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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Australia and Indonesia have long had an uneasy relationship, over issues ranging from Timor-Leste’s independence to asylum seekers and bans on live cattle export to the aftermath of the Bali bombings. While the politics have long been challenging, there’s reason to believe a change may be coming. One of the fastest-growing economies in the world, Indonesia has long been powered by coal. Now, it’s endeavouring to go green through renewables, grid modernisation, electric vehicles and geothermal. That’s where Australia comes in. In March this year, the two nations formalised a climate partnership, named KINETIK. Through the agreement, Indonesia will secure supplies of lithium for EV batteries, and Australia will gain more export markets for its critical minerals, as well as potential access to the batteries’ industry supply chain. Why has the relationship been rocky? Since winning independence from the Dutch, Indonesia has focused heavily on keeping its many islands and ethnic groups united. But Australia’s role has sometimes been destabilising. During the Cold War, Australian agencies backed the Indonesian army’s bloody purges of communists. Australia also backed the cause of East Timorese secession. In 1998, Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote to Indonesia’s President, B.J Habibie, pushing for East Timorese independence. A year later, over 5,500 Australian soldiers arrived as peacekeepers during a tense referendum over the region’s future. Many people in Indonesia saw Australia’s involvement as a threat to national unity and cohesion. Before Howard and Indonesia’s next president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, had time to restore the relationship, tensions ramped up again after the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali which killed 88 Australians. Four years later, the Australian decision to grant temporary protection visas to 43 asylum seekers from Papua, which has long sought independence from Indonesia, led Indonesia’s ambassador to Canberra to be recalled. This diplomatic incident bore positive fruit, resulting in improved dialogue and, the same year, the signing of the Lombok Treaty, in which both countries promised not to interfere with the sovereignty of the other. Since then, Australia has been diplomatically silent on other Indonesian territorial issues, such as the separatist movement in Papua. Despite these efforts, many differences remain. Experts have often warned the relationship is tenuous. In 2019, the two nations signed a new Comprehensive Economic Partnership after a tortuous negotiation period. With a focus on climate change and energy transition, this paved the way for this year’s announcement. In a broader context, this partnership also illustrates Australia’s approach as a middle power nation to counterbalance China’s increasing economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Could the green transition help the relationship? In 2022, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Indonesia, where he promised A$200 million to kickstart climate and infrastructure projects. Now we have a formalised partnership. This is an important step, which should improve the political relationship. The two nations already trade $18 billion of goods and services yearly, centred on Australian coal and beef and Indonesian fertilisers and petrol. But there is room for much more growth. Indonesia’s population is young and large, with almost 280 million people. By 2030, estimates suggest it could be the world’s fifth-largest economy. If the KINETIK partnership works, it will be because it offers both nations what they need – Australia gets a new export market for green minerals, technology and know-how, and Indonesia starts to shift away from coal. The agreement builds on a memorandum of understanding on electric vehicles and another between Export Finance Australia and Indonesia’s State-owned Electricity Company last year. What are we likely to see as tangible outcomes? Indonesia perches on the Pacific Ring of Fire, with a number of active volcanoes and frequent earthquakes. This also means the archipelago nation has huge geothermal resources, estimated at 40% of the world’s total. Many geothermal plants are already running. But making the most of the resource faces many technological challenges. The best underground heat resources tend to be located in mountains or in isolated areas. The KINETIK partnership could help through connecting Australian mining expertise to Indonesia’s deep heat resources. Australia’s expertise in using renewables to power isolated communities will be vital to make exploration easier. And Australian investors will be allowed to own a majority share of Indonesian geothermal plants. The partnerships are expected to align with Indonesia’s National Energy Policy, which aims in part to shift from exporting raw energy resources and critical minerals to exporting value-added energy products through downstream projects such as EV and battery industries. Australia is home to the world’s largest hard-rock lithium mine, Greenbushes. The new partnership will open up options for Indonesian battery manufacturers to access this key metal. Indonesia, in turn, is rich in nickel, which will be needed in great quantities for green technologies. In fact, cheaper Indonesian nickel has pushed some Australian producers out of the market. Indonesia has already secured commercial deals with EV and battery manufacturers such as Hyundai and LG from South Korea, as well as Foxconn from Taiwan. Will this be enough? Politically, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia has long been thorny. A new focus on mutual advantageous investment could help, especially given the deal has strong political backing on both sides. Developing electric vehicles in Indonesia was also a key campaign issue for the newly elected Indonesian president, Prabowo Subianto. From the Australian side, the agreement bolsters the Albanese government’s push to make the nation a green energy superpower. Of course, many agreements stay on paper and don’t shape the real world. But this one has a better chance, given the alignment between Indonesia’s efforts to make itself part of the electric vehicle supply chain, and Australia’s dream of becoming a green superpower. Bilateral agreements like these also show how the world is changing. More and more, middle power cooperation is emerging as a counterbalance against the intensifying Chinese-American rivalry. It’s also a positive sign Australia has realised the need to more actively build alliances across the Indo-Pacific region.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. In the wake of the helicopter crash that tragically claimed the lives of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran finds itself at a critical juncture, grappling with both internal and external challenges. Foremost among them is its relationship with the US. Iran is in the middle of a tense regional competition with Israel over the latter’s war in Gaza with Hamas. Washington is invariably drawn into what constitutes a historically contested triad shaping stability and instability in broader West Asia. Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. Two factors, however, are likely to dampen any US expectations from Iran. Iran’s topmost leadership remains intact under the aegis of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the next president will be expected to meet the benchmarks set by previous leaders. For the US, the Iran challenge is likely to remain complex, both due to the leadership transition inside Iran and the growing regional power and influence projected by Tehran. If the Biden administration, despite its initial will, couldn’t bind Iran within the constraints of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a possible Trump presidency would be even less likely to succeed. Regional anti-American sentiments in West Asia, especially among Iran and its proxy groups, seem further entrenched. However, the Biden administration has an opportunity to mitigate regional hostilities by fostering a Saudi-US détente, which remains on the table but is heavily dependent on how much influence Washington can wield with Israel’s highly conservative cabinet in restraining its behaviour in Gaza. Iran’s regional outlook and relations with the US may not be poised for significant shifts, given the predictability associated with the regime, yet the challenge of nurturing inter-generational leaders looms large for Iran. Leadership succession in Iran’s internal politics has always been meticulously planned and nurtured over the years, undergoing a rigorous process to ensure continuity. Internally, Iran faces a crucial test of its leadership amid a situation it has not encountered in decades. However, there is solace in the fact that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei remains alive, poised to select the most suitable candidate. Internally, the vacuum left by the untimely demise of two top leaders presents a crisis as well as an opportunity. However, the socio-cultural divergence with the West, exemplified by the Iranian leadership’s lingering reluctance to embrace any change, may continue to strain the relationship. The crisis in leadership compounds this internal struggle, as no state wishes to appear leaderless during times of uncertainty. Externally, the challenges for Iran are manifold, particularly in filling the leadership void that has been growing since the death of General Qasem Soleimani in 2020 after a US-targeted strike. The new leadership in Iran will be tested in how it continues to project its regional influence and maintain the momentum of clandestine efforts it has propagated across its axis. Internationally, the Iranian leadership’s challenge will primarily be in its tussle with the West on the one hand and maintaining poise in its relationships with varied actors such as China, Russia, and India, all while avoiding Western sanctions. Iran, which has been persistently characteristic in its distinct political stance even in the face of sanctions and regional tensions, has found an alternative axis of support, most notably through partnerships with China and Russia. Besides, Iran has fostered a network of regional support through proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and others. This solidarity axis is now bolstered by a shared commitment to the Palestinian cause. However, the post-October 7, 2023, landscape has seen a nuanced shift in perceptions, including those of regional Arab leaders. As such, the current period is particularly tumultuous in West Asiawith the unabating Israel-Hamas conflict. The loss of key figures in Iran’s leadership couldn’t have come at a worse time, especially as Iran finds itself at a crossroads, balancing unfinished conflicts and shifting regional loyalties. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is now enriching uranium to as much as 60% purity and possesses enough of this material that, if further enriched, could be sufficient for two nuclear weapons. Now that the ‘breakout’ time is close to zero, there are strong incentives for keeping Tehran engaged through the IAEA, if not bilaterally. Despite the seeming belligerence of Iran’s leadership, avoiding war and efforts towards regional peace and stability lie at the core of Tehran’s long-term regional vision. Just a week before the fatal crash, Iran’s foreign minister met with the IAEA chief, and Iran engaged with US officials through intermediaries in Oman on how to avoid the risks of a wider regional war. If anything, these efforts show that both the Biden administration and the Iranian leadership are still willing to sit at the table. That may not be bad inspiration for the next generation of leaders in Tehran to pick up from. This commentary originally appeared in Deccan Herald. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract This study investigates the academic discourse surrounding China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a multifaceted geopolitical project championed by the central government. Through a critical examination of BRI-related literature, primarily in political science and international relations published between 2015 and 2023, the analysis highlights a burgeoning field marked by both growing depth and intensifying critique. It further contends that despite a rise in scholarship, BRI's smaller players and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) call for further investigation. This nuanced approach fosters a comprehensive understanding of BRI's complexities and its evolving global impact. Keywords China- Maritime Silk Road Initiative- Silk Road Economic Belt- Belt and Road Initiative 1. Introduction Following the 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the ambitious undertaking has garnered significant attention from observers for its vast scope and projected economic and political implications.1 The BRI's potential impact on the global order, its member states, diverse regions, and all involved actors has raised a multitude of concerns. A huge body of literature on (BRI) aligns with China’s positive view of the initiative.2 However, a comprehensive review showed that previous research had limitations in scope and depth. Notably, repetitive investigations into established topics and examinations of prior inquiries are prevalent, which hinders the production of novel insights. Furthermore, the trend towards proliferation of topic areas, instead of deeper analysis within existing themes, impedes scholarly advancement. Additionally, many studies assign marginal roles to (BRI), disproportionately focusing on China's perspective. This results in imbalanced literature on China's initiative in terms of quality and nuanced interpretation. From the above mentioned, this study focuses on a key question that revolves around, what are the gaps and limitations in current understanding in BRI’s literatures in the study time period (2015-2023), and what are the challenges and opportunities for the initiative’s researchers and scholars? As focusing on these gaps serves as a catalyst towards more understanding of the dimensions of the initiative, and then contributes to providing a clearer vision for policy decision makers and scholars interested in the initiative. Given these deficiencies, this study aims to critically examine the existing (BRI) literature, drawing upon a diverse selection of academic research, primarily within international relations and political science, published between 2015 and 2023. More significantly, this overview would outline a framework for refining and renewing the discourse surrounding the initiative. This article aims for a deeper understanding of the participants, their plans and future developments. Research should move beyond broad overviews and engage in analyses of the Mari-time Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), focusing on specific regions and project development trajectories. This necessitates rigorous analyses and interpretations of data to lay forward local experiences and diverse future aspirations of (BRI) participants. Secondly, a closer examination of (MSRI) and (SREB) application is imperative. This entails meticulously evaluating the financial performance and sociopolitical implications of completed projects, with particular attention to both economic benefits and potential challenges like debt burdens. Furthermore, a thorough analysis of internal and external policy ramifications for participating countries is crucial, exploring how (BRI) projects align with or challenge existing national and regional frameworks. Thirdly, while existing studies have shed light on Chinese foreign policy through (BRI), further inquiries should expand beyond this singular perspective. Independent research conducted by scholars based in (BRI) recipient countries can offer invaluable insights into local needs, priorities, and concerns. Additionally, comparative studies across diverse regions can illustrate region-specific challenges and successes, enriching our understanding of participant experiences. Finally, it is essential to move beyond China-centric narratives and actively incorporate the perspectives of participating nations within BRI research, which necessitates prioritizing analyses that critically examine the role of Chinese soft power, encompassing cultural exchanges, media engagement, and educational initiatives, and their impact on shaping perceptions and fostering cooperation within the initiative. 2. China’s Initiative at Crossroads Since China's 2013 announcement of the (BRI), its purpose has sparked diverse interpretations among researchers, with ongoing debate focusing on the balance between economic and political motivations.3 While some researchers interpret (BRI) primarily as a domestic economic strategy aimed at market expansion, securing energy sources, and creating investment opportunities for Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs),4 others view it as a manifestation of China's global ambition to achieve dominance in the Eurasian region, and global order.5 A third group of scholars further argue that the BRI is a strategic tool for China to improve its diplomatic relationships with participating countries across Asia, Africa, and Europe. They suggest that by promoting economic cooperation and infrastructure development, the (BRI) can foster regional stability and reduce potential conflict.6 A fourth group of (BRI) studies focuses on the Chinese economy's structural vulnerabilities, arguing that they pose long-term risks to both economic growth and political stability. These vulnerabilities include rampant surplus industrial capacity, which threatens job security and social cohesion; overreliance on land-based energy import routes, potentially exposing China to geopolitical disruptions; and the economic stagnation of western regions, exacerbating regional disparities and social tensions. These studies further examine the extent to which the (BRI) can exacerbate or alleviate these challenges, particularly considering China's heavy reliance on investment, exports, and state-owned enterprises as economic drivers.7 Another area of research focuses on the evolving scope of international dispute resolution mechanisms within the (BRI) framework for projects between China and African countries. This study analyzes the strength and transparency of these new entities, considering factors like legal expertise, judicial independence, and efficient dispute resolution procedures. The study aims to contribute to a better understanding of how disputes relating to China-Africa cooperation will be addressed in the future.8 Adding to the complexity of understanding the BRI's aims, some studies analyze its role as a tool for China's soft power projection,9 They highlight how the initiative's focus on cultural exchange, infrastructure development, and media engagement fosters positive international perceptions of China and enhances its global influence. Others suggest that the (BRI) serves domestic political purposes, potentially serving as a means for Xi Jinping to solidify his leadership within the Chinese Communist Party and strengthen his legitimacy on the international stage.10 This diversity of interpretations underscores the complexity of the BRI's objectives, likely driven by a multitude of motives within China's vast political and economic system. While China emphasizes the collaborative nature of the initiative, portraying it as a 'symphony,' concerns remain about how individual participant interests align with China's own ambitions. Further research is crucial to understand how the BRI's complex motivations translate into tangible outcomes for all involved parties.11 Several studies assess the BRI's impact on both benefits and challenges by examining its relationship with past Chinese development initiatives.12 They argue that the (BRI) draws upon earlier programs like the southern and western campaigns, benefiting from existing infrastructure and communication networks in Central and South Asia. Given the multitude of perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative's objectives and potential consequences, a question arises: do existing research efforts sufficiently cater to the needs and concerns of participating countries? While studies provide valuable insights into aspects like soft power dynamics and geopolitical implications, a crucial factor often remains in the shadows - funding. Despite the BRI's reliance on vast financial resources, research rarely dives into the effectiveness of funding mechanisms, or their potential impact on participants' debt burdens and economic sustainability. To truly gauge the BRI's long-term success and ensure equitable benefits for all involved, future research must prioritize a deeper understanding of its financial dynamics and their consequences for diverse stakeholders. Despite the vast sums promised to the (BRI), a veil of ambiguity hangs over its true financial picture. While platforms like the (MSRI) and (SREB) lack explicit upper limits for project funding, details regarding specific project budgets remain shrouded in secrecy. This loose terminology surrounding "costs," "loans," and "investments" further obscures the potential debt burdens faced by participating countries. Although numerous financial entities, including banks like China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed willingness to participate, specific committed amounts remain elusive. This lack of transparency raises concerns about potential overestimations of the BRI's overall funding capacity and hinders a clear understanding of how financial resources are actually channeled into projects. Future research must prioritize unraveling this tangled web of finances to assess the BRI's true economic feasibility and its implications for all stakeholders involved. The financial picture of the (BRI) remains obscure despite estimations ranging from $400 billion to $8 trillion. This ambiguity stems partly from the lack of publicly disclosed budgetary allocations for specific projects under platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB).13 Further compounding the opaqueness is the loose terminology used by observers, who often conflate "costs," "loans," and "investments" without adequately differentiating their financial implications. Though numerous financial entities, including banks like the China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed interest in BRI projects, concrete commitments regarding specific funding amounts remain elusive.14 This lack of transparency impedes a clear understanding of the initiative's true financial capacity and raises concerns about potential overestimations of total funding. Unraveling this tangled web of financial ambiguity is crucial for future research to assess the BRI's economic feasibility and its implications for participating countries.15 Despite the increasing number of countries engaged in (BRI), its participant roster remains shrouded in a cloud of ambiguity. However, with the initiative's rapid expansion, accurately delineating participants has become increasingly complex. While some prominent nations like the United States, India, and Japan remain firmly outside the initiative, others, including Vietnam,16 Ethiopia,17 Myanmar, Nepal,18 Latin America,19 Africa,20 and numerous numbers of countries nearly 140 in the BRI,21 play significant roles. Estimates suggest the total number of BRI participants now approaches 140. This lack of readily accessible and transparent participant data poses a significant challenge for research and analysis. Accurately understanding the BRI's geographic scope, assessing its economic impact on diverse participants, and predicting its long-term geopolitical implications hinge upon a clear and comprehensive understanding of who stands as part of the initiative. Despite the multitude of studies analyzing (BRI), much remains opaque regarding the distinction between its "connectivity" and "non-connectivity" projects. This is surprising given the initiative's emphasis on hard infrastructure development, encompassing projects like railways, highways, bridges, airports, and seaports.22 However, beyond these tangible linkages lies a spectrum of critical "non-connectivity" projects vital for economic development. These include initiatives addressing areas such as bolstering economic growth, fostering diverse investment opportunities, facilitating mining development, establishing special economic zones, and even deploying satellite monitoring stations. Failing to delve into both connectivity and non-connectivity domains hinders a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's economic impact and broader geopolitical implications. Only by recognizing the intertwined roles of these project types can we fully grasp the initiative's complex landscape and its potential consequences for participating countries.23 While (BRI) draws extensive attention for its transformative hard infrastructure projects like railways, highways, and bridges, its success hinges on an equally crucial yet less visible layer: soft infrastructure. Bilateral investment treaties,24 and free trade agreements form the backbone of this soft infrastructure, establishing clear legal and regulatory frameworks that underpin cross-border investments, trade liberalization, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Recognizing the vital role of this soft infrastructure, alongside the hard connectivity projects, is essential for comprehending the BRI's full scope and assessing its potential impact on participating countries.25 To overcome the limitations identified, future research on (BRI) should shift its focus from broad analyses of the initiative as a whole to delving deeper into specific platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB). These platforms often lack transparency regarding project details, including participants, features, costs, and funding mechanisms. By conducting focused studies on these platforms, researchers can contribute substantially to demystifying the BRI's financial picture and identifying its true participants. 3. Problems Arising in Edited Volumes This section identifies limitations in existing edited volumes on (BRI) and proposes potential solutions, acknowledging varying degrees of implement ability. Remarkably, current volumes often prioritize specific aspects of the BRI, such as its geographical scope, key drivers, diverse stakeholder involvement (including private and public actors), and the participation of subnational and international organizations. However, this fragmented approach overlooks the initiative's broader implications for global governance, power dynamics, international trade flows, transportation infrastructure (including high-speed networks), social movements, and government accountability. Therefore, future edited volumes on the BRI require a more holistic analytical framework that transcends individual thematic strands and comprehensively examines the initiative's multifaceted impact across these interconnected dimensions.26 Another critical concern with a subset of edited volumes on (BRI) lies in the editors' failure to ensure consistent thematic engagement across chapters. This often leads to a lack of focus on empirical analysis, with some chapters delving into specific case studies or data-driven investigations, while others remain mired in theoretical discussions or abstract conceptualizations. This inconsistency undermines the potential for cross-fertilization between chapters and hinders the volume's ability to offer a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's multifaceted realities.27 The thematic inconsistencies between chapters in many edited volumes on (BRI) hinder the development of a comprehensive understanding of the initiative. To enhance the value of their work, (BRI) editors should prioritize thematic coherence and avoid redundancy by curating chapters that offer diverse perspectives and delve deeper into specific aspects of the initiative, rather than presenting overlapping analyses. Several edited volumes on (BRI) suffer from critical lacunae. A significant number lack robust introduction or conclusion, impeding the synthesis of key findings and the formulation of future research directions.28 While individual chapters may possess abstracts, these often fail to engage with overarching thematic threads, identify areas of divergence within the volume, or propose new avenues for inquiry. This fragmentation hinders the volumes' capacity to foster a holistic understanding of the BRI. Furthermore, some edited volumes suffer from outdated data, often relying on information presented at workshops or conferences years prior.29 This presents readers with potentially stale facts and hinders informed analysis. Additionally, a lack of consensus among contributors regarding key terms like "economic growth" and "global governance" can fragment the discussion. With varying definitions, contributors essentially discuss the (BRI) through different lenses, limiting the potential for cohesive analysis and knowledge accumulation. Building upon the identified weaknesses in edited volumes on the (BRI), this study has highlighted several challenges facing BRI research. However, it also offers invaluable groundwork and potential solutions for overcoming these limitations, paving the way for more robust and comprehensive future scholarship in this critical area. 4. BRI’s Operational Problems Operational challenges within (MSRI) and (SREB) projects necessitate a deeper understanding of the dynamic interplay between several factors. This includes the relationship between on-the-ground project realities and the expectations outlined in relevant treaties, as well as the internal and external political and economic forces that can facilitate or hinder project modifications. Such knowledge is crucial for informing sound decision-making. Furthermore, a granular understanding of these critical factors within specific states and regions holds the potential to significantly enhance research on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a whole. While a plethora of studies and analyses on (BRI) exist, many suffer from limitations that impede our understanding of (MSRI) and (SREB) projects. A significant portion focuses on a narrow range of cases, repeatedly analyzing the same treaties or memorandums of understanding. This repetitive approach overlooks the diverse factors and dynamics impacting (MSRI) and (SREB) development. Additionally, an overemphasis on specific, well-documented aspects like high-speed railways in certain Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, Laos, and Pakistan, obscures the broader picture of project complexities and variations across the BRI's vast geographical scope. To enhance the analysis of project execution within (MSRI) and (SREB), four key areas warrant further investigation. Firstly, robust, comprehensive data on project development is crucial. Analyzing actual progress before drawing conclusions about (MSRI/SREB) nature will yield more reliable and nuanced insights. Secondly, researchers must scrutinize the factors with the highest impact on project development. Identifying these critical drivers will enable a deeper understanding of project outcomes and trajectories. Thirdly, examining the dynamic interplay between initial expectations and evolving ground realities is vital. Unveiling the reasons for deviations from expected outcomes, whether positive or negative, will provide valuable knowledge for project management and adaptation. Finally, researchers should delve into the complex interplay between funding mechanisms, project requirements, and associated costs. Untangling these financial relationships is essential for assessing project feasibility and optimizing resource allocation.30 Finally, a comprehensive analysis of project execution necessitates thorough examination of the diverse actors involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This includes scrutinizing their domestic political landscapes, individual characteristics, and contextual operating environments. Understanding these multifaceted influences helps illuminate the motivations, capabilities, and potential limitations of various stakeholders, thereby enabling researchers to more accurately predict their behavior and its impact on project outcomes.31 5. Statement of the Problem It is crucial to examine the multifaceted factors directly or indirectly affecting (MSRI) and (SREB) project execution. This includes a nuanced understanding of the initiative's benefits and costs across various scales: universal, regional, sub-regional, national, and subnational. These benefits encompass a wide range of aspects, including economic development, trade growth, infrastructure improvement, industrial development, productivity enhancements, technology and experience transfer, energy availability and production development, job creation, poverty alleviation, transportation cost and time reduction, and regional economic integration. Investigating the distribution and realization of these benefits, alongside the associated costs, is essential for assessing the overall impact and sustainability of projects.32 While existing research delves into various economic aspects of (BRI), crucial areas warrant further attention. Concerns surrounding heightened domestic trade competition, potential de-industrialization, rising trade deficits, and FDI displacement require deeper investigation. Similarly, political issues related to potential sovereignty concerns and BRI's impact on domestic and foreign policy deserve thorough analysis. Finally, social issues like environmental degradation, pollution, and potential social disintegration demand urgent attention from researchers beyond economics.33 Beyond economists, development specialists, and trade and infrastructure experts, scholars in political science, international relations, and related fields must actively engage with these critical (BRI) dimensions. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of the initiative's impacts necessitates a concerted effort across diverse disciplines to ensure a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's potential consequences. Comprehensive data on the costs and benefits of (BRI) projects serves as a critical tool for enhanced decision-making. Several studies investigating (BRI) rely on broad-stroke statistical analyses and projected benefits without sufficient project-specific detail.34 This approach suffers from several limitations. Firstly, while (BRI) projects unfold over extended periods, these studies often base their conclusions on data from limited timeframes and utilize short-term analytical frameworks. This can paint an incomplete picture and lead to inaccurate predictions. Secondly, these studies often make optimistic assumptions about the guaranteed success, sustainability, and completion of all BRI projects. This overlooks potential challenges and complexities, hindering a balanced and nuanced understanding of the initiative's true potential and pitfalls. A common weakness is overlooking the ground realities of project implementation. While acknowledging potential tensions and rivalries among participating countries,35 these studies often fail to delve deeper into their impacts on project outcomes. Similarly, qualitative research on BRI benefits tends to provide fragmented views. While highlighting positive aspects like training, connectivity, technology transfer, and industrialization, these studies rarely conduct comprehensive analyses or compare benefit distribution across different parties. Additionally, the focus on specific sectors, regions, or countries in a limited number of studies,36 restricts our understanding of the initiative's broader implications. Furthermore, scarce research investigates the total costs of BRI projects in specific regions or their potential negative impacts, such as exacerbating trade deficits, hindering industrialization, or closing certain sectors. While some studies acknowledge the potential boost to China's global reputation and public approval in participating countries, this aspect needs further exploration.37 Likewise, existing research highlighting problems within (BRI) partner countries deserves deeper and more nuanced investigation.38 Elevating the quality of (BRI) research necessitates prioritizing three key areas. Firstly, rigorous studies exploring the proof of identity of (MSRI) and (SREB) are crucial. Secondly, quantitative research on (BRI) projects demands a shift towards realism. Moving beyond the ambitions and aspirations enshrined in official narratives, researchers must utilize robust data and meticulous analysis to assess project costs, benefits, and potential risks. Thirdly, both quantitative and qualitative research should dedicate greater focus to the distribution of (BRI) benefits. Lastly, it is important to focus on projects that affect the environment and society, represented by hydroelectric projects that are required to implement the BRI’s projects. In addition to the energy extraction projects, mining operations and power generation. Thus, it is important for both Finally, a critical research gap lies in analyzing the environmental and social impacts of infrastructure projects associated with the (BRI). This includes, but is not limited to, hydropower dams, energy extraction ventures, mining operations, and power generation facilities. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers must devote attention to assessing the environmental consequences of these projects, such as potential biodiversity loss, pollution, and resource depletion, evaluating their social impacts, including community displacement, cultural disruption, and potential violations of labor rights, and investigating the effectiveness of mitigation measures implemented to address these concerns. 6. Political Influence This section delves into the political ramifications of (BRI) projects for participating countries. It specifically examines the extent to which both internal and external Chinese policies influence the foreign policy characteristics of BRI partners. This includes analyzing the impact on: a) domestic foreign policy features, such as priorities, alliances, and voting alignments; and b) international positions, particularly voting behavior on China-related issues in international forums like the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While several studies have explored Beijing's foreign policy influence within the BRI framework, focusing on specific countries like Cambodia, Ethiopia, Greece, and Sri Lanka,39 a comprehensive understanding necessitates systematic comparative analysis across diverse (BRI) partners, in-depth investigation of both internal and external policy dynamics, and consideration of alternative explanations for shifts in foreign policy beyond solely attributing them to Chinese influence. Such a nuanced approach will ensure a deeper and more accurate understanding of the complex interplay between (BRI) projects, national interests, and the evolving foreign policy landscapes of participating countries. This section further explores the potential spillover effects of Beijing's domestic policies onto participating (BRI) countries. While some studies suggest that the attractiveness of (BRI) projects incentivizes compliance with Chinese regulations, this hypothesis requires closer scrutiny. More research is needed to systematically analyze the specific content and implementation of relevant Chinese policies and their potential impact on partner countries, investigate the mechanisms through which such influence might occur, beyond mere project incentives, and consider alternative explanations for policy changes in (BRI) partner states, such as domestic drivers, regional pressures, or global influences. By moving beyond simplistic assumptions and conducting rigorous empirical research, we can gain a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between internal Chinese policies, (BRI) projects, and the evolving legal and regulatory landscapes of participating countries. The interplay between economic incentives and the political behavior of countries holds substantial research potential. Several studies have highlighted a correlation between economic and commercial relationships and the behavior of actors within those relationships. This link often involves a nuanced interplay of both positive and negative incentives, suggesting that economic factors can influence political decisions and actions in complex ways. Further research in this area should delve deeper into the specific mechanisms through which economic incentives translate into political behavior, the conditions under which these incentives have the strongest impact, and the potential unintended consequences of using economic levers to influence political outcomes.40 While political and economic factors are critical considerations for policymakers, it is crucial to avoid oversimplification. Assuming a direct and uniform impact of economic and political costs and benefits arising from bilateral relations between (BRI) partners and China on project-level outcomes would be inaccurate. As previously discussed, believing that all (BRI) projects will be flawlessly executed, yield solely positive outcomes, and universally benefit all participants is unrealistic. A nuanced understanding requires distinguishing between bilateral and project-level dynamics based on an interplay of economic and political factors which may differ significantly in individual (BRI) projects compared to broader bilateral contexts. Then, acknowledging project heterogeneity as (BRI) projects encompass diverse goals, scales, and contexts, necessitating an analysis that recognizes their potential for varying degrees of success and varying impacts on different stakeholders. Finally, accounting for unforeseen challenges as project implementation can be affected by unforeseen complexities, political shifts, and external factors beyond purely economic and political considerations. Therefore, policymakers should adopt a comprehensive perspective that goes beyond simple cost-benefit calculations and considers the interplay of diverse factors across different levels of analysis.41 Numerous studies highlight the fallacy of assuming uniformity in (BRI) projects' outcomes and universally positive net benefits. This critique stems from the understanding that economic relationships involve a complex interplay of positive and negative incentives, with clear linkages between economic stimuli and political behavior. Therefore, emphasizing the influence of political factors alongside economic ones becomes crucial. While pro-China sentiments and economic incentives often act as prominent motivators for countries to join (BRI), deeper analysis reveals that political factors frequently play a more primary role. Internal political motives can be particularly influential. Next, foreign policy objectives as joining the BRI can help countries secure allies, gain international leverage, or advance specific diplomatic goals. Finally, domestic policy priorities as (BRI) projects can be leveraged to address internal challenges like infrastructure deficiencies, economic underdevelopment, or resource scarcity. It is crucial to recognize that these political motives can interact with, and even supersede, economic interests in driving a country's decision to join the (BRI). Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of (BRI) participation necessitates going beyond simplistic cost-benefit calculations and carefully considering the complex interplay of internal and external political factors.42 Moving beyond participation alone, research needs to delve deeper into the implementation and impacts of (BRI) projects within partner countries. This entails addressing crucial questions such as project completion and success, political and economic costs and benefits and unforeseen consequences. Understanding BRI’s success necessitates analyzing the role of third-party actors. While existing research often focuses on bilateral dynamics between China and (BRI) partner countries, neglecting third parties introduces blind spots. A critical research gap exists in understanding (BRI) ramifications for China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). While existing studies often delve into specific aspects like hardware acquisition or naval base plans, a more comprehensive understanding necessitates examining the initiative's broader impact on the PLA's military posture and engagement. This entails investigating, firstly, the potential alterations to the PLA's strategic capabilities, its strategic resources, logistical networks, or potential overseas deployment points. Secondly, research should illuminate the initiative's effects on China's strategic priorities. Thirdly, it is crucial to analyze the BRI's influence on inter-ministerial dynamics within China.43 Research on (BRI) requires careful consideration of China's internal institutional landscape. While existing studies often focus on external factors or aggregate dynamics, a critical gap lies in understanding the role of Chinese institutions in shaping and implementing the initiative. This necessitates investigation into both formal and informal structures.44 7. Understanding BRI from Different Lenses While existing research on (BRI) encompasses wide-ranging analyses, shifting the focus towards implementation, impact, and other enriching areas holds significant potential for advancing understanding of the initiative's outcomes. Examining the practical realities of project execution, assessing its tangible and intangible effects, and exploring complementary avenues can significantly improve the BRI's overall contribution. Future research on (BRI) should prioritize several understudied yet crucial areas. These include the role of non-state actors, the interplay with Chinese foreign policy, the efficacy of soft power, the impact on global governance and regional and infrastructural variations. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research, particularly understanding the diverse actors shaping its dynamics. Existing studies often focus solely on state-level interactions, neglecting the significant roles played by internal actors like Chinese ministries, think tanks, and subnational entities, as well as external actors like Chinese multinational companies and non-BRI regions. Such a comprehensive lens is crucial for appreciating the multifaceted dimensions of the initiative and the factors influencing its trajectory.45 While numerous studies dissect Chinese foreign policy, with detailed analyses of its key players, driving forces like ideology, culture, nationalism, internal factions, the military, and public opinion, a crucial research gap exists around (BRI). This lacuna lies in overlooking the internal and external actors who significantly shape the initiative's dynamics. Understanding the roles of Chinese internal actors, and non-BRI regions is essential for grasping the BRI's multifaceted dimensions and navigating its trajectory.46 The BRI's potential impact on Chinese soft power merits nuanced inquiry beyond simplistic assumptions. While the initiative positions China as a prominent economic sponsor, superpower, or development actor, its influence on international perceptions is likely multifaceted and context-dependent. Analyzing the soft power implications should move beyond mere project scale and "get-things-done" narratives. Crucial research avenues include deconstructing and activating soft power. By adopting this nuanced approach, research can move beyond simplistic claims about enhanced Chinese prestige and instead provide a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's complex soft power dynamics. This can inform more effective strategies for both China and partner countries in navigating the potential opportunities and challenges associated with the initiative's global engagement.47 A significant deficit within (BRI) research lies in its limited engagement with the issue of global governance. While existing studies often explore the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), their focus frequently remains narrowly confined to its creation, primary function as a (BRI) funding institution, and potential to challenge the established global economic order. This restricted lens obscures the broader ramifications of the BRI for global governance structures, norms, and practices.48 However, studies lack a deeper understanding of the BRI's interaction with and potential impact on global governance structures, norms, and practices. This includes international law and standards in various fields relevant to the initiative, such as trade, finance, environment, and development. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research: an overreliance on China-centric perspectives. While understandable given China's ownership and primary funding role, this viewpoint often leads to superficial analyses that neglect deeper examination of the initiative's multifaceted objectives. This results in a profusion of research that, despite focusing on the BRI, fails to adequately unpack its core aims and motivations.49 Beyond a solely China-centric lens, research on the (BRI) must delve deeper into regional variations, local-level impacts, and the complex interplay of international political and economic forces driving participation. Prioritizing the viewpoints of (BRI) partner countries is crucial for a more comprehensive understanding than can be achieved solely through analysis of Chinese perspectives. 8. Conclusion This study critically engages with the (BRI) research landscape with two guiding objectives. First, it systematically appraises existing scholarship, identifying gaps and limitations in current understanding. Second, it seeks to shape future (BRI) research by proposing avenues for more impactful and fruitful investigations. Through a comprehensive review of (BRI) related topics and analyses, the study reveals key shortcomings in current research including overreliance on China-centric perspectives, neglecting diverse viewpoints and local-level impacts. Surface analyses of (BRI) objectives and motivations, often overlooking complex political and economic driving forces. Inadequate exploration of implementation challenges and project outcomes across various regions and sectors. Limited engagement with translation issues, hindering accurate understanding of (BRI) dynamics in non-Western contexts. To address these limitations, the study proposes specific interventions for future research including prioritizing diverse perspectives of (BRI) partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, conducting in-depth case studies and comparative analyses through investigating implementation intricacies and project impacts across different contexts and leveraging translation as a research tool via employing multilingual approaches to gain deeper insights and overcome cultural biases. By actively addressing these critical gaps and adopting more nuanced research strategies, this study aims to significantly enhance the field of (BRI) scholarship and guide future investigations towards a more comprehensive and impactful understanding of this complex global initiative. This study's critical engagement with (BRI) scholarship holds profound implications for policymakers. By unveiling significant limitations in existing research, it demonstrates that overreliance on specific perspectives, superficial analyses of objectives, and inadequate exploration of implementation and impacts can mislead judgments. Decision-makers and policy analysts must therefore exercise caution when navigating the BRI research landscape. To avoid misinterpreting progress, political and economic ramifications, domestic/foreign influences, and broader implications, they should prioritize access to high-quality studies that address the identified shortcomings, critically evaluate all research: consider methodological rigor, bias, and the limitations outlined in this study and seek diverse perspectives: consider research beyond dominant viewpoints to gain a more comprehensive understanding. These steps are crucial for ensuring sound policy decisions informed by reliable and nuanced BRI scholarship. Similar caution applies to entrepreneurs engaging with BRI projects. Basing business, investment, and operational choices solely on analyses prone to the identified drawbacks can be reckless. They should either utilize analyses conducted with rigorous methodologies and awareness of existing research limitations or fully acknowledge the limitations of available research and factor them into their decision-making. By adopting these measures, entrepreneurs can mitigate potential risks and navigate BRI opportunities with greater prudence. For researchers and scholars, this study presents both challenges and opportunities. While the identified gaps indicate the need for considerable future research efforts, they also unlock exciting avenues for investigation. Scholars can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the BRI by conducting in-depth case studies that explore implementation intricacies and project impacts across diverse contexts, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, unpacking the interplay of domestic, regional, and global factors, prioritizing diverse perspectives, incorporating voices of partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars and addressing the limitations unveiled in this study is imperative for all stakeholders. Through rigorous and comprehensive research, we can navigate the complexities of the BRI with greater informedness and foresight, ultimately leading to more effective policymaking, informed entrepreneurial decisions, and a deeper scholarly understanding of this global initiative. Despite its continued, albeit bumpy, trajectory, the (BRI) faces growing research challenges that mirror its own complexities. A burgeoning volume of publications, propelled by an expanding pool of publishers, editors, and scholars, often overlooks methodological rigor and critical depth. Consequently, the full potential of BRI research remains unrealized. To unlock its true value, a shift towards more focused and nuanced investigations is imperative. This necessitates bolstering the infrastructure underpinning social science analysis through deeper engagement with diverse perspectives to incorporate voices from partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars beyond dominant viewpoints. Next, strengthened data collection and analysis which could employ rigorous methodologies and ensuring comprehensive project-level data across various regions. Additionally, enhanced communication and collaboration to foster interdisciplinary dialogue and knowledge sharing among analysts studying different BRI facets. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Iran, like other parties, was taken aback by the Hamas attack on 7/10/2023 in the Gaza Strip (GS) envelope. This occurred at a critical juncture for Iran, as it had recently finalized a prisoner exchange agreement with the United States (US), unlocking $6 billion of its frozen oil revenues in South Korea just two months prior. The attack coincided with Iran’s efforts to ease tensions in regional relations, exemplified by its landmark agreement with Saudi Arabia on 10/3/2024. This analysis delves into Iran’s response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood, examining the factors influencing its stance and actions. First: Determinants of the Iranian Position Iran has consistently backed the resistance since the war’s onset. However, its stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was marked by meticulous calculations and intricate balancing acts, aiming to safeguard and fortify gains while averting potential adverse repercussions. Key factors shaping Iran’s approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood include: 1. Reiterating the pivotal role of Palestine in Iranian foreign policy, particularly in supporting Palestinian resistance and rejecting recognition of the Israeli regime. 2. Geopolitical considerations and Iran’s aspiration to bolster its regional presence and influence as a pivotal force, safeguarding significant gains achieved in preceding years. 3. Iran aims to uphold its strategic alliances with affiliated forces and movements in the region, particularly those aligned with the resistance front. This entails bolstering the strength and influence of these movements while ensuring their continued relevance in the regional landscape. 4. Iran seeks to fortify its regional deterrence capabilities, with a specific focus on managing relations with Israel. Accumulating strength is regarded as a pivotal Iranian strategic imperative in this regard. 5. Iran’s desire to steer clear of entanglement in a widespread regional conflict or direct confrontation with the US is evident. The swift dispatch of US warships to the region serves as a clear message aimed at dissuading Iran from direct participation in the standoff. 6. The challenges confronting the Iranian economy amidst ongoing international sanctions, soaring inflation rates and the depreciation of the Iranian currency. 7. Iran’s immediate focus on de-escalation with the US and European countries, alongside sustained engagement with influential regional stakeholders. Second: Aspects of Iran’s Position The key aspects of the Iranian stance regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood are as follows: 1. From the outset, Iran has been eager to disassociate itself from the October 7 attack orchestrated by Hamas. It has stressed that the operation was an independent decision made by Palestinian resistance factions based on their own assessments and considerations. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly refuted any Iranian involvement, a position reaffirmed by the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (UN). This denial was also echoed by the US administration, with President Joe Biden telling 60 Minutes in an interview, on 15/10/2023, that “there is no clear evidence” implicating Iran in the Hamas attack. 2. The Iranian leadership across all branches (including the Supreme Leader, the Presidency, the government, the military, the Revolutionary Guards, legislative bodies and the media…) has provided robust political backing to the Resistance. They have hosted prominent delegations from Hamas and resistance factions, notably welcoming Isma‘il Haniyyah, the leader of Hamas, on two occasions. Iran has consistently adopted and defended the resistance and its objectives in both regional and international forums. 3. Iran has maintained its military and financial backing for the resistance as part of its longstanding policy, although specific details regarding the magnitude of this support and its delivery methods remain unclear. 4. While denying direct involvement in the October 7th attack, Iran has lauded the operation and reiterated its solidarity with the Palestinian resistance. This support was evident during Operation al-Aqsa Flood and in response to Israeli aggression in Gaza, where Iran endorsed the political and on-the-ground strategies pursued by the Palestinian resistance in managing the war. 5. Since the outset of the war, Iran has demonstrated a clear intention to swiftly conclude hostilities and secure a lasting ceasefire. Iranian diplomacy, spearheaded by Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, has diligently pursued this goal. 6. Despite its reluctance to engage directly in the war theater and to avert escalation into a broader regional conflict, Iran has encouraged its allied forces in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq to actively support the Palestinian resistance, tailoring its involvement to the specific circumstances of each theater. It is evident that Iran has played a significant yet undisclosed role in coordinating actions across the various theaters of the conflict. 7. When faced with the Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Damascus on 1/4/2024, Iran responded with meticulous caution and strategic calculations. Ensuring its retaliation on 13/4/2024 conveyed a powerful deterrent message to Israel. It carefully avoided escalating the conflict into a broader confrontation, when it intentionally announced its response beforehand, allowing Israel and its allies ample time to prepare for the launched rockets and drones. Furthermore, Iran selectively targeted military installations, refraining from unveiling any new strategic weaponry. According to Israeli military officials, “In the attack, 185 drones, 36 cruise missiles and 110 surface-to-surface missiles were fired toward Israel,” The New York Times newspaper reported. Regardless of the precise accuracy of these figures, the response was significant and expansive, serving as a demonstration of force and a bolstering of Iran’s regional standing. The objective seemed more focused on asserting deterrence rather than inflicting substantial damage. Following the Israeli response on 19/4/2024, which was notably restrained and targeted select Iranian sites without an official declaration, Iran demonstrated a commitment to crisis containment and a desire to prevent further escalation. 8. In terms of popular interaction, the Iranian street witnessed a wide mass movement in support of the resistance and the Palestinians in GS, similar to the ongoing state of popular sympathy in the Arab and Muslim world. Third: Ramifications and Projections: Iran’s stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood has yielded both positive and negative repercussions, among the most significant being: 1. A resurgence of tension in Iranian-Western relations ensued, evidenced by the US House of Representatives’ decision on 30/11/2023 to reinstate the freeze on the $6 billion previously lifted on 10/8/2023 and deposited into Qatari banks, before being accessed by Iran. Subsequent to Iran’s assault on Israel on 13/4/2024, the US, along with several European countries, imposed additional sanctions on Iran. 2. Iran’s reputation and standing suffered a blow due to its reserved and cautious stance at the onset of the conflict. This approach failed to meet the expectations of Palestinian, Arab and Islamic public, given the promises and positions expressed in previous years. Many within these circles perceived Iran’s response as falling short during a critical moment when robust support, beyond mere political and media endorsements, was direly needed. However, Iran’s image and status experienced a notable enhancement following Hizbullah’s significant involvement on the northern front during the months of the confrontation. Additionally, the escalating role of the Yemeni Ansar Allah group in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, particularly in actions against Israeli shipping and vessels bound for Israeli ports, further contributed to this improvement. Moreover, the participation of the Iraqi resistance also played a role in bolstering Iran’s reputation and standing. In a late March 2024 Jordanian elite opinion poll, it was revealed that Iran’s reputation and influence in the Arab world saw a 42% increase due to its stance on the GS war. Additionally, 45% of respondents stated that Iran and its allies’ position contributed to the reduction of sectarian divisions in the region. 3. Iran successfully navigated the initial challenge of applying the slogan of Unity of the Arenas among the parties within the Axis of Resistance. The increased involvement of its allied forces in the conflict marks a tangible step forward, offering potential for further advancement in realizing the slogan. 4. The conflict has significantly impacted Israel’s strategic standing in the region, tarnishing its reputation as a regional stabilizer and a bastion of Western influence. It has also hindered progress in normalization efforts and fueled increased backing from Arab, Muslim and international public for Hamas and the resistance factions. This dynamic bolsters Iran’s political stance, particularly given the perceived inadequacy of Arab official interaction with the resistance and responses to the brutal Israeli aggression on GS. *** In the forthcoming period, Iran is expected to persist in navigating a cautious and balanced strategy concerning Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Palestine issue. Within this framework, Iran aims to bolster its backing for the Palestinian resistance and its regional footprint while sustaining a trend of improved relations across the region. Additionally, Iran is likely to pursue efforts to defuse tensions in its dealings with the US and Western nations. Political Insights: A periodic series that provides brief and condensed political analyses and position assessments, issued by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World & New World Journal.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Increasing geopolitical tensions and domestic political pressures have tested Fiji’s efforts to strike a balance in relations with its traditional partners and China. Its actions also illustrate that on questions of sovereignty, external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. When the Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka was sworn into power in Fiji on Christmas Eve 2022 it marked an historic moment: the beginning of a peaceful transition of power, uninterrupted by coups or civil disturbance. But international attention was preoccupied not with whether Fiji had finally ended the coup cycle, but with what the new Government’s stance would be towards China. As a recently aired documentary by the Australian television program 60 Minutes makes clear, that preoccupation has fanned claims in Western media about China as a disruptive – if not predatory – actor in Fiji and the wider region. It is little wonder that the Fijian prime minister (who is also foreign minister) has repeatedly described the Pacific as being “at the centre of geopolitical tensions.” Major powers were, in his view, seeking to “polarize the Pacific into their own camps,” compelling countries to choose sides and further militarising the region. Like a number of other Pacific island countries, Fiji has long held the position of “friends to all, enemies to none.” In the Pacific islands context, this posture has been interpreted to mean being free to choose who to partner with; and not being told by others who they can or cannot be friends with. It is a form of non-alignment that does not preclude security agreements but seeks to avoid or resist being confined to spheres of influence. As former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama declared in 2015: “We have no desire as a Pacific Small Island Developing State to be drawn into the conflicts of others.” This non-alignment principle has been qualified to some extent by the foreign policy orientation of the government of the day. During the early years of the Bainimarama era, there was a tilt towards China. This was primarily a response to the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed on the government by Western partners (including Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) after the coup of 2006, which had compelled Fiji to actively seek new friends and allies. After the return to elected government in 2014, relations were restored with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and some foreign policy equilibrium was achieved. But it was not long before the Western partners, led by Australia, began publicly asserting the existence of a Chinese strategic threat to the region. Soon thereafter, these states launched a new campaign of “strategic denial” and, inter alia, escalated their engagement with Fiji. When Bainimarama’s regime was ousted by a coalition of parties dominated by Rabuka’s People’s Alliance Party in the 2022 general election, it was expected that the new government would be less friendly towards China and realign itself more with its “traditional” Western partners. Some saw signs of such a shift in Rabuka’s cancellation of a meeting with the visiting Chinese foreign minister in April 2023, the March reinstatement of the Taiwanese mission’s name to Trade Mission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Fiji (after a 2018 downgrade), and promises of an end to Fiji’s longstanding police cooperation agreement with China. But Western optimism did not last. The diplomatic upgrade of the Taiwan Trade Office was reversed; Fiji withdrew its signature from the 51 country statement at the UN calling for an end to China’s persecution of its Uighur minority; and revised but did not terminate the policing agreement. Fiji also accepted a large Chinese grant for the construction of roads in Vanua Levu and, to great alarm among its Western partners, announced on the sidelines of APEC that China had agreed to help with port upgrades and with developing a shipbuilding industry. The Chinese government admitted that the quid pro quo for this infrastructure assistance to Fiji was that “China expects Fiji to continue providing firm support on issues concerning China’s core interests and major concerns.” The “core interests and major concerns” are the One China policy, China’s domestic sovereignty, and its rights in its territorial disputes with neighbouring states. Fiji’s governments are likely to continue to provide such support as long as there is no serious conflict with Fiji’s fundamental foreign policy interests. These include upholding the sanctity of the principles and rules embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, Fiji benefits from Chinese development assistance, and does not view China’s regional presence as strategically threatening as do its Western partners. Rabuka’s continued engagement with China has had the effect of provoking these Western partners into seeking to outbid or delegitimise Chinese initiatives, especially in the security sector where China is suspected of attempting to extend its strategic reach. But, while his government would have anticipated and welcomed the Australian offer to replace China as its partner in upgrading Fiji’s ports and shipbuilding industry, Australia’s attempt to delegitimise the policing arrangement with China by associating it with official Chinese transnational drug promotion was not appreciated. As the Fiji government’s reaction to the latter suggests, its concerns about the effects on its sovereignty of external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. That Western partners, and in particular Australia, have increasingly asserted their right to a say in regional and individual Pacific Island Countries foreign policy decisions has caused some dismay and discomfort. The Rabuka government may be attempting to maximise Fiji’s foreign policy independence, manoeuvrability, and leverage, or to strike a balance between its relations with its traditional partners and China. But it also may not yet have developed a settled foreign policy posture based on consultation and consensus within its foreign policy and security establishment. If there is some disagreement and a lack of direction and coordination, the recently initiated Foreign Policy White Paper drafting process should, if sufficiently inclusive, prove of great value. Sandra Tarte is Associate Professor and acting head, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of the South Pacific Pacific. Sandra specialises in the international politics of the Pacific Islands region with a particular interest in Fiji’s foreign policy. Nicola Baker lectures in the Diplomacy and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva. Her research interests encompass various aspects of the region’s geopolitics.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском From Namibia to Armenia, and from Rwanda to Bosnia, the perpetrators of mass murder said they were acting in self-defense. Yes, it is genocide. It is so difficult and painful to admit it, but despite all that, and despite all our efforts to think otherwise, after six months of brutal war we can no longer avoid this conclusion. Jewish history will henceforth be stained with the mark of Cain for the “most horrible of crimes,” which cannot be erased from its forehead. As such, this is the way it will be viewed in history’s judgment for generations to come. From a legal point of view, there is still no telling what the International Court of Justice in The Hague will decide, although in light of its temporary rulings so far and in light of increasing prevalence of reports by jurists, international organizations, and investigative journalists, the trajectory of the prospective judgment seems quite clear. As early as January 26, the ICJ ruled overwhelmingly (14-2) that Israel may be committing genocide in Gaza. On March 28, following Israel’s deliberate starvation of the Gazan populace in Gaza, the court issued additional orders (this time by a vote of 15-1, with the only dissent coming from Israeli Judge Aharon Barak) calling on Israel not to deny Palestinians their rights which are protected under the Genocide Convention. The well-argued and well-reasoned report by the UN special rapporteur on the human tights situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, reached a slightly more determined conclusion and is another layer in establishing the understanding that Israel is indeed committing genocide. Israeli academic Dr. Lee Mordechai’s detailed and periodically updated report (which collects information on the level of Israeli violence in Gaza), reached the same conclusion. Leading academics such as Jeffrey Sachs, a professor of economics at Columbia University (and a Jew with a warm attitude toward traditional Zionism), with whom heads of state all over the world regularly consult on international issues, speak of the Israeli genocide as something taken for granted. Excellent investigative reports such as those of Yuval Abraham in Local Call, and especially his recent investigation of the artificial intelligence systems used by the military in selecting targets and carrying out the assassinations, further deepen this accusation. The fact that the military allowed, for example, the killing of 300 innocent people and the destruction of an entire residential quarter in order to take out one Hamas brigade commander shows that military targets are almost incidental to killing civilians and that every Palestinian in Gaza is a target for killing. This is the logic of genocide. Yes, I know, they are all anti-Semites or self-hating Jews. Only we, Israelis, whose minds are fed by the IDF spokesperson’s announcements and exposed only to the images sifted for us by the Israeli media, see reality as it is. As if interminable literature had not been written about the social and cultural denial mechanisms of societies committing serious war crimes. Israel is really a paradigmatic case of such societies, a case that will still be taught in every university seminar in the world dealing with the subject. It will be several years before the court in The Hague will hand down its verdict, but we must not look at the catastrophic situation purely through legal lenses. What is happening in Gaza is genocide because the level and pace of indiscriminate killing, destruction, mass expulsions, displacement, famine, executions, the wiping out of cultural and religious institutions, the crushing of elites (including the killing of journalists), and the sweeping dehumanization of the Palestinians, create an overall picture of genocide, of a deliberate conscious crushing of Palestinian existence in Gaza. In the way we normally understand such concepts, Palestinian Gaza as a geographical-political-cultural-human complex no longer exists. Genocide is the deliberate annihilation of a collective or part of it—not all of its individuals. And that’s what’s happening in Gaza. The result is undoubtedly genocide. The numerous declarations of extermination by senior Israeli government officials, and the general exterminating tone of the public discourse, rightly pointed out by Haaretz columnist Carolina Landsman, indicate that this was also the intention. Israelis mistakenly think that a genocide, to be viewed as such, needs to look like the Holocaust. They imagine trains, gas chambers, crematoria, killing pits, concentration and extermination camps, and the systematic persecution to death of all members of the group of victims to the last one. An occurrence like this has indeed not taken place in Gaza. In a similar way to what happened in the Holocaust, most Israelis also imagine that the victim’s collective is not involved in violent activity or actual conflict, and that the murderers exterminate them because of an insane senseless ideology. This is also not the case with Gaza. The brutal Hamas attack of October 7 was a heinous, terrible crime. Some 1,200 people were killed or murdered, including more than 850 Israeli (and foreign) civilians, including many children and the elderly. Some 240 live Israelis were abducted to Gaza, and atrocities such as rape were committed. This is an event with profound, catastrophic, and lasting traumatic effects for many years, certainly for the direct victims and their immediate circle, but also for Israeli society as a whole. The attack forced Israel to respond in self-defense. However, although each case of genocide has a different character, in the scope and features of the murder, the common denominator of most of them is that they were carried through out of an authentic sense of self-defense. Legally, an event cannot be both self-defense and genocide. These two legal categories are mutually exclusive. But historically, self-defense is not incompatible with genocide—it is usually one of its main causes, if not the main one. In Srebrenica—where the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia determined on two different levels that a genocide took place in July 1995—“only” about 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and youths, over the age of 16, were murdered. The women and children had been expelled earlier. The Bosnian Serb forces were responsible for the murder, their offensive took place amid a bloody civil war, during which both sides committed war crimes (albeit immeasurably more by the Serbs) and which erupted following a unilateral decision by the Bosnian Croats and Muslims to break away from Yugoslavia and establish an independent Bosnian state (in which the Serbs were a minority). Bosnian Serbs, with bleak past memories of persecution and murder from World War II, felt threatened. The complexity of the conflict, in which neither side was innocent, did not prevent the ICC from recognizing the Srebrenica massacre as an act of genocide, which exceeded the other war crimes committed by the parties, since these crimes cannot justify genocide. The court explained that the Serbian forces intentionally destroyed—through murder, expulsion, and destruction—Bosnian Muslim existence in Srebrenica. Today, by the way, Bosnian Muslims live there again, and some of the mosques that were destroyed have been reinstated. But the genocide continues to haunt the descendants of murderers and victims alike. The case of Rwanda was totally different. There, for a long time, as part of the Belgian colonial control structure based on divide and rule, the Tutsi minority group ruled, and it oppressed the Hutu majority group. However, in the 1960s the situation was reversed, and upon independence from Belgium in 1962, the Hutu took control of the country and adopted an oppressive and discriminatory policy against the Tutsi, this time with the support of the former colonial powers. Gradually, this policy became intolerable, and a brutal bloody civil war broke out in 1990, beginning with the invasion of a Tutsi army, the Rwanda Patriotic Front, consisting mainly of Tutsi who fled Rwanda after the fall of colonial rule. As a result, in the eyes of the Hutu regime, the Tutsi became collectively identified with an actual military enemy. During the war, both sides committed serious crimes on Rwandan soil, as well as on the soil of neighboring countries to which the war spilled over. Neither side was absolutely innocent or absolutely evil. The civil war ended with the Arusha Accords, signed in 1993, which were supposed to involve Tutsi people in government institutions, the army, and state structures. But these agreements collapsed, and in April 1994, a plane carrying Rwanda’s Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana, was shot down. To this day, it is not known who shot down the plane, and it is believed that they were, in fact, Hutu fighters. However, the Hutu were convinced that the crime had been committed by Tutsi resistance fighters, and this was perceived as a genuine threat to the country. The Tutsi genocide was on its way. The official rationale for the act of genocide was the need to remove the Tutsi existential threat once and for all. The case of the Rohingya, which the Biden administration recently recognized as genocide, is very different again. Initially, after Myanmar (formerly Burma) won independence in 1948, the Muslim Rohingya were seen as equal citizens and part of the mostly Buddhist national entity. But over the years, and especially after the establishment of the military dictatorship in 1962, Burmese nationalism was identified with several dominant ethnic groups (who were mainly Buddhist), excluding the Rohingya. In 1982 and thereafter, citizenship laws were enacted, stripping most Rohingya of their citizenship and their rights. They were viewed as foreigners and as a threat to the existence of the state. The Rohingya, among whom there have been small rebel groups in the past, made an effort not to be dragged into violent resistance. By 2016, however, many felt they could not prevent their disenfranchisement, repression, subjection to state and mob violence, as well as their gradual expulsion, and an underground Rohingya movement started attacking Myanmar police stations. The reaction was brutal. Raids by Myanmar’s security forces expelled most Rohingya from their villages, many were massacred, and their villages completely obliterated. When in March 2022 Secretary of State Antony Blinken read out a statement at the Holocaust Museum in Washington acknowledging that what was done to Rohingya was genocide, he said that in 2016 and 2017, about 850,000 Rohingya were deported to Bangladesh and about 9,000 of them were murdered. This was enough to recognize what was done to Rohingya as the eighth such an occurrence that the United States views as a genocide apart from the Holocaust. The Rohingya case reminds us of what many genocide scholars have established in terms of research, and is very relevant to the case of Gaza: a link between ethnic cleansing and genocide. The connection between the two phenomena is twofold, and both are relevant to Gaza, where the vast majority of the population was expelled from their places of residence, and only Egypt’s refusal to absorb masses of Palestinians on its territory prevented them from leaving Gaza. On the one hand, ethnic cleansing signals the willingness to eliminate the enemy group at any cost and without compromise, and therefore easily slips into genocide or is part of it. On the other hand, ethnic cleansing usually creates conditions (e.g. disease and famine) that enable or cause the partial or complete extermination of the group of victims. In the case of Gaza, the “safe haven zones” have often become death traps and deliberate extermination zones, and in these refuges, Israel deliberately starves out the population. For this reason, there are quite a few commentators who believe that ethnic cleansing is the goal of the fighting in Gaza. The genocide of Armenians during World War I also had a context. During the declining years of the Ottoman Empire, Armenians developed their own national identity and demanded self-determination. Their different religious and ethnic character, as well as their strategic location on the border between the Ottoman and Russian empires, made them a dangerous population in the eyes of the Ottoman authorities. Horrific outbreaks of violence against the Armenians occurred as early as the end of the 19th century, and therefore some Armenians were indeed sympathetic to the Russians and saw them as potential liberators. Small Armenian-Russian groups even collaborated with the Russian army against the Turks, calling on their brethren across the border to join them, which led to an intensification of the sense of an existential threat in the eyes of the Ottoman regime. This sense of a threat, which developed during a deep crisis of the empire, was a major factor in the development of the Armenian Genocide, which also began a process of expulsion. The first genocide of the 20th century was also executed out of a concept of self-defense by the German settlers against the Herero and Nama people in South West Africa (present-day Namibia). As a result of the severe repression by the German settlers, the locals rebelled and in a brutal attack murdered some 123 (perhaps more) unarmed men. The sense of threat in the small settler community, which numbered only a few thousand, was real, and Germany feared that it had lost its deterrence vis-à-vis the natives. The response was in accordance with the perceived threat. Germany sent an army led by an unrestrained commander, and there, too, out of a sense of self-defense, most of these tribesmen were murdered between 1904 and 1908. Some by direct killing, some under conditions of hunger and thirst forced on them by the Germans (again by deportation, this time to the Omaka desert), and some in cruel internment and labor camps. Similar processes occurred during the expulsion and extermination of indigenous peoples in North America, especially during the 19th century. In all these cases, the perpetrators of the genocide felt an existential threat, more or less justified, and the genocide came in response. The destruction of the collective of victims was not contrary to an act of self-defense but from an authentic motive of self-defense. In 2011, I had a short article published in Haaretz about the genocide in South West Africa, concluding with the following words: “We can learn from the Herero and Nama genocide how colonial domination, based on a sense of cultural and racial superiority, can spill over, in the face of local rebellion, into horrific crimes such as mass expulsion, ethnic cleansing and genocide. The case of the Herero rebellion should serve as a horrifying warning sign for us here in Israel, which has already known one Nakba in its history.”

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The announcement of Spain's recognition of the State of Palestine constitutes a significant step, but it is not accompanied by the adoption of other necessary measures for its effective consolidation. Already, 147 fully-fledged member states of the United Nations recognize the State of Palestine. With Norway's, Ireland's, and Spain's decisions, along with Slovenia's recent accession, three-quarters of the UN's 193 member states now uphold this commitment. Beyond the particular implications of this, it remains to be defined whether it will be accompanied by other necessary measures of broader scope to achieve full recognition and to act urgently for a permanent ceasefire, the end of Israeli occupation, and the massacre against the Palestinian people. According to the Ministry of Health, more than 37,000 people, including 12,000 children, have been killed in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of Israel's military offensive in early October last year. Among these actions are the reconsideration of diplomatic and trade relations with Israel, an arms embargo, support for South Africa's lawsuit in the International Court of Justice for the genocide in Gaza, and the involvement of the international community to effectively ensure a process of peace, security, and guarantees in the territory. The Dimension of Recognition May 28th, 2024. This was the day when the Council of Ministers approved the official recognition of the State of Palestine by Spain. This date also marked the change in the designation of Husni Abdel Wahed, who had been the representative of the Palestinian National Authority in Spain since March 2022, to now serve as the ambassador of the State of Palestine to Spain. "We are very grateful for a measure that holds significant political and legal importance in strengthening the bonds of brotherhood and friendship, where Spain is playing a crucial role in favor of a peaceful solution at a time when Israel is committing genocide with the support of the United States, Germany, and other countries," states Wahed, emphasizing the importance of opening a space of hope that recognizes the rights of the Palestinian people to live freely in their own state. The 1967 borderlines upon which this recognition is based, as well as its effectiveness, have been debated in recent days. According to Wahed, "If it were merely symbolic, Israel would not react with such hysteria, because they know this goes beyond symbolism and has practical effects because, when more countries join in recognizing Palestine, it constitutes pressure not only on Israel as the occupying power but also on its supporters, who are complicit in the genocide." The recognition itself is not the goal for the ambassador but rather a step on the path that needs to be continued. Ana Sánchez, member of the Solidarity Network Against the Occupation of Palestine, distinguishes in her assessment the dual nature of the measure as both a necessary but insufficient step, stating that "it does not meet the needs or guarantee the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people as a whole, nor will it have an impact on the daily lives of Palestinian individuals," for which she calls for more decisive measures against the apartheid and genocide being committed by Israel. It was September 2009 when the then Prime Minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, called for Palestinian recognition as a key element for peace in the Middle East in a speech at the United Nations headquarters. This commitment did not materialize until fifteen years later, about which, in addition to other related issues in the report, this media outlet sought to inquire from the current Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs, Diego Martínez Belío. The response from the ministry's communication team was a refusal to grant an interview citing scheduling reasons. Regarding the delay in Palestinian recognition over time, Sánchez, from the RESCOP, recalls how governmental arguments pointed to the intention for recognition to be more coordinated with other EU member states, emphasizing the need to promote this process institutionally with the necessary conditions for effective implementation. On the other hand, Olga Rodríguez, a journalist specializing in international affairs and the Middle East, agrees with Sánchez on the positive direction of the recognition step, but also highlights that it comes late and is insufficient. This promise to recognize the Palestinian state by Spain "has not materialized until now due to political reasons and because there was no price to pay for not doing so." Rodríguez specifies in the historical and political context how not only did the trend of neglect towards Palestine continue, but also how the United States, first under Trump and then under Biden, pushed the Abraham Accords to formalize relations between several Arab countries and Israel as if the Palestinian issue did not exist. In fact, she recalls that when Hamas attacks occurred on October 7th, the United States had been promoting the signing of these agreements between Saudi Arabia and Israel for some time, following their signing by several Arab countries in recent years. According to her, the fundamental key lies in the fact that today the territory designated for the Palestinian state is not available to the Palestinian population because it has been illegally occupied by Israel since 1967, thereby violating several United Nations resolutions. "In recent years, especially in the last two decades, this occupation has tripled, and settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have expanded with the connivance and support of Europe and the United States, major powers dominating the region, which have maintained their preferential economic and trade alliances with Israel," she adds. What additional measures can be taken? The United Nations General Assembly's 1947 partition plan allocated 54% of the territory of historic Palestine to the Israeli state and the remaining 46% to the Palestinian state, despite the Palestinian population being numerically larger than the Jewish population at that time. The Zionist conception of a Jewish state was tied to a Jewish majority, leading to an ethnic cleansing known as the Nakba, which resulted in the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinian people from their homes. Israel, through Plan Dalet, occupied new territories that were not allocated in that partition and used the wartime scenario to annex up to 78% of historic Palestine. Therefore, as Rodríguez mentions, when discussing the allocation of a future Palestinian state, we are only talking about 22% of historic Palestine, which is also filled with checkpoints, settlements, and under Israel's military dominance. "The essential thing is to end the Israeli occupation. This issue often gets overlooked, even when discussing the recognition of the Palestinian State and the so-called two-state solution. Everything must be based on a starting point, which is the end of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of troops from all Palestinian territory in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem", proposes Wahed. The Ambassador of the State of Palestine to Spain emphasizes that without Israeli withdrawal and the end of the occupation, Israel's apartheid regime against the Palestinian people will continue. "The question is how long will the international community continue to be, in many cases, complicit in this?". Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory since 1967, recently published the report called "Anatomy of a Genocide," in which she concludes that Israel is committing the crime of genocide against the Palestinian population in Gaza by "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group." Both, she and 52 other UN experts and rapporteurs, have called for sanctions and arms embargoes on Israel following the shocking Israeli attack on the refugee camp in Rafah. From the Solidarity Network Against the Occupation of Palestine, Sánchez believes that recognizing a State while maintaining relations with the State attempting to eliminate it is a double standard. "It is very hypocritical to say that dignity and hope are recognized shortly after the heartbreaking images from Rafah, and that alongside this recognition, there is no arms embargo on Israel, no severing of diplomatic, economic, commercial, military, academic, and sports relations with those perpetrating such crimes. I do not find this policy very coherent." Despite the Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union, and Cooperation, José Manuel Albares, stated that arms exports to Israel had been suspended since October 7th, military equipment worth over one million euros was exported from Spain to Israel in November and December 2023, according to a research conducted by the Centre Delàs. Sánchez reaffirms the above by arguing that Spain has not stopped buying or selling weapons to Israel, nor has it stopped allowing Spanish territory to be used as a transit space for weapons destined for the Zionist state. She demands more information and transparency regarding the role of the Rota base in recent months. "The demand for a military embargo is a historical request to the international community. This is not just about the current genocide in Gaza, but if Israel is capable of perpetrating this televised genocide, it's because they have been armed for decades," she explains. Rodríguez also agrees that without real pressure on Israel through political and economic measures at the level of nation-states, the European Union, and the United Nations, "nothing will change, as demonstrated by Israeli history in recent decades." Therefore, she contrasts the immediate mechanisms applied to Russia, while, except for some countries, there has been no suspension or rupture of diplomatic relations with Israel, protected by the United States and Europe. Furthermore, she highlights how these sanctions and arms embargoes have been requested for years because this did not start on October 7th, as Israel "has been violating international law, illegally occupying, implementing an apartheid system, torturing, killing, and discriminating for a long time." Therefore, she regrets that all this has continued to happen, even becoming more sophisticated, because nothing has been done due to geopolitical reasons, being in Europe and under its umbrella and within the American orbit, with all that this implies. "This is the impunity and the policy of Israeli fait accompli." Rodríguez believes there is a significant risk of collapse of the "fragile scaffolding" built upon the United Nations Charter and international law, as she considers that in recent months all red lines have been crossed with insults and breaches by Israel, but also with very concerning and serious challenges from the United States. She opines that the severity lies in transitioning to the law of the jungle, the law of the strongest, "at a time of devouring capitalism and resource depletion, where major powers will compete for the domination of wealth, with victory going to those who arrive first through war." Currently, there are two international courts investigating Israel. On one hand, there is the International Criminal Court's request for arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Meanwhile, on the other hand, there is the genocide complaint regarding Gaza that South Africa filed against Israel in the International Court of Justice, the most prominent judicial body of the United Nations. Regarding the latter, Spain has joined the proceedings but has not taken a position to support the lawsuit. In response, Sánchez sees the accountability processes in international courts as a positive development, but she adds that it is more of a political and diplomatic message rather than something that will have practical application with consequences on the ground. Therefore, the next consistent and coherent step should be the implementation of other measures such as an arms embargo against Israel. Finally, Rodríguez believes that the way Minister Albares presented the initiative has watered it down because he has insisted that they will not take sides. "We will have to see the statement of intervention in the procedure when they send the request, but he has made it clear that they do not support South Africa's complaint and that they will limit themselves to supporting the provisional measures issued by the Court for compliance by Israel." Therefore, she emphasizes that this will not have effective capacity unless it is accompanied by political actions that push to achieve that goal. Camping and Academicide In the realm of demanding actions to be carried out, the academic sphere is also involved. The University Network for Palestine, which is present in over forty public universities in Spain, advocates several demands to university leadership teams, the Conference of Rectors of Spanish Universities, and the Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities. Specifically, these five points: condemning the destruction of universities in Palestine, demand for an immediate ceasefire allowing necessary humanitarian interventions, severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, non-collaboration with companies involved in genocide, and allocation of economic resources for hosting students and academic staff in Palestine and for the reconstruction of universities in Gaza. In the face of Israel's daily normalization of genocide against the Palestinian people, student encampments at universities highlighted the unacceptability of these actions and the need to defend human rights. The effect of these encampments expanded like what happened in 2011 in the city squares during the 15M movement. Within the network's common framework, each encampment operates autonomously. Specifically, the encampment in Madrid was formed through a coalition of university groups that had previously worked on Palestine-related issues. From there, the encampment was convened, attracting people beyond its original coalition. Oriol Erausquin, a Sociology Ph.D. student at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) and the Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), who participated in the Palestine camp at the UCM, believes that the recognition, which has been promised on several occasions and could exert some pressure on Israel, "may seek to enhance the international projection of the Pedro Sánchez government, but the reality is that there is a genocide happening". Therefore, he asserts that it is essential to act with sanctions and an embargo on commercial activities with Israel, because "anything short of direct action on what is happening seems very limited, inadequate, and belated to us." The encampment in Madrid has directed its proposals to the public universities in Madrid. “We want to sit down with them and achieve agreements in a unified manner”, emphasizing the difficulty of this due to the refusal to negotiate by the Rectorate. “The pressure we are exerting, with some universities yielding to the demands and the international situation unfolding, may lead to the need to break a series of agreements that are whitewashing and legitimizing the Israeli regime, in addition to actively participating in its industry and war machinery”, Erausquin points out. So far, the universities in Madrid have not responded, while the universities of Barcelona, Seville, Jaén, Granada, Valencia, Salamanca, Cádiz, and Pablo de Olavide have fully embraced the points raised by the network and have suspended relations with Israeli institutions. In conjunction with the student block, the faculty has also mobilized. The Network of Teachers and Workers of Universities in the Community of Madrid for Palestine emerges within a broader national network that includes 44 universities across the country. Within this network, initiatives from faculty members of public universities in Madrid have arisen to unite and carry out more specific actions within the community since March of this year. These initiatives include organizing activities such as outdoor classes, roundtable discussions, and conferences that have enabled them to consolidate as a collective. One of their fundamental contributions is the quantification and visibility of what the term "academicide" entails. Through this, they seek to highlight the framework of the killings of over 230 teachers and 5,000 students in Palestine. Joan Pedro Carañana, a member of this network, explains that academicide consists of the systematic extermination of education and research: "It is scandalous that Israel has bombed all universities in Gaza, that it has killed thousands of people in the educational and scientific fields, and that more than 90,000 students cannot attend university." Academicide is therefore "a key vector of genocide that not only seeks to kill people associated with thought, but also to deprive an entire people of their right to knowledge, speech, and memory," he points out. Due to the difficulty in finding the people killed under the rubble, the number of victims will be higher than previously counted. The network considers various sources for this, such as the United Nations or Scholars Against the World in Palestine, among others. Additionally, according to the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate, at least 140 journalists have been killed since October 7th, 2023. Before that date, Carañana details how in January of the previous year, there were 902 crimes, violations, and punishments by Israeli occupation forces committed during 2022. "This is obviously about silencing the victim so they can't even protest and raise their voice to convey their point of view. It's part of the dehumanization that accompanies genocide," he concludes. The right to self-determination of the Palestinian people Netanyahu displayed a map at the United Nations Assembly two weeks before Hamas' attacks, showing Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights as part of Israel. In other words, he desires that territory, without Palestinians, as Rodríguez points out. Given the complexity of the so-called two-state solution, she recalls that some advocate for a more just and egalitarian idea of a single state with equality, rather than a state where rights are only for one ethnicity or religion. In fact, many Palestinian people who were expelled in 1948 and 1967 have the right, for whom the United Nations recognizes their right of return through a resolution to return to the homes they were born in, which were taken from them through the Absentees' Property Law. For Wahed, the self-determination of the Palestinian people is always present and is something they will not relinquish. "I want to remind you that this so-called two-state solution is not a Palestinian demand. It is a Western plan, initiated by George Bush, which was embraced as the solution by the international community. We have adopted it, but our original demand from Palestine is a democratic and secular state for all citizens." He adds that Palestinian people today live in a state where Israel occupies nearly 100% of historic Palestine, but with two systems: one of democracy for Jews and another of apartheid for Palestinians. That's why he argues that the issue goes beyond the Palestinian people and that it is necessary to invest in a culture of peace. He points out, for example, that in recent years, most of NATO countries have approved increasing military spending to at least 2% of GDP. The Palestinian ambassador to Spain suggests that part of this GDP should instead be allocated to promoting a culture of peace, as this is the solution to combating war with peace, poverty with investment in the future, or hunger by dedicating resources to combating climate change and land desertification. "This is the solution not only for Palestine but for all humanity." On the other hand, Carañana believes it would be worthwhile to pay attention to what the people of Palestine are saying, where they welcomed this recognition as a step forward but with the need to delve deeper and implement measures beyond this. The path, he estimates, involves discussing the borders of the recognized State and how the construction of that State will be made effective in a context of occupation by the Israeli army, in order to then, intensify pressure on Israel so that it is forced to agree to a ceasefire and promote a peace process. Recently, the Camp for Palestine in Madrid has decided to dismantle and leave the esplanade of the Complutense University where they were, but not before planting an olive tree for peace. They do this firmly believing that the struggle for human rights continues in other spaces, where, as Erausquin explains, they will have to mobilize all the strength that has been gathered to continue fighting for the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, in the RESCOP, they emphasize the complexity of whether a Palestinian state with sovereignty can exist in the current situation. "The policy of fait accompli that Israel is developing in the occupied West Bank seriously questions whether this is indeed a process that has the minimum guarantees to succeed," declares Sánchez, highlighting that the present and future must be approached from a decolonial perspective in response to the colonial regime policies being carried out by Israel. To guarantee the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, Sánchez believes that there must first be a process of accountability for those who have systematically violated the rights of the Palestinian people as a whole. "If we want negotiations to take place, the parties must be on equal footing because right now it's like placing someone who has been suffering abuses for decades against someone who is perpetrating them." Thus, he explains that there should be two processes: on one hand, Israel must face international courts to be judged for war crimes, apartheid, and genocide committed against the Palestinian population; on the other hand, the Palestinian population should be asked how they want to manage this process of self-determination, to avoid imposing a colonial framework that prevents people who have to decide their own destiny. Finally, Rodríguez reminds us that the self-determination of the Palestinian people is a right that has been overwhelmingly ratified through a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. However, as she counters, the problem lies in the fact that the Israeli Parliament also recently voted overwhelmingly against the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. This is a chamber where there are barely any parliamentary representatives advocating for peace and an end to Israel's violations of international law. "We must build everything to promote a culture of peace," emphasizes Rodríguez. This would encompass educational programs from childhood that are reinforced in high schools and universities, incorporating elements that emphasize peace culture and human rights. It also involves replacing in the media the promotion of war culture, which often receives awards, with peace culture. Additionally, she advocates for a modification of the voting and veto systems in the United Nations to achieve fairer mechanisms of mutual respect among states, replacing imposition with multilateralism. In essence, it is a long-term task for defending the Palestinian population and human rights that must be activated across multiple fields such as politics, social issues, media, and law. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском MAY 2024.- Speaking about the spectacular growth of China's GDP, someone might argue that GDP is not the only indicator to observe in a country's improvement, and that is true. What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) has surpassed the latter in life expectancy of its inhabitants? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity), has a much lower poverty rate than the United States? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What are human rights for the West? The most evident thing is that human rights for the West are a media weapon to attack China. Every time Western media mention China, they inevitably, as a self-imposed style guide, have to vilify China for its lack of human rights. “Tell me what you boast of, and I will tell you what you lack.” For the West, human rights focus on defending Western "Democracy" against what they term Chinese “Autocracy." If we look at this Western-style "Democracy," we see that it is characterized (primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries and to a lesser extent in other Western countries) by the alternation in government between two political parties that uphold the same political system. The exclusive dominance of these two parties over the state is built upon the absolute repression of organizations opposed to the system. This repression is executed through various means: Firstly, elections are designed on a marketing basis that requires mobilizing large sums of money to have any chance; secondly, the media, which shapes the population's thinking, is controlled by the same business groups that control the two parties; and thirdly, when any political force emerges with fresh air in this neoliberal jungle, the entire legal and illegal machinery of the state is unleashed upon it until it is annihilated. A system that has been working for two centuries now and has allowed the American empire to rise. The West fills its mouth with the word "Democracy" to cover up all its democratic shortcomings and deficiencies. A "Representative Democracy" based on elections every four or five years where the parties of the neoliberal system always "win" because other parties are prevented from having the necessary means to have any chance. And it uses this supposed legitimacy it claims due to its presumption of democracy to deny human rights to its citizens. (Of course, while the human rights of its citizens are denied, the human rights of citizens in the rest of the world are directly massacred. In addition to the hundreds of interventions in numerous countries, in Latin America and other continents, to manipulate and change their governments in favor of American interests, in just the current century, the United States has waged war with its military against the following countries or regions: Afghanistan -2001/2021-, Iraq -2003/2011-, Somalia -2007/2021-, Indian Ocean -2009/2016-, Libya -2011-, Uganda -2011/2017-, Iraq -2014/present-, Syria -2014/present-, Libya -2015/2020-, Mozambique -2021/present-, and Yemen -2023/present-.) The Political System of China Firstly, and it seems unlike the West, human rights in China consist of 30 rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations), and not just neoliberal democracy. Let's start with "Democracy." In China, there are nine political parties with parliamentary representation, and all of them support the existing participatory democracy in the country: Ø Communist Party of China Ø Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang Ø China Democratic League Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø China National Democratic Construction Association Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party Ø China Zhigong Party Ø Jiusan Society Ø Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League The political membership of Chinese citizens in these parties is much higher than in the West, and the majority far exceeds one hundred thousand members. If we look at Article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which focuses on the Right to participate in public affairs, we see that it establishes that: 1. "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives." 2. "Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in their country." 3. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." China's participatory democracy is based on People's Congresses, which currently have 2.77 million elected deputies. There are five levels of People's Congresses: municipality, county, city, province, and national. In last June elections, 921 million voters participated in municipal elections, representing 86.49% of registered voters, and 623 million voters participated in county elections, representing 85.63% of registered voters. The upper three levels of deputies (city, province, and national) are elected by deputies from the lower level. If we look at the XIV National People's Congress (NPC), it consists of 2,977 deputies. Some important characteristics to highlight about the composition of these deputies are as follows: Ø Ethnic minorities: There are 55 ethnic minorities in China represented by a total of 442 deputies. Ø Women: Their representation remains low. There are 790 female deputies, representing only 26.54% of the total NPC. Ø Workers and farmers: With 497 deputies, their participation reaches 16.69% of the total deputies. Ø Communist Party of China: There are 969 deputies, accounting for 32.55% of the total deputies. We can conclude that the North American political system is designed to perpetuate the neoliberal democracy upon which it is based. Similarly, the Chinese political system is designed to perpetuate Chinese socialist democracy. Both systems formally meet the three requirements of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From the perspective of effectiveness, it seems that the neoliberal system, on one hand, in the current crisis situation, is generating a level of confrontation between the two parties that alternate in power (Republicans and Democrats in the United States, Socialists and Populars in Spain) that is hindering the government's work and muddying the political situation with the goal of obtaining power above any principle. On the other hand, the electoral marketing style on which it is based enhances government actions on short-term needs at the expense of medium and long-term plans, which cease to be an electoral priority. Looking towards China, the Chinese political system centered on grassroots People's Assemblies has two important advantages: on one hand, electoral confrontation does not occur between two national machineries geared to compete and win, but between grassroots individuals known to and neighbors of the voters who will elect them, where the individual holds greater value than the party itself. On the other hand, this system based on individuals allows for their selection based on their capabilities and promotes the rise to power of the most qualified. This phenomenon has been referred to as "Meritocracy" or the government of the best, and China today represents the clearest depiction of this meritocratic system. The other 29 articles of the Human Rights Declaration Without going deep into each of the Human Rights due to space constraints, let's focus on those that are driving the quality of life of Chinese citizens. In general, the United States uses human rights as a political tool for interference in the internal affairs of other countries, to influence and overthrow governments in its strategy of global domination. The State Department periodically publishes reports that are disseminated by Western media. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador expressed a few days ago regarding the latest U.S. report that "The State Department is talking about the human rights situation in Mexico being gray. The only thing is to ask [the agency] to review its recommendations because they violate the sovereignty of peoples. They are no-one to extend letters of good conduct to independent and sovereign countries and peoples." In relation to this latest report, many voices have risen up to rebuke the United States and assert that it lacks the capacity, or even the moral high ground, to criticize what happens in other countries regarding human rights. They point to everything happening with Julian Assange, the brutal repression of students in the United States, or the military support for the genocide of Palestinians, to express that this country cannot speak about human rights because it lacks moral authority. The right to equality and non-discrimination. Articles 1 and 2 are about the right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination. If we use their representation in the highest legislative body of each country for various minority groups to compare their level of discrimination, the result is as follows:   While ethnic minorities in China are overrepresented in the highest legislative body, in the United States, Latinos and African Americans together are discriminated against compared to non-Latino white individuals in the House of Representatives. The situation of women in both countries in their legislative bodies is discriminatory and at a similar level. In China, only 26.5% of deputies in the National People's Congress are women, and in the United States, only 28% of congresswomen in the House of Representatives are women. The respect for ethnic minorities and their national integration in China is notable. The most evident case is the Uyghur minority settled in the Xinjiang region, which is of Muslim origin and for which the United States has been financing all kind of Islamist terrorist groups to destabilize China without any success and launching worldwide discrediting campaigns. The Right to the Satisfaction of Economic, Social, and Cultural Needs According to Article 22, every person has the right to the satisfaction of these needs. China's progress in poverty alleviation, as seen in the previous graph, is spectacular. It shows how, starting from extremely high poverty levels (over 50% in the year 2000), China outpaces the United States from 2014 until its elimination. Meanwhile, no progress is observed in the United States over the last 50 years. Never before so many people have exited poverty in such a short time in human history. This result is the consequence from the different objectives of both societies; while in the United States the focus is on maximizing the benefits of the capitalist system, in China, the focus is on meeting the social needs of the entire population. The Right to Social Security in the Event of Illness, Disability, Widowhood, Old Age, or Other Circumstances Beyond One's Control Article 25 speaks of this right. We have already shown above the evolution of life expectancy in the United States and China, which is the best indicator of the satisfaction of this right. China's advantage in healthcare and social services does not come from higher healthcare spending by this country. On the contrary, the United States is the world's largest spender on healthcare in terms of percentage of GDP, but this expenditure is not distributed evenly and solidarily among all its citizens. Nearly 30 million people in the United States lack health insurance and have had no insurance at all throughout 2022, and worse, they have also lacked the financial means to meet their healthcare needs, which in the United States are all paid for. The U.S. Census does not provide information on how many, in addition to these 30 million, have only had access to health insurance at some point during the year. The Right to Education Article 26: Everyone has the right to education. Let's see how the United States and China spend their budgets:   China has opted for the widespread and open generalization of education. For example, it has been sending nearly 400,000 students each year to American universities until Biden began to prevent their access, and another 300,000 students to other countries worldwide. The gross enrollment ratio in higher education in China reached 59.6% in 2022. Today, Chinese universities host most students worldwide enrolled in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. As a conclusión China draws its strength from human rights to drive its economy and progress. We find a country where the population shares the benefits of progress in solidarity, expanding social security, healthcare, and education nationwide. This has created the world’s most skilled workforce, setting annual records in patents, surpassing both the United States and all combined university systems of European Union countries in graduate students, with 11.6 million new graduates in the last academic year. And it's not just the labor force that the standard of living, healthcare, or education generate in a country; it's also the personal satisfaction of citizens with the respect of all their rights. The French company Ipsos is responsible for conducting worldwide studies on the level of happiness in different countries and has been pointing out China as the happiest country in the world. There is no doubt that Chinese society is a satisfied one. A satisfaction that hints at the pride of belonging to a country that has carried out the largest and fastest economic and social revolution in history.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Should the U.S. get rid of pennies, nickels and dimes? The debate has gone on for years. Many people argue for keeping coins on economic-fairness grounds. Others call for eliminating them because the government loses money minting low-value coins. One way to resolve the debate is to check whether people are still using small-value coins. And there’s an unlikely source of information showing how much people are using pocket change: the Transportation Security Administration, or TSA. Yes, the same people who screen passengers at airport checkpoints can answer whether people are still using coins – and whether that usage is trending up or down over the years. Each year, the TSA provides a detailed report to Congress showing how much money is left behind at checkpoints. A decreasing amount of change would suggest fewer people have coins in their pockets, while a steady or increasing amount indicates people are still carrying coins. The latest TSA figure shows that during 2023, air travelers left almost US$1 million in small change at checkpoints. This is roughly double the amount left behind in 2012. At first glance, this suggests more people are carrying around and using coins. But as a university researcher who studies both travel and money usage – as well as a keen observer of habits while lining up at airport checkpoints – I know the story is more complicated than these numbers suggest. What gets left behind? More than 2 million people fly each day in the U.S., passing through hundreds of airport checkpoints manned by the TSA. Each flyer going through a checkpoint is asked to place items from their pockets such as wallets, phones, keys and coins in either a bin or their carry-on bag. Not everyone remembers to pick up all their items on the other side of the scanner. About 90,000 to 100,000 items are left behind each month, the TSA estimates. For expensive or identifiable items such as cellphones, wallets and laptops, the TSA has a lost-and-found department. For coins and the occasional paper bills that end up in the scanner bins, TSA has a different procedure. It collects all that money, catalogs the amount and periodically deposits it into a special account that the TSA uses to improve security operations. That money adds up, with travelers leaving behind almost $10 million in change over the past 12 years. The amount of money left varies by airport. JFK International Airport in New York City is consistently in one of the top slots for most money lost, with travelers leaving almost $60,000 behind in 2022. Harry Reid International Airport, which serves Las Vegas, also sees a large amount of money left behind. Love Field in Dallas, headquarters of Southwest Airlines, is often near the bottom of the list, with only about $100 lost in 2022. People lose money while going through security for a few reasons. First, some cut it close getting to the airport, and in their rush to avoid missing their plane, they don’t pick up everything after screening. Second, sometimes TSA lines are exceptionally long, leaving people to again scramble to make up time. And finally, TSA checkpoints are often confusing and noisy places, especially for new or infrequent travelers. Making it more confusing is that some airports have bins featuring advertisements, which distract travelers who only quickly glance to check for all their items. How much is lost? TSA keeps careful track of how much is lost because the agency is allowed to keep any unclaimed money left behind at checkpoints. TSA records show people left behind half a million dollars in 2012. This rose to almost a million in 2018. The drop in travel due to the COVID-19 pandemic reduced the figure back to half a million in 2020. In 2023, people left $956,000.   These raw figures need two adjustments to accurately track trends in coins lost. First, the numbers need to be adjusted for inflation. From 2012 to 2023, the consumer price index rose by 33%. This means a dollar of change in 2012 purchased one-third more than it did 12 years later. Second, the number of people flying and passing through TSA screening has changed dramatically over time. In 2012, about 638 million people went through the checkpoints. By 2023, that had risen to 859 million people, which is about 1,000 people every 30 seconds across the entire U.S. when airports and checkpoints are open. Adjusting for both inflation and the number of people screened shows no change in the amount of money lost. My calculations show back in 2012 about $1.10 in coins was lost for every 1,000 people screened. In 2023, about one penny more, or $1.11, was lost per 1,000. The peak year for money being lost was 2020, when $1.80 per 1,000 people was left behind. This was likely due to people not wanting to touch objects out of misplaced fear they could contact COVID-19. During the pandemic, people in general carried less money.   The world is increasingly using electronic payments. The data from TSA checkpoints, however, clearly shows people are carrying coins at roughly the same rate as back in 2012. This suggests Americans are still using physical money, at least for making small payments – and that the drive to get rid of pennies, nickels and dimes should hold off a while longer.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The French election results are everything except what predictions had forecast. Only days ago, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party was tipped to win. But as results came in it became clear it was the loser of these National Assembly elections. The far right National Rally is coming third, behind Macron’s centrist Ensemble coalition in second. And in first place, somewhat against the odds, is the three-week-old left-wing alliance the New Popular Front. This is a major twist in the roller coaster that French politics has been since June 9 when Macron called a snap election. Macron, who will serve as president until 2027, now faces a turbulent period of government. Results are still coming in, and will for another few hours. However, the New Popular Front is tipped to win 177 to 192 seats, Macron’s alliance 152 to 158 seats, and the National Rally 138 to 145 seats. Only a week ago polls were predicting 200 to 260 seats for the National Rally and a decimated Centrist coalition. The latter certainly did better than expected, so did the moderate right of the Les Républicains party, with 63 to 67 seats in the new house. However, the results mean that no party will likely be able to form a parliamentary majority on its own, and France is heading for what will likely be a turbulent coalition government. Overall, this election is a significant victory for the left. However, the New Popular Front is unlikely to be able to deliver on its key electoral promises, contrary to what divisive hard-left populist Jean-Luc Mélanchon claimed in a victory speech he gave on behalf of La France Insoumise, the lead party within the New Popular Front coalition. Why will the coalition that came first not be able to form a government on its own? The French parliamentary system under the Fifth Republic was designed for two large blocs: the moderate right and the moderate left, with a small centre in the middle and even smaller extremes on the far left and far right. This is how it’s been working since 1958, with only two exceptions in over six decades: President Valéry Giscard D'estaing (1974-1981) and President Macron (since 2017), two centrists presidents who took the nation by surprise. Today, however, the situation is unheard of with three major coalitions very close to one another in the French lower house. None will be able to form a government on their own: they simply do not have the numbers. To achieve a majority in the French lower house, a coalition needs 289 of the 577 MP seats. Even today’s winner – the New Popular Front – is far from this magic number. So, how do you govern France with no leading majority coalition? In theory, any French government must have the support of the lower house – the National Assembly – in order to govern effectively and pass legislation. If a majority of MPs do not support the government, the government falls and a new government is constituted from that majority. With today’s results, potential crossbenchers have multiplied in the French lower house, creating what is likely to be France’s most unstable political landscape since the French Fourth Republic that went through 22 governments within 12 years, between 1946 and 1958. That being said, France’s next government will be left-leaning. It is unclear for now whether it will be uncompromisingly left or simply mildly labour – this will depend on how elected members of the new house decide to work with one another and transform election coalitions into government coalitions. What is clear, however, is that the New Popular Front will need to broker a deal with Macron’s coalition if it wants to govern and soften its agenda of reforms. The problem is that the most radical fringe of the New Popular Front (populist left-wing party La France Insoumise) does not wish to work with Macron, which they have spent the last two years detesting loudly. Although it is victorious today, the New Popular Front may very well implode, shortly or in a few months. Macron still has enough MPs to assemble a motley coalition spanning from the moderate labour of the Socialist Party and the Greens to the most moderate members of Les Républicains. But the Socialist Party is initially likely to try to work with its new unexpected ally of the France Insoumise (far left) to deliver a more left wing agenda and act as a power broker between the hard left and Macron’s centrists. In most other European countries, today’s results would not be an issue. Italy, Belgium and Germany for example are used to having coalition governments in office. France does not know how to do this. Its institutions are not designed for such types of government precisely because Charles De Gaulle wanted to avoid coalition government when he drafted the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic under which France is still operating. Besides institutions, French political culture is a little more sectarian and flamboyant by tradition, and collaboration is seen as a sin and a betrayal rather than a virtue. If the left and Macron’s centre are not able to collaborate for at least 12 months (the minimum constitutional delay for a new election), they can be sure that they will pave the way for the National Rally to win the next election as a result of popular exasperation. What do the results mean for Europe and the rest of the world? For now, and after much upheaval, very little is likely to change with regard to French foreign policy, regardless of the government that will emerge in the coming days or weeks. This is because although the National Rally has increased its MPs in the house – a small victory within a bigger defeat – the other parties are generally pro-European and pro-Ukraine. They are divided on internal politics, but much less so on foreign policy. French sovereignty, nuclear deterrence, multilateralism will remain keystones of French foreign policy. One notable difference with the former Macron government is that with a larger left in the lower house, pressure on Israel to stop the war in Gaza is likely to increase. A democracy in crisis? These elections have clearly shown that the French are unhappy with their political class, despairing of unresponsive centralised state services that seem to work for forms and permits rather than for the people, tired of waiting weeks and sometimes months to get a doctor’s appointment in rural areas, tired of restrictive green legislation they are not consulted about. The yellow vest movement was a violent eruption of frustrations that are now being voiced at the polling booth. France’s type of democracy is in crisis and its next government is unlikely to resolve structural issues and practical problems that plague French peoples’ everyday life, because such issues cannot be fixed overnight. Within a month, the French have voted three times. Never before has the far right done so well despite its ultimate defeat. Whether this was a vote sanction (a vote used to protest, rather than to show support to a political program) or a genuine move toward the far right, these results remain a warning that the French are longing for change.