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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On September 24, 2024, speaking from the gargantuan Kazan International Exhibition Centre during the BRICS Summit in Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphatically extolled the “collective rise of the Global South [as] a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world.” While celebrating “Global South countries marching together toward modernization [as] monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” the Chinese leader hastened to add that China was not quite a part of but at the Global South’s “forefront”; that “will always keep the Global South in [their] heart, and maintain [their]roots in the Global South. As emerging powers in the BRICS+ grouping thronged Kazan in a clear sign to the West that they would not unwittingly entrench Vladimir Putin’s full-scale diplomatic isolation, China’s message was clear: as a great power, they would not ignore or undermine the interests of the Global South.  The rise of the Global South as a central voice in world politics concurs with the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a diplomatic field. This is not a coincidence, as they are both intimately related to broader changes in the international order, away from a US-led liberal international order, toward a post-liberal one, whose contours are still being defined, but where informal groupings, such as the BRICS+ play a key role. One could even argue that it is this transition to a new order that has pushed states to engage diplomatically on issues around cyberspace. What was once the purview of the Global North, and particularly the US, is now a contested domain of international activity. In this text we explore how the Global South has entered this contestation, and how it articulates its ever-growing presence in shaping the agenda of this domain. However, as cyber diplomacy is mainstreamed across the Global South, it is unclear whether it will continue to be a relevant collective force in forging the rules and norms that govern cyberspace, or whether the tendency will be for each country to trace their own path in service of their independent national interests. The evolution of cyber diplomacy in a post-liberal world Cyber diplomacy is very recent. One could argue that its practice only really started in the late 1990s, with Russia’s proposal of an international treaty to ban electronic and information weapons. Cyber diplomacy, as “the use of diplomatic resources and the performance of diplomatic functions to secure national interests with regard to the cyberspace” (or more simply, to the “the application of diplomacy to cyberspace”  is even more recent, with the first few writings on the topic emerging only in the last 15 years.   To be sure, the internet was born at the zenith of the US-led liberal international order and was viewed as an ideal tool to promote based on liberalism, free trade and information exchange with limited government intervention and democratic ideals. Cyber libertarians extolled the virtues of an independent cyberspace, free from state control and western governments, particularly the US, did not disagree. They viewed the internet as the perfect tool for promoting US global power and maintaining liberal hegemony -“ruling the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas.” The internet was ensconced in the relatively uncontested unipolar geopolitical moment. As the pipe dreams of a liberal cyberspace began to unravel with China and Russia pushing for an alternate state-centric vision of cyberspace, cyber diplomacy began to emerge both as a “response to and continuing factor in the continuing battle in and over cyberspace.” Explicitly, we can pin down its origin to two factors. First, is the perception that cyberspace was becoming an increasingly intertwined with geopolitics and geo-economics, with states starting to better understand its threats, but also its opportunities. Moonlight Maze, the 2007 attacks against Estonia or even Stuxnet were all cases that helped focus the mind of policymakers around the world. Second, the broader context of underlying changes in the international order necessitated cyber diplomacy as a bridge-building activity both to mitigate great power rivalry and to preserve the stability of cyberspace and the digital economy. Private companies, till then the beneficiaries of an open and de-regulated internet, also had to step in to ensure that their own interests and profit motives were safeguarded. These two intertwined factors dominated the discussions around cyber diplomacy for most of the 2000s. Initially, the predominant focus was arms control, reflected in the composition of the first few Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) iterations, the forum created by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to discuss the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in international security. And although experts appointed by countries from the Global South were present since the first meeting in July 2004 the debate was very much framed as a discussion among great powers. As discussions progressed, and the GGE became a process in itself, some states outside the permanent members’ group started to engage more actively. This also coincided with the progressive creation of cyber diplomacy posts and offices in foreign ministries around the world. The field was becoming more professional, as more states started to realise that these were discussions that mattered beyond the restrictive group of power politics. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, or Kenya started to push for the discussion of issues that affected a larger group of states, with a particular focus on cyber capacity building not just at the UN-GGE but also at other multilateral and multi-stakeholder processes and conferences including the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN First Committee (after an acrimonious diplomatic process) had an important effect in the diversification and democratisation of the discussions, as these were now open to the whole UN membership, and non-state actors were given the opportunity to observe and participate in these sessions. Further, in 2022, the UN set up an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a cybercrime convention (adopted by consensus by UNGA members in December 2024) that also enabled all UN members to participate in the negotiations. The opening up of these processes exposed many states, particularly in the Global South, to the field, and it forced them to actively engage in discussions that until recently were seen as the dominion of great powers. The African Group and the G77 were now able to actively participate in the discussions, with frequent statements and contributions. Conceptualising the Global South in cyber diplomacy As cyber diplomacy progressed, policy-maker and academics alike understood global cyber governance to be divided along three main blocs of states. The status quo defenders were led by the US and (mostly Western) like-minded states, focused on the promotion of liberal values and non-binding norms shaped by a multi-stakeholder approach and adherence to existing tenets of international law but resisted significant changes in the governance of cyberspace. A revisionist group, led by Russia and China, advocated for a new binding international treaty and multilateral governance with the objective of guaranteeing security and order rather than necessarily promoting liberal values. Given this impasse, the role and influence of a group of states termed ‘swing states’ or ‘digital deciders’ has been recognized as critical to determining the future of cyberspace, most prominently in a detailed 2018 report by the Washington DC-based think-tank New America . This grouping that largely includes emerging powers from the Global South including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, are understood as countries that are yet to “gravitate towards either end of the spectrum, some undecided and others seeking a third path.” Given these groupings, it is worth considering how the Global South fits in with present conceptualisations of cyber diplomacy, or whether it is a grouping at all. The term ‘Global South’ has come in for some criticism given the heterogeneity of countries it describes and its geographical inaccuracy (many Global South countries are not quite in the geographical South.) To be fair, the term never aspired for terminological accuracy and was instead coined to conceptually represent a group of countries during the Vietnam dissatisfied with the political and economic exploitation from the Global North. In that regard, Global South is a “mood,” a metaphor for developing countries aiming to find their way in an increasingly contested world. The war in Ukraine only augmented these fissures as the West were confounded by the Global South’s refusal to take a stand against brazen Russian aggression in Europe. The developing world saw it differently though: in an international order long-built on racism and inequality, expecting these countries to take a stand in their “petty squabbles” while they had also carried out “similarly violent, unjust, and undemocratic interventions—from Vietnam to Iraq” was a bridge too far. The Ukraine war helped clarify the combination of behaviours that countries within the Global South exhibit to attain this strategic goal: ideological agnosticism or neutrality; selective engagement with norms and rules; and finally, multi-pronged bilateral and minilateral groupings, with equidistance from the major powers. These three approaches helped illuminate the multiple different forms of agency that each developing country exercises vis-à-vis the international order based on their own interests and quest for strategic autonomy. However, what became evident as Russians bombs started to fall on the street of Kyiv, was already visible in these states’ interactions in cyber diplomacy. First, much of the Global South has refused to take an explicit stand on the controversial fissures that the leading powers have spent much of their time debating, including whether cyberspace governance should be state-centric or driven by new rules or existing international law.  Throughout the negotiating processes at the UN OEWG and AHC, as Russia and China clashed with the United States and its allies on the text of several controversial proposals, most developing countries took an agnostic approach, neither explicitly endorsing or opposing any of these potential treaty provisions. (There are naturally some exceptions: an analysis of voting patterns suggests that Iran and North Korea have firmly pegged themselves to the Russian and Chinese side of the aisle whereas some smaller developing countries have gravitated towards the US side of the aisle.) Second, there has been selective engagement when security or developmental interests are directly impacted. For example, in its joint submission to the UN’s Global Digital Compact (GDC), the G77+China asserted the need for equitable cross-border data flows that maximize development gains. The GDC is the UN’s first comprehensive framework for global digital cooperation. Long concerned about the misuse of the multi-stakeholder model by private actors for profit at the expense of developmental interests, the G77 also highlighted the need for “multilateral and transparent approaches to digital governance to facilitate a more just, equitable and effective governance system.” Finally, countries in  the Global South have entered into multiple technology partnerships across political and ideological divides. US efforts at restricting the encroachment of Chinese hardware providers like Huawei and ZTE into the core technological periphery of several Global South countries using allegations of surveillance were sometimes rebuked, given the Five Eyes’ proclivity and reputation for also conducting similar surveillance, including on top officials. By being agnostic on controversial ideological issues, countries in the Global South have been able to maintain ties with great powers on all sides of the political spectrum and foster pragmatic technological partnerships. Will the Global South rise? The Global South’s rise as a potent force in cyber diplomacy will, however, depend on three factors. Can it maintain ideological consistency on developmental and rights concerns, including on how the internet is governed at home? Can they continue to work with multiple partners without succumbing to pressure either from Washington or Beijing? Will emerging powers in the Global South (like India, Brazil and Indonesia) bat for the interests of the larger developing world, rather than simply orchestrating global governance to service their own interests or that of the regime in power? Given that cyber diplomacy emerged and developed as the playground of great powers, analysing it through the perspective of the Global South enables us to focus on cyber governance as an issue that goes beyond (cyber)security concerns – including economic development and identity (cutting across issues of race, gender, and colonialism) – and to see the world from a perspective that goes beyond the dynamics of great power competition. Analytically, it is useful to understand how these states position themselves and justify their actions on behalf of the whole. When looking inside the box, we see some collective movement but also a desire on part of the great powers, including China to incentivise the developing world to see the world as they do. The Global South remains relevant as a construct that captures the mood of the developing world on the geopolitics of technology of cyber issues. Its “great strength” will emerge not from swinging between Washington and Beijing or being orchestrated through New Delhi or Brasilia. It will instead come through standing their ground, in service of their own security and developmental interests in cyberspace. And as they progress, it remains to be seen whether the “Global South” retains its relevance as an analytical construct or whether it will give way to other denominations that better capture the developing world’s nuances and differences vis-à-vis the international cyber order. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

Dr. Gabriele Abbondanza is Lecturer and Marie Curie Fellow at the University of Madrid (UCM), Associate Researcher at the University of Sydney (USYD), and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).As the Indo-Pacific gradually becomes the world’s geopolitical and geoeconomic epicentre, states and regional organisations are progressively pivoting to it. Due to a combination of drivers – chiefly US pressure, economic opportunities, strategic interests and politico-normative priorities – European and Indo-Pacific actors have increased cooperation with Washington and NATO in the region. However, the second Trump administration looks considerably less aligned with the conventional pillars of US foreign policy. In light of the unfolding fracture between the US and its European allies over Ukraine, what lies ahead for NATO-Europe-US cooperation in the Indo-Pacific? [1] The priorities of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners The so-called Indo-Pacific Four (Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand – IP4) are NATO’s regional partners as well as formal US allies, each of them with specific priorities and concerns. Australia is possibly the US’s most unwavering ally in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra has second-tier yet noticeable military capabilities, a large military expenditure and moderate expeditionary experience.[2] The country has cooperated with NATO in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, and is a NATO “Enhanced Opportunities Partner”.[3] Consequently, greater Australia-NATO cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is foreseeable, although this would require US approval and would be subject to President Trump’s transactional approach. Japan is another steadfast Indo-Pacific player, being the country in which the modern iteration of the “Indo-Pacific” as a strategic concept originated. Tokyo is acutely threat-aware – its exclusive economic zones border both China’s and Russia’s – and is entirely aligned with Washington. Despite the country’s constitutional and budgetary limitations, its military capabilities are very significant, although their deployments are traditionally minimal. Japan has mostly supported NATO via financial means, yet the latest tailored partnership shows much scope for future cooperation. As with Australia, any major NATO-oriented development is subordinated to US approval. South Korea is a more recent component of the Indo-Pacific equation, chiefly due to its vast security-trade divide visà-vis the US (a treaty ally with around 30,000 troops stationed in the country) and China (whose bilateral trade is worth over 300 billion dollars). Even so, the country is now more explicitly aligned with the US, and although its contribution to NATO activities is less prominent than Australia’s, Seoul’s position as a major defence player could stimulate stronger cooperation with the Alliance in the region. Once again, a continuing US commitment would be a prerequisite in this case too. Lastly, New Zealand, arguably the “odd man out” among the IP4 due to its low threat perception, its focus on non-traditional security, the nuclear-free policy in its waters, a consequently “milder” relationship with the US, and its lower material capabilities. Still, Wellington has recently performed passing exercises (PASSEXs),[4] it has previously supported NATO in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, and currently focuses on technology and military capacitybuilding. Hence, more cooperation in these specific areas could be envisioned, given their “low-security” perimeter. In short, the IP4 displays varying degrees of Indo-Pacific cooperation with NATO. While there is a general convergence on greater involvement, stronger cooperation traditionally requires US consent, which is a less straightforward condition compared to the past. Europe at a crossroads Europe’s interaction with the IndoPacific is gaining momentum, despite being relatively recent. The spillover effects of Indo-Pacific security issues have prompted a widespread recognition of the region’s significance, including the “big four” (France, the UK, Germany and Italy) with their broad alignment to the US, large material capabilities (and blue-water navies) and expeditionary experience.[5] This development holds much promise for Europe-NATO convergence in the region, also considering their substantial cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. France spearheaded the European approach to the Indo-Pacific, on account of its status of “resident power” (with overseas territories, population and military bases in the region), through an effective combination of hard and soft power. The UK, the only other resident power, has systematically engaged with the region in more recent times, following a more traditional (USled) balancing strategy. Germany and the Netherlands, two major trading nations, tend to interact with the IndoPacific in a more “neutral” way, with Germany trying to limit its excessive reliance on China. Italy represents a particular case, as its economic, normative and security engagement (including major deployments and naval diplomacy) in the region is both rooted and substantial (the country’s “Enlarged Mediterranean” sphere of interest overlaps with the western Indo-Pacific), although it does not have a formal regional strategy (yet).[6] The EU, too, has openly recognised the necessity of an Indo-Pacific pivot and is pursuing it with its own policy tools.[7] Lastly, other European countries – virtually all NATO members – are gradually refocusing on this region. However, the widening fracture with Europe’s greatest ally – the US – marks a major shift in transatlantic relations. While this may not be a permanent turn in US foreign policy, Washington’s instability is prompting Europe to do more, to do better and to do it rapidly. On the one hand, the current US posture is already spurring a greater European role in its immediate neighbourhood, which undoubtedly remains the main priority area. On the other, given that Europe’s interests are now inextricably intertwined with the Indo-Pacific, a stronger European activism in this region is altogether possible, mainly due to economic, strategic and political interests, in addition to renewed US burden-sharing pressures. As more intense rivalry with China is unlikely due to well-known issues concerning political and material resources, greater cooperation with Europe’s many IndoPacific partners – including the NATO IP4[8] – may well represent a realistic step forward towards further developing European countries’ role in the region. To achieve this, Europe needs a more realistic (that is, higher) threat awareness, greater defence spending, more integrated defence systems[9] and, arguably, a European security-oriented minilateral which gathers a “coalition of the willing” aiming to protect Europe and its partners. This can take the form of a “European pillar” within NATO and/or a European defence union, among other options. Although these are remarkably ambitious goals, challenging times warrant more decisive actions. Shockwaves from Washington, and how to navigate them In the Euro-Atlantic area, Washington is the informal though undisputed leader within NATO; in the Indo-Pacific, it is at the helm of a ‘hub and spokes system’ of alliances and partnerships. This latticework of security architectures has guaranteed stability for US allies – and US primacy – for around 80 years.[10] Today, this unprecedented collective security endeavour faces not only external challenges – chiefly Russian and Chinese revisionism – but also internal ones due to Trump’s destabilising policies. The latter are creating divisions among NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, preoccupations among Indo-Pacific partners (Taiwan above all) and, conversely, greater confidence among systemic rivals. While Washington’s sudden unreliability in supporting Ukraine cannot be fully compared to the Taiwan case – chiefly due to the US grand strategy’s emphasis on the IndoPacific – the Trump administration’s recent foreign policy demands higher cooperation between NATO’s members and global partners. Stronger support for maritime security, interoperability, reciprocal access agreements and cooperation on non-traditional security issues are necessary. Nevertheless, this shouldn’t necessarily take place with NATO’s official aegis, given the Indo-Pacific’s traditional wariness of security-based initiatives, hard power politics and confrontational approaches more in general, which has led to many states adopting “hedging postures” over the years. Amidst the volatile 2020s, two final implications stand out. First, the IndoPacific’s sheer importance can no longer be ignored. While other regions acknowledged it long ago, Europe is making up for the time lost, although it still lacks a unified approach. Second, as the US adds to global uncertainties rather than addressing them, allies and partners must assume greater international roles while hoping that cooperation eventually resumes. This should prompt greater EuropeIndo-Pacific-NATO cooperation in light of growing economic, political, and security interdependence.  Some recent developments – the Draghi and Letta reports for the EU, the European Commission’s response to them, NATO’s resilience amid this uncertainty – are promising, though only time will tell if they will produce the foreign policy shifts that are required to adapt to a more challenging 21st century. NOTES & REFERENCES [1] This op-ed draws on the author’s contribution to a recent high-level roundtable organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation. See “A Roma esperti a confronto sul futuro ruolo della Nato nell’Indo-Pacifico”, in Agenzia Nova, 4 March 2025, https://www.agenzianova.com/news/?p=395219.  [2] Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index 2023: Australia,https://www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/countrySheetPage?countries=36&years=2023. [3] NATO, Relations with Partners in the IndoPacific Region, 24 October 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/el/natohq/topics_183254.htm. [4] They entail the passage (without military exercises) through international or territorial waters as granted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[5] Gabriele Abbondanza and Thomas Wilkins, “Europe in the Indo-Pacific: Economic, Security, and Normative Engagement”, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 5 (November 2024), p. 640-646, https:// doi.org/10.1177/01925121231202694; Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index 2023, https://www.globalpresence. realinstitutoelcano.org/en. [6] Gabriele Abbondanza, “Italy’s Quiet Pivot to the Indo-Pacific: Towards an Italian Indo-Pacific Strategy”, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 5 (November 2024), p. 669- 679, https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231190093. [7] Gorana Grgić, “Ambition, Meet Reality: The European Union’s Actorness in the Indo-Pacific”, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 5 (November 2024), p. 680-689, https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231191275. [8] Giulio Pugliese, “How to Facilitate NATOIP4 Defense Industrial Cooperation: The Case of Italy and Japan”, in Liselotte Odgaard (ed.), Moving the NATO-IP4 Partnership from Dialogue to Cooperation Maritime Security and Next-Generation Technologies, Washington, Hudson Institute, March 2025, p. 32-35, https:// www.hudson.org/node/49515. [9]  Gaia Ravazzolo and Alessandro Marrone, “EU Defence Industrial Initiatives: A Quantum Leap Is Needed”, in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|79 (December 2024),https://www.iai.it/en/node/19309. [10] Thomas Wilkins, “A Hub-and-Spokes ‘Plus’ Model of US Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New ‘Networked’ Design”, in Elena Atanassova-Cornelis Yoichiro Sato and Tom Sauer (eds), Alliances in Asia and Europe. The Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategic Context and Inter-Regional Alignments, London, Routledge, 2023, p. 8-31. 

The Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum does not mark the end of a stage, but the beginning of a new phase in the Sino-Latin American relationship. Since its inception in 2014, the China–CELAC Forum (FCC) has gone through three key stages that outline its evolution. The first ministerial meeting, held in Beijing in 2015, laid the normative foundation for the mechanism, establishing its intergovernmental and voluntary nature. The second, held in Santiago, Chile, in 2018, consolidated priority areas of cooperation and linked the Forum to the Belt and Road Initiative. The third, held virtually in 2021, updated the agenda in a pandemic context, incorporating new topics such as health, digitalization, and sustainability. After a period of relative inertia, the Fourth Ministerial Meeting—held on May 13, 2025, in Beijing—represented a turning point both in ambition and strategic scope. It is essential to remember that the Ministerial Meeting constitutes the highest level of deliberation within the mechanism, bringing together the foreign ministers of China and Latin American countries. In this edition, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi presided over the sessions, emphasizing that, as developing countries and members of the Global South, China and Latin America must coordinate efforts to defend their legitimate rights and interests. As a result of the meeting, two key documents were adopted: the Beijing Declaration and the Joint Action Plan 2025–2027, approved by all 33 participating countries—with the exception of Argentina, which chose not to endorse the documents. Although the FCC is primarily ministerial in design, it occasionally takes on a broader political dimension, with the participation of heads of state and government. Such was the case this time, as the intervention of President Xi Jinping—host and central figure of the meeting—gave the forum a strategic tone and outlined its future roadmap. In the face of global challenges such as unilateralism, trade wars, and the climate crisis, Xi proposed a cooperation architecture based on five strategic programs combining political, economic, social, cultural, and security objectives. First, the Solidarity Program reflects the political dimension. In this regard, Xi Jinping stated that “China is ready to continue supporting each other with LAC [Latin America and the Caribbean] on matters concerning our respective core interests and major concerns.” This stance contrasts with more restrictive approaches promoted by the United States, such as during the IX Summit of the Americas (2022), where Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua were excluded. Moreover, the Beijing gathering fits into an active diplomatic sequence that includes the G20 summit in Rio (November 2024), APEC in Lima (November 2024), and the upcoming BRICS summit in July 2025, also in Rio. Far from being symbolic gestures, the frequency of these encounters reveals a convergent strategy of global engagement on China’s part, based on sustained regional alliances. Second, the Development Program encompasses the economic dimension. This pillar aims to promote cooperation in growth, investment, and productive transformation, expanding into strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy. Xi announced a credit line of 66 billion yuan to support regional development, which constitutes not only a financial contribution but also a clear sign of confidence in Latin America amid trade fragmentation and the reconfiguration of global value chains. Third, the Civilizations Program expresses the cultural dimension in the cooperation agreements. Beijing promotes intercivilizational dialogue grounded in equality, mutual learning, and inclusion. This translates into initiatives such as Latin American Art Seasons in China, joint heritage conservation projects, and comparative studies on ancient civilizations. In a region historically influenced by American cultural ideology, this strategy seeks to diversify symbolic references, strengthen Chinese soft power, and project a more respectful and relatable image in Latin America. Fourth, the Peace Program underscores the increasingly relevant security dimension. This pillar marks a qualitative evolution in China’s outreach to the region, as it addresses non-traditional security issues from a cooperative standpoint. Based on support for the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace (CELAC, 2014), China proposes to strengthen collaboration in areas such as cybersecurity, counterterrorism, corruption, drug trafficking, and organized crime. This approach reinforces the principles of non-interference and peaceful resolution, aligning with the concrete needs of Latin American states. Fifth, the People-to-People Program expresses the social dimension. This component consolidates the social connection between China and Latin America through scholarships, technical training, Chinese-language teacher education, and community projects. The inclusion of tourism as a focal point—alongside the upcoming implementation of a visa waiver policy for five Latin American countries—highlights the intention to promote direct exchange between populations. The five programs outlined by Xi Jinping—solidarity (political), development (economic), civilizations (cultural), peace (security), and people (social)—constitute a comprehensive framework that positions China as a multidimensional partner for Latin America. This strategic vision is grounded in an already robust economic relationship: in 2024, bilateral trade surpassed $500 billion, reaching the goal set a decade ago. In this context, the third edition of the White Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to be published soon, a document that will complement the commitments made in the final declaration and the Action Plan adopted in Beijing. Thus, the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum does not mark the end of a phase, but the beginning of a new chapter in Sino–Latin American relations. The scope and quality of this phase will depend on the ability of Latin American actors to engage strategically and proactively with China’s proposal. The opportunity is there. *This article was originally published on the REDCAEM website.

China relies heavily on Malaysia as a bridge for cooperation, dialogue, and coordination with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and China in confronting the economic and political challenges imposed by the United States on China and many countries around the world after President “Trump” increased US tariffs on China. To this end, China seeks to coordinate with Malaysia during its presidency of the (ASEAN Summit) this year 2025, and its concurrent presidency of the (ASEAN-GCC Cooperation Summit), a situation China is keen to capitalize on through its distinguished partnership with Malaysia. In addition, Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Malaysia in mid-April 2025, during which they issued a joint statement on support for Gaza and the Palestinian cause in the face of Israeli violations.  Malaysia's meetings and its current hosting of the (ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN-GCC Cooperation Summit) come after important trade talks between the United States and China in Switzerland in May 2025, the same month as the ASEAN and ASEAN-GCC Cooperation Summits with China. The ASEAN-GCC Summit may be a real opportunity to lay the foundation for deeper negotiations between the world's two largest economies after a period of escalation in the trade war between the two sides.  Given the importance of the ASEAN region to Southeast Asia, which represents China's vital backyard, it is at the heart of the strategy for managing major events between Washington and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, Washington and Beijing signed a strategic partnership agreement with ASEAN, given its critical importance to both countries.  Former US President Joe Biden signed a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), describing it as a decisive step toward addressing the biggest issues of our time. Meanwhile, Beijing emphasized strengthening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement it signed with ASEAN in 2021, with China keen to jointly build the world's largest free trade area.  The most prominent complex global issues on the agenda of ASEAN countries, China, Malaysia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in their confrontation with Washington and Russia include (the war in Ukraine, climate change, regional tensions around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, North Korea's missile launches, the recent Gaza war, and US tariffs), among others.To this end, China officially confirmed Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Malaysia in late May 2025 to attend a summit coordinated by China with a newly formed group of Southeast Asian and Arab countries, through which Beijing hopes to garner support in the face of Washington's tariffs. China also launched a campaign to mend relations with the European Union, Japan, and South Korea, after US President Donald Trump imposed a series of tariffs on numerous countries on April 2, 2025, before abruptly suspending them for dozens of countries except China.  Chinese Premier “Li Keqiang” will also be in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to attend the (ASEAN-GCC-China Summit) on May 27, 2025, which will be held one day after the ASEAN Summit scheduled for May 26, 2025. China has not publicly confirmed the names and number of Chinese officials who will comprise the Chinese delegation it will send to Malaysia before the summits in Malaysia.  From my analytical perspective, this may stem from China's fear that the United States and its ASEAN allies will exert pressure on those Chinese figures who will participate in the (ASEAN-GCC Summit) in particular.  In my view, Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Malaysia in mid-April 2025 is linked to the role Malaysia will play, along with its ally China, in confronting US protectionist policies. This follows President Xi Jinping's visit to three Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia) to win them over to China's side in its trade war with the United States. To this end, China is seeking to win Malaysia over, particularly at this time, as Beijing intensifies its current efforts to secure partnerships to protect its economy from the escalating trade war with the United States. While the three countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia) will benefit from Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit in mid-April 2025 to diversify their Chinese supply chains, it also places them in a challenging position with the US, and in the crosshairs of US President Trump as he seeks to restrict the reshipment of Chinese goods to its regional neighbors and then transport them through them to the world.  In anticipation of all stages of US escalation against China, Chinese President “Xi Jinping” convened and chaired the Central Working Conference on Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries in early May 2025. This conference highlighted China's increasing focus on strengthening regional relations, particularly with its neighbors, most notably Malaysia and its ASEAN partners.  On the other hand, there is competition between the United States, China, and Europe to enhance economic presence at the joint summit between the Malaysia-led ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The GCC countries are in fierce competition with the United States, Russia, China, and Europe to strengthen their economic presence in the vibrant ASEAN, which holds promising opportunities in multiple fields for the Gulf community. The ASEAN summit with the Gulf states and China represents an important milestone that reflects the growing interest of the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in strengthening relations with the ASEAN countries and China, in the face of economic and geopolitical challenges that require deeper coordination and more flexible cooperation. This is especially true given the unbalanced nature of Trump's personality, from the perspective of the Gulf states, even his closest allies. Many GCC leaders fear a sudden Trump coup against his closest allies, which is one of the reasons for the Gulf's move towards rapprochement with the ASEAN and China, led by Malaysia. The geopolitical transformations and escalating international competition between China and the United States over the Asian region and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in East and Southeast Asia, on the part of Russia, Europe, the United States, and China, have highlighted the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to strengthen their economic and political presence in this vital region through strategic partnerships that transcend traditional considerations and are based on mutual interests and commonalities. ASEAN countries represent emerging economies that hold promising opportunities in multiple fields for China and the Gulf countries, such as energy and infrastructure. This is why all GCC countries are currently investing in it. Furthermore, there are important commonalities, including that these countries, like the Gulf states, are also seeking to distance themselves from geopolitical polarization in their regional environment, especially after the recent Gaza war. The GCC countries are currently unwilling to enter into economic alliances against other parties. This provides common ground for fruitful cooperation between all, led and coordinated by Malaysia as a bridge for communication, dialogue, and coordination between the GCC countries, primarily with China.  There is also a mutual desire to strengthen Sino-Gulf relations with ASEAN countries through Malaysia at various levels, including cultural cooperation, based on a shared history spanning hundreds of years, particularly through the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which represents numerous cultural and civilizational aspects, in addition to its economic, commercial, and investment importance for all.  The secret to ASEAN's success and the encouragement of GCC countries to cooperate and coordinate with it and with China through Malaysia is its focus on economic objectives, transcending ideology and non-interference in the internal politics and affairs of other countries, while giving priority to development and investment. The new and vital area of coordination between ASEAN, China, Malaysia, and the GCC countries is the Maritime Cooperation Mechanism, recognizing the importance of oceans and seas as a key factor in driving growth.  Therefore, there is a working agenda for a framework for maritime cooperation among all concerned countries, to ensure the security of maritime and logistical straits, achieve the principles of maritime safety and security, and ensure freedom of navigation and air traffic without obstacles that limit the movement of legitimate maritime trade. It also promotes peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the principles of universally recognized international law.   The Gulf's move toward cooperation with ASEAN countries and China, through Malaysia's coordination of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit with ASEAN and China, has several fundamental reasons. These include the United States' imposition of tariffs on several countries, including the GCC itself, at varying rates. This will impact their exports to the US market. This move will inevitably push them to seek alternative markets, enhancing opportunities for cooperation between ASEAN and China, led by Malaysia, with the Gulf countries. This comes amid Chinese efforts to leverage these changes to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Americans. Perhaps the positive thing is that Washington announced the suspension of these tariffs on China for 90 days, but I most likely expect it to impose other tariffs on China and the Gulf countries and set other conditions. This will make economic relations between the GCC countries, ASEAN, and China vis-à-vis Washington more tense in the short and long term, as their exports to the US will inevitably be affected in the near future. Therefore, we note that these common challenges facing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), ASEAN, China, and Malaysia together in the face of these American pressures, even after Trump's visit to the three Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE) in the same month as the (ASEAN-China-GCC summit) in Malaysia in May 2025, open the door to new economic dialogues between all parties and help form regional blocs between ASEAN, China, Malaysia, and the GCC countries. There is clear enthusiasm from all parties to make this happen on the ground. Suffice it to mention the keenness of the concerned parties to hold real summits at the level of heads of state, in addition to ongoing ministerial and technical meetings. This reflects the existence of a genuine political will that seeks to translate all these aspirations into practical partnerships on the ground.  In this context, China, ASEAN, and Malaysia welcomed Saudi Arabia's bid to host Expo 2030 in Riyadh, highlighting the importance of organizing regional and international exhibitions to revitalize economic and cultural exchanges between the Gulf and ASEAN regions, including Southeast Asian countries, China, and Malaysia. They also emphasized the importance of conducting consultations to explore cooperation on implementing the “ASEAN Integration Initiative Action Plan” (2021-2025) and integration programs in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with China and Malaysia. This is what the ASEAN-GCC Joint Summit with China and Malaysia seeks to explore and achieve.  The ASEAN-GCC-China Joint Summit, led by Malaysia, is expected to discuss the Joint Action Plan until 2028 and enhance cooperation between the two organizations, particularly political, economic, security, and cultural aspects, as well as investment, tourism, agriculture, halal products, education, and training.  Coordination between these parties, through Malaysia's presidency of the current ASEAN-GCC summit with China, is focused on key economic partnership priorities, namely enhancing regional market integration and integrating them through cooperative partnerships among all, while strengthening the multilateral trading system. This summit also aims to strengthen existing relations between the Gulf states, ASEAN, and China, given the current circumstances, regional conditions, and rapid international changes. The summit will also enhance the dynamics of relations between ASEAN, the GCC, China, and Malaysia, by discussing the path forward and strengthening cooperation across a number of existing areas of cooperation, including combating international crimes and terrorism. It is also an opportunity to identify new areas of cooperation in security, politics, economics, and cultural pillars. The most important aspect, from my perspective, is that the currently emerging multipolar international order requires middle powers such as the Gulf states, ASEAN, China, and Malaysia to stick together and reach a joint dialogue to support multilateral relations, particularly political aspects, and to coordinate their common positions, especially after the recent Gaza war and the American pressures that have become openly exerted on everyone. In general, the relationship between the Gulf and ASEAN sides, along with China and Malaysia, is considered primarily economically important for all, but it has also evolved due to circumstances in the political dimension. ASEAN countries enjoy a reputation for great neutrality and flexibility regarding international positions, with a greater focus on the economic dimension, while Gulf leaders are placing greater importance on developmental aspects alongside the economy.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском US President Donald Trump’s visit to Arab states in the Middle East this week generated plenty of multibillion-dollar deals. He said more than US$1 trillion (A$1.5 trillion) worth of deals had been signed with Saudi Arabia alone, though the real total is likely much lower than that. Qatar also placed an order for 210 Boeing aircraft, a deal worth a reported US$96 billion (A$149 billion). Trump will no doubt present these transactions as a major success for US industry. The trip also helped counter concerns about US disengagement from the Middle East. For more than a decade, local elites have viewed Washington’s attention as shifting away from the region. This trip was a reaffirmation of the importance of the Middle East – in particular the Gulf region – to US foreign policy. This is an important signal to send to Middle Eastern leaders who are dealing with competing interests from China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. And from a political standpoint, Trump’s lifting of sanctions on Syria and meeting with the former rebel, now president, Ahmed al-Sharaa was very significant – both symbolically and practically. Until recently, al-Sharaa was listed by the United States as a terrorist with a US$10 million (A$15 million) bounty on his head. However, when his forces removed dictator Bashar al-Assad from power in December, he was cautiously welcomed by many in the international community. The US had invested considerable resources in removing Assad from power, so his fall was cause for celebration, even if it came at the hands of forces the US had deemed terrorists. This rapid turn-around is dizzying. In practice, the removal of sanctions on Syria opens the doors to foreign investment in the reconstruction of the country following a long civil war. It also offers an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as Turkey, to expand their influence in Syria at the expense of Iran. For a leader who styles himself a deal-maker, these can all be considered successful outcomes from a three-day trip. However, Trump avoided wading into the far more delicate diplomatic and political negotiations needed to end Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and find common ground with Iran on its nuclear program. No solution in sight for the Palestinians Trump skirted the ongoing tragedy in Gaza and offered no plans for a diplomatic solution to the war, which drags on with no end in sight. The president did note his desire to see a normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel, without acknowledging the key stumbling block. While Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have no love for Hamas, the Gaza war and the misery inflicted on the Palestinians have made it impossible for them to overlook the issue. They cannot simply leapfrog Gaza to normalise relations with Israel. In his first term, Trump hoped the Palestinian issue could be pushed aside to achieve normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel. This was partially achieved with the Abraham Accords, which saw the UAE and three other Muslim-majority nations normalise relations with Israel. Trump no doubt believed the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreed to just before his inauguration would stick – he promised as much during the US election campaign. But after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire in March, vowing to press on with its indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, he’s learned the hard way the Palestinian question cannot easily be solved or brushed under the carpet. The Palestinian aspiration for statehood needs to be addressed as an indispensable step towards a lasting peace and regional stability. It was telling that Trump did not stop in Israel this week. One former Israeli diplomat says it’s a sign Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lost his leverage with Trump. There’s nothing that Netanyahu has that Trump wants, needs or [that he] can give him, as opposed to, say, the Saudis, the Qataris, [or] the Emiratis. More harsh rhetoric for Iran Trump also had no new details or initiatives to announce on the Iran nuclear talks, beyond his desire to “make a deal” and his repeat of past threats. At least four rounds of talks have been held between Iran and the United States since early April. While both sides are positive about the prospects, the US administration seems divided on the intended outcome. The US Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called for the complete dismantling of Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium as a sure safeguard against the potential weaponisation of the nuclear program. Trump himself, however, has been less categorical. Though he has called for the “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program, he has also said he’s undecided if Iran should be allowed to continue a civilian enrichment program. Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium, albeit under international monitoring, is a red line for the authorities in Tehran – they won’t give this up. The gap between Iran and the US appears to have widened this week following Trump’s attack on Iran as the “most destructive force” in the Middle East. The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi called Trump’s remarks “pure deception”, and pointed to US support for Israel as the source of instability in the region. None of this has advanced the prospects of a nuclear deal. And though his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE was marked by pomp and ceremony, he’ll leave no closer to solving two protracted challenges than when he arrived.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The United States and Vietnam, former adversaries but now significant trading partners, are in their second year of the comprehensive strategic partnership, further improving their ties. In 2025, the comprehensive strategic partnership makes a major two-year milestone as both America and Vietnam are thirty years into normalization, as five decades ago, both countries were intertwined in one of the most deadly wars in modern history. The comprehensive strategic partnership is a significant counterbalance in international relations in the Indo-Pacific region against China’s rising soft power and naval force projection into the South China Sea. In its second year, questions remain: Will the partnership hold up, and is there still room to grow between Washington and Hanoi? On September 10th, 2023, then-U.S. President Joe Biden and the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong of Vietnam signed the comprehensive strategic partnership, which is a major turning point in Southeast Asia. The elevation of relations between Hanoi and Washington puts America along the same bilateral status as Russia and China in Vietnam’s hierarchy, signifying a major diplomatic breakthrough between the former two countries. Under the upgraded relations, Vietnam and the United States will further strengthen cooperation in trade, investments, science, technology, and climate action, with more opportunities in other sectors. Southeast Asia is an emerging global supply chain hub for not just the United States but the entire world, and Hanoi is a top ten major trading partner of Washington. The opportunity to grow supply chains in the Indochina region with Vietnam as a starting point would be an essential step toward digressing from the People’s Republic of China, which the United States government looks to do, especially as the latter two superpowers now compete for global hegemonic status. The United States and Vietnam share the ideals of growing their technological and economic sectors. The growth of semiconductors in Eastern Asia continues to grow not only in Taiwan, China, Japan, and South Korea but also in Vietnam. Amkor, an American firm, is opening a $1.6 billion firm in Vietnam for this endeavor. Furthermore, Reuters reported in January 2024 that fifteen American firms are vying to invest $8 billion in semiconductors in Vietnam. American companies and business owners currently heavily invest in Vietnam, such as Intel, Apple, Nike, Amkor, Marvell, and First Solar, and the list can continue to grow in the comprehensive strategic partnership. Simultaneously, Vietnamese companies such as VinFast and VGN Corporation are increasing investments in the United States. VinFast’s growth in North Carolina is helping the local economy by creating more manufacturing opportunities. Though Vietnam and the United States have reached new peaks in upgraded relations, it is vital to mention that the comprehensive strategic partnership is not a mutual defense accord including direct military assistance. During the joint signing, neither Washington nor Hanoi mentioned ‘containment’ of Beijing’s ambitions, even though the South China Sea continues to grow into a potential regional powder keg. Vietnam’s upgraded partnership with the United States correlates with India’s current strategy of not fully aligning to one side to trigger ire or retaliation from the People’s Republic of China but strategically keeping full diplomatic cohesion with all regional powers while maintaining its sovereignty. Vietnam is also a close ally of Russia as the United States ignored the original requests for their self-determination post-WWII. Though they do not supply the Russian military’s illegal aggression in Ukraine, it is tantamount for the U.S. government not to push or strong-arm Hanoi closer to Moscow. Nevertheless, in the future, the U.S. and Vietnamese Armed Forces could establish backchannels to warn each other of any potential military threat by the People’s Liberation naval movements around the South China Sea without openly engaging in military cooperation that could draw strong actions from China and Russia. Hanoi looks to advance its interests amidst rising economic and technological competition in the Indo-Pacific and growing American investments will only push Vietnam’s marketing further. Simultaneously, Washington gains a growing economic and diplomatic presence in Southeast Asia. To promote a growing relationship, the United States can also further reconciliation efforts in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, as many of Vietnam’s demographic majority and elderly still remember the American aggression in the Indochina conflicts. In its second year, Hanoi and Washington continue to grow ties through several key sectors that advance both country’s national interests and further open opportunities between the East and West. Rebuilding and rewriting the wrongs of the past, the United States reached out to Vietnam to solidify a comprehensive strategic partnership, which is decades in the making and a landmark agreement long envisioned by Ho Chi Minh. With opportunities to expand into the technology, economic, and trade sectors, Hanoi and Washington continue to grow bilateral ties in year two of the partnership. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The impact of a government is not only measured by its institutional performance, but also by its ability to transform the mental habits of politicians, officials, and citizens. Political action must offer collectively desirable futures. Retrospectively, however, many future projects are like lottery tickets that have already been played: records of unfulfilled illusions. The case of Petro’s government is no exception—but that doesn’t mean everything remains the same in Colombia. Change came and didn’t come. In some respects, the “government of change” has, in reality, remained stationary. This is the case, to begin with, regarding corruption. From campaign financing to suspicions of gifts offered to congress members in exchange for approving reforms, and including the various scandals involving the president’s son, the administration has been embroiled in numerous controversies. In Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Colombia dropped several positions, although it still ranks similarly to Brazil or Argentina, and at levels consistent with those seen under President Duque during most of his term. On matters of peace and security, and despite a shift in strategy, the government’s results are just as poor as its predecessor’s. The opposition’s narrative—that Petro’s arrival has brought the country to the brink of collapse in terms of security—is unsustainable. Red zones like Catatumbo have a long and complex history, and the Gulf Clan wasn’t invented yesterday. Nonetheless, the “Total Peace” policy is unlikely to be more than a grandiose slogan, with tangible results limited to a few local successes—such as the demobilization of one ELN dissidence group in Nariño and a temporary truce among the main gangs in Buenaventura. The protection of social leaders has not substantially improved (174 assassinations in 2024), the homicide rate, though slightly reduced, remains very high (25.4 per 100,000), crimes such as extortion have increased (18% rise between 2023 and 2024), and by April 2025, 21 police officers had been killed—four times more than during the same period the previous year. At the macroeconomic level, this government has not been the disaster predicted by the opposition, but broadly speaking, it also fits within the country’s stationary movement. President Petro has boasted, for example, about inflation rates (5%) and the unemployment rate (8.2%). However, inflation control is partly the result of measures taken by the Central Bank, and although Petro inherited the highest inflation in 23 years (13.1%), the average inflation rate during the Uribe, Santos, and Duque administrations was 4.88%. Petro’s unemployment figures are positive, but for much of Santos’s second term they were similarly favorable. Multidimensional poverty has continued its uninterrupted 14-year decline and, nationally, stands at 11.5% for 2024 (0.6% lower than the previous year). Economic growth under Petro has been rather modest (1.7% in 2024). Under Duque, average annual growth was 3%, and both previous administrations had higher averages. Growth expectations for 2025 don’t exceed 3%. In short, there’s been neither collapse nor spectacular takeoff. A constant, inertial movement is not change. So where is the change, then? In terms of public policy and governance practices, first, there has been a rethinking of the executive’s relationship with big business and the military leadership. Colombian capitalism has not mostly been built by heroic, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who innovate and take risks, but rather by a kind of “crony capitalism” based on reciprocal favors between economic and political elites—and, as shown emblematicly in the Odebrecht case, their capacity to cover for one another. Petro’s bitter relationship with Sarmiento Angulo is part of this. That Petro is branded by the opposition as an “enemy of business” and labeled a “communist” is a natural reaction to a disruption in the usual dynamics between the presidency and large corporate conglomerates. The same can be said, secondly, about criticisms regarding the alleged weakening and “demoralization” of the Armed Forces. As proven by the initial appointment of Iván Velásquez as Minister of Defense, Petro has emphasized the need to reject the criminalization of social protest and human rights violations that, for decades, were legitimized by the counterinsurgency discourse of the “internal enemy.” The purging of generals has been part of this aim. Opposition marches have been aggressive, but there hasn’t been a hint of police brutality. The contrast—especially with the right-wing governments of Uribe and Duque, marked by extrajudicial executions and repression of the Social Uprising—could not be more stark. Naturally, the right links Petro’s civilian approach with poor security outcomes. Duque, however, is his opposite, and the results were no better. Thirdly, Petro has pursued an ambitious social policy, and as the failed health reform illustrates—derailed by the convergence of pharmaceutical managers, traditional politicians, and health service providers—he has shown a willingness to challenge powerful groups. This framework also includes the pension reform approved in Congress, which will benefit 2.8 million elderly Colombians. Likewise, there has been a strengthening of rural communities through the creation of 13 new peasant reserve zones and the acquisition and formalization of land at volumes far surpassing those of the previous two governments. In the same vein, there’s the labor reform (blocked in Congress), which will be submitted to a public referendum. The reform aims to restore workers’ rights eroded over the past 20 years and coincides with a historic 9.5% increase in the minimum wage. Also worth mentioning are the development of 300 energy communities and the guarantee of free higher education in public institutions. Seniors, rural workers, formal laborers, ethnic communities, and youth are the direct beneficiaries of these policies—groups that have not typically been at the center of recent Colombian governments. Beyond concrete practices or policies, however, the greatest transformation brought by the “Government of Change” is cognitive openness. Petro has sparked controversies that have de-naturalized hegemonic ideas. The virulent reactions against him are partly due to his break from the establishment’s common sense on many issues—that is, he has turned into public problems, requiring justification and debate, what was previously accepted as obvious, generalized consensus. It has been a pleasure to see politicians and journalists forced to react to discussions on “degrowth,” the “energy transition,” or the “extractivist model”; compelled to justify the mantra that better labor conditions mean higher unemployment; to reflect on whether illegal crops are effectively fought with glyphosate spraying; or to ask, in disbelief, whether habitual submission to the United States is truly desirable, or whether a “pragmatic” foreign policy allows one to speak, with Petro’s moral clarity, about the genocide in Gaza. Not everything the president has said on these topics has been accurate, of course, but the point is how the generation of these debates contributes to the development of a more plural, reflective, and democratic political culture in Colombia. The impact of a government cannot be measured solely in terms of institutional performance, but also in terms of changes in the mental habits of professional politicians, public officials, and citizens. In that sense—more than in any other—the Government of Change has indeed lived up to its name.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While Trump declared the truce agreement a US victory, Ansar Allah said that Washington contacted them in order to “avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement reached a ceasefire deal with the United States on Wednesday, May 7, according to Oman, which mediated the negotiations. The deal stipulates the halt of Ansar Allah’s attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an end to US aggression on Yemen. However, it does not prevent the Yemeni movement from launching attacks on Israel.  “Following recent discussions and contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman with the United States and the relevant authorities in Sana’a, in the Republic of Yemen, with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides,” Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, wrote on X. “In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” the minister added. Peoples Dispatch spoke to a member of the Communist Party of Jordan, Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh, to discuss the ceasefire, which he described as a “sudden development in the war in the Red Sea.” Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh indicated that “both the US and Oman didn’t comment on Ansar Allah’s missiles targeting Israel, especially that this agreement was reached shortly after a Yemeni missile reached Ben Gurion airport, near the occupied city of Lydda (also known as Lod).” As per Al-Hatabeh’s analysis, “important questions about this agreement are left without answers. Taking into consideration the Omani role in the American – Iranian negotiations, is the ceasefire in the Red Sea part of the deal? Another question will arise from this assumption, did America give up some of Israel’s interests in order to reach an agreement with Iran? Where does this agreement leave Netanyahu’s government, especially after Ansar Allah’s spokesman told Reuters that the agreement doesn’t include Israel.” Ansar Allah says the US contacted them seeking a truce One day before Oman announced that the deal was sealed, US President Donald Trump alluded that a ceasefire agreement was about to be reached, claiming that Ansar Allah agreed to stop the fight with the US because they “capitulated”.  “They just don’t want to fight, and we will honor that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated,” Trump said from the White House on Tuesday, May 6. “They will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that’s what the purpose of what we were doing. So that’s just news. We just found out about that. So I think that’s very, very positive,” he added. Although Trump bragged about the deal, presenting it as a US victory, analysts suggest that it was Ansar Allah that forced the world’s greatest military superpower to the negotiating table, after paralyzing US naval traffic off the Yemeni coast.  Ansar Allah’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, confirmed during an interview with Almasirah TV channel, that the movement “did not make any request to the Americans to hold ceasefire talks”. Abdulsalam asserted that, on the contrary, the movement recently received US requests and messages seeking a truce, via the Sultanate of Oman. The Yemeni official pointed out that US endeavors to reach a ceasefire with Ansar Allah were a great disappointment to Israel. “The Israelis have endured great disappointment after the stance of the US, which tried to walk away and avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen,” he said. However, Abdulsalam clarified that Ansar Allah is still “assessing this US position so that the facts on the ground do not contradict its statements”. He further warned that in the event that the US “would not abide by the agreement in any way”, the movement “will respond”. Abdulsalam considered the deal “a success to be added to Yemen’s credit, as it enhances a situation that would leave the “usurper entity” [Israel] in a situation of loneliness, in confrontation with the great popular and military stance led by Yemen on behalf of the Arab and Islamic nation.” The ceasefire was announced two months after Trump ordered a large-scale aerial campaign against Yemen on the pretext of protecting US shipping, air, and naval assets and to restore “navigation freedom” from Ansar Allah’s attacks. Trump’s order followed Ansar Allah’s decision to resume a ban on Israeli ships due to Israel’s continuous blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yemen threatens Israel with a devastating and painful response for attacking Sana’a airport  While Ansar Allah agreed to a truce with the US, it vowed to escalate its operations against Israel as long as its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza is not lifted.  In response to Israel’s aggression on Sana’a International Airport on Tuesday, that destroyed terminal buildings and caused USD 500 million in damage, Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Chairman, Mahdi al-Mashat, threatened that “Sanaa’s response will be devastating, painful, and beyond what the Israeli enemy can endure.” “From this moment onward, stay in your shelters or leave for your homelands immediately. Your failed government will no longer be able to protect you,” Al-Mashat warned Israeli people.  Moreover, the Yemeni senior official reaffirmed that no aggression will deter Yemen from its “rightful decision” to support the people of Palestine “until the genocide ends and the siege on Gaza is lifted.” The Yemeni Armed Forces’ spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, also confirmed in a televised statement late Wednesday, that the movement will continue its ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, alongside the comprehensive aerial blockade on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском April 2025 marks the second anniversary of Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the prospect of joining the alliance began to be seriously considered after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, a final decision was repeatedly postponed due to the unclear advantages of this move and insufficient public support. Despite close economic ties with Russia and a tradition of cautious diplomacy known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen line” (often criticized as “Finlandization”), the 2022 international crisis pushed Finland to join NATO. Since then, the once-neutral country has shifted its foreign policy, increased defense spending, and expanded its arms exports. Government and Military Perspectives In December 2024, the Finnish government presented a new Defense Report in Helsinki, replacing the previous strategy issued in September 2021. Back in 2021, Finland had highlighted the growing military activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, along with the increased interest of major powers in the natural resources of the North and the Northern Sea Route. Notably, the country didn’t name any specific enemy, choosing to keep its message broad and carefulThe 2024 document takes a much more serious tone. It clearly names Russia as the main source of global instability and describes China as a growing power that challenges the U.S. and its allies. Terrorism is mentioned too, but much less often. Some of the main points about global security include the following - The return of a "large-scale, protracted war" to the European continent;- The Special Military Operation (SMO) is interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008;- An increase in hybrid attacks and incidents involving critical infrastructure;- Growing Chinese influence on Finland and its neighboring countries;- An unpredictable and unstable defense and international security environment, with a clear tendency toward further deterioration;- The largest NATO military buildup on the eastern flank since the end of the Cold War;- Accession to NATO is described as “the most significant transformation in Finland’s defense policy since World War II”;- Ongoing integration of Finland’s armed forces into NATO’s structures and joint defense planning;- Finland is now planning its defense together with NATO, focusing not just on its own territory but also on the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In the section on shifts in global power, Russia is named as the main cause of instability. It is described as “the most significant and immediate threat to the Allies, to security, and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Other claims include: a long-standing effort to weaken the European Union, a push to restore its great power status, and an attempt to divide Europe into spheres of influence using military force. Russia is also accused of using hybrid tactics—such as spreading fear, influencing public opinion, stirring political divisions, and blocking decisions—to target European countries and their people. Its Special Military Operation is seen as the beginning of a broader, more direct, and unpredictable conflict with the West. China is characterized as a less aggressive player. It is noted that Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, has intensified intelligence activities in the United States and Europe, and has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia, the development of which will determine Moscow’s ability to exert influence over Europe. At the same time, Finnish strategists place greater emphasis on the ongoing competition between China and the United States for global political, military, economic, and technological dominance. In matters concerning NATO’s role in defense, it is noted that the Alliance has intensified its cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, increased its military presence on the eastern flank and the number of military exercises, and is continually updating both general and regional defense plans in the event of a large-scale conflict. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO has become geographically closer to strategically important areas for Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Belarus, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, ensuring the security of maritime transport routes and the modernization of military infrastructure in Northern European countries is viewed as a key condition for the potential reinforcement of troops from North America. The role of the European Union is described as complementary to NATO, while it is also noted that the EU is increasing defense spending and expanding technological cooperation. The report was published after the election victory of Republican U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his isolationist views, which is partially reflected in the document through emphasis on European independence in security matters and the need for further military expenditures. On intra-European regional issues, the report focuses on cooperation with the member states of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic States, and the United Kingdom, as well as on Germany’s shift in security policy, France’s increased defense spending, and Poland’s growing purchases of military equipment. In military and technology matters, the document highlights the growing role of unmanned systems (both remote-controlled and autonomous), artificial intelligence, and advanced human capabilities like improved thinking and synthetic biology. It stresses the need to use the latest scientific and tech innovations in developing weapons — a step that could help make up for fewer soldiers on the battlefield. Cyberspace and outer space are seen as new areas of military and technological competition. This view is based on several factors: the rapid growth of space technologies (driven by private companies), easier access to space, and heavy reliance on cyber tools and satellites for both military and civilian use. Information warfare is also becoming more influential alongside traditional combat. The document notes that small countries can benefit in such conflicts by using innovations smartly and managing resources well. Still, Helsinki does not rely only on high-tech solutions. A key part of Finland’s military strategy is preparing both its army and population for long-term, grinding conflicts. This includes signing long-term arms supply contracts, building strategic reserves, keeping supply chains strong, and staying ready to protect their way of life. Among the main conclusions, the authors of the report present the following: - Finland and Europe are facing a significant decline in security, with no short-term improvement expected.- Russia poses and will continue to pose a constant security threat to Europe and Finland;- Finland will provide military assistance to Ukraine for as long as necessary;- Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region, and the High North have formed a unified geostrategic space; the Baltic Sea region holds strategic importance for Finland;- Finland’s defense will rely on maintaining conscription, strengthening the training of its military reserve, a strong public will to defend the country, and support from NATO membership.- Commitment to total defense — a combination of all national and international military and civilian measures that ensure the protection of the country under any circumstances (seven components are listed: government administration, international relations, defense capability, internal security, economy, functional capabilities of the population, and psychological resilience of people); There is a need to improve working conditions in the defense industry, increase production, and secure steady, reliable supply chains. A gradual increase in Finland’s military spending. - The development of the EU’s defense potential, and movement toward greater independence of the European Union both in policy and in the development of military technologies and defense supplies;- NATO’s readiness to provide the full spectrum of forces necessary for large-scale, high-intensity combat operations; Finland, in turn, must also create all the necessary conditions for the presence of allied troops on its territory. Similar assessments are presented in the Military Intelligence Review of Finland — 2025 (previous publications date back to 2021 and 2023), prepared by the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces. Russia is also named as the main threat there, which “seeks to reduce Western influence, secure its sphere of influence,” “views security policy as a zero-sum great power game in which NATO expansion strengthens the position of the United States and thereby weakens Russia’s security,” and “the interests or security of neighboring countries are not an important factor in Moscow’s calculations.” In addition, Russia is accused of seeking to turn the Global South against Western countries, in particular, there is a reference to “an attempt to present the BRICS group as part of an anti-Western ‘global majority’” . As for the Northern European direction, the Finnish General Staff notes the buildup of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic region, attributes to Moscow attempts to gain unrestricted access to the Northern Sea Route and to weaken the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO structures. Helsinki predicts that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s priority will be the accelerated buildup and modernization of forces in the reestablished Leningrad Military District, bordering Scandinavia. Finnish military officials do not believe in a quick settlement of the situation in Ukraine and forecast a deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West in the coming years, a struggle by Russia for shipping in the Baltic Sea “by any means,” continued attacks on underwater infrastructure in the Baltic (a reference to damage to undersea cables, although no exact culprit is named), escalation of the race between the West, Russia and China for the resources of the High North, and increased intelligence and sabotage activities by Russian special services in Finland. China is not viewed in an entirely negative light; instead, there is recognition of Beijing's ambition to become a political, economic, military, and technological leader by 2049, marking the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China's growing influence over countries of the Global South is also noted. Russia–China relations are seen as a "lifeline" for the Russian economy and a means of circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing is not seen as an equal partner, but as someone benefiting from Russia’s growing isolation. This makes Russia more dependent on China. The war in Ukraine is seen as helping China, since it distracts the West from China's global rise. At the regional level, Helsinki plans to enhance cooperation and update the foundational NORDEFCO agreement during its presidency of the organization in 2025. This push for renewal is driven by the evolving security environment and Finland’s recent accession to NATO alongside Sweden. Back in April 2024, the defense ministers of the member states signed a memorandum outlining a new vision for NORDEFCO. According to the document, by 2030 the countries plan to improve joint military planning and operations, make it easier to move troops across borders, boost cooperation and intelligence sharing, both directly and through NATO and the EU, and keep strengthening the defense industries of the Nordic countries. NORDEFCO is not officially seen as a mutual defense agreement or a command system like NATO; however, in recent years, it has started to show features usually found in a defense alliance, mostly because of the actions of some of its members. In 2021, the defense ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden signed a deal to strengthen cooperation, allowing for "joint action in times of peace, crisis, or conflict." In 2022, they gave each other permission to use their airspace and military bases. That same year, the defense ministers of Finland, Norway, and Sweden updated their three-way agreement, further growing their military cooperation. After Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway made a joint promise to fully support them if either country were attacked. While NORDEFCO has not yet become an organization like NATO, the current level of defense cooperation between the Nordic countries at the regional level — and repeated promises to help each other in case of conflict — suggest that in the coming years, this effort might start to look like a smaller version of NATO in Northern Europe. This kind of setup would likely be less full of red tape, quicker at making decisions, and made up of countries that share similar views and speak with one voice. It would also have a lower risk of going backward — unlike some NATO members who, in recent years, have threatened to block decisions, added extra demands for new members, or even talked about leaving the Alliance. Defense and Military-Industrial Complex Expenditures Threats identified by Finnish politicians and the military automatically require growing expenditures and an acceleration of the defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2014 to 2020, Finland’s military spending remained annually at the level of 1.5% of GDP, while in absolute terms it gradually increased — from $3.57 billion to $3.9 billion. Amid the pandemic in 2021, the figure dropped to $3.65 billion, but by the end of 2022 it amounted to $4.47 billion, and in 2023 — to $6.85 billion, or 2.4% of GDP. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides similar estimates: growth from $3.72 billion in 2014 to $6.89 billion in 2024, with the budget for 2025 estimated at $7.47 billion. Helsinki does not intend to stop there — on April 1, 2025, following recommendations from the Ministry of Defense, the government began preparations for a phased increase of the military budget to at least 3% of GDP by 2029. Over four years, it plans to raise allocations by €3.7 billion, expand the state defense order, and develop new rearmament programs for the 2030s. Helsinki also views the prospects of its domestic defense industry with optimism — according to the Finnish think tank SaferGlobe (which, according to its website, is “engaged in the study and development of tools to promote sustainable peace and security”), in 2023 arms exports reached €333 million (of which €141 million accounted for weapons intended for civilian use in self-defense, sports, and hunting) — a record since record-keeping began in 2002. About 85% of military exports were distributed within Europe. The largest importing countries by value were Sweden (€51 million), Latvia (€34 million), and Lithuania (€19 million) — together, these three countries accounted for more than half of all military product exports. In value terms, the largest share of exported military products (32%) consisted of land vehicles and their components. The next largest export categories were ammunition (17%), as well as explosives and charges (15%). The largest exports of civilian weapons were to the United States (€52 million), Canada (€15 million), and Australia (€9 million). The year 2023 also set a record for issued export licenses for military products — €667 million. The largest recipient countries of export licenses were Slovakia (€201 million), Japan (€154 million), and Ukraine (€88 million). Similar conclusions were reached by the state investment company Finnish Industry Investment (Tesi), which in autumn 2024 surveyed 368 domestic defense companies: 144 of them were identified as “fast-growing startups and growth companies,” while the rest were described as “more established players with a long history, mainly providing consulting services to the Finnish Defence Forces.” The highest growth rates were shown by producers of dual-use goods, whose net profit has increased annually by 30–40% since 2022. At the same time, companies engaged exclusively in the military sector faced difficulties in attracting investment. 50% of defense companies were located in the capital region of Uusimaa, where the leaders were Helsinki (74 companies) and its satellite city Espoo (65); another 16% were based in the Pirkanmaa region centered around Tampere (40). Rounding out the top five were the high-tech “capital” Oulu (21) and another satellite of Helsinki, Vantaa (14). By type of activity, the majority of companies (246) operated in the support and logistics sector; 70 were engaged in the design of combat command and control systems (C4I — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence); 20 firms cooperated with the land forces, 13 with the navy, 10 with the air force, five worked in joint operations, and the remaining four were involved in space technologies. A New Strategy — A New President Finland’s entry into NATO happened during the second and final term of President Sauli Niinistö. While he followed the West’s general approach on the war in Ukraine and supported anti-Russian sanctions, he still tried to keep some level of political dialogue with Russia. After February 2022, this became almost impossible, and Finland officially ended its nearly 80-year policy of staying neutral. In the two-round election held in January and February 2024, Finnish voters chose Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party as their new president. Stubb studied in the United States and France, and previously worked as a Member of the European Parliament, as well as Finland’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Back in 2014, when Finland still followed the "Paasikivi–Kekkonen line" of cautious foreign policy, Stubb was one of the only top officials who openly supported joining NATO. On the topic of relations with Russia, he said that “Russia’s integration with the West was an illusion.” This view may be influenced by his family history. Stubb’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Käkisalmi — a town that was given to the Soviet Union after the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, renamed first as Kexholm (in Swedish), and later as Priozersk. On his father's side, Stubb’s grandparents came from Vyborg, which also became part of the Soviet Union after the war. However, the family had already moved to Helsinki before the conflict started. In his inaugural speech on March 1, 2024, Alexander Stubb uncompromisingly stated to the citizens of Finland that “the post–Cold War era is over” (placing the blame on Russia), “the instruments of cooperation have been turned into weapons,” “the world is in a transitional state,” and “the creation of a new world order takes time.” He added that Finns “will have to respond quickly to changing circumstances, as was the case with NATO membership,” and that “when times become difficult, I too will be ready to make tough decisions to ensure the security of our country.” In addition to his campaign promises, the newly elected president confirmed his commitment to the previously introduced “value-based realism” (arvopohjainen realismi), which he pledged to be guided by in the conduct of foreign policy if elected. Later, this was officially included in the government’s report on foreign and security policy in June 2024. Among other ideas, the report especially highlighted the following: commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, international law, and human rights; strengthening the country’s defense; staying out of military conflicts; and being open to dialogue with countries that do not share these values. The election of A. Stubb as president strengthened the pro-Western trends in Finland’s foreign policy. On September 1, 2024, the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States entered into force, under which Finland opens 15 of its military facilities for possible use by U.S. forces, while Helsinki will not charge rent for premises or land made available to the United States. On September 27 of the same year, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced the placement of NATO headquarters on Finnish territory — in Mikkeli in the southwest of the country, 140 km from the border with the Russian Federation, and in the northern region of Lapland. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish authorities announced preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines (a similar step had previously been taken by the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia), stating that this is “a cost-effective way to supplement the capabilities of the armed forces,” but adding that the country would remain “committed to the humanitarian goals of the convention” even after a possible withdrawal. On April 15, 2025, a Finnish servicemember took part for the first time in a flight aboard a NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during Ramstein Alloy 2025 exercises in the Baltic region. The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) includes personnel from 17 countries, in addition to which Canada, France, Finland, and Lithuania also contribute their staff. NATO noted that the E-3A is the first multinational flying unit created by the Alliance. Statements regarding Russia, despite initial uncompromising tone, began to soften after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, who held a different view of the Ukrainian conflict compared to the strongly pro-Ukrainian administration of Joe Biden. As early as April 2024, Alexander Stubb stated that there was no need to conduct political dialogue with Russia, and considered military action the only path to peace in the context of Ukraine. Under the new Washington administration, the Finnish president approved of the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian leaders, but again repeated the Ukrainian position on the need for a “just peace” and Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. During his March 2025 visit to Florida, Stubb attempted to dissuade Donald Trump from cooperating with Russia and also called for tougher sanctions against Moscow. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish president admitted that European countries had started talking about renewing contact with Russia. He said that Finland must "morally prepare" for rebuilding political ties with Russia, since "nothing changes the fact that Russia exists and will always be a neighbor." However, he did not give any timeline for when relations might be restored. The situation around the war in Ukraine is made more difficult by the Trump administration’s growing isolationism, along with threats to pull out of talks and a trade war that Washington has launched against almost the entire world (though some parts of it have been paused). This raises fears of a new “Great Depression.” The European Union’s success at the negotiating table will depend on how united its member states are, since they have different geopolitical interests. Although Finland supports calls for a ceasefire, it does not plan to stop its military support for Ukraine or oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Alexander Stubb, on at least two occasions (in November 2024 and March 2025), publicly warned Ukraine against following a “Finnish scenario.” This would mean giving up on NATO membership and possibly giving up territory—similar to what Finland did after World War II, when it accepted neutrality and lost 11% of its land. In a comment on efforts to resolve the conflict in 2025, Stubb criticized Finland’s past policy of “good neighborliness” with the Soviet Union. He said that while Finland kept its independence in 1944, it lost land, part of its sovereignty, and the ability to make its own decisions freely.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском H.E. President of the Republic, Gabriel Boric Font, together with the Minister of Economy, Development, and Tourism of Chile, Nicolás Grau, and the Minister of Planning of Brazil, Simone Tebet, leads the inauguration of the Roundtable: Business and Investment Opportunities on the Bioceanic Corridor, Brasília 2025. Thank you very much, Nicolás, Minister Tebet, and everyone present. First of all, I apologize for the 15-minute delay. We were previously attending a preparatory forum for the COP in Belém do Pará, convened by President Lula with several world leaders, including the presidents of China, France, Spain, Vietnam, and South Korea. That delayed us a bit, so my apologies. That said, it is truly an honor for me to be here because it represents something that resonates with me on two distinct yet complementary dimensions. The first is South American integration. One of the things that Pepe Mujica has repeated to me countless times whenever I visit him — and something President Lula has also emphasized on every occasion we have met — is that Latin American integration, and particularly South American integration, must necessarily go beyond rhetoric, beyond adjectives, and beyond summit photographs. It must be about result-oriented actions, concrete actions that materialize, that our people and communities can see and feel in their daily lives. I believe that the Bioceanic Corridor is one of the best examples of this serious approach to integration. Beyond, I insist, adjectives and rhetoric. And secondly, because it is integration with decentralization. This is no small matter. Brazil is a federal state, while Chile is a unitary state — which is an elegant way of saying "centralized." Although we have gradually advanced in granting greater power and resources to the regions — for example, by electing governors, who used to be appointed by the President of the Republic — we still have a long way to go. It is enough to see that more than 40% of Chile’s population, out of 20 million inhabitants, lives in the capital, Santiago. This is partly due to cultural inertia, but also to a lack of opportunities and development in the other regions. I come from an extreme region — from Chilean Patagonia, from the southernmost part of the world. I was a deputy for eight years representing Magallanes and the Chilean Antarctic. Therefore, I am fully aware that from places like Planalto in Brazil or La Moneda in Chile, the daily reality of the regions — especially the most remote ones — is not always fully perceived. That is why I am very pleased that, in the case of Chile, this initiative is being carried out by empowering the north of the country with local authorities. That is why today we are joined by Ricardo Díaz, Governor of the Antofagasta Region, and José Miguel Carvajal, Governor of the Tarapacá Region, which provide a significant portion of Chile’s wealth. However, this wealth is not necessarily reflected in the quality of life within those regions, despite their tremendous potential. Therefore, I believe this project is very positive in both dimensions. The Bioceanic Road Corridor aims to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through an extensive network of road and port infrastructure. I have shared this anecdote before, but since there are people here I hadn’t met previously, I’ll tell it again. The former President of Chile, Ricardo Lagos — who, if I remember correctly, served during the same period as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the first term of President Lula — once told me, thinking about the future, that the Mediterranean was the center of the civilized world, at least from a European perspective, for much of history. After World War II, the center of the world shifted to the North Atlantic. But today, the future of the world lies in the South, particularly in the Pacific, in the Pacific Ocean. Chile is part of several treaties, including the CPTPP 11, and various free trade agreements with ASEAN countries, particularly with China, and we are also working on others. These agreements grant us, I would say, privileged access to sectors that are among the fastest growing in the world today. As Minister Grau mentioned, we are also working on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India, the world’s most populous country with 1.4 billion people. The Bioceanic Corridor will be at the heart of South America. The Mayor of Iquique showed me a world map and pointed out, "Iquique is the center of the world." Mayors, governors, and leaders everywhere always praise their own regions, but I find that a beautiful idea. Now we are talking about the Bioceanic Corridor, not about a particular city or a particular country. We are speaking about more than 2,400 kilometers that will significantly reduce cargo transport times from the interior regions of Brazil and Paraguay to the markets of the Asia-Pacific. Instead of crossing the Panama Canal — which, as we know, is currently facing significant congestion due to the climate crisis and water shortages — we will create a new route. And what will this lead to? We will link the Pantanal with the Atacama Desert, two ecosystems that are unique on the planet — and this is not just about trade. I really liked what Minister Tebet said: "This is also about tourism." We discussed it yesterday during the business forum we attended, where President Lula also participated: how tourism is not only one of the few non-polluting industries, but also how tourists often become the best ambassadors for our countries and the best promoters of the destinations they visit. In 2024, we had a record number of Brazilian tourists visiting Chile. This happened because the tourists who came in previous years had a good experience and shared it with their families, friends, and colleagues. The same is true for Chileans traveling to Brazil — and not just to Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, but also to Bahia, Fortaleza, Mato Grosso, and the Amazon. Thus, we have opportunities in many areas. We have taken this very seriously, and from Chile, we created a high-level commission to drive this project forward in a coordinated manner. One of the greatest challenges for states is achieving coordination and collaboration among different public agencies to move projects forward more quickly. That’s why what Nicolás mentioned is so important regarding the input we need from the private sector to more rapidly identify and resolve bottlenecks and obstacles together. In this high-level commission, we have brought together various ministries, regional governments, and local actors because we have learned from experience that without involving organized communities, these initiatives do not work well. We want to ensure that this project brings direct benefits to our people — to the families of Tocopilla, Antofagasta, and Iquique, as well as to the provinces of Santa Fe, Jujuy, Salta, and Mato Grosso do Sul. However, we still face significant challenges. One of the main concerns of our populations — and I am sure this is true in Brazil as well, but I will speak specifically about Chile — is security. While we have made significant progress in infrastructure — Nicolás outlined the improvements we have achieved and the ones we will continue to make, as infrastructure is a long-term investment — we must also address the challenge of security. Today, we see that crime, delinquency, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms trafficking are no longer purely local issues; they are transnational. The case of the Tren de Aragua is perhaps the most well-known in recent times in Latin America, at least in the Pacific region. But this issue deeply concerns our people, and therefore, opening new routes must go hand in hand with providing security for those traveling along them. All trucks must be guaranteed safety, as well as dignified conditions for rest, meals, and repair services in case of vehicle breakdowns — and of course, security for all people. Whether through scanners, police presence, artificial intelligence, or other mechanisms, we must ensure that everyone can feel safe. Because ultimately, when crime spirals out of control and we are unable to contain it, it effectively becomes a new kind of tax — an undeclared tax — because it forces increased spending. And in the end, it is the consumers who bear that cost. Therefore, we must be extremely careful and put great effort into addressing this issue. Another positive aspect is the very clear complementarity between our countries. Brazil is a first-rate industrial and agri-food powerhouse. Chile enjoys privileged access to the Pacific and Asian markets and has increasingly positioned itself as a technological hub. Argentina and Paraguay contribute with critical transport routes and productive capacities. If all of this is properly coordinated, it can transform South America into a global integration platform with sovereignty, without external tutelage, promoting free trade in times of uncertainty for the benefit of our peoples. Here we are also talking about strengthening many SMEs — small and medium-sized enterprises — in addition to large companies. If we do this well, it will generate benefits, circulation, and a dynamic that will positively impact many people. Achieving this, however, is primarily the responsibility of the states, but certainly also in close partnership with the private sector. At this moment, global integration is being called into question. The United States has unleashed a trade war marked by volatility and great uncertainty. And the best way to respond to this trade war is not through loud declarations. From Chile’s point of view, and considering the position we hold in the world as a medium-sized country, we will not respond with retaliation. We will respond with more integration. We will respond through the CEPA agreement with India, through the initiatives we are advancing with the United Arab Emirates. We will also push and engage in dialogue with countries like France to expedite the approval of the agreement between the European Union and Mercosur. And we will continue integrating regionally within South America, working together with our regions. That is why we must continue working diligently to facilitate customs processes, promote cross-border investments, and improve logistics throughout the entire supply chain. And I ask, particularly of the private sector, that you intensify these business alliances. I assure you that you can trust the Chilean state to provide guarantees for long-term investment. We have a development path that is environmentally conscious and understands that to better distribute wealth, first we must grow more. There is a balance to be struck: generating more wealth to distribute it better, not merely accumulating it in the hands of a few. But this is a cycle — to distribute wealth better, we must first create it. We cannot be satisfied with what we already have. Trade is one of the main drivers of this, along with strengthening our own industries — an area where Brazil is ahead of us, and which Minister Grau has also strongly promoted within Chile. Minister Tebet lamented how long it has taken us to advance this integration. President Lula mentioned yesterday that during his first term, the first bridge with Peru was built — if I recall correctly — after so many years of being neighbors. What I want to tell you is that it is never too late, and that today it is up to our generation to make this integration a reality. This is a unique opportunity, and we have no right to waste it. We cannot let this opportunity slip away. The Bioceanic Road Corridor will be much more than a transport route; it will be a path for human development, a bridge between peoples, and a symbol of what South America can achieve when it stands united. Thank you very much.