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Western countries are facing a critical inflection point in immigration governance, where outdated policy frameworks have struggled to balance humanitarian obligations, labor market needs, and social cohesion. Rising irregular migration, overstretched asylum systems, political polarization, and fragmented border management have collectively contributed to a perception of disorder rather than opportunity. Yet immigration, when governed strategically, remains a powerful driver of economic growth, demographic renewal, and innovation. A new immigration policy for the West must therefore move beyond reactive control and crisis management toward a coherent, development-oriented framework that is predictable, fair, and enforceable. By aligning migration pathways with labor demand, strengthening legal entry channels, restoring credibility to asylum systems, and embedding integration as a core policy objective, Western states can transform immigration from a source of chaos into a catalyst for sustainable development and social stability. Below, we will discuss different aspects of this New Immigration Policy. Policy of Each Western Country to do a complete Evaluation of its Economy A key aspect of the new immigration policy requires Western countries to conduct thorough, evidence-based evaluations of their economies, analyzing beyond fundamental indicators like GDP and unemployment. This includes examining sector-specific dynamics, productivity gaps, and labor needs in industries that rely heavily on labor mobility, such as healthcare and agriculture. The goal is to establish data-driven workforce strategies that fulfill actual economic demands, enhancing domestic labor utilization through education and training. Immigration is to complement, not replace, local workforce development. Only after optimizing domestic labor should countries assess immigrant labor needs, creating targeted and regulated immigration pathways to address specific labor shortages. This method links immigration to economic necessity, promoting business growth and public service sustainability while fostering long-term financial stability. Most Western immigration systems employ pre-entry screening mechanisms to manage security risks and improve labor market matching, though their scope and rigor vary significantly. Points-based systems in countries such as Australia and Canada illustrate how education, language proficiency, and occupational demand can be systematically incorporated into selection decisions. At the same time, overly rigid credential recognition frameworks have been shown to underutilize the skills of migrants, particularly in regulated professions. Security screening and health assessments similarly reflect a balance between risk prevention and administrative proportionality. Analytical evidence suggests that pre-entry screening is most effective in contributing to integration outcomes when it is transparent, interoperable across agencies, and complemented by post-arrival credential bridging and skills recognition. Screening, therefore, functions less as a gatekeeping tool than as an anticipatory governance mechanism that shapes downstream integration trajectories. Policy of doing complete thorough checks on Immigrants before coming Another core element of the new immigration policy is the implementation of a standardized pre-entry screening framework across Western countries. This framework includes comprehensive background checks, such as international criminal record verification, biometric identity authentication, and strict validation of educational and professional credentials to prevent fraud. Degree verification should occur directly with accredited institutions, while professional licenses need recognition by certified regulatory bodies. These measures aim to enhance national security, protect labor markets, and maintain the integrity of skilled migration systems. The policy also sets clear entry readiness standards centered on integration capacity and public welfare. This encompasses mandatory language proficiency benchmarks relevant to workplace and civic participation, comprehensive health screenings to safeguard public health, and assessments of employability and sectoral fit. Health evaluations focus on prevention and readiness, ensuring transparency regarding healthcare access upon arrival. Additional factors, such as verification of financial self-sufficiency and orientation training on laws and social norms, are suggested to minimize integration risks. By adopting thorough, fair, and transparent pre-arrival checks, Western nations can transition their immigration governance from a reactive stance to proactive planning, ensuring newcomers are equipped to contribute to economic growth and social stability from the outset. Comparative experience suggests that policy effectiveness depends less on the severity of stated rules than on the consistency and credibility of their implementation. For example, Australia’s offshore processing and maritime interception policies significantly reduced unauthorized arrivals, but also generated sustained legal and ethical debate regarding human rights compliance. In contrast, several European Union states have combined stricter border controls with expanded legal entry pathways, producing mixed outcomes where enforcement gaps continue to incentivize irregular entry. These cases indicate that the deterrence of irregular migration is most effective when enforcement is predictable, legally bounded, and accompanied by accessible lawful alternatives. From an analytical perspective, the key policy trade-off lies between institutional legitimacy and deterrence: overly permissive systems risk erosion of rule compliance. At the same time, excessively rigid approaches may provoke legal contestation and humanitarian backlash. Effective governance, therefore, requires calibrated enforcement embedded within a coherent legal framework for migration, rather than categorical prohibition alone. Policy of doing complete, thorough checks on Immigrants before coming A new immigration framework introduces a structured rotation-based labor migration system, allowing immigrants to be admitted on defined, time-bound contracts of typically one to two years based on prior economic assessments linked to specific sectors and employers. At the end of these contracts, migrants are expected to return to their countries, ensuring a controlled flow of labor that mitigates long-term settlement pressures and public service burdens. This system promotes fairness by broadening access to work opportunities, enabling more individuals to participate in legal labor migration, provided they meet eligibility criteria. To incentivize productivity and integration, the policy includes a performance-based extension mechanism, allowing immigrants with exceptional work performance, language acquisition, and favorable evaluations to qualify for contract renewals or longer-term status. This balanced approach reinforces immigration as a regulated, development-oriented partnership, offering opportunities without defaulting to permanence, thus alleviating concerns about demographic shifts in host societies. Temporary and rotational labor migration schemes have been widely adopted to address sector-specific labor shortages while limiting permanent settlement pressures. Programs such as Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s contract-based labor systems illustrate both the advantages and risks of rotation models. On one hand, time-bound contracts offer employers flexibility and allow governments to regulate inflow volumes with greater precision. On the other hand, weak labor protections and limited mobility rights have, in some cases, produced worker exploitation and reduced productivity. Comparative evidence suggests that rotation systems are most effective when combined with enforceable labor standards, transparent renewal criteria, and return incentives linked to skills transfer or development benefits in the countries of origin. Thus, rotational migration should be understood not as a control mechanism alone, but as a policy instrument whose outcomes depend on regulatory design and bilateral cooperation. Policy of No Free Welfare or No Free Money for Immigrants, Refugees, or Asylum seekers Another key aspect of the proposed immigration framework is the separation between labor migration and welfare entitlement. This policy enforces a “no free welfare, no free money” principle for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers during their initial stay, aiming to prevent welfare dependency and protect public systems. Welfare systems are intended as safety nets for citizens and long-term contributors; giving unrestricted access to newcomers could jeopardize their sustainability. The focus is on self-reliance through work, with immigrants admitted based on their employability and the labor market's demands. Limited conditional support may be provided to avert humanitarian crises, but not as a substitute for employment. For refugees and asylum seekers, prompt access to work is prioritized to reduce long-term dependence and restore dignity. Eligibility for broader social benefits may eventually be linked to stable employment and tax contributions. This approach aims to reframe immigration as a system based on effort and contribution, thereby enhancing social cohesion while safeguarding public resources. Access to welfare benefits for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers remains one of the most politically sensitive dimensions of immigration governance. Empirical evidence from countries such as Germany and Sweden suggests that early access to social assistance can help stabilize newcomers during their initial settlement. Still, it may also delay labor market integration if not accompanied by strong activation policies. Conversely, systems in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom are increasingly conditioning access to benefits on factors like employment participation, language acquisition, or residency duration. These models suggest that welfare design functions as a policy signal, shaping incentives for self-reliance and integration. Rather than adopting unconditional inclusion or total exclusion, comparative analysis indicates that welfare regimes should be conditional, striking a balance between humanitarian protection and fiscal responsibility. The analytical challenge lies in designing thresholds that prevent long-term dependency without undermining social cohesion or violating international protection norms. Policy of a Complete ban on illegal migration A strict commitment to the rule of law characterizes the proposed immigration framework, which enforces a ban on illegal entry and unlawful presence. Western countries would reject immigration and asylum claims resulting from immigration law violations, such as unauthorized border crossings and document fraud. This policy aims to uphold institutional credibility, as tolerance of illegality at entry undermines compliance and public trust. Furthermore, unchecked illegal migration is linked to transnational crime, with organized networks exploiting irregular routes for human trafficking, drug smuggling, forced labor, and more. A zero-tolerance approach towards illegal entry, coupled with robust enforcement and deportation, seeks to disrupt these criminal activities and prevent the exploitation of vulnerable populations. The policy requires swift removal procedures for individuals entering or remaining in the country illegally, ensuring that deportations observe due process and human rights standards while preventing procedural loopholes. Legal migration and asylum pathways are maintained and must be accessed lawfully, thereby reinforcing that opportunities are tied to compliance with the law. This ensures that order is restored, security is enhanced, and humanitarian provisions are protected for law-abiding individuals. Policy of a Complete ban on Ads or the use of Western women to entice people for Immigration The new immigration framework incorporates a complete ban on misleading advertising practices that exploit the objectification of Western women to attract migrants from developing nations. Such advertisements, often propagated via social media and unregulated agencies, misrepresent realities and take advantage of gender stereotypes, promoting social or romantic opportunities as migration pathways. These practices distort the fundamental purpose of immigration, which should be focused on lawful work, skills, or protection, while undermining women's dignity by treating them as marketing tools. The policy addresses the disproportionate targeting of uneducated, unemployed, and economically vulnerable populations, leading to false expectations and irregular migration attempts. Furthermore, these deceptive campaigns often involve fraudulent intermediaries, resulting in financial losses, legal risks for migrants, and inflows that do not align with labor market needs. To combat this issue, Western countries should establish specialized cyber-monitoring units to dismantle and prosecute deceptive practices, collaborating with digital platforms and regulators to eliminate illicit content and enforce penalties. Legal prohibitions against gender manipulation in migration advertising must be implemented to ensure that migration decisions are made in a manner that is legal, informed, and respectful of women’s dignity. Additionally, while Western nations often depend on migration to address declining fertility rates, studies suggest it is not a long-term solution for stabilizing dependency ratios. Countries like France and Hungary demonstrate that demographic sustainability is closely tied to labor market conditions, gender equality, and family policies, rather than relying solely on financial incentives. Immigration and demographic policies should be viewed as complementary, with a focus on balanced investments in family policy to mitigate migration pressures and foster social cohesion. Policy of exceptional facilities and rewards for Western women who become new mothers A new demographic and development strategy aims to incentivize Western women to have children in response to declining birth rates, aging populations, and shrinking workforces. Instead of relying solely on immigration, which has been the common compensatory mechanism, this policy reframes motherhood as a public good and essential for national sustainability. Women who give birth would benefit from a range of financial incentives, including income tax reductions, property tax waivers, preferential mortgage rates, and enhanced childcare and healthcare support. These measures aim to alleviate financial pressures that discourage childbearing. The policy emphasizes a cumulative support system were increased family size leads to greater long-term assistance, creating transparent incentives for family formation without pressure. This shift aims to reduce economic penalties associated with pregnancy and child-rearing, thus empowering women in their family decisions. Unlike short-term monetary bonuses, the sustained fiscal relief reflects a long-term commitment from the state, providing stability during challenging years of child-rearing. By focusing on boosting native birth rates, the policy also challenges the justification for mass immigration, advocating for a sustainable demographic policy that lessens dependency on foreign labor. Ultimately, this approach aims to harmonize labor supply with cultural continuity and fiscal sustainability, positioning immigration as a selective tool rather than a primary solution to demographic challenges. Several Western countries implicitly rely on immigration to offset declining fertility and population aging, yet comparative demographic research suggests that migration alone cannot fully stabilize dependency ratios in the long term. Countries such as France and Hungary have experimented with pro-natalist policies, offering fiscal incentives and childcare support to encourage family formation, with uneven but instructive results. Hungary represents a more explicitly pro-natalist budgetary model. The government has introduced lifetime income tax exemptions for women who have four or more children, subsidized housing loans for families, and preferential mortgage schemes for new parents. These cases demonstrate that demographic sustainability is influenced by labor market conditions, gender equality, housing affordability, and work–life balance, rather than financial incentives alone. From a policy framework perspective, immigration and demographic policy should be treated as complementary instruments rather than substitutes. Overreliance on continuous labor inflows may defer structural reforms, while balanced investment in family policy can moderate long-term migration pressures and enhance social cohesion. Policy of Citizenship Restriction and Long-Term Residency without Naturalization Some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, have adopted an immigration governance model that clearly differentiates between long-term residency and citizenship. This model grants renewable residence visas to foreign nationals while hindering access to birthright citizenship or naturalization, treating citizenship as a privilege linked to lineage and national identity. By doing so, these nations manage demographic control, depend on foreign labor for economic growth, and strengthen state authority over demographics and welfare, while lessening long-term fiscal obligations associated with pensions and social security. Thus, migration remains temporary, creating a significant divide between citizens and non-citizens. Although the model offers administrative clarity, it faces challenges such as limited rights for residents, restricted social integration, and reliance on employer-sponsored visas. GCC countries impose strict immigration regulations, contrasting with Western democracies that prioritize equality and human rights. In these Western contexts, conversations around birthright citizenship and naturalization are evolving, with some nations opting for conditional citizenship that requires stricter residency criteria while still permitting a naturalization process. This analysis highlights the diversity in policy approaches, ranging from permanent residency without automatic citizenship to merit-based naturalization. While the GCC's system focuses on demographic control rather than political inclusion, it serves as a valuable case study for Western nations examining migration management and its implications for nation-building. Recognizing the complex interactions between citizenship and residency is essential, as it transforms these concepts from automatic rights to strategically managed political assets. Policy of Privatizing Religion and Restricting Public Religious Expression Policies aimed at privatizing religion attempt to limit religious belief and practice to private settings while prohibiting public expressions such as symbols, prayers, or proselytization. Advocates argue this fosters civic neutrality and diminishes religious conflict in diverse societies. However, it raises significant legal and normative issues, particularly concerning international human rights, with Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights underlining the necessity of allowing public religious manifestations. Evidence suggests that broad prohibitions on religious expression may be counterproductive, as seen in judicial cases like S.A.S. v. France, emphasizing proportionality in legal restrictions. Experiences from France and Quebec show that secular governance can respect visible religious expressions without harming societal unity. Research indicates that strict state-imposed religious limitations may lead to social tensions instead of harmony. While proponents highlight the benefits of administrative simplicity and equality, excessive restrictions risk undermining individual freedoms and alienating minority religions, pushing expressions underground and possibly increasing conflict. Policies that anonymize religious identity to prevent political exploitation may also infringe on freedom of expression and personal identity. As such, privatization strategies must navigate a careful balance of equality, liberty, and social cohesion to avoid undermining the very stability and inclusiveness they aim to promote. Strategic Risks with Final Remarks Strategic immigration frameworks offer potential economic and social benefits but also pose significant risks that require proactive management. Key risks include institutional overreach due to inadequate administrative capacity, which may be mitigated through phased implementation and investment in digital infrastructure. Labor market distortions can arise from dependency on migrant labor, necessitating integration with broader labor reforms. Social polarization and political backlash may emerge from perceived exclusionary policies, which can be addressed via transparent communication and participatory design. Human rights concerns related to stricter enforcement require adherence to legal safeguards in policy development. Lastly, external spillovers affecting countries of origin highlight the need for equitable development-linked migration agreements. Overall, careful consideration of these risks and corresponding mitigation strategies is essential for effective immigration policy reform. In summary, the proposed new immigration policy for Western countries reframes migration as a disciplined, development-oriented system grounded in legality, economic realism, and social sustainability. By aligning immigration with verified labor needs, enforcing strict entry and conduct standards, eliminating welfare dependency, rejecting illegality and exploitation, and simultaneously investing in domestic demographic renewal, governments can restore public trust and policy coherence. Immigration is neither dismissed nor romanticized; it is regulated as a strategic instrument rather than a substitute for weak governance or demographic inaction. Implemented cohesively, this framework offers a credible pathway to end systemic chaos, strengthen national resilience, and ensure that both development and social stability are achieved on lawful and ethical foundations.

In the chilling expanse of the Arctic, where ice and ocean frame the edges of the known world, a geopolitical drama has quietly gathered momentum. The world’s strategic gaze is no longer fixed solely on the traditional theatres of diplomacy in Europe, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the High North — and particularly Greenland, the vast Arctic territory within the Kingdom of Denmark — has emerged as a critical arena where great-power competition, national security priorities, global trade dynamics, and climate change converge. This transformation did not occur overnight. For decades, military planners, geographers, and strategic thinkers recognized the Arctic’s latent importance. Yet only in recent years have those projections translated into urgent geopolitical reality. At the center of this shift stands the United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), unveiled in late 2025, which redefines American priorities in a world shaped by renewed great-power rivalry. While the strategy addresses multiple global theatres, its emphasis on territorial security, critical resources, strategic geography, and adversarial competition underscores why Greenland has moved from the periphery to the heart of international geopolitics. Greenland today sits at the intersection of U.S. homeland defense, NATO cohesion, Arctic militarization, global trade transformation, and the accelerating race for critical minerals. The tensions surrounding the island reveal not only disputes among allies but also deeper structural changes in the international system. This article argues that Greenland is no longer a remote outpost but a strategic fulcrum of the Arctic, whose future will shape the balance of power in the High North and beyond. America’s Strategic Recalibration in the 2025 National Security Strategy The NSS 2025 marks a clear departure from post-Cold War doctrines centered on expansive multilateralism and global institution-building. Instead, it reflects a return to strategic realism, prioritizing the protection of core national interests, territorial security, and the prevention of adversarial dominance in critical regions. The strategy defines the United States’ primary objective as “the continued survival and safety of the United States as an independent, sovereign republic,” coupled with maintaining decisive military, technological, and economic power. Although the Indo-Pacific remains central, the strategy elevates the Western Hemisphere and adjacent strategic regions, emphasizing the need to prevent hostile encroachment on areas vital to U.S. security and economic resilience. Supply chains, critical minerals, missile defense, and strategic geography feature prominently throughout the document. Within this framework, Greenland has transitioned from a peripheral Arctic territory to a linchpin of U.S. strategic defense and resource security. While the NSS does not outline a standalone Arctic doctrine, its underlying logic — securing access to essential materials, protecting strategic approaches to the homeland, and denying adversaries positional advantages — aligns directly with the intensifying focus on Greenland. Latest developments: US position over Greenland. As already mentioned, the release of the NSS 2025 made one thing clear: US foreign policy is now defined by an assertive approach towards the entire Western Hemisphere – where Greenland is part of –. Moreover, this implies that the US might claim the right to intervene in other countries’ domestic affairs in order to guarantee its strategic and corporate interests. Therefore, after Venezuela – in addition to its rhetoric towards Cuba and Mexico – Greenland has become a hot topic, due its geopolitical, economical and strategical position and of course as part of the US “national security” and interest. The interest from the US over Greenland is not new, during Trump’s first administration an attempt to buy Greenland occurred and even at the beginning of his second administration there were comments to obtain the island. Next are presented the developments that occurred until January 22nd: - The US-Greenland-NATO crisis escalated when Trump’s desire to have Greenland either “by hook or by crook” sparked the global debate, while Europeans, Greenlanders and Danish rejected his ideas and showed support for Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark itself. - A later diplomatic meeting between Danish, Greenlandic and US officials in Washington ended up in a “fundamental disagreement” over the sovereignty of the island on January 14th. - A joint statement of several European countries supporting the idea that “Greenland belongs to its people, and only Denmark and Greenland can decide on matters concerning their relations” was released on January 18th. - Launch of “Operation Arctic Endurance” and the initial deployment of a small number of troops from the European allies plus Danish soldiers. By January 18th there were over 100 troops in Nuuk and another 100 in Kangerlussuaq. (numbers could be increased in a short time). - Worries within Europe and the NATO allies. In addition, China urged the US to stop using the so-called “China threat” as a pretext for pursuing its own interest. - General concern for Greenlanders and several protest in Denmark, and Greenland against the US actions. - The imposition of 10% tariffs from the US over Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Finland, the UK and the Netherlands that would increase by 25% on June 1st if there is no deal reached. After Trump’s speech in the World Economic Forum, he confirmed that tariffs threats were off the table as there was a “framework of a future deal” for Greenland. In summary, in January 2026, Washington’s posture toward Greenland has sharpened into a high-profile mix of strategic urgency and political brinkmanship, framed publicly as an Arctic and homeland-security imperative. Recent reporting describes President Donald Trump repeatedly arguing the U.S. “needs” Greenland for security, while also signaling limits on how far he would go — saying at the World Economic Forum in Davos that he would not use military force to acquire it. At the same time, the episode has clearly strained allied politics: coverage indicates Denmark has insisted Greenland’s sovereignty is not negotiable even as the U.S. debate escalated, and Greenland’s own authorities have taken the moment seriously enough to urge practical preparedness at home. The most concrete “near-term” direction emerging in January 2026 is not annexation but a NATO – and alliance-linked security bargain. Multiple outlets report Trump backing away from threatened tariffs after announcing a “framework” tied to future Arctic security cooperation with NATO leadership — suggesting the administration is trying to convert its Greenland pressure campaign into expanded defense access, posture, or burden-sharing rather than an immediate territorial transfer. Even where details remain vague, the logic is consistent: Greenland’s geography — especially its role in Arctic air/sea lanes and missile-warning architecture — makes it a leverage point for U.S. deterrence and homeland defense planning, and U.S. officials appear to be testing what they can gain diplomatically inside the alliance system when outright sovereignty change is off the table. This posture also lines up with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which elevates the Western Hemisphere as the top priority region and argues the U.S. will “deny non-Hemispheric competitors” the ability to “own or control strategically vital assets” in the hemisphere, while calling for readjusting military presence and “establishing or expanding access in strategically important locations.” While the NSS text excerpt does not name Greenland in the lines above, its framework — reasserting hemispheric primacy, blocking external footholds, and expanding access — maps neatly onto a Greenland approach that treats the island as a critical node in Arctic security competition and infrastructure control. European Parliament analysis likewise characterizes the NSS as a “pivot” toward a Monroe Doctrine–style sphere-of-interest logic in the Western Hemisphere, reinforcing the idea that Greenland is being handled less as a narrow Denmark dispute and more as part of a broader hemispheric strategy. Greenland’s Geographic Centrality: The broader US security interest of the Island. Figure 1: Arctic states, counties and other administrative regions with capitals. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Credit for the border data: Runfola, D. et al. (2020) geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0231866. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231866e. Figure 2: Arctic Population Centers. Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. When viewed from a polar perspective, the Arctic is not a distant fringe but the shortest connective space between North America, Europe, and Eurasia. The Arctic as seen in Figure 1 is composed of several administrative areas, including Canada, Alaska (USA), Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Greenland (Denmark). The latter can be said to be located at the center between North America and Europe and Eurasia, underscoring its geopolitical importance. In other words, Greenland occupies the central Atlantic–Arctic axis, the shortest air and missile trajectories between Russia and North America and a pivotal position between the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Russian Arctic coast. This geography carries deep strategic implications. First, Greenland is part of the so-called GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a crucial corridor for monitoring naval and air activity in the North Atlantic. The GIUK Gap played an important role during the Second World War and the Cold War and nowadays it has become crucial in securing air and sea surveillance through radar stations, while securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) as well as supply lines making them uninterrupted between NATO’s European members and the USA. The GIUK Gap can assist in ensuring maritime visibility and assist anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in case of conflicts. The presence of Russian submarines in the Arctic is a central pillar of Russia’s military strategy and nuclear deterrence, making the region one of the most militarized maritime spaces in the world. Russia views the Arctic as both a strategic sanctuary and a launch platform. In consequence, its Northern Fleet – headquartered on the Kola Peninsula –, is the most powerful of Russia’s fleets and operates a large share of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as the Borei and Delta IV classes. These submarines carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and are designed to remain hidden under Arctic ice, ensuring a second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict. The ice cover, combined with Russia’s familiarity with Arctic waters, provides concealment and operational depth. In addition to SSBNs, Russia deploys nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the Arctic. These vessels conduct intelligence gathering, protect ballistic missile submarines, and pose threats to NATO naval forces and undersea infrastructure, including communication cables. Russian submarines regularly transit through key chokepoints such as the GIUK Gap, bringing them into strategic relevance for Greenland, Iceland, and NATO’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) posture. In addition, the Arctic also supports Russia’s broader bastion defense concept, which seeks to create heavily defended maritime zones where submarines can operate safely. Air defenses, surface ships, icebreakers, and coastal missile systems complement submarine operations. As climate change reduces sea ice and increases accessibility, Russian submarine activity in the Arctic is expected to remain intense, reinforcing the region’s importance for NATO surveillance, early warning systems, and transatlantic security — especially for locations like Greenland that sit astride critical Arctic–Atlantic routes. Second, Greenland’s high latitude makes it an ideal place for early detection of long-range missile launches. Russia has long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), if ever launched from Russia toward the United States, the total flight time would be roughly between 25 to 35 minutes – depending on the launch location and target. But because of the Earth’s curvature, the shortest path from Russia to the continental US goes over the Arctic which is why Greenland is so strategically important for early detection and missile defense. In practical terms, US decision-makers would have only minutes to assess the threat and respond after a launch is detected. Establishments such as the U.S. Pituffik Space Base underscore how Greenland functions as a first line of surveillance against possible ballistic missile threats from the Eurasian landmass. Therefore, Greenland is indispensable to early-warning and missile-defense systems. Sensors, radars, and space-tracking infrastructure based on the island form a crucial layer of “U.S. homeland defense”. Finally, Greenland is the only large Arctic landmass under Western democratic control outside Eurasia. Russia dominates the Eurasian Arctic coastline, while Alaska and Canada anchor North America. Greenland bridges these spaces, serving as a keystone for transatlantic Arctic security. Its isolation does not diminish its importance; rather, it magnifies it. – making Greenland a linchpin of US homeland defense and NATO’s northern security architecture. Greenland and NATO: The Fragile Architecture of Arctic Security Figure 3: NATO’s and Russia’s militarization in the Arctic. Figure 3 exposes a stark asymmetry in the Arctic militarization between NATO and Russian. The latter maintains a dense, continuous network of military bases stretching from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. These installations support air defense, naval operations, missile forces, and surveillance — forming an integrated arc of control along Russia’s northern frontier. On the other hand, NATO’s Arctic posture is fundamentally different. It relies on discrete strategic nodes rather than territorial saturation, interoperability over mass and coordination among multiple sovereign states. Within this fragmented architecture, Greenland is NATO’s most critical node. Nonetheless, the US has presence in Greenland, specifically with the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), which is located in northwest Greenland. This base – as mentioned before – is indispensable for early missile warning, space surveillance and tracking adversary launches across the polar region. While the UK has presence in Norway in the logistic Camp Viking site. Without Greenland, NATO’s Arctic posture would fracture into disconnected segments — North America on one side, Scandinavia on the other — with no central anchor. This reality explains the sharp European response in 2025–2026 to U.S. rhetoric suggesting unilateral action or coercive pressure regarding Greenland. The deployment of European troops under Operation Arctic Endurance was not merely symbolic; it was an assertion that Greenland is a collective NATO concern, not a bilateral bargaining chip. Greenland’s Resources: Strategic Minerals in a Fragmenting World Beyond military geography, Greenland’s subsoil wealth significantly enhances its geopolitical importance. The island holds substantial deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), lithium, graphite, niobium, titanium, uranium and zinc. As it is well known these strategic materials are indispensable and critical for renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, advanced electronics, missile guidance and radar technologies and space and defense infrastructure. Last but not least there is also oil and gas, but the conditions and viability to extract them make them an economic challenge. In the context of the control of natural resources, the NSS 2025 repeatedly stresses the need to reduce U.S. dependence on adversarial supply chains — an implicit reference to China’s dominance in rare-earth processing. Therefore, US eyes are on Greenland, as it represents one of the few politically aligned alternatives with large-scale potential reserves – ironically not under Chinese or Russian influence, but under US “allies” control. Yet resource abundance does not automatically translate into strategic advantage. Mining in Greenland faces severe challenges: extreme climate conditions, environmental risks, limited infrastructure, and strong local opposition to environmentally destructive projects. As a result, Greenland’s mineral wealth is strategically valuable but politically sensitive. Its development requires local consent and long-term cooperation, not coercion — a fact often overlooked in external strategic calculations. The Arctic Trade Revolution: Melting Ice, Shifting Routes Figure 4: Arctic Seaways (Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage and Transpolar Sea Route). Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Climate change is transforming the Arctic faster than any other region on Earth. As sea ice recedes, new maritime routes are becoming seasonally viable, with potentially transformative consequences for global trade. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Arctic coast already reduces transit times between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, even though some parts are free of ice for some months per year. On the other hand, a future transpolar route, cutting directly across the Arctic Ocean, could bypass traditional chokepoints such as: The Suez Canal, The Panama Canal or The Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Greenland importance relies on its geographic position that places it adjacent to these emerging corridors. Potential roles for the island include: the search-and-rescue hubs, refueling and logistics points, maritime surveillance and communications infrastructure. This elevates Greenland from a military asset to a potential gatekeeper of future Arctic trade, linking regional security directly to global economic flows. Icebreakers and Power Projection: Mobility as Sovereignty Figure 5: Major Icebreakers and Ice-Capable Patrol Ships highlight a decisive but underappreciated imbalance. Source: generated with Chat GPT using Routers Nov 2022 data. The transit in the Arctic can be defined by the possibility to move freely without any inconvenience due its extreme conditions – or at least with the least inconveniences. In consequence major ice breakers and ice-capable patrol ships became very important assets for the countries in the region. In a simple comparison, Russia possesses more icebreakers than NATO combined, as shown in Figure 5, including nuclear-powered vessels capable of year-round Arctic operations. These ships are instruments of sovereignty, enabling continuous military presence, escort of commercial shipping, enforcement of Arctic regulations and rapid crisis responses. By contrast, the United States has long underinvested in icebreaking capacity. NATO relies on a patchwork of national fleets, with Finland and Sweden contributing significantly but still lagging behind Russia’s scale. The strategic implication is clear: Russia controls mobility while NATO controls nodes. In such an environment, fixed strategic anchors like Greenland become even more critical. Competing Arctic Visions Russia Russia views the Arctic as a core strategic and economic priority, central to its national identity, security, and long-term development. Its Arctic vision emphasizes sovereignty, military security, and the exploitation of vast natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons and minerals. Moscow sees the Northern Sea Route as a critical shipping corridor that can enhance Russia’s control over Arctic navigation and generate economic revenues. To support this vision, Russia has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, icebreaker fleets, and military modernization, positioning itself as the dominant Arctic power and framing the region as vital to its great-power status. The Arctic is not an extension of Russian power; it is central to it. Figure 6: Cargo volume in Russia’s Northern Sea Route (1933-2023) China China approaches the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” framing its vision around scientific research, economic opportunity, and global governance. Beijing emphasizes participation in Arctic affairs through international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and promotes cooperation rather than territorial claims. Its strategy emphasizes long-term access to resources, influence over Arctic governance norms, and participation in future trade routes. Its concept of a “Polar Silk Road” reflects an interest in future shipping routes, energy projects, and digital connectivity, linking the Arctic to China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative. Even though China presents its Arctic engagement as peaceful and mutually beneficial, while gradually expanding its strategic and economic footprint in the region, it also has interest in Greenland’s mining sector, for example, which has heightened concerns about strategic leverage rather than direct control. Figure 7: Map of China’s Polar Silk Road. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. United States The U.S. approach, as reflected in the NSS 2025, is reactive but intensifying. Greenland crystallizes American concerns about strategic vulnerability, supply-chain dependence, and alliance credibility. Yet pressure tactics risk undermining the very alliances that make Arctic stability possible. The United States views the Arctic as an increasingly important region for national security, environmental stewardship, and economic opportunities. At the same time, it recognizes the strategic implications of growing Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Arctic States The European Arctic states emphasize sustainability, human security, and regional cooperation as the foundation of their Arctic vision. Their policies prioritize environmental protection, responsible resource management, and the rights and livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, while balancing economic development in sectors such as fisheries, renewable energy, and limited resource extraction. These states strongly support multilateral governance through institutions like the Arctic Council and stress adherence to international law. Collectively, they view the Arctic as a region where stability, cooperation, and climate leadership are essential, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and accelerating environmental change. Canada Canada’s Arctic vision centers on sovereignty, Indigenous partnership, and sustainable development, reflecting the region’s importance to national identity and security. Ottawa emphasizes the protection of its northern territories and views the Northwest Passage as internal waters, while supporting a rules-based Arctic order. A core pillar of Canada’s approach is its collaboration with Indigenous peoples, recognizing their rights, knowledge, and role in governance and stewardship. Canada also prioritizes climate change adaptation, environmental protection, and responsible economic development, seeking to ensure that increased Arctic activity benefits northern communities while maintaining peace and stability in the region. India India’s Arctic vision is primarily science-driven and climate-focused, reflecting its broader emphasis on environmental security and multilateral cooperation. Through its Arctic research station, Himadri, and active participation in the Arctic Council as an observer, India seeks to understand the Arctic’s impact on global climate systems, particularly the Indian monsoon. New Delhi also recognizes the long-term economic and geopolitical significance of the Arctic but approaches the region cautiously, prioritizing sustainable development, international collaboration, and respect for Arctic states’ sovereignty. Strategic Futures: Cooperation or Fragmentation The future of Greenland and the Arctic more broadly will hinge on whether the region evolves toward structured cooperation or strategic fragmentation. In a cooperative scenario, Greenland becomes a stabilizing anchor within a renewed Arctic security framework, where the United States, Denmark, and NATO align their defense priorities with Greenlandic self-determination and environmental safeguards. Such an approach would emphasize multilateral governance, transparency in resource development, confidence-building military measures, and shared investment in infrastructure, search-and-rescue capabilities, and climate resilience. Cooperation would not eliminate competition, particularly with Russia and China, but it would establish rules, norms, and mechanisms to prevent escalation and miscalculation in an increasingly accessible Arctic. By contrast, a fragmented Arctic would be characterized by unilateral actions, coercive diplomacy, and the erosion of trust among allies. Pressure tactics aimed at securing access, influence, or control over Greenland could weaken NATO cohesion, fuel local resistance, and open political space for external actors to exploit divisions. In such a scenario, the Arctic risks becoming a patchwork of contested zones rather than a managed strategic commons. Therefore, fragmentation would increase the likelihood of militarization without coordination, resource development without legitimacy, and crisis dynamics without effective communication channels — conditions that historically precede instability rather than security. Conclusion Greenland’s transformation from a remote Arctic territory into a strategic fulcrum reflects deeper shifts in the international system. The United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 captures a world defined by renewed great-power rivalry, supply-chain vulnerability, and the reassertion of geography as destiny. In this context, Greenland sits at the intersection of homeland defense, NATO credibility, critical resource security, and emerging Arctic trade routes. Its importance is not a product of any single factor, but of the convergence of military, economic, and environmental dynamics reshaping the High North. Yet Greenland’s strategic value does not grant external powers unlimited leverage. Geography may confer importance, but legitimacy, consent, and alliance cohesion determine whether that importance translates into durable influence. Attempts to treat Greenland as a transactional asset risk undermining NATO unity, destabilizing Arctic governance, and alienating the very population whose cooperation is essential for security and development. The Arctic’s future must not be decided solely by military deployments or mineral deposits, but by the political relationships that sustain them. Ultimately, Greenland illustrates the central paradox of the new Arctic geopolitics: the region’s growing accessibility increases both opportunity and risk. Stability will depend not on dominance, but on restraint, not on unilateralism, but on partnership. Whether the Arctic becomes a zone of managed competition or strategic fragmentation will shape not only the balance of power in the High North, but the credibility of international order adapting to a rapidly changing world. Also, it is important to highlight Greenland’s voice – referring to sovereignty and identity. Usually under great-power maneuvering, Greenland’s own population has often been sidelined. Yet Greenland is not merely an object of strategy; it is a political community with a strong Indigenous identity, environmental concerns, and aspirations for greater autonomy. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind its constitutional status within the Kingdom of Denmark, their principle of self-determination and the political costs of alienating local consent. Paradoxically, the more external powers push, the more Greenlandic society resists — complicating both security arrangements and resource development. Finally, the Arctic is not only Greenland, the US or the NATO, there are other authors involved, Russia for instance appears as the main one, while, China and India are increasing their interests in the region Moreover, climate change seems to be game changer as new Arctic seaways gain importance in terms of trade and mobility, which in consequence are and will redefine sovereignty. For instance, either icebreakers or minerals would become as strategic as missiles. The Arctic transformation is already happening, and who will lead and what will happen in the region in the future are questions to be solved in the near future. References Agneman, G. (2025, February 04). Trump wants Greenland – but here’s what the people of Greenland want. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/trump-wants-greenland-but-heres-what-the-people-of-greenland-want-248745 Aljazeera. (2026, January 15). European troops arrive in Greenland as talks with US hit wall over future. Retrieved from Aljazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/15/european-troops-arrive-in-greenland-as-talks-with-us-hit-wall-over-future Aljazeera. (2026, January 18). Trump announces new tariffs over Greenland: How have allies responded? 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Greenland’s melting ice and landslide-prone fjords make the oil and minerals Trump is eyeing dangerous to extract. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/greenlands-melting-ice-and-landslide-prone-fjords-make-the-oil-and-minerals-trump-is-eyeing-dangerous-to-extract-249985 Bierman, P. (2025, February 19). Greenland’s melting ice and landslide-prone fjords make the oil and minerals Trump is eyeing dangerous to extract. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/greenlands-melting-ice-and-landslide-prone-fjords-make-the-oil-and-minerals-trump-is-eyeing-dangerous-to-extract-249985 Bierman, P. (2026, January 14). US military has a long history in Greenland, from mining during WWII to a nuclear-powered Army base built into the ice. Retrieved from The Conversatiion: https://theconversation.com/us-military-has-a-long-history-in-greenland-from-mining-during-wwii-to-a-nuclear-powered-army-base-built-into-the-ice-273355 Bonsoms, J. 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Trump le dice a Noruega que ya no se siente obligado a "pensar únicamente en la paz" en carta sobre el Nobel y Groenlandia. Retrieved from CNN Español: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/19/eeuu/trump-paz-noruega-nobel-reux Kumar, A., & Haldar, S. (2024, October 2024). An evolving partnership in the Arctic between China and Russia. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/an-evolving-partnership-in-the-arctic-between-china-and-russia L. Montgomery, S. (2026, January 14). 4 reasons why the US might want to buy Greenland – if it were for sale, which it isn’t. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/4-reasons-why-the-us-might-want-to-buy-greenland-if-it-were-for-sale-which-it-isnt-246955 Lebowitz, M. (2026, January 18). Treasury secretary defends Greenland tariffs: 'The national emergency is avoiding the national emergency'. 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Abstract This is the second part of the analysis regarding the realist interpretation of the ongoing war in Ukraine. (The first part is available here). This paper examines the ongoing war in Ukraine through the lens of realism, challenging optimistic Western narratives and highlighting Russia's strategic gains despite extensive sanctions. Since 2022, the EU has imposed 19 sanctions packages targeting Russia's economy, yet Russia has adapted and continued military offensives across multiple fronts, making significant territorial advances, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. The strategic importance of Odessa, Ukraine's largest deep-water port, is underscored due to its economic, military, and geopolitical value, with Russian experts openly discussing its potential capture. The conflict has also driven modernisation in Russia's military-industrial complex, introducing advanced missile systems and hypersonic weapons that challenge NATO defences. Post-war territorial changes remain uncertain, with diplomatic options constrained by Ukraine's constitution and international law. European public opinion is divided on war readiness, reflecting broader societal hesitations. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Reality on the ground – the territorial losses and military developments Following the super optimistic narrative and the consequent groupthink, as evidenced in the first part of this paper, the EU has so far imposed no fewer than 19 sanctions packages.[1] The latest package adopted on October 23, 2025, focuses on intensifying pressure on Russia's war economy by targeting key sectors, including energy, finance, military capabilities, transportation, and professional services, while also enhancing anti-circumvention measures. [2] Source: Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en In the meantime, Russia seems to have accepted any adverse consequences of the sanctions and learned to live with them. Source: Grok – prompt: Latest macroeconomic indicators for the Russian Federation economy available at: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1998598998345814522 Militarily speaking, though, Russia (which is in fact fighting several NATO countries alongside Ukraine) seems to be not only advancing in the field. As of December 10, 2025, Russian forces have continued offensive operations across multiple fronts in eastern and southern Ukraine. These advances are part of a broader push amid ongoing heavy fighting, with Russian officials claiming momentum along the entire line of contact. Examples include: Pokrovsk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Kupiansk/Kharkiv Direction, Lyman Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Siversk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Zaporizhia/Southern Direction. On top of that, the media reports advances on multiple fronts, including Borova, Novopavlivka, and the eastern areas; the liberation of Rovnoye and Petropavlovka; the encirclement and liquidation of Ukrainian forces; and the fall of Dimitrov — widespread strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.[3] Source: Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ukraine_with_Cities.png Importantly, Russian experts and military advisors openly debate the possibility of seizing control of Odessa.[4] Let us make no mistake here. Odessa is strategically important. Economically, Odessa is Ukraine's largest and only deep-water port, handling around 65% of the country's sea-based imports and exports, which account for 70% of Ukraine's total trade.[5] For Russia, controlling or disrupting this port serves to cripple Ukraine's economy while bolstering Russia's own position in global markets. First: Ukraine is a major global grain exporter, and Odessa is central to shipping these commodities. Russian attacks on the port, such as those following the withdrawal from the U.N.-backed grain deal in 2023, aim to prevent Ukrainian shipments, allowing Russia to dominate markets in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Russia's Black Sea ports (e.g., Novorossiysk) handle its own $43 billion in annual grain exports, and undermining Odessa helps Russia create global reliance on its foodstuffs amid food insecurity.[6] Second, the port processes petroleum, natural gas, minerals, and even high-purity neon gas for semiconductors. Russia has targeted oil facilities near Odessa to disrupt fuel logistics, and control here would secure routes for Caspian Sea and Middle Eastern energy flows, aligning with Russia's strategy to diversify exports as hydrocarbon revenues decline.[7] Losing Odessa would be a "massive strategic blow" to Ukraine, akin to Britain losing Dover. Militarily, as a major Black Sea hub, Odessa enables Russia to project power and maintain dominance in the region. First, Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, can blockade Ukrainian coasts from Odessa, preventing resupplies and conducting amphibious operations — though these are high-risk due to Ukrainian defenses like mined waters.[8] The fleet supports expeditionary missions (e.g., the 2015 Syrian intervention) and hosts significant missile capabilities, with the capacity to deploy 80 long-range missiles in the area.[9] Second, even without full capture, Russia can harass shipping through mining or interdiction, extending tactics used in the Sea of Azov since 2014. This obstructs Ukrainian trade in the long term, potentially even in ceasefire scenarios, while facilitating Russian oil shipments (22% of which pass through the Black Sea).[10] Geopolitically, Odessa's location amplifies Russia's regional influence. First, capturing Odessa would create a land bridge to Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region in Moldova just 35 miles away, allowing Russia to intimidate Moldova and potentially expand conflict there.[11] This aligns with broader aims to control Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast, threatening neighbours like Romania.[12] Second, dominating the northern Black Sea coast from Odessa would weaken Ukraine's security, block NATO reinforcements, and provide Russia with leverage in negotiations. It's seen as more critical to Russia's objectives than other Ukrainian regions, such as Kharkiv. President Putin has indicated in fact that the coastal area "rightfully belongs to Russia" as war spoils.[13] Finally, Odessa was founded in 1794 by Russian Empress Catherine the Great on former Ottoman territory, and it became one of the Russian Empire's largest cities and ports.[14] Arguably, the harbour city has a large Russian-speaking population (Russians are the second-largest ethnic group in Odessa Oblast), and Kremlin officials assert it has "nothing in common with the Kiev regime," viewing it as inherently Russian.[15] More interestingly, it appears that the Russian Military Industrial Complex (MIC) has been using the war, as MICs always do, as a perfect opportunity to modernize its military equipment. Consequently, Russia has advanced missile systems that NATO countries find a real challenge. Examples include: - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) RS-28 Sarmat, Russia's newest heavy ICBM, operational since 2023, with a range exceeding 18,000 km (up to 35,000 km in sub-orbital flight), a payload of over 10 tons including up to 16 nuclear warheads or hypersonic glide vehicles, and advanced countermeasures against missile defenses.[16] It's considered the world's longest-range and most powerful ICBM in service. - Hypersonic Systems Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), deployed on ICBMs like the Sarmat, can reach speeds up to Mach 27 (about 20,700 mph), perform unpredictable manoeuvres at high altitudes, and generate immense kinetic energy (equivalent to over two megatons of TNT). It's designed to evade all known missile defence systems.[17] Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, an air-launched hypersonic missile with a range of over 2,000 km and speeds up to Mach 10. It can manoeuvre mid-flight, carry nuclear or conventional warheads, and has been used operationally in conflicts like Ukraine.[18] 3M22 Zircon, a scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missile reaching Mach 9, with a range of about 1,000 km. It's primarily anti-ship, launched from ships or submarines, and has demonstrated hits on maritime targets in exercises like Zapad 2025.[19] - Air and Missile Defence Systems S-500 Prometheus, an advanced surface-to-air missile system capable of intercepting targets at 600 km, tracking up to 300 simultaneously, and engaging hypersonic weapons, ICBMs, and stealth aircraft. It's integrated with multiple radars for resilience against jamming.[20] - Emerging or Experimental Systems 9M370 Burevestnik (SSC-X-09 Skyfall), a nuclear-powered cruise missile with theoretically unlimited range due to its onboard reactor. It underwent a successful test flight in October 2025 but remains in development, with concerns about safety and reliability.[21] Poseidon (Status-6), an unmanned, nuclear-powered underwater drone (torpedo-like) capable of carrying megaton-class warheads over intercontinental distances. It's designed for coastal targets and was tested alongside Burevestnik in 2025, though full operational status is unclear.[22] Oreshnik, a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with hypersonic capabilities, is evading Western defences. Russia plans deployments in Belarus by late 2025, enhancing strike options in Europe.[23] Last but not least, the media reports on a new, potentially game-changing technology: the TOS-1A Solntsepyok, a heavy multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) designed primarily to deliver thermobaric (fuel-air explosive) and incendiary munitions. It is mounted on a modified T-72 tank chassis for mobility and protection in combat zones, and it serves as a short-range area-denial weapon, often used to target fortified positions, infantry, and light armoured vehicles by creating massive blast waves and high temperatures.[24] Possible Territorial Changes after the War? As of early 2026, Russia continues to make territorial gains (capturing over 5,600 square kilometers, mainly in Donetsk Oblast). According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (a non-partisan, non-profit American think tank), German intelligence sources claim that “Germany expects Russia to target German energy and defence infrastructure early, given Germany’s role as a NATO hub for moving and sustaining forces and forecasts that Russia will see Germany as a priority target for long range missile strikes, armed drones, and special forces after an open armed attack on NATO’s eastern flank”[25] Consequently, according to ISW, Russia would likely be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many Western estimates, particularly in the event of a future ceasefire in Ukraine that would free up Russian forces and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute.   Against this backdrop, any post-war territorial options generally involve compromises due to military realities, though complete restoration of Ukraine's 2014 borders is seen as improbable without major shifts. These options are shaped by Ukraine's constitution (which prohibits ceding territory without a nationwide referendum or amendments), international law against forced border changes, and Russia's demands for recognition of annexed areas such as Crimea, the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk), Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.[26] Russia's battlefield advantages and confidence reduce incentives for concessions, while Ukraine seeks security guarantees (e.g., EU integration or European military presence) in exchange for any deals.[27] Below, the reader will find a summary of some of the options discussed by diplomats: Source: Grok - https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=2008833222403387754 In addition to territorial change options, any deal will most likely include non-territorial elements such as Ukraine's neutrality (no NATO), demilitarisation caps, the return of abducted children, and economic reintegration of Russia (e.g., sanctions relief). Experts warn that rushed agreements could lead to renewed conflict, emphasising sustainable security for Ukraine (e.g., European troops or arms build-up).[28] Outcomes in 2026 hinge on battlefield shifts, US pressure, and European unity, with diplomacy intensifying but no breakthroughs yet. Conclusion On 11 December, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in a speech in Germany that Russia is escalating its war campaign against Europe, not just Ukraine. “We must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured,” he said.[29] On the very same day, the EU made the bold move of indefinitely immobilising frozen Russian assets worth €210 billion; €185 billion held at Belgium’s Euroclear, and €25 billion held in banks across other member states. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen hailed the move that day, sending a strong signal to Russia that "as long as this brutal war of aggression continues, Russia's costs will continue to rise. […] This is a powerful message to Ukraine: We want to make sure that our brave neighbour becomes even stronger on the battlefield and at the negotiating table,” von der Leyen added. There is one problem that most EU leaders overlook. Namely, European societies are deeply divided, with large sections unwilling to go to war with Russia. Numerous polls evidence this. A recent ECFP Poll (June) was conducted by YouGov, Datapraxis, and Norstat across 12 countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, UK). It focused on readiness for potential war, including amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine and U.S. policy shifts. Key findings suggest: 50% overall support increasing defence spending (highest in Poland and Denmark at 70%); majorities in France (62%), Germany (53%), and Poland (51%) favour reintroducing mandatory military service; 59% support continuing military aid to Ukraine even without U.S. involvement; 54% back a European nuclear deterrent independent of the U.S. All of this seems to reflect acceptance of preparation for conflict, though not direct personal willingness to fight.[30] According to John Mearsheimer, a leading realist scholar, Russia's decision to invade Ukraine was primarily a rational response to the changing material realities of the international system, particularly the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), which Russia perceived as a direct threat to its core strategic interests and great power status. Mearsheimer contends that the anarchic international system compels states, especially great powers, to maximise their power to ensure survival. Thus, Russia acted to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Western stronghold on its border, viewing the West's policies as provocative and threatening to its security. This perspective emphasises the structural pressures and incentives created by anarchy and power competition, suggesting that the imperative drove Russia's actions to survive and maintain regional dominance amid Western encroachment.[31] Admittedly, Mearsheimer’s views are much criticised by Western scholars and media experts. And yet, with the recent actions of the United States against Venezuela (the kinetic attack against the state and the kidnapping of its president and his wife – all against the most sacred principles of international law), one wonders why the cold-blooded, objective analysis has been forgone in favour of wishful thinking. References [1] Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en [2] Fisch, E. J., Junck, R. D., Sève, M., Albrecht vom Kolke, M., Benson, J., Lainé, W., Mueller, P., Seidner, G., & Vianesi, G. (2025, November 12). EU Adopts 19th Russia Sanctions Package Alongside New Sanctions Being Imposed by US and UK. Skadden. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2025/11/eu-adopts-19th-sanctions-package [3] Grok: What are the latest advances of Russian troops in Ukraine? [4] Каминский, А. (2025, October 2). «СВО закончится взятием Одессы». НАТО готовит румын и французов. Что в планах у Минобороны России? RuNews24. https://runews24.ru/articles/02/10/2025/svo-zakonchitsya-vzyatiem-odessyi-nato-gotovit-rumyin-i-franczuzov-chto-v-planax-u-minoboronyi-rossii also Крылова, А. (2025, December 3). Названы сроки, в которые Российская армия сможет дойти до Одессы. Абзац. https://absatz.media/news/143321-nazvany-sroki-v-kotorye-rossijskaya-armiya-smozhet-dojti-do-odessy or Елистратов, А. (2025, November 20). Эксперт: русским нет смысла соглашаться на план Трампа, они и так дойдут до Одессы. Репортёр. https://topcor.ru/66186-jekspert-russkim-net-smysla-soglashatsja-na-plan-trampa-oni-i-tak-dojdut-do-odessy.html [5] Costea, C. A. (2022, March 25). The strategic importance of the port of Odessa. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://russianstudiesromania.eu/2022/03/25/the-strategic-importance-of-the-port-of-odessa/ [6] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [7] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [8] Ibidem. [9] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [10] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [11] Akage, A. (2022, May 20). Is Odessa Next? Putin Sees A Gateway To Moldova — And Chance For Revenge. Worldcrunch. https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/why-odessa-is-important/ [12] Boyse, M. (2024, March 21). Operation Odesa: Russia Wants the Entire Ukrainian Black Sea Coast. Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/operation-odesa-russia-wants-entire-ukrainian-black-sea-coast-matthew-boyse [13] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [14] Santora, M. (2023, July 19). Why Odesa Is So Important to Ukraine in the War With Russia. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/19/world/europe/odesa-ukraine-war-russia.html [15] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [16] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [17] Ibidem. [18] See more at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/ [19] Charpentreau, C. (2025, September 15). Russia uses Zapad 2025 for ‘hypersonic posturing’ with Zircon, Kinzhal drills. AeroTime. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/zapad-2025-russia-hypersonic-posture-zircon-kinzhal [20] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [21] Gwadera, Z. (2025, November 20). Russia’s Burevestnik and Poseidon tests. IISS. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/11/russias-burevestnik-and-poseidon-tests/ [22] Ibidem. [23] See more at: https://youtu.be/D22JNoLzj9E?si=BtZ3NMCs7KoUk7ue [24] See more at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/tos-1a.htm [25] Young, J., Harward, C., Simanovskyy, M., Mappes, G., Nasreddine, D., & Barros, G. (2026, January 6). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2026. Institute for the Study of War. https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/ [26] Yurchuk, V. (2025, August 12). Ceding land to Russia not only unpopular in Ukraine, but also illegal. PBS NEWS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ceding-land-to-russia-not-only-unpopular-in-ukraine-but-also-illegal [27] Harding, E. (2025, November 24). What Is the Strategy in the Ukraine-Russia Peace Negotiations? Centre for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-strategy-ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations [28] Wright, T. (2025, August 18). The Only Plausible Path to End the War in Ukraine. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/08/trump-ukraine-russia-peace/683907/ [29] Kiorri, E., & Cabanas, L. B. (2025, December 30). Would you fight for the EU’s borders? Take our poll. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/12/30/would-you-fight-for-the-eus-borders-take-our-poll?fbclid=IwT01FWAPFTrZleHRuA2FlbQIxMABzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAwzNTA2ODU1MzE3MjgAAR4KLt3FfIaCbSxjUO8ldmbDys6WPnLeZaNIpZuhAApKVUs073MB4vZj8DKbOA_aem_lLTRWqCcGPL3F9z5-SX65g [30] https://www.eureporter.co/world/2025/06/26/most-eu-citizens-are-ready-for-war-new-poll/ [31] Smith, N. R., & Dawson, G. (2022). Mearsheimer, realism, and the Ukraine war. Analyse & Kritik, 44(2), 175–200. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023

After years of blockages and renegotiations, the European Union approved the agreement with Mercosur, yet the decisive battle — the ratification — has only just begun. On January 9, 2026, the Council of the European Union (EU) approved the long-awaited trade agreement with Mercosur. This decision contrasts with what happened just a month earlier, when the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had to cancel her planned trip to Brazil to sign the instrument, as she had failed to secure the Council’s green light. Now, the signing will take place in Paraguay on January 17. How did we get here, and what lies ahead? What happened: Overcoming internal resistance The basis of the so-called Interim Trade Agreement (ITA), the commercial pillar of the deal, dates back to the “agreement in principle” announced in June 2019 by the leaders of both blocs. That announcement quickly led to the formation of a powerful opposition coalition in Europe, which ultimately brought the approval and ratification process to a standstill. This coalition coalesced around two main components: a traditional one, made up of European agricultural producers, and an emerging one, composed of civil society organizations focused on environmental protection. In a short time, the world changed and, for reasons predominantly associated with the new global geopolitical context, the Commission resumed its efforts to finalize this agreement. To do so, it needed to neutralize the aforementioned opposition coalition, which, taken together, had the capacity to block it — either through national governments in the Council or through their political representatives in the European Parliament. The Commission’s strategy was to deactivate the environmental component of the coalition. To that end, beginning in 2023 it embarked on a renegotiation with Mercosur, particularly with Brazil, aimed at increasing the binding environmental commitments included in the agreement. In exchange, it was willing to forgo some of the market access gains achieved in the 2019 arrangement. On the basis of this trade-off, both blocs announced a new agreement in December 2024. While environmentally based opposition declined markedly after this announcement, agriculturally based opposition persisted. And, as expected, it found a channel for representation in countries with strong agricultural communities. Thus, the governments of France, Poland, and Ireland expressed their opposition to the agreement and sought to build a blocking minority to prevent its approval in the Council. Because this required at least four countries representing at least 35% of the EU population, the opposing countries needed new allies. Along the way, they found an unexpected partner, given its historical support for the agreement: Giorgia Meloni’s Italy. From December 2024 onward, the Italian government sent ambiguous signals, alternating between rejection and conditional support. But when the time came for approval in December 2025, the Italian government did not cast its vote, and as a result the signing could not be finalized. However, Italy’s position turned out to be transactional. After the failure in early December, the Commission negotiated with the Italian government a series of side payments in exchange for its favorable vote, the most significant of which was an advance on agricultural subsidies provided for under the Common Agricultural Policy. In parallel, the European institutions approved a specific mechanism to activate the bilateral safeguards set out in the text of the agreement, which provides for the automatic launch of investigations for a range of sensitive agricultural products if domestic prices or exports from Mercosur fall or rise by 8%, respectively. It should be noted that these safeguards complement the fact that the opening offered by the EU for these sensitive goods is partial, via quotas, which in itself already limits the scope of liberalization in this sector. And although this set of concessions was not sufficient to appease agricultural opposition — leading France, Poland, Ireland, Austria, and Hungary to vote against it (with Belgium abstaining) — the agreement was ultimately approved by a qualified majority in the Council. What comes next: The challenge of ratification Following approval, the ratification stage of the ITA shifts political action to the European Parliament and to the national parliaments of the Mercosur countries. In the former, the emergence of a new battle between supporters and opponents is highly likely. The two largest political groups in the European Parliament — the Popular Party (center-right) and the Social Democrats (center-left), which together underpin the governing coalition in the EU — have already announced their support. However, driven by opposition from agricultural producers, it is to be expected that a significant share of Members of the European Parliament from countries such as France, Poland, and Ireland, among others, will vote in line with their country’s opposing position rather than that of their political group. Thus, while the baseline scenario is one in which there is a majority in favor of ratification, it will certainly be a narrow one, meaning that marginal shifts in position could end up tipping the balance one way or the other. In parallel, there will be efforts by some Members of the European Parliament to refer the agreement to the Court of Justice of the EU, with the formal objective of determining the instrument’s compatibility with European law. Indirectly, these efforts aim to delay the ratification process and buy time to build an opposing majority. There is no certainty that initiatives of this kind will succeed, but in any case, they will be an additional factor to monitor in the coming months. In the Mercosur countries, by contrast, a less contentious parliamentary process is expected in principle. Those who could theoretically be negatively affected in distributive terms—namely, different segments of the manufacturing industry — have supported the agreement (in Brazil) or at least have not actively opposed it (in Argentina). Moreover, in 2019 the Mercosur countries agreed on provisional bilateral entry into force as each member of the bloc, together with the EU, ratifies the agreement. In addition to effectively loosening the adoption of preferential agreements with third parties, this measure is intended to encourage ratification in each national parliament. As each Mercosur member ratifies, the cost of remaining outside preferential access to the European market increases. In short, ratification is the next and final step before the agreement enters into force. As of 2019, the focus will remain predominantly on what may happen in the EU.

The Foreign Policy of the United States in Latin America continues to be influenced by a doctrine that, although formulated in the 19th century, still resonates in the geopolitical dynamics of the 21st century, albeit with a Trump-style update. This adaptation of Trump to the Monroe Doctrine — hereinafter the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine or simply the Donroe Doctrine — while maintaining its origin, now describes the perception of the second Trump administration's desire to reaffirm U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere, specifically in the Americas, not only against European intervention — as it was originally — but against any power that is neither the United States nor native to the region. These ideas were captured in the new U.S. National Security Strategy of 2025. Since its formulation, this principle has been reinterpreted and used to justify military interventions and actions in Latin America, often under the premise of defending "democracy" or confronting the threat of regimes considered authoritarian or ideological enemies. In this context, recent events — the surgical military operation and subsequent capture of Maduro in Caracas in January 2026 — demonstrate the relevance of this modern reinterpretation of the Donroe Doctrine. What’s more, it opens the door to new scenarios and tensions with other countries in the region such as Cuba or Mexico. Recent statements about the possibility of military interventions in Cuba and Mexico, along with the reconfiguration of international relations in countries like Colombia, highlight how geopolitical dynamics in Latin America are influenced by a mix of historical factors and new economic and political realities. The Case of Mexico: The Precariousness of Peace and National Security Mexico, a key actor in Latin America, has been at the center of various international debates due to its proximity to the United States and its role as a regional leader. However, violence and drug trafficking have been chronic problems that have deeply affected the country’s internal security and stability. Since Trump returned to the presidency, he has frequently declared the possibility of U.S. military interventions on Mexican soil, under the pretext of drug trafficking, primarily fentanyl, which enters the United States through its southern border. The rhetoric that has emerged from some political sectors in the United States, particularly from conservative figures, has suggested direct intervention in Mexico to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. These proposals arise in a context of increasing violence related to drug cartels, a rise in murders and kidnappings, and the inability of Mexican security forces to contain this phenomenon. This same rhetoric even claims that Mexico is “governed by narcos,” prompting Trump to mention that “we have to do something” about it, following the Venezuela situation. However, the possibility of foreign military intervention in Mexico raises a series of complex geopolitical questions. Since the signing of the USMCA, Mexico has sought to balance its relations with the United States and has been a close ally, particularly regarding trade and cooperation on security issues. However, the autonomy of its foreign policy and its ability to handle its internal problems have always been central to Mexican diplomacy. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has repeatedly emphasized that Mexico’s sovereignty and independence are non-negotiable and that Mexico “doesn’t need anyone from the outside,” while stressing that the relationship with the United States must be based on collaboration and respect for national sovereignty, not subordination. Her stance is a clear message of rejection for any attempt at foreign military intervention on Mexican soil. Therefore, the possibility of an attack of this nature could have negative repercussions on the international image of the United States, particularly in the context of bilateral cooperation that both countries need to face shared challenges like climate change and migration crises. On a regional level, the possibility of military intervention in Mexico could also have effects on Latin American diplomacy. Countries like Colombia, Brazil, and other members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) might view an increase in U.S. intervention in the region with concern. However, in terms of internal security, the debate over the use of force in Mexico is likely to remain more of an internal political issue and a battle against organized crime rather than an event that leads to large-scale armed conflict. The Case of Cuba: The Rebirth of the Cold War? It is well known that relations between Washington and Havana have not been optimal since the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Although there were rapprochements during the Obama administration (2015), the U.S. embargo and pressure on the island have remained constants in recent years. After the capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and recent statements about the possibility of direct military intervention — Trump recently refrained from referring to intervention, saying Cuba was "about to fall" — tensions escalated on the island. The accusations against Cuba are related to its support for authoritarian regimes in Latin America and its closeness to actors like Russia and China, as well as a memorandum — signed in June 2025 — to harden U.S. policy towards Cuba, which includes prohibiting direct or indirect financial transactions and reinforcing the ban on tourism to the island, among other economic measures. The Cuban government, led by Miguel Díaz-Canel, has firmly responded to these threats, recalling decades of resistance to the embargo and U.S. regime-change policies. For Cuba, any attempt at military intervention would not only be a violation of its sovereignty but also a return to an era of direct confrontation with the global superpower. From a geopolitical perspective, Cuba remains a stronghold of political influence in the Caribbean, which grants it a key role in regional security. On the other hand, the island also faces a deep economic and energy crisis, leading to a massive exodus of Cubans to the United States and other countries. While Venezuela, like Mexico, has become a major supplier of oil for the Cuban regime, the crisis is so profound that the oil is insufficient. Moreover, Cuba ended 2025 with an annual inflation rate of 14.07%. Finally, the fall of Maduro's regime and the “alignment” of the new government of Delcy Rodríguez — under threat — with the United States is a rather unfavorable scenario for Díaz-Canel’s regime. Maduro's Venezuela provided oil and was an economic source for the Caribbean state. However, it seems that with Venezuela's new alignment, Cuba's prolonged internal economic crisis, and the endless U.S. embargo, it’s only a matter of time before Miguel Díaz-Canel is completely suffocated. Trump himself, via Truth Social, suggested — in his style — that Cuba “reach an agreement before it’s too late.” Hours later, Trump claimed that “he is talking to Cuba.” The Case of Greenland: The Race for Arctic Resources Greenland, a strategic island with abundant mineral resources and critical metals, has also become a global geopolitical focal point. Its location in the Arctic and the opening of new maritime routes due to melting ice make it relevant both for the economy and for international security. The United States has shown particular interest, considering the island a key point for regional surveillance and defense, as well as access to strategic minerals for technology and the energy transition. Following the Donroe Doctrine, President Trump has been explicit in his statements about Greenland, claiming that the United States will do something to "control" the island, "by fair means or foul." Obviously, these statements have raised international alarm and speculation about potential scenarios, ranging from economic and defense cooperation agreements with Denmark and the Greenlandic autonomous government to more direct actions to secure critical infrastructure. This has led to dissatisfaction and concern primarily from Denmark, the European Union, and NATO members themselves, who have even questioned the continuity of NATO. U.S. interest is not new; there have been several attempts of all kinds to take control of the island in the past. However, the current context of growing global competition is worrying, as it is not only the United States; China and Russia are also seeking a presence in the Arctic, though mainly with economic and scientific approaches. Trump's rhetoric reflects how Greenland's strategic resources and geopolitical position have become a point of friction among powers, forcing Denmark and Greenland to reinforce their diplomacy and seek a balance between foreign investment and territorial sovereignty. In this case, diplomacy has been prioritized. Denmark has requested a meeting with Marco Rubio, the U.S. Secretary of State, and both Danish and Greenlandic officials have expressed their rejection of both a purchase and military intervention. It is important to highlight that Greenland has active agreements with the United States regarding national security and mineral extraction, so the meeting with U.S. officials could simply reaffirm and highlight these agreements. However, the argument and "need" or "desire" of Trump for the island will continue to cause concern for the Danes, Greenlanders, and the world in general. The Case of Colombia: De-escalation of Tension and the Future Petro-Trump Meeting The relationship between Colombia and the United States, traditionally one of the strongest alliances in Latin America, entered one of its worst crises in decades with the beginning of Donald Trump's second term. What began as diplomatic tensions over immigration policies and deportations quickly escalated into public accusations, sanctions, and open threats of military intervention. The turning point came when Trump accused Colombian President Gustavo Petro — a former guerrilla fighter and the country’s first left-wing leader — of allowing the proliferation of drug trafficking. At various points, Trump even called him “a sick man” and “a co-conspirator in drug trafficking,” rhetorically linking him to organized crime without clear judicial evidence. This rhetoric led to concrete actions, including U.S. sanctions against Colombian officials, revocation of diplomatic visas, and suspension of intelligence cooperation on security matters. These tensions triggered a strong internal response in Colombia: mass protests, Petro’s calls to defend national sovereignty, and debates about the possible violation of the principles of non-intervention and respect for international law. Even the Colombian government stated that its military should be prepared to defend the country in the event of a hypothetical foreign military action, underscoring the confrontational climate generated by the regional threats. In this extreme context of tension, a phone call between Trump and Petro on January 7, 2026, following the capture of Maduro, marked a significant turning point. After months of cross accusations, the two leaders spoke for over an hour to discuss issues such as drug trafficking and other bilateral disagreements. Trump called the call “a great honor” and expressed that he valued the tone of the conversation, while Petro, after the dialogue, spoke to his followers in Bogotá, emphasizing the importance of resuming diplomatic talks and avoiding further escalation. Colombian officials, such as Ambassador García Peña, described the exchange as an opportunity to ease tensions and strengthen cooperation, especially in the fight against drugs — an area that has historically been central in the relations between the two countries. The conversation also paved the way for a future meeting at the White House, which both Bogotá and Washington view as a step toward normalizing relations after months of confrontation. Although the specific issues to be discussed and the date of the meeting were still pending confirmation, this represented an important de-escalation between the two countries. Conclusion This article provides a comprehensive analysis of how the Donroe Doctrine, an adaptation of the Monroe Doctrine during Trump's second term, has shaped U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. It highlights how this modern interpretation, while rooted in a historical context, is driving interventions in the region with a focus on reaffirming U.S. dominance. By exploring the potential military interventions in countries like Cuba, Mexico, and Colombia, it demonstrates the continuation of U.S. interventionist trends, now with particular emphasis on national security concerns such as drug trafficking, authoritarian regimes, and geopolitical interests. The article also discusses the specific challenges each country faces in responding to these pressures, from Cuba's historical resistance to U.S. policies to Mexico's firm stance on its sovereignty. In conclusion, the article paints a picture of a geopolitically tense and increasingly fragmented Latin America, where the United States is exerting pressure both directly and indirectly. While regional dynamics suggest that the Donroe Doctrine could lead to greater instability and conflict, it is also clear that Latin American countries are seeking to assert their sovereignty and balance their relationships with both the United States and other global powers. As countries like Colombia and Mexico try to manage these tensions, there remains a delicate balance between cooperation and resistance, with both local and international consequences that will shape the future of U.S.-Latin American relations. The trajectory of these relations will likely depend on how these nations navigate sovereignty, security, and the evolving global order. References Ámbito. (11 de Enero de 2026). Donald Trump va por la intervención de EEUU en Cuba: "Que llegue a un acuerdo antes de que sea demasiado tarde". Obtenido de Ámbito: https://www.ambito.com/mundo/donald-trump-va-la-intervencion-eeuu-cuba-ya-no-tiene-mas-petroleo-ni-dinero-venezuela-n6232907 Atwood, K., & Bertrand, N. (08 de Enero de 2026). Diplomáticos de Groenlandia y Dinamarca se reunieron con funcionarios de la Casa Blanca mientras Trump impulsa la adquisición. Obtenido de CNN: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/08/eeuu/diplomaticos-groenlandia-dinamarca-reunion-casa-blanca-trax Bassets, M. (11 de Enero de 2026). “Por las buenas o por las malas”: así puede Trump conquistar Groenlandia. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/internacional/2026-01-10/por-las-buenas-o-por-las-malas-asi-puede-trump-conquistar-groenlandia.html Beth Sheridan, M. (09 de Enero de 2026). Trump quiere que México ‘elimine a los cárteles’. Estas son las razones por las que eso es tan difícil. Obtenido de CNN: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/09/mexico/trump-eliminar-cartales-mexico-complejo-sheinbaum-orix Blanco, U. (09 de Enero de 2026). Un año de relaciones entre Trump y Petro: de las amenazas y el odio a una llamada de teléfono y la distensión. Obtenido de CNN: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/09/colombia/trump-petro-amenazas-tension-llamada-orix Cubanet. (11 de Enero de 2026). Donald Trump: “Se está hablando con Cuba”. Obtenido de Cubanet: https://www.cubanet.org/trump-afirma-que-ya-se-esta-hablando-con-cuba/ DW. (19 de February de 2025). Trump dice que México está "gobernado por los carteles". Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/trump-dice-que-m%C3%A9xico-est%C3%A1-gobernado-por-los-carteles/a-71666187 Fouda, M. (11 de Enero de 2026). Trump lanza un ultimátum a Cuba: "No habrá más petróleo ni dinero de Venezuela". Obtenido de Euro News: https://es.euronews.com/2026/01/11/trump-ultimatum-cuba-petroleo-dinero-venezuela France 24. (11 de Enero de 2026). Trump dice a Cuba que alcance "un acuerdo, antes de que sea demasiado tarde". Obtenido de France 24: https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20260111-trump-dice-a-cuba-que-alcance-un-acuerdo-antes-de-que-sea-demasiado-tarde Hernando, C. (08 de Enero de 2026). ¿Va Trump a invadir Groenlandia? Cuatro escenarios sobre el futuro de la isla. Obtenido de El Orden Mundial: https://elordenmundial.com/trump-invadir-groenlandia-cuatro-escenarios/ Infobae. (12 de Enero de 2026). Donald Trump advirtió que EEUU controlará Groenlandia “de una forma u otra”. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2026/01/12/donald-trump-advirtio-que-eeuu-controlara-groenlandia-de-una-forma-u-otra/ M., C. M. (06 de Enero de 2026). ‘En México resolvemos los mexicanos’: Sheinbaum frena intervención extranjera. Obtenido de Vanguardia MX: https://vanguardia.com.mx/noticias/en-mexico-resolvemos-los-mexicanos-sheinbaum-frena-intervencion-extranjera-GF18846312 Martínez, M. (05 de Enero de 2026). MÉXICO ESTÁ GOBERNADO POR EL NARCO: ACUSA DONALD TRUMP Y AMENAZA CON ACCIONES TERRESTRES CONTRA CÁRTELES. Obtenido de Péndulo Informativo: https://www.penduloinformativo.com/%F0%9F%87%BA%F0%9F%87%B2%F0%9F%87%B2%F0%9F%87%BDimportante-mexico-esta-gobernado-por-el-narco-acusa-donald-trump-y-amenaza-con-acciones-terrestres-contra-carteles/ Medina, D. A. (10 de Enero de 2026). Sheinbaum: La independencia y la soberanía no se negocian. Obtenido de Imer Noticias: https://noticias.imer.mx/blog/sheinbaum-afirmo-que-la-independencia-y-la-soberania-no-se-negocian-asevero-que-mexico-y-eu-son-paises-iguales-y-no-hay-subordinacion/ Milenio. (03 de Enero de 2026). Trump dice que habrá que hacer algo con México al hablar sobre cárteles de la droga. Obtenido de Milenio: https://www.milenio.com/internacional/trump-reaviva-tension-con-mexico-narcotrafico-controla-al-pais Peralta, P. (06 de Enero de 2026). De aliados a enemigos: crece la distancia en la relación entre Colombia y Estados Unidos. Obtenido de France 24: https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260105-de-aliados-a-enemigos-crece-la-distancia-en-la-relaci%C3%B3n-entre-colombia-y-estados-unidos Ronald, I. (06 de Enero de 2026). ¿Por qué Trump quiere Groenlandia y por qué es tan importante? Obtenido de CNN: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/06/mundo/por-que-trump-groenlandia-seguridad-nacional-trax RTVE.es. (10 de Enero de 2026). Trump asegura que Estados Unidos hará "algo" con Groenlandia "por las buenas o por las malas". Obtenido de RTVE.es: https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20260110/trump-asegura-estados-unidos-hara-algo-groenlandia-buenas-por-o-malas/16889356.shtml Sana (Syrian Arab News Agency). (11 de Enero de 2026). Trump insta a Cuba a un acuerdo antes de que sea demasiado tarde. Obtenido de Sana (Syrian Arab News Agency): https://sana.sy/es/world/2288904/ Swissinfo.ch. (08 de Enero de 2026). Trump reitera que el Gobierno cubano «está muy cerca» de caer tras captura de Maduro. Obtenido de swissinfo.ch: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/trump-reitera-que-el-gobierno-cubano-%22est%c3%a1-muy-cerca%22-de-caer-tras-captura-de-maduro/90746448 Ventas, L. (19 de Febrero de 2025). El gobierno de Trump designa a los carteles mexicanos y al Tren de Aragua como "organizaciones terroristas": qué significa y qué consecuencias puede tener. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c805kp4eke5o

Europe stands at a precipice. Following the US military operation in Venezuela, President Donald Trump and his close advisers have reiterated that Greenland – currently an autonomous territory of Denmark – will be next. “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security, and Denmark is not going to be able to do it,” Trump told reporters this week. “Let’s talk about Greenland in 20 days.” The threat is not mere hyperbole. Trump has appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry, who publicly supports US annexation, as special envoy to Greenland. And Katie Miller, wife of top Trump adviser Stephen Miller, recently posted an image of Greenland in US flag colours with the caption “SOON”. These are not random provocations but coordinated pressure tactics against a sovereign territory. Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen responded by saying “That’s enough now. No more pressure. No more insinuations. No more fantasies of annexation.” Danish leaders have warned a US attack on Greenland would signal “the end of NATO” and of post-second world war security. Threats against NATO members (such as Denmark) could also embolden Russia even more and lead to more uncertainty for Europe. So why are European leaders not more forcefully calling out Trump’s threats against Greenland – as well as his government’s shocking intervention in Venezuela? And what’s at stake? Europe’s weak response NATO’s Article 5 commits members to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. If the US were to attack Greenland, Denmark would expect NATO’s collective defence mechanisms to activate against the US. European leaders have been forced to confront a reality they hoped to avoid: the US, NATO’s founding member, may become the alliance’s gravest threat. But so far, the response across the continent to both the Greenland threats and the US’ actions in Venezuela has been feeble and confused. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer admitted he wanted to speak to President Trump before he condemned the attacks, epitomizing Europe’s subordination. A letter signed by the Danish prime minister and the leaders of France, Germany, Spain, the UK, Italy, and Poland, has affirmed only Greenland and Denmark should determine Greenland’s future. The European Union has pledged to defend members’ territorial integrity. But they didn’t articulate any solid counter-threat to Trump’s comments about Greenland. They could, for instance, have reiterated their long-term partnership, the potential collapse of the biggest alliance in human history, or the costs in losing cooperation (both economic and security) with Europe that directly benefits the US. And such vague declarations about Greenland ring hollow when the same governments hesitate to condemn US violations of international law in Venezuela. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the “legal classification of the US intervention [in Venezuela] is complex” and that Germany needed time to consider this. Such equivocation on the most basic, foundational concept of international law not only signals incredible weakness. It also undermines Europe’s credibility when invoking the “rules-based order” against Russia and its actions in Ukraine, making it near impossible to mobilise Global South support, sustain sanctions coalitions, or claim principled restraint. When European leaders respond so cautiously to the Venezuela operation – stressing respect for international law while avoiding direct criticism of Washington – their principles are exposed as highly selective. Russia benefits Russia understands this dynamic perfectly. Moscow has already characterised US actions as “armed aggression” while pointing to Western hypocrisy. Moscow benefits from this in fundamental ways. First, Western hypocrisy validates Russia’s narrative that international law is merely a tool the powerful use against the weak. The vacillation on condemning US action in Venezuela or threats against fellow NATO members contradicts the European narrative against Putin’s war. Second, NATO’s potential collapse or paralysis would hand Moscow a strategic victory that Russian military power alone has been unable to secure. If the United States annexes Greenland, Denmark would face an existential choice: accept the violation and remain in a compromised NATO or leave an alliance that no longer protects its members. All other members would face the same choice. The NATO alliance cannot function if its members no longer share fundamental values about sovereignty and law. Trump has forced Europe to confront whether it will defend these principles universally or accept a world where might makes right. Appeasement all over again? This moment recalls Europe’s crisis of the Munich agreement. In 1938, Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty to appease Nazi Germany, excluding Prague from negotiations over its future while negotiating away its territory. Only later would the democratic powers discover that appeasing aggression – however politically convenient at the time – would only invite yet more aggression. Today, Europe faces a parallel dilemma: how to respond when its most powerful ally directly threatens an EU and NATO member state. Europe is edging toward another Munich agreement moment, with concessions dressed up as stability and peace a euphemism for appeasement. The events in the coming weeks will largely determine the very future of Europe. The continent faces a choice between political expediency or rules-based international order built on the prohibition of aggressive war, respect for sovereignty, and collective security. Will its leaders be prepared to confront their own hypocrisy or timidly accept the erosion of the rules they claim to defend?

On January 3, 2026, in a surgical operation in the early hours of the morning, just days after the New Year celebrations, the Delta Force special unit successfully carried out a raid capturing Nicolás Maduro, who had held power uninterruptedly for 13 years. The first images showed him aboard the USS Iwo Jima, being taken to the courts in New York to finally face trial — a scene that, along with the operation itself, will provide Hollywood with material for years to come. We are left to wait and see how long the sentence will take. Beyond the immediate event, the message and worldview it conveys for the rest of the world are far broader and more significant. What happened can be read in multiple ways, beyond the basic explanations of oil, resources, or the threat to the United States. Reality is much more complex, full of twists and intersections that enrich the events. We have an opportunity to see beyond the obvious, to reflect on things even the protagonists themselves may not fully understand. This event invites us, like few others, to reflect on one of the central axes of humanity: power. How is it understood now? How is it interpreted? Is power something one possesses, demonstrates, or enacts? Or perhaps all of the above? We can debate not only these questions but also the legality of Maduro’s overthrow, yet it is also true: what else could have been done? This is where the issue of power comes into play — not only through the act of detention itself, but through the operation designed to remove it. However, underlying this is a fragile topic: the institutions themselves, their weaknesses, and whether they will ever fulfill their function, if they even have one. Both Venezuela and the United States have become central actors in international anarchy, yet the latter, in exercising its power, raises the question of why, while the former is left with the uncertainty of what. Beyond them, one must ask: what happens with the rest? How is the global geopolitical board now positioned? How does this influence other actors, and how does it affect us? Each aspect could merit an in-depth analysis, but the aim of this piece is to open these questions for discussion. To go beyond what happened, to invite thought and debate, and not to let ourselves be swayed by media narratives that seek to extinguish the most human thing we have: our voice. The Trump Corollary: Power and the New Paradigm. U.S. Decisions, “The Why.” Since the end of the First World War, and with greater emphasis after the Second, the United States consolidated its global image not only as a great power but as a defender of democratic ideals. During the Cold War, it dispersed its forces to contain the Soviet Union while always ensuring what once again resonates strongly today: the American hemisphere. Years after that bipolar confrontation, the world shows new arrangements. There is no longer direct rivalry with a single power, but the unipolar dominance of the United States seems to have given way. Are we facing a multipolar reality? Do actors have true autonomy in the continuum of political decisions? It is difficult to answer definitively, but the fact is that the capture of Maduro completely changes these perceptions. It is no secret that Venezuela was a historic target sought after by Donald Trump. Ever since he was first president, he tried through various means to remove Maduro; however, now he has succeeded with a shrewdness and forcefulness he lacked in his prior four years. From this arises the first questions for analysis: Why now? Why Venezuela? The speed of the operation is surprising. It is not just the audacity of the command, but the authority with which it was carried out: without calls for interrogation, freely using the instruments of power at Trump’s disposal. The interpretation centered on oil is the most obvious: the president himself does not hide that between 30 and 50 million barrels will be transported to the U.S. But the background is more complex. Facing weak economic foundations in his administration, volatility with the Federal Reserve, and the spectacular failure of his tariff policy against China, Trump needed a show of authority. In his early days in charge, Donald Trump began threatening various countries with tariff increases until April 2, 2025, the so called “Day of Liberation,” on which he announced dozens of taxes. Whether to negotiate or actually implement them, this proved to be a spectacular failure, far from what Trump believed. Not only did he have to renegotiate most of them without securing concessions or beneficial agreements for the United States — with some simply maintaining the status quo — but his main “rival,” China, ended the year in a stronger position. This made two things clear: commercially, China is at least very difficult to match, and Trump lost authority. This authority — or, more precisely, negotiation power and credibility — was lost on the ground and under the rules of agreements and dynamics we believed would prevail from the American side. What Trump did in Venezuela not only enhances his figure and empowers him, but also shows that his comments on social media (the new form of political communication) are serious. He left both allies and enemies in uncertainty: those who believed in his decline because of tariff issues and those who counted on them, because in order to exercise power, he can go beyond what was thought to be “fantastical” or “crazy.” The warnings to Colombia and its president, Gustavo Petro — who, knowing his position of weakness, has already communicated with the White House — as well as to Mexico — where a ground operation against cartels has already been announced and whose president, Sheinbaum, according to Trump, is worried — or Cuba make this evident. But even more striking is his obsession with Greenland: without directly attacking NATO, he frames it as a matter of hemispheric security. All of this is part of the new dynamic imposed by Trump; the one people fear is him and his persona, positioning himself as the figure that even Russia or China watches closely, understanding that, beyond commerce, they have little real influence in the hemisphere. Trump’s ambition for power blossomed at the beginning of this year, and we do not know if it will end. Ignoring Africa, keeping the Middle East and Europe in view, and knowing that beyond Japan or South Korea there is little he can do, he elevates the American continent. In fact, he speaks of a new Monroe Doctrine, rebranded as the “Donroe,” making clear the question of power: how he exercises it and how he now uses it to construct his own narrative. The “why” behind this desire will likely remain unknown; beyond the good of the United States, we are entering a new reality of leaders who place themselves above all else, like Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China: figures who shape the board to their liking. Perhaps the reason is more human than we think, perhaps the most human fear: death. From being a successful businessman to becoming president, in his latest term he seeks to leave a mark in history and thus ensure that he does not “die” in a spiritual sense. Or perhaps it is a unilateral decision made at random; the truth only he will know. It cannot be ignored that this is his last term, and in addition to criticism, he is already experiencing electoral setbacks, as in New York, where Zohran Mamdani of the Democratic Party won as mayor, representing a clear challenge to his use of power. Even political scientist Andrés Malamud argued that the Republican base rejects foreign interventions, so Trump must justify to them that this action will bring a concrete economic benefit. The internal dynamics seemingly unfolding within the party between J.D. Vance and Marco Rubio — the architect of the operation — also invite reflection on how this move is being positioned. Rubio emerges as a prominent figure, enhancing his stature, drawing a parallel to Kissinger during the Cold War. In his analysis of classical realism, Rubio acts similarly in a different world: seeking to centralize instruments to build that sphere of influence and diversify the tools that become the American directives for countries in the Americas. Completely leaving aside institutions or democratic legality — a topic I will address later — Donald Trump demonstrates how, under the new dynamics and the new multipolar order, the old artifice of power must still be maintained. As if following Machiavelli, this move makes one thing clear: what he does is, and will remain, Power. The Venezuelan “What,” the Drift of the Apeiron: What Remains for the Rest of the Hemisphere? That Maduro was a dictator who perpetuated himself in power through fraudulent actions is a fact. Each person will decide whether he was a good ruler for his people or not; despite cases of corruption or political censorship, making a definitive judgment about his governance inevitably leads to confrontation between those who supported his ideology and those who opposed it. Here, what happened left a vacuum in the Chavista apparatus of the ousted leader. Despite the low standard of living endured by Venezuelans, the reality is that Maduro’s certainty — negative as it was from that perspective — was exactly that: certainty. Delcy Rodríguez, who assumes the presidential role, is a strong figure within Chavismo who has held very important positions within the apparatus and was supposed to constitute a solid axis to confront Donald Trump. Contrary to expectations, she now responds to the U.S. as a partner in the so-called stabilization process, or phase one. An equation that becomes mutually beneficial for both the United States and Rodríguez. For his part, Trump cannot be challenged for directly imposing or controlling Venezuela through any of his men; while it is clear that Caracas now aligns with American interests, aside from Maduro’s removal, the names remain the same: the change occurs in the responsibilities and alignment. Rodríguez herself seeks the same as Trump, but from a subordinate position: power. Here, this new arrangement — or the image projected to the world — is demonstrated once again: that in order to ensure one’s continuity, one is capable of anything, including changing historical positions within a party or reinterpreting theories of betrayal. It is also clear that, in the case of the Venezuelan leader, there are no options, as she is already threatened by Trump with worse consequences. Yet it is evident that the entire apparatus that answered to Maduro complies and collaborates without resistance, at least in practice, to maintain their positions. This image reinforces the idea that there are no values or ideals to uphold — only power to wield. For the people, the worst part remains. From Maduro’s perspective, those who suffered under his rule, while confident that he will face some form of punishment, know that he will not be held accountable for the crimes committed in his own country — or at least not judged for them — but rather for what he did against the United States. This leaves, at least symbolically, a form of penalty — not in legal terms — for the Venezuelan people. The internal situation is also unclear: the apparatus has already begun releasing political prisoners, but it is uncertain how this process will continue. The United States has not issued clear directives for the population, only specifying the concessions that must be made to the nation and how the U.S. will now deal with it and with countries it considers hostile. It remains to be seen whether there will be elections, or whether Edmundo González Urrutia or María Corina Machado will respond to those who declare them winners, despite Trump’s dismissal of them. The return of a clear system is far off, and under the decision and judgment of the United States, the question remains: Does the U.S. truly care about Venezuela and its people, in human and institutional terms? Or do they only respond to material interests, regardless of the power figures involved? There is also an unfinished path in terms of the hemisphere. The Donroe Doctrine no longer guarantees the complete freedom and autonomy of countries within the system; they remain at the mercy of their subservience to the United States, or at least to what the U.S. deems necessary. Events like those in Argentina, where Trump himself claimed that Milei’s legislative victory was thanks to him, or Nasry Asfura in Honduras during the presidential elections, demonstrate that, despite minor gestures, the President of the United States is beginning to pull the strings across the Americas. This shift — or turn — toward the right in the Americas is perhaps less a change in mindset than a product of dependency and the condition of being tied to the United States. Countries like Brazil are the main exception: through their links with other multipolar actors (China, Russia, India, as part of BRICS), they secure at least some autonomy and maneuverability in this process of change. Even with unresolved issues like Cuba or the dictatorship in Nicaragua, there remain theoretical aspects of the Donroe Doctrine to clarify: Who does it apply to? Under what cases? What distinguishes it from its predecessor? What can be said with certainty is that the doctrine fluctuates and evolves according to Trump’s decisions, which may be designed to prepare for a confrontation with other global actors, justifying why the Americas do not ally with China and remain aligned with the United States, creating unity under a single mandate and exercising that power. What remains to be seen are the consequences of Trump’s Greenland issue, which sooner or later will become his next international victory. Tensions with Denmark are already difficult to manage, and Europe is unlikely to oppose U.S. decisions. Trump has stated that he will not dismantle NATO by any means, but considers the lack of control over the island a national security risk. With little economic or resource potential, the issue is more symbolic, as previously discussed: the Donroe Doctrine, national security, and Trump’s ambitions, in addition to the strictly geopolitical concerns and the strategic position it would provide in a confrontation with China or Russia. As the latter is the goal closest to the top of the president’s agenda, time will reveal how events unfold. What is certain is that every aspect, which could be analyzed from a particular lens, is conditioned by Trump — by his logic, perspective, and desires — demonstrating the exercise of his power. The International Conception: From the Periphery to the Power From an international perspective, and positioned on the periphery, what best aligns with the world ahead is what Argentine political scientist Carlos Escudé described with his concept of peripheral realism. The parallels with this theory are clear: we see states that set the rules — in this case, the United States for our hemisphere, but also China within its sphere; states that follow the rules, such as countries that align due to Trump’s influence and end up gravitating toward Washington; and rebellious states, like Venezuela, which paid the price. Faced with the new logics introduced by the U.S. president, Escudé provides a theoretical framework to understand the behavior of countries. He shows how we can, even without full freedom (if Latin America ever truly had it), use our autonomy and take advantage of what a great power can offer. Avoiding confrontations and maintaining “close relations” allows us, even under the oversight of being in their hemisphere, to make progress. Accepting our role as a peripheral actor serves as a starting point to build more domestically than internationally, understanding that we lack sufficient autonomy to set new rules of the game. American scholar John Mearsheimer also offers insight into Trump’s stance, which, together with Escudé’s perspective, clarifies the reasoning behind these events in the system’s anarchy. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism makes it clear that Trump’s proposals on national security and hemispheric defense align with the idea that states only seek security, and the only way to achieve it is by having more power than others. This frames Trump’s logic within the dynamics of a multipolar world. The goal pursued by the United States is the same as Mearsheimer describes: to be the regional hegemon. Uncertainty about what other actors can do represents a threat; therefore, security through power is fundamental, and this power is unlimited: the more, the better. These theories, framed within a realist perspective, define the current international system and will likely describe events to come while the Trump administration is in charge and exercising hard power. Soft power actions, while important in various areas, are set aside, as they cannot match what is gained through the use of hard power. While these situations could be analyzed through other lenses, this analysis is centered on the axis of power. How Trump is handling it creates a scenario that, far from idealism, forces us to operate within realist frameworks. This moves us away from idealized global perspectives and confirms that the system, anarchic as always, functions through power relations — and it is precisely these that the President of the United States is targeting. The Meaning of Institutions and the Anticipatory Future Finally, without going into detail — since the topic itself would warrant a full analysis —the role of institutions, both international and democratic, deserves at least a mention. Not only because they form the foundations of what we know as society, but also to reflect on their functionality and effectiveness: are they truly necessary? Should they be modified? On the international side, it is clear that they seem outdated. UN meetings often function merely as spaces for presentations or speeches that lack real results. From its flawed composition to its limited capacity for action, one would not expect years to pass before resolving situations like the recent case in Venezuela. The United States has withdrawn from 66 UN bodies; other countries that do not participate raise the same question: what is the UN really for? Does it need restructuring? How? One might accuse Trump of violating international law regarding the legality of his action, but what can really be said? He addressed a problem in his own way, defending his nation against offenses related to drug trafficking. Which organization could realistically sanction the United States for this move when the UN itself cannot provide solutions to even larger problems? The legality of the act is debatable, but no resolution could realistically be reached; once again, we are left to consider how decisions might be made without producing confrontations in the legal realm, which, rightly or wrongly, operate within the territory of power. Other bodies, such as MERCOSUR — which recently approved its agreement with the European Union after 25 years — demonstrate that essential or basic issues can take decades to resolve. The fragility of NATO regarding Greenland further shows that even in defense organizations, rules are unclear; naturally, interests collide, which has even contributed to conflicts like that between Russia and Ukraine. What remains for these institutions in terms of power and organization if their own interpreters override them? Democracy is also called into question: how can Trump transgress the institutional legal procedures of his country to achieve his goals? Various world leaders celebrate such violations — like Emmanuel Macron, President of France — while supporting Paul Biya’s regime in Cameroon. So, what is truly being defended? What constitutes a dictatorship? What represents a breach of democracy? Rather than speaking strictly of democracy, we could refer to the concept of polyarchy, introduced by American political scientist Robert Dahl. However, even with democracy as an ideal, its meaning loses moral or practical weight when we see that major actions must occur outside institutional channels, and support shifts depending on each actor’s geopolitical convenience. Discussing democracy and international organizations invites broader analyses and alternative proposals, which must go beyond the specific case of Venezuela. But it is worth mentioning them, because they form part of the daily workings of power; although power can override them, these institutions are supposed to act as brakes, yet they lack solid foundations and rely on tools that are themselves imperfect. On the international level, we are left to rethink the role of institutions: do they genuinely act as participants in the system, or are they merely observers with minimal influence? The unfolding of events will show how they develop under the new logics of a multipolar world and how the geopolitical board is configured. Are we witnessing a new paradigm? Should this be understood as an isolated case, or merely as the result of Trump’s actions? Surely Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin also have their national security ambitions. Outcomes like the conflict in Russia and Ukraine, Middle East tensions, and the fragile or developing institutions in Africa are the key areas to monitor this year. What happened in Venezuela demonstrates that international affairs affect us closely; we are not far removed from these events and must attempt to understand them. The new dynamics of power present different scenarios, which we may never fully know, but one thing is clear: despite everything, history and decisions are ultimately grounded in a single reality —power.

I. Introduction Relations between Japan and China entered a state of crisis on November 7th, 2025, after Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan potentially constituted an “existential crisis” under the Legislation for Peace and Security, allowing Japan to take military action in collective self-defense [1]. Following Takaichi’s remarks, the Chinese general consul in Osaka, Xue Jian, made threatening comments against Takaichi on X, triggering a diplomatic row between the two countries. Both sides protested the other’s remarks. In response to questions from the members of Japanese parliament, Takaichi refused to withdraw her remarks, claiming that they were consistent with the Japanese government’s existing position on the issue. Japan requested that China take “appropriate measures” against Xue. China refused the Japanese request and instead demanded Takaichi retract her statements. Then the Chinese government issued numerous retaliatory measures against Japan, including restricting travel and cultural exchanges, issuing a travel advisory, and cutting off seafood imports from the country. Moreover, On November 15th, the China Maritime Safety Administration announced that the People’s Liberation Army would conduct live-fire exercises in the central Yellow Sea from November 17th to 19th, and that navigation in this area would be prohibited during this period. The notice drew criticism from Taiwan, which accused China of saber-rattling in Japan for political gain [2]. On November 16th, the China Coast Guard announced that a formation of its ships carried out a patrol within the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, a territory disputed between Japan, China, and Taiwan. On December 2nd, Chinese and Japanese coastguard vessels engaged in a standoff over the islands. China said that it had implemented “necessary control measures” and driven a Japanese fishing boat away from the islands. On the other hand, Japan stated that it had intercepted and driven away two Chinese coastguard vessels, which approached the Japanese fishing boat. [3] From December 6th to 7th, Chinese Liaoning aircraft carrier transited through the Miyako Strait between the islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and began takeoff and landing drills with Shenyang J-15 jets; aircraft took off from and landed on the aircraft carrier roughly 100 times in two days. [4] On December 7th, Japanese defense minister Shinjirō Koizumi accused China of two incidents on December 6th in which Shenyang J-15 jets from the Liaoning aircraft carrier at locking their fire-control radar at Japanese F-15 jets near the Miyako Strait. The Japanese government strongly protested to China. Takaichi also called the incident “extremely disappointing.” Japanese vice foreign minister Takehiro Funakoshi summoned Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao over the incident. [5] In response, the PLA Navy spokesperson Wang Xuemeng accused Japan of a “slander and smear campaign,” saying that the Liaoning was carrying “routine carrier-based fighter jet flight training. [6]” In addition, he said that Japan Self-Defense Forces' aircraft had repeatedly approached and disrupted its fighter jet training. Japanese officials later said that their Chinese counterparts didn’t answer the hot line during the incident. Japanese defense minister Koizumi also said that while notified, Japan “did not receive sufficient information” regarding the military exercises, while Kihara said Japanese jets were far away from the Chinese jets while training. [7] The US criticized the radar targeting of Japanese aircraft and strengthened the US alliance with Japan. A US State Department spokesperson also said that “China’s actions do not contribute to regional peace and stability.” [8] The Liaoning aircraft carrier group traveled northeast from their position east of Kikai Island following the incident. A Chinese naval Type 054 frigate also sailed through the Miyako Strait on December 8th, while another traveled through the Osumi Strait. On December 9th, two Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers, four Chinese Shenyang J-16 fighter jets, and two Chinese Xi’an H-6 bombers flew through the Miyako Strait into the Pacific Ocean as part of joint military drills. On December 10th, two US B-52 bombers flew together with three Japanese F-15 jets and three F-35 jets. The Japanese defense ministry said that the US and Japan “reaffirmed their strong resolve to prevent any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force.” [9] With this recent tension between China and Japan in the background, this paper explores the impacts of the China-Japan conflict on the global economy. This paper first explains major conflicts between China and Japan in the past and then examines the effects of the China-Japan conflict on the global economy. II. Past Conflicts between China and Japan The First Sino-Japanese War The First Sino-Japanese War (July 25th, 1894 – April 17th, 1895) was a conflict between the Qing dynasty of China and the Empire of Japan primarily for influence over Korea. [10] After more than six months of unbroken successes by Japanese naval and land forces and the loss of the ports of Lüshunkou (Port Arthur) and Weihaiwei, the Qing government sued for peace in February 1895 and signed the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan two months later, thereby ending the war. In the late 19th century, Korea remained one of the Qing tributary states, while Japan viewed Korea as a target of imperial expansion. In June 1894, the Qing government, at the request of the Korean emperor Gojong, sent 2,800 troops to aid in suppressing the Donghak Peasant Revolution. The Japanese government considered this a violation of the 1885 Convention of Tientsin and sent an expeditionary force of 8,000 troops to Korea. The Japanese force landed in Incheon. The Japanese army moved to Seoul, seized the Korean emperor, and set up a pro-Japanese government on July 23rd, 1894 in the occupation of Gyeongbokgung. The Qing government decided to withdraw its troops, but rejected recognition of the pro-Japanese government, which had granted the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Qing’s Huai Army from Korea. However, approximately 3,000 Qing troops remained in Korea, and could be supplied only by sea; on July 25th, the Japanese Navy won the Battle of Pungdo over the Qing navy and sank the Qing’s steamer Kowshing, which was carrying 1,200 Qing reinforcements. Japan declared war against the Qing on August 1st. Following the Battle of Pyongyang on September 15th, Qing troops retreated to Manchuria, allowing the Japanese army to take over Korea. Two days later, the Qing’s Beiyang Fleet suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of the Yalu River, with its surviving ships retreating to Port Arthur. In October 1894, the Japanese army invaded Manchuria, and captured Port Arthur on November 21st. Then Japan captured Weihaiwei on the Shandong Peninsula on February 12th, 1895. This gave the Japanese army control over the approaches to Beijing, and the Qing court began to negotiate with Japan in early March. The war concluded with the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17th, which required the Qing government to pay a massive indemnity and to cede the island of Taiwan to Japan. Japan gained a predominant position in the Korean peninsula. The war demonstrated the failure of the Qing dynasty’s attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats to its sovereignty, especially when compared with Japan’s successful Meiji Restoration. For the first time, regional hegemony in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; the prestige of the Qing dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow. [11] Inside China, the defeat was a catalyst for a series of political upheavals led by Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei, culminating in the 1911 Revolution and ultimate end of the Qing dynasty in China. The Second Sino-Japanese War The Second Sino-Japanese War was fought between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China and between 1937 and 1945, after a period of war localized to Manchuria that started in 1931. [12] It was the largest war in Asia in the 20th century. [13] On September 18th, 1931, the Japanese staged the Mukden incident, a false flag event fabricated to justify their invasion of Manchuria and establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. This is sometimes marked as the beginning of the war between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. From 1931 to 1937, China and Japan engaged in skirmishes, including Shanghai, as well as in Northern China. The military forces of Nationalist and Chinese Communist Party, led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong respectively, had fought each other in the Chinese Civil War since 1927. In late 1933, Chiang Kai-shek encircled the Chinese Communists in an attempt to finally destroy them, forcing the Communists into the Long March. The Communists lost almost 90% of their men. Although a Japanese invasion became imminent, Chiang still refused to form a united front with the Communists before he was placed under house arrest by his subordinates who forced him to form the Second United Front in late 1936 in order to resist the Japanese invasion together. [14] The full-scale war started on July 7th, 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge incident near Beijing, which prompted a full-scale Japanese invasion of the rest of China. The Japanese army captured the capital of Nanjing in 1937 and perpetrated the Nanjing Massacre. After failing to stop the Japanese capture of Wuhan (China’s de facto capital at that time) in 1938, the Nationalist government relocated to Chongqing in the Chinese interior. After the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Soviet aid bolstered the National Revolutionary Army and Air Force. By 1939, after Chinese victories at Changsha and with Japan’s lines of communications stretched deep into the interior, the war reached a stalemate. The Japanese forces could not defeat the Communist forces in Shaanxi, who waged a campaign of sabotage and guerrilla warfare. In November 1939, Nationalist forces carried out a large-scale winter offensive, and in August 1940, Communist forces launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive in central China. In April 1941, Soviet aid was halted with the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact. [15] In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and declared war on the US. The US increased its aid to China under the Lend-Lease Act, becoming its main financial and military supporter. With Burma cut off, the US Air Forces airlifted material over the Himalayas. In 1944, Japan launched Operation Ichi-Go, the invasion of Henan and Changsha. In 1945, the Chinese Expeditionary Force resumed its advance in Burma and completed the Ledo Road linking India to China. China launched large counter-offensives in South China, repulsed a failed Japanese invasion of West Hunan, and recaptured Japanese occupied regions of Guangxi. [16] Japan surrendered on September 2nd, 1945, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US, Soviet declaration of war against Japan and subsequent invasions of Manchukuo and Korea. The war resulted in the deaths of approximately 20 million Chinese. China was recognized as one of the Big Four Allied powers in World War II and one of the “Four Policemen,” which formed the foundation of the UN. [17] It regained all lost territories and became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946, ending with a communist victory and the Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The government of the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan. Senkaku Islands Dispute September 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision The Senkaku boat collision incident occurred on the morning of September 7th, 2010, when a Chinese trawler (Minjinyu 5179) collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands. The Senkaku Islands are a group of five uninhabited islands and three islets located in the East China Sea, which are under the administrative control of Japan, but also claimed by China and Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands have both economic and military value. There are rich fishing grounds in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding the Senkaku islands, as well as significant oil and gas deposits. The islands are also of great geostrategic value, facilitating control over the East China Sea. [18] The Senkaku Islands are claimed by Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). [19] In 2008 a sports fishing boat from Taiwan, Lien Ho, was rammed and sunk by Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships which led to an official apology and monetary compensation of NT$10 million paid by Japan. Multiple events involving Japanese Coast Guard and fishing boats from nearby Chinese provinces and Taiwan have occurred since 1972. From 2005 to the 2010 incident, however, bilateral relations between Japan and China had been positive.  [20] According to the Japanese Coast Guard, the patrol boat Mizuki of the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters encountered Minjinyu 5179 at around 10:15 (JST) on September 7th, 2010. Mizuki ordered Minjinyu 5179 to stop for inspection since Minjinyu 5179 was traveling 12 km (7.5 mi) north-west of the Senkaku Islands, which is outside the agreed area for Chinese fishing, and within disputed Japanese territorial waters. Minjinyu 5179 refused to follow the order and attempted to flee from the scene. During the chase and interception, Minjinyu 5179 collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessels. On September 8th, 2010, Japanese Coast Guard boarded the Chinese trawler and arrested its captain for obstruction of performance of public duty and illegal fishing. [21] The trawler, the captain, and 14 crew members were transported to Ishigaki Island of Japan for detention. A Japanese investigator told the press that he smelled alcohol on the arrested captain but apparently no alcohol test results were ever released. The collision and Japan’s subsequent detention of the captain, Zhan Qixiong resulted in a major diplomatic dispute between Japan and China. When China’s repeated demands for the release of the captain were refused and his detention extended for ten more days, the Chinese government canceled official meetings of the ministerial level and above. [22] In response to the arrest, the Chinese government made a series of diplomatic protests, demanding the immediate release of the trawler and all its crew. China summoned Uichiro Niwa, the Japanese ambassador to China in Beijing, six times, each time with an official of higher diplomatic rank, on one occasion after midnight. Moreover, China initiated a series of escalatory measures, including rhetorical threats, encouraging popular protests across China, the arrest of four Japanese citizens in China for allegedly photographing military targets and the implementation of an unofficial embargo on Rare Earth Elements (REE). These measures were implemented with various degrees of ambiguity and designed to exploit a number of Japanese vulnerabilities – including the Japanese government’s weakened domestic position and the Japanese economy’s high dependency on Chinese REE exports. [23] In the short-term, China attempted to force Japan to release the detained trawler captain immediately. In the long-term, however, China tried to demonstrate its ability to use a strong economic instrument which could be used as deterrent, and as coercive measure. The detained Chinese crew members were released without charge and were allowed to return home. In China, the overall event is perceived as a diplomatic victory, while the Japanese government’s “weak-kneed” handling of the issue was criticized in Japan, in particular by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. [24] One hundred Japanese conservative lawmakers signed a letter criticizing the release of the Chinese captain, and Japanese citizens took to the street to protest both China’s behavior and the “weakness” of the Japanese government. Video footage proving the deliberate nature of the boat ramming was only shown to Japanese lawmakers in a closed screening, but not released to the wider public, likely out of fear of further diplomatic clashes with China. The footage was eventually leaked online and led to increased criticism of the Japanese government for keeping details of the incident from the public. The crisis was resolved by the end of November 2010 when diplomatic dialogue between Japan and China was fully restored, and a significant de-escalation of measures took place. September 2012 Japanese Government’s Island Purchase The Senkaku Islands dispute in September 2012 was a major flare-up between Japan and China, triggered by Japan‘s purchase (from private owners) and nationalization of three of the uninhabited islands, which China claims as its territory. In April 2012, the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, a right-wing nationalist, announced a plan for his municipal government to purchase three of the islands (Uotsuri, Minamikojima, and Kitakojima) from their private owner and build on them in order to assert Japanese sovereignty. In August 2012, Chinese activists from Hong Kong briefly landed on the islands, triggering a visit by Japanese activists in response. In September 2012, the Japanese government completed the purchase of the three islands from a private Japanese owner. This action triggered massive anti-Japanese protests across China, disruptions to Japanese businesses, boycotts of Japanese products, and increased patrols by Chinese vessels near the islands, thereby escalating tensions between China and Japan over sovereignty. This action also impacted trade between the two countries and tested the US-Japan security alliance. Consequences of the conflict were as follows: First, the dispute intensified nationalist feelings in both China and Japan, with demonstrations occurring in more than 100 Chinese cities, coinciding with the anniversary of the Mukden Incident. The Japanese embassy in Beijing was attacked. Major Japanese companies temporarily shut their factories and offices in China. Two more Japanese activists landed briefly on the islands. Secondly, Chinese Boycotts and business disruptions hit Japanese companies like Panasonic, Honda, and Canon, with significant drops in Japanese car sales and exports to China. Third, in response to Japan’s purchase of the three islands, China sent patrol boats to the area, challenging Japan’s administration and marking a new, more confrontational status quo. Later six Chinese ships sailed into the waters around the islands, staying for a short period of time to assert China’s territorial claim. Chinese maritime surveillance vessels made 12 forays into the waters close to the Islands after Japan bought the three islands in September 2012. Japan increased the number of coastguard vessels patrolling the island from three to thirty. Moreover, in December 2012, a Chinese maritime surveillance plane flied over the islands for the first time. Japan responded by scrambling eight F-15 fighter jets. The incident demonstrated that the dangers of an armed clash existed not only at sea, but also in the air. The dispute wasn’t resolved; instead, it marked a significant escalation, with Japan solidifying its de facto administrative control and China increasing its assertive presence. Fourth, since 2012, China has maintained a daily presence with its coast guard vessels near the islands, thereby creating the situations of confrontation with the Japanese navy. III. The Economic Effects of Conflicts between China and Japan 1. Evolution of China-Japan Conflict It is hard to predict what effects China-Japan conflicts will have on global economy, as well as the economy of both countries. Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies at University of Cambridge carried out research on this issue in June 2014 after Japanese government purchased three of the uninhabited Senkaku islands and then the conflict between China and Japan took place in September 2012. Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies categorizes China-Japan Conflict as a magnitude 3 conflict. Table 1: Magnitude scale of conflict (source: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies) Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies provided three scenario for the China-Japan Conflict (S1, S2, and X1). Standard Scenario S1 consists of 9 months of conflict before stalemate occurs and intervention enables peace to be concluded. Scenario Variant S2 is similar to the standard scenario, but the conflict period lasts for 2 years, with trade disruption continuing for a further 3 years. An important aspect of the macroeconomic consequences is the duration of the disruption to international trade. Phase 4 in the scenario is prolonged, with double the economic losses and around 250,000 people dead. Scenario Variant X1 (Extreme 1) is the most severe variant considered in the impact analysis. Conventional weapons are still preferred but the conflict lasts more than 5 years, thereby causing over 3 times the losses and nearly 500,000 deaths. Such a variant plunges the whole world into a three-year recession after 90% of export trade is lost. According to Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, the China-Japan Conflict evolves through Phase 1 through 7. Phase 1: escalating tensions Diplomatic posturing, Naval maneuvers, and large-scale war-games have defined recent tensions between Japan and China. Amid military modernization, increased Chinese nationalism, the legacy of conflict (Sino-Japanese wars) and an extreme thirst for natural resources, Japan and China have continued to clash over the Senkaku Islands. As Japan imports 90% of its energy, it is eager to maintain an open and free flow of maritime trade, but despite bilateral trade reaching US$ 345 billion, China has pursued a more assertive position, fueled by nationalism and a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment. [25] Since Japan’s nationalization of three of the disputed Senkaku islands in 2012, China has increased the frequency and scale of incursions. For example, Chinese aircraft have entered the disputed airspace, and Chinese frigates have engaged Japanese destroyers. Tensions have reached their highest level since the end of World War II in 1945. In a show of self-determination, Japan’s Diet (parliament) passed new laws that repealed limitations of the Constitution on use of military force to settle international disputes. There is a growing concern that the situation in the East China Sea will soon escalate beyond the disputes in the South China Sea, where the Chinese navy attacked commercial Vietnamese vessels over proximity to the Spratly Islands. [26] A Japanese fishing vessel is fired upon after straying into Chinese waters. Although the crew of the damaged boat are returned safely, angry diplomatic exchanges begin from the highest levels of both Japanese and Chinese governments. Japan acknowledges the error of the fishing boat and promises immediate action to prevent further incidents. [27] Although tight-lipped at first, details emerge that the Japanese government deployed naval engineers to install radar equipment on the disputed Senkaku islands to ‘help ships and boats navigate the area safely.’ The Chinese government and state-run media react angrily to the news, stating that the objective of ‘preventing marine accidents’ is a ‘thinly veiled attempt to disguise a notorious, unlawful and dangerous attempt to claim Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku islands.’ Phase 2: provocation and posturing Stocks tied to Japanese businesses suffer heavy losses on Chinese stock markets as tensions between Japan and China increased amid uncertainty over the Chinese response. Although expected to call for a UN Security Council meeting, the Chinese government bypass diplomatic protocols and issue a public condemnation and ultimatum, demanding that Japan remove immediately the radar and personnel within 72 hours. Failure to do so, the statement from the Chinese government continues, is considered “an unacceptable act of aggression against Chinese sovereignty.” Despite international calls for calm action and volatility in global stock markets, Japan refuses to remove the radar equipment, reiterating their “honest and responsible intent to protect all in the East China Sea.” After 24 hours, China orders an immediate cessation of all trade import agreements with Japan. China also issues a travel advisory, warning all Chinese citizens to leave Japan immediately. The US and several EU countries urge calm. The Dow Jones and FTSE100 are among many global markets that suffer heavy losses on fear of war and the implications for long-term economic growth. The world waits anxiously for the deadline. Rumors of negotiations excite the press and prop up the markets but the sudden and conspicuously coordinated departure of all non-essential personnel from the Chinese embassies and consulates in Japan creates widespread pessimism. Many international operations decide to withdraw executives from their offices in key cities in the region. Phase 3: military incidents Seventy-two hours after the ultimatum, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Lanzhou-class destroyer launches a C-602 cruise missile against the radar installation on the disputed islands. The missile destroys the radar along with a naval transportation unit, killing 18 members of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The Western countries condemn the Chinese missile attack with UK, US, and France calling an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council. Japanese citizens are outraged. The Japanese government publicly promises retaliation against China. The US government urges restraint on Japan and warns that any proactive Japanese actions to provoke China could compromise US ability to support them in future actions. Stock markets plunge as fear of war sets in, with commodity prices, in particular oil, increasing significantly. The following evening two Japanese Mitsubishi F2 fighter planes from Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka, armed with ASM-2 anti-ship missiles, destroy the Chinese ship responsible for the missile attack on Senkaku Islands. China state news agencies report 37 Chinese sailors killed in the attack, with the destroyer afloat in open water but damaged beyond repair. Protestors in China take to the streets, criticizing Japan’s attacks. Japanese citizens are jubilant, with nationalistic media coverage. The wider international community condemns the retaliation act. China instigates a full blockade of Japanese vessels traveling through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, while promising safe passage for all non-Japan bound ships; China closes its airspace to airplanes coming to or from Japan. Japan reacts similarly, restricting movement of Chinese ships and airplanes. To prevent any attempt on the part of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force to access the islands, Chinese PLAN enacts a familiar mine warfare strategy to block access. The ‘Elfreida’, a commercial US$200m Ultra Large Container Vessel traveling from Busan in South Korea to Singapore, is lost at sea along with nearly 15,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) of cargo. Although the cause is not confirmed, speculation mounts that the ship struck a Chinese mine that had drifted into open water. Japan is quick to label it as another Chinese act of recklessness, while China blames a Japanese submarine attack for the disaster. Amid the high level of tension, another civilian disaster occurs as a commercial aircraft carrying 400 passengers disappears. A 747-400 heading from Beijing to Sydney disappears from the radar over the East China Sea. Accident investigators cannot determine whether it was destroyed in an act of war. Aside from the human cost, insurance claims are expected of up to a billion dollars. The US, Australia, and India create a total blockade of the East China Sea. Ships traveling from Japan are forced to travel south of the Philippines, thereby increasing journey times by over 30%. South Korea’s trade routes with Asia and Europe are also severely affected, however, as it is summer, trade with Europe suffer less, as they can use Arctic-shipping lanes and actually reduce shipping times by almost one week. China’s imports and exports are hit hardest. Their cross-Pacific journeys are rendered almost impossible, severely hampering trade and diplomatic relations with the US. [28] Chinese citizens take to the streets in protest. Although protests are generally anti-Western, they focus on anti-Japanese protests. Japanese businesses are ransacked and burned, and Japanese commercially branded products destroyed on the street. A Japanese factory in Shanghai is stormed by an angry mob, killing Japanese managers. Dozens more Japanese workers are taken hostage by Chinese protestors. Phase 4: all-out conflict Japan’s Special Forces mount a clandestine operation to rescue the Shanghai hostages, bringing commandoes ashore and into the factory compound in central Shanghai, undetected by Chinese defense forces. The clandestine operation successfully extracts the Japanese hostages, and the Japanese Special Forces escape before the Chinese army react, but several Chinese protestors are killed. China responds with a subtle but devastating act. A cyber attack shuts down Japan’s Futtsu Power station, near Tokyo, the second largest gas power station in the world and key provider of energy to the Keihin and Keiyo Industrial Zones (the largest industrial region in Japan). The attack cripples Japan’s industrial sector and denies power to military bases in the region. Power shortages restrict industries to three-day weeks as Japan starves for energy. At the same time, Washington D.C. suffers a mysterious but temporary power outage. Despite China denying responsibility for computerized hacking of the US power grid, military commentators interpret it as ‘virtual shot across the bow’, to warn the US away from military intervention in the China-Japan conflict. Trading is suspended on global stock markets as fear of a world war triggers sharp falls. Panic strikes Japan as people begin to evacuate the major cities in Japan. Many foreign nationals have already left but those who remain struggle to find ways to exit Japan. A full diplomatic effort is launched to remove citizens from both China and Japan. Foreign governments provide a constant stream of flights to India, Singapore and Australia as fear of escalation spreads. After a short period of relative calm, Japan carries out a pre-dawn air strike against mainland China. Ship-launched cruise missiles and aircraft-launched air-to-ground missiles target the military bases and radar stations around Shanghai, Beijing, and the Hong Kong - Guanghzou region. It is the start of a major period of offensive action by Japanese military forces, which continues for nearly three months of nightly bombing. As the anti-aircraft defenses around the cities in China are degraded, air raids are launched targeting the major industrial and commercial centers, in a concerted action of strategic bombing to reduce the economic power of China and change the strategic balance of military power and global influence in the region after the conflict. Assembly plants, office buildings, factories, ports, trucking and rail facilities are destroyed in concerted waves, night after night. Chinese air defense is fierce, and Japanese aircraft suffer heavy losses. Despite the night timing of the attacks, and air raid warnings, tens of thousands of Chinese workers are reported killed in the first few weeks. The death toll mounts over the coming months. China’s retaliation is swift; carrying out similar airstrikes against industrial and commercial sites in Japan’s Sendai region, and commencing an intensive bombing campaign of Japan’s power plants, liquid petroleum gas plants and shipping terminals. Japan’s already restricted energy supply is further damaged, and China’s strategy is now to cripple Japan’s economic infrastructure and to place pressure on the Japanese government to back down. China launches waves of missile attacks against industrial sites in the Tokyo-Yokohama region. In addition to tens of thousands of casualties, Japan’s industrial capacity suffers severe damage. Phase 5: stalemate The hostilities between Japan and China provokes global condemnation and the international community suffers economically from the fallout of the war, but for some period of time nobody can prevent the conflict from continuing. China’s membership of the UN Security Council is suspended. The UN Security Council calls for an immediate ceasefire and de-militarization of the area, but is unable to get agreement to mandate trading sanctions against the belligerent nations. Shipping of gas and oil supplies to both Japan and China are severely curtailed and energy reserves in both countries are reported running low, but critically so in Japan. The US declares that it is not prepared to let the Japanese citizens run out of fuel, and soon will provide Japan with the gas and oil supplies it needs. Japan agrees to suspend military attacks against China. A US shipping convoy of oil tankers heads for Japan, and the US demands that China withdraws its naval blockade around Japan to let it pass. Aircraft carriers and supporting ships from the US Pacific fleet move into tactical positions around the South China Sea. The implication is clear. The US can not allow Japan to lose the conflict and now prepare to intervene militarily if necessary. Russia protests against the US action and hints that it will make its gas and oil available to China in reciprocation, but after diplomatic pressure Russia finally aligns with the international consensus to end the China-Japan conflict. The rest of the ‘democratic security diamond’- i.e. Australia and India, as well as the UK, France, Germany, and regional actors, Vietnam and the Philippines – shows public solidarity around the initiative to end the war. For weeks the US navy and Chinese navy face off at sea, circling and withdrawing, but no shots are fired. There are no further attacks on the Japanese mainland and there is a period of stalemate between the two countries. Phase 6: negotiated peace The US, along with Russia as a partner, calls for an immediate ceasefire, the removal of the weapons on the disputed islands, and the opportunity for both China and Japan to address the UN on the issue of each country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Chinese premier and the Japanese prime minister finally meet at peace talks in Singapore. After three days of negotiations, a peace treaty is signed, thereby guaranteeing the free flow of trade through the South and East China Sea and gestures towards the reconstruction of each other’s infrastructure. Global markets respond positively. Phase 7: aftermath China agrees to the conditions that any further attack would void all agreements, and that Pacific and South China Sea shipping lanes will be opened as soon as possible so that trade with the US and Canada can begin again. Japan also agrees to the ceasefire and to the US and Russia’s role in negotiating trade relations with China and restoring most of the US$ 345 billion agreement. The free flow of shipping routes returns within 3 months, causing an increase in global stock markets as some normality returned. It requires a large presence and deployment of US Naval forces, at significant cost to their economy. Commodity prices began to drop within hours of the agreement. Ownership of the Senkaku islands remains disputed, but after 9 months of conflict, 100,000 deaths, and billions of dollars in losses, neither side has the political will, energy supplies, the public support, or the money to continue the conflict. 2. Examination of the Effects of China-Japan Conflict on Global Economy To model the effects of a China-Japan conflict, Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies at University of Cambridge selected a number of key indicators. Shocks were chosen based on historical precedents that would be expected to occur during a China-Japan conflict. While the conflict may last for only a few months, most of the shocks applied in the model persist and generally last for a period of one year before returning to baseline over the next several years. Several of the variables were shocked for a longer period to represent the ongoing macroeconomic effects created by conflict. The effects of conflict. on some variables were very long lasting and have very high macroeconomic inertia in the system, thereby taking several years to return to pre-disaster levels. Such an example is the effect of conflict on global trade. The modeling by Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies was carried out in 2014, but the Cambridge Centre is interested in generic results for whenever a conflict might break out in future years. Variable descriptions The three independent scenarios (S1, S2, and X1) have been modeled using the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model. Following are the variables in the model to which the shocks were applied. Table 2 provides an overview of the input (parameter) variables applied. Table 2: Input (parameter) variables in macroeconomic modeling   Inward foreign direct investment is investment in business and capital. China has significant inflows of foreign direct investment and is therefore much more affected by a conflict shock to this variable than Japan. A 40% reduction of inward foreign direct investment represents a loss of approximately US$ 100 billion per year to the Chinese economy at its peak in year 2. In Japan, this represents a loss of about US$ 2.1 billion per year at its peak in year 2. Government consumption increases during the conflict to pay for military, ammunition and additional resources required for conflict. China spent 2% (US$ 166 billion) of GDP on defense in 2014, while Japan spent 1% (US$ 59.3 billion) of GDP on defense. In each of the three scenarios, government spending increased 7% in the first year and then returned to baseline levels by the end of the second year. This represents an increase in government spending of US$ 86 billion per year for China and US$ 70 billion per year for Japan. Exports and imports account for a significant share of GDP for both Japan and China. In China, exports account for 26% of GDP and in Japan, exports account for 18%. One of the largest economic effects that will occur as a result of this conflict will result from exports and imports being prevented to entering the East China Sea. Exports and imports are both shocked simultaneously and equally in each scenario. The peak of the shock to exports and imports occurs at the outbreak of conflict but takes a further six years to recover to pre-conflict levels. Capital destruction is defined as capital that can no longer be used as a productive resource and is an expected but unfortunate consequence of conflict. A declining capital base therefore has very serious consequences for economic growth and output. The level of capital destruction increases in each of the three scenarios from 2% of the capital stock in S1, 5% in S2 and 10% in X1. Share (stock) prices capture the market valuation of firms within an economy and incorporate the assets into a firm’s books and the expected value of future revenue and profit. Share prices therefore capture the level of confidence that the market has in the future profitability of a firm. Any firm that operates in a country that is in conflict will face increasing risks to its normal business operation and long-term strategic objectives. Increased uncertainty about future growth will have significant downward pressure on the market valuation of firms that operate in these areas. Share prices have been shocked 2% in S1, 5% in S2 and 10% in S3 compared to the baseline. Share prices are also expected to decline in other parts of the world as future global expectations are amended downward. These effects are modeled directly on neighboring Asian countries and the US stock market. In all three scenarios, however, share prices return to baseline by the end of second year after the conflict began. Capital flight occurs when assets and money rapidly move out of a country or region. Capital flight is most likely to occur when investment and business outlooks are uncertain, and investments are placed at risk. In Japan, capital flight is modeled as a devaluation of its exchange rate benchmarked against the US dollar. A 10% devaluation of the Japanese currency takes place in S1, 15% in S2 and 50% in X1. Modeling capital flight from China is more problematic. China has strict controls on capital, and the Yuan does not float on international currency markets. As a result, the exchange rate in China is fixed at present levels across all scenarios. Capital flight from China is therefore indirectly captured through a decline in investment funded by loans. This is represented by a shock of 40% in S1, 60% in S2 and 80% in X1 with recovery back to baseline projections taking six years. World oil prices typically rise during conflict due to increased demand for energy and heightened uncertainty around supply. This is modeled as a 20% increase in S1, 30% increase in S2 and 50% increase X1. The rise in oil prices lasts for 12 months during the conflict and then is allowed to return to base during the second year. Impact of China-Japan conflict on exports and imports A shock on exports and imports to Japan and China represents one of the most significant effects that will affect global economic output. Figures 1 and 2 show the international exports from Japan and China which are halted by the conflict. The biggest recipient of exports from Japan and China, apart from each other, is the US. Figure 1: China exports by value and type to different countries Figure 2: Japan exports by value and type to different countries. As a result of the conflict, total exports in China for the year 2 drop by 80% in the X1 scenario or approximately US$ 1.5 trillion. And for Japan exports decline by US$ 726 billion. Behind Japan and China, exports from the US are the most adversely affected international market dropping in traded value by over US$ 450 billion in the X1 scenario. Globally, the aggregate value of total exports declines by over US$ 6 trillion. A similar picture can be described for imports. Imports to the US reach a minimum in year 2 with a drop of US$ 165 billion, while the value of aggregate global imports drops by almost $4 trillion across all markets and sectors. Impact of China-Japan conflict on energy prices Brent crude spot price spikes at US$ 120 per barrel in scenario X1 and roughly US$ 110pb in each of the other two scenarios. This occurs despite downward pressure on global aggregate demand due to a decline in aggregate output, a substantial shock to global trade and a significant drop in market confidence. The biggest impact on global oil prices occurs 12 months after the conflict began with a steep decline in oil prices as the world recovers from the shock of conflict. There is then a period of two years of persistent decline in oil prices until the end of year 3. Global oil prices does not fully recover to pre-conflict levels by the end of the model period in year 7. Impact of China-Japan conflict on commodity prices A similar pattern will occur in the price of most other natural resources and commodities. Prices of raw commodities will initially rise as Japan and China increase demand for raw materials and resources in preparation for conflict. Coal, iron ore, natural gas and other rare earth metals will all spike in price as the threat of conflict looms. Once a long and protracted conflict between Japan and China looks unlikely and the international community is successful in getting the peace treaty signed, the price of natural resources will then decline rapidly as aggregate demand drops. By this point, the signs of a global recession are imminent. Aggregate demand is down, and trade between Japan and China has ceased. And market confidence will be at an all-time low. China, which was once the world’s largest exporter, struggles to attract foreign direct investment and cannot find sufficient buyers for its manufactured goods. This leads to lower demand for raw materials, which in turn leads to persistently low prices for raw commodities and resources for the next several years. Impact of China-Japan conflict on employment A drop in global aggregate demand leads to a rapid increase in unemployment caused primarily by a drop in exports and a loss in the value of share price. In both Japan and China, there is a rapid increase in unemployment as the economy adjusts in the post-conflict period between year 2 and year 7. Unemployment in Japan skyrockets after the end of the conflict and reaches a peak at 14% in year 5, 10% higher than baseline. In China, the effects of unemployment are much more acute, reaching a peak unemployment rate of 9% during the first year, 5% above baseline. Similarly, unemployment in the rest of the world is also adversely affected. Unemployment in the US reached 9.4% in year 3, 2 years after the conflict has started, 3.8% above baseline projections. Impact of China-Japan conflict on inflation Historically, one of the most devastating macroeconomic consequences in post-conflict periods is high and runaway inflation. Figure 3 shows the effects of the conflict on inflation in different countries in the scenario S1. Figure 3: Impact of the conflict on inflation in different countries, in scenario S1 In the conflict scenario, both Japan and China experience inflationary pressure and a rise in consumer prices precipitated by a combination of import inflation and cost-push inflation. Cost push inflation occurs because important resources and goods are diverted away from the real economy and used for the war effort. Manufacturing plants that once made goods for general consumption are now used to produce weapons required for conflict – this drives up the price of normal goods in the economy as there are limited supplies of alternatives. Import inflation will occur because the import of goods from international markets are blocked from coming through the South and East China Seas, with a limited supply of local substitutes, prices for these goods will also rise. In China, prices are down in line with a drop in aggregate demand, a direct result of a reduction in foreign direct investment. In the most extreme scenario X1, there is a short period of deflation in the Chinese economy, peaking at -1.5%, which is followed by increasing inflationary pressure after the conflict ends. Inflation reaches a peak at 9.6% in year 4 in the S1 scenario before declining to pre-conflict levels by year 7. In Japan, where FDI is quite small, inflationary pressure accompanies the start of the conflict. Scenario S1 peaks at 5% inflation in year 2 before going into deflation in year 6. In scenario X1, inflation reaches 20% in year 2 before plunging to negative levels (deflation) from year 5 onwards. The global economy experiences a similar pattern of inflation. During the conflict, inflation increases and reaches peaks in scenarios S2 and X1 before starting a long decline. Average global consumer prices then go down for 4 to 5 years before returning to positive growth rates from year 6. Impact of China-Japan conflict on government balance and reserves The scenario results in a significant decrease (compared to baseline) in foreign reserves for both Japan and China. In the X1 scenario, Japan and China will decrease their foreign reserve holdings by US$ 2.2 trillion and US$ 430 billion respectively when compared to baseline by year 7. In a similar way, gross government debt as a percentage of GDP will also increase. In China, the debt to GDP ratio approaches 45% in scenario X1 and a little over 30% in scenario S1 by year 7. In Japan, the debt to GDP ratio increases from 212% in year 0 to around 277% in year 7. Impact of China-Japan conflict on interest rates Interest rates are often used exogenously as a policy instrument to affect economic activity. Lowering interest rates gives the economy a boost and encourages borrowing, while raising interest rates has the effect of slowing down an economy that is overheating. In the scenario, interest rates are allowed to adjust endogenously (not through policy intervention) to reflect economic pressures that occur in the economy. For example, interest rates adjust to inflationary expectations and demand. When inflation is expected to go up in the future, borrowers need to compensate lenders for the expected drop in the value of money. Figure 4: Short-term interest rate impacts from the conflict, scenarios S1 and X1. Inflation in both Japan and China increases over the scenario period, contributing to a rise in the interest rates in both nations. Interest rates also increase because of increased risk. During and after the conflict both Japan and China experience increased exposure to risk, which places upward pressure on interest rates. Exchange rates represent the relative value of a nation’s currency and are closely correlated with a nation’s interest rates. In the scenario, Japanese exchange rates are free to adjust on currency markets, reflecting relative value of the Japanese Yen, while China controls its currency on international markets, depressing the value of the Yuan to favor its own exports. This different policy approaches to currency will result in different impacts on interest rates in both countries. In China, where exchange rates are fixed during the modeling period, short-term interest rates experience the highest increase in scenario S1, reaching a peak at a little over 12%. Because the Yuan is fixed and not allowed to devalue, the major forces acting on interest rates are dominated by inflation and the money supply. In Japan, where exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate on international markets, high interest rates are caused by an increase on the risk premium of US denominated debt and the lagged effects of the exchange rates affecting investment and consumption. In Japan, therefore, the highest interest rates will occur in scenario X1. Figure 5: Long-term interest rate impacts from the conflict, scenarios S1 and X1. As Figures 4 and 5 show, short-term interest rates increase over the medium term before steadily declining. In China, a small decline in short-term interest rates for a period of 18 to 24 months after the conflict began is caused by the drop in foreign direct investment and increase in capital flight. Short-term interest rates then start to rise above baseline projections two to three years after the conflict started due to rising inflation and an increase on the risk premium of US denominated debt. By contrast, Japan experiences an immediate increase in short- term interest rates caused by rising inflation and increased risk premiums. Interest rates in the rest of the world are represented by the US in Figure 5. Historically, UK and US interest rates behave very similarly. Short-term interest rates are shown to decrease and plateau at a little over 0% for four years after the conflict before rising again. In a similar way, long-term interest rates drop to a low of 0.5% and 1.5% in the UK and US respectively in year 6 before rising once again. Impact of China-Japan conflict on productivity and growth In all scenarios, both Japan and China go into recession in the first year of the conflict, year 1. In China, the recession lasts approximately 12 months, with negative growth reaching a peak at -10% in scenario X1 (see Figure 6). Figure 6: Result of the conflict on China GDP In Japan, the recession is much more protracted, lasting five years in scenario X1 (see Figure 7). Figure 7: Result of the conflict on Japan GDP Globally, the recession lasts 1.5 years in scenario S2 and 2 years in scenario X1 with negative growth peaking at -2%. The conflict is shown to have a significant effect in terms of lost output (see Figure 8). Figure 8: Result of the conflict on Global GDP Table 3 shows the cost of the conflict compared to baseline over a five-year period between the start of year 1 and the end of year 5 for different regional economies. It is notable that the global economic consequences of the conflict are almost as significant in the US and the EU as they are in Japan and China. Table 3: Lost output over 5 years from China-Japan Conflict scenario, ‘GDP@Risk’, US$ Trillions.   IV. Conclusion This paper examined the effects of China-Japan conflict on global economy through three scenarios. The conflict had negative effects on all aspects of global economy, including exports & imports and GDP. As the China-Japan conflict prolongs, the negative economic impacts of the conflict became bigger. Therefore, the negative economic impacts were largest in the scenario of X1. References [1] See Wikipedia, 2025 China-Japan diplomatic crisis. [2] Su, Yung-yao; Chin, Jonathan (16 November 2025). "Taipei slams Beijing for Yellow Sea live-fire drill". Taipei Times. [3] Wei, Alcott (2 December 2025). "Chinese and Japanese coastguard ships confront each other near disputed islands". South China Morning Post. [4] Kobara, Junnosuke (9 December 2025). "Japan says China didn't answer hotline during radar incident". Nikkei Asia. [5] Wang, Orange (8 December 2025). "Mid-air military stand-off triggers duelling protests in China-Japan row latest". South China Morning Post. [6] Hernández, Javier C. (7 December 2025). "Japan Says China Aimed Military Radar at Its Fighter Jets". The New York Times. [7] Murakami, Sakura; Gale, Alastair (10 December 2025). "Japan and China Remain at Odds Over Radar Use as US Weighs In". Bloomberg News. [8] Psaledakis, Daphne; Geddie, John (10 December 2025). "US backs Japan in dispute with China over radar incident". Reuters. [9] Kaneko, Kaori; Kelly, Tim (11 December 2025). "US bombers join Japanese jets in show of force after China-Russia drills, Tokyo says". Reuters. [10] Kim, Samuel S. (2006). The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. Cambridge University Press. p. 2. [11] The Defeat That Changed China's History -- Beijing Review". [12] China's War with Japan". Faculty of History, University of Oxford. Retrieved 13 July 2024. [13] Bix, Herbert P. (1992). "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility". Journal of Japanese Studies. 18 (2): 295–363. [14] Hotta, E. (25 December 2007). Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931–1945. Palgrave Macmillan. [15] See Wikipedia, the Second Sino-Japanese War [16] See Wikipedia, the Second Sino-Japanese War [17] Frank, Richard (2020). Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War: July 1937-May 1942. W. W. Norton & Company. [18] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [19] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [20] Unryu Suganuma (2000). Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations. University of Hawaii Press. [21] "High-seas collisions trigger Japan-China spat". Agence France-Presse. 7 September 2010. [22] Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. [23] Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press [24] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [25] Storey, Ian. “Japan’s Growing Angst ov er the South China Sea ”, ISEA’S Perspective, In stitute of Southeast Asian Stu ies, Singapore. [26] Kyodo News International; March 3, 2014; ‘Japan eyes revising current laws to enable collective self-defense’. [27] Senkaku air intrusion prompts radar upgrade”, December 15, 20102, Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/15/national/senkaku-air-intrusionprompts- radar-upgrade/#.Ugz9oxapBYI [28] Lim Jae-Un, Korea gains permanent observer s tatus on Arctic Council, May 21 2013, http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=108026 [29] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (http://webjapan.org/factsheet/en/pdf/02RegionsofJap.p df)

The Israel-Hamas War has calmed down. The events that preceded it – including the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel and the taking of Israeli and other hostages – and that resulted from it will be remembered for decades to come, especially the dead and wounded, the trauma and pain, the destruction of dreams and property. If there is any lesson to be learnt, it is that better ways must be found to resolve conflict. There is deep concern now that the West Bank is increasingly reaching a critical point. The weak governing structure of the Palestinian Authority, the contraction of the Palestinian economy, settler violence, and much more are causing serious distress and instability. What is preventing conditions from spiraling out of control are Israel’s strict security measures and Palestinian fear that the West Bank will turn into Gaza, even though both regions are different. Years of diplomatic inertia have been counterproductive. The status quo is untenable. Much is at stake and indecision is costly for all concerned. Why continued conflict? Israelis and Palestinians have become victims of their own exclusive national narratives and are speaking past each other. Many on each side are unable to go beyond their zero-sum mentality. They selectively highlight the rightness of their own cause, accuse the other side of bad intentions or misconduct, and fail to realize how their own rhetoric and acts cause aggravating conditions. While the obstacles in the way of progress to peace are numerous and real – power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, one state reality with Israel dominant over the Palestinians, hardening of attitudes in Israel and Palestine, relative weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps, Israeli settler radicalization, Palestinian anti-normalization stance, terrorism – these must not delay or prevent the search for opportunities and positive outcomes. In this regard, simple facts present themselves. First, Israelis and Palestinians are neighbors forever. Their present and future are intertwined whether they choose this reality or not. Second, the longer Israelis and Palestinians wait to negotiate, the more complicated the issues become and the less room there will be for an agreeable peaceful solution. Third, the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians – borders, the separation wall, security, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, water – are well-known, thoroughly debated, and resolvable. The challenge is to initiate negotiations and negotiate in good faith. Fourth, Israelis and Palestinians have proved to be both incapable and unwilling to restart negotiations on their own. The United States thus must go beyond managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to taking the lead to resolve it. It is indispensable for the promotion and sustenance of peace negotiations, as was recently shown in the diplomatic intervention to stop the Israel-Hamas War. Fifth, the inclusion of regional and international actors becomes key as peace requires assurances, follow-up, and support to take root and grow. As Gershon Baskin argues, “Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and confidence require external mechanisms to verify implementation of the agreements, to ensure compliance, and to offer external dispute resolution” (Baskin, 2025). The prerequisites for peacemaking (e.g., context and timing, leadership and political will, societal strength and resilience, process, and content and creativity) are known (Kurtzer, 2020). US diplomacy must be credible, intentional, sustained, and transformative. This comprises not only making peace a priority, but also acting accordingly. The situation on the ground must change. A realistic plan and process of peacemaking must be prioritized. Israelis and Palestinians must be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The vital policies of Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords (especially United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) and others that mediated (that is, United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey) or attended the Gaza “peace conference” in October 2025 should impel them to motivate Palestinians to make hard decisions to end conflict and reach a peaceful settlement. Israel needs to reciprocate. Circumventing the Palestinian issue or wishing it away will not advance Israel’s strategic goals, especially in the long run. Initiating unilateral moves and thinking of the Palestinian issue as a security matter only without addressing its political and territorial dimensions will not enhance Israel’s defense. If anything, they will continue to rile the Palestinians, particularly the youth among them. The two-state solution, the official United States policy since 2002, has become increasingly less viable. This is at a time when 157 out of 193 Member States of the United Nations have already recognized the State of Palestine. On July 28-30, 2025, a High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution was held at the United Nations. The conference, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, committed “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but [also] to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution” (United Nations, 2025a). Follow-up work took place on September 22, and the commitment was made to continue the implementation of the conference’s outcomes. The US’s plan (Trump, 2025) to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and to reconstruct it for the benefit of its inhabitants is a good start, and the plan’s “Phase 2” was even endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025 (United Nations, 2025b). However, resolving all aspects of the Gaza issue will take years. Meantime, it is essential for the US to take a leading role in endorsing again the two-state solution, as it is in the best national interest of Israel, Palestine, and the US. Moreover, the US can facilitate the solution by urging Israel and the Palestinians to seriously consider the idea of confederation, which adjusts or introduces important modifications to the two-state solution. While there have been more than a dozen confederation models over the years – with some specific only to Israel and Palestine and others that encompass Jordan as well – a main goal of confederation, according to the proponents of the Holy Land Confederation (me included), is not to totally separate the Palestinians from the Israelis living in the Holy Land, i.e., “divorce,” but to empower them to “cohabitate” in the two respective sovereign states (Holy Land Confederation, 2025). This cohabitation would allow for greater cooperation and movement between them. “If properly implemented, confederation would enable Palestinians to advance their search for freedom, independence, and statehood without being anti-Israel, and it would enable Israelis to have their security and wellbeing without being anti-Palestinian” (Beilin and Sarsar, 2022). The Gaza crisis must be solved. However, the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian relations must be broken as well. If past negotiations are any indication, there is middle ground between the positions of Israel and Palestine. The US possesses the vital capabilities to move both parties to take the necessary political risks by compromising and engaging in unavoidable tradeoffs on the path to peace. References - Baskin, Gershon. (2025) “Monitoring agreements and verifying implementation.” October 18, https://gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/monitoring-agreements-and-verifying. - Beilin, Yossi and Sarsar, Saliba. (2022) “Israeli-Palestinian confederation is a way forward for peace.” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696830. - Holy Land Confederation. (2025) “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution.” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_hlc. - Kurtzer, Daniel C. (2020) “The Ingredients of Palestinian-Israeli Peacemaking.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring): 5-16. - Trump, Donald J. [@RapidResponse47]. (2025, September 29). “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” X. https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494. - United Nations. (2025a) “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” July 28-30, https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025/. - United Nations. (2025b) United Nations Security Council, November 17, https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

Background (Venezuelan Presidential Crisis [2019–2023] and the 2024 Presidential Elections) Between 2019 and 2023, Venezuela experienced a political crisis centered on the legitimacy of the country’s presidency, stemming from “irregular” elections that declared Nicolás Maduro the winner. As a result, the Fourth Legislature of the Venezuelan National Assembly — controlled by the opposition — declared Maduro a usurper of the presidency and appointed Juan Guaidó as interim president under Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution (León, 2019). Subsequently, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice declared the National Assembly unconstitutional (BBC News Mundo, 2019), as well as Guaidó’s appointment, thereby triggering a political crisis that would persist until 2023. During this period, Maduro and Guaidó governed in parallel. Guaidó’s government was recognized by the United States, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and several European countries and international organizations, while Maduro’s government was recognized by Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, and South Africa, among others. Countries such as Mexico, New Zealand, India, and Indonesia remained neutral. Figure 1: Countries recognizing Guaidó’s presidential legitimacy as of February 8, 2019, during the peak year of international recognition for Guaidó. Black: Venezuela; Grey: Neutral; White: No official position; Dark green: Recognizes Guaidó; Bright green: Supports the opposition National Assembly; Red: Recognizes Maduro. By Jose001aef23 – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=76054258 Figure 2: Recognition of Venezuela’s president in 2023. Black: Venezuela; Red: Recognition of Maduro; Dark blue: Recognition of Guaidó; Light blue: Support for the Fourth National Assembly; Grey: Explicitly neutral. By ZiaLater – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=75890028 The crisis lasted for nearly four years and was marked by economic sanctions, social unrest, widespread public dissatisfaction, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a dialogue between opposition parties and the Maduro government that ultimately culminated in the signing of the Barbados Agreement. In the end, Guaidó’s interim government — despite enjoying broader international backing — failed to achieve its initially stated objectives, and the National Assembly formally dissolved it in January 2023. The Barbados Agreement (International Crisis Group, 2023) — signed in 2023 between the Venezuelan government and the opposition with the aim of guaranteeing electoral safeguards and political rights, as well as protecting national interests — paved the way for presidential elections held on July 28, 2024. However, both the outcome of the elections and the way they were conducted gave rise to allegations of irregularities and electoral fraud (Infobae, 2024; Singer, 2024; Gómez Forero, 2024; Diario Las Américas, 2024). According to the National Electoral Council (CNE), Maduro won the election with 51.95%, while Edmundo González received 43.18%. By contrast, the opposition platform Comando Con Venezuela (CCV) released results claiming González won with 67.05%, compared to 30.49% for Maduro. It is important to note that González ran as the opposition candidate after María Corina Machado, an opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was barred from participating in the election. Figure 3: Comparison of the 2024 presidential election results according to the CNE and the CCV. Source: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_presidenciales_de_Venezuela_de_2024#cite_note-:19-27 As of now, Maduro remains in power in Venezuela. González, meanwhile, is exiled in Spain and has been recognized as the winner or president-elect by Argentina, Costa Rica, Italy, Ecuador, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Israel, among others. Relations with the United States (Suspension of Relations and Current Situation) Diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela have steadily deteriorated since Hugo Chávez — who governed Venezuela with an anti-imperialist and socialist discourse — was president. From Chávez’s tenure through the 2019 presidential crisis, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Venezuela, and bilateral relations experienced periodic fluctuations. However, beginning in 2019, relations worsened significantly, culminating in a formal rupture initiated by Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro severed diplomatic ties with the United States after Donald Trump, during his first term, recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president (CNBC, 2019). Although the National Assembly later dissolved the interim government, the United States did not recognize Maduro. At present, relations between the two countries are critical. With Trump’s return to the White House, the already minimal level of interaction has shifted toward threats, warnings, and displays of power, including a military deployment described by Trump as “the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America” (Maher & Liptak, 2025). This escalation has been justified — or framed — by the Trump administration as part of an effort to protect U.S. citizens from drug flows originating in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. As part of its broader campaign against drug trafficking, Trump has also designated certain organized crime groups as terrorist organizations (The White House, 2025). Among these newly designated groups — relevant to this analysis—are the Tren de Aragua gang (Knickmeyer, 2025) and the Cartel of the Suns (Cártel de los Soles) (Wells & Blasey, 2025; InSight Crime, 2025). Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have accused Nicolás Maduro of being the leader of the Cartel of the Suns (Savage, 2025). The U.S. Department of State has even offered a reward of up to $50 million for information leading to Maduro’s arrest (U.S. Department of State, 2025). Maduro, for his part, has denied all such accusations and alleged ties. Tensions in the Caribbean The threats and actions carried out in recent months between the United States and Venezuela have culminated in an unprecedented U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean Sea. The United States has mobilized up to 15,000 troops in the region, in addition to reinforcements and personnel stationed in Puerto Rico. The arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford alongside the USS Iwo Jima, as well as warships, destroyers, submarines, fighter jets, bombers, helicopters, drones, and other military assets, has further reinforced the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea (Ellis, U.S. Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team, 2025). Alongside this military buildup, the United States launched Operation Southern Spear, aimed at deterring Venezuela and targeting alleged drug-trafficking speedboats in international waters. From the start of these attacks in early September through December 16, 2025, 25 attacks had been recorded, resulting in at least 95 deaths (Muñoz Morillo, 2025). The U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean has been supported by Trinidad and Tobago. The United States and Trinidad and Tobago have conducted joint training exercises and military drills in the region over recent months (Infobae, 2025), and Trinidad and Tobago has also agreed to allow U.S. military aircraft to transit through its airports (Rios, 2025). Venezuela responded by suspending a joint gas agreement and declaring Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, persona non grata (DW News, 2025). For its part, Venezuela has mobilized approximately 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militia members in large-scale exercises and has deployed 5,000 Igla missiles (Sliwinski, 2025). The Venezuelan government has also urged preparations for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and social destabilization to render the country ungovernable (Reuters, 2025) — a strategy that may be viewed as the most effective response given the asymmetry between the two sides. Maduro further warned that Venezuela would not become the “Gaza of South America”, while proclaiming a message of “peace, life, and love — no to hatred, no to war” (Swissinfo.ch, 2025). Maduro has likewise turned to international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as regional bodies including CELAC and ALBA, to denounce the escalation of tensions in the region. He has even called for Colombian military support in light of the critical situation in the Caribbean (El Colombiano, 2025). However, recent polarization in Latin America has been reflected in the responses. Lula (Brazil) and Petro (Colombia) have applied the strongest pressure regarding regional destabilization, while Mexico, maintaining an ambiguous neutrality, has taken a more cautious stance, emphasizing sovereignty and self-determination. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago have aligned with the U.S. position (Rivas Molina, Galarraga Gortázar, Marcial Pérez, & Esteban Lewin, 2025). Finally, outside the region, Russia (OIR-MPPCI Cojedes, 2025) — one of the main suppliers of arms and military equipment to the Bolivarian National Armed Forces — along with Iran (Sputnik, 2025) and China (Revista Economía, 2025), all allies of Venezuela, have expressed various forms of support for the South American country, though their rhetoric has focused primarily on concerns over what the U.S. military deployment and harassment could trigger in the region. War Speculation and the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine All of the above brings together the necessary elements to consider the possibility of an invasion or a declaration of war by the United States against Venezuela, and such possibilities clearly exist. However, there are key factors that, for now, would prevent the outbreak of a new war. Regardless of the logistical difficulties involved in a large-scale invasion, the United States lacks a clear casus belli to declare war. Moreover, U.S. domestic politics — particularly the opposition — are not fully convinced that an invasion would be the best course of action. Nonetheless, Trump has shaped and carried out a series of political maneuvers, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and more recently a total oil blockade (BBC News, 2025), aimed at paving the way for a potential invasion or declaration of war, though so far without success. It is important to note that most of these actions — whether justified or not — such as the designation of cartels as terrorist groups, extrajudicial attacks in international waters against alleged drug-trafficking vessels, the military deployment in the Caribbean, and the seizure of a sanctioned oil tanker (BBC News, 2025), primarily generate heightened expectations of an impending war. In addition, on December 2, 2025, the U.S. government published its National Security Strategy (The White House, 2025). Without delving into details and for the purposes of this article, the strategy seeks to maintain the United States as a global power — while acknowledging the rise of China — and to consolidate U.S. dominance over the “Western Hemisphere” by controlling the American continent, establishing a supremacy-based relationship with aligned European countries, and ensuring that neither the European Union nor any other bloc emerges as an alternative center of power (González Posso, 2025). Rare Earths, Oil, and a Possible Regime Change in Venezuela? At this point, the reasons behind the escalation of tensions between Venezuela and the United States may not appear entirely clear, although they are hardly surprising and can be understood considering the divergent worldviews held by both countries. This sequence of events — fraudulent elections, military deployments, sanctions, and economic blockades — has gradually breathed new life into a pre-existing rupture that had previously remained stagnant. However, as is often the case, there is always a broader underlying context that tends to be overlooked. Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, estimated at around 300 billion barrels, representing approximately 18% of global reserves. It also possesses substantial natural gas reserves and deposits of more than 40 types of minerals and precious stones, including iron, bauxite (aluminum), coal, gold, coltan, diamonds, nickel, zinc, and rare earth elements, among others (Blanco, Rey S., Romero, Rosendo, & Berroterán). No less significant, Venezuela ranks seventh among the world’s 17 megadiverse countries, hosting roughly 9% of global flora and fauna (Álvarez Bernard, 2022). In addition, Venezuela holds the tenth-largest freshwater reserves globally — approximately 1,233 km³ — and contains an extensive network of rivers and lakes, which are essential for agricultural and livestock activities, supported by fertile soils, as well as for electricity generation and hydroelectric power (Montoya, n.d.). Given Venezuela’s natural resource potential, it is unsurprising that the United States has sought to “recover all the oil, land, and other assets that they previously stole from us,” as Trump wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social (Trump, 2025). Trump’s remark refers to the nationalization of oil projects carried out by Hugo Chávez in 2007, which affected major U.S. oil companies ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil (Al Jazeera Staff, 2025). As for a possible regime change in Venezuela, all remains speculative. Maduro continues to hold onto power, or at least presents an image of firmness before the cameras. At the same time, speculation about a potential war or invasion places him in a precarious position, fueling rumors and theories about resignation or exile. What is clear, however, is that U.S. pressure on the Venezuelan government is real. Although Maduro and Trump held a phone call in late November in search of a diplomatic off-ramp, the demands of both sides prevented any agreement. Prior to that call, in September, Maduro sent a letter to Trump seeking to “preserve peace through dialogue” (TRT Español, 2025). One month later, according to The New York Times, Maduro reportedly offered the United States significant participation in Venezuela’s oil fields, while remaining in power — a proposal that displeased U.S. officials and led to the suspension of talks at that time (Haberman & Kurmanaev, 2025). Discussion The situation between Venezuela and the United States is highly significant from a geopolitical perspective. On one hand, the United States appears to be poised and waiting for the green light to launch a potential large-scale invasion. On the other, Maduro, through his characteristic anti-imperialist discourse, is attempting to navigate and prolong the survival of his regime. This is no minor issue. Maduro’s continued hold on power has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency, its numerous irregularities, and even electoral fraud. Nevertheless, the recent escalation of tensions with the United States has worked to his advantage, reinforcing his anti-imperialist rhetoric and strengthening his Bolivarian nationalist narrative. Unfortunately, these recent developments are more likely to further suffocate the Venezuelan population than to consolidate Maduro’s position. Regardless of the underlying causes, Venezuelans have endured years of hardship, and toying with the prospect of war is far from sensible — a reality Maduro himself has implicitly acknowledged by attempting to de-escalate tensions by any available means. However, whether driven by ambition, ideology, or sheer will to power, the simplest exit — stepping down from office — does not appear to be, nor is it likely to become, part of his plans. Thus, while Maduro projects strength domestically and repeatedly calls for peace and rejects war at public rallies, he is experiencing a level of strain whose sustainability remains uncertain. The external pressure exerted by the United States — both diplomatic and in the form of a total economic blockade — is likely, sooner or later, to yield results for Washington. It is important to recall that Venezuela has survived in recent years largely due to oil revenues. With a total blockade focused on that asset, Venezuela’s economic situation would deteriorate further, with potentially severe social and political consequences. In short, the near-term outlook is far from optimistic. As for the United States, it appears ironic and contradictory that Trump — a figure who has boasted of having “ended” seven wars and portrayed himself as a staunch advocate of peace — is now demonstrating the opposite in the Caribbean by deploying the largest naval force seen in the region in years. One could argue that a war has not yet begun and may never materialize, but the very nature of these actions and their consequences cast doubt on his credibility, not to mention the attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels in international waters. It is understandable that the deployment of the U.S. naval forces in the region may be intended as an “extreme” form of diplomatic pressure. However, this does not justify — in terms of international relations, even if it might within the framework of U.S. foreign policy — the interference in and violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. Even more concerning is that the very rhetoric so often condemned by Maduro has long been one of the primary tools used by the United States to maintain its influence and intervention in the region since the last century. Nevertheless, the erosion of this approach in the medium and long term could prove costly for the United States. At this stage, as can be observed, drug trafficking and the economic and social crisis have been relegated to the background; they function merely as pretexts. What is truly at stake are national — or personal — interests, influence, and power in a world where the more one possesses, the better. This dynamic is clearly illustrated by the recent support Venezuela has received from Russia and China, which has been largely rhetorical rather than material (Paredes, 2025), in contrast to earlier instances when their backing was direct and tangible. The current situation, although complex, could have been avoided, as its underlying causes have been developing for several years. However, it would be irresponsible to take sides. One cannot defend an “illegitimate government,” nor align with a state that has consistently undermined the sovereignty of others in pursuit of its national interests — an approach that is even explicitly embedded in its national security strategy. International condemnation should be directed at both parties, and while diplomacy should prevail, this case is ironically contradictory, as both actors have operated outside international norms. Against this backdrop, multiple questions arise: What will ultimately happen? Will Maduro step down and negotiate a “democratic” transition? Will the United States invade Venezuela and succeed in overthrowing the Maduro regime? How long will the economic blockade and attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels continue? What role will Venezuelan society play, and will the opposition be able to capitalize on this moment? What role will other countries in the region truly assume? Many questions remain unanswered, and the coming weeks are likely to bring significant developments. References Al Jazeera Staff. (17 de December de 2025). Trump aide Stephen Miller suggests Venezuelan oil belongs to US. Obtenido de Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/17/trump-aide-stephen-miller-suggests-venezuelan-oil-belongs-to-us Álvarez Bernard, D. (21 de Enero de 2022). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Ecología Verde: https://ecologiaverde.elperiodico.com/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela-3609.html BBC News. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Fuerzas de EE.UU. interceptan y confiscan un buque petrolero sancionado frente a las costas de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c14vp73mk16o BBC News. (17 de Diciembre de 2025). Trump ordena el bloqueo "total y completo" de todos los petroleros sancionados que entren y salgan de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cx2p45d0g2xo BBC News Mundo. (21 de Enero de 2019). El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela declara "inconstitucional" a la Asamblea Nacional y anula el nombramiento de Juan Guaidó como su presidente. Obtenido de BBC News Mundo: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46952641 Blanco, Á., Rey S., S., Romero, D. E., Rosendo, M., & Berroterán, Z. (s.f.). Influencia de la distribución de los recursos naturales en el desarrollo regional de Venezuela. Universidad Central de Venezuela. Facultad de Humanidades y Educación. Escuela de Geografía., 118. CNBC. (24 de January de 2019). Maduro says Venezuela is breaking relations with US, gives American diplomats 72 hours to leave country. Obtenido de CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/venezuela-president-maduro-breaks-relations-with-us-gives-american-diplomats-72-hours-to-leave-country.html Diario Las Américas. (10 de Agosto de 2024). ONG señala que el CNE omitió tres auditorías post electorales en Venezuela. Obtenido de Diario Las Américas: https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/ong-senala-que-el-cne-omitio-tres-auditorias-post-electorales-venezuela-n5361569 El Colombiano. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). Régimen de Maduro lanza llamado desesperado a Colombia en busca de apoyo militar ante tensión con EE. UU. Obtenido de El Colombiano: https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/maduro-pide-ayuda-militar-colombia-tension-ee-uu-EN31879278 Ellis, E., US Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team. (26 de November de 2025). We've tracked the US military build-up in the Caribbean. Here's what it could do. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://stories.theconversation.com/tracking-the-us-military-in-the-caribbean/ Gómez Forero, C. (30 de Julio de 2024). ¿Por qué ver estos decimales ayudaría a hablar de un fraude en Venezuela? Obtenido de El Espectador: https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/elecciones-venezuela-2024/por-que-ver-estos-decimales-nos-ayudaria-a-hablar-de-un-fraude-en-venezuela/?outputType=amp González Posso, C. (7 de Diciembre de 2025). Corolario Trump a la doctrina Monroe: I take west – O la paz por la fuerza –. Obtenido de Indepaz: https://indepaz.org.co/corolario-trump-a-la-doctrina-monroe-i-take-west-o-la-paz-por-la-fuerza/ Haberman, M., & Kurmanaev, A. (2025 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y Maduro hablaron por teléfono la semana pasada. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/28/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-maduro-llamada-venezuela.html Infobae. (30 de Julio de 2024). El burdo cálculo matemático en la información oficial que aumenta las sospechas sobre la manipulación de la elección en Venezuela. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/30/el-burdo-calculo-matematico-en-la-informacion-oficial-que-aumenta-las-sospechas-sobre-la-manipulacion-de-la-eleccion-en-venezuela/ Infobae. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago aprobó el uso de sus aeropuertos por aviones militares de Estados Unidos para combatir el narcotráfico. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2025/12/15/trinidad-y-tobago-aprobo-el-uso-de-sus-aeropuertos-por-aviones-militares-de-estados-unidos-para-combatir-el-narcotrafico/ InSight Crime. (22 de September de 2025). Cartel of the Suns. Obtenido de InSight Crime: https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile/ International Crisis Group. (20 de Octubre de 2023). Pacto en Barbados: la ruta sinuosa de Venezuela hacia comicios competitivos. Obtenido de International Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/es/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/barbados-deal-sets-venezuela-rocky-path-competitive-polls Knickmeyer, E. (19 de February de 2025). PBS News. Obtenido de Trump administration designates 8 Latin American cartels as ‘foreign terrorist organizations’: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-designates-8-latin-american-cartels-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations León, I. (11 de Enero de 2019). Efecto Cocuyo. Obtenido de Prensa de la AN rectifica comunicado que proclama a Juan Guaidó Presidente de la República: https://web.archive.org/web/20190702155934/http://efectococuyo.com/principales/prensa-de-la-an-rectifica-comunicado-que-proclama-a-juan-guaido-presidente-de-la-republica/ Maher, K., & Liptak, K. (17 de December de 2025). Trump orders ‘total and complete blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers coming to and leaving Venezuela. Obtenido de CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/16/politics/blockade-venezuela-sanctioned-oil-tankers#:~:text=%E2%80%9CVenezuela%20is%20completely%20surrounded%20by,%2C%E2%80%9D%20Trump%20said%20Tuesday%20night. Montoya, J. D. (s.f.). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Desarrollo Sustentable: https://www.desarrollosustentable.co/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela/#:~:text=Biodiversidad:%20recursos%20animales%20y%20plantas%20de%20Venezuela,-Aves%20de%20Venezuela&text=Venezuela%20es%20un%20pa%C3%ADs%20con,el%20ave%20nacional%20del%20pa%C3%ADs. Muñoz Morillo, M. (16 de Diciembre de 2025). Un nuevo ataque de EE.UU. contra 3 narcolanchas deja 8 muertos en el Pacífico. Obtenido de Euro News: https://es.euronews.com/2025/12/16/un-nuevo-ataque-de-eeuu-contra-3-narcolanchas-deja-8-muertos-en-el-pacifico Noticias DW. (25 de Noviembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago anuncia ejercicios militares con EE. UU. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/trinidad-y-tobago-anuncia-nuevos-ejercicios-militares-con-estados-unidos/a-74755359 OIR-MPPCI COJEDES. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Rusia considera “especialmente preocupante” tensión en el Caribe. Obtenido de Ciudad Cojedes: https://ciudadcojedes.com/rusia-considera-especialmente-preocupante-tension-en-el-caribe/ Paredes, N. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Por qué China y Rusia parecen haber abandonado a Nicolás Maduro en plena escalada con EE.UU. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cj97rxlw8zro República Bolivariana de Venezuela. (30 de Diciembre de 1999). Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Obtenido de https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/constitucion_venezuela.pdf Reuters. (12 de November de 2025). Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. Obtenido de Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ Revista Economía. (5 de Noviembre de 2025). China defiende su alianza con Venezuela y critica la presión militar de EE.UU. en el Caribe. Obtenido de Revista Economía: https://www.revistaeconomia.com/china-defiende-su-alianza-con-venezuela-y-critica-la-presion-militar-de-ee-uu-en-el-caribe/ Rios, M. (15 de Diciembrre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago permitirá el tránsito de aviones militares de EE.UU. por sus aeropuertos; Venezuela toma medidas. Obtenido de CNN Latinoamérica: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/12/15/latinoamerica/trinidad-y-tobago-transito-de-aviones-militares-eeuu-trax Rivas Molina, F., Galarraga Gortázar, N., Marcial Pérez, D., & Estaban Lewin, J. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). América Latina toma partido ante la amenaza de Estados Unidos a Venezuela. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2025-11-30/america-latina-toma-partido-ante-la-amenaza-de-estados-unidos-a-venezuela.html Savage, C. (18 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y compañía dicen que Maduro lidera un ‘cártel’. Esto es lo que significa. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/18/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-cartel-soles-maduro.html Singer, F. (14 de Agosto de 2024). La ONU concluye que las elecciones en Venezuela no cumplieron las medidas “de integridad y transparencia”. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2024-08-14/la-onu-concluye-que-las-elecciones-en-venezuela-no-cumplieron-las-medidas-de-integridad-y-transparencia.html Sliwinski, K. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). El aumento de tensiones en el Caribe: EE.UU. y Venezuela en medio de un complejo regional de seguridad. Obtenido de World & New World Journal: https://worldandnewworld.com/es/eeuu-venezuela-crisis-caribe/ Sputnik. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Irán expresa su apoyo a Venezuela ante las "provocaciones hostiles" de EEUU. Obtenido de Sputnik: https://noticiaslatam.lat/20251217/mapa-como-avanza-la-operacion-especial-de-rusia-en-ucrania-1126329635.html Swissinfo.ch. (15 de Noviembre de 2025). Maduro dice que Venezuela no será la Gaza de Suramérica en plena tensión con EE.UU. Obtenido de Swissinfo.ch: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/maduro-dice-que-venezuela-no-ser%C3%A1-la-gaza-de-suram%C3%A9rica-en-plena-tensi%C3%B3n-con-ee.uu./90337213 The White House. (20 de January de 2025). Designating Cartels And Other Organizations As Foreign Terrorist Organizations And Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/ The White House. (November de 2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf TRT Español. (22 de Septiembre de 2025). Carta de Maduro a Trump invita a "preservar paz con diálogo" y rechaza "fake news" de narcotráfico. Obtenido de TRT Español: https://www.trtespanol.com/article/cdae6966f705 Trump, D. (17 de December de 2025). @realDonaldTrump. Obtenido de Truth Social: https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115731908387416458 US Department of State. (7 de August de 2025). Nicolás Maduro Moros. Narcotics Rewards Program: Wanted. Obtenido de US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros Wells, I., & Blasey, L. (17 de November de 2025). US to designate Venezuela's Cartel de los Soles as terrorists. Obtenido de BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxr3w2464eo