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Since the 1970s, the US-China relationship has been defined by a combination of cooperative and competitive objectives. Competitive interests, however, have prevailed, resulting in a rising competition between the two countries. (Pillsbury, 2015) Candidates in the 2016 presidential election treated China as an adversary, with Donald Trump's China-bashing becoming a trademark of his campaign. Rivalry with China has become the organising premise of American foreign policy under Trump's administration. Republicans and Democrats differ on most issues, but they agree on the need to change America's approach towards China. This has sparked speculation about whether the US-China relationship has devolved into a possibly violent clash or a new Cold War. The Trump administration has openly announced a shift in US policy towards China, with Matt Pottinger claiming that the US has modified its China policy to emphasise competition. Former Vice President of Trump Pence stated that the United States will combat China aggressively on all fronts, including economic, military, diplomatic, political, and ideological. This statement is regarded as "the declaration of a new Cold War." (Pence’s, 2018) Former Trump advisor Stephen K. Bannon has declared economic war on China, blaming its exports on the American working and middle classes. Many people agree that China is economically dominating America, and the US government and industry have done little to solve the situation. Globalists such as Madeline Albright, Tom Friedman, and Fareed Zakaria have grown increasingly concerned about China's lack of reciprocity in economic dealings with the United States. David Lampton, a pro-engagement advocate, has criticised China's WTO membership for increasing bilateral trade surpluses. (Staff R. , 2017) The second stage began when Donald Trump determined to halt Chinese commercial and technological advancements, renouncing liberal internationalism in favor of a new grand strategy against China. (Drezner D. R., 2021) The growing view of Xi Jinping as a harsh leader with an aggressive foreign policy contributes to the sense of an ideological clash. China and the United States have initiated an unconstrained war for bilateral, regional, and global dominance, ushering in a new age of strategic conflict that has yet to be fully defined. (Rudd, 2020) The US-China conflict appears to be a Cold War, and any return to a pre-2017 environment of "strategic engagement" with Beijing is no longer politically viable. (Rudd, 2020)However, (Zakaria, 2019) does not feel that the liberal international order has deteriorated as much as is widely assumed, and China is far from a grave threat to the liberal international system. Despite the best intentions of both countries, the US-China relationship is more likely to devolve into economic and military competition. (Lake, 2018) China's strategy aims to modernize its industrial capacity and secure its position as a global powerhouse in high-tech industries. The strategy aims to reduce reliance on foreign technology imports, increase Chinese-domestic content of core materials, and upgrade its dominant position in major strategic industries, such as pharmaceutical, automotive, aerospace, semiconductors, and most importantly, IT and robotics. The 14th Five-Year Plan of China (2021-2025) emphasizes high-quality growth driven by green and high-tech industries, service sectors, and domestic consumption. The US judged China's old growth model as generating a somewhat balanced win-win relationship between the two economies, based on "comparative advantage" and "cost-benefit" evaluations. However, Beijing's new growth model, particularly the "Made in China 2025" aspiration, is perceived as competition with the US service and knowledge economy, resulting in trade and high-tech warfare between the two countries since 2018. (Bernal-Meza L. X., China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-core competition?, 2021) The US business community, once a staunch supporter of engagement, has complained that China has hacked American industrial secrets, created barriers to American firms investing in China, enforced regulations that discriminate against foreigners, maintained high tariffs that should have been reduced decades ago, and blocked American Internet businesses. In a rare joint statement by the allies, the intelligence chiefs of the Five Eyes countries convened on Tuesday to charge China with stealing intellectual property and using artificial intelligence to hack and spy on the countries. (Bing, 2023) The officials from the United States,Britain,Canada,Australia and Huawei,for example,has tight relations with the Party and has been accused of stealing intellectual property as well as spying on Western countries. The United States is concerned about Huwaie's 5G supremacy, which is why it’s CEO, Meng Wan Zhou, was arrested in Canada. Indeed, its importance was highlighted when the United States imposed restrictions restricting, and in some cases prohibiting, Chinese telecoms operations in the American market, and launched a global effort to persuade friends, partners, and others to follow suit. Thus, while President Trump allowed one company (ZTE) a respite from what appeared to be a ban that would put it out of business, later American limitations on Huawei threatened to destroy China's premier international technology company's global viability. (Goldstein, 2020) When it comes to both green technology and chips, it is now at the center of American politics. The CHIPS Act, approved by Congress last year, included $52 billion in grants, tax credits, and other subsidies to stimulate American chip production. That's the kind of industrial policy that would make Hamilton gape and clap. Over the next few years and decades, China will pour vast sums of money into its own industrial strategy programmes, spanning a wide spectrum of cutting-edge technology. According to one Centre for Strategic and International Studies researcher, China already spends more than 12 times as much of its GDP on industrial programmes as the United States. (BROOKS, 2023) Certain social media sites, such as Facebook and Google, are prohibited in China.In the United States, there is a restriction on TIKTOK and WECHAT. To counter China, the United States has implemented a number of statutes, including the: 1.COMPETES Act 2020.: The House Science, Space, and Technology Committee decided to advance the America Competes Act of 2022, which intends to improve America's scientific and technology efforts in the twenty-first century in order to compete with China in vital fields. The bipartisan Act is divided into eleven sections, with Division K headed "Matters Related to Trade." Trade Adjustment Assistance, Import Security and Fairness Act, National Critical Capabilities Review, Modification and Extension of Generalized System of Preferences, Reauthorization of the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 and Other Matters, and Temporary Duty Suspensions and Reductions are the seven sections of the Act. President Joe Biden has indicated his support for the Act, arguing that it will strengthen America's supply chains and reenergize the economy's innovation engine, allowing it to compete with China and the rest of the globe for decades to come. 2.Chips and Science Act 2022: President Joe Biden signed the Chips and Science (or CHIPS) Act into law, promising local semiconductor producers more than $50 billion to expand home output and "counter China." (Cosgrove, 2023) 3.The United States passed the Inflation Reduction Act 2022: Although China now dominates clean technology manufacturing, the Inflation Reduction Act contains provisions geared primarily at strengthening the United States' clean energy supply chain. Furthermore, the global transition to clean technology such as solar panels and electric vehicles is unavoidable and ongoing as they become more affordable than fossil-fueled alternatives and countries take action to achieve their Paris climate obligations. (NUCCITELLI, 2023) CHIP War After failing to achieve an agreement with Chinese regulators, Intel cancelled a $5.4 billion takeover deal with Israel-based Tower Semiconductor. China is one of Intel's most important markets, and on July 3, Beijing announced a license requirement for exporters of gallium and germanium, rare-earth metals used in semiconductor manufacturing. The chip war is mostly motivated by the United States' concerns about China's military exploitation of semiconductor technology. However, China's military sector has a key weakness: most of its cutting-edge applications rely on foreign technological inputs, particularly microprocessor exports. China will be the world's largest buyer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment in 2021, accounting for 26% of worldwide demand. Biden established an export license requirement in October 2022, limiting China's access to semiconductor innovations manufactured by US corporations. In July 2023, Japan officially prohibited the sale of 23 types of semiconductor equipment to China, which is significantly more widespread than the US restriction, impeding China's development of advanced chips and basic chips used in technology such as automobiles and smartphones. The Netherlands Standing Committee on Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation said in September that it will begin limiting its semiconductor technology exports to China. According to Nikkie Asia, this new legislation would prohibit the Dutch ASML from exporting innovative chip manufacturing methods without first getting government-approved licenses. (CHENG TING-FANG, 2023) These export limitations have pushed Beijing to retaliate, with China's most recent regulation on gallium and germanium shipments serving as a direct retaliation to the US' global allies. According to the New York Times Magazine, Taiwan manufactures more than 90% of the world's most advanced microchips and could risk armed confrontation if China goes on the offensive in the future. (Palmer, 2023) Former national security advisor Robert O'Brien, on the other hand, believes that in the case of an impending invasion,the US would destroy Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturers rather than allow them to fall into the hands of China. The chip battle has further pushed Taiwan into an awkward position in the changing geopolitical landscape. (Carr, 2023) The Biden administration intends to restrict shipments of advanced artificial intelligence chips designed by Nvidia to China as part of a broader set of actions aimed at preventing Beijing from gaining advanced US technologies to enhance its military. The action is intended to address regulatory gaps and limit China's access to advanced semiconductors, which might feed AI advances and sophisticated computers crucial to Chinese military purposes. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, emphasised that the administration's goal is not to harm Beijing economically. (Alexandra Alper, 2023) In the words of Lampton, "There was a widespread public perception that the Sino-American economic playing field had been unfair to Americans, with the assertion that the American economy was hollowed out, in part due to overt and covert technology transfer to China" (Lampton, 2015) . China's new growth strategy is leading to more rivalry than complementarity in the China-US economic partnership. The fact that "China's achievement in moving up in the global supply and value chains has led to Beijing's larger share of global surplus and the reduction of the profit margin for traditional core states" has disturbed the United States. (Li X. , 2020) As Lenin would have argued, the dynamics of the US-China rivalry are an inter-imperial rivalry driven by inter-capitalist struggle. Competition for the global market could quickly escalate into escalating confrontations of zones of influence, if not war. Conclusion The US-China rivalry is characterised by a complex interplay of economic, technological, and ideological issues. Although the relationship resembles a new Cold War, some argue that it is best understood as a capitalist intra-core competition driven by inter-imperial rivalry. As Lenin foresaw, competition for global markets may escalate into conflicts over areas of control. The contest is likely to last and have an impact on the global order for many years to come since both nations have made large investments in industrial strategy and technology. Advanced semi-conductors and AI chips are necessary for the next race for technological supremacy. 6G telecom and quantum computing. The globe was forced to protect the supply chain for rare earth materials due to this high-tech rivalry. Since they are currently the epicentre of the world's military and economic might. For many years to come, its influence will shape international politics, trade disputes, and technological advancements. Global struggle for these minerals is anticipated in the twenty-first century, much like the wars for oil and gas in the twentieth. Rare earths will be the focus of the twenty-first century. Mineral-rich nations like Brazil, India, Australia, and Vitenam will also become strategically significant for other reasons. As competition for these resources intensifies, international relations will shift and geopolitical alignment will result. 5Gs is no longer the focus of this new technical cold war. It now comes down to controlling the basic materials that enable technology. For this reason, JD Vance adds, "Give us your financial resources, and we'll take care of you." In the trade and technology conflict that has intensified since the Biden Administration increased the restrictions on sales of cutting-edge American technology to China, the Pentagon has designated rare earth as a strategic mineral that is essential for US defence.In response to US technology sanctions, China restricted the export of rare earth materials.It has nothing to do with economics, but rather with military supremacy on a worldwide scale. This is how the US sees the discovery of these rare earth minerals. Donald Trump is threatening Canada, Greenland, and Ukraine for this reason. Due to their large stockpiles of rare earth materials, they are able to protect the global supply chain in this way.Interestingly, however, China produces 63% of rare earth minerals and refines 83% of them. It can store 44 million metric tonnes of reserves in this manner. The US would still have 4-5 million tonnes of metric reserves if it were to seize the deposits of Greenland, Canada, and Ukraine.Thus, they are negligible compared to 44 million metric tonnes in China. If China wisely controls its rare earth export strategy, it will be powerful enough to remind the world of its might without being overly harsh. Then it can demonstrate that Beijing is just as adept at using resources as Washington is at using dollars or sanctions. However, if the world manages to get past it or if China's grip wanes, its greatest advantage may begin to diminish. The next few months are critical because tanks and missiles are not being used in the largest power fight this time. Minerals and magnets will be used to combat it. Bibliography Alexandra Alper, K. F. (2023, October 18). Biden cuts China off from more Nvidia chips, expands curbs to other countries. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/technology/biden-cut-china-off-more-nvidia-chips-expand-curbs-more-countries-2023-10-17/Bernal-Meza, L. X. (2021, May 1). China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-core competition? Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol. 64, no. 1. Retrieved from https://www.redalyc.org/journal/358/35866229009/html/#B39Bing, Z. S. (2023, May 23). Chinese hackers spying on US critical infrastructure, Western intelligence says. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/technology/microsoft-says-china-backed-hacker-targeted-critical-us-infrastructure-2023-05-24/BROOKS, D. (2023, March 23). The Cold War With China Is Changing Everything. Retrieved from The NewYork Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/23/opinion/cold-war-china-chips.htmlCarr, E. (2023, August 22). The 2023 US–China Chip War: The Nexus Of High Tech And Geopolitics. Retrieved from Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/earlcarr/2023/08/22/uschina-chip-war-the-nexus-of-high-tech-and-international-relations/?sh=618bc5ed1bd3CHENG TING-FANG, L. L.-B. (2023, June 30). Netherlands unveils chip tool export curbs in fresh blow to China. Retrieved from Nikkei Asia: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Netherlands-unveils-chip-tool-export-curbs-in-fresh-blow-to-ChinaCosgrove, L. (2023, May 5). Lawmakers Tout Effect of CHIPs Act in US Competition with China. Retrieved from THE EPOCH TIMES: https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/lawmakers-tout-effect-of-chips-act-in-us-competition-with-china-5243151Drezner, D. R. (2021, May/June 13). The end of grand strategy. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs,: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/end-grand-strategyGoldstein, A. (2020). US–China Rivalry in the twenty-first century: Déjà vu and Cold War II. China International Strategy Review volume 2,, 48-62.Kautsky, K. (1914, September 11). Ultra-imperialism. Der Imperialismus," Die Neue Zeit, 32 (1914), Vol. 2, 908-922. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/ultra-imp.htmLake, D. A. (2018). Economic openness and great power competition: lessons for China and the United States. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3, 237-70.Lake, D. A. (2018). Economic openness and great power competition: lessons for China and the United States. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3, 237-270.Lampton, D. (2015, June 2). David Lampton on “A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations”. Retrieved from COUNCIL PACIFIC AFFAIRS: https://www.councilpacificaffairs.org/news-media/security-defense/dr-david-lampton-on-a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations/Li, X. (2020). The rise of China and its impact on world economic stratification and re-stratification. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 34, no. 4 , 530-50.NUCCITELLI, D. (2023, September 20). The Inflation Reduction Act is reducing U.S. reliance on China. Retrieved from The YALE Climate Connection: https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/09/the-inflation-reduction-act-is-reducing-u-s-reliance-on-china/Palmer, A. W. (2023, August 11). An Act of War’: Inside America’s Silicon Blockade Against China. Retrieved from The NewYork Times Magazine : https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/12/magazine/semiconductor-chips-us-china.htmlPence’s, P. J. (2018, October 5). China Speech Seen as Portent of ‘New Cold War’. Retrieved from New York Times. : https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/world/asia/pence-china-speech-cold-war.htmlPillsbury, M. (2015). The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower . Henry Holt and Co.Rudd, K. (2020, May 6). The coming post-COVID anarchy. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-05-06/coming-post-covid-anarchyStaff, R. (2017, August 17). 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Introduction   The 21st century global politics has now taken a new shape with the advent of artificial intelligence (AI). The traditional nature of great power rivalry revolves around military maneuvers, defensive-offensive moves, and weapons deployment to challenge each other, maintaining their respective hegemony over the international arena. The revival of artificial intelligence has reshaped the conventional great power game.(Feijóo et al. 2020) From now onwards, whenever the strategic circles discuss the security paradigm, AI has to be its part and parcel. The emergence of AI has altered the status quo, where major powers are now shifting towards AI-based technology. As the most basic function of AI is to create such machines and platforms that can perform tasks more proficiently than humans, it has the ability to enhance decision-making, increase efficiency, and reduce the likely risk of human errors. But at the same time, risks are also lingering.   The United States (US) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are considered to be the main players of great power politics. Their rivalry has long been centered around territorial conflicts and maritime contests. With the PRC claiming most of the territories in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the US, under its Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022), has challenged the Chinese assertion.(Hassan and Ali 2025) But what the world has witnessed is that both economic hegemons have been avoiding any direct military conflict with each other. The most prominent area where both the US and the PRC are now in a continuous competition is the technological domain. China has always maintained an edge over the US in the respective field due to the fact that it holds most of the world’s known rare earth minerals—a key to technological superiority. Through trade barriers, i.e., tariffs, quotas, etc., and restricting trade with prominent Chinese companies, the US has always tried to contain technological developments in China.(Wang and Chen 2018)   “The reality is that both China and the United States are focused on getting the infrastructure necessary to win the so-called AI race. Now, whether it’s actually a race is a separate question, but data, energy, and human capital are all critical inputs to this. The massive investment infrastructure is top of mind for leaders in both countries as they seek to do it. China’s access to the advanced technology and semiconductors is going to be a key cornerstone in this regard.”(Sacks, 2025) US and China have placed AI at the center of their national policies and global strategies. Both have been introducing various policy papers, strategies, and action plans for the advancements in the field of artificial intelligence and how to counter the side. Now, the international arena is witnessing two parallel AI setups: one created by the US and the other by China. As both are tremendously investing in research, development, and innovation in artificial intelligence, their national narratives and global plans are competing with each other, further exacerbating the international AI landscape.   This paper aims to critically analyze key policies highlighted under the national action plans and strategies launched by the US and the PRC, respectively. Applying the theoretical lens of constructivism, which deals with the role of ideas, norms, and values in shaping the international system, the paper will demonstrate key differences between the AI strategies of the US and China and how their ideological beliefs shape their respective AI policies. Moreover, the analysis will provide expert views on the future landscape of the AI race, its relation to the Great Game, and its political, economic, and military repercussions for the rest of the world. Furthermore, the analysis will mostly rely on expert interviews, key excerpts from official administrative documents, and research findings. This study will also provide insights into the Trump 2.0 administration’s policy outlooks vis-à-vis Beijing’s National AI policy.   America’s AI Action Plan 2025   President Trump unveiled his administration’s national strategy on artificial intelligence on 23rd July 2025. Entitled as “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan”, this strategy is a long-term road map to counter and contain China’s growing profile in the tech world, in particular the AI.(White House, 2025) The title of the strategy explicitly announces that the US has entered into the global AI race. Under this strategy, the United States does not want to eliminate China, rather the US desires to lead the AI world as a core nation, while the PRC should operate as a periphery nation. On July 15 2025, while addressing the AI Summit in Pittsburgh, President Donald Trump stated, “The PRC is coming at par with us and we would not let it happen. We have the great chips and we have everything great. And, we will be fighting them in a friendly fashion. I have a great relationship with President Xi and we smile at the back and forth, but we are leading…...”(AFP, 2025)   America’s AI Action Plan: Key Pillars   A. Accelerate AI Innovation   This first pillar of the AI national strategy by the US deals with the fact that AI should be integrated into every sector of American lives. From the grassroots level to the national or international level, the US should be a leading AI power. AI innovation states that any type of barrier, i.e., legal, regulatory, or domestic constraints, must be eradicated at first to promote, enhance, and boost AI innovation in the US. The strategy clearly states the innovation in artificial intelligence to be the fundamental step towards AI global dominance. The American beliefs, values and norms hold much significance in this regard. This strategy laid down the framework where AI platforms and models should have to align with the US democratic principles, including free speech, equality, transparency, and recognition. This means that the US AI action plan will operate under the umbrella of capitalist ideology.(White House, 2025)   Another most important feature in the field of AI innovation is the conglomeration of public-private ventures. Both the governmental authorities and public institutions are provided with such policies and frameworks to integrate AI platforms into their day-to-day operations. Creating an AI ecosystem is the cornerstone of this strategy.(White House, 2025) It aims to build an American workforce mastered in AI capabilities, defense forces and their key platforms integrated with AI, and provide a secure and safe environment to national and international investors, thus encouraging them to increase their investments in the US. Last but not least, the development of various departments countering the unethical use of AI, i.e., deep fakes, thus securing the national sovereignty and integrity of the homeland.   Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Lynne Parker, while highlighting the significance of the US 2025 AI Action Plan, stated, “The Trump Administration is committed to ensuring the United States is the undeniable leader in AI technology. This plan of action is our first move to enhance and preserve the US AI interest, and we are eager to receive our public perception and viewpoints in this regard.”(House, 2025) The AI innovation drive is indicative of the US being a liberal-democratic and entrepreneurial society. It has an innovation culture that focuses on open research, leadership in the private sector, and ethics based on its national myth of freedom, individualism and technological optimism.   B. Building the AI Infrastructure   This is the most crucial pillar of the US AI Action Plan 2025. From propagating the idea of AI innovation, the next step is to build a strong, secure, and renowned infrastructure to streamline the policy guidelines highlighted in the national AI strategy. This includes the development of indigenous AI factories, companies, data facilities, and their integration into the American energy infrastructure. The most significant step highlighted in this pillar is the construction of indigenous American semiconductor manufacturing units.(White House, 2025) Now what does it mean? As of today, China is considered to be the center of semiconductor manufacturing. Semiconductors are the basic units of any technology, i.e., weapons, aircraft, smartphones, etc. The US has long been importing semiconductor chips from China. Integration of the US energy infrastructure with that of the AI facilities is the ultimate objective of this strategy. Immense energy-producing units, i.e., electricity, under the ‘National Energy Emergency Act’ would be established to provide a continuous supply of electricity to AI data centers and facilities without any hindrance.(House, 2025)   But the Trump 2.0 administration, under its protectionist policies, aspires to restrict imports from China and build a domestic semiconductor processing unit. Highlighting the American dependence on Chinese chips, the American chemist and politician John Moolenaar stated, “The Trump administration has made one thing abundantly clear: we must reassert control over our own economic destiny. That’s not isolationism; that’s common sense. The Chip Security Act, outbound investment restrictions, and stronger export controls—those aren’t closing ourselves off. They are about ensuring America isn’t subsidizing or facilitating our own decline. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using American capital to fund aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and AI systems that target our allies and threaten our freedoms.”(Moolenaar, 2025)   The norm of decentralized innovation is applied in developing the infrastructure, and it empowers universities, startups, and private corporations. This is an expression of confidence in market mechanisms and civil liberties, which is in line with its social values of open innovation and competition.   C. AI Diplomacy and Security   The last pillar of the US AI national action plan is to collaborate with international partners and allies. This simply means to export American AI technology to strategic partners and those with common interests. This will, as a result, give rise to new types of groupings known as ‘AI Alliances.”(White House, 2025) The Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), QUAI AI Mechanism, and US-EU Trade and Technology Council are some of its best manifestations. Like the security and defense partnerships, the AI alliances will enable the US and the West to encircle the PRC in the tech world, where strong western collaborations and partnerships would hinder the PRC from becoming the tech giant or from excelling in AI production. It Encourages responsible AI governance and a democratic form of AI standards of the US, which are based on its self-perception as a global governor of the liberal values.   Thus, in order to enhance AI-related exports to allies, the US has established various institutions, including the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The US AI diplomacy aims to counter China’s growing footprints in the international bodies and institutions.(State 2023) As these global bodies are a key to spreading particular norms and values, shaping the public perception, and framing the global order, the US wants to challenge Chinese entrenchments in these organizations through political and diplomatic coalitions and groupings. Doing this, the West will be able to propagate their version of the global AI order. This means capitalism vs. communism will now be clearly visible in the global AI race between the economic hegemons.   The US Vice President J.D. Vance, while addressing the European Union (EU) leaders in Paris explicitly stated, “The US really wants to work with its European allies. And we wish to start the AI revolution with an attitude of cooperation and transparency. However, international regulatory frameworks that encourage rather than stifle the development of AI technology are necessary to establish that kind of trust. In particular, we need our European allies to view this new frontier with hope rather than fear.”(Sanger 2025) In case of security, the strategy aims to establish various AI Safety Institutes (AISIs) to reduce or eliminate the risk of AI-related accidents, which include errors in AI platforms, most specifically in the AI-operated weapon systems, and the unethical use of AI programs, i.e., generative AI or LLMs. Similarly, the strategy emphasized the danger posed by the non-state actors. These violent actors must be restrained from acquiring such advanced yet sophisticated technology.(White House, 2025)   China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan   For the first time in July 2017, the PRC launched its long-term national AI vision 2030, entitled “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” which is comprised of all the policies, guidelines, and measures to be taken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to foster its AI developments.(Council 2017) China’s AI 2030 vision is none other than the extension of the idea that President Xi Jinping circulated in 2012 regarding China’s future role in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This strategy aims to strengthen China’s AI footprints in the international arena. Ranging from investments to infrastructure, this plan of action explicitly declared to develop the PRC into the hub of AI innovation and investment by 2030. This plan of action is determined to bring about a profit of $160 billion by 2030.(O’Meara 2024) While addressing the Politburo Study Session on 25th April 2025, the Chinese President Xi Jinping noted, “To gain a head start and secure a competitive edge in AI, it is a must to achieve breakthroughs in basic theories, methodologies, and tools. By leveraging AI to drive the transformation of scientific research paradigms, we can speed up achieving breakthroughs in scientific and technological innovation in all sectors.”(Agency 2025)   China’s AI Vision 2030: Key Objectives   A. AI Leadership (2020)   The PRC has successfully accomplished this objective. Under this pillar, China has established significant AI infrastructure, including key facilities and data centers, coming at par with the US. Within this, the CCP urged the academic institutions to promote, enhance, and foster research in the AI domain, which resulted in the major developments in the sectors of big data, swarm intelligence, and super artificial intelligence.(Council 2017) China has successfully established its domestic AI industrial complex worth $22 billion. Various educational institutions, i.e., Tsinghua, Peking, etc., and major companies, i.e., Baidu, iFlyTek, etc., have now completely transformed into AI hubs where research, innovation, and practices are conducted through highly advanced AI platforms.   Commenting on the US-China AI leadership contest, Dr. Yasar Ayaz, the Chairman and Central Project Director of the National Center for AI at NUST, Islamabad, explicitly remarked, “Efficiency is the new name of the game now. Chinese AI inventions and developments clarify the fact that even with the smaller number of parameters, you could achieve the same kind of efficiency that others with an economic edge are achieving.”(Ayaz 2025) The AI leadership symbolically builds the socially constructed narrative of the Chinese Dream and national rejuvenation into the need to overcome the century of humiliation and take its place in the world order. Here, AI leadership is not just a technical objective but a discursive portrayal of the Chinese self-concept of being a technologically independent and morally oriented civilization.   B. AI Technology (2025)   The second most important objective of China’s AI Vision 2030 is to reach a level of tech supremacy in the international arena by 2025. Major work areas include localization of chip industries, advancements in semiconductors and robot manufacturing, etc. The first phase of 2020 basically laid the infrastructural foundation of the plan, while this phase deals with the development and innovation of key AI-operated platforms, including robots, health equipment, and quantum technology.(Council 2017) Another most crucial feature of the 2025 phase is to establish various AI labs throughout mainland China. This would result in the integration of AI into different public-private sectors, i.e., finance, medical, politics, agriculture, etc. Last but not least, a civil-military collaboration is described to be a cornerstone in this regard.   The AI-operated platforms would be utilized by both civil and military institutions, thus preserving the PRC’s national security and safety. Giving remarks over China’s technological edge, Syed Mustafa Bilal, a technology enthusiast and research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), added, “China, which for the longest time has been criticized for having a technologically closed-off ecosystem, is now opting for an open-source approach. That was evident by the speeches of Chinese officials at the Global AI Action Summit, in which they tried to frame China’s AI strategy as being much more inclusive as compared to the West. And one illustration of that is the ironic way in which deep search is currently furthering OpenAI's initial selfless objective of increasing AI adoption worldwide.”(Bilal 2025) Thus, the AI vision of China reflects ideational promises of social order, central coordination, and a moral government, ideals that are based on its political culture and civilization background.   C. AI Innovation Hub (2030)   By 2030, China aims to be at the epicenter of global AI innovations, development, and investments. The PRC’s political, economic, and defense institutions will be governed under AI overhang. The most significant feature of this phase is to counter the US-led AI order by challenging the US and the West in various international bodies like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The main tenet of China’s 2030 vision is to transform it into a completely AI-driven economy—an AI economic giant.(Council 2017) As the PRC is ruled by the communist regime of President Xi Jinping, China aspires to counter the Western-led AI order through instigating its communist values, including high surveillance, strict national policies, and population control. By avoiding a completely liberal, free speech AI environment in mainland China, the CCP aims to come on par with the US by having authoritative control over its people, thus maintaining its doctrine of ‘techno self-reliance.’   Giving his insights on the new global AI order and the ideological rift between the US and China, Dr. Wajahat Mehmood Qazi, advisor on AI and digital transformation to the private tech companies and faculty member at the COMSATS University, Lahore, explicated, “Yes, there is a digital divide, but the interesting part over here is this: the world is evolving, so this big divide is no more about the decentralization or the centralization. If we look at how China is promoting openness by releasing its foundation models, at the same time the ecosystem of their LM models or AI is still in close proximity. Whereas, the western world is having a different narrative. They are talking about the openness of the models, but at the same time it’s more market-driven. In my view, we are entering into a world where innovation requires openness and closed methods simultaneously.”(Qazi 2025)   The concept of innovation with Chinese features is used to describe a socially constructed attempt to exemplify another approach to technological modernity, which combines dictatorial rule and developmental prosperity. It is a mirror image of self-concept in China as a norm entrepreneur that wants to legitimize its system of governance and impact the moral and technological discourse of AI at the global scale.   Conclusion   The constructivist perspective informs us that the competition between Washington and Beijing is not predetermined; it is being conditioned by the perceptions, suspicion, and competing versions that can be rebuilt through dialogue and mutual rules. The ideological divide can be overcome by creating inclusive tools of AI governance, with transparency, ethical principles, and shared responsibility in their focus. The common ground created through the establishment of a mutual conception of the threats and the ethical aspects of AI will enable the United States and China to leave the zero-sum game on AI and enter into a model of normative convergence and accountable innovation. Constructivism thereby teaches us that cooperation in AI is not just a strategic requirement but also a social option, which is constructed on shifting identities and the recognition of global interdependence with each other.   The great power competition is now in its transformative phase, bypassing the traditional arms race for a more nascent yet powerful AI race. In the context of the US-China contest, administrations on both sides are trying their utmost to launch, implement, and conclude critical national strategies and formulations in the field of artificial intelligence. Both are moving forward at a much greater pace, thus developing advanced technologies in the political, economic, and military domains. Be it China’s Deep Seek or the Western Chat GPT, be it Trump’s Stargate project or Xi’s AgiBot, both are investing heavily into the tech-AI sector. Despite this contest, both economic giants also need joint efforts and collaborations in various matters of concern. Until now, it’s been very difficult to declare which will lead the global AI order. The chances of a global AI standoff are there.ReferencesAFP. 2025. “Trump Vows to Keep US Ahead in AI Race with China.” The News International. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1328672-trump-vows-to-keep-us-ahead-in-ai-race-with-china.Agency, Xinhua News. 2025. “20th Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 1–3.Ayaz, Dr. Yasar. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82MMzI_g2c&t.Bilal, Syed Mustafa. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82MMzI_g2c&t.Council, State. 2017. “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/.Feijóo, Claudio, Youngsun Kwon, Johannes M. Bauer, Erik Bohlin, Bronwyn Howell, Rekha Jain, Petrus Potgieter, Khuong Vu, Jason Whalley, and Jun Xia. 2020. “Harnessing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Increase Wellbeing for All: The Case for a New Technology Diplomacy.” Telecommunications Policy 44 (6). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2020.101988.Hassan, Abid, and Syed Hammad Ali. 2025. “Evolving US Indo-Pacific Posture and Strategic Competition with China.” Policy Perspectives 22 (1). https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.22.1.ra4.House, White. 2025. “Declaring a National Energy Emergency – The White House.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/.House, White. 2025. “Public Comment Invited on Artificial Intelligence Action Plan – The White House.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/public-comment-invited-on-artificial-intelligence-action-plan/.Moolenaar, John. 2025. “The 2025 B.C. Lee Lecture Featuring Congressman John Moolenaar.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIIUZlaKofU.O’Meara, Sean. 2024. “China Ramps Up AI Push, Eyes $1.4tn Industry By 2030.” Asia Financial. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.asiafinancial.com/china-ramps-up-ai-push-eyes-1-4tn-industry-by-2030-xinhua.Qazi, Dr. Wajahat Mehmood. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82MMzI_g2c&t=.Sacks, Samm. 2025. “China’s Race for AI Supremacy - YouTube.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xaccSxP8pOQ&t=8s.Sanger, David E. 2025. “Vance, in First Foreign Speech, Tells Europe That U.S. Will Dominate A.I.” THe NewYork Times. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/11/world/europe/vance-speech-paris-ai-summit.html.State, US Department of. 2023. “Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” no. October, 103–13. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Department-of-State-Enterprise-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy.pdfWang, You, and Dingding Chen. 2018. “Rising Sino-U.S. Competition in Artificial Intelligence.” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 4 (2): 241–58. https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740018500148.White House. 2025. “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf

Introduction Hegemony is the core principle in International Relations. It has been conceptualized through military strength, economic influence, and ideological control. The theory of cultural hegemony by Antonio Gramsci is based on assuming control but not necessarily through force, whereas realist theorists such as John Mearsheimer stress the relevance of military strength for ensuring global dominance (Mearsheimer 2001). The 21st century, though, brought into being a different era of transformation and technological breakthroughs that turned the existing arrangements on their head. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber war, and space technology, great powers are transforming from traditional soldiers to cyberspace warriors. AI and other cyber tools are altering the strategic equation between major powers, providing avenues for countries like China and Russia to undermine US hegemony (Rooney et al. 2022). Hegemony in the past had been founded on military superiority, but at present, academics have discovered that technological hegemony is leading the way. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) and AI have captivated researchers because they can transform war. Cyberspace has become the new battleground of power. The US and China are competing for cyber hegemony (Akdaǧ 2025). Space is increasingly regarded as a new battleground in geopolitics. The US Space Force and China’s BeiDou system illustrate how nations weave surveillance and communication in their strategic decision-making (O’Hanlon 2020). Thus, new technologies are reshaping the China-US rivalry. To counter this, countries are investing in tech-based industries, which will change the way human thinks. The analysis will explore whether emerging technologies can efficiently replace traditional tools of hegemony or not. Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power provides a critical framework in this modern era, where influence may flow from military boots to silicon chips. Global powers are moving towards influence and deterrence-based tech models, supplementing hard power. However, this transition has its risks, such as overdependence and ethical concerns. The paper argues that a complete transformation is not happening, but there will be dual-track hegemony where military and technology will coordinate to dominate. Policy implications of this shift are profound. Global powers must collaborate to draft international norms for AI and cyberwarfare, developing nations must develop their technology rather than dependency on global powers, as it will be easier for them to surveil and dominate, and international institutions must proactively govern the techno-political landscape to prevent destabilization. This study will use a qualitative approach, and it will be a case-based methodology combining theoretical perspectives of philosophers. This analysis is important as it delves into the transformation of the mechanics of global power from military hegemony to technology-oriented hegemony. It uses secondary sources like policy briefs, think tank reports, books, etc. Finally, this analysis concludes that soldiers may never be the first line of every fight, but the battle for global supremacy is firmly human-hinged in decisions on technology, ethics, and governance. Hegemony is a core concept in International Relations, grounded in military capacity, economic influence, and institutional influence. Historically, great civilizations like the Roman and British empires attained hegemony by dominating in naval power, making alliances and expanding their territories. In the post-World War II era, the US built dominance through overseas military bases and nuclear deterrence. Historical Foundations of Traditional Hegemony The Roman Empire, a classic example of past hegemony, attained this power by constructing roads, forts, and legions in the world's islands. Later, the British Empire sustained its dominance by modernizing the Royal Navy and the global trade network. The post-World War II era saw the hegemony of the United States with overseas military bases and security alliances. John Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, says that according to great powers, hegemony is the best way to ensure their security (Mearsheimer 2001). Limitations of Traditional Hegemony The primary limitation of the traditional hegemonic model is the risk of overreach, entering into too many overseas agreements that become economically and politically unsustainable. Imperial overstretch, a model proposed by Paul Kennedy, explains the collapse of empires when they are unable to maintain their economy due to huge global aims (Kennedy 1988). Concurrently, we can see that after so many years have passed in the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, the US is spending trillions. Approximately $3.68 trillion was spent on Iraq and Afghanistan (Costs of War | Brown University 2025). This highlights that military dominance can be costly and unsustainable. Mearsheimer, in an interview at the New York Times, claimed that ‘the United States is responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis’. Lack of legitimacy and local resistance is another great flaw in the traditional hegemonic pattern. For example, in Vietnam, soldiers used their knowledge of geography to push back against America's advanced weapons. Similarly, in Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign-led missions struggled with local insurgents. The New Tools of Technological Hegemony Cyber Power Cyber power has rapidly become a strategic field where states project their influence far beyond the geographic borders, often without soldiers. Cyber operations are dominating in this digital age, and the SolarWinds hack shows how states can achieve global influence through an Information Technology (IT) infrastructure breach. In March 2020, Russian hackers placed a secret backdoor in SolarWinds’ Orion software. This infected around 18000 users, including US major government departments (Cybersecurity 2021). The cyberattacks went undetected for several months, revealing vulnerabilities in the digital network. It was the worst cyber-espionage attack ever, an analyst described. Iran's 2019 cyberattack on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia shows that the acquisition of digital superiority can help influence norms, command the critical infrastructure, and set global political narratives without foreign boots on the ground. To address this vulnerability, it is essential to know cyber deterrence theory. It discusses capability, attribution, and resolution. States should advance digital tools, modify their tracking system and enhance communication and transparency. The most lethal weapon today may not fire a projectile-it fires packets. This metaphor illustrates that state actors can erode adversary national infrastructure, banks and election systems without traditional warfare. The US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III described the integrated Deterrence that integrates cyber with land, sea, and space under a unified strategy (Masitoh, Perwita, and Rudy 2025). Cybersecurity experts say that cyberpower is now a geopolitical power. And cyber warfare is not a sideshow; it’s a frontline strategy. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data AI’s strategic significance for national security has been emphasized by leaders like Jason Matheny, CEO of RAND Corporation. He warns that AI could make it easier to make harmful weapons and dangerous technologies (Matheny 2024). The 2023 report of RAND on AI and Geopolitics argues that AI may be the next frontier in US-China rivalry (Pavel et al. 2023). ChatGPT and Bard, like generative AI models, have humanitarian strategic applications, which makes fake news so believable that it feels like fact. This capability of AI can transform propaganda into scalable digital warfare. Beyond surveillance, AI has transformed military operations tactics. Military applications like drone swarming, algorithmic targeting, and predictive ISR create scenarios where the frontline shifts from kinetic zones to data centers. AI diplomacy is becoming the new foreign aid. Financial Times article notes that tech giants are deploying AI mechanisms in Africa not only for development but for their advantage as an influence tool. Thus, AI and big data are a new form of informational hegemony. Space Militarization and Satellite Dominance Space militarization emerged during the Cold War. States like the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan have developed anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (Samson and Cesari 2025). General John Jay Raymond at the US Space Command Launch said that, “Outer space is now recognized as a domain of military operations” (Raymond 2021). China’s 2007 ASAT test, which destroyed its own Fengyun-1C weather satellite, is still a thorn in the eyes of major powers. Russia has also launched missions like Kosmos-2553. Evolution from GPS to GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) reflects strategic change. The US has GPS, China has BeiDou, Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite constellation, and Europe has Galileo; each system highlights the sovereignty in digital positioning. China’s counterpart doctrine states in its 2021 Space White Paper that space-based assets are not crucial for renaissance only but for strategic deterrence without deploying soldiers or causing deaths of your military men (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2022). Undersea Cables and Digital Infrastructure Control Undersea cables carry over 95% of global data transmission (Sherman 2021). Disruption or surveillance of these cables can impact the worldwide flow of data and diplomatic communications. In developing countries like Pakistan, Kenya, and Ecuador, Huawei-funded infrastructure provides smart city services. Cable route is not just wiring undersea, it is influenced by encryption. The US and EU have Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, like surveillance platforms. Cable-Landing zones (CLZs) are the chokepoints used for manipulation, Cloud interconnection policies allow control of traffic flow, and Surveillance software and firmware installed at data centers can be remotely controlled, bypassing local safeguards. Blocking connections can slow or disrupt foreign economic leverage. Digital infrastructure has become a domain for hegemony that is more insidious in strategic potential. This map exposes the physical foundations of digital power. Nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control. Disruption or surveillance of these cables can cripple economies or governance. Regional chokepoints also reflect strategic leverage in geo-economics and cyber diplomacy, making this infrastructure as consequential as traditional military bases. Figure 1: This map shows the physical foundations of digital power, nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control.Superpowers’ Technological Footprint United States Silicon Valley is the heart of US technological hegemony, and some other government agencies, like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are contributing to maintaining US technological hegemony. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs), drones, and defense-grade AI-powered decision-support systems are a tech-military hybrid force. Furthermore, the US controls major pillars of technology like operating systems (Microsoft, Apple, Google dominate desktops and mobile devices), and Satellites. Advanced technologies have enabled remote force projection like drone strikes, executing surgical operations, Cyber Command operations from SolarWinds retaliation, deployment of Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA), enhancing deterrence. China Made in China 2025 vision aims to displace US techno-hegemony. China’s centralized Social Credit System reflects a template of techno-surveillance hegemony. Beijing is now selling surveillance systems to developing countries, highlighting its tech supremacy. China is controlling telecommunications architecture by promoting Huawei’s 5G worldwide. China’s cyber army, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), specializes in offensive and defensive cybertech warfare (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019). China’s Digital Silk Road links infrastructure investments in Asia and Africa with national encryption systems and cloud data centers. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in a bilateral dialogue, said that ‘our fiber networks and data exchanges are now integrated with Beijing’s national infrastructure policy’. Thus, acquiring such a position in technology will prove China’s hegemony and can make it a superpower, making the world again a bipolar one. China’s strategic doctrine focuses on autonomous systems and digital authoritarian export over occupancy and geopolitical projection, respectively. Russia Russia’s global strategy remains rooted in a hybrid doctrine that combines cyber tools, space capabilities and disinformation operations. The Gerasimov Doctrine, Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, emphasizes the blend of political, cyber, and economic tools to achieve strategic goals without casualties. The Ukraine conflict is a great example of cyber dominance. Russia has cyber units such as APT28 (Fancy Bears), Satellite Spoofing and Jamming, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which have executed targeted hacks against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), disrupted Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, and led disinformation campaigns. Russia’s power formula centers on dense cyber capacity, economic coercion, and unpredictability (making deterrence harder). Risks and Criticism of Tech-Based Hegemony Technology provides tools for security and influence, but overdependence causes strategic vulnerability, which leads to ethical dilemmas and raises questions about digital sovereignty. Overdependence and System Vulnerability A fundamental flaw of technological hegemony is its fragility. Systems are dependent on infrastructure (cloud servers, AI control nodes, etc.). The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) says that lethal autonomous weapons are the cause of escalation in conflicts (CCW 2022). Take the SolarWinds breach of 2020, in which an update exposed thousands of sensitive pieces of information. Ethical Concerns China, Ethiopia, and some other states have AI-powered surveillance regimes. China exports networked camera systems and facial recognition tools to states that use them to suppress dissent. A senior researcher at Amnesty noted that, ‘delegating life and death decisions to software is ethically unjustifiable’. Global South Dependency and Digital Colonialism Due to technological influence, digital dependency has increased in the Global South. Digital dependency without regulatory safeguards leads to digital colonialism. Countries lacking advanced technology are reliant on digital ecosystems developed by superpowers. It is said by Dr Ruha Benjamin that ‘when code becomes law, and pipelines become policy enforcers, sovereignty is outsourced’. Hegemony Without Consent Soldiers are a visible force, but technology imposes itself quietly via platforms, which results in domination without democracy. Tech-enabled coercion doesn’t need tanks; it needs standards embedded in devices, laws baked into algorithms. This contradicts liberal norms of International Relations (IR), where hegemony should rest on consent for international legitimacy (Sakumar, Broeders, and Kello 2024). Future Power Projections: Domain-wise Breakdown There are five interconnected domains of future power projections: land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Land Domain In traditional combat, troops were used to counter enemy force, but now in the third digital era, surveillance grids, AI-powered motion detection systems, and autonomous land robots are replacing soldiers. The Israeli military is testing unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which they have named Jaguar, to patrol borders, and this will reduce human casualties. The diagram illustrates the interaction or the coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS), and the target within a given environment. At first, the operator gives a high-level command which activates the controller, and the system provides feedback to the operator, such as mission success or failure. The controller is the brain of this system. It monitors the environment, processes data and controls the weapons. It operates in loops, evaluating the environment and updating the decision. Once the target is detected autonomously, the gun acts, which includes missile launch or gunfire. This entire process takes place in a dynamic environment. Figure 2: The coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS) Air Domain Traditional manned fighter jets were dominating in aerial combat. Now, aerial dominance is shifted towards hypersonic weapons and AI-enabled drone swarms. Russia’s Zircon and China’s DF-ZF are hypersonic missiles that can travel at Mach 5+ speeds. AI drone swarms are rendering conventional missile defense systems obsolete. The US Air Force’s “Golden Horde” project and China’s GJ-11 stealth drone exemplifies this shift. Sea Domain Sea powers used to refer to blue-water navies and submarine fleets. They remain the core of maritime protection, but unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are quickly supplanting aircraft carriers. UUVs are being used to surveil for months on their own, and they will not be detected. Subsea data cables, which transport 95% of internet traffic, are a strategic resource; such cables are undersea digital arteries. Securing the sea in the 21st century means controlling what is beneath it. The diagram illustrates major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). It is an important element in current naval battles and marine monitoring. The GPS/RF module is situated at the top of the AUV, through which the vehicle can position itself beneath the water. The propeller motor is the mobility unit of an AUV, driven by lithium-ion batteries. It provides thrust and directional movements. An electronic aid container serves as a housing store; it includes an onboard computer, a mission processor, a power distribution unit, and communication interfaces. AUVs have sensors which detect how deep the AUV is in the water column by measuring hydrostatic pressure. Acoustic Doppler Current Profile (ADCP), is a sonar device that uses Doppler shift in acoustic signals to measure the speed of water currents. An AUV manage its vertical position with a buoyancy tank. AUVs use an inertial navigation system; they determine the position of the AUV based on prior data. AUVs also contain forward-looking (Sound Navigation and Ranging) SONARs and Altimeters that scan and detect any obstacles in front of them and maintain a safe height from the seabed, respectively. Transducers are the mouth and ears of AUVs; they transmit and receive acoustic signals. They are crucial for clandestine communication and sensing of the environment. These AUVs are extremely crucial in contested sea areas such as the South China Sea or the Arctic. Therefore, AUVs are revolutionizing maritime operations by enlarging surveillance, exploration, and undersea warfighting capabilities. As technology evolves, AUVs will define the future of naval strategy and oceanographic study. Figure 3: Major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). Cyber Domain Cyberspace has no borders. Global powers like the US, China and Russia have developed cyber command units to disrupt the power grids of the opposite side. Russia’s cyber interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, China’s alleged breach of U.S. personnel databases (OPM hack), and the Stuxnet worm targeting Iran’s nuclear program exemplify how software has become a strategic weapon. According to NATO’s 2025 Cyber Doctrine, ‘A cyberattack triggering Article 5 [mutual defense] is not just theoretical—it’s a matter of time.’ Space Domain Traditionally, space power was limited to spy satellites, but now anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), Starlink and military satellite systems have transformed into a combat zone. The US created its Space Force in 2019 to dominate in space militarization. In the Ukraine war, SpaceX’s Starlink became crucial for Ukrainian battlefield communication, prompting Elon Musk to limit military use to avoid escalation. Table 1 (figure 4): Old model versus new model comparison in each domain of future power projection. Done by the author. Domain Old Model New Model Land Troop deployment - Armored divisions - Occupation warfare AI-enabled surveillance grids - Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) - Real-time satellite + sensor networks Air Fighter jets - Airbases - Strategic bombers Hypersonic missiles (e.g., DF-ZF, Zircon) - Drone swarms with AI autonomy - Human-out-of-loop air dominance Sea Naval fleets - Aircraft carriers Submarines Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (ORCA UUV) - Seafloor cable warfare - Autonomous maritime surveillance Cyber (No traditional equivalent) State-sponsored hacking - Data theft & disinformation ops - Cyber jamming, spoofing in kinetic war Space Reconnaissance satellites Missile early-warning systems ASAT weapons (China, Russia tests) - Satellite internet constellations (Starlink) - Real-time warfighting integration (JADC2) Can Technology Fully Replace Military Power? The emergence of advanced technologies like AI, autonomous weapons and space militarization has sparked the debate about whether technology can replace military power, wholly or not? Strategic autonomy, in which a nation’s ability to defend its interests independently requires both technology and military. Technology acts as a critical enabler but not a substitute. AI can analyze satellite data in seconds, but only trained personnel can conduct peacekeeping missions in fragile regions. Modern warfare is shifting towards grey zone conflicts that fall below the threshold of open combat. Russian operations in Crimea in 2014 blended cyberattacks and physical deployments of troops, due to which the line between technology and military became blurry. This incident shows that technology without boots is of no advantage. In addition, technology needs regular upgrades and educated users, and excessive reliance upon these systems may cause interruptions such as electronic warfare (EW) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. In a time of humanitarian crisis, disaster response, and counterinsurgency, forces are indispensable. To defeat an enemy or to dominate, one must employ both technology and an educated military. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have altered the character of air war. Great powers are investing heavily in military AI and quantum communication to improve battlefield awareness, minimize human loss of life, and enhance decision-making, but note that international decisions do not depend on a machine. They don't aim to replace the military, but they want to develop their technology. Thus, the emerging model of global power is not soldiering versus technology, but it is soldiers plus technology. It is known as dual-track hegemony, and a nation that acquires it will dominate shortly. A tech-savvy soldier, supported by AI and robotics, is the face of tomorrow’s war. Conclusion The United States, China and the EU are global powers of the modern era. These states possess the technological capital and military infrastructure that shape the regulation of engagement in cyberspace and AI. Firstly, they must strengthen international norms for cyber operations and AI governance. UNGGE has made some progress relevant to this, but this needs a broader enforcement mechanism like the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, global powers must invest in ethical and auditable technology. As AI is dangerous due to biased surveillance systems, facial recognition abuses, and it is also used in predicting policies, which is a major ethical concern. Algorithmic transparency, data protection, and privacy rights must be enforced as soon as possible. Lastly, multilateralism must extend to outer space. As space is becoming a battlefield, complicating geopolitical rivalry, to counter it, multilateralism must be encouraged. For developing countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria, the emergence of technological hegemony is both a threat and an opportunity. These countries should enforce digital sovereignty policies. These nations should avoid digital dependency, as it will be easier for global powers to surveil and dominate. Emerging powers should build defensive cyber infrastructure instead of offensive. They should build secure networks and legal protection against espionage on their own. Defensive strategy will serve as a strategic safeguard and can be used as a pawn in great power rivalries. Emerging powers should pursue a multilateral coalition among Muslim majority states to enhance their connectivity and ties. South-south cooperation must be promoted. The UN, G20 and other international bodies must move towards digital governance mechanisms instead of vague declarations. UN should form a Global Charter on Tech Governance, similar to a Digital Magna Carta. The charter should have ethical limits on the establishment and use of Artificial Intelligence and Lethal Autonomous Weapons. They should increase their coordination with the G20 to amplify these efforts. G20 should create a Tech and Ethics working Group, which can bridge the trust gap between Developed and developing countries in the digital arena. Global order continues to evolve in the 21st century, and the foundations of power projection are rewritten. There is a paradigm shift from boots to bots. This research demonstrates that while technology has transformed, it cannot entirely replace traditional modes of combat. Technology can only help the military to dominate in a region or conflict, but cannot fully replace it. There will be dual track hegemony, and the one who will acquire this hegemony will control world islands, and controlling world islands means ruling the world. However, this transformation comes with serious risks like AI miscalculations, vulnerabilities of digital infrastructure and ethical concerns. But we should keep in mind that military power is no longer sufficient, nor is technology alone a guarantee of dominance, in post-silo, where military, technological, and normative tools must function together to sustain leadership.ReferencesAkdaǧ, Yavuz. 2025. “Great Power Cyberpolitics and Global Cyberhegemony.” Perspectives on Politics. doi:10.1017/S1537592725000040.CCW. 2022. “Document Viewer.” : 16. https://docs.un.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/2021/3 (October 18, 2025).“Costs of War | Brown University.” https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/ (October 18, 2025).Cybersecurity, Centre for. 2021. 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Does the U.S. Economy Benefit from U.S. Alliances and Forward Military Presence? RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA739-5/RAND_RRA739-5.pdf.Sakumar, Arun, Dennis Broeders, and Monica Kello. 2024. “Full Article: The Pervasive Informality of the International Cybersecurity Regime: Geopolitics, Non-State Actors and Diplomacy.” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2023.2296739 (October 18, 2025).Samson, Victoria, and Laetitia Cesari. 2025. “Secure World Foundation: 2025 Global Counterspace Capabilities Report.” https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/2025-global-counterspace-capabilities-report (October 18, 2025).Sherman, Justin. 2021. Cyber Defense across the Ocean Floor : The Geopolitics of Submarine Cable Security. Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2019. China’s National Defense in the New Era. Foreign Languages Press. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2022. “Full Text: China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective.” https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202201/28/content_WS61f35b3dc6d09c94e48a467a.html (October 18, 2025)

Coca-Cola and Pepsi are among the most recognized and consumed soft drinks in the world, with Coca-Cola leading as the global favorite (World Population Review, 2025). However, in recent years, geopolitics has shaped their presence in certain regions, particularly in the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries. The reason behind this is interesting, these brands are often seen or associated with the United States (Hebblethwaite, 2012), a nation whose fame in these regions has always been questioned and been controversial, and whose policies in the region have long sparked controversy and criticism. Overview of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the US Coca-Cola was born on May 8th, 1886, when Dr. John Pemberton delivered his newly perfected syrup to Jacob’s Pharmacy in downtown Atlanta, USA. After 139 years, what started as medicine evolved into the iconic soft drink that is enjoyed in more than 200 countries and territories every day (The Coca Cola Company, 2025). On the other hand, a few years later, in 1893, Brad’s drink, later rebranded as Pepsi-Cola, was invented in New Bern, North Carolina, USA by Caleb Brandham, as an aid in digestion (History of the Birthplace, 2018). Pepsi’s presence worldwide also covers more than 200 countries and territories and can be said it is Coca-Cola’s closest rival. While these brands have built a reputation, they have a long history, their competition has been fierce to the dominance of their market across the globe. The term “Cola Wars” represents this fierce competition. Cola wars gained global attention and likely reached their peak around the 1970s and 1980s in the US, while nowadays the fight keeps on, those years were key in how their presence around the globe has resulted nowadays. A bit of the context of the Cola Wars; during the beginning of the 20th century Coca-Cola led the market, while Pepsi had a rough time and went bankrupt in 1923. After its restructured, Pepsi maintained but Coca-Cola advertisements, such as those featuring Santa Claus, made it difficult for Pepsi to compete and by the time of WWII, Coca-Cola could be found in 44 countries already. In 1965 Pepsi merged with Frito-Lay-Inc trying to gain better footholds in restaurants and supermarkets. At the time Coca-Cola was expanding its brand into other soft drinks beverages, Pepsi could simply not compete against them. But by the mid-1970s, Pepsi launched its “Pepsi Challenge”, a genius blind test marketing bet in which over 50% of Americans chose Pepsi over Coca-Cola due its sweeter taste, of course Pepsi claimed its first victory over giant Coca-Cola and started its rise. Coca-Cola's response came with celebrity endorsement and the diet coke in the early 80’s. But by the mid 80’s, Pepsi sales skyrocketed due to its collaboration and promotion with Michael Jackson and appearance in several movies like Back to the Future. Coca-Cola had an identity crisis at the time, but after going back to its roots, (Weird History Food, 2022) once again it came back to fight and claimed its important place in the industry. Coca-Cola and Pepsi around the world While the Cola Wars were largely defined within the American market, their global expansion strategies took very different trajectories once they reached international audiences. Coca-Cola made their debut in the international market in the early 20th century, but it was until WWII when it got international recognition. A marketing associated with American optimism and modernity was followed by the company, and during the war, the company produced millions of bottles for US troops abroad, introducing the drink to soldiers and civilians across Europe, Africa and Asia. The strategy transformed Coca-Cola from a domestic beverage into a global cultural symbol. Pepsi, meanwhile, took a more opportunistic route. After financial struggles between the 1920s and 1930s, the brand re-emerged with a more aggressive global approach. Its internationalization came in 1949 with exports to Canada and later expanded to Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines, but it was until the Cold War, when its real global expansion began (FBIF Food & Beverage Innovation, 2014), when it merged with Frito-Lay and diversified its portfolio. By 2024, PepsiCo generated $92 billion net revenue (PepsiCo, 2025) while Coca-Cola grew 3% to stand at $47.1 billion net revenues (The Coca-Cola Company, 2025) that same year and their products and diversifications not only include the classical soft drinks, but also other beverages and foods. Yet despite their shared dominance in over 200 countries, both face different degrees of acceptance depending on local political, cultural and religious attitudes. The role of geopolitics: soft power, sanctions, wars, risks and opportunities As stated already, both brands are known globally, however, it is important to highlight that their presence in different regions of the world has been shaped by other actors more than just commercial advertisements, or even due to their advertisements and commercial strategies. Let me explain in more detail. In the case of Coca-Cola, during WWII and the Cold War, many people outside of the United States associated the product with American culture, Coca-Cola became a symbol of American soft power and globalization, clearly seen in war advertisements featuring soldiers enjoying cokes suggesting the commonly used “bring people and nations together” phrases. (Edelstein, 2013) On the other hand, with a more social-cultural strategy, Pepsi used the American pop-culture as their approach to gain attention worldwide. Michael Jackson, Madonna, Britney Spears, Beyoncé, among others (Kalgutkar, 2024) were iconic in the brand. In addition, Pepsi’s marketing leveraged music, youth, and rebellion, giving a softer and aspirational appeal. However, this cultural and ideological symbolism also made both companies vulnerable to political backlashes and somehow have defined their reputation and presence in some areas of the world. In the 1950’s, France coined the term “coca-colonization” denouncing American influence. During the Cold War, Coca-Cola became a capitalist symbol (in the eyes of outsiders), and it was banned in the Soviet Union, an opportunity Pepsi took advantage of there. Later, when the Berlin Wall fell, Coca-Cola became a representation of freedom. (Hebblethwaite, 2012) However, the most notable geopolitical response came when the Arab League boycotted the brand between 1968-1991 in the 13-nation organization, because it chose to operate in Israel while the Palestinian land was under occupation. Pepsi capitalized on this absence, solidifying its position in the Arab markets. In addition to the Arab League boycott, there are other cases where sanctions imposed by the US to different countries have led to a small or lack of sales of the products, such as Myanmar, North Korea, Cuba or the Soviet Union, back on time. Moreover, occasional protests and bans in countries like Iran, Venezuela or Thailand (Hebblethwaite, 2012) has also affected the brands at certain points of the history and of course have created an image and reputation in the society, with positive, neutral or negative perceptions. Moving towards present day, after the war in Gaza broke out in October 2023, pressure on the brands reappeared on the Middle East; Coca-Cola, who has a factory in the illegal settlement in East Jerusalem in the Atarot Industrial Zone, was accused of complicity and violations of the international law, in addition to being “related” with the Israeli army. These led to the BDS Movement to add it to a boycott list, which led to protests and has also been spread across other Muslim-majority countries. Of course, sales have dropped sharply in different countries in the region like Egypt and Bangladesh. (Boycat Times, 2025) Pepsi, on the other hand, even though it has a major presence in the Middle East market built over the space left by Coca-Cola during the 1968-1991 boycott, has also been affected by the War in Gaza and the boycotts in the region. PepsiCo reported stagnation in beverage growth across Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan, compared with 8-15% growth a year earlier the war started. (Awasthi, 2024) The boycott of these American brands in the Middle East and some Muslim-majority markets has led to important losses in the share market and the sales itself. For instance, Coca-Cola sales reportedly fell by 23% in Bangladesh and dropped by over 10% in Egypt, overall, there is an estimation of 7% regional revenue loss in the MENA region. The losses of the American brands had become an opportunity to the local brands, like Pakistan’s Cola Next and Pakola (shared market increased from 2.5% up to 12% after the boycott (The Economic Times, 2024)), Qatar’s Kinza or Egypt’s V7, which have up to 40% in market share growth and up to 350% growth in exports, canalizing consumer preferences for local alternatives. (The Economic Times, 2024), (Awasthi, 2024), (CBC, 2024), even in the West Bank, the Palestinian Chat Cola has been positioned in the market, with sales of over 40% in 2023 compared to the previous year. (Associated Press, 2025) Coca-Cola and Pepsi boycotts are not the only ones, other companies like McDonald’s or Starbucks have also been affected in the region, due to similar or same reasons. Even more, in Canada, another great example is the “americano” [coffee] being renamed as “canadiano”, (Barista Magazine, 2025) as response to the economic and political tensions developed earlier this year between Canada and the USA. Despite the boycotts, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have a base in the region, and they have seek opportunities to continue, through investments (Coca-Cola invested $22 million in upgrading technology in Pakistan) or new strategies (PepsiCo reintroduced Teem soda in Pakistan with a “Made in Pakistan” printed on the label) (Shahid, DiNapoli, & Saafan, 2024). Overall, both companies are trying to maintain, penetrate and expand their products in the market, they have been using and relying on bottling companies as a strong tool for those purposes, creating alliances with local companies as well as innovating and testing different new products in the region. Conclusion The current boycott of Coca-Cola and Pepsi across the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries is not only a reflection of political anger – it is a window into how geopolitics can directly reshape consumer economies. What once symbolizes Western globalization, and cultural appeal has now become a marker of political identity and economic nationalism. In a society driven by consumerism – where success is often measured by how much one owns – people tend to care less about genuine human values such as love, kindness, respect, empathy and consideration (MET, 2022). Ironically, today that statement seems reversed. For many consumers, boycotting Western brands has become not only a moral choice but also an act of solidarity and empowerment. Beyond economics, the boycott also reflects a psychological and cultural response. For many consumers in the Middle East, choosing what to drink has become a symbolic act of identity, resistance and empathy. Avoiding brands such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi offers a sense of agency and unity Palestine, turning everyday consumption into an expression of political consciousness. Although both companies remain resilient and continue to invest heavily in local markets, their challenges go beyond short-term losses. The rise of local brands such as V7. Kinza and Cola Next highlights a deeper regional shift – where consumers are not merely reacting to politics, but redefining loyalty based on ethics, identity and sovereignty. In the long term, this phenomenon could accelerate the regionalization of the markets, as local producers gain confidence and international corporations are compelled to adapt – by respecting cultural sensitivities, building genuine local partnerships, and ensuring transparency across their supply chains. Ultimately, the story of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the Middle East demonstrates that in today’s interconnected world, soft power is no longer a one-way export. Consumer behavior itself has become a form of diplomacy – capable of rewarding inclusion or punishing complicity.ReferencesAssociated Press. (2025, 03 02). Coca-Cola's appeal to Palestinians fizzles amid war. Retrieved from VOA News: https://www.voanews.com/a/coca-cola-s-appeal-to-palestinians-fizzles-amid-war/7991182.htmlAwasthi, S. (2024, 09 15). Middle East conflict bites Coca-Cola, Pepsi. Retrieved from SBS News: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/podcast-episode/middle-east-conflict-bites-coca-cola-pepsi/z445sv6glBarista Magazine. (2025, 02 25). Move Over, Americano: The ’Canadiano’ Has Arrived. Retrieved from Barista Magazine Online: https://www.baristamagazine.com/move-over-americano-the-canadiano-has-arrived/Boycat Times. (2025, 09 02). Everything You Need to Know: Why We Boycott Coca Cola. Retrieved from Boycat Times: https://blog.boycat.io/posts/boycott-coca-cola-israel-gaza-palestineCBC. (2024, 09 04). Muslim countries' local sodas see boost amid Coke and Pepsi boycott over Gaza. Retrieved from CBC: https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/coke-pepsi-boycott-1.7313370Edelstein, S. (2013, 05 13). A visual remix of the American Dream as pictured in Mid-Century media. On the front lines with Coca Cola pt II. Retrieved from Envisioning the American Dream: https://envisioningtheamericandream.com/2013/05/30/on-the-front-lines-with-coca-cola-pt-ii/FBIF Food & Beverage Innovation. (2014, November 18). PepsiCo's path to global dominance: from beverage brand to food empire. Retrieved from Food Talks: https://www.foodtalks.cn/en/news/54496Hebblethwaite, C. (2012, September 11). Who, What, Why: In which countries is Coca-Cola not sold? Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19550067History of the Birthplace. (2018, October 18). Retrieved from Wayback machine: https://web.archive.org/web/20181004163206/http://www.pepsistore.com/history.aspKalgutkar, N. (2024, November 28). Pepsi’s Advertising: An Iconic Campaigns and Pop Culture Impact. Retrieved from Treehack: https://treehack.com/pepsis-advertising-an-iconic-campaigns-and-pop-culture-impact/MET. (2022, 07 29). The effects of living in a consumer society. Retrieved from MET: https://group.met.com/en/mind-the-fyouture/mindthefyouture/consumer-society/#:~:text=July%2029%2C%202022,the%20operation%20of%20a%20company.PepsiCo. (2025). Who we are. Retrieved from PepsiCo: https://www.pepsico.com/who-we-are/about-pepsicoShahid, A., DiNapoli, J., & Saafan, F. (2024, 09 05). Coke and Pepsi boycott over Gaza lifts Muslim countries' local sodas. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/coke-pepsi-boycott-over-gaza-lifts-muslim-countries-local-sodas-2024-09-04/The Coca Cola Company. (2025). Our Company. Retrieved from The Coca Cola Company: https://www.coca-colacompany.com/about-usThe Coca-Cola Company. (2025, February 02). Coca‑Cola Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results. Retrieved from Thr Coca-Cola Company: https://www.coca-colacompany.com/media-center/coca-cola-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2024-results#:~:text=For%20the%20full%20year%2C%20net,the%20timing%20of%20concentrate%20shipments.The Economic Times. (2024, 09 04). Coca-Cola and PepsiCo lose popularity to local Cola brands due to boycott over Gaza in Muslim countries. Retrieved from The Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/coca-cola-and-pepsico-lose-popularity-to-local-cola-brands-due-to-boycott-over-gaza-in-muslim-countries/articleshow/113064771.cmsWeird History Food. (2022, 07 24). Do You Remember the Cola Wars: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi? Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtwkKrjHlhcWorld Population Review. (2025). World Population Review. Retrieved from Top-Selling Soft Drinks by Country 2025: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/top-selling-soft-drinks-by-country

The libertarian revolution of Javier Milei, which had promised to free Argentina from the State, ended up being sustained by a bailout from the U.S. Treasury, the ultimate symbol of the interventionism he had sworn to fight. When Javier Milei took office in December 2023, brandishing a chainsaw as a campaign symbol, he promised nothing less than a libertarian revolution. An outsider to traditional politics, he declared war on an overextended Argentine state, pledging to cut ministries, privatize industries, dollarize the economy, and slash social spending to the bone. He even proposed abolishing the central bank. Many libertarians and cryptocurrency enthusiasts around the world welcomed his rise as the long-awaited dawn of anarcho-capitalism in power: a real experiment in turning radical free-market theory into national policy, inspired by Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of “creative destruction.” From the outset, Milei reinforced his global image. He dissolved the Ministry of Women, Genders and Diversity, threatened to remove femicide from the penal code, and attacked gender parity in politics. At Davos, he launched a fierce critique of “wokeism,” lumping together feminism, diversity, inclusion, equity, abortion, environmentalism, and gender ideology under one “woke ideology” to be fought. Mapuche women—members of one of Argentina’s largest Indigenous groups—denounced an increase in racist and misogynistic attacks. For conservatives from Washington to Budapest to New Delhi, this was electrifying. Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, a propagandist aligned with Modi, praised Milei alongside Elon Musk’s failed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), seeing in both an attack on the welfare state and on the enemies of cultural traditionalism. In Milei, the global right found not just another politician but a standard-bearer of its dream to fuse libertarian economics with cultural radicalism. Less than two years later, the contradictions of his project are exposed. Reserves are depleted, household incomes stagnant, unemployment high, and public confidence eroded. Argentina remains trapped in crisis, repeating old cycles. History warns us: Carlos Menem left massive debts and unemployment despite two terms between 1989 and 1999; Fernando de la Rúa resigned amid collapse; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner governed with growing subsidies and controls; Mauricio Macri faced a currency crisis in 2018 despite IMF support. In remarkably similar fashion, Milei’s political standing has weakened. His party’s defeat in Buenos Aires provincial elections in September, coupled with corrupt allegations against his sister and closest adviser, has undermined his authority. Congress overturned one of his vetoes and is preparing to challenge others. The peso, already fragile, brushed up critical levels as it approached breaking the IMF’s stipulated currency band. On September 17, it crossed that threshold, trading at 1,475 per dollar, forcing the central bank to spend nearly $1 billion in reserves to defend the currency. Country risk soared, and fears of collapse grew. Then came an extraordinary intervention. On September 22, minutes before markets opened, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent wrote on X: “Argentina is a systemically important ally for the United States… all stabilization options are on the table. Argentina will be great again.” He suggested Washington might use swap lines, direct currency purchases, or the Exchange Stabilization Fund to buy Argentine debt. Markets responded: Argentine bonds rose six cents to 71 cents on the dollar, the peso strengthened 4%, and stocks climbed 6%. Panic gave way to relief. Days later, at the UN General Assembly in New York, Milei appeared alongside Trump and Bessent. Trump praised him for “cleaning up Argentina’s mess” and hinted at support for 2027, though he downplayed the idea of a bailout. For Milei, it was vindication: ideological affinity with Trump translated into tangible backing. But the irony was striking. A president presented as an anarcho-capitalist crusader was rescued not by markets but by the most interventionist state actor of all: the U.S. Treasury, through a classic government bailout. This echoed how Musk’s DOGE and chainsaw rhetoric ended in farce—like Liz Truss’s mini-budget in the UK or the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Milei’s libertarian revolution increasingly resembles a recycled continuation of Argentina’s old failures. Like his predecessors, he burns through reserves, begs for Washington’s support, and claims credit for temporary inflation drops. His promise of “creative destruction” has not rebuilt the productive base, spurred innovation, or repaired the social fabric. It has merely redirected Argentina’s dependence outward, making the country once again reliant on foreign sponsorship. Trump’s support adds another paradox. For a leader who proclaims, “America First,” rescuing Argentina seems inconsistent. But geopolitics explains it. With Washington straining ties with middle powers like India and Brazil, and regional powers like Colombia leaning toward Beijing or Moscow, Argentina stands out for aligning firmly with the United States. Milei has echoed Trump on Cuba, Venezuela, and U.S. wars abroad, even calling for the demolition of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Palestine — the third holiest site in Islam — “to bring the Messiah.” In return, he receives dollars and political backing. What is presented as libertarian solidarity is, in reality, a geopolitical transaction. But the deal only postpones the inevitable. Argentina faces midterm elections on October 26, and Milei’s weak performance in Buenos Aires suggests a possible Peronist resurgence. Investors are uneasy not only about the elections but also about his longer-term prospects in 2027. Some problems are structural, such as Argentina’s chronic dependence on the U.S. dollar. Anchoring the peso creates a dual economy — one domestic and one dollarized — that leaves the currency overvalued and prone to collapse. Abandoning the peg has proved just as destabilizing. When Milei briefly allowed the peso to float, confidence collapsed, inflation surged, and recession deepened. He soon had to revert to a peg-like scheme, defended with borrowed reserves. Argentina remains trapped: pegging drains credibility and reserves, while floating exposes the economy to immediate collapse. Inflation has fallen under Milei, from nearly 300% in 2024 to around 30% today. But at an enormous cost: sharp cuts in education, infrastructure, and welfare have driven poverty higher, while professional classes, shielded by an overvalued peso, enjoy cheap vacations abroad. Poverty in Argentina rose to 52.9% in the first half of 2024, up from 40.1% a year earlier, reaching its highest level in more than two decades. In the end, Milei’s experience underscores the limits of libertarianism in power. Libertarianism thrives in opposition, with its rhetoric of freedom and chainsaws. But in government it collides with three immovable forces: markets that demand safety nets, citizens who require protection, and political institutions that resist dismantling. Milei’s struggles show that libertarianism cannot escape the state: it only reshapes its dependencies, often in contradictory and self-defeating ways.

Abstract The War on Terror (WOT) initiated after the September 11, 2001, attacks has been one of the most consequential and complex military and political campaigns in modern history. Looking back it dignifies the idea that the global war on terrorism was an aggression frustration response of US towards the 9/11 attack of 2001. As it not only created a dense overlapping financial burden on the US but also the cost of the invasion was never in favor with US peace and conflict policies. Many scholars argue about the utility of WOT with other ethics of war and conflict mediating techniques along with using the paradigms of realist and liberal theories. But now when the NATO alliances withdrawal enacted the end of a 20-year constitutive war. As the NATO withdrawal marked end of WOT without a remediate response, it enacts a dispersed or iconic philosophical thought that was the WOT was a success or utter failure? This article will foreshadow the events of WOT, NATOs withdrawal and human rights violation that emerge exploring this issue through primary lens of utilitarian paradox in international political theory. Introduction Afghanistan is a multi-diverse state situated in the central south Asia. Its borders are tied by mountain ranges and trading ports submerge in southern and eastern parts of Asia, Europe & the Middle East. The geography of Afghanistan has been a frontier for colonial reign for centuries. From being occupied by the from the USA – USSR post -cold war struggles till the US invasion in Afghanistan in the WOT. Afghanistan has struggled to maintain a monopoly of economy, governance, infrastructural and parental isolation of Taliban within their own boundaries. The WOT was launched by the United States in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The attack became one of the most contentious military and foreign policy actions in contemporary history. The war which initially aimed to dismantle terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda eliminate the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and secure global peace has lasted over two decades involving not only the USA but also the NATO forces. The centrality of military intervention and counter terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and other regions has been met with both support and intense criticism particularly regarding its humanitarian consequences, effectiveness and long –term strategic outcomes. The complex history between the United States and Afghanistan, particularly form the Soviet- Afghan War 1979-1989 to the 9/11 attacks, offers a case study of how international relations, realpolitik, and the principle of utility (central to utilitarianism) can guide state behavior. By examining the role of foreign of U.S. policy in terms of net benefit or harm to global security and human welfare, especially when applying the principle of utility, which aims to maximize well-being and minimize suffering for the greatest number. This article seeks to explore the WOT through the principle of utility, a central concept in utilitarian philosophy. The principle of utility rooted in the works of philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, posits that actions should be judged based on their ability to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people [1]. By applying this principle, the review critically examines the ethical dimensions of the WOT, NATOs involvement and the humanitarian violations that have occurred throughout the conflict. The article is organized into the following sections: 1. Theoretical foundation of utilitarianism along with US and USSR influence in Afghanistan 2. US foreign policy and military strategies during the WOT. 3. NATOs overall assessment of the WOT under the principle of utility. In each section, the analysis will assess the actions taken by the US, NATO and other actors exploring whether the outcomes align with the utilitarian ideal of maximizing overall well-being. 1. Theoretical foundations: the principle of utility in war Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory that holds that the right course of action is the one that maximizes overall happiness or wellbeing. It evaluates actions based on their outcomes rather than their intrinsic moral qualities. This framework is particularly useful in the context of WOT. The principle of utility can be applied to assess whether the human, financial and political cost of the War were justified by the benefit of greater security, freedom from terrorism and regional stability. While NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has been framed as strategic realignment, it has also triggered a range of human rights violation, most notably the treatment of civilians, the resurgence of the Taliban and plight of women and minorities. This research will critically examine the interplay between the WOT, NATO withdrawal and human rights violation that emerge exploring this issue through primary lens of utilitarian paradox in international political theory. Utilitarian calculus in war: US relations in Afghanistan (1950-1970) The utilitarian calculus involves comparing the benefits of military intervention (such as the defeat of terrorist organizations the promotion of security and the establishment of stable democratic government) against it cost (including civilian causalities, economics expenditure and long-term social destabilization). As the WOT unfolded, the decision –making process in the US and NATO appeared to prioritize short -term security gains over long term humanitarian outcomes. For instances, the US began engaging with Afghanistan as part of its boarder strategy to contain Soviet expansion during the Cold War. The Helmand Valley Project aimed at modernizing the Afghan agriculture, and US aid under King Zahir Shah and Muhammad Dauod Khan government were early manifestation of US interest in Afghanistan. However, Soviet influence also grew particularly through infrastructure projects like the Salang Tunnel. The competition between the US and Soviet Union for influences in Afghanistan explains the context of utility of benefits in a realist perspective where states act primarily acts to protect and expand their own power for the greater benefit of good for the greater number of people. (Morgenthau, 1948). Also, the key challenges in applying the principle of utility to the WOT is determining who benefits and who suffers. for instance, the US and NATO countries may have gained security by weaking terrorist groups, but the Afghan and Iraqi population have borne significant cost in term of civilian causalities, displacement and economic destabilization of the Middle East and growth of radicalization, complicates any simplistic utilitarian evaluation. Under the presumptive analysis of utility: Any war or WOT occurs where there is an imbalance in the collapse of the monopoly of the inter-state relations among the rivalry. Furthermore, from a utilitarian perspective, the US & USSR interventions aimed to protect national security and detain the expansion of the rival superpower. However, the long-term consequences of such competition particularly the US focus on the military aid and covert actions led to the instability, civil war and the eventual Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The overall outcome – while achieving short term strategic gains in containing the Soviet influence ultimately disrupted Afghan society, leading to the widespread maximizing welfare for the Afghan people or for the global peace in the long run, as they contributed to a power struggle that further destabilized Afghanistan. Utilitarian critique of preemptive war Utilitarianism also directly critiques the preemptive war doctrine espoused by the George W. Bush administration. The Invasion of Iraq in 2003, based on the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) illustrated a problematic application of utilitarian reasoning. Critics argue that the invasion was not only morally unjustifiable but also inefficient as it caused massive human suffering without achieving its purported goals. According to the utilitarian philosophy such as Peter Singer’s the catastrophic outcomes of the Iraq War – millions of displaced, the loss of thousands of lives and destabilization of regions – far outweighed by any potential benefits in term of preventing future threats to US security. Also, the US influence deterred the rise of the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan which was aligned with the soviet interest. This led to the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 intended to prop up the PDPA government. The US response was to support the Mujahedeen Rebels providing them with military aid (including stinger missiles) & funding through intermediaries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Thus, this covert operation was seen as a part of broader Cold War strategy to undermine Soviet influence in the region. In the long run, the intervention was a justified action and response to Soviet expansionism. According to Hans Morgenthau’s principles of international politics states act based on their national interest which in this case was to counter Soviet influence. The US built alliances with the Islamism groups in Afghanistan which while supporting US geopolitical goals led to the creation of radicalized Islamist network, contributing global terrorism. The creation of this network, with groups like Taliban and Al-Qaeda exemplifies the unintended consequences for foreign intervention that may maximize short term strategic benefits but lead to a long–term instability and suffering. The soviet withdrawal left Afghanistan in a state of chaos. The Mujahedeen factions, funded by the US turned against each other, leading to the rise of the Taliban in 1996. Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden, who had been in Afghanistan during the Soviet conflict, founded Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s rise the Taliban support for them would set the stage for 9/11 attacks. While on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, orchestrated the terrorist attack on the United States. The attacks killed nearly 3,000 people and led to the Taliban regime that harbored it and prevent further attacks. Utilitarianism and long-term consequences From a utilitarian viewpoint the US role in fostering Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan can be seen as contributing to a greater global harm in the form of terrorism. The short-term goal of defeating the Soviet Union led to the rise of extremist group that would go on to inflict severe harm globally, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. The utilitarian perspective here emphasizes that although the US successfully countered Soviet expansion, the long–term consequences – including the development of Al-Qaeda and its attacks on the US and other countries – created a greater global security threat. These consequences starkly illustrate the limits of the principle of utility raises important ethical concerns about the methods used and their long–term impacts where interventions create unforeseen global risks. Also, the immediate benefits of the US invasion were clear: the removal of Taliban and the disruption of Al-Qaeda’s operation in Afghanistan reduced the immediate threat of global security. However, the long-term consequences – including the loss of civilian lives, economic costs, and the rise of new insurgencies – raised questions about whether the intervention truly maximized global well-being. The humanitarian cost of War, including the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians, the destabilization of the country and the ongoing conflict must be weighed against the benefits of preventing further terrorist attacks Moreover, the prolonged US military presence in Afghanistan until their withdrawal in 2021 led to the significant economic and social costs that have yet to be fully realized in terms of global welfare. 2. US Foreign policy and military strategies during the WOT The US action during the WOT was justified under the assumption that eradicating terrorism and ensuring national security would promote greater good, both domestically and internationally. However, the application of the principle of utility raises important ethical concerns about the methods used and their long-term impacts. The WOT initiated by the United States in the aftermaths of September 11, 2001 attacks, fundamentally reshaped international relations and military strategy, particularly in Afghanistan. These interventions, characterized by the use of military force, under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) aimed to eliminate Al-Qaeda and dismantle the Taliban regime that harbored them. The US was soon joined by NATO allies in what was labeled operation enduring freedom and later operation led to significant human, political, and humanitarian costs. The Bush administration’s approach to security The Bush administration response to the 9/11 attacks was fundamentally shaped by realist principles of international relations, which emphasize the pursuit of national interest, power, and security in an anarchic international system. Under a realist paradigm, states must act in their own self-interest, often using force to ensure their survival and dominance. This is especially evident in offensive realism, as articulated by scholars like John Mearsheimer, which suggest that great powers seek to maximize their influence and security, often through coercion and military intervention. Under President George W. Bush the primary rationale for the WOT was the principle of self-defense and the protection of citizens from the threat of terrorism. The US government invoking the Bush Doctrine adopted a policy of preemptive military strikes, aimed to maximize the safety for the greatest number of Americans by neutralizing terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda and dismantling the Taliban support for such groups. However, the application of preemptive military force led to significant civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Amnesty International the US military use of air strikes drone attacks and ground operation led to thousands of civilian deaths raising questions about whether the benefits of eliminating immediate terrorist threats justified the loss of innocent lives. Noam Chomsky and other scholars had argued in the past that the Iraq War, in particular, was a costly endeavor that not only failed to eliminate terrorism but also contributed to the rise of groups like ISIS exacerbating the global security threat in the long-term. This outcome from a utilitarian standpoint challenges the initial justification for the WOT as the human cost seemed disproportionate to the benefits achieved. According to UN reports and media outlets like Al-Jazeera, the conflict resulted in the loss of over 100,000 lives, including both civilians and military personnel. These humanitarian issues, however, were often sidelined in favor of military objectives and maintaining control over Afghanistan’s strategic importance. The principle of utility in military intervention: benefits and harm The principle of utility, central to utilitarianism, seeks to maximize overall well-being and minimize harm. From a utilitarian perspective the effectiveness of military intervention like the WOT can be evaluated by examining whether the benefits – such as the elimination of terrorist threats outweigh the harm caused to civilians, the humanitarian crises and regional instability. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks the US & NATO military actions were justified on the grounds of protecting the lives of American citizens and global security by dismantling Al-Qaeda and ousting the Talban, in utilitarian terms these goals seemed to promise a net benefit: by limiting al-Qaeda safe haven the intervention could potentially prevent future terrorist attacks on the US and its allies thereby protecting millions of lives. The humanitarian costs and the questions of net utility However, from a utilitarian viewpoint, the long-term harm caused by the intervention, including civilian deaths, displacement, and the destabilization of Afghanistan, must also be factored into the equations. According to various reports including the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan caused widespread civilians being killed or injured. Additionally, the war exacerbated poverty, displacement, and psychological trauma for millions of Afghans. These humanitarian factors, especially when weighed against the limited gains in terms of security, question the net utility. Furthermore, the war led to prolonged instability in Afghanistan, which has seen a resurgent Taliban and the growth of new extremist groups like ISIS-K. This indicates that the intervention did not lead to long-term stability and may have contributed to further global security. The continued suffering of the Afghan people and the rise of new threats to global security (such as the Taliban’s return to power in 2021) suggests that the long-term consequences of the intervention might outweigh its initial benefits, thus failing the utilitarian criterion of maximizing overall well-being. State-building efforts and the decline of utility The US and NATO also pursued the strategy of state-building in Afghanistan which was intended to create a stable democratic government. The hope was that a New Afghan Government would prevent the country from becoming a heaven of terrorists, however, despite significant investment in democratic institutions human rights and social justice the central goal of security remained elusive. The inability to create a functioning state in Afghanistan, coupled with the increase of violence and corruption, indicated that the state-building efforts were not successful in improving the long-term welfare of Afghan population. While the US & NATO intervention in Afghanistan may have been justified through the lens of realism – to secure national interest and protect against terrorism – the utilitarian evaluation of the intervention reveals that the human and geopolitical cost likely outweighed the benefits, calling into question the true utility of the war and its outcomes. Further interventions must weigh these long-term consequences more carefully and seek to maximize the well–being of both local populations and global security. Obama’s counterterrorism strategy: drone warfare The Obama administrations sought to reduce ground troop deployment and shift to a strategy of targeted killings, particularly through the drone strikes, while distancing itself from the controversial Iraq War. This approach not only aimed to minimize US causalities while addressing threat posed by the groups like Al-Qaeda and Taliban. While drone strikes targeted high valued terrorists, like ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Taliban, they also crated collateral damage along with deaths of civilian in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia while achieving the primary interest of assonating Osama bin laden. The approach of Obama’s administration emphasized the pursuit of national interest, security and state sovereignty in an anarchical international system. Realism often holds the ideal that a state acts in their self-interest, often through military force to ensure their survival and to maintain power relative to other states. Under Obama the core objective of the US foreign policy remained the same: to eliminate terrorist threat to the US and its allies particularly from Al-Qaeda. Also, the decision to continue the Afghanistan War while pulling back from Iraq was largely framed as a more focused, efficient approach to combat terrorism by selective military actions and intelligence, instead of fugitive prolonged war. This principle prioritized the effectiveness of military power over ideological or humanitarian goals. A key feature of the Obama’s realist approach was the unilateral actions the US took to pursue its objectives, particularly in the case of Operation Neptune Spear – the Navy Seal Operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. The operation, conducted in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was not coordinated with Pakistani authorities which led to significant tension between the US and Pakistan. From a realistic standpoint the unilateral actions can be understood as a pragmatic use of military power to neutralize a direct threat to US security. In a world of anarchy, where no global authority can enforce laws, the state must often take matters into their own hands. By conducting a covert operation without seeking Pakistan’s approval, the US acted out perceived self –interest taking actions to eliminate a high valued target who posed an ongoing threat to American citizens and interests. However, Pakistan's sovereignty was violated in this instance, which raised significant international law concerns. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the use of force by one state on another is prohibited, except in cases of self-defense. The U.S. justified the operation as a self-defense measure, arguing that Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan was a direct threat to U.S. security, and that the operation was an act of preemptive self-defense against terrorism. From a realist perspective, this is a reasonable justification for intervention, as the preservation of national security often supersedes concerns about sovereignty. From a utilitarian perspective, Obama’s drone strategy presents a moral paradox. While it may have successfully neutralized terrorist leaders and prevented attacks on US soil it also caused significant harm to local populations, violated international law and arguably contributed to anti-American sentiment in affected regions. In this case the benefits to US security were weighed against the moral and human cost of innocent lives lost raising question about whether the outcomes were truly in the service of the greater good. Utilitarian analysis of the Obama administration’s WOT: maximizing security and minimizing harm. The Obama administration’s approach to WOT can also be observed by its ability to maximize overall security and minimize harm both to the US and to civilians of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The idea is to assess whether the benefit of military actions, such as the elimination of high valued targets, outweighs the costs including civilian casualties, displacement of population and the destabilization of the region. One of the key successes of the Obama’s administration was the target killing of Osama bin Laden. The operation provided a sense of closure to the 9/11 attack, which is benefit from the perspective of US public security and national pride. The death of Bin Laden was framed as a symbolic victory over Al-Qaeda, and this may be seen as a positive outcome because it removed a key figure head of terrorism, which could reduce the perceived threat to global security. However, the humanitarian cost of the broader WOT – which included the use of drone strikes and special force operations – were substantial. While drone strikes allowed precise targeting of terrorist operatives, they also led to numerous civilian causalities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Drone warfare has been heavily criticized for the lack of transparency, the risk of collateral damage, and the psychological impact on local populations. In the case of Pakistan, the unilateral nature of the Bin Laden’s operation not only undermined Pakistan’s sovereignty but also caused political fallout that weakened the US-Pakistan relationship. The operation demonstrated that US actions even when taken in interest of self–defense could have serious long-term geopolitical consequences, such as the erosion of trust and cooperation between states. From a utilitarian perspective, the broader costs – including the destabilization of US relations with Pakistan particularly when it comes to larger goal of regional stability – outweigh the perceived benefits of the operation. The ethics of targeted killings The increasing use of targeted killing, especially through drone strikes also raised significant ethical concern from a utilitarian perspective. While these operations may have been effective in neutralizing specific terrorist threats, the long-term consequences, including the moral hazard of using covert killings without oversight, can lead to escalations of violence and increased instability in the regions already plagued by a conflict. The principle of utility requires a careful balance of costs and benefits. In many instances, targeted killings have resulted in collateral damage, including the deaths of innocent civilians, which diminishes the overall moral benefit of these actions. Ultimately while the Obama administration efforts had eliminated specific threats and achieved short term gains, the long-term impact of the regional stability and international relations suggest that the utilitarian cost benefits analysis of the WOT points to a more complex legacy. Further interventions must carefully consider both the military objectives and humanitarian cost, to better align actions with the ultimate goal of global security and human flourishing. Trump’s “America First” approach and the cost of withdrawal Donald Trump’s first administration continued the WOT with a focus on unilateralism and reducing US military involvement aboard. The Doha Agreement (2020) negotiated between the Trump administration and the Taliban was a significant shift in the US policy, aiming for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. While this decision aligned with Trump “American First” philosophy, which prioritized US interest over global obligation, the execution of the withdrawal was chaotic, leading to the rapid resurgence of the Taliban significant humanitarian crises. From a utilitarian perspective the withdrawal decision can be seen as an effort to end a costly and unproductive military engagement that was producing diminishing returns. However, the aftermath of the Taliban returns to power accompanied by the collapse of Afghan government and widespread humanitarian suffering – raises significant doubts whether this decision ultimately maximized the welfare of the Afghan population or the global community. The decision to abandon NATO allies and the Afghan government, left a power vacuum, creating conditions for renewed conflict and humanitarian suffering thus failing to achieve the greater good in the long run. Paradoxically, Trump sought to reduce US involvement in long standing conflicts like Afghanistan which he viewed as a dent on American resources with minimal return in terms of national security. His decision to withdraw NATO forces from Afghanistan reflects this approach, emphasized the reduction of military expenditures and prioritizing domestic issues over international commitments. Trump’s decision to withdraw NATO forces can be viewed as an attempt to minimize the costs of prolonged military engagement while attempting to safeguard American lives. The moral benefit of withdrawal lies in the relief of American soldiers from the ongoing conflict and allowing the US to refocus its attention on the issues perceived as more pressing like economic revitalization & domestic infrastructure. However, the humanitarian consequences of such a move were severe. The Doha Agreement signed in 2020, aimed to facilitate the US withdrawal in exchange for Taliban assurances failed to deliver on key promises such as the protection of human rights and the creation of legitimate Afghan government. The agreement, while offering the possibility of peace did little to address the internal division in Afghanistan or to ensure the long-term stability of the country. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 resulted in a swift collapse of the Afghan movement, marking a humanitarian disaster as the Taliban took over Kabul, triggering widespread violence displacement and violation of human rights, particularly women rights. The decision to withdraw without securing a lasting peace agreement resulted in a net negative outcome for Afghanistan civilian population. While the US may have minimized its military risk the benefits of withdrawal were offset by the harm inflicted on the Afghan people. The Doha Agreement and peace talks. The Doha Agreement (February 2020) reflected Trump’s aims of ending the “forever war” in Afghanistan. The agreement led to US-troop reduction in exchange for Taliban promises not to harbor terrorist organization and a commitment to negotiating with the Afghan government. From a utilitarian perspective, the promise of peace talks was intended to maximize overall stability by ending the cycle of violence. However, the exclusion of the Afghan government from the peace talks and the continued violence by the Taliban during that period – undermined the utility of the agreement. The lack of inclusivity in the talks created a perception that US was abandoning its Afghan allies and supporting a regime that had a long history of human rights violation. The net benefit of the Doha Agreement therefore can be seen as limited, as it failed to bring about the desired peace or long-term stability in Afghanistan, while the Taliban rapidly retook the power once the US troops began their withdrawal. Biden’s commitment to ending the WOT Biden decision to proceed with the US withdrawal was framed as a continuation of a long-standing policy of ending the war. Biden argued that the US mission had evolved from counter terrorism to nation-building and that the Afghan government was not capable of holding power without US military support. In his view, the war had become a strategic quagmire, consuming trillions of dollars and thousands of lives without clear, sustainable outcomes. Biden’s decision to withdraw aimed at minimizing the harm to American soldiers and the financial burden of the war. However, the immediate humanitarian impact of the withdrawal was catastrophic. The rapid fall of Kabul in August 2021, months ahead of the scheduled withdrawal, led to scenes of chaos and desperation. The human cost of the disorganized withdrawal, the Taliban resurgences and the human right abuses that followed outweigh the short-term benefits of US troop withdrawals. From a utilitarian perspective, Biden decision to withdraw aimed at minimizing the harm to American soldiers and the financial burden of the war. However, the immediate humanitarian impact of the withdrawal was catastrophic. The rapid fall of Kabul in August 2021, months ahead of the scheduled withdrawal, led to scenes of chaos and desperation, as thousands of Afghan Civilians – including those who had assisted US troop withdrawals. While Biden justified the pullout as a necessary step for ending the war, the immediate aftermath suggested that the overall utility of the withdrawal was minimal, as the Taliban’s return marked a return to an authoritarian rule, with increased repression of women, journalist and other civil society groups. Biden’s foreign policy and NATO’s role Biden’s administration faced significant criticism for its handling of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. The collapsing Afghan government left NATO allies in a difficult position, as they were forced to evacuated personnel and citizen alongside US forces. The dis-orderly nature of the withdrawal strained NATO alliances, as many European countries felt sidelined by the US decision–making process. From a utilitarian viewpoint, the US withdrawal had a dual impact on NATO. On one hand, it removed NATO forces from an increasingly unpopular and costly conflict, thereby reducing the risk for Western nations. On the other hand, it undermined the credibility of NATO as a security alliance, casting doubt in US commitment to collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and creating a vacuum within the EU and NATO that was quickly filled by the resurgence of the Taliban. 3. NATO’s role and withdrawal from Afghanistan NATO roles in Afghanistan were to assist in stabilizing the country after the initial US invasion and to ensure that Taliban could not regain power. However, NATO efforts through significant in terms of resources and manpower were ultimately undermined by the persistent instability corruption and a lack of clear political resolution in Afghanistan. However, the Biden administration faced significant criticism for its handling of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. The collapsing Afghan government left NATO allies in a difficult position as they were forced to evacuate personnel and citizens alongside US forces. The disorderly nature of the withdrawal strained NATO alliances as many European countries felt sidelined by the US decision-making process. From a utilitarian viewpoint the US withdrawal had a dual impact on NATO. As it undermined the credibility of collective defense under article 5 of the NATO Treaty, the EU and NATO allies faced the challenge of reassessing their own defense strategies as they were left to cope with the vacuum created by the US pullout and the resurgence of the Taliban. The Utility of NATO’s Intervention was framed as a collective security mission aimed preventing terrorism and fostering a stable democratic Afghanistan. From a utilitarian perspective NATO goal was to promote peace and security for the Afghan people while supporting the broader international community fight against terrorism. NATO actions contributed to civilian casualties raising ethical concern about the cost-benefit ratio of the intervention. The chaotic withdrawal in 2021 mirrored under President Biden was another critical juncture in the WOT. The sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban swifts return to power raised questions about the utility of NATO long-term involvement in Afghanistan. The withdrawal did not produce a greater good as the human cost of Taliban resurgence, and the subsequent humanitarian crisis significantly outweighed the benefits of the mission. Regional geopolitics and the Taliban’s return to power The Taliban’s rapid rise to power was followed by international recognition from China, Russia, and Pakistan, all of whom were keen engage diplomatically with the new regime. China’s BRI initiative showed interest in Afghanistan’s strategic location, while Russia and Pakistan sought to maintain their regional influenced. From a utilitarian perspective, this shift in regional power dynamics presents mixed outcomes. On the positive side, the Taliban’s reassertion of control over Afghanistan could potentially reduce terrorist activities within the region if the Taliban adheres to the assurances it made to foreign powers regarding counter-terrorism efforts. However, the humanitarian costs, especially for the Afghan population – remain severe. The Taliban’s treatment of women, freedom of speech and other fundamental rights represent a serious human cost that undermines the utilitarian justification for withdrawal. For neighboring countries like Pakistan, the Taliban rise creates a security dilemma as it may embolden domestic insurgents like the Tehreek-e-Pakistan (TTP). This could lead to spiral of violence that destabilizes the entire region, potentially leading to further refugee flows, terrorist activities, and cross conflict. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, under both Trump and Biden was driven by the goal of minimizing the costs of prolonged military engagement, which from a realist perspective, could be justified as a necessary step in re-orienting US foreign policy. However, from a utilitarian standpoint the humanitarian consequences of the withdrawal including civilian suffering, regional instability, and the empowerment of the Taliban, have largely outweighed the short-term benefits. 4. Humanitarian consequences and civilian casualties and the use of force One of the most striking aspects of the WOT and particularly the US and NATO actions in Afghanistan and Iraq is the humanitarian violations that have accompanied military operations, the principle of utility demands that the human cost of war be carefully considered and yet civilian casualties during the WOT have been significant. According to estimates, more than 200,000 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan alone with additional fatalities in Iraq and other regions affected by the conflict. The extensive use of drone strikes air raids and ground operation against the Taliban’s Al-Qaeda targets has resulted in numerous instances where civilians were killed in the process. While these actions may be justified as targeting terrorist the humanitarian consequences raise question about whether the WOT strategic objective were worth the cost incurred. Utilitarian philosophers like Rosa Brooks argue that this violation which may have been undertaken in the name of security failed to maximize the well-being of those affected, particularly the victims of torture. The collateral damage in terms of civilian suffering and the loss of moral credibility further diminishes the utilitarian justification of these actions. Bush administration: the use of force without legal protection The Bush administration’s labeling of Al- Qaeda as a terrorist organization allowed for the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists with many denied the rights of prisoners of war (POWs) as outlined in Geneva Convention article 3. The US government’s treatment of captured militants, including the decision to not grant them POW status, was a direct violation of international law. The lack of judicial trial, along with the use of military commission to try detainees, highlighted the absences of fair trial guarantees and violated basic principles of justice. Detention and torture: Guantanamo Bay The detention of suspects at Guantanamo Bay and the torture inflicted on prisoners there, became a significant violation of international human rights law. Detainees held in indefinite detention without trial were often subjected to enhance interrogation techniques, which included waterboarding, stress positions and other forms of psychological and physical abuse. These actions violated international conventions, including the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), both of which prohibit torture and inhumane treatment. From a utilitarian perspective, these actions fail to justify the moral harm they caused. The human suffering of detainees at Guantanamo, along with the damage to the US international reputation, cannot be outweighed by the perceived benefits of gathering intelligence. While some argue that torture may have produced vital information, the overall harm caused to human dignity, individual rights and the rule of law suggest a net negative utility. Drone strikes and civilian casualties Drone strikes, particularly in Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been another controversial aspect of the WOT. These strikes, which were often conducted with minimal oversight and without regard for sovereignty of countries, resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians. In many cases non-combatants, including women and children were killed in mistaken strikes or when their proximity to a target was deemed insufficient to prevent harm. From a utilitarian standpoint, drone strikes can be seen as a high–risk, high-reward strategy. The argument made by proponents of drone warfare is that it minimizes American causalities and prevents terrorist attacks, therefore maximizing American causalities and prevents terrorist attacks, therefore maximizing national security. However, collateral damage and the disruption of communities in targeted countries can lead to the problem. This creates a vicious cycle, while the US attempts to reduce the immediate threat the long-term harm to global stability and human lives is profound. For instance, the 2010 incident in which 23 civilians were mistakenly killed in a drone strike is a clear example of this negative utility. The mistaken targeting of civilian buses underlines the lack of precision and accountability in the US strategy, which when weighed against the loss of innocent lives, cannot be justified under the utilitarian principle of minimizing harm. Obama administration and violation of IHL Under Obama’s administration, the drone strikes campaign intensified with the goal of targeting high valued terrorist and leadership figures within Al- Qaeda and the Taliban. While the strikes may have helped eliminate specific threats, they were often conducted without proper regard for international humanitarian law, particularly distinction (the principle that combatants and civilians must be distinguished) and proportionality (the requirement that military actions must not cause excessive civilian harm in relation to the anticipated military advantage). For instance, Obama’s Operation Neptune Spear, which targeted Osama bin laden in Pakistan, while celebrates as a success in eliminating a key terrorist figure, raised significant legal questions. The operation violated Pakistan’s sovereignty and was conducted without prior consent, in clear breach of the UN Charters provisions against the use of force on foreign soil without permission. A utilitarian may argue that the elimination of bin Laden may have offered short-term benefits in terms of counterterrorism, the long-term consequences – the violation of international law, the deterioration of US-Pakistan relations and the potential for escalated conflict – suggest that the operation caused more harm than good. 5. The economic and social cost of the WOT The financial cost of the WOT was astronomical. According to the US Department of Defense, the total military expenditure in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2020 was around $ 955 billion with estimates that the total cost of the WOT, including related costs, could reach $2 trillion by 2024. This enormous expenditure, while it supported military and intelligence operations, could arguably have been better utilized from a utilitarian argument, for domestic priorities like health care, education, and infrastructure. Furthermore, the opportunity cost, the benefits that could have been derived from using the resources elsewhere, undermines the utilitarian arguments for continuing the war, particularly given the lack of tangible success in achieving long-term peace and stability in the regions affected by the war. The human cost The human cost of the WOT was profound. Thousands of US soldiers, tens of thousands of Afghan civilians and hundreds of thousands of people in the broader region lost their lives. Many others faced psychological trauma and displacement. The US military emphasizes on counter insurgency and drone strikes, while designed to protect American lives, resulted in widespread civilian casualties and displacement in the countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, further destabilizing the region. Discussion The WOT initiated after September 11, 2001, attacks have been one of the most consequential and complex military and political campaigns in modern history. Looking back there are several key reconditions and conflict mediation on how it could have been handled differently to achieve better outcome, reduced unintended consequences, and hold international law and human rights Applying the principle of utility to assess the overall effectiveness and morality of the WOT reveals a complex picture. While the US and NATO achieved some military successes, including the eliminations of key terrorist leader and the weakening of organizations like Al-Qaeda, these gains were accompanied by profound humanitarian costs. From a short- term utilitarian perspective the WOT may have been justified in terms of protecting US national security and neutralizing immediate threats forms of terrorism. However, when considered from a long-term perspective the human, financial, and strategic costs - especially the rise of radical groups like ISIS, the displacement of millions, and the destruction of entire societies - raised serious doubts about whether the WOT truly maximized global well-being. The ethical implications of the civilian casualties, torture and human rights violation further complicate the utilitarian evaluation. From a utilitarian perspective the WOT appears to have been a failure , the short term benefits such as eliminating terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden – do not outweigh the long-term harm caused by the war including: humanitarian violation (torture, extra-judicial killing, drone attacks), financial burden (trillions of dollars spent, with little to show in terms of lasting peace or security), social and psychological costs (widespread of causalities in Afghanistan and Pakistan), and erosion of international norms (the violations of the Geneva Conventions, particularly the treatment of prisoners, contributed to the decline of international humanitarian standards). Conclusion The WOT and NATO involvement in Afghanistan and the humanitarian violations that accounted for the military intervention provided a rich case to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign policy through the lens of utility. While the WOT was initially justified on the grounds of maximizing security and protecting national interest in the long-term, consequences including civilian causalities, regional instability and the erosion of human rights suggest that the ultimate outcome were far more ideal. Although the utilitarian studies enacted some tactical victories in the WOT, the overall utility in terms of human rights, financial cost and global stability was negative. As a result, the strategy failed to create sustainable peace and instead resulted in a cycle of violence that ultimately undermined the very values it aimed to protect. Consequently, NATO may have failed to achieve greater good, causing more harm than benefit to both the people in the regions affected and the broader international community. In retrospect, instead of heavy reliance on military interventions the US and its allies could have focused more on intelligence gathering, law enforcement and international cooperation to disrupt terrorist cells before they could act. In short, focused on intelligence and law enforcement, not just military force Moreover, engaging more deeply with moderate Muslim –majority countries and regional allies to counter extremist ideologies and promote development and political stability in the Middle East and beyond would be a good idea. The WOT often alienated large segments of Muslims worlds furling resentment and contribution to the efforts of groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. A focus on diplomacy, addressing underlying grievances, and building local political and economic structures would have been more sustainable. Similarly, avoiding overuse of force in Afghanistan and Iraq would have helped. The US-NATO forces could have employed more targeted operations including special forces counter insurgency tactics and precision air strikes, rather than large-scale military invasions and occupations, because these onset of wars accounted for the increase of causalities, which allotted disruption to the laws of wars amendments Furthermore, to ensure lasting peace, it was essential to promote nation building and reconstruction. Military intervention efforts should have focused more on this aspect. Equally important was better adherence to Human Rights and International Law. The WOT should have adhered more strictly to international laws, including the Geneva Conventions and upheld human rights standards to prevent practices like torture, indefinite detention and extraordinary renditions. Actions and unlawful detentions tarnished rage moral authority of the US and its allies and violated human rights standards. This approach not only harmed individuals but also damaged global support for the WOT, leading to accusations of hypocrisy and fueling anti-Western sentiment. The WOT should have been framed as a global problem involving broad cooperation with international organizations like the United Nations and regional coalitions. Finally, addressing the root causes of terrorism - poverty, education, and political grievances -was crucial. Public diplomacy and soft power should have been used more effectively; the US should have relied more on cultural programs and soft power to counter extremist narratives and build goodwill in Muslim-majority countries. References 1. Amanullah Haidary Azadany. 2016. How Would a Realist Explain the Civil War in Afghanistan? Vol 12. European Scientific Journal file:///C:/U s ers /admin/D ow nloads /7171 -A rticle%20Text - 20870 - 1 -10 -20160330%20(1).pdf 2. Emily Stewart. (2021). the history of US intervention in Afghanistan, from the Cold War to 9/11. https://www.vox.com/world/22634008/us-troops-afghanistan-cold-war-bush- bin-laden 3. Mohammed Ahsan Zia. (2000). An Analysis of Peace-building Approaches in Afghanistan. https://asiasociety.org/analysis-peacebuilding-approaches-afghanistan 4. Trevor Blond in. (2015). Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, the Saur Revolution, and the Cold War. Volume 2, (2). The Undergraduate Historical Journal at UC Merced. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5qx01820 5. Julie Lowenstein. (2016). US Foreign Policy and the Soviet-Afghan War: A Revisionist History. https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=applebaum_award 6. Sergey Kyree. (2004). G George Lisa Gee Liska's Realist Alliance Theory s Realist Alliance Theory, and The, And the Transformation of Nato. file:///C:/Users/admin/Desktop/George%20Liskas%20Realist%20Alliance%20Theory%20And%20The%20Transformation%20Of.pdf 7. The U.S. War in Afghanistan. (1991-2021). https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war- afghanistan 8. Prabhash K Dutta. (2021). “20 years of 9/11: From Terror to WOT to Return of Terror”. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/20-years-of-9-11-from-terror-to-war-on-terror-to-return-of-terror-1851656-2021-09-11 9. Bill Calcutt. (2011). “just war theory and the WOT”. Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter-Terrorism. Research gate publishers. file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/Justwartheory-JPICTV6N2-Oct11.pdf 10. Ruairidh Wood. 2020 “Promoting democracy or pursuing hegemony? An analysis of U.S. involvement in the Middle East”. Vol. 6, No. 2. Journal of Global Faultlines’ pp. 166-185. Published by: Pluto Journals. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.13169/jglobfaul.6.2.0166.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7b9ad0d28602a07b5febbc678c780c26 11. Md. Mizanur Rahman. (2018). “The US State-building in Afghanistan: An Offshore Balance?” Vol. 23(1). Pp: 81_104.Jadavpur Journal of International Relations. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0973598418804292 12. Timothy Hoffman. (2015). “Realism in Action: Obama Foreign Policy in Afghanistan”. Political analysis Vol.16. article 6 https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=pa 13. Brett Campbell. (2014). “Realist or Liberal? Theoretical Interpretations of the Obama Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy”. file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/B_Campbell%20(2).pdf 14. Luis E. Chiesa & Alexander K.A. Greenawalt. (2012). “Beyond War: Bin Laden, Escobar, and the Justification of Targeted Killing”. https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1343&context=journal_articles 15. Alexander J. (2013)."The Killing of Osama Bin Laden" Law School Student Scholarship. 308. https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/308 16. Meghan McGee. (2020).” Europe Needs to Push Back against Trump: Disastrous and erratic policies demand a stronger response. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/10/trump-europe-nato-transatlantic-push-back/ 17. Grant Farr. (2020).” The Afghan Peace Agreement and Its Problems”. Published at International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/06/the-afghan-peace-agreement-and-its-problems/ 18. Aljazeera. (2021). “Inside Story: How will US troop withdrawal affect Afghanistan?” https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2021/4/14/how-will-us-troop- withdrawal-affect-afghanistan 19. Furqan Khan. (2021).” The Afghan Conundrum: Taliban’s Takeover and the Way Forward”. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2759350/the-afghan- conundrum-talibans-takeover-and-the-way-forward/ 20. Vilde Skorpen Wikan. (2015). “How Has the Human Rights Regime Been Affected by 9/11 and the ‘WOT?”. https://www.e-ir.info/2015/08/30/how-has-the-human- rights-regime-been-affected-by-911-and-the-war-on-terror/ 21. Human Rights Watch. (2004). “Enduring Freedom”: bourses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan”. Vol. 16, No. 3(C). https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0304.pdf 22. Jean-Marc Piret. (2008).” The war against terrorism », international law and the growth of unchecked executive power in the U.S.” carin. Info. Vol: 60. https://www.cairn.info/revue-interdisciplinaire-d-etudes-juridiques-2008-1-page-59.html 23. Hilde Eliassen Restad. “The WOT from Bush to Obama: On Power and Path Dependency”. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/142735/NUPI-WP-798-Restad.pdf 24. Christopher Paul Kailani Medeiros. (2013). “Neither Legal nor Justiciable: Targeted Killings and De Facto Immunity within the War on Terror”. https://gsj.global.ucsb.edu/sites/secure.lsit.ucsb.edu.gisp.d7_gs-2/files/sitefiles/Medeiros.pdf 25. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission: “Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan Practices of Concern and Example Cases”. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/471f4a500.pdf BBC news. (2021).” Afghanistan: What has the conflict cost the US and its allies? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821

Introduction In the past few years, international tensions have intensified across the globe, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to rising frictions between China and Taiwan. These conflicts cannot be fully explained through traditional military or diplomatic frameworks. Instead, they reveal the emergence of a new strategic model: hybrid warfare, a method that blends military, economic, technological, and informational tools to achieve political goals without open war. Closely related is the concept of the gray zone, a sphere of competition that exists between peace and full-scale conflicts, where states use ambiguity to avoid direct confrontation. The ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates how hybrid warfare operates in practice. Russia’s combination of cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and drone warfare shows how modern conflicts blur the boundaries between combat and politics. Low-cost technologies such as drones have further revolutionized this form of warfare, enabling small actors to inflict significant damage and minimizing direct risk at the same time. What is a Hybrid warfare and gray zone Gray zone The concept of hybrid war is often covered in media as a synonym for the gray zone. However, within the academic field, the gray zone is considered more of a competing term2 It is suggested that the terms are not synonymous, and the gray zone is defined as a space of competition short of war. Hybrid warfare, in this context, is viewed as an operational solution to achieve political objectives in the gray zone, though it is not limited to it. Although both terms have a quite similar approach, the gray zone is considered more physical in comparison to hybrid war. A state’s operation in this area may clearly not cross the thresholds of war due to its ambiguity. For instance, an invasion of drones in the European Union might serve as an example of such a gray zone action. It is difficult to consider such actions as a threat of war, allowing the predatory state to operate near a border and keep itself safe through ambiguity. Simply put, the gray zone is a territory in politics where it is hard to clearly identify aggression, and the aggressor acts ambiguously, finding legal loopholes to gain advantages without necessarily provoking a military response. Historically, there are numerous examples of such gray zone tactics. Russia used these tactics multiple times before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is one of the particular reasons why the world’s reaction to the Crimea annexation and Russian actions prior to 2022 was low-key and had little impact. A gray zone conflict demonstrates a fundamental change in the rules-based international order. By weaponizing ambiguity, one state seeks to undermine norms and erode democratic institutions from within. Interestingly, Philip Kapusta argues that the gray zone might be beneficial. The ambiguity that makes gray zones vexing also makes them useful to statesmen. It is crucial in international relations when one state tests the waters with gray zone activities to determine the potential strength of domestic or international commitments to an endeavor without resorting to the more lethal violence of war. Briefly saying, gray zone conflicts are an immensely better alternative to full-scale wars. [1] [2] What is a hybrid war? While gray zone competition describes the ambiguous environment between peace and war, hybrid warfare refers to the methods used within that environment to achieve political aims. In other words, the gray zone sets the stage, and hybrid warfare provides the playbook. The new concept of hybrid warfare and its correlating hybrid threats can be explained as a wide range of means, not necessarily violent, and a concept that is quite distant from traditional military power. Through non-violent means, a state can achieve a political effect without being embedded in an armed conflict. This term was introduced by Frank G. Hoffman, who described the warfare model as a collection of different strategies and models, including conventional capabilities, violence, coercion, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder. This definition stressed the importance of combining traditional military force with the use of new technologies. [5] However, several scholars question whether hybrid warfare truly represents a new paradigm. Analysts such as Michael Kofman and Lawrence Freedman argue that the term simply rebrands long-standing practices of covert and irregular warfare under a modern label. From this perspective, hybrid tactics—combining propaganda, subversion, and limited military action—were already evident in Soviet “active measures” and Cold War proxy conflicts. Still, the scale and technological sophistication of Russia’s recent operations suggest that hybrid warfare has evolved in scope and impact, even if its core logic is not entirely new. [13] Key characteristics and elements of hybrid warfare include: Fluidity and Ambiguity Debates on hybrid war in Ukraine in 2014 brought attention to the new term. The fluidity and ambiguity of hybrid threats and warfare helped Moscow to achieve a relatively non-violent political shift in Crimea. To escape a power balance, Russia used a creative underdog strategy. [4] Non-State Actors For some scholars, hybrid war and its actors are a new breed of non-state actors (likely sponsored by the state) who replaced the traditional concept of terrorists. They retain ties with the population and devote themselves to the propaganda of the deed. Diverse Definitions The definition of hybrid warfare differs between the West and Russia. For Russians, hybrid war is a new way of dealing with a conflict that avoids the traditional battlefield, utilizing economic, political, and socio-cultural methods. [6] Tactical Methods and Synchronization It is hard to clearly identify hybrid threats of warfare due to their ambiguous nature. However, most of the literature defines it by tactical methods. It is the synchronized use of several operation methods, and due to its unclear nature, the victim state may not be able to identify these multiple instruments. [5] Calculated Ambiguity Similarly to nuclear deterrence, hybrid warfare is full of calculated ambiguity. It is a key factor that makes it reasonable and effective; it is essential. [12] Thus, due to the gray zone's ambiguity, it is hard to indicate hybrid threats until they escalate into warfare. And even in such a case, one cannot necessarily say that hybrid warfare actually happened. Currently, there are high possibilities that Russia has used hybrid threats in several Baltic countries as well as Eastern Europe. So-called pro-Russian parties were critically close to winning presidential or parliamentary elections numerous times Comparison Hybrid war vs Gray zone Since gray zone conflict in its essence can incorporate traditional methods and unconventional tactics, and a complete reliance on unconventional techniques is likely to be less effective at fully and rapidly compelling a relatively strong opponent, states engaged in a gray zone conflict are likely to use hybrid techniques. To clearly illustrate the key notices from this comparison, the following table is provided. As Table illustrates, the primary difference lies in the level and ambition of each concept. The Gray Zone Conflict is a higher-level concept that operates at the strategic level and is directly tied to global and/or regional revisionist ambitions. Hybrid Warfare, conversely, generally pertains only to the operational and tactical levels. [3] Key distinctions between two concepts are Duration and Symmetry and Conventionality of Operations Duration and Symmetry Gray Zone Conflict is characterized by protracted engagement and is used under both symmetric and asymmetric conditions. Hybrid Warfare, however, may be protracted or short and is largely used under asymmetric conditions. Conventionality of Operations In Gray Zone Conflict, non-conventional military operations may be used standalone or alongside conventional operations8. In contrast, Hybrid Warfare treats non-conventional operations as auxiliary tactics used alongside conventional operations. This reinforces the idea that the Gray Zone is a large strategic territory of competition, while hybrid warfare is an operational solution frequently used within it. Drones as a tool of Hybrid warfare Drones' Impact on the Modern Battlefield Nowadays, conflict in Ukraine has proven the role of drones in modern battlefields. Drones now account for approximately 70% of total casualties from both sides. Moreover, it is hard to find actual troops in the war zones; most of the time, there are drone controllers rather than typical soldiers. Thus, in Ukraine, drones act as key actors in modern conflict. Throughout the war, it was clearly shown that drones are very useful against much more expensive and massive military equipment like tanks and planes. A drone that costs less than a thousand dollars can destroy a million-dollar tank, and what's even more terrifying, it is unmanned, meaning the fight will have fewer casualties. By using such drones, Ukraine was able to defend its borders without a further escalation of the conflict to the western part of the country. By using cheap and easy-to-use AI-powered technology, Kyiv was able to fight back against a state that is 28 times bigger. Drones in Ukraine and the Context of Russian Hybrid Warfare The role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) remains complex: in direct combat, Ukraine uses drones not strictly as a hybrid weapon but as a fully powered kamikaze to destroy local goals, functioning as a conventional weapon. However, the nature of these drones is inherently dual use. Some drones used in war can be purchased through commercial websites. For instance, the drone previously used by Ukraine, the «DJI MAVIC», can be purchased online, with a price range starting at $500. Such drones are modified on the field and used as small bombs. In comparison to Russians, some Ukrainians have even spent their own money on new ammunition or drones, creating an emerging civilian-led military supply market in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine is multi-dimensional with blurred lines between the kinetic use of military force and the non-kinetic use of strategic assets. Through the simultaneous use of political, technological, and military measures in achieving its policy objectives to design an ambiguity, Russia deliberately exploited its power to secure consensus for subsequent military actions. Russia has employed all three parameters of ambiguity in hybrid warfare, leaving Ukraine no other option except to fight. Hybrid war in EU? Russia's Strategy: Hybrid Warfare and Grey Zone Tactics Since the US established its dominance in the global stage, Russian involvement in the Baltics, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine since 2007 has been characterized as grey zone and hybrid warfare. Russia employs these tactics against EU and NATO participants, using several methods of cyber-warfare to challenge the military alliance. In Ukraine’s Crimea, for instance, Russia engaged in hybrid warfare by using non-state proxies to supplement a military deficit. In Eastern Europe, Russia relies on economic tools, cyberspace to harm infrastructure, as well as non-state actors. For example, Gazprom canceled a gas discount agreement with the Yanukovych administration. Subsequently, when Ukraine refused to accept Russian hegemony, the power grid was attacked and disabled a large portion of the country's infrastructure. Such incidents, includes alleged election interference in Romania, when in November 2024, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled results of first-round presidential election. Romanian intellegence agencies presented that Russian-linked cyber operations (social media campaigns with AI-driven misinformation and alleged cyberattacks) distorted the electoral process in favour of the far right candidate. In March 2025, investigative reporting detailed pro-Russia groups using Telegram to recruit EU-based individuals for sabotage, vandalism, arson and influence operations across NATO countries. [14] As the Russian economy is strained, the frequency of similar incidents appears to increase. [7] Across the period, the lines between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity continued to blur. Intrusion sets historically distinguished by TTPs’ level of advancement. conducted activities, or assessed objectives increasingly shared toolsets and modus operandi. This was notably exemplified by hacktivist-led DDoS waves by pro-Russia groups around electoral events, where increased activity was often observed as typical FIMI-aligned behavior to associate disruption with aspects of information operations. A prominent facet of this trend is faketivism, where state-aligned intrusion sets leverage hacktivist personas and activities. Notable examples include Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, associated to Russia-nexus Sandworm39, and the CyberAv3ngers group linked to Iran’s IRGC Hacktivists, seeking funding and visibility, embraced ransomware beyond DDoS and defacements. CyberVolk, operating in line with Russian interests, has used and promoted multiple strains—AzzaSec, HexaLocker, Parano, as well as LockBit and Chaos—since May 20244. KillSec, originally a pro-Russia hacktivist brand aligned with Anonymous, debuted its platform in June 2024. Drone Incursions: Testing Defenses and Undermining Support Russia has adapted new drone technologies and is now using them to test and threaten the European Union. For Europe, the usage of drones differs from the frontlines. Most incidents involve UAVs allegedly used for espionage or as a distraction mechanism. The possibility exists that drones sent into EU airspace are meant to frighten Europe and consequently pressure them to reduce military aid to Ukraine. Some argue that Russia uses this as a "carrot and stick" approach to force the EU to cut off military support. [8] Drones in the EU serve as one element of hybrid warfare: they are low-cost, deniable, and intentionally ambiguous. Russia's ambiguous attacks and hybrid threats, according to reports, might leave Europe's energy consumers vulnerable, especially during the winter. Economic Constraints and the Strategy of Exhaustion The financial strain on Russia does not diminish its ambitions. Such economic limitations directly shape Moscow’s strategic calculus. While the Central Bank attempts to manage the economy, the cumulative effect of sanctions and military expenditures is challenging the Kremlin's ability to cover its costs. Russian citizens and businesses are demonstrating creativity in navigating sanctions, but continued war and higher expenses are highly likely to destroy the economy. To maintain spending, the government is already seeking additional revenue sources by increasing taxes and fees on imports and making cuts to non-military budgets. [9] The consensus among experts is that a direct military conflict with NATO is highly unlikely, primarily due to Russian economic struggle. Russia simply cannot afford another large-scale war. [9] Even to sustain a major conflict with NATO, the state would first need to consolidate its forces by ending the war in Ukraine. Escalation Risk and European Resilience The latest drone attacks pose a severe threat to European energy and critical infrastructure. Even though recent drone incidents were relatively far away from key energy assets, they still represent a significant and deliberate risk. Reports suggest a potential disruption in energy supply, especially with winter approaching, could lead to price increases and higher heating costs, impacting not only the economy but also social stability. For instance, drone activity temporarily closed airports in Denmark, increasing the overall atmosphere of unease across EU countries. The Gray Zone attacks in Europe, including drone incursions, regular cyberattacks, and election interference, are part of a coherent hybrid warfare strategy aimed at testing Europe's resilience and preparedness. As international expert Christo Atanasov Kostov suggests, the Kremlin hopes to exhaust the West, not conquer it. This strategy aims to win in Ukraine by weakening the West—using hybrid tools to sow doubt over EU and NATO's ability to prevail and to cause domestic hardship that makes supporting Ukraine politically unattractive. [10] However, some scholars like Mark Galeotti argue that Russia’s hybrid campaigns have reached their limit: they can destabilize but not dominate resilient states. [15] It is very unlikely that Russia will cross the line of hybrid warfare and actually commit conventional forces against EU/NATO, as it is financially and politically untenable. The challenge for Europe is clear: to resist fatigue and demonstrate resilience, not fear. Moscow will likely continue its hybrid attacks, but Europe needs to be prepared through deterrence, technological and political autonomy, and collective defense. [11] Conclusion Hybrid warfare is a strategy that combines conventional military force and non-conventional forces to achieve a strategic political objective. Russia's campaign in Ukraine in 2014 successfully exploited the ambiguity of this hybrid warfare model to capture the initiative and secure political and military gains, particularly in Crimea and Donbas. Through drones, cyber operations, and economic pressure, Moscow continues to challenge European security while remaining below the traditional threshold of conflict. These actions show that hybrid warfare is not an alternative to war but a constant state of confrontation carried out through indirect means. For Europe, this reality creates serious strategic and financial challenges. Responding to low-cost and deniable attacks with expensive defense systems is unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, the main priority for the EU is to adapt its deterrence model, strengthen technological and informational resilience, and reduce dependence on external energy supplies. The evolution of hybrid warfare proves that modern conflicts no longer begin with formal declarations or visible invasions. They emerge through ambiguity, disinformation, and the silent use of technology. As Russia continues to exploit these gray areas, the stability of Europe will depend on its ability to recognize such operations early and respond collectively before the next stage of escalation begins. All we can conclude is that Putin himself is unlikely to stop the war until his maximalist ambitions are satisfied. He will continue to use any method, including the destruction of European stability through hybrid attacks, to exhaust the West. For the EU, the suggested course of action remains to diversify energy sources and demonstrate resilience against hybrid attacks to minimize security and economic challenges. 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Finney, ‘A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare’, Irregular Warfare Initiative, 2023, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/a-full-spectrum-of-conflict-design-how-doctrine-should-embrace-irregular-warfare/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [5] Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [6] Steven Woehrel, Russia: Strategic Economic and Energy Interests, Congressional Research Service, 2011, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42006.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [7] European Youth Portal, ‘How Romania’s Presidential Election Became the Plot of a Cyber Thriller’, 2024, https://youth.europa.eu/news/how-romanias-presidential-election-became-plot-of-cyber-thriller_en [accessed 17 October 2025]. 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The combined population of South Asia is around 2.09 Billion while the world is around 8.24 Billion. When we compare GDP data, South Asia’s GDP is 5.2 Trillion USD, while the entire world is around 115 Trillion USD. South Asia despite having ¼ of the world population contributes only around 4.5% to the world's GDP. If we dig deeper in the data, India contributes to around 86% of South Asia’s GDP; approx 4.5 Trillion USD.Now let's talk about South Asia’s Eastern Neighbours. If we look at the picture in that region, there is a stark contrast. The population of that region is around 701 million, approximately one quarter of South Asia's population but its entire GDP is about 4 Trillion USD. This GDP is spread across all nations. Why this big turn in this region? It was because of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN provided a platform for all these countries to work together.Similar efforts were made by South Asian Countries. In 1985, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) was established. It included member states of South Asia. But this organisation isn't as effective as ASEAN, despite having nearly four times population than ASEAN, the GDP of ASEAN is approximately three-quarters that of SAARC and when we compare global exports; SAARC exports goods and services worth $900 Billion while ASEAN exports $1.9 Trillion.Why was SAARC unable to succeed?The majority of South Asian countries were once part of the British Empire. They obtained their independence from Britain during the late 1940s. But since independence, there has been political instability in almost all countries of South Asia. Besides this there have been conflicts within and among these countries. India & Pakistan, two largest countries of South Asia, fought four wars and many skirmishes since their inception due to the dispute over the region of Kashmir, the dispute has also caused Insurgency in Kashmir. Afghanistan and Pakistan’s entire border is disputed which resulted in minor skirmishes between both nations and Insurgency in the border regions. Nepal has faced political instability, recent incidence of GenZ protest being the best example. Bangladesh has faced dozens of military coups and last year Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power, with elections planned for 2026. Sri Lanka had brutal civil war, after the end of civil war, there was some political stability but due to Government mismanagement there were protest and Rajapaksha was ousted from power in 2022.The problem even continues beyond Conflicts. South Asia suffers from weak physical connectivity, there is poor cross-border rail, road, and energy networks that prevent the flow of goods and people. Tariff and non-tariff barriers remain high, discouraging regional trade. Smaller states also fear Indian dominance, leading to mistrust. And unlike ASEAN, SAARC lacks strong institutional mechanisms to enforce agreements making cooperation more symbolic than concrete. In short, National Politics and Mistrust among nations are the key drivers behind SAARC's inefficiencies. When we compare the workings of ASEAN and SAARC, we find big differences. In ASEAN, there is a system called ASEAN Minus X. It is a decision-making principle used by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to enhance flexibility in regional cooperation, particularly in the field of economic integration. It allows a subset of ASEAN member states to proceed with specific agreements or initiatives, without requiring unanimous participation from all 10 members. The member states can join later on, once they're ready. Unlike ASEAN, SAARC lacks a similar mechanism. Their strict consensus rules often lead to paralysis (e.g., SAARC’s stalled summits due to India-Pakistan tensions). ASEAN Minus X’s flexibility is a key reason for ASEAN’s success.Since the early 1990s, ASEAN members created the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) lowering tariffs across the region. The grouping fostered regional supply chains which has helped in linking production networks between Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. ASEAN has also promoted tourism and easier labor mobility through visa exemptions. By comparison, SAARC’s South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) which was signed in 2006 has failed to meaningfully boost trade because of weak implementation.BIMSTEC: A Pragmatic Solution?While SAARC remains mired in political deadlock, a promising alternative has emerged known as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Launched in 1997 and revitalized by its 2022 Charter, BIMSTEC unites seven nations—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand—spanning 1.73 billion people and a $5.2 trillion GDP. By excluding Pakistan, it dodges SAARC's veto traps and channeling energy into practical sectors like transport connectivity, Regional Trade, Energy, Counter terrorism and so on. This setup positions BIMSTEC as a bridge to ASEAN, with intra-regional trade at ~7% but poised for growth. Recent 2025 momentum, including summits on sustainable development, signals political will to avoid SAARC's pitfalls—focusing on economic development and regional cooperation.Yet challenges persist. BIMSTEC remains under-resourced having a small secretariat and limited funding compared to ASEAN. Its Free Trade Agreement negotiations which were launched in 2004 are still incomplete. Member states often look to India for leadership but this reliance can also breed mistrust because of India's Size & Strength. Without flexible mechanisms like ASEAN Minus X, BIMSTEC risks repeating SAARC’s rigid consensus traps. ConclusionSouth Asia’s demographic weight holds immense economic potential, yet SAARC’s rigid consensus and political disputes, particularly India-Pakistan tensions have stalled integration limiting intra-trade to 5% against ASEAN’s 25%. BIMSTEC, bypassing these hurdles offers a pragmatic path with initiatives like the Master Plan for Transport Connectivity (2022-2028) and interregional ASEAN ties. To succeed, South Asia could revive SAARC with sub-regional frameworks like BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) or empower BIMSTEC with Minus X-style flexibility for trade and energy grids. Shared challenges like climate change, digital economy could unify efforts, leveraging India’s IT sector ($210B exports) and Bangladesh’s garments ($50B). By 2030, a reformed SAARC or robust BIMSTEC could transform South Asia’s demographic strength into global economic clout, rivaling ASEAN’s success and changing the region’s narrative from potential to power. Sources·         Worldometers - Southern Asia Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/southern-asia-population/·         Worldometers - World Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/·         IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2025) https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/SAQ; https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD; https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/IND/GBR·         World Bank South Asia Development Update (April 2025)·         ClearTax World GDP Ranking (2025)·         Worldometers - South-Eastern Asia Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/south-eastern-asia-population/·         IMF World Economic Outlook (ASEAN GDP, 2025)·         Wikipedia SAARC (Exports)·         ASEAN Key Figures 2024 (Exports)·         Wikipedia BIMSTEC (Population, GDP) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIMSTEC·         BIMSTEC Secretariat - 6th Summit 2025·         World Bank Trade in South Asia (SAARC intra-trade)·         ASEAN Stats Bulletin (ASEAN intra-trade, 2024)·         Reuters Nasscom Report (India IT exports, 2025) https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-tech-sector-seen-growing-51-fy25-nasscom-says-2025-02-24/·         Bangla News Garment Statistics (Bangladesh garments, 2025)  https://inews.zoombangla.com/bangladesh-garment-export-statistics-2025-what-the-numbers-say/·         Diversifying Global Supply Chains: Opportunities in Southeast Asia – McKinseyhttps://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/sas/south-asia/exportshttps://oec.world/en/profile/international_organization/aseanhttps://bimstec.org/event/190/bimstec-charter-enters-into-forcehttps://bimstec.org/event/247/thailand-hosts-the-6th-bimstec-summit-in-bangkok-on-04-april-2025-https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-bimstecs-maritime-transport-agreement-is-essential-for-india/ https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-bimstecs-maritime-transport-agreement-is-essential-for-india/

The United States is facing a political polarization that has been increasing over time. Every event in the country ends up highlighting the opposing poles in politics — that is, between the Republican and Democratic parties. Consequently, supporters of each side further divide the country to the point of validating violence as a method of political action. The social tension and polarized environment have become so evident that former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated that sanctions against Russia could last forever, or until the United States collapses during an imminent civil war (Venegas, 2024). The reflection of this polarization was evident when right-wing political activist Charlie Kirk was assassinated, and some left-wing sympathizers reacted by celebrating his death. For his part, President Donald Trump stated that “the problem of violence lies with the left” (The White House, 2025). Similarly, Elon Musk posted on his X account: “The left is the party of murder” (Musk, 2025). Right-wing influencer Andrew Tate wrote on X: “Civil war” (Tate, 2025). However, even before Kirk’s assassination, political polarization in the United States and the perception of a possible civil war were already on the rise. A study published in 2024 found that approximately 1 in every 20 respondents strongly agreed that “in the coming years, there will be a civil war in the United States.” Furthermore, “1 in 25 of those who strongly agreed that a civil war was coming also agreed that ‘the United States needs a civil war to set things right’” (Wintemute et al., 2024). Another study confirmed that one in five Americans believes that violence motivated by political reasons is at least sometimes justified. Consequently, nearly half expect a civil war, and many say they would trade democracy for a strong leader (Pérez, 2022). A recent PBS survey indicates that 30% of Americans are considering resorting to violence to get the country back on track. This shows an increase in support for violence, as 18 months ago only 19% had given the same response (Loffman, 2025). When Barbara Walter joined the U.S. government’s Political Instability Task Force, they identified two factors that predict where political instability and a potential civil war are likely to erupt. First, it depends on whether the country is an anocracy — a government that is neither fully democratic nor autocratic, but something in between. Countries most at risk of civil wars are those that move rapidly from one end of the political spectrum to the other. For example, when the United States entered Iraq, overthrew Saddam Hussein, and tried to establish a democracy, it did not take long for a civil war to break out in that country. However, it can also happen in the opposite direction — that is, when a country transitions from a democracy to something less democratic (Walter, 2022). Secondly, if citizens have mobilized around identity — along ethnic, religious, or racial lines. If a country exhibits these two factors, it is considered at high risk of political violence. What surprised Barbara was realizing that both factors were emerging in the United States at a very rapid pace. Democracy was affected when President Trump refused to accept the 2020 election defeat, and thousands of people took to the streets to protest against the certification of the vote, challenging the election results. Then came the assault on the Capitol by Trump supporters (Mounk, 2021). Consequently, the U.S. was classified as an anocracy. And when a country falls into that category, Walter argues, the risk of political violence reaches its peak and, therefore, it is more likely to face a civil war. Parallels can be seen with Trump’s measures in his current administration. An analysis by The Associated Press showed that 30 of Trump’s 150 executive orders have cited some form of emergency power or authority — a rate far exceeding that of his recent predecessors. In this way, Trump used emergency powers to override Congress’s authority and push forward his political agenda (Tau et al., 2025). However, a U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that most of the tariffs imposed by Donald Trump are “invalid for being contrary to the law” and do not fall within presidential authority. On the contrary, establishing tariffs is “an essential power of Congress” (Matza & Zurcher, 2025). In response, the president wrote on his Truth Social account: “Today, a highly partisan appeals court incorrectly ruled that our tariffs should be removed, but it knows that the United States of America will win in the end” (Matza & Zurcher, 2025). In this way, Trump not only clashes with Congress but also with the Court of Appeals, as both conflict with the interests of his America First foreign policy. In addition, Justice Elena Kagan warned that the conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court allowed Donald Trump to carry out one of his policies without taking the usual time to review its legality. Since his return to a second term, the Court has acted in 23 emergency cases related to his policies, favoring him wholly or partially 21 times (Chung, 2025). In this way, the executive branch has been allowed to move forward with its measures without obstacles before their legality is determined. Consequently, this implies an increase in presidential power that could undermine Congress and the various federal judges who have ruled against him (Chung, 2025). When protests erupted in Los Angeles over the enforcement of immigration laws, Trump sent 2,000 National Guard troops. This measure heightened tensions with California Governor Gavin Newsom, who disagreed with Trump’s decision. “This isn’t about public safety,” said Newsom. “It’s about stroking the ego of a dangerous president” (Dearen et al., 2025). For his part, Trump stated that he would arrest Newsom if he was the “border czar.” The governor responded, “This is a line we cannot cross as a nation — this is an unequivocal step toward authoritarianism” (Hutzler, 2025). Later, on his X account, Newsom referred to Trump’s actions and wrote: “Inciting and provoking violence. Creating massive chaos. Militarizing cities. Arresting opponents. These are the acts of a dictator, not of a president” (Newsom, 2025). This dispute and exchange between the two political authorities further inflamed the conflict and division within California, clearly highlighting the difference between the state and federal approaches. In 2017, Keith Mines noted that if large-scale violence were to erupt in the United States and the National Guard were required to intervene, the chances of a civil war would be 60%. He considered factors such as deep national polarization among citizens, violence as a method for resolving disputes, the weakness of institutions, the press, and the judiciary. In such an environment, only one or a few events would be needed to trigger a large-scale civil conflict. Mines listed possible catalysts: the impeachment or removal of the president from office; a major terrorist attack coupled with a sense that the establishment cannot manage national security; an economic recession in which the president and his allies blame certain groups; or a war gone wrong that polarizes the country, with blame distributed in such a way that factions begin to turn against each other (Ricks, 2017). In 2019, historian Nina Silber pointed out that one of the signs of a possible civil war is the willingness of the masses to engage in violence against their political enemies. “That’s what happened in the 1860s,” she said. “People viewed their political opponents in extreme terms and found it impossible to reach common ground” (BU Today, 2019). In this line, the possibility of a civil war looms over the events that occur before an armed confrontation, as the actors involved use the threat of violence against their previously identified political adversaries. Thus, the triggering event would involve the sudden outbreak of large-scale violence intended to provoke reactions driven by fear, anger, or a desire for revenge. The actors and divisions of the eventual civil war would be a continuation of the political landscape that existed before its outbreak. While the war itself may generate new actors, its emergence only occurs after the escalation toward total conflict (Lacher, 2022). Therefore, considering this background, it can be inferred that while a civil war in the United States is not an inevitable outcome, there is a real possibility that it could occur if the growing political and social polarization persists, along with the normalization of violence as a means of resolving conflicts. Consequently, in a context of geopolitical tensions, this would affect other nations, since the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency and, as the leading global power, the United States continues to play a key role in the international system. As a result, political instability and institutional division within the U.S. could trigger another domino effect — but on a global scale. If the United States were to face a civil war, it would be weakened to the point of leaving a power vacuum in the world, which the BRICS bloc — led by China and Russia — would likely seek to exploit to reconfigure the international order. References BU Today. (2019). BU Historian Answers: Are We Headed for Another Civil War? Boston University. https://www.bu.edu/articles/2019/are-we-headed-for-another-civil-war/Chung, A. (2025). US Supreme Court expands its 'emergency' docket - and Trump's power too. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-supreme-court-expands-its-emergency-docket-trumps-power-too-2025-10-02/Hutzler, A. (2025). 'Acts of a dictator': Newsom lashes out at Trump after arrest threat. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/war-words-trump-newsom-la-protests-escalates-arrest/story?id=122662589Lacher, W. (2022). How does civil war begin? The role of escalatory processes. Violence: An International Journal, 3(2), 139-161.  https://doi.org/10.1177/26330024221130364Loffman, M. (2025). There’s a growing number of Americans who think violence might be necessary to get the country back on track. PBS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/theres-a-growing-number-of-americans-who-think-violence-might-be-necessary-to-get-the-country-back-on-trackMatza, M. y Zurcher, A. (2025). Un tribunal de EE.UU. dictamina que la mayoría de los aranceles globales de Trump son ilegales. BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c0j90d5pe19oMounk, Y. (2021). After Trump, Is American Democracy Doomed by Populism? Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/after-trump-american-democracy-doomed-populismMusk, E. (2025). [@elonmusk]. The left is the party of murder. X. https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1965859343351558352Newsom, G. (2025). [@GavinNewsom]. X. https://x.com/GavinNewsom/status/1931848215802028394Pérez, R. (2022). Half of Americans anticipate a U.S. civil war soon, survey finds. Science. https://www.science.org/content/article/half-of-americans-anticipate-a-us-civil-war-soon-survey-findsRicks, T. (2017). Will we have a civil war? A SF officer turned diplomat estimates chances at 60 percent. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/will-we-have-a-civil-war-a-sf-officer-turned-diplomat-estimates-chances-at-60-percent/Tate, A. [@Cobratate]. (2025). Civil war. X. https://x.com/Cobratate/status/1965866748512780686Tau et al. (2025). The 911 presidency: Trump flexes emergency powers in his second term. AP. https://apnews.com/article/trump-emergency-powers-tariffs-immigration-5cbe386d8f2cc4a374a5d005e618d76aThe White House. (2025). President Trump Isn’t Backing Down from Crushing Radical Left Violence. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/09/president-trump-isnt-backing-down-from-crushing-radical-left-violence/Venegas, N. (2024). Putin Ally Predicts US Will Collapse in ‘Imminent New Civil War’. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/putin-ally-dmitry-medvedev-predicts-us-collapse-imminent-civil-war-1950276Walter, B. (2022). Is the US headed toward civil war? Political violence at a glace. https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2022/01/06/is-the-us-headed-toward-civil-war/Wintemute et al. (2024). Expectations of and perceived need for civil war in the USA: findings from a 2023 nationally representative survey. Injury Epidemiology. 11(40). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40621-024-00521-5

Abstract This paper examines Poland's pivotal role in European geopolitics amid escalating tensions following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Highlighting the September 2025 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace—marking NATO's first engagement with Russian assets within allied territory—it analyses Poland's military, diplomatic, and strategic responses, including border closures with Belarus and the NATO-led Iron Defender-25 exercise.The study contextualises Poland's historical significance from its 1918 independence through Cold War dynamics to its contemporary position as a key NATO and EU member. Poland's substantial support to Ukraine, encompassing military aid, humanitarian assistance, and political advocacy, underscores its role as both a regional security actor and a logistic hub.The paper also addresses challenges stemming from refugee influxes and bilateral tensions, while discussing broader implications for EU security and autonomy, particularly regarding Ukraine's potential membership in the EU. Through this lens, Poland emerges as both a bulwark against Russian aggression and a spearhead of European defence initiatives, navigating complex geopolitical pressures with strategic resolve. Key Words: Poland, Ukraine, Geopolitics, Security, Europe Introduction Between September 9 and 10, 2025, a contingent of 19 to 23 drones, alleged to be Russian, breached Polish airspace. This incident marked the first occasion since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine that NATO forces engaged and neutralised Russian assets within allied airspace.[i] Allegedly, the drones were part of a massive Russian assault on Ukraine, involving over 400 drones and missiles. At least four drones were shot down, primarily by Dutch F-35 jets, with support from Polish F-16s, Italian airborne early warning aircraft, and a Belgian aerial tanker. German Patriot systems in Poland were also on high alert.[ii] The drones caused minor damage, and no casualties were reported. Four Polish airports, including Warsaw's Chopin Airport, were temporarily closed due to the incursion. Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, described the event as a "large-scale provocation" and the closest the country had come to open conflict since World War II. Poland invoked NATO's Article 4, prompting consultations among allies, and an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was requested. Polish officials, including Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, assert the incursion was deliberate, citing the number of drones and their flight paths, some of which reached deep into Poland, including near Gdańsk. The drones, identified as Gerbera models (simplified versions of Iran-designed Geran drones), were unarmed, suggesting they might have been decoys to test NATO's air defences. Russia denied targeting Poland, claiming the drones veered off course due to Ukrainian jamming, a claim supported by Belarus but dismissed by Polish and European leaders. Intelligence officials are divided on whether the incursion was intentional or accidental, with some suggesting Russia aimed to probe NATO's response without escalating to direct conflict.[iii] NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte condemned Russia's "reckless behaviour," and leaders from the US, UK, France, Germany, and others expressed solidarity with Poland, calling the incident a serious escalation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy labelled it a "dangerous precedent" and offered Poland anti-drone training, leading to a Poland-Ukraine agreement on joint drone defence initiatives. The EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, proposed a "drone wall" to protect Europe's eastern flank.[iv] The incident occurred amid heightened Russian attacks on Ukraine and joint Russia-Belarus military exercises (Zapad 2025), raising concerns about regional stability. Some analysts believe Russia was testing NATO's resolve, especially after failed US-brokered peace talks. NATO has since bolstered its eastern defences, and Poland has closed its border with Belarus, citing security threats. The Zapad (meaning "West" in the Russian language) series began in 2009 as part of the Union State agreement between Russia and Belarus, alternating with other drills, such as Union Shield. Previous exercises often raised alarms among NATO members due to their scale and proximity to alliance borders. For instance, Zapad 2017 involved scenarios with fictional states resembling the Baltic nations.[v] At the same time, Zapad 2021 reportedly included up to 200,000 troops and integrated Belarusian forces more deeply into Russian command structures, with elements simulating operations involving Ukraine. The 2023 Zapad exercise was cancelled, attributed to Russia's resource strain from the Ukraine conflict. Notably, similar drills like Union Resolve in early 2022 were used to mask troop buildups for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, fuelling suspicions around Zapad events. Zapad 2025 took place from September 12 to 16 across 41 land and maritime training areas in both Russia and Belarus. Around 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercise, which also involved up to 7,000 Belarusian soldiers and 10,000 pieces of military hardware.[vi] The operation explicitly framed itself as a defensive measure to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union State. Still, it also incorporated high-intensity combat simulations, including the theoretical deployment of tactical nuclear capabilities and advanced missile systems. Despite the presence of military observers from NATO nations and other allied countries at the Zapad 2025 military exercises, the event has raised concerns about regional security, particularly among Poland and the easternmost members of NATO. According to the world's oldest and one of the most cited think tanks specialising in international security, the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), "Zapad 2025 appears as a meticulously calibrated, scaled-down, and geographically-constrained exercise. This is a deliberate and rational adaptation to the immense human and material costs of the ongoing large-scale war in Ukraine and the persistent strain of international sanctions. The exercise worked as a multi-layered instrument of a state in wartime, even though not fully mobilised. Politically, it fostered a perception of resolve continuity to both domestic and international audiences, strengthening the Russian-Belarusian closeness and deploying calibrated, low-resource deterrent messaging. Militarily, it worked as a field laboratory where Russia stress-tested and refined its Initial Period of War (IPW) playbook, incorporating direct lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield. The focus this time was on high-leverage capabilities, such as long-range precision fires, integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), and electronic warfare (EW), while conserving mass and materiel that are critically needed in Ukraine."[vii]Polish reaction to ZAPAD 2025Poland responded resolutely to the joint Russia-Belarus Zapad 2025 military exercises, viewing them as a provocative threat due to their proximity to the Polish border, aggressive scenarios (including nuclear elements and targeting the strategic Suwałki Gap), and the broader context of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and recent incidents like Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace. The reactions encompassed military, border security, diplomatic, and intelligence measures, reflecting heightened tensions and a focus on deterrence.[viii] Poland closed all border crossings with Belarus, including railway lines, effective midnight on September 11-12, 2025 (local Polish time), for an indefinite period until the perceived threat subsided.[1] This decision, announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, was justified by the exercises' aggressive nature, their location near the border, and ongoing hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus, such as arson attacks, sabotage, propaganda, disinformation, and espionage. The closure impacted the transit of Chinese and Russian goods. Additional measures included heightened vigilance at the frontier, with Poland coordinating with allies like Lithuania, which also ramped up security at its borders with Belarus and Russia.[ix] Additionally, Poland deployed up to 40,000 soldiers to its eastern border with Belarus as a direct counter to the drills, emphasising preparedness amid the perceived escalation. In a pre-emptive move, Poland led the NATO-backed Iron Defender-25 exercise, starting on September 2, 2025, as its primary military response.[x] This was described as the largest NATO-led drill of the year, involving approximately 30,000 troops (including Polish Armed Forces, NATO battlegroups, Air Force, Navy, Territorial Defence Forces, and Special Forces) and over 600 pieces of heavy equipment, such as U.S.-made Abrams tanks, K9 howitzers, and Gladius drone systems. The multi-domain exercise (land, sea, air, cyberspace) incorporated lessons from the Ukraine war, testing combat effectiveness in realistic scenarios to enhance interoperability and demonstrate alliance unity. Poland's Defence Ministry framed it as non-targeted training but a clear signal of readiness against potential threats, including large-scale drone attacks and Russia's Iskander-M missile deployments in Kaliningrad. Concurrent NATO drills were also conducted along the border.[xi] Historical Context For a non-specialist, especially one from outside Europe, Poland may seem a big unknown. Let us then very briefly examine the role of Poland in European Politics from a historical perspective over the last one hundred years. Poland's role in European history since 1918 has been transformative, serving as both a symbol of national resilience and a catalyst for broader continental change. From regaining independence after 123 years of partition to becoming a cornerstone of modern European integration, Poland's journey reflects the complex dynamics of 20th and 21st century European politics. Poland re-emerged as an independent state in 1918 following the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. The newly reconstituted Second Polish Republic faced immediate challenges, including border conflicts with neighbouring states from 1918 to 1921 and internal struggles with multiethnic tensions and economic dislocation.[xii] The interwar period was characterised by political instability, debates over competing leadership visions, and the legacy of partitions that shaped Poland's regional ambitions and democratic consolidation efforts.[xiii] Poland became the epicentre of World War II, suffering devastating military occupation under both Nazi and Soviet policies. The country experienced unprecedented civilian trauma, displacement, and the systematic extermination of its population.[xiv] Historians still debate the numbers, but recent analyses suggest that the nation might have lost much more than initially was suggested. Instead of six million, some historians suggest that nine million would be a more realistic number, which would constitute almost 24% of the Polish population.[xv] This wartime destruction fundamentally reshaped Poland's demographics, political landscape, and postwar boundaries, leaving an indelible mark on European memory of the war. After 1945, Poland fell under the Soviet sphere, adopting a communist system that profoundly shaped its institutions, economy, and foreign policy throughout the Cold War. The Soviet-backed regime implemented state socialism, which combined industrialisation with political repression, resulting in periodic episodes of mass dissent.[xvi] Notably, as a member of the Warsaw Pact,[xvii] Poland occupied a central strategic position within the Central and Eastern European architecture, serving as both a critical forward staging area and a substantial contributor to the alliance's conventional forces throughout the Cold War period (1955 - 1989). As part of the "Northern Tier" alongside East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Poland's territory formed the primary staging ground for Soviet operational plans targeting Western Europe, providing essential buffer protection for Soviet rear areas while controlling crucial East-West transit routes across Central Europe.[xviii] The Polish People's Army constituted one of the largest non-Soviet contingents within the Warsaw Pact, with substantial ground forces integrated into Soviet-designed offensive operations that emphasised rapid cross-border campaigns and coalition warfare capabilities. Polish military doctrine was heavily subordinated to Soviet operational art, with force structures, equipment procurement, and training programs synchronised to complement Soviet General Staff concepts rather than independent national defence requirements.[xix] Poland's armed forces regularly participated in major Warsaw Pact exercises that rehearsed theatre-level offensive operations, serving as integral combat elements whose contributions were deemed necessary for the alliance's conventional surprise-attack options. However, this integration came at the cost of operational autonomy, as Soviet personnel and advisers maintained significant influence over Polish military leadership and strategic planning throughout much of the Cold War period. The relationship revealed inherent tensions between Polish national interests and Soviet strategic imperatives, particularly during political crises such as the 1980 - 1981 Solidarity period, when Moscow considered military intervention but ultimately relied on Polish authorities to maintain internal order. By the 1980s, while Poland remained formally committed to Warsaw Pact structures, domestic political changes increasingly undermined the reliability and willingness of Polish forces to serve Soviet strategic objectives, contributing to the gradual erosion of the alliance's military cohesion.[xx] The independent trade union Solidarity, born from mass strikes in 1980, became the primary catalyst for Poland's transition from communism. Despite the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the movement persisted and eventually led to the Round Table negotiations and the pivotal 1989 elections, which produced rapid systemic change.[xxi] Poland's peaceful transition initiated processes that reverberated across Eastern Europe, contributing to the end of the Cold War order. Poland's post-1989 trajectory transformed it from a transition exemplar to an active Euro-Atlantic partner. The country joined NATO in 1999 and acceded to the European Union in 2004, completing its integration into Western institutions.[xxii] Today, Poland serves as the largest economy in Central Europe. It plays multiple roles as a security actor countering Russian influence, a close US partner, and a significant voice in EU decision-making.[xxiii] Below, the reader will find a comprehensive table that contains key political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Source: Grok – prompt: Create a table with the most important political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Visualisation by gamma.app. The Role of Poland in the Ukrainian War As allegedly a Chinese saying goes, "one picture is worth a thousand words", one needs to look no further than at a map of contemporary Europe to understand the central and therefore strategically important location of Poland. Source: https://www.escape2poland.co.uk/poland-guide/poland-map From the very beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Poland has emerged as one of Kyiv's staunchest allies, providing multifaceted support amid escalating geopolitical tensions. This assistance has spanned military, humanitarian, political, and economic domains, reflecting Warsaw's strategic interest in countering Russian aggression while bolstering regional stability. By mid-2025, Poland's total aid to Ukraine has approached $9 billion, equivalent to about 4.91% of its GDP.[xxiv] In the military sphere, Poland has delivered 47 aid packages, positioning itself as Europe's primary logistics hub for defence supplies, with 80% of allied donations transiting through its borders. Cumulative military support has reached €4.5 billion by May 2025, including over 300 T-72 and PT-91 Twardy tanks, BWP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, reconnaissance drones, and 100 million rounds of ammunition. Poland also trained Ukrainian troops on NATO equipment and, in April 2024, offered to repatriate draft-eligible Ukrainian men residing in Poland to bolster Kyiv's forces. A July 2024 bilateral security agreement further commits Warsaw to ongoing defence cooperation.[xxv] Humanitarian efforts have been equally robust, with Poland hosting over 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees by 2025, after more than 7.57 million crossed its borders since the invasion's onset.[xxvi] Warsaw established nine reception points on day one and spent €40 billion (1.9% of GDP) on refugee and humanitarian aid from 2022 to 2024, including welfare, medical supplies, and integration programs.[xxvii] By 2024, Ukrainian refugees reportedly contributed a net 2.7% boost to Poland's GDP through employment, with rates rising from 61% to 69%. However, public support has waned, dropping to 45% for long-term stays by 2025, amid political debates over extending benefits.[xxviii] Politically, Poland condemned the invasion through a unanimous Sejm resolution on February 24, 2022, and has advocated for Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO within forums like the Lublin Triangle. Leaders like President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk have emphasised "non-negotiable" solidarity, pushing for sanctions and intelligence sharing. Tensions flared in 2023 over grain imports, leading to temporary bans and border protests, but dialogue resumed with high-level meetings in 2024.[xxix] Economically, Poland's aid encompasses reconstruction involvement, energy interconnections, and trade facilitation, with refugees contributing to growth. As of September 2025, Warsaw has joined the "Coalition of the Willing" for sustained defence pledges, although domestic fatigue and the 2025 elections pose challenges to its long-term commitment. Overall, Poland's role has solidified its regional leadership, balancing altruism with security imperatives.[xxx] The overall picture regarding the actual situation in Poland regarding the costs and benefits of Ukrainian immigration is not all roses. The influx has triggered notable social, economic, and infrastructural strains. Public support for long-term refugee stays has declined amid growing fatigue and political debates. Key challenges include social tensions, housing pressures, welfare strains, and integration barriers. Rarely, but especially painful from a Polish perspective, are anti-Polish sentiments manifested by some Ukrainians, mostly on social media, which often refer to support for Stepan Bandera, seen as a founder of the modern Ukrainian State. Stephan Bandera, was a Ukrainian nationalist leader associated with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — and a prominent instigator of Volhynia Massacre of 1943 - 1944. During the massacre, UPA forces killed up to 200,000 ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (civilians – mostly women and children) as part of ethnic cleansing efforts. Consequently, Bandera, viewed as a hero in Ukraine for resisting Soviet and Nazi occupations, is often equated in Poland with perpetrators of genocide. SAFE and European Autonomy As analysed here, the EU is in favour of Ukraine's integration into European defence cooperation through the SAFE fund, which highlights Ukraine's unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. With its vast resources, Ukraine can potentially strengthen the EU and contribute to its economic and political growth, thereby enhancing European geopolitical influence. On the downside, Ukrainian semi- or full membership in the EU, which is likely to include membership in the postulated European Defence Union (EDU), will further stretch the EU dangerously to the East, shrinking the geographical distance between the EU and Russia. Consequently, Europe is likely to face an elevated strategic challenge posed by Russia, given its military potential and, most importantly, the historical and current context of political and economic adversary relations. Simply speaking, once Ukraine becomes an EU member, the EU will be exposed to constant security challenges to a degree much higher than before. The theory of escalation by Herman Kahn should therefore be studied in detail by European policymakers and military leaders to make sure that Europe does not find itself again drawn into a military conflict that may damage its societies for generations to come.[xxxi] Curiously, political leaders of Poland (such as Prime Minister Donald Tusk or Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski), supported by Estonian, German, French and British leaders, strike somewhat risky poses and flex muscles verbally challenging the delicate status quo. For example, a recent Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace (8-9 September 2025) produced a lot of chaos and uncertainty. As a consequence, some damage was done to civilian infrastructure. Polish authorities were quick to declare that Russian drones had caused the damage. Only later did it transpire through media reports that the damage had, in fact, been caused by friendly fire. A Polish missile mistakenly hit the civilian infrastructure instead of a hostile drone.[xxxii] Similarly, on November 15, 2022, during a massive Russian missile barrage targeting Ukrainian infrastructure, a missile struck a grain drying facility in the Polish village of Przewodów (near the Ukraine border), killing two Polish civilians and causing an explosion.[xxxiii] Initial reactions from the Ukrainian and the Polish governments hinted at Russian agency. Later on, it turned out that it was, in fact, a Ukrainian missile that mistakenly hit the Polish territory.[2] Interestingly, in a recent interview, the former President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, admitted that the Ukrainian side clearly used the event as an attempt to force the Polish hand to join the war against Russia.[xxxiv]Poland, once again, finds itself at the forefront of the geopolitical border between the collective West and Russia, and once again, it serves as both a bulwark and a spearhead. A role that never really paid any dividends in the 20th century. A role that cost millions of lives, destruction and decades of servitude. Broader Geopolitical Context In a broader geopolitical context, the Polish government has recently taken a significant step by blocking the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. The closure of the border with Belarus halted all road and rail traffic, including a critical rail route that handles about 90% of EU-China freight train shipments — part of China's Belt and Road Initiative — valued at around €25 - 30 billion annually. The disruption affected perishable goods, forced rerouting to less efficient paths, such as the Middle Corridor (via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), and led to potential losses for Chinese investors. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski emphasised to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on September 16 that security took precedence over trade, rejecting the initial request to reopen. The border reopened on September 25, allowing rail trade to resume gradually, though short-term congestion and instability persisted.[xxxv]Initially, Poland was positive about OBOR, which was formally launched back in 2013. Poland's participation positioned it as a key European gateway, leveraging its central location for rail, port, and trade links. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Poland in June 2016 and held a meeting with then-President Andrzej Duda and then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło. They signed a declaration elevating ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, emphasising OBOR cooperation in trade, investment, and infrastructure. The next several years saw a focus on rail and port projects where Poland positions itself as a "hub" for the Silk Road Economic Belt, with investments in logistics and connectivity.[xxxvi] In June 2024, President Xi met Duda in Beijing to mark 75 years of diplomatic relations. They issued an Action Plan (2024–2027) for strengthening the partnership, including high-quality OBOR cooperation.Recent events show that the Polish leadership has reevaluated its role in global and European geopolitics. By doing so, it appears that the Polish political leadership is playing a high-stakes game in the current geopolitical arena — a picture all too familiar to anyone who has studied the history of World War II. We can only hope that this time the future will not bring an all-European war.  [1] The border was reopened at midnight 25 of September.[2] The Ukrainian side has issued no official acknowledgement nor any compensation.   [i] Easton, A., & Lukiv, J. (2025, September 11). Poland says it shot down Russian drones after airspace violation. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c147065pzdzo[ii] Charlish, A., Kelly, L., & Erling, B. (2025, September 11). Poland downs drones in its airspace, becoming first NATO member to fire during war in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10/[iii] Walker, S. (2025, September 15). Russian drone incursion into Poland ‘was Kremlin test on Nato.’ The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/14/russian-drone-incursion-poland-nato-ukraine-europe[iv] Emergency Briefing on Drone Incursion into Poland. (2025, September 12). Security Council Report. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/emergency-briefing-on-drone-incursion-into-poland.php[v] Yeryoma, M. (2025, August 26). As Russia-Belarus Zapad military exercises begin, here’s everything you need to know. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-russia-belarus-zapad-2025-military-drills-set-for-september/[vi] Bifolchi, G. (2025, September 17). Russia-Belarus Joint Military Exercise “Zapad-2025”: Intel Briefing. The Kyiv Independent. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/09/17/russia-belarus-zapad-2025/[vii] Minniti, F. (2025, September 22). Wartime Zapad 2025 Exercise: Russia’s Strategic Adaptation and NATO. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/wartime-zapad-2025-exercise-russias-strategic-adaptation-and-nato[viii] Query, A. (2025, September 20). Iron Defender-25: Is NATO Finally Ready to Shield Its Eastern Flank? UNITED24 MEDIA. https://united24media.com/world/iron-defender-25-is-nato-finally-ready-to-shield-its-eastern-flank-11795[ix] Poland to close Belarus border due to Russia-led military exercises, PM says. (2025, September 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-close-belarus-border-due-russia-led-military-exercises-pm-says-2025-09-09/[x] Polska odpowiedź na “Zapad-2025”. “Unikamy eskalacji, nie boimy się.” (2025, August 9). Polskie Radio24.Pl. https://polskieradio24.pl/artykul/3562822,polska-odpowiedz-na-zapad-2025-unikamy-eskalacji-nie-boimy-sie[xi] Federation of Exercises codenamed IRON DEFENDER-25 - One Goal, Many Forces, Shared Readiness. (2025, August 26). Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland. https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/federation-of-exercises-codenamed-iron-defender-25--one-goal-many-forces-shared-readiness[xii] J. Lukowski and H. Zawadzki, "Independence regained and lost, 1914–1945," in A Concise History of Poland, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Also J. Böhler, Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland, 2018.[xiii] Górny, M. (2019). A Century of Selective Ignorance: Poland 1918–2018. Slavic Review, 78(3), 654–662. doi:10.1017/slr.2019.227  [xiv] A. J. Prazmowska, Poland: A Modern History, 2010. Also P. D. Stachura, Poland in the Twentieth Century, 1999.[xv] Davies, N. (n.d.). Europa walczy 1939-1945. Nie takie proste zwycięstwo. ZNAK.[xvi] A. Kemp‑Welch, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History, Cambridge University Press, 2008.[xvii] See more at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Pact[xviii] M. Sadykiewicz, "Organizing for Coalition Warfare The Role of East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning," RAND, 1988.[xix] Jones, C. D. (2003). Soviet military doctrine as strategic deception: An offensive military strategy for defense of the socialist fatherland. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 16(3), 24–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040308430567[xx] Mastny, V. (1999). The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War. Europe-Asia Studies, 51(2), 189–211. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153609[xxi] A. Paczkowski and C. Manetti, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, 1980–1989, 2015.[xxii] A. F. Tatham, "The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and European Law," in European Law and the Eastern Enlargement, Brill, 2013.[xxiii] R. Zięba, "The Evolution of Poland's International Roles," in Central Europe and the Changing International Order, 2020. Or A. Szczerbiak, "A model for democratic transition and European integration? Why Poland matters?" Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 2016.[xxiv] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxv] Palowski, J. (2025, April 8). Poland delivered 100 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine. Details on Germany and USA. Defence 24.Com. https://defence24.com/defence-policy/poland-delivered-100-million-rounds-of-ammunition-to-ukraine-details-on-germany-and-usa Also Słowański, M. T. (2025, January 13). Poland and Ukraine: A Partnership Forged in Resilience. Fair Observer. https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/poland-and-ukraine-a-partnership-forged-in-resilience/[xxvi] Fusiek, D. A. (2022, November 28). The needs of refugees. European Investment Bank. https://www.eib.org/en/stories/ukrainian-poland-infrastructure-refugees[xxvii] See more at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location/10781[xxviii] See more at: UKRAINE EMERGENCY. (2025, September 25). UNHCR. https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/[xxix] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxx] Ukrainian refugees give Poland big economic boost, report says. (2025, June 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-refugees-give-poland-big-economic-boost-report-says-2025-06-10/[xxxi]https://www.amazon.com/Escalation-Metaphors-Scenarios-Herman-Kahn/dp/1412811627#:~:text=In%20this%20widely%20discussed%20and,closer%20to%20all%2Dout%20war.[xxxii] Kacprzak, I., & Zawadka, G. (2025, September 16). Polska rakieta uderzyła w dom na Lubelszczyźnie. Rzeczpospolita. https://www.rp.pl/wojsko/art43015001-polska-rakieta-uderzyla-w-dom-na-lubelszczyznie[xxxiii] Henley, J. (2022, November 16). Missile that hit Poland likely came from Ukraine defences, say Warsaw and NATO. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/poland-president-missile-strike-probably-ukrainian-stray[xxxiv] Scheffer, J. (2025, September 5). Poland’s Ex-President Duda Exposes How Ukraine Tries to Pull Allies into War. Hungarian Conservative. https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/ukraine-war-andrzej-duda-allies-false-flag-drone-strike/[xxxv] Dean, J. D. (2025, September 23). Poland to China: So, You Want to Play Hybrid War? Hungarian Conservative. https://cepa.org/article/poland-to-china-so-you-want-to-play-hybrid-war/[xxxvi] Jakubowski, A., Komornicki, T., Kowalczyk, K., & Miszczuk, A. (2020). Poland as a hub of the Silk Road Economic Belt: is the narrative of opportunity supported by developments on the ground? Asia Europe Journal, 18, 367–396. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-020-00571-6