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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In the current global disorder, the countries that comprise Latin America are simultaneously emerging as key players in tipping the balance of global power and are courted by major powers seeking influence and access to their natural resources, infrastructure, and services. For a decade, China has been growing in importance in the region, driven by its interest in establishing itself there through the Belt and Road Initiative, loans, investment, and construction, challenging the United States for relevance on the continent as a preferred ally. Currently, another player of the magnitude of India is slowly but surely making inroads in Latin America in trade, financing, and political relations, and is being courted by many Latin American states as an alternative to the risks that staking everything on an alliance with China can entail. Brazil, the undisputed regional leader, maintains privileged relations with both Asian giants, and the three countries cooperate and share interests and forums, such as the BRICS+ and the G20+, where common projects are developed. Introduction: a relationship with historical background The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization led to growing regional competition in Asia, focused on both political influence and economic dominance. One of the most significant developments in the aftermath of these transformations has been the consolidation of China as a regional and, subsequently, global power. In the current context, China, India, and other nations are seeking to expand their alliances and redefine their strategies, including their relationship with Latin America, a region that has experienced multiple phases of engagement with external actors throughout its history. During the 19th and 20th centuries, interaction was centered on Europe and the United States; however, since the 21st century, the dynamics have diversified and taken on a multipolar character. Today, Latin American countries are the object of interest of various powers, from China and Japan to India and Iran. While China's presence in Latin America is evident and significant, India has traditionally maintained a more distant stance, except for Brazil.1 For decades, the limited interaction between India and Latin America was mainly attributed to factors such as geographical remoteness and lack of strategic opportunities. However, this perception has changed since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. In recent years, China has considerably expanded its influence in the region through various mechanisms, while India seeks first to integrate into this dynamic and, in the medium, to compete with China in certain areas. China has established itself as one of Latin America's main trading partners, as well as one of its largest global lenders and investors.2 Its influence does not currently compare with that of India, but rivals that of the United States, the only country that surpasses it in terms of exports and imports in the continent, and the European Union in multiple sectors. In the political and diplomatic sphere, China has made significant progress, such as persuading five Latin American countries - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama - to transfer their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China, although Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay are still doing so. It has also established alliances with countries sanctioned by the US - Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela - which it has supported with loans, military cooperation, and investment. However, in a context of global uncertainty, several Latin American countries are seeking to diversify their strategic alliances and reduce the risks of excessive dependence on a single power. In this scenario, India emerges as a relevant actor, with the potential to balance China's presence in the medium term in key sectors such as trade, infrastructure, supply chains, technology and defence, where India still has ample room for growth in the continent. China in Latin America: economic and strategic expansion China has indisputably been the most influential actor in Latin America between the two Asian powers, especially in the economic sphere, standing out for its participation in infrastructure projects in the Southern Cone as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Since the beginning of the 21st century, its presence in the region has grown rapidly, with Chinese state-owned companies consolidating themselves as key players in strategic sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology, surpassing in some areas even the United States, traditionally dominant in these areas. In addition, China has strengthened its influence through cultural and diplomatic mechanisms. The links between China and Latin America have historical roots dating back to the 16th century, when the Manila Galleon facilitated the exchange of goods such as porcelain, silk and spices between China and the Viceroyalty of New Spain. After the independence of Latin American countries in the 1840s, there was a major Chinese migration, with hundreds of thousands of workers employed on sugar plantations, in mines and as servants in countries such as Cuba and Peru, a phenomenon that persisted throughout the 19th century. Today, Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela are home to the largest Chinese communities on the continent. Initially, most Latin American countries did not recognize Mao's government after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949; however, following US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, most Latin American states established diplomatic relations with Beijing, thus initiating a period of cooperation in the cultural, economic and political spheres. On the economic front, China has established itself as a major player. In 2000, the Chinese market represented less than 2 % of Latin American and Caribbean exports, but its demand, especially for raw materials, has grown exponentially.3 By 2024, China would absorb 17% of these exports, with a value of more than 500 billion dollars.4 The main products exported by the region include soybeans and other vegetables, copper, oil and other raw materials, while imports from China consist mainly of manufactured goods. In countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, China has become the main trading partner.5 The strengthening of economic ties has been formalized through comprehensive strategic partnerships with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. China has also signed free trade agreements with Chile - the first country in the region to do so in 2005 - Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru, while negotiations with Uruguay remain stalled. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, twenty-two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have signed agreements with China, which have facilitated investments and loans amounting to more than USD 9 billion, equivalent to 6 % of China's total investment abroad. These investments, managed through the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank, have largely gone to energy and infrastructure projects, in many cases in exchange for oil. Venezuela has been the main recipient, doubling the amount received by Brazil, the second largest recipient.6 China's impact in Latin America is manifested in infrastructure development and the energy sector. Chinese investments have financed the construction of refineries and processing plants in countries with coal, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium deposits. In the case of copper, China is the main buyer of Chilean production, purchasing more than 40 % of the country's exports. China has also taken a special interest in lithium, with significant investments in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, countries that make up the so-called 'Lithium Triangle' and account for approximately half of global lithium reserves, although the development of these projects has raised environmental concerns.7 At the same time, China has promoted the financing of renewable energies, with outstanding initiatives such as the largest solar plant in Latin America in Jujuy, Argentina, and the Punta Sierra wind farm in Coquimbo, Chile. Since former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's historic thirteen-day tour of Latin America in 2001, high-level political exchanges have intensified. President Xi Jinping has visited the region five times since coming to power in 2013, most recently in November 2024, when he reaffirmed the construction of major projects, including the port of Chancay in Peru.8 China has financed various infrastructure projects in Latin America, including airports, roads, ports and rail networks. Chinese companies control more than a hundred ports around the world, of which at least a dozen are in Latin America and the Caribbean.9 In terms of technology and communications, China has promoted projects in artificial intelligence, smart cities and 5G networks, with the participation of companies such as Huawei. Likewise, cooperation in space has become relevant, with the installation of the largest Chinese space base abroad in Argentine Patagonia and the construction of satellite ground stations in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.10 China has also consolidated its presence in Latin America through soft power strategies, strengthening cultural and educational ties through the Confucius Institute, student scholarships and the expansion of Spanish-language media, such as CGTN and Xinhua. Furthermore, it has reinforced its image as a supportive actor at the international level, which was evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic with the supply of vaccines and medical equipment to governments in the region. In this context, China's influence in Latin America is projected as a long-term phenomenon, with implications that span the economic, political, and cultural spheres, in a scenario in which other powers, such as India, are also seeking a presence in the region. India's arrival and expansion in Latin America Historically, relations between India and Latin America have been limited due to geographical distance, the absence of common strategic interests and the lack of a consolidated bilateral agenda. Latin America occupied a marginal role in India's foreign policy, despite diplomatic visits such as Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's 1961 visit to Mexico and Indira Gandhi's 1968 visit to eight countries in the region. A significant change occurred in the 1990s, when India signed trade agreements with seven Latin American countries and promoted the FOCUS LAC program (1997), designed to strengthen economic relations with the region.The turning point in India's perception of Latin America came in 2014, when the newly appointed prime minister, Narendra Modi, participated in the BRICS Summit in Brazil. The expansion of the India-Mercosur Preferential Trade Agreement, initially signed in 2004, but extended in 2016,11 evidenced India's commitment to strengthening its ties with the region. Bilateral trade between India and Latin America currently stands at USD 43 billion, with Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia as its main trading partners. Like China, India finds in Latin America a key source of mineral resources, such as copper, lithium, and iron ore, essential for its growing industrial demand. An example of this was the strategic partnership agreement signed in 2023 between India's Altmin Private Limited and Bolivia's state-owned lithium company. The region has also become an important partner in the supply of oil: in recent years, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil have accounted for 30 % of crude oil exports to India. In return, India exports products from strategic sectors such as information technology and pharmaceuticals to Latin America. India is also involved in infrastructure development in the region, investing in railways, roads, and energy supply systems.12 In 2022, India's foreign policy gave a new signal of rapprochement with Latin America by bringing the Latin American members of the G20 (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) under the jurisdiction of the foreign minister, rather than a junior minister. In April 2023, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar made a historic visit to Guyana, Panama, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, marking the first time an Indian foreign minister had visited these countries. This tour reflected the growing importance of Latin America on India's diplomatic agenda as the region with the second highest number of projects spearheaded after Asia: India currently has 181 projects in Asia, thirty-two in Latin America and the Caribbean, and three in Central Asia and Oceania. These initiatives have expanded qualitatively in recent years, especially in terms of the size of the credit lines and the complexity of the projects.13 While on 3 August 2023 and on the sidelines of the ninth meeting of the Confederation of India-Latin America and Caribbean Industry in New Delhi, Jaishankar advocated deepening India-Latin America engagements, especially in the areas of agriculture, supply chain diversification and mutual resource sharing partnership. Thus, while China has captured greater political and diplomatic attention in the region, India's presence has raised expectations.14 Unlike China, India is a democracy and faces similar challenges to many Latin American countries, which has facilitated its rapprochement with the region. Its economic growth has sparked interest in Latin America, leading several governments to prioritize relations with India in their foreign policy strategies. Although its expansion in the region responds in part to the intention of countering China's influence, India seeks to consolidate itself as an actor with a vision of strategic autonomy and a stance aligned with non-alignment, promoting relations based on cooperation and the diversification of partners. However, its presence still faces structural limitations, such as the lack of effective regional integration and its limited participation in key Latin American blocs such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).15 At the G20 summit+, held in Rio de Janeiro on 18-19 November, Modi took the opportunity to hold bilateral meetings, apart from with Brazilian President Lula, with some of India's most important partners in the Latin American region, including Argentina and Chile, where a bilateral meeting with President Gabriel Boric marked the expansion of the India-Chile Preferential Trade Agreement, described by Chile as a genuine Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement on a par with those India has signed with the United Arab Emirates, South Korea or Japan, overcoming with Chile New Delhi's reluctance to corroborate these free trade agreements. India is aware that its influence in Latin America is minor compared to that of China, but it also recognizes its growth potential.16 One of its main resources to strengthen its presence in the region is soft power, especially through its cultural projection. Elements such as the Bollywood film industry, gastronomy, and traditional practices such as yoga have gained popularity in Latin America, facilitating the expansion of India's influence in the region and contributing to its positioning as an emerging global partner. Partners in BRICS+: China and India's influence on Brazil Both China and India have a special relationship with the Latin American giant, Brazil, as the three countries share several international forums, most notably BRICS+, of which Argentina - a candidate country and finally accepted as a member at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August 2023 - dropped out in early 2024, after Javier Milei's victory in the presidential elections. Brazil has been a key country in the expansion strategy of China, which has become the main trading partner and one of its main investors, and now of India in Latin America, especially due to the economic size, natural resources and regional leadership capacity of the Brazilian giant.17 All in all, China has a more dominant presence in the Brazilian economy, while India is gaining space in the technology, pharmaceutical and energy trade sectors. If the trend continues, India could strengthen its influence, but it is unlikely to overtake China in the short to medium term. Starting precisely with China, diplomatic relations with Brazil have evolved significantly in recent decades, consolidating into a strategic link in the commercial, investment and technological spheres, except during Jair Bolsonaro's term in office between 2019 and 2023, when even China expressed concern over the hostile statements of the then Brazilian president.18 During the last two years the relationship has been on the right track and even in 2024 the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of official relations was celebrated. In March 2023, Lula visited China with the aim of strengthening trade and political ties between the two nations, which had deteriorated during Bolsonaro's term in office. During the visit, an agreement was announced to trade in yuan instead of dollars, reducing dependence on the US financial system and strengthening Brazil's financial autonomy in the international arena.19 Apart from politics, and although Brazil has never joined the Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral Sino-Brazilian trade has grown steadily since the mid-2000s, dominated by the export of raw materials, especially oil, and attracting important Chinese state-owned companies such as China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec in its acronym) and China National Petroleum Corporation. Subsequently, Chinese investment diversified into strategic sectors such as power generation and distribution, with the presence of conglomerates such as State Grid and China Three Gorges, manufacturing, with the arrival of Chinese companies from various sectors, These include BYD, TCL, Gree, Midea and Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, the mining sector, and the agricultural sector, where Chinese firms such as COFCO and Long-Ping High-Tech have expanded their operations, from product marketing to the manufacture of chemical inputs for agribusiness. In infrastructure, Chinese participation has been significant with projects driven by China Communications Construction Company and China Merchants Port, which in 2018 acquired the Paranaguá Container Terminal. The future seems to point towards increased Chinese investment in new communications infrastructure, energy transition and technology. In 2021, despite Bolsonaro's criticism, Brazilian regulators reversed their decision to ban Huawei from developing the country's 5G networks, which came weeks after China provided Brazil with millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccine20 , while two years later, the two countries announced their participation in joint technological projects such as the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) for monitoring the Amazon.21 India has also had a strong influence on Brazil, at least culturally, since Gandhi's time, as his teachings on non-violence gave rise to social movements and partly shaped the two countries' non-aligned foreign policy. Economically, Brazil is one of India's most important partners in Latin America, being the largest importer (over 41 %) and exporter (over 29 %) to India, with significant investments in sectors such as information technology, energy, mining, and automobiles. Already in 2022, India's exports to Brazil exceeded those of Germany, Australia, South Korea, or Indonesia. Brazil is now among the top ten export destinations from India, spurred by a 295% increase in refined oil sales. India's imports from Brazil increased, driven by purchases of soybean oil. Relations between Brazil and India have never been particularly intense, but under Lula's third presidency this has also changed. In the political sphere, they share strategic objectives, such as the reform of the UN Security Council, where they aspire to obtain a permanent seat, as well as their collaboration in global initiatives, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the aforementioned BRICS+ and the G20+ of emerging economies. In 2020, the 'Brazil-India Defence Dialogue' was established for the first time and agreements were signed to expand technological collaboration in the military field. Brazilian companies such as Taurus have entered into partnerships with Indian companies, such as Jindal, for the joint production of armaments. In addition, Brazil is exploring the export of military technology, including cargo and training aircraft, armored vehicles and submarines, to which China, a traditional supplier of aircraft and equipment to several countries on the continent, including Brazil, responded in January 2025 by offering the Brazilian government the acquisition of the fourth-generation Chengdu-10 fighter.22 Finally, both states wish to diversify their external relations. India, concerned about its geopolitical rivalry with China, seeks a pragmatic balance between close relations with the US and other regional actors, such as in the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD), while maintaining its long-standing ties with Russia. Historically, Brazil has sought to mitigate US influence in South America, something that continues under President Lula's government. However, like other Latin American countries, it is also aware of its economic vulnerability stemming from its high dependence on commodity exports to China and its current dearth of foreign investment. Another forum shared by Brazil, China and India is the G20+. The rotating presidency in 2024 was held by Lula da Silva, who focused the organization’s objectives on three priorities, highlighted in the final declaration: social inclusion and the fight against hunger and poverty; sustainable development, with energy transition and the fight against climate change and, thirdly, the reform of global governance institutions, both from China and India not only ratified the declaration, but even Narendra Modi devoted special attention to Brazil's priorities, echoing New Delhi's common interests in renewable energy, the elimination of poverty and hunger, and focusing on nutrition and food security.23 Xi Jinping, also present at the summit and later on an official visit to Brasilia, expressed his support for President Lula's proposal to create the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, underlining China's commitment to inclusive and equitable development, while signing 37 bilateral agreements between Brazil and China in various fields, such as trade, finance, infrastructure and environmental protection.24 Conclusion: Still unequal competition China and India have adopted different strategies in their relations with Latin America, strategies that have been marked by time in terms of their interest in being present in the continent. While China has established itself as a dominant player in recent times and in terms of investment and project financing in the main Latin American countries, India has awakened in the last decade after a historical lack of interest in this area and is beginning to focus an increasing presence on matters such as technological cooperation and trade in strategic sectors, especially the supply of crude oil. In fact, both China and India have realized that the South American region is a key partner for the supply of raw materials to economies in continuous expansion and, in terms of international politics, the consolidation of new alliances in the so-called global south. India is a potential competitor in several economic niches, and in some of them it is even a major player, such as in information technology, the pharmaceutical sector, where Indian companies have maintained a leading position in exporting products to Latin America, and the automotive industry, where sales are fairly balanced. However, they are the exception that proves the rule, since in general terms, China maintains a substantial advantage in trade and investment figures in Latin America, operating on a completely different scale to India and the result of its interest for much longer. Another difference between the two Asian giants in terms of their influence in Latin America is their involvement in treaties, agreements, and deeper bilateral relations with Latin American countries. Indeed, one of the main challenges for India lies in the lack of a stable institutional framework through which to strengthen its relationship with Latin American countries, unlike China, which has long established trade agreements and strategic initiatives with various countries and regional blocs, starting with the Belt and Road Initiative itself. India has not yet developed comprehensive free trade agreements, cooperation mechanisms similar to China's, or bilateral agreements with supranational groupings such as SICA, CELAC, Mercosur or the Pacific Alliance, which constrains the growth of its trade. On the other hand, India has an advantage over China, such as the prestige of its traditional non-alignment and its historical representativeness of developing countries. In a region like Latin America whose countries recurrent structural obstacles, such as inflation, social and political instability and chronic infrastructure deficits, the geopolitical context and the ideological leanings of the different governments make China's presence, its network of trade agreements and its diversified investment strategy stable... until now, as this may change in the future. Diversifying risks and investments with options such as India represents a positive factor for Latin American countries, as well as a significant challenge for India. The relationship between India, China and Latin America is beneficial for Latin American countries, which are expanding their possibilities for bilateral cooperation on issues such as trade, climate change and security, while increasing competitiveness between the two Asian giants in a scenario that has traditionally been geographically and culturally distant, but which is currently of unquestionable interest to them. So far, China's predominance in the region seems to remain unchanged and it has even overtaken the United States as the main trading partner and source of investment in most South American countries. Competing in this division could take India several years, although the Chinese example itself shows that the arrival of agreements, treaties, cooperation, and investment from India could exponentially increase its influence in the continent in a few years' time. In recent times, Latin America has diversified its economic and diplomatic relations, reducing its dependence on a single strategic partner, be it China or the United States, another major player in this game of competition in the region. Although the decline in the role of the United States is notorious, precisely because of the irruption of the Chinese presence,25 especially in the economy, many countries have continued to move towards greater autonomy and diversification of their international ties, a trend that seems to be consolidating, regardless of the changes in US policy with the beginning of Trump's second term in office in the United States and his policy towards Latin America. Both the desire to diversify relations beyond the China option and the possible US disinterest in the region may benefit India's interests, although it is clear that China will continue to be the dominant actor in the region. References 1 GANGOPADHYAY, Aparajita. "India-China Competitions in Latin America: Some Observations", Global & Strategis, Th. 8, No. 1. January-June, 2014. Available at: http://irgu.unigoa.ac.in/drs/bitstream/handle/unigoa/4110/Jurnal_Global_dan_Strategis_8%281%29_2014_1-13.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 13/3/2025).2 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues?", The Diplomat. 19 May 2022. Available at: India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues? - The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/india-vs-china-in-latin-america-competing-actors-or-in-separate-leagues/ (accessed 13/3/2025)3 DADUSH, Uri. 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Available at: Mercosur-India talks expected to expand preferential trade agreement - MercoPress https://en.mercopress.com/2016/08/15/mercosur-india-talks-expected-to-expand-preferential-trade-agreement (accessed 13/3/2025).12 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Latin America's tryst with the other Asian giant, India", Wilson Center. May 2022. Available in: Microsoft Word - LAP PUB Template.docx (accessed 13/3/2025).13 JAISHANKAR, Subrahmanyam. The Indian way. Strategies for an uncertain world. Harper Collins India, 2020, pp. 107-108.14 "Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement', The Hindu. 3 August 2023. Available at: Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement - The Hindu https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-bats-for-deeper-india-latin-america-engagement/article67153329.ece (accessed 13/3/2025).15 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century," Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief no. 634. April 2023. Available at: Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century https://www.orfonline.org/research/redrawing-india-latin-america-relations-in-the-21st-century (accessed 13/3/2025).16 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America", Observer Research Foundation. 10 December 2024. Available at: The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-g20-turns-new-delhi-s-eyes-on-latin-america (accessed 13/3/2025).17 BLASCO, Emili J. "Brasil: la persistente ambición de un país que se imagina a sí mismo como continente", Middle Powers: Transitando hacia un orden multipolar. IEEE Strategy Notebook, 225. June 2024. Available at: Ch. 5. Strategy Notebook 225.pdf (accessed 13/3/2025).18 SPRING, Jake. "Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil", Reuters. 26 October 2018. Available at: Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil | Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/world/bolsonaros-anti-china-rants-have-beijing-nervous-about-brazil-idUSKCN1MZ0DR/ (accessed 13/3/2025).19 "Brazil and China agreed to trade in each other's currencies to bypass the dollar", Infobae. 30 March 2023. Available in: Brazil and China agreed to trade in their currencies to bypass the dollar - Infobae https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/03/29/brasil-y-china-acordaron-comerciar-en-sus-monedas-para-eludir-el-dolar/ (accessed 13/3/2025).20 RIVERA, Jhonnattan. "Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei", Techbro. 1 March 2021. Available at: Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei - TechBros https://somostechbros.com/2021/03/01/brasil-aprueba-reglas-de-subasta-del-espectro-5g-sin-prohibicion-a-huawei/ (accessed 13/3/2025).21 CARIELLO, Tulio. "50 years of Brazil-China relations: Solid foundations for a sustainable future", Red China & Latin America. 1 September 2024. Available at: 50 años de relaciones Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para un futuro sostenible / 50 anos de relações Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para um futuro sustentável - Red China y América Latina https://chinayamericalatina.com/50-anios-de-relaciones-brasil-china-bases-solidas-para-un-futuro-sostenible/ (accessed 13/3/2025).22 "China offers Brazil the Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap", Galaxia Militar. 9 January 2025. Available in: China offers Brazil Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap. - Galaxia Militar, https://galaxiamilitar.es/china-ofrece-a-brasil-el-chengdu-j-10-para-cubrir-la-brecha-de-aviones-de-combate/ (accessed 13/3/2025).23 "Prime Minister's Remarks at the G20 Session on "Social Inclusion and the Fight Against Hunger and Poverty", Prime Minister's Office. 18 November 2024. Available at: Press Release: Press Information Bureau, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2074413 (accessed 13/3/2025).24 VILELA, Pedro Rafael. "Brazil and China sign 37 bilateral agreements", Agencia Brasil. November 21, 2024. Available at: Brasil y China firman 37 acuerdos bilaterales | Agência Brasil, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/es/politica/noticia/2024-11/brasil-y-china-firman-37-acuerdos-bilaterales (accessed 13/3/2025).25 RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ, María. "Iberoamérica ¿prefiere a mamá China o a papá Estados Unidos?", bie3: Boletín IEEE (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies), 34. April-June, 2024, pp. 542-559. Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/ejemplar?codigo=672227&info=open_link_ejemplar (accessed 13/3/2025).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction  We are only two and a half months into the new Trump administration. However, President Donald Trump's long-threatened tariffs have plunged the country into a trade war abroad. On-again, off-again, new tariffs continue to escalate uncertainty around the world. Trump already launched a trade war during his first term in office, but he has more sweeping tariff plans right now. The second Trump administration has embarked on a new and more aggressive tariff policy, citing various economic and national security concerns. His administration has proposed, imposed, suspended, revoked, and then reimposed various new tariffs. It could be difficult for average citizens to keep up with all the proposals. As of March 19, 2025, there are ten proposed or active tariff initiatives. They range from broad-based tariffs that cover all goods from a certain country (China, Mexico, Canada) to tariffs that cover certain types of goods (aluminum & steel), promises of future tariffs (copper, lumber, automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical), and promised retaliatory tariffs (European wine and other alcoholic beverages). Moreover, although we have seen more tariff announcements in the first two months of the second Trump administration than in the entire first Trump administration, "fair and reciprocal" tariff rollout will overpower the tariffs imposed until today. The ten tariff initiatives that are proposed or in play are as follows in Table 1.   This paper aims to evaluate economic impacts of tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. It first explains the effects of tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration and then forecasts the impacts of the second Trump administration's tariffs.  II. Literature on Tariff Effects A tariff is a type of tax that a government adds to imported goods. Companies importing goods pay the tariff to the government. If any part of a product arrives with a tariff, whether it is an imported avocado or a car built locally with imported steel, its cost is part of the price everyday consumers pay before sales tax.  Economists reject tariffs as an effective tool to improve the welfare of U.S. citizens or strengthen key industries. In a survey conducted during the first Trump administration, 93 % of economic experts did not agree that targeted tariffs on aluminium and steel would improve Americans' welfare. Recent research has strengthened economists' opposition to this policy instrument. Numerous studies demonstrate that American consumers entirely bear the burden of tariffs imposed during the first Trump administration, with disproportionately large impacts on lower-income U.S. households. A framework for analysing the impact of higher import tariffs on the economy is provided by Mundell and Fleming. Mundell (1961) claimed that the country that raised tariffs on imported products may benefit because more people choose domestically produced products over imported ones. Protection from foreign competition could also benefit domestic industries. Large countries can also benefit from improved terms of trade. However, increased tariffs on imported products are assumed to lead to an increase in the current account balance by increasing savings relative to investment. Higher savings dampen aggregate demand. The situation of households deteriorates because of rising consumer prices. Domestic industries are also negatively affected by lower household demand and the need to pay more for imported input products.  Over the years, Mundell and Fleming's model has been developed further by other scholars such as Eichengreen (1981), Krugman (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Eichengreen (2018). Overall, the theoretical literature demonstrates that higher import tariffs could affect the economy through various channels. The impacts of tariffs on the economy differ between a nation imposing the tariffs and nations exporting to the nation raising the tariffs. However, nations that are not subject to the increased import duties are also affected. Main effects of higher tariffs are as follows: Higher inflation: Higher import tariffs lead to higher prices for imported products. Depending on which tariffs are increased, this could lead to higher prices for both consumers and companies. Domestic firms may also raise their prices because of reduced competition from foreign companies (Cavallo et al. (2021)).  Higher consumer prices lead to a decline in real disposable household income, which hampers private consumption. Higher business costs have impacts on companies' profits, which in turn dampen employment and companies' willingness to invest. Companies are also more likely to pass on some of their higher costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. The rise in imported prices might be smaller in large countries, as they are more able to influence the world price of products. Increased consumption of other products: Higher imported prices can lead companies and consumers to increasingly buy cheaper domestic products. But it can also lead to increased imports of products from countries not subject to higher import tariffs.  Domestic industries are protected: Higher import tariffs improve the competitive position of domestic companies. These benefits can lead to increased investment, production, and employment in protected industries. However, the longer-term effect of protecting some domestic industries from foreign competition can be negative, as it might reduce incentives to improve production efficiency, thereby dampening productivity and GDP.  Decreased trade: Increased tariffs usually lead to reduced trade. This can lead to reduced knowledge transfer between nations in the form of less direct investment, reduced technology transfer, and reduced access to skilled labour. These factors in turn can lead to companies moving further away from the technological frontier, thereby hampering productivity (Dornbusch (1992) and Frankel and Romer (1999)).  Stronger exchange rate: When demand changes from foreign to domestic production, the exchange rate tends to rise to balance it out. One reason is that higher inflation often leads to higher interest rates relative to other nations. The nominal exchange rate might appreciate if imports decline significantly and demand for foreign currency drops. An appreciation of the exchange rate hampers exports but keeps imports cheaper.  Global value chains: Higher tariffs can lead to disruptions in global value chains by making imported inputs from abroad pricier. If firms are part of global value chains, higher costs for firms facing higher import costs may also lead to higher costs for domestic firms further down the production chain.  Uncertainty and confidence: Higher import tariffs may increase uncertainty about future trade policy and lead to increased pessimism among households and companies. Such uncertainty may hamper household consumption and business investment (Boer and Rieth (2024)).  III. Tariffs under the first Trump administration The first Trump administration's tariffs involved protectionist trade initiatives against other nations, notably China.  In January 2018, the Trump administration-imposed tariffs on solar panels and washing machines of 30–50%. In March 2018, the administration-imposed tariffs on aluminium (10%) and steel (25%), which are imported from most countries. In June 2018, the Administration expanded these tariffs to include the EU, Mexico, and Canada. The Trump administration separately set and escalated tariffs on products imported from China, leading to a trade war between the U.S. and China.  In their responses, U.S. trading partners imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products. Canada imposed matching retaliatory tariffs on July 1, 2018. China implemented retaliatory tariffs equivalent to the $34 billion tariff imposed on it by the U.S. In June 2019, India imposed retaliatory tariffs on $240 million worth of U.S. products.  However, tariff negotiations in North America were under way and successful, with the U.S. lifting steel and aluminium tariffs on Mexico and Canada on May 20, 2019. Mexico and Canada joined Argentina and Australia, which were the only countries exempted from the tariffs. But on May 30, Trump announced on his own that he would put a 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico starting on June 10, 2019. The tariffs would go up to 10% on July 1, and then by another 5% every month for three months, until illegal immigrants stopped coming through Mexico and into the U.S. Then the tariffs were averted on June 7 after negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico. U.S. tariffs on Chinese products had been applied as follows: On March 22, 2018, Trump signed a memorandum under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to apply tariffs of $50 billion on Chinese products. In response, China announced plans to implement its tariffs on 128 U.S. products. 120 of those products, such as fruit and wine, will be taxed at a 15% duty, while the remaining eight products, including pork, will receive a 25% tariff. China implemented their tariffs on April 2, 2018.  On April 3, 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative's office (the USTR) published an initial list of 1,300+ Chinese products to impose levies upon products like flat-screen televisions, medical devices, aircraft parts and batteries. On April 4, 2018, China's Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council decided to announce a plan to put 25% more tariffs on 106 U.S. goods, such as soybeans and cars.  In the response, On April 5, 2018, President Trump directed the USTR to consider $100 billion in additional tariffs. On May 9, 2018, China cancelled soybean orders exported from the United States to China. On June 15, 2018, President Trump released a list of Chinese products worth $34 billion that would face a 25% tariff, starting on July 6. Another list with $16 billion of Chinese products was released, with an implementation date of August 23.  On July 10, 2018, in reaction to China's retaliatory tariffs that took effect July 6, the USTR issued a proposed list of Chinese products amounting to an annual trade value of about $200 billion that would be subjected to an additional 10% in duties. During the G20 summit in Japan in June 2019, the U.S. and China agreed to resume stalled trade talks, with Trump announcing he would suspend an additional $300 billion in tariffs that had been under consideration. IV. Economic Effects of the Tariffs from the First Trump Administration Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported products and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (producers of domestic substitutes, foreign producers of the goods subject to the tariffs, producers in downstream industries, and consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), the following six outcomes came out at the level of individual firms and consumers as well as at the level of the national economy. 1. Increased costs for U.S. consumers Higher tariff rates lead to price increases for consumers of products subject to the tariffs and for consumers of downstream products as input costs rise. Higher prices in turn lead to decreased consumption, depending on consumers' price sensitivity for a particular product. For example, consider the monthly price of U.S. laundry equipment, which includes washing machines subject to tariff increases as high as 50% since February 2018. The monthly price of this equipment increased by as much as 14% in 2018 compared to the average price level in 2017, before the tariffs took effect (see Figure 1).   Figure 1: U.S. laundry equipment prices According to Jin (2023), many companies passed the costs of the Trump tariffs on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Following impositions of the tariffs on Chinese products, the prices of U.S. intermediate goods rose by 10% to 30%, an amount equivalent to the size of the tariffs. An April 2019 working paper by Flaaen, Hortaçsu, and Tintel not found that the tariffs on washing machines caused the prices of washers to rise by approximately 12% in the United States. A Goldman Sachs analysis by Fitzgerald in May 2019 found that the consumer price index (CPI) for tariffed products had increased dramatically, compared to a declining CPI for all other core goods. According to the Guardian, the Budget Lab at Yale University found that American consumer prices could rise by 1.4% to 5.1% if Trump implemented his comprehensive tariff plan, which would amount to an additional $1,900 to $7,600 per household. 2. Decreased domestic demand for imported goods subject to the tariffs and less competition for U.S. producers of substitute goods: U.S. producers competing with the imported products subject to the tariffs (e.g., domestic aluminium and steel producers) may benefit to the degree they are able to charge higher prices for their domestic products and may expand production because of increased profitability. Since March 2018, U.S. imports of steel and aluminium have faced additional tariff charges of 25% and 10%, making foreign supplies of these products more expensive relative to domestic products. Because of these tariffs, U.S. imports of these goods went down in 2018 and 2019 compared to what they were usually like in 2017 before the tariffs, while U.S. production went up (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). By the first quarter of 2020, real U.S. imports of steel and aluminium (adjusted for price fluctuations) had decreased by more than 30% and 16%, respectively, from their average 2017 levels. The quarterly production of steel and aluminium in the U.S. during this period, however, increased by as much as 13.5% and 9.0%, respectively, above average 2017 levels.   Figure 2: Domestic production and imports: Steel  Figure 3: Domestic production and imports: Aluminium 3. Increased costs for U.S. producers in downstream industries, resulting in a decline in employment U.S. producers that use imported products subject to the additional tariffs as inputs ("downstream" industries, such as auto manufacturers in the case of the aluminium and steel tariffs) might be harmed as their costs of production increase. Higher input costs are more likely to lead to some combination of lower profits for producers, which in turn might dampen demand for these downstream products, leading to some contraction in these sectors.  A study (2019) by Federal Reserve Board economists Flaaen and Pierce, which examined effects on the manufacturing sector from all U.S. tariff actions in 2018, found that higher input costs from the tariffs were associated with higher prices, employment declines, and reductions in output for affected firms. Another study (2020) by Handley, Kamal, and Monarch found that the higher input costs associated with the tariffs might have led to a decrease in U.S. exports for firms reliant on imported intermediate inputs. Handley, Kamal, and Monarch suggested that export growth was approximately 2% lower for products made with products subject to higher U.S. tariffs, relative to unaffected products. Another study (2019) by Federal Reserve Board economists Flaaen and Pierce found that the steel tariffs led to 0.6% fewer jobs in the manufacturing sector than would have happened in the absence of the tariffs; this cut amounted to approximately 75,000 jobs. A study (2024) by Ma and David concluded that the United States lost 245,000 jobs because of the Trump tariffs.  4. Decreased demand for U.S. exports subject to retaliatory tariffs  Retaliatory tariffs place U.S. exporters at a price disadvantage in export markets relative to competitors from other countries, potentially decreasing demand for U.S. exports to those markets. Since Q3 2018, after Section 232 retaliatory tariffs took effect in China, the EU, Russia, and Türkiye, U.S. exports to these trading partners subject to the tariffs declined by as much as 44% below their 2017 average values (Figure 4). U.S. exports to China subject to retaliation during the same period declined even further from their 2017 levels, falling as much as 68% on a quarterly basis. By contrast, during this same period, overall U.S. exports were as much as 10% higher each quarter relative to 2017, suggesting the retaliatory tariffs played a role in the product-specific export declines.  Figure 4: Declines in U.S. exports subject to retaliation A study by Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy, and Khandelwal published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in October 2019 estimated that consumers and firms in the U.S. who buy imports lost $51 billion (0.27% of GDP) because of the 2018 tariffs. This study also found that retaliatory tariffs resulted in a 9.9% decline in U.S. exports. This study also found that workers in counties with a lot of Republicans were hurt the most by the trade war because agricultural products were hit the hardest by retaliatory tariffs.  5. U.S. National Economy In addition to industry- or consumer-level effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect the broader U.S. national economy. Quantitative estimates of the effects vary based on modelling assumptions and techniques, but most studies suggest a negative overall impact on U.S. GDP because of the tariffs.  The Congressional Budget Office (2020) estimated that the increased tariffs in effect as of December 2019 would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5% in 2020, below a baseline without the tariffs, while raising consumer prices by 0.5%, thereby reducing average real household income by $1,277. From a global perspective, the International Monetary Fund estimated that the tariffs would reduce global GDP in 2020 by 0.8%. Dario Caldara et al. (2020) also found that in 2018, investment dropped by 1.5% because of the uncertainty caused by U.S. trade policy. Moreover, a study (2019) by Amiti, Redding, and David published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives found that by December 2018, Trump's tariffs resulted in a reduction in aggregate U.S. real income of $1.4 billion per month in deadweight losses and cost U.S. consumers an additional $3.2 billion per month in added tax. Furthermore, Russ (2019) found that tariffs, which Trump imposed through mid-2019, combined with the policy uncertainty they created, would reduce the 2020 real GDP growth rate by one percentage point.  6. Trade balance  The Trump administration repeatedly raised concerns over the size of the U.S. trade deficit, thereby making trade deficit reduction a stated objective in negotiations for new U.S. trade agreements. Broad-based tariff increases affecting a large share of imports may reduce imports initially, but they are unlikely to reduce the overall trade deficit over the longer period due to at least two indirect impacts that counteract the initial reduction in imports. One indirect effect is a potential change in the value of the U.S. dollar relative to foreign currencies. Another potential effect of U.S. import tariffs is retaliatory tariffs. Economists argue that while tariffs placed on imports from a limited number of trading partners may reduce the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with those specific nations, this is likely to be offset by an increase in the trade deficit or reduction in the trade surplus with other nations, leaving the total U.S. trade deficit largely unchanged.  Figure 5 shows the relative change in the U.S. goods trade deficit with the world as well as the bilateral U.S. deficits with three major partners, China, Mexico, and Vietnam, from 2017 to 2019. Since the U.S. tariffs took effect, the overall U.S. trade deficit has increased, rising 8% from 2017 to 2019. However, the U.S. trade deficit in goods with China declined by 8% from 2017 to 2019, while the U.S. trade deficit in goods with Vietnam and Mexico significantly increased by more than 40% during the same period.  Figure 5: Changes in the U.S. goods trade deficits with China, Mexico, and Vietnam According to Zarroli (2019), between the time Trump took office in 2017 and March 2019, the U.S. trade deficit increased by $119 billion, reaching $621 billion, the highest it had been since 2008. American Farm Bureau Federation data showed that agriculture exports from the U.S. to China decreased from $19.5 billion in 2017 to $9.1 billion in 2018, a 53% reduction.  V. What are the Potential Consequences of Trump's Tariff Plan? Last year, the Peterson Institute for International Economics examined the impact of President Trump's proposed tariffs based on his campaign promises, which would impose 10 % additional tariffs on US imports from all sources and 60 % additional tariffs on imports from China. The major outcomes were lower national income, lower employment, and higher inflation. McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024) at the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that both of Trump's tariff plans—imposing 10% additional tariffs on U.S. imports from all sources and 60% additional tariffs on imports from China—would reduce both U.S. real GDP and employment by 2028. But the former proposal damages the U.S. economy more than the latter. If other nations retaliate with higher tariffs on their imports from the U.S., the damage intensifies.  Assuming other governments respond in kind, Trump's 10 % increase results in U.S. real GDP that is 0.9 % lower than otherwise by 2026, and U.S. inflation rises 1.3 % above the baseline in 2025.  The 10 % added tariffs hurt the economies of Canada, Mexico, China, Germany, and Japan—all major US trading partners that see a lower GDP relative to their baselines through 2040. Mexico and Canada take much larger GDP hits than the U.S. The 60 % added tariffs on imports from China reduce its GDP relative to its baseline, much more than that of other U.S. trading partners. Mexico, however, sees a higher GDP than otherwise as some production shifts to Mexico from China. This paper focuses on Trump's universal 10 % tariffs rather than 60 % tariffs on imports from China because extreme 60 % tariffs on Chinese imports are not expected. McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024) assume the 10 % tariff increase is implemented in 2025 and remains in place through the forecast period. They also consider a second scenario in which U.S. trading partners retaliate with equivalent tariff increases on products they import from the U.S.  Figures 6–11 show the results for the uniform additional 10 % increase in the tariff on imports of goods and services from all trading partners.   Figure 6: Projected change in real GDP of selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) When tariffs go up by 10%, the U.S. real GDP goes down by 0.36 % by 2026, and it goes down even more in Mexico and Canada by 2027 (see Figure 6). Chinese GDP drops by 0.25 % below the baseline in 2025. After the initial demand-induced slowdown, U.S. GDP recovers as production shifts from foreign suppliers to U.S. suppliers, leading to a slightly lower long-term GDP of 0.1 % below baseline by 2030 in the U.S.   Figure 7: Projected change in employment (hours worked) in selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) The results for aggregate employment are like the GDP outcomes (see figure 7). Employment drops in the United States by 0.6 % by 2026 but recovers due to a supply relocation towards U.S. suppliers. U.S. employment returns to baseline eventually because real wages decline permanently to bring employment back to baseline by assumption.  Figure 8: Projected change in inflation in selected economies from an additional 10% increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) The imposition of higher tariffs increases prices of both consumer and intermediate goods, contributing to a rise in inflation of 0.6 % above baseline in 2025 (see figure 8).  The higher tariff is inflationary everywhere except in China due to the tightening of Chinese monetary policy to resist change in the exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar.   Figure 9: Projected change in the trade balance in selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024)) Figure 9 shows the change in the trade balance as a share of GDP. In theory, the trade balance can worsen or improve due to changes in exports and imports. From 2025 to 2028, the U.S. trade deficit narrows slightly but then widens as capital flows into the U.S. economy, appreciating the U.S. real effective exchange rate. By 2030, the U.S. trade deficit will worsen by 0.1 % of GDP due to capital moving from Mexico and Canada into the U.S. Government savings rise due to additional tariff revenues.  VI. Conclusion  This paper showed that tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration had negative impacts on the U.S. economy, particularly inflation, incomes, and employment. It also demonstrated that tariffs which will be imposed by the second Trump administration are expected to have negative effects on the U.S. economy. Then a question arises: "Why does Trump attempt to impose tariffs on products from abroad?" Today, more people mention tariffs as tools to protect U.S. companies and farmers. They are discussed as a tool for bringing back manufacturing businesses into the U.S. as well as a bargaining tactic in negotiations over the flow of fentanyl and immigration. Trump has used and promised to increase tariffs for three purposes: to raise revenue, to bring trade into balance, and to bring rival countries to heel. It is unclear whether Trump will achieve his goals. However, President Donald Trump believes that tariffs are a panacea. Trump believes that his tariffs would bring hundreds of billions—trillions— into the US Treasury. Moreover, Trump is confident that he can force countries to give up something he believes is in America's best interest. For example, his tariffs on Canada and Mexico have led Mexico and Canada to agree to expand their border patrols. Reference  Amiti Mary, Redding Stephen, David E, “The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare,” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 33 (Fall 2019): 187–210. Boer, L. and M. 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(1981), “A Dynamic Model of Tariffs and Employment under Flexible Exchange Rates,” Journal of International Economics 11:341-359.  Eichengreen, B. (2018), “Trade Policy and the Macroeconomy,” Keynote address Mun dell-Fleming Lecture, International Monetary Fund, 13 March 2018.  Fajgelbaum, P.D., P.K. Goldberg, P.J. Kennedy and A.K. Khandelwal (2019), “The Return to Protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(1): 1-55.  Fitzgerald, Maggie, “This Chart from the Goldman Sachs Shows Tariffs are Rasing Prices for Consumers and It could Get Worse.” CNBC. May 13, 2019. Flaaen, A. and J.R. Pierce (2019), “Disentangling the effects of the 2018-2019 tariffs on globally connected U.S. Manufacturing sector,” Working Paper, Finance Economic Discussion Series 2019-086, Board of Governors Federal Reserve System, Washington DC.  Flaaen, A., A. Hortacsu and F. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском First months of the 2025 year were uneasy for Canada, it started with waves of changes. The era of Justin Trudeau, who was the leader of the country for 10 years from 2015 to 2025, and the beginning of the new presidential term of Donald Trump made things different for Canada and added uncertainty. On the ninth of march the new leader of the Liberal Party has been chosen, Mark Carney became the new prime minister of Canada. It remains unclear how long he will stay in his position, because Canada is standing on the threshold of federal elections. The end of era Like any leader, Justin Trudeau had certain achievements but also enough failures that affected the decline in his popularity among the population, lack of trust from fellow party members and opposition parties, which in the best years were even ready to collaborate with him together. In 2022 the New Democratic Party (NDP) and Liberal Party make an agreement to build trust and solidify a position on significant socio-economic issues. However, by the end of autumn 2024 the leader of the New democratic party Jagmeet Singh said that Justin Trudeau was not coping with the tasks facing the country and announced the NDP withdrawal from the agreement. This statement had a negative impact on the rating of the Liberal Party while they were passing decisions through Parliament. In the end of December Jagmeet Singh asked Justin Trudeau to resign and state that he is ready to support a vote of no confidence in the government, which the Conservative Party has been systematically calling for by that time. In the end of December of 2024 suddenly minister of finance and deputy prime minister of Canada Chrystia Freeland unexpectedly announced her resignation. This action raised a wave of negative sentiments around Justin Trudeau. The greatest criticism of the Prime Minister was caused by the failed migration policy, shortage of housing stock coupled with the sharp increase in housing prices, high inflation, and unemployment and the introduction of unpopular carbon tax. As a result of severe pressure of fellow party members and leaders of opposition parties Justin Trudeau was forced to announce the resignation on 6th of January, from the moment when a successor will be found within the liberal party. At the same time, he noted that if he must wage and internal party struggle, he does not consider himself as a suitable candidate for the role of a leader for the party during the next elections.  Beginning of New Uncertainty The era of political uncertainty in Canada worsened when Donald Trump repeatedly “attacked” the country’s sovereignty by verbally proposing Canada to become the 51st state of the United States. He also threatened to impose a 25% tariff on Canadian products, although he canceled this decision several times. On December 1st, Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing a 25% tariff on products coming from Canada and a 10% tariff on energy from Canada. The U.S. stated that this was a measure to combat emerging threats due to high levels of migration and fentanyl trafficking across the U.S.-Canada border. In response, Canada threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs on critically important minerals and fossil, electricity supplies, energy resources, and other products. Justin Trudeau, who was in the final days of his term, achieved some success during negotiations on February 3rd between Canadian and American leaders. As a result, Donald Trump agreed to postpone the imposition of tariffs on Canadian products for 30 days. This decision followed Canada’s promise to strengthen border security measures and invest an additional $1 million into those efforts. The tariffs were imposed on March 4th, and Justin Trudeau responded with retaliatory measures targeting U.S. products. However, on March 5th, Donald Trump canceled the tariffs on the automobile industry, and on March 6th, after a phone call with the leaders of Mexico and Canada, he signed an executive order temporarily suspending tariffs on Canadian and Mexican products that comply with the terms of the USMCA (United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement). If the tariffs were imposed in full, they would have had a negative impact on the Canadian economy. Supply chain channels would suffer, leading to an increase in the prices of various goods traded between Canada and the U.S. Additionally, the tariffs would reduce the competitiveness of Canadian products in the U.S. market. The most harmful consequences would be felt by sectors and products highly dependent on the American market. Trust credit The topics related to tariffs and bilateral agreements with the USA during the last two months became the main subject of discussion in Canada and in the main election campaign for the leader of the Liberal Party. On the 9th of March, the successor of Justin Trudeau was selected. It was Mark Carney, who received 85.9% of the votes. During the final stage, there were four candidates for the position of leader of the Liberal Party. The second after Mark was the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Chrystia Freeland. She did not get many votes, receiving only 8% of the votes from the electorate. The other two candidates — Karina Gould, the leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and Frank Baylis, who was a member of Parliament, received 3.2% and 3%, respectively. The main topics of Mark Carney’s internal party campaign were the economic development of Canada, climate change, and a green incentive program. He proposed a carbon tax from consumers to large companies, removing trade barriers between Canadian provinces and territories, increasing the pace of housing construction and investments in this sphere while cutting the government budget. The success of Mark Carney can be attributed to a few reasons. He is the only candidate who did not hold any official position in Justin Trudeau’s Cabinet and did not have a position in Parliament. So, he represents some distance from the course of the prime minister, which Canadians did not like during the post-pandemic times. Canadians associate Mark Carney with new opportunities and changes for Canada. He is not a person from politics; he is related to the economy and business sector. Among his numerous roles, he was the Governor of the Bank of Canada during the 2008 crisis, when Canada avoided the worst impacts due to good financial and banking policies. In 2013, he was appointed as Governor of the Bank of England. He handled the economic processes during Brexit and the following economic and political crises. This experience casts Mark Carney in a positive light for voters and provides him with trust during tough times in the country, marked by unfriendly statements and actions from the closest partner — the US. Carney himself highlights his success in crisis management and believes that he would be able to negotiate with Trump, even though he agrees that the 25% tariff and policy that Trump has stated are a serious challenge in modern Canadian history. In his victory speech after being elected as the leader of the Liberal Party, he highlighted that: "The United States of America are not Canada. Canada will never become a part of the US in any form, in any way." All other political elites are in solidarity with him. Carney states that Canada must fight Trump’s tariffs using retaliatory measures in the form of "dollar for dollar." The main goal is the diversification of trade agreements in the medium term. Both goals are important. For now, Canadian analysts are concerned that Trump’s tariffs in the short term may cause a recession in the Canadian economy. It is important to remember that Donald Trump is a businessman, and in political discussions, he has often said that he is ready for deals. Maybe Carney, with his experience in the economy and finance, will find a way to make such a deal — if he has time. What is next? For how long Mark Carney will stay in the prime minister position is hard to predict now. According to the schedule, another federal election in Canada should take place no later than October 2025, however, the Canada Elections Act provides the opportunity for long-term elections. There is a high probability that Mark Carney will use his popularity and announce voting in the next few weeks. According to the law, the pre-election period must last from 37 to 51 days. The main opposition for Carney will be the leader of the Conservative Party, Pierre Poilievre. For the last 1.5 years, the rating of the Conservative Party has been significantly higher than the rating of the Liberal Party. According to the data, the popularity rate of the Conservative Party on January 6th was equal to 44.2%, and the Liberal Party had 20.1%. However, the rating of the Liberals started to grow after Justin Trudeau announced his resignation. According to the data on March 5th, the rating of the Conservative Party was equal to 40.3%, and the Liberal Party had 30.8%. Pierre Poilievre, with his views, is close to the ideas of right-wing populism. He is a supporter of the Freedom Convoy — the protest movement that spread across Canada in early 2022. People often say that his positions and approaches are similar to those of Donald Trump. Even though the pre-election campaign has not officially started yet, Pierre Poilievre unofficially began his campaign in January.  After Justin Trudeau announced his impending resignation, Pierre Poilievre changed his political slogan “Axe the Tax” (which referred to the unpopular carbon tax) to “Canada First,” which is similar to Trump’s slogan “America First.” Poilievre promises that he will remove trade barriers for provinces, tighten punishments for fentanyl dealers, strengthen border security, construct a base in the Arctic, the construction of which will be financed by cutting foreign aid. Border security, fentanyl contraband, and low defense costs in Canada are the main complaints of Donald Trump. Mark Carney, talking about his opponent Pierre Poilievre, said: “Donald Trump is trying to weaken our economy, but there is also another person who is doing the same. And this person is Pierre Poilievre. Pierre Poilievre’s plan will leave us divided and ready for conquest because he is a person who worships Trump, and he will stay on his knees in front of Trump, not oppose him.” The election on March 9th for the leader of the Liberal Party is not the final stage of the political situation in Canada. It remains to be seen who will become the new prime minister for the next four years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A series of rapid domestic political changes in Lebanon has disrupted the established balance of power, creating a foundation for a reassessment of the positions of key players. Amid a pause in regional escalation, the debate on the decline of Hezbollah’s influence — long the dominant military and political force in the country, has become a topic in numerous publications. However, there is no consensus on the group's future: some experts predict its complete disappearance, while others, on the contrary, believe that the current conditions will serve as a catalyst for its restructuring. A sober view of what Hezbollah represents today seems more important than ever. Since the election of Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon and the subsequent appointment of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister, Lebanese politics has continued to undergo changes that are shaping its new landscape. The intensification of diplomatic contacts, escalating tensions in the border region, and unexpected administrative decisions — all these factors reflect the search for a renewed equilibrium that aligns with contemporary realities. Weakened by war and political shifts, Hezbollah finds itself at the center of these transformational processes. Hezbollah's Pyrrhic Victory With the end of active military operations in November 2024, the question arose regarding the extent of the damage suffered by the Shiite group. Despite all the statements by the organization's Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, about a "great victory" over the Zionist enemy, the pathos of his rhetoric is significantly devalued when confronted with the stark reality. In fact, the transition of Hezbollah’s current leader to this position from his long-held role as Deputy Secretary-General — a position he occupied for over 30 years under Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah — is directly linked to a key consequence of the war: significant losses within the organization’s ranks. One of the most devastating blows to the group was the physical elimination of the majority of its leadership. Since Hezbollah’s involvement in supporting Hamas's "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation, key figures within the organization have been consistently targeted and killed. Among them were prominent Radwan Unit commander Wissam Tawil, the heads of the Nasr and Aziz special units Talib Abdallah and Mohammed Nasser, as well as the overseer of Hezbollah’s rocket program and chief military advisor to the Secretary-General, Fuad Shukr. Additionally, Ibrahim Aqil, a member of the Jihad Council, Hezbollah’s main military body, was also eliminated. The most shocking event, however, was the death of Hezbollah's longtime leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, following an Israeli strike on Dahiyeh, the southern suburb of Beirut. The attack also claimed the lives of another Jihad Council member, Ali Karaki, and General Abbas Nilforoushan, a commander of Iran’s Quds Force. Hezbollah supporters would likely have reacted with even greater dismay to the elimination of Hashem Safi al-Din, the head of the group's Executive Council [1]. This is because the Shura Council, Hezbollah's main administrative body, is required to elect two Secretary-Generals every three years — one acting and the other "reserve". This procedure was established in the 1990s after the assassination of Hezbollah’s second leader, Abbas Musawi, to prevent internal discord and confusion in the event of a sudden elimination of the Secretary-General. Hashem Safi al-Din was precisely such a designated successor, yet due to his untimely death, he never had the opportunity to enact this contingency mechanism. The losses suffered by the Shiite group, of course, were not limited to its senior command. Before the launch of Israel’s Operation Northern Arrows, the number of Hezbollah casualties among rank-and-file members was estimated at around 400–500 fighters. However, by the end of the Third Lebanon War, Arab and Israeli sources reported that this number had risen to 3,000–4,000, accounting for approximately 6–8% of the organization's 50,000-strong force (as estimated by the U.S. Congress). This figure does not even include a significant number of non-fatal combat casualties — those wounded and rendered incapable of further service. It is also important to note that the number of casualties continues to rise even after the ceasefire agreement came into effect, as Israel’s interpretation of the agreement grants it "full military freedom of action" against Hezbollah. The Israeli military continues to carry out air and missile strikes on any targets suspected of harboring Hezbollah members or being linked to the group. By the end of December 2024, the number of ceasefire violations had already exceeded 300 cases. The "Blue Helmets" (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL) peacekeeping mission in Lebanon has expressed concern over Israel’s actions. Another crucial aspect of Hezbollah’s post-war situation is the state of its missile arsenal, which posed the primary threat to Israel. As of March 2024, the group was estimated to possess between 100,000 and 200,000 missiles, the majority of which were short-range rockets. According to U.S. and Israeli assessments, Hezbollah’s remaining arsenal now constitutes between 20% and 50% of its pre-war stockpile. However, independent analysts tend to agree only with the upper limit of this estimate. Thus, it becomes almost indisputable that the events of the Third Lebanon War have dealt a significant blow to Hezbollah. The hopes of its supporters for a swift and miraculous recovery are unlikely to materialize. Given the deteriorating geopolitical environment and growing internal pressure on Hezbollah within Lebanon, it remains unclear where the organization will find the resources for its restoration. At the same time, it would be premature to write off the Shiite group entirely. Even Israeli media acknowledge this, publishing bold headlines stating that Hezbollah has not been defeated. The most valuable asset of any political organization is its people, and in this regard, Hezbollah still holds strong advantages. Among objective Lebanese analysts, there is a consensus that support for Hezbollah within the Shiite community remains consistently high. Some even argue that its position has strengthened. Faced with widespread dissatisfaction with the group outside its sectarian base and increasing external pressure on Lebanon, Shiites fear becoming scapegoats. The fear of collective punishment is pushing them to rally around their traditional leadership, as they recognize that they are all in the same boat. Today, the ball is in Hezbollah’s court. The group must act with the utmost responsibility and precision to justify the trust of its supporters. A key focus of this strategy will be its cooperation with the new government, where Hezbollah and its allies, notably, still hold a significant position. The New Cabinet: Remembering Siniora or Bring Back My 2005 On Saturday, February 8, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced the completion of the formation of a new national government, calling it a "government of reform and salvation". The process took 26 days, which, for the country's political history in the 21st century, is almost a record. The only time a cabinet was formed faster was in 2005, when Prime Minister Fouad Siniora assembled his government in 19 days amid nationwide mobilization following the Cedar Revolution [2]. This rapid pace is, in fact, a testament to the critical state of Lebanon, whose governmental and bureaucratic system only begins to "wheeze into action" when it is just steps away from plunging into the abyss. The cabinet has been deliberately composed of 24 figures who are formally unaffiliated with political parties [3] and do not intend to participate in future elections. According to the prime minister's vision, this approach is meant to reduce political friction within the government and ensure its effective functioning. Instead of engaging in Lebanon’s traditional positional party politics, ministers are expected to focus solely on their respective portfolios. However, the consultation process between the prime minister and political forces somewhat dilutes the effectiveness of this strategy. Powerful parties still have a significant influence over appointments due to the requirement for parliamentary approval of the cabinet. Nevertheless, the composition of the new government has been strongly influenced by the personal vision of reform-minded President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam — an unusual situation for Lebanon. Ten ministerial candidates were directly nominated by this top-level tandem, while another twelve were backed by political forces [4]. Despite widespread predictions of doom, the Hezbollah-Amal duo — often referred to as the "Shiite duo" — secured four trusted representatives in the government, two from each organization. Another Shiite quota, assigned to the Minister of State for Administrative Development, became a compromise between the Prime Minister and Speaker Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal. However, in the final assessment, this was still framed as a "non-partisan" appointment made on behalf of the head of government. Thus, the configuration of Shiite ministers in the new cabinet clearly demonstrated the practical inevitability of Hezbollah and Amal’s continued influence. The political weight of the "Shiite duo" simply did not allow the Prime Minister to significantly limit their representation in the highest executive body, even though it seems that Nawaf Salam himself is at least somewhat interested in weakening Hezbollah and Amal’s positions. Furthermore, Amal managed to retain its long-standing monopoly over the Ministry of Finance, which was given to former MP Yassine Jaber, a member of the movement. This appointment was preceded by intense speculation, as the Finance Minister holds the second most powerful position in government after the Prime Minister. Any governmental decision that requires budgetary allocations must be signed off by the Finance Minister, meaning that the lack of approval could effectively block any government initiative. Although Jaber was quick to assure that he would not abuse his position, it is clear that President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, who are oriented toward the West and the Gulf monarchies, are unlikely to be pleased that a key tool for obstructing government operations remains in the hands of figures close to pro-Iranian Hezbollah. At the same time, it appears that in exchange for this “veto” power, another mechanism of obstruction for the Shiite duo has been neutralized — the current cabinet includes a Shiite minister who is not directly dependent on the will of Hezbollah and Amal. This means that if the four representatives of the duo decide to withdraw from the government in an attempt to delegitimize it, the Minister of State for Administrative Development, Fadi Makki, will remain in office. As a result, the argument about the lack of Shiite representation — and therefore the alleged illegitimacy of the cabinet — would become irrelevant. This move by the country’s leadership was not merely a symbolic concession — it is rooted in historical precedents. During the tenure of Fouad Siniora’s government (2005–2009), Hezbollah and Amal effectively withdrew [5] all five Shiite ministers from the cabinet, arguing that the government had become unrepresentative due to the absence of Shiite figures. At that time, Hezbollah and its allies demanded the formation of a national unity government in which the opposition — meaning themselves — would hold a so-called "blocking third". Government decisions in Lebanon require a two-thirds majority, meaning that a political force controlling at least one-third of the cabinet plus one minister has the power to veto decisions and, if necessary, bring down the government. The crisis peaked in 2008, leading to violent clashes between Hezbollah and pro-government forces, which resulted in over 100 casualties. The conflict was eventually resolved, but it remains a cautionary precedent in Lebanese politics. Since then, and until the formation of the current cabinet, every Lebanese government has had one political alliance that held the coveted "blocking third", effectively giving it the ability to stall the cabinet's work. This dynamic is precisely why Lebanon has experienced four governmental crises since 2009. Against this backdrop, Nawaf Salam’s decision to eliminate this risk in the new cabinet appears prudent, as it significantly reduces the chances of yet another executive power collapse. Meanwhile, the Minister of Finance remains a trump card in the hands of Nabih Berri, a highly skilled political tactician. It will only be played if the stakes become too high and the current political arrangement starts leading toward defeat. The Shiite duo is not in a position to oppose the government without cause, but it still has the leverage to defend its core interests when necessary. At the same time, the Shiite duo’s main domestic political opponents — the Lebanese Forces (LF) and Kataeb Party — secured a total of five ministerial portfolios. Additionally, two seats in the government went to candidates from the traditionally Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which has a long history of political maneuvering in pursuit of the best outcome for its community. Its de facto leader, Walid Jumblatt, has alternated between criticizing Hezbollah and aligning with it, depending on the political climate. Another ministerial position was assigned to Noura Bayrakdarian, a representative of the Lebanese branch of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) "Dashnaktsutyun". The Dashnaks have long been junior partners in the March 8 Alliance [6] and have maintained close ties with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Notably, for the first time in two decades, the FPM failed to secure a single cabinet appointment — a situation last seen during Fouad Siniora’s government. A particularly symbolic shift occurred with the Ministry of Energy, a traditional stronghold of the FPM, which was handed over to the Lebanese Forces (LF). The decoupling of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) from Hezbollah, which we previously discussed, largely predetermined the Shiite bloc’s isolation in the new government — this is the first time they are in the cabinet without a strong Christian ally (the Marada Movement has also been left "overboard"). Following the cabinet’s approval, FPM leader Gebran Bassil expressed willingness to work constructively in opposition, yet at the same time, he voiced serious dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister’s actions. According to Bassil, Nawaf Salam granted greater influence over the cabinet’s composition to Shiite and Druze forces, at the expense of Christian and Sunni interests. His discontent over FPM’s exclusion from the government was further evident during the parliamentary confidence vote. During the session, Gebran Bassil accused the Prime Minister of reneging on commitments made during consultations over his appointment. As a result, the FPM faction refused to support a vote of confidence in Nawaf Salam’s government, stating that the Prime Minister "did not deserve it". However, the parliamentary confidence vote left Gebran Bassil and his Strong Lebanon bloc in the minority. The ministerial statement delivered by the Prime Minister focused on the same priorities outlined in President Joseph Aoun’s inaugural speech: restoring the rule of law and sovereignty, reforming institutions, and committing to the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. The declaration contained at least two clear warning signals directed at Hezbollah. Nawaf Salam reaffirmed the government’s stance that only the state should have the authority to decide on matters of war and peace and hold a monopoly on the use of weapons. Regarding judicial independence, the declaration stressed the urgent need to shield the judiciary from interference and pressure, particularly in relation to the investigation of the Beirut port explosion. This was an explicit reference to the fact that the "Shiite duo" has been obstructing the work of Judge Tarek Bitar, who, in the course of his investigation, attempted to summon high-ranking members of the Amal Movement for questioning. In his speech, Mohammed Raad, the leader of Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, while offering a few policy recommendations, refrained from harsh criticism of the government and expressed the faction’s trust in it. Other MPs' speeches reflected cautious optimism toward the government's agenda, frequently emphasizing that their support was conditional and could only be justified by concrete steps toward promised reforms. Common ground for the speeches were calls to resolve the problems of depositors and the entire banking sector, to conduct electoral reform and future elections on time, and to economically revitalize depressed areas. The two most popular appeals turned out to be issues that opposing forces usually raise on their banners - the need to put an end to the Israeli occupation and to hand over all weapons to the state. Ultimately, 95 MPs voted to vote in confidence in the cabinet, 12 voted against it and 4 abstained from voting. Overall, the new Lebanese government appears to be, at the very least, an extremely interesting and therefore promising structure. Attention is drawn both to the stylistic aspects – the high representation of women and people with an academic background – and to the formal ones – the absence of a blocking third and the large number of ministers appointed by a tandem of senior officials. All this creates the impression of a very balanced and well-composed cabinet, which is likely to be largely capable of coping with the ambitious tasks of restructuring the country. At the same time, the cabinet in its current form will exist only until the parliamentary elections in May 2026, when the updated balance of power will be established. In this regard, the little over a year that the cabinet has seems to be a period that is insufficient to achieve all the goals set, but suitable for starting the flywheel of change. And despite the fact that Hezbollah and the new Lebanese leadership, represented by the president and prime minister, do not find understanding on all issues, there is something that unites them - to put it mildly, a cool attitude towards Israel. However, on this front, as it turns out, everything is not going as smoothly as we would like. Retreating "Israeli-Style": The IDF Bids Farewell, But Doesn’t Quite Leave… The ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel officially expired on February 18, by which time the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were expected to fully withdraw from Lebanese territory. However, few anticipated that the process would proceed without surprises, given reports of Israel’s interest in extending the agreement once again. Indeed, just one day before the deadline, Israeli military officials announced that, as a temporary measure, the army would maintain its presence on five strategic heights. The United States, as the leading party in the ceasefire monitoring committee established by the agreement, was quick to support this move. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s entire political leadership — including the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament — continues to insist on the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. Israel's strategy in the Lebanese direction remains in the logic of tough and uncompromising suppression of security threats. In reality, the "delay" of Israeli troops and the continuation of strikes devalue the entire meaning of the established agreements, giving one of the parties a "legal" opportunity to violate them. In turn, in response, the Israelis insist that Hezbollah is violating its obligations to care for the Litani River. Some experts suggest that the five strongholds in southern Lebanon will become objects of long-term occupation. Control over the hilly terrain along the perimeter of the Israeli border deep in Lebanese territory should obviously create a certain buffer zone, which in theory will secure the borders of the Jewish state. However, if the IDF does not plan to linger on Lebanese soil, it is not very clear until what point its military presence is necessary. In accordance with the agreements, this territory is taken under control by units of the Lebanese Armed Forces, which do not pose any threat to Israel. Moreover, the sincerity of statements about the temporary nature of such measures also calls into question the fact that the land component of the cross-border tensions between Hezbollah and Israel has never been the main cause for concern. The main threat has always come from the missile potential of the Shiite group. In his recent statement, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem predictably demanded a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory after October 18 and called on the government to pursue this without compromise. At the same time, he did not disclose what specific actions would be otherwise, but noted that “everyone knows how to deal with occupation.” The restrained tone of his remarks (albeit against the backdrop of the usual anti-Israeli rhetoric) and the lack of any particular threats in the words of the organization’s leader in the language of Hezbollah can be considered cautious statements. Without a doubt, the group at this stage does not have the resources to actively oppose Israel: deliberately going into confrontation today is the same as throwing a slingshot at a tank. Moreover, escalation puts at risk the predominantly Shiite population of southern Lebanon, which is a key component of the organization’s supporters and has already become refugees. The Waning Influence of Hezbollah In addition to the challenges of de-occupation of Lebanese territory, both domestic and foreign policy developments in recent months have been marked by other significant events. All of them point to a certain reconfiguration of Lebanon’s political landscape — one that, more often than not, appears to be unfavorable for Hezbollah. The expected shift is taking place in the system of foreign relations - preconditions for strengthening American-Saudi influence are emerging, namely, the name of the recently elected president of the country was associated with the protection of Washington and Riyadh. Thus, it is this alliance (but, above all, the Saudis) that has for many years acted as a counterweight to Iranian influence on Lebanon, the main conductor of which is Hezbollah. In January, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, visited Beirut for the first time in 15 years. He expressed support for the president and the prime minister in their course for reform. A few weeks later, the example of her Saudi colleague was followed by the deputy special representative of the US president for the Middle East, Morgan Orgatus. However, her visit caused much more noise: from indignation over a ring in the form of the Star of David at a meeting with the Lebanese president to an audience with an ally of Hezbollah, the speaker Nabih Berri, who during the conversation called Israel "absolute evil". It is curious that the American envoy's visit took place on the eve of the announcement of the cabinet composition. In this regard, her statements that «Hezbollah should not be part of this government in any form» did not go unnoticed, especially after the list of ministers was made public. Another big event was the announcement that Lebanon had a “future” again. Saad Hariri, the longtime leader of the Mustaqbal (Arabic for “future”) movement and former prime minister, announced his return to politics after a three-year hiatus on the twentieth anniversary of the assassination of his father, also Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Before the 2022 parliamentary elections, he announced that he would not participate in them and effectively dissolved his movement. This step left the Sunni forces fragmented (and therefore weak), and the Sunni part of Lebanese politics was left without a clear leader at the helm. This happened because Mustaqbal had long dominated this segment of society, and now Saad Hariri found the best opportunity to make a political comeback. His return to politics can also be seen as an additional factor in the growth of Saudi influence, since he himself is a native of Riyadh and a subject of the kingdom. His ties to the Al Saud family, which go back to his father, have never been a secret, but after the incident in 2017 [7], the relationship has been going through hard times. He also has certain connections to the Emirati elite, in particular to Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Finally, the most important news of recent weeks is the government-initiated ban on Iranian civilian aircraft landing in Lebanon, and in particular at Beirut's Rafik Hariri International Airport. After one of the Iranian airliners was denied landing, Hezbollah supporters began protests and blocked the road to the only international airport in the country. The government's extension of this measure, first until February 18, and now indefinitely, is due to information published by the IDF that Iran is sending funds to Hezbollah via aircraft. In his statement following the events, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem did not vigorously attack the country's leadership, noting that the decision was made under the threat of an Israeli «strike on the runway» if the Iranian plane landed. At the same time, he criticized the government's position, which assumes compliance with Israeli orders. This development once again demonstrates the waning power of Hezbollah and reveals how tense the situation is in Lebanon. *** The recent public funeral of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, as a symbol of the end of an era, involuntarily becomes the leitmotif of complex internal Lebanese processes. The flight of Israeli fighters over the funeral procession of many thousands and the absence of the president and prime minister, despite the invitation, make comments unnecessary. At present, in the words of the funeral speech of Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem, the time has come for “state responsibility” — Hezbollah is deliberately giving way to the proscenium (but not leaving), realizing the sensitivity of the moment and its own difficulties. And although today it seems that the new reality has already been formed, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this transition is still far from complete. Most likely, a somewhat predictable situation (if this is applicable to Lebanon at all) will be achieved only after the parliamentary elections in 2026. The path to them in the next year or so will be no less important, but electoral cycles often tend to present surprises. For now, Hezbollah's chosen line of minimizing conflict and a reasonable, but sometimes unyielding, conversation with the new government seems balanced. Three aspects will be key factors at this time that can determine Hezbollah's future. First, the degree of consolidation of the Shiite population around the organization. The extent to which the leadership manages its resources in relation to people is the extent to which the group will remain firmly on its feet. As after the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah (through its institutions such as Jihad al-Binaa [8]) is engaged in the reconstruction of housing in the affected areas and the payment of targeted compensation (rent). However, this campaign is already facing financial difficulties, despite the tens of millions of dollars spent, since the organization relies almost exclusively on Iran. In this and other dimensions, Tehran's position in the medium term is also critical. Second, the topic of Hezbollah's disarmament will acquire particular importance in the foreseeable future. This problem has already been outlined by the country's top leadership on several occasions, and has also been mentioned in the government's declaration to parliament and supported by a considerable number of deputies in their speeches thereafter. It is becoming clear that such statements are not a bluff, they are for the benefit of Lebanon's international image, but it is not yet at all obvious how this process can be set in motion without clashes within the country. The requisition of weapons from Hezbollah will mean a radical change in the ontological foundations of the group's existence. Strictly speaking, it will no longer be Hezbollah, but something else. The last defining aspect, certainly related to everything outlined earlier, is Israel's behavior. Its escalation will catalyze two mutually directed processes - the government will increasingly put pressure on Hezbollah with the goal of pacifying it or even disarming it, while the group itself will be less and less willing to do so. At the same time, the scenario in which the Israelis manage to completely defeat Hezbollah seems as unrealistic as the idea that Israel will soon abandon its assertive (if not aggressive) policy of suppressing security threats. In this regard, the development of the situation in the Washington-Tehran-Tel Aviv triangle will, for obvious reasons, continue to be relevant for Lebanon and Hezbollah. It is still too early to see Hezbollah as a dying swan. At this stage, the organization stands at a crossroads, where the choice of path carries significant consequences. Only time will tell whether the new leadership can make the right decisions, rebuild the organization's structure, and improve its internal Lebanese relations. The current state of international politics, with its unexpected twists and sudden outcomes, suggests that Hezbollah should rather be viewed as a black swan.  1. The Executive Council is one of the five main bodies of Hezbollah, responsible for the non-military and non-political development of the group (education, social support, medical care, media support, etc.). 2. The Cedar Revolution is a series of popular protests after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, centered around the Syrian military presence in Lebanon (both condemning and supporting it). As a result of the protests, Syrian troops were withdrawn from the country after 30 years on Lebanese soil. 3. According to the Lebanese newspaper L’Orient-Le Jour, the Minister of Youth and Sports Nura Bayrakdaryan is an active member of the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun party, however, according to the prime minister’s inaugural statements, the cabinet does not have any ministers who are party members. 4. There are 24 ministers in the government, including the prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively, the remaining 22 ministers are responsible for their respective areas. 5. The ministers stopped participating in the government's work and submitted their resignations, which, however, were not accepted by the prime minister. 6. The pro-Syrian (and/or pro-Iranian) parliamentary bloc that emerged as a result of the Cedar Revolution of 2005 was formed on the basis of three major political forces: Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, as well as their junior partners. 7. In November 2017, while serving as the prime minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri was effectively detained in Saudi Arabia. He then went on television to announce his resignation and condemn Hezbollah and Iranian influence in the country. The situation was later resolved and the prime minister was released. 8. Jihad al-Binaa is an organization within Hezbollah that is involved in the construction of infrastructure and the construction (reconstruction) of buildings.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The question of migration occupies a central and divisive place in US politics. Yet critical questions are rarely asked about why migrants decide to leave their homes in the first place and what role US foreign policy might play in that decision. This oversight is especially glaring when it comes to one of the most common tools of US foreign policy: broad economic sanctions. There is overwhelming evidence (1) that migration1 is driven in large part by adverse economic conditions and (2) that sanctions can have severe, harmful economic and humanitarian consequences for civilians in targeted countries. The cases of Cuba and Venezuela demonstrate this relationship clearly: The imposition or tightening of sanctions by the US government have, in recent years, fueled economic crises that in turn have led to record migratory outflows. Addressing migration at its roots will require rethinking US sanctions policy as part of a broader research and policy agenda that considers the role of US foreign policy in fueling migratory push factors abroad. Economic Hardship Drives Migration The decision to emigrate — often involving leaving one’s home, family, and community to undertake a perilous journey to a new country with a different language and culture, without any guarantee of safety, accommodation, or employment — is not typically one that is taken lightly. Such a life-altering decision is rarely reducible to a single factor but is rather made in the context of multiple and interrelated push and pull factors. However, one of the most well-established sets of factors that impact migration are economic. There is broad consensus that economic conditions in the country of origin are a major determinant of the desire to migrate. A recent review of 72 peer-reviewed, survey-based analyses of migration aspirations found an overwhelming relationship between the desire to migrate and economic factors, including perception of national economic conditions, employment opportunities, household financial situation, food security, contentment with public services, and expectations of future economic conditions. A similar relationship holds true of realized migration. Many have hypothesized an inverted U-shaped relationship between development and migration, whereby higher GDP per capita is associated with increased migration as would-be migrants gain the means to do so, until a certain point — after which higher income is associated with decreased migration. However, recent research suggests that this U-shaped relationship, though observed in cross-sectional analyses, does not hold for a given country over time.2 Rather, the relationship is clearer: poor or deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions cause people to migrate from developing countries while growth and stability lead people to stay home. Sanctions Fuel Economic Hardship Over the past two decades, the number of US-imposed sanctions has grown nearly tenfold. The United States is by far the most prevalent user of sanctions, with one-third of all countries — and over 60 percent of low-income countries — facing US sanctions in some form. While many sanctions are narrowly targeted against particular individuals or entities, others target entire sectors or even the entire economy of a country. Such broad-based sanctions are indiscriminate and can have profound impacts on the economies, and therefore civilians, of targeted nations (and even purportedly targeted sanctions can have significant spillover effects). Broad-based sanctions can impede economic growth, potentially triggering or extending recessions and even depressions; restrict access to critical resources like medicine, food, and energy; disrupt humanitarian aid (despite nominal exemptions); and consequently exacerbate poverty, illness, and hunger. As a result, sanctions can lead to a significant number — in some cases tens of thousands — of preventable deaths. In a 2023 literature review for CEPR, economist Francisco Rodríguez determined that 94 percent of peer-reviewed econometric studies on the subject found substantial, statistically significant “negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality, and human rights” as a result of sanctions. One study associated sanctions with, on average, a 26 percent drop in GDP per capita — roughly the size of the Great Depression. Another tied sanctions to a 1.4-year decline in female life expectancy — comparable with the global impact of COVID-19. Yet another found a 2.5 percent increase in childhood HIV infection rates. While such indiscriminate impacts are often denied by the policymakers that impose sanctions, it is difficult to reconcile this denial with the fact that major macroeconomic factors such as growth rates, oil production, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of essential goods are widely used — often by these very same policymakers — as metrics of “success” of sanctions. That these macroeconomic factors would in turn impact civilians is all but undeniable. In fact, there are significant reasons to believe that the broad economic and humanitarian impacts of certain sanctions regimes are intentional — and therefore are not a matter of calibration, but are inherent to the policy itself. Sanctions Induce MigrationIf migration is driven in part by economic hardship and sanctions can cause great economic and humanitarian suffering, then it follows that sanctions can substantially contribute to migration. This is not just borne out logically, but can be seen in the data. In October 2024, the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization published what may be the first and only systematic cross-national empirical analysis of how such sanctions impact international migration. The findings are striking. Using data on migration flows from 157 countries over more than half a century, the authors find that Western multilateral sanctions3 have increased emigration from target countries by, on average, 22 to 24 percent. Notably, they also find that “migrant flows return to their pre-sanction level once sanctions are lifted.” In few cases is this relationship between sanctions and migration clearer than in the cases of Cuba and Venezuela. Trump-Biden Sanctions Spur Cuban Depopulation The US embargo against Cuba — referred to by many as a blockade due to its extraterritorial impacts — is the US’s oldest and most comprehensive sanctions regime. Beginning in 1960 with export prohibitions in response to the Castro government’s agrarian reforms and nationalizations, successive administrations soon escalated this embargo into a comprehensive ban on nearly all trade, travel, and financial transactions, with the goal of destabilizing and ultimately toppling the Cuban government. While these sanctions have been periodically tightened or relaxed over the years, this foundational, comprehensive embargo has remained intact for over six decades and has since been enshrined into law through the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. During his last two years in office, President Barack Obama took significant steps toward the normalization of bilateral relations with Cuba by, among other things, formally resuming diplomatic relations, loosening restrictions on travel and remittances, and removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SSOT) list, a measure that had effectively cut the island off from much of the global financial system. However, under the first Donald Trump administration, these policies were largely reversed, and the embargo was expanded to an unprecedented level. President Joe Biden, despite campaign promises to change the course of Cuban policy, maintained most of President Trump’s measures. Days before leaving office, Biden issued executive orders undoing Trump’s harshest sanctions measures only to see them predictably rescinded immediately following Trump’s return to the White House. In the case of both Trump and Biden, Cuban policy appears to have been driven in large part by electoral considerations in Florida, where hawkish Cuban American voters have long (and questionably) been seen as a key demographic in both parties’ efforts to win the state. The US embargo has long hindered Cuban economic growth and development, particularly since the late 1980s when the Soviet Union and its COMECON partners discontinued economic support for the island. In 2018, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean validated the Cuban government’s estimates that the six-decade embargo had cost the country $130 billion. By 2024, that estimate had grown to $164 billion. A recent econometric study on changes in US policy toward Cuba between 1990 and 2020 found a “substantial negative impact of sanctions policy shifts on Cuban economic growth.” Further, “this impact on GDP is concentrated in the component of household consumption” — in other words, Cuban citizens bear the highest burden. Over the last few years, Cuba’s economic situation has deteriorated further, in large part as a result of Trump-Biden policies. Measures such as returning Cuba to the SSOT list (despite no evidence of Cuban support for terrorism), restricting remittances, and prohibiting US citizens from doing business with dozens of “restricted entities” have greatly limited Cuba’s access to foreign exchange. This has, in turn, prevented Cuba from importing many essential goods (including critical pharmaceutical and agricultural inputs) and services (including maintenance services for Cuba’s ailing energy infrastructure), servicing its external debt, and perhaps most crucially, stabilizing the local currency following a major monetary reform in 2021. Another Trump measure — his decision to implement Title III of the LIBERTAD Act — has had a significant chilling effect on foreign investment in Cuba only a few years after the enactment of a reform opening up most sectors of the economy to foreign investors. This controversial provision, which allows for lawsuits against US or foreign persons doing business with Cuban entities that use or benefit from property expropriated at the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, had been waived by prior presidents and by Trump himself, until April 2019. The far-reaching negative impact of these and other Trump measures are part of the reason why Cuba’s economy has failed to significantly recover from the global economic downturn triggered by the COVID pandemic. Cuba has been plunged into the most serious economic and humanitarian crisis of its contemporary history, characterized by repeated blackouts, water shortages, fuel shortages, rising food costs, the deterioration of basic services such as garbage collection, and the spread of preventable diseases. Cuba’s fledgling private sector, which greatly expanded following Obama’s normalization measures and domestic liberalization measures in 2019 and 2021, is facing an uncertain future as a result of the crisis and new, stricter Cuban regulations designed in part to offset the effects of sanctions by capturing increasingly scarce foreign exchange. This economic crisis has in turn spurred a migration crisis. Data from the national statistics office of the government of Cuba shows skyrocketing net emigration following 2020 (see Figure 1). By August 2022, the outflow of migrants had surpassed that of the famous 1980 Mariel boatlift and the 1994 Balsero/Rafter crises combined.   Independent research — later confirmed by the Cuban government — estimates an even larger increase than those published by the national statistics office: the departure of over one million people, representing 10 percent of the country’s entire population, in 2022 and 2023 alone. As one researcher warned in 2022: “Cuba is depopulating.” While not all of these migrants ended up in the United States, the years 2022 and 2023 saw record-breaking numbers of encounters with Cuban migrants by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2022, the CBP encountered more Cubans than any other nationality except Mexicans. Cubans constituted more than 10 percent of all encounters.4 Given the Trump administration’s, and particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s, apparent commitment to maintaining the current policy toward Cuba — and perhaps even hardening it with yet more sanctions — we can expect out-migration from the island to continue at record levels for the foreseeable future. “Maximum Pressure” Sanctions Fueled Venezuelan Exodus While the US has maintained limited sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, the current sanctions regime is defined by the “maximum pressure” campaign initiated during the first Trump administration in an attempt to push President Nicolás Maduro out of office. In August 2017, Trump blocked the government of Venezuela, including the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), from accessing financial markets. In late 2018, Trump sanctioned the gold sector. Perhaps most significantly, the oil sector and PDVSA were designated as sanctioned entities in January 2019. Additional sanctions on the financial and defense sectors and the central bank soon followed, alongside the escalation of secondary sanctions against third parties. The US’s and many of its allies’ policy of nonrecognition of the Maduro government has also led to effective sanctions, such as the loss of access to roughly $2 billion in reserves held at the Bank of England and $5 billion in Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund. These “maximum pressure” policies were largely maintained under the Biden administration, with a few significant exceptions. Since November 2022, Chevron Corporation has been permitted to produce and export oil from Venezuela. In October 2023, Biden issued a General License temporarily lifting most oil sector and PDVSA sanctions but allowed the license to expire six months later (while leaving a wind-down period). Though Venezuela’s economic crisis — driven in part by both misguided economic policies and falling global oil prices — began prior to the imposition of sanctions, US sanctions have substantially contributed to the severity and longevity of the contraction. Sanctions impact the Venezuelan economy through numerous channels, but perhaps none more significantly than through oil. The Venezuelan economy is highly dependent on oil exports, historically relying on the sector — and its main actor, PDVSA — for 95 percent of its foreign exchange. From 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd) prior to the crisis, oil output hit a low of 0.4 million bpd in mid-2020 — an 83 percent collapse. Even with today’s Chevron license, output has yet to break 1 million bpd. A 2022 analysis by Francisco Rodríguez attributes 797,000 bpd of this decline to the 2017 sanctions alone. Other assessments point to similar figures, with some attributing more than half of the decline to sanctions. As Rodríguez points out, new sanctions are associated with marked downward inflection points in Venezuelan oil output (see Figure 2).   Ultimately, the Venezuelan crisis saw a 71 percent collapse in GDP per capita. As Rodríguez notes, this was the equivalent of three Great Depressions and the largest peacetime economic contraction in modern history. By Rodríguez’s assessments, more than half of this decline was attributable to sanctions and related political acts. Whatever claims policymakers may make about the targeted nature of sanctions, such broad macroeconomic effects inescapably and indiscriminately impact civilians. In addition to the general effects of economic contraction and the loss of foreign exchange with which to import essential goods such as food and medicine, sanctions have also inhibited shipments of COVID vaccines and other medical supplies; contributed to the degradation of the energy grid and frequency of electrical shortages; and otherwise furthered the deterioration of public health, education, and water services. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures reports that sanctions on Venezuela have “prevented the earning of revenues and use of resources to maintain and develop infrastructure and for social support programs, which has a devastating effect on the entire population of Venezuela, especially — but not only — those living in extreme poverty, women, children, medical workers, people with disabilities or life-threatening or chronic diseases, and the indigenous population.” According to one CEPR estimate, sanctions likely led to tens of thousands of excess deaths in one year alone. Unsurprisingly, such a dire humanitarian crisis has contributed to an unprecedented mass exodus. In the last decade, over seven million Venezuelans have left the country. In one of the few direct quantitative studies on the impacts of sanctions on migration, Francisco Rodríguez finds that over four million of these seven million left “as a result of the economic deterioration caused by sanctions and toxification effects.” Rodríguez further estimates that a return to “maximum pressure” policies would result in the emigration of an additional one million Venezuelans in the coming five years. While the vast majority of these Venezuelan migrants ended up in countries closer to home, such as Colombia and Peru, a growing number have made their way to the US border as well (see Figure 3).   In 2023 and 2024, CBP encountered more migrants from Venezuela than any other country except Mexico.5 According to survey data from the Migration Policy Institute, Venezuela is the single fastest growing country of birth of immigrants to the US since “maximum pressure” began in 2017 (alongside other sanctioned countries, such as Afghanistan — number 2 — and Nicaragua — number 7). The Trump administration was repeatedly warned that mass migration was a likely consequence of its sanctions policy, yet pursued it anyway. According to one senior US Department of State official: “This is the point I made at the time: I said the sanctions were going to grind the Venezuelan economy into dust and have huge human consequences, one of which would be out-migration.” To Address Migration, Lift Economic Sanctions Though migration has many causes, and it is difficult to precisely quantify the contribution of sanctions to overall emigration levels, the following are nonetheless clear: 1. Migration is driven in large part as a reaction to adverse economic conditions.2. Economic sanctions often have profound adverse economic impacts.3. Econometric evidence indicates that sanctions directly contribute to migratory flows.4. In Cuba and Venezuela, economic sanctions are associated with mass migration. While fearmongering and anti-migrant sentiment should be flatly rejected, it is plainly preferable that people in other nations not be forced into circumstances that compel their displacement. To achieve this goal, broad economic sanctions must be lifted. Recognition of the link between sanctions and migration has been growing among US policymakers. In May 2023, 21 members of Congress — led by members representing border states that have witnessed an influx of large numbers of migrants — sent a letter to President Biden urging the easing of sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela to mitigate push factors for migration. A separate letter from over 50 economists and other scholars shortly followed, corroborating the claim that lifting sanctions would help ease migration. Former Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whose country is also impacted by migratory flows, has said the same. An Alternative Approach to Migration Is Available This relationship between US economic sanctions and migration further suggests the need for a research and policy agenda that considers migration within the context of global inequalities and underdevelopment and critically considers the role of US foreign policy — including but not limited to sanctions — in reproducing and exacerbating migratory push factors. In other words, addressing migration at its root requires rethinking and rectifying the US’s approach to Latin America as well as other parts of the Global South. While the Biden administration proclaimed a “root-causes” strategy toward addressing migration from Central America, intending to address push factors in countries of origin, including corruption, crime, and economic insecurity, the strategy failed to consider how the US’s own policies might exacerbate these conditions. In contrast, the recently established Congressional Caucus to Address Global Migration and the Migration Stability Resolution introduced by its co-founder, Rep. Greg Casar (D-TX), take a more comprehensive approach, aiming to — in Rep. Casar’s words — “[change] the failed US policies that cause displacement abroad and force people to flee their home countries.” Tackling broad economic sanctions, anti-worker trade agreements, US security assistance for repressive governments, inequalities in the global financial system, and more, these efforts offer an alternative path toward addressing migration: a path that is both more humane and more effective. Footnotes 1. For the purposes of this article, “migration” is used to refer specifically to international migration.2. Moreover, as CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez explains, even if there were truth to the U-shaped hypothesis, it would be a story of the long-run structural and societal transformations that accompany development and would not contradict a thesis that short-run economic contractions — such as those that might result from the imposition of sanctions — fuel migration across income levels. Indeed, short-run fluctuations in growth and employment are observed to significantly impact migration.3. While this study assessed joint US-EU sanctions specifically, one can expect a similar relationship to hold in unilateral US sanctions, given the dominant role of the United States in the global financial system and given that EU sanctions policy often follows the lead of US policy.4. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.5. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Strategic minerals, essential to our modern life, not only explain geopolitical movements and current conflicts but also why the world is turning its attention to Africa. In another of his theatrical statements since taking office, the new President of the United States, Donald Trump, presented his proposal to bring peace to Ukraine after a phone conversation with Vladimir Putin. Among Trump's remarks, one of the most surprising aspects (aside from territorial concessions to the Russians and the guarantee that Ukraine would not join NATO) was that the U.S. president put a price not only on the military aid provided to Zelensky so far but also on U.S. mediation services: access to Ukraine's rare earth minerals. Trump's words make it clear that strategic minerals are now the key element in understanding geopolitical movements around the world. These minerals also help to explain the geopolitical "revaluation" that the African continent is experiencing — that is, why Africa is attracting so much attention from Chinese, Russian, Indian, Arab nations, Turks, and, of course, Europeans. Last week, I explained how strategic minerals (such as coltan, cobalt, etc.) are one of the main factors behind the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). They are also key to understanding why Rwanda is being allowed to support a rebel group (a UN report states that 5,000 Rwandan soldiers are on the ground) or even to directly challenge Congo's territorial sovereignty. This is what experts call "the geopolitics of mineral resources," which explains why Africa is experiencing this moment of “renewed” global interest. The growing demand for electric batteries, wind turbines, and solar panels have put critical minerals at the center of attention, as they are essential for their production — many of which are found in abundance on the African continent. In fact, Africa holds a significant share of the world's essential minerals for global industry: 70% of the world's cobalt reserves, 90% of platinum, 60% of manganese, and 40% of diamonds, among other strategic resources. The advancement of electrification and the transition to renewable energy have driven up the demand for minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel, which are essential for lithium-ion batteries that power electric vehicles and energy storage systems. Demand for these materials is expected to triple by 2040 and increase sixfold by 2050. China, Europe, and the United States have intensified their investments in Africa to secure access to these strategic resources, sparking debates about African economies' dependence on external actors. Rare earths, a group of 17 chemical elements essential to produce advanced technology, are also part of Africa's geopolitical landscape. These minerals, such as neodymium (used in permanent magnets for electric motors), dysprosium (key in wind turbines), and lanthanum (used in batteries and optical lenses), are crucial for the energy transition. Although Africa accounts for only about 5% of global production, countries like South Africa, Burundi, and Tanzania hold significant deposits. As global demand grows, the continent has the potential to increase its market share if it can develop extraction and refining capabilities. Cobalt is a clear example of the dilemma surrounding Africa's mineral wealth. As I mentioned last week, the DRC is the world's largest producer, supplying 70% of the global market. However, it is also at the center of an industry plagued by severe social and environmental issues. Mining operations in the country are marked by reports of child labor, poor working conditions, and conflicts over control of mineral deposits. Despite efforts to regulate the sector and promote responsible mining, cobalt remains a strategic resource fiercely contested by multinational corporations and governments seeking to secure their supply for the battery industry. Beyond the key minerals for the energy transition, Africa remains a major supplier of traditional resources such as gold and diamonds. South Africa, Ghana, and Mali produce around 25% of the world’s gold, while Botswana, Angola, and the DRC account for more than 50% of diamond production. However, the history of these minerals is marked by conflict and exploitation. I vividly remember the movie “Blood Diamond”, which portrays the reality of “conflict diamonds,” extracted from war zones and used to finance armed groups — a problem that still persists in regions like Sierra Leone and the DRC. Obviously, Africa’s main challenge is that the extraction of these minerals adds no value, meaning that what is taken from its soil is not processed within its territory. This is what economists call value chains: the dependence on exporting unprocessed raw materials keeps African countries at the lower end of the value chain, limiting their economic benefits. If you add to that, in countries like the DRC, a chaotic environment filled with armed groups, illegal smuggling to neighboring countries, and an almost entirely informal mining economy, the resource curse becomes clear: elites take their share, workers live in near-slavery conditions with virtually no labor protections, and the real wealth is accumulated in countries far from these mineral deposits — mostly in China and the West. The future of mining in Africa will be shaped by the growing demand for these critical minerals, the expansion of foreign investment, and the challenge — yet also the responsibility — of making mining more sustainable. Cobalt, lithium, and rare earths will become increasingly sought after by global powers like China, the European Union, and the United States, intensifying competition for their control. And while this seems to reinforce the resource curse, treating the continent as a piggy bank to be emptied coin by coin, it should instead represent a huge opportunity for Africans — to gain access to the wealth generated by the raw materials they live upon. The key lies in strengthening local refining and manufacturing and improving governance in the mining sector. Transparency, stability, and infrastructure development will be crucial for mining in Africa to drive economic growth and social progress. Its role in the geopolitics of minerals is already essential and will become even more so in the coming decades. If the continent can overcome its structural challenges, it will be able to transform its mineral wealth into a driver of sustainable development and economic autonomy. A wish that, unfortunately, may sound excessively utopian in the face of a system driven by greed, one that only wants minerals to keep producing more devices and generating more profit. And to achieve that, it needs them to be cheap, which is why it doesn’t question whether the extraction of coltan and cobalt is causing deaths in the Congo or any other corner of Africa. The first step toward change is for all of us, as citizens, to understand what we hold in our hands when we make a call or order food through our phones. We must start demanding that the governments allowing their sale and the companies profiting from them ensure that these resources are not obtained through exploitation and the killing of innocent people. Article written by José Segura Clavell, Director General of Casa África, and published originally in eldiario.es, Kiosco Insular, and Canarias 7 on February 14 and 15, 2025.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the return to power of the center-left coalition "Broad Front" (Frente Amplio, FA) in 2025, Uruguay has entered a new political cycle. Although Uruguay is a very stable country by Latin American standards, various forecasts about possible changes in the country's foreign policy under the new president, Yamandú Orsi, have already started appearing in the media. Most expectations focus on the regional dimension, which is logical for several reasons. Firstly, the regional subsystem of international relations plays a crucial role in Uruguay's participation in global politics, particularly in advancing key foreign policy priorities that are important to all ideological camps in the country, such as conflict mediation, development assistance, support for international law, and human rights. Secondly, a critical stance toward Latin American integration structures became a hallmark of the outgoing conservative government of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), which left office on March 1, 2025. His presidency was marked by debates over the direction of regional integration, including discussions on the potential revival of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), strengthening the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in response to crises in energy, healthcare, and food security during the 2020s, and overcoming the stagnation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Uruguay consistently positioned itself as a staunch and vocal skeptic on all these matters. According to one of Uruguay’s leading international relations experts, Nastasja Barceló, this stance has harmed national interests by contributing to the "isolation of Uruguay and a break with the country’s traditional foreign policy approaches".  Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that the team of the newly elected president openly emphasizes the priority of the regional dimension. A key figure in Yamandú Orsi’s team is Álvaro Padrón, his advisor on international political affairs, who, in an interview, outlined the concept of "concentric circles" in Uruguay's foreign policy: "The first circle consists of bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil… the second is MERCOSUR… the third is South America". According to Padrón, aligning positions on various international issues with South American and Latin American neighbors should serve as the foundation for advancing Uruguay's interests on global platforms. Orsi’s allies also highlight that his government aims to leverage regional opportunities to facilitate Uruguay’s integration into the evolving multipolar world order. Thus, the election of Yamandú Orsi has raised hopes that Uruguay will significantly strengthen its presence in regional integration groups. At the very least, this is expected to apply to CELAC, UNASUR, and MERCOSUR, which are frequently mentioned in the rhetoric of the future president, Vice President Carolina Cosse, Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin, advisor Álvaro Padrón, as well as in the still-limited assessments of international affairs experts. Naturally, questions arise about the specific opportunities and challenges on this path: what tools and strategies can Uruguay use to "revitalize" the regional framework? How will the new government's Latin American agenda align with its global policy? While it is difficult to provide definitive answers before Orsi officially takes office, contradictions are already apparent that may weaken the positive impact of the change in power on regional integration. Challenges to Regional Integration and Uruguay's Approach In a conceptual sense, projects like CELAC and UNASUR are associated with the so-called idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", which rose on the wave of the "left turn" of the 2000s - early 2010s. One of the brightest supporters of this philosophy was the popular Uruguayan President (2010-2015) José Mujica, who still exerts a significant influence on the balance of power in the "Broad Front". His support for the candidacy of Yamandú Orsi in the last elections was so obvious that the future president was literally nicknamed the "heir" of J. Mujica. In light of the close ties between the two politicians, it seems logical that J. Orsi will also promote the idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", defending the consolidation of his region on the international arena in the face of major powers that have their own interests in Latin America. In the speeches of J. Orsi and A. Padrón, there are indeed calls to strengthen CELAC so that Latin America can have more weight in international affairs, or to structure leadership in South America, but in real life there are challenges to the implementation of such plans. One of them is the reactive position of Iain Orsi's team on the Venezuelan issue. Over the past decade, discussions about the right of Nicolás Maduro to remain in power have polarized Latin America and prevented the development of unifying initiatives. The administration of L. Lacalle Pou has solidified its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of N. Maduro's government, which limits the possibilities of cooperation with the Chavistas. Although Iain Orsi has stated in connection with the Venezuelan issue that the importance of dialogue with states is higher than judgments about political regimes, his team has not made any special changes on the Venezuelan vector. After N. Maduro was re-elected to his post once again in the summer of 2024, Iain Orsi said that there is a “dictatorship” in the Caribbean country, and none of the key figures of the CF went to N. Maduro's inauguration in January. At one time, Jose Mujica offered his good services to Colombia, where the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC took the difficult path of reconciliation, and one might expect that the moderate leftist J. Orsi would try himself in the role of mediator of the internal political crisis in the Bolivarian Republic. But for agreements and mediation, Caracas and Montevideo need at least to restore normal diplomatic interaction, which was frozen after the elections in Venezuela in July 2024. As noted in the media, the prospect of "defrosting" is absolutely unclear. The second challenge is doubts that Uruguay under J. Orsi will be able to contribute to the consolidated and independent positioning of Latin America in the current geopolitical conditions. As far as can be judged now, the team of the elected leader is distinguished by an extremely evasive position on the crises around Ukraine and Gaza, combining emphasized official neutrality, non-participation in sanctions and diplomatic demarches, but also a certain sympathy for the Western point of view. This is hinted at, for example, by J. Orsi's positive attitude to sending a Uruguayan delegation to the summit on Ukraine in Bürgenstock in June 2024 and his statements about Russia in the spirit that "perhaps other points should have been included" in the program of principles of the "Broad Front", condemning US and NATO imperialism. In the Middle East drama, J. Orsi, like his vice-president K. Kosse, while agreeing with the Palestinians' right to claim statehood, does not condemn Israel's actions. This differs from the position of many other left-wing leaders in the region, which some critical experts have already noted. When analyzing the roots of these approaches, two key points emerge. First, it is likely that under this president the liberal attitudes characteristic of the mainstream of Uruguayan elites will be preserved. They may also be relevant for the moderate left within the “Broad Front”, to which Yamandú Orsi belongs, who defines himself as a “pragmatist” and “non-Marxist.” The consequence of adherence to such a political philosophy usually becomes a loyal attitude to the course of the Euro-Atlantic powers and their closest allies, so it is unlikely that Uruguay under Yamandú Orsi will oppose the Western-centric world order. Secondly, the involvement of major powers in geopolitical contradictions, the adoption of obligations or parties in this regard, including the unambiguous label of “non-alignment”, does not fit into Montevideo’s line of behavior on the global stage at all. The positioning of this small South American state in the context of the formation of a multipolar world, as built in the discourse of political elites, presupposes an economic-centric strategy and “free hands”. The key idea is to interact with various actors, especially for the implementation of the goals of trade and investment diversification, and to promote a positive image of Uruguay as a neutral and peace-loving state focused on socio-economic development. The U.S. dimension deserves special mention, as distancing from Washington and challenging its dominance has traditionally been a defining feature of proponents of Latin American patriotic unity. Uruguay has maintained relatively stable relations with the United States, though previous administrations under the "Broad Front" encountered certain areas of disagreement. One key issue has been hemispheric security and the functioning of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), which the "Broad Front" views as repressive and outdated. This stance was evident under the last left-wing government led by Tabaré Vázquez (2015–2020), which initiated Uruguay’s withdrawal from the treaty. However, the administration of Luis Lacalle Pou reversed this decision, leaving Montevideo’s future participation in the Rio Pact uncertain as of the 2024 elections. The program of principles of the "Broad Front" for 2025-2030, which the coalition formulated on the eve of the elections, stated that Uruguay should secure the support of the region and finally withdraw from the controversial treaty - "a legacy of the Cold War" and "a symbol of Latin America's status as the backyard of the United States." Moreover, as one of the "main experiments" of regionalism, it mentions the South American Defense Council (SADC). It operated under the auspices of UNASUR and was focused on developing common South American solutions in matters of military security and peacekeeping, excluding the influence of external powers. In Orsi's entourage, nothing has been said about Uruguay's attitude to either the Rio Pact or the SADC. On the other hand, shortly after his electoral triumph, Orsi met with US Ambassador Heidi Fulton, who confirmed that Washington and Montevideo have common views, including on security issues. In light of this, it currently appears that the Uruguayan leader is not interested in being at the forefront of critics of US influence in Latin and South America. The emergence of Donald Trump at the helm of the US, who in the first weeks of his presidency has already managed to enter into a rhetorical conflict with the heads of Mexico, Colombia and Central American states, may further encourage J. Orsi to behave cautiously. Especially considering that Uruguay is one of the few countries in the region under leftist rule that has not received its share of criticism from D. Trump and his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a “hawk in Latin American affairs”. The desire to maintain a calm, positive interaction with Washington, which the outgoing administration of L. Lacalle Pou achieved, can also be perceived as a consequence of J. Orsi’s pragmatism and moderation, despite his leftist orientation. It certainly cannot be considered a resource for uniting the regional neighbourhood with the idea of fighting against the “North American dictate”. Thus, at this stage, the new president’s approach to international affairs appears too passive and cautious to actively support any bloc identity in Latin America. Therefore, if strengthening CELAC and restoring UNASUR remain priorities for the new government, its focus will likely be on the inclusivity and representativeness of these platforms rather than their sovereigntist positioning. Nevertheless, although J. Orsi does not seem to be a figure who will strengthen political integration in the spirit of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", he may well increase the overall regional presence of Montevideo. The politician has repeatedly emphasized that in the Latin American field, the development of multilateralism and presidential diplomacy are important to him. Under his leadership, Uruguay will be able to show itself in individual initiatives and working groups under the auspices of CELAC or UNASUR on environmental issues, human rights, and sustainable development. For example, in December 2024, J. Orsi already discussed plans to promote a "regional alliance" on clean energy and joint efforts to preserve the Amazon with his Colombian counterpart Gustavo Petro. A New Phase for MERCOSUR? Regarding MERCOSUR, the "Broad Front" (FA) has a clear stance—to strengthen and expand it. This position is shared by the new president's team, and it seems to be more than just rhetoric. Even before the end of 2024, Yamandú Orsi met with all the bloc’s neighboring presidents except Javier Milei—Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Paraguay’s Santiago Peña, and Bolivia’s Luis Arce. During these meetings, the Uruguayan leader emphasized regional unity and expressed his commitment to developing MERCOSUR. Relations with Brazil are of decisive importance and have become a strategic priority for J. Orsi. Under L. Lacalle Pou, interaction with the northern neighbor was pragmatic. Lula da Silva's ambitions to turn MERCOSUR into a tool for promoting Brazil on the international stage irritated the Uruguayan president. Now, however, completely different assessments have begun to be heard from the Uruguayan side: A. Padron calls Brazil a regional "heavyweight", stating that, by increasing its own global role, Uruguay must "accompany Brazil's leadership". In his view, such "accompaniment" presupposes support for multilateral groups led by the northern neighbor, among which MERCOSUR plays a key role as the oldest organization. At the same time, the circle of J. Orsi is characterized by the established ideas in the political elites of Uruguay that MERCOSUR still requires reforms and should follow the path of open regionalism. On the one hand, this assumes that the economy remains a priority area of cooperation in the bloc, the improvement of the common market requires the growth of the organization's importance among all economic entities in the member states, the correlation of its work with the tasks of technological and innovative development of its participants. On the other hand, MERCOSUR must adhere to the principles of free trade and build up external relations in order to strengthen the positions of its participants in the international division of labor. At the same time, today the association finds itself in conditions where globalization is slowing down, the struggle for strategic resources is intensifying, and supply chains are being restructured. Given these circumstances, several areas can be identified that may be of interest to the government of J. Orsi, both from the point of view of revealing Uruguay’s competitive advantages in MERCOSUR and from the point of view of modernizing the bloc.  Firstly, this is an emphasis on the integration of production chains with neighbors, the promotion of "friendshoring" in MERCOSUR. This is supported by the fact that Uruguay's industrial supplies are primarily focused on the bloc's members. The electric transport industry, pharmaceuticals and the production of organic food products are growth points for the industrial and innovative potential of the Uruguayan national economy and at the same time create a field for complementarity of economies in MERCOSUR. For example, Uruguay is the record holder in South America for the prevalence of electric vehicles, and it also has the most extensive network of charging stations for them in the unification zone. However, the country's own production of cars and batteries has not been established and remains an important task for the future, as noted in a report prepared in 2023 by the Technological University, the National Institute of Employment and Vocational Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Uruguay. Resources to solve this problem can be found within MERCOSUR. The bloc now includes Bolivia, which is aiming to industrialize its vast lithium sector and has national expertise in producing electric cars. Secondly, Uruguay has traditionally been distinguished by its special attention to the concept of sustainable development, which is consistent with the concept of building bioeconomy in the South American Common Market. Recently, it has been discussed by scientists as an alternative to import-substituting industrialization, which guided the bloc until the 2010s and began to stall after the onset of the 2014–2015 crisis. According to IDB estimates, Uruguay has some of the highest standards in Latin America for the implementation of renewable energy sources, environmental awareness practices in organizational, managerial and production activities. Such competencies increase its importance for MERCOSUR if the bloc decides to focus on the energy transition and promote the formation of circular economies. For now, these plans seem hypothetical, but the appearance of an association agreement with the European Union on the horizon will make them relevant. Given that MERCOSUR not only reached a trade agreement with the EU in December 2024, but is also considering the formation of FTAs with China, Korea and Singapore, another important area for Uruguayan diplomacy will clearly be building the bloc's relations with external powers. The rhetoric of J. Orsi and K. Cosse, as well as A. Padron, shows that the Uruguayan side expects to combine all these areas and rely on its neighbors in order to strengthen its position in negotiations and reduce the asymmetry in interactions with larger global players. It was in this vein that the decision was made for J. Orsi to abandon a separate FTA agreement with China, which the outgoing government of L. Lacalle Pou sought. The beginning of the widespread protectionist offensive of the United States under D. Trump really creates an opportunity for MERCOSUR to open its doors to European and Pacific partners. Uruguay, which champions free trade principles, can take advantage of this. At the same time, the options related to the bloc leave their unspoken. The most obvious of them is the coordination of interests with Argentina, which, as mentioned, will be included in the “first circle” of the foreign policy strategy of the new government. Although J. Orsi optimistically declared that he would reach a consensus with Javier Miley, this has not yet been possible. Plans to hold talks with this eccentric leader at the MERCOSUR summit in Montevideo in early December 2024 have failed. The lack of mutual understanding with the far-right J. Miley remains a problem, because without the political consent of its members, the association is in principle unable to evolve. Argentina also plays an important role in the industrial and infrastructural potential of MERCOSUR, without its participation it is difficult to imagine initiatives to promote economic complementarity in the bloc. Another issue is the compatibility of plans to modernize the organization and accelerate cooperation with external actors. Thus, from the point of view of the prospects of the agreement already reached with the EU, the MERCOSUR zone attracts it primarily as a pool of strategic natural resources and food, which is especially true for Uruguay. In turn, the automotive, textile, pharmaceutical and chemical industries are viewed by Europe as niches for the expansion of its goods and services and its presence in South America. Such a view cannot but affect investment preferences, including plans for new models of MERCOSUR development. In one form or another, these layouts can be repeated in the interaction of the bloc with China and other highly industrialized players. Therefore, for Uruguay and its neighbors, no matter which option for increasing the global competitiveness of the association through openness they choose, the strategic problem will remain the preservation of industrial sovereignty and limiting the reprimarization of their economies. It is worth adding that similar warnings were already voiced at a meeting between Yamandú Orsi and representatives of the scientific and business communities in June 2024. What is the bottom line?  It is safe to say that the new Uruguayan government will increase its attention to regional integration. If Luis Lacalle Pou called MERCOSUR a "suffocating corset" that can and should be gotten rid of, then with the election of Yamandú Orsi, the integration platforms, on the contrary, emphasize the useful function of supporting national interests. Although calls to reform multilateral groups so that they better correspond to specific policy objectives and the spirit of the times have not gone away. In Latin American political science thought, participation in integration groups is often presented as a way to achieve autonomy or, as one of the leading Argentine international theorists, Juan Carlos Puig, put it, “the ability to independently make foreign policy decisions, taking into account the objective conditions of the real world.” The autonomist course is usually associated with left-wing forces, but it does not necessarily imply the creation of blocs like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which directly challenge the West. Pragmatic diversification of ties with major powers, support for regional leaders, neutrality and non-interference can also be reflections of such a course. If we look at the rhetoric and first steps of I. Orsi’s team from this angle, we can link his attitude to regional structures with the search for autonomy in the international arena. Of course, with an adjustment for the traditional principles and limitations of Uruguayan diplomacy. At the same time, a significant shift or revitalization of Latin American regionalism is unlikely to result from Uruguay's leadership change. This is not only due to Uruguay's relatively small geopolitical weight but also because the new president does not seem inclined to challenge the regional status quo, forge a distinct identity, or promote it on the global stage. Uruguayan political analyst Daniel Buquet, reflecting on how Yamandú Orsi's victory might impact the leftist forces supporting integration, used a chess metaphor: “It’s like winning a pawn, but not a bishop”—a rather fitting analogy.  This article was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 23-78-01030, within the project "Latin America and the Concept of a Multipolar World: Key Approaches, Impact on Foreign Policy, and Relations with Russia".

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This departs from an assumption that the EU is an outstanding example of liberal institutionalism. It has been very successful in providing lasting peace for Europeans who are now facing a series of existential challenges.The central hypothesis of this paper is that if these challenges are not addressed effectively, the EU may not survive in the long term.The first part of the analysis explores five external challenges that affected the macroeconomic and political environments of the EU in the third decade of the 21st century.The second part of the analysis signals five internal and more profound challenges the EU must face if it wants to continue in any viable form.The author concludes that the future of the world order and, by extension, the environment of the EU will most likely be decided by three great powers: the US, China, and Russia. Keywords: EU, Great Powers, World Order, US, China, Russia Introduction 2024 is exactly 20 years since the so-called ‘Big Bang enlargement’, which is why the author of this paper takes the liberty of looking at the future of the European Union (EU). The EU is, according to voluminous literature, the best working example of Liberal Institutionalism, which at its very core is about prescribing peace and security. Yet, the EU project seems derailed in the last few years and is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. This lack of internal cohesion is arguably based on several political phenomena: overregulation, ideologisation, and bureaucratisation being the proverbial tip of the iceberg. This paper examines the EU's economic and political environment and then lists five most pressing challenges it must face to survive as an institution. British citizens have already shown the first ‘red card.’ Core external challenges - the macroeconomic and political environments To say that the contemporary world is complex is to state an obvious truism. However, five phenomena should be outlined here as significant variables regarding the EU’s environment. Firstly and most fundamentally, the changes in the international political economy and corresponding structural changes that undermine states’ positions. What we are witnessing is the emergence of non less than the New World Order, which not only challenges the so-called traditional great powers by shifting the centre of gravity to the East but, perhaps most importantly, challenges the position of state actors as ‘shakers and movers’ of the international system. The Great Reset and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are phenomenal examples of the challenges ahead. Secondly, the ongoing war in Ukraine. Apart from obvious regional European relevance, it should also be analysed globally. Russian invasion threatens principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. If allowed and left unchecked, it encourages other acts of aggression, and in doing so, it confirms a worrying trend according to which the so-called great powers stand above international law. The war draws attention to Ukraine's strategic importance as a large European country. In that sense, the outcome of the conflict will shape the balance of power on the continent. It tests the Western alliance and its response to such challenges. Moreover, it bears global economic consequences—Ukraine & Russia are significant exporters of grain, energy, and raw materials. Prolonged conflict involving these two risks, long-term inflation and food/fuel shortages abroad, is equivalent to the global spread of instability. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict bears an uncanny resemblance to a proxy war between the East and the West competition. An argument could be made that it can be seen as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, where Russia’s victory strengthens authoritarianism abroad. Finally, let us not forget the nuclear aspects of the conflict. A risk of direct Western involvement would raise the threat of nuclear escalation. The outcome could influence nonproliferation norms for security assurance. Thirdly, and partly as a response to the above two phenomena, there comes the question of German leadership/vision of the future of the EU. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two stand out among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[1] Fourthly, and again in significant part as a response to the first two phenomena, we are witnessing unprecedented resistance among large sections of European societies. In particular, the now openly verbalised and physically demonstrated dissatisfaction mainly, but not exclusively by the farmers, to the seemingly inevitable plan for the green transition as heralded by the ‘Fit-for-55’. It is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 [2]. This ambitious initiative includes actions in fourteen areas, from the reform of the EU’s emissions trading system through reducing emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste to regulation on methane emissions reduction. Effectively, this means that EU farmers will have to accept an unprecedented and unequal burden. On top of that, there is a question of Ukrainian farming products that enter the European market in equally unprecedented quantities. This prompts many farmers to demonstrate their objections towards their governments and the European Commission by blocking capital cities and transportation arteries across the block. The protests are massive in their character, with thousands upon thousands across most EU member states. Political elites in Europe probably had not expected this and possibly have not experienced such a level of dissatisfaction and resistance towards their policies since the creation of the European Union. Farmers have been aided by other professional groups, from truckers to taxi drivers and even ordinary citizens. Notably, the protests are a bottom-up initiative, though they have also drawn the attention of right-wing parties.[3] Last but not least, there is the question of massive immigration to the EU from outside Europe and consequent challenges to social cohesion in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. As of the writing of this paper (2025), more and more members of the societies of Western EU countries challenge the official narrative of their governments based on the assumption that massive immigration is primarily positive for the economies and that large numbers of non-Europeans pose no threat to the quality of life and security of ordinary citizens (the phenomenon referred to earlier by the author of this paper as ‘a-securitisation’ – Sliwinski, 2016).[4] Worse still, the differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the EU, namely Hungary under Victor Orban, pose a formidable challenge to the immigration policy of the entire EU and, consequently, the future of the EU's integrity. It is not unimaginable at this stage to fathom a day when Hungary, like Britain before, decides to leave the EU,[5] pressured by Brussels and Berlin to accept thousands of immigrants from the Middle East or Africa. Slovakia could follow suit. Core internal challenges – the weakness from within Many of these problems were accidentally quite openly expressed by J. D. Vance, US Vice President, during his speech at the latest Munich Security Conference (February 14th, 2025). Vance did not spare strong criticism directed at European elites and, in a typical ‘American fashion’, called a spade a spade. His criticism of the EU included six general points: retreat from democratic values, censorship and limitations on the freedom of speech, limitations of religious liberties, lack of election integrity, uncontrolled mass migration, and the general unwillingness of the political elites to engage with views other than those of the left and even tendency to suppress dissent.[6] - Centralisation (Federalisation) Today, the EU continues to centralise, particularly in response to challenges like the economic crisis COVID-19, taking on more fiscal policy, health, and security responsibilities. This trend is evident in recent proposals, such as the European Commission’s role in determining budgetary paths, but it faces resistance from member states concerned about losing sovereignty. Historically, the EU has been moving to a federation through recent treaty revisions: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). According to Alberto Mingardi from the GIS, there is a so-called ‘creeping power grab’ phenomenon.  “It assumes that Brussels should become more powerful while Rome, Berlin and Paris less so. [...] europhiles tend to look for opportunities that might allow them to give carte blanche to Brussels, albeit beginning with apparently limited endeavours. Hence, the EU is supposed to grow through crises, and thanks to crises, whatever the problem or issue, it could foster a slice of national sovereignty that can be cut and brought up to a higher level. Behind this, there is an overarching belief in the higher efficiency of centralisation, which is perhaps the true landmark of modern politics. Politicians trust themselves more than the taxpayers; they seek a single control room, and the more it controls, the better. This approach fits well with a protectionist outlook of economics, which sees Europe (‘fortress Europe’, as some say) as one trading bloc set to countervail others (the US, China).”[7] The centralisation (federalisation) logic rests heavily on the arguments presented by legalism. On the one hand, it derives from the strict and literal reading of regulations. On the other, it implies that no sphere of life should be left unregulated. Consequently, overregulation has become a characteristic feature of the European Union.[8] Additionally, the overregulation leads to the often cited democratic deficit,[9] exemplified by the fact that the majority of European legislation that EU member states are obliged to follow is proposed by nonelected technocrats working for the European Commission. - Demographic Decline and Social Welfare An ageing population and falling birth rates threaten the EU’s long-term economic stability and social welfare systems. With a shrinking workforce, funding pensions, healthcare, and social services is increasingly difficult, particularly in weaker economies. This demographic shift also amplifies labour shortages, prompting debates over immigration as a solution—yet one that risks further political backlash as it will inevitably affect European identity. According to available data, Europe is the only continent projected to experience population decline until 2070, with the EU's working-age population (20–64 years) expected to decrease by around 20%. Concurrently, the share of older individuals (65 years or older) will be the second highest globally among large economies. This demographic shift poses significant challenges, potentially undermining the EU's economic and social model, exacerbating existing disparities, and creating political divisions among Member States if not adequately addressed.[10] According to Eurostat, The natural population change (difference between live births and deaths) has been negative since 2012. This is primarily due to the ageing population described in this publication and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2022.[11] - Economic Competitiveness and Growth After the so-called Big Bang Enlargement, all available data suggests that the gap between the EU and the US with regards to GDP output has been steadily growing, that is to say, that the US economy, which recently has been experiencing huge problems, still has been developing faster than the EU.[12] Contemporary the EU is grappling with stagnating economic growth and a loss of competitiveness compared to global powers like the United States and China. High regulatory burdens, internal market fragmentation, and insufficient investment in innovation and technology hinder its ability to keep pace. The growing threat of US tariffs under a second Trump administration will only likely exacerbate these issues, disrupting supply chains and increasing costs. Additionally, the EU’s energy dependence—highlighted by the shift away from Russian gas after the Ukraine invasion—has driven up costs, further straining industries and economies, particularly in countries like Germany.[13] - Weakness as an international actor Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to pose a significant security challenge. The conflict has exposed the EU’s reliance on NATO and the US for defence while increasing pressure to bolster its own military capabilities—sometimes referred to as a ‘European Defence Union’. Tensions with China, particularly over trade and technology, and uncertainty about US commitment to transatlantic alliances add to the geopolitical strain. The EU must also address hybrid threats (e.g., cyberattacks, disinformation) targeting critical sectors like energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. In light of this, Americans are already calling for much more input from the European members of NATO regarding their defence budgets (5% of GDP).[14] This will most likely reinvigorate calls for creating a European Army,[15] which no doubt will be dominated by Germany and France. German domination will be met with considerable unease by some Central and Eastern European Countries (members of the EU). At the same time as the recent meeting, Ryiad shows the US is not even treating the EU as a partner worthy of a place at the negotiating table.[16]When pressed by the likes of Trump and charged with not sharing a fair part of their own security costs, European political leaders invoke the notion of Europe as a normative power. Supposedly, though weak militarily, the EU and its members are a beacon of values such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In his seminal publications, Iaan Manners, argued that the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and legal constitution enable it to promote norms that go beyond state-centric concerns, particularly in areas such as human rights and the abolition of the death penalty. Manners claims that the EU's ability to define what is considered 'normal' in world politics is a significant aspect of its power, and this normative approach is crucial for understanding the EU's role in shaping international relations.[17] As nice as it sounds, it does not seem to bear much weight in the practice of international security in recent decades. It is the EU, in fact, as an institution and the political leadership of France, Germany, and the European Commissioner, who stand accused now of contradicting all of the above-mentioned values. The latest visit by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to Kiev, and her strong support for the continuation of war against Russia is a case in point.[18]   - Ideologisation 'Europeanism' has become an ideology shared among intellectual, political, judicatory, societal,  and even dominant economic elites that influence or shape the European Union as an institution and its major policies. As an ideology, 'Europeanism' is a somewhat exotic mixture of various seemingly incoherent trends that give the current European Union its intriguing characteristics. On the one hand, economically, one can easily identify numerous elements of neoliberalism, especially regarding the financial aspects of European integration. Likewise, arguments used by the major proponents of European integration vis-à-vis the USA, China, or Japan are of neoliberal character. At the same time, regarding international trade in agricultural products, intellectual property, or internal (single market) competition (freedom of labour), one quickly spots distinct elements of protectionism and overregulation. Finally, regarding philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, 'Europeanism' seems to focus mainly on the progressive agenda and a particular ‘obsession’ with climate change revocation. Conclusion As the Munich Security Conference confirmed, EU political elites are way out of touch with reality and a rapidly changing world. Their proverbial Europocentrism is based on, among others, self-precepted moral high grounds, a history of economic and political domination and exploitation, and an undiscerning belief in bureaucratic, if not technocratic, policy-making and regulation of every sphere of life and institutionalism. Their weakness is probably most accurately depicted by the reaction of the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Christoph Heusgen, who broke down during his closing remarks, unable to finish his speech.[19] He was patted on the back and given a hug. (This reaction must have undoubtedly caused bewilderment, if not pity, in Washinton, Beijing, and Moscow.) The original integration goals have little to do with today’s Eureaucrats’ obsessions with saving the planet or pushing for Diversity, Equality, and Inclusivity (DEI). With the election of Donald Trump, the world of the ‘Davos Men’ seems to be stalled. Interestingly, the EU is now one of the last standing actors to represent the ideology of globalism, with its tenets based on neoliberalism - unlimited free trade and the capturing role of international transnational companies. The rest of the world, including the US, seems to be moving in the opposite direction – the world driven by state actors. The world order, therefore, is likely to be directed by strong and nationally based governments from no, possibly the US, China and Russia – a ‘Concert of Powers’ of sorts. References ________________________________________[1] The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752[2] “Fit for 55”, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/[3] Tanno, Sophie and Liakos, Chris. “Farmers’ protests have erupted across Europe. Here’s why.” CNN, World, Europe. Last modified February 10, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/europe/europe-farmers-protests-explainer-intl/index.html[4] Sliwinski, Krzysztof. “‘A-Securitization’ of Immigration Policy - the Case of European Union.” Asia–Pacific Journal of EU Studies 14, no. 1: 25 -56.[5] Körömi, Csongor. “Hungary reveals plan to send asylum-seekers to Brussels.” Politico August 22. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-asylum-plan-brussels-migration-refugees-gergely-gulyas/[6] Pangambam, S. “Full Transcript: VP JD Vance. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference”. The SIngju Post. https://singjupost.com/full-transcript-vp-jd-vance-remarks-at-the-munich-security-conference/?singlepage=1[7] Mingardi, Alberto, “The EU’s future: Like Switzerland or more like Italy?”GIS, May 20, 2022. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-future/ see also: Dunleavy, P., and G. Kirchgässner. “Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis.” Edited by P. Moser, G. Schneider, and G. Kirchgässner. Decision Rules in the European Union, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62792-9_7.[8] Van Malleghem, Pieter-Augustijn. “Legalism and the European Union’s Rule of Law Crisis.” European Law Open 3, no. 1 (2024): 50–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2024.5.[9] Neuhold, C. Democratic Deficit in the European Union, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.1141.[10] Zalai, Csaba. “Too Little Too Late?” Európai Tükör 27, no. 1 (December 13, 2024): 169–93. https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2024.1.9.[11] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/demography-2024#population-change[12] See more at: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/wld/world/gdp-gross-domestic-product[13] See more at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-outlook-2025-the-impact-of-a-new-US-presidency?utm_campaign=MA00001133&utm_medium=paid-search&utm_source=eiu-google&utm_content=&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8fW9BhC8ARIsACwHqYqwk_M8I--YkZ_fiDS6leiOiRLjPXlG63SHjKwQZgP2kaovx_sc4qIaAkGYEALw_wcB[14] See more at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/trump-says-nato-members-should-spend-5-of-gdp-on-defence/ and https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tells-allies-spend-5-percent-gdp-defense-nato/[15] See more at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgl27x74wpo[16] See more at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-russia-meeting-improving-relations-ukraine-war/[17] Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.[18] See more at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/24/ursula-von-der-leyen-arrives-in-kyiv-with-35-billion-in-fresh-aid-for-weapons[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhNy0u5-ijY

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has been an ever-present vexation in Western political discourse since its full extent was first revealed in 2002. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Security Council, United States of America, European Union, and Israel have employed an ever-widening and steadily-strengthening combination of negotiations, sanctions, and threats in attempts to rein in Iran’s atomic ambitions. Yet, and the severe impact of international actions upon on their nation’s economy notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic’s leaders have not been persuaded to limit the scope of nuclear activities or grant the IAEA enhanced oversight of the program.[1] Not always placed within the context of the Islamic Republic’s actions is that Iran’s nuclear quest began in 1973 while Iran was a Cold War ally of the US. The seeds had been sown more than a decade earlier, when the Tehran Research Reactor was provided by Washington in 1959. Then, as now, it seems Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons capability in tandem with and under the guise of a civilian nuclear program.[2] Much like the ayatollahs today, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi denied such intentions – claiming Iran was only pursuing nuclear energy in accordance with its rights as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). So, re-examining motivations and developments from before the Islamic Revolution can cast light upon contemporary events despite differences between the two Iranian regimes. The Shah’s Intensions During the 1970s just as now, Iran’s quest to become a nuclear power was rooted at least partially in the regional dynamics of its location between South Asia and the Middle East. The shah envisioned his nuclear program as a response to atomic efforts by India, Pakistan, and Israel. He even hinted in June 1974 that the national security of Iran may be best served by possessing a nuclear deterrent: “If in this region each little country tries to arm itself with armaments that are precarious, even elementary, but nuclear, then perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand it do the same.” The shah did add, to placate his international allies, “But I would find that completely ridiculous.”[3] Nonetheless, other nations were suspicious based on imperial Iran’s growing appetite for sophisticated weapons and the shah’s harkening back to the nation’s historical hegemony. So the possibility of Iran harboring nuclear weapons ambitions came sharply into international focus when the shah asserted that possibility to a French journalist in June 1974. Asked if Iran would one day possess a nuclear weapon like India had just one month previously, the shah declared: “Without any doubt, and sooner than one would think.”[4] Nuclear weapons require sophisticated targeting and delivery systems. At the present, with years of sanctions in place, the regular Iranian Navy and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) counterpart have been forced to innovate, rather successfully, in domestically enhancing maritime nuclear warfare capabilities.[5] In January 1975, however, the shah sought to purchase such nuclear-capable technology. Seeking to push through a deal for nuclear submarines from France, Iranian negotiators even claimed the administration in Washington had “been hinting that the U. S. might sell them.” US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger learned of this from French Presidential Secretary General Pierre Brousalette. Understandably concerned, Kissinger responded pointedly and repeatedly that the Iranian claim was “inconceivable … I’m 99.9% sure.”[6] Purchasing nuclear submarines would violate the multi-billion dollar US-Iran arms agreement forged in May 1972 when President Richard Nixon allowed the shah to purchase any weapons he wished from the US short of nuclear weapons and associated technology. Another warning sign was spotted in May 1975 when the shah sought to purchase six battalions of Lance surface-to-surface missiles from Washington. The US administration under President Gerald Ford worked through Secretary of State Kissinger to discourage Iran’s plan because “DOD [Department of Defense] does not consider the Lance a cost-effective weapon when used with a conventional warhead. Congressional critics of our arms sales to Iran would tend to link Iran’s purchase of the Lance with its nuclear development plans.”[7] Again, the parallel with modern day developments as the IRGC produces and seek to purchase missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads should not be overlooked.[8] Offers and Counter-Offers Undeterred by mounting international concern over his nuclear program, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi even proposed acquiring six to eight reactors from American suppliers plus more from French and German companies. His stated aim was to meet domestic energy requirements through atomic fission thereby reserving Iran’s petrochemical wealth for export to energy-hungry foreigners. At first glance, the proposal seemed like a win-win situation for everyone. Moreover, as the US government’s production of enriched nuclear fuel began reaching full capacity and plans were made to assemble a private sector consortium to add further capacity, the shah offered to purchase a 30 percent stake. The gesture was significant, as other interested parties had proven reluctant to commit significant funds. Iran eventually loaned US $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission and was slated to acquire a 10 percent stake in the French Eurodif uranium enrichment plant. Although that stake did not materialize, the Islamic Republic remains an indirect investor through a Franco-Iranian consortium.[9] At that time during the Ford Administration (1974–1977), however, alarm in Washington over nuclear proliferation resulted in a provision that Tehran would have to relinquish reprocessing of atomic fuel to a multilateral conglomerate or allow direct American oversight within Iran.[10] The shah denounced those conditions as discriminatory because Iran was a member of the NPT and therefore entitled to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. The situation bears an uncanny resemblance specifically to events in 2009 when the fuel swap proposal from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany failed to win Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s approval and broadly to the vexed history of failed attempts at nuclear safeguards for Iran.[11] The IAEA, US, and EU estimate that the Islamic Republic’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium far exceeds needs of the Tehran medical research reactor for many years to come.[12] Likewise, during the Ford Administration, the US Department of State reported that the shah’s planned electricity generating capacity of 23,000 megawatts went well beyond all projections of Iran’s domestic energy needs. The report therefore concluded that Iran’s motives were “not entirely clear” and seemed to be propelled at least in part by a desire to develop nuclear weapons.[13] As a result, negotiations continued to falter over the reprocessing issue until President Jimmy Carter reached a provisional agreement on the issue with the shah in 1978. Yet, whether the shah would have honored the agreement will never be known for he was overthrown the following year. It is likely, however, that Iran would have ended up confronting the West generally and the US specifically over its nuclear program even if the shah had remained on the throne and continued to be an American ally. Indeed, the shah’s thinly-masked quest for nuclear power was apparent to officials who served him, even as Western governments remained uncertain of the end game as they now seem to be with the ayatollahs. Minister of Court Asadollah Alam wrote in his diary on 29 November 1975 that the shah’s scheme “though he denies it, probably includes our manufacturing of a nuclear deterrent.”[14] Akbar Etemad, the shah’s chief atomic energy adviser, was more definitive when interviewed after the Pahlavi dynasty had been ousted: “I always suspected that part of the shah’s plan was to build [nuclear] bombs.”[15] The Ayatollahs’ Aims Having experienced colossal military and civilian causalities during the Iraqi-triggered border war from 1980 and 1988, Iran’s leadership concluded that survival of their nation and regime were paramount. Like the shah before them, the ayatollahs turned to a nuclear program in the hope of assuaging those concerns. After the Islamic Republic reluctantly agreed to termination of hostilities with Iraq, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani laid the groundwork for the nuclear program’s recommencement. Even religious ideals which regarded nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as haram or prohibited were cast aside. Speaking to the IRGC in October 1988, while serving as Speaker of Parliament, Rafsanjani advocated developing weapons of mass destruction “because the need for such armaments was made very clear during the [Iran-Iraq] war … [so] we should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defense use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.”[16] Once a political consensus had been achieved in late 1988, Mohsen Rezai who commanded the IRGC, and now serves as Secretary of the Expediency Guidance Council, wrote to then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini requesting both religious endorsement and administrative permission for the revolutionary guards to initiate a nuclear weapons program. Mir Hossein Mousavi who served as Iran’s Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989 supported the request by Rezai and the campaign by Rafsanjani.[17] Although Supreme Leader Khomeini had initially been opposed to the atom’s might, they were able to sway Iran’s revolutionary founder into agreeing that “We have nothing against setting up atomic installations.”[18] So the Islamic Republic commenced fledgling steps toward nuclear power. Subsequently as two-term president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani ensured Iran fully resumed its quest toward nuclearization. His presidential successors Seyyed Mohammad Khatami who held office from 1997 to 2005 and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who has been in office since 2005 continued the energy and weapon programs set up by Rafsanjani, Rezai, and Mousavi. Khatami did suspend uranium enrichment in 2003 hoping to improve relations with the US, but legislative elections in 2004 saw resurgence of hardliners on the Iranian political scene and a recommitment to atomic goals.[19] Over the next two decades the Islamic Republic turned not only to its pre-revolutionary technology but also to foreign sources including A. Q. Khan’s illicit Pakistan-based network, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China as it steadily built-up domestic nuclear capacity. On the political and ideological fronts, a convergence of self-preservation, nationalism, and suspicion of the West leads many Iranian leaders to embrace nuclear ambitions. Hence, like the Pahlavi dynast before it, the Islamic Republic of Iran is unlikely to abandon either nuclear power or the possibility of weaponization.[20] Indeed, negative responses to Ahmadinejad’s attempt to reach a nuclear fuel swap deal with the West in late 2009 are highly instructive. “The discussions in Geneva were really surprising … the hard work of thousands of [our] scientists would be ruined,” lamented Mousavi. Unsuccessful presidential candidate Seyyed Mehdi Karroubi accused Ahmadinejad’s administration of “trying to change its policies” rather than “observing national and religious interests.” Not to be outdone by other politicians, Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani claimed that “Westerners are insisting in a direction that suggests cheating us out of our nuclear rights.” Sensing the overall pro-nuclear sentiment within his administration, Supreme Leader Khamenei then expressed distain for compromise: “When we carefully look at the situation, we notice that they [the U.S. and its allies] are hiding a dagger behind their back.”[21] Present Mimics the Past with Graver Dangers Yet, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently denied it seeks anything more than nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But Supreme Leader Khamenei’s unconvincing words that “We do not have nuclear weapons, and we do not intend to produce them,” are reminiscent of those by the last shah and his diplomats that “Iran is not thinking of building atomic weapons.” Such statements are directed at defusing the brewing storm in Washington, London, and Jerusalem rather than for domestic policy-makers, however. Indeed, and contrary to claims of peaceful intentions, Khamenei has threatened repeatedly by declaring “Iran will respond with the same level of power,” the shah’s regime too left open the possibility of assembling nuclear warheads by claiming “the regime may revise its policy if other non-nuclear nations do.”[22] There is an essential difference in such rhetoric, however, for the shah was not threating the US, EU, Saudi Arabia, Israel, or any other nation with preemptive or retaliatory attacks nor sponsoring terrorism. So unlike the shah, much of the pressure Iran faces is a direct consequence of the confrontational positions taken by its leaders.  Nuclear weapons fitted well with the shah’s ideas of deterring external adversaries and strengthening his hold on power at home, just as similar ideas motivate the ayatollahs who run the Islamic Republic to continue enhancing their nuclear program. If the shah’s pattern of obfuscation between 1973 and 1979 is any indicator, it is unlikely that Iran’s current leaders will meet NPT obligations – even at great socio-economic cost to their citizens and fever-pitch global consternation. Worse, unlike the royal regime whose tyranny inside Iran set a model for that of the Shi‘ite clergymen, the Islamic Republic has come to be associated with threats and violence beyond its borders directed against nations and persons perceived as foes of theocratic rule. Moreover, unlike the shah, the Muslim theocrats who now govern seek to export their intolerant brand of fundamentalism to other nations with an avowed goal of “leading the world.” Equally problematic, they speak of “sharing nuclear knowledge and technology” – thereby further undermining the NPT and possibly even global stability.[23] For the ayatollahs who hold power by force at home and seek to dominate the world stage through terror abroad, nuclear weapons would serve as the ultimate deterrent against punitive consequences, international adversaries, and externally-imposed regime change. Consequently, as the shah did in the 1970s, Iran’s current leaders undoubtedly view acquisition of nuclear technology as a self-servingly rational decision even at the expense of alienating Iran from other countries.[24] Western nations, like Iran’s Arab and Israeli neighbors, were wary of the shah’s motives. Now they are downright fearful of the ayatollahs’ intentions. Even the US with its formidable military resources may only be able to set back Iran’s nuclear plans by a few years if Washington feels compelled to attack. The basic dilemma confronting nations that seek to halt the Islamic Republic’s progress toward atomic power is that rational choices do not always indicate levelheaded decision-makers. Like the shah before them, the ayatollahs resort to political paranoia on the domestic and international fronts as part of their rationale for espousing nuclear technology.[25] Yet unlike the shah’s program coming to a halt through regime change, those opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran reaching and crossing the nuclear threshold cannot place hope on a new government emerging in Tehran anytime in the near future. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source. [1]. Jamsheed K. Choksy, “More Documentation of Iran’s Relentless Pursuit of Nukes,” Forbes (7 November 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2011/11/07/more-documentation-of-irans-relentless-pursuit-of-nukes/. [2]. Abbas Milani, “The Shah’s Atomic Dreams,” Foreign Policy (29 December 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/29/the_shahs_atomic_dreams. [3] . US Department of Defense, “US Embassy Paris Cable 15445 to Department of State, Further Remarks by Shah on Nuclear Weapons,” (25 June 1974), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc01b.pdf. [4]. US Department of Defense, “US Embassy Paris Cable 15305 to Department of State, Interview with Shah,” (24 June 1974), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc01a.pdf. [5]. Jamsheed K. Choksy, “Why Iran’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition Matters,” The American Interest, (5 August 2011), http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/middleeast/2011/08/05/why-irans-blue-water-naval-ambition-matters/. [6]. US Department of State, “Teleconference: Henry Kissinger and Pierre Brousalette, KA13128,” (8 January 1975), http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000D9F4.pdf. [7]. The Digital National Security Archive, “Sidney Sober, Your Meeting with the Shah at Blair House, Confidential Briefing Memorandum to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,” (9 May 1975), http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=6a6_1181429741. [8]. Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Iran Primer (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 2012), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program. [9]. Oliver Meier, “Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A Troubled Model,” Arms Control Association (January/February 2006), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IranEnrich. [10]. William Burr, “The History of Iran’s Nuclear Energy Program,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (19 January 2009), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-history-of-irans-nuclear-energy-program. [11]. Arms Control Association, “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” (last updated March 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. [12]. Olli Heinonen, “The 20 Percent Solution,” Foreign Policy (11 January 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/11/the_20_percent_solution?page=full. [13]. William Burr, “A Brief History of US-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 65 (January 2009), pp. 24–25, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/65/1/21.full. [14]. Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969–1977 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993) p. 453, http://www.amazon.com/Shah-Confidential-Diary-Irans-1968-77/dp/1845113721#reader_1845113721. [15]. Maziar Bahari, “The Shah’s Plan was to Build Bombs: Interview with Akbar Etemad,” New Statesman (11 September 2008), http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2008/09/iran-nuclear-shah-west. [16]. Institute for Science and International Security, “Nuclear Iran: Nuclear History,” http://www.isisnucleariran.org/nuclear-history. For a similar statement in December 2001, see Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran’s Radical Leader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 118–119, http://www.amazon.com/Ahmadinejad-Secret-History-Radical-Leader/dp/0520256638#reader_0520256638. [17]. Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “The Birth of a Bomb: A History of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Der Spiegel (17 June 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-701109,00.html; and Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 117. [18]. Harold J. Salemson and Tony Hendra, eds., Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini: Political, Philosophical, Social, and Religious (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), p. 17; and Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 117. [19]. Karl Vick, “Iran’s Gray Area on Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post (21 June 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/20/AR2006062001584.html; and Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 119; and Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 247. [20]. Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choksy, “A Nuclear Iran is Inevitable,” Forbes (19 March 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/19/iran-nuclear-sanctions-opinions-contributors-jamsheed-and-carol-choksy_2.html. [21]. Reported by Khaleej Times (29 October 2009), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2009/October/middleeast_October795.xml§ion=middleeast; Yahoo News (8 November 2009), http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20091108/wl_nm/us_iran_karoubi; Press TV (24 October 2009), http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=109516§ionid=351020104; and Washington Post (4 November 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/03/AR2009110301397.html?sub=AR. [22]. US Department of Defense, “US Embassy Tehran Cable 5192 to Department of State, Shah’s Alleged Statement on Nuclear Weapons,” (25 June 1974), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc01c.pdf; and Mehr News Agency, “Iran will Respond to Any Attack at ‘Same Level’: Leader,” (20 May 2012), http://www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1562963. [23]. Jamsheed K. Choksy, “Iran’s Global Ambitions – Part I,” Yale Global (13 September 2010), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/irans-global-ambitions-part-i. [24]. Fareed Zakaria, “Interview with Gen. Martin Dempsey,” CNN GPS (19 February 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1202/19/fzgps.01.html. [25]. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 111–131; reprinted as “The Paranoid Style in Iranian Politics,” Frontline: Tehran Bureau (27 August 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/the-paranoid-style-in-iranian-politics.html.