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Energy & Economics
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 23 April 2024: Crowds demonstrate in the square of the National Congress for public, free and quality university education.

Milei’s administration: Is freedom advancing?

by José Manuel Corrales Aznar

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The first months of Javier Milei's presidency in Argentina have been marked by deep tension and polarization. The striking statement by the Argentinian president, who declared "there is no money," was a clear warning of the inevitable economic recession. Paraphrasing Churchill, a tough phase of "blood, sweat, and tears" was thus inaugurated. Criticism of Milei's administration has pointed to its antisocial and erratic economic drift, fearing an increase in inequality and a possible bankruptcy. These critical voices question the extreme approach of his policies, warning about macroeconomic stability, freedoms, and the well-being of the population. Inequality is increasing Inflation, which continues to soar, is eroding the purchasing power of families, and half of the population is living in poverty — 23 million Argentinians out of a total of 46 million inhabitants. This situation complicates economic planning for both families and businesses. A striking example is the increase in gas prices, which in some cases has risen by more than 300%. The initial political actions of Milei's administration have been based on drastic cuts to public services, mass layoffs, and reductions in key areas such as health, education, and transportation, which have sparked intense social mobilizations. This reduction in state spending has already led to the dismissal of tens of thousands of public employees, worsening the quality of life for the population. During the first months of Javier Milei's administration, widespread poverty in Argentina has intensified. The lack of opportunities and the economic crisis have left many families in a desperate situation, deepening the gap between the rich and the poor. The government is attempting to reverse this trend by eliminating social assistance programs and cutting essential services. Additionally, it is trying to impose labor precariousness without prior dialogue, which is seen by the labor movement as a serious attack on workers' rights. Economic deterioration The restriction of public spending and the goal of achieving a budget surplus have been cornerstones of Milei's administration. However, dismantling vital areas such as health, education, and transportation has not succeeded in restoring liquidity and confidence in the economic system. Economic policies must go beyond cold numbers and consider their human impact. Poverty in Argentina has become widespread, with 60% of the population struggling and 3.5 million people living in extreme poverty, without access to adequate housing or sufficient food. The purchasing power of families has diminished due to runaway inflation, cutting wages and pensions. Meanwhile, the prices of goods and services have skyrocketed, and tax revenues have plummeted. All social welfare indicators have worsened, and the Argentinian economy faces significant challenges. Milei’s government must seek a balance between economic stability and the quality of life for the population to address these challenges. Cuts to freedom Additionally, significant restrictions on press freedom have been reported, further complicating the country's democratic situation. For example, on May 21st in Argentina, following serious conflicts between the Argentinian government and the press, social media platforms and public media websites were suspended. These decisions, coupled with a dismissive discourse towards those who disagree, have exacerbated tensions and political polarization. As a result, numerous voices have emerged advocating for more inclusive and dialogue-based policies to address the country's real issues. The social deterioration, persistent inflation, unbearable accumulated debt, and economic uncertainty must be addressed with rationality and moderation. The impoverishment of many Argentine families is not just a statistic; it represents broken lives and shattered dreams, with no signs that socioeconomic recovery is near. Radical populist right-wing ‘La Libertad Avanza’ is the political party that supports Javier Milei, with a populist agenda. This movement aligns with the radical right-wing currents gaining ground globally, driven by the leadership of figures like Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Nayib Bukele, Giorgia Meloni, and Viktor Orbán, among others. The elections at the end of the year in the United States could mark a turning point in the success of this ideological current. For Milei, it would be very beneficial if Donald Trump returned to the presidency in the White House, even though he has recently been convicted by a court and still has several pending legal cases. Since Javier Milei assumed the presidency of Argentina, his administration has strayed from principles of dialogue, consensus, and the pursuit of the common good. The recent diplomatic incident in Spain, involving serious insults against the Spanish Prime Minister and his wife, is a clear example of this intentional provocation. Instead of moving toward greater freedom and prosperity, his government has deepened societal confrontation in Argentina. Need for dialogue In this context of division and confrontation, it becomes evident that Milei's government needs to adopt a more inclusive, flexible, and dialogue-driven approach that allows for building bridges and seeking consensual solutions to the problems Argentina faces. It can be concluded that Milei's management in his first months in office has not led to progress in terms of freedom. Instead, what seems to be advancing is harmful controversy and social polarization. The political decisions and statements of the Argentinian government have generated heated debates and further deepened the division and tension within Argentinian society, exacerbating existing tensions.

Diplomacy
USA Vice President Kamala Harris met Guatemala's President and community leaders to discuss migration and corruption control.

Kamala Harris and the Hope of the World

by Collin Chapman FAIIA

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Donald Trump is now having his lead whither before him as the fresh and young face of Kamala Harris steps forward for the Democrats. It is Trump’s to lose, and any continuation of current tactics are unlikely to be unhelpful. Only a few days ago most of us expected that Donald J Trump would win the battle to become the next president of the United States, beating an aging and befuddled Joe Biden by a substantial majority, according to the polls. Today, we ponder the implications of the first black and South Asian woman running for president and of America electing its first woman president in history. Kamala Harris has long been written off as a contender for the highest office by members of the commentariat, but many are now changing their tune. Within days of Biden renouncing the nomination, leading Democrats and commentators were lining up to give her their strong support and admitting that their earlier judgments could have been wrong. Late but unequivocal support came from Barack and Michelle Obama, who had allegedly been doubtful about her prospects or suitability for the office. In a call to Harris, captured on video, the former president said he “couldn’t be prouder to endorse [Harris] and to do everything he could to get her through the election and into the Oval Office.” Michelle Obama told Harris: “I am proud of you. This is going to be historic.” In a subsequent statement the Obamas said that “There is no doubt in our mind that Kamala Harris has exactly what it takes to win this election and deliver for the American people.” Within a week, everything had changed. Such is the nature of this year’s American presidential election. It is going to be a contentious, close and, almost certainly, dirty fight. But Kamala Harris, a former state prosecutor, has already shown she has more than enough steel in her to withstand whatever blows Trump and his acolytes choose to throw, and can give as good as she gets. The assaults will come but it is unlikely they will inflict any serious wounds, and the return to the White House that Trump longs for and had assumed was his for the taking is, in fact, his to lose. Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator at the Financial Times, sat down with political analyst Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of the National Interest magazine, after learning of the belated withdrawal of Joe Biden from the presidential race, to discuss how strong a candidate Kamala Harris would be. Heilbrunn told Rachman, “I think Harris will be an extremely formidable candidate who is well positioned to slice and dice Donald Trump on a variety of issues, ranging from abortion to gun control to women’s rights. And I don’t think he has any idea of what awaits him. …. The climate is perfect for Harris because she does represent the generational change that the country has been thirsting for. If the Republicans stick with Trump, who is almost 80 years old, they now have the candidate who is elderly and clearly the loopy, if not mentally challenged.” It is not hard to imagine what Mr Trump’s response might be, but were I asked, I would respectfully suggest that he avoids the use of personal invective against Kamala Harris – it will almost certainly backfire on him. Harris, for her part, would be well advised to do the same, avoiding bashing Trump as a convicted felon in favour of convincing the people that she can be trusted to defend American values at home and abroad, acknowledging voters’ struggle with inflation, continuing to speak out strong for women’s reproductive rights, and endorsing America’s global role and the rule of law. Of course, the decision is a matter for the people of the United States, not those of us who live in Europe or elsewhere. But suddenly we feel an uplift of spirit: there is a real contest to play out in the next 100 or so days. Having survived an assassination attempt, Mr Trump enjoys an unshakable hold on his party. But he can be beaten. His rambling and mean-spirited acceptance speech for the party’s nomination at the Republican convention showed the man for what he is. Kamala Harris has made a compelling start in raising funds for her campaign and attracting strong support. She was the beneficiary of Joe Biden’s obstinacy in relinquishing the fight for a second term; his delay in doing so averted an open primary, which she may have lost. Simply by being 59, she is now the face of a new generation of leadership, making Donald Trump, the oldest nominee in history. Despite all this, she remains the underdog in this race, and time is not on her side. Her status as the uncontested nominee for the Democratic party in the presidential election could lead quickly to recriminations if her campaign starts to go wrong. We must hope that Ms Harris can show the American people that she is up to the job of president, and offer them—and the world—hope.

Defense & Security
A child in a destroyed house. Ukrainian children during the war.

The Children of War

by Lila Roldán Vázquez

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shaken the world order and has seriously disrupted international peace and security. The geopolitical impact, the causes of the war and the reasons invoked to justify the armed aggression have been widely discussed. Among the many facets of the war, there is one issue that requires special attention, since it constitutes, without a doubt, one of its most serious consequences: the death of hundreds of children and the abduction of thousands of them, in flagrant violation of humanitarian law. We aim to analyze the circumstances and consequences of these actions, which may constitute a war crime, and to evaluate their impact in the medium and the long term. Children as victims of the war Motyzhyn is a village in the Bucha region, forty-five kilometers west of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. It was occupied by Russian forces in the days following the invasion of February 24, 2022, for about a month and a half. Several houses in the town were destroyed and its school partially demolished. When the Russian troops had to withdraw, the bodies of five civilians who had been executed were found, with their hands tied behind their backs. Among them were the village’s mayor, her husband and their son, who had refused to collaborate with the invaders. Today, the school in Motyzhyn is being rebuilt, but the children and young students who saw their teachers and neighbours die cannot forget the images of war. A group of teenagers trembles as they give their testimony. They express their fear of not being able to have a safe, peaceful life, of not having a future in their land. Their lives are marked forever. They are not the only ones. The stories of children witness of atrocities number in the hundreds. There are thousands of children separated from their parents, either because they have died, or because the children themselves have been displaced away from the front of the war, or because they have been kidnapped and taken to occupied territories or outside of Ukraine, to Russia or Belarus. In March 2022, just a month after the full-scale Russian invasion, the United Nations estimated that 78 children had already died and 105 had been injured.' Just over a year later, on June 1, 2023, the UN issued a report according to which the number of children killed in Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion reached 525. The report also stated that there were at least 1047 children injured in 289 cities, towns and villages throughout Ukraine, both in the areas controlled by the Government and in those occupied by Russia, from that same date.2 The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, deployed in 2014 in the wake of the occupation of the Crimean peninsula occupation and the armed conflict in the east of the country, stated that until June 2023, the Russian invasion of February 2022 has caused a total of almost 9.000 civilian deaths and more than 15.000 injuries, warning that the real number could be considerably higher, due to the difficulties faced by UN observers in accessing some areas of Ukraine where intense fighting was recorded. In October, the said Observation Mission updated the number of civilian deaths at almost 10.000 people and tens of thousands of wounded. To the figures detailed in the referenced reports, which are not exhaustive, since no certain data is available on the areas occupied by the Russian Federation, we must naturally add the victims —-dead and injured children that have occurred since the date of evaluations so far. New cases are registered practically every day. The war in Ukraine has not only caused death and injury to children and adolescents. Forced displacement, abandonment of their homes, disruption of schooling and a normal life, are also indelibly marking their lives. In the first days of the Russian invasion, millions of families were separated, mothers and younger children leaving Ukrainian territory while fathers and older siblings joined the national forces. These massive displacements to, preferably, neighbouring countries -Poland, Romania, Moldova- and from there to other destinations, were carried out under very precarious emergency conditions. Most of the displaced had to remain for long months in refugee camps. According to information collected by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), some children had to escape from Ukrainian territory alone, thereby increasing their exposure to possible abuse, sexual exploitation and human trafficking. During the course of the war, there were also numerous internal displacements from Ukrainian regions where there is greater war activity to regions considered safer, with the consequent unavoidable consequences: housing precariousness, interruption of schooling and special difficulties for institutionalized or disabled children. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, established by the Human Rights Council on March 4, 2022, to investigate alleged violations and abuses of human rights, violations of International Humanitarian Law and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation (Resolution 49/1)3, documented sexual crimes and gender violence against civilians, in victims from 4 to 82 years of age. The Commission certified cases of children who were raped, tortured, illegally detained, murdered and injured in indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons. On April 4, 2023, the Council, through Resolution 52/32, Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression, extended the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry for a new period of one year. This Resolution, approved by 28 votes (Argentina), 2 against (China and Eritrea) and 17 abstentions (Bolivia, Cuba, India and others), in its paragraph 17 “Stresses the importance of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of children and protecting children from all forms of violence, including sexual and gender -based violence, and emphasizes the importance of investigating and documenting violations and abuses of the rights of the child and violations of international humanitarian law, including forcible transfers and deportation, by relevant mechanisms, including the Commission of Inquiry”.4 In its October 2022 report, the Commission of Inquiry signalled that it had found evidence of the commission of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law corresponding crimes, by the Russian authorities, in areas under their control on Ukrainian territory: “The evidence collected demonstrates that the Russian authorities have committed the war crimes of murder, torture, rape and other sexual violence and the deportation of children to the Russian Federation”.5 Shortly after the full-scale invasion began, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) entrusted its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) with monitoring the situation in Ukraine. In the three reports submitted to date, in July and December 2022 and in July 2023, the ODIHR refers to the children’s situation. In the first of those reports, the high number of hospitals and schools bombed by the Russian Army is recorded, in “apparent violation of their protected status under International Humanitarian Law”. The report indicates that, according to information from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, 1899 educational establishments were damaged and 215 were destroyed as of June 30, 2022.6 Also, in the OSCE’s sphere, the Moscow Mechanism adopted in 1991 allows its Member States to request the appointment of an ad hoc mission of independent experts to investigate a particular problem related to the human dimension of the OSCE, either in their own territory or in that of another Member of the Organization. Ukraine first invoked the application of this Mechanism on March 3, 2022, with the support of 45 Member States. A mission of three experts appointed under this framework was given a broad mandate, which was to establish possible contraventions of OSCE commitments, violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law; as well as possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including due to deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; and to collect and analyse this information with a view to presenting it to the corresponding accountability mechanisms, as well as to the courts or tribunals with jurisdiction in the matter. The Mission, whose mandate was renewed twice, prepared three reports: in April and December 2022 and in June 2023. In their First Interim Report of April 2022, the experts confirmed that the conflict has affected children in many different ways: first, they are among the direct victims of the war and, even if they are not directly victims, many of them have lost their parents, which implies a family life interrupted forever. The report stated that, according to United Nations figures, more than half of the Ukrainian population under 18 years of age -that is, 4.3 million people- had been displaced from February 24, 2022, to that date. More than 1.8 million had left the country, while the remaining 2.5 million were internally displaced. Many of these children and adolescents —among them several thousand who were institutionalized before the conflict- have travelled alone, exposing themselves to numerous risks: dying or being injured during displacement, the risk of human trafficking and exploitation, the risk of child labour, the risk of forced recruitment or the risk of gender violence. Likewise, the Report stated that the conflict has caused the largescale destruction of civil infrastructure and the interruption of vital services, such as food, water and electricity or the provision of health services, all of which also affect children.7 In May 2022, Missing Children Europe also published a report on the children who were reported missing in Ukraine during the first 60 days of war and called on the European Union and its Member States to provide support and protection to all children and families at risk of entering that condition as a result of the conflict.8 Forced displacement and kidnapping of children In early June 2022, on International Children’s Day, President Zelenskyi noted that as of that date, there were already 200.000 Ukrainian children who had been forced to leave the country and were dispersed in the territory of the Russian Federation. The purpose of those forced transfers of Ukrainian children, according to the president, “is not only to steal them, but to make those who were deported forget about Ukraine and unable to return.9 Ukraine has denounced, and Russia has admitted, the displacement of thousands of children to territories occupied by the Russian Federation or to its territory, although the figures indicated by both states differ. At the end of September 2023, the official website of the Government of Ukraine that provides updated data and consolidated information on children suffering from the consequences of the armed conflict, registered 19.546 deportees or forcibly displaced minors. According to statements by Ukrainian officials, this figure includes children who have crossed the border with the Russian Federation accompanied by their parents. It would also include those children sent —presumably with paternal consent- to summer camps. For its part, the Russian Federation maintains that approximately 744.000 Ukrainian children, transferred for reasons of “evacuation”, “medical treatment”, “vacation” or “rehabilitation travel”, now live in Russia or Russian-occupied territories. As of July 2023, the office of the Russian Federation Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, reported that of the approximately 4.8 million residents of Ukraine “accepted” in Russia since the beginning of the war, more than 700.000 would be minors, the vast majority of whom would have arrived in that country with their parents or other relatives.10 There was information and statements coming from Russia prior to that date, which would make said figure plausible.11-11bis The Ukrainian authorities have stated, however, that these figures could be exaggerated: Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmitro Lubinets, suggested that the number of children could reach 150.000.12 Meanwhile, the President’s Commissioner for Children’ Rights, Daria Gerasymchuk, estimates that there could be “between 200 and 300 thousand abducted children”.13 Although all the information available coincides in a very high number of deported minors, the difficulties in establishing accurate figures are evident, given the lack of information shared between the authorities of both countries and the complexity of the regulatory situation, since some Ukrainian territories have been “annexed” by the Russian Federation (without the recognition of the international community) and Putin’s government applies the legislation of that country to them, regarding matters such as nationality, citizenship, adoption and custody of minors. The difficulties that this creates from the point of view of Private International Law, in cases of parents or legal guardians of minors who require their return, as well as of Public International Law in restitution claims filed by the government of Ukraine, must be the subject of a detailed study. In its report to the Human Rights Council, the Monitoring Mission in Ukraine points out the lack of information about Ukrainian children, some of them institutionalized and with physical and intellectual disabilities, who have been transferred to localities within the occupied zones or deported to Russia. Cases are mentioned of children who were sent to summer camps in Russia, supposedly with their parents’ consent, but who were then not returned to their homes. The UN Mission warns that the government of the Russian Federation did not identify those children or reunite them with their families.14 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine identified three situations in which Russian authorities have transferred unaccompanied Ukrainian minors from an area controlled by them in Ukrainian territory to another area in the same situation or to the territory of the Russian Federation: i) minors who lost their parents or contact with them during the hostilities; ii) minors who were separated as a result of the arrest of their parents; iii) minors placed in public institutions. According to the Commission, in some of those cases the transfers were made in violation of International Humanitarian Law and qualify as illegal transfers or deportations, which constitutes a war crime. Another worrying aspect of the deportations is also pointed out, which arises from information provided by Commissioner Lvova -Belova, as well as from interviews with relatives or legal representatives of some children and from press information, and which refers to the placement of minors in foster families in the Russian Federation, with the ostensible goal of having them remain in that country for extended periods of time.15 Indeed, of the 31 minors transferred to the Russian Federation from a public institution in the city of Donetsk in May 2022, one was placed in the custody of Mrs. Maria Lvova- Belova, who in September of that year announced that the minor had been granted a Russian passport and he was now “ours”. This is not a unique case, as other abductions of Ukrainian children by Russian families have already been confirmed. Regarding the response of the Russian government to the concerns raised by the Commission and by public opinion in general, regarding an eventual mechanism agreed between the two States for the return of transferred children, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared in September 2023 that “If families are located, we will assist them in reunifying with those children”.16 Mrs. Maria Lvova-Belova in turn pointed out that if a child “has a parent with full parental rights, the family has every possibility of being reunified”.17 However, there are very few cases in which transferred minors have been returned to their parents, in response to private initiatives by the parents, legal guardians or the minors themselves. Occasionally, third States have also intervened to obtain the return of some children. However, these are always specific cases: the majority of transferred minors have not returned to Ukraine or been able to reunite with their parents; on the contrary, they have remained in the Russian Federation for long periods of time, since their abduction. These actions contravene the legal requirement of International Humanitarian Law, in the sense that evacuations of children must be temporary and can only occur in cases of force majeure for reasons of health or medical treatment. Considering these parameters, the Commission considered that transfers that continue over time are assimilated to illegal deportations, which constitutes a war crime. The reports of the OSCE-ODIHR, by direct mandate of the Organization or in application of the Moscow Mechanism, also refer to forced transfers of civilians and in particular to forced transfers and deportations of children. Furthermore, the Observation mission carried out by the third ODIHR report on application of the Moscow Mechanism in June 2023, was specifically designated to address that issue and was expressly mandated to “...establish the facts and circumstances involving possible violations of relevant OSCE commitments, violations and abuses of human rights and violations of International Humanitarian Law and Internacional Human Rights Law, as well as possible cases of war crimes and crimes against Humanity, associated with or resulting from the forcible transfer of children within areas of the territory temporary controlled or occupied by Russia and/or their deportation to the Russian Federation...”.18 In their reports, the experts address with great concern the forced transfers and deportations of unaccompanied children, signalling that the policies applied by the Russian Federation in such cases could be contrary to International Law. The last of these reports established that the reasons more commonly invoked to justify the organized displacement of these children are: i) evacuation for security reasons; ii) transfer for adoption or foster care purposes; and iii) temporary stays in the so-called “recreation camps”. “Evacuation for security reasons” was invoked as legal support for the massive transfers of the civilian population, including children, which were carried out from the Ukrainian regions so called “Donetsk and Luhansk republics”, even from a week prior to the invasion of 24 February 2022. By the 20th, the authorities of the Rostov region, in the Russian Federation, reported that more than 2.904 children from those regions of Ukraine had entered their territory. Regardless of the reasons invoked for their transfer or the form of integration: whether by adoption —preferably in cases of children from Crimea— or by virtue of temporary guardianship or custody, Ukrainian children find themselves in an entirely Russian environment, including language, customs and religion and are exposed to information campaigns aimed at re-educating them, as well as giving them military education. The authorities of the Russian Federation do not take any measures to actively promote the return of Ukrainian children to their country, but rather create obstacles for families seeking to recover them. The experts appointed by the ODIHR reported that, according to statements by officials and the media, the Russian Federation transferred children from occupied territories to “holiday camps”, but once transferred to Crimea or to Russian territory, they are not returned to their families as originally agreed. Cases are cited in Kherson, where in the wake of violent attacks and schools closures, some parents accepted Russia’s offer to take their children to camps in Crimea but were then unable to contact or retrieve them.19 Some Ukrainian minors were even forcibly transferred to Belarus, as it was admitted by the director of the Belarusian Red Cross, Dzmiytryi Shautsou, who pointed out that these transfers had been made for rehabilitation treatments. The authorities of that country recently admitted that more than a thousand children are in Belarus “for health reasons’. The ODIHR experts assessed that “although certain displacements carried out by the Russian Federation were in line with its obligations under International Humanitarian Law, other practices of non-consensual evacuation, transfers and prolonged displacement of Ukrainian children constitute violations of International Humanitarian Law, and in certain cases involve serious violations of the Geneva Convention IV (GCIV) and war crimes, particularly a violation of the prohibition of forcible transfer or deportation under article 49 of the GCIV”.20 They also considered that altering the nationality of Ukrainian children is a violation of Article 50 of the GCIV. Imposition of citizenship and illegal adoptions Just three months after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine began, President Vladimir Putin issued a Decree (330/2022) to facilitate the procedures for attributing Russian citizenship to those Ukrainian children who were not under their parents’ care, which opens the way for subsequent adoption by Russian families.21 This decree also grants directors of orphanages located in occupied territories the possibility of demanding Russian citizenship for minors under fourteen years of age, admitted to the institutions under their charge, without asking for their consent. In January 2024, Putin issued a new Decree (11/2024) officially aimed at facilitating the process of granting Russian citizenship to foreign nationals and stateless persons. This decree establishes that Ukrainian orphans and children who are not in family care can receive Russian citizenship by Putin’s personal decision alone, without considering all or some of the requirements of federal legislation.22 The naturalization process can be carried out by whoever has legal guardianship of the child or by the head of a Russian organization responsible for the minor. According to the Commissioner for Human Rights of Ukraine, Dmytro Lubinets, the next step after the granting of Russian citizenship is adoption by a Russian family: in this way deported Ukrainian children no longer count de jure as Ukrainians on Russian territory. The observation missions designated to evaluate possible violations of International Humanitarian Law in the framework of this war, had already expressed their concern about the adoption of the first decree (330/2022), highlighting that International Humanitarian Law prohibits the Russian Federation from changing the status of those children and that the procedures of the Russian Federation do not appear to include measures for the reunification of families or to ensure the principle of respecting the child’s best interest. Applicable international law prescribes that children have the right to retain their identity, name, nationality and family relationships and that children should not be separated from their parents against their will, except when the separation is carried out in accordance with due process of law and if it serves the children’s best interest. Following the issuance of Decree No. 330 by President Putin, several Russian officials admitted that Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine had been “adopted” by Russian families. A Russian-appointed Kherson regional administration official, speaking to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, announced that starting February 24, 2022, children born in that region would automatically acquire Russian nationality. Likewise, orphaned children would also be registered as Russian citizens.23 Shortly after, Ms. Maria Lvova-Belova stated that several Russian families had obtained temporary custody rights over 108 orphans from the Donbass region and, as she noted, “now that the children have received Russian citizenship, temporary custody can be transformed into permanent”.24 In October 2022, Lvova-Belova announced that already 350 orphaned children from Donbass had been placed in foster families in sixteen regions of the Russian Federation. The Commissioner’s Office reported that months earlier, in February 2022, around 2.000 orphaned children or children placed in public institutions without parental control, had been transferred to the Russian Federation and subsequently, those from Donetsk and Luhansk were placed in foster families or in public institutions. Lvova-Belova declared that she herself had adopted a fifteen-year-old minor transferred to the Russian Federation in a group that came from a public institution in the city of Donetsk. In a bulletin from her Office (2023), it was recorded that the other minors in that group were placed in family centers and later in foster families or under temporary custody of residents of the Moscow region. One of those minors, 17 years old Bohdan, was effectively “placed” in the care of a Russian family, given Russian documents, and recently received a summons to report to a recruiting office. Which means that he would probably have been forced to fight against his own country’s army. Bohdan, who in March 2023 had already tried to escape and return to Ukraine, was detained at the border. He was finally able to return to his country last November, thanks to the notoriety that his case gained and efforts from the governments of Ukraine and Qatar.25 Children’s relocations to the Russian Federation for the purposes of adoption or custody has been practiced with children from Crimea since the peninsula’s illegal annexation in 2014 and the subsequent application of Russian family laws. In October of that same year, the so-called Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the occupation administration of the peninsula made public an initiative called the “Train of Hope”, so that “families coming from other regions of the Russian Federation” can contact orphans and children who were not under parental care, with the aim of “placing” them in their families. Within the framework of the investigations conducted by designated international experts, the Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea reported that more than 1.000 children from the peninsula could have been deported to various parts of the Russian Federation through this initiative. The new legislation on the adoption of Ukrainian minors ordered by President Putin has even benefited a renowned Russian congressman, Sergey Mironov, president of the Only Russia political party -of the opposition authorized by the Russian State- who would have adopted with his wife, Inna Varlamova, a little two-year-old girl, Margarita, transferred to Moscow along with 47 other minors from a center for infants in Kherson. According to statements from the centre’s employees, it was Russian soldiers and officials who took Margarita —who had already been previously visited by Mrs. Varlamova, and shortly after returned to “evacuate” the rest of the children.26 Children forcefully transferred to Russia must attend schools with local curricula and books —-even some that have been edited or adapted since the beginning of the war to give a biased vision of History-, they are not allowed to speak Ukrainian and must express pro-Russian feelings, singing for example the national anthem of the Russian Federation, as part of a re-education campaign which includes “patriotic” and military instruction. The Moscow-appointed governor of the Zaporizhia region -which, although illegally annexed by Russia, is not fully occupied by its army- reported that the Russian Ministry of Culture had transferred more than 300 children from that region to Moscow and Saint Petersburg, in order to educate them in Russian culture, within the framework of a program that foresees the participation of more than 2.500 schoolchildren. From the Russian Federation, the governor of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, announced the launch of a three-year program in which more than 500 Ukrainian children from the Volnovaya region, in the occupied zone of Donetsk, will participate and will visit cultural heritage sites in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod. The forced reintegration and re-education of a large number of Ukrainian children can have serious ethnic and sociological consequences, causing a severe impact on the future projection of Ukrainians as a national group, by constituting a factor of disruption in its continuity. Psychological Impact The row of seven or eight children standing in front of a group of academics and foreign visitors, in the classroom of a school in which others are still completely destroyed, is a devastating image. They are teenagers, perhaps between twelve and sixteen years old, and some of them are holding hands to support each other. Only two or three of them speak, sometimes through tears; the others nod with eyes still full of terror. They have seen death and destruction and when they speak, they tell how hard the experience of the Russian occupation has been, but they also talk about their future. They are convinced that it will be very hard, that they will have a very different life than the one they had or dreamed of eighteen months ago, although they are also sure that they want to fight for that future. They don’t want to leave Ukraine, they say, they just want to be left alone to recover, study and rebuild their country. In its report on the psychological impact of the war on Ukrainian children and adolescents, “A Heavy Toll”, the nongovernmental organization Save the Children estimated that “the boys and girls in Ukraine have been forced to hide underground for an average of 920 hours in the last year (2022) - which is equivalent to 38,3 days, or more than a month- since the reactivation of the conflict on February 24 of last year’. They have been “constantly faced with danger” with “the psychological distress of having witnessed violence, separation from family and friends, displacement or lack of access to education”. The fighting has forced the closure of schools in many parts of the country and in those cases only the possibility of online education remains, but less than 30 percent of Ukrainian children have access to an individual computer and frequent power outages make access difficult for those who do have them. Many of them have lost years of education due to the duration of the conflict in the east since 2014, the quarantine due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing hostilities in the country.27 As mentioned above, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has documented cases in which minors have been raped, tortured, illegally confined, killed or injured in indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons. This exposure to permanent explosions, crimes, forced displacement and separation from family members profoundly affects the well-being and mental health of children and adolescents. 75 % of parents report that their children have symptoms of psychological trauma and that 1 in 6 children report memory problems, attention deficits and a decrease in their learning ability. The hostilities have had a significant impact on children’s right to education due to damage or destruction of hundreds of schools and daycare centers.28 Minors in recreational or educational fields. The ZMINA Center for Human Rights, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization, has verified the existence of at least 43 “camps” in the occupied areas of Ukraine, where the occupation authorities intern minors. Likewise, according to statements by Russian officials, a distribution of children from the occupied areas was organized in different centers for minors in Russian territory, assigning correspondence between districts or regions of Ukraine and regions of the Russian Federation. In cases of parents in a vulnerable situation, or who, due to the violence of the fighting in the area or the lack of housing or food, wish to protect their children, the occupation authorities offer them to sign a “consent for the transfer” document for a certain period of time, which does not specify the person who will take care of the minor. At the same time, the child’s documents and birth certificate are confiscated. The children are not returned at the end of the “recreation stay”: in some cases, the “stay” is extended, in others the children are transferred to another camp without their parents’ knowledge, and sometimes Russian regional leaders declare that the children will not return. One of the main objectives of internment in these camps would be the re-education of minors: according to the ZMINA report, at least 32 of the 43 camps are “actively and systematically involved in providing education and cultural development” of the Ukrainian children according to the Russian system. The program includes narratives about the nature of the large-scale invasion and the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Minors receive lessons on “main or important topics”, such as the peace-keeping operations of the Russian army in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia or Kazakhstan, the defeat of terrorists in Syria, the protection of Russian nationals and the “liberation” of the Donbass. And they must speak exclusively in the Russian language. The ZMINA'’s report recalls that according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, States are obliged for respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference. ... Due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background. The education of children under 15 years old, orphaned or separated from their families as a result of the war, should be entrusted to people with the same cultural traditions and, as far as possible, of the same nationality, language and religion.29 The Ukrainian government has established in Kyiv a center for the care of minors affected by the war, whether they are attacks’ survivors, recovered from deportations or who have remained in a filtration center: the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights, Minors are received there to give them support; they usually have an initial conversation with those responsible for the Center and are provided assistance with a multifunctional team of doctors, psychologists and other professionals. Margarita, 6 years old and her sister Xenia, 12, both of them born in Mariupol, recently passed through that Center. They had been deported to Russia and once recovered, were able to reunite with their mother. Their father is still a prisoner in the Russian Federation. And there now is Oleg, 12 years old, who gives a heartbreaking testimony: coming from a small town near Mariupol, he remembers the night when he heard 22 “Grads” explosions and shortly after the town was occupied. Oleg and his family spent two months in a basement, without bread or running water. One day when his mother and aunt went to another town in search of food, explosions were heard near the shelter. Oleg went out and found bodies of his neighbours lying on the street. Russian soldiers detained him, and he spent two months in a “filtration camp” until his family was able to rescue him. Today, Oleg suffers from eating disorders, psychological disorders and aggressiveness. Minors in “filtration camps”. Particular attention should be given to cases of minors who, by themselves or with their parents or relatives, have been detained by the Russian military or authorities appointed by the Russian government, for prolonged periods of time, in order to determine their status and loyalty to Ukraine. The “filtration” consists of a process of interrogating civilians from territories occupied by Russia in its military campaign, to find out their political opinions. It also includes the collection of biometric data and the requisition of their personal effects, including their cell phones. This process can last several hours or be extended for more than a month. If the parents of a minor fail to “approve” the filtration and are detained or forcibly disappeared, the minor will be deported to the Russian Federation. In September 2022, United Nations Under- Secretary General for Political Affairs and Peace -Building, Rosemary DiCarlo and Under- Secretary General for Human Rights and Head of UN Haigh Commissioner for Human Rights Office (OHCHR) in New York, Ilze Brands Kehris, presented reports to the Security Council, in which they addressed the “filtration” system practiced by Russia in the occupied Ukrainian territories. Rosemary DiCarlo, while mentioning the very high number of refugees and internal displaced people provoked by the war, emphasized that the persistent reports of forced displacements, deportations and the so called “filtration camps” are extremely worrying and demanded that such information be investigated with due diligence and with the cooperation of competent authorities. She added that the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine must have free access to all the individuals detained in connection with the war. llze Brands Kehris informed the Council that the OHCHR has verified that the Russian armed forces and armed groups related to them have subjected Ukrainian citizens to the practice of “filtering”, a system of security checks and collection of personal data during which they practice detailed searches and interrogations, and women and girls are at risk of sexual abuse. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations responded to these presentations that the term “filtration” does not have a clear definition in International Humanitarian Law and that the identification of Ukrainian citizens who want to emigrate to the Russian Federation is a normal practice for any army. Recalling that his country is the largest recipient of Ukrainian refugees, he underlined that this is a registration process, not “filtration.”30 International reaction The Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the Russian Federation is a party, prescribes in its Article 6 that “States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life” and that the Parties “shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child”.31 Given the increasingly critical conditions for minors in war zones, the UN General Assembly created in 1997 the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflicts, with the mandate of evaluating the progress, the measures adopted, and the difficulties detected in the protection of children in situations of armed conflicts. In a 2004 report, the Special Representation detected the six mayor violations against children committed in that context, one of which is the abduction of children. In 2015, following a new report that -particularly evaluating the situation of children in armed conflicts in African countries— highlights this crime, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2225 (2015) on the subject in which, among other recommendations, the resolution called for the “immediate, safe and unconditional” release of children kidnapped during the conflict.32 In July 2022, once a pattern of violations against children in the framework of conflict had been proved, Ukraine was included as a “situation of concern” in the UN Secretary General’s Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflicts. From this inclusion, the Organization has the responsibility of controlling and reporting on serious violations against children, which has been accomplished through the UN Human Rights Observation Mission (created previously, in 2014, following the invasion of Crimea) and from 2022, also through the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, whose reports we have commented on. In an almost unprecedented decision -with the only exception of Libya in 2011-, on April 7, 2022, the United Nations General Assembly decided the suspension of the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council, by 93 votes in Favor, 24 against and 58 abstentions (Argentina voted in Favor). In the text of the Resolution, the General Assembly expresses “grave concern at the ongoing human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, in particular at the reports of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation, including gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights...”. In its decision, the General Assembly considered the expressions of concern by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, as well as the latest update on the human rights situation in Ukraine by the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine, of 26 March 2022.33 At the Latin-American regional level, the Organization of American States (OAS) approved a Communiqué34 and a Resolution35 condemning the Russian Federation for the invasion of Ukraine, and finally decided to suspend it as an Observer Member of the Organization.36 The European Parliament also adopted a decision on this issue. In July 2023, the European body issued a Joint Motion for a statement on the detention of two Ukrainian minors by Russian authorities and the denunciation of their actions against minors, citing numerous reports on the oppression of Ukrainian children, “the victims most vulnerable of the Russian war of aggression”. Parliament mentions figures of deceased and injured minors and those deported to Russia (around 19.500), as well as those missing (3.924) and condemns the deliberate Russian targeting of minors through measures that include forced transfer within the territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia, illegal deportations to Belarus and Russia, illegal adoptions and attempts to impose re-education on them.37 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a Resolution in April 2023, in which it stated that the forcible transfer and Russification of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation “indicates an intention to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainian identity, as well as the cultural and linguistic characteristics of its people” and highlighted that “the forced transfer of children from one group to another with the intention of destroying, totally or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group is considered a crime of genocide” according to the Convention against Genocide, in the first pronouncement of an international organization in that regard.38 In November of that same year, PACE approved the creation of a Special Committee for Ukrainian Children’s Affairs and in January 2024 it adopted Resolution 2529 (2024) in which “the Parliamentary Assembly firmly reiterates its condemnation of the full-scale war of aggression being waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the massive violations of the rights of Ukrainian children, who are particularly vulnerable victims of this war. Children should never be used as means of exerting pressure, or as war trophies”. Through the Resolution, “The Assembly calls upon member States’ parliaments to enhance their political support towards meeting the objectives of the humanitarian response plan for Ukraine, with a specific emphasis on the needs of internally displaced children and their families”.39 The kidnapping and transfer of Ukrainian children was the crime -a potential war crime for which, unlike the economic sanctions applied to institutions and individuals of the Russian Federation, international justice held President Vladimir Putin directly responsible. In late February 2022, International Criminal Court prosecutor Karim Kahn opened an investigation for war crimes and crimes against Humanity. Slightly more than a year after, on March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with the support of the UN, issued an arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin, in connection with alleged war crimes related to the deportation and “illegal transfer” of Ukrainian children. The international arrest warrant is extensive to the Russian Government’s Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova. In his statement on the decision, Prosecutor Kahn indicated that, based on the evidence collected, there are sufficient indications to believe that Putin and Lvova-Belova bear criminal responsibility for the illegal deportation and transfer or Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. He added that many of these children have been put for adoption in that country and that, by decree, President Putin had modified the applicable law in order to facilitate the granting of Russian citizenship to these children and, consequently, expedite their adoption by Russian families. Prosecutor Kahn also pointed out that these actions, among others, demonstrate the intention to permanently separate these children from their country of origin.40 The recovery of minors abducted by the Russian Federation is extremely difficult, given the particular conditions in which deportations take place and the subsequent distribution of children in territories occupied by Russia or in its own extensive territory, to which is added the change of identity through the granting of Russian nationality and adoptions. And as Belgian diplomat Mariam Lambert, who works with a non-governmental organization in the recovery of Ukrainian children, says: “they must be brought back quickly, because the more time passes, the more difficult it will be to track them and it will be much more traumatic for the children, after a new transfer, a new change in their lives, with the consequent psychological impact”. Many States and non-governmental Human Rights organizations constantly demand that Russia cease these kidnapping and deportation actions and return the minors currently in its possession. Recently, efforts carried out by Qatar have managed to return several minors between two and seventeen years old to Ukraine and their families, four the first time in October 2023 and six more in the first days of December the same year. Qatar also mediated for the return of Bohdan, a Ukrainian teenager who had been placed with a foster family in Moscow province and then summoned to military service, as we mentioned above. 41-41bis In December 2023, the Ukrainian Government convened the first meeting of the International Coalition of Countries for the Return of Ukrainian Children, which was attended by seventy-two high-level representatives from several countries - Canada, Qatar, the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, the Netherlands, Estonia, among others- and international organizations such as the United Nations Observation and Monitoring Mission, UNICEF, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, among others. The objective of this international coalition is to support Ukraine in the return of forcibly transferred minors, as well as their rehabilitation and reintegration. Unfortunately, between the noise of war cannons and the geopolitical confusion on the international scene, the tragedy of the Ukrainian children is not adequately addressed by the international media nor, consequently, sufficiently known. It is, however, one of the most worrying aspects of this war, in which Putin seeks precisely the extinction of the Ukrainian identity and the people of Ukraine as an independent nation. The world, Western or not, must open its eyes to this true tragedy and demand in every stance the restitution of the children of Ukraine and the interruption of a practice that defies all moral parameters and international coexistence. References: 1 United Nations. “One month after the war, note that half of Ukraine’s children have been displaced”. 15 March 2022. https://news.un.org/es/story/2022/03/1506172 2 United Nations. “More than 1500 children dead or injured in Ukraine’s war”. 1 June 2023. https://news.un.org/es/story/2023/06/1521552 3 Resolution 49/1 adopted by the Human Rights Council, March 4, 2022. Situation of Human Rights in Ucrania following the Russian invasion. 4 Resolution 52/32 adopted by the Human Rights Council,, April 4, 2023. Situation of Human Rights in Ucrania following the Russian invasion. 5 International Independent Investigative Commission Report to the UN General Assembly. October 18, 2022 6 OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Interim Report on reported violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Ukraine. 7 OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 132/2022 - ODIHR.GAL/26/22/Rev.1 - Report of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism’s mission of experts entitled ‘Report On Violations Of International Humanitarian And Human Rights Law, War Crimes And Crimes Against Humanity Committed In Ukraine Since 24 February 2022'. 8 War on Ukraine responsible for surge in missing children cases, Missing Children in Europe, 25 May 2022. https://missingchildreneurope.eu/press-releaseimed-2022/ 9 President Zelenskyi: 243 Ukrainian children have died, 446 have been injured and 39 remain disappeared, warning that these numbers could be even bigger, since there is no reliable information on the zones occupied by Russia. The Associated Press, “Volodymyr Zelenskyy Says 200,000 Children among Ukrainians Forcefully Taken to Russia,” First post, 2 June 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/world/volodymyr-zelenskyv-says-200000-children-among-ukrainians-forcefully-taken-to-russia-10747981.html 10 https://www.currenttime.tv/a/v-rossiyuvyvezli-bolee-700-tysyach-ukrainskihdetey/32527102.html 11 In May 2022, Russian news agency TASS published declarations from an official of the Russian Federations’ Ministry of Defense, Mikhail Mizintsev, on the transfer of a million people from Ukraine to Russia, including approximately 200.000 children, in the previous two months. The official added that this figure included more than 1.800 children who had been “evacuated to the Russian Federation” the day before from dangerous zones in Donetsk, Luhansk and other Ukrainian regions, “without the participation of the Ukrainian authorities”. 2 In July 2022, the same TASS agency reported that more than 2.8 million Ukrainians had entered the Russian Federation from Ukraine, including 448.000 children, in a dispatch collected by Human Rights Watch (09/2022) and by the OSDE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (12/2022). “We had no choice’: ‘Filtration’ and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia”, Human Rights Watch, 1 September 2022, https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forciblytransferring-ukrainiancivilians#fin107. 11 bis За год с Украины и из Донбасса на территорию РФ прибыло 5,3 млн беженцев, ТАСС, 20 февраля 2023. 12 Кількість незаконно вивезених у росію українських дітей може сягати 150 тисяч, Укрінформ, 17. 2. 2023. 13 У Офісі Президента заявили, що у росії створили понад 70 таборів для "перевиховання" депортованих дітей з України, Рубрика, 23 квітня 2023 14 Head of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine presents the latest human rights report 06 October 2023. https://ukraine.un.org/en/248423-head-unhuman-rights-monitoring-mission-ukraine-presents-latest-human-rights-report. 15 UNGA - A/78/540 Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. 16 See United Nations Web TV, “Press conference: H.E. Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation”, September 23, 2023. 17 See Maria Lvova-Belova, “Activities of the Russian Federation Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova to protect children during a special military operation”, The Bulletin, no. 1, 4 April 2023 (2023). 18 ODIHR.GAL/37/23/Rev.1/Corr.1 4 May 2023. Report on violations and abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, related to the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation. 19 Ibid. 20 ODIHR.GAL/37/23/Rev.1/Corr.1 4 May 2023. Report on violations and abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, related to the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation. 21 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 30.05.2022 No. 330, Russian Federation official internet portal of legal information, 30 May 2022, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202205300008. 22 President of the Russian Federation’s Decree 11/2024, January 4th, 2024. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/sXZxkRw7u0DOOSE2Snp3416FcAPNuPRL.pdf 23 “Moscow says babies born in occupied Kherson will automatically get Russian citizenship”, New York Times, 16 June 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kherson-babies-russian-citizenship.htm. 24 Lvova-Belova: Families from six regions of the Russian Federation will take custody over 108 orphans from Donbas, RGRU, 15 July 2022. 25 Ukrainian teen who received call-up to Russian army. BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67368313, 10/11/2023. 26 “Missing Ukrainian child traced to Putin ally” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646. 23/11/2023 27 Save the Children, A Heavy Toll – Full Report, 02/12/23. Boys and girls in Ukraine have spent 900 hours in bunkers, more than a month of their lives. https://www.savethechildren.es/sites/default/files/2023-02/ 28 A/77/5332/2322-23590 Report of the Independiente International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine - https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/637/77/PDF/N2263777.pdf? Open Element 29 Forcible Transfer and Deportation of Children from the Temporary Occupied Territories of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Analytical Report by the Human Rights Center ZMINA, April 2023. 30 UN Security Council, “Reports of Russian Federation Forces Putting Ukrainian Civilians in ‘Filtration’ Camps Must Be Investigated” SC/15023, 7 September 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15023.doc.html 31 Convention on the Rights of the Child. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instrumentsmechanisms/instruments/conventionrights-child 32 United Nations Security Council: Resolution 2225 (2015) adopted by the Security Council in its 7466a session, on June 18, 2015. https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2015/10114.pdf, Dr. Virginia Gamba, of Argentine nationality, has occupied the position of Secretary General Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflicts since April 2017. 33 UNGA, Eleventh extraordinary period of emergency sessions. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on April 7, 2022, ES-11/3 Suspension of the Russian Federation’s right to integrate the Human Rights Council. 34 Organization of American States General Secretariat Communiqué Comunicado C-008/22. Source: OAS. 35 Organization of American States Permanent Council Resolution “The crisis in Ukraine” (CP/RES. 1192 (2371/22), 3/25/2022. Source: OAS. 36 Organization of American States Permanent Council Resolution CP/RES. 1195 (2374/22), 4/24/2022. Source: OAS. 37 European Parliament “Joint Motion”. European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 2023 on the torture and criminal prosecution of Ukrainian minors Tihran Ohannisian and Mykyta Khanhanov by the Russian Federation (2023/2735(RSP)) 38 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9075/the-forcible-transfer-and-russification-ofukrainian-children-shows-evidence-ofgenocide-says-pace, Resolution 2495 (2023) https://pace.coe.int/en/files/31776/html, 4/27/23. 39 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 2529 (2024) Situation of the children of Ukraine, 25 January 2024. https://pace.coe.int/en/files/33348/html 40 ICC, Statement by Prosecutor Karim A. Khan KC on the Issuance of Arrest Warrants against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova, 17 March 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-againstpresident-vladimir-putin 41 Russia returns four Ukrainian children in Qatari deal. BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67121574, 10/16/2022 41 bis Qatar announces return of 6 Ukrainian children from Russia. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/gatar-announces-release-of-6-ukrainian-children/. 12/16/2023.

Diplomacy
Palestinians around the destruction focused on an Israeli military operation in the eastern areas of the Zawaida camp in the central Gaza Strip on June 24, 2024

A Gaza Ceasefire

by International Crisis Group

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” The ceasefire deal the U.S. has tabled represents the best – and perhaps last – hope for both ending the Gaza war and getting the hostages held in the strip back any time soon. Israeli and Hamas leaders should accept it. Efforts by Egyptian, Qatari and U.S. mediators to reach a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas have reached a decisive juncture. The proposal on the table comes closer than its predecessors to getting past the main sticking point regarding a permanent ceasefire, which Hamas demands and to which Israel refuses to commit. It envisages an immediate truce and partial hostage/prisoner exchange, with talks to follow on Gaza’s governance and security. Though the deal on offer fully satisfies neither side, no better one is likely to emerge any time soon that can both end the fighting that has devastated Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages held in the strip. Moreover, the longer the war continues, the graver the risk that tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border, or between the U.S. and Iran-backed groups elsewhere, set off a regional escalation that could further draw in Washington and Tehran. Israel and Hamas should embrace the deal on the table as a humanitarian imperative and because neither side can achieve strategic victory and each has long passed the point of diminishing returns. Continued war will neither destroy Hamas as Israel seeks nor strengthen Hamas’s hand, let alone improve prospects for Palestinians. It guarantees only greater suffering to a people who desperately need relief. Three Phases, Many Questions Full details of the deal on offer have yet to become public, but the rough outlines have been widely reported. They follow the model in the mediators’ previous proposal in early May, a draft of which Hamas accepted, albeit with caveats, and which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government then rejected. The new version, which U.S. President Joe Biden announced in a White House speech on 31 May, appears to leave key elements in place: a ceasefire in three phases, with each consisting of steps that together would end the war. In the first phase, of six weeks’ duration, Israel would withdraw its forces from all “populated areas” of Gaza. Hamas would release Israeli civilian, elderly and wounded hostages, as well as the remains of some deceased hostages, in exchange for Israel freeing an agreed-upon list of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Israel would also allow displaced Palestinian civilians to return to their homes including in Gaza’s north and allow the entry and distribution of more goods and fuel into the strip. The transition from phase one to two would follow talks between Israel and Hamas. Critically, the proposal states that the ceasefire is to hold as long as the parties continue their negotiations even if these extend beyond the allotted six weeks. The deal’s second phase would see the release of all remaining hostages, including soldiers, and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. At that point, the phase one ceasefire would turn into a permanent cessation of hostilities. In the third phase, Hamas would hand over the remains of the last of the deceased hostages. The import regime also would be relaxed, with Israel lifting its blockade to enable the movement of people and entry of goods as full reconstruction gets under way. The provision on a “permanent cessation of hostilities” in phase two is the most significant modification to the earlier proposal, which had referred merely to a “sustainable period of calm”. It seeks to bridge the gap that caused previous negotiations to break down, namely between Hamas’s demand that a ceasefire be permanent and Israel’s that it not. Since Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack, Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that they are still committed to destroying Hamas (or at least its military and governance capability) in the long term. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and Minister Benny Gantz within the war cabinet and the military establishment have been more willing to halt fighting, at least temporarily, to get the hostages back, though that position is hindered by the fact that Netanyahu has a personal interest in refusing to enter any ceasefire deal, as it would almost certainly mean he would lose power. Hamas, for its part, has been unwilling to hand over hostages, especially the military officers which it considers to be key bargaining chips, in exchange for anything less than explicit guarantees that a ceasefire be permanent. The Biden administration, with the new proposal, has attempted to mollify both sides. It posits an immediate cessation of hostilities; a mechanism to maintain that ceasefire in place if good-faith negotiations on implementation continue; and a permanent cessation of hostilities as the end point of the second phase. That sequence can be read from the Hamas side as achieving a permanent end to fighting. It can be read by Israel as preserving some room for manoeuvre to return to hostilities. By encouraging each side to tolerate the ambiguities that make the deal feasible for the other, Washington is signalling to Hamas that it will make sure the ceasefire holds if the movement embraces the deal while reassuring Israel that even should the deal hold and a permanent ceasefire take root, its military campaign has rendered Hamas incapable of reprising the kind of attack it staged on 7 October. Implicit in the U.S. approach is a belief that a functioning ceasefire will create incentives for both sides, generating momentum and raising the costs of breaking the agreement. Still, even if the two sides sign up, their mutually exclusive positions will make the agreement fragile and contingent. Achieving its primary purpose – stopping the bloodletting and getting the hostages home – will be subject to the completion of phase one and negotiations toward phase two. The absence of detail in the proposal regarding terms and mechanics, presumably even in the full unpublished text, is both its strength and its weakness. Mediators see the ambiguity as necessary for getting both sides to sign up and end a war that is devastating Gaza and its population, tanking Israel’s global standing and risking a wider regional escalation. But the lack of clarity on the most divisive disputes, in effect, punts those issues to talks in the first phase. Fraught negotiations loom. For example, what would constitute Israel’s “full withdrawal” from all “populated areas” of Gaza is open to interpretation, meaning details of even the deal’s initial phase are ambiguous. How will the areas from which Israel withdraws be delineated? Will Israel launch incursions into those areas, as military officials have said it would continue to do after the war? Who would they target in such operations? It is widely assumed that Israel will continue to go after Hamas’s senior leadership, but how widely that is interpreted will bear on the sustainability of a ceasefire. Getting to the second phase and beyond will require addressing the still more challenging questions of post-war governance and security in Gaza. Once even a temporary ceasefire is in place, humanitarian aid is supposed to ramp up and some reconstruction begin, though precisely what material Israel will allow in is unclear. The proposal does not address the political status of Gaza after hostilities end or whether Israel will maintain its systems of physical and administrative control of the strip. It does not address how Gaza would be governed after the war, much less who would govern it, nor the core question of Hamas’s future role. Nor does it lay out a process that could decide these questions. Trying to resolve those questions ahead of time, however, would rule out an immediate stop to the fighting. The focus now is on whether Washington’s assurances will convince the two adversaries to proceed. On Israel’s side, the U.S. president’s decision to make a public statement outlining the proposal, asserting that Israel had already accepted it, caught Netanyahu off guard and put him on the spot. U.S. officials reportedly notified Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Herzog, Gallant and Gantz of the main points in Biden’s speech just an hour and a half before the president delivered it. Netanyahu’s initial comments seemed to hedge, not rejecting the proposal or denying that Israel had agreed to the wording, but offering his broad interpretation that it would allow Israel to keep pursuing its cardinal war objective of destroying Hamas and its governing capability in Gaza. Whether his statements aimed to manage domestic politics or undercut ongoing diplomacy, they have reinforced Hamas’s suspicions about Israeli intentions. The war cabinet has closely guarded the proposal’s full text – which reportedly runs four and a half pages – lest spoilers, especially to Netanyahu’s right, try to torpedo it. While Netanyahu appears to have the votes in the coalition to see the ceasefire deal approved, and polls suggest that a plurality of Israelis favour a hostage deal, two of his far-right ministers, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, have threatened to leave the coalition government should he proceed, which could precipitate the government’s collapse, forcing Netanyahu to either form a temporary alternative coalition or leave office and hold elections. As for Hamas, for now it insists on an explicit, up-front guarantee of an end to hostilities and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as the final outcome of the staged process. It welcomed Biden’s statements, and has continued to do so, but said it would not agree to a text that diverges from them; asserting that the proposal, which Hamas called “the Israeli paper … does not guarantee a permanent ceasefire, but rather a temporary ceasefire, and it does not closely link the three stages stipulated”. Hamas also called on Biden to “ensure that the occupation government agrees to [his statements] and that they are reflected in the text of the agreement”. Hamas argues, based on past experience, that once it appears that the war is over, even if only provisionally, pressure on Israel and the Biden administration will abate, the process will bog down, and Gaza – already destroyed – again will be forgotten and Israeli military operations will resume. In addition, while recent Hamas statements have prioritised a complete Israeli withdrawal and permanent ceasefire, a senior movement official claimed that the latest proposal imposes unacceptable restrictions on the release of politically prominent prisoners and insists on sending many of them into exile. Time for a Deal By making the proposal’s outlines public, Biden has vested significant personal credibility in his administration’s ability to produce a ceasefire ahead of the November U.S. elections. He is unlikely to be able to use his own authority in another big push for an end to the war before the November vote. His objective appears to be to deny Israel and Hamas negotiating space, making it difficult for either to say no. To put muscle behind his move, the U.S. circulated a draft resolution on a ceasefire in the UN Security Council to mobilise international support for the initiative. Prime Minister Netanyahu should accept the Biden proposal – which the U.S. has gone to lengths to make ambiguous enough for him to work with and that the Israeli defence establishment supports – and avoid public statements to the contrary. For Israel, its eight-month assault has underlined the sobering reality that it has been unable to deal a decisive, strategic blow to Hamas. Nor is Israel’s war effort diminishing Hamas’s power as a political movement; to the contrary, its popularity has surged in the West Bank and beyond. Some vestige of Hamas’s power in Gaza will remain for the foreseeable future, to be diluted, if at all, primarily through politics. Continuing the war will bring further destruction of civilian infrastructure and further damage to Israel’s international standing, not the body blow it hopes to deliver Hamas. It would also mean the continuation and possible escalation of the intensive war of attrition with Hizbollah on the Israel-Lebanon border, which could quickly spiral out of control and has already left tens of thousands of Israelis (and even more Lebanese) displaced. An end to the fighting in Gaza is necessary to halt these exchanges: Hizbollah will only stop rocket fire with such a ceasefire in place. The potential ensuing calm could allow residents on both sides of the border to return. As for Hamas, while the group may not set great store by the U.S.’s signalling that it supports a permanent ceasefire, it has shown that it can survive Israel’s onslaught but is unlikely to achieve anything more than small-scale tactical victories in territory it can neither protect nor fully control. Maintaining the current trajectory in the hope of extracting a higher price from Israel by killing and wounding its troops, draining its resources, undermining perceptions of its military prowess, sullying its international reputation and straining its relationship with the U.S. is unlikely to yield a better deal, while inflicting more suffering and destruction on Gaza. The deal on offer includes an important concession from Israel, based on the communicated proposal – that the phase one ceasefire will be extended as long as negotiations continue in good faith. It is an opportunity for a prolonged cessation of hostilities that many Palestinians would blame Hamas for wasting. Further, if Hamas rejects the current proposal, the Biden administration will almost certainly also blame the group for the collapse of talks and, as November approaches, would be more likely to throw up its hands and let Israel follow its own war logic. The two sides’ acceptance of the ceasefire deal would be just the start of difficult talks, requiring concerted diplomacy from the U.S., Egypt, Qatar and pressure and support from others, to bridge what for now seem almost unsurmountable differences and sustain negotiations. But a rejection of the proposed plan will make arrangements for the day after more complex than they already are. Far better to stop fighting now and seriously discuss what should happen next than to put off what is an inevitable reckoning yet again while, in the meantime, thousands more Palestinian civilians are killed, starved, displaced and further immiserated, and hope of getting the hostages out alive fades.

Diplomacy
June 10, 2024 Washington DC President Joe Biden hosted the 10th Juneteenth celebration, which Vice President Kamala Harris

Joe Biden faces the record of his foreign policy

by Romuald Sciora

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After his visit to France, which is taking place these days, a crucial NATO summit, scheduled in Washington from July 9 to 11, awaits the American president, who, soon to end his term, must face the sad record of his foreign policy. Obviously, if we compare him to Trump, who was nothing but chaos and incompetence, there is no comparison. Nevertheless, if we are somewhat honest, we must recognize that the Biden years, as far as international affairs are concerned, will have been cruel. Cruel for America, which will have seen its influence diminish even more, and for the Western bloc in general, dragged along by it, to which the global South has ceased to give credit, in particular because of the double standards practiced in Gaza and Ukraine. The first major error was to condition the return of the United States to the Iranian nuclear agreement on Iran's strict compliance with the terms of 2015 and on new negotiations on ballistic missiles. While it was the United States that unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Vienna nuclear deal with Iran, under the Trump administration in 2018, leading Iran to increase its uranium enrichment and reduce its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it would have been more adroit for the Biden administration to make a gesture of goodwill towards Tehran by first returning to the agreement before making its legitimate demands. This would have changed nothing in substance, but everything in form, and we might not be here today. As imperfect as the agreement wanted by Obama was, and as unpleasant as the Mullahs' regime is, the JCPOA at least had the merit of having stabilized the region somewhat. Joe Biden's second mistake in international policy, this one of historic magnitude, of course concerns Ukraine. Readers of these correspondences know that, as the son of a Ukrainian woman and with family not far from the front line of the Minsk agreements, I condemned the illegal invasion led by Putin, a mafia president if ever there was one, on February 24, 2022. They may also remember that I pleaded, at the beginning of the war, for a “muscular” response from NATO, namely the creation of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, as Zelensky had requested. This was, in my opinion, the only way to calm things down and bring the Russian president, whose army had proven incapable of reaching kyiv, to the negotiating table. This is not the option that Washington has chosen. Instead, it has decided to arm the Ukrainian forces and push them to continue and continue a war that they will probably, and unfortunately, not be able to win, neither in the short term nor in the medium term – the long term does not exist since they will probably be abandoned by America by then –, due to a lack of sufficient men and equipment. Since we knew that without the risky deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian soil, which would probably have led to a new world war, the battle was lost in advance, it was irresponsible not to invite Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate when, in the fall of 2022, Ukraine found itself, if not in a position of strength, at least in a favorable position in the Donbass. A missed opportunity that may not come again. The Ukrainian defeat that seems to be looming would therefore not only be that of Kiev, but also that of the policy of an American president trapped in the prism of the Cold War. This policy, devoid of strategy, will have consisted largely of waging a proxy war with Russia, without any precise objective, other than that of pushing Ukraine to fight until an improbable “final victory”. Finally, third and fourth significant errors: the visionless approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adopted by the 46th President of the United States throughout his term, who has never really tried to relaunch the peace process and the two-state solution, as well as his lack of consistency in his relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he nevertheless detests. A lack of consistency that led Joe Biden and his entourage to condemn the massacres committed by the IDF in the Gaza Strip while providing it with the weapons necessary to perpetrate them and which forced the United States to build an artificial port at more than 320 million dollars in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gazans, because Israel subjects land access points to drastic controls. Other inconsistencies in current American diplomacy could be noted, such as the sanctions against Cuba, decided by Trump and maintained by his successor, who, however, when he was vice-president, had been at the origin of the resumption of relations with Havana. But the image that will remain indelibly attached to Biden's international policy, and which will have set the tone for the majority of Americans, is the debacle in Kabul in August 2021. Biden is obviously not responsible for the Afghan disaster as a whole, but this unprecedented rout of American power is his work and bears his signature. While nothing was forcing the United States into haste, it was he who stubbornly clung to the August 31 date to conclude the American withdrawal negotiated by his predecessor. This chaotic end was then perceived as a humiliating defeat, revealing the failure of American foreign policy and the mismanagement of conflicts. Paralyzed in front of their screens, the American people saw their military power, a power that they were told was unparalleled in human history, thwarted by "peasants armed with Kalashnikovs and riding mopeds," to quote a television commentator. Joe Biden is a sincere man, full of good intentions, but a man who is definitely a prisoner of the past and therefore overwhelmed by the geopolitical challenges of today's world. In the Ukrainian crisis, he has led America and its allies into a deadlock, while his adversaries have consolidated a Sino-Russian bloc, allied with North Korea and Iran, and supported by South Africa, as well as many other states around the world, perhaps even India. The November election will obviously not be played out on the international stage, but this theme will nevertheless be present in the debates. Joe Biden will then find himself confronted with a record that few of his predecessors suffered while campaigning for re-election. To find a similar situation, we have to go back to the time of Jimmy Carter.

Diplomacy
Russian Flag with Chinese Flag and North Korean Flag

Kim-Putin deal: why this is a coded message aimed at China and how it worries Beijing

by Chee Meng Tan , Chi Zhang

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, paid a visit to Pyongyang this week and signed a defence pact with reclusive North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, as he looks for new allies who can help him increase Russia’s supply of munitions for the war in Ukraine. As part of this mutual aid deal, the two leaders promised that each country will come to the defence of the other if attacked. Kim also promised North Korea’s full support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. What’s interesting about the entire Russia-North Korea showy display of camaraderie is China’s response: silence. China has misgivings about how things are unfolding, which reports suggest prompted Chinese president Xi Jinping’s call to Putin to call off the latter’s visit to Pyongyang. Obviously, Putin didn’t heed Xi’s request. Why would Beijing be so rattled by the Russian-North Korea defence treaty? After all, China has its own defensive pact with North Korea, which was inked in 1961 and renewed in 2021. Beijing also has a “no limits” partnership with Russia. Logically, if China could sign its own defence treaty with North Korea, so can Russia. But the pact made by Putin and Kim severely threatens Chinese security. China was already worried that whatever control it has over North Korea was weakened when Pyongyang reportedly supplied almost 7,000 containers worth of weapons to Moscow. And this is why, in April, the Middle Kingdom sent its third most senior leader within the Chinese Communist party hierarchy, Zhao Leji, to assure the North Korean strongman that Beijing was still a strong ally. Now the defensive pact that draws Moscow and Pyongyang closer threatens to further diminish China’s influence over Kim. The Kremlin knows that one of Beijing’s greatest fears is that a renegade North Korea may one day point its weapons at China. And this is a key reason behind Putin’s peace treaty with Pyongyang. China and North Korea’s turbulent past For decades, China had tried to maintain its influence over Pyongyang by being the mediator between North Korea and the rest of the world. This included attempting to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Beijing does so to safeguard its own safety and survival, and probably believes that as long as North Korea remains dependent on China, it wouldn’t bite the hand that feeds it. China also remains North Korea’s biggest trade partner. This all sounds awfully bizarre, since China’s mutual defence pact with North Korea suggests that both nations are close allies. But North Korea has a tradition of defying China, and this deal with Russia might embolden it further – and that will be worrying Beijing. In 2017, for instance, Kim Jong-un, in clear defiance of China, ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, in Malaysia. And when China retaliated by halting all coal imports from North Korea into China, North Korea not only condemned Beijing for “dancing to the tune of the United States”, but also vented its anger by firing missiles in the direction of Japan. But where the missiles originated from in North Korea and the distance that it covered towards the direction of Japan provided China with a rather grim check on reality: North Korea’s weapon capabilities extend to major Chinese cities. The Sino-Korean animosity dates back centuries and took shape when Korea was a vassal state of imperial China. Unfortunately, this animosity extended to modern times when Mao Zedong decided to station Chinese troops in North Korea even after the conclusion of the Korean war, and when Beijing did not aid Pyongyang in its nuclear ambitions. It didn’t help either that the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, was suspected of espionage and was nearly executed by the Chinese Communist party in the 1930s. All this history plays a part in what decisions and alliances are being made today, and why. It would be a serious mistake to think that the Russians, even in desperation, would believe that making North Korea an ally would turn the tide of the Ukrainian-Russian war in Russia’s favour. But this move, and his recent trip to Vietnam, shows Putin’s desperation. Even if Pyongyang continues to supply Russia with much-needed ammunition and weapons, Moscow will need greater technology and firepower to win against a Ukraine that uses weapons supplied by the US and Europe. Putin’s agenda This fact is not lost to Putin, and he knows that for Russia to stand a winning chance in the war that he started in 2022, requires its partner of “no limits” to stand firmly by Russia’s side. But beyond supplying Russia with the dual-use technology (which could be used for civilian or military purposes) to fuel Russia’s industrial war complex, China appears to have fallen short of supplying actual weapons to Russia. Even if China wanted to provide weapons to Russia it can’t. This is because it fears further antagonising the west, and triggering economic sanctions would prove lethal for an already ailing Chinese economy. China knows that it needs a strong Russia so that the west doesn’t consolidate its resources to deal with the perceived Chinese threat. But on the other hand, helping Moscow may prove too much for Beijing to stomach since that would harm China’s economy. So, Putin needs to force Beijing’s hand, and the peace treaty that he just signed with North Korea might just do the trick.

Energy & Economics
Skyline of La Habana, Havanna, Cuba, Carribean, Central Amerika

Thirsty in paradise: Water crises are a growing problem across the Caribbean islands

by Farah Nibbs

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the popular imagination, the Caribbean is paradise, an exotic place to escape to. But behind the images of balmy beaches and lush hotel grounds lies a crisis, the likes of which its residents have never experienced. Caribbean islands are in a water crisis, and their governments have warned that water scarcity may become the new norm. Within the past five years, every island in the region has experienced some sort of water scarcity. For example, Trinidad is experiencing its worst drought in recent memory, and residents are under water restrictions through at least the end of June 2024, with fines for anyone who violates the rules. Dominica, considered the nature island of the Caribbean for its mountain rain forests, is seeing a significant decrease in freshwater resources and increasingly frequent water shortages. In Grenada, known as the spice isle, drought has affected water systems throughout the island. Jamaica is also facing water restrictions and has had to resort to water shutoffs in recent years, limiting water availability to a few hours per day in some areas. St. Vincent and St. Kitts have had to ration water. Barbados has experienced several water bans in recent years. In fact, recent data shows that the Caribbean is one of the most water-stressed regions in the world. I study the intersection of critical infrastructure and disasters, particularly in the Caribbean. Safe water is essential for all human activity and public health. That’s why it is important to understand the root causes of the water crises and to find effective, affordable ways to improve water supply systems. 3 reasons water demand is outstripping supply Changing precipitation patterns and droughts are straining Caribbean water supplies, but water demand has also been outstripping supply for a number of reasons. 1. Rapid urbanization and industrialization The Caribbean is one of the most rapidly urbanizing regions in the world. About three-quarters of its population lives in cities, and that percentage is rising, adding pressure on public water systems. At the same time, increased industrialization and commercialization of agriculture have degraded water quality and in some cases encroached on sensitive water catchment areas, affecting the soil’s capacity to retain water. This competing demand for limited fresh water has reduced stream flows and led to water being drawn down from sensitive sources. In Dennery North, a major farming community in St. Lucia, water shortages have left residents collecting water from rivers and other sources for their homes and farms. Unregulated extraction of groundwater can also worsen the problem. Many islands depend on groundwater. For example, 90% of water supply in Barbados comes from groundwater, while in Jamaica it is 84%. However, increasing demand and changes in annual rainfall patterns are affecting the ability of aquifers or groundwater to recharge. As a result, supply isn’t keeping up with demand. This is a huge problem for the island of Utila, located off the coast of Honduras, where the current rate of aquifer recharge is only 2.5% annually. For comparison, Barbados has a recharge rate of 15% to 30% of annual rainfall. 2. Water-intensive tourism industry It’s no secret that the Caribbean is a popular tourist destination, and tourist economies depend on vast quantities of water. Even during water rationing, water is diverted to hotels and other tourist-dependent sites first. That can leave local residents without water for hours or days at a time and facing fines if they violate use restrictions. Tourism not only increases the consumption of water but also the pollution of water resources. Building golf courses to attract more tourists further increases tourism’s water demand and runoff. 3. Weak water infrastructure governance Another problem water systems face is weak governance that leads to excessive loss of treated water before it even reaches the customer. A well-performing water utility will usually have water losses – known as nonrevenue water – below 30%. In the Caribbean, the average nonrevenue water is 46%, with some as high as 75%.   The reasons range from lack of appropriate management practices to metering inaccuracies, leaks and theft. Climate change and extreme weather worsen water insecurity These troubled water systems can struggle on good days. Worsening extreme weather, such as hurricanes and flooding, can damage infrastructure, leading to long outages and expensive repairs. The Caribbean is the second-most disaster-prone region in the world. The islands face frequent earthquakes, landslides, devastating hurricanes and other destructive storms. As global temperatures and sea levels rise, the risk of extreme weather and storm surge causing erosion, flooding and saltwater contamination increases.   Three months after Hurricane Maria hit in 2017, well over 14% of the Caribbean population was still without potable water. Hurricane Dorian in 2019 left Grand Bahama Utility Co. and the country’s Water and Sewerage Corp. with U$54 million in damages. A year after Dorian, WSC was “still working on restoring operations to pre-Hurricane Dorian levels.” How hybrid rainwater harvesting can help Improving water access in the Caribbean means working on all of those challenges. Better governance and investment can help reduce water loss from theft and leaks. Government and social pressure and educating tourists can help reduce waste at hotels and resorts. There are also ways to increase water supply. One involves being more strategic about how the islands use a practice the region has relied on for centuries: rainwater harvesting. Rainwater harvesting involves capturing rainwater, often from where it runs off rooftops, and storing it for future use. It can replace irrigation, or the water can be treated for household uses. Right now, rainwater harvesting is not managed as part of the islands’ centralized water management system. Instead, households bear the cost to finance, build and maintain their own systems. Finding technical support can be difficult, leaving households to contend with seasonal variations in water quantity and quality. That makes risks to drinking water safety difficult to identify. If rainwater harvesting were instead combined with central water systems in a managed hybrid water model, I believe that could help expand safe rainwater harvesting and address water issues in the region. It’s a relatively new concept, and integrating decentralized sources can be complex, including requiring separate pipes, but it has potential to reduce water stress. Decentralized sources, such as rainwater harvesting, groundwater or recycled gray water, could serve as backup water sources during shortages or provide water for nonpotable purposes, such as flushing toilets or irrigation, to reduce demand for treated water. Engineers in Australia are weighing the potential of hybrid water systems to help face the challenges of delivering secure, safe and sustainable water in the future. Fulfilling a human right in the islands The World Health Organization has declared that access to a sufficient, safe and reliable water supply is a fundamental human right, and that to accomplish this, water suppliers have a responsibility to provide adequate quantities of potable water. Hybrid water systems could help ensure water safety and security for island communities and improve the water systems’ resilience amid the human and environmental pressures facing the Caribbean.

Diplomacy
As part of Xi Jinping's state visit, Russia and China signed the package of documents.

Russia: From China’s Big Brother to Vassal

by Jack A. Jarmon , Alexander J. Motyl

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском While the flurry over Vladimir Putin’s visit with Xi Jinping last May caused a gush among many media outlets, the public declarations of an enduring alliance is more of the same old bluster rather than a serious démarche. A longer view of Sino-Russo relations tells a far more serpentine story. Future historians will be amused by the irony of how quickly, in world historical time, China and Russia changed places. In 1949, China was the Soviet Russian empire’s vassal, a victorious Communist state that tried to emulate all things Soviet. By 2024, a mere 75 years later, Russia had become China’s vassal, a stale dictatorship hoping to survive a pointless war it had initiated a year before. Rising from the misery of World War II and its own civil war, China entered the succeeding era adrift. Its economy was in ruins, its military vulnerable. As leader of the Communist bloc, the USSR appeared as the natural strategic big brother. The mutual benefits were obvious. China was in desperate need of assistance. The USSR required access to Chinese rail links and ports in the Far East. Moscow felt it needed to defend its interests against potential armed attacks from Japan, while China was wheeling toward international isolation. Both countries feared the growing dominance of the United States. Since that time, relations between Soviet Union/Russia and China have undergone a unique push and pull. The interplay has shift from patron/client state to a formal military alliance (1950-59), schism (1960s), open conflict (1969), détente (1970s), rapprochement (1980s) and, normalisation (after the collapse of the Soviet Union). Now, the war in Ukraine has set loose a new politesse between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a “no limits” partnership. Or so the Russians would like to believe. The Chinese disagree: their EU ambassador Fu Cong characterised the partnership in 2023 as “nothing but rhetoric.” To be sure, Russia’s need of a market for its natural resource wealth and China’s energy intensive growth have certainly impelled them to seek a mutually beneficial arrangement. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have met 40 times since 2012. Both men share a similar family story as well as similar views about civilisational wars, the decline of the West, color revolutions, and the threat posed by the United States and NATO. However, despite these personal, philosophical, and trade complementarities, the PRC and Russia are moving on diverse tracks. Fu Cong’s dismissive attitude is on the mark. To start, the economic synergy is exaggerated. Russia is fourteenth among China’s largest trading partners. Its trade with Russia is relatively inconsequential. Each is more dependent on third countries than on the other. Russia needs the EU. China relies on other Asian countries and the United States. Further, despite its economic heft, China cannot match Europe’s potential as a driver of industrial and commercial modernisation for Russia. Secondly, due to its monopsonistic position, China forces Russia to sell oil, natural gas, and coal at heavily discounted prices. These discounts are so deep that Russian gas exports to China often do not cover the operational costs of their extraction and transportation. Additionally, the PRC makes payments to Russia in Chinese renminbi and uses these transactions to leverage its position over non-Russian suppliers. Unsurprisingly, direct Chinese investment in Russia has almost exclusively focused on the energy and other extraction industries. Sectors with the greatest potential for productivity gains, such as high-tech manufacturing, utilities, construction, financial services et al, go undeveloped. In addition to trade priorities, another reason for this neglect is that the Chinese have found that doing business in Russia is as daunting for them as it is for western investors. The infrastructure in Russia’s Far East is so underdeveloped that the PRC has had to make substantial investments to get access to the resources it wants. By all reports, these investments have underperformed. Further, the lack of rule of law and the absence of a business-friendly ecosystem leave even the Chinese frustrated and grumbling. Russia wants investments but not investors—a common refrain often directed at the PRC. The Russian economy has long been beset by structural problems: low diversification, a faltering industrial base, uncontrolled corruption, the absence of an entrepreneurial class and now, inflation. The mounting costs of the war in Ukraine exacerbates existing matters and will probably prolong the economic dysfunctionality far into the future. In short, Putin’s hunger to reconstitute the Soviet empire is “making Russia a smaller, worse-educated and poorer country.” China’s own economy has its challenges, too. Rising corporate debt, labour shortages and, poor investment efficiency are driving it into stagnation. In 2012, the PRC launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to link its economy with under-developed regions from Central Asia, Africa, and Europe. The dream was to provide its export-oriented economy with markets. There have been several major defaults, and recipients of Chinese loans are subject to falling into debt traps. In light of the current pressures on the economy, the risk is even more intense. By most analyses, the PRC will need cooperation from the West if the scheme has any hope of success. In Central Asia, a confrontation with Russia may be percolating. China’s Belt and Road could compete with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). From the beginning, the Eurasian Union was a token attempt at economic regionalism and a veiled instrument of Russian geopolitics. Many contend it survives as merely another façade to reconstitute the Soviet Union. While it offers little incentive in the way of any real political or market institutions, it represents Russia’s bid to bolster its influence in the region and beyond. Although its threat to the BRI is not significant, it has prompted one regional expert to conclude China may fear a Russian victory in Ukraine because it could strengthen Moscow’s influence in Central Asia. In a move that diminishes Russian energy policy as a source of political influence, Chinese companies have taken stakes in Central Asian oil and gas fields and have built a network of pipelines. Beijing also abandoned its interest in investing in the Power of Siberia II pipeline. Additionally, the China-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) froze lending to Russia and Belarus in 2023. As a vassal state, there is little Moscow can offer Beijing except for its agency as a counterbalance against the United States. The fundamental difference is that Xi wants to reform the global economy, while Putin wants to upend it. As one Chinese analyst puts it, “Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.” Russia’s war against Ukraine has troubled the Chinese. The global economy on which China depends so greatly is being disrupted. Indeed, Beijing may be preparing for a Russian defeat. A recent analysis by Beijing University’s Feng Yujun is worth quoting at length for what it surely reveals about the current Chinese leadership’s views of Moscow: “Russia’s eventual defeat [is] inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea…. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO. “The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr. Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, … Mr. Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.” At some point the Kremlin will become a liability for Beijing. Putin and his circle can bray at the moon about the constant state of siege between nations and societies, invoke other nuggets of Leninist doctrine, and even claim how Poland attacked Nazi Germany and, thus, began World War II. But when the time comes, Xi, rather than conjure up Lenin, will take counsel from another source – Sun Tzu: “There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare.” When that moment finally arrives is uncertain. However, the sway China holds over Russia and the tide of events suggest it is approaching.

Defense & Security
Disputed Claims In The South China Sea.

Africa’s delicate diplomacy in the South China Sea dispute

by Samir Bhattacharya

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Diplomacy
Election word Venezuela or Venezuela with election sign showing the parliamentary election of Venezuela

Explainer: Venezuela's 2024 Presidential Elections

by Chase Harrison

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Publication credits to AS/COA and Chase Harrison.Nicólas Maduro keeps stacking the deck to win come July 28, but polls favor opposition candidate Edmundo González. The big question for Venezuela’s July 28 elections may not be who voters prefer but whether their preference will be respected. The previous presidential election, which took place in 2018, was marked by irregularities. The reelection of Nicólas Maduro was considered illegitimate by the EU and countries around the world. Now, Maduro is seeking to extend his already decade-long reign with another six-year term. But will this race be free and fair? The fact that Venezuelans will even have the chance to go to the polls was not a given just a few months ago. The framework for this election was established in through the Barbados Accords, signed in October 2023 by the Maduro government and an alliance of opposition parties known as the Unitary Platform. The agreement set out conditions for the election, including that it must take place in the second half of this year, electoral reforms must be made, and international observation must be allowed. It also covered guarantees for the opposition’s participation and primary election process. The United States, which was not party to the accords, agreed to drop some sanctions to get Maduro to stick to his Barbados pledges. A few conditions have been met. The opposition did have its primary in October 2023. And, Maduro set the date for July 28—his deceased predecessor Hugo Chávez’s birthday, marking a date that is early but within the promised range. But other promises have been violated, with one key example being the January disqualification of presidential candidate Maria Corina Machado, who won the opposition primary with 93 percent of the vote. This prompted international outcry and the resumption of some sanctions. Now, the Unitary Platform has a new candidate, former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, and polls suggest he has a commanding lead of as much as 50 points over Maduro. What is González proposing? And how might Maduro undercut his rivals? AS/COA Online covers the electoral context and the candidates. Electoral context Venezuela’s election is being overseen by the country’s Electoral Council (CNE). While the body once included members seen as part of the opposition, in June 2023, the government-controlled constituent assembly replaced all 15 members to create an unanimously pro-Maduro council. So far, the CNE has undertaken several moves that watchdogs and foreign observers view as anti-democratic, such as the disqualification of opposition parties and candidates. Under the Barbados Accords, the CNE was tasked with updating the electoral registry. Currently, the roll includes about 21.6 million of Venezuela’s 28.8 million citizens. Of the about 8 million Venezuelans who live outside the country, only about 228,000 are registered abroad. That’s because the rules for absentee voting in Venezuela are onerous, requiring voters to be registered at a foreign address for at least three years and living in that place legally. Those seeking refugee or asylum status are banned from participating. Moreover, registered voters must go to a consulate to cast their ballots. But in many countries, such as the United States, Venezuelan government buildings have been shuttered, leaving no available voting sites. Meanwhile, the October 2023 opposition primary, which was independently organized and had more relaxed registration rules, attracted 2.4 million voters from abroad. Even for those living in the country, registration remains difficult, as it must be performed at official buildings in state capitals. In 2023, it was estimated that there are 3.5 million potential new voters who remain unregistered in the country. The CNE is also in charge of facilitating the participation of international electoral observers. Under the Barbados Accords, the Maduro regime promised that missions from bodies like the EU, the UN, the African Union, and the Carter Center would be able to observe the election. However, the regime revoked the EU’s invitation in May. Other groups, like the Carter Center and the African Union, are still slated to observe with small missions. Aside from the CNE, the Venezuelan military plays a role in overseeing the elections. Historically, the military has been loyal to Maduro, helping him stay in power. However, the military might be key to guaranteeing that the will of the voters is respected. “They will see and they will know if a major fraud is committed,” explained AS/COA Senior Director Guillermo Zubillaga. “The military will be the deciding factor.” Machado has already called for the military to guarantee a democratic transition. Nicólas Maduro, United Social Party of Venezuela Maduro took over the reins of the country after the death of his mentor, Chávez, in 2013 and he has overseen the acceleration of the country’s democratic and economic collapse ever since. From 2014 to 2021, Venezuela’s GDP shrank nearly three-quarters. The country has seen a small amount of growth since then, but it remains bogged down by hyperinflation, a debt load of $154 billion, mass emigration, and a crippled oil sector. His career grew in Chávez’s shadow. After working as a bus driver and trade unionist, he was elected to the National Assembly in 2000. From there, he served as minister of foreign affairs (2006-2012), vice president (2012-2013), and acting president once Chávez passed. He declared himself victorious in a 2013 presidential special election with 1.6 percent more of the vote than his closest rival. The opposition protested against vote-rigging and Maduro’s unfair use of state resources to campaign. As president, Maduro’s ideological commitment to Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution has seen him stack institutions with allies, advance economic policies that maximize state control, and pursue a foreign policy agenda in opposition to the United States. In turn, Venezuela has sunk to the bottom of global indexes focused on freedom and democracy amid shrinking checks and balances; chavistas control the country’s judiciary and electoral courts. The opposition did control the National Assembly after 2015 elections but, in 2017, the country’s top court dissolved the legislature. That same year, Maduro called for the election of a constituent assembly in a contest boycotted by the opposition. The constituent assembly has now usurped the National Assembly to become the de facto legislating body. Maduro has used his control of the courts and the legislature to tilt the playing field in his favor in this year’s elections. He’s jailed more than 270 dissenting voices, stacked the members of the electoral court, and disqualified presidential candidates. Despite these maneuvers, Maduro polls with as little as 8 percent of the vote in the July elections. How might he still win? He’s hoping the strong chavista party structure can aid his campaign. He also might leverage clientelist networks. Already, Maduro has increased public spending by 80 percent from January to May and raised the monthly income for public workers. But waning enthusiasm and state resources might hamper the chavistas’ electoral abilities. “In the past, they’ve been able to mobilize the party members and loyalists, before and on the day of the election. This year, that ability is in question,” said Zubillaga. Maduro maintains a prolific media presence in the country, appearing across television and radio. Opposition figures, meanwhile, are barred from appearing on most radio and TV stations. And, Maduro is tapping into Tik Tok, expanding his use of social media to portray himself as charismatic, to appeal to youth voters. Polling shows that this group continues to be the most supportive of the opposition. Edmundo González, Unitary Platform The 73-year-old former diplomat and academic did not intend to become the presidential hopeful for the Venezuelan opposition. Originally a placeholder, González was affirmed as the official nominee after substitutes for Machado, like academic Corina Yoris, were disqualified. But even if he was not so well known a few months ago, González now leads polls and, alongside Machado, headlines large rallies across the country. Pitching himself as a reconciliation candidate, his platform articulates a transition back to a pluralistic democracy, touching on themes of amnesty for the Maduro regime and rebuilding institutions. Outside of a focus on facilitating a democratic transition, González defers to the political program of Machado, noting that she, not him, was the primary voters’ choice. She has championed stabilizing the country’s macroeconomics by developing its energy reserves, as well as promoting nearshoring, and investment in infrastructure. González also references his long tenure in Venezuela’s foreign service to divorce himself from any particular political ideology. He highlights that he served successive administrations during posts in Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, El Salvador, and the United States. In an interview with El Pais, he described himself “as a democrat, a moderate person, far from extreme positions.” Still, even if González is voters’ top choice, worries persist that he will be disqualified before or, should he win, after the election. Four members of his team have already been detained on charges of instigating hate and conspiracy. Other candidates Eight other candidates will appear on the ballot for president. While there was potential for some of these candidates to split opposition votes, so far none of them poll above 2 percent in the May 2024 Meganalisis poll. Still, they are muddling an already confusing ballot. Candidates appear under each party they represent, meaning there are 38 headshots even though there are ten candidates. Maduro appears in 13* places; Gónzalez just three times. Many of the other candidates—such as evangelical pastor Javier Bertucci, lawyer Antonio Ecarri, and comedian Benjamin Rauseo—are trying to present themselves as a third way, rebuking chavismo but criticizing the Unitary Platform for either its strategy or its policies. *Editor's note: The original version of this article stated that Maduro appears 14 times on the electoral ballot.