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Macron has raised doubts about how serious France is when it comes to managing the negative externalities of China’s rise. Just when it seemed the European Union was finally achieving strategic coherence as a global geopolitical actor, French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China has shattered that myth. The French president and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, headed to China last week, hoping to project a sense of unity vis-à-vis Beijing at a time when global fault lines are sharpening among major powers. The two leaders were aiming to stabilise an increasingly difficult trade relationship with their largest trading partner as well as try to push China into taking a more active role in ending the Ukraine war. Other European leaders, like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, have also tried to engage Chinese leadership in recent months. But Macron went beyond others as he advocated “strategic autonomy” for Europe as a “third superpower.” Arguing that Europe faces “the great risk” if it “gets caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy”, Macron stirred up instant controversy by suggesting that Europe must reduce its dependency on the U.S. and avoid getting dragged into a confrontation between China and the U.S. over Taiwan. In case of an aggravation of the U.S.-China conflict, Macron advocated, “we [Europe] will not have the time nor the means to finance our own strategic autonomy, and we will become vassals, whereas we could become the third pole [in the world order] if we have a few years to develop this”. Though von der Leyen went to China at Macron’s invitation, the visit has been overshadowed by Macron’s posturing and Beijing’s apparent glee that it is indeed possible to drive a wedge in transatlantic relations. Macron was given a red carpet welcome in China, and his comments have received widespread coverage. The Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times said the comments were “clearly the result of Macron’s long-term observation and reflection” and represented a path that was “relatively objective, rational, and in line with Europe’s own interests”. Macron has described the visit as an attempt to “consolidate common approaches” over the war in Ukraine and to force China to acknowledge the costs of its ties with China. But it was hardly evident how this was achieved during and after the visit. Ursula von der Leyen, who has been largely given the cold shoulder in China, has been much more emphatic in her denunciation of the Chinese 12-point plan to end the war in Ukraine and has been underlining the need for “de-risking” in Europe’s trade ties with China. But Macron’s intervention has led to an intense backlash from all sides. The Europeans are making it evident that there is hardly any widespread support for the French leader’s position. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China said in a statement that Macron’s comments are “severely out of touch” with sentiment across European leadership and that he does not speak for Europe. In particular, the officials of central and eastern Europe have been vocal in their dismay and opposition to Macron’s policy preferences. “Instead of building strategic autonomy from the United States, I propose a strategic partnership with the United States,” Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki bluntly put it to his European partners. Those European nations that are on the frontlines of Russian military aggression see the challenges of today in existential terms. They have no time for a French philosophical treatise on statecraft. With France and Germany devoid of any significant military prowess, the reliance of the EU on the U.S. is a strategic imperative. Macron’s ill-timed comments have once again revealed the divergences between the “old” and “new” Europe, even though “old” Europe has not been supportive of Macron’s worldview. Reactions from the U.S. have been equally scathing. Though the White House has maintained that it is “focused on the terrific collaboration and coordination that we have with France”, the Republicans have latched onto this controversy. The Republican senator Marco Rubio rhetorically asked if, after Macron’s comments, the US should just consider focusing its foreign policy on containing China and leave Europe to handle the war in Ukraine. Mike Gallagher, the Republican chairman of the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, described Macron’s comments as “embarrassing” and “disgraceful.” And of course, former President, Donald Trump was more colourful in his response when he said that Macron “is over with China kissing [Xi’s] ass in China.” Macron’s stance will be concerning to Washington as they are likely to embolden China, even as it reignites the debate about how much America should commit to European security. Macron has been under siege in France, with his approval ratings down in the dumps and his government narrowly surviving a vote of no confidence last month. So posturing on the global stage on an issue that has had a long pedigree in French politics perhaps makes sense for him politically. Ad he has made controversial comments in the past as well, such as NATO experiencing “brain death” and trying to offer Russian President Vladimir Putin “security guarantees” months after his invasion of Ukraine. But at a time when the West has tried with great difficulty to project a serious China policy and when Chinese aggression, especially against Taiwan, has been explicit, making remarks that end up doing exactly the opposite of what the visit was intended for in the first place betrays a lack of resolve that Beijing will be only too pleased to exploit. And for France’s partners in the Indo-Pacific, Macron has raised doubts about how serious France is when it comes to managing the negative externalities of China’s rise.

Tunisia is beset by deepening political and economic challenges. President Kais Saied is transforming the country’s parliamentary system into an authoritarian presidential one that has become increasingly repressive. Arrests and convictions of opposition politicians have surged. Saied’s aggressive anti-foreigner discourse has fuelled xenophobic sentiment and contributed to a spike in violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. Economically, Tunisia is grappling with the fallout of a decade of sluggish growth compounded by a series of economic shocks since 2020. The nation’s public debt has soared, with significant debt repayments looming. As the country tries to deal with mounting financial constraints, its inability to attract foreign loans is further clouding its economic future. Saied now must decide whether to embrace a credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or potentially default on Tunisia’s foreign debt. Against this backdrop, the EU and, in particular, Italy have a pivotal role to play. They can either help steer Tunisia toward a more stable economic future or watch it descend into chaos. A worrying political and economic outlook While the protests that led to the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, the promise of a more democratic and egalitarian society in the North African country did not come to fruition. To be sure, the protests did lead to the overthrow of autocratic Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. Moreover, Tunisia was the sole country to emerge from the regional uprisings with a new democracy. That experiment, however, foundered after Saied – who was elected to the presidency in 2019 – seized a monopoly on power in July 2021. Over the past two years, he has replaced the country’s semi-parliamentary system with one lacking checks and balances, consolidating power in his hands. People’s fear of repression resurfaced. Since mid-February 2023, arrests and convictions of public figures, especially politicians, have accelerated, undermining a disorganised and divided opposition. Meanwhile, large sections of the population have focused on survival in the face of a worsening economic crisis and have increasingly disengaged from politics. President Saied has attempted to shore up his dwindling support by pushing nationalist policies. He has jailed members of the opposition in a move that seems aimed at bolstering his standing with swathes of the public who are frustrated with the former political class. Saied has also xenophobically accused sub-Saharan migrants of conspiring to change Tunisia’s identity, creating a climate conducive to repeated violent attacks against a vulnerable minority. Economically, the country is still reeling from a decade of slow growth. After the 2011 uprising, the Tunisian government combatted rising unemployment in part by hiring hundreds of thousands of civil servants. Today, the public sector is the country’s largest employer and half of the annual budget is spent on the public payroll. At the same time, public and private investment in infrastructure, research and other growth-enhancing spending items has dropped significantly, leading to a sharp decline in GDP growth. External factors also chipped away at the Tunisian economy. The Covid-19 pandemic brought a collapse in tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, led to a spike in commodity prices. Surging inflation – particularly in food prices – and shortages of basic goods have eroded Tunisian living standards. Against this backdrop, Tunisia’s public debt has skyrocketed, reaching nearly 90 per cent of GDP in 2022, with substantial financing requirements needed to maintain current levels of spending. Credit rating agencies have downgraded the country as it struggles to balance its budget. The latest downgrade took place in June, when Fitch lowered Tunisia’s rating to CCC- (well into junk status territory). As a result, access to international financial markets has been virtually shut off, given the prohibitive interest rates (over 20 per cent) that this sovereign rating would entail. While the current account deficit has shrunk and foreign currency liquidity has improved over the past few months because of an uptick in tourism revenues and remittances from Tunisians working abroad, servicing its external debt will continue to be extremely challenging. With 2.6 billion US dollars in repayments scheduled for 2024 (including a euro-denominated bond maturing in February, equivalent to 900 million US dollars), it is still unclear how the government will be able to secure sufficient funds to meet these liabilities. The 2024 budget draft anticipates loans from Algeria and Saudi Arabia, as well as other, as yet unknown, external sources. The IMF deal and the role of the EU Despite these financing difficulties, Tunisia has not yet signed a deal with the IMF. In October 2022, Tunisia and the IMF agreed on the terms of a 48-month, 1.9 billion US dollar loan aimed at stabilising the economy, but Saied rejected the deal, fearing social unrest from cutting subsidies and reducing the public sector wage bill. The IMF board postponed the deal in response. Since then, the president has remained steadfast in his rejection of what he calls “foreign diktats” from the IMF and Western states. The Europeans – in particular, Italy – have pressed the IMF to reopen negotiations and offered incentives to persuade Saied to accept a revised deal, despite their internal divisions on how to treat Tunisia. They are applying this pressure largely because the economic fallout from a debt default could further increase the number of people – both nationals and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa – leaving Tunisia for Europe. While some EU member states, such as Germany, have taken a more critical stance towards Kais Saied’s authoritarian turn, eventually the migration, security and economic interests of Italy and, to an extent, France seem to have prevailed within the EU. Due to its geographic proximity to Tunisia, Italy would receive a majority of a migration influx, at least initially. For this reason, the Italian government has reiterated its concerns over Tunisia’s economic situation on multiple occasions, while refraining from expressing any criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian turn and violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. The EU has offered incentives to Tunisia to accept a deal with the IMF. After Giorgia Meloni and later EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte visited Tunis in June, they unveiled 900 million euros in macro-financial assistance conditioned on a deal with the IMF and 105 million euros for joint cooperation on border management and anti-smuggling measures to reduce irregular migration to Europe. Despite the sweeteners the EU offered, the likelihood of a revised deal between Tunisia and the IMF has receded. In August, Saied removed the head of government, Najla Bouden, who had been directly involved in the negotiations with the IMF, and replaced her with a more pliant official, Ahmed Hanachi. Since then, Tunisia hasn’t put forward a revised proposal to the IMF. In October, the president reinforced his position by sacking Economy Minister Samir Saied after the latter claimed that a deal with the IMF would send a reassuring message to Tunisia’s foreign creditors. Tunisia has also rejected part of the funds offered by the EU. On 3 October, Saied rejected the first tranche of EU financial help, declaring that this “derisory” amount ran counter to the agreement between the two parties and was just “charity”. The repercussions of this refusal on the rest of the EU’s financial incentives are unclear. A fork in the road There are obvious reasons for Tunisia to secure a loan from the IMF. It would send a reassuring signal to Tunisia’s foreign partners and creditors. It could encourage Gulf Arab states to provide additional financial support in the form of government loans and deposits with the central bank, and investment in the economy. That would provide the Tunisian government with breathing space. But implementation of reforms required under the loan’s terms could set off anti-government protests by the country’s main trade union (the UGTT) and, in turn, government-led repression. To forestall such a scenario, the president himself could incite protests and riots by using nationalist rhetoric to scapegoat the IMF for any unpopular measures required by the loan. A no-agreement scenario, however, would have much more severe and potentially even catastrophic consequences. Without a loan, Tunisia would struggle to find alternative funding sources to meet its scheduled foreign debt repayments. Saied could then resort to a politically motivated strategic default, followed by negotiations to restructure the country’s external debt. Some Tunisian economists and supporters of the president are advocating for this approach: they say that declaring bankruptcy on external debt would allow the government to hammer out a restructuring plan with creditors and argue that the impact on the economy would be fairly limited, thanks to Tunisia’s capital controls and its banking sector’s low exposure to foreign bonds. But this approach carries great risk, as a foreign debt bankruptcy could lead to a run on Tunisian banks and destabilise the financial sector. In addition, the government could end the central bank’s independence to print money, fuelling an inflation spiral. Politically, a default and its socio-economic repercussions could open the door to a dangerous spiral of social and criminal violence. It could also boost irregular outward migration, with Tunisians fleeing the growing political and economic chaos. Widespread protests may erupt against the disastrous social effects of the president’s failed economic policy, prompting a violent response targeting businesspeople and political opponents for their alleged links to the West, as well as Western diplomats and the local Jewish community. Balancing economic support and respect for rights In light of these two possible scenarios, the EU and Italy should continue to encourage the Tunisian authorities to negotiate with the IMF, which remains the least politically and economically destabilising option on the table for Tunisia, if carried out with due care. At a minimum, a revised deal should include reduced expenditure cuts compared with the earlier proposal, particularly in the context of energy subsidies. At the same time, Italy and the EU should exercise caution and avoid turning their understandable concerns about Tunisia’s stability into a blank check for the president. In particular, they should press the authorities to rein in the abuses perpetrated against migrants and stave off potential attacks against opposition politicians, businesspeople and the local Jewish community. Aside from humanitarian considerations, this would serve Italy’s overarching goal of curbing migration: after all, attacks against the sub-Saharan minority have spurred outward migration, a trend that would accelerate if government persecution becomes even more severe. While supporting the deal, however, the EU and Italy should also prepare for the possibility of Tunisia continuing to reject it and declaring a foreign debt default. In such a scenario, the EU should be prepared to offer emergency financing to the country to help with imports of wheat, medicines and fuel. In doing so, the EU should synchronise the positions of member states to prevent conflicting agendas. Schisms have already emerged between countries like Germany and Italy over how to address Tunisia’s authoritarian drift. For this reason, acknowledgement of the importance of internal stability could provide a common ground in overcoming divisions and helping prevent a new wave of anti-migrant violence.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, today, at the Prime Minister's Knesset office, met with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo. Prime Minister Netanyahu showed them sections of the horrific footage from the IDF Spokesperson's Office and told them afterwards: "We face a peculiar kind of enemy, a particularly cruel and inhuman foe. They're genocidal. They're not fighting for this or that territory; they're fighting to eliminate the Jewish state in whatever boundary. They say so. Their charter says if you find a bush and a Jew is hiding behind it, kill the Jew. Kill all the Jews. Their goal goes beyond the destruction of Israel. They're part of an axis of terror: Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis. They say death to America—that's the Great Satan. Israel is the Small Satan. I hope I don't find any offense with any of you. You're a middle-sized Satan. They hate our free civilization. They want to bury it. They have an ideology that is mad. In the 21st century, after the Enlightenment, after the Scientific Revolution, after the advance of human rights and democracy, this is sheer madness. I don't give it relative moralism that says, moral relativism that says, well, they have this society. They can do these horrible things to women. They can do these horrible things to human beings. That's their value system. That's not a value system. That's something that has to be fought. And one thing that we discovered in the 21st century is that our assumption that we can live our civilized lives in our advanced countries, seeking peace, prosperity and progress, and we can just sit back and the barbarians will not come back, they come back. They come back in many places, and if we are unwilling to fight the barbarians, they will win. There's a great historian that I admire, an American Christian Humanist by the name of Will Durant, who wrote, in the last century he wrote "The History of Civilization." And he said history does not favor Jesus Christ over Genghis Khan. History favors the strong. Your moral values do not stand up if you're not willing to fight for them. Here is a classic case of savagery and barbarism against civilization. Now, this savagery has two techniques. One is to deliberately target civilians. The whole laws of war, humanitarian law, which we're committed to completely, makes a simple distinction. On one line, they draw, they draw a line in the middle of the world and they say on one line are combatants, and the other line are non-combatants. You can target the combatants. You should target the combatants. But don't deliberately target the non-combatants. They can be hurt, unintentionally. That accompanies every legitimate war. What the terrorists do is erase the sense of sin. They say everyone is a target. These girls in a music festival, these women. They're targets. Babies. They're targets. Old people. They're targets. Holocaust survivors. They're targets. Everyone is a combatant. Everyone! They not only target everyone, every citizen, no one is a civilian, no one is exempt from their murder, from their harm. They also hide behind their civilians. They deliberately implant themselves in hospitals, in schools, in residential areas, in UN facilities. They fire their rockets from there. Thousands of them. We might have an alert as we speak. There is no symmetry here! These people target directly our cities all the time. Thousands and thousands and thousands of rockets. Falling on Barcelona, falling on Madrid, falling on Brussels, falling on Antwerp. Or any one of the European cities. Thousands! Israel is a small country. They deliberately target civilians and they deliberately hide behind civilians and use them as a human shield. That's a war crime. So what is a democracy, committed to the human, to the laws of war, supposed to do? Do the laws of war give exemption to such criminals? And the answer is: They don't. They say do your best to target the terrorists. Do your best to minimize civilian casualties. But if we, the democracies, accept, say that under no circumstances should we go in because civilians tragically get killed, then we lost. We lost before we begin. You lost and you lost. Spain lost. Belgium lost. Because this will spread. You will see it. Very soon. Because the Axis of Terror is not going to stop. If they can emerge victorious here, they intend to bring down the Middle East, and next they'll go to Europe. After that they'll go elsewhere. If you think I'm exaggerating, I am not. This is where the pivot of history now is going to be decided. Do we stop them there? Or do they come to you? Now, how do you stop them? What do you do? What did the Western countries, what did the democracy do when terrorists embed themselves amidst civilians? Let me say from the start that any civilian death is a tragedy. Any one. And to avoid them, what you do is first, you try to get the civilians out of harm's way. And that's exactly what we did. We asked, called, sent leaflets, phoned the civilians in the areas where we were going to hit the terrorists, the Hamas terrorists, and we said please leave. When they tried to leave, Hamas kept them at gunpoint. Stay, because Hamas doesn't care that their civilians are killed. This is a messianic death cult that hides in the bunkers. As one of their spokesmen said: the underground belongs to Hamas; aboveground, so civilians, that's Israel's problem and the UN problem. Not their problem. On the contrary. It's their shield. So, what do you do? We ask them to leave. Hamas tries to stop them from leaving. Thankfully, many left. We set up a safe corridor, from the north of Gaza, where we were concentrating our effort against the terrorists, to the south. A safe zone in the south, safe corridor to the south. Hamas shot the safe corridor. They fired on the safe corridor, so the people would be trapped in. But they kept on leaving. I'm happy to say that there is a decline in civilian casualties, which is our goal. Our goal is to have none. And primarily that's because of the ground action. The ground action has resulted in the fact that the warnings that we give are addressed by the population, the civilian population that goes south. When they go south, we give them humanitarian support. There are about 150 trucks now going in. Probably go up to 200 and beyond: food, medicine, water. I have not seen yet the effort that I'd like to see from the UN and the international agencies to build there shelters. Winter is coming and there is no reason not to build tens of thousands of tents in the safe zone, next to the safe zone. Because they don't enter the safe zone, the UN, which I think is shocking. I said, okay, we'll give you a lot of little zones. And they're building little safe zones to get the population out of harm's way. Israel is doing everything in its power to get the population out of harm's way. Hamas is doing everything in its power to keep that population in harm's way. That's the facts. I'll give you an example – Hitler, the original Nazis, they invade Europe, they do these horrors on a mass scale. And by the way, these killers would do exactly what Hitler did if they could away with it. The difference is only in capability, not in intent and not in savagery. Hitler invades Europe, perpetrates these horrible savageries, the Holocaust and so on. And so on. And the Allies invade. They invade Normandy. The German army is in the cities. You've seen the footage. The Allies say, "No, we can't do anything. We can't fire," because they're amid civilians? Of course not. They try to do exactly what we are doing: try to minimize the cost. And then they go through the cities of France and they go through the cities of Germany. And unfortunately, many, many, many civilian casualties occur. I don't know what history would have been like if we had demonstrations and protests in the West against the Allies for incurring civilian, German civilian casualties. I know history would have been very different. But we are the Allies, along with the moderate Arabs, with the United States, with Europe. We're the Allies. And they're the new Nazis. Israel cannot be held to a standard that no one is being held to. We have to fight the terrorists. We're in complete compliance with international law. I think in many ways, we're setting a different standard. We seek to minimize civilian casualties, and Hamas seeks to maximize it. And I would strongly urge you to make that distinction, not merely because it's right and just, but because your very societies are on the line. You're next. This is a battle for civilization. It has to be won. We will win it, because we have no other choice. We don't have a future if we don't. Hamas has already said, 'We'll do it again and again and again.' So we'll have to eradicate them. Just as you couldn't leave a reduced Nazi presence, you know, in Germany. You couldn't do that. And we are not going to leave a reduced Hamas presence in Gaza. But the consequences are much bigger. And I think that we should all unite in making sure that this kind of savagery never shows its face again. I thank you." The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding.

IntroductionEurope is confronting twin energy crises resulting from the impact of climate change and its energy dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Addressing these crises will require the European Union (EU) and its member states to engage in nothing short of an energy revolution that will decarbonise Europe’s energy usage and end dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused transatlantic attention on the importance of energy security and ending energy reliance on Russia. While the EU and US are now both taking immediate steps to reduce consumption and reliance on Russian supplies, some of these steps may result in increased emissions or will lead to greater reliance on other autocratic suppliers. To address the twin challenges of climate catastrophe and Russian aggression, significant action will be needed on the energy transition front in the short, medium, and long term.  Estonia, like other EU (and NATO) members is therefore at an energy crossroads. Unlike many of its EU fellow member states, it has not been highly dependent on Russian energy supply and is relatively energy secure. Domestically produced oil shale accounts for 55% of Estonia’s domestic energy supply (as of 2020).While, prior to the Russia-Ukraine war, Estonia received roughly 93 percent of its natural gas from Russia, natural gas accounts for less than 8% of Estonia’s overall energy consumption.Furthermore, the imports of the Russian gas came to an end as a result of steps taken by the Estonian government, in response to Russia’s aggression, and were replaced by liquified natural gas (LNG) from other suppliers. However, oil shale is very carbon-intensive, while increasing reliance on natural gas will do little to decarbonise energy system in the long-term. In order to meet Estonia’s climate commitments, embedded in the EU’s Green Deal and “Fit for 55” goals, Estonia will need to develop alternative sources of energy but will encounter manifold challenges in this transition. As the climate crisis deepens, the failure to meet climate targets could also have significant reputational costs internationally. Moreover, the effort to “electrify everything” – from cars to heating – will likely lead to increased demand for electricity. This will require not simply swapping out energy sources but producing more electricity with the goal of having an abundance of energy. Additionally, an abundance of cheap and clean energy will be necessary to support carbon removal projects, such as through direct carbon capture and storage technology. Thus, no matter the technological developments in other energy types, there will be demand for an abundance of clean energy. Furthermore, while there have been significant advances in renewables, there are also concerns about intermittency – when the sun is not shining, or wind is not blowing – as well as space needed for deployment. One potential zero carbon technology for Estonia to consider is new advanced nuclear technology in the form of small modular nuclear reactors (SMR). Developing a small modular reactor could contribute to enhancing regional energy security within the EU and to achieving the EU’s climate objectives. A decision to adopt nuclear energy, however, has implications not only for the national energy system or broader climate objectives. It is a sensitive area that intersects with geopolitical and national security considerations. Its pursuit means new opportunities for deepening strategic partnerships, and cooperation in nuclear energy technology is often an effective vehicle to enhance not only commercial and technological interactions but also security and foreign policy ties between countries. This is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek the greater involvement of main allies such as the US, UK, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter geopolitical pressure from Russia and China. The United States stands out as a pivotal ally, but the US “footprint” in Estonia remains small compared to what it could be. Also, Estonia’s foreign and security policy is currently heavily tilted towards diplomatic, military and cyber aspects when it comes to engaging the US, while energy security and energy technology receive far less attention. Nuclear energy cooperation would create new opportunities for enhancing US-Estonia ties.  At the same time, any efforts of Estonia to have “more US” in the region – particularly in such sensitive sector as nuclear energy, but also across the board – may encounter resistance. Some of it would inevitably arise from Russia and its geopolitical confrontation with the West, but it would also stem from the notions of “European sovereignty” as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations, structural issues in national energy policies, and diverging geopolitical perspectives of some key countries in the EU. These aspects must be factored in when considering the geopolitical prospects of nuclear energy in Estonia and the highly appealing transatlantic dimension of these aspirations.1. Estonia’s Energy Security and Nuclear Energy OptionThe Estonian government is yet to make its decision regarding the adoption of nuclear energy for electricity generation. There is an inter-agency nuclear energy working group established to analyse the issue and articulate recommendations by 2024.The electricity prices crisis of late 2021-early 2022 drew attention and elicited many favourable assessments from various public figures. The government even decided to expedite decision-making on the matter. Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and the then Minister of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure Taavi Aas indicated their support to possible adoption of nuclear energy. Political leadership of major parliamentary political parties both in the governing coalition and opposition are mostly in favour, while only the Greens, who do not hold any seats in the parliament, are opposed. Public opinion polls conducted in early 2022 also showed high public support to nuclear energy, with 59% of the respondents being in favour. At the same time, some officials emphasize that Estonia need to carefully follow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines on national nuclear energy programme deliberations, limiting how much decision timelines could be compressed.The political decision-makers might also decide to put the option for a vote in a referendum. Estonia, by some accounts, has a strong anti-nuclear undercurrent in society, stemming from the negative experiences of Soviet-era environmental mismanagement and the civil nuclear disasters of Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. If Estonia is to adopt nuclear energy, this sentiment would have to be engaged and mitigated well before any further practical steps are made, which opens opportunities for hostile disinformation operations by malignant actors. Currently, there is only one clear proposal on the table – by Fermi Energia which also has Swedish Vatenfall as a minority shareholder and expects more investors to join soon. Fermi Energia assesses that it can ensure, within a framework of a long-term contract, supply of electricity at the price of €55 per MWh for 15 years, which is about half or even one third of the current market prices in NordPool spot market in early 2022. Given that price volatility is likely to continue and even worsen, while pressure to accelerate decarbonisation will only increase, as Estonian electricity production is the most greenhouse gas-intensive in Europe, this could be seen as an economically attractive and competitive proposition. In addition, there would be heating supply available to nearby municipalities at a very competitive price compared to natural gas option. Theoretically, Estonia could, instead of developing own nuclear power, join as an investor and participant in a larger project (e.g., in Poland). However, the lead times of such projects are often too long and compound various risks, as illustrated by the recently cancelled Hanhikivi-1 project in Finland.Estonia also has a very negative experience from the Lithuanian Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) project debacle that led to failure of Lithuania to launch a regional NPP project agreed with the other Baltic states and Japan’s Hitachi in 2011-12, while the option of buying into one of the upcoming Polish projects might not be very appealing to Estonia.In the view of some Estonian energy executives and policymakers, Polish energy needs would likely supersede those of any other participating country’s when allocating the output, and many small investors are not of high interest to nor needed by the Polish companies behind Poland’s nuclear projects. There is, however, room for cooperation in training, regulatory capacity building, R&D and similar aspects, much of which could be undertaken in the framework of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), where the US has a leading role. Even in construction, if it takes place in parallel, some common pooled purchases could be undertaken.  Thus, should there be an affirmative decision by the government, Estonian developers are leaning towards having a national solution, even though remaining open and even actively courting participants from neighbouring countries as investors, thus in reality turning it into a regional project. Latvia is among the priorities and shows a clear interest, as demonstrated by discussions between Fermi Energia and state-owned energy corporation, Latvenergo (in this case, if Latvenergo joined the project, Estonia would deploy four SMR units instead of two). There are also ongoing talks with Finnish Fortum as a potential investor into the Estonian project, as the Russian electricity trade embargo enacted by the Kremlin – possibly in response to Finland’s application to join NATO – and the failure of the Hanhikivi-1 venture prompted Finland to seek new sources of supply in the region to satisfy future electricity demand.Thus, the company leading the Estonian project sees it as a regional one, just without the governments being in the lead. On the other hand, some officials insist that governments would inevitably come to play an essential role in such a project of strategic importance not only to Estonia, but also to the wider region. The Estonian project developers have already chosen BWRX-300 by GE Hitachi, a joint US-Japanese venture. So far, it appears that BWRX-300 will be the only reactor type that might be fully licensed – by Canada – and could obtain license in Estonia by 2030. This date is a crucial milestone for Estonia due to the plans to close oil shale-based power generation plants and the need to make further and faster progress towards fulfilling Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments – the pace of which is strongly criticised by the civil society – without losing domestic generation capacity necessary to provide stable baseload which the rapidly growing but intermittently performing renewables would not be able to ensure. At the same time, some of Estonia’s energy policy stakeholders insist that, come 2030-40, the renewable sector will possibly have addressed, through technological innovation in grid storage and other areas, the intermittency problem and, given especially the offshore wind potential in the Baltic Sea, might make introduction of nuclear energy with all the attendant complexities and societal stigma unnecessary altogether. Indeed, the government's decision in August 2022 to accelerate the energy transition to 100% renewable electricity consumption in Estonia as early as 2030 indicates the abundance of optimism about such innovation. Others, however, believe that renewables and nuclear energy can successfully co-exist and point to Finland as an example, but there are views that an Estonian SMR could be ready by 2040 at the earliest. If Estonia decides to adopt nuclear energy and given that the company leading the project selected GE Hitachi SMR, its deployment can be expected to be a high priority in US-Estonia and Canada-Estonia cooperation and possibly the highest value business engagement for the period of 2024-35 until the reactors have been deployed and operate routinely. The US would be the main partner on maintenance services, training, and education. According to the Fermi Energia executives, GE Hitachi would be the design supplier, which includes all technical drawings, equipment specifications, safety studies, and personnel training, as well as the supplier of final fuel elements, fuel assembly services, instrumentation equipment and software, turbines, generators and more. Canada, as the first-of-a-kind (FOAK) deployment nation for this type of SMR, would be important in personnel training and supply chain management, with very significant supplies such as reactor pressure vessel (RPV), primary steam piping, RPV internals, valves, pumps, and uranium being provided by the Canadian suppliers. French Orano, 51% owned by the French government, could have a significant role in fuel cycle by providing the uranium enrichment and spent fuel recycling services, thus mitigating potential French objections to more US tech in Europe as contravening European “tech sovereignty” notions. It is likely that companies and export credit agencies from Sweden, Finland, France, US, Canada could be important investors and creditors. The envisaged capital expenditures (CAPEX) breakdown would be roughly as follows: in the US – 30%; in Canada – 30%, other countries – 10%; in Estonia – 30% (local suppliers of construction materials, services during the construction, etc). In addition, given its nuclear competence, very close economic ties with Estonia, and Vattenfall’s investments, Sweden would also be an important partner, especially in personnel training. Estonia’s success could also provide know-how and a point of reference to countries such as Lithuania, where there are already some voices calling for deploying SMRs as a solution to achieving energy independence, a goal of its national strategy.The fact that Estonia is “nuclear naïve” at the moment does not seem to put off potential investors; quite to the contrary, it makes Estonia’s lack of legacy baggage more interesting to partners from Sweden, Finland or Canada. However, it is the political sentiment and geostrategic considerations in the US and EU – both in the EU institutions and among key member states – that will be of paramount importance if Estonia goes forward with nuclear energy and selects an SMR solution of US origin.2. The US Policy and InterestsThe United States has a strategic interest in increasing European energy security, particularly in the Baltic region. Washington has long been concerned about European dependence and reliance on Russia for its domestic energy. Throughout the previous decade, US administrations have opposed the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline and have pressed Europe to diversify its energy supply away from Russia. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US and Europe sought to increase pressure on the Russian economy, and Russia’s energy sector which accounts for about 45% of Russia’s total exports became one of the key targets of comprehensive sanctions. Admittedly, the US also has its own parochial reasons to push Europe away from Russian gas. Over the last decade, America has undergone its own energy revolution, becoming a major producer of natural gas with fracking technology. It has become a major exporter of LNG and has encouraged Europeans to expand their LNG infrastructure to take advantage of American supplies. There are major US political stakeholders that have an interest in expanding US LNG exports to Europe and see an opportunity in the current crisis to increase market access for US exports, which would justify increasing investment to expand domestic production. However, LNG is not the only game in town when it comes to the US interests. Nuclear energy sector is increasingly becoming a pivotal area of geoeconomic competition with such rivals as Russia and China. SMRs and their potential market are viewed as an important aspect of US efforts to regain a share of the global nuclear reactor market and are a feature of both US commercial marketing and diplomatic outreach. The establishment of the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) programme in April 2021, which Estonia joined in January 2022, is indicative of the US government’s focus on SMRs in its near-term nuclear export strategy. Market research organisations estimate the SMR market to grow by 15% and reach roughly $19 billion by 2030. The United States began considerable investment in SMR development in 2012 with the US Department of Energy’s establishment of the SMR Licensing Technical Support Program. Since that time, a wide variety of SMR designs have been under development and are in various stages of licensing. The twin geopolitical and geoeconomic interests have seen the United States become a major proponent of the 3SI. This initiative was launched by the Presidents of Poland and Croatia in 2015 with the goal to develop north-south infrastructure, particularly relating to energy infrastructure. The United States views the 3SI as a way to expand LNG imports to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas, as well as provide a potential counter-balance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its 16+1 format. There is strong US support for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). For instance, President Donald Trump attended the 2017 Three Seas Annual summit. In November 2020, the House of Representatives passed a bipartisan resolution “expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security” (H.Res. 672, 116th Congress). In December 2020 the US approved a $300 million investment in the 3SI Investment Fund, “primarily for projects focused on energy security.” This investment was enabled by the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, which eased restrictions on investing resources for energy infrastructure projects in higher-income countries, such as the European Union. In February 2021, a bipartisan group of members of congress urged the new Biden Administration to continue the previous Administration’s pledged financial support for the 3SI and to finalise its approved $300 million investment. While the 3SI has drawn significant attention, its projects are largely supported by European, not US, investments and several pre-existing projects were simply rebranded as part of the 3SI. Nevertheless, 3SI has focused attention on the need for north-south infrastructure within Europe. For instance, 3SI is supporting a gas interconnection between Poland and Lithuania, thus connecting the three Baltic states and Finland to the European gas network. Of note, however, is that this project was funded through EU and member state contributions. The United States is a secondary player when compared to the EU in terms of infrastructure investment. For instance, three-fourths of the funding to desynchronise Baltic states from the Russian grid and synchronise them with the continental comes from the EU, with the US playing a much smaller financial role. Nevertheless, the pressure from Congress on the Biden administration to make investments in European energy security will likely increase due to Russia’s aggression. Congress will be especially focused on expanding LNG infrastructure. The Ukraine supplemental funding bill, which passed congress in March 2022, urged the administration to create a “Baltic Security and Economic Enhancement Initiative.” The purpose of such an initiative is to provide the Baltic states with security assistance, bolster “physical and energy security needs,” look for opportunities for US foreign direct investment, and improve “high-level security and economic cooperation.” Congress has also called on the administration to send high-level representatives to the Baltics at least twice a year and attend trade, energy, and business fora.How and whether this initiative will be implemented by the Biden administration remains to be seen. But there is now significant funding being made available to the administration for security assistance and energy financing. Pressure will therefore increase on US agencies to show support for the Baltics and Eastern Europe, leading US agencies to scramble to identify sensible projects and investments. Should Estonia pursue American SMR technology, there will be immense US support for the project from the US congress and the Biden administration. It is increasingly visible that the US government has already identified the Trimarium region as one of the priority directions for advancing nuclear energy through the so-called Partnership for Trans-Atlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation (P-TECC) – an international platform initiated by the US Department of Energy. This nuclear energy strand of a broader effort to improve energy security and resilience across the region clearly checks a lot of boxes for US government agencies: It serves a strategic purpose of expanding European energy supply, it promotes American businesses, and develops new zero carbon technology. Thus, there would be strong support from within the US government for stronger bilateral engagement in this area. This is illustrated by a recent P-TECC meeting that focused on nuclear energy in the Central and Eastern Europe. The Estonian SMR project, if pursued, would likely become a show-piece project for the US government, and the US officials would take great interest in its success. For instance, one major topic on the agenda during the visit of Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Elliot Kang, to Estonia was SMR technology. There is little doubt that proceeding with a climate-friendly energy project that has geopolitical ramifications and is based on cutting-edge US technology would help to deepen diplomatic relations with the United States. It would also further bolster Estonia’s image in the United States as an incredibly capable and cutting-edge ally that punches above its weight within the transatlantic alliance.3. Security Dimension of Nuclear Energy and Cooperation with the USThe evolution of the bilateral security cooperation agenda that is likely to take place as a result of Estonia’s choice to pursue nuclear energy based on the US SMR technology largely depends on what security risks result from this choice and how the US government could assist Estonia in addressing those risks.Traditionally, US security assistance to help protect and secure nuclear facilities has been largely focused on countering the threats posed by terrorism – whether preventing terrorist attacks against the plant itself or addressing the proliferation threats to ensure nuclear materials do not fall into the wrong hands. However, the war in the Ukraine has made clear that nuclear power plants are also national strategic assets and therefore potential military targets. Moreover, the hybrid threat environment in which Estonia finds itself means that its SMR project could be exposed to the use of various vectors of attack (e.g. cyber, disinformation, etc) applied by hostile state powers seeking to advance their interests through the medium of so-called “grey zone” conflict. Interaction between the US government and Estonian authorities in monitoring and countering such risks would form an important strand of bilateral security cooperation. 3.1 Conventional Military ThreatRussia’s invasion of Ukraine provides important lessons for Estonia to consider when assessing whether to proceed with an SMR. This war has created an unprecedented situation in which nuclear power plants have been in the crossfire of war. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that an SMR would be a potential target for Russia, whether in a conventional military operation against Estonia or in conducting asymmetric or grey-zone operations to weaken or undermine the government in power. For instance, Russia in 2015 targeted Ukraine’s power sector through a cyberattack, successfully shutting off the power for 200 000 Ukrainians before Christmas. Similarly, during the war in Ukraine, Russia has also launched cyberattacks against Ukraine’s power grid. The targeting and seizing of power plants in Ukraine means that Estonia must consider the likelihood that Russia will target an SMR in a potential conflict. In a conflict with Estonia, Russia’s military objectives may also differ significantly than its objectives with Ukraine. Russia has appeared intent on changing the regime in Kyiv and occupying the country and has therefore allowed plants to continue operating. But in an attack against Estonia, Russia may have more destructive ends that would resemble the aims of its large-scale strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy system since Autumn 2022. Hence, instead of seizing and operating power plants, Russia may simply seek to destroy the SMR and deprive the country of significant source of electrical power. Thus, the construction of an SMR, which if built, would likely provide Estonia with an important portion of its power supply and potentially provide power to Latvia as well, would be a prime target for Russia in the event of a military conflict. 3.2 Cyber, Espionage, and Terrorist TargetAn SMR, especially one tied to the United States, would also be a prime target for Russian cyber and espionage campaigns. Developing robust cyber security standards would be a must, as would maintaining extremely careful security protocols for staff. Power plants and power grids have been major targets for Russian cyber operators in the past. For instance, Ukraine’s electrical grid was taken offline in December 2015, with the attack impacting more than 225 000 Ukrainian customers. Russian intelligence and cyber hackers would likely see the plant as a key target both to disrupt operations at the plant, as well as to conduct industrial espionage to improve Russia’s nuclear industry. Lastly, an SMR or any high-profile critical infrastructure must be seen as a potential target for terrorist networks. 3.3 Disinformation TargetThe impact of malignant disinformation campaigns on political processes and national security is well understood by the US and Estonian governments, as is the role of hostile state powers in orchestrating such campaigns. Given the societal sensitivities about nuclear energy, disinformation is one of the most serious challenges that an SMR project would face in Estonia, especially during the public debate on adopting nuclear energy and then during the project’s implementation. In 2006-12, Lithuania’s intentions to build an NPP together with Latvia and Estonia would have significantly changed the current picture of electricity generation in the Baltic region, but Russia’s actions designed to negatively influence the public debate contributed to the suspension of this project. Similar actions should be expected to target Estonia.4. Headwinds and Tailwinds from Other PlayersFrom the geopolitical standpoint and as far as diplomatic strategy concerns, three fellow EU member states and NATO allies – Germany, France, and Poland – stand out for Estonia when considering embracing US nuclear technology and cooperation. The former two have historically formed the most important tandem in shaping the direction of the EU, while the latter has emerged as an important hub for the Trimarium. All three are highly important security and defence partners for Estonia and other two Baltic states. They are, however, positioned on different points of two axes – anti-/pro-nuclear axis and transatlantic/Eurocentric axis – and thus pose different, if somewhat overlapping, sets of challenges. When it comes to the nuclear part, France and Poland are natural allies in making a continued case in favour of nuclear energy’s role in future climate neutral world. Poland also would be an important partner whenever collaborative efforts are required to maintain and benefit from the US involvement in nuclear energy development in the region. Due to the scope of its nuclear ambitions, Poland may come to dominate the US attention and thus diminish the potential political benefits for Estonia, particularly in terms of visibility. Inevitably, Tallinn will have to be very careful and specific about which aspects of practical nuclear cooperation with Poland are desirable – for example, pooled training, specialist mobility, R&D, etc. – and which ones are not. It would be important for the Estonian government, ministerial and commercial actors, as well as civil organisations, such as think-tanks and academic organisations, to establish regular and institutionalised consultations with their Polish counterparts in SMR deployment. A consistent, shared legal, regulatory and standards framework, if possible, would seem highly desirable, to simplify cooperation for decades hence. However, it is important to understand that, although the Polish SMR deployment – just as in Estonia – is more an industry-initiated and led endeavour with state support, the overall Polish programme specifically focuses on large-scale reactors. Germany’s policy, on the other hand, continues to be dominated by anti-nuclear sentiment and “renewables-only” perspective about future energy supply, which is unlikely to change due to the structural and ideological forces at play in German economy and society. Contrary to Estonia’s already strong emphasis on and commitment to renewables, such as offshore wind, Estonian nuclear aspirations are therefore likely to be unpopular in Berlin and will possibly draw continuous criticism. This criticism would lack credibility, given the complete failure – in geopolitical and energy security terms – of the German energy policy, exposed by Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, unlikely as it is to do much significant damage to the overall bilateral relations in foreign and security affairs, Berlin’s anti-nuclear stance – given the sheer lobbying weight of Germany – may still dampen the enthusiasm in the Baltic region and, more importantly, in Brussels over the long-term prospects of nuclear energy industry in the EU. Furthermore, reliance of the Estonian programme on the US may kindle the anti-American instincts in those sections of the German political establishment and policy community that have long sought to balance out the US role in the European security order through energy relations with Russia and industrial relations with China. There will also be growing geoeconomic competition between Germany and the US over the shape of energy policies and the attendant commercial opportunities in the Trimarium, with the former advocating for more alignment with the philosophy of global energy transition, or Energiewende, and with the latter emphasizing the need for nuclear power in the energy mix as a pathway to energy security of the region. Tallinn will have to invest diplomatic efforts into cultivating the transatlanticist policy stakeholders in Berlin and highlighting the strategic benefits of the US involvement in energy security of the Baltic region and Europe as a whole. Estonia’s constructive role in maintaining German interest in building synergies and complementarities with the US contribution to the region’s energy security – including through the 3SI framework – rather than competing with the US would be beneficial to all sides. It might even help Berlin offset some of the loss of political capital and credibility in the Trimarium, incurred by the NS2 saga and then its ambivalence regarding the extent, speed, and nature of support to Ukraine during the war with Russia. Reliance on the US in a nuclear energy programme, however, may prove more problematic in the geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis of Paris. Its agenda of pushing forward European sovereignty means that extensive technological dependence on the US may not be viewed very favourably in some quarters, especially as France continues developing its own SMR for sales in international markets. Estonia should expect that France will make a persistent case for cooperation on the European SMR and will highlight that the EU framework already provides sufficient range of security cooperation instruments to address the risks associated with the adoption of nuclear energy. Some of the potential political opposition from France can be defused by integrating its nuclear industrial base into the supply chains of the Estonian nuclear energy programme, even after choosing the US SMR as the proposed project intends, but this will be hardly sufficient to avoid the optics that Estonia is not supportive of strengthening the EU’s sovereignty aspirations in practice. Estonia will have to be prepared to make a strong case to Paris that dependency on the US – be it in energy technology or military technology – is not contrary to Europe’s interests but rather conducive to greater cohesion and strength of the collective West. The EU has been playing a pivotal role in pushing for and coordinating common responses to the climate crisis and Russia’s use of energy as a tool of geopolitical coercion. Policy instruments and strategies agreed by the member states, such as the EU Green Deal and RePowerEU, advance the diversification of energy sources, promote the energy transition to climate neutrality, and provides for greater coherence, solidarity, security, and closer integration of national energy systems.Although choices concerning national energy mix remain the prerogative of the member states, the overall policy direction undertaken by the EU and the general sentiment in Brussels about the approaches of individual member states clearly matter in assessing the risks and opportunities for Estonia related to nuclear energy. At the end of 2021, the Commission finally completed an extended process that culminated with a decision to include nuclear energy – and natural gas – in its Green Finance Taxonomy (often referred to as simply “green taxonomy” in most discussions), established under the Union’s Green Deal. On the upside, the pro-nuclear decision can be considered a victory for science- and data-driven policy against green-populism, with crucial input made by various scientific studies on the climate impact of nuclear energy. The EU Commission’s decision primarily represents an acknowledgement of the reality that nuclear energy is, de facto, the only scalable solution to reliable base-load carbon-free generation that can displace coal – and eventually natural gas – and does not require the installation of massive, generalizable grid-scale storage, as does an over-reliance on variable renewables. With such popular and ideological forces in favour of the 100%-renewables-and-no-nuclear-model, only the appearance of significant difficulties with this model motivated the Commission and ministerial actors to weather the formidable shaming of “green washing” to open new opportunities for nuclear energy.ConclusionThe United States remains of pivotal importance to Europe’s and Estonia’s security, and this importance was further underlined by its role in countering Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as well as strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank (or “eastern front,” as it is increasingly referred to). Its continued bilateral and, through various cooperative formats such as 3SI, minilateral engagement in the Baltic region is vital foreign and security policy interest of Estonia. Maintaining this engagement will be increasingly difficult because the US repeatedly seeks to pivot to the Asia-Pacific, as the great power competition dynamics in that area of the globe requires its strong focus on countering the long-term challenge of increasingly assertive China, while European – let alone Baltic or Estonian – security concerns will often struggle to remain among the strategic priorities in Washington. Adding civil nuclear energy cooperation to this continuous engagement is a unique opportunity, available both because of alignment with the bi-partisan pro-nuclear sentiment in energy policy of the United States and the need for the US companies to regain their competitive edge in the international nuclear energy market with novel technology to counter China. It also provides a useful vector for increasing US contribution to the energy security of Estonia and the entire Baltic region that goes beyond the present-day focus on LNG supply – a focus that will diminish in importance due to the temporary “bridging” role of natural gas in energy transition towards “zero carbon” future. In the long-term, it would also help to create a competence base in Estonia enabling country’s integration into the US SMR technology chains, thus further strengthening the bilateral partnership. Full exploitation of this opportunity, however, is clearly contingent on Estonia being among the first movers in adopting the American SMR and thus positioning its programme to be a showcase of the successful adoption of the new generation US nuclear energy technology.

Migration flows from South Asia to Western Europe have a long history, the origins of which can be traced in the colonial development of the states of this region.  The end of British colonial rule in India in 1947 was accompanied by the split of the once unified territorial space of Hindustan into two national entities - India and Pakistan. During the first decades after independence, there were intense migratory movements from the former colony to the former metropolis. British migration policy determined the direction and intensity of migration flows from the Hindustan Peninsula to the United Kingdom. The first post-colonial migration flows were based on the following reasons: Britain's interest in the influx of additional labor force, mostly of low qualification; the practice (which existed before 1947) of free human movements from the colonies to the mother country; features of the immigration policy of the United Kingdom, which allowed citizens of the countries of the British Commonwealth to choose their country of residence and even have their own companies in the UK. The vast majority of migrants from India were Sikhs, people from a peasant environment (mainly middle-class farms), who served in the colonial army and police units, as well as their relatives, who did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity to leave. Prior to the adoption of The British Commonwealth Immigration Acts 1962 and 1968 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, indians, as Commonwealth citizens, had unlimited rights to enter the territory of the former metropolis. Many of the new arrivals settled in industrial centers such as Leicester or Birmingham. Newly arrived migrants were employed in the textile and service industries. A significant part of them were employed in the services of Heathrow Airport in west London. The 1962 Act, which restricted the freedom of migration to the British Isles from the Commonwealth countries, actually already encouraged immigrants from India and other South Asian countries to settle on British territory. Soon their family members joined them. By the mid-1960s, most Indians arriving in the UK were listed as "dependants", as British government statistics described them. Dependents made up 75% of immigrants in 1965 and 80% in 1966. Migration flows from India to the former metropolis peaked in 1968, when the number of arrivals in the United Kingdom exceeded 23 thousand people. Migration flows from India intensified sharply between 1995 and 2005. Data from population censuses shows that the number of Indian migrants actually tripled between 1961 and 2001, from 166,000 to 470,000. To be fair, we note that the British, who were born in India, were also immigrants. In 2001, the Indian community in the United Kingdom numbered about 1 million people, with about a fifth of its composition coming from South Africa and former East African colonies. In 2007, the number of Indians in the UK increased to 1.3 million people. Until the early 1990s, the former metropolis remained the main haven for Indian migrants, but gradually their influx began to spread to Western and, to an increasing extent, Eastern Europe. For the period 1995–2005 about half of the migrants from India heading for Europe ended up in the UK. The rest preferred other EU countries, primarily Germany and Italy, which accounted for 18 and 12% of Indian migrants respectively. During the period under review, there was an increase, albeit slowly, in the number of Indians moving to Belgium and Sweden. Approximately 1,000 settlers per year settled in France, where the Indian community, which by the mid-2000s was about 65,000 people, largely consisted of ethnic Indians from Madagascar, the Seychelles, Reunion and Mauritius. For a better understanding of the reasons for the intensification of migration flows from India and other countries culturally related to this country, it is worth recalling the policy deliberately pursued by a number of European governments, the meaning of which was to invite skilled and relatively inexpensive labor from the “largest democracy in the world”. Thus, the temporary “green card” migration initiative that operated in Germany from 2000 to 2005 was initially focused on attracting Indian information technology specialists. In Italy, the Indian community was formed from those who initially entered the Apennines illegally, and subsequently received legal grounds for staying in the country. The vast majority of Indian migrants in Italy are from Punjab, working on dairy farms and other agricultural sectors. The development of information technology and related industrial clusters in India, the high-quality professional training of graduates from Indian institutes of technology - these and other factors predetermined the interest of the United States, Western Europe, and Australia in attracting skilled labor from India. Already in 2000, at least one third of migrants in the field of information technology in the UK represented India. In 2000–2004 more than 245 thousand migrants of this profession settled in the USA. In this kind of "migration competition" India was second only to Mexico, China and the Philippines. In the UK, in October 2004, a program was adopted to "naturalize" successful Indian students (as well as representatives of other Commonwealth countries) in the specialties: physical sciences, mathematics and engineering. The naturalization program has become an additional source of attraction to the United Kingdom of future specialists in the field of natural sciences and exact sciences from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. At the same time, this program has become a tool for managed migration to the UK. This practice is followed by the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, as well as France, Germany and the Netherlands. Demand for foreign labor with a high share of added intellectual value is ultimately determined by the characteristics of the socio-demographic structure of the population of Western European countries. The rapid “aging” of the workforce in the countries of the historical “core” of the current EU encourages the governing bodies of this organization to use such tools to attract future workers in the “knowledge economy” as educational fairs. At the same time, the use of foreign “intellectual production proletarians” is conceived as the provision of appropriate services without staying in a Western European country on a permanent basis. The movement of human capital from India and South Asian countries to Western Europe, in the understanding of local elites, has a twofold goal: 1) to increase the competitiveness of Western European economies in the world economy and at the same time 2) to deprive the countries of the South Asian region of independence in choosing national models for the development of the information technology industry. There are also restrictions even for this type of migration: the EU authorities are seriously afraid that the massive import of labor from India and other (not only South Asian) countries with a high share of added intellectual value may in the future undermine the reproduction of national scientific schools in Western European countries employed by developments in the field of information technology and their application in the economy. Finally, a group of political factors is of no small importance in the formation of the migration policy of the EU countries, in particular, dissatisfaction with the “substratum of other civilizations” in the Western European cultural environment on the part of forces supporting national populism. A significant proportion of Pakistani migrants to the UK originate from the Mirpur district in Azad Kashmir (area now under Pakistani control). The county has a long history of emigration. So, people from Mirpur worked as stokers on British ships, whose home ports were Bombay and Karachi. Subsequently, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some of them settled in the United Kingdom. Post-war Pakistani migrants in the British Isles took jobs in the textile factories of Lancashire, Yorkshire, Manchester and Bradford, in the car factories of the West Midlands and its largest city of Birmingham, filled the light industry development zones in cities such as Luton and Slough. Among other groups of migrants from Pakistan, it is customary to single out Punjabis who settled mainly in Glasgow, Birmingham and Southall, an area of west London that is often called “little Punjab”. The main migration flows from Bangladesh to the British Isles occurred in the first half of the 1970s. They were a reaction to civil unrest in the newly formed state and affected primarily the Sylhet region in the north-east of the country, located directly near the Bangladeshi-Indian border. Initially, Bangladeshi migrants were employed in steel mills and textile mills throughout the UK, but after the closure of these enterprises due to the economic crisis, Bangladeshi migrants rushed into small businesses, primarily in tailoring and catering, including restaurant business. Many people from Bangladesh actively joined the network of Indian restaurants, which was rapidly developing in those years, and subsequently took over a significant part of it. The first migration flow from the relatively developed Sri Lanka (before 1972 - Ceylon) to the UK, modest in size, falls on the 1960s-1970s. Migrants arriving from the former colony were employed in the UK National Health Service, as well as in other areas of the economy where white-collar workers work, becoming employees, administrators, managers, etc. For the most part, the migrants who arrived in the British Isles were from wealthy families and well-educated. They quickly found a use for their abilities in the United Kingdom. The second wave of Sri Lankan migration to the UK occurred in the 80s and was a product of the civil war that swept the island at that time. A significant number of wealthy Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in the former metropolis. The migrants of the second wave were not as well-born as their predecessors, however, like many refugees to the West, they did not belong to the "lower classes" of society. Sri Lankans are employed in the traditional segment of the service sector: in shops and restaurants, and some of them even managed to open their own business. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS OF 2015 Significant adjustments to the intensity of the movement of people from the territories of the “global South” to the space of the “historical North” were introduced by “truncated globalization” (which further exacerbated the contradictions between the leaders of the world economy, primarily the United States, Western Europe, Japan, with on the one hand, and the rest on the other). It gave rise to both active (“passionary” anti-globalization movements and projects) and passive (intensification of migration flows towards the original “core” of the EU) response of transitional societies – the main part of the ecumene. It is believed that the main migration “corridors” from transitional societies to industrialized countries will retain their main direction in the future, especially since demographic processes in the “global South” will continue to exert migration pressure on future generations in the coming decades. India (and South Asia in a broad sense) remains the territory of origin of the largest number of international migrants: 17.5 million Indians live abroad. For the countries of South Asia, a region with significant labor surpluses, migration eases labor market strains while contributing to poverty alleviation through remittances. It is therefore not surprising that the countries of the South Asian region remain the largest recipients of remittances in the world: in 2018, in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, remittances from abroad exceeded 5% of the GDP of these states. It is also worth noting the factor of internal migration in the countries of South Asia: for the period 2001–2011 the urban population of these countries increased by 130 million people, which became an additional incentive for external migration. The most desirable destination regions for illegal migrants from South Asia are Western Europe, North America and Oceania. Demographers note that South Asian migrants bound for Western Europe are smuggled to their destination mainly through Central Asia and the Russian Federation, but also through the Middle East towards the Western Balkans. Finally, South Asians are driven to move to Western Europe and the Gulf region by the constant risk of natural disasters, which primarily affect Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Obviously, the most socialized and adapted groups of the urban population of South Asia are ready to change their way of life. As of 2019, the largest migrant groups in the United Kingdom were immigrants from India, Poland and Pakistan. In the UK, France and Germany, there is a positive correlation between the high quality of human capital among migrants and their innovative activity. Migration flows are expected to influence the activation of the forces of national populism in Western Europe. Thus, after the migration crisis of 2015, the influence of the respective parties is rapidly growing, winning back positions from the centrists and social democrats. “People's parties” are becoming more and more successful, uniting various segments of the population, including those who are dissatisfied with the growing influx of “other civilizational substrate” into the countries of Western Europe. Thus, the policy of "traditional" parties contributes to the growth of the influence of the forces of national populism. Traditional parties justify their policy of accepting migrants by the need to integrate the labor market in the face of a growing shortage of skilled labor. According to traditionalists, the integration of the labor market has an inevitable consequence of strengthening the economic viability of society and increasing the viability of its political institutions, as well as the feeling of new arrivals of their belonging to the host society. The problem of socio-economic (as well as cultural) adaptation of migrants in the societies of Western Europe remains acute: in 2017 in the EU, the unemployment rate among migrants was 13.3%, while among the autochthonous population it did not exceed 6.9%. The coronavirus pandemic has made significant adjustments to the intensity of migration flows. As a result of the pandemic, the IMF blog writes, “migration flows suddenly stopped. The Great Lockdown is temporary, but the pandemic could reinforce general sentiments of insularity and disbelief in opening up to the outside world and have a more lasting effect on countries' propensity to accept migrants. Decline in immigration and high unemployment in destination countries will have a negative impact on the situation in its origin countries, especially the poorer ones, which are heavily dependent on the remittances that migrant workers send home”. The costs of migration also include the need to overcome geographical and linguistic barriers. Integration into the economic system of the host country implies a thorough mastery of its language, which is a precondition for the adaptation of migrants in a different cultural and social environment. So, immigrants from Bangladesh adapted well to the Apennine Peninsula because they were able to master the Italian language, which is difficult for the inhabitants of South Asia. As the Italians believe, people from Bangladesh are more industrious and less pretentious than Indians, and are ready to work in the most adverse conditions. Finally, migration from Bangladesh is economically beneficial for Italians: migrants with skills in light industry are welcome “guests” in the Apennines, since they make up a significant part of the staff of textile enterprises that manufacture products with the “Made in Italy” identification label especially valued by foreigners. Other dangers await the settlers. It is worth remembering that migrants to the West often find themselves in a “poverty trap” due to insufficient funds to pay the costs associated with migration. Nevertheless, experts believe that a one percentage point increase in migrant influx relative to total employment increases output by almost 1% by the fifth year of the resettlement in a new place. The desire of South Asians to move to Western Europe may be due to the fact that in the case of immigration to countries with emerging markets and transition societies, such a positive impact of labor productivity growth is not observed, primarily due to the difficulties of adapting to the conditions of local markets of underdeveloped countries. Migration can also create problems in the area of income distribution in the host society, since in some segments of the labor market, local workers (or people from Eastern and Central Europe who have already settled down in Western Europe) may suffer material damage, at least temporarily. Modern migration and migration policy in Western European countries continue to be influenced by the experience of previous decades. Thus, post-war migration to Western Europe from the former colonies was structured both by centuries of experience in moving along the route of the colony-mother country, and by a significant demand for relatively inexpensive labor for the needs of modernizing the economies of Western European countries after World War II. And some former colonial powers, such as the Kingdom of the Netherlands, were engaged in the movement of labor from their eastern possessions (Indonesia) to South America (Suriname). Historical memory is also invisibly present in the migration policy of France. So, in the 30s, almost a third of the population of this country was in the status of migrants, mainly they were immigrants from the countries of Southern Europe. Memories of the past, coupled with the migratory consequences of imperial existence, gave rise to the phenomenon of anti-immigrant political parties. The growth of the influence of the forces of anti-migrant populism was already observed in the 90s. Then the “National Front” quickly gained influence. As if responding to the challenge of anti-migrant populism, the right-wing government headed by E. Balladur is taking tough measures to limit the migration flow to the maximum and minimize emigration for political reasons. Subsequently, migration reforms were somewhat relaxed, but entry into France was strictly controlled, and the labor market was tightly regulated. The authorities of another colonial empire, Great Britain, acted in approximately the same way, pursuing a liberal line in relation to highly qualified migrants and implementing strict restrictive measures against refugees for political reasons. When assessing the prospects for resettlement of immigrants from India and other South Asian countries to Western European countries, it is necessary to take into account the EU factor, which has become a central element in building a new migration space in the unity of institutional rules for the movement of migrants and patterns of movement of peoples in the vastness of this integration association. It is important to keep in mind that migration is not a long-term solution to the demographic problems of the developed countries of Europe. It is assumed that most EU members, with the exception of France, Ireland and the United Kingdom, are doomed to a serious reduction in working-age populations in the coming decades. In addition, according to experts, labor markets in the EU countries are more inert and less flexible in relation to changing circumstances than in the US. Potential resettlers have to reckon with growing migration concerns in the EU's leading countries. At the same time, the attitude of receiving countries towards migration varies from country to country. Thus, in the countries of Southern Europe (Spain, Greece, Portugal), a “permissive” political culture that does not condemn migration is still influential. It is no coincidence that almost half of the migrants who have arrived in the EU since 2000 began their journey to Europe from Spain. However, even in Spain, new arrivals are viewed by public opinion not only as a socio-economic challenge, but also as a threat to cultural and ethnic identity. Since the early 1990s, the UK has been implementing a policy aimed at limiting the number of refugees and migrants as much as possible. Sometimes the authorities of the United Kingdom resort to frankly everyday motivation for their anti-migration actions, referring to the aggravation of the housing problem and the growth of social tension in London and southeast England. Nevertheless, the UK remains one of the preferred destinations for migration to Western Europe. Moreover, the very policy of the Western European states remains contradictory. On the one hand, the desire to appease public opinion results in uncompromising rhetoric against irregular migration. On the other hand, the desire to attract the skilled labor force necessary for the economy dictates an emphasis on the temporary nature of migration, which does not imply the granting of citizenship or residence permits. Nevertheless, since 2002, the number of people entering the EU has been an impressive figure - from 1.5 million to 2 million people. In other words, the conflict between the principles of the functioning of the nation-state and the guiding principles of multiculturalism defended by the settlers (as a method of managing interethnic relations in the host society) is becoming an integral part of the political development of many European countries. From now on, the confrontation between the principles of assimilation and multiculturalism becomes the axis of the entire socio-political development of the West. Until recently, multiculturalism had a strong influence on the attitude towards migrants in the Scandinavian countries, while assimilation has become clear in Greece, Austria, Poland, and Hungary. However, within the EU, the “multicultural consensus” is being increasingly tested for strength, in particular in Sweden. Similar trends are observed in the UK, France and the Netherlands. The sheer number of migrants can sometimes be misleading. Thus, the largest number of immigrants is recorded in large countries (Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom), while their highest proportions are noted in small states (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland), which has an inevitable projection on the sphere of political relations. In addition, many countries do not keep statistics on the religious affiliation of the population, which is done in the name of the sacred principles of secularism. However, the situation is starting to change. Thus, in the UK in 2001, they began to take into account the confessional identity of the population, primarily to control migration flows from India and South Asia. At the same time, in the censuses in France and Germany, religious affiliation is not yet recorded. By the ratio of the principles of multiculturalism and assimilation, it is customary to single out several groups of European states. States that do not officially recognize the fact of multiculturalism (Germany, France, Greece, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Ireland). At the same time, Italy, Finland, Germany, and Ireland practice bilingualism in relation to compact national minorities that have been living in these countries since ancient times. This principle does not apply to migrants. States that have delegated “linguistic powers” to several languages (Spain, Switzerland, Belgium). The envisaged status for French and Flemish in Belgium and the similar legal status for Catalan and Basque in Spain are intended to stop separatist tendencies in these societies and do not apply to the linguistic means of communication of migrants. States where multiculturalism has historically existed (United Kingdom, comprising England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), but its principles do not apply to migrants. States with a detailed policy towards migrants on a secular basis (Sweden, Norway), which is subjected to extensive criticism by various socio-political forces. States that initially accepted multiculturalism but subsequently rejected it (Netherlands). On the one hand, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the largest centers of multiculturalism, special services for helping migrants have been preserved. On the other hand, the main socio-political forces of the country and the parties expressing their interests are strongly opposed to further external migration, and not only from the “global South”. The attitude towards the principles of assimilation and multiculturalism is also manifested in the life attitudes and practical activities of various social forces. Thus, liberals and social democrats prefer the discourse of multiculturalism, while conservatives present themselves as the guardians of the values of the nation-state, Christian ethics and national culture. However, the above dichotomy acquires important clarifying characteristics and nuances when the analysis program includes the contradictory position of trade unions, on the one hand, belonging to the left side of the political spectrum, and on the other hand, forced by the logic of internal political development to counteract the migration of foreign labor and the adaptation of migrants in the host country. The attitude towards migration of the business community, conservative in its cultural orientations and attitudes, and at the same time interested in the import of foreign labor as a factor in “compensating” the insufficient demographic potential of an “aging society” and an instrument of economic growth within a particular Western European country, is also distinguished by a considerable originality. The initial unfriendly reaction of the local population to the new arrivals was dictated by fears of an exclusively economic nature, that is, the unwillingness to financially support migrants. Settlers were not then seen as a threat to national culture and national identity. However, as refugees settled in a new place, their families increased, religious buildings were built, and European politics were actively involved, the attitude of Europeans towards migrants began to change. The “clash of civilizations” (SP Huntington) in Europe intensified. The “racial riots” of 1958 in Great Britain can be considered the historical starting point for the escalation of conflicts on a civilizational basis. In this country, most migrants had the status of subjects of the British Empire, which definitely facilitated their entry into the arena of political life. Race remained at the heart of the issue of multiculturalism in the UK until at least the late 1990s. At first, no serious significance was attached to the factor of religion as a fundamentally different model of behavior in Western Europe. The spread of Islamist radicalism and terrorism, rooted, as some politicians now argue, in the Islamic value system, has become a kind of watershed. The essence of their ideas boils down to the fact that Islam is allegedly in a state of “permanent war” with the West in general and with Christianity and democracy in particular. This kind of sentiment is supported by a part of the Western European press, which regularly publishes anti-Islamic stories coming from the Middle East and Central Asia. Shifts in the positions of political parties in Western European countries on migration issues can be summarized as follows:  - there is a strengthening of the motives of national culture, the principles of assimilation and loyalty to European political values; - control over migration processes is being tightened, including increased attention to political refugees;  - the “horizontal” interaction of the migration authorities of the interested European countries in the field of control over the movement of foreigners to the EU countries is being strengthened;  - there is an actual refusal of the political elites of Western Europe from the principles of multiculturalism, as well as from the concept of "universal values";  - attempts are being made to introduce “rational” (that is, deliberately complicated) concepts of migration policy into the life of the EU countries;  - organizational resources and political powers of organizations supervising migration processes are increasing.  Such steps by the Western European elites, which do not formally abolish the principles of racial equality and the practice of religious rites by migrants, actually exclude the further development of the principles of multiculturalism. The situation of migrants is also complicated by the unwillingness of orthodox Muslim activists to compromise with the authorities of the host country in the sphere of religious rites, which undermines the position of supporters of multiculturalism in Western Europe. In the current conditions, militant opponents of multiculturalism are turning for support not only to Western European lumpen and outcasts, but also to a significant part of the middle class and anti-migrant parties that advocate Christian values. For their part, members of the Muslim community believe that the "war against terror" in the West, started in 2001, has escalated into a "war against Islam." In the smaller EU countries, fears of being “absorbed” by a foreign culture are constantly fueling radical, anti-immigrant sentiments.  It can be assumed that the events of the beginning of this century (September 11, 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorist attacks in the countries of Western and Southern Europe, etc.), as well as the European migration crisis of 2015–2016 laid the foundation for shifts in the public consciousness of the population of the EU leaders that are unfavorable for migrants. The dominance of multiculturalism was replaced by the idea of the nation-state as a community bound by the unity of interests and the norms of Christian culture. At present, in the broad sections of the population of Western Europe, the idea of the ongoing erosion of the fundamental principles of the life of society, which undermines its integrity, is being strengthened. In the current reality, even highly educated migrants are beginning to be seen as a threat to the national unity of society. Such mindsets are constantly fueled by the systemic economic crisis, which calls into question the once stable notions of multiculturalism as a force capable of simultaneously ensuring the prosperity and security of Western society. CURRENT TRENDS IN MIGRATION FROM SOUTH ASIA TO THE EU The migration crisis of 2015–2016 turned the problem of migration into a central political issue in the internal life of the leading Western European countries. In the new conditions, socio-political forces and parties that advocate tough restrictive measures against the influx of migrants of other cultures into the EU receive more and more significant support in the new conditions. However, the resettlement of immigrants from South Asian countries to Western Europe continues, which is confirmed by the example of the Netherlands and Italy. Migration from India and other South Asian countries to these two countries is mostly “productive” in nature: for the Netherlands, an influx of quality labor in the information technology sector is important, while Italy needs a “demographic dividend” in the agro-industrial complex. In the Netherlands, where there is a need for qualified personnel for a rapidly growing information technology cluster, educated migrants from India have benefited from the liberalization of migration policy in important segments of the economy. True, in this country, a kind of Damocles sword is suspended over the problem of migration: the murder of film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a native of North Africa stimulated the growth of anti-migrant sentiment in the Netherlands, which traditionally had a reputation as a “home of tolerance”. Note that the need for skilled workers in the Netherlands is higher than the EU average (by 10%). Here, as in other countries of Western Europe (primarily in the UK), expat Indians represent the most dynamically growing group of migrants. In the Netherlands, this community includes workers with the necessary professional training in the fields of information technology, consulting services, engineering, and enterprise personnel management. Significant Indian migration to the Netherlands began in the 1980s. By the beginning of the 2010s, about 22 thousand Indians lived in the country (compared to 9 thousand in 1996). The Kingdom attracts Indian migrants, first of all, with a favorable living environment, a high standard of living, the widespread use of the English language in the country, a tolerant attitude towards foreigners, etc.  Young educated Indians find themselves in the Netherlands in several ways. In addition to the traditional recruitment practices of Dutch companies, the factor of expanding the activities of Indian companies in the kingdom is becoming increasingly important. Thus, currently more than 200 companies from India, mainly from the information technology sector, are active in this country. It should be taken into account that the information technology sector, on the one hand, is a powerful driving force for economic growth in India, and on the other hand, this segment of the national economy accounts for more than 45% of all exports of services from India. Another way of delivering Indian labor to the Netherlands is the activity of transnational companies (TNCs) operating in the country, interested in attracting from India the profile workforce of the required quality. The reluctance of some Dutch people to perform certain types of activities in the information technology segment also plays a role. In this case, English-speaking and law-abiding Indians are perhaps the best candidates for high-paying positions in this sector. In other words, the Netherlands attracts skilled, expensive labor to the country, the price of which (as of the beginning of 2019) starts at 4.5 thousand euros per month and 3.2 thousand euros per month for people under 30 years old. In turn, the Italian economy is experiencing a need to increase the volume of dairy production, which opens up opportunities for the Indian labor force, primarily from the northern state of Punjab. Many migrants from India arrived in the Apennine peninsula without an accurate understanding of the nature of the Italian labor market and the peculiarities of Italian society. Some migrants have joined families of relatives who have already arrived in the EU. Arriving in the Apennines, Indian settlers from the Punjab countryside quickly adapted to northern Italy, an industrial zone that lacks quality labor for the agricultural sector. However, this was more a happy coincidence than the result of the successful functioning of the labor market due to the competent intervention of Italian government departments. Indian migrants have recently turned their attention to Italy. Thus, in 2003, the total number of Indian migrants to the Apennine Peninsula was fixed at around 35.5 thousand people, while by 2018 it had more than quadrupled to 151.7 thousand peoplef. As a result, India has now moved from 10th to 6th place in the list of the main “suppliers” of migrants to the EU countries (and to 5th place among non-EU countries). The configuration of the main concentrations of Indian immigrants to Italy has also become somewhat different. If in 2003 the Indians settled unevenly in the central subregions of northern Italy and in Rome, then at present the contours of settlement have become more dispersed: the Indians live mainly in ten provinces, and their largest concentration is in Brescia (14 thousand people per 200 thousand of the local population). Unlike the Netherlands, migration to Italy is often carried out on an unplanned basis - as a result of a situational shortage of labor in a particular segment of the labor market or as a situational reaction of the Italian migration system to migration flows from non-Western societies. It should be noted that in Italy the majority of Indians are engaged in low-skilled labor outside the agro-industrial complex, in particular in industry. In terms of the share of employment in this segment of the national economy, immigrants from India do not stand out among migrants who came from non-Western societies. The agricultural sector, being the area of activity of 28.6% (2016) of migrants, remains the main area for the application of labor skills for Indian migrants (24.1% of the total labor force from outside the EU countries). Even among self-employed workers who came from countries outside the EU, the share of Indians (7% in 2016) has increased almost sixfold since 2007. It should be noted that agriculture is a relatively small and ever-shrinking segment of the Italian economy, accounting for no more than 2% of the country's GDP and in which wages are only half of the total level in the national economy. However, when assessing the potential of the agro-industrial complex, nuances are important. Thus, with the declining role of agriculture, agricultural production in Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto tends to increase - not least due to the hard work of Indian immigrants. The dynamic dynamics of development in these regions is shown by dairy production. An illustrative example is Cremona (population - about 75 thousand people), the administrative center of the Italian province of the same name. The resettlement of Indians began in the first half of the 90s with the use of tourist visas. Dairy production in the region was affected by the technological modernization of this sector, which began in the 60s and sharply reduced the demand for labor in Italian agriculture. However, the reduction in the supply of labor in the dairy sector was so significant that it was necessary to attract skilled labor from abroad, and this was a historic opportunity for hardworking Punjabis. A particularly significant contribution of Indian migrants was to the preservation of the cheese industry in the province of Cremona. In other words, the traditions of working on the ground were in demand in the north of Italy, where climatic conditions and temperature conditions almost perfectly match those of the Punjabi. Finally, the hard work of the Indians, their willingness to work on weekends and holidays, as well as overtime, are invariably noted by Italian employers. However, the interest of Indians to work in Italy has its own practical reasons. On the one hand, overtime work allows you to earn up to 3 thousand euros per month, receiving part of the payment “in an envelope” (a procedure common in Italy). Thus, the total income increases, which allows not only to send part of the proceeds to Punjab, but also to invest in the future - to invest savings in various sectors of the Italian economy. On the other hand, living on farms at work allows Indians to avoid the vicissitudes of the housing market in Italy, including discrimination against newcomers. In addition, employers highly appreciate the role of family ties among Indians as a stimulant of productive work. It is significant that employers have a positive attitude towards such qualities of Indians as internal balance, punctuality in the performance of official duties, enthusiasm for work, and note their lower predisposition to conflicts (both with the employer and with colleagues), which favorably distinguishes Indians from, for example, Egyptians and Moroccans. However, it should be taken into account that the Punjabis are a historically formed community of high-quality labor force. Their qualifications are highly valued far beyond the borders of India, whose national economy clearly lacks professionally trained workers capable of performing modern production operations. European migration crisis in 2015–2016 made significant adjustments both to the routes of movement of immigrants, and to the intensity of the human flows themselves from the “global South” to the “historical North”. India and other countries of South Asia remain one of the main sources of migration activity in the world. The examples of the Netherlands and Italy show that there is a “demographic dividend” in the South Asia region that can be used to benefit economic growth and development in industrialized countries. Both the Dutch and the Italians use the services of India's competitive populations. This experience, perhaps, should be used by Russia, which is in need of importing a “demographic dividend”. However, it is advisable to remember that the Indian authorities, conducting relevant negotiations with the Russian leadership, offer labor with low qualification characteristics for export. Defending national interests in such a specific area of bilateral relations will contribute to a better understanding by the Indian side of our real needs in the import of human capital and will confirm Russia's serious attitude towards multidisciplinary cooperation with the "largest democracy in the world." 

As Russian troops withdraw from occupied Ukrainian villages and towns in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, the military, forensic experts, and the world media are being shown the extent of Russian war crimes. In the 21st century, the Kyiv suburb of Butscha takes on a creepy meaning that was set for Auschwitz in the 20th century. Since April 2022, "Butscha" has not only become synonymous with the planned systematic extermination of people because of their membership in the Ukrainian community, but has also served to expose the cynicism of European elites who, over the past two decades, have turned a blind eye to the nature of the Russian regime and the practices of modern Russian statehood. Bluff about "civilized country" and "threat from the West" In February 2007, before the expiration of the second (as it turned out, not the last, although the Constitution of the Russian Federation did not provide for this) presidential term, Vladimir Putin sharply criticized the unilateral power politics of the United States at the Munich Security Conference. He said that the use of force in international relations is possible only on the basis of the UN Charter. He insisted that energy sources must not be used as weapons or means of extortion against consumers. He promised to create a free and open market economy in Russia, primarily with the help of Germany. At the same time, Putin denied that the opposition in Russia is brutally repressed; he did not admit that the rights of people in Chechnya are systematically violated through torture, murder, and kidnapping; he denied involvement in the transfer of missile technology to Iran and support for its nuclear program. All of this gave the impression that Russia's leadership wants to build an open and democratic country that pursues responsible and predictable policies and is ready for profitable, multi-billion dollar economic cooperation with its European neighbors. In return, Putin wanted "very little." First, the transformation of NATO from a defense alliance into a political organization in which European countries would conduct their policies independently of the United States. This is because, according to Putin, it is the United States that, by stationing its troops on the territory of countries that became NATO members after 1991, is fomenting a threat to Russian sovereignty and tensions throughout Europe. Second, Putin did not want European states to make the development of relations with Russia dependent on their assessment of the democratic or authoritarian character of the Russian regime. His assistant Vladislav Surkov even invented a special term - "sovereign democracy" - to justify Putin's authoritarianism and seduce Europeans with the prospect of Russia's slow democratic "evolution". Respect, equal treatment and security: demands of an autocrat In short, Putin demanded respect, equal treatment, and security. Aren't these the same principles on which NATO and the EU are based! By successfully manipulating these values and profitable economic deals, Putin achieved his goals. By February 24, 2022, many European politicians either shared the opinion that Russia was trustworthy because it was developing and liberalizing economically. Or they argued that Russia had a reason for threats and a show of force to protect its borders from NATO expansion. Putin forced European governments to turn a blind eye to the murder of tens of thousands of Chechens in 1994-2007. He managed to avoid condemnation and punishment for open aggression against Georgia in 2008. Even in 2014, he managed to get France and Germany to recognize his role as a "peacemaker" in the self-created "Ukraine crisis" and the hybrid war in the Donbass. In fact, the facts indicated that Russia began to move toward autocracy when Putin came to power. However, it was not even a party autocracy as in China, which provided for internal competition and relied on an extensive network of technocratic managers who adopted Western standards in this way or another. Putin, as president, began to restore the vertical of the KGB - the Soviet secret police and intelligence service that throughout its history viewed the democratic world as an existential enemy and a target for destruction. As a KGB apprentice, he naturally wanted revenge for the collapse of the USSR, which he considered his defeat. When Putin promised to build democracy and a market economy in Russia, he was bluffing. His calculation was based on the idea of the instability and corruption of the European political and business elites, who, for the sake of high and stable profits, will be willing to justify the "excesses" of the authorities and the "weakness" of Russian civil society. Neglecting his country for a perfidious vision When Putin pointed to the threat posed by NATO, he sought only a justification at home for constantly increasing spending on the army and defense industry, while neglecting the modernization of social and transport infrastructure in most regions of Russia. In foreign relations, Putin rewarded leaders and governments that were slow to implement common goals within NATO or promoted their national interests as opposed to pan-European or U.S. interests. This may explain how politicians as diverse as Silvio Berlusconi, Nicolas Sarkozy, Gerhard Schröder, Robert Fico, and Viktor Orbán managed to build long-term alliance relationships with the Kremlin. Despite the shock over Russia's lies and crimes that accompanied the aggression against Ukraine, Putin continues to actively use the old bluff about "normal Russia" and threatens retaliation for violation of "Russian security," which means control over Ukrainian territories. Putin's bluff is his declaration of occupied Ukrainian territories as Russian and the corresponding threat to defend them with nuclear weapons. Russian troops are fleeing the Kherson and Donbass regions with no sign of preparation to use weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, if Putin has to choose between withdrawing from Crimea and risking losing everything in a nuclear confrontation, he will choose to withdraw and retain his power. This is because Crimea is the same "integral part" of Russia as Kherson and Kharkiv oblast, from which the Russians are withdrawing as a result of military defeats. Putin, however, could be heading down a dangerous path of escalation if voices continue to be raised in Europe that his conquests must be recognized by the conclusion of a cease-fire. The Kremlin's calls for a willingness to negotiate are aimed at spreading uncertainty among European leaders about Russia's goals. This maneuver is being carried out to force everyone to suddenly turn a blind eye to mass executions, torture camps, and the bombing of peaceful Ukrainian cities in order to sow doubt that Russia is waging a war aimed at destroying an entire European nation. Putin again offers to believe that secure relations with the Russia he leads are possible if his demands are heeded. If the debate in Europe is resumed according to the logic imposed by Putin, he will use all means of terror to divide the continent and within individual states into the camps of "uncompromising" and "moderate". And without solidarity in Europe, it will be much easier for Russia to continue the war with impunity and ruthlessness. Even far beyond Ukraine. Russia hybrid means to divide Europe.At stake is trade in oil, coal, and natural gas. Since early 2021, Russia's Gazprom refused to supply gas to Europe beyond contracted volumes, artificially contributing to stock market speculation and price increases. This had a painful impact on household spending on municipal services. It also led to higher consumer prices due to more expensive electricity generated by burning Russian gas and fuel oil. Against a backdrop of public discontent, Russian intelligence services mobilized the Russian diaspora into spectacular protests in Germany and the Czech Republic and put forward the thesis of the "harmfulness" of anti-Russian EU sanctions. And such actions have a political impact. In France, Marine Le Pen actively criticized the renunciation of Russian energy sources and promised to maintain the purchase of oil from Russia if elected. In Italy, the "Lega" and "Forza Italia!" parties, which became part of the governing coalition, also opposed sanctions that hurt Italian industry. In Germany, the opposition parties "Alternative for Germany" and "The Left" expressed even more open theses about the need for "understanding" with Russia, for the sake of energy sources. The Kremlin is watching such processes closely, and they convince it that such a policy of division will bring the desired results. Russian efforts will be especially dangerous this winter. The ideology of the "Russian world" and the myth of the "Great Victory".Every year since the attack on Ukraine in 2014, the Russian president has justified his aggressive policy of conquest on the basis of Russia's special historical mission. It consists in restoring historical justice - the borders of the Russian state, which should unite all bearers of "traditional Russian values." These are the Russian language, the Orthodox faith, education in the traditions of Russian culture and literature. The Kremlin calls this bizarre combination the ideology of the "Russian world." Considering the fact that the Russian diaspora is currently manifesting itself very actively throughout Europe, from Italy and Germany to Latvia and Finland, this creates, in the view of the Russian leadership, a sufficient legitimate reason to spread measures of direct and hybrid aggression against new countries. And Putin constantly talks about the inevitability of a "multipolar world" in which Russia will be one of the "poles". While the fate of Europe, in his opinion, will be ruined by excessive American influence. That is why he often refers to the Yalta Conference in 1945, which made Stalin's Russia the owner of half of the European continent, while the other half was controlled by the Allies led by the United States. In relations with Europe, Putin wants to see himself not only as a "veto player," the leader of a "great power" that belongs to a narrow circle of its peers (the United States and the PRC) that have a decisive influence on world politics, but as a hegemon. As the ruler of a victorious state to which the others are grateful for their security and existence. Therefore, despite the defeats in Ukraine, he continues to say, "We haven't really started it yet." Obviously, Hitler and Stalin could have said the same thing when they invaded and divided Poland in September 1939 and prepared for new conflicts. So far, this history has a slim chance of repeating itself. 

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak has announced that Russia’s production and exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) rose by almost 9% to around 33 million tonnes (c. 46 bcm) in 2022. Most of the Russian LNG was produced at the Yamal LNG project (c. 20 million tonnes), whose main shareholders include Russia’s Novatek (50.1%), France’s TotalEnergies (20%) and China’s CNPC (20%) and the Silk Road Fund (9.9%). Nearly 15 million tonnes from this project went to Europe (up 14% y-o-y), and around 5 million tonnes were shipped to China. In addition, more than 10 million tonnes were produced in the Gazprom-controlled Sakhalin-2 project in the Russian Far East, an increase of 2% year-on-year. The main customers for this gas were Japan (the Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi are shareholders in the project) and China. According to Chinese customs data, a total of 6.5 million tonnes of LNG were shipped to the PRC from Russia in 2022, up from 5.7 million tonnes a year earlier. LNG is also being produced in two small-scale projects in the Leningrad region in the Baltic Sea. The Novatek-owned Vysotsk terminal produced around 700,000 tonnes and the Gazprom-owned Portovaya LNG produced around 350,000 tonnes. Gas from both projects was supplied to the European market. The deputy prime minister also asserted that Russia intends to deliver on its ambitious plans to double its LNG production in the next few years, and increase its LNG exports to 100 million tonnes in 2030 as a result. This would be achieved mainly through the development of Arctic LNG projects, including the Novatek-owned Arctic LNG 2. This expansion has been promised even though Russian production may decline in 2023 due to planned maintenance work on two (out of four) Yamal LNG production lines. CommentarylLNG was the only Russian fuel whose supplies to Europe increased in 2022. Consequently, the importance of LNG has increased both with regard to Russia’s exports (LNG accounted for 25% of all Russian gas supplied to the EU) and the EU’s imports (less 20% of the EU’s total LNG imports).lIt will be very difficult, if possible at all, to realise Russia’s ambitious plans for a robust increase in LNG production in the years to come. Forecasts from the Russian Ministry of Energy published in May 2022 showed that LNG production will be much lower than previously assumed. Under the current baseline scenario, LNG exports are projected to reach almost 31 million tonnes in 2023 and 35.7 million tonnes in 2024, compared to the previous target of over 50 million tonnes. lAs a result of sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s LNG sector has been cut off from the Western technology and equipment which played a key role in the development of this sector. Many foreign companies (German, French, Spanish and others) have withdrawn from cooperation with Russia in this area; for example, one of the shareholders in Arctic LNG 2, France’s TotalEnergies (10%), has stopped investing in the project and started the process of completely withdrawing from the venture, which should be finalised in the first half of 2023. Nonetheless, the Russian authorities are insisting that they will manage to complete the construction of the first Arctic LNG 2 production line by December 2023 (about 90% of the work had already been done when the sanctions were introduced), and that the next two lines will also be put into operation according to the original schedule, that is, in 2024 and 2026. Leonid Mikhelson, the CEO of Novatek, has affirmed that the corporation has managed to purchase the necessary equipment by cooperating with companies from countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Russian companies are also working on developing their own gas liquefaction technologies. At present, these are inefficient (the production lines are capable of producing a maximum of 1 million tonnes per year) and often fail. It is unlikely that Russia will be able to fully replace Western technologies and equipment by circumventing the sanctions or developing its own solutions. Indeed, the effectiveness of such efforts so far proven to be limited.  

Russia has been at war with Ukraine for more than 10 months, with no end in sight and with just as little prospect for direct negotiations between the warring parties. These were last broken off mutually on 17 May 2022. Since then, there have been repeated calls in Germany, whether in opinion articles or open letters, for more diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities. Such calls were often combined with demands for the federal government to cease arms deliveries to Ukraine: when all is said and done, peace is achieved not with arms, but with a truce, the argument goes. And continuing the war with the already unrealistic goal of a Ukrainian victory and the recapture of all the territory occupied by Russia would only mean useless bloodshed. These calls are all too understandable given the horrific images of suffering and destruction that reach us daily from Ukraine. Even so, it would be wrong right now to urge Ukraine to negotiate – or even give up parts of its territory and the people living there. Surely, no one wants the guns to go silent more than the Ukrainians themselves. They are the victims of this war. It is their hospitals, kindergartens and schools that have been destroyed by Russian missiles and drone attacks. Many have lost their homes. When the air raid sirens sound, it is they who sit in the shelters and who go without heating, electricity or running water, often for hours or days on end. The exact number of soldiers who have died at the front is unknown; US estimates put the count at up to 100,000. And yet, the Ukrainian government wants to continue the fight against the Russian aggressor – and only negotiate directly with Russia if and when the Kremlin first answers for its war crimes before an international tribunal and withdraws all troops from Ukraine, including from the illegally annexed areas. In this,  the government is supported by the vast majority of the Ukrainian population.Putin wants total control of UkraineIt is clear to the Ukrainians that the Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in finding a way for a secure coexistence with a sovereign and independent Ukraine that can determine its own future.  He wants it gone. In his view, today's Ukraine is nothing more than a ‘colony with a puppet regime’, an externally controlled and hostile ‘anti-Russia’, set up against the ‘real cultural, economic and social interests of the people and the true sovereignty of Ukraine’. For Putin, Ukraine and Russia are ‘one people’.  A Ukraine that is independent of Russia and wants to open up to Europe along the lines of its central European neighbours is unacceptable because it calls into question the very foundations of the Russian imperium, which Putin is determined to prevent from falling apart. The repeatedly expressed assumptions that Russia is ultimately only concerned with preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, or only has geographic interests in the Donbas, are wrong. In truth, Moscow wants Ukraine to relinquish much more: its freedom, its identity, its self-determination, its culture. The destruction of Ukrainian life, Ukrainian art and Ukrainian statehood, together with repressions – from murder to rape to abduction – in the occupied territories are clear demonstrations of this. So far, there is no reason to believe that Putin's thinking has changed in recent months. On the contrary, with every further step, Putin makes clear that he is not ready to make concessions. Although he and other members of the Russian government regularly mention the word ‘negotiations’, they have so far not presented a concrete option. As recently as the end of December 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeated the call for the ‘demilitarisation and denazification’ of Ukraine and described the illegally annexed areas of Ukraine as Russia’s ’new territories’. Clearly, Putin has not abandoned his goal of complete political control over the country but has merely adjusted his approach and timeline. Because Russia was not militarily successful, the devastating airstrikes on the Ukrainian civilian population and the energy infrastructure are now intended to break the population's will to resist and to wear down the country – until Russia is able to launch a new offensive in the spring. Putin is also counting on the fact that the western supporter states – also under pressure from their populations – will soon tire and run out of weapons, ammunition and money for Kyiv. If the West were now to press for a ceasefire or peace negotiations, perhaps with the threat that it would otherwise end support for Ukraine, that would signal to the Kremlin that its method is working and that all it has to do is wait until we lose patience. So far, none of the advocates of an imminent ceasefire have been able to convincingly explain how Putin can be persuaded to make concessions without exerting further military pressure on him.Preventing Russia from dictating peaceWe Germans, in particular, have for years been repeating the mantra that ‘there is no military solution’ to this or that conflict. Unlike Vladimir Putin: in Georgia, the Crimea and Syria, he has learned that he can very successfully use military force to achieve his political goals. In the current conflict, therefore, only Ukraine's military successes prevent such a dictated peace from happening. In other words, Russia must first be stopped and pushed back militarily before there can be any chance of real diplomacy. It's about enabling Ukraine to hold its own against the Russian invasion and showing Putin that even a new military offensive in the spring has no chance of succeeding – and that this won't change over time. The West itself has a paramount interest in Putin not making any gain from his war of aggression. His ambitions are a danger to all of Europe. If he gets away again with using force and nuclear blackmail to bring parts of another state under his control, this invites repetition elsewhere, be it by Russia or another state. The goal of an overall revision of the European security order, which is essential for peace and prosperity also here in Germany, was announced by Russia in the treaty texts of December 2021. The decision by Germany, the US and France to now also supply Ukraine with armoured personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles is therefore logical. It emphasises that the major military powers of the West will not force Ukraine into an unacceptable deal with Russia.  Of course, the danger of escalation must always be kept in mind when providing military support. However, the reactions after missiles fell on the Polish-Ukrainian border in particular has shown that the West is aware of this and is reacting prudently and is capable of risk management. Real negotiations will only begin again when both Russia and Ukraine come to the conclusion that there is more to be gained from a truce than from fighting on. Perhaps the cards will be reshuffled after spring — if the ’hot autumn’ and the ’winter of fury’ in Europe fail to materialise, if the western democracies continue to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine and if a new Russian offensive proves unsuccessful. What is certain is that any negotiations and compromises will reflect the resulting balance of power between the parties. Our goal must therefore be to get Ukraine ready as well as possible for this point in time and to prepare together with Kyiv for the moment when the window for diplomacy indeed opens.

Emmanuel Macron has just completed a state visit to the United States of which everyone, both on the American and French side, is pleased with the success. In the entourage of the French president, it is put forward that it was a state visit, therefore of primary importance in the protocol order. France also highlights that this was the first state visit by a foreign head of state to the United States since Biden's election, demonstrating the good relationship between the United States and France. . But it is always embarrassing to note that European countries systematically boast of being Washington's favorite, when the United States never boasts of maintaining good relations with a European country. This testifies to a recognition, on the part of Washington, of the peripheral status of European countries in relation to the United States. Sumptuous dinner in the gardens of the White House, successful visit to New Orleans to highlight the French-speaking world, celebration of unity against Russia in Ukraine… Some unfortunate subjects were nevertheless on the program, particularly on the economic level. . There was indeed talk of the US plan called the Inflation Reduction Act amounting to 370 billion dollars aimed at supporting the greening of the US economy, which, in the words of Emmanuel Macron, is “hyper-aggressive”. We can only be pleased that the United States is greening its economy. Moreover, at first, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen congratulated the United States for embarking on such a plan. But very quickly, France, Germany and European countries in general realized that this plan risked having extremely negative consequences on a European industry already in bad shape. Indeed, industrialists, regardless of their nationality, can recover up to 40% of their investment if they invest in the United States or in countries that have free trade agreements with them, namely Mexico. and Canada. The great fear of Europeans, exacerbated by the fact that the continent is already experiencing an economic crisis due to rising energy costs, inflation and an industry that is generally not doing very well, rests on the fact that American industrialists present in Europe can return to the United States to benefit from this aid, and even more so that European industrialists drop their investments in Europe to direct them to the United States. Some big names in European industry, particularly Germany, have already threatened to do so, also because of the extremely attractive cost of energy in the United States. Emmanuel Macron made very strong statements on this subject before his visit. This would have, according to him, allowed him to be heard by the American president. Heard okay, but not sure he was listened to. Joe Biden has indeed said that the United States does not apologize, that he does not apologize. He made no concessions to the demands of European politicians. Emmanuel Macron did not return with any tangible results. In the interview he gave to Le Parisien on Sunday December 4 on the plane that brought him back to Paris, Emmanuel Macron declared that American officials had told him that their objective was not to weaken European industry. If the goal is not this, it could be the result. Let's hope that this trip will have at least made it possible to awaken European consciences in the face of this danger for their economies. Once again, Europeans are lagging behind American decisions. Emmanuel Macron declared that for the moment no European voice had been raised against this American law. He is right, but we must now take action and not be content with good words, as was the case after the AUKUS affair. Joe Biden then assured Macron during a reconciliation meeting in Rome that the Americans would not do it again. France, which had recalled its ambassador to Washington, then sent him back. Not much had happened then. France and Europe cannot simply be satisfied with comforting, even anesthetic words from the Americans if they are not accompanied by concrete gestures and positive results. In reality, the United States defends its national interests, they are right to do so. Not acting in the same way, because divided and paralyzed, it is the Europeans who are at fault. There is not a “Buy European Act” like there is a Buy American Act. China on the one hand, the United States on the other really defend their interests, Europe does not. When France evokes the idea of defending the national interest against the United States, Paris is quickly accused of anti-Americanism. On the other hand, the United States is not accused of anti-Europeanism when it defends its national interest vis-à-vis Europe. Joe Biden is on the way to achieving what Donald Trump wanted to do, but he is doing it slowly. Donald Trump banged on the table, threatened and insulted, Joe Biden speaks in a soft and calm voice and assures Europeans of his friendship. We have often heard that it is time to get out of naivety about Russia or China. It may also be time to do it with regard to the United States because through such legislation they are not treating Europe as an ally. If the transatlantic strategic alliance is undeniable, especially in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the relationship remains, from a commercial and economic point of view, a competition. With this plan, this competition is no longer quite fair from the United States. It is essential to be aware of this in Europe. From a strategic point of view, the Europeans are paralyzed by the Russian military threat, they think that only the United States can defend them against this threat and that it is worth some concessions. But in fact, there is no major Russian military threat to European Union member countries. Indeed, Russia is proving unable to conquer the Donbass as a whole, and fails to control the territories it has illegally annexed. This makes the prospect of an attack on Western Europe difficult to envisage. The Russian military threat is therefore certainly to be put into perspective. It is not a question of doing so regarding the aggressive intentions of Vladimir Putin, but of measuring this threat from a capability point of view. If this military threat is more supposed than real, then this does not imply neglecting European economic and commercial interests to benefit from American protection. Emmanuel Macron therefore issued a warning cry. Now we have to take action.

Last week’s decision by the governments of Germany and France to postpone their joint biannual Cabinet meeting sent waves of comments about the future of the bilateral partnership.Some media in both countries even went as far as predicting the possible demise of French-German cooperation. Yet, at the same time, they largely ignored that President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Olaf Scholz will still meet this Wednesday, over a working lunch aimed precisely at dispelling misunderstandings between the two parties.In the midst of the confusion and the perplexity that have followed the postponement of the Cabinet meeting, it would be futile to deny problems in today’s relations between Germany and France. Too many grievances have been aired recently between the two capitals to pretend that all is fine. But are we really witnessing the chronicle of a death foretold or is it more a partnership in need of profound revision?For many observers, the piling up in the last months of diverging views between the two nations in so many areas—defense projects, the gas price ceiling, the sub-Mediterranean pipeline, state subsidies to enterprises, Chinese investments in Europe—has not only brought the cooperation between Berlin and Paris to a standstill, as illustrated by the postponed Cabinet meeting; it has also epitomized the vulnerability of a partnership that critics say has lost its efficiency and perhaps its purpose.According to these same commentators, the belief in necessary and useful French-German cooperation should be questioned when a new balance of power is emerging inside an enlarged EU and at a time when Germany itself is experiencing major changes in the very foundations of its economy and foreign policy.With a fundamentally transformed Europe comes the perception of a Franco-German partnership that is structurally flawed and increasingly outdated.Naturally, official voices on both sides of the Rhine are contesting this interpretation. And some well-versed commentators on French-German politics are quick to underline that relations between Paris and Berlin have never been a smooth affair.The coming into office of new governments alternatively in each capital has traditionally brought laborious periods of adjustment. Today, the so-called traffic light coalition in Germany is no exception and requires time to adapt.More substantially, deep divergences in the two countries’ interests have been there from the start. In fact, they are at the heart of the Franco-German partnership and can even be considered its raison d’être. It is precisely because former French president Charles de Gaulle and then German chancellor Konrad Adenauer understood early on the depth of divergences in their national interests that they decided in 1963 to work on an enduring partnership.From the opposition over the completion of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy to the birth of the euro or the new voting rights that favored Germany, the European integration process has seen Paris and Berlin overcoming time and again their deep-rooted differences to shape bilateral compromises that could be endorsed by all European states.If anything, the existential merit of the Franco-German partnership has been precisely to understand that the diverging interests between the two countries usually embodied the overall substance of the discussion at the European level.Agreements between Berlin and Paris therefore paved the way to solutions acceptable to all European partners. No doubt this prominence has stirred complaints from union members but, when faced with a collapse of French-German collaboration, the same members were the first ones to call for fence-mending between the two countries.This contribution of the Franco-German partnership to the EU’s progress still stands the test of time. Additionally, the enlarged EU has little to do with the reasons behind today’s grudges between Paris and Berlin.If there is one major complaint addressed in Paris to the Scholz government, it is that of a selfish Germany displaying too little solidarity for its EU partners.As for the criticisms addressed to France, they seem equally to blame French traditional eagerness to lead defense projects and distance Europe from U.S. leadership.So, what is missing today in the collaboration between Berlin and Paris that can explain that feeling of under-delivery? Perhaps it is the more substantial and free-flowing conversation at all levels of state institutions to build a deeper understanding between the two sides.Contacts at the highest political level are indispensable, but they are not enough to get messages through and have decisions implemented. More efficient working methods need to be applied with team leaders appointed on specific cooperation projects to keep them under constant review and deliver tangible results according to plans.At the same time, France and Germany should pay more attention to their Central and Eastern European partners’ concerns and misgivings. For that purpose, the Weimar Triangle—a format between France, Germany, and Poland—could be more often used and eventually enlarged.Accusations of “Franco-German imperialism” in some Eastern European capitals are exaggerated, but the misunderstanding they articulate must be heard.In the end, it is a revival of the partnership between France and German that is needed today—not a drifting apart of the two countries.