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I. Introduction In late December 2025, mass protests erupted across Iran, driven by public anger over the deepening economic crisis. Initially led by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran, the demonstrations quickly spread to universities and major cities such as Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad, becoming the largest unrest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Over time, the movement expanded beyond economic demands to include calls for freedom and, in some cases, the overthrow of the regime. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans such as “death to the dictator.” [1] In response, since late December 2025 Iranian state security forces have engaged in massacres of dissidents. The Iranian government has also cut off internet access and telephone services in an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing. The Iranian government has accused the US and Israel of fueling the protests, which analysts suggest may be a tactic to increase security forces’ willingness to kill protesters. A Sunday Times report, based on information from doctors in Iran, said more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the mass protests. The Interior Ministry in Iran verified 3,117 people had been killed in protests. [2] The Iranian protests, the largest in the Islamic Republic’s 46-year history, appear to have subsided for now in the face of a violent government crackdown. US President Donald Trump has threatened to “hit very hard” if the situation in Iran escalates, reigniting concerns about possible US intervention in the region. Even Trump called Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “sick man” in an interview with Politico on January 17th, 2026, and said, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” It appeared to be the first time Trump had called for the end of Khamenei’s rule in Iran. [3] Despite having repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the regime were to start killing protesters, Trump has held off on any immediate military action against the Islamic Republic. While the US reportedly sent the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the Middle East on January 15th, 2026, President Trump has not specified what he might do. However, on January 28th, 2026, Trump posted on social media: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran... It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” Saying that time is running out, Trump demanded that Iran immediately negotiate a nuclear deal. He also suggested his country’s next attack on Iran could be worse than last year’s. In response, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned the US that any attack on his country would result in a “regional war” as US President Donald Trump has amassed military assets in the Middle East. With this tension between Iran and the US running high, Iran and the US held a nuclear talk on Friday on February 6th, 2026, in Oman. However, the deal was not reached, although both sides agreed to resume the talks. If the US and Iran fail to strike a deal and then the US carries out military strikes on Iran, what will happen? Does US military strikes make a democratic transition in Iran possible? This paper deals with this issue. It first introduces theory on democratic transition and then examines whether US military strikes against Iran makes a democratic transition in Iran possible. II. Theory on democratic transition There is a considerable body of literature on theories of democratic transition. These broadly fall into the following categories: [4] a. Structuralist approaches which see the emergence of democracy as tied to factors such as economic development (Lipsett, 1959; O’Donnell 1979), political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), civil society and class conflict (Moore, 1966). b. Strategic choice approaches which focus on the calculations and decisions made by elites (Rustow, 1970; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Burton and Higley, 1987). c. Institutionalist approaches which stress the impact of institutions on policies and patterns of political actions (Leftwich, 2017). d. Political economic approaches which stress economic determinants of political change and democratization, in particular the impact of economic crises (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Guo, 1999). Empirical case studies (for example, Haggard and Kaufman, 1995) suggest that, rather than a single theory to explain democratic transitions, a combination of these theories is usually applicable. According to Idris (2016)’s study of the five case studies of South Africa (1986), Ghana (2000), the Philippines (1986), Indonesia (1999) and Ukraine (2004), enabling factors for the emergence of democracies are below: [5] - Unpopular incumbent: With the exception of Ghana, all the incumbent regimes were very unpopular, often characterized by human rights abuses, corruption, mismanagement and denial of democratic freedoms. A breakdown of the ‘authoritarian bargain’ in the Philippines and Indonesia, whereby growth and development were provided with limited democracy, fueled public opposition. - Economic development & situation: Economic development was a main factor in many democratic transitions, but the precise influence varied. Indonesia is the clearest example of democratic transition advanced by economic crisis (effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997); in the Ukraine, in contrast, growth had been strong overall, but inequality and corruption fueled public frustration. However, the modernization theory (Lipsett, 1959) that economic growth and development is a prior condition/enabling factor for democratization rarely applied. - United opposition and strong leadership figures: The ability of the opposition to unite around a common goal, especially behind strong leaders, was an important factor in democratic transitions. Cory Aquino in the Philippines, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine played this role. - Strong civil society: An organized civil society played a significant role in mass mobilization, monitoring government actions (e.g. election fraud) and countering government measures to suppress them. In Ukraine, for instance, many leaders of the 2004 Orange Revolution had taken part in anti-government protests in 2000-1; civil society groups in South Africa mounted a very effective civil disobedience campaign. - Mass mobilization: was a critical factor in successful democratic transitions, seen in South Africa, the Ukraine, the Philippines, and Indonesia. This came about because of information dissemination through television, radio, and the internet, as well as civil society groups. Mass protests created an irreversible momentum for change and led to defection or unwillingness to use force and violence against demonstrators on the part of the security forces. - International pressure/support: Military/Diplomatic/donor (e.g. IMF) pressure on an authoritarian regime could force it to make concessions where domestic factors alone would not. South Africa exemplifies this: without international sanctions and international condemnation of the apartheid regime, reform and democratization would not possible or likely have taken much longer. Ghana’s democratic transition arguably began mainly because of IMF pressure. External ‘democratic aid’, e.g. to raise public awareness of democratic values and build up the capacity of civil society groups, also made a difference. In Ukraine, a decade of such external support meant civil society groups were able to effectively monitor and document electoral fraud by the Kuchma government. III. The Case of Iran US military strikes on Iran is an international pressure/support that this paper explained as an enabling factor for the emergence of democracies. US military strikes on Iran are the most important element in facilitating a democratic transition in Iran. Thus, this paper first takes a look at current US military build-up to attack the Iranian regime and then explores whether US military strikes on Iran make a democratic transition in Iran possible. 1. US military build-up As US President Donald Trump considers a major strike on Iran, the US military has accelerated a weeks-long buildup of military hardware in the Middle East, open-source data shows. As Figure 1 shows, the arrival of the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, now in the northern Arabian Sea, represents the most dramatic shift in military positioning. The group includes the USS Abraham Lincoln along with three guided-missile destroyers and the carrier air wing which includes squadrons of F-35C Lightning II fighters, F/A-18E Super Hornet fighters, and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets. The US Navy also has three destroyers — the USS McFaul, USS Delbert D. Black, and USS Mitscher — in the region separate from the aircraft carrier strike group. Three littoral combat ships — USS Santa Barbara, USS Canberra, and USS Tulsa — based out of Bahrain could be called upon for minesweeping duties if Iran chooses to deploy such armaments. Figure 1: US military presence in the Middle East (source: Congressional Research Service, Airframes.io and FlightRadar24) In recent days, the US has deployed various air defense systems to the region as well, including additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, and Patriot missile systems that appeared at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar last week, Those systems would be key to combating retaliatory missile strikes of Iran by taking aim at either US military assets or US allies in the region. The guided-missile destroyers steaming with the Lincoln and elsewhere in the region offer significant strike potential. Each destroyer can carry dozens of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles with a range of 1,000 miles and wielding a 1,000-pound conventional warhead. In addition, US Navy carrier strike groups usually operate with an attack submarine that can also launch Tomahawks, but the presence of submarines is almost never disclosed. While the aircraft carrier provides a floating base for military operations, the US has a number of permanent locations in the region where a slew of other aircraft have also been heading. As Figure 2 shows, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the US has at least 19 military bases - eight of which are considered to be permanent - across the Middle East. The US has a major military presence in Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman and the UAE. In Djibouti and Turkey, the US maintains large military bases that serve different regional commands, but contribute to activities in the Middle East. Currently, there are approximately 40,000 US troops in the Middle East, according to US defense officials. Around a quarter of them are in al-Udeid, Qatar, which hosts combat aircraft, tankers, aerial refueling and intelligence assets. Al-Udeid is the largest US military base in the region, hosting around 10,000 troops. The next biggest military base in terms of personnel is thought to be the naval base in Bahrain. Bahrain (hosting 9,000 American troops) is where the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is headquartered, with responsibility over the Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and some of the Indian Ocean. Kuwait hosts Camp Arifjan. That is the name of the tactical (or forward) headquarters of the US Army Central - a military formation that serves as the army component for Centcom. Ali al-Salem air base is also in Kuwait, along the Iraqi border. Another Kuwait base is Camp Buehring, which has been a staging post for units heading to Syria and Iraq. In total, around 13,500 US troops are stationed in Kuwait. Figure 2: US troops numbers in the Middle East (source: Middle East Eye) The UAE is home to 3,500 US troops, as well as Al-Dhafra Airbase, a site shared between the US and the Emiratis. It has been used during missions against the Islamic State group, as well as for reconnaissance missions in the region. The US military presence in Iraq includes the Ain al-Asad airbase in Anbar - a site that was targeted by Iranian missiles after the US assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the senior Iranian general. There’s also the Erbil airbase in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, which is used for training exercises. Approximately 2,700 US troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia, providing air and missile defense capabilities. The Prince Sultan Airbase, near Riyadh, is a major air force hub where its main assets include Patriot missile batteries. For its missions in the Levant, Muwaffaq Salti airbase in Jordan’s Azraq is the key hub. It hosts the US’s 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing. Further afield in Turkey, the major base run jointly with Turkish forces is the Incirlik Airbase in southern Adana. That base reportedly hosts US nuclear warheads. The size of US military bases, personnel, and equipment has fluctuated in recent years and months, reflecting shifting regional priorities. Early in President Trump’s second term, several warships departed the Middle East to support US international operations. However, naval and air power is now being bolstered in the region to attack Iran. On January 29th, 2026, an E-11A jet arrived at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This is one of the last critical assets that the US needs to coordinate complex operations. On the same day, a transport aircraft modified for combat search and rescue operations arrived in the area of Operation. A squadron of F-15E Strike Eagle fighters, capable of carrying a variety of guided bombs and air-to-surface missiles, also recently deployed to the region as part of a planned troop rotation. Surveillance flights by US drones and reconnaissance aircraft have continued in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Since last Monday, reconnaissance aircraft have been flying nonstop from US bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and even beyond the Middle East. Modified versions of the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, capable of detecting radioactive debris and interpreting electromagnetic signals, have also been deployed to the Middle East. On January 29th, 2026, at least eight aerial refueling tankers, used to provide aerial refueling for small military aircraft, crossed the Atlantic and landed at Morón Air Base in Spain. The six F-35 fighters were crossing the Atlantic and landed at Lages Air Base in Portugal. Amid high tensions over President Trump’s recent threats, US Central Command announced on January 27th, 2026 that it had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [6] 2. Will US strikes on Iran bring about a democratic transition in Iran? Iran and the US held a nuclear talk on Friday on February 6th, 2026, in Oman. However, no last-minute deal with Iran was reached, although both sides agreed to resume the talks. If the US and Iran fail to strike a deal and then the US carries out military strikes on Iran, what will happen? Will US military strikes make a democratic transition in Iran possible? According to Idris (2016)’s study of South Africa (1986), Ghana (2000), the Philippines (1986), Indonesia (1999) and Ukraine (2004), enabling factors for the emergence of democracies are: [7] • Unpopular incumbent • International pressure/support • Bad economic situation (economic crisis) • Mass mobilization • United opposition and strong leadership figures: • Strong civil society Table 1: presence or absence of six enabling factors for emergence of democracies in Iran   Among six preconditions for democratic transition, four conditions are present in Iran, while two are absent. The first condition (Unpopular incumbent) is present. Iranian regime or Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is very unpopular. He has faced recurring, intense public unrest (since 2017), indicating deep-seated unpopularity among significant segments of the population. Anti-government protests in Iran have continued since 2017, as seen below: • 2017–2018 Iranian protests • 2018–2019 Iranian general strikes and protests • 2019–2020 Iranian protests (economy, anti-government) • 2021–2022 Iranian protests (water shortages, economy) • 2022 Iranian food protests • 2022–23: Mahsa Amini protests • 2025 Iran water crisis protests (May–August) • 2025–2026 Iranian protests (anti-government, economy, human rights) Especially, according to Wikipedia, more than 3,000 anti-government protests took place in Iran each year in the 2020s. The second condition (International pressure/support) is present. US president Trump is ready to carry out military strikes on the Iranian regime to change Iran. The third condition (Bad economic situation) is present. The most serious economic problem of Iran is a skyrocketing inflation. As Figure 3 shows, inflation in Iran skyrocketed to over 48.6% in October 2025 and 42.2% in December 2025. This high inflation has been chronic in the 2020s, severely impacting household budgets. Figure 3: Inflation in Iran (source: Statistical Center of Iran) Moreover, as Figure 4 shows, food prices have significantly increased in the 2020s. For instance, the price of rice has surged by 2.11 times between 2012 and 2023, while bread costs have risen 3.4 times from 2011 to 2023. Potatoes have tripled in price over the same period, and chicken fillets have seen a 2.06-fold increase from 2010 to 2023. Figure 4: Food price index in Iran In addition, Iran faces a severe energy shortage, marked by rolling blackouts, gas cuts, and infrastructure strain, despite its massive oil and gas reserves. The Iranian energy crisis is a multifaceted problem that has been exacerbated by a combination of factors, including poor governance, foreign policy failures, and the dominance of industries under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As of November 2024, Iran faces its most severe energy crisis in decades, with frequent power outages and disruptions to natural gas supplies. The country’s energy infrastructure is outdated and in disrepair, with many refineries and power plants operating below capacity. Iran’s energy supply is unreliable, with frequent blackouts and shortages affecting daily life, industries, and essential services. The IRGC's control over key industries, including power generation and distribution, has hindered efficient management and strategic planning. The regime’s prioritization of political interests over efficient management and infrastructural development has exacerbated the crisis. A notable example is the extensive usage that the IRGC makes in electricity to mine cryptocurrency which leaves Iran in the dark.[8] Despite ongoing power shortages, Iran continues to export electricity, with a surge of nearly 92% in the first four months of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. The crisis has put a stop to 50% of industry. In January and February 2025, constant power shutdowns were conducted with the schools as well as Iranian industries. Since February 2025, Iran has been suffering from daily blackouts, each lasting for 3-4 hours. The energy shortage does not equally affect all segments of the population. For example, in Teheran, rich northern neighborhoods experienced only 1% of outages while poorer southern districts endured 32%. [9] This energy crisis created deep public frustration and anger. With inflation running extremely high, a high unemployment rate hit Iran. The unemployment rate in Iran averaged 11.04 percent from 2001 until 2024, as Figure 5 shows. Fortunately, the unemployment rate in Iran decreased to 7.20 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 from 7.50 percent in the third quarter of 2024, but the unemployment rate in Iran is still high. Figure 5: Unemployment rate in Iran (source: Central Bank of Iran) In particular, the youth unemployment rate has been very high. As Figure 6 shows, the youth unemployment rate in Iran averaged 25.01% from 2011 until 2024. Youth unemployment rate in Iran was very high at 20.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024, although it has declined. More seriously, according to Majlis reports, 50% of males between 25–40 are unemployed and not looking for employment. [10] Figure 6: youth unemployment rate in Iran (source: Central Bank of Iran) Under the situations of high inflation and high unemployment, in March 2025, estimates ranged from 22% to 50% of Iranians living under the poverty line — a stark increase from 2022. [11] As a result, the number of people that cannot afford a healthy diet increased substantially. As Figure 7 shows, the number of people in mal nourishment increased to over 14 million in 2022. The ministry of social welfare in Iran announced in 2024 that 57% of Iranians are having some level of mal nourishment. Figure 7: Number of people in mal nourishment in Iran. These economic crises have triggered nationwide protests in Iran in 2025-26. The fourth condition (Mass mobilization) is present. Anti-government protests in Iran triggered by the economic crisis are under way in 2025-26, although they have recently subsided. According to a Sunday Times report, more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the mass protests of 2025-26. Moreover, according to Wikipedia, anti-government protests in Iran have continued since 2017, as shown before. Figure 8 shows the number of anti-government protests in Iran since 2016. Over 3,000 protests took place in Iran each year in the 2020s. Figure 8: the number of anti-government protests in Iran (source: Wikipedia) However, the fifth and sixth conditions (United opposition and strong leadership figures & Strong civil society) are absent in Iran. According to Maryam Alemzadeh, a professor at the University of Oxford, the Iranian regime has effectively suppressed any attempt for organized opposition in Iran over the past decades and arrested and silenced its leaders. There is no main opposition organization and leader in Iran such as the ANC and Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Even non-political NGOs, student groups, labor unions, and anything that could resemble a bottom-up order has been quashed. As a result, neither leadership nor grassroots organization can be expected, and protests are left contingent on ad hoc individual or collective decisions of the protesters. [12] 3. Analysis of a democratic transition in Iran As this paper explained above, among six preconditions for democratic transition, four conditions are present in Iran, while two are absent. Therefore, it is not clear whether Iran can make a democratic transition. The most important factor for democratic transition in Iran is US military intervention. The democratic transition in Iran mainly depends on to what extent the US militarily intervenes in Iran and what military options US uses. A. Scenario 1: US makes targeted, surgical strikes US secretary of state Marco Rubio assessed that the Iranian regime was probably weaker than it had ever been. US naval and air forces may conduct limited, precision strikes targeting military bases of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Basij unit - a paramilitary force under the control of the IRGC - ballistic missile launch and storage sites as well as Iran’s nuclear program. An already weakened Iranian regime might be toppled, eventually making a transition to a genuine democracy where Iran can rejoin the rest of the world. This is a highly optimistic scenario but is highly unlikely. Western military intervention in both Iraq and Libya did not bring a smooth transition to democracy. Although brutal dictatorships ended in both countries, it ushered in years of chaos and bloodshed. A senior Israeli official said that Israel does not believe US airstrikes alone can topple the Islamic Republic, if that is Washington’s goal. A protracted US air campaign is considered unlikely, military experts say, citing Trump’s reported desire for a limited and decisive attack. Jason Brodsky, a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project, said that President Trump has historically favored “quick, surgical, targeted, dramatic, and decisive military operations,” pointing to US airstrikes in Syria during his first term. But even a monthslong offensive would not guarantee the fall of the Iran regime. “A sustained US air campaign could severely degrade Iran‘s conventional military by ripping up command-and-control, and fixed infrastructure, but it is unlikely by itself to produce the collapse of Iranian security forces, which can disperse, hide, and shift to low-signature internal repression,” said Michael Horowitz, an independent defense expert in Israel. [13] “If you’re going to topple the Iran regime, you have to put boots on the ground,” he told Reuters, noting that even if the US killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran would “have a new leader that will replace him.” [14] Jason Brodsky also said any US military intervention could involve leadership decapitation alongside attacks on Iran’s military and security infrastructure. However, Brodsky cautioned that Iran’s political system is designed to survive even major leadership losses. [15] “The Islamic Republic is bigger than any one individual,” he said, noting that institutions and succession mechanisms exist to fill any vacuum — even if the removal of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could be temporarily destabilizing. Moreover, Iran’s leadership had been weakened by the massive protests but remained firmly in control despite the ongoing deep economic crisis that sparked the protests. Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence official now with the Atlantic Council, warned that US military strikes could actually strengthen hardliners. A US attack would more likely consolidate elite cohesion around the regime, marginalize protesters and reinforce Iran’s narrative of external siege,” he said. Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, said that without large-scale military defections, Iran’s protests remained “heroic but outgunned.” Only a combination of external pressure and an organized domestic opposition could shift Iran’s political trajectory, Vatanka said. However, opposition groups in Iran are ideologically diverse, including monarchists, republicans, secular nationalists, communists, socialists, ethnic separatists (e.g. Kurdish nationalists), supporters of Western liberal democracy, and Islamists (including Shia Muslims dissidents and Sunni Salafis and Kurdish Islamists). The opposition movement is currently fragmented and riddled with internal divisions over the future of a post-Islamic Republic Iran. [16] Moreover, US President Trump has notably avoided endorsing a successor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Iran’s exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi lacks sufficient support within the country to immediately be installed as a leader. [17] While some Western media have pointed out Reza Pahlavi – the son of the ousted Shah of Iran – who had called on protesters to take to the streets against Khamenei’s rule, as a possible alternative, many analysts don’t see in him the ingredients of a true leader. Many people see Pahlavi as a figure too close to Israel’s Zionist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Reza Pahlavi, even himself, is not looking forward to coming back to Iran,” says Fatemeh Karimkhan, an Iranian journalist. Karimkhan says that while there are some pro-monarchy supporters in Iran, they are not as many as projected. Karimkhan claims that “they are much less in number and in ability.” B. Scenario 2: Along with air strikes, the US send ground forces to Iran for a regime change Many experts say it is unlikely that the US would send ground troops to Iran. “President Trump is not a nation builder. He does not believe in long-term commitments or building democracy. He gave up on Afghanistan. So, he is not going to commit to boots on the ground in Iran. It is simply way too costly,” Akbarzadeh said. [18] Under Trump, the US moved decisively towards ending its long war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001. In 2020, during Trump’s first term, US officials and Taliban representatives signed the Doha agreement after months of negotiations in Qatar to end the war. The actual withdrawal of troops took place in 2021, during the presidency of Joe Biden. More importantly, the US can't invade Iran. [19] This is because there is no place from which to launch an invasion. To invade a country, you need one of two things: You need to be able to invade it by land or you need to be able to invade it by sea (an amphibious invasion). The US can do neither. [20] No land invasion is possible because the US controls no land that borders Iran. As Figure 9 shows, Iran’s neighbors are for the most part hostile to the US. Iran shares land borders with eight nations (that is, if you count the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karahakh). None of them agreed to be used for a land invasion of Iran. Moreover, the US lacks regional bases necessary to invade Iran, destroy its armed forces, and displace the revolutionary regime in Iran. Gulf allies such as Saudi Arabia do not want their soils and air spaces to be used for US attacks on Iran. Iraq has US troops stationed in the country, but Iraq has solid and good relations with the Iran regime at this point. There is basically no chance the Iraqis allow the US military to stage an invasion from there and neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are under direct US occupation any longer. [21] Figure 9: Iran’s neighboring countries are for the most part hostile to the US Alternatively, the US could undertake an amphibious forced entry into Iran. This would be the largest amphibious invasion attempt since D-Day of World War II and would result in heavy US casualties on the beaches of Iran. As tens of thousands of US servicemen are dying in a war with Iran, this military option will not be popular domestically in the US. Iran has tons of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as some of the largest stockpiles of artillery in the world. And Iran’s allies (China, Russia, and North Korea) can help arm the Iranian regime easily in the result of a full-scale US invasion. Simply put, it would be an incredibly difficult and costly military operation. Even if the US is willing to endure heavy casualties, then US troops would still need to traverse rugged and mountainous terrain in Iran in order to get to Tehran, conquer it, and remove the regime from power. This would be like fighting in the jungles of Vietnam only much worse. [22] More than 50,000 US servicemen died in roughly 8 years of fighting in Vietnam. In Iran, there would likely be tens of thousands of dead Americans a year. Is the US government and public willing to stomach losses like that? Such losses may be unheard of in the US since the Vietnam and Korean Wars, perhaps even World War II if it gets ugly enough as it has in the Russo-Ukrainian War where there have been hundreds of thousands of deaths in a little over 3 years. There would surely be a sizable level of resistance in the US if a war is launched against the Iranian regime, and the US government has to weigh these factors in when considering using military force for regime change operations. The Trump administration does not want to create the biggest anti-war movement in the country since the Vietnam War, which could also increase dissents regarding other issues like an immigration issue in the country. A war with Iran would radicalize a good amount of Americans. [23] Moreover, there are several geostrategic considerations to factor in as well with regional allies of the US. A war of any kind on Iran would not be supported by Saudi Arabia at this point and Iran can inflict severe damage onto US assets in the region which are stationed in places like Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, etc. These countries in the Gulf don’t want to be dragged into being a theater of the war, nor do they want their energy sectors attacked by Iran. In addition, there’s always the possibility that an American-Israeli war on Iran could metastasize into World War III. China gets roughly 40% of their oil from the Persian Gulf, which would surely be shut down for some time in the event of a US invasion of Iran. Will China sit idly by? Not likely. At the very minimum China would help arm Iran to defend itself, but there’s simply an inherent risk of global conflict given a third of world energy supplies come from this region. Middle East energy is existential to China right now as it stands. China has been expanding oil and gas imports from Russia, but these will take time to get China less reliant on Middle East resources. [24] Therefore, the deployment of US ground troops is highly unlikely, and a regime change and a transition to democracy in Iran are almost impossible. IV. Conclusion This paper raised a question “Does US military strikes on Iran make a democratic transition in Iran possible? To address this question, this paper first examined theories and preconditions for a democratic transition and then evaluated whether US military attacks on Iran makes a democratic transition in Iran possible. As explained above, US military interventions in Iran can’t bring about a democratic transition in Iran. References [1] Barin, Mohsen (31 December 2025). "Iran's economic crisis, political discontent threaten regime". DW News. [2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-president-warns-us-attack-on-supreme-leader-would-mean-full-scale-war/ [3] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/17/trump-to-politico-its-time-to-look-for-new-leadership-in-iran-00735528?_kx=LSFywwe4GSg_lcFWo5DyId8VKdphy2F0zhlZVneJnA97jKgVYFyty4cB80GJkTHR.U5D8ER&utm_id=01KF7GKF35MAAW8BRA143VFM9M&utm_medium=campaign&utm_source=Klaviyo [4] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [5] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [6] it had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [7] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [8] "Power Outages in Iran: The Rich Stay Lit, The Poor Go Dark". iranwire.com [9] "Power Outages in Iran: The Rich Stay Lit, The Poor Go Dark". iranwire.com [10] "تحلیل نشریه تایم از وضعیت ایران؛ آیا جمهوری اسلامی در آستانه فروپاشی است؟". euronews (in Persian). 18 December 2025. 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Prime Minister Keir Starmer gave a speech during the Munich Security Conference For many years, for most people in the United Kingdom, war has been remote. Something that concerns us deeply, but which happens far off. But now we feel the solidity of peace, the very ground of peace now softening under our feet. It is the job of leaders to be ahead of these seismic shifts. Yet that is against the grain of history. Time and again, leaders have looked the other way, only re-arming when disaster is upon them. This time, it must be different. Because all of the warning signs are there. Russia has proved its appetite for aggression, bringing terrible suffering to the Ukrainian people. Its hyper-threats extend across our continent, not just threatening our security, but tearing at our social order. Collaborating with populists to undermine our values. Using disinformation to sow division. Using cyber-attacks and sabotage to disrupt our lives and deepening the cost-of-living crisis. It is true that Russia has made a huge strategic blunder in Ukraine, and the Russian casualties number well over a million. But even as the war goes on, Russia is re-arming, reconstituting their armed forces, an industrial base. NATO has warned that Russia could be ready to use military force against the Alliance by the end of this decade. In the event of a peace deal in Ukraine, which we are all working hard to achieve, Russia’s re-armament would only accelerate. The wider danger to Europe would not end there. It would increase. So, we must answer this threat in full. At the outset, it is important to be prepared. We do not seek conflict. Our objective is lasting peace, a return to strategic stability, and the rule of law. And in the face of these threats, there is only one viable option. Now, to break the convention of a house of speeches, we are not at a crossroads. The road ahead is straight and it is clear. We must build our hard power, because that is the currency of the age. We must be able to deter aggression. And yes, if necessary, we must be ready to fight. To do whatever it takes to protect our people, our values, and our way of life. And as Europe, we must stand on our own two feet. And that means being bold. It means putting away petty politics and short-term concerns. It means acting together to build a stronger Europe and a more European NATO, underpinned by deeper links between the UK and the EU, across defence, industry, tech, politics, and the wider economy. Because these are the foundations on which our security and prosperity will rest. This is how we will build a better future for our continent. True to the vibrant, free, diverse societies that we represent, showing that people who look different to each other can live peacefully together. But this isn’t against the tenor of our times. Rather, it’s what makes us strong, as we’re prepared to defend it with everything that we have. And we are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore. Because we know that in a dangerous world, we would not take control by turning in. We would surrender. And I won’t let that happen. That’s why I devote time as Prime Minister to Britain’s leadership on the world stage. And that’s why I’m here today. Because I am clear, there is no British security without Europe, and no European security without Britain. That is the lesson of history and is today’s reality as well. So together we must rise to this moment. We must spend more, deliver more, and coordinate more. And crucially, we must do this with the United States. The US remains an indispensable power. Its contribution to European security over 80 years is unparalleled. And so is our gratitude. At the same time, we recognise that things are changing. The US National Security Strategy spells out that Europe must take primary responsibility for its own defence. That is the new law. Now, there have been a series of thoughtful interventions about what this means, including the argument that we’re at a moment of rupture. Now, I would agree that the world has changed fundamentally, and that we must find new ways to uphold our values and the rule of law. But in responding to that, we must not disregard everything that has sustained us for the last 80 years. That could be a moment of destruction. And instead, I believe, we must make this as a moment of creation. Instead of a moment of rupture, we must make it one of radical renewal. So, rather than pretending that we can simply replace all US capabilities, we should focus on diversifying and decreasing some dependencies. We should deliver generational investment that moves us from over-dependence to interdependence. I’m talking about a vision of European security and greater European autonomy. It does not herald US withdrawal, but answers the call for more burden-sharing in Europe and remake the ties that have served us so well. Because we know the value of our own power. The nature of our power is at the core of human decision. It achieved something that leaders have been trying to do for centuries. From Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna to Versailles. After centuries of conflict, the founders of NATO finally united our continents in peace and security. Our militaries, that once faced each other on the battlefield, now stand side-by-side, pledged to each other’s defence. It is a shield over our heads every single day. And whilst some on the extremes of our politics chip away at this alliance, we defend it. I am proud that my party fought for NATO’s creation. While our then Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called it a spiritual union of the West. And we’ve shown our fidelity to that idea, asserting each other’s sovereignty, as we did on Greenland. And crucially, coming to each other’s aid under Article 5. We fought together in Afghanistan, at terrible cost to many in my country and across many allied countries. And so, I say to all NATO members, our commitment to Article 5 is as profound now as ever. And be in no doubt, if called on, the UK would come to your aid today. Instead, we must move forward together to create a more European NATO. As I see it, Europe is a sleeping giant. Our economies dwarf Russia more than ten times over. We have huge defence capabilities, yet too often this adds up to less than the sum of its parts. Fragmented industrial planning and procurement have led to gaps in some areas, and massive duplication in others. Europe has over 20 types of frigate, and 10 types of fighter jet. We have over 10 types of main battle tanks, whilst the US has one. It’s wildly inefficient, and it harms our collective security. The US security umbrella has allowed these bad habits to develop. But now we must break them. And we have shown that we can coordinate in great effect, as was just set out. Supporting Ukraine in a way that Putin never really imagined. Creating the Coalition of the Willing, which now covers almost all of Europe, as well as Canada and our friends in the Asia-Pacific. And going further in our support, with the UK announcing over £500 million this week for more air defence for the Ukrainian people. To meet the wider threat, it is clear that we are going to have to spend more faster. And we have shown our collective intent in this regard as well. With the historic agreement to increase spending to 5% on security and defence. And we are prepared to explore innovative solutions. So, we are stepping up work with like-minded allies on options for a collective approach to defence financing, to help accelerate this vital investment. And as we increase spending, we must use it to its full potential. We must come together to integrate our capabilities on spending and procurement and build a joint European defence industry. I welcome the steps that we have taken so far, which could allow us to participate in the £90 billion Euro loan to Ukraine. I hope we can work together like this going forward. Because, look, the logic of defence is solidarity and collective effort, not market access. In a crisis, our citizens expect us to be ready. So, we need to deliver a step change in collaboration. And I am proud of the work we are already doing together. Delivering cutting-edge drones with Ukraine. Developing next-generation long-range missiles with Germany, Italy and France. Working with our JEF allies to protect our northern flank. Doubling our deployment of British commandos in the Arctic. Taking control of NATO’s Atlantic and Northern Command in Norfolk, Virginia. And transforming our Royal Navy by striking the biggest warship deal in British history with Norway. We are building a fleet of warships to hunt Russian submarines and protect undersea infrastructure. We want to replicate this level of collaboration with other allies across the High North and the Baltics. And I can announce today that the UK will deploy our Carrier Strike Group to the North Atlantic and the High North this year led by HMS Prince of Wales, operating alongside the US, Canada and other NATO allies in a powerful show of our commitment to Euro-Atlantic security. That is also why we are enhancing our nuclear cooperation with France. For decades the UK has been the only nuclear power in Europe to commit its deterrent to protect all NATO members. But now any adversary must know that in a crisis they could be confronted by our combined strength. It shows beyond doubt how vital it is that we work together. So, we must also look at what more we can do with the EU. We must go beyond the historic steps that we took at last year’s UK-EU summit to build the formidable productive power and innovative strength that we need. British companies already account for over a quarter of the continent’s defence industrial base. They are a job-creating, community-building machine employing around 239,000 people across the UK, including in Wales, where this month we’re launching the first of five regional defence-grade deals. We want to bring our leadership in defence, tech and AI together with Europe to multiply our strengths and build a shared industrial base across our continent which could turbocharge our defence production. That requires leadership. To drive greater coherence and coordination across Europe. That is what we’re doing with Germany and France in the E3, working closely with EU partners, particularly Italy and Poland as well as with Norway, Canada and Turkey. So, my message today is the United Kingdom is ready. We see the imperative. We see the urgency. We want to work together to lead a generational shift in defence industrial cooperation. Now this includes looking again at closer economic alignment. We are already aligned with the single market in some areas to drive down the prices of food and energy. We are trusted partners. And as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said this week, deeper economic integration is in all of our interests. So, we must look at where we can move closer to the single market in other sectors as well where that would work for both sides. The prize here is greater security. Stronger growth for the United Kingdom and the EU, which will fuel increased defence spending and the chance to place the UK at the centre of a wave of European industrial renewal. I understand the politics very well. It will mean trade-offs. But the status quo is not fit for purpose. And to me there is no question where the national interest lies. I will always fight for what’s best for my country. I started today talking about avoiding mistakes of the past like delaying action or fragmenting our efforts. But there is something else. In the 1930s, leaders were too slow to level with the public about the fundamental shift in mindset that was required. So, we must work harder today to build consent for the decisions we must take to keep us safe. Because if we don’t, the peddlers of easy answers are ready on the extremes of left and right and they will offer their solutions instead. It’s striking that the different ends of the spectrum share so much. Soft on Russia. Weak on NATO. If not outright opposed. And determined to sacrifice the relationship we need on the altar of their ideology. The future they offer is one of division and then capitulation. The lamps would go out across Europe once again. But we will not let that happen. If we believe in our values, in democracy, liberty and the rule of law. This is the moment to stand up and to fight for them. That is why we must work together. And show that by taking responsibility for our own security, we will help our people look forward. Not with fear, but with determination. And with hope. Thank you very much. Contenido bajo licencia Open Governement Licence v3.0 [https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/] UK Prime Minister’s Office. GOV.UK. Web.

The War in Yemen and the Rift Between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Amid the dramatic developments in the Yemeni civil war around the turn of the year, the regional power configuration between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been fundamentally reshaped. The military offensive by Emirati-supported separatists and the counterstrike by the Yemeni government allied with Saudi Arabia are more than just another chapter in the war — they have caused the long-simmering tensions between the two Gulf monarchies to boil over. For the first time, the deep-rooted animosity between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has come to the surface. This confrontation also makes a new round of conflicts in the Gulf more likely and raises fundamental questions about stability in the Middle East, a region where the Gulf states were once seen as guarantors of security. A new phase of Gulf politics could be emerging, with two opposing poles within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pursuing divergent regional visions through different coalitions. The break in the former Saudi-UAE alliance will also have consequences for European foreign policy in the Middle East, which has historically relied on both protagonists as anchors of stability. The Lightning Offensive in Eastern Yemen’s Hadramaut The rapid offensive in Yemen’s eastern province of Hadramaut came as a shock to Saudi Arabia and to the Yemeni government closely aligned with the Kingdom. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) – Yemeni separatists backed by the UAE – seized not only the oil-rich Hadramaut but also other regions in eastern Yemen within a few days. In the transitional capital Aden, the militia took over the presidential palace of the internationally recognized government – which the STC formally belongs to, but from which it has always sought to separate in pursuit of an independent state on the territory of the former South Yemen (until 1990). When the Yemeni government’s president, temporarily based in Aden, fled to Saudi Arabia, the STC’s dream of an independent state seemed within reach. Shortly afterward, the STC’s campaign dissolved like a mirage. The military advance had not only shifted the dynamics of Yemen’s twelve-year civil war but also threatened to alter the balance between regional power Saudi Arabia and its Emirati neighbor, both of which have been external actors in Yemen for over a decade. After years of restraint in the Yemeni conflict, the kingdom took a surprising stance against the STC: Saudi fighter jets first bombed a weapons shipment from the Emirati city of Fujairah at the STC-controlled port of Mukalla. Then the Yemeni government, with Saudi air support, launched a counteroffensive that led to the dissolution of the STC, the flight of its leader Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, and the withdrawal of Emirati troops from Yemen. These dramatic events over the turn of the year mark not just a new twist in Yemen’s convoluted civil war but also reveal deeper rifts between two key Gulf states, whose engagement – from Sudan to Gaza, Syria to Somalia – remains a major driver of regional stability (or instability). Less than five years ago, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an alliance of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their four neighboring monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula, was paralyzed by a dispute with the Emirate of Qatar. Is the Gulf now heading toward another conflict between fraternal states? Between Threat and Ambition, Control and Power Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened together in 2015 against the Houthi militia in the Yemeni civil war, the two Gulf powers had different and sometimes opposing priorities from the start. These differences repeatedly caused tensions and were often only mitigated through careful diplomatic maneuvering. Saudi Arabia views the war as a geostrategic threat on its doorstep. The kingdom shares a 1,300-kilometer porous land border with its southern neighbor. Access from Saudi ports on the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean passes through a narrow maritime bottleneck, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, just off the Yemeni coast. Even before the Houthis took Sanaa in 2014, they—part of Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”—had launched attacks on Saudi territory. In light of these multiple threats on its southern flank, Saudi Arabia responded not only with military intervention but also with direct control over the Yemeni government—illustrated by the fact that from 2016 to 2022, former President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi carried out most of his duties from Riyadh rather than Aden. Although Abu Dhabi also perceived the Houthi threat, the UAE was less directly affected by Yemeni instability due to the geographic distance. This allowed the Emirates to focus on their strategic ambitions, especially controlling key ports and territories along the Gulf of Aden, the southern Red Sea, and the Socotra archipelago. To secure these zones of influence along international trade routes, the UAE relied on non-state actors of all kinds rather than the Yemeni government. These proxies, such as the STC founded in 2017 with Emirati support, not only fought the Houthis but also pursued their own specific interests. Deeply rooted internal Yemeni affairs thus intertwined with the UAE’s strategic actions. In addition, the UAE—the most powerful counterweight to extremism and political Islam in the region—prioritized fighting Yemen’s branch of Al-Qaeda and marginalizing the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islah party, which was part of the Hadi government. Up to 2021, the STC’s main achievements were driving Islah out of Socotra and the southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa. This gap between control and fear, ambition and power, continued to widen, forcing Saudi Arabia to make repeated diplomatic concessions to its Emirati partner. Riyadh mediated power-sharing agreements with the STC in 2019 and 2022, which even led to President Hadi’s resignation. Nevertheless, Saudi-Emirati differences escalated further, reaching a climax in late 2025 in Hadramaut. This oil-rich province in southeastern Yemen, with a 700-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia and serving as a strategic rear base, had long been divided between inland areas controlled by a Riyadh-backed coalition and coastal zones with the strategic port of Mukalla dominated by UAE-aligned forces. When a Riyadh-supported tribal coalition took control of the province’s largest oil field at the end of November, the STC struck back, first seizing the provincial town of Seiyun in the interior and, a few days later, the neighboring Al-Mahra region bordering Oman. Primacy of the State against Separatist Ambitions What might appear to be a new chapter in the civil war in Yemen is actually a facet of a complex regional game, marked by competing power claims and divergent political visions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Not only in Yemen but beyond the borders of this southernmost state of the Arabian Peninsula, the foreign policies of the two Gulf powers are no longer complementary but often directly contradictory. The Kingdom acts in a conservative, cautious manner focused on the state. According to Riyadh, only the existence of a strong central state, with uncontested sovereignty over its territory, can guarantee stability. This approach is applied without compromise, particularly in its immediate neighborhood. Saudi Arabia thus supports not only the Yemeni government but also state structures in Syria, Lebanon, or Egypt, providing aid, equipment, and guidance. Riyadh also tolerates repressive or fragile regimes, as evidenced by its support for the Somali government in Mogadishu or General Abdulfattah Al-Burhan in Sudan. Furthermore, after years of ultimately unsuccessful confrontations with regional rivals such as Iran or Qatar in the late 2010s, Saudi Arabia is now trying to avoid getting involved in the conflicts and entanglements of its neighbors’ wars as much as possible. From ending the Qatar crisis in 2021 to the ceasefire with the Houthi militia in 2022 and the restoration of diplomatic relations with Tehran in 2023, Riyadh has sought de-escalation with its rivals and a disengagement from regional conflicts — in order to stabilize its neighborhood and secure the degree of regional calm it requires for the ambitious economic reform agenda to which the Kingdom has committed itself through 2030. The UAE’s regional strategy, on the other hand, seems to be the direct counter-model to Saudi centrism and de-escalation. From Mukalla to Berbera, and up to Benghazi, the UAE has created a "string of pearls" consisting of ports and zones of influence, relying on a network of non-state armed actors in contexts of weak states along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Behind this "string of pearls" lie lucrative economic interests, such as access to gold mines in Sudan or Chad, as well as fertile land and strategic African markets. These areas also offer the UAE strategic depth and a pool of troops that can be deployed as mercenaries in other regional conflicts. Whereas the Emirati and Saudi approaches previously complemented each other, for example during the ousting of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt in 2013, the intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Qatar blockade in 2017, or even in Sudan until 2021, Abu Dhabi’s opportunism now disrupts Riyadh’s state-centric approach. The UAE continues to arm the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), engaged since 2023 against General Al-Burhan, supported by Saudi Arabia in the Sudanese civil war, while the extension of Emirati influence in Somalia has fueled separatism in Somaliland. In both cases, Emirati action weakens the central state and destabilizes the immediate neighborhood of the Kingdom, as is currently happening in Yemen. A guiding principle of the Emirati regional strategy is often the fight against political Islam, a struggle that, if necessary, is also waged with the help of non-state armed actors such as the RSF. The Kingdom, too, takes a critical view of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist actors. However, the Saudi doctrine of a strong state relies on established regimes even when they include Islamist forces, as Riyadh’s support for Burhan in Sudan and for the Islah party in Yemen demonstrates. As a result, there is now little overlap left between what were once largely aligned regional approaches of the Gulf’s key powers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Role of Israel as an Accelerating Factor Israel’s actions in the region, and the Gulf states’ handling of them, have also played a significant role in accelerating the shift in political relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Prior to the brutal Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Saudi Arabia had been close to normalizing relations with Israel. In the two years since, however, the trajectory has reversed. Israel’s war in Gaza and its broader regional operations — especially its attack on Qatar in September 2025 — have contributed to a reversion in Riyadh to its traditional position vis-à-vis Israel and to a growing perception within the Kingdom that the current Israeli government is substantially destabilizing the region. In contrast, the UAE upheld its normalized relationship with Israel established under the January 2020 Abraham Accords. While Abu Dhabi has repeatedly condemned Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip and shares the wider Gulf concern about the destabilizing impact of Israel’s regional military reach, its relatively even-handed approach toward Israel, its clear departure from the positions of other Gulf states on numerous disputes within the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the targeted expansion of economic cooperation between the Emirates and Israel since the Gaza ceasefire have, from Saudi Arabia’s strategic perspective, nourished the perception of a supposed “Emirati–Israeli axis.” The reciprocal recognition of Israel and the Emirati-backed Somaliland in December 2025 further cemented this view in Riyadh. The factor of Israel also played a role in Yemen. Shortly after the Houthi militia began its campaign against Israel and civilian shipping in the Red Sea in 2023, reports indicated that the Southern Transitional Council (STC) expressed its willingness to support Israel in the event of a potential Israeli counter-response. STC leader Al-Zubaidi also repeatedly expressed openness to the possibility of an independent South Yemen, controlled by the STC, joining the Abraham Accords. In the regional context, the consecutive events of the STC’s military campaign and Israel’s normalization with Somaliland led to growing concerns in Riyadh that a southern flank on the Arabian Peninsula, controlled by rivals, could strategically challenge the Kingdom, particularly along the opposite coast of the Gulf of Aden. Is a New Fratricidal Conflict Looming? As unusual as the Saudi counterreaction was, the Emirati concession is just as remarkable. Just before New Year's Eve 2025, Saudi bombings marked the beginning of a ground offensive by the Yemeni army and the Homeland Shield Forces, trained by the Kingdom. Within ten days, this combined effort not only reversed the recent territorial gains of the STC (Southern Transitional Council), but also led to the recapture of the previously STC-controlled transitional capital of Aden. Not only did the separatists dissolve afterward, but the Emiratis also complied with Saudi demands by withdrawing their remaining troops from the Yemeni southern coast and vacating their base on Socotra Island. Riyadh's first direct intervention against the proxies of its smaller neighbor caused Abu Dhabi's ten-year project in Yemen to collapse like a house of cards. Looking at Yemen, it is now clear that only one foreign power has the upper hand in Aden. This new position of power means that Riyad must now ensure stability in government-controlled areas, strengthen the anti-Houthi coalition, and push the internationally recognized leadership to provide services to its citizens. Moreover, the Kingdom will have to deal with separatist movements, which, despite the dissolution of the STC, continue to enjoy broad support. In this regard, the planned dialogue with representatives from various factions in the south, scheduled for February, will be a litmus test. Although Riyad, as a hesitant hegemon in recent years, tried to escape the deadlocked war in Yemen, the Kingdom is now fully back with responsibility. Replacing the previous Emirati support networks, which were crucial both militarily and economically, is no easy task. Beyond Yemen, the main question now is whether the publicly aired rift between Riyad and Abu Dhabi will challenge the unity of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states and provide a preview of future conflicts in the Gulf region. An increasing hypernationalism in both countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia, which has led to public mudslinging on social media and smear campaigns in state-affiliated newspapers, will be hard to contain through diplomatic damage control. However, it is not certain that this atmosphere of animosity will affect leadership figures in the power apparatus in Riyad and Abu Dhabi. In the short term, the Emirati-Saudi rift is leading to a clearer division among the fragile neighboring states in the Gulf region. The government in Aden declared in December that its defense agreement with the UAE was null and void, while Mogadishu also annulled all bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi in January. The military rulers in Sudan had already suspended their diplomatic relations with the UAE in May 2025. However, it is unlikely that this division between states aligned with Riyad and those favorable to the Emiratis will spill over into the GCC or evolve into a regional crisis of the magnitude of the Qatar blockade. A full-scale bilateral conflict would cause too much damage to both countries, not least because of their close trade relations and Saudi Arabia’s reliance on billions of dollars in investments from the UAE and Dubai’s port infrastructure for its exports. Nevertheless, it appears that the era of joint Saudi-Emirati alliances, as seen in the 2010s, is likely over. Instead, Abu Dhabi and Riyad will probably act in opposing coalitions going forward. For example, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are increasingly finding themselves on the same side of regional issues, as evidenced by their support for the governments of Syria, Sudan, and Somalia. Similarly, the Saudi partnership with Pakistan, with which a bilateral defense pact was signed in September 2025, will gain relative importance in the future. The UAE, on the other hand, will continue to strengthen its relations with Israel and further expand security cooperation with India. However, most of these non-Arab states, such as India, Pakistan, and Turkey, will likely be unwilling to risk their (sometimes newly regained) relations with both countries and will seek to remain neutral wherever possible. Germany and Europe now face significant challenges due to the new status quo in the Gulf. Both Riyad and Abu Dhabi hold particular importance as anchors of stability in a volatile region, due to their economic weight, good relations with (almost) all sides, and political influence in neighboring countries. The growing rivalry between these Gulf powers not only destabilizes their relationship with each other but also means that two key European partners are no longer working in unison, and bilateral misunderstandings or confrontations can lead to crossing red lines and military escalation beyond the Arabian Peninsula. A fragmentation of the Middle East along the Riyad-Abu Dhabi fault line is not in Germany's interest, nor does a political rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council make strengthening the strategic partnership between the GCC and the EU any easier. Moreover, the turbulent events of recent weeks once again highlight the limits of European influence on the ground: Without real levers of power on the Arabian Peninsula and with minimal political attention to conflicts in seemingly unimportant countries like Yemen, neither Berlin nor Brussels were relevant (mediating) actors in the recent conflict. Instead, Europe must stand by as a mere spectator to the strategic shifts in the Gulf, even though these developments will ultimately have implications for its own interests.

On January 19, 2026, an unprecedented event in Bulgarian political history in the post-socialist period occurred: President of the Republic of Bulgaria Rumen Radev announced his early resignation. The resignation of the head of state fits into the logic of the country's long-standing crisis, in which European integration serves not so much as a factor in economic modernization but also as a catalyst for political instability and social alienation from traditional institutions. Radev served as president for nine years, from January 2017 to January 2026. During this period, the country underwent dramatic transformations: the collapse of the traditional bipolar party system (GERB-BSP), the formation of new political forces (especially the nationalist Vazrazhdane Party), the fragmentation of the parliamentary majority, and a wave of unprecedented government changes. Between 2021 and 2025, Bulgaria experienced ten government changes, including four technical cabinets appointed by President Radev himself. His resignation marked the eleventh change. This instability not only reflects a systemic crisis but also proves the inability of the country's political system to function and ensure governance. The July 2021 elections brought an end to decades of the two-party system between GERB and BSP. Although they remained major parties, their combined share of parliament fell from a historical 70% to 45%. The emergence of numerous new political actors for the following elections (ITN, PP-DB, Vazrazhdane, Sword, APS, and others) fragmented the political field and made it difficult to form stable coalitions. In the October 2024 elections, fragmentation reached new heights: nine parties won parliamentary representation, with the centrist GERB party winning 26.4% of the vote (66 seats), and the PP-DB coalition only 14.2% (36 seats). Turnout was 39%. Euro integration as a catalyst for political instability Radev's resignation takes on particular significance in the context of the Euro integration. Bulgaria's accession to the European Union in 2007 cemented European integration as a central vector of foreign policy and a key driver of domestic reform. However, this process has been characterized not only by the structural adaptation of institutions but also by growing socio-political polarization. Although more than half of the country's population opposed the introduction of the euro in February of last year, the transition to the single European currency was officially launched on January 1, 2026. In his final speech as president, Radev noted that during his tenure, the country had joined the Schengen Agreement and adopted the euro, but expressed doubt that these initiatives had brought stability and satisfaction. This rhetoric suggests that his resignation was a calculated move aimed at positioning Radev as an alternative center of political power capable of overcoming the crisis. Parallel to political instability, Bulgaria faced an unprecedented wave of mass protests. Beginning in November 2025 over a proposed budget that included tax and social security increases, the protests quickly escalated into a general expression of discontent with corruption and poor governance. According to the MYARA news agency, support for the protests stood at 71.3% of the population, indicating widespread alienation from traditional political institutions. Simultaneously, support for Rosen Zhelyazkov's government fell to 19.2%, while dissatisfaction reached 66%, just 100 days after its inauguration. Trust in the National Assembly was even lower: only 15.2%, compared to 75.1% of citizens who disapproved of its performance. Amid widespread dissatisfaction with political institutions, the only figure left with voter trust was former President Radev himself. According to the MYARA agency, 44.6% approved of his performance in September 2025, while only 37.9% dissatisfied, significantly higher than any other political figure. A paradoxical situation is emerging: a popular president is unable to resolve the crisis of a parliamentary system in which he has only limited powers; his resignation could be interpreted as a refusal to act as an arbiter of the parliamentary game and a transition to the role of an alternative leader capable of proposing a new political project. The strategic nature of Radev's resignation In Bulgaria's parliamentary system, the president has limited powers. His primary functions are essentially limited to appointing technical governments during parliamentary blockades, submitting laws for parliamentary review, and representing the country in international affairs. In practice, his role is to act as an "arbitrator" between the branches of government and various institutions. Real executive power rests in the hands of the prime minister and his government. During his nine years as president, Radev made the most of these limited powers – appointing seven technical governments was a record. His resignation allows the now-former president to move on to a new phase of his political career. There is active media speculation that the outgoing president will create his own political party and run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. If this happens, Radev will be able to assume the post of prime minister – a position that carries considerably more real power. The head of state's transition from institutional arbiter to active party leader has created a fundamentally new reality for all political forces, forcing them to urgently reassess their strategies. The ruling Euro-Atlantic coalition of GERB-SDS and PP-DB has suffered the most significant blow. For them, the emergence of Radev's political project is tantamount to a "black swan," disrupting the familiar bipolar model of confrontation. While the president could previously be used as a convenient lightning rod to excuse one's own failures, accusing him of exceeding his authority and blocking reforms, this tactic has now become meaningless. Radev has become a direct competitor, attacking the government's vulnerabilities in the socio-economic sphere. He is successfully attracting not only protest voters but also disillusioned moderate voters, tired of endless compromises within the government and the lack of tangible results. The conflict with Delyan Peevski's wing of the DPS has also entered a more acute phase. What previously looked like an institutional war between the branches of government has now evolved into a brutal, head-on clash on the electoral field. The former president now has a free hand to directly criticize corruption patterns, posing an existential threat to the "New Beginning" project, depriving its leader of the opportunity to position himself as the sole defender of parliamentarism from "presidential tyranny." Paradoxically, the new alignment poses the greatest electoral risks to forces ideologically aligned with Radev – the Vazrazhdane party and the BSP. The popular leader's emergence as a defender of national sovereignty threatens to "divvy up" their voter base. For the BSP, this could be a fatal blow, as their former candidate could completely absorb the remnants of the left-wing electorate, effectively relegating the party to the margins of history. Vazrazhdane, meanwhile, faces the loss of their monopoly on Eurosceptic rhetoric and the prospect of competing against a political heavyweight whose personal trust ratings significantly exceed those of their own party leaders. National minority parties (DPS, APS) have traditionally been crucial for the formation of majorities in Bulgarian politics, often determining the composition and viability of governing coalitions. Radev's resignation does not change their fundamental strategy – ensuring access to state resources for their communities and political representation of their interests. For them, his resignation could mark the end of a period in which they enjoyed disproportionate influence. If parliamentary elections result in a more stable majority (without the support of the DPS), these parties' influence could decline. However, given the fragmented nature of the Bulgarian parliament, it is unlikely that any coalition will be able to avoid the need for negotiations with national minority parties. Parliamentary elections in spring 2026: hope and risk The parliamentary elections planned for spring 2026 could either resolve the crisis or deepen it. On the one hand, new elections provide an opportunity for the electorate to express its will more clearly and create the basis for a more stable coalition. On the other hand, if voters continue to vote volatilely, as they did in 2021, 2023, and 2025, new elections will simply reproduce a fragmented parliament, and the crisis will continue. Moreover, if Radev creates a new political party and proves successful in the elections, this could lead to further fragmentation of parliament, as his new party will seek the votes of voters who currently support existing parties. During his nine years as president, Radev exhausted all constitutional tools available to him for managing the political crisis. The president's resignation could facilitate long-needed institutional reforms that could strengthen the Bulgarian political system. If new elections result in clearer political majorities, the former president could create a political party that positions itself as a reformist alternative to GERB and PP-DB. Or, if constitutional changes are made to strengthen executive power, this could usher in a new phase in the development of Bulgarian democracy.

Abstract This paper analyses the current challenges facing NATO and questions its future viability amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. It highlights the evolving U.S. stance, marked by a 2025 National Security Strategy that prioritises self-reliance for European allies and a reduced American military role in Europe, reflecting a broader "America First" approach. Russia's persistent opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine, fuels ongoing conflict and threatens regional stability. Germany's emerging leadership role in European security is explored, showcasing its increased defence commitments and strategic cultural shift from restraint to readiness. Turkey’s crucial geopolitical position and military capabilities underscore its significance within NATO despite recent tensions. The paper also discusses the Greenland dispute as a symbol of intra-Alliance tensions and as a challenge to collective defence principles under Article 5. Ultimately, the Ukraine war serves as a critical test for NATO, raising doubts about the Alliance’s coherence and effectiveness amid internal divisions and external threats. Key Words: NATO, Russia, US, Europe, Security Introduction Allegedly, Lord Ismay (Hastings Lionel Ismay), the first Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), famously claimed that NATO was set up for three major reasons: to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out (he meant the USSR) and to keep the Germans down.[1] Historians and international security experts generally agree that NATO has been a fundamental part of European security architecture, helping maintain peace on the European continent during the Cold War amid the great powers’ rivalry. Not only did the American presence on the European continent deter a possible Soviet invasion, but it also served as a pacifier regarding European military and political ambitions, especially German. As of today, "the Alliance" (as Nato is often referred to) seems to be edging towards the end of its coherence due to many internal and external reasons. This short paper will explore some of them, albeit the topic naturally requires a much longer and deeper approach. The Americans: still in? On December 9, 2025, Republican Congressman Thomas Massie of Kentucky introduced H.R. 6508, the NATO Act, which calls for the United States to withdraw from NATO. In his statement, following (consciously or not Lord Ismay) Massie states: “NATO is a Cold War relic. We should withdraw from NATO and use that money to defend our own country, not socialist countries. NATO was created to counter the Soviet Union, which collapsed over thirty years ago. Since then, U.S. participation has cost taxpayers trillions of dollars and continues to risk U.S. involvement in foreign wars. Our Constitution did not authorise permanent foreign entanglements, something our Founding Fathers explicitly warned us against. America should not be the world’s security blanket — especially when wealthy countries refuse to pay for their own defense.”[2] This is but a small ripple in a much bigger pool of water that hosts the U.S. concerns regarding their involvement in the European Security architecture. To cut a long story short, there seems to be a formidable force in U.S. politics advocating a "refocus" of US foreign policy doctrine and the consequent foreign policy and security strategies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the U.S. President has recently unveiled the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump administration indicates a shift away from the U.S. focus on Europe in foreign and security policy, emphasising greater self-reliance for European allies and prioritising other regions.[3] The NSS ranks global regions by priority, placing the Western Hemisphere first (elevated from fifth in the 2017 NSS), Asia second, and Europe third—a demotion from its previous second-place ranking. This reorientation aligns with an "America First" approach that emphasises burden-sharing, non-interventionism, and a narrower definition of U.S. national interests, thereby avoiding overextension in regions such as Europe. Key elements signalling a less focused approach to Europe include, among others, the encouragement of European self-defence. The strategy calls for Europe to assume primary responsibility for its own security as sovereign nations. It urges ending NATO's expansion and requires allies to meet a new 5% of GDP defence spending commitment (dubbed the "Hague Commitment"), far above the current 2% target, to ensure fair burden-sharing. Secondly, the NSS outlines a limited U.S. role in Europe. The U.S. involvement is framed as diplomatic support for stability (e.g. negotiating an end to the Ukraine war and fostering relations with Russia for reconstruction and strategic stability) rather than sustained military commitments. The document criticises Europe's economic decline, migration issues, and EU "transnationalism" that undermines sovereignty, but positions the U.S. as a helper only for aligned partners willing to open markets and combat hostile practices such as mercantilism. As far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, the NSS asserts U.S. preeminence through a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, focusing on migration control, supply chains, and denying adversarial influence through active military and economic measures (Central and South America and the Caribbean). This marks a departure from past NSS documents, which often centred on Europe due to NATO commitments and threats like Russia, toward a more transactional and restrained U.S. posture in the region.[4] With regards to that last point, the very latest National Defence Strategy of the U.S. confirms the direction away from Europe.[5] The strategy prioritises Europe taking primary responsibility for its own conventional defence, with critical but more limited support from the United States. This includes supporting Ukraine’s defence as primarily a European responsibility. Moreover, according to the document, Russia remains a persistent but manageable threat to NATO's eastern members. The Russians: already in? The ongoing war in Ukraine, which has lasted for 4 years now, has allowed the Russian army to make formidable advances in the field. Russian experts and military advisors are pushing for control of Odessa (I write about it here). It appears probable at this stage that the Russian Federation will want to control as much territory of Ukraine as possible and that the lack of effective diplomacy means that the outcome of the war will be settled on the battlefield rather than in the comfort of negotiation chambers. Regardless of the mainstream narratives constantly pushed by CNN or BBC, the Russians have not really changed their fundamental demand - that Ukraine should not be permitted to become a NATO member. Western societies and their political elites can, of course, feel moral outrage when confronted with such demands. The facts are, however, painfully simple. After the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany was agreed to and accepted by the then-Soviet Union, on the condition that NATO would not expand eastward. (I write about here). NATO did expand westward multiple times, however. From the Kremlin's perspective, Ukraine's possible membership in NATO is the last red line Russia cannot allow to be crossed. Put simply, Ukraine's geography makes it a strategic asset to NATO. Let us also remember that countries such as Turkey, Poland, all three Baltic states, and, recently, even Finland are already NATO members.[6] Importantly, Russian security and military experts see this as a fundamental threat to Moscow and its European environment. (Russia, after all, is also a European country). (The pivotal moment came at the April Bucharest Summit, where NATO leaders — despite opposition from France and Germany — declared that Ukraine (and Georgia) "will become members of NATO." This was not an immediate invitation but a promise of future membership once conditions were met, with the U.S. lobbying heavily for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Ukraine had formally requested a MAP in January 2008.)[7] Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/central-europe-map.htm According to the European Parliament, as early as back in 2014, Moscow identified several challenges as threats to its national security, with a particular focus on the West. First, it is the opposition to Russia's independent foreign policy. Russia perceives that its independent foreign and domestic policies are met with resistance from the United States and its allies, who seek to maintain their domination in world affairs and to "contain" Russia through political, economic, military, and informational pressure.[8] Second, Russia had always viewed the enlargement of NATO, the location of its military infrastructure close to Russian borders, NATO's "offensive capabilities," and the trend towards NATO acquiring global functions as direct challenges to its security Third, Russia was concerned about U.S. initiatives like the global antimissile system, Global Strike capabilities, and the militarisation of space, which it views as efforts to undermine its strategic deterrent. Fourth, Russia resented Western criticism of its policies in the post-Soviet countries, often described by Moscow as neo-imperialistic, and perceives NATO and the EU's enlargement and development of cooperative ties in the shared neighbourhood as expanding their spheres of influence at Russia's expense. Fifth, Moscow condemned efforts to provoke regime changes through means such as "colour revolutions," as it views these as attempts to destabilise its internal situation, supported at times by military force. This includes references to events in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004 and 2014 "Revolution of Dignity"), Kyrgyzstan (2005), and the Arab Spring (2010-2012). Sixth, the Kremlin perceived an increasing competition with the West, including rival systems of values and societal models, and it rejects the normative dimension of the EU's external action, which it sees as an attempt to impose its norms and values on Russia. Next, Russia faced economic sanctions, financial, trade, investment, and technological policies used by the West as instruments to address geopolitical problems and contain alternative centres of power, such as Russia. Finally, across its strategic documents, Russia consistently emphasised the West (including the EU) as its main challenger to its great-power ambitions and security. The latest National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation as approved by President Putin in July 2021 (still before the beginning of the War in Ukraine), NATO and Western European countries are perceived by Russia as sources of pressure and threats.[9] The Strategy states that attempts to exert pressure on Russia, its allies, and partners, including building up NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders and intensifying intelligence activities, contribute to increasing military dangers and threats to Russia. Moreover, there is mention of Western countries' desire to maintain hegemony, which is associated with the crisis of economic development models, rising disparities and social inequality, attempts to limit the role of states, and the exacerbation of political problems and inter-state contradictions. The document also notes that some states view Russia as a threat or even a military adversary, and that there are efforts to instigate disintegration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States to undermine Russia's ties with its traditional allies. Additionally, unfriendly actions by foreign countries, including Western states, are seen as attempts to exploit Russia's socio-economic problems to undermine internal unity and radicalise protest movements. Furthermore, information campaigns by foreign countries seek to form a hostile image of Russia, restrict the use of the Russian language, ban Russian media activities, and impose sanctions on Russian athletes. The document describes these as unjustified accusations and discrimination against Russian citizens and compatriots abroad. Overall, NATO and Western European countries are portrayed as pursuing policies aimed at containing Russia, undermining its sovereignty, and interfering in its internal affairs, which Russia views as threats to its national security and statehood. Now, as mentioned here, it seems that the outcome of the War in Ukraine is most likely to be decided on the battlefield and that the Russians will keep expanding their territory control, possibly even including Odessa, and that ultimately, they will want to keep as much Ukrainian territory under their direct or indirect control as possible. It is very unlikely at this stage that Ukraine will ever regain its territorial integrity (compared to pre-2014 status and Crimean operation). The Germans: up or what? In one of the recent publications (available here), I claimed that German leadership has, for some time now, promoted the idea of "special responsibility" for Europe and European security. To briefly recollect: "The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership’s vision regarding the European defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the EU's future at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four “revolutionary” ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the potential enlargement of the European Union to up to 35 states, a transition to majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy is urged. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the former German Chancellor asserts that Europeans are becoming more autonomous across all fields, assuming greater responsibility for their security, working more closely together, and standing even more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[10] Arguably, Germany's self-proclaimed special role stems from a re-evaluation of its strategic culture, moving from "restraint to readiness."[11] Post-reunification in 1990, Germany was reluctant to lead on security issues, preferring multilateralism through the EU and NATO while avoiding military assertiveness due to its Nazi past and a culture associating power with guilt rather than responsibility. However, events like the 2014 Crimea annexation and the 2022 Ukraine invasion forced a "profound transformation," with leaders arguing that Germany's previous "strategic ambiguity" is no longer viable in a world of revisionist threats.[12] Former Chancellor Scholz described this as a "mandate to act," not just a description of change, emphasising Germany's obligation to secure peace and foster EU solidarity. [13] Chancellor Merz has built on this, asserting that "everything else is subordinate to external security" and that Europe expects German leadership after years of underperformance.[14] German leaders generally justify this role through a combination of geopolitical, economic, and normative arguments, often tied to specific policy actions like defence spending hikes and institutional reforms. First, geopolitical necessity and threat response. Germany portrays itself as uniquely positioned to confront existential threats like Russian aggression, given its central location in Europe and proximity to conflict zones. Scholz argued that Germany must act as the "guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be," defending the international order against autocracies and serving as a bridge-builder in the EU. [15] Merz has emphasised the need to fill the void left by U.S. disinterest, stating that Germany faces a "dual shock" from Russian imperialism and American retrenchment, necessitating leadership to maintain transatlantic security. [16] This includes strengthening NATO's deterrence, with Germany committing to nuclear sharing and viewing alliance solidarity as part of its "reason of state."[17] Second, economic power and resource capacity. As Europe's largest economy, Germany justifies its role by leveraging its financial clout for defence investments, aiming to reach 3 - 3.5% of GDP by 2029 — surpassing NATO's 2% target and outpacing France and the UK.[18] Apparently, recently, Merz has relaxed the constitutional debt brake to fund €500 billion in infrastructure and defence, arguing this enables Germany to lead systemic renewal in European security without overburdening allies. [19] Leaders like Scholz and Merz frame this as a responsibility commensurate with Germany's potential, turning economic strength into security leadership rather than mere fiscal discipline.[20] Third, there is the question of perceived historical responsibility and the evolution of strategic culture. Drawing on Germany's past, its contemporary political leaders argue for a shift from "fence-sitting" to "pace-setting," redefining power as responsibility rather than aggression.[21] This includes overcoming "outdated beliefs" about post-Cold War peace and embracing a "geopolitical, security-driven master narrative." Scholz invoked Germany's duty to foster multilateral solutions and reject isolationism, while Merz highlights the need to reshape public perceptions of military force as a tool for stability. This narrative aligns with broader values such as defending democracy, human rights, and the rules-based order, positioning Germany as a defender of European unity.[22] What of Turkey? Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, joining primarily to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War, and it remains a pivotal ally due to its unique geopolitical position, military strength, and contributions to alliance objectives. As far as the country's location, Turkey straddles Europe and Asia, serving as NATO's southeastern anchor and controlling the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, which connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.[23] Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey regulates naval traffic through these waterways, effectively limiting Russian (and other non-Black Sea states') military movements — a role that's become even more critical amid Russia's actions in Ukraine and increased Black Sea presence.[24] This position also borders key regions like the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Iran), the Caucasus, and Europe, enabling NATO to project influence and address threats from multiple fronts, including countering Russian A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategies. In terms of military strength, Turkey boasts NATO's second-largest standing army, providing significant "military mass" for defending extended frontiers and sustaining operations where other allies might lack scale. [25] It hosts vital NATO assets, including the Incirlik Air Base (which stores around 50 U.S. nuclear weapons and supports Middle East operations), the Allied Land Command headquarters in İzmir, AWACS facilities at Konya, and a radar station in Kürecik for NATO's ballistic missile defence system. [26] These capabilities enhance the alliance's rapid response and deterrence in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Turkey has actively participated in numerous NATO operations, from sending 4,500 troops to the Korean War (which helped secure its NATO membership) to leading roles in Afghanistan (ISAF and Resolute Support), Iraq, the Balkans, and Mediterranean patrols like Operation Active Endeavour. More recently, it has supplied military aid to Ukraine, including Bayraktar TB2 drones that have proven effective against Russian forces, and co-led the Black Sea Grain Initiative to ensure global food security amid the ongoing war.[27] Turkey also collaborates on counterterrorism efforts against groups like ISIS and the PKK, and helps stabilise regions like the South Caucasus and Eastern Mediterranean. [28] Turkey's growing defence sector produces affordable, battle-tested equipment, such as drones and other systems, which offer NATO alternatives to more expensive Western options and enable rapid production for allies like Ukraine.[29] This industrial capacity strengthens the alliance's overall resilience and reduces dependency on single suppliers. Beyond military might, Turkey extends NATO's diplomatic reach through cultural, economic, and political ties in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia — areas where Western allies often face credibility gaps. It engages with challenging regimes to secure resources, energy deals, and counter Russian or Chinese influence, acting as a bridge for the alliance. However, recently Turkey's relations with NATO have faced strains — such as its purchase of Russian S-400 systems (leading to U.S. sanctions and F-35 exclusion), disputes with Greece over Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and delays in approving Finland and Sweden's memberships (resolved by 2024). It is fair to say that Turkey plays a strategically important role in European security, and its leadership effectively leverages this position against European partners. Given its geographic location and military potential, Ankara will largely influence NATO's future. Greenland Conundrum Perhaps the most intriguing in recent days is the U.S. President's claim regarding Greenland. As of January 27, 2026, tensions between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland have escalated due to renewed U.S. interest in expanding its strategic presence on the Arctic island. President Donald Trump has reportedly issued an ultimatum, pushing for greater control over parts of Greenland to bolster military bases and counter Russian influence in the region, including restrictions on drilling rights for Russia. This follows historical U.S. attempts, such as Trump's 2019 proposal to purchase Greenland outright, which was rebuffed by Denmark. Importantly, the U.S. already operates Pituffik Space Base in Greenland for early warning and missile defence, but the current demands aim to expand this amid Arctic geopolitical competition with Russia and China. Recent talks in Washington between U.S. and Danish officials have led to the formation of a working group aimed at a diplomatic resolution. However, interpretations differ: U.S. officials, including Ambassador Leavitt, frame it as facilitating a transfer or enhanced control, while Denmark emphasises disagreement and no sale. For example, a recent New York Times report indicates Denmark may grant the U.S. sovereignty over select land pockets for military bases, modelled after arrangements like those in Cyprus, to strengthen Arctic defences. [30] Greenland's Prime Minister has declared the island's sovereignty a "red line," rejecting any outright transfer.[31] Denmark has reportedly increased troop deployments to Greenland in response, insisting the territory is not for sale. To spice things up, Trump has questioned Denmark's legal claims, stirring further controversy.[32] This has arguably strained U.S. - EU relations, with Europe adopting a firmer stance against Trump's approach. As a NATO member and EU affiliate through Denmark, Greenland's status has prompted calls for allies to boost Arctic security.[33] Some European leaders worry this could force divestment from U.S. ties or heighten NATO divisions.[34] In an interesting twist, a number of European leaders issued strong rhetoric against Trump and his claims about Greenland. A Joint Statement from European Leaders declared in a collective rebuke: "Greenland belongs to its people. It is for Denmark and Greenland and them only to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland," […] "Security in the Arctic must therefore be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO allies including the United States, by upholding the principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. These are universal principles, and we will not stop defending them."[35] Herein lies the fundamental conundrum: the core of the security guaranteed by NATO (at least legally speaking) is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the so-called Casus Foederis.[36] The article 5 states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Originally conceived as a defensive military alliance, NATO was established to protect its member states from external threats, according to its founders. In the event that one member state turns against the others, the Alliance risks becoming ineffective, akin to the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, which served as a mechanism for exerting control over weaker states. Should such a scenario occur, the survival of NATO would be in jeopardy. Historical precedent suggests that oppressive institutions inevitably collapse over time. Conclusion It is imperative to acknowledge that NATO is currently engaged, albeit indirectly, in a conflict with Russia. This situation is significant as it serves as a test of NATO's capabilities. Presently, it appears that NATO is not prevailing. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert, as I have argued in my previous analysis (available here), that Russia is likely to achieve its primary objective: ensuring that Ukraine will not join NATO. Additionally, I expect Russia to retain its territorial acquisitions and, in some manner, exert influence over the political system that will emerge in Ukraine following the conflict. Several pertinent questions arise in this context. Will the eventual peace, following the conclusion of the conflict, be sustainable? Will it adequately consider the national interests of all parties involved? Will it offer a satisfactory compromise? Is there a probability of a resurgence of Cold War-like relations between Western European nations and Russia? In the event of a renewed Cold War scenario, will NATO continue to be perceived as an effective instrument? Furthermore, given the United States' strategic focus on the Far and Middle East, will it remain committed to participating in the European security framework through institutions such as NATO? References [1] NATO. (2026, January 15). A short history of NATO. NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/a-short-history-of-nato [2] Rep. Massie Introduces Bill to Remove the United States from NATO. (2025, December 9). Congressman Thomas Massie. https://massie.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395782 [3] United States of America. (2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America (November 2025). The White House. Washington. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf [4] Grieger, G. (2025, December). The 2025 US National Security Strategy. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://eprs.in.ep.europa.eu [5] Department of War. (2025). National Defense Strategy [Unclassified document]. U.S. Government. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF [6] See more at: https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-on-the-map [7] Pifer, S. (2024, August). Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO. American Diplomacy. https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2024/08/ukraines-long-path-toward-nato [8] Facon, I. (2017). Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine and their implications for the EU (Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/Lot6/11 EN). European Parliament. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/379ea707-e9dc-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en [9] President of the Russian Federation. (2021, July 2). National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Decree No. 400). Kremlin. [10] Sliwinski, K. (2025, June 16). Germany – the EU’s challenging leadership in challenging times. World and New World Journal. https://worldandnewworld.com/germany-eu-leadership/ [11] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? Germany Considers Conscription. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/from-restraint-to-readiness-germany-considers-conscription/ [12] Kandyuk, O. (2025, October 15). THE END OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY? GERMANY’S NEW ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. Ukraine Analytica. https://ukraine-analytica.org/the-end-of-strategic-ambiguity-germanys-new-role-in-european-security/ [13] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [14] Cliffe, J., & Puglierin, J. (2025, May 6). From fence-sitter to pace-setter: How Merz’s Germany can lead Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/from-fence-sitter-to-pace-setter-how-merzs-germany-can-lead-europe/ [15] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [16] Freytag von Loringhoven, A. (2025, December 16). Germany: Europe’s New Security Leader. Centre for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/germany-europes-new-security-leader/ [17] Dempsey, J. (2023, June 22). Judy Asks: Is Germany Getting Serious About Security and Defense? Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2023/06/judy-asks-is-germany-getting-serious-about-security-and-defense?lang=en [18] Koenig, N., & Schütte, L. (n.d.). Don’t Dodge Dilemmas Three Tests for German Leadership in European Defense. Munich Security Conference. Retrieved January 23, 2026, from https://securityconference.org/en/publications/analyses/dont-dodge-dilemmas-german-leadership-in-european-defense [19] Fuhrhop, P., & Kempin, R. (2025, December). New ambitions, old constraints: Germany’s role in shaping European defence. Berlin Perspectives, (08). Institut für Europäische Politik. https://www.iep-berlin.de [20] U.S. Department of State. (2024). Integrated Country Strategy: Germany (Approved May 25, 2022; Revised January 30, 2024). [Report]. https://placeholder-url-for-document.org [21] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? Germany Considers Conscription. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/from-restraint-to-readiness-germany-considers-conscription/ [22] Weiss, S. (2016, October 1). Germany’s Security Policy. From Territorial Defense to Defending the Liberal World Order? Newpolitik. https://www.bfna.org/politics-society/germanys-security-policy-1ozhaghk6w/ [23] The United States and Türkiye: A Key NATO Ally and Critical Regional Partner. (2023, February 19). U.S. EMBASSY TÜRKİYE. https://tr.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-turkiye-a-key-nato-ally-and-critical-regional-partner/ [24] Ellehuus, R. (2019, December 2). Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving. Centre for Strategic &International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving [25] Jones, D. (2025, February 20). Turkish army could play key role in Europe’s security. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/turkish-army-could-play-key-role-in-europe-s-security/7982514.html [26] Turkish Armed Forces. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved January 24, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Armed_Forces [27] Lucas, R. (2025, March 18). Turning Towards Turkey: Why NATO Needs to Lean into Its Relationship. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/turning-towards-turkey-why-nato-needs-to-lean-into.html [28] The United States and Türkiye: A Key NATO Ally and Critical Regional Partner. (2023, February 19). U.S. EMBASSY TÜRKİYE. https://tr.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-turkiye-a-key-nato-ally-and-critical-regional-partner/ [29] Lucas, R. (2025, March 18). Turning Towards Turkey: Why NATO Needs to Lean into Its Relationship. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/turning-towards-turkey-why-nato-needs-to-lean-into.html [30] Jakes, L., Tankersley, J., & Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2026, January 21). Trump Says He Has Framework for Greenland Deal as NATO Mulls Idea of U.S. Sovereignty Over Bases. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/us/politics/trump-greenland-threats-diplomacy-force.html?searchResultPosition=2 [31] Greenland and Denmark say sovereignty ‘red line’ after latest Trump remarks. (2026, January 22). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/22/trumps-greenland-pact-will-demand-allies-boost-arctic-security-nato-chief [32] Westfall, S. (2026, January 25). Trump tells one history of Greenland. Historians tell another. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/25/greenland-deal-trump-history-denmark-europe/ [33] Adler, K. (2026, January 20). Confronted over Greenland, Europe is ditching its softly-softly approach to Trump. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0lx7j1lrwro [34] Schoen, D. E. (2026, January 26). What Trump’s risking in the row over Greenland. The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5703677-trump-greenland-geopolitical-impact/ [35] Joint Statement on Greenland. (2026, January 6). ÉLYSÉE. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/01/06/joint-statement-on-greenland [36] See more at: https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1949/04/04/the-north-atlantic-treaty

The price of gold has risen to over US$5,000 (£3,662) an ounce for the first time ever, after doubling in value over the course of a very strong 2025 for the precious metal. The usual explanation for such strong rises is that gold is considered a safe bet for investors when other options look a little shaky. High inflation for example, when cash quickly loses value, is often linked to gold price rises. Trade wars and actual wars usually have a similar effect. A common view then, is that gold performs well in moments of instability. But the research I was involved with suggests that gold prices are not simply a reaction to short-term economic events. Instead, they are a response to something deeper, reflecting an overall level of confidence in how economic systems are managed over time. During recent periods of sustained economic stability in the west, gold prices have remained largely flat. The steady growth, moderate inflation and predictable policy of the early 1990s and 2000s for example, were not good times for gold. And rather than responding to every economic peak or dip, the thing that really pushes gold prices up is instability in what’s known as “monetary credibility”. In other words, when there are doubts about whether central banks and governments will be able to maintain discipline over inflation, public debt and currency value over the coming decades. At times like this gold becomes more desirable. This helps explain why gold can continue to rise even as inflation falls, as has happened recently in several big economies, including the US and parts of Europe. And although recent weakness in the dollar and political uncertainty in the US have probably added momentum to gold’s rise, these factors amplify a deeper shift in confidence rather than explain it on their own. Our findings suggest that no single set of macroeconomic variables (like inflation, interest rates and stock prices) consistently explains gold prices across developed and emerging economies. They matter sometimes, but not always. So simple narratives (whether they’re about inflation, or trade wars or the weakening of the US dollar) are not enough to account for today’s gold market. Inflation alone cannot explain why gold prices remain elevated even as headline price pressures have eased. What gold tells us about the world There is more evidence for this in the fact that, according to the World Gold Council, central banks have been buying gold at the fastest pace in decades, particularly since 2022. This has continued even as inflation has fallen in many countries, again suggesting that these decisions are driven by longer term considerations rather than short term price movements. The decisions of central banks reflect concerns about resilience, diversification and trust. And to those banks, gold’s appeal lies squarely in the fact that it carries relatively little risk. It is not issued by a government like fiat currencies. It cannot be created at will like paper money. And it does not depend on the credibility of any single institution. So, in a world of high public debt, geopolitical fragmentation and increasing pressure on central bank independence, gold offers stability and insurance. And its price rises when confidence in the rules governing money becomes uncertain. That uncertainty can persist even when growth resumes or inflation falls. Seen in this light, gold’s recent surge does not signal a kneejerk panic or imminent collapse. Instead, it reflects a reassessment of long-term monetary confidence at a time when governments face difficult trade-offs between debt sustainability, political pressures and price stability. With its current high value, gold is not predicting a specific crisis. Nor does it provide a clear forecast for inflation. But it is revealing something important about the current moment. Markets appear less certain that the frameworks governing money, debt and policy will remain unchanged. That does not mean those systems have failed, but it does suggest their credibility is no longer taken for granted in the way it has been in the past. Gold does not predict the future. But it does offer a window into how confident markets are about the foundations of the world’s economics system.

I. Introduction In late December 2025, mass protests erupted across Iran, driven by public anger over the deepening economic crisis. Initially led by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran, the demonstrations quickly spread to universities and major cities such as Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad, becoming the largest unrest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Over time, the movement expanded beyond economic demands to include calls for freedom and, in some cases, the overthrow of the regime. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans such as “death to the dictator.” [1] In response, since late December 2025 Iranian state security forces have engaged in massacres of dissidents. The Iranian government has also cut off internet access and telephone services in an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing. The Iranian government has accused the US and Israel of fueling the protests, which analysts suggest may be a tactic to increase security forces’ willingness to kill protesters. A Sunday Times report, based on information from doctors in Iran, said more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the mass protests. The Interior Ministry in Iran verified 3,117 people had been killed in protests. [2] The Iranian protests, the largest in the Islamic republic’s 46-year history, appear to have subsided for now in the face of a violent government crackdown. US President Donald Trump has threatened to “hit very hard” if the situation in Iran escalates, reigniting concerns about possible US intervention in the region. Even Trump called Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “sick man” in an interview with Politico on 17 January 2026, and said, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” It appeared to be the first time Trump had called for the end of Khamenei’s rule in Iran. [3] Despite having repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the regime were to start killing protesters, Trump has held off on any immediate military action against the Islamic Republic. While the US reportedly sent the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the Middle East on January 15, 2026, President Trump has not specified what he might do. However, on January 28, 2026, Trump posted on social media: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran... It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” Saying that time is running out, Trump demanded that Iran immediately negotiate a nuclear deal. He also suggested his country’s next attack on Iran could be worse than last year’s. In response, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned the US that any attack on his country would result in a “regional war” as US President Donald Trump has amassed military assets in the Middle East. “They should know that if they start a war this time, it will be a regional war,” the 86-year-old supreme leader, who has held absolute power for 37 years, said at an event in downtown Tehran on February 1, 2026. With this tension between Iran and the US running high, Iran and the US agreed to resume nuclear talks on Friday on February 6, 2026, in Oman. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi will meet in Oman in an effort to revive diplomacy over a long-running dispute about Iran’s nuclear program and dispel fears of a new regional war, However, experts expect that the deal will not be reached. Then the US will consider military strikes on Iran. Reflecting the pessimistic prospects, the US military on February 3, 2026 shot down an Iranian drone that “aggressively” approached the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea. So if the US carries out military strikes against Iran, what will happen? Which scenarios will follow? This paper deals with this issue. It first describes the US military presence in the Middle East and then examines the scenarios if the US conducts military strikes on Iran. II. US military presence in the Middle East As President Donald Trump considers a major strike on Iran after discussions about limiting Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile production haven’t progressed, the US military has accelerated a weeks-long buildup of military hardware in the Middle East, open-source data shows. That includes near-constant surveillance flights and dozens of C-17 and C-5 military planes dropping off loads of cargo at US military bases across the region. As Figure 1 shows, the arrival of the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, now in the northern Arabian Sea, represents the most dramatic shift in military positioning. The group includes the USS Abraham Lincoln along with three guided-missile destroyers and the carrier air wing which includes squadrons of F-35C Lightning II fighters, F/A-18E Super Hornet fighters, and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets. Figure 1: US military presence in the Middle East (source: Congressional Research Service, Airframes.io and FlightRadar24) The Navy also has three destroyers — the USS McFaul, USS Delbert D. Black, and USS Mitscher — in the region separate from the aircraft carrier strike group. Three littoral combat ships — USS Canberra, USS Santa Barbara, and USS Tulsa — based out of Bahrain could be called upon for minesweeping duties if Iran chooses to deploy such armaments. In recent days, the US has deployed various air defense systems to the region as well, including additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, and Patriot missile systems that appeared at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar last week, Those systems would be key to combating retaliatory missile strikes if Iran were to respond to a strike by taking aim at either US military assets or US allies in the region. The equipment has accumulated as Trump has repeatedly threatened military action, saying on Wednesday that if Iran doesn’t agree to a deal, “the next attack will be far worse” than last June’s attack on its nuclear facilities. “Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary,” Trump said of the Abraham Lincoln. [4] The guided-missile destroyers steaming with the Lincoln and elsewhere in the region offer significant strike potential. Each destroyer can carry dozens of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles with a range of 1,000 miles and wields a 1,000-pound conventional warhead. In addition, US Navy carrier strike groups usually operate with an attack submarine that can also launch Tomahawks, but the presence of submarines is almost never disclosed. While the carrier provides a floating base for military operations, the US has a number of permanent locations in the region where a slew of other aircraft have also been heading. As Figure 2 shows, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the US has at least 19 military bases - eight of which are considered to be permanent - across the Middle East. The US has a major military presence in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman and the UAE. While in Djibouti and Turkey, the US maintains large military bases that serve different regional commands, but contribute to activities in the Middle East. Currently, there are approximately 40,000 American troops in the Middle East, according to US defense officials. Around a quarter of them are in Al-Udeid, which hosts combat aircraft, tankers, aerial refueling and intelligence assets. Al-Udeid airbase in Qatar, in the desert on the outskirts of Doha, is the tactical headquarters of the US Central Command, also known as Centcom. Centcom’s area of responsibility is not only the Middle East, but also parts of Central and South Asia. Al-Udeid is the largest American base in the region, hosting around 10,000 troops. The next biggest military base in terms of personnel is thought to be the naval base in Bahrain. Figure 2: US troops numbers in the Middle East (source: Middle East Eye) Bahrain (hosting 9,000 American troops) is where the US navy’s fifth fleet is headquartered, with responsibility over the Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and some of the Indian Ocean. Kuwait hosts Camp Arifjan. That is the name of the tactical (or forward) headquarters of the US Army Central - a military formation that serves as the army component for Centcom. Ali al-Salem air base, known as “The Rock” for its isolated environment, is also in Kuwait, along the Iraqi border. Another Kuwait base is Camp Buehring, which has been a staging post for units heading to Syria and Iraq. In total, around 13,500 US troops are stationed in Kuwait. The UAE is home to 3,500 American troops, as well as al-Dhafra airbase, a site shared between the US and the Emiratis. It has been used during missions against the Islamic State group, as well as for reconnaissance missions in the region. The American presence in Iraq includes the Ain al-Asad airbase in Anbar - a site that was targeted by Iranian missiles after the US assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the senior Iranian general. There’s also the Erbil airbase in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, which is used for training exercises. Approximately 2,700 American troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia, providing air and missile defense capabilities. The Prince Sultan airbase, near Riyadh, is a major air force hub where its main assets include Patriot missile batteries. For its missions in the Levant, Muwaffaq Salti airbase in Jordan’s Azraq is the key hub. It hosts the US’s 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing. Further afield in Turkey, the major base run jointly with Turkish forces is the Incirlik airbase in southern Adana. That base reportedly hosts US nuclear warheads. The size of US military bases, personnel, and equipment has fluctuated in recent years and months, reflecting shifting regional priorities. Early in President Trump’s second term, several warships departed the Middle East to support US international operations. However, naval and air power is now being bolstered in the region to attack Iran. On January 29, 2026, an E-11A jet arrived at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This is one of the last critical assets the US needs to coordinate complex operations. The E-11A, a converted business jet, serves as a high-altitude communications relay system, transmitting data to support air and ground forces. [5] On the same day, a transport aircraft modified for combat search and rescue operations arrived in the area of operation. A squadron of F-15E Strike Eagle fighters, capable of carrying a variety of guided bombs and air-to-surface missiles, also recently deployed to the region as part of a planned troop rotation. Surveillance flights by US drones and reconnaissance aircraft have continued in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Since last Monday, reconnaissance aircraft have been flying nonstop from US bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and even beyond the Middle East. Modified versions of the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, capable of detecting radioactive debris and interpreting electromagnetic signals, have also been deployed to the region. On January 29, 2026, at least eight aerial refueling tankers, used to provide aerial refueling for small military aircraft, crossed the Atlantic and landed at Morón Air Base in Spain. Several of the tankers transmitted messages during the flight, suggesting they were supporting at least seven additional small aircraft ‘en route’, likely conducting electronic warfare or fighter missions. Messages sent by two tankers on Thursday night specifically referred to the F-35 Operations Center, and these were recorded on the flight tracking dashboard tbg.airframes.io, showing that the F-35 fighter was crossing the Atlantic. Both, aerial refueling tankers mentioned in the message took off from Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. Less than two hours after the message was sent, six F-35 fighter jets landed at Lages Air Base in Portugal. Amid high tensions over President Trump’s recent threats, US Central Command announced on January 27, 2026 that it had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [6] Given the US military’s extensive aerial refueling tanker network, it is unclear what other assets from around the world will be deployed in the military operation against Iran. As a reminder, in June 2025, seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers flew from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to Iran for 37 hours, dropping over a dozen bombs on three Iranian nuclear sites. Furthermore, guided missile submarines were also used in the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025. The U.S. Navy has four Ohio-class guided missile submarines, converted ballistic missile submarines whose locations are kept secret, that can carry up to 154 Tomahawk missiles. III. What could happen if the US strikes Iran? Seven scenarios. Iran and the US agreed to resume nuclear talks on Friday on February 6, 2026, in Oman. However, if no last-minute deal with Iran can be reached and President Donald Trump decides to order US forces to attack Iran, then what are the possible outcomes? Here are seven scenarios. [7] Scenario 1: Targeted, surgical strikes, minimal civilian casualties, a transition to democracy US naval and air forces conduct limited, precision strikes targeting military bases of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Basij unit - a paramilitary force under the control of the IRGC - ballistic missile launch and storage sites as well as Iran’s nuclear program. An already weakened Iranian regime is toppled, eventually making a transition to a genuine democracy where Iran can rejoin the rest of the world. This is a highly optimistic scenario but is highly unlikely. Western military intervention in both Iraq and Libya did not bring a smooth transition to democracy. Although it ended brutal dictatorships in both countries, it ushered in years of chaos and bloodshed. US secretary of state Marco Rubio assessed that the Iranian regime was probably weaker than it had ever been. However, a senior Israeli official said that Israel does not believe US airstrikes alone can topple the Islamic Republic, if that is Washington’s goal. A protracted US air campaign is considered unlikely, experts say, citing Trump‘s reported desire for a limited and decisive attack. But even a monthslong offensive would not guarantee the fall of the Iran regime. “A sustained US air campaign could severely degrade Iran‘s conventional military by ripping up command-and-control, and fixed infrastructure, but it is unlikely by itself to produce the collapse of Iranian security forces, which can disperse, hide, and shift to low-signature internal repression,” said Michael Horowitz, an independent defense expert in Israel. [8] “If you’re going to topple the Iran regime, you have to put boots on the ground,” he told Reuters, noting that even if the US killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran would “have a new leader that will replace him.” [9] Only a combination of external pressure and an organized domestic opposition could shift Iran’s political trajectory, the Israeli official said. The Israeli official said Iran’s leadership had been weakened by the massive protests but remained firmly in control despite the ongoing deep economic crisis that sparked the protests. Western diplomats and Arab officials also told Reuters that they were concerned that instead of bringing people onto the streets, US air strikes could weaken a movement already in shock after the bloodiest repression by Iranian authorities since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, said that without large-scale military defections Iran’s protests remained “heroic but outgunned.” Trump has notably avoided endorsing a successor, and Iran’s exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi lacks sufficient support within the country to immediately be installed as a leader. Jason Brodsky, a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project, said President Trump has historically favored “quick, surgical, targeted, dramatic, and decisive military operations,” pointing to US airstrikes in Syria during his first term. He said any US military intervention could involve leadership decapitation alongside attacks on Iran’s military and security infrastructure. However, Brodsky cautioned that Iran’s political system is designed to survive even major leadership losses. [10] “The Islamic Republic is bigger than any one individual,” he said, noting that institutions and succession mechanisms exist to fill any vacuum — even if the removal of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could be temporarily destabilizing. Scenario 2: Regime survives but moderates its policies This could broadly be called the “Venezuelan model” whereby swift, powerful US military action leaves the regime intact but with its policies moderated. Some in Washington hope that US military pressure could force Iran to moderate its behavior — scaling back its nuclear ambitions, missile program and regional proxy network. In Iran’s case, this would mean the Islamic Republic survived, which won‘t satisfy large numbers of Iranians, but is forced to curtail its support for violent militias across the Middle East, curtail or cease its domestic nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as easing up on its suppression of protests. Again, this is at the more unlikely end of the scale. The Islamic Republic leadership has remained defiant and resistant to change for 47 years and is unlikely to shift its course now. Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence official now with the Atlantic Council, warned that US military strikes could actually strengthen hardliners. “A US attack would more likely consolidate elite cohesion around the regime, marginalize protesters and reinforce Iran’s narrative of external siege,” he said. Scenario 3: Iran regime is replaced by military rule Many experts think that this is the most likely possible scenario. While the Iran regime is clearly unpopular with many, and each successive wave of protests over the years weakens it further, there remains a huge and pervasive security deep state with a vested interest in the status quo. The main reasons why the protests have so far failed to overthrow the Iran regime is because there have been no significant defections to their side, while those in control are prepared to use unlimited force and brutality to remain in power. At present, there is no credible alternative pathway to a stable and democratic Iran. Any attempt by the US to impose regime change by force, whether through the dismantling of the regime or the assassination of Khamenei, would almost certainly produce catastrophic outcomes. The most likely scenarios would be a full takeover by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or a descent into civil war. Iran currently lacks a viable domestic opposition capable of governing the country. At the same time, the exiled opposition, including figures such as Reza Pahlavi, remains fragmented, weak, and organizationally unprepared to assume power. In the confusion of the aftermath of any US strikes it is highly likely that Iran ends up being ruled by a strong, military government composed largely of IRGC figures. One of the most likely scenarios, according to both Atlantic Council experts and BBC analysts, is a shift toward overt military rule. [11] If Iran’s current leadership gets weak but does not collapse, power could move fully into the hands of the IRGC — a force that already dominates Iran’s security network and large parts of its economy. Brodsky at the Atlantic Council said that an IRGC figure like parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf could emerge as a central authority. But rather than bringing reform, such a transition could entrench a more hardline system. Scenario 4: Regime collapses, replaced by chaos This is a very real danger and is one of the major concerns of neighbors like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The greatest danger now is that President Trump, having amassed powerful military forces close to Iran‘s borders, decides he must act, and a war starts with no clear end-state and with unpredictable and potentially damaging repercussions. Despite its Persian-speaking majority, Iran has a diverse population with at least 40% belonging to different non-Persian ethnic groups, which may play a significant role in the event of a US attack, according to several analysts. Perhaps the gravest risk, experts say, is the collapse of central authority in Iran. BBC analysis highlights the possibility of civil war, ethnic unrest involving Baluchis and Kurds, and a humanitarian crisis in a country of over 90 million people. Atlantic Council analysts warn that regime failure without an organized opposition could produce great instability rather than democracy. Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence official, said that “Iran lacks a credible, organized opposition capable of governing the country.” He added that externally imposed regime change could lead to chaos. While some Western media have pointed out Reza Pahlavi – the son of the ousted Shah of Iran – who had called on protesters to take to the streets against Khamenei’s rule, as a possible alternative, many analysts don’t see in him the ingredients of a true leader. Many people see Pahlavi as a figure too close to Israel’s Zionist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Reza Pahlavi, even himself, is not looking forward to coming back to Iran,” says Fatemeh Karimkhan, an Iranian journalist. Karimkhan says that while there are some pro-monarchy supporters in Iran, they are not as many as projected. Karimkhan claims that “they are much less in number and in ability.” Scenario 5: Iran retaliates by attacking US forces and neighbors using missiles and drones Iran has vowed to retaliate against any US attack, saying that “its finger is on the trigger.” Specifically, on February 1, 2026, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned the US that any attack on his country would result in a “regional war” as President Donald Trump has amassed US military assets in the Middle East. Iran is clearly no match for the might of the US Navy and Air Force but it could still lash out with its arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones, many concealed in caves, underground or in remote mountainsides. During the 12-day war in June 2025, Israel hit Iran’s military infrastructure, including missile-production centers. Israel struck sites around Tehran, including the Parchin military complex, the Khojir military base, the Shahrud missile site, and a factory in the Shamsabad Industrial Zone. The strikes took aim at Iran’s production of medium-range ballistic missiles that have threatened Israel and are “fairly potent,” said Sascha Bruchmann, a military analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. [13] Even then, Iran was still capable of firing hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel. Dozens of the missiles, aimed mostly at military sites, penetrated Israel’s formidable air defenses. Israel estimated that Iran had 1,000–1,500 missiles remaining after the 12-day war in June 2025, down from 2,500 held previously. But by the end of 2025, it assessed that Iran was rebuilding its inventory. As a result, Figure 3 shows, Iran “still has a large arsenal of short and medium range missiles that can easily hit US military bases in the Middle East, as well as cruise missiles and drones that it would likely use to target US ships,” said Michael Horowitz, an Israeli independent defense expert. [14] Figure 3: Iran’s ballistic missiles (source: IISS) Many of the medium-range ballistic missiles are “liquid-fueled and rely on infrastructure to be loaded, fueled, and launched,” said Bruchmann. Iran also possesses short-range ballistic missiles that are “often solid-fueled, much more flexible, and thus more difficult to detect before launch,” added Bruchmann, estimating that Iran has several thousand of the missiles. [15] Bruchmann said the short-range missiles “constitute a real threat, particularly for the smaller Gulf countries” like Bahrain and Qatar that house US bases and forces. There are US military bases and facilities dotted along the Arabian side of the Gulf, notably in Bahrain and Qatar. As Figure 4 shows, almost all US bases in the region fall within the range of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities. But Iran could also, if it chose, target the critical infrastructures of any nation it considered was complicit in a US attack, such as Jordan or Israel. Moreover, Iran has had large-scale production of cheap short-range armed drones over the past decade. These drones have already been used to exert chilling effects in Ukraine by Russia. They are easily hidden and their manufacture can be readily dispersed into numerous small factories. Iran’s Shahed suicide drone, for example, has proved to be a destructive tool in Russia’s war in Ukraine. While few have the range to cause serious damage to Israel, many drones are well within range of plenty of US military forces, including its largest air base in the region, in Qatar, and the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Iran has prepared many drones after the US attack in June 2025. Iran’s Army Chief, General Amir Hatami, said Iran changed its military strategy after the 12-day conflict in June 2025. As part of this shift, Iran has prepared a large number of drones. Recently the IRGC received a batch of 1,000 new drones while Iran has prepared for a military confrontation with the US. [16] General Amir Hatami said these drones can be launched from both land and sea. The devastating missile and drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s petrochemical facilities in 2019, attributed to an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq, showed the Saudis just how vulnerable they were to Iranian missiles. Figure 4: Selected Iranian aerial weapons to target the middle East region (source: Center for Strategic and International Studies) Iran’s Gulf neighbors, all US allies, are understandably extremely jittery right now that any US military strike on Iran is going to end up rebounding on them. This is because Iran could use its arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones to hit infrastructures in Middle East countries it sees as complicit. Scenario 6: Iran retaliates by laying mines in the Gulf or closing the Strait of Hormuz Iran could disrupt global energy flows by laying sea mines in the Gulf or closing the Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping route through which around a fifth of the world’s oil and gas exports pass, as Figure 5 shows. Laying mines in the Gulf has long loomed as a potential threat to global shipping and oil supplies ever since the Iran-Iraq war when Iran mined the shipping lanes in the Gulf. The narrow Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman is a critical chokepoint. Approximately 20% of the world‘s Liquified Natural Gas exports and between 20-25% of oil and oil byproducts pass through this strait each year. Iran has conducted military exercises in rapidly deploying sea mines. If it did so, then it would inevitably impact on world trade and oil prices. Figure 5: Iran may lay sea mines inside the Strait of Hormuz (source: BBC) Iran, one of the world’s biggest energy producers, sits on the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway. The Iran regime has threatened to close it if it is attacked — a prospect that experts warn could send fuel prices soaring far beyond Iran’s borders and trigger a global economic recession. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s very important shipping chokepoints connecting the oil-rich Persian Gulf to the rest of the world. Approximately 20% of global production flows through the waterway. Iran controls its northern side. Figure 6: The Strait of Hormuz (source: US Energy Information Administration) Experts say that targeting the global economy through the Strait of Hormuz may be one of Iran’s most effective options. However, it is also the most dangerous because of its widespread impact. A prolonged closure of the Strait would represent a “dangerous scenario,” said Umud Shokri, a senior fellow at George Mason University. “Even partial disruptions could drive sharp price spikes, disrupt supply chains and amplify inflation globally. In such a scenario, a global recession could be a realistic risk.” [17] Such an aggressive move would likely be a last resort for Iran, because it would severely disrupt its own trade and that of neighboring Arab states, many of which have lobbied President Trump against attacking Iran and pledged not to allow US access to their territory for an assault on Iran. The Iranian regime says that it has naval bases deep underground across the country’s coast with dozens of fast attack boats ready to deploy across Persian Gulf waters. The Iranian military has spent three decades building its own fleet of ships and submarines with production ramped up over the past years in anticipation of possible naval showdown. Retired Vice Adm. Robert Harward, a former deputy commander of US Central Command, said that Iranian naval capabilities and proxies present a challenge for shipping in the Strait of Hormuz that “can be addressed very quickly.” However, he said “asymmetric” tools such as drones and other tactics could prove challenging for shipping and oil flow. [18] Iran’s ability to disrupt global shipping and shock the global economy has historical precedent. In 2019, several oil tankers were hit in the Gulf of Oman during heightened tensions between Iran and Arab nations of the Persian Gulf following President Trump’s withdrawal from a nuclear agreement with Iran. Iran was widely believed to have been responsible. More recently, during the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis disrupted commercial shipping at the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea, through which approximately 10% of the world’s seaborne trade passes. Together with Iran’s ability to threaten traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran wields outsize power to inflict global economic pain. The Houthi group in Yemen has been targeted by both Israel and the US, but it remains one of Iran’s most strong and destructive surrogates, and it has also indicated that it will defend Iran, its patron. Last weekend, the Houthis released a video showing images of a ship engulfed in flames, accompanied by the simple caption, “Soon.” With Iranian support over the past few years, the Houthi group has struck Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, as well as US ships in the Red Sea. Scenario 7: Iran retaliates, sinking a US warship A US Navy Captain onboard a warship in the Gulf claimed that one of the threats from Iran he worries about most is a “swarm attack.” [19] This is where Iran launches so many high explosive drones and fast torpedo boats at a single or multiple targets that even the US Navy’s formidable close-in defenses are not able to eliminate all of them in time. The IRGC Navy has long replaced the conventional Iranian Navy in the Gulf, some of whose commanders were trained at Dartmouth during the time of the Shah. Iran’s naval crews have focused much of their training on unconventional or “asymmetric” warfare, looking at ways to overcome or bypass the technical advantages enjoyed by their main adversary, the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. As Figure 7 shows, the sinking of a US warship near Iran, accompanied by the possible capture of survivors among its crew, would be a massive humiliation for the US. Figure 7: US warships near Iran (source: TRTWorld) While this scenario is unlikely, the billion-dollar destroyer the USS Cole was crippled by an Al-Qaeda suicide attack in Aden harbor in 2000, killing 17 US sailors. [20] Before that, in 1987 an Iraqi jet pilot fired two Exocet missiles at a US warship, the USS Stark, killing 37 sailors. While considered unlikely, analysts warn that Iran has trained extensively for “swarm attacks” using drones and fast boats designed to overwhelm US naval defenses. A successful strike on a US warship would represent a major escalation and a symbolic blow to US military dominance in the region. IV. Conclusion This paper raised a question, “What would happen if the US carried out military attacks on Iran?” amidst escalating tensions between Iran and the US. To address this question, this paper first examined the US military presence in the Middle East, which is intended to attack Iran. It then analyzed seven scenarios that could arise if the US conducts military attacks on Iran and evaluated the feasibility of each scenario. The most likely scenarios currently are Scenario 3 (Iran’s regime transition to military rule), Scenario 4 (Iran’s regime collapses and chaos ensues), and Scenario 5 (Iran retaliates with missiles and drones against the US military and US allies in the Middle East). Referencias [1] Barin, Mohsen (31 December 2025). "Iran's economic crisis, political discontent threaten regime". DW News. [2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-president-warns-us-attack-on-supreme-leader-would- mean-full-scale-war/ [3] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/17/trump-to-politico-its-time-to-look-for-new-lead ership-in-iran-00735528?_kx=LSFywwe4GSg_lcFWo5DyId8VKdphy2F0zhlZVneJnA97jKgVYFyty4cB80GJkTHR.U5D8ER&utm_id=01KF7GKF35MAAW8BRA143VFM9M&utm_medium=cam2paign&utm_source=Klaviyo [4] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-massive-armada-heading-iran-warns-time-running /story?id=129635685 [5] https://www.itamilradar.com/2026/02/02/usaf-e-11a-heads-back-to-the-united-states-as-a -second-bacn-aircraft-reinforces-the-gulf/ [6] It had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [7] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [8] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [10] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/trump-iran-us-strikes-war-regim e-change-nuclear-b2909957.html [11] https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/if-the-us-strikes-iran-what-could-happen-next-experts -warn-of-chaos-and-escalation-1.500424901 [12] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [13] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-us-israel-strikes-war/33662293.html [14] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-us-israel-strikes-war/33662293.html [15] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-us-israel-strikes-war/33662293.html [16] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-884948 [17] https://caspianpost.com/analytics/if-u-s-strikes-iran-possible-scenarios-and-regional-fall out [18] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/29/middleeast/iran-response-options-trump-intl [19] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [20] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o

In the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico, the word “security” functions as a hinge: it can open doors to cooperation or abruptly shut down any attempt at understanding. The busiest border in the world, a deeply integrated economy, and a public health crisis in the United States associated with fentanyl consumption have, in recent years, shaped a scenario in which interests converge, but where historical mistrust, structural asymmetries, and unilateral temptations also accumulate. Although latent tension between the two countries has long existed, it was not until early January 2026 — specifically after the capture of Maduro by the United States — that this tension became more visible. In Mexico, concern grew over signals and U.S. military “movements” — real, perceived, or amplified by the media — which were interpreted not so much as immediate preparations for a U.S. intervention, but rather as political messages in a context in which political discourse in Washington once again flirts with a high-voltage idea: the possibility of sending troops, carrying out incursions, or executing armed actions on Mexican territory to combat Mexican drug trafficking cartels — recently classified as terrorist organizations in the United States. Many analysts share the view that the relevance of these episodes lies not solely in their operational dimension, but in their symbolic value within a broader strategy of diplomatic pressure. Three currents fueling interventionist temptation The idea of a U.S. intervention in Mexico has not emerged out of nowhere; in fact, it could be said that there are three simultaneous currents that feed this idea. The first is domestic, inherent to the internal situation of the United States. The fentanyl crisis has become one of the country’s main public health problems, with tens of thousands of deaths annually. This crisis has been used and translated by broad political sectors into a narrative of an external threat. Within this framework, Mexican cartels are portrayed as transnational actors comparable to terrorist organizations, which enables — at least discursively — the use of exceptional tools against them. Moreover, as several analyses published in U.S. media and echoed by the Mexican press point out, this narrative has a clear electoral utility, in which there is pressure to offer “visible” — or tangible — solutions with immediate impact, even when their strategic costs are high. All of this occurs within the context of the fight against drug trafficking. The second current is the Mexican reality. The persistence of high levels of violence and corruption within the institutional apparatus, the fragmentation of territorial control, and the uneven penetration of criminal networks at the local level feed the perception in Washington that Mexico is not doing “enough.” Mexican security policy has oscillated between attempts at territorial control, containment strategies, and the management of a chronic conflict that neither fully resolves nor fully escalates. From the outside, this ambiguity is often interpreted as incapacity or lack of will; from within, on the other hand, it is seen as a pragmatic adaptation to a long-term structural problem. The third current is historical and symbolic. For Mexico, any mention of a U.S. military intervention recalls records of past grievances such as the territorial loss of half of its territory in the nineteenth century, occupations, diplomatic pressures, and episodes of subordination. Therefore, even when bilateral cooperation is intense — and it is — the political margin to formalize or accept a foreign military presence on Mexican territory is virtually nonexistent. Analysts from the Mexican Council and CESPEM remind us and emphasize that the principle of non-intervention is not merely a doctrinal element of Mexican foreign policy, but a pillar of internal legitimacy. The real architecture of cooperation Despite media noise and the dramatization of the public debate, security cooperation between Mexico and the United States is broad, constant, and deeply integrated. For decades, both countries have collaborated in intelligence sharing, border control, judicial actions, the fight against money laundering, and operations against criminal networks, with mixed results. However, the format has recently changed: today, technical and discreet mechanisms are prioritized over large public plans. At the same time, intelligence sharing and operational cooperation are emphasized under clearly defined red lines regarding sovereignty. Even so, this architecture contains a central paradox. The more integrated the cooperation becomes, the more politically fragile it is, as it depends on trust between governments and on the ability of both to justify it before their increasingly polarized domestic audiences. This is why in Mexico, any perception of subordination can erode the government’s legitimacy; while in the United States, any sign of “softness” toward the cartels can turn into electoral ammunition. In January 2026, this dynamic became clearly evident with the transfer of 37 individuals linked to criminal organizations from Mexico to the United States, in a context in which more than 90 handovers had already been recorded in less than a year. Beyond its judicial impact, the gesture — although it had a clear political dimension, aimed at showing tangible “results” to reduce pressure from Washington and deactivate the temptation of unilateral actions — is fundamentally symbolic and masks a deeper dilemma for the Mexican government. From the Mexican perspective, the signal is ambivalent. On the one hand, it seeks to demonstrate that the state retains the capacity to act and can strike criminal structures without accepting foreign military tutelage. On the other hand, it implicitly acknowledges that the bilateral relationship operates under a regime of permanent evaluation, in which U.S. perceptions of Mexican effectiveness condition the level of political pressure and rhetoric. In other words, it is a form of conditional subordination. In the United States, by contrast, these gestures continue to be perceived as insufficient by influential political sectors. The reason is that the problem is measured through indicators that cannot be resolved through mass extraditions: the availability of synthetic drugs, overdose deaths, the industrial capacity of clandestine laboratories, territorial control of routes, or the flow of weapons to the south, among others. Given the influence of these sectors and the impact of the phenomenon on U.S. territory, the issue is often used as a domestic electoral weapon, frequently highlighting “visible” solutions — troops, drones, incursions — without considering their strategic costs. Drug trafficking, politics, and institutional corrosion Speaking about the involvement of drug trafficking in the Mexican state requires analytical precision. It is not a matter of a homogeneous capture of the “government” as a whole, but rather of a fragmented and layered phenomenon. What numerous reports and investigations have documented and repeatedly pointed out is a mosaic of local co-optations with consequences at the national and even international level: infiltrated municipal police forces, regional authorities pressured or bought off, clientelist networks financed with illicit resources, and, in high-impact cases, links to political actors that end up becoming sources of bilateral friction, among many other examples. At this stage of the relationship with the United States, the most explosive political issue is not only the existence of corruption, but the political use of that corruption as a lever of pressure. From Washington, it has been suggested that Mexico should go beyond operational arrests and target political figures with alleged ties to organized crime, even within the governing party — MORENA. However, for the Mexican administration, such a step would entail an extremely high internal cost and the risk of political destabilization, in addition to a potential contradiction of MORENA’s narrative legitimacy regarding its promises of honesty and transparency, which it has strongly defended since coming to power. Here lies one of the core dilemmas. When drug trafficking “invests” in politics, it does not seek only impunity; it seeks governance. Controlling strategic nodes — customs offices, ports, local prosecutors’ offices, police forces, mayoralties — makes it possible to manage violence in ways that are functional to the criminal business. In that context, cooperation with the United States becomes a double-edged sword. While it can contribute to dismantling criminal networks, it can also amplify the narrative of a “failed state,” either through the imposition of external agendas or through the exposure of institutional weaknesses. In turn, this perception, rooted in certain U.S. political sectors, often translates into the promotion of coercive responses or approaches. Figure 1: Mexico cartel map 2024. Source: Ioan Grillo. https://www.crashoutmedia.com/p/mexicos-cartel-map-2024 Military noise as diplomatic language Reports of recent, unusual, and amplified U.S. military activity related to Mexico —magnified by regional media and echoed within Mexico — have generated a climate of alarm that goes beyond the immediate plausibility of an intervention. In this environment, what matters is not whether an aircraft, a navigation notice, or a border deployment implies an imminent action, but rather the political message they convey, especially following U.S. military actions in the region and the simultaneous hardening of rhetoric against the cartels. In other words, the demonstration of capability — and the ambiguity surrounding intentions — is being used, or is functioning, as a way to force and extract concessions from Mexico: more cooperation, greater access to intelligence, more measurable results, and greater alignment. From this perspective, the pressure does not necessarily seek to cross the red line of intervention, but rather to come close enough to extract concessions. Consequently, the Mexican response has been repetitive and carefully calibrated: “cooperation yes, subordination no.” This framing, present in official statements and in analyses by national media, seeks to draw clear boundaries without breaking the relationship. It is a defensive — “negotiating” — strategy that acknowledges the asymmetry of power but attempts to contain it within institutional frameworks. The range of options and their strategic costs When people speak of an “invasion,” the term tends to polarize more than it explains. In the U.S. debate, however, this word is often more rhetorical than descriptive. In practice, the range of options circulating in the media is broad and, at times, dangerous, precisely because it is gradual: 1. Expansion of the presence of advisers and liaisons in command centers. This is what Mexico can accept with greater political ease if it remains under institutional control. 2. Joint operations with direct participation of U.S. forces (for example, accompaniment during raids). According to reports cited by the media, this is something the United States has sought and Mexico has consistently resisted. 3. “Surgical” unilateral actions (for example, drones or the deployment of special forces against laboratories or criminal leaders). This is militarily feasible but politically devastating. 4. Sustained intervention (what the public imagination calls an “invasion”). It is extremely costly and also difficult to justify legally and politically at present. Moreover, it would trigger a major bilateral crisis. From the above, the greatest strategic risk lies in the intermediate options. “Limited” incursions may appear efficient from Washington’s perspective, but in Mexico they would be interpreted as a direct violation of sovereignty, with effects ranging from nationalist cohesion to the rupture of bilateral cooperation and even incentives for criminal groups to present themselves as defenders of the territory. In such a scenario, a unilateral action by Washington could lead Mexico to restrict intelligence sharing, close operational channels, and turn the issue into a permanent dispute — precisely at a time when coordination is indispensable to strike at the logistical chains of drug trafficking. Sheinbaum’s position: sovereignty and calculated concessions President Claudia Sheinbaum has been clear in her repeated rejection of the entry of U.S. troops into Mexico. This stance appears time and again in reports and media coverage that emphasizes opposition to any intervention while supporting cooperation. Moreover, this position responds both to historical convictions and to calculations of internal stability. As previously mentioned, accepting a foreign military presence would entail a high political cost. At the same time, her government has sought to shield the bilateral relationship through visible actions: extraditions, seizures, port controls, and a discourse focused on results. Some media outlets, such as El País, report that Sheinbaum has defended these advances and insisted on “mutual respect and shared responsibility,” reminding that the United States must also address its domestic consumption and the trafficking of weapons from the United States. That last point — the trafficking of weapons — is crucial, as the U.S. firearms market fuels the firepower of cartels in Mexico. For Mexico, insisting on “shared responsibility” is not merely rhetoric or a moral argument; it is an attempt to rebalance the narrative and prevent the problem from being defined exclusively as an external threat originating in Mexico. Figure 2: Opioid-related and other drug poisoning deaths per 100,000 people in the USA. Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics via CDC Wonder Database. https://statehealthcompare.shadac.org/trend/197/opioidrelated-and-other-drug-poisoning-deaths-per-100000-people-by-drug-type#32/1/162,163,127,125,126,129,128/21,19,20,9,10,11,12,13,14,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,15,24,25,27,32,37,42,76/233 Figure 3: Illegal arms trafficking from US to Mexico The Trump factor and the U.S. political limit In discourse attributed to Trump and his inner circle, Mexico frequently appears as a space where the state is “dominated” by cartels and, therefore, where exceptional action would be justified. This framing appears both in press coverage and in political debate in the United States. However, even within the U.S., there are warnings about the “disaster” that bombing or intervening in Mexico would entail — not only because of the human impact, but also due to the geopolitical consequences of opening a conflict with a key trading partner and a neighbor with whom borders, migration, supply chains, and regional security are shared. Moreover, a military operation in Mexico is not comparable to an “overseas” action. Proximity means that any escalation would have immediate repercussions: border tensions, commercial disruption, migration waves, political radicalization in both countries, and incentives for criminal groups to respond with spectacular violence or low-intensity terrorism, precisely in an effort to break bilateral cooperation. Conclusion The United States and Mexico share a structural crisis — synthetic drugs, violence, weapons, migration — but they do not share the same narrative to explain it, nor the same tools to resolve it. Washington tends to frame it as an external threat requiring immediate action; Mexico, by contrast, tends to view it as an internal problem with a binational dimension that calls for cooperation without intervention. As long as these narratives remain unreconciled, the security relationship will continue to be tense, marked by cooperation and distrust at the same time. In 2026, the ghost of deploying troops to Mexico is not merely a military scenario: it is a negotiating tool, an identity symbol, and a test of political strength. The least costly path is not spectacular, but it is the only sustainable one: deep cooperation with clear limits, shared responsibility (drugs, weapons, money), institutional strengthening, and verifiable results that allow both governments to tell their societies they are acting without crossing lines that, once broken, could turn the border into a battlefield. It is also important to remember that drug trafficking is not a conventional army; it is an adaptive criminal economy. Striking one node can fragment and disperse violence. In Mexico, this dynamic has already been observed: the decapitation of leadership can generate succession wars and multiply victims, which is why strategy, risks, and strategic costs must be carefully considered. Ultimately, what is at stake is not only security, but legitimacy: who defines the problem, who imposes the solution, and who bears the political and human costs of carrying it out. Until that dispute is resolved, the bilateral relationship will remain a taut rope, stretched between mutual necessity and historical fear. Finally, an additional element that also weighs on the Mexico–United States relationship is the economic dimension, specifically the future of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). Its 2026 review has generated political and commercial uncertainty that intertwines with the security agenda, as U.S. pressure is not limited to drug trafficking but also extends to trade and regulatory compliance issues. This could affect Mexico’s economic stability and, consequently, its capacity to respond to the security crisis. The USMCA juncture comes precisely at a moment when bilateral relations — from trade to security cooperation — are under strain. Although a total rupture is unlikely due to deep regional interdependence, the agreement could remain in a limited or “zombie” state, with more frequent reviews and no significant renewals. In this context, defending agreements such as the USMCA becomes a strategic tool for Mexico, allowing it to balance sovereignty, cooperation, and pragmatism in the face of external pressure. References ABC7 Los Angeles. (20 de January de 2026). Crece inquietud en México ante movimientos militares de Estados Unidos. Obtenido de ABC7 Los Angeles: https://abc7.com/post/crece-inquietud-en-mexico-ante-movimientos-militares-de-estados-unidos/18433593/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Canchola Raygoza, D. L. (31 de Octubre de 2025). De AMLO a Sheinbaum: los desafíos que impone el fentanilo a la política exterior. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/sheinbaum-desafios-fentanilo-pol-ext?catid=9&Itemid=101 Carbajal, F. (16 de Enero de 2026). Desafíos actuales de la Seguridad Nacional en México. Obtenido de E Sol de México (OEM): https://oem.com.mx/elsoldemexico/analisis/desafios-actuales-de-la-seguridad-nacional-en-mexico-27693374?ref=consejomexicano.org Carreño Figueras, J. (13 de Enero de 2026). ¿Intervención? Posible, pero no probable II. Obtenido de El Heraldo de México: https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/13/intervencion-posible-pero-no-probable-ii-758570.html?ref=consejomexicano.org Carreño Figueras, J. (16 de Enero de 2026). EU-México: La presión como diplomacia. Obtenido de El Heraldo de México: https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/16/eu-mexico-la-presion-como-diplomacia-759598.html?ref=consejomexicano.org Carreño Figueras, J. (19 de Enero de 2026). EU-México: un momento preocupante. Obtenido de El Heraldo de México: https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/19/eu-mexico-un-momento-preocupante-760093.html?ref=consejomexicano.org Cázares Luquín, V. (12 de Diciembre de 2025). De la defensa a la acción: México y la reinterpretación del principio de no intervención. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/de-la-defensa-a-la-accion-principio-de-no-intervencion?catid=9&Itemid=101 Contreras, A. (21 de Enero de 2026). Avión militar de EUA llega a Toluca. ¿Cooperación o alerta? Obtenido de COMEXI: https://www.consejomexicano.org/avion-militar-de-eua-llega-a-toluca-cooperacion-o-alerta/ Corona, S. (24 de Enero de 2026). Sheinbaum marca límites ante amenazas de Trump sobre acciones contra el narco; "México negocia con EU, pero no se subordina". Obtenido de El Universal: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/sheinbaum-marca-limites-ante-amenazas-de-trump-sobre-acciones-contra-el-narco-mexico-negocia-con-eu-pero-no-se-subordina/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Díaz Santana, A. S. (23 de January de 2026). Intervención militar de EE. UU. en México: la duda ahora es cuándo y cómo se producirá. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/intervencion-militar-de-ee-uu-en-mexico-la-duda-ahora-es-cuando-y-como-se-producira-274088 Drusila Castro, L. (20 de Enero de 2026). México, ante las amenazas de Trump: “Donde pisa el ejército estadounidense no llega la paz”. Obtenido de El Salto: https://www.elsaltodiario.com/estados-unidos/donde-pisa-ejercito-estadounidense-no-llega-paz El Economista. (23 de Enero de 2026). Intervención militar de EU en México: La duda ahora es cuándo y cómo se producirá. Obtenido de yahoo! noticias: https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/intervenci%C3%B3n-militar-eu-m%C3%A9xico-duda-125025443.html Flores Delgado, I. (15 de Junio de 2025). Diplomacia en tiempos de incertidumbre: la política exterior de México frente a la imprevisibilidad del gobierno de Donald Trump. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/diplomacia-tiempos-incertidumbre-pol-ext-mx-imprevisibilidad-trump?catid=9&Itemid=101 France 24. (10 de Enero de 2026). México en la mira de Trump: demócratas alertan de un potencial "desastre" y Sheinbaum llama al diálogo. Obtenido de France 24: https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260110-m%C3%A9xico-en-la-mira-de-trump-dem%C3%B3cratas-alertan-un-potencial-desastre-y-sheinbaum-llama-al-di%C3%A1logo Garrido, V. M. (17 de Enero de 2026). Sheinbaum asegura que hay resultados concretos de seguridad ante la presión del Gobierno de Trump. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/mexico/2026-01-16/sheinbaum-asegura-que-hay-resultados-concretos-de-seguridad-ante-la-presion-del-gobierno-de-trump.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com Gil Olmo, J. (22 de Diciembre de 2025). Corrupción, el talón de Aquiles de Morena. Obtenido de Proceso: https://www.proceso.com.mx/opinion/2025/12/22/corrupcion-el-talon-de-aquiles-de-morena-365063.html Graham, T. (21 de January de 2026). Sheinbaum defends transfer of Mexican cartel members amid efforts to appease Trump. Obtenido de The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/21/sheinbaum-mexican-cartel-trump Gutiérrez Velázquez, M. F. (12 de Noviembre de 2025). Geopolítica global y la política exterior de México: entre dependencia y liderazgo regional. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/entre-dependencia-y-liderazgo-regional?catid=9&Itemid=101 Latinus_us. (26 de Enero de 2026). Mesa de Análisis con Loret: Dresser, Becerra, Silva-Herzog, Córdova y Aguilar Camín. Obtenido de YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tfd5MI3PbaM Macías Salgado, D. (17 de Diciembre de 2025). México entre Estados Unidos y América Latina: liderazgo regional en un sistema internacional complejo. Obtenido de CESPEM: https://www.cespem.mx/index.php/component/content/article/mx-liderazgo-regional-en-un-sistema-internacional-complejo?catid=9&Itemid=101 Madhani, A. (5 de May de 2025). Trump blasts Mexico’s Sheinbaum for rejecting offer to send US troops into Mexico to fight cartels. Obtenido de AP: https://apnews.com/article/trump-sheinbaum-mexico-drug-cartels-c2113e74cfc122f8f5a9e162644a470f Noticias DW. (12 de Enero de 2026). EE.UU. y México buscan mayor cooperación contra narcotráfico. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/eeuu-y-m%C3%A9xico-buscan-mayor-cooperaci%C3%B3n-contra-narcotr%C3%A1fico/a-75468890 Olivera Eslava, M. A. (23 de Agosto de 2023). México y Estados Unidos: un frente común contra el Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación. Obtenido de Centro Mexicano de Relaciones Internacionales: https://cemeri.org/art/a-mexico-estados-unidos-cjng-it Pardo, D. (15 de Enero de 2026). "México es el más fuerte y el más débil ante Trump": la encrucijada de Claudia Sheinbaum tras la intervención de EE.UU. en Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/ce3enj4j8g5o Soriano, R. (21 de Enero de 2026). Trump usa las amenazas a México en seguridad para alardear de su poder ante su electorado. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/mexico/2026-01-21/trump-usa-las-amenazas-a-mexico-en-seguridad-para-alardear-de-su-poder-ante-su-electorado.html The New York Times. (15 de January de 2026). The U.S. Is Pressing Mexico to Allow U.S. Forces to Fight Cartels. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/15/world/americas/us-mexico-cartels.html Treader, V. (12 de Enero de 2026). Intervención en México: "Donald Trump está dispuesto a todo". Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/intervenci%C3%B3n-en-m%C3%A9xico-donald-trump-est%C3%A1-dispuesto-a-todo/a-75481087 Wagner, J. (20 de Enero de 2026). México responde a la presión de Trump y envía a 37 delincuentes a EE. UU. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2026/01/20/espanol/america-latina/mexico-envio-37-narco-trump.html

Good afternoon everyone, and thank you again for being here. I am very pleased to have hosted Chancellor Merz and his Ministers in Rome today for this intergovernmental summit between Italy and Germany – the second in just over two years, following the one we held in Berlin in November 2023. Among other things, this summit kicks off a particularly significant year for the bilateral relationship between our nations, with 2026 marking the 75th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin. This summit is also clearly being held at a particularly complex moment in time, which is forcing Europe to choose whether it intends to play a leading role in its own destiny, or have its destiny dictated to it. In our view, this phase requires clarity of mind, responsibility, courage and, above all, the intelligence required to transform crises into opportunities. I am personally convinced that, at this turning point in history, Italy and Germany have a special responsibility, by virtue of their history, influence and leadership. We are two great European nations, founders of the European Union and leading players in international dynamics. We are Europe’s two main manufacturing powers, with strongly interconnected production and industrial systems that are complementary in many ways. However, above all, we both share a common vision on some of the most strategic issues, and are in fact pursuing the same underlying goal: to build an authoritative Europe that is aware of its role in the world and is able to be competitive on the global stage, a Europe capable of strengthening its strategic autonomy with pragmatism, concreteness and common sense. Two years ago, in Berlin, we signed an Action Plan whose objective was to take our bilateral cooperation to a higher level and explore new areas for common growth. That is precisely what we have done over these years and months, as can be seen in the many examples of collaboration we have developed. I am thinking of the agreement on the security of gas supplies; the joint venture between Leonardo and Rheinmetall; the agreement for the integration of ITA Airways into the Lufthansa Group; and I could name many others. With today’s summit, we have decided to continue along this path and keep investing with conviction in our strengthened cooperation by setting ourselves even more ambitious goals. I believe I can now say that Italy and Germany are closer than ever, and I think this is good news, not only for our peoples, but also for Europe as a whole. For if two important nations are friends, allies, and solid from both an economic and an industrial point of view – as Italy and Germany are – and they decide to move in the same direction, with each contributing their own added value, then the conditions are in place to achieve excellent and significant results for our businesses, our workers, our citizens, and their families. Today, we have decided to strengthen our cooperation - cooperation in the truest sense of the word. As I have said before on several occasions: the etymology of words gives us back a picture and the underlying meaning of what we say. ‘Cooperation’ comes from the Latin ‘co-operari’, meaning ‘to work with’. Cooperation never involves an active and a passive role, someone who buys and someone who sells, for example. When there is true cooperation, something new is always born, with each party contributing their own added value. That is precisely what we are doing, and what we have done on this important day by adopting three very significant documents, in addition to the agreements you saw signed and exchanged earlier. The first is a cooperation protocol to expand our areas of collaboration, which updates the bilateral Action Plan we signed in 2023. I am thinking of agriculture, our plans to further strengthen our already solid industrial cooperation, cultural dialogue, and cooperation in the management of migration flows. Migration is one of the crucial challenges for our continent, on which there is full alignment with the German Chancellor. We both think the main challenge lies in defending the European Union’s external borders, fighting human trafficking, and working to ensure respect for legality in strengthening the return system, as well as in cooperating with the nations of origin and of transit, which Italy in particular (but not only Italy) is trying to develop through a new model of cooperation with the African continent. Clearly, our goal is to consolidate the change of approach which, thanks also to our governments, has taken hold and is becoming increasingly well established in Europe. Over the last years, this new approach has enabled us to guarantee a significant reduction in the number of irregular entries, illegal departures and landings. Italy also intends to pursue this commitment through innovative solutions, starting with the protocol with Albania we have been promoting. I want to tell Chancellor Merz that I am grateful for his decision to regularly participate in the informal working group of like-minded countries, which meets in the margins of European Council meetings to discuss precisely the issue of migration. The other very important matter on which Chancellor Merz and I agree is the need for a decisive step change in Europe regarding the competitiveness of our companies. It is now evident and clear to anyone with intellectual honesty that a certain ideological view of the green transition has ended up bringing our industries to their knees, giving Europe new and dangerous strategic dependencies, and without even managing to have a real impact in terms of protecting the environment and nature globally. We are convinced there is room to correct these mistakes and avoid our continent’s industrial decline, but, of course, courage is required. We want to accelerate on these issues, which is why we will be presenting our joint non-paper at the next informal meeting in Brussels on 12 February, where discussions will begin regarding the next European Council meeting in March - of particular importance precisely for matters regarding competitiveness. This joint non-paper is focused on a number of priorities which, in our view, cannot be postponed: simplifying and cutting EU red tape; strengthening the single market; relaunching the automotive industry based on technological neutrality; ensuring an ambitious trade policy based on shared rules and a level playing field. This is the second document we signed today, and it is a document which I consider to be very significant and which we intend to share with the European Commission and the President of the European Council as well as with all the other leaders who will be participating in these discussions. The third document we signed this morning on defence, security and resilience is equally as important. These are sectors in which Italy and Germany can count on industrial players of absolute excellence, which generate incredibly high added value. We want to strengthen our cooperation in this area, and we believe our production systems can make a significant contribution to building a solid European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, which for many years we have been calling for without ever really making any progress, and to act accordingly. To this end, I have informed Chancellor Merz of Italy’s decision to join the multilateral agreement on arms exports, which is already in place between Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. This is the reason why we held an important 2+2 meeting this morning between our Foreign and Defence Ministers, in order to coordinate our positions and also work even more closely together on the main international issues, starting with Ukraine and the Middle East. We have always been strongly aligned on both of these fronts too, and we will continue to do our part to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and to build a stable framework for security and prosperity in the Middle East. This morning, we also discussed how to enhance our cooperation in many other areas. I am thinking of energy interconnections and economic and infrastructure interconnections, which are increasingly crucial in this era. We are working together to support strategic initiatives that are in line with this goal, for example: the SoutH2 Corridor; Medlink; Elmed; and the IMEC, which is the corridor that will connect India, the Middle East and Europe, and in relation to which Italy and Germany are playing a key role in Europe. The work we have done, and have still yet to do, is very extensive. Today, Italy and Germany are not only confirming their partnership but are also deciding to strengthen it at all levels, by working side by side on challenges that are crucial for our time. I’ve read a number of comments over the last few hours, with some observers saying that 2026 will be “the year of Italy and Germany”. I can’t say whether this prediction corresponds to reality, but what I can say is that we intend to give it our all; we absolutely intend to do our part in order to consolidate a friendship that is strategic not only for our nations, but for Europe as a whole. Thank you again.

Will the US-Iran ‘peace talks succeed or fail? Given the mix of personalities and national interests involved, we just don’t know. Success would likely be a short-term, mutually face-saving compromise, leaving many major bilateral and regional issues still to be resolved. Failure is likely to lead to a US-initiated war with chaotic outcomes and perhaps no real winners. What does President Donald Trump want? In the short term, he wants a “peace deal” comprising multiple components. While not all details are public, the first and foremost goal is nuclear. Iran must not have the capability to make a nuclear weapon. While some reports suggest the US demands that Iran close down its whole nuclear program, most reporting claims US demands are limited to Iran ceasing the production of and giving up all enriched uranium beyond that needed for its domestic nuclear energy needs. US demands also include Iranian agreement to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to verify they comply with this commitment. Other demands include limiting the range of all ballistic missiles to some 500 km (compared to some 2000 km at present), the cessation of all hostilities toward both regional countries, and support for other nations or proxies engaged in such hostilities. These terms would put all of Israel out of range and discourage further attacks from Iran on Israel, despite the term “hostilities” being left vague. It is difficult to see Iran agreeing to the former. A deal on the latter might be possible. One formula could be through recognizing Israel’s right to exit (as does the Palestine Authority - PA) and ceasing hostilities and support to proxies in the context of progress towards a two-state solution. Trump’s aim is ‘maximum pressure’, precipitating ‘regime change’— that is, the end of Iran’s conservative mullah-led autocracy and its military guardians, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This is a longer-term goal, but one he would pursue opportunistically in the short term if circumstances permit, such as in the event of an outbreak of war. Denials and Tricky Negotiations Iran has always denied its intention to develop nuclear weapons; most recently, this week, by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi. The international community generally believes Iran knows how to make a nuclear weapon and would do so if it could; however, Iran won’t because it could not hide the process, and external intervention in response could be horrendous. Therefore, Iran is willing to negotiate the nuclear issue. It did so before, as part of negotiations between Iran and the US, resulting in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 during the presidency of Barack Obama. The difference between Obama and Trump is that Obama understood the subtleties of negotiating with Iran, i.e. build trust through the JCPOA before moving on to missiles and issues of regional hostilities. Trump 1.0 trashed the JCPOA in 2018, remarking it was “the worst deal in history.” Although Iran continued to comply with its conditions for a further 12 months. President Joe Biden dropped the ball on this issue, and Trump 2.0, upon re-election, continued where he left off in 2021. The Iranians are certainly not easy to negotiate with. Relevant “subtilties” include being a proud, fiercely independent, well-educated people who seek to own/control their own resources (e.g., oil) and, to the extent possible, be self-sufficient. They do not like being bullied, and trust is a key part of relationships. They claim Trump has consistently bullied them with his threats and actions, and all trust has long gone, dating back to Trump 1.0. Iranian officials have argued privately that the policies and actions of both Trump 1.0 and Biden, including the heavy economic sanctions, forced Iran into the “axis of evil” for basic survival reasons. They claim they want their independence, and have no particular affinity for the Russians, Chinese and North Koreans. One conclusion from that any negotiations with the US will occur in an atmosphere of tension and distrust. So, who does Iran trust? Violence on the Streets of Tehran: Regime Change and Civil Unrest On the issue of regime change, US (and Israeli) exploitation of last month’s widespread demonstrations throughout Iran was both an opportunity and a challenge. But the regime survived. There are four basic criteria for the successful change of any regime: leadership, the reason for change, the will of the majority of the people, and the support of a significant element of the armed forces and security forces to facilitate and sustain change Discontent with the Iranian government has been evident among different groups in the country for some time. Mostly, this has been political, but this time the driver was economic, driven principally by the hard squeeze of external sanctions, coupled with mismanagement and corruption. The outreach of hardship and dissent was much broader than before. And despite targeted input from outside Iran, the regime did not topple. Demonstrators were strongly suppressed by the government, and Trump’s threat to help demonstrators did not eventuate. Would his military intervention have been the tipping point? We can only guess. But here was no apparent split within the armed or security forces – given their deep involvement in the economy, there were strong self-interest motives not to – and no leadership figure, civilian or military, emerged. Attempts to promote Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, who was deposed in 1979, as a rallying figure, if only temporarily, failed. I doubt he has much appeal in-country due to the heavy suppression and corruption of his father. But the message was loud: there is disaffection, political and especially economic, which could ignite if the fuse is right. What to Expect Will Trump be tempted to use military force to try to facilitate regime change if he doesn’t get his way at the next round of nuclear negotiations, now due to be held in Oman late this week? He has the fleet in place, and comprehensive planning will be well underway, building on lessons learned from the Israeli-US 12-day war last June and recently in Venezuela. The planning focuses on key kinetic and non-kinetic targets, especially those requiring a preemptive strike. Israel will be part of this, with its own targets, which presumably will include key leadership, military and other persons. Iran will have done its planning also around its own lessons learned. Iranian early warning of an attack, even if measured in only minutes, will be critical in determining how quickly events unfold within and outside Iran, and how devastating they are. However, if this does force regime change, who will take over? Without the mullahs and lacking any civilian opposition infrastructure, the military (minus the IRGC?) would have to be the backbone of any new government. Civilian leadership is an unknown, though talented politicians and technocrats exist. Iran could become very fragmented and unstable as it sorts itself out. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.