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Energy & Economics
concept background of US China trade war banknotes on chess board

Trade wars undermine multilateralism, fuel market volatility, and create uncertainty

by Armando Alvares Garcia Júnior

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Trump escalates his trade war rhetoric and has just begun his second term. In response to the Colombian government's protest over the conditions of its citizens' deportation, the 47th U.S. president retaliated with a furious announcement of a 25% tariff hike, forcing Petro to withdraw his demands. Against Canada and Mexico, his neighbors and trade partners, he has just signed another 25% tariff increase. The reasons? According to Trump, their borders are a sieve for drugs and illegal immigrants. As for China, he has so far imposed a 10% tariff, though his campaign promise was 60%. In the 21st century, trade wars are one of the most controversial strategic tools in international relations. The Economy: A Geostrategic Factor Tariffs have historically been used to protect local industries and balance trade deficits. However, their current use goes beyond their original purpose. These policies have transformed global economic dynamics, reshaping supply chains and markets, and profoundly impacting geopolitical, social, and financial structures. Competitiveness and Technological Strength The contemporary use of trade wars follows a more complex and multifaceted logic. In the case of the United States, for example, the tariffs imposed by recent administrations have aimed both to limit China’s competitiveness and to preserve U.S. technological and economic supremacy. This strategy, however, is not limited to a bilateral confrontation. The United States has also imposed trade barriers on traditional partners such as the European Union and Canada. As a result, traditional alliances have become secondary to the unilateral goal of maximizing profits. This policy has been justified under national security arguments, a legal tool that has generated tensions within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and challenges the principles of non-discrimination and multilateralism that have underpinned the global trade system since the mid-20th century. The impact of these policies affects both intergovernmental relations and, directly, consumers and producers. Tariffs and the Domestic Economy The implementation of tariffs on products from China, such as technological goods and manufactured equipment, has driven up their prices in markets like the United States. As always happens when goods become more expensive, this has especially harmed the most vulnerable sectors of the population by exacerbating economic inequalities and reducing their purchasing power. To maintain competitiveness, many companies have opted to relocate their operations to countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, or Mexico, which entails transition and adaptation costs. Regionalization against Protectionism At a global level, trade wars have triggered a phenomenon of regionalization, leading to the creation of agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), led by China and signed by countries in Asia and Oceania, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which includes nations from the Pacific coasts of Asia and Latin America. Through these agreements, the signatory countries seek to counteract the effects of U.S. protectionist policies. Since 2019, the United States has blocked the appointment of new members to the WTO Appellate Body, weakening its ability to resolve disputes and increasing uncertainty, as well as the likelihood of escalating trade tensions. While regionalization forces a reassessment of the sustainability of the multilateral trade system, in this climate of instability and uncertainty, countries are searching for alternatives that ensure economic stability — though these solutions ultimately reinforce the fragmentation of global trade. Trade War and Geopolitics The impact of trade wars is also evident in the geopolitical sphere. The rivalry between the United States and China, driven in part by tariffs and technological restrictions, is redefining international alliances. On one hand, countries like Japan and South Korea have strengthened ties with the United States to counter China’s influence. On the other hand, emerging economies in Latin America, such as Mexico and Brazil, face pressure to align with one of these blocs, limiting their maneuverability and autonomy on the global stage. In Europe, tensions with the United States have led the European Union to prepare new tariffs and strengthen regulations to protect its strategic industries, such as the automotive and technology sectors. Uncertainty and Volatility While the imposition of tariffs can provide immediate benefits to the countries that implement them — whether in terms of tax revenue or political influence — their social and economic costs can be significant. Trade wars impact the flow of goods and services but also financial stability. Trade tensions increase stock market volatility, influence investment decisions, and weaken global economic growth prospects. The uncertainty generated by protectionism forces companies to adapt to an ever-changing and unpredictable environment. Trade wars have exposed the fragility of global supply chains, underscored the importance of diversifying production sources, and highlighted the need to strengthen multilateral institutions that promote fair and equitable trade. What to Do? The solution goes beyond simply removing tariffs or reversing protectionist policies; a more strategic and resilient approach is needed. This involves fostering international cooperation to address trade tensions, reforming the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanisms, and promoting the relocation of supply chains to more stable regions. Countries that impose tariffs must also consider the impact of these measures on households. Rising prices should prompt policies to mitigate growing social inequalities and protect the most vulnerable sectors. The trade wars of the 21st century reflect a complex balance between protecting national interests and preserving global stability. The key to progress lies in adopting a cooperative and sustainable approach that, beyond immediate economic benefits, also considers collective well-being and international cohesion in the medium and long term.

Defense & Security
Unite State, Russia ,china and Ukraine on chessboard. High quality photo

Opinion – Ukraine’s Future Is Not in Its Own Hands

by Mazlum Özkan

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

Defense & Security
Flag of Congo Democratic painted on the cracked wall with soldier shadow

Goma, the City on the Volcano

by Nikita Panin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In January 2002, the city of Goma, located in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, lay in ruins. The cause was not the Great African War,[1] which had been ravaging the country for several years. The war’s first rebellion had, in fact, started here in August 1998, when Banyamulenge-Tutsi fighters, led by a former ally of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila and backed by Rwanda (where Paul Kagame has ruled since the 1994 genocide), seized control of much of Congo’s resource-rich northeast. By early 2002, tensions were mounting between Rwanda and the Congolese Banyamulenge, while peace talks, facilitated by South Africa, were finally on the horizon. In January 2002, Goma—a city on Lake Kivu’s northern shore, at the foot of the Virunga Mountains—was still in rebel hands. But it also sat just 14 kilometers away from Nyiragongo, a volcano whose lava, low in silicates, moves fast—up to 100 km/h during an eruption. When Nyiragongo erupted, it took just hours for the lava to reach the city center, displacing over a million people and pushing the region toward yet another humanitarian disaster. The region teetered on the brink of it—yet again. Fast forward to January 2025, Goma once again made global headlines. This time, it was not because of a volcano, though the city’s situation did not look too different at first glance. On January 25–26, the M23 rebel group—born in 2012, partly from the remnants of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) that rebelled in 1998—launched a major offensive in North Kivu. Within days, they captured key locations in and around Goma, including Mount Goma, the airport and the TV station, though the city remained contested. The rebels also seized the nearby towns of Saké and Minova—both crucial for Goma’s supply lines—and started advancing into South Kivu, toward Bukavu, the provincial capital, and Nyabibwe, a key tin-mining site. Clashes led to a fire at Munzenze prison, allowing some 3,000 inmates to escape, adding to the chaos not only in the country’s northeast but also in the capital. On Tuesday, January 28, frustration over international inaction spilled onto the streets of Kinshasa, where mobs targeted embassies, including those of the U.S. and France. Any hope for de-escalation between the DRC and Rwanda now seems all but shattered: borders and embassies are shut, and most openly accuse Kigali of backing M23. Meanwhile, Rwanda remains under the firm grip of Paul Kagame, who was reelected in July 2024 for a fourth term with 99.15% of the vote—an election whose legitimacy, notably, did not raise many eyebrows in the West. Meanwhile, in Goma, early estimates suggest that one in five residents—out of a population of two million—has been forced to flee their homes, even before the conflict reached the current level of intensity. There is no electricity, and shortages of water, food and fuel are worsening, while UN humanitarian efforts appear to be scaling down rather than ramping up. Roots of the conflict The escalation in eastern DRC began long before alarming headlines started appearing in the media. But how far back do we go? Options are open and include: • 2022, when tensions steadily rose as M23 expanded its territorial control in eastern DRC;• 2021, when M23 resurfaced after its military defeat in 2013;• 2012, when M23 first emerged, reached its peak capturing Goma;• The Second Congo War (1998–2003), or even further back to the colonial era, when the ethnic dynamics that now fuel the conflict first took shape to complicate the current events. At this point, one might ask: who are the Banyamulenge and why are they closely linked to Rwanda? The answer lies in the history of the Lake Kivu region, home to multiple ethnic groups. Many of these groups can be classified under the broader linguistic umbrella of Kinyarwanda speakers—meaning they speak different variations of the same language and live not only in Kivu but also in Rwanda. Their core identity lies in ethnic categories such as Hutu, Tutsi or the lesser-known Twa. However, many other ethnic groups in eastern DRC do not see Kinyarwanda as autochthonous (indigenous), which fuels tensions and conflicts, both socially and politically. In response, Kinyarwanda-speaking communities have emphasized their Congolese, rather than Rwandan, identity by adopting local geographic names instead of ethnic labels. That is why we hear terms like Banyabwisha, Banyamasisi and Banyamulenge. Banyamulenge literally means “people from Mulenge,” a highland plateau in what is now South Kivu province. The issue of indigenous status is far from theoretical. On a practical level, perceptions of who is autochthonous and who is not dictate access to land, resources, and political rights and influence. And since power dynamics between ethnic groups in the region are constantly shifting—along with the broader political landscape in the country—so too are identity categories based on autochthony. For instance, the Hutu population in Goma often considers itself more “native” than the Tutsi. One reason for this is that Hutu and Tutsi were arriving in eastern DRC at different points in history: • The earliest waves of migration reached Kivu before the arrival of European colonizers (Germans and Belgians).• The second wave was engineered by colonial authorities, who sought loyal local administrators (such as the Banyamulenge) and a larger labor force for their plantation economy—since Kivu did not have enough workers.• Between 1959 and 1963, Rwanda was shaken by the “Wind of Destruction”—a revolution that overturned Belgian-backed Tutsi rule in Rwanda–Urundi and brought the Hutu to power in an independent republic. Thousands of Tutsis fled, settling in Kivu, where they became known as the “fifty-niners.”• Finally, after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when Hutu extremists turned their weapons against the Tutsi, the “defeated” Hutu (Banyarwanda) fled to eastern Congo, adding yet another layer of instability to the region. Over time, Congolese authorities treated different “waves of migrants from Rwanda” differently, adjusting their policies to fit the political expediency. They repeatedly changed citizenship laws, granting or stripping Kinyarwanda speakers of political rights. For example, a new law established 1885 as the official “cut-off date” for autochthony, effectively denying voting rights to most of the Banyamulenge—a decision that was enforced during the 1982 and 1987 elections. Unsurprisingly, this political and social exclusion created (and continues to create) fertile ground for mobilization and conflict under various pretexts. In the 1990s, for instance, many Congolese Tutsi, whose ambiguous citizenship status left them disconnected from Congo, joined Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took control of northern Rwanda and later ended the genocide by capturing Kigali. A few years later, the Banyamulenge threw their support behind Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), which helped Rwanda’s new government partially “resolve the issue” of Hutu refugees who had fled to Congo. After fleeing Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, many Hutu militants eventually rebranded themselves into the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The presence of both Hutu and Tutsi armed groups in eastern Congo effectively transplanted Rwanda’s ethnic conflict across the border. And both the Congolese and Rwandan governments found ways to manipulate this struggle to serve their own interests. This historical context is important to highlight the complex and often contradictory dynamics among the seemingly related ethnic groups living around Lake Kivu. The various ethnic communities in the area are fractured by competing interests, historical grievances and shifting alliances, with numerous armed factions operating on the ground. While Kinshasa and Kigali may view them as proxies, they fall short of full control over these groups, whose actions are often dictated by immediate gains and local rather than regional political interests. The Volcanic Republic On the other side of the border, in Rwanda, the notion of autochthony carries a different significance. Many Rwandans believe that a split of the Banyarwanda (“people from Rwanda” as opposed to Kinyarwanda, “people speaking Rwandese”) between two countries was a colonial construct, imposed by European powers, suggesting that borders in the region are quite artificial. A more extreme version of this narrative argues that Rwanda was historically much larger: “From a vast country that covered swathes of eastern Congo, southern Uganda and north-western Tanganyika, Rwanda became the tiny hill of Central Africa,” a perspective echoed by Rwanda’s formal President Pasteur Bizimungu in 1996. But this is more myth than reality as this claim oversimplifies history and ignores ethnic distinctions. More importantly, it fails to acknowledge that eastern Congo was never under a sustained Rwandan rule—neither before nor after colonization. Still, the idea of a “Greater Rwanda” breeds and fuels certain revanchist sentiments in some corners of Rwanda’s leadership. That is why many Congolese believe Rwanda is trying to carve out a “Volcanic Republic” (République des Volcans) in Kivu—a proxy state that would give it direct access to the region’s vast natural resources. Rebel leaders themselves reinforce these fears. For instance, Laurent Nkunda, leader of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)—a faction that split from the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) that rebelled in 1998 and maintains strong ties to Rwanda through Banyamulenge–Tutsi networks—argued: “If there had been no colonization, and thus the creation of totally new and artificial territorial entities in Africa, today’s Congo would never have existed for sure; but Bwisha would certainly be here as a transvolcanic province of ancient Rwanda.” Ultimately, this has for a long time contributed to both inter- and intra-ethnic tensions in the region, with shifting political, territorial or even personal allegiances of the groups. Who are the M23? To answer this question, we must once again trace the evolution of rebel groups in eastern DRC. During the First Congo War (1996–1997), Tutsi rebels, under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila[2] and with open support from Rwanda and Uganda, succeeded in toppling Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled since 1965 with support from the West. As the Cold War ended, Mobutu had outlived his usefulness by the 1990s, allowing Laurent-Désiré Kabila to take power. The problem was that many in Congo viewed Kabila as a Rwandan pawn. When he tried to shake off Kigali’s influence, the Second Congo War erupted (see above). Rwanda (and partly Uganda) responded by backing a new rebel group—the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)—which included Tutsi fighters. But when the war stalled, in part due to SADC’s military intervention led by South Africa, the RCD splintered. Its most powerful faction—RCD-Goma—held onto North and South Kivu, although Rwanda’s military remained the true power behind the scenes. In 2002, the Sun City Accords allowed Joseph, Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s son, to stay in power while granting RCD-Goma and the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), operating in northern Congo, formal status as legitimate political actors. As part of the deal, Rwandan and Ugandan troops withdrew from the DRC. By 2006, Joseph Kabila sought to consolidate his rule, but his 2007 election victory triggered clashes in Kinshasa with the MLC and a fresh Tutsi-led uprising in the east. This time, it was the Tutsi-dominated National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a faction that grew out of RCD-Goma. Neither Congolese troops nor UN peacekeepers could stop the CNDP’s advance. The rebels seized control of key mines and supply routes, though they ultimately failed to capture Goma—largely due to their lack of legitimacy and support locally. However, after a peace agreement reached between Kinshasa and the CNDP on March 23, 2009, the Congress formally transformed into a political party, while Joseph Kabila remained in power. In 2011, the CNDP suffered a crushing defeat in parliamentary elections, while Kabila retained the presidency, even as virtually all support for him in the east collapsed. Trying to preempt another rebellion, he decided to redeploy former CNDP fighters, who had by then been “integrated” into the Congolese army, away from the east. At the same time, he moved to arrest their leader, Bosco Ntaganda[3], who had been wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2006. This strategy backfired, triggering a new rebellion and the birth of M23, named after the peace deal of 2009, which they claimed Kinshasa had violated. M23 started out small (around 300 fighters in April 2012) compared to its predecessor, the CNDP, it quickly followed in its footsteps and even captured Goma in November 2012. However, this was a step too far for the international community, which quickly mobilized efforts to crush M23 militarily. By 2013, the group had suffered an irreversible defeat—or so it seemed at the time. Paradoxically, however, it was not military pressure alone that led to M23’s downfall. After years of continuous conflict, the rebel leaders—who had transitioned from the RCD to the CNDP and then to M23—had lost much of their political credibility. While they claimed to defend the interests of Congolese Tutsis and protect them from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—a Hutu militia hostile to Tutsis and Kigali—in reality, their real struggle was internal as they competed for power among themselves (M23 changed leadership just one month into the rebellion) and became ever more dependent on Rwanda’s direct military support, which further eroded their local legitimacy and claims to autochthony. Their rhetoric was highly populist, filled with calls for a nationwide revolution, but it failed to address the real concerns of Congolese Tutsis. Military control never translated into political support. By 2013, they were isolated and crushed. The remnants of M23 retreated over the border into Rwanda. With M23 collapsing, its factions splintered into local militias, losing any ideological pretence but continuing to operate along ethnic and materialist lines. The presence of a growing number of armed factions in eastern Congo as well as their constant fracturing is one of the reasons why the conflict has such a complex mosaic to it. Adding to the complexity are the Wazalendo (“patriots” in Swahili)—quasi-governmental militias, some of whom originated from the old Mai-Mai militias that once fought the CNDP. While they may oppose M23, they are far from a unified front. Instead, they operate independently, often pursuing economic interests not too dissimilar from those of M23 and expanding their political clout at the local level. Some of their leaders, too, have been hit with international sanctions. Rather than trying to rein the Wazalendo in, the government in Kinshasa has tolerated their presence, effectively militarizing governance in the country’s east—preferring to co-opt their influence rather than risk another line of conflict. When Goma fell in 2012, it forced the DRC government into something it is now desperate to avoid: direct negotiations with M23. The Kampala Dialogue dragged on for about a year, but it was hardly a real political process. By the time an agreement was reached—where M23 renounced rebellion and agreed to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate—the group had already been militarily defeated and was no longer a real negotiating force, nor was it a pollical actor. The retreat of M23’s remnants into Rwanda only reinforced Kinshasa’s stance: there was no point in talking to a fractured and disorganized rebel group with no clear political vision. If any real negotiations were needed, they had to be with Rwanda, not M23. The group’s main goal had always been controlling the resources and getting the rent—for its leaders, this was about profits, not politics. Even for ordinary M23 fighters, ideology often took a backseat to personal loyalty toward commanders they had known since the CNDP days or before. Volcanoes and minerals In May 2021, Nyiragongo erupted again. While this was just a coincidence, by November 2021, M23 had risen “from the ashes.” Crossing over from Rwanda, they returned to North Kivu, just as they had in 2012, and began their operations in Rutshuru—a town 30 kilometers from Rwanda, home to both Tutsis and Hutus (many of whom had settled there after the Rwandan genocide). Controlling Rutshuru is rather lucrative, as the region holds one of the world’s largest deposits of pyrochlore (a niobium oxide essential for electronics, aerospace, defense and other industries) as well as several gold mines. Without diving into the complex web of connections, it is worth noting that niobium/tantalum became Rwanda’s fifth-largest export in 2022—making it the ninth-largest exporter globally (accounting for 3.35% of global exports and surpassing the DRC’s less than 2%). Thanks to volcanic activity, the provinces on Lake Kivu are especially rich in highly sought-after minerals. North Kivu alone holds deposits of tantalum, cassiterite, cobalt, tungsten, gold, diamonds, tourmalines and pyrochlore. The problem, however, is that mining here is anything but transparent. Most extraction is artisanal, lacking proper environmental, safety or any oversight. The world’s growing demand for critical minerals is only making things worse in eastern DRC. The country relies on mining for 35–40% of its government revenue, and the mining sector is a key pillar of economic growth. However, agreements with Kinshasa do not always guarantee real access to resources. Even within a single province, competing power structures—provincial politicians, the Congolese military, local armed groups, and rebels proxy-linked to the neighbour country—can all contest control over mining sites. Rather than declining, illicit mineral exports—regardless of how they flow—have only increased in recent years, as global demand for these minerals surges and more competition kicks in. Eastern DRC has an estimated 2,500 mining sites—each one sustaining local armed groups and ensuring that the cycle of conflict remains unbroken. Since 2021, the EU and the U.S. have taken a much more proactive stance on critical minerals as new policies were introduced, partnerships with countries like the DRC and Rwanda have been strengthened, and steps have been taken to secure supply chains for critical raw materials while also developing a joint procurement platform. Around the same time, M23 made its comeback. While no direct causal link can be established, it can be suggested that close ties between the West and Rwanda have at the very least given Kigali the confidence to act without major international backlash. It is also probable that Rwanda indirectly controls eastern DRC’s resources through M23, since the group’s successes heavily depend on Rwandan military and logistical support. If these assumptions are correct, Western powers may well see Rwanda as a more reliable and predictable partner—one that could secure their resource interests in the region, something Kinshasa has failed to do for years due to its geographical and political detachment from the conflict zone. However, the situation is more complex than it seems. As M23 expands the territory under its control, it is not just gaining land—it is also increasing its ability to tax local populations. In late 2023, estimates suggested that M23 was collecting around $69,500 per month through various forms of taxation. This steady cash flow, combined with subsistence farming and local trade, actually sustains M23’s daily operations far more than mineral resources do. Extracting value from minerals is a slow, complex and difficult-to-control process, making it a less immediate source of funding for the rebels. So, while minerals are undeniably a catalyst for conflict and something that attracts both regional and global players, they are not the main factor keeping M23 alive. It would be a mistake to view it as the sole driving force behind instability. Even if access to resource extraction were cut off, M23 would still find ways to profit from controlling eastern DRC—which means the conflict in eastern DRC will persist regardless of changes in the resource trade. Why is the conflict exploding now? After its resurgence, M23 has been playing a long game, slowly building momentum for a decisive push. Until the right conditions were in place, they pushed forward assertively but carefully—avoiding an escalation that could bring the same level of international scrutiny as in 2012–2013, when it led to their defeat. In May 2022, M23 tested the waters near Goma but was repelled by the Congolese army and UN peacekeepers. A month later, in June, they triggered a “small-scale” humanitarian crisis at Uganda’s border by seizing the town of Bunagana, forcing thousands to flee—including Congolese soldiers. This move allowed them to control trade routes between Uganda and the DRC, giving them a stronger foothold. By February 2023, they had captured Mushaki and Rubaya, securing control over mines that produce nearly half of the DRC’s coltan output. And the more territory they controlled, the stronger their ranks grew. Meanwhile, there were several failed attempts at diplomacy. In April 2022, the Congolese government agreed to direct talks with several rebel groups in Nairobi, but nothing came of them. In July 2022, Angola attempted to broker a ceasefire, but violations by both sides rendered it ineffective. March 2023 saw new peace agreements, but these quickly collapsed, too. By December 2023, negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda had failed, further escalating tensions in Kivu. At the same time, public frustration with the perceived inaction of UN peacekeepers reached a boiling point. In August 2022, protests erupted in Goma and surrounding areas, targeting MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission deployed since 1999, by far the most costly in UN history. That same month, the East African Community (EAC) deployed a regional task force, but it was stationed in South Kivu rather than North Kivu, where the crisis was most acute. Their presence often led to M23 not being fully removed, but simply repositioning and sometimes coexisting with peacekeepers, as seen in Bunagana. Many locals viewed troops from Burundi and Kenya as little different from the “occupiers” from M23. In the end, the Congolese government demanded the withdrawal of the EAC contingent by December 2023. That same month, after repeated appeals from DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to withdraw MONUSCO from South Kivu and scale down its activities in other provinces. By the end of 2024, the mission was set to be fully dismantled. For M23, this was the perfect storm. The failures of international peacekeeping efforts, along with the stagnation and futility of negotiations—regardless of the mediators or external pressures on Rwanda and the DRC—ultimately played into M23’s hands. Though internal divisions persisted within the group, they understood that their window of opportunity was approaching. The arrival of SADC peacekeepers—who replaced the EAC forces—did little to change things. South Africa, the largest contributor, has been unwilling to fully commit. Public opinion largely views the casualties among South African troops as unjustifiable, while the country’s military is perceivably lacking the necessary preparedness for operations of such complexity, as is the case for eastern Congo. Throughout 2024, M23 laid all the groundwork to make their rapid advance on Goma possible in January 2025. In February 2024, they seized Shasha, a critical choke point controlling access to Goma’s supply routes. Around the same time, they came close to capturing Saké, which they fully took over in 2025—though sporadic shelling never ceased. By May 2024, half of Masisi Territory was under their control. Looking at the maps tracking M23’s territorial expansion compared to their 2012 peak when they first took Goma, it becomes painfully clear: their march toward Goma was never a question of ‘if’—only ‘when.’ Source: IPIS It appears that M23—and quite so Rwanda—have learned critical lessons from their 2013 defeat. Back then, as previously noted, the movement lacked both a political leader and a clear agenda, aside from an empty call for revolution across the DRC. Now, however, a major political figure has entered the scene: Corneille Nangaa has arrived in Goma, now under M23’s control. Formerly the head of the DRC’s National Electoral Commission, he was the one who validated Félix Tshisekedi’s contested victory in the 2018 elections. However, by 2023, tensions with Tshisekedi escalated, leading Nangaa to break ranks and align himself with M23. For the movement, he represents their first national-level political figure, unaffiliated with the Tutsi. Moreover, Nangaa has his own vision for the conflict: “In Congo, we have a non-state. Where all the armed groups have sprung up, it's because there’s no state. We want to recreate the state.” This suggests that the endgame for the current iteration of the conflict could be about securing political power in Kinshasa. This, in turn, echoes the dynamics of the First Congo War. Meanwhile, international mediators continue to flounder. Turkey has been dismissed, Angola’s peace talks have gone nowhere, South Africa has suffered reputational damage that led to tensions with Rwanda, and France’s shuttle diplomacy has achieved little. The EAC and SADC emergency summits continue, but this all with little coordination or tangible impact—each actor is seemingly pursuing their own interests, hoping for a chance of breakthrough. In stark contrast, M23 has moved with confidence and clarity, seeking solid control over eastern DRC and now willing to install an ally (at least) in Kinshasa.

Diplomacy
Toronto, Canada - Feb 04, 2025 - Trade War between Canada and United States of America

Trade War with the U.S.: How Trump’s Tariffs Are Reshaping Canada’s Political Landscape Ahead of Elections

by Dr. Maria V. Solyanova

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the arrival of the Donald Trump administration, trade relations between the United States and Canada have undergone significant changes, particularly in light of the introduction of new 25% tariffs on Canadian goods, including automotive products, steel, and aluminum. These measures are justified as a "national threat" due to migration and drugs [1]. In response, Canada imposed reciprocal measures worth $155 billion, affecting food products, alcohol, electric vehicles, and aerospace products [2]. Experts predict that these mutual restrictions could reduce Canada's GDP by 2.6%, while the U.S. GDP could decline by 1.6% [3]. Additionally, a revision of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is expected. The Trump administration intends to evaluate trade imbalances and their impact on jobs, which could lead to a shift from a trilateral agreement to bilateral agreements. Risks of this revision include tightening rules of origin for the automotive industry, pressuring Canada to open its dairy market, and using the USMCA as leverage to address border security and migration issues. There is also an expectation that the U.S. will attempt to include border security and military spending issues in trade negotiations [4]. Through these actions, the United States could push Canada toward closer dialogue with China, strengthening its role as an alternative market for Canadian resources and becoming another significant factor in the changing trade dynamics between the U.S. and Canada. In the midst of the trade war with the U.S., Canada was left without clear leadership due to the resignation of Justin Trudeau and the suspension of parliament until the end of March. Not only did this lead to a split within the Liberal Party, with its members simultaneously competing for leadership and attempting to formulate a response to the external threat, but the lack of a unified strategy also weakened the country's position in negotiations with the U.S. administration. Amid the crisis, the provinces took matters into their own hands, increasing pressure on Ottawa. The introduction of tariffs has caused a split between the provinces, whose economies depend on trade with the U.S. in different ways. Newfoundland Premier Andrew Furey called the tariffs an "existential threat" and demanded tough retaliatory measures, including sanctions on critical minerals important for the American industry [5]. Meanwhile, Ontario, home to the automotive industry, which accounts for about 25% of the province's GDP, is demanding an aggressive response from the federal government to the U.S. actions. Preparing for early elections, the province announced a $23 billion business relief package, as well as reciprocal tariffs on American goods, including alcohol and home appliances, setting a precedent for other regions [6]. Alberta, where oil and gas exports make up 68% of the economy, opposed the ban on shipments to the U.S. Premier Danielle Smith called such measures "harmful to Canadians" and urged targeted retaliatory actions, such as tariffs on goods from "red states" [7]. British Columbia and Quebec opted for symbolic sanctions. Premier David Eby, for instance, imposed a ban on alcohol imports from Republican states and announced a priority for Canadian goods in government procurement [8]. Quebec, whose aerospace industry is closely tied to the U.S., has so far limited itself to strong rhetoric. The conflict of interest also emerged in the issue of internal trade barriers. The Trudeau government announced plans to eliminate interprovincial trade barriers, which are said to reduce GDP by $130 billion annually [9]. However, provinces with developed agriculture (Manitoba, Saskatchewan) are blocking the liberalization of the meat market, while Ontario and Quebec are defending the retention of dairy quotas. Premier of Nova Scotia Tim Houston, as a symbol of this systemic issue, criticized the inability to "ship a bottle of wine across the provincial border" [10]. Interprovincial and intergovernmental escalation could strengthen Canadian regionalism. According to the "B.C. Economic Forecast", 25% tariffs could cost British Columbia 120,000 jobs, while Ontario would lose 200,000 [11]. This will likely lead to increased demands from regions for a redistribution of federal subsidies, becoming a factor that threatens the unity of the country. So far, provinces are acting separately, from Ontario’s push for infrastructure investments to British Columbia’s initiative to accelerate projects in remote regions. The federal government is facing criticism from opposition parties that are calling for more support for the population rather than businesses, warning of rising prices for food and fuel. The Conservatives and the New Democrats have responded decisively, urging immediate action to protect Canadian workers and industries from the impact of tariffs. Pierre Poilievre and Jagmeet Singh have demanded that the government implement protective measures, further intensifying the political discourse around trade and economic policy. While this situation risks deepening divisions between the federal and provincial governments, U.S. tariffs present an opportunity for political unity among parties that typically have differing views on trade. The immediate threat could force various factions within the Liberal Party to unite around a common strategy to combat U.S. trade aggression. This could strengthen Trudeau’s position, as he takes steps to address public concerns related to job losses and economic stability. However, the long-term consequences for Canada's domestic politics may extend beyond immediate economic issues. The tariffs have sparked noticeable public outrage in Canada. Many Canadians are bewildered by Trump’s actions, particularly given the historically close economic ties between the two countries. Canadians have begun to publicly express their displeasure, such as booing the U.S. national anthem at sporting events, which reflects deep frustration with Trump’s unilateral decision [12]. This reaction also indicates that American actions are perceived as an unfair attack on Canadian sovereignty and economic stability. A recent survey conducted by the Canadian Labour Congress revealed that a significant majority of Canadians (around 80%) believe that American tariffs will increase the cost of living in Canada and negatively affect relations with the U.S [13]. Nearly 90% of respondents support government investment plans aimed at strengthening the Canadian economy and protecting jobs from the adverse effects of these tariffs. In light of these events, a movement is growing among Canadians to prioritize domestic goods over American imports. Many citizens are actively seeking ways to support local businesses as a form of protest against Trump’s tariffs. Social media campaigns urging consumers to buy Canadian-made products are gaining momentum, and some citizens are even canceling plans to travel to the U.S. as a manifesto against American trade policies. If the government’s retaliatory measures do not yield favorable results or if they worsen the economic downturn, public discontent may intensify, leading to shifts in voter sentiment ahead of this year’s elections. Economic difficulties will turn into political challenges, as voters tend to hold the ruling parties responsible for perceived failures in managing trade relations. Moreover, as Canada reevaluates its trade strategies in light of the aggressive policies of the U.S., there may be calls for a more assertive approach to international trade agreements and partnerships outside the North American region, which could significantly alter the platforms of Canadian political parties. References [1] Imposing Duties To Address The Flow Of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border. The White House Official Website. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-duties-to-address-the-flow-of-illicit-drugs-across-our-national-border/[2] Canada responded with $155 billion in mirror measures affecting food, alcohol, electric vehicles and aerospace products. Experts predict that these mutual restrictions could reduce Canada's GDP by 2.6% and the U.S.'s by 1.6%. CTV News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/canada-to-slap-25-per-cent-tariff-on-155b-of-us-goods-after-trump-initiates-trade-war/[3] Trump’s 25% Tariff Threat: New Analysis Reveals Severe Economic Fallout for Both Canada and the U.S. Canadian Chamber of Commerce’s Business Data Lab (BDL). November 28, 2024. Available at: https://chamber.ca/news/trumps-25-tariff-threat-new-analysis-reveals-severe-economic-fallout-for-both-canada-and-the-u-s/[4] Experts React: Trump Just Slapped Tariffs On Mexico, Canada And China. What’s Next? Atlantic Council (признан нежелательной организацией в РФ). February 2, 2025. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-trump-just-slapped-tariffs-on-mexico-canada-and-china-whats-next/[5] Premiers decry Trump's tariffs, announce countermeasures and call for federal response. CBC News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/several-premiers-decry-trump-s-tariffs-and-call-for-powerful-canadian-response-1.7448301[6] As Trump's tariffs become a reality, Ontario's party leaders pitch plans to respond. CBC News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/trump-tariffs-ontario-party-leaders-respond-1.7448203[7] 'It doesn't need to happen': Trump's tariffs rattle Alberta. Calgary Herald. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/it-doesnt-need-to-happen-trumps-tariffs-rattle-alberta[8] Premier announces immediate response, vows to defend B.C. against Trump tariffs. Office of the Premier of British Columbia. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0014-000077[9] Lack of federal leadership hurts Canada’s response to Trump tariff threat. Policy Options. January 29, 2025. Available at: https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2025/foreign-relations-confusion/[10]‘Time to fix this’: Could the tariff threat bring down Canada's interprovincial trade barriers, once and for all? Financial Post. January 30, 2025. Available at: https://financialpost.com/news/economy/tariffs-bring-down-canada-interprovincial-trade-barriers[11] Premier announces immediate response, vows to defend B.C. against Trump tariffs. Office of the Premier of British Columbia. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0014-000077[12] Fans at Raptors game continue trend of booing US national anthem at pro sporting events in Canada. Asssociated Press. February 3, 2025. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/fans-boo-national-anthem-tariffs-canada-2c7210574c0373348870a94445814407[13] Canadians reject Trump’s tariff threats: New CLC poll. Canadian Labour Congress. January 23, 2025. Available at: https://canadianlabour.ca/canadians-reject-trumps-tariff-threats-new-clc-poll/

Defense & Security
Democratic Republic of the Congo flag on soldiers arm. Army, troops, military, Africa (collage).

Conflict in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo: New Reality

by Sergey Georgievich Karamaev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The conflict in the African Great Lakes region, which had long remained in a low-intensity state, flared up again in the second half of January 2025. In the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter – DRC), rebel forces of the anti-government group M23, fighting against the Armed Forces of the DRC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC), launched an offensive and captured new territories. As of January 27, M23 entered the city of Goma, the largest city in the province [1]. Moreover, the DRC authorities claim that the city is also occupied by regular units of the Rwandan Armed Forces [2]. The rebel offensive has triggered panic and an outflow of local residents as well as refugees – Goma had been a refuge for several hundred thousand displaced persons. There are casualties not only among civilians but also among the UN peacekeeping contingent (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO) and peacekeepers from the Southern African Development Community – Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SAMIDRC. The escalation of the conflict has been condemned by leading world powers and the United Nations – the UN Security Council has demanded an immediate ceasefire [3].  Rwanda plays a distinct role in these events. The Congolese rebel group M23 consists of ethnic Tutsis living in the DRC and aims to “ensure the rights of the Tutsi ethnic minority in the DRC” [4]. It was formed in 2012 and, after several military operations against government forces, ceased hostilities. However, in October 2022, M23 resumed military operations in North Kivu. The DRC government almost immediately accused Rwanda of fully supporting M23 — accusations that Rwanda has categorically denied and continues to deny to this day [5]. However, the United States and several European countries, citing intelligence reports, have openly stated that M23 is being used by Rwanda as a proxy force to conduct military operations in the eastern DRC [6]. The current fighting in North Kivu is a direct consequence of the failed attempt by the government of the Republic of Angola to mediate the peace process. The President of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, ran in the 2018 elections partly on a promise to achieve peace in the east of the country. However, throughout his time in office, he has failed to make any significant progress in this direction. In 2024, Angolan President João Lourenço proposed direct negotiations between the leaders of Rwanda and the DRC [7], which led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the two countries at the end of June 2024. However, further progress toward peace encountered a major obstacle: Tshisekedi categorically refused to recognize M23 as a participant in the negotiation process, stating that they are terrorists with whom direct dialogue is impossible [8]. Nevertheless, after a series of meetings between the foreign ministers of Angola, the DRC, and Rwanda, an agreement was reached that M23 representatives would still take part in the negotiations [9]. However, the trilateral summit in Luanda, scheduled for December 15, 2024, was canceled just days before it was set to take place. Both sides blamed each other for the meeting’s collapse [10]. As it now appears, the failed summit may have served as a starting point for M23's January offensive in North Kivu. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, Angola’s Foreign Minister, Téte António, during a working breakfast with members of the UN Security Council, called on the Council to continue its strong support for the negotiation process, effectively acknowledging that Angola’s efforts on this track had failed [11]. At the same time, Rwanda’s Foreign Minister, Olivier Nduhungirehe, speaking at the UN Security Council on counterterrorism issues, sharply criticized the DRC government, stating that “despite the direct and clear threat of terrorism, the DRC is trying to divert attention from addressing real problems” and accusing the DRC of distorting the actual situation in the east of the country [12]. Just days after these statements, M23 launched its offensive. It is important to note that the rebels launched their offensive well-prepared. As early as October 2024, reports emerged that revenue from the sale of minerals was bringing M23 at least $300 000 per month, which the rebels used to arm and equip their combat units. For more than a year, M23 has controlled mines in the Rubaya area of North Kivu — these deposits contain 15% of the world’s coltan reserves, a strategically critical mineral essential for high-tech industries [13]. At the same time, FARDC units stationed in the province suffered from supply shortages and demonstrated low combat readiness [14]. As a result, M23 forces rapidly broke through, capturing key cities in the province. Currently, M23 (and, as it is believed, the Rwandan army) has taken control of the cities of Sake and Goma — securing all key crossroads and roads in this part of North Kivu. Sake provides M23 with a route south to the Numbi mining region, which is rich in tin, tantalum, niobium, and tungsten [15]. If this region also falls to the rebels, the revenue from mineral extraction and sales will reach enormous levels, transforming M23 from a purely military force into a political power. Additionally, Goma is a port on Lake Kivu, and with access to watercraft, the rebels could launch amphibious operations anywhere along the northern shores of the lake, further expanding their controlled territory. The most enigmatic factor at the moment remains the behavior of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Since the start of M23's offensive on Goma, his administration has not issued a single official statement. The last time Kagame commented on the situation in North Kivu was during a press conference on January 9, where he expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would take a more thoughtful and balanced approach to the conflict, considering all influencing factors [16]. On January 26, 2025, Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press statement expressing deep concern over the renewed escalation and reaffirming its commitment to a political resolution [17]. Apart from this, there have been no high-level statements from Kigali. However, political experts from various countries unanimously agree that all Rwandan state institutions, particularly the armed forces, are under Kagame’s total control [18]. They assert that any involvement of the Rwandan military in the DRC conflict — whether confirmed or merely suspected — would be impossible without his direct order. The most likely assumption is that Rwandan President Paul Kagame has begun implementing his long-term strategy: creating a buffer zone in eastern DRC with the help of M23. This would not only push the border further away (currently, the distance from Kigali to the DRC border is 150 km) but also significantly improve Rwanda’s economic position. The buffer zone’s territory would provide Rwanda with abundant water, agricultural, and mineral resources [19]. Moreover, such a buffer zone would give Kagame additional leverage in future negotiations, as the territories occupied by M23 would be directly linked to the political resolution of the conflict. A new territorial reality has already been established in eastern DRC. For Angolan President João Lourenço, this is a highly unfavorable outcome — his bid to become a regional peacemaker has failed [20]. One possible reason for Lourenço’s failure is the loss of U.S. interest in the DRC conflict at the end of 2024. As some analysts suggest, “Once Washington stopped applying pressure, Rwanda realized there was nothing to fear and withdrew from the negotiation process” [21]. Now, the task of translating this territorial reality into diplomatic and political terms has been taken up by Kenyan President William Ruto. On January 27, he issued an official statement announcing that a meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame would take place in the near future. If this meeting occurs and results in any agreements, it will mark a diplomatic success for Ruto and strengthen his position on the regional stage [22]. Notes: [1] Rwandan-backed rebels enter Congo's Goma in major escalation // https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-enter-centre-congos-goma-after-claiming-capture-city-2025-01-27/[2] DR Congo says Rwanda army in Goma // https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-says-rwanda-army-in-goma/a-71422564[3] Rebel Conflict in Congo Escalates with Capture of Goma // https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2025/january/goma-capture-congo-M23/[4] Luanda summit postponed: Kinshasa’s maneuvers to frustrate peace process // https://www.thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Luanda--summit--postponed%3A--Kinshasa%E2%80%99s--maneuvers--to--frustrate--peace--process_1626[5] Rwanda denies backing armed group in DRC // https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-militia-violence-3828930[6] Rwandan army ‘ready to invade DRC’ and help rebels seize city // https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jan/25/rwandan-army-ready-to-invade-drc-and-help-rebels-seize-city[7] Presidente angolano propõe diálogo directo entre Rwanda e RDC // https://angop.ao/noticias/politica/joao-lourenco-propoe-dialogo-directo-entre-rwanda-e-rdc/[8] Avancée du M23: Discours de Félix Tshisekedi (Intégralité) // https://actualite.cd/2022/11/04/avancee-du-m23-discours-de-felix-tshisekedi-integralite[9] POSTPONEMENT OF LUANDA SUMMIT DUE TO UNRESOLVED CRITICAL ISSUES // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/postponement-of-luanda-summit-due-to-unresolved-critical-issues[10] Emergency ministerial meeting on the current escalation of the conflict in Eastern DRC // https://amaniafrica-et.org/emergency-ministerial-meeting-on-the-current-escalation-of-the-conflict-in-eastern-drc/[11] Angola Aims for UN Security Council Support On DRC Issue // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230042.html[12] Africa: Rwanda Proposes Five Steps to Reinforce Africa's Counter-Terrorism Effort // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230067.html[13] M23 rebel roup generates approximately $300,000 a month from mining-UN // https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/01/m23-rebel-group-generates-approximately-300000-a-month-from-mining-un//[14] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[15] Petrology and Detail Geological Mapping of the Precambrian Basement Rocks of the Sn-Ta-Nb Numbi Deposit, Democratic Republic of the Congo // https://www.iieta.org/journals/eesrj/paper/10.18280/eesrj.090102[16] Africa’s anticipation of Trump’s foreign policy // https://en.igihe.com/politics-48/article/africa-s-anticipation-of-trump-s-foreign-policy[17] STATEMENT ON SITUATION IN EASTERN DRC // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/statement-on-situation-in-eastern-drc[18] The Case Against Rwanda's President Paul Kagame // https://www.newsweek.com/case-against-rwandas-president-paul-kagame-63167[19] What does Rwanda want in the DRC? // https://www.egmontinstitute.be/what-does-rwanda-want-in-the-drc/[20] Thousands uprooted as Congo M23 rebels near Goma in major advance // https://www.yahoo.com/news/thousands-uprooted-congo-m23-rebels-105837754.html[21] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[22] Rwanda, Congo presidents to meet as rebels take Goma, Kenya's leader says // https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-congo-presidents-to-meet-as-rebels-take-goma-kenya-leader-says-/7952210.html

Defense & Security
The Caucasus, Caucasia, colored political map. Region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, mainly occupied by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and parts of Southern Russia. Map with disputed areas.

The Security Complex of South Caucasus and its Role in Global Geopolitics

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This short analysis is based on the Security Complex theorem. Its departure point is the definition of the term, as introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.  The author then briefly introduces the historical background of the Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and their relationships with Russia and suggests further readings for those willing to consult the existing scientific literature. The central part of the analysis focuses on five distinct components of the Caucasus Security Complex, which include interconnected security concerns, a distinctiveness as a geographical region, anarchical structure, shared security dynamics and Social construction of threats. The paper concludes by examining the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus region for the two Great powers, Russia and the United States of America, and the reference for the European Union. The introduction I will start by briefly explaining the notion of a Security Complex for the reader's convenience. The term "security complex" was introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in their 1998 book Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  This refers to a distinct geographical region in which security concerns are interconnected. In other words, the security of one state in a complex is inextricably linked to that of others, creating a dynamic and often volatile environment. The key elements of this notion include: a) interconnected security concerns - a security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. b) Distinct geographical region - security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns. c) Anarchical structure - just like the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. d)  States within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. e) Social construction of threats – the concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. At the same time, it would be wise not to confuse the meaning of Security Complex with the notions of Security Community (shared sense of identity and trust among its members) or Security Regime (a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations). This short analysis will focus on three countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and explore their geopolitical situation at the beginning of 2025 from the perspective of a security complex theorem, particularly their relationships with Russia. Historical introduction The Caucasus, a region nestled between the Black and Caspian Seas, has a rich and tumultuous modern history. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, each with distinct cultural and historical trajectories, have navigated a complex landscape of imperial collapse, nation-building, and conflict. Armenia In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Armenians, then part of the Russian Empire, faced increasing tensions with their neighbours, particularly the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by the Ottoman government during World War I, resulted in the systematic extermination of 1.5 million Armenians. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire, Armenia briefly experienced independence before being incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922.    In 1988, the country was devastated by an earthquake and rising tensions with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to Armenia's renewed independence but also to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, also part of the Russian Empire, declared independence in 1918, establishing the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. This short-lived independence ended in 1920 with incorporation into the Soviet Union. Similar to Armenia, Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dominated much of Azerbaijan's post-Soviet history, resulting in significant displacement and ongoing tensions.  Georgia Georgia, too, declared independence following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. This independence was short-lived, as Georgia was invaded by the Red Army in 1921 and became part of the Soviet Union.  The country regained its independence in 1991. The post-Soviet period has been marked by internal conflicts, including the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and efforts to establish democratic institutions and closer ties with the West. The Security Complex of South Caucasus Regional Dynamics and Conflicts – Major issues The Caucasus region has been plagued by ethno-territorial conflicts, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict, rooted in historical territorial claims and ethnic tensions, has resulted in significant human suffering and remains a major obstacle to regional stability. Readers interested in in-depth analysis performed by scholars researching the region are advised to consult Jansiz & Khojaste. Their thought-provoking paper discusses the history of the Caucasus crisis and its impact on regional security.  Börzel & Pamuk examine the challenges of Europeanization and fighting corruption in the Southern Caucasus. The region's geopolitical significance, located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, has also led to great power involvement, further complicating regional dynamics.   The following part of the analysis will look at the region through the lens of the Security Complex theorem to analyse its dynamics of security interrelationship. This will, in turn, allow us to understand the role of the Caucasus for the Great Powers and the European Union. Interconnected security concerns  A security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. According to Natalie Tavadze, “It is important to understand that Eurasianinism and Moscow’s approaches toward the Caucasus correspond to each other. In this regard, the Central Caucasus is considered as Russia’s backyard. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea constitute strategic dimensions for Russia. The latter is determined to dominate the region and uses the “ethnic card” to keep the countries of the Central Caucasus off balance. From the Russian standpoint, any foreign influence in its “near abroad” is seen through the prism of its national security. Such a menace should be thwarted by any means, as Moscow made clear more than once that it does not entertain any notion of conceding territories of its utmost geopolitical interests.”  This extended but thought-provoking quote from one of the local experts pretty well sketches the region's security dynamics. Now, let us look at its geographical dynamics. Distinct geographical region. Security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns.  Geographically, the Caucasus is defined by the Caucasus Mountains, a formidable range dividing the region into the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus. The Greater Caucasus, the main range, boasts towering peaks like Mount Elbrus, the highest peak in Europe. This rugged terrain has historically isolated communities, leading to the development of a rich mosaic of languages and cultures. The Lesser Caucasus, located south of the Kura-Aras Lowland, further adds to the region's geographical complexity. This varied topography, ranging from high-altitude glaciers to fertile valleys and semi-desert landscapes, supports a remarkable biodiversity. The Caucasus's location at the crossroads of continents has made it a historical battleground and a corridor for trade and migration. This strategic importance has left its mark on the region's cultural landscape. The Caucasus is home to many ethnic groups, each with its distinct language, traditions, and history. This diversity, while enriching, has also been a source of conflict and tension. Throughout its history, the region has witnessed numerous internal and external power struggles. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Caucasus Anarchical structureLike the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. As Cornell and Starr adequately observe, “Many states in the Caucasus struggle with weak governance structures. This weakness is characterised by a lack of effective state control over territories, which undermines the rule of law and the provision of public services. The failure to establish strong, sovereign states based on the rule of law leads to corruption and mismanagement, further complicating governance.”  At the same time, Russia's role is significant. Russian policies have often destabilised the region, as Moscow's interventions and attempts to maintain dominance can exacerbate local conflicts and governance issues. The reliance on coercive diplomacy and military presence has undermined the sovereignty of local governments and complicated efforts toward conflict resolution.Shared security dynamicsStates within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. The region has been plagued by unresolved armed conflicts, which create a persistent security deficit. These conflicts destabilise the affected areas and have broader implications for regional peace and security. The ongoing hostilities hinder effective governance and contribute to widespread instability. Partly as a consequence of this, the region has seen a rise in organised crime and radical ideologies, particularly in the North Caucasus, where poverty and unemployment create fertile ground for extremist groups. The intertwining of criminality and political violence poses a significant threat to governance and societal stability.On top of that, one continues to observe ethnic and national tensions. The presence of various ethnic groups with competing national aspirations exacerbates tensions. This situation is further complicated by external influences and historical grievances, leading to a complex landscape of inter-ethnic relations that can quickly escalate into violence.Finally, there are serious socio-economic problems. Economic collapse and high poverty levels across the region contribute to governance challenges. The lack of economic opportunities fuels discontent and can lead to social unrest, making governance even more difficult.The social construction of threatsThe concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. In the case of the Caucasus, it is easy to identify a number of threats and challenges that are typical for this security complex. Regional Destabilization -  the aftermath of the Chechen war and ongoing frozen conflicts in regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh create instability. These conflicts may still have the potential for spill-over effects and have been exploited by international terrorist networks. Authoritarian Governance - there is a trend of growing authoritarianism in the region, with Soviet-era power structures maintaining control. Political opposition is often suppressed, leading to a lack of democratic reforms and deteriorating living standards.Ecological Issues - the region faces significant ecological challenges, such as the deterioration of the Aral Sea and limited agricultural land, which contribute to instability and can exacerbate existing tensions.Militant and Radical Islam - the rise of militant Islamic groups, partly due to the exclusionary tactics of local regimes, poses a security threat, although it is currently considered a lesser factor compared to issues like drug trafficking.The remaining part of the article will focus on the Caucasus region's geopolitical importance for Russia, the USA, and the EU.Geopolitical ImportanceFor RussiaRussian Federation has been a significant power in the region for many years. "Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus" by Neil Melvin (published by Royal United Services Institute) explores Russia's changing role in the South Caucasus amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. Historically, Russia has viewed the region as a buffer against Western influence and as integral to its ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East. However, the emergence of multipolarity and the involvement of new international actors, such as Turkey, Iran, and China, have challenged Russia's dominance. The 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts further shifted the balance of power, diminishing Russia's leverage, particularly with Armenia. In response, Russia is reconfiguring its strategy, emphasising economic and transport ties while maintaining a security presence. The document argues that Russia seeks to reassert its influence by fostering relationships with regional powers and adapting to the new geopolitical landscape. The Euro-Atlantic community faces challenges in countering Russia's efforts as regional states pursue multi-alignment policies, and the prospect of NATO and EU integration diminishes. Ultimately, the paper highlights the need for the West to recalibrate its approaches to effectively engage with the evolving realities of the South Caucasus.Additionally, the South Caucasus is significant for Russia for several reasons. Firstly, Russian troops in the South Caucasus allow Russia to project military power and influence regional security dynamics. Following the Second Karabakh War, Russia positioned peacekeepers in Azerbaijan and has military bases in Armenia, reinforcing its role as a key security provider in the area. Economically, the South Caucasus is strategically important for energy transit routes. Russia aims to maintain control over energy supplies and infrastructure that pass through the region, ensuring its leverage over energy distribution to Europe and other markets. Finally, Russia's involvement in mediating conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, allows it to assert its role as a key player in regional stability. By doing so, Russia can prevent conflicts from escalating that might threaten its interests or lead to Western intervention. For the USAIn 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published an interesting analysis by Rumer Sokolsky and Stronsky. According to the authors, the importance of the South Caucasus region for the U.S. is undisputable and rests on several arguments. According to the document, the main interests of the U.S. in the South Caucasus include: preserving regional stability (preventing the resumption of frozen conflicts and promoting a peaceful environment among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), supporting democratic change and governance (the U.S. seeks to support democratic transformations and better governance in the South Caucasus states, facilitating their integration into the international community), economic development (the U.S. is interested in fostering economic growth and development within the South Caucasus, recognizing that economic prosperity can contribute to stability), energy security (although the significance of Caspian energy resources is noted, allegedly the U.S. interest in energy from the region has become less vital due to changes in global energy markets) and finally, countering illicit activities (the U.S. is concerned with combating transnational crime and illegal trafficking, which poses risks to regional stability and security).  According to James Carafano (Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation), the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, which started in February 2022, caused the United States to reconsider its global interests and responsibilities diametrically.  Accordingly, the conflict has highlighted the need for energy diversification in Europe, leading to renewed interest in the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and other regional partnerships. The SGC, which connects gas fields in Azerbaijan to Europe, is crucial for reducing reliance on Russian energy and enhancing European energy security. Next, regional integration. Projects like the modernization of ports in Georgia and Azerbaijan are vital for developing logistics and transport networks and promoting regional cooperation. Turkey is expected to play an increasingly significant role in the South Caucasus, supporting regional integration and security as Georgia seeks alternatives to NATO and EU membership.The remaining challenges from the perspective of the US include: geopolitical Tensions (Russia, China, and Iran continue to exert influence in the region, although their capacities may be overstretched due to the ongoing war and sanctions), economic viability (the middle corridor faces challenges such as customs and border control issues and the need for modern infrastructure. However, it presents an alternative logistical route that is gaining interest from various stakeholders); climate policy Implications (the ongoing energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine may prompt changes in climate policies, potentially favouring increased investments in oil and gas infrastructure). Last but not least, the path ahead requires the U.S. to consider military cooperation - enhanced US military support for Azerbaijan could signal a deeper commitment to regional stability, Three Seas Initiative (3SI) - success in expanding the 3SI could benefit the South Caucasus by fostering infrastructure development and regional integration, Black Sea security - NATO's evolving role in Black Sea security will be critical in linking to the middle corridor and ensuring regional stability and finally investment in energy resources - interest in the Transcaspian Gas Pipeline and other energy initiatives will be significant for Europe's efforts to diversify energy supplies.For Europe (The EU)The South Caucasus is essential for the EU for several reasons. Firstly as a geostrategic gateway. The region is a crucial gateway between Europe and Asia, making it significant for trade routes and connectivity. It is positioned at the intersection of major global trade routes, enhancing the EU's access to East and South markets. Secondly, in terms of energy supplies. The South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, plays a vital role in the EU's energy strategy, especially as the EU seeks to diversify its energy supplies and reduce dependence on Russian energy. Azerbaijan is a key supplier of natural gas to the EU, which has become increasingly important following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.Thirdly geopolitically, the region's geopolitical landscape has shifted due to recent conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The EU's engagement with South Caucasus countries is essential for maintaining stability and influencing regional dynamics, especially as these nations navigate their foreign policy options between the EU and Russia.Fourthly, as an economic partner. Strengthening ties with the South Caucasus countries can enhance economic collaboration, which is particularly important given the EU's interest in bolstering regional trade and investment. This can also increase economic growth and stability in the EU's neighbourhood.Finally, The South Caucasus is becoming increasingly significant in the context of EU sanctions against Russia, as it could serve as a transit route for goods. The EU's ability to monitor and influence trade flows through this region is critical for enforcing its sanctions.ConclusionThis short analysis proves the importance of the Caucasus (South Caucasus, to be more exact) for the international community and its potential to play the role of an essential geopolitical factor that could potentially tip the scale regarding the global balance of power. Recent political developments in Georgia (Georgian Protests 2024 – 2025), where the ruling party, Georgian Dream, won the majority of seats in parliament, were met with protests fueled by claims of the opposition parties that the elections were fraudulent.  The winning party has decided to suspend the talks with the European Union about the country’s accession to the EU until 2028.  The move is seen as anti-EU (ergo pro-Russian).  At the same time, pro-Russian commentators have claimed that the demonstrators have been supported by the CIA (a claim that has been put forward with regard to the Ukrainian Maidan of 2013 or even the HK protests of 2019). As it appears, the Southern Caucasus plays a crucial role on the geopolitical chessboard attended by the U.S.A., Russia, Turkey, Iran and the EU. All of them are, at least for the time being, interested in peace and stability, which means status quo, at least as long as the war in Ukraine is not decidedly over. The future depends, among others, on the outcome of the end of the Ukrainian war and the visions and actions of the 47th President of the U.S., who already stunned the world with his claims regarding the Panama Canal and Greenland.References1  Buzan, B and Wæver, O. 1998. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” Lynne Rienner Publishers.2  “Armenia.” 2018. https://armeniapedia.org/index.php?title=Armenia. 3  “აქართველო.” 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country). 4  Jansiz, Ahmad, and Mohammad Reza Khojaste. 2015. “Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach.” Journal of Politics and Law. Canadian Center of Science and Education. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v8n1p83. 5  Börzel, Tanja A., and Yasemin Pamuk. 2011. “Pathologies of Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus.” West European Politics. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631315.  6  Tavadze, Natalie. 2024. “Geopolitics of the Central Caucasus.” Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-geopolitics-of-the-central-caucasus/ 7  Jansiz, Ahmad, and Mohammad Reza Khojaste. 2015. “Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach.” Journal of Politics and Law. Canadian Center of Science and Education. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v8n1p83. 8   Cornell, E. S and Starr, F.S. 2006. The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe. Silk Road Paper. Central Asia – Caucasus INstitutte Silk Road Studies Program. https://isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/publications/2006_cornell-starr_the-caucasus-a-challenge-for-europe.pdf   9  Schmidt, Jürgen. "Security Challenges in the Caucasus and Central Asia - A German and European Perspective." Paper presented at the German-U.S. Conference, Conflicts in the Greater Middle East and the Transatlantic Relationship, Jena, February 28 - March 1, 2003. 10  Melvin, Neil. *Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus*. Occasional Paper. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2024. Accessed 30.1.2025. https://static.rusi.org/retying-the-caucasian-knot-russias-evolving-approach-to-the-south-caucasus.pdf 11  Neset, Siri, Mustafa Aydin, Ayça Ergun, Richard Giragosian, Kornely Kakachia, and Arne Strand. *Changing Geopolitics of the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War: Prospect for Regional Cooperation and/or Rivalry*. CMI Report, No. 4. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, September 2023. https://www.cmi.no/publications/8911-changing-geopolitics-of-the-south-caucasus-after-the-second-karabakh-war 12  Rumer, Eugene, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski. U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus: Take Three. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13079. 13  Carafano, James. "Future and Consequences of US Strategic Interest in the South Caucasus." *Caucasus Strategic Perspectives* 3, no. 2 (Winter 2022): 41-51. Caucasus Strategic Perspectives https://cspjournal.az/post/future-and-consequences-of-us-strategic-interest-in-the-south-caucasus-489. 14  Akhvlediani, Tinatin. "The EU and the South Caucasus: Geoeconomics at Play." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/the-eu-and-the-south-caucasus-geoeconomics-at-play?center=europe&lang=en 15  Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2024: Georgia." Last modified January 31, 2025. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/georgia. 16  Shamin, Sarah., 3 Dec. 2024. “Georgia protests: What’s behind them and what’s next?”. ALJAZEERA. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/3/georgia-protests-whats-behind-them-and-whats-next  17  DISINFO: Georgia protests are a planned CIA operation according to Maidan scenario. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/georgia-protests-are-a-planned-cia-operation-according-to-maidan-scenario/  see also: Kaltenberg, Kit., 6 Oct. 2023. “A Maidan 2.0 color revolution looms in Georgia”. https://thegrayzone.com/2023/10/06/maidan-color-revolution-georgia/ 

Defense & Security
Auchi, Edo/Nigeria - 10 20 2020: scene from the end sars protests that have been going on around the country by the youth to protest police brutality

2025 for Africa (Part I: Security challenges)

by José Segura Clavell

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Conflict hotspots and democratic instability are the major challenges facing a continent that now everyone in the world wants to partner with. In these, which will be the first articles of the year, we aim to reflect on 2025, a key year to consolidate Africa's growing importance in global geopolitics, a trend that has been evident in the last two years. A key point: we are just days away from the inauguration of an unleashed Donald Trump* in international relations. It will be crucial to observe how he handles his ties with Africa and how African countries react in a world marked by populism, far-right politics, and the decline of multilateral organizations. This weakens global consensus and reduces the prominence of Human Rights in increasingly polarized international debates, marked by disinformation and noise. Today, I will address the main challenges and threats facing the continent, from a more security-oriented perspective, including the main active and potential conflicts. Next week, I will take a more positive approach, focusing on the opportunities, even in this uncertain global scenario. Sudan: The worst humanitarian catastrophe in the least mediated war Sudan is facing the worst humanitarian catastrophe today, with over 150,000 deaths, millions of displaced people and refugees since the civil war began in April 2023. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has left 24 million people facing food insecurity and triggered a cholera outbreak, accounting for 10% of the global humanitarian needs despite representing less than 1% of the world's population. In 2025, the outlook remains bleak. The supply of weapons and fuel by Russia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates fuels the conflict, while the lack of political will between the SAF and RSF blocks any progress toward peace. Without a drastic change in international intervention, Sudan will remain trapped in a cycle of war, hunger, and global neglect. The conflict in Sudan is so complex that it is impossible to clearly define who the aggressors and the victims are, unlike in Ukraine or Palestine. In a world of simplification and misinformation, these complexities are overlooked, which explains why Sudan receives so little attention. Sahel In 2025, Sahel faces growing political instability and jihadist violence. Coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have led to the formation of the Sahel Alliance (AES), an anti-Western military bloc seeking to consolidate its authority. However, it must gain legitimacy both with citizens and international institutions while managing crises in governance, development, and security. In this context, the region's stability and regional influence will depend on its relationship with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (it is expected that in the coming days or weeks, the definitive rupture and exit** of the three countries from this West African economic bloc will be official), the African Union (which is also undergoing elections and renewal of its leaders) and foreign powers. Russia's growing presence, especially through the previously known Wagner Group (now Africa Corps), further complicates the dynamics in the Sahel. Moscow has filled the void left by France's withdrawal and the diminished influence of the EU, offering military support to the juntas in exchange for expanding its geopolitical influence (while also taking large amounts of gold to finance its invasion of Ukraine). However, the activities of Russian soldiers have been linked to human rights abuses, which could exacerbate social tensions and the delegitimization of military governments. It is a complicated moment, with a context of reinforcing the anti-Western narrative in the region (Senegal and Ivory Coast have already joined the call for the French to withdraw their troops from the military bases they still maintain in those countries) while consolidating the military juntas' dependence on external actors, rather than strengthening their state capabilities. The rise of jihadist organizations and the resulting violence remain the biggest security challenge for the region. Factors such as poverty, corruption, and state weakness perpetuate the influence of these groups, which have shown a remarkable ability to adapt and fund themselves through the exploitation of local resources and illicit activities. The withdrawal of international forces has left a security vacuum that not only facilitates the expansion of their territorial and social control but also increases their recruitment capacity, as they become the only option for some young people to find a way to support themselves. We thus have a prolonged Sahel crisis ahead, with all the implications it holds for the migration scenario along the so-called Atlantic Route, now primarily driven by young Malians fleeing the instability caused by jihadism and government breakdown. At the same time, we must remain attentive to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, whose control should be a concern for us. Other conflicts We must not forget that there are other points on the African continent that we must remain constantly alert to. Here, telegraphically, we highlight the main ones: Somalia The humanitarian crisis in Somalia remains one of the most complex in the world, exacerbated by internal conflicts, clan violence, and recurring climate disasters. In 2024, more than 4.5 million people in 20 districts were affected by insecurity and clashes, including over seventy clashes between clans since June, which caused the displacement of nearly 395,000 people. Additionally, military operations against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab and protection incidents related to displacement, which exceeded 11,000 between January and October 2024, are worsening the situation. Climate change has increased the country's vulnerability, with devastating events such as the 2020-2023 drought and the 2023 Deyr floods, which caused damages estimated at $176.1 million in 16 districts. The combination of conflicts and climate crises continues to undermine the country's recovery and development efforts. Democratic Republic of the Congo The DRC faces a critical stage in 2025, marked by the intensification of armed conflicts and severe food insecurity. Tensions in North Kivu, due to the advance of the M23/AFC group, and the increased military presence in provinces such as Maniema and Mai-Ndombe, threaten to cause massive displacement of people. Additionally, the concerning projections from United Nations agencies (FAO and WFP) on acute food insecurity foresee a significant deterioration for the most vulnerable populations in the country. Ethiopia Following the war between the central Ethiopian government and the northern Tigray region, Ethiopia has not yet closed the chapter on active conflicts, as it remains embroiled in a violent internal conflict, this time led by militia groups from the Amhara and Oromia regions. There are also concerns about the return of political hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  —-*Article was written before Trump’s inauguration, which was on January 20, 2025**Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso formally exited ECOWAS on January 29, 2025.

Energy & Economics
Mexico City, MEXICO - Jan 14 2025 : A post titled “Indonesia Joins BRICS Group of Emerging Economies” is displayed on an iPhone from the BRICS website.

Indonesia’s Membership in BRICS: Strengthening Emerging Economies and Elevating the Global South

by Amrita Jash

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Indonesia’s inclusion in BRICS enhances the representation of the Global South and strengthens efforts to reform global governance institutions. This move positions the bloc as a stronger platform for collaboration among developing nations. On 7 January, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS grouping. In welcoming Indonesia, the Brazilian Government issued a statement, saying: “With the largest population and economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia shares with other members a commitment to reforming global governance institutions and contributes positively to deepening South-South cooperation.” With full membership, Indonesia has become the first country in Southeast Asia to join BRICS. Currently, Thailand and Malaysia are official partners, but not full members. Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement said the BRICS membership is “a strategic step to improve the collaborations and cooperation with other developing nations, based on the principle of equality, mutual respect, and sustainable development.” Economically, this could mean an increase of 0.3 percent growth to GDP, and the expansion of Indonesia’s access to BRICS markets. Geopolitically, it provides Indonesia a bargaining position in the global arena as well as a platform to voice the aspirations of the Global South. For BRICS, Indonesia’s membership adds another feather to its hat by bringing in greater representation of the Global South to its multipolar vision. This makes it imperative to assess the trajectory of the grouping. What started as an acronym “BRIC,” coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001 in the report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” the grouping was projected in the next decade to grow significantly. Founded in 2009 by the four countries—Brazil, Russia, China, and India—the bloc’s first expansion came in 2010 with the joining of South Africa. In the last 16 years, BRICS has graduated from being a popular buzz word in international politics to a significant platform of emerging economies representing the “Global South.” What is noteworthy is that BRICS is not yet a formal multilateral organisation like the United Nations, World Bank or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but increasingly there has been a greater demand among states (mostly developing countries) to join this club of emerging economies. Despite its informality, what made BRICS relevant in the international order was the 2008 financial crises, which raised scepticism and concerns over the dollar-dominated monetary system. This invariably challenged the effectiveness of the West-led Bretton Woods institutions given the suffering of the United States and Europe in the wake of the financial crisis. In contrast, the BRICS economies showed resilience. The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 2009, where the Joint Declaration put forward the desire of BRIC countries to develop “an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open, and transparent dialogue and cooperation” that is “conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” This was reaffirmed at the most recent 16th BRICS Summit held in October 2024 in Kazan. With the indicative expansion of its institutional framework and functionaries since 2009, the most significant outputs have been the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides developmental funds to countries; the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with a resource pool of US$100 billion, which provides a mutual support mechanism for short-term balance of payments pressures, enhancing the financial safety net of member countries; and the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 for effective integration of BRICS enterprises into global and regional value chains. A significant milestone was the call, during the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, for the expansion of BRICS by inviting new states to join. Another, in 2024, was the deliberation on the formation of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (also known as BRICS Pay), where BRICS countries would trade with each other without converting to US dollars by utilising blockchain technology and tokens to circumvent the SWIFT financial payment system. Although BRICS Pay is still only a concept, its development would seriously undermine the US dollar’s long-standing dominance. Today, the inter-governmental organisation boasts of 10 full members with the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025; and has nine official partner countries—Nigeria is the ninth partner country of BRICS (admitted on 17 January 2025), joining Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Statistically put, BRICS member countries comprise about 45 percent of the world’s population, 28 percent of the global economy, and collectively they produce more than a third of the world’s crude oil. And if Saudi Arabia joins the group (which it is yet to consider the BRICS invitation), the grouping would then produce some 43 percent of global crude oil. This growth among emerging nations is set to widen the gap between BRICS+ and the G7 nations. As IMF estimates suggest, BRICS+ will account for 37.6 percent of world GDP at purchasing power parity in 2027, compared with 28.2 percent for the G7. This will signify a shift in economic power towards emerging economies, enhance intra-BRICS trade and regional networks rather than relying on G7 markets, and also lead to the creation of alternate alliances and institutions. Apart from expanding its membership, BRICS has also broadened its agenda beyond economics to include global challenges. The two main pillars of BRICS are practical cooperation in various fields through meetings of Working Groups and Senior Officials, and consultation on matters of shared interests through meetings of Leaders and Ministers of Finance, Trade, Health, Science & Technology, Education, Agriculture, Communication, and Labour, among others. The intra-BRICS collaboration now includes social welfare, intellectual property, tourism, science & technology, culture, outer space, think tanks, and internet governance and security. With BRICS+, emerging economies are establishing new standards for order making. In other words, despite its informal existence, BRICS has emerged as a strong contestant for building an alternative discourse on global governance—one that is non-western. The expansion gives BRICS a greater economic and demographic weight as well as a stronger voice to the Global South, potentially reshaping discussions in institutions like the UN and WTO. However, the long-term success of an expanded BRICS will depend on its ability to balance diverse interests and act as a unified voice on the global stage. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

Energy & Economics
DAVOS, SWITZERLAND - OCTOBER 31, 2021: Building of the Davos Congress Center, place of the world economic Forum wef

Davos 2025 as a Concentrated Expression of Geopolitical Uncertainty

by Vladislav Belov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From January 20 to 24, 2025, the traditional World Economic Forum (WEF) took place in Davos. The organizers registered approximately 2,000 participants from over 130 countries, including around 1,600 executives from major corporations, among them 900 CEOs. The political agenda of the WEF was supported by more than 50 heads of state and government. As part of the official program, about 300 sessions were held, 200 of which were broadcast live. Press accreditation was granted to 76 media companies. For official events, 28,043 square meters of space were allocated, accommodating 117 meeting rooms and 23 lounge areas. Additionally, several participating companies (such as HSBC, EY, and Cognizant) rented additional venues separately for their own events. WEF President Børge Brende, announcing this meeting, emphasized that in 2025, due to geopolitical conflicts, ongoing economic fragmentation, and the acceleration of climate change, the forum would be held under conditions of exceptionally high global uncertainty for the first time in decades. The theme of the Forum was “Cooperation in the Age of Intelligence”. On January, WEF experts presented four reports. The first one, a traditional report and the 20th edition, analyzed the most significant global risks and threats facing the international community. The study is based on a survey of over 900 experts from various fields and covers short-term (2025), medium-term (until 2027), and long-term (until 2035) perspectives. The key risks identified for these periods include the following:- in 2025 the most serious threat for most respondents is interstate armed conflicts, followed by extreme weather events and geoeconomic conflicts, including sanctions and trade measures;- by 2027 key risks include disinformation and fake news, which undermine trust in institutions and intensify social polarization, tension, and instability, as well as an increase in cyberattacks and espionage cases;- by 2035 environmental threats are a major concern, including extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, ecosystem destruction, critical changes in Earth's systems, and natural resource shortages. Additionally, technological risks such as the negative consequences of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies are highlighted.The authors emphasize the need to strengthen international cooperation and increase resilience to global threats. According to them, rising geopolitical tensions, climate challenges, and other risks require coordinated global action to prevent the escalation of existing issues and the emergence of new crises. The second report presents the perspectives of leading experts on the global economic outlook for 2025. They predict moderate economic slowdown, driven by geoeconomic fragmentation and protectionist measures. The most resilient economic growth is expected in the United States and South Asian countries, while Europe, China, and Latin America may face significant challenges. Inflation is projected to rise in most countries, primarily due to increased government spending and shifts in global supply chains. Most experts consider a further escalation of the U.S.-China trade war likely, along with continued regionalization of global trade, leading to the formation of more isolated economic blocs and reduced global interdependence. While experts acknowledge the high potential of artificial intelligence (AI), they emphasize the need for greater investment in infrastructure and human capital to fully leverage its benefits. The third study provides a comprehensive analysis of employment issues. The main conclusion is that ongoing changes, global trends and new technologies will cause 92 million people to leave the labor market worldwide by 2030, but will also create 170 million new jobs. One of the challenges in this regard is the need to improve skills and train for new specialties. The fourth report assesses the state of global cooperation across five key areas: trade and capital, innovation and technology, climate and natural capital, health and well-being, and peace and security. After analyzing more than 40 indicators, the authors conclude that due to heightened geopolitical tensions and instability, overall cooperation remains at the same level. However, positive trends are observed in areas such as climate, innovation, technology, and health. Davos as a Symbolic Benchmark of Switzerland Despite existing criticism, the Davos Forum remains a key platform for the annual interaction of leading figures in global politics, business, and the expert community. Without Switzerland's neutral status, the Davos Forum likely would not exist. However, it was Klaus Schwab, who founded the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 24, 1971, who played a crucial role in transforming this event and its host location into one of Switzerland’s comparative advantages in political and economic terms. Despite his advanced age, Schwab continues to be an active ideologue and architect of Davos, moderating key discussions while fine-tuning his creation and addressing annual criticism. Yet, he has his own limitations—despite Switzerland’s neutrality and his personal reputation for impartiality, Schwab once again refrained from inviting Russian representatives, even at the level of individual entrepreneurs and experts. Such a move, rather than formal attempts to broaden participation and accessibility, could have enhanced the forum’s status. The participation of a Russian delegation would have been particularly relevant in this critical year for global politics, marked by the unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump, which is set to shape most geopolitical and geo-economic processes worldwide. Including Russian representatives could have strengthened the WEF’s competitive standing, but once again, it did not happen. The Swiss leadership highly values the opportunities that the Davos platform provides, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and, most notably, foreign economic relations. In September 2024, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament—the Council of States (the smaller chamber) and the National Council (the larger chamber)—decided to continue state support for the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and allocated budget funding for the period 2025–2027. During the discussions, lawmakers emphasized that the event strengthens Switzerland’s role as a global hub for international dialogue, while also having a positive economic impact on the Graubünden region. As the host country of the forum, Switzerland actively leverages it to advance its own interests. This year, six out of the seven members of the Swiss Federal Council (Cabinet of Ministers) attended the WEF. As part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Swiss Economy Minister Guy Parmelin signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Kosovo and Thailand, bringing Switzerland’s total number of FTAs to 37. There are also plans to adapt and update the existing FTA with China. One of Bern’s key priorities remains securing an FTA with the MERCOSUR bloc. As a result, a focal point of this year’s WEF was Argentine President Javier Milei, who, during an “exceptionally warm bilateral meeting,” invited Swiss President Karin Keller-Sutter to visit Buenos Aires in 2025. The Trump Factor The opening of the current WEF coincided with the inauguration of Donald Trump, who, in recent months, has made numerous provocative statements and promises, swiftly beginning their implementation upon taking office on January 20. The U.S. president signed nearly 100 executive orders, including the repeal of 78 regulations enacted by his predecessor, Joe Biden. Among these were directives for all federal agencies and departments to address rising living costs and to end government-imposed censorship of free speech. The most significant orders included the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization, as well as the declaration of a state of emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border to enforce strict immigration controls. In one way or another, the presence of the “new-old” president was felt across nearly all discussion platforms at the forum. On January 23, Donald Trump addressed the participants of the Davos Forum via video conference, outlining the following agenda:- NATO defense spending: Member states should increase their defense budgets from 2% to 5% of GDP to ensure a more equitable distribution of financial burdens within the alliance.- Trade tensions with the EU: The EU and its member states treat economic relations with the U.S. unfairly. European business regulations, including tax policies, disadvantage American companies, particularly in the tech sector, prompting Trump’s call for tariffs on European imports.- Criticism of the EU’s Green Deal: Labeling it as a “new green scam”, Trump emphasized that the U.S. would ramp up oil and gas production and expand power plant construction to become the “capital of artificial intelligence and cryptography”.- Oil prices and the Ukraine conflict: Trump suggested that lower oil prices from Saudi Arabia could help resolve the Ukraine conflict and urged Saudi leadership to take necessary steps, emphasizing their responsibility in the matter.- Tariffs on companies outsourcing production: Countries whose companies manufacture outside the U.S. will face tariffs to incentivize production relocation to American soil.- China's role in Ukraine: Trump called on China to support ending the Ukraine conflict, while stating his own efforts to mediate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.- U.S. domestic policy shift: A large-scale deregulation program is underway in the U.S., including tax cuts and potential elimination of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which Trump views as discriminatory.Trump’s speech elicited mixed reactions among forum participants. His focus on protectionist policies and sharp criticism of international partners raised concerns about potential consequences for the global economy, particularly among European attendees. Additionally, his stance signaled an escalation in the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is expected to play out through potential trade conflicts, tensions in the South and East China Seas, continued arms sales to Taiwan, and other geopolitical developments. The Europe Factor   At Davos, Europe is traditionally represented by the European Union, with the United States as its primary political and economic partner. Ursula von der Leyen, re-elected as President of the European Commission and beginning her new term on December 1, 2024, addressed the forum on January 21. Her speech largely responded to challenges outlined by Donald Trump before the WEF began, setting out the EU’s key priorities for the coming years: overcoming economic stagnation, enhancing competitiveness, and further integrating the single market across all 27 member states. A central theme of her address was the “Competitiveness Compass” initiative, first introduced in late 2024. This strategy, shaped by recommendations from Mario Draghi’s influential report, aims to drive economic reform and growth within the EU. The European Commission planned to unveil the full document by the end of January. At Davos, Ursula von der Leyen effectively introduced the concept of “Europe United” as a counterbalance to “America First” and cautioned the U.S. against igniting a trade war with the European Union. She emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue on shared interests, stating: “Our priority will be to initiate discussions as early as possible, focusing on common interests and readiness for negotiations. We will be pragmatic, but we will always adhere to our principles. Protecting our interests and defending our values is the European way”. At the same time, the European Commission president highlighted the high level of interdependence between the European and American economic models. She underscored that the era of global cooperation has given way to intense geostrategic competition, stating: “The world's largest economies are competing for access to raw materials, new technologies, and global trade routes—from artificial intelligence to clean technologies, from quantum computing to space, from the Arctic to the South China Sea. The race is on”. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) emphasized that Brussels must be prepared for U.S. trade tariffs which are expected to be more “selective and targeted”, especially given the “existential crisis” facing the EU economy. She also noted that the ECB is not overly concerned about the impact of inflation from other countries, including the U.S., on the eurozone. The UK was also represented at Davos, with its delegation led by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves. She used the trip primarily to promote Britain’s economic landscape, focusing on the country’s political and economic stability, its business-friendly environment, and recent government efforts to reduce regulatory barriers—all under the central message: “Now is the time to invest in Britain”. However, the extent to which this narrative aligns with reality remained beyond the scope of the Forum. The true assessment was left to the executives of major corporations with whom Reeves held meetings, including JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs, discussing investment opportunities in the UK's infrastructure and green projects. Additionally, the UK delegation engaged in negotiations aimed at restoring and strengthening ties with sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the U.S. and the Gulf states. The Ukraine Factor Due to the ongoing Ukraine conflict, Davos once again served as a prelude to the Munich Security Conference, which traditionally takes place in early February in Bavaria. While the war and Donald Trump’s influence shaped many discussions, Ukraine was not the central focus of the forum, resulting in a somewhat reduced emphasis compared to previous years. Ukraine’s interests at the World Economic Forum (WEF) were primarily represented by V.Zelensky, who took it upon himself to “educate” European politicians and “interpret” the signals previously sent by Donald Trump. His focus was on defense spending, emphasizing that a significant portion should go toward supporting the Kyiv regime, the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, and the need for “real security guarantees”. In the first days after taking office, the U.S. president made several key clarifications regarding his previously stated 24-hour timeline for resolving the Ukraine conflict — this period has now been significantly extended. The reason lies in the fact that, regardless of the revocation of Zelensky’s well-known decree, Ukraine must have a head of state authorized to negotiate and officially confirm any agreements or their outcomes. As of late January, no such figure was present in Kyiv, and Washington is aware of this reality. Switzerland, while emphasizing its neutral status (despite being designated by Russia as an “unfriendly state”), consistently maintains that it provides Ukraine only humanitarian aid and diplomatic support at Kyiv’s request. At the 2024 WEF, the well-known Bürgenstock Conference was announced, which later took place in the summer. However, in 2025, no similarly large-scale initiatives were introduced. Nevertheless, discussions at the Forum once again touched on the possibility of granting Switzerland the right to represent Kyiv’s interests on the international stage. Additionally, it was reported that a Swiss-Ukrainian memorandum was signed, with Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko representing Kyiv. The agreement focuses on the participation of Swiss private businesses in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. V.Zelensky used Davos as an opportunity to meet with world leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who had recently blocked additional aid to Ukraine. However, his main competitor in Germany’s upcoming snap Bundestag elections, Friedrich Merz, was more open to the idea of support, and Zelensky also held a discussion with him. Both meetings were held behind closed doors, and no details were disclosed. Meanwhile, German Green Party leader Robert Habeck managed to avoid an impromptu conversation with Zelensky, who had attempted to engage with him on the spot. At a January 23 briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova commented on V.Zelensky’s speeches at Davos 2025, describing them, among other things, as “narcotic madness”. The Germany Factor Germany, still holding its position as the political and economic leader of the European Union, was represented at Davos by key political heavyweights: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Economy and Climate Protection Minister (and Vice-Chancellor) Robert Habeck, and CDU/CSU Chairman Friedrich Merz. All three have been selected by their respective parties as key candidates for chancellor in Germany’s snap Bundestag elections scheduled for February 23, 2025. Given this, it was no surprise that they used the Swiss platform as part of their election campaigns. The current head of the German government had an objective advantage: he delivered a keynote speech on behalf of Germany, in which he focused on the presence of traditional standard factors (the largest economy in the EU; efficient small, medium and large businesses; government support for investments; low level of government debt), which should help to overcome the crisis. Regarding the United States, he declared his interest in maintaining close relations with the new administration, but “without false fawning and servility”. D. Trump and his team, according to him, will keep the whole world on edge in the coming years, but the German leadership will be able to cope with this. O. Scholz's main message is that constructive European-American interaction “is of decisive importance for security throughout the world and is the engine of successful economic development”. It is noteworthy that there were many empty seats in the hall and after the Chancellor's speech there were no questions for him for a long time, which greatly surprised the moderator of the session, K. Schwab. O. Scholz's closest associate, Finance Minister J.Kukis, who was appointed to this position to replace K. Lindner, who was dismissed in early November 2024, was participating in the Forum. He was unable to provide any special pre-election support to his boss during the Forum, and did not distinguish himself in any special way. Incidentally, K. Lindner himself preferred to remain in Germany and continue to fight there for the votes of voters, which are extremely necessary for the liberals to overcome the five percent barrier and get into the Bundestag. F.Merz, who is very likely the future head of the German Cabinet, and his possible future deputy R. Habeck also sought to prove their chances of winning the elections during their speeches. O. Scholz and F.Merz organized meetings with leading representatives of German business, trying to show which of them understood their problems better and was ready to solve them constructively. Despite all their differences, they were united on one issue - the need to soften the provision on the “debt brake” enshrined in the Basic Law (Constitution) and increase support for entrepreneurs. External observers considered that F.Merz was more convincing, including regarding the transatlantic economic vector. R.Habeck unexpectedly engaged in self-criticism during the podium discussion, stating that he initially believed that the difficult economic situation in the country was due to a short-term cyclical crisis, but it turned out that this was a consequence of a long-term structural crisis. Such “self-education” of the minister cost Germany dearly. During the Forum (January 22) in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, an Afghan refugee subject to deportation committed a crime, killing a child and an adult who was protecting him. This event pushed the issue of migration regulation to the top of the election campaign agenda. Unexpectedly, F.Merz found himself in a sticky situation, when his parliamentary request as the leading representative of the opposition in the current Bundestag for stricter controls at the external borders of the FRG could only count on success with the support of the unpopular Alternative for Germany and the center-left Sahra Wagenknecht Union. From Davos, Olaf Scholz traveled to Paris for a meeting with Emmanuel Macron. The French president was unable to attend the Forum due to domestic political circumstances and the need to manage the situation on the ground. The two leaders discussed the prospects for cooperation between their countries in strengthening their economic and political frameworks, as well as the European Union as a whole. None of the three key chancellor candidates managed to present a clear vision for Germany’s economic and political future, one that would be based on creativity, radical progress, technological breakthroughs, and prosperity—transforming the country into an innovation powerhouse not only for Europe but for the collective West as a whole. This means that Germany risks falling behind, failing to establish itself as an economic model capable of competing on equal terms with Donald Trump’s transforming North American economic space.Under Friedrich Merz, Olaf Scholz, and Robert Habeck, Germany faces the danger of remaining trapped in the past, relying too heavily on its post-war economic miracle—Made in Germany—which was achieved through the brilliance of ordoliberal economists and engineers. Davos 2025 made it clear that leaning solely on past achievements is no longer enough to drive a radical leap toward the future. If the German political elite, represented by the “handshake” established parties, remains in such reactionary positions in relation to the need for qualitative changes in economic policy, then the German standard will have no chance to take a leading place among the world's innovation locations. Here we will briefly indicate that, according to the estimates of the authors of the global risks report, the main ones for Germany are (in descending order): a shortage of highly qualified labor, recession / stagnation of the economy, illegal migration, disinformation, and a shortage of energy resources. They are the ones that largely determine the content of the current election campaign for the German parliament. The China Factor Among the political heavyweights representing the countries of the Global South at Davos 2025, the participation of the Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Ding Xuexiang, stands out. In his keynote speech, he emphasized Beijing's commitment to economic globalization, which is “not a zero-sum game, but a process of mutual benefit and common progress” and declared that protectionism does not lead to success, and trade wars have no winners. Among the key messages were that China is economically attractive, does not seek a trade surplus, is ready to import more competitive and high-quality goods and services to achieve balanced trade, is open to investment from foreign companies, and is ready to solve problems faced by both domestic and foreign firms. While condemning protectionism, he emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the role of the UN. While mildly critical of the “new-old” US president, he never mentioned him by name. Ding repeatedly referred to Xi Jinping, including his initiatives on global development and security. As part of the Forum, Ding Xuexiang hosted a private luncheon with top global financiers and business leaders, including the CEOs of BlackRock, Bridgewater Associates, JPMorgan, Blackstone, and Visa. Discussions centered on China’s ongoing economic reforms, efforts to stabilize the real estate market, stimulate domestic demand, and attract foreign investment. Experts noted that global business leaders responded positively to Ding Xuexiang’s statements, signaling growing confidence in China’s economic direction. In general, he fulfilled the standard mission assigned to him: to increase the international community's confidence in China's economic policy and confirm its role as a key player in the global economy. At the same time, the Forum participants remained concerned about a slowdown in China's economic growth, especially in the context of a possible increase in tariffs by the United States. The Artificial Intelligence Factor One of the leitmotifs of the forum, along with rethinking economic growth, industrial development prospects, climate and restoring trust, were discussions on the rapid development of AI, its impact on the labor market, prospects and challenges associated with the integration of this technology into various sectors of the economy. Experts identified a few trends that will emerge by 2030. AI and automation will increase the demand of enterprises for specialists in the field of AI, big data analysis, digital marketing, and cybersecurity. About half of the current skills of such employees in these areas may become obsolete, which suggests the need for timely adaptation of secondary and higher education to such a challenge. Employees whose professions will become unclaimed due to automation, especially in traditional sectors, will have to undergo advanced training programs. Special attention in the expert sessions was given to the ethical aspects of AI application and the related problems of developing the necessary standards. Issues of international cooperation took an important place, including in the context of ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits of AI application, as well as minimizing the potential risks it generates for society (for example, possible discrimination and bias in algorithms, as well as the protection of users' personal data). In terms of geopolitical rivalry in the field of AI, the global race for leadership in this area, which has already begun between the United States, China and several EU countries, was discussed. Experts pointed out the concerns of the leaders of the latter regarding the need to strengthen the positions of European companies in this area. Strategies for government stimulation of innovation and support for businesses developing AI were discussed. In addition, the participants in the discussions considered the possibilities of using artificial intelligence technologies to achieve sustainable development goals, including combating climate change, improving healthcare and increasing resource efficiency. Examples of using AI to monitor the environment, optimize energy consumption, develop new methods of treating diseases, and improve various aspects of life were of interest. *** The World Economic Forum 2025 in Davos was predictably held under the sign of global challenges, the Ukraine conflict, and increased economic competition, set against the backdrop of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes. Børge Brende, summarizing the event, accurately noted that the current time is “a moment of serious consequences and uncertainties”. This is largely linked to the return of Donald Trump to the White House. At the Forum, the United States’ priorities in strengthening national interests were outlined, including the goal of reducing import flows. This move drew criticism from the European Union and other participants, who expressed growing concerns about the escalation of trade conflicts and the fragmentation of the global economy. The President of the European Commission highlighted the prospects for strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and increasing its independence, considering the intensifying rivalry between the American and Chinese economic spheres. In this regard, representatives of China advocated for reducing trade tensions and strengthening regional alliances, while Germany emphasized the current risks facing its economic standard, outlining the difficulties of finding ways to minimize them. The Ukrainian conflict once again became one of the central topics, but with the formal support of the leaders of the collective West, delegations from the global South showed a restrained reaction to V.Zelensky's speech and messages. Discussions about AI became quite meaningful. Overall, Davos 2025 and its participants confirmed the important role of the WEF as a platform for discussing global challenges and finding constructive answers to them. The need for collective efforts to solve the most pressing issues was noted. One of B. Borge's final messages: the only way to achieve progress in solving global problems is to work together and “find solutions that will make the world a better place”. It is evident that Russia could have significantly contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of this approach.

Diplomacy
Foreign Minister Schallenberg on a trip to the Middle East, 27-29/02/2024 - 40

Lebanon enters new creative era

by Viktor Mikhin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The election of General Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon marks the beginning of a new era of hope for a country that has been mired in crisis for decades. The election and General Aoun’s position This election is not just a step towards ending a protracted constitutional crisis, but the beginning of a critical period of challenges and opportunities that require wise leadership and a clear vision to achieve Lebanon’s security and prosperity. From the outset, General Aoun has shown himself to be a leader committed to transparency and clarity. His words after taking the oath of office were devoid of the usual diplomatic platitudes and reflected his honest character and deep love for his country. He has a clear vision and firm goals that prioritise restoring security and rebuilding Lebanon’s institutions on a solid foundation that serves its people and ensures justice. In his speech, Aoun stressed the importance of restoring the authority of the state and strengthening its sovereignty – essential foundations for building a secure future. His speech on institutional reform underlined his desire to strengthen the state and restore public confidence. He also stressed the importance of national unity and the vital role of youth in driving change, expressing his hope for Lebanon’s rebirth with the participation of all its citizens. Lebanon today faces many challenges, but these challenges can be the starting point for reconstruction and its rise. Restoring trust between the state and its people will require concrete steps to fight corruption and increase transparency, principles that Aoun stressed: “Lebanon will rise only thanks to its loyal citizens”. Moreover, fulfilling international commitments such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, which call for, among other things, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah, will be crucial to establishing stability and removing Lebanon from regional power struggles. Aoun’s firm stance that Lebanon “will not become a battleground for settling scores” offers hope for a sovereign and independent future for the country, free from regional tensions. At this critical juncture in Lebanon’s history, the appointment of a competent prime minister is an urgent task. This person must have both economic experience and integrity, be able to lead economic reforms and attract investment to restore confidence in state institutions. Such an appointment will lay the groundwork for the successful implementation of the plan to return Lebanon to a path of growth and stability, politically, economically and spiritually. Lebanon has always been a beacon of culture, diversity and tolerance and now, with the election of a new president, the Lebanese hope that the country will regain its rightful place among other nations of the world. Aoun recognizes the important role of the Gulf countries in supporting Lebanon’s renaissance and calls on them to return and invest in rebuilding the country’s economy. This call is not only economic: it is an expression of gratitude and appreciation for the vital role that the Gulf monarchies have historically played in Lebanon’s development. Position of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement In the second round of voting, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement decided to support the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president, ending a two-year presidential deadlock. The resounding statement by the ‘Shiite duo’ was that the crucial decision on the numerical and political quorum was largely up to the resistance movement and that the president could not be elected without it. Reluctantly, the ‘Shiite duo’ gave in to unprecedented foreign pressure, while still claiming a powerful presence in the Lebanese political arena. In fact, the ‘duo’ put Lebanon’s best interests and national harmony first. Mohammed Raad, head of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, paid tribute to the “martyrs of the resistance who defended the country so that a meeting uld be held, and national harmony could be achieved in this difficult period. By postponing the election of the president, we wanted to send the message that we are the guarantors of national harmony”. A consensus was reached before the second round during a meeting between Mohammad Raad and Ali Hassan Khalil and Joseph Aoun, who allayed the Shia duo’s fears about the military, security and politics. The meeting focused on the responsibilities of the new era, particularly in terms of reconstruction, forming a national government and preserving the achievements of the resistance movement. Joseph Aoun promised to rebuild what the Israeli enemy had destroyed, saying: “Our dead are the spirit of our determination, and our prisoners are the pillars of our strength”. Moscow welcomes Aoun’s election as Lebanese president This opens up prospects for strengthening Lebanon’s domestic political stability and improving the country’s difficult socio-economic situation, the Russian Foreign Ministry said. Moscow welcomes the resolution of the presidential crisis, which has lasted since October 2022. This opens up prospects for strengthening internal political stability in Lebanon and rectifying the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, the Foreign Ministry said. It said: “Russia believes that the restoration of a broad national consensus is the key to ensuring unity and civil peace in multi-confessional Lebanon. The Russian Federation reaffirms its unwavering position in support of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the friendly Republic of Lebanon. It is determined to further develop Russian-Lebanese relations and closely coordinate efforts in the interests of ensuring peace and security in the Middle East region, which is going through a period of military and political turbulence,” the ministry added. Aoun’s election is a milestone in Lebanon’s history. His honest leadership and transparent approach inspire hope for a bright future. But realising that hope will require collective effort and serious action. Lebanon deserves the best, and with strong leadership and the support of its people and allies, a country worthy of its history and status can be rebuilt. Let this new era be a great opportunity for a fresh start, and let us always remember that hope is built on action and commitment.