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Shortly after the opening salvo of U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026 – with missiles targeting cities across the country, some of which killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – President Donald Trump declared the objective was to destroy Iran’s military capabilities and give rise to a change in government. Framing the operation as a war of liberation, Trump called on Iranians to “take over your government.” In the first days alone, Israel dropped over 2,000 bombs on Iranian targets, equal to half the tonnage of the 12-day Israel-Iran conflict in June 2025. Heavy U.S. bombing, meanwhile, has targeted Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as well as ballistic missile and aerial defense sites. The destruction is real. But, as an international relations scholar, I know that destruction is not the same as political success. And the historical record of U.S. bombing campaigns aimed at regime change shows that the gap between the two – the point at which Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya campaigns all stalled – is where wars go to die. Destruction is not strategy Decades of scholarship dating back to World War I on using air power to force political change has established a consistent finding: Bombing can degrade military capacity and destroy infrastructure, but it does not produce governments more cooperative with the attacker. Political outcomes require political processes – negotiation, institution-building, legitimate transitions of power. Bombs cannot create any of these. Instead, what they reliably create is destruction, and destruction generates its own dynamics: rallying among the population, power vacuums, radicalization and cycles of retaliation. The American record confirms this. In 2003, the George W. Bush administration launched “Shock and Awe” in Iraq with the explicit aim of regime change. The military objective was achieved in weeks. The political objective was never achieved at all. The U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army created a vacuum filled not by democratic reformers but by sectarian militias and eventually ISIS. The regime that eventually emerged was not friendly to American interests. It was deeply influenced by Iran. In 2011, the Obama administration led a NATO air campaign in Libya that quickly expanded from civilian protection into regime change. Dictator Moammar Gadhafi was overthrown and killed. But there was no plan for political transition. Chaos and political instability have endured since. Asked what his “worst mistake” was as president, Barack Obama said, “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.” Libya remains a failed state today. The intervention also sent a powerful signal to countries pursuing nuclear weapons: Gaddhafi had dismantled his nuclear program in 2003. Eight years later, NATO destroyed his regime. Even Kosovo, often cited as the success story of coercive air power, undermines the case. Seventy-eight days of NATO bombing did not, by themselves, compel Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to withdraw. What changed was the credible threat of a ground invasion combined with Russia’s withdrawal of diplomatic support. The political outcome – contested statehood, ongoing ethnic tensions – is hardly the stable governance that air power advocates promise. The pattern is consistent: The United States repeatedly confuses its unmatched capacity to destroy from the air with the ability to dictate political outcomes. Why this war? The recent U.S. attacks on Iran raise a fundamental question: Why is the United States fighting this war at all? The administration has declared regime change as its objective, justifying the campaign on the grounds of Iran’s nuclear program and missile capabilities. But that nuclear program was being actively negotiated in Geneva days before the strikes. And Iran’s foreign minister told NBC the two sides were close to a deal. Then the bombs fell. Iran did not attack America. And it currently does not have the capability to threaten the American homeland. What Iran challenges is Israel’s regional military dominance, and I believe it is Israel’s objective of neutralizing a rival that is driving this operation. Israel targeted 30 senior Iranian leaders in the opening strikes. Israeli officials described it as a preemptive attack to “remove threats to the State of Israel.” I see the strategic logic for these killings as Israel’s, and Americans are absorbing the costs. U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have taken Iranian missile fire. American service members are in harm’s way – three have already been killed – not because Iran attacked them, but I believe because their president committed them to someone else’s war without a clear endgame. Each coercive step in this conflict – from the 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear deal, to the 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Iran’s most powerful military commander, to the June 2025 strikes – was framed as restoring leverage. Each produced the opposite, eliminating diplomatic off-ramps, accelerating the very threats it aimed to contain. The regime is not one man Decapitation strikes assume that removing a leader removes the obstacle to political change. But Iran’s political system is institutional — the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Revolutionary Guard have survived for four decades. The system has succession mechanisms, but they were designed for orderly transitions, not for active bombardment. The group most likely to fill the vacuum is the Revolutionary Guard, whose institutional interest lies in escalation, not accommodation. There is a deeper irony. The largest protests since 1979 swept Iran just weeks ago. A genuine domestic opposition was growing. The strikes have almost certainly destroyed that movement’s prospects. Decades of research on rally-around-the-flag effects – the tendency of populations to unite behind their government when attacked by a foreign power – confirms that external attacks fuse regime and nation, even when citizens despise their leaders. Iranians who were chanting “death to the dictator” are now watching foreign bombs fall on their cities during Ramadan, hearing reports of over 100 children killed in a strike on a girls school in Minab. Trump’s call for Iranians to “seize control of your destiny” echoes a familiar pattern. In 1953, the CIA overthrew Iran’s democratically elected prime minister in the name of freedom. That produced the Shah, the Shah’s brutal reign led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the revolution produced the Islamic Republic now being bombed. What comes next? And what guarantee is there that whatever emerges will be any friendlier to Israel or the United States? What does success look like? This is the question no one in Washington has answered. If the objective is regime change, who governs 92 million people after? If the objective is stability, why are American bases across the Middle East absorbing missile fire? There is no American theory of political endgame in Iran — only a theory of destruction. That theory has been tested in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya – and Iran itself over the preceding eight months. It has failed every time, not because of poor execution, but because the premise is flawed. Air power can raze a government’s infrastructure. It cannot build the political order that must replace it. Iran, with its sophisticated military, near-nuclear capability, proxy networks spanning the region and a regime now martyred by foreign attack, will likely not be the exception. U.S. law prohibits the assassination of foreign leaders, and instead Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader while American warplanes filled the skies overhead. Washington has called the result freedom at hand, but it has not answered the only question that matters: What comes next?

China's engagement in overseas renewables grew once again, though not as much as in oil and gas Last year, Chinese companies’ “engagement” in 150 countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reached its highest level since the BRI was launched 12 years ago. The value of construction deals involving Chinese companies reached USD 128 billion, up 81% on 2024. While investments totalled USD 85 billion, up 62%. The unprecedented boom has been revealed by annual data from the Griffith Asia Institute, an Australian think-tank, and the Green Finance and Development Center, a think-tank hosted in Fudan University, Shanghai. “I did not foresee last year that 2025 would be such a strong year [for BRI engagement],” said report author Christoph Nedopil Wang during an online launch. “Engagement” refers to both investments by Chinese companies, implying an ownership stake in a project, and the value of construction contracts awarded to them for engineering services. The striking upsurge comes after years of government-directed messaging, and analyst predictions, that the initiative would focus more on “small and beautiful” projects, rather than the mega projects pursued in its early years. “Small yet beautiful should be seen as a bygone,” Nedopil Wang said, noting both the total value of construction and investment deals, and the growth in average project value. Last year also saw notable shifts in the targets for Chinese companies’ activities around the world. Their engagement in renewable-energy projects grew in 2025 but not as rapidly as in oil and gas projects, which will concern many. Rapid growth in engagement in mining, and in the technology and manufacturing sector, demonstrates the evolution of the BRI since it began in 2013. Finally, Africa became the top destination for Chinese companies’ overseas engagement. The end of ‘small and beautiful’? Last year saw a marked rebound in the size of projects. The average value of investments reached USD 939 million, up from USD 672 million in 2024 and three times higher than deal sizes five years ago, during the BRI’s Covid contraction. The average value of construction deals reached USD 964 million, up from USD 496 million the previous year. Nedopil Wang says this indicates the end of “small and beautiful” BRI projects, a term promoted by the Chinese government in response to financial headwinds and the environmental and social problems which arose in the first five years of the initiative. Chinese government discourse has certainly not dropped the emphasis, however. On 27 January, People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, stated that “more than 700 aid projects, including … small and beautiful livelihood projects” were delivered overseas in 2025. Booming renewables – and fossil fuels Energy was once again the top sector for engagement in Belt and Road countries, accounting for about 43% of the total. Total engagement in energy sectors reached USD 93.9 billion, the highest ever recorded. However, while just a few years ago renewable-energy projects accounted for nearly half of total energy projects overseas, in 2025 renewables made up just 21%, while fossil fuels accounted for over 75%. Nedopil Wang sees risks in the boom in oil and gas engagement. “I see a rapid rise of oil and gas engagement as an environmental risk due to the associated climate emissions. They also become an economic risk under declining fossil-fuel-demand scenarios driven by electrification of mobility and scaling of green electricity,” which would lead to lower oil and gas demand, respectively, he said. The dominance of oil and gas projects also implies an emphasis on energy extraction, rather than generation. According to the report’s breakdown, the value of investments and contracts in extractive projects amounted to USD 51.4 billion, while generation accounted for USD 25.8 billion. That said, Chinese companies’ engagement in oil and gas projects is primarily via construction contracts rather than equity ownership. This may minimise some of the economic risks Nedopil Wang identifies. When it comes to renewable projects, while these make up a smaller proportion of total energy engagement in 2025, they have seen a marked increase in real terms. Last year saw engagement worth USD 21.4 billion, up from USD 12.3 billion in 2024. “2025 was both the greenest and the brownest year” for the BRI, Nedopil Wang said during the report launch. Renewables, by their nature, also contribute to generation rather than extraction. Last year saw projects worth 23.8 GW of solar, wind and hydro generation capacity, compared to around 15 GW in 2024. “I do not immediately read the surge as a return to fossil-fuel expansion,” notes Fikayo Akeredolu, senior research associate in climate policy and justice at the University of Bristol. She points out that while oil and gas projects accounted for a large proportion of the value of construction contracts in 2025, foreign direct investment from China is supporting renewables. Meanwhile, at least in Africa, lending from China’s government-backed policy banks is backing power-transmission projects. The lending data comes from the recently updated Chinese Loans to Africa database, published by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center. “[We see] a segmentation of instruments, rather than a reversal of China’s energy-transition stance,” Akeredolu says. Moving up value chains Another key sector of growth in 2025 was technology and manufacturing, referring to both traditional manufacturing activities and high-tech areas such as solar PV and batteries. Its growth demonstrates the evolution of the BRI over the last 12 years, from a focus on infrastructure to an increasing interest in developing manufacturing bases overseas. The sector saw 27% year-on-year growth in engagement and has been growing steadily since 2023. Engagement in green tech like solar PV and batteries dropped slightly compared to 2024, however. “The growing role of tech and manufacturing highlights China’s growing ability to build and manage factories (and in particular high-tech-related factories) across the world,” Nedopil Wang said. “While the original BRI engagement was concentrated in infrastructure, the new BRI is seeing the expansion of China’s manufacturing base to overseas markets.” Metals and mining also saw strong engagement in 2025, a record high of USD 32.6 billion. This was dominated by construction contracts for two mega projects in aluminum and steel in Kazakhstan, worth USD 19.5 billion together. However, other regions also saw major deals, the African continent in particular. Interestingly, data from the report shows a higher proportion of engagement in processing rather than extractive mining facilities. Processing of mined minerals and metals is seen by many resource-rich countries as a key strategy for moving up value chains, particularly in green technologies. For now, however, it is unclear if the data represents a trend or simply a one-off. In contrast, transportation infrastructure is in decline, with only USD 13.3 billion, the least since the BRI began life being touted primarily as a global connectivity project. Nedopil Wang suggests this may be connected to problems securing finance for traditional infrastructure projects, including the fall in lending from China’s development finance banks. Africa rising In 2025, the largest market for Chinese companies’ engagements along the BRI was Africa. The Belt and Road partners on the continent saw USD 61.2 billion worth of engagement, a 283% expansion compared to 2024, according to the report. The majority of that engagement was in the form of construction contracts, rather than investment. Nedopil Wang indicates this may have to do with Chinese companies seeking ways to avoid US tariffs. Akeredolu from the University of Bristol points to “Africa’s growing role in resource security amid global supply-chain fragmentation” as another reason shaping the boom in Chinese engagement in African economies. “Whether this is good news for African governments depends on bargaining power,” says Akeredolu. “Where states can secure local content, downstream value addition, or revenue-sharing, opportunities exist. Where engagement is limited to turnkey construction without equity or technology transfer, the developmental upside is thinner.”

For years, the relationship between Mexico and Cuba was portrayed—when not deliberately minimized—as a low-intensity bond: a propagandistic mirage [1], symbolic, rhetorical, or, at best, consistent with a shared Latin Americanist diplomatic tradition upheld by governments of different political orientations during the authoritarian period and the democratic transition. Even under the governments of Morena, closeness with Havana was interpreted by broad sectors of public opinion [2] as an ideological affinity—celebrated or lamented—but largely harmless, devoid of deep material implications and far removed from the organic alignments Cuba maintained—and continues to maintain—with openly authoritarian regimes such as those of Venezuela and Nicaragua. That reading, however, has begun to crack. Amid recent developments, the debate over Cuban influence in Mexico has acquired unprecedented density. The capture of Nicolás Maduro and the evidence pointing to the active presence of Cuban agents within Venezuela’s intelligence and repression apparatus not only revived discussions about Havana’s role as an exporter of authoritarian know-how, but also forced a rethinking of its regional projection beyond the myth of passive survival. Added to this is the sustained increase in shipments of Mexican oil to the island, ordered by the government of Claudia Sheinbaum, which are increasingly being interpreted as a political subsidy to a failed regime rather than as a humanitarian or diplomatic gesture. It is no coincidence, in this context, that influential voices in Mexico’s public debate—such as Carlos Bravo Regidor [3] or Julio Patán [4]—have begun to point out the risks and contradictions of a foreign policy that, while brandishing a sovereigntist and democratic rhetoric, materially sustains one of the hemisphere’s longest-standing dictatorships. What for years was considered irrelevant, exaggerated, or ideologically biased is now beginning to be perceived as a real problem of political coherence and, more importantly, as an institutional risk. This shift in the public conversation is revealing—but also belated. Long before the oil subsidy placed Cuba at the center of the national debate, various analyses had already warned of a growing and multifaceted Cuban influence in Mexico. Authors such as Armando Chaguaceda and Johanna Cilano, in an article published in Letras Libres, [5] as well as multiple reports by the organization Government and Political Analysis A.C. (GAPAC), [6] had previously argued that the relationship between the self-styled Fourth Transformation and the post-Castro regime could not be reduced to symbolic gestures or historical affinities. On the contrary, they pointed to a dynamic of persistent influence across economic, cultural, and political spheres, anchored in material exchanges, institutional networks, and authoritarian promotion. Yet, as has happened for far too long with the disbelief—born of a mixture of naïveté and ideological affinity—toward the domestic reality and global influence of Castroism, no one was listening. [7] From this perspective, the question is not only why Cuba influences Mexico, but why—until now—that influence had been systematically denied, relativized, or normalized. The current conjuncture did not inaugurate the phenomenon; it merely made it media-visible. And in doing so, it forces a critical reassessment of a relationship that, far from being exceptionally innocuous, appears to fit within a regional pattern of authoritarian symbiosis. The Oil Subsidy and the End of Assumed Irrelevance The increase in shipments of Mexican oil to Cuba has functioned as a turning point in public perceptions of the bilateral relationship. For the first time in years, closeness with Havana ceased to be read exclusively in symbolic terms and began to be evaluated in terms of concrete material costs. In a country with severe energy shortages, a heavily indebted state-owned company, and wide unmet social demands, the decision to allocate strategic resources to sustain a foreign regime in crisis could hardly go unnoticed. The controversy lies not only in the volume of oil sent, but in the political meaning of the gesture. According to reports by the Financial Times, [8] Mexico has already become Cuba’s main supplier of crude oil, effectively displacing Chavismo—and other allies such as Russia and Iran—as the island’s primary energy lifeline. This shift is far from trivial: it entails assuming, consciously or not, a role of external support long played by Venezuela, and doing so in a regional context marked by the collapse of the Bolivarian axis and by growing evidence of Havana’s active role in preserving allied authoritarian regimes. With the added threat [9] of tariffs announced by Trump against countries that “sell or otherwise supply oil to Cuba, protecting the national security and foreign policy of the United States from the malign actions and policies of the Cuban regime,” Claudia Sheinbaum’s position becomes even more problematic, exposing Mexico to potential coercive measures by the U.S. administration should oil shipments to the island continue. This policy openly contradicts the Mexican government’s sovereigntist rhetoric. While foreign interference is denounced and national self-determination is invoked, a support scheme is maintained that props up the economic viability of a single-party dictatorship—while compromising national stability. The principle of non-intervention is selectively invoked and disappears when it comes to assisting an ideologically aligned regime. Oil, in this sense, has stripped the bilateral relationship of its rhetorical veil and placed it squarely in the realm of political responsibility. An Influence That Goes Beyond Oil Reducing Cuban influence in Mexico to the energy sphere would nonetheless be analytically insufficient. As recent research [10] has shown, Havana’s regional projection does not depend exclusively on material resources, but on a combination of political, institutional, and symbolic instruments that operate cumulatively and, in many cases, discreetly. One of the most sensitive areas concerns Cuban medical missions. Presented as a pragmatic solution to healthcare system deficits, these missions have been widely questioned for their implications of forced labor, wage retention, and political surveillance. In the Mexican case, the problem is compounded by the opacity of the agreements signed and by the normalization of practices incompatible with basic democratic and labor standards. Health cooperation is not, in this sense, a neutral technical exchange, but rather a mechanism with clear political implications. Added to this are the party-to-party ties [11] between the Communist Party of Cuba and Morena. These exchanges go beyond protocol gestures and constitute spaces of ideological affinity and mutual learning in matters of political mobilization, discursive hegemony-building, and power management in polarized contexts. That Mexico’s ruling party maintains organic relations with an organization that upholds a single-party regime is far from trivial, particularly in light of the growing disdain among some official sectors for institutional checks and balances. The academic and cultural sphere completes this web of influence, as documented by GAPAC. [12] Exchange programs, seminars, and institutional collaborations have at times served as platforms for legitimizing the Cuban model or relativizing its authoritarian nature. Authoritarian influence is rarely imposed abruptly; it more often filters through narratives and interpretive frameworks that gradually erode democratic consensus. The Venezuelan case offers a cautionary tale: for years, Cuban presence was dismissed as opposition exaggeration, until its role within intelligence and repression apparatuses became incontrovertible. The Collapse of a Narrative The renewed interest in Cuba’s influence in Mexico does not stem from a sudden revelation, but from the collapse of a long-standing narrative: that of irrelevance. The oil subsidy has acted as a catalyst, but the phenomenon is broader and deeper. What has now become visible is a relationship characterized by growing political symbiosis that contradicts both the sovereigntist rhetoric of the current Mexican government and its professed commitment to democracy. One in which the leaderships of a new authoritarianism—born of a successful populist and illiberal project—forge close ties with a veteran antiliberal autocracy, whose advisers, agents, and agitators are more than willing to export—chequebook in hand—their accumulated experience in indoctrination, repression, diplomatic influence, and social control. Recognizing this reality does not imply adopting alarmist positions or mechanically extrapolating foreign experiences. Rather, it requires abandoning comfortable myths and acknowledging that threats to contemporary democracy rarely appear abruptly. More often, they take root gradually and asymmetrically, shielded by discourses of solidarity, sovereignty, or social justice. In this sense, the influence of Cuban authoritarianism in today’s Mexico is not a speculative hypothesis, but an uncomfortable reality that demands public scrutiny and political coherence. To evade it is to repeat mistakes that, in other regional contexts, have already produced consequences that are difficult to reverse. References [1] https://confabulario.eluniversal.com.mx/mexico-y-cuba-el-pasado-incomodo/ [2] https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=71310 [3] https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/13/subsidio-autocratico-758593.html [4] https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/14/el-fracaso-cubano-758900.html [5] https://letraslibres.com/revista/el-elefante-en-la-habitacion-cuba-en-el-mexico-de-la-4t/ [6] https://gobiernoyanalisispolitico.org/cuba-en-america-latina-la-influencia-persistente/ [7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ExrLPbu6U4 [8] https://www.ft.com/content/f04088c3-66af-4d7c-b5fd-df0e423bd837 [9] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba/ [10] https://www.amecip.com/publicacion/detalle?id=55 [11] https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2025/05/03/politica/partido-comunista-de-cuba-pcc-firma-acuerdo-con-morena [12] https://gobiernoyanalisispolitico.org/mexico-exporta-a-cuba-no-solo-petroleo-tambien-apoyo-academico/

1. Introduction to the conflict In the early 1920s Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), where the overwhelming majority of the population consisted of indigenous Armenians, was annexed to the Azerbaijan SSR. This ultimately led to Artsakh attempting to unite with Armenia in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union began to collapse. The region's Armenian people, facing anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan, decisively voted to declare their independence from the country. This led to the outbreak of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1988 between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan with support from Turkey. Following thousands of deaths and more than a million displaced people, the war ended in a ceasefire in 1994 with Turkey, a nation that still denies the Armenian Genocide, supporting Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Battles broke up again in 2016, and it concluded in a 44-day war in 2020 that led to Azerbaijan annexing a significant portion of the area along with seven neighboring districts. Figure 1: Nagorno-Karabakh on map. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) 2. Historical context Artsakh, in terms of geopolitics, has a long and complex history, dating several centuries back. Artsakh is celebrated for its strong Armenian cultural and religious identity. It has been a part of the Kingdom of Armenia since at least the 5th century BCE. Through several eras, including the semi-autonomous Armenian states, it remained an integral part of Armenian identity. Artsakh is directly related to Siunik and Utik, its bordering regions, linguistically and ethnographically. One of the earliest known Armenian dialects is the one spoken in Artsakh. In the 7th century AD, the grammarian Stephanos Siunetzi wrote the earliest account of it. (c. NKRUSA) In the early 1800s the Russian Empire annexed the Artsakh region which ended up bringing significant political and demographic changes. The term “Karabakh”, which is a Turkic version of the Persian name for the area, Bagh-e-Siah (meaning “Black Garden”), is frequently used to refer to Artsakh. This phrase is a portion of “Nagorno Karabakh”, which is a simplified version of the Soviet term “Autonomous Region of Mountainous [“Nagorniy” (Нагорный)] Karabakh,” which refers to the Armenian autonomy of Artsakh situated within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan of the USSR. (c. NKRUSA) This historical context is crucial in understanding the deep-seated nationalistic and cultural motivations behind the current conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The ancient and medieval Armenian presence in Artsakh is central to Armenia's historical claim to the region. 3. Causes of the conflict How is the Armenian Genocide of 1915 tied to this conflict and how does it play into the mutual disdain between Armenians and Azerbaijanis to this day? The majority of Armenians worldwide are the great-grandchildren and grandchildren of those who survived the 1915 Genocide, and they are witnessing another instance of history as Turkey and Azerbaijan repeatedly massacre and drive out Armenians from regions where they have lived for thousands of years. Furthermore, there is a clear link between the Young Turks' swiftly assembled republic of Azerbaijan in 1918 and the Ottoman Empire of 1915, which sought to establish a presence in the Caucasus. The Young Turks advocated a pan-Turkic philosophy that aims to unite all Turkic peoples from Turkey to Kazakhstan via Azerbaijan, forming a large empire. The president of Turkey at the moment is pro Pan-Turkism. (c. Rajat Ghai, 2023) Perhaps one of the most disrespectful and heartbreaking evidences of the anti-Armenian narrative is the renaming of one of the streets in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, in ‘honor’ of Enver Pasha, one of the main perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide, who was probably the most anti-Armenian official at the time. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Democratic Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan were established in 1918. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) became a disputed territory, with claims from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1923, following the formation of the Soviet Union, and Armenia-Azerbaijani wars over this disputed land, Joseph Stalin declared that Nagorno-Karabakh would become an autonomous region within the borders of Azerbaijan SSR. (c. Bulut, 2023). Despite being a part of Azerbaijan, the majority of the population and the cultural identity of the region remained Armenian. For decades, Azerbaijani forces have attempted to control Armenians and force them to recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty through massacres, blockades, and ultimatums. When the Armenians of Artsakh wanted to exercise their right to self-determination, they were confronted with pogroms in Azerbaijan that resulted in the cruel death of Armenians and the theft of their belongings. These pogroms had the intention of frightening Artsakh's Armenian population into leaving or submitting, despite the fact that they had lived there for centuries and had developed and continuously defended their national sovereignty, which was vital to Armenian history. “The first victims of Azerbaijan’s policy to suppress the will of the people of Artsakh were the Armenians of the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait located several hundred kilometers away from Artsakh.” (c. Bulut, 2023) As the Soviet Union started to fall apart in the late 1980s, tensions increased. Violent encounters between Armenians and Azerbaijanis resulted from the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh's desire for unification with Armenia. 4. Conflict dynamics The first Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994): After the USSR collapsed, Armenia and Azerbaijan launched a full-scale war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia finally took control of Nagorno-Karabakh and a number of its neighboring areas by 1994. The area remained in a state of frozen war despite the establishment of a ceasefire but no peace treaty was signed. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020): Six weeks of fighting ensued after reopening of hostilities in September 2020. Turkey and Israel provided major military assistance to Azerbaijan in order for it to retake control of portions of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas. A ceasefire mediated by Russia brought the war to an end in November 2020, changing the map significantly and deploying Russian peacekeepers. Nevertheless, the military aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenians hasn't stopped. Azerbaijan and its ally, Turkey, started blockading Artsakh and its citizens (est. 130,000) in December 12, 2022. The Republic of Armenia's former human rights defender, Arman Tatoyan, reported that Artsakh had been without electricity since January 9. There hadn't been any gas since March 21 and no humanitarian help (including food) since June 15. (c. Bulut, 2023) This blockade persisted despite an internationally recognized court order from February 22, 2023, which guarantees the unhindered flow of people, cars, and goods along the Lachin Corridor in both directions, and lasted for 9 months. The forced displacement of Armeanians (2023): Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians left the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in the last few days of September 2023 and fled into neighboring Armenia. As has been well documented, the mass escape occurred as a result of Azerbaijan subjecting the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh to a 24-hour period of intense bombing, preceded by a 10-month long blockade and forced starvation, all of which led to the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh to surrender. Before the occupation, indigenous Armenians had lived in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory for millennia. It is currently estimated by the UN that there are only 50 Armenians remaining. To this day, hundreds of Armenian cultural sites throughout Artsakh are at the risk of being destroyed or appropriated now that Azerbaijan has complete control over Artsakh or Nagorno-Karabakh. Some have already been destroyed or are currently being ‘restored’, as the Azerbaijani government refers to the erasure of their Armenian identity. “Despite the scale and severity of the damages, the erasure of Armenian cultural patrimony by Azerbaijan remains woefully under-reported, in large part due to the regime’s crackdown on independent journalists.” (Nayyar, 2024) 5. Armenia’s main allies Russia The core of Armenia and Russia's military cooperation has been their membership in the Joint CIS Air Defense System and the same military alliance (CSTO). However, due to the continuous tensions between Putin and Pashinyan, Russia appeared to be hesitant to publicly help Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020). Criticism of CSTO membership grew within Armenian political circles when the CSTO mission chose a rather uncertain stance in the conflict. Armen Grigoryan, the secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, even stated that he no longer saw any hope for the CSTO. Pashinyan said that Russian peacekeepers sent to uphold the cease-fire agreement were not doing their duties. He also stated that Armenia is attempting to broaden its security partnerships. (c. France 24, 2026) Armenia has withdrawn from a regional security agreement with Russia, stating that Moscow failed to support it in its conflict with Azerbaijan. In recent years, Armenia has taken steps to strengthen ties with the US and the EU while suspending its membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, there are still strong cultural, linguistic, and economic links to Russia; as is the case with every other former Soviet country. Iran In September 2022, the Iranian foreign minister emphasized that the Iran-Armenia border must not change amid the recurring border tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a meeting with Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in May 2024, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khameri highlighted Iran's opposition to any border changes in the South Caucasus. After the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2024, Armenia and Iran increased their military relations and discussed a potential $500 million arms deal. (c. Sayeh, 2025) 6. Azerbaijan’s main allies Turkey Azerbaijan's longtime ally Turkey sees Armenia as one of its primary regional enemies. That is evident in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement in 2023: “We support the steps taken by Azerbaijan – with whom we act together with the motto of one nation, two states – to defend its territorial integrity”. (c. Al Jazeera, 2023) In addition to military equipment, Turkish assistance takes the form of direct advisors, joint training, and perpetual diplomatic support. Turkey has previously supported Azerbaijan in all regional and global events. However, Turkey's position evolved to one that was more proactive, forceful, and involved by the beginning of the Second Karabakh War. (c. Villar, 2025) Israel Israel serves as Azerbaijan's primary supplier of advanced arms, including intelligence technologies, artillery systems, and Heron and Harop drones. These supplies were significant in the conflicts of 2016 and 2020, where Azerbaijani forces had technological advantage. In exchange, Israel receives intelligence cooperation regarding Iranian operations and general access to an area close to Iran. Additionally, about 40% of Israel's oil demands are met by hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan, making it an essential source for them. (c. Villar, 2025) Russia From 2022 to 2024, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were at their strongest. The Declaration on Allied Interaction was signed in February 2022, which enhanced relations between both countries. Azerbaijan's president Ilham Aliyev realized that in order to accomplish Azerbaijan's regional goals of gaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh without the Russian peacekeepers and opening the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, he needed to improve ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity was the most significant aspect of the Declaration for Baku. In 2024 Russian peacekeepers withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh entirely. (c. APRI Armenia, 2025) 7. Iran’s concerns Iran's territorial integrity is threatened by the Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation, according to Iran's political and military leaders. Citing remarks from Turkish and Azerbaijani officials as well as media that support the ‘liberation’ of so-called ‘Southern Azerbaijan’ – which refers to Iran's northwestern provinces with an Azerbaijani majority – the Iranian government has accused both countries of inciting “separatist movements” among Iran's Azerbaijani population. Iran's worries have been increased by what they call “historical distortion” in Azerbaijan's educational system, which promotes expansionist narratives to younger generations by speaking of a ‘Greater Azerbaijan’ that includes territory within Iran. (c. Villar, 2025) 8. EU’s response and involvement “I saw that governments would make grand statements about morality and do nothing. I saw that they would try to take advantage of the unrest in the Caucasus in order to further their own ideological agendas. I saw that it would be the people, my people, the Armenians of Artsakh, who would suffer.” (c. Arslan, 2023) While EU officials and lawmakers have expressed their ‘concerns’ and made vocal statements of sympathy with the people of Nagorno-Karabakh since December, none of the EU's member states or heads of state have attempted to advocate for involvement in Azerbaijan for the protection of the Nagorno-Karabakh population. According to French MEP François-Xavier Bellamy, the EU's decision on Nagorno-Karabakh is turning into a matter between the Parliament and the Commission. The Parliament has voted in favor of imposing sanctions on Azerbaijan, but the European Commission has chosen not to follow through. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, traveled to the city of Azerbaijan in July 2022 to announce the deal doubling Azerbaijan's gas imports into the EU. She said that the European Union made the decision to loosen its ties with Russia in favor of more dependable, trustworthy allies like Azerbaijan. She stated: “The European Union is committed to a secure, stable and prosperous South Caucasus”. Azerbaijan has a history of war crimes, violations of human rights, and is ranked very low on freedom indexes. It is also the biggest destabilizer in the South Caucasus. “Azerbaijan exported more than €21bn of gas to countries in the EU between January 2022 and the end of November 2023, according to Eurostat data obtained by openDemocracy. Armenia’s Human Rights Ombudsman’s office made more than 130 public statements warning of threats to ethnic Armenians caused by Azerbaijani military actions in the 18 months before the MoU was signed. Estonian MEP Marina Kaljurand, who heads the Parliament’s delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, told openDemocracy that the commission had “traded EU values for gas”.” (c. Martirosyan & Sargsyan, 2024) The hypocrisy of the European Union is astounding, as they are well aware of the ethnic cleansing that Azerbaijan intends to inflict on Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. The idea that the European Union is in decline because of its disregard for morality comes from the EU's decision to support authoritarian governments, such as Azerbaijan and Israel, that are determined to erase Armenians and Palestinians rather than advancing peace and justice. 9. Consequences Although a wave of refugees from the Karabakh war in 2020 was taken in by Armenia, the problem is far more serious. Yerevan is facing pressure not only from its citizens, but also Karabakh Armenians who are unsure of their future and are pulling together the pieces of an integration plan. Azerbaijan had made it clear by openly announcing their intent to annex the Armenian region of Syunik in order to establish an oil pipeline that would link its borders with Turkey, furthering their century-long plan of pan-Turkism. Anti-armenian sentiment has grown into a dominant ideology in Azerbaijan. It rejects any and all claims made by other ethnic groups and civilizations to their territories. It ignores the facts of history. Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, is frequently referred to as an Azerbaijani city by Azerbaijani academics and media. “Baku might want to capitalize on the depopulating of Nagorno-Karabakh with a swift military movement across Armenian territory to control access to Nakhchivan, an exclave region of Azerbaijan bordering Iran. But now that Armenia is poised to join the ICC, Azerbaijan’s political and military leaders would likely risk investigation by the ICC prosecutor of the crime of aggression. That may explain the Armenian Parliament’s rapid move to ratify the Rome Statute – to address not only the fate of ethnic Armenians but to deter any Azerbaijani aggression across its territory.” (c. Scheffer, 2023) 10. The Peace Deal and current situation Under US guidance, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a peace deal in the beginning of August 2025. The White House declared it historic, and Western media quickly reported that a decades-long dispute had finally been resolved as a result of U.S. President Donald Trump's intervention. But is that really the truth? The United States' involvement in the proposed Zangezur corridor has been criticized by Iran and Russia as an incursion. The peace agreement's failure to address the right of return for former ethnic Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh due to Azerbaijan's nine-month military siege and offensive has also drawn criticism from observers. While the agreement secures the road linking Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, it is crucial to note that it gives the United States the right to manage and develop the corridor for 99 years. The US would sublease the property to a consortium that would build rail, oil, gas, and fiber optic lines in addition to potentially transmitting electricity along the 43km corridor. This further proves that the true intention behind this initiative was to gain more control by reducing the influence of Russia and Iran in the region. After the parties decided on the agreement form, Azerbaijan stated that before Armenia would sign, it needed to meet two additional demands. First: Baku wanted the two nations to jointly petition the OSCE to abolish the Minsk Group. The issue over “Nagorno-Karabakh”, which Baku interprets as the period of Armenian control, is the focus of the Minsk Group's 1995 mission, which Azerbaijan finds objectionable. The two signed a letter requesting that the OSCE shut down the Minsk Group, fulfilling that demand. The second one was far more concerning, which is Azerbaijan's demand that Armenia change its constitution. Officials from Azerbaijan say they want peace, but only if Armenia gives up its territorial claims. They reject claims that the demand for a constitutional change is unreasonable. The power ultimately stays with Azerbaijan once again. The executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America, Aram Hamparian, stated that “normalizing ethnic cleansing is not peace” and believed that the agreement was based on the erasure of Nagorno-Karabakh, the abandonment of holy sites, the disregard for hostages, and the strengthening of Azerbaijani occupation. The signing of the peace deal left the majority of Armenians in dismay. The general consensus is that the Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan has betrayed the people of Armenia and Artsakh, and that there should be no peace without justice. 11. Conclusion Peace does not always mean that there is no military conflicts. Aliyev hasn't completely stopped using hostile language toward Armenia. Azerbaijani leaders are emphasizing more and more that the war has ended. However, the president enthusiastically promoted the idea of “Western Azerbaijan” at a speech he gave in November. The normalization effort continues amid the fact that state media and elites, including Aliyev, continue to use anti-Armenian rhetoric for home audiences. Approximately 200 square kilometers of internationally recognized Armenian land are still occupied by Azerbaijan, which they acquired during their offensives in 2022. It is essential for Armenia's future administration to seek justice. In order to foster lasting peace, the first step is recognizing history. The fact that even Adolf Hitler admitted the massacre in 1939 makes the demand for greater acknowledgment all the more urgent. The Armenian Genocide served as a model for what he was about to achieve in Poland: “I have placed my death-head formations in readiness – for the present only in the East – with orders to them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish derivation and language. Only thus shall we gain the living space (lebensraum) which we need. Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in 1943-1944 to refer to the deliberate annihilation of peoples. After hearing about the trial of Soghomon Tehlirian in 1921, who killed a major perpetrator of the Armenian Genocide, he started studying mass exterminations. The term was developed to describe the mass atrocities against Armenians in order to define the Holocaust. The word itself would not exist without the Armenian Genocide, and yet, it is officially recognized by just 35 nations. Not enough people are prepared to stand up for victims and potential victims; too many would be happy to complete what was begun in the 1910s and ignore the Armenian people in the name of Turkish nationalism. If there is another threat of genocidal intent against Armenia and its people, we cannot and we must not turn a blind eye. 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1. The Strategic Importance of Space Development: A Measure of National Competitiveness Space has evolved beyond being a domain of scientific exploration to become a crucial strategic asset that determines a nation's survival and prosperity. Whereas the space race during the Cold War was primarily a "pride competition" to showcase ideological superiority, space development in the 21st century has become a practical battlefield for controlling economic, security, and technological dominance. First, the importance of space in national security and military aspects. Modern warfare is fundamentally an "information war." Real-time surveillance through reconnaissance satellites, precision strike capabilities using GPS, and high-speed satellite communication networks form the backbone of contemporary military power. Nations that fail to secure space assets risk becoming "blind" in terms of information, which can lead to critical gaps in their defense capabilities. The global trend of establishing "space forces" is a direct result of space becoming firmly established as the 4th battlefield, after land, sea, and air. Second, the economic value and creation of new industries. With the onset of the "New Space" era, the private sector-led space industry is growing explosively. Building a global internet network using small satellite constellations, space tourism, and the manufacturing of ultra-precise semiconductors or new drugs in space are generating enormous value. Moreover, rare resources like rare earth elements and helium-3 found on the Moon or asteroids are seen as the final hope for solving Earth's resource depletion issues. Nations that secure these resources will likely control the future global economy. Third, the spillover effect on science and technology. Space development involves overcoming extreme environmental challenges, and the technologies developed — such as rocket propulsion, advanced materials engineering, artificial intelligence, and robotics — spill over into civilian industries, revolutionizing daily life. Technologies like water purifiers, microwaves, and cordless vacuum cleaners were all originally spin-offs from space exploration. In this way, investment in space development serves as a lever to elevate a nation's overall technological level. Lastly, international status and diplomatic influence. Countries that possess independent launch vehicle technology and satellite operations capabilities gain strong influence in the international arena. Space development requires significant capital and highly advanced technologies, and nations that succeed in this field acquire symbolic capital as "technological powerhouses." This helps them play a leading role in international cooperation frameworks and enhances national pride. In conclusion, space development is not merely a future investment but an essential national strategy to protect current security and secure future resources. As the saying goes, "He who controls space, controls the Earth," pioneering the path to space is a mission for sustainable national development in this era. 2. The History of South Korea's Space Development. South Korea’s Space Development History: A Record of Challenges from Nothing to Something South Korea's journey in space development began later than that of many advanced nations, yet it has grown at an extraordinarily rapid pace — so much so that it is hard to find a parallel in the world. From laying the foundation in the early 1990s, South Korea has risen to become one of the top seven space-faring nations in just about 30 years. This journey marks the transformation from a "follower" to a "leader" in space development. 2.1. South Korea's Satellites The journey began in August 1992 with the launch of Arirang-1, South Korea’s first satellite. Built in collaboration with a British university, this small satellite was the first "eye" South Korea sent into space, making the country the 22nd nation in the world to have a satellite in orbit. Throughout the 1990s, South Korea focused on domestically producing satellite bodies and payload technology, notably through the Arirang series and multipurpose satellites, laying the foundation for the country’s space technology. Figure 1. Timeline of South Korea's Satellites (Source: Namu Wiki) 2.2. South Korea's Launch Vehicles The development of launch vehicles began in earnest in the 2000s. In 2002, South Korea successfully launched its first liquid-propelled scientific rocket, KSR-III, which helped the country accumulate crucial rocket engine technology. This laid the groundwork for the construction of the Naro Space Center in 2009, the heart of South Korea's space development. However, the road to self-sufficiency in launch vehicles was challenging. The Naro rocket (KSLV-I), developed in cooperation with Russia, faced two failed launches, a painful setback. Despite these failures, South Korea achieved a historic milestone with the successful launch of Naro-3 in January 2013, sending a domestically built satellite into space for the first time. The success of Naro-3 became a springboard for the development of South Korea’s indigenous launch vehicle, the Nuri rocket (KSLV-II). Unlike the Naro rocket, which used Russian engines, the Nuri rocket had to be entirely designed, built, tested, and operated with South Korean technology — a monumental challenge. After an incomplete success in its first launch in 2021, South Korea achieved full success with the second launch of Nuri in June 2022. With this achievement, South Korea became the seventh country in the world to launch a practical satellite weighing over 1 ton using a domestically developed launch vehicle. The country's progress continues at an even faster pace. In August 2022, South Korea launched the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO), the country’s first lunar orbiter, which successfully entered lunar orbit. This marks South Korea's first step beyond low Earth orbit and into deep space exploration. Additionally, South Korea’s Space Agency (KASA), responsible for overseeing space development, officially opened in May 2024 in Sacheon, Gyeongsangnam-do, aligning the country's space policies with specialized expertise and consistency. Currently, South Korea is following an ambitious “Space Economy Roadmap”, which includes plans to launch a lunar lander in 2032 and a Mars exploration mission by 2045. Moving past the phase of technology imitation, South Korea is now advancing its capabilities in cutting-edge reconnaissance satellites, small satellite constellations, and high-performance next generation launch vehicles, positioning itself as a leading player in the global exploration of humanity’s new frontiers. Here is the Timeline of South Korea’s Launch Vehicles (Source: Wikipedia). Note: KSR: Korea Sounding Rocket (Korean Scientific Observation Rocket). KSLV: Korea Space Launch Vehicle (Korean Space Launch Vehicle: I represents the Naro series, II represents the Nuri series) • 1377: During the 3rd year of King Uwang of the Goryeo Dynasty, Choi Mu-seon created the first Korean rocket, called "Juhwa" (走火), later known as "Shingijeon". • 1451: The 1st year of King Munjong of the Joseon Dynasty, Munjonghwacha (a fire-wheeled vehicle, a type of rocket). • 1958 January: Inha University establishes a Department of Weapons Engineering. • 1958: The Ministry of Defense establishes a rocket research organization at the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). • 1959 July: ADD successfully launches a two-stage rocket (67th rocket) and a three-stage rocket (556th rocket) from the coastal area of Gojan-dong, Incheon. • 1960 November 15: Inha University develops the IITO-1A rocket. • 1960 November 19: Inha University develops the IITO-2A rocket. • 1960 November 19: Test launch of the IITO-1A and IITO-2A rockets from the waters off Songdo, Incheon, at 3:50 PM. • 1961: ADD disbanded. • 1962 April: Inha University establishes the Inha Rocket Research Society. • 1964 May: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the IITO-1A from the coast of Gojan-dong, Incheon. • 1964 October: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the IIT-3A rocket, which fails. • 1964 December: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the two-stage rocket IITA-4MR. • 1964 December: Inha Rocket Research Society launches the largest three-stage rocket, IITA-7CR, using a solid propellant from Japan. • 1970: Air Force Academy's Park Gui-yong and Jo Ok-chan's team launch the AXR-55 rocket with asphalt propellant, supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology. • 1971: Air Force Academy launches the AXR-73 rocket with asphalt propellant. • 1972: ADD begins rocket research. • 1972 December: Air Force Academy launches the AXR-300 rocket, with a total of three launches. • 1978: ADD develops the domestic medium-range ballistic missile, Baekgom, modeled after the U.S. Nike Hercules. • 1986: Inha University begins the development of the IS-X rocket series under the Inha Rocket Research Society. • 1987: The Space Science Institute of the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASI) is established to start developing scientific rockets. • 1988 February: Inha University launches IS-001 and IS-002 rockets. • 1988: Scientific rocket development project is selected as a specific research task by the Ministry of Science and Technology. • 1988 December: Inha Rocket Research Society presents the IS-X research report. • 1989 October: The Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) is established. • 1993 June: KARI launches the solid rocket KSR-I (KSR-420) from the Anheung Test Site on the west coast. • 1993 September: KARI successfully launches KSR-I (KSR-420) for the second time from Anheung Test Site. • 1995: South Korea develops its first pressurized liquid-fueled rocket engine with a thrust of 13 tons. • 1996: South Korea establishes its Mid- and Long-Term National Space Development Plan, aiming to achieve the capability to launch low-earth orbit satellites independently by 2010. • 1997 July 9: KARI launches the two-stage solid scientific rocket KSR-II. • 1998: The 5th Science and Technology Ministers' Meeting approved the modification of the national space development plan, shortening the goal for independent satellite launches to 2005. • 2000: The second revision of the space development plan is approved, setting goals for securing small satellite launch vehicle technology by 2005, 1-ton practical satellite launch technology by 2010, and 1.5-ton practical satellite launch technology by 2015. • 2002: KARI launches South Korea's first liquid-propelled scientific rocket, KSR-III. • 2004: South Korea and Russia sign a space technology cooperation agreement. • 2006: South Korea and Russia sign a space technology protection agreement. • 2008: KARI develops a 30-ton rocket engine, completing prototype development and partial testing of the turbo pump-gas generator system. • 2008: KARI begins the development of a 75-ton rocket engine. • 2008: The Naro Space Center is completed. • 2009 August 25: KARI attempts the first launch of Naro-1 (KSLV-I), South Korea's first satellite launch vehicle. The launch fails due to fairing separation issues. • 2010 June 10: KARI attempts the second launch of Naro-2. The rocket explodes during flight, resulting in failure. • 2013 January 30: KARI successfully launches the Naro-3, sending the Naro Scientific Satellite into orbit and achieving successful communication. • 2015 July 30: South Korea announces the successful completion of the first phase of the Korean launch vehicle development program. • 2018 November 28: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) test vehicle. • 2018: South Korea successfully launches the Arirang 2 satellite. • 2021 October 21: South Korea attempts the first launch of the Nuri rocket. The launch fails. • 2022 June 21: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri rocket (KSLV-II) for the second time. • 2023 May 25: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) for the third time. • 2025 November 27: South Korea successfully launches the Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) for the fourth time. Upcoming Launches: • 2026: The 5th launch of the Nuri rocket. • 2027: The 6th launch of the Nuri rocket. • 2030: Development of the next generation launch vehicle. • 2035: Development of a large geostationary launch vehicle. Figure 2. South Korea’s Space Development Progress Plan 3. Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) Technical Characteristics: The Core Mechanisms of the Korean Launch Vehicle The Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) is the first space launch vehicle to be entirely developed using South Korea's independent technology, from design and production to testing and launch operations. This achievement is not just about launching a rocket; it represents a significant technological milestone in securing sovereign control over the "transportation vehicle" to space, marking immense technical value. The most critical technological achievement of the Nuri Rocket is the indigenous development of the 75-ton liquid rocket engine. The Nuri Rocket consists of three stages: the first stage contains four 75-ton engines clustered together to form a 300-ton engine; the second stage uses one 75-ton engine; and the third stage carries one 7-ton engine. The 75-ton engines, in particular, represent a complex technological achievement, as they must reliably burn extremely cold oxidizers at -183°C and high-pressure fuel — technologies that demand advanced precision. The Key Technical Features: 1. Engine Clustering Technology: The first stage of the Nuri Rocket uses four 75-ton engines arranged in a cluster. These engines must operate as though they were a single engine, requiring precise synchronization. To prevent combustion imbalances or vibrations between the engines, advanced synchronization technology has been applied. This ensures that the rocket achieves stable thrust. Even the slightest error in one of the four engines would cause the rocket to deviate from its flight path, making this clustering technology a central achievement of Nuri. 2. Lightweight Structure and Large-Scale Component Manufacturing: For efficient launch, the rocket structure needs to be both strong and as lightweight as possible. The fuel tanks of the Nuri Rocket are made with walls as thin as 2mm to 3mm, showcasing an advanced level of manufacturing. The large aluminum sheets used for the tanks are precisely welded, and high-pressure resistance is ensured through spinning and specialized welding techniques. These methods represent cutting-edge manufacturing capabilities in the aerospace field. 3. Cryogenic and High-Temperature Environment Control: The Nuri Rocket has to manage two extreme conditions simultaneously — cryogenic temperatures to store liquid oxidizers and high temperatures reaching thousands of degrees Celsius during engine combustion. To handle these conditions, specialized thermal insulation and heat-resistant materials are used. Additionally, the rocket's gimbaling system, which controls the angle of the engines to adjust the direction of flight, is designed to function perfectly even under high acceleration and in vacuum conditions. 4. Indigenous Flight Control and Guidance Software: The brain of the Nuri Rocket is its flight control computer, which automatically calculates and adjusts the trajectory from launch to orbit insertion. With algorithms developed entirely using domestic technology, this computer can precisely place satellites into their intended orbits without external assistance. This capability is crucial for national security, as it involves the precise and autonomous control of satellite launches. 5. Satellite Separation and Deployment Technology: As demonstrated during the third launch of Nuri, the ability to deploy multiple satellites at specific time intervals without causing collisions is a highly precise mechanism. This technology is essential for building large-scale satellite constellations in the future, laying the groundwork for future advancements in space. Overall, the Nuri Rocket's design and development represent a comprehensive mastery of advanced space technologies and mark South Korea’s leap into the forefront of space exploration. 4. Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II) Launch Achievements: Milestones in Expanding South Korea’s Space Territory The successful launch of Nuri Rocket (KSLV-II), South Korea’s domestically developed launch vehicle, is not just the achievement of putting a rocket into orbit; it represents a significant accomplishment in terms of national prestige and technological self-reliance. Through three major launches, South Korea has firmly joined the ranks of "space powers." The most notable achievement is South Korea's entry into the "Top 7 Space Powers." With the success of the Nuri Rocket, South Korea became the 7th country (after Russia, the U.S., Europe, China, Japan, and India) capable of independently launching a 1-ton or heavier practical satellite into low Earth orbit. This means South Korea has secured complete sovereignty over its "transportation vehicle" for space exploration and development, enabling the country to launch satellites at its desired time without relying on other countries. Examining the step-by-step launch achievements reveals a clear progression: 1st Launch (October 2021): South Korea successfully launched a satellite simulator to a target altitude of 700 km, proving the performance of the engine in flight. Although the rocket failed to reach orbit due to an early shutdown of the third-stage engine, the launch confirmed that most of the challenges in developing large liquid rockets had been overcome. 2nd Launch (June 2022): South Korea successfully deployed the performance verification satellite into its designated orbit. This moment proved the reliability of the launch vehicle, entirely built with 100% domestic technology, to the world. 3rd Launch (May 2023): The third launch successfully carried out a "real-world mission," deploying eight operational satellites, including Next-Generation Small Satellite 2. Notably, the technology to separate multiple satellites sequentially was successfully demonstrated, proving the launch vehicle’s operational capabilities. Industrial Achievements: The development of Nuri involved over 300 domestic companies. This collaboration allowed private companies to accumulate expertise in component design, assembly, and testing for large-scale scientific projects. This shift in expertise has accelerated the transition from Old Space (government-led space programs) to New Space (private-sector-led space ventures). Companies like Hanwha Aerospace have emerged, marking the start of a full-fledged aerospace industry ecosystem. National Security and Diplomatic Achievements: The technology behind launch vehicles has significant overlap with that of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Therefore, the success of Nuri symbolizes South Korea’s strong national deterrence and technological stature. Additionally, owning an independent launch vehicle has enhanced South Korea’s negotiating power in international space collaborations, such as the Artemis Program, enabling the country to participate as an equal partner in global space exploration initiatives. Public Sentiment and National Pride: Finally, Nuri has instilled a sense of pride and hope among the South Korean people. The journey from nothing to becoming a space power in 30 years has ignited a sense of ambition and a spirit of challenge in the younger generation. The ongoing 4th to 6th launch series will further increase the reliability of the rocket, laying a strong foundation for South Korea’s expanding space economy. Future missions, including the lunar lander launch, will help to further broaden South Korea's space economic territory. In conclusion, the successful launches of Nuri Rocket not only establish South Korea as a key player in space exploration but also highlight its technological self-sufficiency and the evolving space industry, setting the stage for continued advancements in space exploration. 5. Economic Competitiveness and Commercialization of the Space Industry: New Growth Drivers in the 'New Space' Era In the past, space development was seen as a massive budget expenditure aimed at enhancing national prestige. However, we have now entered the era of the ‘Space Economy’, which generates tremendous added value. Particularly, the commercialization strategy led by private companies is fundamentally reshaping the space industry’s paradigm. First, Revolutionary Reductions in Launch Costs Have Opened the Doors to Commercialization: The "reusable rocket" technology introduced by SpaceX has lowered launch costs to a fraction of what they once were — about one-tenth of previous levels. Building on the success of the Nuri Rocket, South Korea is also working to enhance its economic competitiveness through the development of next generation launch vehicles. As launch costs decrease, more companies will be able to venture into space, leading to the diversification of commercial services in the space sector. Second, Miniature Satellite Constellations Are Opening New Markets for Commercial Services: Instead of a single large satellite, hundreds or thousands of small satellites in low Earth orbit are now being launched to create global, ultra-high-speed internet networks, as seen with the Starlink model. This approach targets underserved areas like remote islands, airplanes, and ships, generating significant revenue. South Korean companies such as Hanwha Systems and KAI are actively entering the satellite communications and Earth observation data markets to enhance their commercial competitiveness. Third, Space Resource Mining and Manufacturing Offer New Opportunities: Resources like helium-3 (a potential energy source) on the Moon, and rare minerals from asteroids, are expected to be at the heart of future resource wars. Additionally, In-space Manufacturing in zero-gravity environments allows us to produce ultra-pure fiber optics, large single-crystal semiconductors, and 3D-printed bioengineered organs — products that are impossible to create on Earth. These high-value products promise to offset transportation costs and generate substantial commercial profits. Fourth, Spin-offs and Technology Transfer to the Private Sector: The technology developed for the Nuri Rocket being transferred to integrated companies (such as Hanwha Aerospace) is an example of how public-sector-led technologies can be turned into commercial business ventures. By increasing domestic production rates and establishing mass production systems, South Korea can enter global supply chains, generating economic success through exports of launch vehicle components and subsystems to the international market. Finally, the Rise of the Space Tourism and Services Market: Private space travel, led by companies such as Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic, is already creating a premium market with ticket prices in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. This trend goes beyond mere tourism and is driving the growth of related industries, including space hotels, space funerals, and space insurance. In conclusion, the commercialization of the space industry goes beyond technological perfection and depends on the ‘sustainability of profit models’. South Korea, building on the technological foundation established by the Nuri Rocket’s success, must combine private creativity and capital to develop economic strategies aimed at increasing its share in the global space market. Space has now transitioned from being merely a domain of exploration to a highly competitive business arena. 6. Next-Generation Launch Vehicle Plans South Korea's next-generation launch vehicle (commonly referred to as KSLV-III) plan can be summarized in one sentence: "After Nuri (1.5-ton class), develop a larger launch vehicle capable of sending a lunar lander into space with a focus on the private sector, and aim to launch a lunar mission (lander) in the early 2030s." Key Goals: • Development of a Next-Generation Launch Vehicle aimed at launching a lunar lander. • Nuri Rocket will undergo repeated launches and technology transfer to the private sector by 2027, after which the focus will shift to the next generation launch vehicle. Timeline (Overview): • The goal is to have the first launch of the next-generation vehicle by 2030. • The next generation launch vehicle for the lunar lander mission is expected to be ready by 2033. o Different documents may refer to these milestones as "first launch in 2030" and "lunar lander mission launch in 2033," but it’s generally understood as a staged process from initial flight testing to lunar mission deployment. Propulsion System (Direction): • The development emphasizes private sector leadership and public-private cooperation, enhancing the "industry-led" approach compared to the previous Nuri system. What About Reusability? • Officially, reusable launch vehicles haven’t been confirmed yet. However, discussions in space policy and industry circles often mention reusability as part of the next-generation vehicle's advancement, reflecting a trend toward incorporating modern launch technologies. Development Strategy: • The next generation launch vehicle is set to transition from Nuri (1.5-ton class) to larger launch vehicles capable of handling lunar lander missions. • The government and KARI (Korea Aerospace Research Institute) plan to achieve initial flight by 2030, with a lunar mission (lander launch) targeted for 2033. o The process will follow a step-by-step roadmap, from initial testing to deployment for lunar missions. Key Focus: • The development approach is shifting from state-driven initiatives to private sector-driven and public-private partnership models, aiming to expand industrial capabilities. • Reusability and other advanced technologies will likely be incorporated into the development process but are not yet finalized as the primary technical path. They remain a consideration under the broader goal of next generation launch vehicle refinement. Conclusion: South Korea's next generation launch vehicle plan is centered on industrialization and operational experience accumulated from the Nuri rocket. The long-term goal is to achieve lunar lander missions in the early 2030s, marked by larger, more advanced rockets, and a shift toward a private-sector-led space industry.

Donald Trump delivered an ultimatum to Iran at the first board of peace meeting in Washington on February 19. He told Tehran to reach a “meaningful” deal with the US within ten to 15 days, or “really bad things” will happen. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt had earlier said there are many arguments for taking military action in Iran. These comments came as reports indicated that the latest round of indirect talks between the two countries in Switzerland on February 17 had made at least some headway. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, emerged from the negotiations hailing what he saw as “good progress”. He added that the US and Iran had reached an understanding on “guiding principles”. The assessment of US representatives was less positive. Despite acknowledging that “in some ways” the talks went well, US vice-president J.D. Vance said Iran was refusing to acknowledge core US demands. The US wants Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme completely, reduce the number and range of its ballistic missiles and end its support for regional proxy groups. Following the talks, the US has continued to reinforce its military presence in the Middle East. Cargo planes, fighter jets, refuelling tankers and an aircraft carrier have been moved to the region, with a second aircraft carrier expected to arrive soon. According to the New York Times, the buildup of US forces in the Middle East is now sufficient for Trump to order military action at any moment. Iran appears to be gearing up for a confrontation. Its military held joint drills with Russia on February 19, days after the Strait of Hormuz was closed temporarily as Iran carried out live-fire exercises. And while emphasising that it “neither seeks tension nor war”, Iran has told the UN that if it were attacked it would consider “all bases, facilities and assets of the hostile force” in the region as “legitimate targets”. These developments come less than a week after hundreds of thousands of people, largely from the Iranian diaspora, demonstrated in cities worldwide. They did so in solidarity with protesters who took to the streets of Iran in January to demand regime change. In late December, protests that began over worsening economic conditions quickly spread nationwide in one of the most serious threats to Iran’s political establishment since the Woman, Life, Freedom protest movement of 2022. That protest wave began after the death of a 22-year-old women called Mahsa Amini in police custody. This time round, the Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown, creating a nationwide communications blackout in an effort to suppress the unrest. Human rights groups say thousands of people were killed, while many more were injured, detained or remain missing, in what was one of the most severe crackdowns in Iran’s modern history. According to local police, around 250,000 people rallied on February 14 in the German city of Munich alone, where world leaders had gathered for Europe’s biggest security conference. Many of those in attendance waved flags bearing the lion and sun emblem of Iran that was used before the Islamic revolution in 1979 ended the Pahlavi dynasty. Israeli and American flags were also visible at many of the rallies. This has widely been seen as a call for foreign intervention against Iran’s clerical leadership. Trump had raised the prospect of US military action during the unrest, urging the Iranian people to continue protesting and telling them that help was “on its way”. Such action now appears likely. Brink of war Iran’s fate is hanging in the balance. The deployment of US military assets to the Middle East suggests Trump may be preparing for imminent military action. However, despite making no secret of his desire to topple the Iranian regime, there is still a chance that Trump settles for a diplomatic agreement with the country’s leadership. Iranian opposition voices, including exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi, say such a deal would only prolong the survival of the Islamic Republic rather than address the demands of people in Iran for regime change. In an interview with American political commentator Glenn Beck on February 11, Pahlavi called the negotiations between the US and Iran “another slap in the face of the Iranian people”. But the prospects that any deal will be reached look slim. The US and Iran remain in fundamental disagreement over Tehran’s nuclear programme and have been unable to reach a deal since the Trump administration withdrew the US from a previous agreement in 2018 that had been negotiated by the Obama administration. Many people, including the US vice-president, are also sceptical that Iran’s authorities will budge on additional US demands around ballistic missiles and proxy groups like Hamas and Hezbollah – whether or not they are threatened with military action. Iran’s future is murky. But one thing is for certain: with war or without war, the Iranian people have started a revolution that has extended beyond their country’s borders.

I. Introduction In late December 2025, mass protests erupted across Iran, driven by public anger over the deepening economic crisis. Initially led by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran, the demonstrations quickly spread to universities and major cities such as Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad, becoming the largest unrest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Over time, the movement expanded beyond economic demands to include calls for freedom and, in some cases, the overthrow of the regime. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans such as “death to the dictator.” [1] In response, since late December 2025 Iranian state security forces have engaged in massacres of dissidents. The Iranian government has also cut off internet access and telephone services in an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing. The Iranian government has accused the US and Israel of fueling the protests, which analysts suggest may be a tactic to increase security forces’ willingness to kill protesters. A Sunday Times report, based on information from doctors in Iran, said more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the mass protests. The Interior Ministry in Iran verified 3,117 people had been killed in protests. [2] The Iranian protests, the largest in the Islamic Republic’s 46-year history, appear to have subsided for now in the face of a violent government crackdown. US President Donald Trump has threatened to “hit very hard” if the situation in Iran escalates, reigniting concerns about possible US intervention in the region. Even Trump called Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “sick man” in an interview with Politico on January 17th, 2026, and said, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” It appeared to be the first time Trump had called for the end of Khamenei’s rule in Iran. [3] Despite having repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the regime were to start killing protesters, Trump has held off on any immediate military action against the Islamic Republic. While the US reportedly sent the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the Middle East on January 15th, 2026, President Trump has not specified what he might do. However, on January 28th, 2026, Trump posted on social media: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran... It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” Saying that time is running out, Trump demanded that Iran immediately negotiate a nuclear deal. He also suggested his country’s next attack on Iran could be worse than last year’s. In response, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned the US that any attack on his country would result in a “regional war” as US President Donald Trump has amassed military assets in the Middle East. With this tension between Iran and the US running high, Iran and the US held a nuclear talk on Friday on February 6th, 2026, in Oman. However, the deal was not reached, although both sides agreed to resume the talks. If the US and Iran fail to strike a deal and then the US carries out military strikes on Iran, what will happen? Does US military strikes make a democratic transition in Iran possible? This paper deals with this issue. It first introduces theory on democratic transition and then examines whether US military strikes against Iran makes a democratic transition in Iran possible. II. Theory on democratic transition There is a considerable body of literature on theories of democratic transition. These broadly fall into the following categories: [4] a. Structuralist approaches which see the emergence of democracy as tied to factors such as economic development (Lipsett, 1959; O’Donnell 1979), political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), civil society and class conflict (Moore, 1966). b. Strategic choice approaches which focus on the calculations and decisions made by elites (Rustow, 1970; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Burton and Higley, 1987). c. Institutionalist approaches which stress the impact of institutions on policies and patterns of political actions (Leftwich, 2017). d. Political economic approaches which stress economic determinants of political change and democratization, in particular the impact of economic crises (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Guo, 1999). Empirical case studies (for example, Haggard and Kaufman, 1995) suggest that, rather than a single theory to explain democratic transitions, a combination of these theories is usually applicable. According to Idris (2016)’s study of the five case studies of South Africa (1986), Ghana (2000), the Philippines (1986), Indonesia (1999) and Ukraine (2004), enabling factors for the emergence of democracies are below: [5] - Unpopular incumbent: With the exception of Ghana, all the incumbent regimes were very unpopular, often characterized by human rights abuses, corruption, mismanagement and denial of democratic freedoms. A breakdown of the ‘authoritarian bargain’ in the Philippines and Indonesia, whereby growth and development were provided with limited democracy, fueled public opposition. - Economic development & situation: Economic development was a main factor in many democratic transitions, but the precise influence varied. Indonesia is the clearest example of democratic transition advanced by economic crisis (effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997); in the Ukraine, in contrast, growth had been strong overall, but inequality and corruption fueled public frustration. However, the modernization theory (Lipsett, 1959) that economic growth and development is a prior condition/enabling factor for democratization rarely applied. - United opposition and strong leadership figures: The ability of the opposition to unite around a common goal, especially behind strong leaders, was an important factor in democratic transitions. Cory Aquino in the Philippines, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine played this role. - Strong civil society: An organized civil society played a significant role in mass mobilization, monitoring government actions (e.g. election fraud) and countering government measures to suppress them. In Ukraine, for instance, many leaders of the 2004 Orange Revolution had taken part in anti-government protests in 2000-1; civil society groups in South Africa mounted a very effective civil disobedience campaign. - Mass mobilization: was a critical factor in successful democratic transitions, seen in South Africa, the Ukraine, the Philippines, and Indonesia. This came about because of information dissemination through television, radio, and the internet, as well as civil society groups. Mass protests created an irreversible momentum for change and led to defection or unwillingness to use force and violence against demonstrators on the part of the security forces. - International pressure/support: Military/Diplomatic/donor (e.g. IMF) pressure on an authoritarian regime could force it to make concessions where domestic factors alone would not. South Africa exemplifies this: without international sanctions and international condemnation of the apartheid regime, reform and democratization would not possible or likely have taken much longer. Ghana’s democratic transition arguably began mainly because of IMF pressure. External ‘democratic aid’, e.g. to raise public awareness of democratic values and build up the capacity of civil society groups, also made a difference. In Ukraine, a decade of such external support meant civil society groups were able to effectively monitor and document electoral fraud by the Kuchma government. III. The Case of Iran US military strikes on Iran is an international pressure/support that this paper explained as an enabling factor for the emergence of democracies. US military strikes on Iran are the most important element in facilitating a democratic transition in Iran. Thus, this paper first takes a look at current US military build-up to attack the Iranian regime and then explores whether US military strikes on Iran make a democratic transition in Iran possible. 1. US military build-up As US President Donald Trump considers a major strike on Iran, the US military has accelerated a weeks-long buildup of military hardware in the Middle East, open-source data shows. As Figure 1 shows, the arrival of the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, now in the northern Arabian Sea, represents the most dramatic shift in military positioning. The group includes the USS Abraham Lincoln along with three guided-missile destroyers and the carrier air wing which includes squadrons of F-35C Lightning II fighters, F/A-18E Super Hornet fighters, and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets. The US Navy also has three destroyers — the USS McFaul, USS Delbert D. Black, and USS Mitscher — in the region separate from the aircraft carrier strike group. Three littoral combat ships — USS Santa Barbara, USS Canberra, and USS Tulsa — based out of Bahrain could be called upon for minesweeping duties if Iran chooses to deploy such armaments. Figure 1: US military presence in the Middle East (source: Congressional Research Service, Airframes.io and FlightRadar24) In recent days, the US has deployed various air defense systems to the region as well, including additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, and Patriot missile systems that appeared at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar last week, Those systems would be key to combating retaliatory missile strikes of Iran by taking aim at either US military assets or US allies in the region. The guided-missile destroyers steaming with the Lincoln and elsewhere in the region offer significant strike potential. Each destroyer can carry dozens of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles with a range of 1,000 miles and wielding a 1,000-pound conventional warhead. In addition, US Navy carrier strike groups usually operate with an attack submarine that can also launch Tomahawks, but the presence of submarines is almost never disclosed. While the aircraft carrier provides a floating base for military operations, the US has a number of permanent locations in the region where a slew of other aircraft have also been heading. As Figure 2 shows, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the US has at least 19 military bases - eight of which are considered to be permanent - across the Middle East. The US has a major military presence in Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman and the UAE. In Djibouti and Turkey, the US maintains large military bases that serve different regional commands, but contribute to activities in the Middle East. Currently, there are approximately 40,000 US troops in the Middle East, according to US defense officials. Around a quarter of them are in al-Udeid, Qatar, which hosts combat aircraft, tankers, aerial refueling and intelligence assets. Al-Udeid is the largest US military base in the region, hosting around 10,000 troops. The next biggest military base in terms of personnel is thought to be the naval base in Bahrain. Bahrain (hosting 9,000 American troops) is where the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is headquartered, with responsibility over the Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and some of the Indian Ocean. Kuwait hosts Camp Arifjan. That is the name of the tactical (or forward) headquarters of the US Army Central - a military formation that serves as the army component for Centcom. Ali al-Salem air base is also in Kuwait, along the Iraqi border. Another Kuwait base is Camp Buehring, which has been a staging post for units heading to Syria and Iraq. In total, around 13,500 US troops are stationed in Kuwait. Figure 2: US troops numbers in the Middle East (source: Middle East Eye) The UAE is home to 3,500 US troops, as well as Al-Dhafra Airbase, a site shared between the US and the Emiratis. It has been used during missions against the Islamic State group, as well as for reconnaissance missions in the region. The US military presence in Iraq includes the Ain al-Asad airbase in Anbar - a site that was targeted by Iranian missiles after the US assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the senior Iranian general. There’s also the Erbil airbase in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, which is used for training exercises. Approximately 2,700 US troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia, providing air and missile defense capabilities. The Prince Sultan Airbase, near Riyadh, is a major air force hub where its main assets include Patriot missile batteries. For its missions in the Levant, Muwaffaq Salti airbase in Jordan’s Azraq is the key hub. It hosts the US’s 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing. Further afield in Turkey, the major base run jointly with Turkish forces is the Incirlik Airbase in southern Adana. That base reportedly hosts US nuclear warheads. The size of US military bases, personnel, and equipment has fluctuated in recent years and months, reflecting shifting regional priorities. Early in President Trump’s second term, several warships departed the Middle East to support US international operations. However, naval and air power is now being bolstered in the region to attack Iran. On January 29th, 2026, an E-11A jet arrived at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This is one of the last critical assets that the US needs to coordinate complex operations. On the same day, a transport aircraft modified for combat search and rescue operations arrived in the area of Operation. A squadron of F-15E Strike Eagle fighters, capable of carrying a variety of guided bombs and air-to-surface missiles, also recently deployed to the region as part of a planned troop rotation. Surveillance flights by US drones and reconnaissance aircraft have continued in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Since last Monday, reconnaissance aircraft have been flying nonstop from US bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and even beyond the Middle East. Modified versions of the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, capable of detecting radioactive debris and interpreting electromagnetic signals, have also been deployed to the Middle East. On January 29th, 2026, at least eight aerial refueling tankers, used to provide aerial refueling for small military aircraft, crossed the Atlantic and landed at Morón Air Base in Spain. The six F-35 fighters were crossing the Atlantic and landed at Lages Air Base in Portugal. Amid high tensions over President Trump’s recent threats, US Central Command announced on January 27th, 2026 that it had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [6] 2. Will US strikes on Iran bring about a democratic transition in Iran? Iran and the US held a nuclear talk on Friday on February 6th, 2026, in Oman. However, no last-minute deal with Iran was reached, although both sides agreed to resume the talks. If the US and Iran fail to strike a deal and then the US carries out military strikes on Iran, what will happen? Will US military strikes make a democratic transition in Iran possible? According to Idris (2016)’s study of South Africa (1986), Ghana (2000), the Philippines (1986), Indonesia (1999) and Ukraine (2004), enabling factors for the emergence of democracies are: [7] • Unpopular incumbent • International pressure/support • Bad economic situation (economic crisis) • Mass mobilization • United opposition and strong leadership figures: • Strong civil society Table 1: presence or absence of six enabling factors for emergence of democracies in Iran   Among six preconditions for democratic transition, four conditions are present in Iran, while two are absent. The first condition (Unpopular incumbent) is present. Iranian regime or Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is very unpopular. He has faced recurring, intense public unrest (since 2017), indicating deep-seated unpopularity among significant segments of the population. Anti-government protests in Iran have continued since 2017, as seen below: • 2017–2018 Iranian protests • 2018–2019 Iranian general strikes and protests • 2019–2020 Iranian protests (economy, anti-government) • 2021–2022 Iranian protests (water shortages, economy) • 2022 Iranian food protests • 2022–23: Mahsa Amini protests • 2025 Iran water crisis protests (May–August) • 2025–2026 Iranian protests (anti-government, economy, human rights) Especially, according to Wikipedia, more than 3,000 anti-government protests took place in Iran each year in the 2020s. The second condition (International pressure/support) is present. US president Trump is ready to carry out military strikes on the Iranian regime to change Iran. The third condition (Bad economic situation) is present. The most serious economic problem of Iran is a skyrocketing inflation. As Figure 3 shows, inflation in Iran skyrocketed to over 48.6% in October 2025 and 42.2% in December 2025. This high inflation has been chronic in the 2020s, severely impacting household budgets. Figure 3: Inflation in Iran (source: Statistical Center of Iran) Moreover, as Figure 4 shows, food prices have significantly increased in the 2020s. For instance, the price of rice has surged by 2.11 times between 2012 and 2023, while bread costs have risen 3.4 times from 2011 to 2023. Potatoes have tripled in price over the same period, and chicken fillets have seen a 2.06-fold increase from 2010 to 2023. Figure 4: Food price index in Iran In addition, Iran faces a severe energy shortage, marked by rolling blackouts, gas cuts, and infrastructure strain, despite its massive oil and gas reserves. The Iranian energy crisis is a multifaceted problem that has been exacerbated by a combination of factors, including poor governance, foreign policy failures, and the dominance of industries under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As of November 2024, Iran faces its most severe energy crisis in decades, with frequent power outages and disruptions to natural gas supplies. The country’s energy infrastructure is outdated and in disrepair, with many refineries and power plants operating below capacity. Iran’s energy supply is unreliable, with frequent blackouts and shortages affecting daily life, industries, and essential services. The IRGC's control over key industries, including power generation and distribution, has hindered efficient management and strategic planning. The regime’s prioritization of political interests over efficient management and infrastructural development has exacerbated the crisis. A notable example is the extensive usage that the IRGC makes in electricity to mine cryptocurrency which leaves Iran in the dark.[8] Despite ongoing power shortages, Iran continues to export electricity, with a surge of nearly 92% in the first four months of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. The crisis has put a stop to 50% of industry. In January and February 2025, constant power shutdowns were conducted with the schools as well as Iranian industries. Since February 2025, Iran has been suffering from daily blackouts, each lasting for 3-4 hours. The energy shortage does not equally affect all segments of the population. For example, in Teheran, rich northern neighborhoods experienced only 1% of outages while poorer southern districts endured 32%. [9] This energy crisis created deep public frustration and anger. With inflation running extremely high, a high unemployment rate hit Iran. The unemployment rate in Iran averaged 11.04 percent from 2001 until 2024, as Figure 5 shows. Fortunately, the unemployment rate in Iran decreased to 7.20 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 from 7.50 percent in the third quarter of 2024, but the unemployment rate in Iran is still high. Figure 5: Unemployment rate in Iran (source: Central Bank of Iran) In particular, the youth unemployment rate has been very high. As Figure 6 shows, the youth unemployment rate in Iran averaged 25.01% from 2011 until 2024. Youth unemployment rate in Iran was very high at 20.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024, although it has declined. More seriously, according to Majlis reports, 50% of males between 25–40 are unemployed and not looking for employment. [10] Figure 6: youth unemployment rate in Iran (source: Central Bank of Iran) Under the situations of high inflation and high unemployment, in March 2025, estimates ranged from 22% to 50% of Iranians living under the poverty line — a stark increase from 2022. [11] As a result, the number of people that cannot afford a healthy diet increased substantially. As Figure 7 shows, the number of people in mal nourishment increased to over 14 million in 2022. The ministry of social welfare in Iran announced in 2024 that 57% of Iranians are having some level of mal nourishment. Figure 7: Number of people in mal nourishment in Iran. These economic crises have triggered nationwide protests in Iran in 2025-26. The fourth condition (Mass mobilization) is present. Anti-government protests in Iran triggered by the economic crisis are under way in 2025-26, although they have recently subsided. According to a Sunday Times report, more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the mass protests of 2025-26. Moreover, according to Wikipedia, anti-government protests in Iran have continued since 2017, as shown before. Figure 8 shows the number of anti-government protests in Iran since 2016. Over 3,000 protests took place in Iran each year in the 2020s. Figure 8: the number of anti-government protests in Iran (source: Wikipedia) However, the fifth and sixth conditions (United opposition and strong leadership figures & Strong civil society) are absent in Iran. According to Maryam Alemzadeh, a professor at the University of Oxford, the Iranian regime has effectively suppressed any attempt for organized opposition in Iran over the past decades and arrested and silenced its leaders. There is no main opposition organization and leader in Iran such as the ANC and Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Even non-political NGOs, student groups, labor unions, and anything that could resemble a bottom-up order has been quashed. As a result, neither leadership nor grassroots organization can be expected, and protests are left contingent on ad hoc individual or collective decisions of the protesters. [12] 3. Analysis of a democratic transition in Iran As this paper explained above, among six preconditions for democratic transition, four conditions are present in Iran, while two are absent. Therefore, it is not clear whether Iran can make a democratic transition. The most important factor for democratic transition in Iran is US military intervention. The democratic transition in Iran mainly depends on to what extent the US militarily intervenes in Iran and what military options US uses. A. Scenario 1: US makes targeted, surgical strikes US secretary of state Marco Rubio assessed that the Iranian regime was probably weaker than it had ever been. US naval and air forces may conduct limited, precision strikes targeting military bases of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Basij unit - a paramilitary force under the control of the IRGC - ballistic missile launch and storage sites as well as Iran’s nuclear program. An already weakened Iranian regime might be toppled, eventually making a transition to a genuine democracy where Iran can rejoin the rest of the world. This is a highly optimistic scenario but is highly unlikely. Western military intervention in both Iraq and Libya did not bring a smooth transition to democracy. Although brutal dictatorships ended in both countries, it ushered in years of chaos and bloodshed. A senior Israeli official said that Israel does not believe US airstrikes alone can topple the Islamic Republic, if that is Washington’s goal. A protracted US air campaign is considered unlikely, military experts say, citing Trump’s reported desire for a limited and decisive attack. Jason Brodsky, a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project, said that President Trump has historically favored “quick, surgical, targeted, dramatic, and decisive military operations,” pointing to US airstrikes in Syria during his first term. But even a monthslong offensive would not guarantee the fall of the Iran regime. “A sustained US air campaign could severely degrade Iran‘s conventional military by ripping up command-and-control, and fixed infrastructure, but it is unlikely by itself to produce the collapse of Iranian security forces, which can disperse, hide, and shift to low-signature internal repression,” said Michael Horowitz, an independent defense expert in Israel. [13] “If you’re going to topple the Iran regime, you have to put boots on the ground,” he told Reuters, noting that even if the US killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran would “have a new leader that will replace him.” [14] Jason Brodsky also said any US military intervention could involve leadership decapitation alongside attacks on Iran’s military and security infrastructure. However, Brodsky cautioned that Iran’s political system is designed to survive even major leadership losses. [15] “The Islamic Republic is bigger than any one individual,” he said, noting that institutions and succession mechanisms exist to fill any vacuum — even if the removal of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could be temporarily destabilizing. Moreover, Iran’s leadership had been weakened by the massive protests but remained firmly in control despite the ongoing deep economic crisis that sparked the protests. Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence official now with the Atlantic Council, warned that US military strikes could actually strengthen hardliners. A US attack would more likely consolidate elite cohesion around the regime, marginalize protesters and reinforce Iran’s narrative of external siege,” he said. Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, said that without large-scale military defections, Iran’s protests remained “heroic but outgunned.” Only a combination of external pressure and an organized domestic opposition could shift Iran’s political trajectory, Vatanka said. However, opposition groups in Iran are ideologically diverse, including monarchists, republicans, secular nationalists, communists, socialists, ethnic separatists (e.g. Kurdish nationalists), supporters of Western liberal democracy, and Islamists (including Shia Muslims dissidents and Sunni Salafis and Kurdish Islamists). The opposition movement is currently fragmented and riddled with internal divisions over the future of a post-Islamic Republic Iran. [16] Moreover, US President Trump has notably avoided endorsing a successor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Iran’s exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi lacks sufficient support within the country to immediately be installed as a leader. [17] While some Western media have pointed out Reza Pahlavi – the son of the ousted Shah of Iran – who had called on protesters to take to the streets against Khamenei’s rule, as a possible alternative, many analysts don’t see in him the ingredients of a true leader. Many people see Pahlavi as a figure too close to Israel’s Zionist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Reza Pahlavi, even himself, is not looking forward to coming back to Iran,” says Fatemeh Karimkhan, an Iranian journalist. Karimkhan says that while there are some pro-monarchy supporters in Iran, they are not as many as projected. Karimkhan claims that “they are much less in number and in ability.” B. Scenario 2: Along with air strikes, the US send ground forces to Iran for a regime change Many experts say it is unlikely that the US would send ground troops to Iran. “President Trump is not a nation builder. He does not believe in long-term commitments or building democracy. He gave up on Afghanistan. So, he is not going to commit to boots on the ground in Iran. It is simply way too costly,” Akbarzadeh said. [18] Under Trump, the US moved decisively towards ending its long war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001. In 2020, during Trump’s first term, US officials and Taliban representatives signed the Doha agreement after months of negotiations in Qatar to end the war. The actual withdrawal of troops took place in 2021, during the presidency of Joe Biden. More importantly, the US can't invade Iran. [19] This is because there is no place from which to launch an invasion. To invade a country, you need one of two things: You need to be able to invade it by land or you need to be able to invade it by sea (an amphibious invasion). The US can do neither. [20] No land invasion is possible because the US controls no land that borders Iran. As Figure 9 shows, Iran’s neighbors are for the most part hostile to the US. Iran shares land borders with eight nations (that is, if you count the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karahakh). None of them agreed to be used for a land invasion of Iran. Moreover, the US lacks regional bases necessary to invade Iran, destroy its armed forces, and displace the revolutionary regime in Iran. Gulf allies such as Saudi Arabia do not want their soils and air spaces to be used for US attacks on Iran. Iraq has US troops stationed in the country, but Iraq has solid and good relations with the Iran regime at this point. There is basically no chance the Iraqis allow the US military to stage an invasion from there and neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are under direct US occupation any longer. [21] Figure 9: Iran’s neighboring countries are for the most part hostile to the US Alternatively, the US could undertake an amphibious forced entry into Iran. This would be the largest amphibious invasion attempt since D-Day of World War II and would result in heavy US casualties on the beaches of Iran. As tens of thousands of US servicemen are dying in a war with Iran, this military option will not be popular domestically in the US. Iran has tons of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as some of the largest stockpiles of artillery in the world. And Iran’s allies (China, Russia, and North Korea) can help arm the Iranian regime easily in the result of a full-scale US invasion. Simply put, it would be an incredibly difficult and costly military operation. Even if the US is willing to endure heavy casualties, then US troops would still need to traverse rugged and mountainous terrain in Iran in order to get to Tehran, conquer it, and remove the regime from power. This would be like fighting in the jungles of Vietnam only much worse. [22] More than 50,000 US servicemen died in roughly 8 years of fighting in Vietnam. In Iran, there would likely be tens of thousands of dead Americans a year. Is the US government and public willing to stomach losses like that? Such losses may be unheard of in the US since the Vietnam and Korean Wars, perhaps even World War II if it gets ugly enough as it has in the Russo-Ukrainian War where there have been hundreds of thousands of deaths in a little over 3 years. There would surely be a sizable level of resistance in the US if a war is launched against the Iranian regime, and the US government has to weigh these factors in when considering using military force for regime change operations. The Trump administration does not want to create the biggest anti-war movement in the country since the Vietnam War, which could also increase dissents regarding other issues like an immigration issue in the country. A war with Iran would radicalize a good amount of Americans. [23] Moreover, there are several geostrategic considerations to factor in as well with regional allies of the US. A war of any kind on Iran would not be supported by Saudi Arabia at this point and Iran can inflict severe damage onto US assets in the region which are stationed in places like Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, etc. These countries in the Gulf don’t want to be dragged into being a theater of the war, nor do they want their energy sectors attacked by Iran. In addition, there’s always the possibility that an American-Israeli war on Iran could metastasize into World War III. China gets roughly 40% of their oil from the Persian Gulf, which would surely be shut down for some time in the event of a US invasion of Iran. Will China sit idly by? Not likely. At the very minimum China would help arm Iran to defend itself, but there’s simply an inherent risk of global conflict given a third of world energy supplies come from this region. Middle East energy is existential to China right now as it stands. China has been expanding oil and gas imports from Russia, but these will take time to get China less reliant on Middle East resources. [24] Therefore, the deployment of US ground troops is highly unlikely, and a regime change and a transition to democracy in Iran are almost impossible. IV. Conclusion This paper raised a question “Does US military strikes on Iran make a democratic transition in Iran possible? To address this question, this paper first examined theories and preconditions for a democratic transition and then evaluated whether US military attacks on Iran makes a democratic transition in Iran possible. As explained above, US military interventions in Iran can’t bring about a democratic transition in Iran. References [1] Barin, Mohsen (31 December 2025). "Iran's economic crisis, political discontent threaten regime". DW News. [2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-president-warns-us-attack-on-supreme-leader-would-mean-full-scale-war/ [3] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/17/trump-to-politico-its-time-to-look-for-new-leadership-in-iran-00735528?_kx=LSFywwe4GSg_lcFWo5DyId8VKdphy2F0zhlZVneJnA97jKgVYFyty4cB80GJkTHR.U5D8ER&utm_id=01KF7GKF35MAAW8BRA143VFM9M&utm_medium=campaign&utm_source=Klaviyo [4] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [5] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [6] it had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [7] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [8] "Power Outages in Iran: The Rich Stay Lit, The Poor Go Dark". iranwire.com [9] "Power Outages in Iran: The Rich Stay Lit, The Poor Go Dark". iranwire.com [10] "تحلیل نشریه تایم از وضعیت ایران؛ آیا جمهوری اسلامی در آستانه فروپاشی است؟". euronews (in Persian). 18 December 2025. [11] Hafezi, Parisa. "Despite tough talk, economic woes may force Iran to bargain with Trump". Reuters. Retrieved 5 April 2025. [12] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/which-are-irans-main-opposition-groups [13] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [14] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [15] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/trump-iran-us-strikes-war-regime-change-nuclear-b2909957.html [16] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/which-are-irans-main-opposition-groups [17] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/who-makes-up-irans-fragmented-opposition-2025-06-18/ [18] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/14/what-are-trumps-military-options-for-an-attack-on-iran [19] https://medium.com/@markvmorgan/america-has-no-ability-to-attack-iran-4b5e51478542 [20] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/ [21] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/what-would-us-military-invasion-iran-look-209506 [22] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/ [23] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/ [24] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/

Prime Minister Keir Starmer gave a speech during the Munich Security Conference For many years, for most people in the United Kingdom, war has been remote. Something that concerns us deeply, but which happens far off. But now we feel the solidity of peace, the very ground of peace now softening under our feet. It is the job of leaders to be ahead of these seismic shifts. Yet that is against the grain of history. Time and again, leaders have looked the other way, only re-arming when disaster is upon them. This time, it must be different. Because all of the warning signs are there. Russia has proved its appetite for aggression, bringing terrible suffering to the Ukrainian people. Its hyper-threats extend across our continent, not just threatening our security, but tearing at our social order. Collaborating with populists to undermine our values. Using disinformation to sow division. Using cyber-attacks and sabotage to disrupt our lives and deepening the cost-of-living crisis. It is true that Russia has made a huge strategic blunder in Ukraine, and the Russian casualties number well over a million. But even as the war goes on, Russia is re-arming, reconstituting their armed forces, an industrial base. NATO has warned that Russia could be ready to use military force against the Alliance by the end of this decade. In the event of a peace deal in Ukraine, which we are all working hard to achieve, Russia’s re-armament would only accelerate. The wider danger to Europe would not end there. It would increase. So, we must answer this threat in full. At the outset, it is important to be prepared. We do not seek conflict. Our objective is lasting peace, a return to strategic stability, and the rule of law. And in the face of these threats, there is only one viable option. Now, to break the convention of a house of speeches, we are not at a crossroads. The road ahead is straight and it is clear. We must build our hard power, because that is the currency of the age. We must be able to deter aggression. And yes, if necessary, we must be ready to fight. To do whatever it takes to protect our people, our values, and our way of life. And as Europe, we must stand on our own two feet. And that means being bold. It means putting away petty politics and short-term concerns. It means acting together to build a stronger Europe and a more European NATO, underpinned by deeper links between the UK and the EU, across defence, industry, tech, politics, and the wider economy. Because these are the foundations on which our security and prosperity will rest. This is how we will build a better future for our continent. True to the vibrant, free, diverse societies that we represent, showing that people who look different to each other can live peacefully together. But this isn’t against the tenor of our times. Rather, it’s what makes us strong, as we’re prepared to defend it with everything that we have. And we are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore. Because we know that in a dangerous world, we would not take control by turning in. We would surrender. And I won’t let that happen. That’s why I devote time as Prime Minister to Britain’s leadership on the world stage. And that’s why I’m here today. Because I am clear, there is no British security without Europe, and no European security without Britain. That is the lesson of history and is today’s reality as well. So together we must rise to this moment. We must spend more, deliver more, and coordinate more. And crucially, we must do this with the United States. The US remains an indispensable power. Its contribution to European security over 80 years is unparalleled. And so is our gratitude. At the same time, we recognise that things are changing. The US National Security Strategy spells out that Europe must take primary responsibility for its own defence. That is the new law. Now, there have been a series of thoughtful interventions about what this means, including the argument that we’re at a moment of rupture. Now, I would agree that the world has changed fundamentally, and that we must find new ways to uphold our values and the rule of law. But in responding to that, we must not disregard everything that has sustained us for the last 80 years. That could be a moment of destruction. And instead, I believe, we must make this as a moment of creation. Instead of a moment of rupture, we must make it one of radical renewal. So, rather than pretending that we can simply replace all US capabilities, we should focus on diversifying and decreasing some dependencies. We should deliver generational investment that moves us from over-dependence to interdependence. I’m talking about a vision of European security and greater European autonomy. It does not herald US withdrawal, but answers the call for more burden-sharing in Europe and remake the ties that have served us so well. Because we know the value of our own power. The nature of our power is at the core of human decision. It achieved something that leaders have been trying to do for centuries. From Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna to Versailles. After centuries of conflict, the founders of NATO finally united our continents in peace and security. Our militaries, that once faced each other on the battlefield, now stand side-by-side, pledged to each other’s defence. It is a shield over our heads every single day. And whilst some on the extremes of our politics chip away at this alliance, we defend it. I am proud that my party fought for NATO’s creation. While our then Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called it a spiritual union of the West. And we’ve shown our fidelity to that idea, asserting each other’s sovereignty, as we did on Greenland. And crucially, coming to each other’s aid under Article 5. We fought together in Afghanistan, at terrible cost to many in my country and across many allied countries. And so, I say to all NATO members, our commitment to Article 5 is as profound now as ever. And be in no doubt, if called on, the UK would come to your aid today. Instead, we must move forward together to create a more European NATO. As I see it, Europe is a sleeping giant. Our economies dwarf Russia more than ten times over. We have huge defence capabilities, yet too often this adds up to less than the sum of its parts. Fragmented industrial planning and procurement have led to gaps in some areas, and massive duplication in others. Europe has over 20 types of frigate, and 10 types of fighter jet. We have over 10 types of main battle tanks, whilst the US has one. It’s wildly inefficient, and it harms our collective security. The US security umbrella has allowed these bad habits to develop. But now we must break them. And we have shown that we can coordinate in great effect, as was just set out. Supporting Ukraine in a way that Putin never really imagined. Creating the Coalition of the Willing, which now covers almost all of Europe, as well as Canada and our friends in the Asia-Pacific. And going further in our support, with the UK announcing over £500 million this week for more air defence for the Ukrainian people. To meet the wider threat, it is clear that we are going to have to spend more faster. And we have shown our collective intent in this regard as well. With the historic agreement to increase spending to 5% on security and defence. And we are prepared to explore innovative solutions. So, we are stepping up work with like-minded allies on options for a collective approach to defence financing, to help accelerate this vital investment. And as we increase spending, we must use it to its full potential. We must come together to integrate our capabilities on spending and procurement and build a joint European defence industry. I welcome the steps that we have taken so far, which could allow us to participate in the £90 billion Euro loan to Ukraine. I hope we can work together like this going forward. Because, look, the logic of defence is solidarity and collective effort, not market access. In a crisis, our citizens expect us to be ready. So, we need to deliver a step change in collaboration. And I am proud of the work we are already doing together. Delivering cutting-edge drones with Ukraine. Developing next-generation long-range missiles with Germany, Italy and France. Working with our JEF allies to protect our northern flank. Doubling our deployment of British commandos in the Arctic. Taking control of NATO’s Atlantic and Northern Command in Norfolk, Virginia. And transforming our Royal Navy by striking the biggest warship deal in British history with Norway. We are building a fleet of warships to hunt Russian submarines and protect undersea infrastructure. We want to replicate this level of collaboration with other allies across the High North and the Baltics. And I can announce today that the UK will deploy our Carrier Strike Group to the North Atlantic and the High North this year led by HMS Prince of Wales, operating alongside the US, Canada and other NATO allies in a powerful show of our commitment to Euro-Atlantic security. That is also why we are enhancing our nuclear cooperation with France. For decades the UK has been the only nuclear power in Europe to commit its deterrent to protect all NATO members. But now any adversary must know that in a crisis they could be confronted by our combined strength. It shows beyond doubt how vital it is that we work together. So, we must also look at what more we can do with the EU. We must go beyond the historic steps that we took at last year’s UK-EU summit to build the formidable productive power and innovative strength that we need. British companies already account for over a quarter of the continent’s defence industrial base. They are a job-creating, community-building machine employing around 239,000 people across the UK, including in Wales, where this month we’re launching the first of five regional defence-grade deals. We want to bring our leadership in defence, tech and AI together with Europe to multiply our strengths and build a shared industrial base across our continent which could turbocharge our defence production. That requires leadership. To drive greater coherence and coordination across Europe. That is what we’re doing with Germany and France in the E3, working closely with EU partners, particularly Italy and Poland as well as with Norway, Canada and Turkey. So, my message today is the United Kingdom is ready. We see the imperative. We see the urgency. We want to work together to lead a generational shift in defence industrial cooperation. Now this includes looking again at closer economic alignment. We are already aligned with the single market in some areas to drive down the prices of food and energy. We are trusted partners. And as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said this week, deeper economic integration is in all of our interests. So, we must look at where we can move closer to the single market in other sectors as well where that would work for both sides. The prize here is greater security. Stronger growth for the United Kingdom and the EU, which will fuel increased defence spending and the chance to place the UK at the centre of a wave of European industrial renewal. I understand the politics very well. It will mean trade-offs. But the status quo is not fit for purpose. And to me there is no question where the national interest lies. I will always fight for what’s best for my country. I started today talking about avoiding mistakes of the past like delaying action or fragmenting our efforts. But there is something else. In the 1930s, leaders were too slow to level with the public about the fundamental shift in mindset that was required. So, we must work harder today to build consent for the decisions we must take to keep us safe. Because if we don’t, the peddlers of easy answers are ready on the extremes of left and right and they will offer their solutions instead. It’s striking that the different ends of the spectrum share so much. Soft on Russia. Weak on NATO. If not outright opposed. And determined to sacrifice the relationship we need on the altar of their ideology. The future they offer is one of division and then capitulation. The lamps would go out across Europe once again. But we will not let that happen. If we believe in our values, in democracy, liberty and the rule of law. This is the moment to stand up and to fight for them. That is why we must work together. And show that by taking responsibility for our own security, we will help our people look forward. Not with fear, but with determination. And with hope. Thank you very much. Contenido bajo licencia Open Governement Licence v3.0 [https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/] UK Prime Minister’s Office. GOV.UK. Web.

The War in Yemen and the Rift Between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Amid the dramatic developments in the Yemeni civil war around the turn of the year, the regional power configuration between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been fundamentally reshaped. The military offensive by Emirati-supported separatists and the counterstrike by the Yemeni government allied with Saudi Arabia are more than just another chapter in the war — they have caused the long-simmering tensions between the two Gulf monarchies to boil over. For the first time, the deep-rooted animosity between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has come to the surface. This confrontation also makes a new round of conflicts in the Gulf more likely and raises fundamental questions about stability in the Middle East, a region where the Gulf states were once seen as guarantors of security. A new phase of Gulf politics could be emerging, with two opposing poles within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pursuing divergent regional visions through different coalitions. The break in the former Saudi-UAE alliance will also have consequences for European foreign policy in the Middle East, which has historically relied on both protagonists as anchors of stability. The Lightning Offensive in Eastern Yemen’s Hadramaut The rapid offensive in Yemen’s eastern province of Hadramaut came as a shock to Saudi Arabia and to the Yemeni government closely aligned with the Kingdom. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) – Yemeni separatists backed by the UAE – seized not only the oil-rich Hadramaut but also other regions in eastern Yemen within a few days. In the transitional capital Aden, the militia took over the presidential palace of the internationally recognized government – which the STC formally belongs to, but from which it has always sought to separate in pursuit of an independent state on the territory of the former South Yemen (until 1990). When the Yemeni government’s president, temporarily based in Aden, fled to Saudi Arabia, the STC’s dream of an independent state seemed within reach. Shortly afterward, the STC’s campaign dissolved like a mirage. The military advance had not only shifted the dynamics of Yemen’s twelve-year civil war but also threatened to alter the balance between regional power Saudi Arabia and its Emirati neighbor, both of which have been external actors in Yemen for over a decade. After years of restraint in the Yemeni conflict, the kingdom took a surprising stance against the STC: Saudi fighter jets first bombed a weapons shipment from the Emirati city of Fujairah at the STC-controlled port of Mukalla. Then the Yemeni government, with Saudi air support, launched a counteroffensive that led to the dissolution of the STC, the flight of its leader Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, and the withdrawal of Emirati troops from Yemen. These dramatic events over the turn of the year mark not just a new twist in Yemen’s convoluted civil war but also reveal deeper rifts between two key Gulf states, whose engagement – from Sudan to Gaza, Syria to Somalia – remains a major driver of regional stability (or instability). Less than five years ago, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an alliance of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their four neighboring monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula, was paralyzed by a dispute with the Emirate of Qatar. Is the Gulf now heading toward another conflict between fraternal states? Between Threat and Ambition, Control and Power Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened together in 2015 against the Houthi militia in the Yemeni civil war, the two Gulf powers had different and sometimes opposing priorities from the start. These differences repeatedly caused tensions and were often only mitigated through careful diplomatic maneuvering. Saudi Arabia views the war as a geostrategic threat on its doorstep. The kingdom shares a 1,300-kilometer porous land border with its southern neighbor. Access from Saudi ports on the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean passes through a narrow maritime bottleneck, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, just off the Yemeni coast. Even before the Houthis took Sanaa in 2014, they—part of Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”—had launched attacks on Saudi territory. In light of these multiple threats on its southern flank, Saudi Arabia responded not only with military intervention but also with direct control over the Yemeni government—illustrated by the fact that from 2016 to 2022, former President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi carried out most of his duties from Riyadh rather than Aden. Although Abu Dhabi also perceived the Houthi threat, the UAE was less directly affected by Yemeni instability due to the geographic distance. This allowed the Emirates to focus on their strategic ambitions, especially controlling key ports and territories along the Gulf of Aden, the southern Red Sea, and the Socotra archipelago. To secure these zones of influence along international trade routes, the UAE relied on non-state actors of all kinds rather than the Yemeni government. These proxies, such as the STC founded in 2017 with Emirati support, not only fought the Houthis but also pursued their own specific interests. Deeply rooted internal Yemeni affairs thus intertwined with the UAE’s strategic actions. In addition, the UAE—the most powerful counterweight to extremism and political Islam in the region—prioritized fighting Yemen’s branch of Al-Qaeda and marginalizing the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islah party, which was part of the Hadi government. Up to 2021, the STC’s main achievements were driving Islah out of Socotra and the southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa. This gap between control and fear, ambition and power, continued to widen, forcing Saudi Arabia to make repeated diplomatic concessions to its Emirati partner. Riyadh mediated power-sharing agreements with the STC in 2019 and 2022, which even led to President Hadi’s resignation. Nevertheless, Saudi-Emirati differences escalated further, reaching a climax in late 2025 in Hadramaut. This oil-rich province in southeastern Yemen, with a 700-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia and serving as a strategic rear base, had long been divided between inland areas controlled by a Riyadh-backed coalition and coastal zones with the strategic port of Mukalla dominated by UAE-aligned forces. When a Riyadh-supported tribal coalition took control of the province’s largest oil field at the end of November, the STC struck back, first seizing the provincial town of Seiyun in the interior and, a few days later, the neighboring Al-Mahra region bordering Oman. Primacy of the State against Separatist Ambitions What might appear to be a new chapter in the civil war in Yemen is actually a facet of a complex regional game, marked by competing power claims and divergent political visions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Not only in Yemen but beyond the borders of this southernmost state of the Arabian Peninsula, the foreign policies of the two Gulf powers are no longer complementary but often directly contradictory. The Kingdom acts in a conservative, cautious manner focused on the state. According to Riyadh, only the existence of a strong central state, with uncontested sovereignty over its territory, can guarantee stability. This approach is applied without compromise, particularly in its immediate neighborhood. Saudi Arabia thus supports not only the Yemeni government but also state structures in Syria, Lebanon, or Egypt, providing aid, equipment, and guidance. Riyadh also tolerates repressive or fragile regimes, as evidenced by its support for the Somali government in Mogadishu or General Abdulfattah Al-Burhan in Sudan. Furthermore, after years of ultimately unsuccessful confrontations with regional rivals such as Iran or Qatar in the late 2010s, Saudi Arabia is now trying to avoid getting involved in the conflicts and entanglements of its neighbors’ wars as much as possible. From ending the Qatar crisis in 2021 to the ceasefire with the Houthi militia in 2022 and the restoration of diplomatic relations with Tehran in 2023, Riyadh has sought de-escalation with its rivals and a disengagement from regional conflicts — in order to stabilize its neighborhood and secure the degree of regional calm it requires for the ambitious economic reform agenda to which the Kingdom has committed itself through 2030. The UAE’s regional strategy, on the other hand, seems to be the direct counter-model to Saudi centrism and de-escalation. From Mukalla to Berbera, and up to Benghazi, the UAE has created a "string of pearls" consisting of ports and zones of influence, relying on a network of non-state armed actors in contexts of weak states along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Behind this "string of pearls" lie lucrative economic interests, such as access to gold mines in Sudan or Chad, as well as fertile land and strategic African markets. These areas also offer the UAE strategic depth and a pool of troops that can be deployed as mercenaries in other regional conflicts. Whereas the Emirati and Saudi approaches previously complemented each other, for example during the ousting of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt in 2013, the intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Qatar blockade in 2017, or even in Sudan until 2021, Abu Dhabi’s opportunism now disrupts Riyadh’s state-centric approach. The UAE continues to arm the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), engaged since 2023 against General Al-Burhan, supported by Saudi Arabia in the Sudanese civil war, while the extension of Emirati influence in Somalia has fueled separatism in Somaliland. In both cases, Emirati action weakens the central state and destabilizes the immediate neighborhood of the Kingdom, as is currently happening in Yemen. A guiding principle of the Emirati regional strategy is often the fight against political Islam, a struggle that, if necessary, is also waged with the help of non-state armed actors such as the RSF. The Kingdom, too, takes a critical view of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist actors. However, the Saudi doctrine of a strong state relies on established regimes even when they include Islamist forces, as Riyadh’s support for Burhan in Sudan and for the Islah party in Yemen demonstrates. As a result, there is now little overlap left between what were once largely aligned regional approaches of the Gulf’s key powers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Role of Israel as an Accelerating Factor Israel’s actions in the region, and the Gulf states’ handling of them, have also played a significant role in accelerating the shift in political relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Prior to the brutal Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Saudi Arabia had been close to normalizing relations with Israel. In the two years since, however, the trajectory has reversed. Israel’s war in Gaza and its broader regional operations — especially its attack on Qatar in September 2025 — have contributed to a reversion in Riyadh to its traditional position vis-à-vis Israel and to a growing perception within the Kingdom that the current Israeli government is substantially destabilizing the region. In contrast, the UAE upheld its normalized relationship with Israel established under the January 2020 Abraham Accords. While Abu Dhabi has repeatedly condemned Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip and shares the wider Gulf concern about the destabilizing impact of Israel’s regional military reach, its relatively even-handed approach toward Israel, its clear departure from the positions of other Gulf states on numerous disputes within the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the targeted expansion of economic cooperation between the Emirates and Israel since the Gaza ceasefire have, from Saudi Arabia’s strategic perspective, nourished the perception of a supposed “Emirati–Israeli axis.” The reciprocal recognition of Israel and the Emirati-backed Somaliland in December 2025 further cemented this view in Riyadh. The factor of Israel also played a role in Yemen. Shortly after the Houthi militia began its campaign against Israel and civilian shipping in the Red Sea in 2023, reports indicated that the Southern Transitional Council (STC) expressed its willingness to support Israel in the event of a potential Israeli counter-response. STC leader Al-Zubaidi also repeatedly expressed openness to the possibility of an independent South Yemen, controlled by the STC, joining the Abraham Accords. In the regional context, the consecutive events of the STC’s military campaign and Israel’s normalization with Somaliland led to growing concerns in Riyadh that a southern flank on the Arabian Peninsula, controlled by rivals, could strategically challenge the Kingdom, particularly along the opposite coast of the Gulf of Aden. Is a New Fratricidal Conflict Looming? As unusual as the Saudi counterreaction was, the Emirati concession is just as remarkable. Just before New Year's Eve 2025, Saudi bombings marked the beginning of a ground offensive by the Yemeni army and the Homeland Shield Forces, trained by the Kingdom. Within ten days, this combined effort not only reversed the recent territorial gains of the STC (Southern Transitional Council), but also led to the recapture of the previously STC-controlled transitional capital of Aden. Not only did the separatists dissolve afterward, but the Emiratis also complied with Saudi demands by withdrawing their remaining troops from the Yemeni southern coast and vacating their base on Socotra Island. Riyadh's first direct intervention against the proxies of its smaller neighbor caused Abu Dhabi's ten-year project in Yemen to collapse like a house of cards. Looking at Yemen, it is now clear that only one foreign power has the upper hand in Aden. This new position of power means that Riyad must now ensure stability in government-controlled areas, strengthen the anti-Houthi coalition, and push the internationally recognized leadership to provide services to its citizens. Moreover, the Kingdom will have to deal with separatist movements, which, despite the dissolution of the STC, continue to enjoy broad support. In this regard, the planned dialogue with representatives from various factions in the south, scheduled for February, will be a litmus test. Although Riyad, as a hesitant hegemon in recent years, tried to escape the deadlocked war in Yemen, the Kingdom is now fully back with responsibility. Replacing the previous Emirati support networks, which were crucial both militarily and economically, is no easy task. Beyond Yemen, the main question now is whether the publicly aired rift between Riyad and Abu Dhabi will challenge the unity of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states and provide a preview of future conflicts in the Gulf region. An increasing hypernationalism in both countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia, which has led to public mudslinging on social media and smear campaigns in state-affiliated newspapers, will be hard to contain through diplomatic damage control. However, it is not certain that this atmosphere of animosity will affect leadership figures in the power apparatus in Riyad and Abu Dhabi. In the short term, the Emirati-Saudi rift is leading to a clearer division among the fragile neighboring states in the Gulf region. The government in Aden declared in December that its defense agreement with the UAE was null and void, while Mogadishu also annulled all bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi in January. The military rulers in Sudan had already suspended their diplomatic relations with the UAE in May 2025. However, it is unlikely that this division between states aligned with Riyad and those favorable to the Emiratis will spill over into the GCC or evolve into a regional crisis of the magnitude of the Qatar blockade. A full-scale bilateral conflict would cause too much damage to both countries, not least because of their close trade relations and Saudi Arabia’s reliance on billions of dollars in investments from the UAE and Dubai’s port infrastructure for its exports. Nevertheless, it appears that the era of joint Saudi-Emirati alliances, as seen in the 2010s, is likely over. Instead, Abu Dhabi and Riyad will probably act in opposing coalitions going forward. For example, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are increasingly finding themselves on the same side of regional issues, as evidenced by their support for the governments of Syria, Sudan, and Somalia. Similarly, the Saudi partnership with Pakistan, with which a bilateral defense pact was signed in September 2025, will gain relative importance in the future. The UAE, on the other hand, will continue to strengthen its relations with Israel and further expand security cooperation with India. However, most of these non-Arab states, such as India, Pakistan, and Turkey, will likely be unwilling to risk their (sometimes newly regained) relations with both countries and will seek to remain neutral wherever possible. Germany and Europe now face significant challenges due to the new status quo in the Gulf. Both Riyad and Abu Dhabi hold particular importance as anchors of stability in a volatile region, due to their economic weight, good relations with (almost) all sides, and political influence in neighboring countries. The growing rivalry between these Gulf powers not only destabilizes their relationship with each other but also means that two key European partners are no longer working in unison, and bilateral misunderstandings or confrontations can lead to crossing red lines and military escalation beyond the Arabian Peninsula. A fragmentation of the Middle East along the Riyad-Abu Dhabi fault line is not in Germany's interest, nor does a political rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council make strengthening the strategic partnership between the GCC and the EU any easier. Moreover, the turbulent events of recent weeks once again highlight the limits of European influence on the ground: Without real levers of power on the Arabian Peninsula and with minimal political attention to conflicts in seemingly unimportant countries like Yemen, neither Berlin nor Brussels were relevant (mediating) actors in the recent conflict. Instead, Europe must stand by as a mere spectator to the strategic shifts in the Gulf, even though these developments will ultimately have implications for its own interests.

On January 19, 2026, an unprecedented event in Bulgarian political history in the post-socialist period occurred: President of the Republic of Bulgaria Rumen Radev announced his early resignation. The resignation of the head of state fits into the logic of the country's long-standing crisis, in which European integration serves not so much as a factor in economic modernization but also as a catalyst for political instability and social alienation from traditional institutions. Radev served as president for nine years, from January 2017 to January 2026. During this period, the country underwent dramatic transformations: the collapse of the traditional bipolar party system (GERB-BSP), the formation of new political forces (especially the nationalist Vazrazhdane Party), the fragmentation of the parliamentary majority, and a wave of unprecedented government changes. Between 2021 and 2025, Bulgaria experienced ten government changes, including four technical cabinets appointed by President Radev himself. His resignation marked the eleventh change. This instability not only reflects a systemic crisis but also proves the inability of the country's political system to function and ensure governance. The July 2021 elections brought an end to decades of the two-party system between GERB and BSP. Although they remained major parties, their combined share of parliament fell from a historical 70% to 45%. The emergence of numerous new political actors for the following elections (ITN, PP-DB, Vazrazhdane, Sword, APS, and others) fragmented the political field and made it difficult to form stable coalitions. In the October 2024 elections, fragmentation reached new heights: nine parties won parliamentary representation, with the centrist GERB party winning 26.4% of the vote (66 seats), and the PP-DB coalition only 14.2% (36 seats). Turnout was 39%. Euro integration as a catalyst for political instability Radev's resignation takes on particular significance in the context of the Euro integration. Bulgaria's accession to the European Union in 2007 cemented European integration as a central vector of foreign policy and a key driver of domestic reform. However, this process has been characterized not only by the structural adaptation of institutions but also by growing socio-political polarization. Although more than half of the country's population opposed the introduction of the euro in February of last year, the transition to the single European currency was officially launched on January 1, 2026. In his final speech as president, Radev noted that during his tenure, the country had joined the Schengen Agreement and adopted the euro, but expressed doubt that these initiatives had brought stability and satisfaction. This rhetoric suggests that his resignation was a calculated move aimed at positioning Radev as an alternative center of political power capable of overcoming the crisis. Parallel to political instability, Bulgaria faced an unprecedented wave of mass protests. Beginning in November 2025 over a proposed budget that included tax and social security increases, the protests quickly escalated into a general expression of discontent with corruption and poor governance. According to the MYARA news agency, support for the protests stood at 71.3% of the population, indicating widespread alienation from traditional political institutions. Simultaneously, support for Rosen Zhelyazkov's government fell to 19.2%, while dissatisfaction reached 66%, just 100 days after its inauguration. Trust in the National Assembly was even lower: only 15.2%, compared to 75.1% of citizens who disapproved of its performance. Amid widespread dissatisfaction with political institutions, the only figure left with voter trust was former President Radev himself. According to the MYARA agency, 44.6% approved of his performance in September 2025, while only 37.9% dissatisfied, significantly higher than any other political figure. A paradoxical situation is emerging: a popular president is unable to resolve the crisis of a parliamentary system in which he has only limited powers; his resignation could be interpreted as a refusal to act as an arbiter of the parliamentary game and a transition to the role of an alternative leader capable of proposing a new political project. The strategic nature of Radev's resignation In Bulgaria's parliamentary system, the president has limited powers. His primary functions are essentially limited to appointing technical governments during parliamentary blockades, submitting laws for parliamentary review, and representing the country in international affairs. In practice, his role is to act as an "arbitrator" between the branches of government and various institutions. Real executive power rests in the hands of the prime minister and his government. During his nine years as president, Radev made the most of these limited powers – appointing seven technical governments was a record. His resignation allows the now-former president to move on to a new phase of his political career. There is active media speculation that the outgoing president will create his own political party and run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. If this happens, Radev will be able to assume the post of prime minister – a position that carries considerably more real power. The head of state's transition from institutional arbiter to active party leader has created a fundamentally new reality for all political forces, forcing them to urgently reassess their strategies. The ruling Euro-Atlantic coalition of GERB-SDS and PP-DB has suffered the most significant blow. For them, the emergence of Radev's political project is tantamount to a "black swan," disrupting the familiar bipolar model of confrontation. While the president could previously be used as a convenient lightning rod to excuse one's own failures, accusing him of exceeding his authority and blocking reforms, this tactic has now become meaningless. Radev has become a direct competitor, attacking the government's vulnerabilities in the socio-economic sphere. He is successfully attracting not only protest voters but also disillusioned moderate voters, tired of endless compromises within the government and the lack of tangible results. The conflict with Delyan Peevski's wing of the DPS has also entered a more acute phase. What previously looked like an institutional war between the branches of government has now evolved into a brutal, head-on clash on the electoral field. The former president now has a free hand to directly criticize corruption patterns, posing an existential threat to the "New Beginning" project, depriving its leader of the opportunity to position himself as the sole defender of parliamentarism from "presidential tyranny." Paradoxically, the new alignment poses the greatest electoral risks to forces ideologically aligned with Radev – the Vazrazhdane party and the BSP. The popular leader's emergence as a defender of national sovereignty threatens to "divvy up" their voter base. For the BSP, this could be a fatal blow, as their former candidate could completely absorb the remnants of the left-wing electorate, effectively relegating the party to the margins of history. Vazrazhdane, meanwhile, faces the loss of their monopoly on Eurosceptic rhetoric and the prospect of competing against a political heavyweight whose personal trust ratings significantly exceed those of their own party leaders. National minority parties (DPS, APS) have traditionally been crucial for the formation of majorities in Bulgarian politics, often determining the composition and viability of governing coalitions. Radev's resignation does not change their fundamental strategy – ensuring access to state resources for their communities and political representation of their interests. For them, his resignation could mark the end of a period in which they enjoyed disproportionate influence. If parliamentary elections result in a more stable majority (without the support of the DPS), these parties' influence could decline. However, given the fragmented nature of the Bulgarian parliament, it is unlikely that any coalition will be able to avoid the need for negotiations with national minority parties. Parliamentary elections in spring 2026: hope and risk The parliamentary elections planned for spring 2026 could either resolve the crisis or deepen it. On the one hand, new elections provide an opportunity for the electorate to express its will more clearly and create the basis for a more stable coalition. On the other hand, if voters continue to vote volatilely, as they did in 2021, 2023, and 2025, new elections will simply reproduce a fragmented parliament, and the crisis will continue. Moreover, if Radev creates a new political party and proves successful in the elections, this could lead to further fragmentation of parliament, as his new party will seek the votes of voters who currently support existing parties. During his nine years as president, Radev exhausted all constitutional tools available to him for managing the political crisis. The president's resignation could facilitate long-needed institutional reforms that could strengthen the Bulgarian political system. If new elections result in clearer political majorities, the former president could create a political party that positions itself as a reformist alternative to GERB and PP-DB. Or, if constitutional changes are made to strengthen executive power, this could usher in a new phase in the development of Bulgarian democracy.