in the French Eurodif uranium enrichment plant. Although that stake did not materialize, the Islamic Republic remains an indirect investor through a Franco-Iranian consortium.[9] At that time during the Ford Administration (1974–1977), however, alarm in Washington over nuclear proliferation resulted in a provision that Tehran would have to relinquish reprocessing of atomic fuel to a multilateral conglomerate or allow direct American oversight within Iran.[10] The shah denounced those conditions as discriminatory because Iran was a member of the NPT and therefore entitled to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. The situation bears an uncanny resemblance specifically to events in 2009 when the fuel swap proposal from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany failed to win Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s approval and broadly to the vexed history of failed attempts at nuclear safeguards for Iran.[11] The IAEA, US, and EU estimate that the Islamic Republic’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium far exceeds needs of the Tehran medical research reactor for many years to come.[12] Likewise, during the Ford Administration, the US Department of State reported that the shah’s planned electricity generating capacity of 23,000 megawatts went well beyond all projections of Iran’s domestic energy needs. The report therefore concluded that Iran’s motives were “not entirely clear” and seemed to be propelled at least in part by a desire to develop nuclear weapons.[13] As a result, negotiations continued to falter over the reprocessing issue until President Jimmy Carter reached a provisional agreement on the issue with the shah in 1978. Yet, whether the shah would have honored the agreement will never be known for he was overthrown the following year. It is likely, however, that Iran would have ended up confronting the West generally and the US specifically over its nuclear program even if the shah had remained on the throne and continued to be an American ally. Indeed, the shah’s thinly-masked quest for nuclear power was apparent to officials who served him, even as Western governments remained uncertain of the end game as they now seem to be with the ayatollahs. Minister of Court Asadollah Alam wrote in his diary on 29 November 1975 that the shah’s scheme “though he denies it, probably includes our manufacturing of a nuclear deterrent.”[14] Akbar Etemad, the shah’s chief atomic energy adviser, was more definitive when interviewed after the Pahlavi dynasty had been ousted: “I always suspected that part of the shah’s plan was to build [nuclear] bombs.”[15] The Ayatollahs’ Aims Having experienced colossal military and civilian causalities during the Iraqi-triggered border war from 1980 and 1988, Iran’s leadership concluded that survival of their nation and regime were paramount. Like the shah before them, the ayatollahs turned to a nuclear program in the hope of assuaging those concerns. After the Islamic Republic reluctantly agreed to termination of hostilities with Iraq, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani laid the groundwork for the nuclear program’s recommencement. Even religious ideals which regarded nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as haram or prohibited were cast aside. Speaking to the IRGC in October 1988, while serving as Speaker of Parliament, Rafsanjani advocated developing weapons of mass destruction “because the need for such armaments was made very clear during the [Iran-Iraq] war … [so] we should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defense use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.”[16] Once a political consensus had been achieved in late 1988, Mohsen Rezai who commanded the IRGC, and now serves as Secretary of the Expediency Guidance Council, wrote to then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini requesting both religious endorsement and administrative permission for the revolutionary guards to initiate a nuclear weapons program. Mir Hossein Mousavi who served as Iran’s Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989 supported the request by Rezai and the campaign by Rafsanjani.[17] Although Supreme Leader Khomeini had initially been opposed to the atom’s might, they were able to sway Iran’s revolutionary founder into agreeing that “We have nothing against setting up atomic installations.”[18] So the Islamic Republic commenced fledgling steps toward nuclear power. Subsequently as two-term president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani ensured Iran fully resumed its quest toward nuclearization. His presidential successors Seyyed Mohammad Khatami who held office from 1997 to 2005 and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who has been in office since 2005 continued the energy and weapon programs set up by Rafsanjani, Rezai, and Mousavi. Khatami did suspend uranium enrichment in 2003 hoping to improve relations with the US, but legislative elections in 2004 saw resurgence of hardliners on the Iranian political scene and a recommitment to atomic goals.[19] Over the next two decades the Islamic Republic turned not only to its pre-revolutionary technology but also to foreign sources including A. Q. Khan’s illicit Pakistan-based network, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China as it steadily built-up domestic nuclear capacity. On the political and ideological fronts, a convergence of self-preservation, nationalism, and suspicion of the West leads many Iranian leaders to embrace nuclear ambitions. Hence, like the Pahlavi dynast before it, the Islamic Republic of Iran is unlikely to abandon either nuclear power or the possibility of weaponization.[20] Indeed, negative responses to Ahmadinejad’s attempt to reach a nuclear fuel swap deal with the West in late 2009 are highly instructive. “The discussions in Geneva were really surprising … the hard work of thousands of [our] scientists would be ruined,” lamented Mousavi. Unsuccessful presidential candidate Seyyed Mehdi Karroubi accused Ahmadinejad’s administration of “trying to change its policies” rather than “observing national and religious interests.” Not to be outdone by other politicians, Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani claimed that “Westerners are insisting in a direction that suggests cheating us out of our nuclear rights.” Sensing the overall pro-nuclear sentiment within his administration, Supreme Leader Khamenei then expressed distain for compromise: “When we carefully look at the situation, we notice that they [the U.S. and its allies] are hiding a dagger behind their back.”[21] Present Mimics the Past with Graver Dangers Yet, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently denied it seeks anything more than nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But Supreme Leader Khamenei’s unconvincing words that “We do not have nuclear weapons, and we do not intend to produce them,” are reminiscent of those by the last shah and his diplomats that “Iran is not thinking of building atomic weapons.” Such statements are directed at defusing the brewing storm in Washington, London, and Jerusalem rather than for domestic policy-makers, however. Indeed, and contrary to claims of peaceful intentions, Khamenei has threatened repeatedly by declaring “Iran will respond with the same level of power,” the shah’s regime too left open the possibility of assembling nuclear warheads by claiming “the regime may revise its policy if other non-nuclear nations do.”[22] There is an essential difference in such rhetoric, however, for the shah was not threating the US, EU, Saudi Arabia, Israel, or any other nation with preemptive or retaliatory attacks nor sponsoring terrorism. So unlike the shah, much of the pressure Iran faces is a direct consequence of the confrontational positions taken by its leaders.  Nuclear weapons fitted well with the shah’s ideas of deterring external adversaries and strengthening his hold on power at home, just as similar ideas motivate the ayatollahs who run the Islamic Republic to continue enhancing their nuclear program. If the shah’s pattern of obfuscation between 1973 and 1979 is any indicator, it is unlikely that Iran’s current leaders will meet NPT obligations – even at great socio-economic cost to their citizens and fever-pitch global consternation. Worse, unlike the royal regime whose tyranny inside Iran set a model for that of the Shi‘ite clergymen, the Islamic Republic has come to be associated with threats and violence beyond its borders directed against nations and persons perceived as foes of theocratic rule. Moreover, unlike the shah, the Muslim theocrats who now govern seek to export their intolerant brand of fundamentalism to other nations with an avowed goal of “leading the world.” Equally problematic, they speak of “sharing nuclear knowledge and technology” – thereby further undermining the NPT and possibly even global stability.[23] For the ayatollahs who hold power by force at home and seek to dominate the world stage through terror abroad, nuclear weapons would serve as the ultimate deterrent against punitive consequences, international adversaries, and externally-imposed regime change. Consequently, as the shah did in the 1970s, Iran’s current leaders undoubtedly view acquisition of nuclear technology as a self-servingly rational decision even at the expense of alienating Iran from other countries.[24] Western nations, like Iran’s Arab and Israeli neighbors, were wary of the shah’s motives. Now they are downright fearful of the ayatollahs’ intentions. Even the US with its formidable military resources may only be able to set back Iran’s nuclear plans by a few years if Washington feels compelled to attack. The basic dilemma confronting nations that seek to halt the Islamic Republic’s progress toward atomic power is that rational choices do not always indicate levelheaded decision-makers. Like the shah before them, the ayatollahs resort to political paranoia on the domestic and international fronts as part of their rationale for espousing nuclear technology.[25] Yet unlike the shah’s program coming to a halt through regime change, those opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran reaching and crossing the nuclear threshold cannot place hope on a new government emerging in Tehran anytime in the near future. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source. [1]. Jamsheed K. Choksy, “More Documentation of Iran’s Relentless Pursuit of Nukes,” Forbes (7 November 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2011/11/07/more-documentation-of-irans-relentless-pursuit-of-nukes/. [2]. Abbas Milani, “The Shah’s Atomic Dreams,” Foreign Policy (29 December 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/29/the_shahs_atomic_dreams. [3] . US Department of Defense, “US Embassy Paris Cable 15445 to Department of State, Further Remarks by Shah on Nuclear Weapons,” (25 June 1974), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc01b.pdf. [4]. US Department of Defense, “US Embassy Paris Cable 15305 to Department of State, Interview with Shah,” (24 June 1974), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc01a.pdf. [5]. Jamsheed K. Choksy, “Why Iran’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition Matters,” The American Interest, (5 August 2011), http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/middleeast/2011/08/05/why-irans-blue-water-naval-ambition-matters/. [6]. US Department of State, “Teleconference: Henry Kissinger and Pierre Brousalette, KA13128,” (8 January 1975), http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000D9F4.pdf. [7]. The Digital National Security Archive, “Sidney Sober, Your Meeting with the Shah at Blair House, Confidential Briefing Memorandum to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,” (9 May 1975), http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=6a6_1181429741. [8]. Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Iran Primer (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 2012), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program. [9]. Oliver Meier, “Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A Troubled Model,” Arms Control Association (January/February 2006), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IranEnrich. [10]. William Burr, “The History of Iran’s Nuclear Energy Program,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (19 January 2009), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-history-of-irans-nuclear-energy-program. [11]. Arms Control Association, “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” (last updated March 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. [12]. Olli Heinonen, “The 20 Percent Solution,” Foreign Policy (11 January 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/11/the_20_percent_solution?page=full. [13]. William Burr, “A Brief History of US-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 65 (January 2009), pp. 24–25, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/65/1/21.full. [14]. Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969–1977 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993) p. 453, http://www.amazon.com/Shah-Confidential-Diary-Irans-1968-77/dp/1845113721#reader_1845113721. [15]. Maziar Bahari, “The Shah’s Plan was to Build Bombs: Interview with Akbar Etemad,” New Statesman (11 September 2008), http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2008/09/iran-nuclear-shah-west. [16]. Institute for Science and International Security, “Nuclear Iran: Nuclear History,” http://www.isisnucleariran.org/nuclear-history. For a similar statement in December 2001, see Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran’s Radical Leader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 118–119, http://www.amazon.com/Ahmadinejad-Secret-History-Radical-Leader/dp/0520256638#reader_0520256638. [17]. Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “The Birth of a Bomb: A History of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Der Spiegel (17 June 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-701109,00.html; and Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 117. [18]. Harold J. Salemson and Tony Hendra, eds., Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini: Political, Philosophical, Social, and Religious (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), p. 17; and Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 117. [19]. Karl Vick, “Iran’s Gray Area on Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post (21 June 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/20/AR2006062001584.html; and Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 119; and Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 247. [20]. Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choksy, “A Nuclear Iran is Inevitable,” Forbes (19 March 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/19/iran-nuclear-sanctions-opinions-contributors-jamsheed-and-carol-choksy_2.html. [21]. Reported by Khaleej Times (29 October 2009), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2009/October/middleeast_October795.xml§ion=middleeast; Yahoo News (8 November 2009), http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20091108/wl_nm/us_iran_karoubi; Press TV (24 October 2009), http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=109516§ionid=351020104; and Washington Post (4 November 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/03/AR2009110301397.html?sub=AR. [22]. US Department of Defense, “US Embassy Tehran Cable 5192 to Department of State, Shah’s Alleged Statement on Nuclear Weapons,” (25 June 1974), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc01c.pdf; and Mehr News Agency, “Iran will Respond to Any Attack at ‘Same Level’: Leader,” (20 May 2012), http://www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1562963. [23]. Jamsheed K. Choksy, “Iran’s Global Ambitions – Part I,” Yale Global (13 September 2010), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/irans-global-ambitions-part-i. [24]. Fareed Zakaria, “Interview with Gen. Martin Dempsey,” CNN GPS (19 February 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1202/19/fzgps.01.html. [25]. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 111–131; reprinted as “The Paranoid Style in Iranian Politics,” Frontline: Tehran Bureau (27 August 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/the-paranoid-style-in-iranian-politics.html.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The European Union was taken by surprise by the geopolitical turning point of 24 February 2022. Yet, at a time when the geography of enlargement is changing, the Union is struggling to revive a process in the Western Balkans on which its credibility and, increasingly, its security depend. The European Union’s failure to ensure that its vulnerabilities in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia do not worsen calls for a rethink of the European policy of influence in the region. The EU’s policy of influence in the Western Balkans is based primarily on the accession process in which Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are currently participating. This process, initiated in 2000 at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, makes these countries’ progress towards joining the EU conditional on the implementation of key reforms, with the aim of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. By pursuing this political, economic and legal convergence objective, the Union aspires to transform and shape the countries of the region in its own image. This goal reflects the ideals of the European project, from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon, affirmation of Europe’s ambition to be a powerful force along its own borders. The EU’s strategy over the last 20 years has enabled the countries of the Western Balkans to be integrated into the European geography and system. And yet it has not brought them significantly closer to the door of membership. Reform proposals and a blind spot The situation is alarming. The fading membership prospects of the countries in the region, combined with political and institutional deadlocks within the EU, have created gaps into which rival powers, starting with Russia, are rushing. To offset this vulnerability, the EU has endeavoured to revive its accession policy with a series of summits and aid plans, to no avail. Under French leadership, it adopted a new approach in 2020, which emphasised the importance of the political logic inherent in the accession process, in addition to the reforms to be carried out. However, progress is slow, especially at a time when the EU faces new challenges in the East. The EU granted Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia the status of candidates for accession in 2022 —three countries whose territorial integrity is in dispute—. The EU has already opened accession negotiations with the first two countries. As the East seems to be overtaking the Balkans in the race for membership, the idea of reforming the accession process is now becoming a necessity in most capitals. The June 2022 European Council called for acceleration of the accession process. Various proposals have been put on the table: progressive accession, accession in stages, accession to the single market, setting an indicative date for accession, etc. Most of these proposals aim to further strengthen the integration of the countries in the region into the European system. They assume, as the Commission has done for the past twenty years, that integration is a guarantee of membership; that the former necessarily leads to the latter. This axiom is misleading, as the case of Northern Macedonia illustrates perfectly. The integration of the countries in the region is necessary, as are the reforms, but it is not sufficient to bring to a successful conclusion a process whose outcome, membership of the EU, is a matter of co-optation. One of the most ambitious proposals is the report released by the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform, also known as the Group of Twelve, which is the fruit of Franco-German reflection. It has the merit of considering the enlargement of the EU in the light of the need for institutional reform, so that Europe’s ability to act and its sovereignty can finally be strengthened in a fragmenting world. The idea is to reform the accession process as part of a political project that the Union must carry forward both among its Member States and in the Western Balkans. Among these proposals, however, there is an unresolved issue: territorial disputes and disputed sovereignty, a key area in which the EU is struggling to take action. Yet what influence can the Union aspire to in the Western Balkans and beyond, if it sidesteps the most sensitive issues in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia? These issues, which involve sovereignty, territorial integrity, irredentism and geopolitics, are of cardinal importance. It is crucial that the EU now gets involved in these areas, so that the accession policy is no longer limited to promoting the rule of law, good governance and economic integration. It is not only necessary to affirm the credibility of the Union today in the Western Balkans, but also tomorrow in the East. Is the EU at an impasse in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU is confronted first and foremost with strong irredentism in Republika Srpska, which is contributing to a poisonous climate in the country. In its report of 23 November 2023, the Council of Europe condemned inter-ethnic violence, ethno-nationalist and hate speech, the denial of genocide and war crimes, the glorification of war criminals and, more generally, the intolerance that is gaining ground. This irredentism, which has been fuelled for several years by the historic leader of the Serbian entity, Milorad Dodik, is expressed at a political level by an assertive secessionism, striving to dismantle the Bosnian state. To achieve this, the Serbian entity is trying to challenge the authority of central institutions, starting with the courts, whose decisions it is hindering. It is also challenging the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court, where international judges sit to ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords, and the authority of the High Representative, who is also responsible for the Dayton Accords. The weakening of these institutions, further exacerbated by the spectre of a secessionist referendum, would pave the way for the dismantling of other regal bodies, notably the army, posing an existential threat to the country’s sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, Russia is stepping into these cracks, as the instability in the country is hardly attracting the attention of the West. The ties forged between Republika Srpska and Russia have been strengthened against a backdrop of international tensions. While the EU was anticipating a difficult winter, Milorad Dodik travelled to Moscow in September 2022, much to the EU’s displeasure. In January 2023, Milorad Dodik honoured Vladimir Putin with the highest distinction awarded by the Serbian entity, then went to the Kremlin at the beginning of the summer to receive a distinction himself —the Order of Alexander Nievsky—. This collusion between the two men prevents the central state of Bosnia-Herzegovina from aligning itself with the European sanctions against Russia; it facilitates the penetration of Russian propaganda into the country, and gives Serbian secessionism in Bosnia-Herzegovina an international dimension, since Russia is in a position to block or slow down certain decisions relating to the international presence in the country. According to a poll published in June 2022, 89% of Bosnian Serbs have a positive opinion of Russia’s role in the country, and Vladimir Putin’s popularity is undeniable. As well as undermining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik is suspected of embezzlement, corruption and nepotism. But unlike the United States, which adopted sanctions against him in 2022, the EU remains on the sidelines. And there’s a clear explanation for this. Milorad Dodik has an ally among the Member States: Hungary. Political affinities link the leader of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to its leader, Viktor Orbán, with political and financial support given specifically to Republika Srpska. Both politicians harbour the same ideological distrust of Brussels and progressive values. On the European stage, Milorad Dodik can count on Viktor Orbán’s protection, particularly when it comes to sanctions, since Orbán opposes any decision in this regard. However, Hungary is not the only country hampering Europe’s policy of influence. Croatia is also playing a shady game. It has lobbied, through the EU, for the adoption in 2022 of an electoral reform that consolidates the power of the Croatian nationalist party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even if it means deepening the ethnic divisions in the country. This reform, which was also supported by Hungary, ran counter to the European vision of a system based on civic rather than ethno-national identities. The EU’s response to these challenges remains limited to the (necessary) promotion of the rule of law and fundamental rights, the fight against corruption and public administration reforms. In 2019, the EU identified fourteen priorities prior to opening accession negotiations, and then granted Bosnia-Herzegovina candidate status in 2022, despite the limited progress made in this area. For this reason, France, the Netherlands and, to a certain extent, Germany were less than enthusiastic about the decision. But in the current geopolitical context, it was the position of Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy that prevailed, and in the end this enabled Bosnia-Herzegovina to move forward without penalising the political elites compromising the country’s future, or calling into question their relays among the Member States. Is the EU stuck in a rut in Kosovo? In Kosovo, the EU is facing a particularly serious challenge, and it has been working for over 10 years to tackle it through the dialogue it facilitates between Belgrade and Prishtina. Yet its efforts have not led to the much hoped-for normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. In fact, the security situation on the ground has continued to deteriorate. Serbia, which opposes the country’s independence, supports pockets of instability and parallel institutions in the north of Kosovo, and fuels irredentism among a section of the Serb population that is resolutely hostile to the authority of the central Kosovan state. In March 2023, tensions arose when Kosovo Albanian mayors were forcibly prevented from taking up their duties in the north of the country, following municipal elections that had been the subject of a Serb boycott orchestrated by Belgrade. Scuffles broke out, with the participation of agitators from Serbia; the Serbian army was placed on alert, and for the first time Serbian protesters attacked Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers, an international NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo under the UN mandate. Instead of incriminating Serbia and Serbian irredentism in Kosovo, the EU, at the instigation of France and Germany, adopted sanctions against the authorities and civil society in the weakest party to the dispute, Kosovo. An even more worrying incident occurred shortly afterwards, in September 2023, when a group of Serb nationalists, armed with an impressive arsenal of weapons, attacked police forces, killing a Kosovar policeman. The attack, carried out by a Kosovo Serb political leader with close links to the political party of the president of neighbouring Serbia, gave rise to considerable concern, especially as Belgrade was at the same time reinforcing its armed forces on Kosovo’s borders. Nationalist, militaristic and pro-Russian rhetoric in Serbia fuelled the perception of an imminent threat to Kosovo, along the lines of that posed by Russia in Ukraine. KFOR stepped up its presence accordingly. In Serbia, a day of national mourning was declared in response to the death of three Serb assailants killed in the shoot-out. In European capitals, the incident was condemned, but the responsibility of the authorities in Prishtina, more so than Serbian irredentism in the north of Kosovo and the diplomacy of the srpski svet in Belgrade, was singled out. These serious incidents attest to the hardening of irredentism fuelled by Belgrade. Above all, they illustrate the current impasse in the dialogue facilitated by the EU. Devoid of any strategic objective, the dialogue has been limited to preparing the ground for an illusory agreement to “normalise” relations between Belgrade and Prishtina. To this end, it focused mainly on technical issues of document recognition, border management, freedom of movement and so on. This was the case, for example, with the “historic” agreement reached in Brussels in 2013, and the dozen or so others that followed. However, these agreements have all been poorly implemented. Furthermore, the attention paid to each stumbling block, along with the resulting tensions, has led the EU to lose sight of the political objective of resolving the dispute – that of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state and of its territorial integrity. This is not one of the objectives of the dialogue. The dialogue is focusing increasingly on issues of internal governance in Kosovo. In particular, the creation of an association of Serbian municipalities in the north of Kosovo is giving rise to controversy, as it is reminiscent of the problems encountered by Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But with an added pitfall. The dialogue currently supported by France and Germany is now making the granting of a form of autonomy to these irredentist municipalities a prerequisite for the “normalisation” of relations with Serbia, with no guarantee that Kosovo will eventually gain international recognition. To increase pressure on Prishtina, France, Germany and Italy have now gone as far as withholding support for Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe in an unprecedented move that brought about satisfaction in Belgrade and Moscow. Unable to adopt a common position on the matter due to five Member States (Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia), the EU is struggling to project a policy of influence on this issue through dialogue. Instead, it finds itself forced to manage repeated crises as a matter of urgency, to prevent the situation on the ground from flaring up. To no avail, as the incidents worsen and multiply, the EU leaves a gaping hole into which the regimes in Serbia and, unsurprisingly, Russia rush. Both have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo on this issue, which is a vector of instability, and in ensuring that the EU stays in the same rut. The EU’s limited influence in Serbia The European policy of influence is showing its limits in Serbia too. It has failed to effectively support the democratic forces in Serbia that had been protesting for months against the rise of authoritarianism there. It continues placing its faith in a regime that has continuously demonstrated its neglect for democratic processes and political pluralism. The rigged elections of late 2023, which the EU has not sanctioned, illustrates the EU’s geopolitical helplessness and incapacity to itself face a local authoritarian regime at its doorsteps. The EU, likewise, has failed to significantly influence Serbia’s foreign policy towards Russia. In 2009 Serbia entered into a strategic partnership with Russia, which was extended in 2013 to include cooperation on security and defence. This partnership paved the way for the acquisition of various Russian weapons systems (fighter aircraft, guided missiles, etc.), and for joint military exercises to be held between 2014 and 2021 with Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which Serbia joined as an observer. Economically, cooperation has intensified with the conclusion in 2019 of a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, although trade between Serbia and Russia, representing less than 10% of exchanges, remains well below that with the EU. The war in Ukraine and the EU’s policy of isolating Russia has not lead Serbia to reconsider its approach. At the United Nations, Serbia has indeed supported a number of resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, without saying so loud and clear. But this has not meant that the country has aligned itself with the European sanctions against Moscow. It has only adopted measures against Belarus and pro-Russian figures in Ukraine, and dual-use technologies banned from export by the EU are said to be finding their way to Russia via Serbia. Belgrade has also failed to align itself with most of the statements made by the EU High Representative and the decisions taken by the Council in all areas of foreign and security policy. Yet this is a contractual obligation under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Art. 10.) it concluded with the EU in 2013. Its behaviour as a candidate country for EU membership is troubling. In June 2022, Serbia was represented at ministerial level at the official St Petersburg International Economic Forum, alongside Milorad Dodik. In August 2022, as the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, Belgrade sent Aleksandar Vulin, then head of Serbian intelligence, now deputy prime minister and figurehead of irredentism and srpski svet diplomacy in the Balkans, to the Kremlin. He was decorated by the Russian defence minister. In September 2022, Serbia signed an agreement with Russia reinforcing cooperation in foreign policy. After a few months of restraint, Aleksandar Vučić became more vocal in March 2023 when he expressed his disapproval of the International Criminal Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. In September 2023, he received the Russian ambassador in Belgrade to discuss the situation in northern Kosovo, and finally, in October 2023, he met Vladimir Putin in Beijing, with whom he had a “cordial exchange”. The presence of Russian media in Serbia, and the control of the press by the Serbian authorities, means that public opinion is shaped accordingly. Criticism of the depraved and hegemonic West is commonplace, as is that of the hypocrisy of the EU, the aggressiveness of the United States and NATO, and the injustice allegedly suffered by the patriots of srpski svet. Unable to assert itself on either the issue of recognition of Kosovo or Serbia’s geopolitical orientation, the EU has also had to deal with the close ties between Aleksandar Vučić and Viktor Orbán, and their affinities with the Enlargement Commissioner, Olivér Várhelyi. These connections facilitate Serbia’s access to European funds. Despite the democratic setback and pro-Russian ambiguities in the country, in February 2023 the Commission awarded Serbia the most generous subsidy (€600 million) ever granted in the region. This is part of a package worth more than €2 billion allocated to Serbia to finance a high-speed railway line extending the section that China is currently building between Belgrade and Budapest —a project plagued by corruption scandals, but which meets the objectives of trans-European connectivity—. Likewise, when it comes to accession policy, Aleksandar Vučić finds in Viktor Orbán an influential ally in the Council, to ensure that authoritarian and pro-Russian abuses in Serbia are not punished. The serious irregularities that marred the Serbian general elections in December 2023 and the poisonous climate that reigned during the campaign bear witness to the abuses taking place in Serbia. Can a policy of alliance make up for the EU’s powerlessness? Unable to exert strategic influence on the most sensitive issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia, the EU faces a major challenge. Where could it be better to practice the “language of power” than in this small, landlocked region that has been earmarked for accession? The EU, which is an imperfect power, is struggling to shake off the illusion that the transformative power it is trying to exert through its accession policy will act as a miracle cure in a region plagued by irredentism, Russian disinformation and authoritarian tendencies. This illusion may prove harmful, for the Balkans lie in the shadows of an even more complex problem in the East. Institutional reform of the EU, which in the future may make qualified majority voting the norm, will not enable the Union to project strategic and political influence overnight, at least not in these most sensitive areas. The same is true of enhanced conditionality that emphasises the rule of law. So how will this help to establish the disputed sovereignty of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to anchor Serbia geopolitically in the European camp? Unfortunately, in the absence of a strong and visionary Commission, the Union cannot be expected to do much, as the Member States, and therefore the Council, do not share the same vision of the political union to which the European project should aspire. Some of them, mainly in the East, remain faithful to sovereignty and intend to resist the Union’s logic of interference everywhere. Others, such as Germany, swear by neofunctionalism and struggle to think of the (political and territorial) purpose of the European project beyond economic integration. As for France, it calls for a political deepening of the Union through a revival of intergovernmentalism but it rejects any federalist logic. These differences in vision inhibit the Union’s ability to develop a policy of influence that is not limited to a membership process that ultimately proves inadequate. To compensate for this weakness, what if the EU were to make greater use of alliances? Within the Union, this would mean strengthening coordination between Member States that share the idea that the challenges in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia should be the subject of a strong political and diplomatic commitment that is separate from the EU accession process. The challenge for the Member States in question would be to help the Union learn the “language of power”, with the aim of consolidating the contested sovereignties of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and changing Serbia’s foreign policy. In the Western Balkans, this logic of alliance would find support in civil society, in the opposition in Serbia and among the new generation of political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stronger support for these progressive political forces, including on the streets, and more scathing criticism of those figures, elected or not, who are fuelling irredentism and instability in the region, would send out an important signal and, above all, develop new levers of influence.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. As the invasion enters its third year, its most immediate and visible consequences have been loss of life and large numbers of refugees from Ukraine. However, given the interconnected structure of the international political, economic, and policy systems, the ramifications of the conflict can be felt well beyond Ukraine and Russia.Much of the recent literature and commentaries have focused on the military and strategic lessons learned from the ongoing Ukraine conflict (Biddle 2022; 2023; Dijkstra et al. 2023). However, the conflict has potentially much wider global consequences for various policy areas. Robert Jervis noted that the international system is not only interconnected but also often displays nonlinear relationships and that “outcomes cannot be understood without adding together the units or their relations.” (Jervis 1997, 6).  This article focuses on the economic effects of the Ukraine war, emphasizing the energy issue, because Russia has been a major player in the global energy market.  II. Literature on the effects of wars Wars have the potential to alter the parties and “transform the future” of belligerents (Ikle 1991), they also bring about fundamental changes to the international system (Gilpin 1981).  Scholars in Economics have provided considerable analysis of the macroeconomic effects of a conflict across spatial levels: locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. Studies have examined the effects of specific wars such as the Syrian civil war (Kešeljević and Spruk, 2023) or the Iraq war (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). They have also examined the effects of war in general. For instance, Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor (2010) examine bilateral trade relations from 1870 to 1997 and find “large and persistent impacts of wars on trade, and hence on national and global economic welfare.” Similarly, Vally Koubi (2005) investigates the effects of inter- and intrastate wars on a sample of countries and finds that the combined pre-war contemporaneous and postwar effects on economic growth are negative.  A “war ruin” school emphasizes that the destruction caused by wars is accompanied by higher inflation, unproductive resource spending on the military, and war debt (Chan 1985; Diehl and Goertz 1985; Russett 1970). By contrast, a “war renewal” school argued that there could be longer-term positive economic effects from war because war can lead to increased efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of rent-seeking special interests, triggering technological innovation, and advancing human capital (Olson 1982; Organski and Kugler 1980). Early analysis estimated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had an economic cost of 1% of global GDP in 2022 (Liadze et al. 2023)Some political scientists focused on the domestic consequences of war. For example, Electoral political scientists have often examined the effects of war on public opinion. A key concern has been whether war produces a “rally around the flag effects” to bolster the support of incumbent leaders – or whether war weariness can contribute to declining support for governments, including those governments committed to conflicts abroad. John Mueller (1970) was the first scholar to develop the concept of the “rally-round-the-flag”, with later scholars identifying some of the factors that may shape or mitigate the effect (Dinesen and Jaeger 2013). Kseniya Kizilova and Pippa Norris (2023) considered any rally effects during the first few months of the Ukraine war. They claim that the reason that motivated Putin’s military invasion was an attempt to boost popular support among the Russian electorate. They show evidence of a surge in support for Putin following the invasion, which persisted longer than usual in democratic systems. However, Kizilova and Norris question whether this will likely be sustained as the economic costs of the war increase.   III. Brief Summary of the Ukraine War The roots of the Ukraine war go back to the early 1990s when Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. While the Ukrainian economy was still firmly tied to the Russian economy, the country shifted its political focus towards the EU and NATO. This shift culminated in the Orange Revolution 2004 and the “Euromaidan” demonstrations in 2013. Portraying the “Euromaidan” protests as a Western-backed coup, Russia invaded Crimea and declared the annexation of Crimea into Russia in March 2014. Conflict soon erupted in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where Russia supported pro-Russian separatist forces (Walker 2023a). Despite attempts to negotiate a ceasefire through the Minsk Agreement I and II, the conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine had continued (Walker 2023a), resulting in over 14,000 deaths between 2014 and 2021. Against this backdrop, on 21 February, 2022, Russia recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Three days later, confounding most Western observer’s expectations, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, calling it a “special military operation”. During the initial weeks, Russia made substantial advances (CIA Fact-book 2024) but failed to take Kyiv in the face of strong Ukrainian resistance supported by Western allies. In October 2022, Russia declared the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (even though they were not entirely under Russian control) (Walker 2023b). As of February 2025, the meeting between the US and Russia to end the war is underway. IV. The Effects of the Ukraine war The impacts of war are far-reaching and devastating. War causes immense destruction of property and loss of life. It also creates psychological trauma for those who have experienced it firsthand. War can also have long-term economic impacts, such as increased unemployment and poverty. War can also lead to the displacement of people, as we have seen the millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their homes due to conflicts. War can also have political effects, such as creating new states or weakening existing nations. It can also lead to the rise of authoritarian regimes in many post-war nations. War can also increase militarization as nations seek to protect themselves from future conflicts.  Regarding the effects of the Ukraine war, Bin Zhang and Sheripzhan Nadyrov (2024) claimed that in addition to inexpressible human suffering and the destruction of infrastructure, the economic and financial damage inflicted on European countries would be profound, especially in the context of rising inflation. The positive changes due to the conflict may occur in four areas: acceleration of the Green Deal, increased European attention to defense, improved prospects for individual countries to join the European Union (EU), and the unfolding of broader Eurasian economic integration.  The Ukraine war might have broader economic consequences. The supply chains may be affected because of the destruction of infrastructures and resources. War mobilization may affect the workforce and economic production. Actors in the economy may also act strategically to deploy resources elsewhere, to support the war effort or because the war has affected incentive structures or decide to cease production altogether because of expected losses. These effects can be local to geographical areas engulfed in conflict but also cause ripple effects to a broader regional area and the global economy. Trade, production, consumption, inflation, growth and employment patterns may all be influenced.  Figure 1: Global implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the European and World Economies. Source: Peterson K. Ozili. (2022)  Ozili (2022) claimed that the scale of the Ukraine war had a negative impact on the economies of almost all countries around the world. As Figure 1 shows, the main effects of the Ukraine war on the global economy are: Rising Oil and Gas Prices – European countries import about a quarter of their oil and 40% of their natural gas from the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is the second largest oil producer in the world and the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe. After the invasion, European oil companies will have problems getting these resources from the Russian Federation. Even before the Russian invasion, oil prices rose because of growing tensions between countries, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other factors, but remained in the $80–95 per barrel range. After the invasion, this price reached $100 and could reach $140. Natural gas prices have risen 20% since the war began. Rising gas prices can drive high inflation and increase public utility bills.  Decline in production and economic growth, rising global inflation, and the cost of living are more related to the consequences of the above-mentioned factors, especially rising oil and gas prices, which lead to high inflation and, therefore, a decline in supply and demand.  Impact on the global banking system: This factor’s negative effect will be felt more strongly by Russian banks and is associated with international financial sanctions. Foreign banks that will suffer significant damage from sanctions are those that have conducted large operations in the Russian Federation.  The Russian Federation’s export ban and its own counter-ban on imports of foreign products disrupted the global supply chain, resulting in shortages and higher prices for imported commodities. As Ozili (2022) claimed, higher inflation is a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 2 shows, inflation in the EU jumped in the first month of the invasion, and the increasing trend continues. EU inflation in 2022 peaked in October and amounted to 11.5%, a historical record. However, inflation has slowly declined as energy prices have gone down.  This higher inflation in Europe resulted from an increase in energy prices. As Figures 3, 4, and 5 show, energy prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022. As Figure 3 shows, energy prices have been the most important component of inflation in the EU. Figure 2: Average inflation rate in the EU (%). Source: EurostatCreated with Datawrapper   Figure 3: Main components of inflation rate in the Euro areas.  Figure 4: Natural gas prices in Europe, January 2021- end 2024  Figure 5: Crude oil price, January 2020-January 2025 Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper As Figure 6 shows, the inflation rate in major EU countries such as Germany and France followed the pattern of EU countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and then slowly declined over time. Figure 6: Inflation rate in major EU countries. Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper  As Ozili claimed, a lower growth rate was also a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 7 shows, GDP in the EU was down to 3.5 % in 2022 compared to 6.3% in 2021, and it was further down to 0.8 % in 2023 because economic stagnation and high inflation caused by the Ukraine war impacted European economies. The European Commission forecasts that the European economy will grow by 0.9 % in 2024 and 1.5% in 2025.  Figure 7: Average annual GDP growth rate in EU, 1996-2025. Following the pattern of entire EU countries, growth rates in four big European countries declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and are expected to grow moderately in 2024. The growth rates in four big European countries are in Table 1 and Figures 8-11.    Figure 8: Growth rate in Germany  Figure 9: Growth rate in France  Figure 10: Growth rate in the UK   Figure 11: Growth rate in Italy    Regarding the effect of the Ukraine war on the global banking system, the effect was minimal because most international financial sanctions targeted Russian banks. The sanctions, including the ban of selected Russian banks from SWIFT, only affected foreign banks with significant operations in Russia. Many foreign banks experienced losses after several Western countries imposed financial sanctions on Russian banks, the Russian Central Bank, and wealthy Russian individuals. The most affected banks were Austria’s Raiffeisenbank, Italy’s Unicredit, and France’s Société Générale. Other foreign banks recorded huge losses when they discontinued their operations in Russia. The losses were significant for small foreign banks and insignificant for large foreign banks.  After almost 20 months into the full-scale war, Ukraine’s banking sector continued demonstrating remarkable resilience and functioning as the backbone of the real economy. No bank runs have occurred, and access to cash was maintained. In addition to crucial reforms since 2014, comprehensive measures by the National Bank of Ukraine and a strong level of digitalization are key reasons for the observed stability. However, a significant liquidity buffer is not only a sign of resilience. It also reveals a lack of lending. The bank loan portfolio declined by around 30% compared to pre-war levels in real terms.  Regarding the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on European stock markets, Figures 12 and 13 show the movement of the FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50). As seen from Figures 12 & 13, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, both indices showed a noticeable decline in 2022, particularly early 2022. However, both indexes showed a noticeable rise after late 2022. Although there were ups and downs in both indices in 2023 and 2024, they show upward movement from 2023 to 2025.  Figure 12: The FTSE 100 index in Europe  Figure 13: Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50)   Regarding the global supply chain, military operations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine disrupted multiple sectors. In particular, Russia’s ban on exports and retaliatory ban on imports, including its refusal to allow foreign cargoes to pass through its waterways and airspace during the early phase of the invasion, disrupted the global supply chain.  Regarding global supply chain disruption, this article focuses on Russian oil and gas because they are the most important Russian products that affect not only Europe but also the world.  Figures 14 and 15 show a world map of the countries that exported oil and gas to Europe: the color of the country corresponds to the percentage share of the country’s exports (indicated below the Figure). In 2021, around a third of Europe’s energy came from gas (34%) and oil (31%), according to Al Jazeera’s data analysis from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Europe was the largest importer of natural gas in the world. Russia provided roughly 40% and 25% of the EU’s imported gas and oil before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 16 shows, major gas importers from Russia in 2021 were European countries. Figure 14: EU oil import sources in 2021. Figure 15: EU natural gas import sources in 2021. Source: Eurostat  Figure 16: Major EU importers from Russian Gas in 2021.  However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 9,119 new economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia, making it the most sanctioned country in the world. At least 46 countries or territories, including all 27 EU nations, have imposed sanctions on Russia or pledged to adopt a combination of US and EU sanctions. The sanctions have strongly affected, resulting in a 58% decline in exports to Russia and an 86% drop in imports from Russia between the first quarter of 2022 and the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 17). Figure 17: EU trade with Russia  Russia has blamed these sanctions for impeding routine maintenance on its Nord Stream I gas pipeline which is the single biggest gas pipeline between Russia and Western Europe. In response, Russia cut its gas exports to the EU by around 80% since the Russian invasion, resulting in higher gas price in Europe, as Figure 18 shows. As a result, many European countries had to rethink their energy mix rapidly. The ripple effects of higher natural gas prices were felt in Europe and around the world. One of the most immediate consequences of Russia’s cut in gas delivery and sanctions on Russia, as well as sanctions on Russian was a sharp increase in European demand for LNG imports: in the first eight months of 2022, net LNG imports in Europe rose by two-thirds (by 45 billion cubic meters compared with the same period a year earlier).  Russia’s pipeline gas share in EU imports dropped from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. Russia accounted for less than 15% of total EU gas imports for pipeline gas and LNG combined. The drop was possible mainly thanks to a sharp increase in LNG imports and an overall reduction in gas consumption in the EU. Figure 18: Natural gas price in Europe, January 2021- December 2024  Figure 19 shows how gas supply to the EU changed between 2021 and 2023. Import from Russia declined from over 150 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 to less than 43 bcm. This was mainly compensated by a growing share of other partners. Import from US grew from 18.9 bcm in 2021 to 56.2 bcm in 2023. Import from Norway grew from 79.5 bcm in 2021 to 87.7 in 2023. Import from other partners increased from 41.6 bcm in 2021 to 62 bcm in 2023. Source: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/#0) Figure 19: Major EU import sources of Gas.  However, as Figure 20, shows the EU’s import from Russian gas increased in volume in 2024.  Figure 20: EU trade of natural gas with Russia     EU imports of Russian petroleum oil also dropped. Russia was the largest provider of petroleum oil to the EU in 2021. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a major diversion in the trade of petroleum oil took place. In the third quarter of 2024, the volume of petroleum oil in the EU imported from Russia was 7% of what it had been in the first quarter of 2021 (see Figure 21) while its value had dropped to 10% in the same period.  The EU’s share of petroleum oil imports from Russia dropped from 18% in the third quarter of 2022 to 2% in the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 22). The shares of the United States (+5 pp), Kazakhstan (+4 pp), Norway (+3 pp), and Saudi Arabia (+2 pp) increased in this period. The U.S. and Norway became the EU’s no.1 and no.2 petroleum oil providers, respectively. Figure 21: EU trade of petroleum oil with Russia    Figure 22: EU’s leading petroleum oil providers  The EU’s de-Russification policy has successfully reduced the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. However, the EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a think-tank in Finland, compiles estimates of the monetary value of Russian fossil fuels procured by each country and region (Figure 23). Figures 23 & 24 show the countries that imported Russian coal, oil and gas since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, and the EU. Asian countries such as Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan are among the major importers of Russian fossil fuels.  Figure 23: Value of Russian fossil fuels purchase (January 1, 2023 to January 24, 2024)  Figure 24: Largest importers of Russian fossil fuels (January 1, 2023 to February 16, 2025)  Moreover, according to Statista, value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type is as follows as Figure 25 shows. China have been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and South Korea. Figure 25: value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type.  However, Figures 23, 24, and 25 show some differences among major importers of Russian fossil fuels. China, India, and Turkey imported more Russian oil than gas or coal, while EU imported more Russian gas than oil or coal. Interestingly, South Korea imported more Russian coal than oil or gas. If we focus on Russian oil, we know that China and India’s imports of Russian oils significantly increased, as shown in Figures 26, 27, and 28. Since the EU imposed its embargo on Russian crude oil shipments, China purchased the most from Russia, at EUR 82.3 billion, followed by India and Türkiye, at EUR 47.0 billion and EUR 34.1 billion, respectively. The EU came in fourth, with oil and gas imports continuing mainly through pipelines to Eastern Europe. Notably, the oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) purchased oil (crude oil and petroleum products) from Russia.  Figure 26: Russian Oil Exports, by country and region, 2021-2024. (Navy blue: EU, Blue: US & UK, Light green: Turkey, Green: China, Yellow: India, Orange: Middle Eastern nations) Since the advent of the Ukraine crisis, China and India have been increasing the amount of crude oil they imported from Russia. According to statistics compiled by China’s General Administration of Customs, as Figure 27 shows, monthly imports increased from 6.38 million tons in March 2022 to 10.54 million tons in August 2023. Annual imports in 2023 exceeded 100 million tons for the first time.  Figure 27: China’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (2021 to 2023)   As Figure 28 shows, India, which historically imported little crude oil from Russia, rapidly increased its imports partly due to the close geographical distance since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to statistics compiled by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, its imports of Russian crude oil increased from March 2022 onward, with the total amount imported during 2022 exceeding 33 million tons. Crude oil imports from Russia grew into 2023, with monthly imports in May 2023 reaching a record-high level of 8.92 million tons. Annual crude oil imports from Russia in 2023 were expected to be at least 80 million tons. Figure 28: India’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (January 2021 to November 2023)  In conclusion, after EU ban on Russia until January, 2025, the biggest buyers of Russia’s fossil fuels are as follows as Figure 29 shows: China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian coal, and crude oil the most, while the EU has been the largest importer of Russian Gas, both pipeline and LNG. Figure 29: Which country bought Russia’s fossil fuels after EU ban until January 2025 Still, although the EU has significantly reduced gas imports from Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU still is no. 1 importer of Russian gas. However, China replaced EU as the biggest buyer of Russian crude oil. China is also the biggest buyer of Russian coal. Data from January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2025 show how Russian fossil fuels have flowed by geography as Figure 30 shows. The flows of Russian energy to EU have significantly declined, while the supply of Russian energy to China, India, and Turkey has significantly increased.  Figure 30: The flows of Russian energy to regions    Despite the EU’s restrictions on Russian-sourced energy, Russia has maintained a substantial revenue level by selling it to other countries. As Figure 31 shows, Russian energy revenues have somewhat declined between January 2022 and January 2025. Russian energy export revenue was a little less than 750 million Euro in January 2025 compared to 1000 million Euro in January 2022 just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, considering that Russia’s total oil and gas revenues were 72.6 billion dollars in 2020, 122.9 billion in 2021, 169.5 billion in 2022, and 102.8 billion in 2023 and that 2022 was the best year for energy revenues in recent years, Russian energy revenues after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not insufficient. This in turn has blunted the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the West.   Figure 31: Russian energy export revenue between 2022 and 2025.  V. Conclusion  This article examined the economic effects of the Ukraine war based on the argument of Ozili (2022). This article investigated four economic aspects (Inflation, economic growth, global banking, and global supply chain) on which the Ukraine war has had impacts. This article focused on Europe and the global supply chain because Russia and Ukraine were parts of Europe and because Russian energy has had a significant impact on Europea and all around the world.  This article showed that the Ukraine war significantly affected European inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets while the war had minimal impact on global banking. However, this article showed that the economic effects of the Ukraine war on inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets in Europe were short-term. The oil and gas prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022 and then declined slowly and continuously. In addition, growth in Europe declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and energy prices jumped up. However, European countries grew moderately in 2024 and are expected to increase in 2025. The same thing happened to European stock markets. The FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50) showed a noticeable decline in 2022, in particularly early 2022. However, both indices showed a noticeable rise after late 2022.  On the other hand, after Russia invaded Ukraine, European countries significantly reduced imports of Russian fossil fuels. The EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. After EU’s imposition of sanctions on Russian energy, Russian fossil fuels mainly went to Asian and Middle East markets, mainly to China, India, and Turkey. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine of February 2022 has propelled EU enlargement to the top of Europe’s political agenda and linked it inextricably to the question of European security. The reshaping of the global political landscape, where strategic competition, growing global instability and attempts to undermine the rules-based international order are prominent features, has added further complexity to EU enlargement. The geopolitical imperative has seemingly expedited EU enlargement, while the merit-based transformative objectives of the process sit uncomfortably in the balance. This article provides a critical analysis of the evolution of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, zooming in on the EU perspective and key initiatives of its Member States. It explains how the initial ambition and hope that the enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans embodied drifted towards enlargement fatigue. It also outlines the hurdles confronting the enlargement process and the Western Balkans, the efforts exerted to revive EU enlargement, and finally considers the questions facing the EU during the new legislative term. EU enlargement perspective – strict but fair? EU enlargement is perceived historically as having played a transformative role. It supported the consolidation of democracy in the Southern European countries and later, in the Central and Eastern European countries, the EU accession process is seen as having fostered stability, democratisation and economic prosperity. The arduous transformative process has, however, been longer and bumpier for the Western Balkans. North Macedonia has been stuck in the EU’s lobby for almost 20 years, Montenegro since 2011, Serbia since 2012 and Albania since 2014. This was partly due to the hardening of rule of law conditionality. A key lesson identified from Romania and Bulgaria’s EU accession path was that the transformation of a country, in particular in the rule of law area, was not only a long process but it was also fraught with obstacles, notably resistance from applicant governments. To remedy the shortcomings identified, the 2005 negotiating framework for Croatia strengthened rule of law conditionality by introducing a specific Chapter 23 on ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’ in addition to the existing Chapter 24 on ‘justice, freedom and security’ in the EU acquis communautaire. This approach continued and was hardened during the EU accession negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. The Western Balkans were first promised a “European perspective” at the Zagreb Summit of 2000. At the June 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki, the EU reaffirmed that the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU. To deliver on this, the enlargement process was tied to substantial financial and technical support through which the EU has aimed to push for the democratisation and resilience of Western Balkan institutions, societies and economies. EU support was made conditional upon the Western Balkans meeting ‘European standards’ (conditionality), including (and especially) rule of law prerogatives. This approach was reflected in the negotiating framework adopted in June 2012 for negotiations with Montenegro, in the High-Level Accession Dialogues respectively with North Macedonia (then former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, fYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law with Kosovo, [1] all launched in 2012. The European Commission, but most adamantly civil society in the Western Balkans, repeatedly pointed to the failings of the region’s governments to implement reforms, leading to façade compliance. In parallel, the ‘Brussels dialogue’ between Kosovo and Serbia has oscillated between normalisation and a state of strained peace and conflict prevention, with the signature of the April 2013 ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’ (known as the Brussels Agreement) constituting an exception of ephemeral hope. [2] Moreover, slowly but firmly, stabilitocracy grew roots. Autocrats in the Western Balkans, ruling through informal power structures, state capture by ruling parties, patronage and control of the media, managed to combine EU accession with stronger domestic control. [3] Certain Member States turned a blind eye to or downplayed the democratic backsliding, (indirectly) supporting autocratic leaders accused of nurturing stabilitocracy. Notable examples include Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanović and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić who Member States initially hoped would be able to settle the Kosovo status question. EU enlargement fatigue: the breaking point The multiple and overlapping crises that Europe has faced since 2008, from the global financial crisis to the perceived 2015 migration crisis, to the 2020 Covid crisis and the energy and inflationary crisis that followed, relegated the EU integration of the Western Balkan countries to second tier. At the beginning of the Juncker Commission, it had become clear that EU enlargement would be for the long haul. The unfortunate European Council decision of October 2019 not to open EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania manifested the fatigue felt with the EU enlargement process, not only in the Western Balkans but on the EU side too. The merit-based process no longer rewarded prospective members engaging in reforms. While Skopje turned a page with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s election in May 2017, ending stabilitocracy, signing the historic June 2018 Prespa Agreement with Greece that solved the name issue, it was NATO that granted North Macedonia membership in March 2020. The EU accession process was (and continues to be) often kept hostage by the vetoes of individual Member States which are utterly unrelated to the economic and democratic conditions that supposedly govern the process. The exasperation felt in the Western Balkan countries because of the empty promises and broken dreams, gave rise to alternative scenarios and Plan Bs if EU enlargement to the Western Balkans were not to materialise. It opened the doors of the region to other donors and contested powers, in particular Russia through disinformation, China on investments in infrastructure, and Turkey and the Gulf countries through investments and cultural programmes. Their influence in the region came to the detriment of EU leverage. [4] With EU enlargement on the backburner, ways to keep the momentum for reform and initiatives from the region were welcomed. The Berlin Process, a diplomatic initiative by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was launched in 2014 with a view to reinvigorating the integration process. A platform focusing on increased high-level regional cooperation and connectivity between the Western Balkan Six —Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia— and the EU Member States, the process also involves the EU institutions, international financial institutions and the region’s civil society. In addition, the 2013 Brdo-Brijuni Process is a regionally owned platform for political dialogue on sensitive bilateral and regional issues, initiated by Slovenia and Croatia. The ‘Western Balkans Six’ format enables the region’s governments to agree on and promote joint initiatives, with the full cooperation of the European Commission. These initiatives were also a way to show other powers —notably Russia, Turkey and China— that the EU is in the region to stay. Revitalising EU enlargement? The 2018 Strategy for the Western Balkans of the Juncker Commission marked a U-turn, putting the enlargement perspective of the region back on the EU agenda. It also set the tone for the 2019-2024 legislative term. Already during her campaigning for votes in the European Parliament for the confirmation of her nomination as Commission President following the 2019 European elections, Ursula von der Leyen had expressed her support for enlargement. This became clear in her Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Commission, in which she committed to supporting the European perspective of the Western Balkans. [5] At the same time, experts argued that a move from Juncker’s political Commission to Von der Leyen’s geopolitical and therefore “politicized” Commission would translate to more pressure from Member States on the Commission. That could compromise the Commission’s role as guardian of the EU Treaties, they explained. [6] In a way, EU Member States’ backroom dealings that led to a deviation from the expected Spitzenkandidat process in 2014, were a precursor to how they would deal with the EU enlargement process. The February 2020 revamped EU enlargement methodology, urged by French President Emmanuel Macron, aimed to make the process more credible, more dynamic and predictable. It also sought to make the enlargement process more robust by putting pressure on those candidate countries (notably Serbia) that have been comfortably hiding behind empty political promises for reform while nurturing stabilitocracy. In terms of EU decision-making, the new methodology decreased the number of Member State’s veto points in the Council by introducing the opening of clusters instead of individual chapters, which was hoped would expedite the enlargement process. In addition, some experts highlighted that “by reinvigorating democratic reform, facilitating foreign and security policy alignment, and making real once more the idea that Western Balkan countries are welcome as new Member States, the EU would suck the oxygen from competing and malign illiberal influences”. [7] Nevertheless, at the outset, the prospective new members perceived the novelties in the enlargement methodology as yet another way to slow down the accession process. The new methodology further reinforced the requirements for rule of law reforms (including the oversight of the relevant institutions) allowing Member States to put negotiations on hold, re-open closed chapters, reconsider funding availability and, in the worst-case scenario, suspend accession negotiations altogether. Moreover, it took the Commission more than three years to implement the methodology, fuelling the uncertainty felt in the Western Balkans. At the same time, North Macedonia, in particular, and Albania as its collateral victim, given that its accession progress was coupled to that of North Macedonia, faced intense resistance to progress on its EU accession path both from France and the Netherlands. The European Council gave its long-awaited green light to start North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations in March 2020 (together with Albania). But even then, the unity in Council was tarnished by Bulgaria, which requested that a statement be attached to the March 2020 Council conclusions, insisting, among other things, on scrapping references to the Macedonian language and to the existence of an ethnic Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. [8] These hurdles have effectively meant that accession negotiations have not started with either North Macedonia or Albania. In that light, more initiatives parallel to the EU enlargement process were launched, raising controversy. On the Western Balkans side, Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia agreed on the Open Balkans Initiative (better known as Mini-Schengen), in August 2021, although it had been under discussion since 2019. Its stated aim was to deepen political and economic ties by opening the borders between the three countries and creating a common market that would bring the countries closer to EU integration. Kosovo and Montenegro have expressed support for this idea, while Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to garner the necessary political support. Geopolitical EU enlargement: a turning point The 2022 Russian war in Ukraine has “injected new urgency into the enlargement debate but it has also underscored enlargement as a strategic necessity” for European security. [9] In June 2022, EU leaders expressed their full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and called for acceleration of the accession process. The latest EU Strategic Agenda “underscores the importance of enlargement as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity” [10] That geopolitical urgency led at last to the official opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in July 2022. The enlargement momentum, which accelerated the opening of accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and an offer for conditional candidacy to Georgia in December 2023, spilled over to Bosnia and Herzegovina despite its constitutional blockage. The EU decided to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2024. These political decisions were a clear signal that the EU is still serious about the enlargement process. At the same time, in line with the general framework of the Copenhagen political criteria and the 2006 renewed EU consensus on enlargement, the Council’s latest conclusions on enlargement of 12 December 2023 stressed the need for fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits. The June 2024 endorsement of the rule of law benchmarks (Chapters 23 and 24 in the ‘fundamentals cluster’) at Montenegro’s Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) is a key milestone for the country’s EU accession path, but also of the centrality of the merit-based approach. In parallel, the Council led by French President Macron, has also stressed the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own development, including its capacity to integrate new members. This new hurdle in the way of EU accession has led experts and policy-makers alike to consider the latest Council decisions on EU accession as “relatively symbolic”. Besides the length and unpredictability of the enlargement process, this is also the case because of the number of obstacles applicants have found on their way to the EU, including vetoes over bilateral disputes that are unrelated to the Copenhagen criteria. [11] In addition to the vetoes North Macedonia has faced consecutively from Greece and Bulgaria, Tirana’s opening of the first cluster of negotiation chapters was obstructed more recently by Athens over the jailing of an ethnic Greek Albanian mayor accused of electoral fraud. The momentum for EU enlargement has revived concerns about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, i.e., the EU’s preparedness for accepting new members. These concerns have revived the debate on the need for EU institutional reforms to ensure the effective functioning of the Union post-enlargement. Yet much of this debate is linked to the decision-making bottlenecks in the Council, when responding to urgent and complicated crises (particularly the war in Ukraine). In terms of the legal feasibility of EU enlargement, the Treaty of Lisbon contains the necessary provisions regarding institutions and decision-making processes for the EU to be able to welcome new members without any Treaty changes. In addition, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU has liberated seats in the European Parliament that would make the absorption of small new members possible. In reaction, some experts and policy-makers have seen the determination with which France and a few other Member States push for EU internal reforms as yet another attempt to either hinder EU enlargement and/or rather move towards a multi-speed EU. [12] Against this backdrop, the rise of the populist right in the European elections and national elections across the EU has amplified the mantra that EU “values and the rule of law are our compass, both internally and externally”, [13] led by a group of Member States with France in the lead. Hence, support for EU enlargement may be more complicated in the Council, where a number of EU governments have shifted to the far right and when, in a super-election year, more such parties are likely to find themselves at the helm of or in governing coalitions in the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the European Commission and Parliament are likely set to continue to support EU enlargement in the 2024-2029 legislative term. In her political priorities, incoming Commission President von der Leyen has framed enlargement as “a moral, political and geostrategic imperative” for the EU and appointed a Commissioner dedicated specifically to enlargement. In support for boosting enlargement, von der Leyen has also committed to presenting in her first 100 days in office, pre-enlargement policy reviews across a wide array of EU policy sectors, implying that there will be post-enlargement phase. [14]  The political priorities also note that the “emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental values…will always remain the cornerstone of the EU’s enlargement policy”. [15]  This could entail further delays in the accession process, for reasons already explained. The Parliament has applied a ‘cordon sanitaire’ on all leadership positions (Committee chairs and vice-chairs, Quaestors and Vice-Presidents) to block those seen as positioning themselves against the EU project (namely the far right). It is hoped this will ensure that the EP’s mainstream positions hold, including its strong support for EU enlargement. In that regard, David McAllister MEP (EPP, Germany) was re-elected chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), which is the main committee legislating on and scrutinising progress in EU enlargement. Initiatives on EU enlargement for a new legislative term 2024-2029 Several ideas have been discussed in EU circles on how to move forward with enlargement and capitalise on the current enlargement momentum. The EU has also launched new initiatives aiming to incentivise the Western Balkans to make the necessary reforms to meet the enlargement requirements. The discussion on gradual integration or “phasing-in”, in the words of the European Commission, is not a new concept. The idea of fashioning a new kind of conditionality, a way to encourage reform especially in the rule of law, but also in regional integration, good neighbourly relations, reconciliation and the resolution of bilateral disputes, now goes beyond the promises of the revised EU enlargement methodology. It became more concrete with the adoption of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, in May 2024, whose stated aim is to support the Western Balkans partners on their EU path by encouraging faster socio-economic convergence with the EU. Specifically, in return for socio-economic and fundamental reforms, including in the rule of law and fundamental rights, the Western Balkans countries will benefit from EU integration in the areas where they have met the acquis requirements. In addition to those conditions, Serbia and Kosovo are expected to engage constructively on the normalisation of their relations, leading to tangible results. At the centre of this new plan is the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, a new financial instrument that will provide €6 billion (€2 billion in grants and €4 billion in loans) over the 2024-2027 period. An additional €2 billion was allocated to the Facility as part of the mid-term revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027. For their part, each candidate and prospective candidate has prepared a detailed reform agenda explaining how it will undertake EU-related reforms. But experts have raised questions on whether the financial support is sufficient for such broad-based and demanding reforms, whether the carrots offered are enough to convince Western Balkan governments to implement reforms, whether conditionality is applicable and how it will be monitored and measured. [16] The idea of introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) —55 percent of Member States representing at least 65 percent of the EU population— in the Council of the EU for decisions pertaining to the common foreign and security policy has inspired experts and politicians alike to consider QMV for decision in the intermediary steps of EU enlargement. The European Parliament has been a strong proponent of this idea during the last legislative term, but importantly, this idea has gained traction in the Council itself, the ultimate decision-maker on EU enlargement. Specifically, a Slovenian-German non-paper to the General Affairs Council of January 2024 proposed that the opening (and only the opening) of negotiating clusters, including the Opening Benchmark Assessment Reports (OBAR) be decided in Council by QMV. This proposal is supported by some 15 other Member States. Experts have explained that introducing QMV could facilitate bypassing blockages that result from bilateral disputes between Member States and candidate countries. [17] It has also been argued that QMV could be way of providing a realistic accession scenario for the Western Balkan countries thus, on the one hand, helping the EU regain its credibility in the eyes of the Western Balkans while, on the other, rendering the enlargement process fairer and more effective. [18] Combining these two broad themes, some experts have pushed for a ‘staged accession’ to restore positive momentum to EU enlargement and ease the most serious concerns that EU Member States have regarding the prospect of further enlargement. Among other things, this proposal suggests granting QMV powers —rather than veto powers— to new Member States upon accession, in anticipation of and conditioned on streamlining the whole EU decision-making process. In that case, ‘new Member States’ could be regarded as avant-garde, in that their exclusion from veto voting power would align them to the revamped EU, which would itself progressively adapt institutionally by reducing unanimity requirements. In parallel, this provisional period of socialization would allow new Member States to be gradually introduced to the intricacies of EU policy-making. [19] The geopolitical imperative for enlargement is likely to be felt more strongly in the coming years. Russia, China and others remain active in the Western Balkans and continue to “capitalise on every opportunity that the EU fails to use and on any moment of strategic confusion and hesitance”. [20] The return of Donald Trump to the White House will likely mean a call for the EU to tackle its own responsibilities on its continent. It will take resolute EU leadership for progress in EU accession to be concrete. It implies that the enlargement process should be recalibrated so that the Western Balkan candidates are not left lingering behind the Eastern trio. It also requires that the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) starting later next year adequately reflects enlargement as a priority. Geopolitical choices cannot resort to ‘selective democracy’ as each of the Western Balkan countries should be treated on its merits. Ultimately, the EU integration of the Western Balkans needs to be understood as a win-win for all. References and footnotes 1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.2 Ioannides, I. (2018). “Peace and Security in 2018: An evaluation of the EU peacebuilding in the Western Balkans”. EPRS, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2018)6218163 Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (2017). “The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy”. Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz. https://www.biepag.eu/publication/policy-paper-the-crisis-of-democracy-in-the-western-balkans-authoritarianism-and-eu-stabilitocracy/ 4 Bechev, D. (2017). Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. Yale University Press. See also Shopov, V. (2021). “Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans”. European Council for Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-how-china-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/ 5 Von der Leyen, U. (2019). “A Union that strives for more. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024”. Directorate-General for Communication. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/063d44e9-04ed-4033-acf9-639ecb187e87_en?filename=political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf 6 Blockmans, S.; Gros, D. (2019). “From a political to a politicised Commission?” Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/from-a-political-to-a-politicised-commission/ 7 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 8 Ioannides, I. (2020). “The New EU Budget and Recovery Fund: A Positive Omen for the EU Enlargement Process?” IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-new-eu-budget-and-recovery-fund-a-positive-omen-for-the-eu 9 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 10 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 11 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 12 Buras, P.; Morina, E. (2023). “Catch-27: The contradictory thinking about enlargement in the EU”. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/ 13 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 14 Von der Leyen (2024). “Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024−2029”. Strasbourg, July 18, 2024, p. 25, p. 30. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 15 Von der Leyen (2024). Mission Letter from Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, to Marta Kos, Commissioner-designate for Enlargement. Brussels, September 17, 2024, p.5. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1a2d0ad0-270d-441b-98c8-b6be364d8272_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20KOS.pdf 16 Uvalic, M. (2024). “The Potential of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans”. Civil Society Forum – Tirana 2023. European Policy Institute – Skopje. https://epi.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/The-Potential-of-the-New-Growth-Plan-for-the-Western-Balkans.pdf 17 Zweers, W.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Dimitrov, N. (2024). “Unblocking decision-making in EU enlargement: Qualified Majority Voting as a way forward?” Clingendael, DGAP, ELIAMEP, and Solutions. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/PB_Unblocking_decision-making_in_EU_enlargement.pdf 18 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 19 Emerson, M.; Lazarević, M.; Blockmans, S.; Subotić, S. (2021). “A Template for Staged Accession to the EU”. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/a-template-for-staged-accession-to-the-eu/ 20 Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Dimitrov, N. (2023). “It’s a Package Deal! Reforming and Enlarging the European Union in a Contested World”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/its-a-package-deal-reforming-and-enlarging-the-european-union-in-a