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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском H.E. President of the Republic, Gabriel Boric Font, together with the Minister of Economy, Development, and Tourism of Chile, Nicolás Grau, and the Minister of Planning of Brazil, Simone Tebet, leads the inauguration of the Roundtable: Business and Investment Opportunities on the Bioceanic Corridor, Brasília 2025. Thank you very much, Nicolás, Minister Tebet, and everyone present. First of all, I apologize for the 15-minute delay. We were previously attending a preparatory forum for the COP in Belém do Pará, convened by President Lula with several world leaders, including the presidents of China, France, Spain, Vietnam, and South Korea. That delayed us a bit, so my apologies. That said, it is truly an honor for me to be here because it represents something that resonates with me on two distinct yet complementary dimensions. The first is South American integration. One of the things that Pepe Mujica has repeated to me countless times whenever I visit him — and something President Lula has also emphasized on every occasion we have met — is that Latin American integration, and particularly South American integration, must necessarily go beyond rhetoric, beyond adjectives, and beyond summit photographs. It must be about result-oriented actions, concrete actions that materialize, that our people and communities can see and feel in their daily lives. I believe that the Bioceanic Corridor is one of the best examples of this serious approach to integration. Beyond, I insist, adjectives and rhetoric. And secondly, because it is integration with decentralization. This is no small matter. Brazil is a federal state, while Chile is a unitary state — which is an elegant way of saying "centralized." Although we have gradually advanced in granting greater power and resources to the regions — for example, by electing governors, who used to be appointed by the President of the Republic — we still have a long way to go. It is enough to see that more than 40% of Chile’s population, out of 20 million inhabitants, lives in the capital, Santiago. This is partly due to cultural inertia, but also to a lack of opportunities and development in the other regions. I come from an extreme region — from Chilean Patagonia, from the southernmost part of the world. I was a deputy for eight years representing Magallanes and the Chilean Antarctic. Therefore, I am fully aware that from places like Planalto in Brazil or La Moneda in Chile, the daily reality of the regions — especially the most remote ones — is not always fully perceived. That is why I am very pleased that, in the case of Chile, this initiative is being carried out by empowering the north of the country with local authorities. That is why today we are joined by Ricardo Díaz, Governor of the Antofagasta Region, and José Miguel Carvajal, Governor of the Tarapacá Region, which provide a significant portion of Chile’s wealth. However, this wealth is not necessarily reflected in the quality of life within those regions, despite their tremendous potential. Therefore, I believe this project is very positive in both dimensions. The Bioceanic Road Corridor aims to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through an extensive network of road and port infrastructure. I have shared this anecdote before, but since there are people here I hadn’t met previously, I’ll tell it again. The former President of Chile, Ricardo Lagos — who, if I remember correctly, served during the same period as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the first term of President Lula — once told me, thinking about the future, that the Mediterranean was the center of the civilized world, at least from a European perspective, for much of history. After World War II, the center of the world shifted to the North Atlantic. But today, the future of the world lies in the South, particularly in the Pacific, in the Pacific Ocean. Chile is part of several treaties, including the CPTPP 11, and various free trade agreements with ASEAN countries, particularly with China, and we are also working on others. These agreements grant us, I would say, privileged access to sectors that are among the fastest growing in the world today. As Minister Grau mentioned, we are also working on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India, the world’s most populous country with 1.4 billion people. The Bioceanic Corridor will be at the heart of South America. The Mayor of Iquique showed me a world map and pointed out, "Iquique is the center of the world." Mayors, governors, and leaders everywhere always praise their own regions, but I find that a beautiful idea. Now we are talking about the Bioceanic Corridor, not about a particular city or a particular country. We are speaking about more than 2,400 kilometers that will significantly reduce cargo transport times from the interior regions of Brazil and Paraguay to the markets of the Asia-Pacific. Instead of crossing the Panama Canal — which, as we know, is currently facing significant congestion due to the climate crisis and water shortages — we will create a new route. And what will this lead to? We will link the Pantanal with the Atacama Desert, two ecosystems that are unique on the planet — and this is not just about trade. I really liked what Minister Tebet said: "This is also about tourism." We discussed it yesterday during the business forum we attended, where President Lula also participated: how tourism is not only one of the few non-polluting industries, but also how tourists often become the best ambassadors for our countries and the best promoters of the destinations they visit. In 2024, we had a record number of Brazilian tourists visiting Chile. This happened because the tourists who came in previous years had a good experience and shared it with their families, friends, and colleagues. The same is true for Chileans traveling to Brazil — and not just to Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, but also to Bahia, Fortaleza, Mato Grosso, and the Amazon. Thus, we have opportunities in many areas. We have taken this very seriously, and from Chile, we created a high-level commission to drive this project forward in a coordinated manner. One of the greatest challenges for states is achieving coordination and collaboration among different public agencies to move projects forward more quickly. That’s why what Nicolás mentioned is so important regarding the input we need from the private sector to more rapidly identify and resolve bottlenecks and obstacles together. In this high-level commission, we have brought together various ministries, regional governments, and local actors because we have learned from experience that without involving organized communities, these initiatives do not work well. We want to ensure that this project brings direct benefits to our people — to the families of Tocopilla, Antofagasta, and Iquique, as well as to the provinces of Santa Fe, Jujuy, Salta, and Mato Grosso do Sul. However, we still face significant challenges. One of the main concerns of our populations — and I am sure this is true in Brazil as well, but I will speak specifically about Chile — is security. While we have made significant progress in infrastructure — Nicolás outlined the improvements we have achieved and the ones we will continue to make, as infrastructure is a long-term investment — we must also address the challenge of security. Today, we see that crime, delinquency, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms trafficking are no longer purely local issues; they are transnational. The case of the Tren de Aragua is perhaps the most well-known in recent times in Latin America, at least in the Pacific region. But this issue deeply concerns our people, and therefore, opening new routes must go hand in hand with providing security for those traveling along them. All trucks must be guaranteed safety, as well as dignified conditions for rest, meals, and repair services in case of vehicle breakdowns — and of course, security for all people. Whether through scanners, police presence, artificial intelligence, or other mechanisms, we must ensure that everyone can feel safe. Because ultimately, when crime spirals out of control and we are unable to contain it, it effectively becomes a new kind of tax — an undeclared tax — because it forces increased spending. And in the end, it is the consumers who bear that cost. Therefore, we must be extremely careful and put great effort into addressing this issue. Another positive aspect is the very clear complementarity between our countries. Brazil is a first-rate industrial and agri-food powerhouse. Chile enjoys privileged access to the Pacific and Asian markets and has increasingly positioned itself as a technological hub. Argentina and Paraguay contribute with critical transport routes and productive capacities. If all of this is properly coordinated, it can transform South America into a global integration platform with sovereignty, without external tutelage, promoting free trade in times of uncertainty for the benefit of our peoples. Here we are also talking about strengthening many SMEs — small and medium-sized enterprises — in addition to large companies. If we do this well, it will generate benefits, circulation, and a dynamic that will positively impact many people. Achieving this, however, is primarily the responsibility of the states, but certainly also in close partnership with the private sector. At this moment, global integration is being called into question. The United States has unleashed a trade war marked by volatility and great uncertainty. And the best way to respond to this trade war is not through loud declarations. From Chile’s point of view, and considering the position we hold in the world as a medium-sized country, we will not respond with retaliation. We will respond with more integration. We will respond through the CEPA agreement with India, through the initiatives we are advancing with the United Arab Emirates. We will also push and engage in dialogue with countries like France to expedite the approval of the agreement between the European Union and Mercosur. And we will continue integrating regionally within South America, working together with our regions. That is why we must continue working diligently to facilitate customs processes, promote cross-border investments, and improve logistics throughout the entire supply chain. And I ask, particularly of the private sector, that you intensify these business alliances. I assure you that you can trust the Chilean state to provide guarantees for long-term investment. We have a development path that is environmentally conscious and understands that to better distribute wealth, first we must grow more. There is a balance to be struck: generating more wealth to distribute it better, not merely accumulating it in the hands of a few. But this is a cycle — to distribute wealth better, we must first create it. We cannot be satisfied with what we already have. Trade is one of the main drivers of this, along with strengthening our own industries — an area where Brazil is ahead of us, and which Minister Grau has also strongly promoted within Chile. Minister Tebet lamented how long it has taken us to advance this integration. President Lula mentioned yesterday that during his first term, the first bridge with Peru was built — if I recall correctly — after so many years of being neighbors. What I want to tell you is that it is never too late, and that today it is up to our generation to make this integration a reality. This is a unique opportunity, and we have no right to waste it. We cannot let this opportunity slip away. The Bioceanic Road Corridor will be much more than a transport route; it will be a path for human development, a bridge between peoples, and a symbol of what South America can achieve when it stands united. Thank you very much.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Labor’s landslide victory and Conservatives in disarray In the same week that Canada swung left, Australia followed with a similar but even more decisive result. Just two hours after polls closed—at 8:25 p.m. on May 3—ABC News officially declared the Australian Labor Party (ALP)'s election victory and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's second term. A red wave swept across the country, delivering the Conservatives their worst defeat in recent memory. The loss was significant in scale, and symbolic: Opposition Leader Peter Dutton even lost his own seat in Parliament, a seat he had held for 24 years. A historic election Prime Minister Albanese defied pre-election polls and predictions, delivering the most decisive victory for Australian Labor Party (ALP) in the country`s modern history. While opinion polls had forecast an ALP win, they suggested it would fall short of a majority, with a hung parliament being the most likely outcome.[i] However, as soon as the polls closed, a nationwide swing toward Labor signaled trouble for the Liberal-National Coalition (an alliance of conservative parties). Less than three hours later, ABC News declared that the ALP would form the next government. This election marks a historic moment for the ALP in at least three key ways. First, Albanese becomes the first incumbent Prime Minister to win consecutive elections since John Howard in 2004, breaking the so-called “incumbency curse” that has plagued several Australian prime ministers in the past two decades. He is also the first Labor Prime Minister to secure re-election since Bob Hawke (1983–1991). Second, with almost 80% of the votes counted, the ALP is projected to win at least 85 of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives, securing a clear majority well above the 76-seat threshold. In contrast, the Coalition trails significantly with just 39 seats.[ii] This has given the ALP an outright majority, passing over the 76 seats required for a simple majority. The number of seats ALP obtained in this election exceeded the 77 seats it had achieved in the last election in 2022 and any election in its history. Third, the Coalition also made history—albeit in a disappointing way. For the first time, Australia’s Opposition Leader has lost their seat in Parliament. Peter Dutton, who entered Parliament in 2001 and had represented the electorate of the constituency of Dickson for 24 years, was defeated by ALP’s candidate, Ali France. Experts had long identified Dickson as “the most marginal seat in Queensland for the Liberal Party.”[iii] Dutton’s departure from Parliament raises significant questions about the future direction and leadership of both his Liberal Party and the broader Coalition. While he accepted full responsibility for the loss in his concession speech, he has yet to address his political future or the party’s leadership situation. How did it get here? The outcome of this election is surprising and unexpected in many ways. The question is how did it get here? What are the internal and external factors that shaped the outcome of this election? The Coalition’s disastrous campaign Not only did the Coalition fail to secure victory, but current projections show a significant drop in their House of Representatives seats—from 53 in the previous election to potentially fewer than 45. However, this figure merely scratches the surface. The Coalition faces deeper, more systemic problems, most notably in its campaign messaging, policy direction, and overall strategy. The voters’ verdict reflected this clearly. Heading into the election, the Coalition appeared ill-prepared and ran an ineffective campaign marked by unclear messaging and a series of tactical missteps. They failed to craft a coherent, consistent narrative that could resonate with the electorate. Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s leadership further compounded these issues, with several high-profile errors reinforcing perceptions that he—and his party—were not ready to govern. Among the most notable blunders were: A flip-flopping „work-from-home“ policy[iv];A partial reversal of planned job cuts for public servants[v];An unpopular and vaguely nuclear energy policy[vi]; andA diplomatic misstep involving Indonesia, which Dutton later admitted during the second leaders' debate[vii]. These misjudgments, all within a short campaign period, pointed to a campaign lacking strategic coordination and message discipline. Ultimately, Dutton failed to present himself or his party as a viable alternative government, especially in a time of global uncertainty when voters sought stability and clarity. An anti-Trump sentiment? In just one week, two major democracies—Canada and Australia—shifted decisively to the left, rejecting conservative and right-wingpolitical alternatives. On Monday, Canadian Opposition Leader Pierre Poilievre lost the election and his seat. By Saturday, Australia’s Peter Dutton met the same fate. Dutton had cultivated a hardline image, advocating for controversial immigration restrictions and adopting elements of Donald Trump’s DOGE playbook, including proposed cuts to the public service – an image that earned him the nickname “Temu-Trump” (referencing the Chinese cheap online retailer Temu). The outcomes of the Canadian and Australian elections signal a broader people’s rejection of extreme or polarizing styles of governance. Analysts have pointed to the “Trump factor” as a key external influence swaying voters against right-wing opposition parties. In the current context of global uncertainty—characterized by geopolitical tensions, economic instability, and the lingering impact of Trump-era trade wars—voters appear more inclined to maintain the status quo. Rather than risk unknown changes, manyseem to have opted for continuity and stability under incumbent governments. “[…] Today, the Australian people have voted for Australian values. In this time of global uncertainty, Australians have chosen optimism and determination. Australians have chosen to face global challenges the Australian way.” Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, during his speech at the ALP campaign headquarters following election victory. What does it mean for Europe and the world? Key foreign policy issues—such as AUKUS, increased defense spending, and international trade—featured prominently during Australia’s election. In the current global context, Australia and the European Union (EU) have much to gain from deepening their partnership. Recently, the United States imposed a baseline 10 percent tariff on several trading partners, including the EU and Australia. The initial proposal suggested tariffs as high as 20 percent on the EU and 10 percent on Australia. These measures pose a challenge not only to the global trading system but also to bilateral trade relations between the US and key allies. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Albanese’s second term presents a timely opportunity to revive efforts toward finalizing the long-stalled Australia-EU free trade agreement. Negotiations have been on hold since the fifteenth round in 2023, but a renewed commitment from both sides could pave the way for a more robust trade partnership.[viii] On defense and security, the ALP-led government increased Australia’s defense budget by A$50 billion during its first term, with plans to raise defense spending to 2.3 percent of GDP by the 2030s. This aligns with the EU’s current push to bolster its own defense capabilities, suggesting a convergence in strategic priorities between the two partners. In brief, the outcome of this election signals continuity in Australia's strategic direction and opens a new window of opportunity for enhanced cooperation with the EU. References [i]     Rania Yallop, “What if no one wins? What to know about a minority government”, SBS News, 28 March 2025. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/what-if-no-one-wins-what-to-know-about-minority-government/v6swmoisl[ii]      ABC News, "Australian federal election lives 2025 results“, 04 May 2025. https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/federal/2025/results?sortBy=latest&searchQuery=&filter=all&selectedRegion=all&selectedParty=all&partyWonBy=all&partyHeldBy=all[iii]      Gavin Butler, “Australian opposition party realing after Albanese’s landslide election win”, BBC News, 04 May 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cevdw14r1mgt[iv]     ABC News, "Peter Dutton partially walks back public service work-from-home vow“, 05 April 2025. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-04-05/dutton-walks-back-public-service-wfh-plan/105141758[v]     ABC News, "Dutton confirms public service cut limit to Canberra, which labor say impossible“, 24 April 2025. abc.net.au/news/2025-04-24/dutton-confirms-public-service-cuts-limited-to-canberra/105211946  [vi]     The Guardian, "Australians’ support for nuclear power ban rises despite Dutton’s best efforts to sell atomic future, survey finds“, 01 May 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/may/01/australians-support-for-nuclear-power-ban-rises-despite-duttons-best-efforts-to-sell-atomic-future-survey-finds[vii]     The Guardian, "Dutton admits he made mistake on Indonesia in ABC leaders’ debate as Albanese evasive on electricity price“, 16 April 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/apr/16/dutton-admits-he-made-mistake-on-indonesia-in-abc-leaders-debate-as-albanese-evasive-on-electricity-prices[viii]     Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, "Australia-EU FTA – report on 15th negotiation round, 24-28 April 2023“, n.d. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aeufta/aeufta-news/negotiating-round-fifteen-24-28-april-2023

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском By assuming that trade relations are a zero-sum game in which one party must lose for the other to win, and that a trade deficit represents a loss while a surplus represents a win, President Trump reveals a simplistic view far removed from the dynamics of international trade. Let’s imagine that the global economy is Central America, that Costa Rica imports more goods than it exports, and that other countries accept paper printed by its Central Bank — bills in colones — as payment for their exports. Furthermore, let’s assume that a good portion of their trade surpluses are used to buy Costa Rican government bonds and make deposits in its banks, accepting — due to confidence in the strength of its economy — lower interest rates than they might obtain in other markets, and that those debts can be paid with the same printed paper. Trade deficits arise because a significant share of Costa Rican consumers and investors prefer to source final, intermediate, and capital goods from other Central American countries where prices are lower than at home. In other words, those deficits are the result of a national choice to enjoy a higher quality of life and greater productivity than what its economy would otherwise allow. Under these circumstances, Costa Rica, far from being a victim of other countries’ policies, would actually be enjoying levels of consumption above its means and economic growth beyond what its productivity would justify. The willingness of those countries to hold the colones derived from their trade surpluses in Costa Rican government bonds and bank deposits results in lower interest rates in Costa Rica. This enables a higher sustainable level of public debt, greater investment at low cost to improve infrastructure and service quality, and lower interest rates for private investment — all of which contribute to a higher rate of economic growth without endangering macroeconomic stability. In such a scenario, making imports more expensive through tariffs to boost local production competitiveness and eliminate trade deficits would, one by one, remove these advantages — amounting to nothing more than an own goal. This remains true even if Central American countries did not retaliate by restoring relative competitiveness to its starting point, and even if Costa Rican investors were not left uncertain about whether a future government might remove the tariffs. The U.S. economy faces the world in a situation identical to that hypothetical scenario of Costa Rica. It takes advantage of the fact that with paper printed by its central bank — the dollar — can pay for the real production of other countries, allowing it to live far beyond its means. Far from being “cheated” by other nations, as Trump claims, the United States enjoys a standard of living well above its capacity precisely because of this. That does not mean the U.S. is cheating anyone, since it is thanks to its economic strength that the rest of the world accepts that paper as a means of payment and trusts in its government bonds and banking system. Thus, by assuming that trade relations are a “zero-sum game” — where one must lose for the other to win — and that a trade deficit signals losing while a surplus signals winning, President Trump ignores these realities. He reveals a board-game level of simplification, detached from the complex chessboard that defines international trade dynamics. It is nothing less than a massive own goal. Trade deficits are an economic problem for countries like Costa Rica, which must pay for their imports using foreign currency, often requiring them to take on debt and/or attract foreign investment through subsidies and tax exemptions. This combination of factors permanently threatens macroeconomic stability and forces governments to limit spending on infrastructure and social services to free up resources to cover interest payments and the growing fiscal costs of structuring an economy based on incentives to foreign companies. Adding to the absurdity of Trump’s proposals, his goal is to achieve trade surpluses with every country in the world. However, the United States does not produce coffee or cocoa; thus, with some of the countries that export these products, running trade deficits is not only inevitable but also beneficial for the U.S. Many countries in the region, even without the advantages the United States enjoys, are unlikely to avoid trade deficits — for example, with oil-producing countries or those manufacturing goods that incorporate cutting-edge technologies. In such cases, raising tariffs could severely damage their economies. Trump boasts that the countries affected by the tariffs are lining up to renegotiate, claiming that this was his goal. If so, it marks the beginning of an uncertain period, contaminated by threats and blackmail, with China standing by to benefit from the resentment against the United States. This scenario will severely affect private sector investment plans, employment, and economic growth — not only in the United States but around the world. Far from "Making America Great Again" (MAGA), Trump is diminishing both his country and the world while violating every rule of international trade, both global ones under the WTO framework and those contained in free trade agreements like CAFTA-DR. This, of course, validates the concerns of those of us who argued that such treaties did not guarantee protected access to the U.S. market against political or geopolitical shifts. In international relations, the historical rule has been that decisions are not based on any moral or legal absolutes but rather on the exercise of power from unequal positions ("might is right"). This is why we always doubted that a free trade agreement with weaker countries would truly guide the behavior of the United States. But Trump's overwhelming violations of international law (surprisingly and disappointingly supported by more than half of his country’s political establishment) strip the United States of any moral authority to criticize countries that do not act according to the rules. This imposing attitude, reaffirmed by Trump when he paraphrases emperors and tyrants — enemies of any democratic principle — who claimed that "those who save their country violate no law," leads us to a world where anything is permitted for those who hold power. From the perspective of the definition of civilization, a world where anything goes loses its value. It takes us back to the law of the jungle — the rule of the strongest, of violence and war, or of peace imposed by one over others, not through harmony and goodwill. This is not a new “Washington Consensus”, now guided by the mercantilism typical of the 18th and 19th centuries, because in this case neither multilateral organizations like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund nor other Western powers share Trump’s decisions. Far from consensus, today the most frequently heard word in those circles is “retaliation”. Latin America will be affected by the potential decline in global GDP growth, the tariffs imposed on our exports, and the rise in interest rates resulting from inflation that could be triggered by higher import taxes in the United States. However, the region could benefit from the U.S. confrontation with its developed-world allies by strengthening economic ties with Europe, China, Japan, India, and other powers of the Global South — without, of course, abandoning the U.S. market. To achieve this, our governments must stop meekly following Trump’s directives, such as preventing Huawei from competing to sell us 5G technology, participating in a shameful deportation policy that violates fundamental human rights, or undermining Panama’s absolute sovereignty over the Canal. What is needed is to build and implement a foreign policy with dignity, one that best serves the interests of each of our countries — not the whims of a single power.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From war threats to negotiations In the early months of 2025, Iran and the United States stood on the brink of open military conflict. The escalation was driven by several factors that coincided in time, heightening the effect of instability. It was one of the most dangerous periods in the history of their relations. Until very recently, Iran lived under a cloud of anxious expectation: would war erupt, or could the situation be contained? The first reason behind the sharp escalation is, without doubt, Donald Trump’s return to office. It is well known that during his first presidency in 2018, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), reinstated prior sanctions and introduced new, extremely severe ones against Tehran. Trump took a hardline stance toward the Islamic regime, viewing it as a threat to human rights and regional stability. By early February of this year, he had already issued strict demands to Iran: to drastically scale back—or possibly entirely dismantle—its nuclear program, relinquish nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cease support for allied groups in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias). He threatened large-scale bombings if Tehran disagreed, but also left room for negotiations. It is worth recalling that Trump personally authorized the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), accusing Shiite militias under Soleimani’s leadership of alleged mass killings of civilians in Syria. In contrast, Iranians see Soleimani as a noble warrior and a professional soldier, who saved the peoples of Syria and Iraq from terrorist atrocities, and were outraged by his extrajudicial killing. From an economic perspective, it was during Trump’s first term that Iranian oil exports plummeted nearly tenfold, from over 2.5 million barrels per day in April 2018 to 300,000 barrels per day in June 2019. Although sanctions remained in place under President Joe Biden, their enforcement became more lenient. As a result, by 2024, Iran had begun rapidly rebuilding its oil exports, which rose to 1.9 million barrels per day by the summer of last year. This sparked hopes for a gradual economic recovery. However, Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 meant a new wave of threats. In his first month back in office, Trump gave Iran a two-month deadline to make concessions or face a firm response. The second reason is Israel’s aggressive and expansionist policy. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, long described Israel as a colonial-settler project created by the West, inherently driven to expand by seizing territory from neighboring Muslim countries and committing crimes against their Muslim populations, all with the ultimate goal of forcibly establishing “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates. In reality, there have been some differences between Israeli governments: under left-wing leadership, Israel tends to act more peacefully and moderately, while right-wing administrations pursue more aggressive and harsh policies. In recent years, however, Israel’s actions toward its neighbors have become especially aggressive—exactly as Khomeini had described—after the rise to power of the most radical ultra-right forces. The devastation that this government has brought upon the Gaza Strip, razing it to the ground, speaks for itself. After the fall of Bashar Assad’s strong leadership in Syria, Israel immediately seized the opportunity to destroy all of Syria’s heavy weaponry, effectively disarming the country. Israel then moved to capture more Syrian land beyond the annexed Golan Heights and committed new violations there. The Iran policy of the current Israeli government is focused on overthrowing the regime and installing puppet authorities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, known for his uncompromising hostility toward the regime in Iran, has spoken openly of his desire to see its end. There were rumors in Iran’s media space suggesting that Israel might be considering Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, as a symbolic leader for a future “secular Iran.” Within Iran, perceptions of the Pahlavi dynasty are overwhelmingly negative: it is seen as a pro-Western dynasty detached from traditional Islamic roots, which exploited national resources and oppressed Muslims and the Islamic clergy. Nonetheless, a portion of Iranian youth and some opposition commentators in the country hold radical views, harbor hostility toward Islam and Arabs, and support Trump, Netanyahu and the Pahlavi dynasty. This group would likely side with the enemy if hostilities broke out. Furthermore, Iran began to lose its regional influence. Israel carried out a series of successful operations against Iranian allies, primarily targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Syria. Key Hezbollah commanders and several IRGC officers were killed, and arms depots were destroyed. It is remarkable that some Syrian Islamists, who had previously been hostile to Israel, welcomed this development as a form of revenge for Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime and thus became temporary tactical allies of Israel. Following the December 2024 coup that brought anti-Iranian Islamists to power, Syria—once a strategic ally of Iran—is now increasingly taking a negative stance toward Tehran. By the start of this year, a sense of pessimism had settled over Iran. Feelings of confusion, anxiety and the realization of diminished influence in the Middle East became widespread among many Iranians, especially conservative ones. At the same time, a different sentiment was growing in Tehran among Iranian patriots and supporters of the Islamic regime: if the U.S., Israel or both launched a military attack, Iran’s response would be as harsh as possible. IRGC officials and prominent religious figures have made this clear. A change within: tracing Iran’s path to negotiations After a long period of tough rhetoric, Iran has made a strategic shift in its foreign policy in recent weeks. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had firmly banned any negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear program, suddenly changed course. What drove this decision? It is important to recognize that this shift resulted not only from an external threat but also from a deep internal reassessment, one that was rational, compelled by the circumstances, yet conscious. Until recently, Iran stuck to the principle of “no concessions under pressure.” Khamenei pointed to the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, which the U.S. exited during Trump’s presidency in 2018. From Khamenei’s perspective, new talks would be meaningless and dangerous because “the Americans will deceive again.” However, by April 2025, the situation had changed so much that Iran’s political and military elites began convincing the supreme leader of the need for dialogue. Reformist circles—especially the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian—played the leading role in this process. He insisted that without negotiations, Iran faced the risk of catastrophe: a major war, domestic unrest and even the fall of the regime. Reports from Tehran suggest he emerged as the main negotiator within the political establishment, persuading Khamenei to invoke the concept of maslahat (expediency)—a religiously sanctioned method for setting aside principles in order to save the Islamic regime. This decision was informed by several factors: - Economic crisis: according to official data, inflation between March 21 and April 20, 2025, reached 39%, while youth unemployment in the last quarter of 2024 stood at 20%. While Iran has seen worse in its recent past, these figures are nonetheless troubling. Furthermore, reserve funds were significantly depleted last year, investments have all but disappeared due to sanctions, and foreign currency reserves have declined. The country has also been hit by an energy crisis.- Erosion of ideology: satellite channels broadcasting from the U.S. and the UK have significantly expanded their reach. Outlets like Manoto, BBC Persian and Iran International have long championed secular, pro-Western views while criticizing the Islamic regime. What has particularly alarmed the authorities is the promotion of the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty: despite its brutal rule and fight against traditional Iranian and Islamic values—still remembered by the older generation—some youths have begun to see the Pahlavis as a possible “alternative” to the ruling clerical establishment.- Risks in domestic politics: political analysts, military officials and intelligence agencies warned the leadership about the risk of a “nationwide uprising” that could be sparked by an external attack. The concern was not just about protests but the potential for pro-Western groups to cooperate with foreign aggressors. The Iranian Interior Ministry said that these elements had become more active amid the 2022 protests and were receiving support from abroad. All these signals from the army, the clergy, the administration and the intelligence agencies compelled the Iranian leadership to adopt a political survival strategy. Drawing on the experience from the Iran–Iraq War, Khamenei reasoned that “continued confrontation would lead to catastrophe.” This is why he allowed the talks to begin while keeping control over their scope and substance. The nuclear program: compromise is possible, surrender is not One of the key issues in the Iran–U.S. negotiations remains the future of the Iranian nuclear program. Despite years of mutual accusations and broken trust, Tehran appears open to tactical compromises but not to surrender. According to sources within Iranian political circles, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has agreed to discussions on all parameters of the nuclear program, including uranium enrichment levels and the terms for international inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities. However, a complete dismantling of the nuclear program is widely seen as out of the question, as it would be perceived as a national humiliation within Iranian political culture. Khamenei and top IRGC officials—guardians of the regime’s ideological foundations—have repeatedly reinforced this position in their public statements. The scenario under consideration in Tehran includes these possible concessions: - a temporary halt to uranium enrichment beyond 60%,- a reduction in the stockpile of highly enriched uranium,- broader IAEA access to selected nuclear sites,- a declaration affirming the peaceful purposes of the nuclear program with legal guarantees. In return, Iran will push for major sanctions relief—not only in the financial sector but also in technology, including the lifting of the ban on investments in the oil and gas industry. These restrictions, in force since the late 1990s, have been particularly damaging: former Iranian official Hossein Selahvarzi put the total economic loss to Iran since 2012 at over USD 1 trillion. Iran’s missile program remains a separate and highly sensitive issue. It is regarded as an untouchable symbol of national pride and strategic autonomy. The supreme leader has made it clear that Iran’s nuclear capabilities “ensure the country’s security” in the face of potential isolation or attack. As a result, Tehran is likely to reject any proposals for reducing its missile potential. All this means that negotiations are possible, but their scope is quite limited. The outcomes of the two latest rounds of indirect talks in Oman and Rome offer some optimism. Flexing muscles: a show of force as a negotiating tool The prospect of talks between Iran and the U.S. does not preclude military tensions. On the contrary, this year both countries carried out a series of shows of force to send a message: “We are approaching negotiations from a position of strength.” Iran, on the one hand, has stepped up military activity along its external borders. In April 2025, Tehran for the first time supplied its allies in Iraq with long-range ballistic missiles and drones, including the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6. These moves were seen both as acts of support for Shiite militias and as a signal of Iran’s readiness to launch strikes in the event of major conflict. The military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz took on special significance, as Iran’s navy conducted a series of maneuvers with missile boats, mines and underwater drones. Up to 20% of the world’s sea-traded oil, or about 18 million barrels per day, passes through the strait. Its possible blockade was considered a measure of last resort to pressure international markets if another round of sanctions was imposed. In addition, Iran has increased its military footprint in the southern provinces, expanding bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Hormozgan. This builds operational depth in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack and reinforces the internal narrative that “Iran will not surrender but stands ready to defend itself.” The U.S., in turn, responded by deploying six B-2 Spirit strategic bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, within striking range of key targets in Iran. These warplanes can carry both nuclear and precision-guided conventional weapons. The U.S. also sent a carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf and reinforced air defense systems at its bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq. Thus, the military buildup in the region is not just preparation for a possible conflict but part of the diplomatic game. Tehran is demonstrating that it can deliver a firm response and that any concessions it makes are not a sign of surrender but a pragmatic step toward stability. Meanwhile, Washington is signaling its readiness for a military scenario in order to gain leverage in the talks. Russia as a mediator: interest in stability and strategic partnership Amid rising tensions between Iran and the U.S., Russia is emerging more clearly as a potential mediator and stabilizing force. Its role is shaped not only by current political dynamics but also by the deep structural ties built between Moscow and Tehran over the past years. In April, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow to discuss preliminary outcomes of consultations on a new nuclear deal with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Beyond nuclear diplomacy, the parties addressed a broad range of regional issues, including Syria, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This meeting was more than a diplomatic gesture; it reflects the genuine interests of both countries. Moscow is interested in the continuity of Iran’s current regime as a source of stability and a partner in the emerging multipolar world. Tehran, for its part, refrains from anti-Russian rhetoric, does not endorse resolutions against Russia at international platforms and shows respect for Moscow’s interests in the region. Russian–Iranian ties are strengthening not only politically but also infrastructurally. In 2023, both countries made significant progress in advancing the International North–South Transport Corridor, a project designed to link St. Petersburg with the Indian port of Mumbai via Iran. This initiative, backed by both Russia and Iran, offers an alternative to Western-centric logistics routes, and its success depends on the stability of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Moscow has already shown itself to be an effective broker in regional conflicts. In 2023, Russian diplomats helped revive dialogue between Iran and Azerbaijan after a long period of hostility fueled by disputes over borders, religious matters and relations with Israel. This experience could be leveraged in the context of Iran–U.S. negotiations, especially given the deep mistrust and the lack of direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Russia’s position is clear: Moscow is opposed to any destabilization of Iran, as it threatens to undermine regional balance, strengthen Western influence and jeopardize the partnership with Iran. As Sergey Lavrov has emphasized, Russia will support any steps aimed at de-escalation and the lifting of sanctions from Iran, as long as sovereignty and international law are respected. Thus, Russia is more than just an ally of Iran; it is one of the few actors that maintains channels of trust-based communication with both Tehran and several Western nations. This makes Moscow a potentially successful mediator, especially at a time when the U.S. has limited options for direct dialogue with Iran, and European brokers have lost much of their former influence. Possible scenarios and a window of opportunity The situation around Iran has reached a critical juncture. Amid a deep internal crisis, sanctions pressure and rising external tensions, Tehran must choose between a limited deal with the West that preserves its strategic assets or a drawn-out standoff that risks plunging the region into broader instability. First scenario: moderate de-escalation If the U.S. and Iran reached a compromise on the nuclear dossier, even in a limited format, it would create a short-term opportunity for stabilization. Iran would benefit from partial sanctions relief, increased oil export capacity and attract investment in critical sectors. In return, Tehran would commit to transparency, lower uranium enrichment levels and IAEA oversight. This scenario could also partially ease tensions around Israel, reducing the risk of direct conflict. However, even this scenario does not remove several fault lines: - The ideological hostility between Iran and Israel,- Tehran’s unwavering position on the missile program,- U.S. military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.This “frozen détente” could last for one to three years, assuming both sides show political will and avoid provocations. Second scenario: a new wave of escalation If the negotiations reach a deadlock—whether due to Washington’s excessive demands, Iran’s refusal to compromise on sensitive issues or outside interference—the situation could quickly spin out of control. In that case, possible outcomes include: - Direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities (by Israel or the U.S.),- Retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Qatar,- Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,- More active operations by Shiite militias in the region. Inside Iran, this could trigger another major wave of protests, especially if the economy takes another hit from stricter sanctions. There is also a risk that some radical opposition groups could try to take advantage of the unrest to start an uprising with high casualties—something Iran’s counterintelligence has already warned about.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In December 2024, Cambodia reached a key point in its foreign policy. Japan delivered a group of patrol boats to Cambodia as part of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) regional initiative. This clearly showed that security cooperation between the two countries is growing stronger. In April 2025, Japan is expected to take another big step by becoming the first foreign country allowed access to Cambodia’s strategically important Ream Naval Base — a facility that has been upgraded by China since 2022.These events, happening just months apart, seem to show Cambodia’s effort to expand its foreign partnerships after relying on China for a long time. The handover of Japanese vessels, while China is leading the base's modernization, is more than just a friendly act from Tokyo. It is a smart move by Cambodia, showing how it is trying to use the rivalry between big powers to strengthen its own security and independence. But can Cambodia really protect its sovereignty by trying to balance the interests of powerful countries? Or is this idea of multiple partnerships just an illusion — hiding the fact that Chinese influence continues to grow? The answers to these questions may shape the future of regional security in Indochina. In August 2023, Hun Manet became Cambodia’s new Prime Minister, replacing his father Hun Sen, who had ruled for nearly 40 years. Unlike his father, Hun Manet has a Western education — he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and earned a PhD in economics from the University of Bristol. His background gave some hope to Western diplomats that Cambodia’s foreign policy might move in a direction closer to their values. These hopes were partially fulfilled when Hun Manet’s first major foreign policy statement reaffirmed Cambodia’s commitment to diversifying its international relationships while strictly adhering to the principle of neutrality. This stance was particularly significant, given Cambodia’s longstanding perception among Western analysts as a pro-China state. For years, the Khmer elites have consistently voiced support for the PRC on the international stage, receiving in return substantial investment and infrastructure aid. However, these actions have occasionally strained Cambodia’s ties with neighboring countries — a dynamic noted by officials within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Cambodia has been a member since 1999. A striking example is the discord surrounding the South China Sea territorial disputes. When affected countries sought to use ASEAN as a platform to pressure Beijing, Cambodia opposed the effort, effectively blocking the adoption of a joint statement in autumn 2024 — something unprecedented in ASEAN’s 45-year history. With a few exceptions, the Khmer elites traditionally supported a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War and, afterward, a neutral stance on foreign affairs. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen himself emphasized that Cambodia seeks ties not only with China, but with all countries, considering this the most beneficial foreign policy path for a developing nation. Among Phnom Penh’s close partners is Japan, which conducts an active foreign policy in the region and stands as one of the Kingdom’s largest economic donors. At the same time, it is important to note that Hun Sen described relations with China as "unbreakable" and consistently rejected external criticism, highlighting only the positive aspects of Cambodia’s deepening ties with Beijing. In the first half of December 2024, Cambodia and Japan signed an agreement on the transfer of military patrol boats to Phnom Penh as part of Japan’s FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) initiative. Cambodia became the first ASEAN country to receive such assistance. However, the Kingdom has no intention of turning its back on China. The principle of neutrality, which underpins the country’s foreign policy, means that partnership with Japan does not contradict friendship with the PRC. Rather, the combination of the two reflects a strategy of multi-vector diplomacy, enabling Cambodia to benefit from relationships with a variety of partners. This approach is supported by several factors. First, Prime Minister Hun Manet has repeatedly affirmed his commitment to an "independent and neutral foreign policy based on the rule of law, mutual respect, and adherence to the principles of the UN Charter." In his words, this policy aims "to promote national interests, strengthen existing friendships, and build more solid ties." Second, Phnom Penh consistently accepts aid from all willing donors, including Australia through the Cambodia-Australia Partnership for Resilient Economic Development (CAPRED), the United States, Japan, and, of course, China. In 2023, marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Japan, Cambodia elevated bilateral cooperation to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. With this move, Japan joined a narrow circle of Phnom Penh’s strategic allies — a status previously held solely by China between 2010 and 2023 — advancing from basic diplomatic engagement and standard strategic partnership. Although China surpassed Japan in aid volume back in 2007, Tokyo remains a vital partner for Phnom Penh. Between 1994 and 2021, Japan implemented 210 investment projects in Cambodia totaling $3.1 billion. In 2024, bilateral trade between Japan and Cambodia reached $40.94 billion, placing Tokyo as the Kingdom’s fifth-largest trading partner. This robust economic cooperation underscores Japan’s strategic importance to Cambodia and highlights Phnom Penh’s efforts to diversify its international relationships, avoiding overreliance on any single partner. Despite Japan’s recent delivery of patrol boats to Cambodia, Phnom Penh’s most robust military cooperation remains with China. Between 2016 and 2024, China and Cambodia conducted six joint military exercises under the name “Golden Dragon” (នាគមាស), with each iteration featuring an increase in the number of troops, weaponry, and military equipment involved. Even amid the global threat of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Phnom Penh proceeded with the fourth iteration of these drills, involving nearly 3,000 soldiers — ten times more than in 2016. [1]. The drills also included dozens of combat helicopters, armored vehicles, and various transport assets. This continuous military support from Beijing underscores Cambodia’s growing reliance on Chinese involvement in strengthening its armed forces. Meanwhile, after seven years of joint military exercises with the United States, Cambodia suspended this cooperation in 2017, officially citing scheduling conflicts due to national elections. However, in June 2024, during a meeting between Hun Sen and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Cambodia announced the resumption of military cooperation with Washington. Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to revive joint military drills and to once again accept Cambodian cadets for training at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. For the United States, the primary point of contention has been the Chinese-built Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, despite Phnom Penh’s repeated assurances that the facility is intended solely for use by the Royal Cambodian Navy. Rumors about the base’s development first surfaced in 2018, sparking increased tensions between Phnom Penh and Washington. At the time, however, the U.S. lacked concrete evidence to formally accuse Cambodia of intending to host Chinese military forces on its territory, and American officials limited their response to diplomatic messages expressing concern. In August 2018, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that he trusted Cambodia’s assurances that the base would be used exclusively by its own navy, and he praised the Kingdom for its “firm defense of national sovereignty.” In early December 2024, a U.S. Navy vessel arrived in Cambodia in the first port call in eight years — a visit made possible after a prolonged period of strained relations due to sustained American criticism of Cambodia’s human rights record. Cambodia’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the visit was arranged following a request from the United States and would help to “strengthen and expand the bonds of friendship, as well as enhance bilateral cooperation” between the two countries. *** In recent years, the Asia-Pacific region has become a stage for intensifying geopolitical competition, directly impacting Cambodia’s security environment and foreign policy choices. The strategic interests of major powers such as the United States and China increasingly intersect in the region, prompting smaller states — including Cambodia — to explore new pathways for safeguarding their independence and national security. In response to these shifts, Phnom Penh has sought to strengthen its defense capabilities and diversify international partnerships, as reflected in the agreement with Japan on the transfer of military vessels. This move not only enhances bilateral relations with Tokyo but also signals Cambodia’s intent to play a more active role in regional security affairs. Such involvement could enable Cambodia to navigate between competing global powers and maintain its independence amid mounting pressure from both China and the United States.Russia, as one of Cambodia’s traditional partners, may also seek to bolster its regional presence by intensifying diplomatic engagement and offering avenues for cooperation in defense, security, and military technology. This would help Phnom Penh better balance its external relations and maneuver between great powers more effectively. For Moscow, it presents an opportunity not only to deepen ties with Cambodia, but also to expand its influence in Southeast Asia and counter the growing presence of Western actors in the region. 1. Phan Thi Hai Yen. (2024). Cambodia's Strategic Embrace of China: Military Cooperation and Its Implications. ISRG Journal of Arts Humanities & Social Sciences (ISRGJAHSS), II(V), 191–198.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Liberal Party led by Mark Carney has secured a fourth consecutive term in government. This victory has come at a time when Canada is facing an unprecedented threat to its economic security and sovereignty from United States President Donald Trump. In an election defined by concerns over Trump’s erratic tariff policy and talk of making Canada a 51st state, voters decided Carney was the leader best equipped to deal with these challenges. Carney previously served as governor of the Bank of Canada, where he guided the country through the 2008 global financial crisis. He later became the first non-British person to head the Bank of England, helping guide the United Kingdom through Brexit, one of the biggest shocks to the British economy in decades. Now the world is facing similar financial shocks from Trump’s trade war. The on-again, off-again nature of Trump’s tariff policy could inflict significant damage to the global economy — even more to the American economy — and cause irreparable damage to its reputation as a rational entity in international trade. In the face of the ill-advised and self-defeating U.S. tariffs, the new Canadian government should take prudent, urgent and bold steps to strengthen the nation’s economy. Here are major and important economic priorities for the government to reshape the economy and spur much-needed economic growth. Stabilize and strengthen the national economy As a primary act, the new government should stabilize the Canadian economy from the tariff shocks. It must continue to develop carefully calibrated retaliations to Trump’s tariffs. The revenue raised from the tariffs should be used to compensate those directly affected by them, using a multi-pronged mechanism that includes training, increased employment insurance benefits and additional transfers to low-income households to reduce the impact of tariffs on food costs. Currently, a series of provincial regulations restrict the goods and services that cross Canada’s provincial borders daily. The new government should urgently remove longstanding interprovincial trade barriers. According to a report by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, removing these impediments could boost the economy by up to $200 billion annually. Similarly, a study by the International Monetary Fund indicates the effect of these barriers is equivalent to a 21 per cent tariff. Removing interprovincial trade barriers would significantly offset the negative effects of Trump’s tariffs on the Canadian economy, and provide a boost to the “Buy Canadian” movement. Carney seems to have made this a priority already, which is promising. In March, he said he aims to have “free trade by Canada Day” among provinces and territories. Streamlining natural resource projects Canada is a natural resource superpower. However, for natural resources and critical minerals to be extracted efficiently, regulatory processes need to be streamlined by cutting red tape and duplicative assessments. The federal government and the provinces should agree to a single environmental assessment that meets the standards of both jurisdictions. Additionally and importantly, respectful, genuine and meaningful consultations must be undertaken by project proponents and governments with the relevant Indigenous communities to address their concerns, respect their rights and safeguard their economic well-being in the development of the natural resources projects. Carney has said he will uphold the principle of free, prior and informed consent when it comes to initiating resource extraction projects and make it easier for Indigenous communities to become owners of said projects. A similar approach should also guide the construction of infrastructure projects such as pipelines and ports, which play a crucial role in facilitating Canada’s exports. Boost Canada’s productivity through innovation A country’s ability to raise living standards for its people mostly depends on its capacity to improve its productivity. Economist Paul Krugman once stated, “productivity is not everything, but, in the long run, it is almost everything.” Canada’s productivity is lagging, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The new Canadian government should take steps to boost the nation’s productivity by increasing direct expenditures on research and development. Additional funding should be allocated to higher institutions of learning, and incentivizing businesses to spend more on research and development through significant tax credits. Although research and development spending continues to grow in Canada, as a percentage to GDP, it is the second lowest among G7 nations. Boosting investments will drive innovation, spur economic growth and ensure Canada remains competitive on the global stage. Dealing with U.S. tariffs One of the government’s primary tasks will be preparing meticulously for trade negotiations with the U.S. to address the threat of tariffs and reach a “win-win” trade deal. Given Trump’s highly unpredictable nature, negotiations will not be easy. Although Trump could have withdrawn from the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), he has not done so, and zero-tariffs remain in effect for products that are certified as being North American origin under the CUSMA rules. This could be a solid starting point for future trade negotiations. At the same time, Carney and his team must work to stabilize the Canadian economy against the unprecedented threat of Trump’s tariffs by strengthening the domestic economy, diversifying Canada’s exports and reducing the country’s dependence on the U.S. Pulling away from the world’s largest economy will not be easy for Canadian businesses, given the deep integration of Canada’s economy with that of the U.S. Still, expanding trade with the European Union, the U.K., Africa and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations — and exploring other opportunities to reducing trade barriers with nations in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America — will enlarge Canada’s export market. By doing all this, Canada can not only prepare for a tough round of U.S. trade talks but also position itself as a stronger, more self-reliant global trading partner.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction U.S. trade with China has significantly grown in recent decades and is crucial for both countries. Today, China is one of the largest export markets for U.S. goods and services (second to Mexico), and the United States is the top export market for China. As Figure 1 shows, this trade—much of which increased after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001—has brought lower prices to U.S. consumers and higher profits for American companies. But it also comes with costs, notably the loss of American jobs because of import competition, automation, and multinational companies moving manufacturing overseas.   Figure 1: US-China Trade over the 20 years Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. After President Donald Trump began a so-called trade war with China in 2018, economic tensions between China and the U.S. have been on the rise. Chinese officials have warned that there are “no winners” in a trade war, but the second Trump administration embarked on a new and more aggressive tariff policy. In the first months of his second administration, Trump has threatened tariffs as high as 145 percent on all Chinese goods, while China’s latest retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports are as high as 125 percent. The Trump administration claims the levies attempt to punish China for unfair trade practices, including Chinese subsidies that hurt U.S. workers and the long-standing accusation that China pressures American companies to hand over their technology and intellectual property, as well as China’s role in illicit fentanyl trafficking. Some economists doubt, however, that Trump’s aggressive approach will achieve its desired goals and raise concerns that tariffs will drive up inflation and the costs of goods, hurting American consumers and exports. This paper attempts to examine the economic effects of the U.S.-China trade war. It first shows the economic effects of the U.S.-China trade war under the first Trump administration and then forecasts for the second Trump administration. II. Trade War between the U.S. and China As Figure 2 shows, the US trade deficit with China has increased as trade between both countries expanded. Therefore, the first Trump administration started the trade war by imposing higher tariffs on Chinese goods. Figure 2: US-China Goods Trade (2001-2024) Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 4 show U.S. and Chinese tariff rates for each other’s goods. As Figure 3-1 shows, the US tariffs on Chinese goods were less than 5 per cent when the first Trump administration began on January 20, 2018. Then the tariff continued to rise. As Figure 3-2 shows, the average US tariffs on China goods were 20.8 percent when the second Trump administration began on January 20, 2025. As Figure 4 shows, after the second Trump administration took office, US tariffs of 10 percent were imposed on all imports from China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) on February 1, 2025. Then the Trump administration increased tariffs on Chinese goods to 20 percent on March 3 and to 34 percent on April 2. US tariffs of 10 percent were imposed on nearly all countries under IEEPA, but with some sector carve-outs on April 5. China retaliated against US tariffs by increasing tariffs on U.S. products to 34 percent on April 4 and to 84 percent on April 10. US tariffs ranging from 1 percent to 74 percent were imposed on nearly all countries with a trade surplus with the US, including China (74 percent). US tariff on Chinese goods included an additional 50 percent tariff as counter-retaliation for China’s retaliation announcement on April 10. Then again China faced an additional 41 percent tariff increase under IEEPA (to 125 percent total). However, Trump instituted a broad 90-day pause on steep Liberation Day tariffs, aiming to give time for negotiators to work out new deals. But Trump has not provided a pause for China. In response, China has raised its duties on imports of US goods to 125 percent from 84 percent on April 12, while US tariffs on Chinese imports have increased to 145 percent by adding a 20 percent tariff in relation to the fentanyl. Figure 3-1: US–China tariff rates toward each other and the rest of the world (ROW) before 2025 Source: MacroMicro. https://en.macromicro.me/charts/130548/china-us-tariff-rates  Figure 3-2: US–China tariff rates toward each other and rest of world, 2018-2025  Figure 4: US–China tariff rates toward each other in 2025 Source: Reuters, April 11, 2025. III. Economic Effects of the Trade War between the U.S. and China A.  The first Trump administration Chad Bowen (2023) at the Peterson Institute for International Economics raised a question “was the trade war between U.S. and China worth it for US exporters”? And his answer so far is no. In the middle of the trade war, the United States and China signed a historic trade agreement on a ‘Phase One trade deal’ on January 15, 2020. Bowen supposes that in 2018–21, US goods exports to China of phase one products had grown at the same pace as China’s imports of those products from the world and that US services exports to China had grown at the rate of US services exports to the world. Cumulative US goods and services exports to China in 2018–21 were about 19 percent lower with the trade war and phase one agreement between the two countries (see Figure 5). His estimates suggest that the United States would have avoided export losses of $24 billion (16 percent) in 2018 and $30 billion (20 percent) in 2019 resulting from the trade war. Exports would also have been $27 billion (18 percent) higher in 2020 and $40 billion (23 percent) higher in 2021 than under phase one agreement.   Figure 5: US exports to China would be higher with no trade war. i. US manufacturing exports suffered in the trade war and did not recover. As Figure 6 shows, China purchased only 59 percent of the full commitment of US manufactured products in 2020–21 under Phase One trade deal. Manufacturing was the most economically significant part of the trade deal, making up 44 percent of covered US exports in 2017. Autos and aircraft dominated US exports before the trade war. Both did poorly during the period of 2020–2021. US auto exports reached only 39 percent of the target over 2020–21. The sector’s suffering is a trade war warning. In July 2018, Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports included auto parts; China’s tariff retaliation hit US car exports. US car exports decreased sharply in 2018, as car makers like Tesla and BMW reacted to the higher costs by moving production destined for the Chinese market out of the United States. (Ford, another major car exporter, including through its Lincoln brand, complained in 2018 that Trump’s separate steel and aluminum tariffs raised the cost of its US-based manufacturing by $1 billion.) Even when China lifted the retaliatory tariffs in early 2019, US exports did not recover. Sales of US aircraft, engines, and parts to China did even worse, reaching just 18 percent of the 2020–21 target. Though the industry was less directly impacted by trade war tariffs, US sales to China plummeted in 2019 after the two crashes of the Boeing 737 MAX. Between March 2019 and late 2020, the airplane model was grounded, with Boeing shutting down production in early 2020. China cancelled orders in April 2020, and though the legal text allows credit for aircraft “orders and deliveries”, additional orders had not been publicly announced by the end of 2021, despite complaints by the Biden administration that China's trade policy was holding back sales. (Exports of the 737 MAX might eventually resume, as Chinese regulators instructed airlines in December 2021 to implement the changes needed to allow the model to fly again in China.) Not all manufactured exports performed poorly during the period of 2020–21. Medical supplies needed to treat Covid-19 significantly increased. US exports of semiconductors and manufacturing equipment also boomed – thanks to a combination of stockpiling by Chinese companies as US export controls in 2019-20 threatened to cut off Chinese firms like SMIC and Huawei as well as increased demand for chips needed for consumer electronics and data servers brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic shift to remote work, schooling, and leisure.  Figure 6: US-China war battered hard US manufacturing exports to China ii.  US agricultural exports suffered in the trade war, received subsidies, and then recovered. To the Trump administration, agriculture was a very politically important part of the trade deal in 2020, despite accounting for only 14 percent of covered exports. As Figure 7-1 shows, when China's retaliatory tariffs hurt US farm exports during the period of 2018–19, the Trump administration awarded the sector tens of billions of dollars in federal subsidies. In the days leading up to the 2020 presidential election, the Trump administration released a report that touted resuming farm sales to China—ignoring the continued troubles facing US manufacturing, energy, and service exports. US farm exports did get back to 2017 pre-trade war levels and ultimately reached 83 percent of the 2020–21 commitment under Phase One deal (see Figure 7-1 & 7-2).  Figure 7-1: US agricultural exports to China Soybeans made up approximately 60 percent of US agricultural exports to China in 2017. As Figure 7-2 shows, exports of US soybeans to China were devastated by the trade war, falling from $12 billion to $3 billion in 2018, because China imposed retaliatory tariffs. Though soybean exports managed to reach their pre-trade war levels during the period of 2020–21, they still fell over 30 percent short of their target under Phase One deal. Products like pork, corn, wheat, and sorghum exceeded expectations, though not necessarily because of the trade deal in January 2020. The outbreak of African swine fever led China to increase pork imports from the U.S. in 2019 before the deal was agreed. (In 2020–21, China's pigmeat imports from the rest of the world also averaged five times 2017 levels.) Wheat and corn imports increased after China began to comply with a 2019 WTO dispute settlement ruling against its unfilled tariff rate quotas. (Compared with 2017, China's imports from the rest of the world in 2020–21 were about 200 percent higher for wheat and 350 percent higher for corn.) Some farm exports also benefitted less from the Chinese purchase commitments under the trade deal in January 2020. Seafood and farm products did not rebound from the effects of the trade war. After being hit with Chinese tariffs, US lobster exports re-achieved about half of their target in 2020–21. US exports of raw hides and skins ended up at less than one-third (see Figure 7-2).  Figure 7-2: US agricultural exports to China (sub-category) iii. U.S. Imports from China: Total US imports from China were down with the beginning of the trade war. For 15 months beginning in July 2018, the Trump administration imposed higher tariffs on Chinese products. The Trump administration began the trade war by imposing tariffs of 25 percent on products covering roughly $34 billion of US imports from China in July 2018 (List 1) and on $16 billion of imports in August (List 2). When China retaliated against the U.S., the trade war continued with Trump imposing 10 percent tariffs on an additional $200 billion of imports in September 2018 (List 3), increasing the tariff rate of those duties to 25 percent in June 2019. In September 2019, Trump hit another $102 billion of imports (List 4A) with 15 percent tariffs, later reducing them to 7.5 percent upon implementation of the US-China Phase One trade agreement in February 2020. (The administration identified another set of products covering most of the rest of US imports from China of more than $160 billion—List 4B—for which it scheduled tariffs to take effect on December 15, 2019 but was cancelled on December 13, 2019.) As a result, as Figure 8-1 & 8-2 show, overall, the trade war reduced US imports from China. Then US imports recovered only slowly, starting in mid-2020. In January 2022, when the term of the first Trump administration ended, US imports from China (red line) remained well below the pre-trade war trend (dashed line), while US imports from the rest of the world (blue line) returned to pre-trade war levels of June 2018. China was the source of only 18 percent of total US goods imports in 2022, down from 22 percent at the beginning of the trade war.  Figure 8-1: Value of US goods imports from China and the rest of the world, 2016–2022 (June 2018 = 100)  Figure 8-2: Value of US imports from China and the rest of the world by trade war tariff list, 2018–2022 (June 2018 = 100) B.  The second Trump administration As of April 12, 2025, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are 145 percent, but this tariff rate is not sustainable over a long period of time because it is way too high and because U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping want to negotiate. In fact, Trump signalled on April 23 that he would cut his 145 percent tariff on Chinese goods substantially. Therefore, it is not reasonable to explore the effects of Trump’s tariffs of 145 percent. Last year, McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) examined the impact of now-President Trump’s proposed tariffs based on Trump’s campaign promises that would impose 60 percent additional tariffs on imports from China. They explored the impacts of a 60 percent additional tariff on China with and without other countries’ retaliating in kind by imposing steeper tariffs on imports from the United States. Figures 9 through 14 show the results from their analyses. Figure 9 shows that China experiences the most significant GDP losses (0.9% below baseline by 2026), while the U.S. also experiences a negative GDP growth rate (0.2% below baseline by 2027).  Figure 9: Projected change in real GDP of selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 Figure 10 shows that the direct impact of the U.S. tariff of 60 percent on Chinese employment is initially negative (-2.25% in 2025), but a gradual decline in Chinese real wages eventually restores employment to the baseline after a decade. US employment will fall 0.23% below baseline by 2027.  Figure 10: Projected change in employment (hours worked) in selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 Figure 11 shows that US inflation rises by 0.4% in 2025, with the higher cost of imports due to tariffs not offset by the stronger US dollar lowering prices of imports from other countries. The tariffs on US imports from China are mildly deflationary in other countries (see Figure 11).  Figure 11: Projected change in inflation in selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 The slowdown in the Chinese economy causes capital to flow out of China and into other economies. This is initially a financial capital flow responding to a fall in financial rates of return in China and a rise in expected profits in countries like Canada and Mexico. That financial inflow becomes physical investment over time, which increases production capacity in these economies. Countries that receive the capital experience a trade deficit (see figure 12). This additional production enables the rise in exports to the US economy. While the US trade deficit with China shrinks, the overall US trade deficit increases (figure 12) as the partial relocation of production back into the US economy causes the dollar to appreciate.  Figure 12: Projected change in the trade balance of selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 So far, figures have focused on the unilateral imposition of US tariffs on Chinese products. In figure 13, McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland compare projected changes in US GDP from the unilateral imposition of tariffs with a scenario where China retaliates by imposing a 60% tariff on US goods and services. By 2026, US GDP losses from Trump’s tariff policy more than double if China retaliates against the US (see Figure 13). The impact on US inflation in 2025 yields a similar result (see Figure 14). With Chinese retaliation, US inflation rises 0.7% above baseline compared with 0.4% without retaliation.  Figure 13: Projected change in US GDP from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, with and without retaliation by China, 2025-40  Figure 14: Projected change in US inflation from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, with and without retaliation by China, 2025-40 IV. Conclusion This paper showed that U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods imposed by the first Trump administration mainly had negative impacts on U.S. exports, although they reduced U.S. imports from China over a short period of time. The analysis by McKibbin, Hogan, Noland (2024) for the second Trump administration also shows that U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will have negative impacts on US GDP, inflation, employment, and trade balance. This paper also showed that U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will have larger negative impacts on U.S. GDP and inflation if China retaliates. Then a question arises: “Why does Trump attempt to impose extremely high tariffs on products from China?” Larisa Kapustina,  Ľudmila Lipková, Yakov Silin and Andrei Drevalev (2020) identify four main reasons that led the U.S. to the greatest trade war between the U.S. and China: a) to reduce the U.S. deficit of bilateral trade and increase the number of U.S. jobs; b) to limit access of Chinese companies to American technologies and prevent digital modernisation of the industry in China; c) to prevent the growth of China’s military strength; and d) to reduce the U.S. federal budget deficit. References Bown, Chad, “China bought none of the extra $200 billion of US exports in Trump's trade deal.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper. July 19, 2022.Bown, Chad, “Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper. October 20, 2022.Bown, Chad, “US imports from China are both decoupling and reaching new highs. Here's how.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper. March 31, 2023. Kapustina, Larisa, Ľudmila Lipková, Yakov Silin and Andrei Drevalev, “US-China Trade War: Causes and Consequences.” SHS Web Conference. Volume 73, 2020: 1-13.McKibbin, W., M. Hogan and M. Noland (2024), “The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 24-20. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском My analysis of South Korean relations with Egypt and a comparison with China, my academic and research specialty, comes as Egypt and South Korea celebrate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations on April 14, 2025. Relations between the two countries have witnessed continuous development, encompassing various political, economic, cultural, and educational fields over the past three decades. Egyptian-Korean relations date back to 1948, when Egypt officially recognized the independence of the Republic of South Korea. Egyptian-South Korean cooperation currently extends to development cooperation for the next five years to meet development requirements, promote the transition to a green economy, and expand sustainable infrastructure projects.  Especially with South Korea's selection of Egypt as a strategic partner in its development cooperation plans for the period 2022-2026. While China is investing in its massive Belt and Road Initiative, and Russia is using its security arms to strengthen its presence in Africa, South Korea is focusing on a different kind of belt related to food security. The South Korea-led Rice Belt Initiative, particularly within the African continent, aims to boost rice production in African countries by introducing high-yielding rice varieties, providing seeds, providing training, and supporting irrigation systems. Through partnerships with eight African countries, most notably Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda, South Korea is investing in agricultural capacity building and promoting rice cultivation and distribution in these and other African countries to enhance food security through partnerships between South Korea and African countries.  Through major South Korean initiatives, such as official development assistance, capacity building programs, technology transfer, and the Rice Belt, South Korea aims to bridge the development gap and strengthen its role as a pivotal global power. With the arrival of US President “Trump” in his second term, following a series of trade wars against China during his first term and his increase in tariffs on China by more than 100%, relations between the United States and China have become fraught with tension, especially with China's firm response to the US administration with a policy of reciprocal retaliation, Beijing's reciprocal increase in tariffs imposed on US goods and products, and even China's imposition of trade restrictions on US companies operating within its territory, particularly those owned by the well-known American businessman “Elon Musk”. Here we see the extent to which South Korea currently benefits from the tensions between the Chinese and American superpowers, as it is a smaller player in managing relations between the major powers.  This is precisely what Keun Lee, former vice chairman of the National Economic Advisory Council to the South Korean president, winner of the 2014 Schumpeter Prize, and author of “China: Technological Leapfrogging and Economic Catch-Up: A Schumpeterian Perspective”, which is issued by: (Oxford University Press, 2022), in this aforementioned book, Keun Lee analyzes the situation for South Korea and the nature of the dispute between China and the United States, emphasizing that South Korean companies are reaping significant benefits from the trade and technological restrictions imposed by the United States on China, which have at least slowed the “Sinicization” of manufacturing and global value chains. Since South Korea and China produce a large number of the same goods and types, such as: (consumer electronics, batteries, cars, ships), and more, according to Keun Lee’s analysis, the less China’s share of the American and Western market diminishes, the more South Korea will have. Indeed, Western and American sanctions, in particular, imposed on the Chinese tech giant Huawei, have given a boost.  Strong sales of wireless systems produced by Samsung. Similarly, if Chinese industry has less access to Western technology, it is likely to turn to South Korean companies. South Korea is attempting to capitalize on this by adopting a new development strategy for partnerships with Egypt and other African countries, and holding the first South Korea-Africa summit in June 2024. Here, we can draw a simple comparison between the development roles of China and South Korea within the African continent. China primarily focuses on its massive financial power through its Belt and Road Initiative, as well as its efforts to fundamentally change the nature of African countries. What is interesting is that South Korea, which possesses significant strengths, has decided to join the bandwagon to win in Africa. South Korea is keen to move away from following the Chinese model in Africa. As noted during the first South Korea-Africa summit in June 2024, South Korea is serving as a bridge or communication channel in the international community as a responsible middle power, based on its own development experience compared to China.  Noting South Korea's keenness to avoid presenting itself as a strong competitor to China or others within the African continent The modern history of South Korean relations with Africa begins with the Korean War on June 25, 1950, with the participation of units from the Ethiopian and South African armies within the United Nations forces. This included the “Mehal Sevare Unit”, the bodyguard unit of the Ethiopian emperor, which was sent to support South Korea, despite Ethiopia being one of the poorest countries in the world at the time. This Ethiopian aid contributed to building friendly and special relations between the two countries after the war ended. As a result, an African Union office in South Korea was established within the Ethiopian embassy, and the South Korean government established a memorial garden in honor of the Ethiopian soldiers who participated in the war in support of South Korea. Given the importance of the partnership with South Korea, President El-Sisi's keenness during his visit to South Korea was to enhance the Egyptian state's efforts to localize South Korean industry in Egypt, reflecting the promising prospects for diverse and anticipated Egyptian partnerships with South Korea. Here, we find President El-Sisi's commitment to localizing South Korean technology in Egypt, which was clearly demonstrated by the localization of the South Korean railway car industry in Egypt in the Suez Canal Economic Zone. This aims to gradually enhance Egyptian local content and bolster Egyptian supply efforts to markets in the Arab region and Africa, through Egyptian partnerships between the public and private sectors in South Korea. Therefore, we find President Sisi keen to benefit from South Korean expertise in localizing technology and attracting foreign investment, which contributes to the creation of approximately 5,000 job opportunities for Egyptian youth in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, achieving social and economic progress in the region. On the development front, South Korea is keen to provide development grants to Egypt and all African countries, through the “Korea International Cooperation Agency” (KOICA), especially in the fields of higher education, intellectual property, vocational training, information technology, establishing an electronic system for government procurement, women's economic empowerment, and combating violence. Meanwhile, South Korea's concessional development financing is diversified, covering (railways, subway car manufacturing, knowledge transfer programs, and government capacity building programs). Egyptian-South Korean cooperation has increased in light of the strategic partnership between the two countries, particularly in light of South Korea's selection of Egypt as its strategic partner in development cooperation for the next five years.  Many South Korean projects in Egypt are being financed through the concessional financing window provided by the Korea Economic Development Cooperation Fund (KEDCF), a subsidiary of the Export-Import Bank of Korea. This was evident in a $460 million South Korean development financing agreement with Egypt to implement the project to manufacture and supply 40 train units (320 cars) for the second and third lines of the Greater Cairo Metro. South Korean companies also have a significant presence in the New Administrative Capital and the Suez Canal Development Corridor, most notably Hyundai Rotem in the Suez Canal Economic Zone. The Hyundai Rotem Group includes more than 14 South Korean companies operating in three main sectors: trains and railway equipment, military industries related to land weapons, heavy machinery and equipment, energy infrastructure, and iron and steel. It is also a leading company in modern technologies related to the use of hydrogen fuel in vehicles and equipments. Egyptian-South Korean relations are diverse across several fields, not limited to development cooperation efforts between the two countries, but also extend to trade, investment, and culture, with many South Korean companies investing in Egypt in various fields, such as technology, communications, electronics, and others. During his recent visit to South Korea, the Egyptian government and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi were keen to advance cooperation with the South Korean side and provide full support for South Korean investments in Egypt, encompassing a wide variety of fields. Korea is one of Egypt's most important trading partners in East Asia. South Korea is also an important source for the transfer of industrial expertise and technology to Egypt.  There are many areas of potential cooperation between South Korea and Egypt in the Dabaa nuclear power plant projects, the most prominent of which, are: (joint manufacturing in the electronics sector, where Korean products for Samsung and LG are manufactured by Egyptians). Furthermore, 90% of Egypt's electronics exports are conducted in cooperation with South Korea. In addition, there is fruitful cooperation between the two countries in electric vehicle projects, seawater desalination, and railway development projects. In 2022, South Korea announced a $1 billion loan to Egypt from the South Korean Development Cooperation Fund. This comes as part of South Korea's efforts to build a cooperative partnership with Egypt and promote sustainable development between the two countries. This agreement also aims to conclude trade agreements and expand the scope of South Korean cooperation with Egypt in the environmentally friendly transportation, maritime, and space development sectors. At the same time, both countries agree on the importance of overcoming the climate crisis, especially after Egypt hosted the (COP27 international climate conference) in Sharm El-Sheikh. In recent years, South Korea has been seeking to create a state of rapprochement with the African continent, especially Egypt. The first Korea-Africa summit, held in early June 2024, marked a historic milestone, as South Korean ex-President “Yoon Suk-yeol” and leaders from 48 African countries met to deepen trade and economic cooperation. This led to the convening of the Korea-Africa Summit, a new initiative launched by South Korea to support cooperation with African countries in light of the challenges facing countries worldwide, particularly food security, climate challenges, and supply chain issues. Given Egypt's prominent position in Africa, South Korea sought to establish a strategic partnership with Africa, particularly Egypt, based on three axes: promoting trade and investment to achieve economic development and confronting global challenges, such as: (climate change and food security, and promoting peace, security, and cooperation in international forums). During the first Africa-South Korea summit, South Korean ex-President Yoon announced South Korea's commitment to increasing development assistance to Africa, pledging $10 billion over the next six years. This significant financial support underscores South Korea's interest in Africa's vast mineral wealth and its potential as a major export market. In his closing remarks, ex-President “Yoon” stated that: “the important Minerals Dialogue launched by South Korea and Africa sets an example for a stable supply chain through mutually beneficial cooperation and contributes to the sustainable development of mineral resources worldwide”. On the Chinese side, given the Chinese government's commitment to holding China-Africa summits, known as “FOCAC”, since 2002, which bring together most African leaders, these China-Africa summits hold significant significance for Western governments and the US administration. While Washington maintains its primary military alliance in East Asia through U.S. Forces Korea—stationing approximately 28,500 troops in South Korea—its growing concern also extends to Africa, where China’s expanding influence, exemplified by the China-Africa summits, represents a new source of geopolitical friction and tension in U.S.-China relations. Through its advanced economic ties with African countries, China provides significant assistance to African regimes that the United States and Europe are seeking to pressure to review their records on human rights, good governance, monopoly policy, and other issues. Sino-African relations have also witnessed rapid development, especially in the economic field, which China prefers as an easy and acceptable path in its dealings with developing countries, whether in the form of trade exchange, loans, grants, or investment gifts. These are characterized by the absence of political conditionality, which distinguishes them from their Western counterparts and makes them acceptable to poor African societies, both at the official and opular levels. This facilitates the task of the Chinese actor in penetrating these societies until Beijing became the main trading partner of the African continent, as Beijing considers its relations with Africans an important part of its strategy to enhance its economic and political influence at the global level and to be the center of the circle for these countries within the concept of its soft and quiet power, within the framework of the policy of relations between the countries of the South-South.  To this end, China seeks to increase its political position within the African continent and address African sensitivities, which are burdened with negative perceptions of Western colonialism. This is achieved by talking about reforming international institutions and glorifying national sovereignty, which was rediscovered after the Western colonial withdrawal from Africa. China also declares its solidarity with the countries of the South through economic positions and development promises. This is the same kind of talk that Africans hear from major powers like Beijing, in the face of Western ambitions. Based on this, we understand the extent of competition between China and South Korea in Egypt and other African countries, and their adoption of African summit policies through solidarity and development cooperation with Egypt and across the African continent, with African countries' ambitions to diversify their businesses, they are pushing both Beijing and Seoul to embrace their vision of building a multipolar world, the right of Africans to a permanent seat on the Security Council after UN reform, opposition to colonialism in all its new forms and manifestations, and the depoliticization of domestic issues such as human rights and democracy, among others.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the Muscat Round Pave the Way for a Potential Deal Between Washington and Tehran? The US-Iranian talks held in Muscat concluded on Saturday, April 12, 2025, successfully addressing contentious issues between the two nations, particularly the Iranian nuclear program crisis. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi led the Iranian delegation, while Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff headed the US team, with Oman serving as mediator throughout the proceedings. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the prevailing atmosphere during the discussions. President Donald Trump characterized the talks as "progressing very well," while Witkoff described the Oman negotiations as "very positive and constructive." According to Araqchi, all parties demonstrated their commitment to advancing discussions until reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Upon conclusion of these productive negotiations, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced a second round of indirect talks would be held on Saturday, April 19, again in Muscat with Omani mediation. Round One The US-Iran talks in Muscat hold significant importance as they represent the first diplomatic engagement since negotiations ceased between April 2021 and September 2022, which had occurred in a 4+1 format with indirect US participation. Notably, these Muscat discussions mark the first diplomatic exchange under both Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump. Several key implications emerge from these talks: 1- A face-saving negotiation format for both sides: Following the announcement of planned discussions, Washington consistently pressed for direct talks to expedite the process and quickly reach an agreement. Tehran, conversely, insisted on indirect engagement, at least initially, to build confidence in American sincerity. According to published reports, the American and Iranian delegations occupied separate rooms in Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi's residence, exchanging written messages through Omani mediators—satisfying Iran's requirement for indirect negotiations. Reports also indicate that after the approximately two-and-a-half-hour session concluded, Araghchi met briefly with Uytkov, conversing for several minutes in the Omani Foreign Minister's presence before departing—thereby fulfilling Washington's desire for direct engagement. Beyond these procedural arrangements for the initial round, such compromises demonstrate both sides' willingness to overcome obstacles impeding an agreement, potentially foreshadowing solutions to other challenges expected during future negotiation rounds. 2- Disagreement over the framework for negotiations: A disagreement over the scope of negotiations has persisted between the two sides since the initial round of talks. Iran adamantly maintains that discussions should focus exclusively on nuclear matters, leaving out both the missile program and regional role concerns. Supporting this position, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei stated on April 13 that an agreement had been reached to limit negotiations to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, confirming these topics would constitute the agenda for upcoming talks. Meanwhile, Washington remains adamant about including additional issues in negotiations with Tehran, particularly arms programs, with the missile program at the forefront. Witkoff stated that any diplomatic agreement with Iran would depend on verification of its uranium enrichment programs and, ultimately, confirmation of the missile arsenal Iran has developed over the years. Tehran has repeatedly declared openness to measures verifying it does not possess nuclear weapons, often citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's fatwa prohibiting such weapons. Such declarations may indicate willingness to reduce its nuclear program and potentially return to the 3.67% enrichment levels stipulated in the 2015 agreement—significantly lower than current levels exceeding 60%. However, Iran has firmly rejected completely dismantling its nuclear program (like the "Libyan model") or transferring highly enriched uranium to third countries, citing distrust of Washington and concerns about another withdrawal from agreements as occurred during Trump's presidency in 2018. Regarding the missile program, Revolutionary Guards spokesman Ali Mohammad Naeini responded to Witkoff's statement about including the missile arsenal in negotiations by declaring that Iran's military capabilities, including its missile program, represent a "red line" that remains non-negotiable under any circumstances. 3- Potential Iranian economic incentives: Some sources indicate that, in response to Trump's letter, Iran offered "economic benefits" that could advantage American companies if an agreement was reached between the two sides. These sources estimated potential benefits at $1 trillion or more. The proposal aligns with President Pezeshkian's April 9 statement that Supreme Leader Khamenei would not object to American investments entering Iran, "but without conspiring against Iran." Araghchi confirmed this position in his Washington Post article published that same day, calling on the United States to prefer diplomatic options when dealing with Iran and describing the Iranian economy as a "trillion-dollar opportunity" for American companies and businessmen. Tehran's attempts reveal a desire to motivate the Trump administration, which prioritizes trade and investment as key determinants of political engagement. One reason Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement was Washington's lack of benefit from investment deals allowed by the opening to Iran, while Europeans gained advantages, particularly in oil and petrochemical sectors. Consequently, Tehran is strategically focusing on economic opportunities, potentially driving Iran toward diplomatic approaches with Washington and an agreement that would lift the burden of sanctions imposed on the country. 4- European exclusion: No European party participated in the Muscat negotiations, and Washington likely held no consultations with the "European Troika" (Britain, France, and Germany) that participated with Iran in the 2015 agreement. Sources indicate that the meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of the three European countries, on the sidelines of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on April 3, failed to produce any joint plan addressing contentious issues with Iran. The exclusion reflects tense relations between Washington and its European allies, stemming from numerous disagreements—most notably the current US administration's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war and the tariffs imposed on most countries, including European ones. Moreover, it highlights Trump's desire to engage with Iran unbound by other parties' interests. Europeans prefer a diplomatic approach to dealing with Tehran, an approach Trump does not see as entirely reliable. Instead, he considers the military option a viable alternative should negotiations fail or not yield an agreement with Tehran. Nevertheless, the "European Troika" maintains significant leverage over Tehran through the so-called "trigger mechanism." The mechanism enables automatic reinstatement of UN sanctions imposed on Iran prior to the 2015 agreement if any of these countries complains to the Security Council about Iran's violation of the agreement. Such leverage perhaps explains why the Iranian delegation in Muscat requested its American counterpart ensure Washington assumes responsibility for preventing activation of the "trigger mechanism" against Tehran. Consequently, the "European Troika" countries will remain parties to negotiations between the United States and Iran, regardless of their format. Potential Effects Following the initial US-Iran discussions in Muscat, several potential repercussions can be anticipated: 1- Postponing the military option: The positive atmosphere during the Muscat talks, coupled with the announcement of future rounds of discussions, suggests Washington may delay military action regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Initially, the Trump administration advocated for military intervention as a pressure tactic to compel Tehran back to negotiations and secure a swift agreement on its nuclear program. Nevertheless, with ongoing dialogue between both parties, any military options might remain on hold until the results of these diplomatic exchanges become clearer. The escalating costs of military conflict may compel both sides to favor diplomatic negotiations and concessions. Tehran recognizes that American strikes on its nuclear facilities—whether conducted unilaterally or with Israeli cooperation—would present an overwhelming challenge to counter and manage. Similarly, Washington acknowledges that bombing Iran's nuclear installations could expose American forces and bases throughout the region to retaliatory attacks from Tehran or its armed proxies, while potentially disrupting vital maritime traffic. Given these high-stakes calculations, both nations may increasingly prioritize diplomatic solutions to resolve their differences, with Washington maintaining military action only as a final option should negotiations fail. 2- Supporting the chances of signing an agreement: Unlike previous negotiations during the Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi administrations, realistic data suggests Tehran faces severe time constraints. Trump has imposed a temporary deadline for Iran to resolve its nuclear program, with military action serving as the alternative. The military option has gained momentum as Tehran lost substantial capabilities among its regional proxies, which would have increased the cost of any attack against it. Moreover, according to Israeli and American accounts, the Israeli strike on October 26, 2024, successfully destroyed critical defense systems within Iranian territory. The approaching October 18 expiration date of the 2015 nuclear agreement intensifies pressure on Iran. Urgency mounts as the nation seeks a solution before the European Troika countries activate the "trigger mechanism" prior to that deadline. Unlike negotiations during the Rouhani and Raisi administrations, current talks will likely proceed more rapidly. Trump's April 13 statement that he expects "a decision on Iran will be made very quickly" further suggests the possibility of an expedited agreement with Iran. 3- Internal Iranian opposition: The move to hold negotiations with Washington may face opposition from some hardline fundamentalist groups. Despite Tehran's negotiations with Washington receiving approval from Khamenei and influential institutions rather than originating from Pezeshkian's government, resistance to these discussions remains possible. Statements from hardline Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) member Hamid Rasaei suggest underlying opposition when he claimed "the current negotiations were conducted with the Supreme Leader's approval to prove their failure, and for some optimistic officials to discover once again that the Americans are not committed and that it is irrational to rely on them." Additionally, any potential deal allowing American investments into the Iranian market might trigger objections based on constitutional restrictions. Articles 81 and 153 specifically prohibit granting concessions to foreign companies and foreign control of resources. From this perspective, such diplomatic moves could encounter resistance from institutions controlling key economic sectors, including the Revolutionary Guard and the bazaar. Some hardliners may interpret these developments as "Westernization of the economy," viewing them as concerning repetitions of historical scenarios embedded in Iranian collective memory. 4- Strengthening the role of the Iranian Foreign Ministry: The information that preceded the Muscat round of talks claimed three figures had been appointed to represent the Iranian delegation: Ali Larijani, advisor to the Supreme Leader; Mohammad Foruzandeh, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council; and Mohammad Javad Zarif, former assistant to the Iranian president for strategic affairs. However, the actual Iranian delegation to Oman was headed by Foreign Minister Araghchi, and included his aides for political affairs, Takht-e Ravanchi; Kazem Gharibabadi, for legal and international affairs; and Ismail Baghaei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, along with other negotiators and technical experts. The composition aligned with Araghchi's earlier assertion that responsibility for the negotiations would fall to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such prioritization indicates the regime's desire to send diplomatic messages, similar to events following former Iranian President Rouhani's election in 2013, which ultimately led to the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement. The diplomatic approach contrasted with periods when Tehran leaned toward hardline positions, during which broad powers were granted to the National Security Council to manage the nuclear issue, as seen during the terms of former presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Raisi. The regime's strategy appears inseparable from other domestic preparations made in anticipation of signing an agreement with the West. Notable examples include moving toward approval of conditions necessary for joining the Financial Action Task Force on Terrorism and Money Laundering (FATF), which would help Iranian banks access services provided by the SWIFT international financial transfer system. Some analysts attribute additional internal measures to this effort, including revisions to the strict provisions of the "chastity and hijab" law, the release of individuals under house arrest such as prominent reformist figure Mehdi Karroubi, and the easing of certain restrictions on internet use. 5- Russian and Chinese discontent: Negotiations between the United States and Iran may provoke discontent from Russia and China, fellow parties to the 2015 nuclear agreement. Both nations fear Tehran might forge an agreement with Washington that would undermine the coordination among Russia, China, and Iran. These concerns intensify amid severely strained Washington-Beijing relations following the announcement of historically high mutual tariffs between the two countries. Adding to the tension is Trump's apparent indifference resulting from Russian President Putin's delay regarding the US peace plan for Ukraine. Accordingly, Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi's visit to Moscow was announced ahead of the second round of talks scheduled for April 19 to brief the Russian side on the progress of the talks with Washington. Additionally, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Vasilievich Vershinin, during a meeting of supporters of the UN Charter in Moscow. The diplomatic efforts represent an attempt to allay Russian concerns and send a message to Washington that Tehran has other international alternatives if the current negotiations fail. In conclusion, the Muscat negotiations served as an exploratory round for both American and Iranian delegations, allowing each side to clarify intentions and demonstrate commitment before proceeding to subsequent steps. Complex and difficult differences persist between the parties, yet both clearly favor diplomatic solutions, at least temporarily, with success hinging upon American demands and potential Iranian concessions. Future rounds will likely experience heightened tension, leaving all possibilities open regarding the ultimate outcome of these diplomatic efforts.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Bukele appears to have the green light from the United States to deepen his authoritarian project with the help of Beijing. Recently, the ruling Salvadoran party, Nuevas Ideas, inaugurated a political training school in Nuevo Cuscatlán. The event was headlined by Félix Ulloa, Vice President of the Central American country, and China’s ambassador to El Salvador, Zhang Yanhui. According to the Central American news portal Expediente Público, the institute was reportedly sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), following a previous visit to Beijing by Ulloa and Xavier Zablah Bukele – leader of Nuevas Ideas and cousin of the Salvadoran president – during which several interparty cooperation agreements were finalized. This event highlights the diversified strategies China employs to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere. While public attention toward the Asian giant typically focuses on intergovernmental diplomacy, trade relations, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), less consideration is given to the forms of cooperation carried out by various international outreach bodies tied to the CCP in Latin America. The Czech think tank Sinopsis, which specializes in Chinese studies, notes: “Unlike many other countries, China’s foreign affairs extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and transcend official state-to-state diplomacy […] This system consists of various bodies and operates under the overarching concept of total diplomacy.” The CCP behind the scenes According to Central American and Chinese-language media, Zablah Bukele and Félix Ulloa held a meeting in April 2024 with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the CCP. On that occasion, representatives of bukelismo signed an agreement with the CCP’s cadre school, securing Chinese sponsorship for the newly inaugurated Political Training Institute of Nuevas Ideas. The ILD was established in 1951 to promote ties between the CCP and other communist parties across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the organization turned its focus to cultivating relationships with leftist groups of all kinds, from European social democrats to liberation movements in the Global South. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, the ILD began adopting a pragmatic approach, fostering good relations with both left- and right-wing parties. For instance, center-right organizations like Argentina’s Republican Proposal (PRO) have maintained ties with the CCP since 2009. Xi Jinping, while maintaining this approach, has made the ILD’s operations more assertive, turning it into a key instrument of Chinese foreign influence. Various think tanks and scholars of Chinese foreign policy have noted the quiet diplomacy exercised by the Asian giant through the ILD and other bodies. These include the United Front Work Department and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which function as parallel bureaucracies to the MoFA and are characterized by opaque activities and a purported autonomy from Beijing. However, these organizations aim to connect various sectors of foreign politics and civil society with the CCP. In particular, the ILD builds influence networks by training foreign politicians. Beyond offering training courses funded in China, the department has promoted the construction of training centers in countries such as Tanzania. In this way, the ILD seeks to forge close ties with foreign elites who, in addition to promoting Chinese soft power narratives – such as the superiority of the one-party model or the primacy of development over democracy and civil liberties – can lobby on Beijing’s behalf in agencies, cabinets, and parliaments. In this sense, Chinese support for Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute marks a significant step forward in cooperation between the CCP and El Salvador’s ruling party. The ILD’s training programs have also become spaces for transmitting authoritarian know-how. Researchers such as Lina Benabdallah and Christine Hackenesch point out that the CCP promotes the Chinese governance model to foreign elites – a model based on mass surveillance technologies, personal data storage, and internet censorship, typically provided by state-owned enterprises like Huawei. These practices are presented as alternatives for strengthening public security and internal stability, but in practice, they reinforce state control and restrict civil liberties in adopting countries. The paradoxes of Bukelismo The link between Nuevas Ideas and the CCP raises questions about the ideological leanings of Nayib Bukele. Just a few weeks ago, the Salvadoran president hosted U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in San Salvador to seal, in Rubio’s words, “a historic agreement, the most extraordinary in the world” on migration. Suppose this event signaled El Salvador’s intent to become one of the United States’ most important regional partners. How should we now interpret the growing political cooperation with China, the U.S.’s main strategic rival? On one hand, it is understandable that El Salvador’s ruling party seeks alignment with the CCP. The inauguration of Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute, with ILD’s blessing, is another episode of authoritarian cooperation in Latin America, where a regime well-versed in repression and control transfers knowledge and resources to another with similar aims. Similar patterns have been observed in the region with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which collaborate among themselves and with extra-regional autocracies like Russia, Iran, and China itself. Given this, it is not surprising that a self-proclaimed socialist regime and another linked to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) would cooperate beyond ideological differences. In fact, this has been the ILD’s hallmark in the 21st century: pragmatism in engaging with parties across the spectrum, ensuring long-term ties with various governments. This phenomenon reflects a central feature of our times: the erosion of the left-right divide in favor of a new tension between democracies and autocracies. On the other hand, the indoctrination of Nuevas Ideas’ cadres might even be tolerable to Trump, given that some CCP perspectives align with his political agenda. The pursuit of a multipolar order that secures spheres of influence for major powers – such as the South China Sea or Greenland – as well as the promotion of illiberal models of democracy – like China’s “whole-process democracy” or the unitary executive without checks and balances – are not foreign concepts to Make America Great Again. Based on this, Bukele may seem to have the green light to deepen his authoritarian project with Beijing’s help. As long as the PRC does not interfere with U.S. strategic interests in El Salvador – such as migration management or control of critical infrastructure – the 47th American president might remain content, regardless of China’s growing soft power in the hemisphere.