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Introduction Hegemony is the core principle in International Relations. It has been conceptualized through military strength, economic influence, and ideological control. The theory of cultural hegemony by Antonio Gramsci is based on assuming control but not necessarily through force, whereas realist theorists such as John Mearsheimer stress the relevance of military strength for ensuring global dominance (Mearsheimer 2001). The 21st century, though, brought into being a different era of transformation and technological breakthroughs that turned the existing arrangements on their head. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber war, and space technology, great powers are transforming from traditional soldiers to cyberspace warriors. AI and other cyber tools are altering the strategic equation between major powers, providing avenues for countries like China and Russia to undermine US hegemony (Rooney et al. 2022). Hegemony in the past had been founded on military superiority, but at present, academics have discovered that technological hegemony is leading the way. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) and AI have captivated researchers because they can transform war. Cyberspace has become the new battleground of power. The US and China are competing for cyber hegemony (Akdaǧ 2025). Space is increasingly regarded as a new battleground in geopolitics. The US Space Force and China’s BeiDou system illustrate how nations weave surveillance and communication in their strategic decision-making (O’Hanlon 2020). Thus, new technologies are reshaping the China-US rivalry. To counter this, countries are investing in tech-based industries, which will change the way human thinks. The analysis will explore whether emerging technologies can efficiently replace traditional tools of hegemony or not. Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power provides a critical framework in this modern era, where influence may flow from military boots to silicon chips. Global powers are moving towards influence and deterrence-based tech models, supplementing hard power. However, this transition has its risks, such as overdependence and ethical concerns. The paper argues that a complete transformation is not happening, but there will be dual-track hegemony where military and technology will coordinate to dominate. Policy implications of this shift are profound. Global powers must collaborate to draft international norms for AI and cyberwarfare, developing nations must develop their technology rather than dependency on global powers, as it will be easier for them to surveil and dominate, and international institutions must proactively govern the techno-political landscape to prevent destabilization. This study will use a qualitative approach, and it will be a case-based methodology combining theoretical perspectives of philosophers. This analysis is important as it delves into the transformation of the mechanics of global power from military hegemony to technology-oriented hegemony. It uses secondary sources like policy briefs, think tank reports, books, etc. Finally, this analysis concludes that soldiers may never be the first line of every fight, but the battle for global supremacy is firmly human-hinged in decisions on technology, ethics, and governance. Hegemony is a core concept in International Relations, grounded in military capacity, economic influence, and institutional influence. Historically, great civilizations like the Roman and British empires attained hegemony by dominating in naval power, making alliances and expanding their territories. In the post-World War II era, the US built dominance through overseas military bases and nuclear deterrence. Historical Foundations of Traditional Hegemony The Roman Empire, a classic example of past hegemony, attained this power by constructing roads, forts, and legions in the world's islands. Later, the British Empire sustained its dominance by modernizing the Royal Navy and the global trade network. The post-World War II era saw the hegemony of the United States with overseas military bases and security alliances. John Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, says that according to great powers, hegemony is the best way to ensure their security (Mearsheimer 2001). Limitations of Traditional Hegemony The primary limitation of the traditional hegemonic model is the risk of overreach, entering into too many overseas agreements that become economically and politically unsustainable. Imperial overstretch, a model proposed by Paul Kennedy, explains the collapse of empires when they are unable to maintain their economy due to huge global aims (Kennedy 1988). Concurrently, we can see that after so many years have passed in the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, the US is spending trillions. Approximately $3.68 trillion was spent on Iraq and Afghanistan (Costs of War | Brown University 2025). This highlights that military dominance can be costly and unsustainable. Mearsheimer, in an interview at the New York Times, claimed that ‘the United States is responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis’. Lack of legitimacy and local resistance is another great flaw in the traditional hegemonic pattern. For example, in Vietnam, soldiers used their knowledge of geography to push back against America's advanced weapons. Similarly, in Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign-led missions struggled with local insurgents. The New Tools of Technological Hegemony Cyber Power Cyber power has rapidly become a strategic field where states project their influence far beyond the geographic borders, often without soldiers. Cyber operations are dominating in this digital age, and the SolarWinds hack shows how states can achieve global influence through an Information Technology (IT) infrastructure breach. In March 2020, Russian hackers placed a secret backdoor in SolarWinds’ Orion software. This infected around 18000 users, including US major government departments (Cybersecurity 2021). The cyberattacks went undetected for several months, revealing vulnerabilities in the digital network. It was the worst cyber-espionage attack ever, an analyst described. Iran's 2019 cyberattack on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia shows that the acquisition of digital superiority can help influence norms, command the critical infrastructure, and set global political narratives without foreign boots on the ground. To address this vulnerability, it is essential to know cyber deterrence theory. It discusses capability, attribution, and resolution. States should advance digital tools, modify their tracking system and enhance communication and transparency. The most lethal weapon today may not fire a projectile-it fires packets. This metaphor illustrates that state actors can erode adversary national infrastructure, banks and election systems without traditional warfare. The US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III described the integrated Deterrence that integrates cyber with land, sea, and space under a unified strategy (Masitoh, Perwita, and Rudy 2025). Cybersecurity experts say that cyberpower is now a geopolitical power. And cyber warfare is not a sideshow; it’s a frontline strategy. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data AI’s strategic significance for national security has been emphasized by leaders like Jason Matheny, CEO of RAND Corporation. He warns that AI could make it easier to make harmful weapons and dangerous technologies (Matheny 2024). The 2023 report of RAND on AI and Geopolitics argues that AI may be the next frontier in US-China rivalry (Pavel et al. 2023). ChatGPT and Bard, like generative AI models, have humanitarian strategic applications, which makes fake news so believable that it feels like fact. This capability of AI can transform propaganda into scalable digital warfare. Beyond surveillance, AI has transformed military operations tactics. Military applications like drone swarming, algorithmic targeting, and predictive ISR create scenarios where the frontline shifts from kinetic zones to data centers. AI diplomacy is becoming the new foreign aid. Financial Times article notes that tech giants are deploying AI mechanisms in Africa not only for development but for their advantage as an influence tool. Thus, AI and big data are a new form of informational hegemony. Space Militarization and Satellite Dominance Space militarization emerged during the Cold War. States like the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan have developed anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (Samson and Cesari 2025). General John Jay Raymond at the US Space Command Launch said that, “Outer space is now recognized as a domain of military operations” (Raymond 2021). China’s 2007 ASAT test, which destroyed its own Fengyun-1C weather satellite, is still a thorn in the eyes of major powers. Russia has also launched missions like Kosmos-2553. Evolution from GPS to GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) reflects strategic change. The US has GPS, China has BeiDou, Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite constellation, and Europe has Galileo; each system highlights the sovereignty in digital positioning. China’s counterpart doctrine states in its 2021 Space White Paper that space-based assets are not crucial for renaissance only but for strategic deterrence without deploying soldiers or causing deaths of your military men (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2022). Undersea Cables and Digital Infrastructure Control Undersea cables carry over 95% of global data transmission (Sherman 2021). Disruption or surveillance of these cables can impact the worldwide flow of data and diplomatic communications. In developing countries like Pakistan, Kenya, and Ecuador, Huawei-funded infrastructure provides smart city services. Cable route is not just wiring undersea, it is influenced by encryption. The US and EU have Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, like surveillance platforms. Cable-Landing zones (CLZs) are the chokepoints used for manipulation, Cloud interconnection policies allow control of traffic flow, and Surveillance software and firmware installed at data centers can be remotely controlled, bypassing local safeguards. Blocking connections can slow or disrupt foreign economic leverage. Digital infrastructure has become a domain for hegemony that is more insidious in strategic potential. This map exposes the physical foundations of digital power. Nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control. Disruption or surveillance of these cables can cripple economies or governance. Regional chokepoints also reflect strategic leverage in geo-economics and cyber diplomacy, making this infrastructure as consequential as traditional military bases. Figure 1: This map shows the physical foundations of digital power, nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control.Superpowers’ Technological Footprint United States Silicon Valley is the heart of US technological hegemony, and some other government agencies, like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are contributing to maintaining US technological hegemony. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs), drones, and defense-grade AI-powered decision-support systems are a tech-military hybrid force. Furthermore, the US controls major pillars of technology like operating systems (Microsoft, Apple, Google dominate desktops and mobile devices), and Satellites. Advanced technologies have enabled remote force projection like drone strikes, executing surgical operations, Cyber Command operations from SolarWinds retaliation, deployment of Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA), enhancing deterrence. China Made in China 2025 vision aims to displace US techno-hegemony. China’s centralized Social Credit System reflects a template of techno-surveillance hegemony. Beijing is now selling surveillance systems to developing countries, highlighting its tech supremacy. China is controlling telecommunications architecture by promoting Huawei’s 5G worldwide. China’s cyber army, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), specializes in offensive and defensive cybertech warfare (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019). China’s Digital Silk Road links infrastructure investments in Asia and Africa with national encryption systems and cloud data centers. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in a bilateral dialogue, said that ‘our fiber networks and data exchanges are now integrated with Beijing’s national infrastructure policy’. Thus, acquiring such a position in technology will prove China’s hegemony and can make it a superpower, making the world again a bipolar one. China’s strategic doctrine focuses on autonomous systems and digital authoritarian export over occupancy and geopolitical projection, respectively. Russia Russia’s global strategy remains rooted in a hybrid doctrine that combines cyber tools, space capabilities and disinformation operations. The Gerasimov Doctrine, Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, emphasizes the blend of political, cyber, and economic tools to achieve strategic goals without casualties. The Ukraine conflict is a great example of cyber dominance. Russia has cyber units such as APT28 (Fancy Bears), Satellite Spoofing and Jamming, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which have executed targeted hacks against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), disrupted Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, and led disinformation campaigns. Russia’s power formula centers on dense cyber capacity, economic coercion, and unpredictability (making deterrence harder). Risks and Criticism of Tech-Based Hegemony Technology provides tools for security and influence, but overdependence causes strategic vulnerability, which leads to ethical dilemmas and raises questions about digital sovereignty. Overdependence and System Vulnerability A fundamental flaw of technological hegemony is its fragility. Systems are dependent on infrastructure (cloud servers, AI control nodes, etc.). The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) says that lethal autonomous weapons are the cause of escalation in conflicts (CCW 2022). Take the SolarWinds breach of 2020, in which an update exposed thousands of sensitive pieces of information. Ethical Concerns China, Ethiopia, and some other states have AI-powered surveillance regimes. China exports networked camera systems and facial recognition tools to states that use them to suppress dissent. A senior researcher at Amnesty noted that, ‘delegating life and death decisions to software is ethically unjustifiable’. Global South Dependency and Digital Colonialism Due to technological influence, digital dependency has increased in the Global South. Digital dependency without regulatory safeguards leads to digital colonialism. Countries lacking advanced technology are reliant on digital ecosystems developed by superpowers. It is said by Dr Ruha Benjamin that ‘when code becomes law, and pipelines become policy enforcers, sovereignty is outsourced’. Hegemony Without Consent Soldiers are a visible force, but technology imposes itself quietly via platforms, which results in domination without democracy. Tech-enabled coercion doesn’t need tanks; it needs standards embedded in devices, laws baked into algorithms. This contradicts liberal norms of International Relations (IR), where hegemony should rest on consent for international legitimacy (Sakumar, Broeders, and Kello 2024). Future Power Projections: Domain-wise Breakdown There are five interconnected domains of future power projections: land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Land Domain In traditional combat, troops were used to counter enemy force, but now in the third digital era, surveillance grids, AI-powered motion detection systems, and autonomous land robots are replacing soldiers. The Israeli military is testing unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which they have named Jaguar, to patrol borders, and this will reduce human casualties. The diagram illustrates the interaction or the coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS), and the target within a given environment. At first, the operator gives a high-level command which activates the controller, and the system provides feedback to the operator, such as mission success or failure. The controller is the brain of this system. It monitors the environment, processes data and controls the weapons. It operates in loops, evaluating the environment and updating the decision. Once the target is detected autonomously, the gun acts, which includes missile launch or gunfire. This entire process takes place in a dynamic environment. Figure 2: The coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS) Air Domain Traditional manned fighter jets were dominating in aerial combat. Now, aerial dominance is shifted towards hypersonic weapons and AI-enabled drone swarms. Russia’s Zircon and China’s DF-ZF are hypersonic missiles that can travel at Mach 5+ speeds. AI drone swarms are rendering conventional missile defense systems obsolete. The US Air Force’s “Golden Horde” project and China’s GJ-11 stealth drone exemplifies this shift. Sea Domain Sea powers used to refer to blue-water navies and submarine fleets. They remain the core of maritime protection, but unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are quickly supplanting aircraft carriers. UUVs are being used to surveil for months on their own, and they will not be detected. Subsea data cables, which transport 95% of internet traffic, are a strategic resource; such cables are undersea digital arteries. Securing the sea in the 21st century means controlling what is beneath it. The diagram illustrates major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). It is an important element in current naval battles and marine monitoring. The GPS/RF module is situated at the top of the AUV, through which the vehicle can position itself beneath the water. The propeller motor is the mobility unit of an AUV, driven by lithium-ion batteries. It provides thrust and directional movements. An electronic aid container serves as a housing store; it includes an onboard computer, a mission processor, a power distribution unit, and communication interfaces. AUVs have sensors which detect how deep the AUV is in the water column by measuring hydrostatic pressure. Acoustic Doppler Current Profile (ADCP), is a sonar device that uses Doppler shift in acoustic signals to measure the speed of water currents. An AUV manage its vertical position with a buoyancy tank. AUVs use an inertial navigation system; they determine the position of the AUV based on prior data. AUVs also contain forward-looking (Sound Navigation and Ranging) SONARs and Altimeters that scan and detect any obstacles in front of them and maintain a safe height from the seabed, respectively. Transducers are the mouth and ears of AUVs; they transmit and receive acoustic signals. They are crucial for clandestine communication and sensing of the environment. These AUVs are extremely crucial in contested sea areas such as the South China Sea or the Arctic. Therefore, AUVs are revolutionizing maritime operations by enlarging surveillance, exploration, and undersea warfighting capabilities. As technology evolves, AUVs will define the future of naval strategy and oceanographic study. Figure 3: Major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). Cyber Domain Cyberspace has no borders. Global powers like the US, China and Russia have developed cyber command units to disrupt the power grids of the opposite side. Russia’s cyber interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, China’s alleged breach of U.S. personnel databases (OPM hack), and the Stuxnet worm targeting Iran’s nuclear program exemplify how software has become a strategic weapon. According to NATO’s 2025 Cyber Doctrine, ‘A cyberattack triggering Article 5 [mutual defense] is not just theoretical—it’s a matter of time.’ Space Domain Traditionally, space power was limited to spy satellites, but now anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), Starlink and military satellite systems have transformed into a combat zone. The US created its Space Force in 2019 to dominate in space militarization. In the Ukraine war, SpaceX’s Starlink became crucial for Ukrainian battlefield communication, prompting Elon Musk to limit military use to avoid escalation. Table 1 (figure 4): Old model versus new model comparison in each domain of future power projection. Done by the author. Domain Old Model New Model Land Troop deployment - Armored divisions - Occupation warfare AI-enabled surveillance grids - Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) - Real-time satellite + sensor networks Air Fighter jets - Airbases - Strategic bombers Hypersonic missiles (e.g., DF-ZF, Zircon) - Drone swarms with AI autonomy - Human-out-of-loop air dominance Sea Naval fleets - Aircraft carriers Submarines Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (ORCA UUV) - Seafloor cable warfare - Autonomous maritime surveillance Cyber (No traditional equivalent) State-sponsored hacking - Data theft & disinformation ops - Cyber jamming, spoofing in kinetic war Space Reconnaissance satellites Missile early-warning systems ASAT weapons (China, Russia tests) - Satellite internet constellations (Starlink) - Real-time warfighting integration (JADC2) Can Technology Fully Replace Military Power? The emergence of advanced technologies like AI, autonomous weapons and space militarization has sparked the debate about whether technology can replace military power, wholly or not? Strategic autonomy, in which a nation’s ability to defend its interests independently requires both technology and military. Technology acts as a critical enabler but not a substitute. AI can analyze satellite data in seconds, but only trained personnel can conduct peacekeeping missions in fragile regions. Modern warfare is shifting towards grey zone conflicts that fall below the threshold of open combat. Russian operations in Crimea in 2014 blended cyberattacks and physical deployments of troops, due to which the line between technology and military became blurry. This incident shows that technology without boots is of no advantage. In addition, technology needs regular upgrades and educated users, and excessive reliance upon these systems may cause interruptions such as electronic warfare (EW) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. In a time of humanitarian crisis, disaster response, and counterinsurgency, forces are indispensable. To defeat an enemy or to dominate, one must employ both technology and an educated military. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have altered the character of air war. Great powers are investing heavily in military AI and quantum communication to improve battlefield awareness, minimize human loss of life, and enhance decision-making, but note that international decisions do not depend on a machine. They don't aim to replace the military, but they want to develop their technology. Thus, the emerging model of global power is not soldiering versus technology, but it is soldiers plus technology. It is known as dual-track hegemony, and a nation that acquires it will dominate shortly. A tech-savvy soldier, supported by AI and robotics, is the face of tomorrow’s war. Conclusion The United States, China and the EU are global powers of the modern era. These states possess the technological capital and military infrastructure that shape the regulation of engagement in cyberspace and AI. Firstly, they must strengthen international norms for cyber operations and AI governance. UNGGE has made some progress relevant to this, but this needs a broader enforcement mechanism like the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, global powers must invest in ethical and auditable technology. As AI is dangerous due to biased surveillance systems, facial recognition abuses, and it is also used in predicting policies, which is a major ethical concern. Algorithmic transparency, data protection, and privacy rights must be enforced as soon as possible. Lastly, multilateralism must extend to outer space. As space is becoming a battlefield, complicating geopolitical rivalry, to counter it, multilateralism must be encouraged. For developing countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria, the emergence of technological hegemony is both a threat and an opportunity. These countries should enforce digital sovereignty policies. These nations should avoid digital dependency, as it will be easier for global powers to surveil and dominate. Emerging powers should build defensive cyber infrastructure instead of offensive. They should build secure networks and legal protection against espionage on their own. Defensive strategy will serve as a strategic safeguard and can be used as a pawn in great power rivalries. Emerging powers should pursue a multilateral coalition among Muslim majority states to enhance their connectivity and ties. South-south cooperation must be promoted. The UN, G20 and other international bodies must move towards digital governance mechanisms instead of vague declarations. UN should form a Global Charter on Tech Governance, similar to a Digital Magna Carta. The charter should have ethical limits on the establishment and use of Artificial Intelligence and Lethal Autonomous Weapons. They should increase their coordination with the G20 to amplify these efforts. G20 should create a Tech and Ethics working Group, which can bridge the trust gap between Developed and developing countries in the digital arena. Global order continues to evolve in the 21st century, and the foundations of power projection are rewritten. There is a paradigm shift from boots to bots. This research demonstrates that while technology has transformed, it cannot entirely replace traditional modes of combat. Technology can only help the military to dominate in a region or conflict, but cannot fully replace it. There will be dual track hegemony, and the one who will acquire this hegemony will control world islands, and controlling world islands means ruling the world. However, this transformation comes with serious risks like AI miscalculations, vulnerabilities of digital infrastructure and ethical concerns. But we should keep in mind that military power is no longer sufficient, nor is technology alone a guarantee of dominance, in post-silo, where military, technological, and normative tools must function together to sustain leadership.ReferencesAkdaǧ, Yavuz. 2025. “Great Power Cyberpolitics and Global Cyberhegemony.” Perspectives on Politics. doi:10.1017/S1537592725000040.CCW. 2022. “Document Viewer.” : 16. https://docs.un.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/2021/3 (October 18, 2025).“Costs of War | Brown University.” https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/ (October 18, 2025).Cybersecurity, Centre for. 2021. 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After ending two decades of MAS hegemony, Rodrigo Paz assumes the presidency of Bolivia with the legitimacy of change, but faces the enormous challenge of governing without a solid party structure.   The center-left candidate from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Rodrigo Paz, secured victory with 54% of the votes, gaining nearly ten points over his rival, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga. This triumph not only puts an end to two decades of dominance by the Movement for Socialism (MAS), led by Evo Morales, but also grants strong legitimacy to the new administration. However, the political challenges facing the government of Paz, set to take office on November 9, are substantial.   The first major test for Paz will be consolidating his power base in the legislature. The main weakness lies in the fact that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) functioned as a “rented womb”—an instrumental vehicle lacking social or national roots to support the candidacy. Although Paz managed to attract votes from the MAS “hard core” in several regions, he did not inherit his predecessor’s party structure or mobilization capacity. This fragility within the party gives rise to two points of friction.   Within the PDC’s parliamentary bloc, multiple factions could emerge, each seeking its share of power. The tensions already visible between Paz and his running mate, Edman Lara, during the campaign could deepen, complicating executive governance and the management of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP).   At the same time, Paz will need to build consensus with other parties. Although he enjoys the explicit support of Samuel Doria Medina’s Unidad party—formalized during the runoff—the relationship with Quiroga’s party, LIBRE, is more strained. Despite sharing ideological affinities (market economy, openness to the world, respect for institutions), the aftermath of the aggressive campaign will make an alliance difficult. A simple majority in the ALP is secured through the PDC–Unidad alliance, but deeper reforms—such as a potential constitutional change—will require rapprochement and negotiation with LIBRE, which holds the key to the two-thirds majority.   A second crucial challenge will be the relationship with powerful and decisive social movements. While the support of these organizations for the PDC ticket was a determining factor in its victory, it does not guarantee unconditional loyalty. With a strong history of political empowerment, these groups will seek to safeguard their privileges and, if they feel sidelined, could resort to mobilizations that threaten social stability. Their backing will be essential to legitimize any economic or social adjustment. How the new government manages tensions with these sectors—and how it handles the legacy of “Masismo”—will be vital to maintaining national stability. In many ways, these are anti-system forces capable of obstructing Paz’s government.   The new administration’s ability to pursue any economic or social policy depends on overcoming these two political challenges: securing a legislature aligned with the executive and establishing effective coordination with social movements.   Once these political hurdles are addressed, the next major challenge will be economic. Paz inherits a country in crisis, facing a shortage of U.S. dollars, inflation, and dwindling international reserves. The removal of fuel subsidies—a crucial step for fiscal sustainability—could trigger serious social unrest. The precedent of 2010, when Evo Morales was forced to reverse a similar measure under pressure from social movements, underscores the delicacy of the situation.   October 19 not only marked the end of a political era but also opened a crucial question: Is Bolivia heading toward genuine transformation—or merely a continuation of the MAS model by other means?   The answer to this question will determine the country’s direction in the coming years. If Rodrigo Paz’s new government chooses the path of genuine transformation, it will be essential to undertake structural reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions. These reforms would include reducing presidentialism and establishing a justice system free from political influence.   If, on the other hand, the Paz administration focuses solely on addressing the most pressing economic issues—such as inflation and fuel shortages—while ignoring their deeper causes, the MAS model may well endure. That model is characterized by a narrow-based economy, lacking significant industrialization and stable job creation.   It is likely that MAS, now without a parliamentary majority, will initially grant the new administration some room to maneuver. However, the political landscape will not be fully defined until next year’s subnational elections. Only then will the new balance of power in the country become clearer. For now, Bolivia is taking its first steps beyond the hegemonic dominance of MAS and the shadow of Morales.

Coca-Cola and Pepsi are among the most recognized and consumed soft drinks in the world, with Coca-Cola leading as the global favorite (World Population Review, 2025). However, in recent years, geopolitics has shaped their presence in certain regions, particularly in the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries. The reason behind this is interesting, these brands are often seen or associated with the United States (Hebblethwaite, 2012), a nation whose fame in these regions has always been questioned and been controversial, and whose policies in the region have long sparked controversy and criticism. Overview of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the US Coca-Cola was born on May 8th, 1886, when Dr. John Pemberton delivered his newly perfected syrup to Jacob’s Pharmacy in downtown Atlanta, USA. After 139 years, what started as medicine evolved into the iconic soft drink that is enjoyed in more than 200 countries and territories every day (The Coca Cola Company, 2025). On the other hand, a few years later, in 1893, Brad’s drink, later rebranded as Pepsi-Cola, was invented in New Bern, North Carolina, USA by Caleb Brandham, as an aid in digestion (History of the Birthplace, 2018). Pepsi’s presence worldwide also covers more than 200 countries and territories and can be said it is Coca-Cola’s closest rival. While these brands have built a reputation, they have a long history, their competition has been fierce to the dominance of their market across the globe. The term “Cola Wars” represents this fierce competition. Cola wars gained global attention and likely reached their peak around the 1970s and 1980s in the US, while nowadays the fight keeps on, those years were key in how their presence around the globe has resulted nowadays. A bit of the context of the Cola Wars; during the beginning of the 20th century Coca-Cola led the market, while Pepsi had a rough time and went bankrupt in 1923. After its restructured, Pepsi maintained but Coca-Cola advertisements, such as those featuring Santa Claus, made it difficult for Pepsi to compete and by the time of WWII, Coca-Cola could be found in 44 countries already. In 1965 Pepsi merged with Frito-Lay-Inc trying to gain better footholds in restaurants and supermarkets. At the time Coca-Cola was expanding its brand into other soft drinks beverages, Pepsi could simply not compete against them. But by the mid-1970s, Pepsi launched its “Pepsi Challenge”, a genius blind test marketing bet in which over 50% of Americans chose Pepsi over Coca-Cola due its sweeter taste, of course Pepsi claimed its first victory over giant Coca-Cola and started its rise. Coca-Cola's response came with celebrity endorsement and the diet coke in the early 80’s. But by the mid 80’s, Pepsi sales skyrocketed due to its collaboration and promotion with Michael Jackson and appearance in several movies like Back to the Future. Coca-Cola had an identity crisis at the time, but after going back to its roots, (Weird History Food, 2022) once again it came back to fight and claimed its important place in the industry. Coca-Cola and Pepsi around the world While the Cola Wars were largely defined within the American market, their global expansion strategies took very different trajectories once they reached international audiences. Coca-Cola made their debut in the international market in the early 20th century, but it was until WWII when it got international recognition. A marketing associated with American optimism and modernity was followed by the company, and during the war, the company produced millions of bottles for US troops abroad, introducing the drink to soldiers and civilians across Europe, Africa and Asia. The strategy transformed Coca-Cola from a domestic beverage into a global cultural symbol. Pepsi, meanwhile, took a more opportunistic route. After financial struggles between the 1920s and 1930s, the brand re-emerged with a more aggressive global approach. Its internationalization came in 1949 with exports to Canada and later expanded to Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines, but it was until the Cold War, when its real global expansion began (FBIF Food & Beverage Innovation, 2014), when it merged with Frito-Lay and diversified its portfolio. By 2024, PepsiCo generated $92 billion net revenue (PepsiCo, 2025) while Coca-Cola grew 3% to stand at $47.1 billion net revenues (The Coca-Cola Company, 2025) that same year and their products and diversifications not only include the classical soft drinks, but also other beverages and foods. Yet despite their shared dominance in over 200 countries, both face different degrees of acceptance depending on local political, cultural and religious attitudes. The role of geopolitics: soft power, sanctions, wars, risks and opportunities As stated already, both brands are known globally, however, it is important to highlight that their presence in different regions of the world has been shaped by other actors more than just commercial advertisements, or even due to their advertisements and commercial strategies. Let me explain in more detail. In the case of Coca-Cola, during WWII and the Cold War, many people outside of the United States associated the product with American culture, Coca-Cola became a symbol of American soft power and globalization, clearly seen in war advertisements featuring soldiers enjoying cokes suggesting the commonly used “bring people and nations together” phrases. (Edelstein, 2013) On the other hand, with a more social-cultural strategy, Pepsi used the American pop-culture as their approach to gain attention worldwide. Michael Jackson, Madonna, Britney Spears, Beyoncé, among others (Kalgutkar, 2024) were iconic in the brand. In addition, Pepsi’s marketing leveraged music, youth, and rebellion, giving a softer and aspirational appeal. However, this cultural and ideological symbolism also made both companies vulnerable to political backlashes and somehow have defined their reputation and presence in some areas of the world. In the 1950’s, France coined the term “coca-colonization” denouncing American influence. During the Cold War, Coca-Cola became a capitalist symbol (in the eyes of outsiders), and it was banned in the Soviet Union, an opportunity Pepsi took advantage of there. Later, when the Berlin Wall fell, Coca-Cola became a representation of freedom. (Hebblethwaite, 2012) However, the most notable geopolitical response came when the Arab League boycotted the brand between 1968-1991 in the 13-nation organization, because it chose to operate in Israel while the Palestinian land was under occupation. Pepsi capitalized on this absence, solidifying its position in the Arab markets. In addition to the Arab League boycott, there are other cases where sanctions imposed by the US to different countries have led to a small or lack of sales of the products, such as Myanmar, North Korea, Cuba or the Soviet Union, back on time. Moreover, occasional protests and bans in countries like Iran, Venezuela or Thailand (Hebblethwaite, 2012) has also affected the brands at certain points of the history and of course have created an image and reputation in the society, with positive, neutral or negative perceptions. Moving towards present day, after the war in Gaza broke out in October 2023, pressure on the brands reappeared on the Middle East; Coca-Cola, who has a factory in the illegal settlement in East Jerusalem in the Atarot Industrial Zone, was accused of complicity and violations of the international law, in addition to being “related” with the Israeli army. These led to the BDS Movement to add it to a boycott list, which led to protests and has also been spread across other Muslim-majority countries. Of course, sales have dropped sharply in different countries in the region like Egypt and Bangladesh. (Boycat Times, 2025) Pepsi, on the other hand, even though it has a major presence in the Middle East market built over the space left by Coca-Cola during the 1968-1991 boycott, has also been affected by the War in Gaza and the boycotts in the region. PepsiCo reported stagnation in beverage growth across Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan, compared with 8-15% growth a year earlier the war started. (Awasthi, 2024) The boycott of these American brands in the Middle East and some Muslim-majority markets has led to important losses in the share market and the sales itself. For instance, Coca-Cola sales reportedly fell by 23% in Bangladesh and dropped by over 10% in Egypt, overall, there is an estimation of 7% regional revenue loss in the MENA region. The losses of the American brands had become an opportunity to the local brands, like Pakistan’s Cola Next and Pakola (shared market increased from 2.5% up to 12% after the boycott (The Economic Times, 2024)), Qatar’s Kinza or Egypt’s V7, which have up to 40% in market share growth and up to 350% growth in exports, canalizing consumer preferences for local alternatives. (The Economic Times, 2024), (Awasthi, 2024), (CBC, 2024), even in the West Bank, the Palestinian Chat Cola has been positioned in the market, with sales of over 40% in 2023 compared to the previous year. (Associated Press, 2025) Coca-Cola and Pepsi boycotts are not the only ones, other companies like McDonald’s or Starbucks have also been affected in the region, due to similar or same reasons. Even more, in Canada, another great example is the “americano” [coffee] being renamed as “canadiano”, (Barista Magazine, 2025) as response to the economic and political tensions developed earlier this year between Canada and the USA. Despite the boycotts, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have a base in the region, and they have seek opportunities to continue, through investments (Coca-Cola invested $22 million in upgrading technology in Pakistan) or new strategies (PepsiCo reintroduced Teem soda in Pakistan with a “Made in Pakistan” printed on the label) (Shahid, DiNapoli, & Saafan, 2024). Overall, both companies are trying to maintain, penetrate and expand their products in the market, they have been using and relying on bottling companies as a strong tool for those purposes, creating alliances with local companies as well as innovating and testing different new products in the region. Conclusion The current boycott of Coca-Cola and Pepsi across the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries is not only a reflection of political anger – it is a window into how geopolitics can directly reshape consumer economies. What once symbolizes Western globalization, and cultural appeal has now become a marker of political identity and economic nationalism. In a society driven by consumerism – where success is often measured by how much one owns – people tend to care less about genuine human values such as love, kindness, respect, empathy and consideration (MET, 2022). Ironically, today that statement seems reversed. For many consumers, boycotting Western brands has become not only a moral choice but also an act of solidarity and empowerment. Beyond economics, the boycott also reflects a psychological and cultural response. For many consumers in the Middle East, choosing what to drink has become a symbolic act of identity, resistance and empathy. Avoiding brands such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi offers a sense of agency and unity Palestine, turning everyday consumption into an expression of political consciousness. Although both companies remain resilient and continue to invest heavily in local markets, their challenges go beyond short-term losses. The rise of local brands such as V7. Kinza and Cola Next highlights a deeper regional shift – where consumers are not merely reacting to politics, but redefining loyalty based on ethics, identity and sovereignty. In the long term, this phenomenon could accelerate the regionalization of the markets, as local producers gain confidence and international corporations are compelled to adapt – by respecting cultural sensitivities, building genuine local partnerships, and ensuring transparency across their supply chains. Ultimately, the story of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the Middle East demonstrates that in today’s interconnected world, soft power is no longer a one-way export. Consumer behavior itself has become a form of diplomacy – capable of rewarding inclusion or punishing complicity.ReferencesAssociated Press. (2025, 03 02). Coca-Cola's appeal to Palestinians fizzles amid war. Retrieved from VOA News: https://www.voanews.com/a/coca-cola-s-appeal-to-palestinians-fizzles-amid-war/7991182.htmlAwasthi, S. (2024, 09 15). Middle East conflict bites Coca-Cola, Pepsi. Retrieved from SBS News: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/podcast-episode/middle-east-conflict-bites-coca-cola-pepsi/z445sv6glBarista Magazine. (2025, 02 25). Move Over, Americano: The ’Canadiano’ Has Arrived. Retrieved from Barista Magazine Online: https://www.baristamagazine.com/move-over-americano-the-canadiano-has-arrived/Boycat Times. (2025, 09 02). Everything You Need to Know: Why We Boycott Coca Cola. Retrieved from Boycat Times: https://blog.boycat.io/posts/boycott-coca-cola-israel-gaza-palestineCBC. (2024, 09 04). Muslim countries' local sodas see boost amid Coke and Pepsi boycott over Gaza. Retrieved from CBC: https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/coke-pepsi-boycott-1.7313370Edelstein, S. (2013, 05 13). A visual remix of the American Dream as pictured in Mid-Century media. On the front lines with Coca Cola pt II. Retrieved from Envisioning the American Dream: https://envisioningtheamericandream.com/2013/05/30/on-the-front-lines-with-coca-cola-pt-ii/FBIF Food & Beverage Innovation. (2014, November 18). PepsiCo's path to global dominance: from beverage brand to food empire. Retrieved from Food Talks: https://www.foodtalks.cn/en/news/54496Hebblethwaite, C. (2012, September 11). Who, What, Why: In which countries is Coca-Cola not sold? Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19550067History of the Birthplace. (2018, October 18). Retrieved from Wayback machine: https://web.archive.org/web/20181004163206/http://www.pepsistore.com/history.aspKalgutkar, N. (2024, November 28). Pepsi’s Advertising: An Iconic Campaigns and Pop Culture Impact. Retrieved from Treehack: https://treehack.com/pepsis-advertising-an-iconic-campaigns-and-pop-culture-impact/MET. (2022, 07 29). The effects of living in a consumer society. Retrieved from MET: https://group.met.com/en/mind-the-fyouture/mindthefyouture/consumer-society/#:~:text=July%2029%2C%202022,the%20operation%20of%20a%20company.PepsiCo. (2025). Who we are. Retrieved from PepsiCo: https://www.pepsico.com/who-we-are/about-pepsicoShahid, A., DiNapoli, J., & Saafan, F. (2024, 09 05). Coke and Pepsi boycott over Gaza lifts Muslim countries' local sodas. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/coke-pepsi-boycott-over-gaza-lifts-muslim-countries-local-sodas-2024-09-04/The Coca Cola Company. (2025). Our Company. Retrieved from The Coca Cola Company: https://www.coca-colacompany.com/about-usThe Coca-Cola Company. (2025, February 02). Coca‑Cola Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results. Retrieved from Thr Coca-Cola Company: https://www.coca-colacompany.com/media-center/coca-cola-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2024-results#:~:text=For%20the%20full%20year%2C%20net,the%20timing%20of%20concentrate%20shipments.The Economic Times. (2024, 09 04). Coca-Cola and PepsiCo lose popularity to local Cola brands due to boycott over Gaza in Muslim countries. Retrieved from The Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/coca-cola-and-pepsico-lose-popularity-to-local-cola-brands-due-to-boycott-over-gaza-in-muslim-countries/articleshow/113064771.cmsWeird History Food. (2022, 07 24). Do You Remember the Cola Wars: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi? Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtwkKrjHlhcWorld Population Review. (2025). World Population Review. Retrieved from Top-Selling Soft Drinks by Country 2025: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/top-selling-soft-drinks-by-country

The libertarian revolution of Javier Milei, which had promised to free Argentina from the State, ended up being sustained by a bailout from the U.S. Treasury, the ultimate symbol of the interventionism he had sworn to fight. When Javier Milei took office in December 2023, brandishing a chainsaw as a campaign symbol, he promised nothing less than a libertarian revolution. An outsider to traditional politics, he declared war on an overextended Argentine state, pledging to cut ministries, privatize industries, dollarize the economy, and slash social spending to the bone. He even proposed abolishing the central bank. Many libertarians and cryptocurrency enthusiasts around the world welcomed his rise as the long-awaited dawn of anarcho-capitalism in power: a real experiment in turning radical free-market theory into national policy, inspired by Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of “creative destruction.” From the outset, Milei reinforced his global image. He dissolved the Ministry of Women, Genders and Diversity, threatened to remove femicide from the penal code, and attacked gender parity in politics. At Davos, he launched a fierce critique of “wokeism,” lumping together feminism, diversity, inclusion, equity, abortion, environmentalism, and gender ideology under one “woke ideology” to be fought. Mapuche women—members of one of Argentina’s largest Indigenous groups—denounced an increase in racist and misogynistic attacks. For conservatives from Washington to Budapest to New Delhi, this was electrifying. Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, a propagandist aligned with Modi, praised Milei alongside Elon Musk’s failed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), seeing in both an attack on the welfare state and on the enemies of cultural traditionalism. In Milei, the global right found not just another politician but a standard-bearer of its dream to fuse libertarian economics with cultural radicalism. Less than two years later, the contradictions of his project are exposed. Reserves are depleted, household incomes stagnant, unemployment high, and public confidence eroded. Argentina remains trapped in crisis, repeating old cycles. History warns us: Carlos Menem left massive debts and unemployment despite two terms between 1989 and 1999; Fernando de la Rúa resigned amid collapse; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner governed with growing subsidies and controls; Mauricio Macri faced a currency crisis in 2018 despite IMF support. In remarkably similar fashion, Milei’s political standing has weakened. His party’s defeat in Buenos Aires provincial elections in September, coupled with corrupt allegations against his sister and closest adviser, has undermined his authority. Congress overturned one of his vetoes and is preparing to challenge others. The peso, already fragile, brushed up critical levels as it approached breaking the IMF’s stipulated currency band. On September 17, it crossed that threshold, trading at 1,475 per dollar, forcing the central bank to spend nearly $1 billion in reserves to defend the currency. Country risk soared, and fears of collapse grew. Then came an extraordinary intervention. On September 22, minutes before markets opened, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent wrote on X: “Argentina is a systemically important ally for the United States… all stabilization options are on the table. Argentina will be great again.” He suggested Washington might use swap lines, direct currency purchases, or the Exchange Stabilization Fund to buy Argentine debt. Markets responded: Argentine bonds rose six cents to 71 cents on the dollar, the peso strengthened 4%, and stocks climbed 6%. Panic gave way to relief. Days later, at the UN General Assembly in New York, Milei appeared alongside Trump and Bessent. Trump praised him for “cleaning up Argentina’s mess” and hinted at support for 2027, though he downplayed the idea of a bailout. For Milei, it was vindication: ideological affinity with Trump translated into tangible backing. But the irony was striking. A president presented as an anarcho-capitalist crusader was rescued not by markets but by the most interventionist state actor of all: the U.S. Treasury, through a classic government bailout. This echoed how Musk’s DOGE and chainsaw rhetoric ended in farce—like Liz Truss’s mini-budget in the UK or the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Milei’s libertarian revolution increasingly resembles a recycled continuation of Argentina’s old failures. Like his predecessors, he burns through reserves, begs for Washington’s support, and claims credit for temporary inflation drops. His promise of “creative destruction” has not rebuilt the productive base, spurred innovation, or repaired the social fabric. It has merely redirected Argentina’s dependence outward, making the country once again reliant on foreign sponsorship. Trump’s support adds another paradox. For a leader who proclaims, “America First,” rescuing Argentina seems inconsistent. But geopolitics explains it. With Washington straining ties with middle powers like India and Brazil, and regional powers like Colombia leaning toward Beijing or Moscow, Argentina stands out for aligning firmly with the United States. Milei has echoed Trump on Cuba, Venezuela, and U.S. wars abroad, even calling for the demolition of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Palestine — the third holiest site in Islam — “to bring the Messiah.” In return, he receives dollars and political backing. What is presented as libertarian solidarity is, in reality, a geopolitical transaction. But the deal only postpones the inevitable. Argentina faces midterm elections on October 26, and Milei’s weak performance in Buenos Aires suggests a possible Peronist resurgence. Investors are uneasy not only about the elections but also about his longer-term prospects in 2027. Some problems are structural, such as Argentina’s chronic dependence on the U.S. dollar. Anchoring the peso creates a dual economy — one domestic and one dollarized — that leaves the currency overvalued and prone to collapse. Abandoning the peg has proved just as destabilizing. When Milei briefly allowed the peso to float, confidence collapsed, inflation surged, and recession deepened. He soon had to revert to a peg-like scheme, defended with borrowed reserves. Argentina remains trapped: pegging drains credibility and reserves, while floating exposes the economy to immediate collapse. Inflation has fallen under Milei, from nearly 300% in 2024 to around 30% today. But at an enormous cost: sharp cuts in education, infrastructure, and welfare have driven poverty higher, while professional classes, shielded by an overvalued peso, enjoy cheap vacations abroad. Poverty in Argentina rose to 52.9% in the first half of 2024, up from 40.1% a year earlier, reaching its highest level in more than two decades. In the end, Milei’s experience underscores the limits of libertarianism in power. Libertarianism thrives in opposition, with its rhetoric of freedom and chainsaws. But in government it collides with three immovable forces: markets that demand safety nets, citizens who require protection, and political institutions that resist dismantling. Milei’s struggles show that libertarianism cannot escape the state: it only reshapes its dependencies, often in contradictory and self-defeating ways.

Abstract The War on Terror (WOT) initiated after the September 11, 2001, attacks has been one of the most consequential and complex military and political campaigns in modern history. Looking back it dignifies the idea that the global war on terrorism was an aggression frustration response of US towards the 9/11 attack of 2001. As it not only created a dense overlapping financial burden on the US but also the cost of the invasion was never in favor with US peace and conflict policies. Many scholars argue about the utility of WOT with other ethics of war and conflict mediating techniques along with using the paradigms of realist and liberal theories. But now when the NATO alliances withdrawal enacted the end of a 20-year constitutive war. As the NATO withdrawal marked end of WOT without a remediate response, it enacts a dispersed or iconic philosophical thought that was the WOT was a success or utter failure? This article will foreshadow the events of WOT, NATOs withdrawal and human rights violation that emerge exploring this issue through primary lens of utilitarian paradox in international political theory. Introduction Afghanistan is a multi-diverse state situated in the central south Asia. Its borders are tied by mountain ranges and trading ports submerge in southern and eastern parts of Asia, Europe & the Middle East. The geography of Afghanistan has been a frontier for colonial reign for centuries. From being occupied by the from the USA – USSR post -cold war struggles till the US invasion in Afghanistan in the WOT. Afghanistan has struggled to maintain a monopoly of economy, governance, infrastructural and parental isolation of Taliban within their own boundaries. The WOT was launched by the United States in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The attack became one of the most contentious military and foreign policy actions in contemporary history. The war which initially aimed to dismantle terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda eliminate the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and secure global peace has lasted over two decades involving not only the USA but also the NATO forces. The centrality of military intervention and counter terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and other regions has been met with both support and intense criticism particularly regarding its humanitarian consequences, effectiveness and long –term strategic outcomes. The complex history between the United States and Afghanistan, particularly form the Soviet- Afghan War 1979-1989 to the 9/11 attacks, offers a case study of how international relations, realpolitik, and the principle of utility (central to utilitarianism) can guide state behavior. By examining the role of foreign of U.S. policy in terms of net benefit or harm to global security and human welfare, especially when applying the principle of utility, which aims to maximize well-being and minimize suffering for the greatest number. This article seeks to explore the WOT through the principle of utility, a central concept in utilitarian philosophy. The principle of utility rooted in the works of philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, posits that actions should be judged based on their ability to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people [1]. By applying this principle, the review critically examines the ethical dimensions of the WOT, NATOs involvement and the humanitarian violations that have occurred throughout the conflict. The article is organized into the following sections: 1. Theoretical foundation of utilitarianism along with US and USSR influence in Afghanistan 2. US foreign policy and military strategies during the WOT. 3. NATOs overall assessment of the WOT under the principle of utility. In each section, the analysis will assess the actions taken by the US, NATO and other actors exploring whether the outcomes align with the utilitarian ideal of maximizing overall well-being. 1. Theoretical foundations: the principle of utility in war Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory that holds that the right course of action is the one that maximizes overall happiness or wellbeing. It evaluates actions based on their outcomes rather than their intrinsic moral qualities. This framework is particularly useful in the context of WOT. The principle of utility can be applied to assess whether the human, financial and political cost of the War were justified by the benefit of greater security, freedom from terrorism and regional stability. While NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has been framed as strategic realignment, it has also triggered a range of human rights violation, most notably the treatment of civilians, the resurgence of the Taliban and plight of women and minorities. This research will critically examine the interplay between the WOT, NATO withdrawal and human rights violation that emerge exploring this issue through primary lens of utilitarian paradox in international political theory. Utilitarian calculus in war: US relations in Afghanistan (1950-1970) The utilitarian calculus involves comparing the benefits of military intervention (such as the defeat of terrorist organizations the promotion of security and the establishment of stable democratic government) against it cost (including civilian causalities, economics expenditure and long-term social destabilization). As the WOT unfolded, the decision –making process in the US and NATO appeared to prioritize short -term security gains over long term humanitarian outcomes. For instances, the US began engaging with Afghanistan as part of its boarder strategy to contain Soviet expansion during the Cold War. The Helmand Valley Project aimed at modernizing the Afghan agriculture, and US aid under King Zahir Shah and Muhammad Dauod Khan government were early manifestation of US interest in Afghanistan. However, Soviet influence also grew particularly through infrastructure projects like the Salang Tunnel. The competition between the US and Soviet Union for influences in Afghanistan explains the context of utility of benefits in a realist perspective where states act primarily acts to protect and expand their own power for the greater benefit of good for the greater number of people. (Morgenthau, 1948). Also, the key challenges in applying the principle of utility to the WOT is determining who benefits and who suffers. for instance, the US and NATO countries may have gained security by weaking terrorist groups, but the Afghan and Iraqi population have borne significant cost in term of civilian causalities, displacement and economic destabilization of the Middle East and growth of radicalization, complicates any simplistic utilitarian evaluation. Under the presumptive analysis of utility: Any war or WOT occurs where there is an imbalance in the collapse of the monopoly of the inter-state relations among the rivalry. Furthermore, from a utilitarian perspective, the US & USSR interventions aimed to protect national security and detain the expansion of the rival superpower. However, the long-term consequences of such competition particularly the US focus on the military aid and covert actions led to the instability, civil war and the eventual Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The overall outcome – while achieving short term strategic gains in containing the Soviet influence ultimately disrupted Afghan society, leading to the widespread maximizing welfare for the Afghan people or for the global peace in the long run, as they contributed to a power struggle that further destabilized Afghanistan. Utilitarian critique of preemptive war Utilitarianism also directly critiques the preemptive war doctrine espoused by the George W. Bush administration. The Invasion of Iraq in 2003, based on the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) illustrated a problematic application of utilitarian reasoning. Critics argue that the invasion was not only morally unjustifiable but also inefficient as it caused massive human suffering without achieving its purported goals. According to the utilitarian philosophy such as Peter Singer’s the catastrophic outcomes of the Iraq War – millions of displaced, the loss of thousands of lives and destabilization of regions – far outweighed by any potential benefits in term of preventing future threats to US security. Also, the US influence deterred the rise of the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan which was aligned with the soviet interest. This led to the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 intended to prop up the PDPA government. The US response was to support the Mujahedeen Rebels providing them with military aid (including stinger missiles) & funding through intermediaries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Thus, this covert operation was seen as a part of broader Cold War strategy to undermine Soviet influence in the region. In the long run, the intervention was a justified action and response to Soviet expansionism. According to Hans Morgenthau’s principles of international politics states act based on their national interest which in this case was to counter Soviet influence. The US built alliances with the Islamism groups in Afghanistan which while supporting US geopolitical goals led to the creation of radicalized Islamist network, contributing global terrorism. The creation of this network, with groups like Taliban and Al-Qaeda exemplifies the unintended consequences for foreign intervention that may maximize short term strategic benefits but lead to a long–term instability and suffering. The soviet withdrawal left Afghanistan in a state of chaos. The Mujahedeen factions, funded by the US turned against each other, leading to the rise of the Taliban in 1996. Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden, who had been in Afghanistan during the Soviet conflict, founded Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s rise the Taliban support for them would set the stage for 9/11 attacks. While on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, orchestrated the terrorist attack on the United States. The attacks killed nearly 3,000 people and led to the Taliban regime that harbored it and prevent further attacks. Utilitarianism and long-term consequences From a utilitarian viewpoint the US role in fostering Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan can be seen as contributing to a greater global harm in the form of terrorism. The short-term goal of defeating the Soviet Union led to the rise of extremist group that would go on to inflict severe harm globally, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. The utilitarian perspective here emphasizes that although the US successfully countered Soviet expansion, the long–term consequences – including the development of Al-Qaeda and its attacks on the US and other countries – created a greater global security threat. These consequences starkly illustrate the limits of the principle of utility raises important ethical concerns about the methods used and their long–term impacts where interventions create unforeseen global risks. Also, the immediate benefits of the US invasion were clear: the removal of Taliban and the disruption of Al-Qaeda’s operation in Afghanistan reduced the immediate threat of global security. However, the long-term consequences – including the loss of civilian lives, economic costs, and the rise of new insurgencies – raised questions about whether the intervention truly maximized global well-being. The humanitarian cost of War, including the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians, the destabilization of the country and the ongoing conflict must be weighed against the benefits of preventing further terrorist attacks Moreover, the prolonged US military presence in Afghanistan until their withdrawal in 2021 led to the significant economic and social costs that have yet to be fully realized in terms of global welfare. 2. US Foreign policy and military strategies during the WOT The US action during the WOT was justified under the assumption that eradicating terrorism and ensuring national security would promote greater good, both domestically and internationally. However, the application of the principle of utility raises important ethical concerns about the methods used and their long-term impacts. The WOT initiated by the United States in the aftermaths of September 11, 2001 attacks, fundamentally reshaped international relations and military strategy, particularly in Afghanistan. These interventions, characterized by the use of military force, under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) aimed to eliminate Al-Qaeda and dismantle the Taliban regime that harbored them. The US was soon joined by NATO allies in what was labeled operation enduring freedom and later operation led to significant human, political, and humanitarian costs. The Bush administration’s approach to security The Bush administration response to the 9/11 attacks was fundamentally shaped by realist principles of international relations, which emphasize the pursuit of national interest, power, and security in an anarchic international system. Under a realist paradigm, states must act in their own self-interest, often using force to ensure their survival and dominance. This is especially evident in offensive realism, as articulated by scholars like John Mearsheimer, which suggest that great powers seek to maximize their influence and security, often through coercion and military intervention. Under President George W. Bush the primary rationale for the WOT was the principle of self-defense and the protection of citizens from the threat of terrorism. The US government invoking the Bush Doctrine adopted a policy of preemptive military strikes, aimed to maximize the safety for the greatest number of Americans by neutralizing terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda and dismantling the Taliban support for such groups. However, the application of preemptive military force led to significant civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Amnesty International the US military use of air strikes drone attacks and ground operation led to thousands of civilian deaths raising questions about whether the benefits of eliminating immediate terrorist threats justified the loss of innocent lives. Noam Chomsky and other scholars had argued in the past that the Iraq War, in particular, was a costly endeavor that not only failed to eliminate terrorism but also contributed to the rise of groups like ISIS exacerbating the global security threat in the long-term. This outcome from a utilitarian standpoint challenges the initial justification for the WOT as the human cost seemed disproportionate to the benefits achieved. According to UN reports and media outlets like Al-Jazeera, the conflict resulted in the loss of over 100,000 lives, including both civilians and military personnel. These humanitarian issues, however, were often sidelined in favor of military objectives and maintaining control over Afghanistan’s strategic importance. The principle of utility in military intervention: benefits and harm The principle of utility, central to utilitarianism, seeks to maximize overall well-being and minimize harm. From a utilitarian perspective the effectiveness of military intervention like the WOT can be evaluated by examining whether the benefits – such as the elimination of terrorist threats outweigh the harm caused to civilians, the humanitarian crises and regional instability. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks the US & NATO military actions were justified on the grounds of protecting the lives of American citizens and global security by dismantling Al-Qaeda and ousting the Talban, in utilitarian terms these goals seemed to promise a net benefit: by limiting al-Qaeda safe haven the intervention could potentially prevent future terrorist attacks on the US and its allies thereby protecting millions of lives. The humanitarian costs and the questions of net utility However, from a utilitarian viewpoint, the long-term harm caused by the intervention, including civilian deaths, displacement, and the destabilization of Afghanistan, must also be factored into the equations. According to various reports including the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan caused widespread civilians being killed or injured. Additionally, the war exacerbated poverty, displacement, and psychological trauma for millions of Afghans. These humanitarian factors, especially when weighed against the limited gains in terms of security, question the net utility. Furthermore, the war led to prolonged instability in Afghanistan, which has seen a resurgent Taliban and the growth of new extremist groups like ISIS-K. This indicates that the intervention did not lead to long-term stability and may have contributed to further global security. The continued suffering of the Afghan people and the rise of new threats to global security (such as the Taliban’s return to power in 2021) suggests that the long-term consequences of the intervention might outweigh its initial benefits, thus failing the utilitarian criterion of maximizing overall well-being. State-building efforts and the decline of utility The US and NATO also pursued the strategy of state-building in Afghanistan which was intended to create a stable democratic government. The hope was that a New Afghan Government would prevent the country from becoming a heaven of terrorists, however, despite significant investment in democratic institutions human rights and social justice the central goal of security remained elusive. The inability to create a functioning state in Afghanistan, coupled with the increase of violence and corruption, indicated that the state-building efforts were not successful in improving the long-term welfare of Afghan population. While the US & NATO intervention in Afghanistan may have been justified through the lens of realism – to secure national interest and protect against terrorism – the utilitarian evaluation of the intervention reveals that the human and geopolitical cost likely outweighed the benefits, calling into question the true utility of the war and its outcomes. Further interventions must weigh these long-term consequences more carefully and seek to maximize the well–being of both local populations and global security. Obama’s counterterrorism strategy: drone warfare The Obama administrations sought to reduce ground troop deployment and shift to a strategy of targeted killings, particularly through the drone strikes, while distancing itself from the controversial Iraq War. This approach not only aimed to minimize US causalities while addressing threat posed by the groups like Al-Qaeda and Taliban. While drone strikes targeted high valued terrorists, like ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Taliban, they also crated collateral damage along with deaths of civilian in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia while achieving the primary interest of assonating Osama bin laden. The approach of Obama’s administration emphasized the pursuit of national interest, security and state sovereignty in an anarchical international system. Realism often holds the ideal that a state acts in their self-interest, often through military force to ensure their survival and to maintain power relative to other states. Under Obama the core objective of the US foreign policy remained the same: to eliminate terrorist threat to the US and its allies particularly from Al-Qaeda. Also, the decision to continue the Afghanistan War while pulling back from Iraq was largely framed as a more focused, efficient approach to combat terrorism by selective military actions and intelligence, instead of fugitive prolonged war. This principle prioritized the effectiveness of military power over ideological or humanitarian goals. A key feature of the Obama’s realist approach was the unilateral actions the US took to pursue its objectives, particularly in the case of Operation Neptune Spear – the Navy Seal Operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. The operation, conducted in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was not coordinated with Pakistani authorities which led to significant tension between the US and Pakistan. From a realistic standpoint the unilateral actions can be understood as a pragmatic use of military power to neutralize a direct threat to US security. In a world of anarchy, where no global authority can enforce laws, the state must often take matters into their own hands. By conducting a covert operation without seeking Pakistan’s approval, the US acted out perceived self –interest taking actions to eliminate a high valued target who posed an ongoing threat to American citizens and interests. However, Pakistan's sovereignty was violated in this instance, which raised significant international law concerns. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the use of force by one state on another is prohibited, except in cases of self-defense. The U.S. justified the operation as a self-defense measure, arguing that Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan was a direct threat to U.S. security, and that the operation was an act of preemptive self-defense against terrorism. From a realist perspective, this is a reasonable justification for intervention, as the preservation of national security often supersedes concerns about sovereignty. From a utilitarian perspective, Obama’s drone strategy presents a moral paradox. While it may have successfully neutralized terrorist leaders and prevented attacks on US soil it also caused significant harm to local populations, violated international law and arguably contributed to anti-American sentiment in affected regions. In this case the benefits to US security were weighed against the moral and human cost of innocent lives lost raising question about whether the outcomes were truly in the service of the greater good. Utilitarian analysis of the Obama administration’s WOT: maximizing security and minimizing harm. The Obama administration’s approach to WOT can also be observed by its ability to maximize overall security and minimize harm both to the US and to civilians of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The idea is to assess whether the benefit of military actions, such as the elimination of high valued targets, outweighs the costs including civilian casualties, displacement of population and the destabilization of the region. One of the key successes of the Obama’s administration was the target killing of Osama bin Laden. The operation provided a sense of closure to the 9/11 attack, which is benefit from the perspective of US public security and national pride. The death of Bin Laden was framed as a symbolic victory over Al-Qaeda, and this may be seen as a positive outcome because it removed a key figure head of terrorism, which could reduce the perceived threat to global security. However, the humanitarian cost of the broader WOT – which included the use of drone strikes and special force operations – were substantial. While drone strikes allowed precise targeting of terrorist operatives, they also led to numerous civilian causalities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Drone warfare has been heavily criticized for the lack of transparency, the risk of collateral damage, and the psychological impact on local populations. In the case of Pakistan, the unilateral nature of the Bin Laden’s operation not only undermined Pakistan’s sovereignty but also caused political fallout that weakened the US-Pakistan relationship. The operation demonstrated that US actions even when taken in interest of self–defense could have serious long-term geopolitical consequences, such as the erosion of trust and cooperation between states. From a utilitarian perspective, the broader costs – including the destabilization of US relations with Pakistan particularly when it comes to larger goal of regional stability – outweigh the perceived benefits of the operation. The ethics of targeted killings The increasing use of targeted killing, especially through drone strikes also raised significant ethical concern from a utilitarian perspective. While these operations may have been effective in neutralizing specific terrorist threats, the long-term consequences, including the moral hazard of using covert killings without oversight, can lead to escalations of violence and increased instability in the regions already plagued by a conflict. The principle of utility requires a careful balance of costs and benefits. In many instances, targeted killings have resulted in collateral damage, including the deaths of innocent civilians, which diminishes the overall moral benefit of these actions. Ultimately while the Obama administration efforts had eliminated specific threats and achieved short term gains, the long-term impact of the regional stability and international relations suggest that the utilitarian cost benefits analysis of the WOT points to a more complex legacy. Further interventions must carefully consider both the military objectives and humanitarian cost, to better align actions with the ultimate goal of global security and human flourishing. Trump’s “America First” approach and the cost of withdrawal Donald Trump’s first administration continued the WOT with a focus on unilateralism and reducing US military involvement aboard. The Doha Agreement (2020) negotiated between the Trump administration and the Taliban was a significant shift in the US policy, aiming for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. While this decision aligned with Trump “American First” philosophy, which prioritized US interest over global obligation, the execution of the withdrawal was chaotic, leading to the rapid resurgence of the Taliban significant humanitarian crises. From a utilitarian perspective the withdrawal decision can be seen as an effort to end a costly and unproductive military engagement that was producing diminishing returns. However, the aftermath of the Taliban returns to power accompanied by the collapse of Afghan government and widespread humanitarian suffering – raises significant doubts whether this decision ultimately maximized the welfare of the Afghan population or the global community. The decision to abandon NATO allies and the Afghan government, left a power vacuum, creating conditions for renewed conflict and humanitarian suffering thus failing to achieve the greater good in the long run. Paradoxically, Trump sought to reduce US involvement in long standing conflicts like Afghanistan which he viewed as a dent on American resources with minimal return in terms of national security. His decision to withdraw NATO forces from Afghanistan reflects this approach, emphasized the reduction of military expenditures and prioritizing domestic issues over international commitments. Trump’s decision to withdraw NATO forces can be viewed as an attempt to minimize the costs of prolonged military engagement while attempting to safeguard American lives. The moral benefit of withdrawal lies in the relief of American soldiers from the ongoing conflict and allowing the US to refocus its attention on the issues perceived as more pressing like economic revitalization & domestic infrastructure. However, the humanitarian consequences of such a move were severe. The Doha Agreement signed in 2020, aimed to facilitate the US withdrawal in exchange for Taliban assurances failed to deliver on key promises such as the protection of human rights and the creation of legitimate Afghan government. The agreement, while offering the possibility of peace did little to address the internal division in Afghanistan or to ensure the long-term stability of the country. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 resulted in a swift collapse of the Afghan movement, marking a humanitarian disaster as the Taliban took over Kabul, triggering widespread violence displacement and violation of human rights, particularly women rights. The decision to withdraw without securing a lasting peace agreement resulted in a net negative outcome for Afghanistan civilian population. While the US may have minimized its military risk the benefits of withdrawal were offset by the harm inflicted on the Afghan people. The Doha Agreement and peace talks. The Doha Agreement (February 2020) reflected Trump’s aims of ending the “forever war” in Afghanistan. The agreement led to US-troop reduction in exchange for Taliban promises not to harbor terrorist organization and a commitment to negotiating with the Afghan government. From a utilitarian perspective, the promise of peace talks was intended to maximize overall stability by ending the cycle of violence. However, the exclusion of the Afghan government from the peace talks and the continued violence by the Taliban during that period – undermined the utility of the agreement. The lack of inclusivity in the talks created a perception that US was abandoning its Afghan allies and supporting a regime that had a long history of human rights violation. The net benefit of the Doha Agreement therefore can be seen as limited, as it failed to bring about the desired peace or long-term stability in Afghanistan, while the Taliban rapidly retook the power once the US troops began their withdrawal. Biden’s commitment to ending the WOT Biden decision to proceed with the US withdrawal was framed as a continuation of a long-standing policy of ending the war. Biden argued that the US mission had evolved from counter terrorism to nation-building and that the Afghan government was not capable of holding power without US military support. In his view, the war had become a strategic quagmire, consuming trillions of dollars and thousands of lives without clear, sustainable outcomes. Biden’s decision to withdraw aimed at minimizing the harm to American soldiers and the financial burden of the war. However, the immediate humanitarian impact of the withdrawal was catastrophic. The rapid fall of Kabul in August 2021, months ahead of the scheduled withdrawal, led to scenes of chaos and desperation. The human cost of the disorganized withdrawal, the Taliban resurgences and the human right abuses that followed outweigh the short-term benefits of US troop withdrawals. From a utilitarian perspective, Biden decision to withdraw aimed at minimizing the harm to American soldiers and the financial burden of the war. However, the immediate humanitarian impact of the withdrawal was catastrophic. The rapid fall of Kabul in August 2021, months ahead of the scheduled withdrawal, led to scenes of chaos and desperation, as thousands of Afghan Civilians – including those who had assisted US troop withdrawals. While Biden justified the pullout as a necessary step for ending the war, the immediate aftermath suggested that the overall utility of the withdrawal was minimal, as the Taliban’s return marked a return to an authoritarian rule, with increased repression of women, journalist and other civil society groups. Biden’s foreign policy and NATO’s role Biden’s administration faced significant criticism for its handling of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. The collapsing Afghan government left NATO allies in a difficult position, as they were forced to evacuated personnel and citizen alongside US forces. The dis-orderly nature of the withdrawal strained NATO alliances, as many European countries felt sidelined by the US decision–making process. From a utilitarian viewpoint, the US withdrawal had a dual impact on NATO. On one hand, it removed NATO forces from an increasingly unpopular and costly conflict, thereby reducing the risk for Western nations. On the other hand, it undermined the credibility of NATO as a security alliance, casting doubt in US commitment to collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and creating a vacuum within the EU and NATO that was quickly filled by the resurgence of the Taliban. 3. NATO’s role and withdrawal from Afghanistan NATO roles in Afghanistan were to assist in stabilizing the country after the initial US invasion and to ensure that Taliban could not regain power. However, NATO efforts through significant in terms of resources and manpower were ultimately undermined by the persistent instability corruption and a lack of clear political resolution in Afghanistan. However, the Biden administration faced significant criticism for its handling of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. The collapsing Afghan government left NATO allies in a difficult position as they were forced to evacuate personnel and citizens alongside US forces. The disorderly nature of the withdrawal strained NATO alliances as many European countries felt sidelined by the US decision-making process. From a utilitarian viewpoint the US withdrawal had a dual impact on NATO. As it undermined the credibility of collective defense under article 5 of the NATO Treaty, the EU and NATO allies faced the challenge of reassessing their own defense strategies as they were left to cope with the vacuum created by the US pullout and the resurgence of the Taliban. The Utility of NATO’s Intervention was framed as a collective security mission aimed preventing terrorism and fostering a stable democratic Afghanistan. From a utilitarian perspective NATO goal was to promote peace and security for the Afghan people while supporting the broader international community fight against terrorism. NATO actions contributed to civilian casualties raising ethical concern about the cost-benefit ratio of the intervention. The chaotic withdrawal in 2021 mirrored under President Biden was another critical juncture in the WOT. The sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban swifts return to power raised questions about the utility of NATO long-term involvement in Afghanistan. The withdrawal did not produce a greater good as the human cost of Taliban resurgence, and the subsequent humanitarian crisis significantly outweighed the benefits of the mission. Regional geopolitics and the Taliban’s return to power The Taliban’s rapid rise to power was followed by international recognition from China, Russia, and Pakistan, all of whom were keen engage diplomatically with the new regime. China’s BRI initiative showed interest in Afghanistan’s strategic location, while Russia and Pakistan sought to maintain their regional influenced. From a utilitarian perspective, this shift in regional power dynamics presents mixed outcomes. On the positive side, the Taliban’s reassertion of control over Afghanistan could potentially reduce terrorist activities within the region if the Taliban adheres to the assurances it made to foreign powers regarding counter-terrorism efforts. However, the humanitarian costs, especially for the Afghan population – remain severe. The Taliban’s treatment of women, freedom of speech and other fundamental rights represent a serious human cost that undermines the utilitarian justification for withdrawal. For neighboring countries like Pakistan, the Taliban rise creates a security dilemma as it may embolden domestic insurgents like the Tehreek-e-Pakistan (TTP). This could lead to spiral of violence that destabilizes the entire region, potentially leading to further refugee flows, terrorist activities, and cross conflict. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, under both Trump and Biden was driven by the goal of minimizing the costs of prolonged military engagement, which from a realist perspective, could be justified as a necessary step in re-orienting US foreign policy. However, from a utilitarian standpoint the humanitarian consequences of the withdrawal including civilian suffering, regional instability, and the empowerment of the Taliban, have largely outweighed the short-term benefits. 4. Humanitarian consequences and civilian casualties and the use of force One of the most striking aspects of the WOT and particularly the US and NATO actions in Afghanistan and Iraq is the humanitarian violations that have accompanied military operations, the principle of utility demands that the human cost of war be carefully considered and yet civilian casualties during the WOT have been significant. According to estimates, more than 200,000 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan alone with additional fatalities in Iraq and other regions affected by the conflict. The extensive use of drone strikes air raids and ground operation against the Taliban’s Al-Qaeda targets has resulted in numerous instances where civilians were killed in the process. While these actions may be justified as targeting terrorist the humanitarian consequences raise question about whether the WOT strategic objective were worth the cost incurred. Utilitarian philosophers like Rosa Brooks argue that this violation which may have been undertaken in the name of security failed to maximize the well-being of those affected, particularly the victims of torture. The collateral damage in terms of civilian suffering and the loss of moral credibility further diminishes the utilitarian justification of these actions. Bush administration: the use of force without legal protection The Bush administration’s labeling of Al- Qaeda as a terrorist organization allowed for the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists with many denied the rights of prisoners of war (POWs) as outlined in Geneva Convention article 3. The US government’s treatment of captured militants, including the decision to not grant them POW status, was a direct violation of international law. The lack of judicial trial, along with the use of military commission to try detainees, highlighted the absences of fair trial guarantees and violated basic principles of justice. Detention and torture: Guantanamo Bay The detention of suspects at Guantanamo Bay and the torture inflicted on prisoners there, became a significant violation of international human rights law. Detainees held in indefinite detention without trial were often subjected to enhance interrogation techniques, which included waterboarding, stress positions and other forms of psychological and physical abuse. These actions violated international conventions, including the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), both of which prohibit torture and inhumane treatment. From a utilitarian perspective, these actions fail to justify the moral harm they caused. The human suffering of detainees at Guantanamo, along with the damage to the US international reputation, cannot be outweighed by the perceived benefits of gathering intelligence. While some argue that torture may have produced vital information, the overall harm caused to human dignity, individual rights and the rule of law suggest a net negative utility. Drone strikes and civilian casualties Drone strikes, particularly in Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been another controversial aspect of the WOT. These strikes, which were often conducted with minimal oversight and without regard for sovereignty of countries, resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians. In many cases non-combatants, including women and children were killed in mistaken strikes or when their proximity to a target was deemed insufficient to prevent harm. From a utilitarian standpoint, drone strikes can be seen as a high–risk, high-reward strategy. The argument made by proponents of drone warfare is that it minimizes American causalities and prevents terrorist attacks, therefore maximizing American causalities and prevents terrorist attacks, therefore maximizing national security. However, collateral damage and the disruption of communities in targeted countries can lead to the problem. This creates a vicious cycle, while the US attempts to reduce the immediate threat the long-term harm to global stability and human lives is profound. For instance, the 2010 incident in which 23 civilians were mistakenly killed in a drone strike is a clear example of this negative utility. The mistaken targeting of civilian buses underlines the lack of precision and accountability in the US strategy, which when weighed against the loss of innocent lives, cannot be justified under the utilitarian principle of minimizing harm. Obama administration and violation of IHL Under Obama’s administration, the drone strikes campaign intensified with the goal of targeting high valued terrorist and leadership figures within Al- Qaeda and the Taliban. While the strikes may have helped eliminate specific threats, they were often conducted without proper regard for international humanitarian law, particularly distinction (the principle that combatants and civilians must be distinguished) and proportionality (the requirement that military actions must not cause excessive civilian harm in relation to the anticipated military advantage). For instance, Obama’s Operation Neptune Spear, which targeted Osama bin laden in Pakistan, while celebrates as a success in eliminating a key terrorist figure, raised significant legal questions. The operation violated Pakistan’s sovereignty and was conducted without prior consent, in clear breach of the UN Charters provisions against the use of force on foreign soil without permission. A utilitarian may argue that the elimination of bin Laden may have offered short-term benefits in terms of counterterrorism, the long-term consequences – the violation of international law, the deterioration of US-Pakistan relations and the potential for escalated conflict – suggest that the operation caused more harm than good. 5. The economic and social cost of the WOT The financial cost of the WOT was astronomical. According to the US Department of Defense, the total military expenditure in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2020 was around $ 955 billion with estimates that the total cost of the WOT, including related costs, could reach $2 trillion by 2024. This enormous expenditure, while it supported military and intelligence operations, could arguably have been better utilized from a utilitarian argument, for domestic priorities like health care, education, and infrastructure. Furthermore, the opportunity cost, the benefits that could have been derived from using the resources elsewhere, undermines the utilitarian arguments for continuing the war, particularly given the lack of tangible success in achieving long-term peace and stability in the regions affected by the war. The human cost The human cost of the WOT was profound. Thousands of US soldiers, tens of thousands of Afghan civilians and hundreds of thousands of people in the broader region lost their lives. Many others faced psychological trauma and displacement. The US military emphasizes on counter insurgency and drone strikes, while designed to protect American lives, resulted in widespread civilian casualties and displacement in the countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, further destabilizing the region. Discussion The WOT initiated after September 11, 2001, attacks have been one of the most consequential and complex military and political campaigns in modern history. Looking back there are several key reconditions and conflict mediation on how it could have been handled differently to achieve better outcome, reduced unintended consequences, and hold international law and human rights Applying the principle of utility to assess the overall effectiveness and morality of the WOT reveals a complex picture. While the US and NATO achieved some military successes, including the eliminations of key terrorist leader and the weakening of organizations like Al-Qaeda, these gains were accompanied by profound humanitarian costs. From a short- term utilitarian perspective the WOT may have been justified in terms of protecting US national security and neutralizing immediate threats forms of terrorism. However, when considered from a long-term perspective the human, financial, and strategic costs - especially the rise of radical groups like ISIS, the displacement of millions, and the destruction of entire societies - raised serious doubts about whether the WOT truly maximized global well-being. The ethical implications of the civilian casualties, torture and human rights violation further complicate the utilitarian evaluation. From a utilitarian perspective the WOT appears to have been a failure , the short term benefits such as eliminating terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden – do not outweigh the long-term harm caused by the war including: humanitarian violation (torture, extra-judicial killing, drone attacks), financial burden (trillions of dollars spent, with little to show in terms of lasting peace or security), social and psychological costs (widespread of causalities in Afghanistan and Pakistan), and erosion of international norms (the violations of the Geneva Conventions, particularly the treatment of prisoners, contributed to the decline of international humanitarian standards). Conclusion The WOT and NATO involvement in Afghanistan and the humanitarian violations that accounted for the military intervention provided a rich case to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign policy through the lens of utility. While the WOT was initially justified on the grounds of maximizing security and protecting national interest in the long-term, consequences including civilian causalities, regional instability and the erosion of human rights suggest that the ultimate outcome were far more ideal. Although the utilitarian studies enacted some tactical victories in the WOT, the overall utility in terms of human rights, financial cost and global stability was negative. As a result, the strategy failed to create sustainable peace and instead resulted in a cycle of violence that ultimately undermined the very values it aimed to protect. Consequently, NATO may have failed to achieve greater good, causing more harm than benefit to both the people in the regions affected and the broader international community. In retrospect, instead of heavy reliance on military interventions the US and its allies could have focused more on intelligence gathering, law enforcement and international cooperation to disrupt terrorist cells before they could act. In short, focused on intelligence and law enforcement, not just military force Moreover, engaging more deeply with moderate Muslim –majority countries and regional allies to counter extremist ideologies and promote development and political stability in the Middle East and beyond would be a good idea. The WOT often alienated large segments of Muslims worlds furling resentment and contribution to the efforts of groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. A focus on diplomacy, addressing underlying grievances, and building local political and economic structures would have been more sustainable. Similarly, avoiding overuse of force in Afghanistan and Iraq would have helped. The US-NATO forces could have employed more targeted operations including special forces counter insurgency tactics and precision air strikes, rather than large-scale military invasions and occupations, because these onset of wars accounted for the increase of causalities, which allotted disruption to the laws of wars amendments Furthermore, to ensure lasting peace, it was essential to promote nation building and reconstruction. Military intervention efforts should have focused more on this aspect. Equally important was better adherence to Human Rights and International Law. The WOT should have adhered more strictly to international laws, including the Geneva Conventions and upheld human rights standards to prevent practices like torture, indefinite detention and extraordinary renditions. Actions and unlawful detentions tarnished rage moral authority of the US and its allies and violated human rights standards. This approach not only harmed individuals but also damaged global support for the WOT, leading to accusations of hypocrisy and fueling anti-Western sentiment. The WOT should have been framed as a global problem involving broad cooperation with international organizations like the United Nations and regional coalitions. Finally, addressing the root causes of terrorism - poverty, education, and political grievances -was crucial. Public diplomacy and soft power should have been used more effectively; the US should have relied more on cultural programs and soft power to counter extremist narratives and build goodwill in Muslim-majority countries. References 1. Amanullah Haidary Azadany. 2016. How Would a Realist Explain the Civil War in Afghanistan? Vol 12. European Scientific Journal file:///C:/U s ers /admin/D ow nloads /7171 -A rticle%20Text - 20870 - 1 -10 -20160330%20(1).pdf 2. Emily Stewart. 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(2013). “Neither Legal nor Justiciable: Targeted Killings and De Facto Immunity within the War on Terror”. https://gsj.global.ucsb.edu/sites/secure.lsit.ucsb.edu.gisp.d7_gs-2/files/sitefiles/Medeiros.pdf 25. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission: “Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan Practices of Concern and Example Cases”. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/471f4a500.pdf BBC news. (2021).” Afghanistan: What has the conflict cost the US and its allies? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821

The attempted sale of CK Hutchison’s Panama Canal operations to the US-based company BlackRock and Terminal Investment Limited was more than a commercial transaction. When Beijing publicly opposed the deal, branding it a betrayal of national interests, it transformed into a case study in how global business is being reshaped by strategic rivalry. The controversy illustrates a deeper question: Can Hong Kong’s leading conglomerates still operate on commercial logic alone, or are they inevitably drawn into the geopolitical contest between the United States and China? For Hutchison, the Panama case shows that the room for neutrality is shrinking. Why does it matter? Beijing’s intervention signals to Hong Kong businesses and foreign investors alike that commercial neutrality is no longer assured. Loyalty, alignment, and political sacrifice are emerging as expectations alongside profit and efficiency. For global decision-makers, this raises two critical issues: Why did Hutchison seek to exit its Panama Canal holdings in the first place? Why did Beijing judge it necessary to intervene in a transaction that, on the surface, was driven by corporate strategy? Why Hutchison sold its Panama Canal operations? 1. Strategic Realignment Toward Core Businesses CK Hutchison has steadily repositioned itself around two “twin engines”, i.e. real estate in Asia and infrastructure in Europe. While ports in Latin America once fit into its global footprint, they were never central to this model. By selling its Panama Canal operations, Hutchison freed resources to consolidate strengths where it sees long-term stability and growth. This is part of a deliberate shift visible over the past decade: acquiring the German infrastructure firm ISTA in 2017 and securing UK regulatory approval in 2024 for the £11 billion merger of Vodafone UK and Hutchison’s subsidiary Three. These moves point to a concentration of capital in Europe’s regulated infrastructure and Asia’s high-demand property markets, underscoring a deliberate pivot toward strengthening European operations and ensuring cash flow visibility. This implies that Hutchison is reducing its exposure and a systematic exit to regions marked by political uncertainty and doubling down on reinvesting into higher-yielding and strategically aligned assets, particularly in European infrastructure platform while deepening its Asian real estate footprint. For governments and investors, this suggests that Hong Kong conglomerates are not retreating from globalization but are planning to recalibrate toward safer, higher-visibility assets. 2. Capitalizing on Market Timing and Asset Valuation The divestment also reflected classic Hutchison discipline: Buying early and exiting when valuations reach the peak. With global demand for strategic infrastructure rising, the Panama Canal assets commanded a premium. The resulting HK$19 billion in proceeds and a sharp rise in share price underlined investor confidence. Such timing underscores Hutchison’s longstanding strategy of opportunistic repositioning. This divestment was both value-accretive and strategically well-timed. By crystallizing gains now, the group strengthens its balance sheet and cash-reserve, maintaining its flexibility to reinvest or return capital to shareholders. For policymakers, this implies that global infrastructure assets are increasingly financialized. Strategic nodes like the Panama Canal are no longer just trade arteries but high-value commodities in global capital markets. Governments must therefore view divestments not only as corporate decisions but as moves that can shift control of strategic assets between geopolitical actors. 3. Geopolitical Considerations and Risk Mitigation The Panama Canal is a corridor of strategic significance and what US-President Donald Trump calls Chinese ownership on the potential dual-use nature of port terminals there inevitably drew scrutiny in Washington. U.S. allies have already tightened the screening of Chinese-linked infrastructure deals and the EU’s 2019 FDI framework explicitly flagged ports as areas requiring “special oversight”. Against this backdrop, Hutchison sought to avoid being cast as a “Chinese state-backed actor”, an extension of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Hutchison has taken deliberate steps to present itself as a neutral and commercially driven multinational investor, rather than an extension of Chinese state policy. The company restructured in 2015 to a Cayman Islands base carefully positioning itself apart from state-linked Chinese enterprises, which creates an international legal identity rather than retaining a mainland Chinese or Hong Kong corporate domicile. By exiting Panama, Hutchison not only monetized assets but also reduced exposure to the intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry in one of the world’s most contested trade chokepoints. For European and U.S. decision-makers, this implies that Hutchison’s move signals how Hong Kong firms navigate geopolitical pressure. It shows that even Chinese-origin conglomerates may prefer retreat to avoid being entangled in state rivalries. Hutchison pre-emptively mitigated the risk of being labelled a “Chinese state proxy” in a critical geopolitical theatre. This move not only alleviated Western concerns about Hutchison’s control of Panama’s ports but also demonstrated the group’s ability to act with commercial neutrality and flexibility, preserving its ability to operate, finance, and expand in Western markets without being constrained by the “Chinese capital” label. For Beijing, however, this retreat risks weakening China’s global port footprint. This highlights a potential divergence between the commercial logic of Hong Kong firms and China’s strategic ambitions. Why did Beijing intervened? 1. Loss of Chinese Strategic Assets and Diplomatic Advantage The Panama Canal is among the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and control of its ports carries weight far beyond commerce. For China, investment in Latin American terminals has been part of a wider strategy to shape global shipping routes and enhance strategic reach. From Beijing’s perspective, CK Hutchison’s divestment was more than a business transaction. This was a strategic setback. The transfer of control to U.S.-linked interests was seen as a symbolic “recapture” of the terminals, which weakens China’s presence at a vital corridor. Within the Chinese leadership, the ports had been regarded as potential bargaining leverage in trade negotiations with Washington. But this loss reduced Beijing’s diplomatic toolkit at a time of rising frictions. The episode illustrates how Chinese policymakers increasingly view overseas ports as instruments of geopolitical positioning, not just commercial assets. Hutchison’s decision to sell underscored a broader reality: not all Chinese-affiliated enterprises act in alignment with state objectives. For Beijing, this implies that the Panama case highlighted the limits of relying on Hong Kong conglomerates to advance strategic interests abroad. For foreign governments and firms, it signalled both China’s heightened sensitivity to divestments in contested regions and the growing tension between corporate autonomy and state geopolitical expectations. 2. Absence of Beijing’s Prior Approval Sparked Political Backlash In the Panama Canal divestment, Beijing’s leadership reacted strongly against CK Hutchison’s “transaction first, then approval” approach. Beijing expressed dissatisfaction and even instructed state-owned enterprises to suspend new collaborations with the Li family, who serve as the controlling shareholders and principal decision-makers of Hutchison. Hutchison defended this sale as a “purely commercial and competitive process” by emphasizing Mediterranean Shipping Company as the principal buyer. Yet, in the context of intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, this stance was no longer acceptable. Regulatory pressure and political intervention from Beijing slowed negotiations, preventing the transaction from proceeding as planned. The broader precedent is clear: in strategically sensitive areas, Beijing now expects Hong Kong firms to align commercial decisions with state priorities. Neutrality is no longer an option. This marks a fundamental shift in the operating environment, binding the leading Hong Kong conglomerates more closely to state interests and constraining their room for independent strategic choices. For policymakers and investors, this implies that the Panama case shows how Beijing is extending political oversight into commercial domains once seen as autonomous. Hong Kong enterprises face increasing limits on their ability to separate business logic from state loyalty, particularly where Sino-U.S. rivalry is at stake. 3. Public Opinion as Strategic Pressure: Shaping a New Regional Order Beijing’s response to Hutchison’s Panama sale was not confined to official channels. Pro-Beijing media denounced the deal as disloyal and profit-driven, framing it as a matter of national honour. When the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, which is the Beijing central body responsible for overseeing Hong Kong and Macao affairs, amplified these narratives, they gained quasi-official status and exerted pressure on both Hutchison and other Hong Kong firms. This discourse resonated beyond China. The Panama Canal Authority warned that excessive concentration of terminal assets could undermine neutrality and competitiveness. This wording strikingly complies with Beijing’s “anti-hegemony” rhetoric. By shaping the terms of debate, Beijing positioned itself to argue for greater balance and competition in Panama’s port operations. Looking ahead, China advocates to leverage new concession tenders to advance its tactical objectives: strengthening the role of China Ocean Shipping Company, counterbalancing U.S. and European dominance and embedding Chinese capital in Latin America’s maritime infrastructure. More broadly, the case illustrates how Beijing integrates public opinion, regulatory narratives, and commercial strategy to shape a regional order more favourable to its interests. For policymakers, this implies that Panama demonstrates how Beijing transforms domestic media pressure into a tool of international influence. What begins as reputational discipline at home can translate into bargaining leverage abroad, particularly in contested regions where infrastructure and influence are intertwined. Points of Special Relevance: Beijing’s Strategic Signal Beijing’s intervention in the Panama Canal case should be read not as a single act but as a strategic signal. Its aims to prevent U.S. and European firms from consolidating control at a vital chokepoint and to avoid the appearance of “losing” strategic assets. At the same time, Beijing used this episode to remind Hong Kong conglomerates that in sensitive geopolitical contexts, commercial logic alone is no longer sufficient. The Panama case demonstrates how Beijing leverages commercial disputes as instruments of statecraft. The more plausible outcome is a conditional arrangement to encourage Panama to introduce mechanisms that limit Western influence in Latin America. China seeks structural adjustments that preserve its influence and reshape the regional order to its advantage. From Neutrality to National Loyalty As U.S. China tensions intensify, many multinational firms pursue de-risking strategies: not full decoupling as it is economically unviable, but carefully calibrated ambiguity that allows them to operate in both markets without explicit political commitments. This balancing act is becoming harder in Hong Kong. Since 1997, the influx of mainland state-linked enterprises has blurred the line between state and market. Benefiting from the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, these firms embedded political expectations into business norms. Ties to the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are increasingly relevant in Hong Kong. By 2019, Beijing moved further, promoting patriotism in the business sector such as the Greater Bay Area Business Support Scheme, which channels funding toward firms demonstrating “patriotic entrepreneurship” or contributions to “national rejuvenation”. The result is a growing convergence of economic and political expectations. Commercial autonomy is increasingly contingent on political alignment, eroding the distinction between business logic and ideological loyalty. For investors and firms, this raises strategic concerns: - Will political loyalty requirements constrain the free flow of capital? - Could companies risk state intervention or even nationalization if perceived as acting against China’s interests? These questions remain unresolved, but Hutchison’s Panama case shows how quickly a commercial decision can be redefined as a matter of national loyalty. The broader uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong’s business environment will shape the city’s role as a financial hub in the decade ahead. This is my view on things: An Outlook on Hong Kong Looking ahead, the space for Hong Kong conglomerates to maintain commercial neutrality is narrowing. The rise of a nationalist business paradigm means companies must increasingly balance political conformity with economic self-interest. Two scenarios are emerging: 1. “Hong Kong, then China”: firms retain some operational autonomy and global credibility by prioritizing commercial logic, while carefully managing political sensitivities. 2. “China, then Hong Kong”: political loyalty takes precedence, with business priorities subordinated to national strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Which path prevails will determine Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub. The tension between economic liberalism and political loyalty is no longer abstract. It is becoming the defining fault line for Hong Kong’s business landscape in the decade ahead.

On 29 September 2025, President Trump held a press conference along with his counterpart, Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and issued 20 Points detailed peace plan for the war-torn Gaza, though he claims that the plan was backed by prominent Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and some other’s. By and large these Muslim states also welcomed the Plan, most importantly Palestinian political body which is Palestinian Liberation Organization also called the plan an opportunity to end the war on Gaza. Some significant points of the peace plan. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned. (Gjevori, 2025)Role of ArabsSince the start of Trump’s tenure  and the new American administration Arabs were making efforts to stop the long running Gaza War, they propose alternatives to Trump’s Gaza Rivera plan and so on. (Jazeera, 2025) Now, when eventually Gaza Peace Plan announced by Trump, they (Arabs ) not only endorsed the Plan but also Nations like Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye take part in negotiations with Hamas and Israel, along with envoy to Middle East Steve Witkoff, and finally brought some relief for Gazans like (ceasefire and immediate supplies of aid) which is very crucial for the starving people Gaza. (Irish, 2025)Proposed Governance ModelGaza would be governed by technocrats, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day public services and municipal functions in Palestine. The committee would be composed of qualified Palestinian and International experts. They will be overseen by a body called the Board of Peace. There would be a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF). To oversee security in Gaza during transition. (Walsh, 2025)Parties response to the plan.Hamas, which is the military body of Gaza has also issued a response to Trump’s Plan, in which they accepted the demands like hostage release, and to hand over the administration of Gaza to independent Technocrats, but they clearly stated that they want to negotiate over some points through mediators.PLO which is Political body of Palestine, welcomed the ceasefire but they are opposed to hand over Gaza’s governance to foreign actors, as Nasser al- Qudwa, a prominent Palestinian and Nephew of Yasser Arafat, has warned against foreign governance of Gaza post-Hamas, (Newspaper, 2025) stressing that leadership must be rooted locally rather than imposed from abroad. The statement highlights the potential opposition and undermines the credibility of the plan.The Israeli Prime Minister called the plan as their victory and fulfillment of their objectives, as they want to decommission Hamas, they will achieve this once the plan is implemented. The tunnels which were in Gaza and which caused Israel unbearable damage, especially in early days of war. (Bronner l., 2025) They are also going to get rid of them by Hamas exclusion and their deradicalization and development of infrastructure by independent actors. The most favorable point for Israel is Trump's statement that “if Hamas does not accept the plan then you [Netanyahu] are allowed to finish the job in Gaza and destroy Hamas completely”. (Griner, 2025) Which I think is a very provocative statement and can cause more bloodshed of innocent civilians. which may end up in complete occupation of the Strip.  Since the day Trump’s plan for Gaza was announced, the Israeli military did not slow down their advancement in the strip, instead they continued with their actions against civilians which reflect their intentions clearly.But for the implementation of the so-called peace plan and to further discuss over its terms both parties take part in negotiations in Egypt. With the mediation of Qatar and Egypt, these negotiations continued for days and then concluded with the statement made by Donald Trump that Israel and Hamas have agreed to his peace plan for Gaza. The Israeli military says that a ceasefire in Palestinian territory took effect on Friday 10th. And that it has begun to withdraw from parts of the Strip as per plan. The first phase of Trump's plan is expected to see the release of all 20 living Israeli hostages in exchange for around 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,700 detainees from Gaza. Increased amounts of aid will also enter the Strip. (BBC, 2025). On October 13th, Hamas released the 20 living hostages and Israel began to release the Palestinian prisoners. (BBC, 2025) The same day, in Sharm El Shaikh, Egypt, an international peace summit was held, attended by representatives from various nations, - including Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK, among others – but notably excluding Hamas and Israel representatives. The summit focused on humanitarian access to Gaza and mechanisms to monitor the proposed ceasefire, aiming to end the two-year war. The outcome was the signing of a joint declaration by Egypt, US, Qatar and Türkiye. Despite these recent developments, the Plan gave the UN only a minimal role, limited to the supply of aid. Although the UN was created to maintain world peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully, when we see the plan, Trump did not assign any role to the peace keeping body, instead he appointed Tony Blair [former British PM, who invaded Iraq in 2003] as head of the Board of peace, which is an international Transitional body whose responsibility is to supervise the apolitical Palestinian committee (responsible for day to day running activities in Gaza). AnalysesThe future of the 20 Points Plan is quite uncertain because it neither has a security guarantee for Palestinian nor any durable provisions about the existence of Palestinian state. The plan calls for an ISF (International stabilization Force) which will be deployed in Gaza immediately for ensuring peace, but the fact is the world does not have a pool of experienced peacekeeping force for this purpose that can handle the situation.  Furthermore, the Israeli PM made it clear that there is no meaningful withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza anytime soon.Moreover, the Plan prohibits Israeli annexation of Gaza, but it does not address the issue of the West Bank. Annexation there is opposed by present and potential Abraham Accord States. But I think soft annexation there would be continued through expansion and establishment of settlement. (weller, 2025)ConclusionWhile the world is admiring Trump’s 20 Points Peace Plan, how can we think of peace anywhere, without an army, and most importantly without recognizing the place as a sovereign State with demarcated borders? Although the Plan has some appealing aspects like immediate ceasefire, entry of aid, development of infrastructure in Gaza and exchange of prisoners, it lacks in terms of security from future Israeli aggression, and it also has no provision about the Palestinian state with borders of before 1967 with East Jerusalem as its Capital. Furthermore, if the plan is implemented Palestinians will be governed by the people of other countries, who will govern them as per the policy devised by the committee, (whose members probably belong to West and other States) not according to the needs and opinion of Palestinians. Which may add more to their misery. So, for a short span of time the Plan may seem like the end of war, but in the long run if more reforms like the recognition of Palestinian statehood and its existence will not be made, then this is just a start of a new occupation. References BBC. (2025, october 9).  BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgqx7ygq41o.ampBBC. (2025, october 14). BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c740jx07vz0oBronner, L. (2025, september 30). Le Monde.  https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/30/netanyahu-accepts-trump-s-gaza-peace-plan-under-pressure-but-sets-conditions_6745930_4.html?utmGjevori, E. (2025, sep 29). al jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/9/29/heres-the-full-text-of-trumps-20-point-plan-to-end-israels-war-on-gazaGriner, A. (2025, oct 3). AL Jazeera. from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/3/trump-issues-sunday-deadline-for-hamas-to-accept-gaza-peace-proposal?utm_sourceIrish, J. (2025, october 8). Reuters. from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/europeans-arabs-meet-flesh-out-next-phase-trump-gaza-plan-2025-10-09/?utm_sourceJazeera, A. (2025, feb 21). Al Jazeera. Arab leaders hold a meeting and discuss alternatives to GazaNewspaper, T. T. (2025, october). the times.  https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/nasser-al-qudwa-gaza-hamas-palestine-israel-news-vl7xmgct9?utm_sourceWeller, M. (2025, oct 2). Cathom house. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/can-trump-peace-plan-gaza-succeed?utm

The United States is facing a political polarization that has been increasing over time. Every event in the country ends up highlighting the opposing poles in politics — that is, between the Republican and Democratic parties. Consequently, supporters of each side further divide the country to the point of validating violence as a method of political action. The social tension and polarized environment have become so evident that former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated that sanctions against Russia could last forever, or until the United States collapses during an imminent civil war (Venegas, 2024). The reflection of this polarization was evident when right-wing political activist Charlie Kirk was assassinated, and some left-wing sympathizers reacted by celebrating his death. For his part, President Donald Trump stated that “the problem of violence lies with the left” (The White House, 2025). Similarly, Elon Musk posted on his X account: “The left is the party of murder” (Musk, 2025). Right-wing influencer Andrew Tate wrote on X: “Civil war” (Tate, 2025). However, even before Kirk’s assassination, political polarization in the United States and the perception of a possible civil war were already on the rise. A study published in 2024 found that approximately 1 in every 20 respondents strongly agreed that “in the coming years, there will be a civil war in the United States.” Furthermore, “1 in 25 of those who strongly agreed that a civil war was coming also agreed that ‘the United States needs a civil war to set things right’” (Wintemute et al., 2024). Another study confirmed that one in five Americans believes that violence motivated by political reasons is at least sometimes justified. Consequently, nearly half expect a civil war, and many say they would trade democracy for a strong leader (Pérez, 2022). A recent PBS survey indicates that 30% of Americans are considering resorting to violence to get the country back on track. This shows an increase in support for violence, as 18 months ago only 19% had given the same response (Loffman, 2025). When Barbara Walter joined the U.S. government’s Political Instability Task Force, they identified two factors that predict where political instability and a potential civil war are likely to erupt. First, it depends on whether the country is an anocracy — a government that is neither fully democratic nor autocratic, but something in between. Countries most at risk of civil wars are those that move rapidly from one end of the political spectrum to the other. For example, when the United States entered Iraq, overthrew Saddam Hussein, and tried to establish a democracy, it did not take long for a civil war to break out in that country. However, it can also happen in the opposite direction — that is, when a country transitions from a democracy to something less democratic (Walter, 2022). Secondly, if citizens have mobilized around identity — along ethnic, religious, or racial lines. If a country exhibits these two factors, it is considered at high risk of political violence. What surprised Barbara was realizing that both factors were emerging in the United States at a very rapid pace. Democracy was affected when President Trump refused to accept the 2020 election defeat, and thousands of people took to the streets to protest against the certification of the vote, challenging the election results. Then came the assault on the Capitol by Trump supporters (Mounk, 2021). Consequently, the U.S. was classified as an anocracy. And when a country falls into that category, Walter argues, the risk of political violence reaches its peak and, therefore, it is more likely to face a civil war. Parallels can be seen with Trump’s measures in his current administration. An analysis by The Associated Press showed that 30 of Trump’s 150 executive orders have cited some form of emergency power or authority — a rate far exceeding that of his recent predecessors. In this way, Trump used emergency powers to override Congress’s authority and push forward his political agenda (Tau et al., 2025). However, a U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that most of the tariffs imposed by Donald Trump are “invalid for being contrary to the law” and do not fall within presidential authority. On the contrary, establishing tariffs is “an essential power of Congress” (Matza & Zurcher, 2025). In response, the president wrote on his Truth Social account: “Today, a highly partisan appeals court incorrectly ruled that our tariffs should be removed, but it knows that the United States of America will win in the end” (Matza & Zurcher, 2025). In this way, Trump not only clashes with Congress but also with the Court of Appeals, as both conflict with the interests of his America First foreign policy. In addition, Justice Elena Kagan warned that the conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court allowed Donald Trump to carry out one of his policies without taking the usual time to review its legality. Since his return to a second term, the Court has acted in 23 emergency cases related to his policies, favoring him wholly or partially 21 times (Chung, 2025). In this way, the executive branch has been allowed to move forward with its measures without obstacles before their legality is determined. Consequently, this implies an increase in presidential power that could undermine Congress and the various federal judges who have ruled against him (Chung, 2025). When protests erupted in Los Angeles over the enforcement of immigration laws, Trump sent 2,000 National Guard troops. This measure heightened tensions with California Governor Gavin Newsom, who disagreed with Trump’s decision. “This isn’t about public safety,” said Newsom. “It’s about stroking the ego of a dangerous president” (Dearen et al., 2025). For his part, Trump stated that he would arrest Newsom if he was the “border czar.” The governor responded, “This is a line we cannot cross as a nation — this is an unequivocal step toward authoritarianism” (Hutzler, 2025). Later, on his X account, Newsom referred to Trump’s actions and wrote: “Inciting and provoking violence. Creating massive chaos. Militarizing cities. Arresting opponents. These are the acts of a dictator, not of a president” (Newsom, 2025). This dispute and exchange between the two political authorities further inflamed the conflict and division within California, clearly highlighting the difference between the state and federal approaches. In 2017, Keith Mines noted that if large-scale violence were to erupt in the United States and the National Guard were required to intervene, the chances of a civil war would be 60%. He considered factors such as deep national polarization among citizens, violence as a method for resolving disputes, the weakness of institutions, the press, and the judiciary. In such an environment, only one or a few events would be needed to trigger a large-scale civil conflict. Mines listed possible catalysts: the impeachment or removal of the president from office; a major terrorist attack coupled with a sense that the establishment cannot manage national security; an economic recession in which the president and his allies blame certain groups; or a war gone wrong that polarizes the country, with blame distributed in such a way that factions begin to turn against each other (Ricks, 2017). In 2019, historian Nina Silber pointed out that one of the signs of a possible civil war is the willingness of the masses to engage in violence against their political enemies. “That’s what happened in the 1860s,” she said. “People viewed their political opponents in extreme terms and found it impossible to reach common ground” (BU Today, 2019). In this line, the possibility of a civil war looms over the events that occur before an armed confrontation, as the actors involved use the threat of violence against their previously identified political adversaries. Thus, the triggering event would involve the sudden outbreak of large-scale violence intended to provoke reactions driven by fear, anger, or a desire for revenge. The actors and divisions of the eventual civil war would be a continuation of the political landscape that existed before its outbreak. While the war itself may generate new actors, its emergence only occurs after the escalation toward total conflict (Lacher, 2022). Therefore, considering this background, it can be inferred that while a civil war in the United States is not an inevitable outcome, there is a real possibility that it could occur if the growing political and social polarization persists, along with the normalization of violence as a means of resolving conflicts. Consequently, in a context of geopolitical tensions, this would affect other nations, since the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency and, as the leading global power, the United States continues to play a key role in the international system. As a result, political instability and institutional division within the U.S. could trigger another domino effect — but on a global scale. If the United States were to face a civil war, it would be weakened to the point of leaving a power vacuum in the world, which the BRICS bloc — led by China and Russia — would likely seek to exploit to reconfigure the international order. References BU Today. (2019). BU Historian Answers: Are We Headed for Another Civil War? Boston University. https://www.bu.edu/articles/2019/are-we-headed-for-another-civil-war/Chung, A. (2025). US Supreme Court expands its 'emergency' docket - and Trump's power too. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-supreme-court-expands-its-emergency-docket-trumps-power-too-2025-10-02/Hutzler, A. (2025). 'Acts of a dictator': Newsom lashes out at Trump after arrest threat. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/war-words-trump-newsom-la-protests-escalates-arrest/story?id=122662589Lacher, W. (2022). How does civil war begin? The role of escalatory processes. Violence: An International Journal, 3(2), 139-161.  https://doi.org/10.1177/26330024221130364Loffman, M. (2025). There’s a growing number of Americans who think violence might be necessary to get the country back on track. PBS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/theres-a-growing-number-of-americans-who-think-violence-might-be-necessary-to-get-the-country-back-on-trackMatza, M. y Zurcher, A. (2025). Un tribunal de EE.UU. dictamina que la mayoría de los aranceles globales de Trump son ilegales. BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c0j90d5pe19oMounk, Y. (2021). After Trump, Is American Democracy Doomed by Populism? Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/after-trump-american-democracy-doomed-populismMusk, E. (2025). [@elonmusk]. The left is the party of murder. X. https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1965859343351558352Newsom, G. (2025). [@GavinNewsom]. X. https://x.com/GavinNewsom/status/1931848215802028394Pérez, R. (2022). Half of Americans anticipate a U.S. civil war soon, survey finds. Science. https://www.science.org/content/article/half-of-americans-anticipate-a-us-civil-war-soon-survey-findsRicks, T. (2017). Will we have a civil war? A SF officer turned diplomat estimates chances at 60 percent. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/will-we-have-a-civil-war-a-sf-officer-turned-diplomat-estimates-chances-at-60-percent/Tate, A. [@Cobratate]. (2025). Civil war. X. https://x.com/Cobratate/status/1965866748512780686Tau et al. (2025). The 911 presidency: Trump flexes emergency powers in his second term. AP. https://apnews.com/article/trump-emergency-powers-tariffs-immigration-5cbe386d8f2cc4a374a5d005e618d76aThe White House. (2025). President Trump Isn’t Backing Down from Crushing Radical Left Violence. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/09/president-trump-isnt-backing-down-from-crushing-radical-left-violence/Venegas, N. (2024). Putin Ally Predicts US Will Collapse in ‘Imminent New Civil War’. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/putin-ally-dmitry-medvedev-predicts-us-collapse-imminent-civil-war-1950276Walter, B. (2022). Is the US headed toward civil war? Political violence at a glace. https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2022/01/06/is-the-us-headed-toward-civil-war/Wintemute et al. (2024). Expectations of and perceived need for civil war in the USA: findings from a 2023 nationally representative survey. Injury Epidemiology. 11(40). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40621-024-00521-5

1. Introduction Since the Korean War, South Korea had long relied on U.S.-made tanks, but in the 1970s it launched a full-scale domestic tank development program under the principle of self-reliant national defense. As a result, beginning with the K1 tank, the country gradually increased its localization rate, and today it has fielded the highly advanced K2 Black Panther, placing itself among the world’s leading tank powers. However, when compared to major tanks competing in the global defense market, a comprehensive analysis is still required not only in terms of performance, but also in cost-effectiveness and export competitiveness. This study examines the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and analyzes the performance of the K2 in comparison with other global competitors to highlight its export potential and strategic significance. 2. Early Background: The Korean War – Early 1970s During the Korean War 1950-1953, North Korean forces launched their invasion spearheaded by the Soviet Union’s best-selling tank, the T-34. In contrast, South Korea did not possess a single tank at the time. The power of the T-34 allowed the North Korean army to advance rapidly in the early stages of the war. However, the arrival of U.S. ground forces changed the situation. The M24 Chaffee light tank was the first to be deployed, followed by the M4 Sherman medium tank, the M26 Pershing heavy/medium tank, and the M46 Patton medium tank, all of which overwhelmed the North Korean forces. Thanks to this reinforcement, the Nakdong River defensive line was held, and the tide of the war shifted in favor of the UN forces. Additionally, by late 1950, the British Army had committed its renowned A41 Centurion tanks to the conflict. After the war, in 1959, South Korea received the M47 Patton tank from the United States as part of its allied support policy and broader equipment modernization program. After the war, South Korea relied on U.S. assistance until 1970 to accumulate experience in operating and maintaining tanks. In particular, in 1966, when the M48 Patton tanks were provided by the United States, South Korea also received a Technical Data Package (TDP), which included key technology transfers alongside major upgrades. Through this, South Korea acquired comprehensive expertise in armor casting and welding, production processes, precision manufacturing and assembly, as well as quality inspection and testing. This foundation became a crucial stepping stone for the subsequent development of the Korean tank industry. 3. Development of the K1 Indigenous Tank: 1970s–1980s Under President Park Chung-hee’s policy of self-reliant national defense, South Korea launched the Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) program in 1975 in cooperation with the United States. Following the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1978, full-scale development began. The design direction was set to base the new tank on the form and performance of the U.S. Army’s latest third-generation tank at the time, the M1 Abrams. Chrysler Defense (now GDLS), the manufacturer of the M1, participated in the project, while South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development and Hyundai Precision (now Hyundai Rotem) worked together to create a smaller, terrain-optimized “Little Abrams” for the Korean Peninsula. In April 1984, two prototypes were produced, and after passing a series of tests, mass production began in 1985. The production K1 tank was armed with a 105 mm rifled gun and equipped with a 1,200 horsepower German MTU-series diesel engine, built with General Dynamics technology. A key feature was the adoption of a hydropneumatic suspension system, allowing adjustable ground clearance suited for Korea’s mountainous terrain. The tank weighed 51.5 tons, carried a crew of four, and a total of 1,026 units were produced between 1985 and 1997. During its service, the upgraded K1A1 variant was developed, featuring a 120 mm smoothbore gun, improved fire-control systems, and enhanced armor protection. A total of 484 K1A1s were produced between 1996 and 2008. Subsequent modernized versions, the K1E1 and K1E2, have ensured that the K1 series continues to serve as a core component of the South Korean Army’s armored forces. 4. The K2 Black Panther: 2000s – Present Beginning in 1996, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces acquired 68 T-80U tanks from Russia as repayment for an economic cooperation loan. At the time, the T-80U was Russia’s latest main battle tank, and for South Korean engineers, who had previously only worked with U.S.-made tanks, it provided a valuable opportunity to gain direct experience with a new model. The lessons learned from operating the T-80U contributed significantly to the later development of the K2 tank. After the Ministry of National Defense announced its next-generation tank program in 1992, a system concept study was carried out in 1995, followed by exploratory development in 1998. In 2003, full-scale system development began. By 2007, three prototypes were unveiled for operational testing and evaluation, and mass production was initially scheduled to begin in 2012. However, issues arose during the development of the domestic powerpack (engine and transmission). These included an engine protection temperature setting error, which failed to safeguard the engine from overheating, and insufficient cooling fan speed in the transmission at maximum output, which led to inadequate cooling. Despite multiple redesigns, persistent problems in performance and reliability testing delayed deployment. As a result, the first production batch of 100 K2 tanks was equipped with Germany’s MTU engines and RENK transmissions instead of the domestic powerpack. These vehicles began delivery to the ROK Army in April 2014. By September 2014, the domestic engine had passed the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s evaluation, and the second batch of 106 tanks and the third batch of 54 tanks were produced with a “hybrid powerpack”—a Korean-made engine combined with a German transmission. Starting with the fourth production batch, SNT Dynamics’ domestic transmission was successfully integrated, completing full localization of the K2 powerpack. Unlike its predecessor, the K1, which had been developed under the leadership of General Dynamics and relied heavily on U.S. components, the K2 Black Panther is a fully indigenous South Korean tank. With domestically developed engines and transmissions, it achieved a high localization rate, giving South Korea independence from U.S. and German export restrictions and allowing greater freedom in operating and exporting its tanks. As South Korea’s most advanced tank, the K2 incorporates cutting-edge technologies that set it apart from its predecessors. These include a 120 mm smoothbore gun, an active protection system (APS), an autoloader, and stealth features, delivering superior mobility, protection, and firepower. Today, it stands as a core asset of the South Korean Army. Specifications (K2 Black Panther):Crew: 3Weight: 55 tonsEngine: Doosan Infracore DV-27K diesel engineTransmission: SNT Dynamics EST15K automatic transmissionMain Gun: Hyundai WIA 120 mm smoothbore CN08Fire Control System: South Korean domestic technologyArmor: Korean-developed composite armor  5. Timeline of South Korea’s Tank Development: From U.S. Aid to the K2 The introduction and development of tanks in the ROK Army have been organized in a chronological timeline with images. This timeline is designed to provide a clear overview of the entire progression — from U.S. aid tanks, to tanks acquired from Russia, and finally to the development of indigenous Korean tanks.   6. K2 vs. Regional Main Battle Tanks — Performance Comparison Tank performance can be compared across four key categories: Mobility, Firepower, Protection, and Sensors & C4I. MobilityComponents: engine & transmission (powerpack), suspension, roadwheels, sprockets, tracks, and fuel systems.Role: determines speed, acceleration, cross-country mobility, and operational range. Maintainability (ease of maintenance and access) is also included here. FirepowerComponents: main armament (gun) — barrel and mantlet, stabilization system, autoloading/manual loading systems, coaxial and anti-aircraft machine guns, ammunition stowage.Role: defines ability to defeat enemy armor and other targets, hit probability (integrated with the fire-control system), and ammunition variety (e.g., APFSDS, HE).ProtectionComponents: baseline composite/steel armor, explosive reactive armor (ERA), active protection systems (APS), smoke generation, fire suppression and NBC protection, and crew survivability compartments.Role: protects crew and systems from penetration, fragmentation, anti-tank weapons, and environmental threats.Sensors & C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)Components: fire-control system (FCS), thermal and night sights, laser rangefinder, communications suites, electronic warfare and laser warning receivers, and power-management systems.Role: responsible for target acquisition, firing accuracy, and networked combat — i.e., information sharing with friendly forces.Below is a comparison of the K2 and the region’s current main battle tanks.    The K2 Black Panther is regarded as a world-class main battle tank, demonstrating well-balanced excellence in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic systems compared to neighboring countries’ tanks. 7. South Korea’s Tank Export Outlook and Key CasesWhile exports of the K1 tank were restricted due to U.S. technology regulations, the K2 tank—developed with fully indigenous Korean technology—became eligible for overseas sales. In 2022, South Korea successfully signed a contract with Poland, and negotiations are currently underway with countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, signaling the expansion of Korean tanks into the global defense market. 7.1. Turkish Joint Development of the Altay Tank Based on the K2 (USD 540 million)In 2007, South Korea signed a design support and technology transfer contract with Turkey for the development of the Altay main battle tank. Under this agreement, South Korea transferred several core technologies derived from the K2 tank, including:- 120 mm CN08 smoothbore gun technology (Korean-produced main gun)Advanced armor and composite equipment design consultation and production support- Powerpack (engine + transmission) technology transfer and testing: the Altay successfully completed durability trials with the HD Hyundai Infracore engine and SNT Dynamics transmission The Altay is scheduled to enter full-scale mass production in 2025, with an initial production run of 250 units and a long-term goal of building up to 1,000 tanks. 7.2. K2 Export to Poland: First Batch of 180 Units (USD 3.4 billion), Second Batch of 180 Units (USD 6.5 billion) In 2022, the K2 tank was selected by Poland over strong competitors such as Germany’s Leopard 2A7 and the U.S. M1A2 Abrams. The key factors behind this successful export were as follows: - Rapid delivery and phased supply: South Korea demonstrated its ability to deliver tanks within a very short timeframe. Following the 2022 contract, the first batch of 10 units was delivered within the same year. By contrast, competitors faced production line bottlenecks, raising concerns over delivery delays. - Modern design with European upgrade potential: The K2 features a 120 mm 55-caliber smoothbore gun, an autoloader, an active protection system (APS), and hydropneumatic suspension—technologies equal to or in some cases more advanced than those found in Europe’s latest MBTs. Moreover, South Korea promised to develop a localized version, the K2PL, through joint development with Poland, tailored to Polish requirements. - Local production and technology transfer: South Korea offered local production of the K2PL, guaranteeing the participation of Polish defense industries, along with technology transfer, industrial cooperation, and the prospect of using Poland as a base for future exports. - Cost competitiveness: Despite being a state-of-the-art tank, the K2 is relatively more affordable than the M1A2 or Leopard 2A7. Maintenance and sustainment costs are also projected to be lower than those of European tanks, giving the K2 a strong reputation as a “cost-effective MBT” with excellent value for performance. - Tactical versatility and advanced systems: Equipped with an autoloader, hydropneumatic suspension, and advanced smart fire-control systems, the K2 offers outstanding adaptability across diverse operational environments, including mountainous terrain, urban warfare, and extreme cold.Through this deal, South Korea and Poland established a relationship that goes beyond a simple arms sale, building long-term defense industry partnership and mutual trust. Potential export destinations for the K2 include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Morocco, and India. 8. Comparison of Tanks from Export Competitor Nations South Korea’s K2 tank has attracted global attention for its outstanding performance, but the international tank market is already dominated by several major players.This chapter analyzes and compares the leading tanks that compete with the K2, while also examining each country’s export competitiveness.   The K2 Black Panther, while incorporating cutting-edge technologies, is lighter than many Western main battle tanks, resulting in relatively lower sustainment costs. It is therefore widely regarded as a cost-effective, well-balanced tank. The cost of a tank varies greatly depending on its design and configuration, but if we break down the production cost (manufacturing, components, and assembly) into four categories, the estimated shares are as follows:- Protection: 30–40%- Firepower: 20–30%- Mobility: 15–25%- Electronics & C4I: 15–25% The actual share, however, depends on specific factors. For example, the use of advanced armor materials (composite/uranium) or the inclusion of an Active Protection System (APS) significantly increases protection costs. Similarly, specialized gun and ammunition systems (such as a 120mm smoothbore, autoloader, or advanced munitions) raise firepower costs. Integration, testing, and safety features greatly affect electronics costs, while options like autoloaders, high-performance thermal sights, and networked systems can heavily influence the final balance. Other important factor is Lifecycle Perspective (Unit Cost vs. Total Life-Cycle Cost), which can be defined as below.- Procurement: About 20–30% of total life-cycle cost (highly variable)- Operations & Support (O&S): 60–70% — dominated by fuel, maintenance, spare parts, and maintenance personnel costs- Upgrades & Depreciation: 10–20% In other words, the long-term operation and maintenance costs take up a much larger share than the initial procurement cost of a tank.Below is a comparison table of modern main battle tank costs: unit acquisition cost, annual sustainment cost, and 30-year life-cycle cost (procurement + sustainment).*The sustainment cost for China’s Type 99A and Russia’s T-90M is an estimate.   9. Conclusion This study has systematically examined the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and verified the level of their advancement through performance comparisons with leading global competitors. In particular, the K2 has demonstrated balanced capabilities in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic command-and-control, supported by advanced technologies and a high degree of localization. At the same time, it offers superior cost-efficiency in sustainment and operational expenses compared to heavier Western MBTs. This makes the K2 not only a key asset for strengthening domestic defense, but also a competitive and cost-effective platform in the global arms market. Taken together, these findings suggest that South Korea’s tanks have progressed beyond being a mere symbol of self-reliant defense, and are now positioned to expand exports and build long-term strategic partnerships worldwide.

The shadow of artificial intelligence looms over the world; depending on the region, it takes the shape of a Chinese dragon or of Miss Manifest Destiny. But AI is among us, little by little taking up space, absorbing ideas without asking, constantly feeding itself in an endless cycle that, whether we accept it or not, undoubtedly consumes the Earth’s energy. While it is an ambiguous promise to affirm that the wave of AI will eventually end, the reality is that it is here, not only consuming but also spreading information that, as we know, is mostly the equivalent of junk content and misinformation — though at a scale greater than anyone would have foreseen. At the same time, it is managing to change the globalizing culture of the internet, transforming the feelings, tastes, and aversions of future generations. It is therefore imperative in these current times to think about what steps the LAC region (Latin America and the Caribbean) should or should not take in the face of the unbridled advance of AI. It is on the basis of this vital point for the future and destiny of LAC that the present reflection is made. It is crucial to delve into some of the opportunities that currently exist in the region for the development, implementation, and transformation of artificial intelligence in Latin America and the Caribbean. As we know, the region is home to enormous wealth, opportunities, and human capital — both labor and intellectual — that, if necessary, it can provide both momentum and renewal to the idea of artificial intelligence from the so-called peripheral countries, in this case, Latin America and the Caribbean. As an example, we can point to Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile (the lithium triangle) (Obaya, 2021), countries in which key raw materials such as lithium and copper give them a crucial role in the future goals of the countries where the main AI companies and corporations originate. This can bring both opportunities and future technological, economic, and social dependencies. That is why the region must learn to manage its resources to its advantage through active regional networks, with ethical and participatory governance, as well as a strong and structured digital diplomacy with a collective voice. But above all, with technological ethics combined with a rationality-based regulatory framework prepared to address humanitarian, social, environmental, and business needs in a harmonious way — also encouraging sociocultural communities to participate actively, considering the natural life cycle of the norms which could, as a likely outcome, eventually form part of a new international regulatory framework. This would be especially necessary given the shortcomings of the international community in addressing issues of constant innovation and impact. In the framework of AI’s evolution and development, this may not be too complicated due to the inherent characteristics of this technology — a technology that will end up being so embedded in daily human life that it will be difficult not to be part of it without being left behind, especially considering the undeniable commercial, social, planetary, and geopolitical relevance represented by dominance over the AI market. And this is without even mentioning the possible arrival of generative AI, which would raise even more issues and concerns. It is also significantly important to understand some of the advances and initiatives being planned or deployed in the LAC region, such as Mexico’s collaboration with Nvidia to develop a Mexican AI language (Mota, 2025). Another example is AI4D, an initiative of Canada’s IDRC, along with other foreign strategic partners (Artificial Intelligence for Development, n.d.). This initiative promotes inclusive, ethical, and human-centered AI, aiming to include itself in different regions of the Global South. Among some of the cases that demonstrate the enormous potential of this initiative are the CENIA in Chile (Centro Nacional de Investigación en Inteligencia Artificial, CENIA, n.d.) and BID Lab in LAC (BID Lab, n.d.), both of which foster comprehensive technological development in the region. While all of the above sounds like a real opportunity to foster the development of a region historically lagging in many social, economic, and technological matters, we must also document our pessimism. That is, we must keep in mind some of the key challenges that, depending on where we put the pin on the map, reveal a diversity of problems that could alter the course of many of these opportunities and initiatives. Among some of the relevant issues are corruption, political instability, technical and economic gaps in LAC—as in other regions of the Global South—criminal networks that in some cases are categorized as terrorist, and others. It is also very important to consider the potential future use of artificial intelligence as automated and systematic instruments of repression by authoritarian governments; its implementation within the criminal organizations of the region; the use of LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems) (Perrin, 2025); or the creation of new easily producible drugs that could cause regional destabilization. In this last regard, the events in Nepal cast a shadowy expectation of the collusion of digital platforms and the use of AI for strategic and recolonizing purposes in service of capital and platforms — without the need for the pretext of drugs or terrorism. In addition, it is important to consider the historical scars of exploitation, abuse, and oppression in the LAC region by foreign forces. Therefore, it is not only important but imperative for the interests of the region to work within a framework of equality and not subordination to the current and future interests of the companies and nations that will focus on the region, which undoubtedly possesses geostrategic strength. Thus, the international rhetoric of the nations forming part of LAC must change or transform in order to put the interests of the region first, to make the most of the wave of artificial intelligence with strategy and geopolitical thought. This is not to mention some of the challenges that as a region we will have to face, such as the fragmentation of regional institutions in LAC, the lack of coordination, and the absence of a unified regional agenda outlining the steps to be taken as a region toward AI implementation, innovation, education, and ethical use — as well as the influence of global powerbrokers, namely digital platforms, in their capacity to remove and install governments in the Global South. The challenge, as can be seen, is enormous. However, the context of the new tripolar world order fuels positive expectations for LAC’s integration in a position of strength to act with national and regional aims that benefit the majority. References Artificial Intelligence for Development. (s.f.). Ai4D.ai. Recuperado el 17 de septiembre de 2025, de https://www.ai4d.aiBID Lab. (s.f.). BID Lab. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Recuperado el 17 de febrero de 2025, de https://bidlab.org/esCentro Nacional de Investigación en Inteligencia Artificial – CENIA. (s.f.). Investigación UC. Recuperado el 17 de febrero de 2025, de https://investigacion.uc.cl/centros-de-excelencia/centro-nacional-de-investigacion-en-inteligencia-artificial-ceniaMota, C. (2025, julio 31). La estrategia de Nvidia en México. El Heraldo de México. https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2025/7/31/la-estrategia-de-nvidia-en-mexico-719056.htmlObaya, M. (2021). Una mirada estratégica sobre el triángulo del litio. Buenos Aires: Fundar.Perrin, B. (2025, enero 24). Lethal autonomous weapons systems & international law: Growing momentum towards a new international treaty. ASIL Insights, 29(1). https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/1