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This fall, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is slated to lead a bipartisan group of U.S. senators to China. The planned trip, like other recent visits to China by high-ranking U.S. officials, is aimed at improving the relationship between the U.S. and China. Such efforts to ameliorate U.S.-China diplomatic relations come amid growing tensions between the two economic giants. They also run parallel to U.S. efforts to strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific countries to limit Beijing’s influence. Take, for example, President Joe Biden’s September 2023 trips to India for the G20 summit and to Vietnam, where U.S. competition with China was a focus of Biden’s discussions. While he was in Asia, Biden made several agreements in science, technology and supply chain security designed to bolster U.S. relations with India and Vietnam. “I don’t want to contain China,” the president told reporters in Hanoi on Sept. 10, 2023, shortly after meeting with Vietnam’s communist party leader. U.S. Reps. Mike Gallagher and Raja Krishnamoorthi echoed similar sentiments during an event held by the Council on Foreign Relations think tank in New York City the following day. But even if the U.S.’s stated goal isn’t to limit China’s global influence, its recent agreements with India, Vietnam and other countries may do exactly that. What US-led G20 deals mean for China The U.S. is actively looking for ways to blunt one of China’s best tools of influence: international loans. During the G20 summit Sept. 9-10 in New Delhi, the U.S. pledged to help reform the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to make them more flexible in lending to developing countries to finance renewable energy, climate mitigation and critical infrastructure projects. Biden committed the first US$25 billion to make those reforms possible and secured additional financial pledges from other countries totaling $200 billion in new funding for developing countries over the next decade. The U.S. also signed onto a deal with the European Union, Saudi Arabia and India that will help connect the Middle East, Europe and Asia through rails and ports. Characterizing it as a “real big deal,” Biden said the rail and ports agreement would help stabilize and integrate the Middle East. These plans are aimed at providing an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Commonly referred to as BRI, the initiative is China’s international infrastructure loan program. Over the past decade, Chinese government agencies, banks and businesses have loaned more than $1 trillion abroad, and 60% of the recipient countries are now in debt to these Chinese entities. The U.S. and other countries have long criticized BRI as “debt trap diplomacy.” One study suggests that the trillions of dollars in infrastructure loans to countries by the government and quasi-government bodies in China typically lead to debt problems that the borrowing countries can’t manage. As China grapples with a slowing domestic economy, it may become more difficult for Chinese entities to keep shelling out funding for big-ticket overseas projects. The new U.S.-led agreements that come out of the G20 could fill the coming gap. These G20 plans complement existing Western economic initiatives to compete with the BRI, including U.S. trade pacts for the Indo-Pacific region and the Americas, the EU’s Global Gateway and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. What the US’s agreement with India means for China In their meeting on the sidelines of the G20, Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to deepen collaboration on developing critical and emerging technology, such as quantum computing and space exploration, as well as 5G and 6G telecommunications. This will help India compete with China in the technological arena in the Indo-Pacific. The telecommunications portion of a joint statement by Biden and Modi specifically mentions the U.S.’s Rip and Replace program. It is about helping smaller telecommunications companies rip out technology from Chinese companies like Huawei or ZTE and replace them with network equipment from the West that will protect users’ data. The U.S. has banned Huawei and ZTE equipment from its telecommunication networks, deeming those companies national security risks. The U.S. and India’s pledge to support Rip and Replace is a direct counter to China’s telecommunication technology expansion. What the US’s agreement with Vietnam means for China In Vietnam, Biden elevated the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, expanding the relationship in everything from economics to education to technology in a country that has long counted China as its top trading partner. The enhanced partnership includes the U.S. providing $2 million to fund teaching labs and training courses for semiconductor assembly, testing and packaging. One company in Arizona and two in California have already pledged to set up semiconductor factories and design centers in Vietnam, and the U.S. artificial intelligence company Nvidia will help Vietnam integrate AI into automotive and health care systems. All these investments will make Vietnam even more attractive to U.S. and Western companies that don’t want China to be the sole source of their supply chain. As Vietnam becomes a key player in the semiconductor market, it will shrink China’s share of the market as well as its regional technological advantage. The U.S. also agreed to provide nearly $9 million to help Vietnam patrol the waters around its borders and beef up port facility security, as well as boost efforts to fight illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, or IUUF. While not explicitly mentioned, China is the target of this initiative; China and Vietnam continue to be at loggerheads over disputed claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and Chinese industrial fishing vessels are the largest culprits of IUUF around the globe. By inking these agreements at the G20 in India and in Vietnam, the U.S. broadened its circle of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that can help counterbalance China. Along with similar diplomatic accomplishments by Vice President Kamala Harris at the recent ASEAN summit in Indonesia; security partnerships like AUKUS, between the U.S., Australia and the UK, and the Quad, between the U.S., India, Australia and Japan; increased military sales and training to Taiwan; and the recent Camp David meeting Biden held with Japan and South Korea, the U.S. is building partnerships all across Asia. These actions are aimed at restraining China’s political, economic and military might, even if U.S. leaders don’t explicitly say that is their intention. Regardless of rhetoric, actions speak louder than words.

Summary  Periodically, initiatives are launched to address the Middle East peace process, including in connection with other simmering issues. Currently, an idea is being discussed that emanates from the Biden administration and is said to have as its goal the recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia. The U.S., whose representatives have previously spoken of a rocky road in this context, most recently denied having entered into any agreements. Away from the international interest focused on the Ukraine war, the region is once again on the move. In this regard, the ideas reported by the U.S. media, which are quite consistent with U.S. strategic interests, reflect a lack of understanding of the region. It would not be new. Analysis According to the Wall Street Journal, the Biden administration has launched a new initiative to kill two birds with one stone: Saudi Arabia's recognition of Israel and curbing China's influence over the regional middle power on the Arabian Peninsula. At the heart of the matter are possible concessions to Riyadh, subject to various conditions. After the Trump family's failed attempt at a 'Deal of the Century,' an improvement in the region's relational fabric with various conditions attached, the new strategy sounds like another 'stroke of genius.' Israeli media in particular are discussing the project; in the Arab world there is rather radio silence. There, the focus is on the first installation of a Saudi ambassador – as a secondary accreditation of the representative in Amman – in Palestine. Visits by U.S. National Security Advisor Sullivan in recent months are fuelling the speculation. The U.S. government already denied having entered into any agreements. After various offers to mediate in the peace process, including one by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the question arises as to the viability and impact of such initiatives.  According to the Wall Street Journal, in return for recognition of Israel, Saudi Arabia would receive support in building up its civilian nuclear energy program, promote the formation of a Palestinian state, and curb Beijing's economic and military influence. The idea includes a number of elements that, while understandably consistent with recent strategies of the Biden administration, each of which already has a clear degree of complexity.  Relations with Israel had already been the subject of discussion once before during a high-profile visit by the Saudi crown prince to the United States – still under the Trump administration. Following this, King Salman had apparently felt compelled to confirm the kingdom's official stance toward Israel and end the discussion. Mohammed bin Salman, according to U.S. officials, is now said to be ready for a 'deal' that does not, however, imply full diplomatic relations. No mention is made of the Wahhabi clergy as a decisive pillar of the royal family's position of power, which has already put the ruling family under pressure on various occasions in the past with its uncompromising interpretation of the Koran on relations with Judaism. With driving licenses for women, the opening of movie theatres, the hosting of cultural events, the dismantling of the religious police and other things, the young generation that Mohammed bin Salman represents is challenging this radical conservative ulama right now anyway. The rigorous crackdown on other parts of the family and the imposition of a succession plan favouring King Salman's descendants since 2015 are also likely to have caused rifts. The effects of dealing with relations with Israel in such a situation will be interesting to observe.  In return for various concessions, Riyadh is supposed to limit its relations with the People's Republic of China and, for example, not allow any Chinese military installations, although it questions whether this is even a real scenario. The establishment of military bases on Saudi territory in the 1990s to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia, whose army was considered inferior, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was a key trigger for Osama bin Laden to turn against the United States. In this, he was not alone, but was in line with Wahhabi preachers. The then-royalist Mufti Bin Baz had to perform significant contortions to justify the presence of 'non-believers' – including women who piloted aircraft and operated weapons. In Saudi Arabia – and especially within Wahhabi circles – this is not forgotten. What real-world value there is in accepting the establishment of a Chinese military base - run by 'communist atheists' (m/f) – in the Land of Two Holy Places will be interesting to observe, especially since Beijing already has a well-developed base on the opposite side of Bab al-Mandab in Djibouti, alongside the US and France, from which, for example, the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Sudan was operated. Initiatives aimed at establishing a functioning Palestinian state remain completely out of touch with reality. Quite independently of the domestic political situation in Israel and the current influence of the settler movement, the various Palestinian groups – Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Intifada movement, Dahlan supporters, etc. – do not appear to be in a position to do so. Although President Abbas and Haniye of Hamas have recently spoken to each other again in Egypt and Turkey, there is no overlap between the two, except for a desire to act against Israel in order to secure their own position of power, which is linked to economic interests, and their positioning with regard to a successor to Abbas. The question of a Palestinian state is therefore more a media concession to the Arab street, which still remembers the deeply buried Oslo Accords. The 'Deal of the Century' presented in the management style of global management consultancies by Trump's son-in-law was already a prime example of similar denial of reality, which thrived on each party hoping for an economic advantage for itself without wanting to make any real compromises and excluding various harsh realities in the region. It seemed more real at times that President Abbas would dissolve the presidential administration and hand over the remnants of government authority in the West Bank to Israel-at least he threatened to do so. In recent years, the rapprochement between Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv has been sustained by the frontline position toward their common adversary Iran. While this has not disappeared, it has weakened noticeably in recent months – even if the Revolutionary Guards continue to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, negotiations with the Huthis in Yemen, and a reported slowdown in Iranian uranium enrichment have taken the Iran scenario somewhat out of the public eye and reduced the pressure to act. It is obvious that U.S. influence in Saudi Arabia, as in the entire region, has declined in recent years. In a speech in Cairo, President Obama announced a policy shift toward the Arab world. The disappointment was all the greater when this did not materialize – and those former elites whose fall was passionately welcomed in Western states during the Arab Spring returned to power. President Trump reduced Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to a buyer of U.S. defense products at the White House. The Saudi visitor was reportedly uncomfortable with this. The current president began his term with tones clearly critical of Riyadh, which fell silent as oil prices rose.  With the proposal now described, the impression arises that it firstly serves interests of Israel, which seeks further normalization of foreign relations with states of the Arab world, secondly fits in with attempts to contain global Chinese influence, and thirdly is intended to counteract the loss of its own importance. Whether the sale of nuclear technology, which is advantageous for U.S. companies, is a high enough price for this will also be interesting to observe. In general, the assessment of relations between Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China, which are clearly marked by an increase in economic interests, overlooks subcutaneous differences. The ideological differences between China's secular party rule and the Saudi royalty, which is supported by a radical conservative clergy, are considerable. Both states have a tradition of not discussing critical issues in public; nevertheless, Riyadh's role in radicalizing individual Muslims in China has been a recurring theme. In recent years, both states have pursued a foreign policy strategy that has tended to rely less on camp-building and coalitions. Instead, there is a great deal of agreement on economic ventures. The People's Republic, with its large, unrivalled, state-subsidized state-owned enterprises, offers the expertise for the rapid, timely implementation of megaprojects necessary for Saudi economic restructuring, and Saudi Arabia pays from its bulging sovereign wealth funds. And China, like South Korea, also has nuclear power plants on offer. And in contrast to high-tech weapons systems, the People's Republic is a serious competitor in nuclear power. Whether this mutually advantageous situation can be undermined by politically motivated conditions remains to be seen. Moreover, Riyadh reacts irritably to paternalism. It does not have to fear this from Beijing. In this region, unrealistic proposals not only mean the superfluous use of working time – that would be bearable –; they can also trigger unintended developments. For radical Islamist groups, as well as for a considerable part of the radical clergy, the question of how to deal with Israel remains central. Without their attacks on Israel, hardly anyone would be interested in Hamas or Islamic Jihad. The renewed rise of very different violent groups in the region and demographic processes such as those in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, which harbour the danger of further radicalization of segments of the population, especially religious radicalization, pose a perceptible risk for the future. The economic situation in some states – first and foremost Egypt – requires significant efforts. Even 'rich' Saudi Arabia, whose ability to feed its growing population is diminishing, is not spared. A sense of proportion, impartiality and impartiality would be prerequisites for finding a good solution.     

While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts.This analysis was first published in the Global Observatory, 30 August 2023.When Jim O’Neill coined the BRIC acronym in 2001, the point he was trying to convey was that the global economic system needed to incorporate the world’s largest emerging economies. His advice fell on deaf ears and in 2009, Brazil, China, India and Russia decided to take matters into their own hands and formed the BRIC grouping. South Africa joined the group in 2010 to form the BRICS. This July, the group held its 15th summit in South Africa, where they decided to add six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. More are likely to join in the future, including countries like Indonesia and Nigeria. What these countries have in common is a frustration, if not a grievance, about being side-lined to the periphery of the world economy. Together, the BRICS represent approximately 40% of the world’s population. The combined size of their economies are approaching approximately 30% of the world’s GDP, which puts them roughly on par with combined size of the economies of the G7 countries, depending on whether size is measured in GDP or PPP.  More importantly, in the next few decades, the combined size of the BRICS economies will surpass that of the G7. Despite this growing parity, all the members of the BRICS, with the exception of Russia, self-identifies as being part of the Global South, i.e., they feel excluded from a global system dominated by the Global North. Their stated aim is to work towards a future system of global governance where they will have equal political and economic say in global institutions, and where no one state will dominate others. In pursuit of this aim, BRICS countries have established their own development bank, set up their own contingency reserve arrangement, are developing their own payment system, and have started to trade with each other in their own currencies. The BRICS want to free their economies from the dollar-based international financial system. They feel exposed to United States interest rates that can have a negative effect on their economies, for no domestic reasons. The dollar-based financial system also provides the US with significant advantages in the global economy, which the BRICS see as unfair. They also feel a dollar-based financial system gives the US hegemonic influence in global affairs, through for example, exerting US jurisdiction on all dollar-based trade or investments that flow through US banks or financial institutions. While the BRICS countries have these clear shared macro-economic interests, many of the members also have competing interests in other domains. China and India are geopolitical rivals in South Asia. Egypt and Ethiopia are at loggerheads over the Nile. Brazil, India, South Africa and the newly-added Argentina are democracies, while other countries in the group are governed by a diverse set of autocratic regimes, which could set up an irreconcilable clash of values on some issues. Many of the members of the BRICS also have close ties to the United States and Europe, including Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in a televised statement to the nation on the eve of hosting the BRICS summit in South Africa, explained that South Africa remains non-aligned, and he announced that in 2023 the country will also host a major United States-Africa trade meeting and an EU-South Africa summit. South Africa will also host the G20 in 2025, the first in Africa. For many countries, membership of the BRICS does thus not necessarily imply aligning themselves with one global alliance versus another, but rather cooperation in a group around a series of shared interests. Where does this place the BRICS on the Russian war in Ukraine? The BRICS summit in Johannesburg steered clear of taking a position on the war, other than welcoming mediation aimed at resolving it through dialogue and diplomacy. Some BRICS members like Iran are clearly supporting Russia, while most others have stopped short of either supporting or condemning Russia. For many such as Egypt, the war has adversely affected their economy. Two of the BRICS members, Egypt and South Africa, are part of an African initiative to seek a mediated end to the conflict, which is perhaps the first African initiative to mediate an international conflict. Overall, however, the BRICS have their eyes on the medium- to long-term transformation of the global macro-economic and financial system, and countries like China are probably frustrated that the Russian war in Ukraine has drawn attention away from this larger objective. Are the BRICS and the West headed for a new cold war? The shift in the center of gravity of the global economy to the East is an unstoppable fact driven by demographics and economic factors like the cost of production. At the same time, Europe and the United States will remain major economic players. In tandem with these changes in the global economy, it is clear that the global political order will become more multipolar, with China, Europe, India, and the United States representing some of the major centers of influence. In an August 27 article, Jim O’Neil argues that the influence of the BRICS will be determined by their effectiveness, not their size. An expanding BRICS will most likely succeed in helping its members to break free from a dollar-based international financial system, but that will take several decades of incremental change before it reaches a tipping point. Whether that is a good or bad thing depends on the degree to which your economy is tied to the United States. Many of the BRICS countries, including China, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa all have economies whose prosperity are closely tied to the Unites States. They will thus have an interest in a slow, stable freeing up of the international financial system, and this should give everyone that is prudent time to adapt. The same logic also applies to changes in global governance architecture. Apart from Russia, all the other BRICS countries have an interest in making sure that changes in the global order are managed at a slow steady pace that does not generate instability. All the BRICS countries, apart from Russia, are also strong supporters of multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center. Many Western countries and BRICS members may thus have more shared interests than the doomsday headlines suggest. While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to have changed course on his country’s foreign relations. At the last NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, he finally lifted his veto on Sweden’s proposed membership in the alliance; but his agreement is still incomplete as it requires the approval of the Turkish Parliament. And Erdoğan has apparently made parliamentary approval contingent on the US Congress approving his country’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets, which many assume may now be a done deal. Moreover, during the talks on Sweden’s accession, Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU) and hoped for a revival of the long-dead EU membership process. Prior to the Vilnius summit, Erdoğan further showcased his foreign policy outreach by hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ankara, signaling support for Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia.  On the domestic front, Erdoğan has formed a new cabinet that signals better relations with the West, as the most ardent anti-western member of the previous cabinet, former Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, has been left out. Additionally, the president aims to instill confidence in western markets by appointing respected figures like Mehmet Simsek as economy minister and Hafize Gaye Erkan as Central Bank governor. These appointments are seen as positive signals of an effort to strengthen economic ties with the West. This series of moves has triggered the hope, especially in western circles, that Turkey could return to the western fold and that Turkish-Russian relations will cool in parallel. However, pessimists, who see Turkey’s departure from the West as a done deal, disagree and are right to believe that Turkey’s relations with both the United States and European countries have fundamentally changed. It is no longer possible to go back to the early 2000s when Erdoğan was steering the country toward EU membership. The EU has no intention of admitting Turkey; but even if it did, the process would not be in Erdoğan’s favor. Nor is it possible to go back to the Cold War era, when Turkey was firmly embedded in the western geopolitical system. Turkey no longer sees Russia as a threat or an adversary in the sense that most western countries do. The fact that Turkey has resisted approving Sweden’s NATO membership for more than a year and that it will only do so in exchange for the delivery of F-16s shows how badly damaged Turkish-European and Turkish-American relations truly are. Therefore, pessimists point out that rather than signaling Turkey’s return to the West, the whole debacle proves how problematic and transactional Turkish-western relations have become. But these analysts overlook the fact that Erdoğan is pushing for a reorientation in foreign policy, and in his relations with the West in particular. This reorientation started long before the most recent presidential elections in May; but the president’s victory gave him a stronger hand to reboot his foreign policy, which is not aimed at bringing Turkey back into the West’s orbit, but rather at building better functioning relations with it. Turkey’s Departure from the West Turkey’s divergence from the West has taken place at the level of both political values and geopolitics. Over the last decade, Turkish democracy has been in serious decline. Especially after the transition to a hyper-presidential system in 2018, which eliminated all checks and balances in the political system, Turkey’s has become an increasingly autocratic regime. Turkish foreign policy has also become increasingly militarized, much to the chagrin of western capitals. Not only has Turkey used its military power in Syria, Iraq, and Libya but it has also deployed its navy to the Eastern Mediterranean, aggressively threatening the sovereignty of two EU countries: Greece and Cyprus. These aggressive policies were backed by an expansionist naval doctrine called Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland), whose ideology has disturbed western policymakers. The naval officers who created and developed the Blue Homeland concept never concealed their pro-Russian leanings and deliberately propagated an anti-American and anti-western narrative. These officers, and the political circles associated with them—dubbed Eurasianists in Turkey—have become an integral part of Turkey’s ruling coalition. Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia took place in such a context and represents the culmination of Turkish-American tensions. Turkey’s autocratic turn at home and its militarized foreign policy, which often work against the interests of its western allies, were simultaneous and mutually-reinforcing processes. But said foreign policy reached its limits toward the end of 2020. Turkey became regionally isolated with an overextended military, and its aggressive foreign policy, the rise of authoritarianism, and the subsequent decline of the rule of law plunged it into a protracted economic crisis. This economic downturn began to undermine Erdoğan’s meticulously-built power, as evidenced by his party’s defeat in the 2019 local elections. Unable to sustain autocratic rule, anti-westernism, and an aggressive foreign policy all at the same time, Erdoğan began to seek a new direction. The essence of the new approach is to maintain his authoritarian rule at home while becoming a less confrontational actor in foreign relations. Reorientation in Foreign Policy This reorientation began first in the Middle East, where Turkish authoritarianism was never going to be a cause for concern. Turkey began to mend fences with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while at the same time aligning itself with the emerging Abraham Accords framework in the region. While accommodating western geopolitical interests, Turkey’s relations with Iran began to enter a more confrontational phase. One of the main motivations for this regional restructuring was economic: Turkey continues to receive significant form of foreign investment from Gulf states. Another motivation was geo-strategic: Turkey hoped that normalization with Israel, and to a lesser extent with supposedly pro-western Arab regimes, would help ease tensions with the United States. While reconciling with its Middle Eastern rivals, the Erdoğan administration was also looking for opportunities to curry favor with Washington and increase its own importance in the eyes of the Biden administration. One of the early opportunities came in the summer of 2021 after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan when Turkey immediately stepped in and offered to take over the protection of Kabul International Airport. This initiative earned Erdoğan his first personal meeting with Biden. However, the unprecedented rapid collapse of the Kabul government prevented Ankara from using the Afghanistan front as a base to build its relations with the United States. A second opportunity arose in February 2022 when the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. New Opportunities for Erdoğan The war in Ukraine has had contradictory effects on Turkey’s foreign policy and on Turkish-western relations. On the one hand, it increased Turkey’s strategic value and facilitated its reengagement with the West. On the other hand, it created additional difficulties as western countries demanded that Turkey sever its ties with Russia, a demand that Turkey rejected. Erdoğan ultimately managed to spread the idea that perhaps it would be better for everyone if Turkey remained relatively neutral. Erdoğan’s personal ties with Putin and the complex and highly interdependent Turkish-Russian relations placed Turkey in a special position among NATO countries. Turkey therefore tried to maintain a pro-Ukrainian line without being anti-Russian. So far, Erdoğan has managed to maintain this seemingly paradoxical position. Turkey has given full military support to Ukraine, and especially in the early days of the war Turkish drones were vital for Ukraine’s defense. To be sure, this support was better than that of many European countries. Politically, however, and while condemning Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory since 2014, it has not joined in imposing sanctions on Russia, and the two countries have maintained good diplomatic relations. Erdoğan clearly enjoyed his balancing role. His policies during the Ukraine war have earned the Turkish public’s respect and helped, at least indirectly, in his reelection as they contributed to his image as a world-renowned statesman. Turkey also enjoyed the economic benefits of its being Russia’s main economic outlet. Not only did Turkish-Russian trade increase, but Putin lent a helping hand in the run-up to the elections by agreeing to delay Turkey’s natural gas payments and depositing much-needed foreign currency in the Turkish Central Bank. Erdoğan justified this unique position by emphasizing his mediating role between Ukraine and Russia and between the latter and the West. In this context, securing the grain deal was a particularly important achievement that helped Erdoğan justify his balancing act. Now the deal appears to be in tatters, raising questions about his ability to maintain his role as mediator. The Turkish president has also raised eyebrows in Moscow by recently hosting President Zelenskyy and increasing his support for Ukraine’s NATO membership. He even tested the Kremlin’s nerve by allowing Azov fighters to return to Ukraine with Zelenskyy, an apparent violation of a prisoner swap deal brokered by Turkey. Despite all this, Erdoğan wants to stick to his original position and continue to play the role of mediator. He is counting on the fact that Putin currently cannot afford a falling-out. Erdoğan has already indicated that he expects to host Putin in Turkey in August for a one-on-one meeting, although so far the Russian side has not confirmed the visit. Russia’s reaction to Turkey’s recent moves, such as ratifying Sweden’s NATO membership and supporting Ukraine’s NATO membership, has also been rather mute. Therefore, Turkey’s pivot to the West does not mean that it will cool its relations with Russia. Erdoğan realizes that the longer he maintains his balancing role, the stronger his hand will be with both the West and Russia. A Revitalization of Turkey-EU Relations? If there is no going back to the Cold War era, there is also no returning to the early 2000s, when Turkey was pushing for EU membership. Despite surprising everyone by rekindling the dormant EU membership process ahead of the Vilnius summit, Erdoğan’s move is unlikely to breathe life into Turkey’s EU accession aspirations. This is primarily due to the fact that EU membership would not align with the president’s personal interests, as it would necessitate a higher standard of the rule of law that might curtail his currently unchecked and absolute authority in the country. The accession process revolves around aligning a nation’s internal standards with EU norms, known as the community acquis. Consequently, becoming an EU member would demand a transformation of Turkey’s domestic political system, which currently concentrates power in Erdoğan’s hands. Given this, how should Erdoğan’s statements on revitalizing the EU process be interpreted? Part of the explanation has to do with his transactional style of policymaking. A master of brinkmanship and bargaining, Erdoğan often raises demands and stakes just to get a better deal. This is why Turkey’s foreign policy disputes are often resolved at the 11th hour, as is still the case with Sweden’s NATO membership. But these tactical moves also reflect Erdoğan’s genuine desire to improve relations with the EU. It is important to note, however, that Erdoğan does not necessarily want Turkey to be inside the EU; he simply wants to do business with it. The EU remains Turkey’s primary economic partner, and Ankara has long been demanding a modernization of the Customs Union agreement with the bloc to boost its trade. Moreover, better relations with European countries are expected to be instrumental in attracting much-needed foreign investment. Gulf money has only carried Turkey so far, and to solve its deep economic problems it is necessary to attract the financial power of the West. Thus, Erdoğan wants more engagement with Europe on the economy, defense, security, and refugee issues, but not in the context of EU membership. In fact, the refugee deal signed between Turkey and the EU in 2016 was designed precisely around the idea that Turkey is not and will not be part of the EU. Accordingly, Turkey continues to block the movement of refugees toward Europe in exchange for financial assistance from the EU. The bloc has recently concluded similar agreements with North African countries, aiming to externalize its refugee problem. For this cooperation with Turkey to work, Turkey needs to be outside the EU, not inside it. Thus, Turkey’s desire to create better working conditions with the EU is emblematic of the nature of its reorientation toward the West. Furthermore, western capitals seem increasingly willing to respond positively to overtures made by the Turkish President. Western Reaction to Erdoğan’s Moves It is not only Erdoğan who has changed his position; the West has also changed its approach to him. Biden and other western leaders were distancing themselves from Erdoğan in anticipation of his loss in the presidential elections. Biden did not invite him to Washington and did not visit Ankara, despite Turkey’s growing importance in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Knowing how much Erdoğan values personal meetings, Biden used them as leverage to resolve stalemates like the one over Sweden’s NATO membership. Moreover, having learned Erdoğan’s style of politics over the years, western leaders successfully avoided becoming his punching bag ahead of the elections, as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel did during Turkey’s 2017 constitutional referendum. To achieve this, they followed a policy of ignoring rather than supporting Erdoğan. But when the elections were over and he was set to rule Turkey almost single-handedly for another five years, western leaders rushed to congratulate him. It is also becoming much easier for the West to work with Turkey on a geostrategic and security level. For the United States, Turkish-American security cooperation is shifting from the Middle East to the Black Sea. Turkish-American relations in the Middle East have inevitably taken on a more political and ideological character, with the two countries’ different threat perceptions and respective approaches to the Kurdish issue and to Kurdish actors in northern Syria remaining the biggest challenge in bilateral relations. In contrast, Turkey and the United States are more in agreement on the Black Sea. Moreover, within the Pentagon, EUROCOM’s approach to Turkey is much more friendly than CENTCOM’s, and has a better track record of cooperation. For Europe, Erdoğan’s commitment to the migration deal makes him a valuable partner, especially given the growing anti-immigration stance of the Turkish and European publics. Moreover, Erdoğan’s preference for working with the EU but for simultaneously not genuinely pushing for membership in it fits well with European policies. The EU and Erdoğan are more in agreement on their common desire to keep Turkey out but to simultaneously build better working relations. Overall, it seems clear that Erdoğan is eying a new reorientation in his foreign policy. At the moment he is at the height of his power at home and does not need to use the West as a punching bag for domestic political gains. Furthermore, economic conditions and regional developments are compelling him to lean more toward western powers. As a result, Turkish foreign policy is poised to take a new direction. Nevertheless, any improvement in relations will likely be limited to the geostrategic and economic realms and will not encompass a realignment of political values. Without common political values, the result will be significantly improved but will remain transactional between Turkey and its western partners. This paper was originally published by Arab Center Washington DC. Republished with permission. © Arab Center Washington DC, October 2023.

Good morning.  I want to thank Speaker Kevin McCarthy, my friend Speaker Kevin McCarthy, for this occasion he gave me. I want to say that I’m very glad to be here in the heart of the American democracy and in the place that Thomas Jefferson, at the time Secretary of State of President George Washington, wanted to call Capitol Hill to commemorate the famous Temple of Giove on the Capitoline Hill, il Campidoglio - one of the seven hills of Rome. And I say it for it is another sign of the incredibly strong ties between Italy and the United States, ties that have become even deeper in recent times after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. More than ever, in this international juncture, our relations are essential. More than ever, we must be able to rely one on the other. Today we had the occasion to exchange views on many international issues, from the war in Ukraine and its effects worldwide, in particular regarding food security, to the stabilisation and development in the Mediterranean area, moreover in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, and Italy’s next Presidency of the G7. I was glad to have this debate with representatives of Congress because it gives me a complete picture of the foreign policy landscape from representatives elected by the American people. I’ve been in politics for most of my life and I’ve been a member of parliament for many, many years, so I perfectly know the importance of parliaments in democracies. That’s why I’m so grateful to Speaker Kevin McCarthy, whom I had the pleasure to meet already in Rome a few months ago, and to the representatives I met today, for the time they wanted to spend with me.  And last but not least, I’m happy to be here in a place decorated by these wonderful frescoes of Costantino Brumidi, another Italian, for this place represents and sums up also the stories of all the Italian-Americans who, with their lives, with their efforts, with their dreams, with their creativity, contributed to strengthening the bonds between our two peoples and contributed to make this democracy the great democracy it is. So, I want to say that I’m proud of these Italians, I’m proud of your grandfather too, Kevin, and I really want to thank them for the contribution they brought to the history and the culture and the identity of this nation. Many of them are today representatives and that shows the role Italy has had for the history of the United States, and that is one reason more to continue strengthening our relations, our cooperation, our friendship, particularly in this tough world, in this tough situation.  Many things are changing around us, but there is something others didn’t expect that we should perfectly prove: that the Western world is united and wants to defend the world based on rules, for without a world based on international law, we would live in a world of chaos, in which who is militarily stronger thinks he can invade his neighbour. That’s not the world we want to live in; we want to live in a world in which we can respect sovereignty and freedom. Thank you very much.

President Herzog, Mrs. Herzog, Ambassador Nides and Virginia,and Taylor, and Taylor's boyfriend,Senator Rick Scott,Speaker of the Knesset,Mayor of Jerusalem,and so many dear friends, Tom, you started your words by remembering an evocative moment, when you were 14 years old in Ein haShofet. Well, somewhat younger than that, I had an evocative moment right here, on this hill top. It was barren. There was no Israel Museum. There was the Monastery of the Cross, olive trees. A barren hilltop except one tree, a balut tree. And we, the Jerusalem kids, would band in the valley and we would try to reach, undetected, to the top, to the tree. Reach the target. I say that because right now, well, last night, Israeli soldiers tried to reach, undetected, the most legitimate target on the planet: people who would annihilate our country. And because this Fourth of July in this extraordinary place falls on an extraordinary moment, Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Government and citizens of Israel, I wish to send my warmest greetings to President Biden and the American people as we join in celebrating their Independence Day. And as Prime Minister, I wish to express my deep appreciation and gratitude for America's enduring support for Israel. For 75 years, the United States has been our irreplaceable and indispensable ally. Irreplaceable. Indispensable. Eleven minutes after our birth, and at vital junctures throughout our history, America has provided Israel with moral and political backing against those committed to wiping us out, to wiping out the one and only Jewish state. No less important, for nearly half a century, America has given generous military assistance to Israel, helping provide us with the tools, the tools we need to defend ourselves by ourselves. Decade after decade, our two countries have moved closer together. I'm proud to say that today, security cooperation has never been better, intelligence sharing has never been deeper and our alliance has never been stronger. I have long said that Israel has no better ally than America, and I say to you, America has no better ally than Israel. I'm confident that Israel's importance to the United States will become even clearer in the years ahead, as we work together not only to protect our common security, but also to develop the most advanced technologies that will reshape the 21st century. They will decide who leads the world. And Israel is America's vital partner in that effort. Ladies and Gentlemen, on July Fourth, all democratic countries should remember that the decisive event that ensured the rise of freedom in modern times, has been the rise of the United States of America. Time and again, America defeated the forces of totalitarianism and terror. Yet we should also remember a basic truth: Freedom is precious, and it's never free. It often requires firm and decisive action against those seeking to spread terror and imperil free societies. I remember that truth every Fourth of July, because that is the day my brother Yoni fell, commanding the rescue force at Entebbe. Today, on the eve of another Fourth of July, Israel's soldiers, once again, find themselves fighting forces of terror. Late last night, the IDF launched a comprehensive action against terrorist strongholds in Jenin. In recent months, Jenin has become a safe haven for terrorists. From that safe haven, terrorists perpetrated savage attacks, murdering Israeli civilians, men, women and children, as many children as they could find. As I speak, our troops our battling the terrorists with unyielding resolve and fortitude, while doing everything, everything, to avoid civilian casualties. I have no doubt that as Israel exercises its inherent right of self-defense, the United States will stand firmly by our side. And I also believe that in the months ahead, Israel and America will work closely together to thwart the danger posed by Iran and seize the opportunity to expand the circle of peace. Ladies and gentlemen, tonight is also an opportunity to thank outgoing US Ambassador Tom Nides for his service and for his friendship towards Israel. Thank you Tom. During your tenure here, you've demonstrated that your support for Israel comes both from the head and from the heart. On a personal level, I will say I'll miss your candor, your wit, your humour and your friendship. No matter what you do, what you decide to do in the next chapter of your life, know that Israel will always be your home away from home. And as you've said many times, quoting President Biden, we are mishpuche. So on behalf of your Israeli family, let me wish you a happy Independence Day. Happy Independence Day America.  God bless America and God bless our valued and unshakable alliance. 

Very well, in these last words, I would like to thank all those who have participated in this meeting, those who have reflected with us, and those who have raised their concerns, worries, and proposals with a view to the future. I would just like to make one comment, which I do not want to overlook, because we have not been unaware of the issue, which is the issue of Venezuela. I would like to recall that Argentina - since I assumed the presidency - left the Lima Group because we understood that there was a clear policy of interference in Venezuela, which was not going to solve the problems that Venezuelans had. The number of exiles that Venezuela has today is mainly the result of the economic sanctions that Venezuela has suffered. Therefore, from the very first moment, we tried to be part of the Contact Group and to sit with the Venezuelan parties to dialogue so that they could find a way out towards a better democracy and a better institutional framework for Venezuela. When the United Nations - through a report by Michelle Bachelet - questioned the treatment of human rights in Venezuela, we put together that report by Michelle Bachelet and then we worked so that the High Commissioner for Human Rights could establish an office in Caracas and work towards guaranteeing full respect for human rights in Venezuela. That was done. We resumed the dialogue through a meeting we had with President Macron and President Gustavo Petro in Paris, and from there, we sat the parties down again to continue the dialogue. Afterwards, there was an extended meeting, in the city of Bogota, if I am not mistaken, where this dialogue continued advancing. What has happened now with María Corina Machado is something that we take into account and that we are raising at the dialogue table, which is where we believe it should be raised. Because the problem in Venezuela should be solved by Venezuelans through dialogue among themselves, without other countries meddling in their internal affairs. If we guarantee, as President Abdo has rightly said, that it will be respecting institutionality and human rights, we are convinced that the best way to do it, dear President and friend, is by recovering the dialogue among Venezuelans. Today, Venezuelans are suffering a very difficult situation as a result of these sanctions, which we believe only hurt the Venezuelan people. That is why, when someone reproached the idea that President Lula had put forward a few days ago about the need to have a broader and more complete view of the Venezuelan conflict, I vindicated it because I believe that what I am telling is the true story. I particularly lived and saw how the problems were being overcome, and problems like this one appear - I am not going to deny that - but it seems to me that the place to raise it is at the dialogue table. It would be very auspicious if all those who disappeared from the dialogue table joined the Venezuelan dialogue table: Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and us. If we genuinely want to help the Venezuelans, let us sit at that table so that they may return to dialogue and once again have the necessary guarantees to recover the fullness of their rights and the fullness of their institutional quality. I say this because I did these things as President of Argentina, not as President Pro Tempore of MERCOSUR. These are things that we should do as Presidents of our respective countries: to guarantee the independence and autonomy of each country and to call for dialogue when democracy or dialogue breaks down in those countries. For me, it is not an issue that went unnoticed; at that table, I raised the problem, dear Marito. At this point, for Argentina and for me personally, it is an immense honor to hand over the Pro Tempore Presidency of MERCOSUR to the sister Federative Republic of Brazil. On this occasion, I would like to emphasize that I am handing over the MERCOSUR Hammer symbol to a great President, to a dear friend, a friend dear to all Argentine men and women, Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva. I understand, my dear friend, that in your hands lies the responsibility of leading this period of MERCOSUR with the conviction and political lucidity that I have always recognized and that has always characterized you. I want you to know, dear friend, that your challenges are our challenges, your decisions are our decisions, and I will support you with courage in the leadership of MERCOSUR during this next semester of 2023. This is your hammer.

Silvio Berlusconi, Donald Trump, and Boris Johnson have recently been in the spotlight. Berlusconi's passing has drawn attention due to his long and controversial personal and political life. Trump is facing a new and potentially perilous legal prosecution. Johnson, on the other hand, has been excluded from a return to the forefront of politics by a committee within his own party, at least in the near future.  All three will be remembered as prominent figures of political populism, a conservative current that primarily but not exclusively offered an alternative to the weakened traditional conservative right. They also presented a challenge, to a lesser extent, to centrist liberalism and social democracy, both of which were undergoing an identity crisis. While there are differences among them, all three were "mass seducers," capable of attracting millions of voters without necessitating trust in their words or actions, regardless of the credibility of their policy proposals. Berlusconi and Trump had scandal-ridden private lives characterized by exaggerated, even exhibitionist, philandering and machismo. Johnson has been somewhat more discreet, but he can hardly be considered a champion of the decency demanded by his conservative base. His actions, even during the pandemic, have led to his current ostracism. Johnson has been the most articulate, educated, and socially privileged among the three, coming from an elite background and rising within the ranks of the Conservative Party. In contrast, Trump and Berlusconi emerged from a state of political obscurity. Trump later colonized the Republican Party, transforming it and, some argue, leading it towards destruction. Berlusconi, on the other hand, disregarded the established post-war party, Christian Democracy, which he deemed corrupt, ineffective, and obsolete. He built something new with highly populist traits, exemplified by the rallying cry of Forza Italia!, appealing to football fanatics. While it maintained its brand for 30 years, its decline appears to have reached its lowest point, as it is now the weakest force within the right-wing coalition, trailing behind Fratelli and Lega with barely 20% of the MPs among the three factions. Each of them has been a product of their respective times, like any political leader. However, all three have also been game-changers, agents of change during their era. Trump upended the political system in the United States, altering the balance within the two-party system, reshaping the dynamics of the conservative electorate, and simultaneously exposing the flaws within American democracy. Berlusconi dismantled the system of the First Republic, which revolved around a binary dynamic between the dominant Christian Democracy (DC) in government and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as the permanent opposition. A minor game consisted of various companion parties (socialists, social democrats, liberals, and republicans) aligning with the dominant party. Il Cavaliere disrupted the delicate balance of this pentaparty system of the Center-Right with a new political culture or rather, the absence of any political culture at all. He applied show business principles to public administration, treating his party as a personal company, driven by the goal of success. Trump did not go as far as Berlusconi. He lacked the talent, patience, and management team that the Milanese businessman possessed. Both individuals had opaque, suspicious, and potentially fraudulent businesses, but to varying degrees and extents. Additionally, they operated within different legal and political environments, albeit under the umbrella of capitalism. They shared the ability, with the help of pseudo-informational media (owned by Berlusconi in the Italian case and manipulated in Trump's New Yorker case), to obstruct, influence, delay, neutralize, or render judicial investigations ineffective in the medium and long term. Both were or have been elusive figures in the political circus they orchestrated around themselves. Johnson, on the other hand, reshaped the political landscape but relied on an existing base. His intention was not so much to transform the rules as it was to exploit them to his advantage. Even Brexit, which many consider his significant achievement, was not originally his project. He appropriated it, infused it with his personal touch, and made it a pivotal factor in the UK's most consequential strategic shift in 50 years. Berlusconi has now become a part of history, or is on the path to doing so. His state funeral has been deemed inappropriate, and the obituaries, as is often the case, tend to either overly praise or justify his fraudulent political career. He was never a statesman but rather a swindler who knew how to exploit the weariness, fatigue, disbelief, and cynicism of an electorate that was at its wit's end. Few believe that Forza Italia will survive the death of its founder. Johnson finds himself once again in a state of uncertainty (not for the first time), facing reprimand from his own party members and being disregarded by the Prime Minister, to whom he once granted the influential position of Chancellor of the Exchequer, overseeing the Kingdom's finances. Such rough-and-tumble politics is not uncommon within the Tory world. Even someone of greater stature, like Margaret Thatcher, fell victim to similar episodes of apparent betrayal, disloyalty, and abandonment. Trump is inching closer to a return to the forefront, despite facing intense legal scrutiny in various cases related to fraud, tax evasion, mishandling of sensitive public documents, obstruction of justice, political conspiracy, and more. The outcomes of these ongoing court cases are likely to turn into a spectacle with evident electoral implications, provided he can maintain control over them, which is no small feat. The numerous rivals who have emerged in recent weeks to challenge him for the Republican nomination do not seem to possess sufficient substance. Trump's greatest adversary is himself. However, his greatest advantage is also himself, as he possesses the ability to connect with a sizable segment of the population that remains unmoved by the hollow discourse of the political elite on democracy and values. These three great tenors of populism have served as inspiration for lesser local figures, with different backgrounds and similar political styles. It is worth clarifying that not all those who deserve to be labelled populist in the media are similar or assimilable. Confusion is frequent. Within the right-wing political landscape in Europe, several key themes prevail among these figures: - national primacy. - a rather outdated form of patriotism. - almost absolute rejection of immigration. - a very traditional conception of the family - demagogic interventions in the liberal economy. However, they are divided by a fundamental dispute: relations with Russia. Two clear groups emerge:  1. The Identitarians, who have maintained a cooperative and non-confrontational relationship with Putin. This group within the European Parliament includes figures such as Marine Le Pen in France, Lega Salvini in Italy, AfD in Germany, Flemish Vlaams Belang in Belgium, and xenophobic factions in Finland and Denmark, among others. Trump could also be placed within this group, although his ideological formulations are not well-defined.  2. Conservative nationalists, staunchly anti-Russian. This is particularly true for the ultra-nationalists in former communist countries, with Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) party at the forefront (excluding Hungary's Orbán, who maintains a cordial relationship with Putin). This group includes NVA in Belgium, the far-right VOX in Spain, Greek ultra-rightists, Swedish xenophobic factions, and more recently, the far-right nationalists under Giorgia Meloni. Johnson's coexistence with this group was not necessarily his own choice, as the Tories were already integrated into the European Parliament group that brings these parties together, known as the European Conservatives and Reformists, before he became the party leader. Berlusconi, being as flexible on the international stage as he is in business, managed to avoid affiliating Forza Italia with either of the two nationalist currents. Instead, he secured membership in the European People's Party (EPP), which made no secret of its position. The EPP did not make any concessions to Victor Orbán's FIDESZ until it had no choice but to initiate an expulsion procedure against him, which ultimately had no effect as Orbán decided to leave the group voluntarily. If Berlusconi had not been admitted to the EPP, he would have likely aligned with the identitarian faction, which maintains a friendlier stance toward Russia. To provide an idea of the strength of nationalism in Europe, the ultra-conservative branch comprises 66 MEPs, while the identitarian branch consists of 62 MEPs, totaling 125 seats. In comparison, the People's Party has 177 seats, and the Socialists have 143 seats. However, when combining the votes obtained by both nationalist factions in the most recent national elections held in each EU member state, it becomes evident that the two nationalist factions have garnered the largest number of votes, surpassing 48.7 million votes. This total is nearly 700,000 votes more than the conservative liberal or Christian Democrat parties within the European People's Party. The Social Democrats trail behind with over 42.2 million votes. 

Pivot to Asia - The Global South is on the march in their attempt to reshape the international system. How will this new order impact the old world? An increasing number of countries from the Global South, especially in Asia, are pushing to redefine the current global order. Three key trends to watch in this attempt to reshape the international system are the (potential) creation of a new economic order, the expansion of the BRICS grouping, and the transformation of China-Russia relationship after the invasion of Ukraine. In this changing international balance, Europe is losing its influence in the Global South, including in Asia. After centuries of global predominance, Europe’s strongest legacy is its role as a major normative power in global affairs. However, this reputation as a rule-setting power is set to change.   Why it matters 1. A (new) economic order. The debate over a “new Washington Consensus” has gained momentum after US national security advisor Jake Sullivan delivered a speech at the Brookings Institution on April 27th. The final communiqué by the G7 countries which met in Hirosahima on May 19-20 is the result of a similar strategic shift within the group, one that implies a move from economic interdependence to economic security. This shift is coupled with a major change in how the G7 intends to deal with emerging economies, such as their rival China and other partners in Asia that might soon become economic competitors in critical technologies. The G7’s sentiment has moved from promoting globalization and open markets to building industrial capacity in critical sectors, while securing existing and creating new strategic supply chains. Europe’s efforts in this context might not be enough: the investments envisaged so far are too little to reverse Europe’s dependency (often on China) in critical sectors. The EU must focus increasingly on diversifying its supply chains through securing access to rising economies in the Indo-Pacific. Here, joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) could represent an opportunity.  2. BRICS+? The BRICS foreign ministers’ summit in June was yet another steppingstone toward enlargement. The countries that expressed a significant interest in joining the grouping are Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Gabon, and Kazakhstan: all these countries sent their representatives to Cape Town. Egypt, Argentina, Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau and Indonesia participated virtually. While the membership process might be a long one, the group’s upcoming expansion highlights the Global South’s political will to rise its voice, with a plethora of actors eager and able to leverage the new competition between powers which is shaping up after the Ukraine war. In this framework, Asian countries such as China and India are competing with one another to lead the BRICS.   3. China and the Stans. On May 19, Xi Jinping met in Xi’an with the (leaders of) the five Central Asian “Stan”-countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan). Russia, the region’s traditional kingmaker, was noticeably absent. The meeting kickstarted – for the first time offline – a summit named C+5 and highlighted Beijing’s belief that it can now make deals within the region without Moscow’s supervision. China’s newfound independence in Central Asia and Moscow’s growing dependence on Beijing after the war in Ukraine provides new insights the on China-Russia relationship: although the two countries are united by their common desire to contest the US-led world order, the Sino-Russian relation seems increasingly tilted in China’s favor. This instable relationship could result in a stronger Chinese presence in Central Asia.  4. Loss of strategic centrality. Europe does not only risk becoming increasingly peripheral in world affairs, but also losing its bargaining power with the emerging Indo-Pacific economies. On the one hand, the EU needs to diversify its supply chains away from China and likely towards the ASEAN; on the other, the Global South – and by default its Asian members – is more aware of the current strategic window of opportunity to redesign the global balance of power.   Our take We are witnessing rapid changes in the international arena. In the coming months there will be increasing requests to review global norms. Therefore, the leading event will be the upcoming BRICS Summit in August: the meeting will probably certify the process to accept new members. Among the countries that are voicing their desire to reset the rules, some are considered by the West (mainly) as rivals, such as China, and as partners, like India. Therefore, Washington and Brussels cannot simply accept or dismiss their requests. Asia is claiming its century: the integration of this claim for a renewed global order into the current world order has just started. Its most important implications will be on the economic side, namely the redistribution of industrial capacity and trade relation in the context of de-risking from China.  Spotlight: G7  The G7 Hiroshima Summit has sent some clear messages to the rest of the world. The decision to invite President Zelensky to the gathering was a move meant to reinforce the unity of the members regarding the Ukraine invasion in the face of Russia — and China, too. The West has criticized China’s 12-point position paper on the Ukraine war, since it does not call for Russia to abandon occupied territories. The G7 countries have also announced a strengthening of the sanctions, seeking to curb products that could be used by the Russian military. The other important takeaway of the G7 is the joint statement directed at China, which includes a strong criticism of Beijing’s “economic coercion” and invites the PRC to play according to international rules. The G7 have also reiterated their position on divisive topics such as security in the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan, retreating their commitment to preserve peace and stability in the region. Despite the joint statement and the declarations by the leaders on the challenges posed by China, the G7’s stance on Beijing is still a balancing act. While concerned about being overly vulnerable with China, G7 economies and their industrial base remain strongly interconnected with the Asian country and despite calls for “de-risking”, such as cutting China out from some sectors like raw materials, it is impossible at the time.  Experts’ views The implications of China’s activism among the BRICS countries  The next BRICS Summit will take place at a critical juncture for the Global South. Russia is still at war, Brazil has a new administration eager to flex its muscles globally, and China has reached unprecedented influence across the developing world. Since they are all connected by the same desire of multipolarity away from US and Western hegemony, it is likely that the BRICS will try to offer a roadmap towards a new international order. This roadmap, however, is far from consensual: will Russia embrace the peace dialogues offered by Brazil or African nations – and what role will China play in brokering any such proposal? Will China and the other BRICS be able to cooperate economically to promote development worldwide? Are the BRICS ready for its first enlargement, and who is most likely to join in the coming years? This arrangement will require some mutual concessions and the outcome will help shape the future world order.  Guilherme Casarões, Fundação Getulio Vargas  The push to strengthen and even expand the BRICS, especially by China, should be viewed more broadly through the lens of a pragmatic Chinese foreign policy. It has not only sought to strengthen ties within BRICS but with other regions and countries who are instrumental for its trade and infrastructure connectivity imperatives.  This happens against the backdrop of a shift towards a multipolar world order with China as a rising power and rising geo-political tensions. Given that this bloc advocates for issues that are relevant to the Global South (global governance reform, support for a rules-based international order and multilateralism in times when countries retreat to unilateral measures), it is no surprise that other countries in the South wish to join. Regarding this summit, I see no major implications for the bloc, the core business of the BRICS will continue with South Africa advancing its five priority areas. However, we can anticipate a discussion on its formal expansion. Trading with local currency seems to have found new impetus following the sanctions placed on Russia. All this notwithstanding, it is important to note that the ‘de-dollarisation’ in trade debate is not a new concept for BRICS and its less about challenging the dollar but strengthening other currencies against external economic shocks. The real test is for the host country depending on whether President Putin attends the heads of state summit in August, given Pretoria’s obligations under the Rome Statute and domestic law.  Luanda Mpungose, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)  China’s push for a stronger BRICS on the global stage is advancing along a number of trajectories. Firstly, there is the BRICS expansion as well as the BRICS+ format that are likely to bring the majority of the Global South into BRICS-related platforms of economic cooperation. The implementation of the BRICS+ format may serve as a precursor for liberalizing trade across the Global South and exploiting the potential for boosting South-South trade and investment ties. The expansion in the membership of the Shanghai-based New Development Bank as well as the creation of its regional centers will increase the scope for connectivity projects across the developing world. There is also the greater use of national currencies (most notably the yuan) via de-dollarization as well as the R5 BRICS common currency project that if launched would mark a key transformation of the global financial system.  Yaroslav Lissovolik, BRICS+ Analytics   What and Where Thailand is ready to Move Forward   The May elections in Thailand resulted in a clear victory for the opposition parties. Led by Pita Limjaroenrat, Move Forward has won 152 seats, becoming the most voted party in the elections. This party is the heir to Future Forward, which was dissolved by the military government in February 2020, and was born out of the 2020-2021 protests against the army and the monarchy. The second party in the country is the historic Thai opposition party led by the Shinawatra family, the Pheu Thai. However, while the population has expressed its preference, there is no guarantee yet that Move Forward, and the opposition, will govern. Indeed, to be elected Prime Minister, and form a government, Pita will need to win the majority in the bicameral parliament made up of the elected 500 seats in House of Representatives and the 250 seats of the Senate – whose members are handpicked by the military. The Move Forward coalition with Pheu Thai and the other opposition parties so far can count on little more than 310 votes, a long shot from the majority needed to govern. The opposition must garner support among the senators – which generally have little interest in going against the military that put them in power – or among the parties that have yet to declare their allegiance.  Cambodia: Hun Sen is getting rid of the competition ahead of July elections  On the 14 of May, Cambodia’s opposition party – the Candlelight Party – has been disqualified from running in the upcoming July elections by the country’s election commission. The party has allegedly failed to submit the necessary documentation to participate in the electoral race. With the exclusion of the Candlelight Party from the coming elections, the only possible competitor to the ruling Cambodian People’s party (CPP) of PM Hun Sen – who has been in power for 38 years – has been eliminated. This is not the first time that the main opposition party has been cut out of the electoral race. For instance, in the 2017 the Cambodian court, which is heavily colluded with the CPP, dissolved the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) before the 2018 general elections – a party that was given new life when its members created the Candlelight Party. However, the members of the opposition continue to be persecuted by Hun Sen’s forces with many political exponents arrested on charges of treason, assaulted, or forced to leave the country. With the opposition forces largely depleted and the main party banned from running for elections, Hun Sen is likely guaranteed another term.   The United States seeks to expand influence in the Indo-Pacific  Washington took advantage of two key international events to strengthen its strategic position in the region. During the Quad Leaders’ Summit, which took place on the sidelines of the G7 in Hiroshima, President Biden, Australia’s PM Albanese, PM Kishida of Japan and PM Modi of India stressed their unity and stated their plans to invest in digital infrastructure in the region. Throughout the meeting they did not mention China directly in their statements, but their references to the country were clear. The Quad expressed concern over the militarization of the region and the use of both economic and military coercion to alter the status quo – a clear reference to Chinese activity in the South China Sea. Another important step for the US to consolidate its position in the region is the announcement of the Supply Chain Agreement under the framework of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). The agreement includes the 14 IPEF partner countries, namely Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the US, and Vietnam. A year following the launch of the IPEF, this agreement is the first practical measure undertaken by the group. The group did not announce any official trade commitments, there is expectation among partners for increased cooperation and monitoring of supply chains fragility. The concrete development is still unclear, but the agreement signals the need for Indo-Pacific countries to avoid supply chain disruption and to minimize their dependence on the region’s main economic player, China.  Semiconductors: China fires back   China has gone on the offensive in competition over the semiconductor sector. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has stated that products by Micron, the US largest memory chip maker, are a “security risk for the information infrastructure supply chain” barring infrastructure operators from buying them. While additional information has yet to be revealed, some negative impacts are expected for Micron even if China and Hong Kong accounted for only 16% of the revenue of the company in 2022. The measure is a retaliation to America’s effort to cut China out from the semiconductor sector and slow the development of its industrial base. Since October 2022, the Biden Administration has imposed strict controls over chips export, followed by the Netherlands and Japan, preventing China from accessing and producing more advanced semiconductors. China’s declaration comes also after the leaders of the G7 grouping released a statement criticizing the country’s economic coercion tactic. After the move from Beijing, Micron fears that their products will be replaced by South Korean competitors, Samsung and SK Hynix, on the Chinese market. In the rising technological row between the US and China, there is also fear that Beijing might choose to put some export controls over other sensitive technologies, such as solar panels – where China dominates the whole supply chain.    TREND: Despite rate hikes, Asian unemployment is faring well (but not for everyone)  In the current context of high inflation and high rates, unemployment has turned out to be one of the main socio-political issues of Asia. With skyrocketing prices hurting businesses and consumers, many central banks in the West have adopted more hawkish monetary policies during the last year. Yet, the soaring cost of money has forced many businesses into a tight spot with concerning consequences on the employment level. Some countries though – like Japan, China, and Indonesia – have made the unorthodox choice to not significantly raise rates during the last year, while others – like South Korea and India – have adopted similar policies to those of the FED and the ECB. However, the results vary. In Japan the unemployment rate has been quite steady at around 2.6% for some time now, but in China the range (5.2-5.7%) was wider, especially due to the uneven nature of the post-Covid economic recovery. Yet, as the economy is slowly returning to normal, Beijing’s unemployment rate is gradually decreasing. Meanwhile Korea has consolidated a positive trend, with the last available figure at 2.5%, but the reforms of the labor market proposed by President Yoon Suk-yeol may cause some issues. The critical indicator though will be youth unemployment. Employment in aging societies, like those of East Asia, will increasingly become a core issue to maintain the viability of existing social welfare programs. So far China has a staggering 20.8% unemployment rate in the 16-24 years old age group which is particularly concerning, as it is the 7.2% recorded in South Korea. Japan is faring quite well but unemployment in the 25-34 years old age bracket has risen since the beginning of the year from 3% to 4%.

Officials from the United States and India occasionally have some difficult private conversations about Ukraine and India’s domestic politics. But the official state visit this week by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the U.S. will mainly be about showcasing the strength of the two countries’ burgeoning partnership.   Modi and President Joe Biden both need the optics of a visit rich in symbolism to demonstrate the substantive achievements of a relationship based on shared concerns about China and multi-billion dollar deals in technology and defense. Modi wants to highlight his standing as a world leader ahead of the 2024 Indian election. Biden wants to underline that, contrary to the criticism of some, he does have a plan to deal with China’s rise and the U.S. has lined up partners and allies to execute that plan. Indian prime ministers have been regular visitors to Washington D.C. since India’s independence in 1947. But Modi’s visit is only the third time an Indian prime minister will be given official state visit protocol, including a state banquet at the White House on June 22.  The fifth Indian prime minister to address a joint session of Congress, Modi will be the only Indian leader to do so for a second time. Indians will be thrilled by the attention given to their prime minister, and the speeches about shared values and similar strategic vision of the world’s oldest and largest democracies will play well in the Indian media.  But the visit will not be about just pomp and show. Trade in goods and services between India and the U.S. reached $190 billion last year and the U.S. is now India’s largest trading partner. Companies from the two countries have made significant investments across borders and Indian and American enjoy close people-to-people ties. Moreover, the U.S. is keen to “friendshore” with India to deal with the threat America sees in China’s rise, and to ensure supply-chain resilience. This involves shifting the manufacturing of certain critical components from China to friendly countries, especially India. The U.S. is funding Indian technology startups and infrastructure projects from its $200 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) Fund.  India, as the world’s most populous country, represents a large potential market for U.S. companies currently reducing their Chinese presence. When Air India, India’s largest airline, decided to purchase 220 Boeing aircraft in a $34 billion deal, Biden celebrated, saying it “will support over 1 million American jobs across 44 states, and many will not require a four-year college degree.” U.S. aerospace and military industries have wanted a greater share of the Indian market for years.  This January, India and the U.S. announced the launch of the U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) to the pave the way for “technology value-chain partnerships that would lead to co-development and co-production of high technology products and services in both countries,” in the words of National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.  During a recent visit to Delhi by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, a defense industrial roadmap was unveiled, reflecting an American willingness to share state-of-the-art technology with India. But India wants to build an indigenous defense industry and is keen on American technology and investment, while the U.S. wants India to stop purchasing military equipment from Russia and buy more from the United States. Historically, that divergence has resulted in announcements that have not always resulted in implementation.  For the Modi visit, the two sides have planned two key defense related deliverables: the purchase by India of 30 General Atomics-manufactured Predator or MQ9B Sea Guardian drones for $3 billion, and an agreement between General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to coproduce GE-F414 turbofan engines for India’s indigenous Tejas Mark-2 fighter jet. India and the U.S. have a long way to go before reaching the $500 billion mark in bilateral trade, which experts see as the future potential of the trade relationship. Americans blame India’s default preference for protectionism, reluctance to offer a level playing field to domestic and foreign players, strict digital privacy rules, and historical skepticism towards free and open trade. Indians complain that America is used to allies who are junior partners, not a country that is not an ally and wants to be treated as an equal. India is not alone in that view in an era when several powers want recognition and are showing a preference for economic and technology partnerships, rather than military alliances.  India is not a treaty ally of the United States, but a partner that prides itself on its strategic autonomy and one that has reservations about how it was treated by U.S. officials in the past. The closest equivalent of that in U.S. experience from the Cold War era would be France under the Gaullists. But just as the U.S. overcame its reservations about real or perceived French prickliness in the interest of preserving the Atlantic Alliance, Americans realize the importance of India in their plans for maintaining a rules-based international order.