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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of B. Assad’s regime was the result of a number of internal and external contradictions, in which the Turkish factor played a key role. Ankara is celebrating the success of its diplomacy in Syria. The success in Syria is giving R. Erdogan wings In its diplomacy, Türkiye consistently tries to adhere to a pragmatic course of achieving its national interests. At the same time, Ankara’s policy does not represent the short-term ambitions of an adventurist leader, rather reflects a long-term programme in accordance with the doctrines and strategies of neo-Ottomanism and neo-pan-Turanism. Türkiye does not hide its ambitions; it makes public various programme provisions and concepts, which focus on raising the status of Turkish statehood to the rank of a regional superpower. For this reason, when former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu explained in Washington the essence of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, developed by him in the framework of his ‘Strategic Depth’, he noted Ankara’s attachment to the post-Ottoman space, i.e. to the peoples and countries that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, no nation freed from the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire will voluntarily return to the new Türkiye or become its vassal, however Ankara does not set (at least at this point in historical development) the task of reuniting independent entities of the post-Ottoman space with Türkiye. Ankara is trying to spread its influence and realise national interests in relation to geographical neighbours, to use its advantageous economic and geographical position on transit routes, which increases Türkiye’s status at the junction of Europe, Africa and Asia. For these purposes, the Turkish authorities are effectively using economic, political and military means. In North Africa, betting on one of the political forces in the devastated Libya and the local use of military forces – combined with the supply of weapons – provided Ankara with the opportunity to gain access to oil fields. The energy partnership with Russia and the consideration of Moscow’s crisis relations with the West have, in a certain sense, created not only trade and economic interests, but also the relative geopolitical dependence of the Russian Federation on relations with Türkiye. As a result, through partnership diplomacy, the Turks localised military and other threats from Russia to implement the geopolitical strategy of neo-pan-Turansim in the post-Soviet southeast. Ankara is supporting Turkic countries in local conflicts With regard to the newly formed Turkic countries, Türkiye did not rely only on Turkism and pan-Turkism, instead choosing a more flexible tactic: combining ethno-cultural kinship and ideological expansion with a more rational, economic (primarily energy, transport, communication and transit) integration strategy according to the formula ‘One people – two (three, four, five, six) states’. However, Ankara has strongly and consistently supported Turkic countries in local conflicts, providing them with the necessary military, military-technical, intelligence and diplomatic assistance. In this regard, the Turkish-Azeri tandem against Armenia in the Karabakh conflict is a good example. As a result, Türkiye, using its position in NATO and its allied relations with the UK and US, achieved the implementation of new strategic communications bypassing Russia to export oil and gas from the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea and then to Europe. This ambitious transport and energy programme, as well as the military victory in Karabakh, laid the foundation for strengthening the independence of Turkic countries and supporting common Turkic integration, which allowed Türkiye to create the international Organisation of Turkic States (OTG) and move towards the goal of a single Turan. In the Middle East, Türkiye supports is allied with Qatar and opposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which previously (2009) abandoned the transit project of a Qatari gas pipeline through Syria to Türkiye and Europe. Given the unsolvable intra-confessional (between Sunnis and Shi’as, Alawites) and inter-ethnic (the Kurdish issue) contradictions in Syria, President Erdogan waged a consistent battle to overthrow the undesirable regime, strengthen the pro-Turkish forces of Sunni Islamic radicals and local Turkmen in Syria, as well as to neutralise any forms of independence of the Syrian Kurds. Türkiye was not only aware of the plans of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) and the Syrian National Army* (SNA) for six months, but it was Türkiye itself that developed the plan for a military operation against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, providing them with the necessary military, technical, intelligence and diplomatic support. Türkiye said that Bashar al-Assad refused the hand that Erdogan extended to him and refused negotiations on Ankara’s terms with the recognition of the reality on the ground (i.e. the de facto Turkish occupation of the ‘security zone’ in the north-west of Syria). In response, Turkish proxy forces taught Assad a lesson by excommunicating him from power and removing him from Syria itself. Erdogan exhibited violent and aggressive rhetoric against Netanyahu because of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and took cosmetic measures within the framework of the trade embargo. In reality, Ankara did not follow Tehran’s example and did not provide military assistance to the Palestinians. Türkiye has not banned the transit of Azeri oil to Israel via its territory. Regarding the military operation against the Assad regime in Syria, Ankara skilfully used Tel Aviv’s signals about the launch of an offensive on Aleppo and Damascus. For some reason, the Turks are not blaming Israel for its numerous airstrikes on Syrian communications and the military arsenal of the former Syrian army, which greatly facilitated the advance of HTS* and SNA* forces in Syria. Ankara did not make harsh statements against Israel about the fact that the IDF entered the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and that Israeli tanks were 20km from Damascus. However, as the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak reports, Türkiye is threatening to shoot down the Israeli Air Force with its air defence systems if they support the Kurdish forces in Syria. Erdogan’s triumph Turkish media is enthusiastically celebrating Erdogan’s triumph in Syria and the fall of the Assad regime. At the moment, the Turks have strengthened their positions in Syria. The interim (or transitional) government in Damascus, headed HTS* leader Mohammed al-Jolani, is, in fact, an ally of Ankara. With even greater effort and reliance on the new Syrian authorities, Türkiye will obviously continue its policy of forcibly resolving and neutralising the Kurdish issue in Rojava. The fall of Assad allows Türkiye to repatriate more than 3 million Syrian refugees and strengthen its influence on domestic political life in a weak Syria. Finally, the Turks are counting on the implementation of the Qatari gas pipeline project in the near future, a project which was postponed due to the past position of Bashar al-Assad and his allies. It is no coincidence that on December 13, the heads of the Turkish and Qatari intelligence services met in Damascus, where they held joint talks with the leader of the HTS*, al-Jolani. Ankara and Doha have already announced their plans to open diplomatic missions in Syria. Immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, Türkiye announced on December 9 that it would help Syria rebuild its energy sector, although Ankara did not receive an official request from the new government. In turn, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar did not rule out that the Qatari gas pipeline project will be revived, as Syria has restored its unity and stability. Bayraktar stressed that it is necessary to ensure the safety of the gas pipeline. It seems that the question of ensuring the security of the future gas pipeline was also addressed by the Turkish and Qatari heads of intelligence with HTS* leader al-Jolani. The most openly pretentious statement vis-à-vis Syrian territory was the speech of President R. Erdogan at a party meeting, in which he proposed to review the results of the First World War and return the Syrian provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Damascus and Raqqa to Türkiye, as they were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. This is how neo-Ottomanism manifests itself in real life. However, Erdogan apparently forgot that following the results of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire lost and collapsed and the territories of the new Türkiye changed. The author of revised borders within the framework of the Versailles Treaty system was Türkiye’s eternal ally Great Britain. Following that logic, today Russia has the right to demand from Türkiye Kars, Artvin, Ardahan and Surmalu district with Mount Ararat, which the Bolsheviks unreasonably ceded in March, 1921, to Kemal Pasha. Which problems may await Türkiye following the regime change in Syria? Of course, at this stage Türkiye’s success in Syria is obvious, but it is unlikely to be the result of Turkish planning alone. The United States did not officially interfere in the situation surrounding overthrowing the Assad regime, but did not leave Syria either. Washington and Tel Aviv actually dragged Ankara into a joint plan to collapse Iran and Russia in Syria. Given the inaction of the Syrian authorities and the army, Moscow did not get involved in a new conflict. Tehran adheres to approximately the same position. Some experts believe that the newly elected US President D. Trump supposedly promised to redistribute spheres of influence with Russia, where Moscow gets peace in Ukraine in accordance with the reality on the ground, but withdraws from Syria. However, in Syria, the United States and Israel will support the Kurds, who are Türkiye’s main opponents. Ankara continues to insist on eliminating Kurdish structures in Syria, which may be at odds with the approaches of the United States and Israel. Russian expert Stanislav Tarasov believes that the Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in Syria can lead to sad consequences for the Turks and the loss of almost eight Kurdish-populated vilayets in the south-east of Türkiye itself with the involvement of the United States and Israel. At the same time, D. Trump’s focus on confrontation with Iran in Israel’s favour prolongs the risk of war waged by the Western coalition against Iran, in which Türkiye will face a military conflict with Tehran. It is more likely that Russia will abstain from intervening in such a conflict. Türkiye, however, could suffer significantly. Syria can either follow the path of ‘Iraqisation’ and the division of its territories into ‘zones of responsibility’ of external and internal forces or find itself divided between neighbours and new entities (including Israel, Türkiye, Iran and Kurdistan). * currently banned in the Russian Federation

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back perpetual wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. Within two weeks of the election of Donald Trump, outgoing US President Joe Biden took an extremely disruptive step in international relations, pushing the conflict in Ukraine to a much more dangerous level by authorising Kiev to use American long-range missiles against Russian territory, a rogue move certainly intended to hinder the détente his successor had announced.As if that weren’t enough, a week later, Turkey (the largest NATO army in Europe) launched an offensive in neighbouring Syria through intermediaries led by HTS*, the former Al-Nusra Front*, effectively tearing up the Astana agreements with Moscow and Tehran on its role in Syria. Towards the end of the Biden administration, two major escalations took place in the two largest military conflicts taking place today, in Ukraine and the Middle East, both geographically separated by Turkey, which has now entered the scene. At whose behest? It would be naive to think that Erdoğan took the initiative to stage the invasion of Syria without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the Americans, the British, the Israelis and the Europeans. Organising, training and arming tens of thousands of men on Syrian territory under his authority or in Turkey itself is an operation that requires logistical and intelligence coordination between various state and non-state entities. Anatolia is the Eurasian axis par excellence, where three tectonic plates meet (the Eurasian, the African and the Arabian). Geographically, Turkey has always been an asset to NATO, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is where the natural spaces of Turkish projection and influence collide with those of Russia. For decades, NATO has tolerated Turkey’s neo-imperial ambitions, especially during the Erdoğan era, even if they have historically been anti-Western. This is a strategic asset that the Atlanticists are saving for the right moment. In reality, Turkish nationalism has been expressed in these regions since the early 1980s, and in the 1990s, with the vacuum left by the post-Soviet chaos, its influence spread and the Turan project was revived, which is now very visible in the form of the Organisation of Turkic States. But Turanism isn’t Ankara’s only asset. On the one hand, the Turkish diaspora in Europe, on the other hand the Islamic charity and educational network that Turkey manoeuvres in Africa, and on the other hand the military expansion with several bases in a good dozen countries in Europe, Africa, the Caucasus and the Middle East, shape Turkey’s aspirations to project power in the world. The crossroads of the Levant The reactivation of the Syrian civil war, or even the dismemberment of the country, is full of contradictions, unlikely alliances and unclear objectives, but also the hidden but known interests of a number of external actors who have been trying to take over the country since 2011. It serves Israel well, after more than 40 years of occupation of the Golan Heights, which are legally Syrian. Tel Aviv could extend its dominance in the area in the face of a Syria that is likely to be dysfunctional and without an army. Netanyahu’s regional escalation is also his way out of the mess he got himself into over a year ago in Gaza and Lebanon, while he waits for the new US administration, full of Zionists in foreign policy positions. Coincidentally or not, the hordes of jihadists took over Syria the day after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was announced. It should come as no surprise that behind this episode lies a tacit pact between Ankara and Tel Aviv to eliminate Iranian influence from the region. The US role is more nebulous. Officially, it didn’t make a statement until the final fall of Assad. But it’s also a role that doesn’t need clarity because it’s the only power that has allowed itself to occupy Syria since 2014, especially with clandestine military bases in the centre-south and east of the country, justifying this blatant international illegality with the flimsy excuse of being able to “fight ISIS*”. In reality, the US is ensuring a strategic military presence with an eye on Iran and Russia, which will certainly be formalised with the next phase in Syria. In addition, Washington has several major players on the ground, such as the Kurds of the SDF, who control the north, and the Free Syrian Army, which confronts them. On the other hand, the leader of the HTS, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who now controls most of the territory, spent five years in US prisons in Iraq (including the notorious Abu Ghraib). Al-Julani will surely be the most important and valuable asset for American interests in this proxy war. But what have the Western powers given Erdoğan to make him take the initiative to conquer Syria? What is the bargaining chip? Is the new Syrian government willing to give up the Russian base in Tartus, or is its removal one of NATO’s conditions for Erdoğan? What about Palestine and the genocide in Gaza? Will Lebanon follow the possible fragmentation of Syria? Who will form the new government, and what will be its vision for the future? Will there be an energy agreement between Ankara, Baku and Brussels? What will happen to trade, energy and infrastructure relations between Turkey and Russia? Will Turkey still be a candidate for the BRICS? Many big questions have been asked. Syria and Ukraine, the same conflict The most worrying aspect of the current scenario is that the two ongoing conflicts, surrounded by volatile regions, are moving closer together. The HTS, brought to Syria by Ankara, has been in Ukraine learning new combat tactics and night attacks from Kiev troops using advanced drones supplied by Qatar. Unlike the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Qatar has never sympathised with the Assad government after it took over Aleppo. Among the members of the Arab League, Qatar, an ally of Turkey (which has a naval base in Doha), is the only Arab country that has consistently sided with the Syrian Salafist opposition since 2011. After Erdoğan’s move, Russia will not be able to accept a freeze in military activity on its borders, lest it see the enemy rearm. It is therefore impossible to expect a ‘Minsk 3’ for the Trump era. In any case, an understanding between Russia and the US is necessary. After such a dark four years of the Biden administration, which brought war again to Europe and the Middle East, there is certainly hope for better relations between the world’s two largest military powers. An escalation of the conflict in Ukraine is unthinkable. More immigration for a Europe in recession For Europe, the current situation in Syria is terrible because it opens up new prospects for hundreds of thousands more refugees, depending on how the situation in Syria develops. Assad’s Syria was a dictatorship, just like Gaddafi’s Libya, but it provided a stability that is no longer guaranteed. The ‘melting pot’ that Europe’s major cities have become after 20 years of perpetual US wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria also has the potential to bring the inter-community and interethnic problems of the Middle East onto European soil at a time of recession, as is the case in Germany. With this move, Turkey has opened the game and shown that it wants to compete with Russia for its sphere of influence. Erdoğan has taken on the destabilising role his external superiors have assigned him. Erdoğan’s alignment with Western designs in Syria opens a rift in relations with Moscow and should be seen as a declaration of intention. War on multipolarism The Syrian war, which has all the makings of a protracted affair, is also a far-reaching move against the BRICS, since Turkey was one of the main candidates for membership of the organisation. The control of this strategic region, which is increasingly in the domain of the Silk Roads and the BRICS, is now entering a period of predictable instability. Indeed, the very strange Hamas attack in October 2023 took place in the middle of the new members of the group (Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran), and launched a war on the region along the lines of the ‘creative destruction’ advocated by the neoconservative think tanks. Just when everything was getting ready for a new US administration that seemed at least minimally pragmatic and willing to engage in dialogue and put an end to the Ukrainian conflict, and to the joy that for the first time in three years a Western statesman was uttering the word ‘peace’, Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back the eternal wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups d’état, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. An old practice of those who can’t compete with economics, trade and diplomacy and think they can with wars. *- banned in the Russian Federation

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now? One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad. But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers. What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham? Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad. The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world. In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.” The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.” This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid. Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria. Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success? Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia. Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria. The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war. It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold. This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics. Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally. How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria? To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations. Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement. This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services. Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups. Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses. In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government. This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups. In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs. Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests. Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off. What does the US think of the group and al-Golani? The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions. Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani. However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list. What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader? First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad. But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies. First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large. This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws. Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups. Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity. Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country. However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support. Sections of this article were first published in an article for The Conversation on Dec. 2, 2024.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The changes which officially made to the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence on November 19, 2024, served as a signal from Russia to the West in response to the first use of U.S. and British-made tactical missiles on Russian territory.  Judging by Russia's actions, the adjustment of its nuclear policy is part of a plan for retaliatory escalation steps, which was prepared some time ago when the United States came close to deciding on the use of its missile weapons deep within Russian territory. We are at the beginning of a dangerous escalation spiral, which could potentially lead to a conventional conflict between Russia and the United States, followed by a nuclear conflict. The immediate task of the Doctrine is to clarify the essence of future Russian signals to the adversary, ensuring their proper interpretation. At the same time, several innovations introduced in this document could have far-reaching consequences for the containment strategies of all world states. Emerging Challenges First and foremost, the changes in the doctrine are driven by the technological revolution that has occurred in military affairs over the past few decades. This revolution has effectively erased the distinction between what was once considered conventional military-technical or military cooperation and direct involvement in warfare. The core of this revolution is that the information and technological aspects of modern warfare now play a decisive role in shaping the course of combat operations. Superiority in technical intelligence, command and control systems, and information processing can provide a decisive advantage on the battlefield and transform the capabilities of weapons systems that might previously have been considered obsolete. A great power providing its partner with real-time intelligence, space communications infrastructure, and command and control and data processing software, all while requiring continuous technical support, provides the ability to fully control and direct the activities of a junior ally. Before the digital age, the recipient of even the most sophisticated weapons could use them as they saw fit, without anyone knowing, at least as long as they had the capacity to maintain them. Real-time intelligence assistance was nearly impossible: satellite images on analog media, typically only usable at the strategic command level, could be transmitted to an ally. Now, Ukraine’s American backers have the ability to blind the Ukrainian Armed Forces and paralyze the Ukrainian command and control system with a single click: all long-range strikes, including those carried out by drones assembled by Ukraine, are planned jointly, and none are carried out without American approval. Thus, any external power that provides significant assistance to a warring party, connected with the use of modern systems of satellite and electronic intelligence, information processing and control, is a full-fledged participant in the war. Consequently, retaliatory strikes against its troops and territory are fully justified. Technical changes are combined with political ones. The progress of the American model of globalization, which continued until recently, led to the coming to power in a number of countries of real "citizens of the world", claiming to enter the global elite and detached from national interests. Such states, under the leadership of a globalist elite accumulating their capital abroad, are capable of making colossal human and economic sacrifices, significant territorial losses in order to implement political directives imposed on them from outside. The durability of such regimes can be significant due to the powerful propaganda apparatus created with American assistance, as well as the systematic use of mass repressions, extrajudicial killings, torture, etc. sanctioned by the United States. Georgia during the reign of Saakashvili and modern Ukraine are classic examples of modern American proxies following this path. This model of relations is much more dangerous than the American alliances of the Cold War, when junior partners of the United States had almost complete freedom in domestic policy and tried to follow their national egoistic interests. Solutions There is no doubt that Russia has the right to strike American reconnaissance and communication satellites, as well as reconnaissance aircraft and drones involved in providing information support for the activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The only question is the feasibility of this step in achieving the goals of the Special Military Operation (SMO). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously stated, in particular, that Western satellites involved in supporting military operations could be legitimate targets for a Russian strike. The updated "Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence" extend this logic to the sphere of nuclear deterrence. The "Basic Principles" specifies that aggression against Russia and/or its allies by a non-nuclear state, carried out with the support of a nuclear state, is considered as their joint attack. Other changes concern possible scenarios for the future use of service "kamikaze states" like Ukraine by the enemy against Russia. This is the receipt of reliable information about a massive launch (take-off) of air attack weapons of all types (from drones to missiles) and their crossing the Russian border. The US can quickly give its proxy a huge capability to strike deep into Russia with drones and missiles; even if Russia completely destroys the immediate aggressor with a retaliatory strike, it will suffer heavy losses, and the US will remain the winner. Therefore, the US should be the target of a retaliatory strike on par with the immediate aggressor. Given the widespread proliferation of long-range attack drones around the world, and the US policy of transferring intermediate- and shorter-range cruise missiles to its junior allies, this condition should potentially create a new framework for future local conflicts. Given that the ability of France and the UK to produce long-range weapons without extensive use of US technology is largely lost, any massive long-range strike against sensitive forces inside Russia, delivered with Western weapons and/or big data, should result in a strike against the US. At this point, since American and European long-range strikes on Russia have already been carried out, Russia probably has no choice but to transfer to one or two countries the weapons or technology that will allow them to reliably deliver payloads to North America and Western Europe: the Americans and Europeans must pay. But how widespread such a practice will be in the future is one of the important questions of the post-war world order. In the course of the current conflict, the question of strikes on American targets will probably arise with the further expansion of the practice of American proxy strikes deep into Russian territory. Another change related to the response to threats of possible conflicts in the coming years was the specification of the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the event of non-nuclear aggression against Russia. If earlier the condition for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons was defined extremely vaguely as "aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened", now we are talking about a "critical threat to the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity" of Russia and Belarus. As the experience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in the Kursk region showed, the United States can send its proxies to carry out operations that lead to an advance into Russia by tens of kilometers. In the future, each such operation should be considered as an attack by the United States on Russia. The Problem of Defining Criteria The issue of "proxy states" or "kamikaze states," which can be rapidly rearmed and thrown into battle under external control, will continue to increase. This will be driven by the development of military capabilities (particularly those involving artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms, and weapon systems, etc.) in combination with the refinement of methods for societal control. Russia is not the only one that will have to deal with this problem. In the long term, there will be a difficulty of developing criteria for the level of "support" by a nuclear state for a non-nuclear country, at which the actions of the junior partner become their joint aggression.  Probably, we can talk about finding a combination of political, economic and military-technical conditions, at which the "junior partner" can no longer be considered as a separate participant in international relations. In this case, the responsibility for any significant attacks from it on Russian or Belarusian territory should be borne by the patron state. Such criteria must be logical and transparent, and their development and announcement probably need to be done in advance. Perhaps such a practice will gain some currency in the future unstable world as a way to protect the national territories of great powers from attack, narrowing the potential for the use of "service states".

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah entered a 60-day ceasefire on Nov. 26, 2024, a move aimed at reducing tensions in the region more than a year into a multifront conflict.Under the terms of the deal, Israel would gradually withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and Hezbollah would fully withdraw north of the Litani River. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Army would “deploy and take control over their own territory,” U.S. President Joe Biden said, adding that the United States, France and other allies have pledged to support the deal.But what does the deal mean for the parties involved and future prospects for a more permanent cessation of hostilities? The Conversation U.S. turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert of Lebanon and border conflicts in the Middle East, to explain why they reached a ceasefire now and what it means going forward. Why is the ceasefire deal happening now? The timing of this ceasefire is the result of a convergence of interests among the government in Israel, Hezbollah itself and that of its chief sponsor, Iran – but all for different reasons. For the Israeli government, domestic issues are at play. First off, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are exhausted after more than a year of war. This is particularly true for Israeli reservists, a growing number of whom are not turning up for duty. The Israeli general public, too, is tired of conflict, and a majority favors a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also has internal issues in his government to contend with. He is facing pressure from the ruling coalition’s ultra-Orthodox partners to draw up laws exempting ultra-Orthodox Jews from the military draft. Reducing the need for active personnel by quieting the front with Lebanon will help in that regard. The secular and national-religious sectors of the society who do serve in the IDF and who are upset with the possibility of a formal draft-exemption law for ultra-Orthodox men may be more inclined to swallow this pill if the war with Hezbollah is over. From the Israeli army’s perspective, the war in Lebanon is coming to a point of diminishing returns. It has succeeded in weakening Hezbollah’s military standing but has been unable to wipe the militant group out entirely. This also factors into Hezbollah’s thinking. The group has been seriously debilitated in Lebanon; the war has eroded its military capabilities. Unlike its previous position – reiterated time and again over the past year by its now-dead leader, Hassan Nasrallah – that a ceasefire would only be possible if first it is reached between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran are now willing to delink the two fronts. This leaves Hamas in a far weaker position as they are now left without the support of Iran’s main proxy “axis of resistance” group. Drawing Hezbollah, and other aligned groups in the region, into direct confrontation with Israel had been Hamas’ hope when it launched its attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hezbollah and Lebanon’s other political factions also have strong domestic pressures to contend with. Lebanon has more than 1 million refugees as a result of the conflict – the vast majority of them Shia, the branch of Islam that Hezbollah is drawn from. The conditions in Lebanon have increased the risk of sectarian fighting between Shia and others factions in the country. For Hezbollah leaders, the time may seem right to cut their losses and prepare to regroup as a political and military body. Iran, too, is seeking to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon as soon as possible. The deal comes as Tehran is bracing for a U.S. administration that could have a more hawkish position on Iran and its proxies in the region, of which Hezbollah is the most significant. With a new Iranian president, and a new U.S. administration, a ceasefire between Iran’s main proxy and Israel may be a first step to Tehran building a constructive dialogue with a Trump White House. What is the role of the US in the ceasefire? What is interesting for me is that despite the very clear position of the U.S. in favoring Israel during the past year of conflict, it still functions as an effective mediator. It is thanks to the U.S. that there is a ceasefire – and it comes despite the fact that Washington is far from neutral in this conflict, being a chief ally of Israel and its main provider of weapons. But the Lebanese government and Hezbollah see a U.S. role, too. And this is not new. The United States was the mediator in the 2022 landmark agreement that, for the first time, set out the maritime boundaries between Israel and Lebanon. The ceasefire deal benefits both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations. For President Joe Biden, it would represent a diplomatic success after a year in which the U.S. has failed to mediate any breakthrough in the conflict in Gaza, and it is an opportunity for Biden to finish his presidency on a positive foreign policy note. From the perspective of Trump, the ceasefire in Lebanon will represent one less problem for him to face. What might be the consequences for Lebanon and Israel? Lebanon has the most at stake in this ceasefire holding. The country was already in a perilous economic situation before the war, and months of fighting has only worsened the structural, economic and political crises in the country. It is as dire as it can get. Further, the war has reignited sectarian tension in Lebanon – talk of a return to civil war in the country is not far-fetched. Lebanon-Israel border: A zone of continued conflict The lower reaches of the Litani River, outlined in blue, are the northern edge of a U.N.-proposed buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Golan Heights, which neighbors Syria, is also disputed territory in the region. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Palestinian territories that are governed by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority respectively, are also often areas of violent conflict.   But there is uncertainty over how the ceasefire will affect the various rival factions in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has been weakened and may well now look for a way to reassert its strength in Lebanon’s politics. The main question is how the other factions and parties respond to that. With a weak Hezbollah, other factions may challenge the militant organization in ways they haven’t before. Before being decimated by Israel, there were no rival groups in a position to challenge Hezbollah in Lebanon. But that has all changed: Hezbollah’s military power has been degraded and Nasrallah, the group’s leader, killed. And Nasrallah was not just the face and brains of Hezbollah, he was also the group’s most important link to Iran. There is concern among some Lebanon experts that the gap left by a weakened Hezbollah may see a struggle for power and further strife in the country. And I believe there should be no illusions that Hezbollah will try to reassert itself as a domestic force. Complicating matters is the fact that any realignment of political forces in Lebanon comes amid a political vacuum. There has been a caretaker government – and no president – for two years now since Hezbollah conditioned the appointment of a new president with the candidate being an ally of the group. Now, Lebanese politicians would need to agree on a new president who in turn would appoint a new prime minister and government. It remains to be seen how this will unfold with a weakened Hezbollah. For Israel, the ceasefire will provide an opportunity to reconstruct parts of the north that have been devastated by Hezbollah missiles and a possible return of the 60,000 Israelis who fled northern areas close to the Lebanon border. It will also allow the Israel Defense Forces to regroup, refresh and focus their resources in Gaza, rather than fighting on two fronts. Could the ceasefire lead to a permanent peace deal? I don’t see any permanent peace deal on the horizon, given the fact that the fundamental political goals of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran have not changed and that the Israel-Palestine conflict continues to fester. But I am hopeful that the ceasefire could lead to calm and stability between Israel and Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The details of the ceasefire agreement are not very different from U.N. Resolution 1701 that ended the last major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. That agreement brought relative calm to the region for 18 years, even if Hezbollah, supported by Iran, used these years to build up its military capability and prepare for a potential ground invasion of northern Israel. In my view, there is a possibility for greater stability this time around given the fact that the ceasefire agreement also stipulates that, if and when it becomes permanent, the deal would serve as a basis for negotiations over the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial boundary. This would not be an easy task, particularly in the area of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar. But with goodwill and good intentions, even difficult border disputes could be resolved.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction In 2010, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was established and ratified in 2011, with membership expanding to 33 countries. According to the organization’s statements, its aims include “deepening the integration of Latin American countries, promoting international peace, and respecting human rights.” Additionally, there is an implicit ambition among several members to reduce the political and economic influence of the US in the region, as suggested by the context of some of the organization’s statements.[2] With a total population of about 635 million people, covering an area of about 22 million km², and accounting for 17% of the United Nations (UN) voting power, their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis for 2023 is approximately $12.8 trillion, equivalent to 7.8% of the world’s GDP. However, four of the 33 countries contribute more than $9.6 trillion, or about 75% of the GDP. These four countries also comprise 68% of the total population of the regional group, as shown in the following table:[3]   CELAC’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood The Latin American and Caribbean region has the highest percentage of leftist political regimes in the world. Among the 19 most significant countries in the region, 12 are now run by left-wing governments, accounting for 63% of the total. These leftist-led countries represent 92% of the region’s people and 90% of its GDP.[4] This demographic and economic dominance is clearly reflected in CELAC’s stance on two interconnected issues: the position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood, marked by varying degrees of rejection of Israeli policy, and a relative independence from US influence in the region. First: CELAC’s Stance as a Political Bloc on Operation al-Aqsa Flood[5] At the eighth CELAC summit, held in March 2024 in Kingstown, the capital of St.Vincent and the Grenadines, a lack of consensus emerged among the members regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Despite the compromise language in the conference statement, 27 countries endorsed it while 6 countries opposed it.[6] The resolution included the following points:[7] a. Condemning the killing of civilians on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides and emphasizing the need to protect civilians in accordance with international law.b. Supporting the UN General Assembly call for a ceasefire.c. Demanding the immediate and unconditional release of hostages.d. Urging the delivery of humanitarian aid to the affected areas in the Gaza Strip (GS).e. Calling for a peaceful solution based on the two-state solution. Second: Stances of the Central States within CELAC[8] Countries with left-leaning governments are often the most vocal in supporting the Palestine issue, as reflected in their leaders’ statements. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro slammed “the international position regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza,” and pointed out that “international justice exists only to protect the interests of American, European, and Western imperialism, in order to conceal the massacres committed against Palestinian families.” Brazilian President Lula da Silva aligned with this view, calling on “the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to set aside their differences and put an end to the genocide in Gaza.” He reiterated his call for an immediate ceasefire, as outlined in the CELAC statement from the 8th Congress. Additionally, he noted Brazil’s efforts to support UN Security Council resolutions aimed at halting the fighting in GS, which were vetoed by the US. Colombian President Gustavo Petro criticized both the United States and Europe for supporting “Israel in committing genocide against the Palestinians,” with similar sentiments expressed by Nicaragua. Generally, the positions of CELAC countries, particularly the major powers, can be categorized into three distinct stances, as illustrated in the table below:[9]   1. Countries closest to the Israeli position: This group varies in their level of support for Israel, as illustrated by the following indicators: a. The Salvadoran stance is notably one of the most vehement against the Palestinians, despite President Nayib Bukele being a Christian of Palestinian descent who calls for the “demise of the Palestinian resistance.” This position aligns closely with that of Paraguay, one of the few countries to label the Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” and announce plans to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Paraguay’s stance on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is marked by a consistent lack of condemnation at the UN and frequent abstentions from voting on resolutions that support Palestinian rights. b. The Jewish minority in Argentina plays a significant role in influencing the government. With a population of between 300–400 thousand, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. The attacks on Jewish institutions in Argentina during 1992–1994, which were linked to Iran—a key supporter of Palestinian resistance—also influenced the government’s stance, despite opposition from the pro-Palestinian Worker’s Left Front – Unity party. c. Guatemala, with a population of about 18 million, was the first Latin American country to move its embassy to Jerusalem. It is also one of the centers of gravity for Anglican Christianity, which tends to be more sympathetic to Zionism. 2. Countries that have adopted a middle ground, attempting to balance support for and opposition to both sides of the conflict: a. Both Mexico and Brazil criticized the attack on Israel on 7/10/2023, but strongly condemned the Israeli response. b. In the diplomacy of Brazil and Mexico, a role reversal was observed. The presidencies of both countries adopted more articulate positions than their foreign ministries, where traditional diplomatic language prevailed. c. Mexico has not severed ties with Israel; however, its representatives at the UN have sharply criticized the Israeli government. d. Ecuador can be included in this group due to its effort to mediate peace between the Palestinian resistance and Israel by sending Ecuadorian Vice President Verónica Abad in October 2023. Additionally, Ecuador has backed Palestine’s bid for full membership in both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, though it has explicitly condemned the resistance attack that occurred in October 2023. 3. Countries that support Palestinian rights are typically left-leaning and their policies often exhibit the following characteristics: a. Nicaragua unequivocally supported the Palestinian position and even received some Palestinian leaders after the war. b. Colombia has taken a definitive stance in strong support of Palestine. It is one of the most vocal critics of Israeli policies, culminating in its decision to sever diplomatic ties with Israel. Colombian President Gustavo Petro has sharply condemned Israeli actions in Gaza, labeling them as “genocide.” It is important to note that Colombia’s position is significant given its historical and strategic ties with Israel. Although Colombia relies on Israeli military equipment for combating armed opposition and drug trafficking groups, and there has been a free trade agreement between the two countries since 2020, as well as various agreements since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957, trade data shows a 53% decline in trade between Israel and Colombia following the recent conflict, compared to 2022. c. The Cuban and Venezuelan position was a continuation of their traditional support for the Palestinian right, and Cuba justified the Palestinian attack on 7/10/2023 as a reaction to 75 years of oppression of the Palestinians. d. Bolivia did not condemn the Palestinian attack in October, instead focusing its statements on de-escalating the conflict between the two sides. However, the lack of Israeli response to its calls led Bolivia to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Additionally, Bolivia supported South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and endorsed a case before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Colombia and Belize have also cut ties with Israel. Notably, during the last week of June 2024, Bolivia experienced a failed coup attempt, raising suspicions that the US and Israel may have been involved as retaliation for Bolivia’s clear stance on the Gaza war.[10] e. The significant presence of the Palestinian community in Chile, the largest in Latin America with nearly half a million having Palestinian roots, has notably influenced Chilean politics. This influence is reflected in the Chilean Senate’s Human Rights Commission decision to ban companies from importing goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. A US State Department official characterized this decision as one that unfairly singles out Israel.[11] f. Honduras has exhibited a decrease in its support for Israel following Israeli attacks on civilians, leading the government to summon the Israeli ambassador to protest these actions. In 2021, Honduras was one of the first countries to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, joining Guatemala and Paraguay, which had made similar moves in 2018. However, Guatemala reversed its decision and returned its embassy to Tel Aviv shortly thereafter. The shift in Honduras’ stance can be attributed to the change in leadership from a right-wing to a left-wing administration after Xiomara Castro assumed the presidency in 2022. g. Since the beginning of the war, Latin American countries’ positions in support of Palestine have evolved at the diplomatic level in particular, and have begun cutting ties and recalling ambassadors from Israel, which was initiated by Chile, Colombia, and Honduras, while Bolivia and Belize cut diplomatic ties with Israel completely. Bolivia was one of the five countries that referred the situation in GS to the ICC for investigation in November 2023. In the referral, Bolivia cites evidence of crimes against Palestinians including murder, torture, inhumane treatment, persecution, apartheid, forced displacement, and the destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage. Mexico and Chile did the same in January 2024, whereas Brazil’s and Colombia’s foreign ministries issued statements supporting South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICJ. The Brazilian position has been the leading one, which has strained relations between Brazil and Israel despite efforts by the Brazilian Israelite Confederation (CONIB) to mend fences. However, the Brazilian president’s remarks that “what is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people hasn’t happened at any other moment in history” except one: “When Hitler decided to kill the Jews,”[12] combined with the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s endorsement of European countries’ recognition of Palestine as a state and support for a two-state solution, have solidified Brazil’s stance against Israeli policies. CELAC’s Vote at the UN A review of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions reveals that the countries most resistant to supporting resolutions favoring Palestinian demands are Guatemala, Paraguay and Argentina, followed by Haiti, Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador. These countries often either oppose or abstain from voting. Argentina, with a population of nearly 46 million, is the most significant ally of Israeli policy. This is followed by Guatemala with about 18 million people, Paraguay with around 7 million, Panama with 4.5 million and Uruguay, with approximately 3.5 million people. Argentina ranks third among CELAC countries in terms of GDP and fourth in terms of population. Argentina’s stance on Palestinian rights reflects the political shift introduced by President Javier Milei, who aims to align Argentina more closely with the Western capitalist bloc through his foreign policy.[13] Argentina did not support the General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire in December 2023 and opposed the resolution to grant Palestine full membership in the UN. The Argentine position can be attributed to the following reasons:[14] a. President Javier Milei’s religious inclination towards Judaism was evident in his prayers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in 2021, accompanied by Rabbi Shimon Axel Wahnish, who was later appointed as Argentine ambassador to Israel. Although the Argentine president is a Catholic Christian, some sources suggest he is considering converting to Judaism. However, other sources claim that President Milei’s display of Jewish faith is a way to express repentance and counter accusations that he concealed his support for a Nazi sympathizer. b. The Argentine president’s intention to strengthen ties with the Jewish minority in Argentina, as previously mentioned, faced opposition from nearly four thousand Argentine Jewish intellectuals, who voiced concern over Milei’s “political use of Judaism.” This concern was highlighted when he became one of the first world leaders to visit Israel after the war erupted, offering high praise for Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies and pledging to move Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Interestingly, the Argentine president demonstrated a clear bias towards Israel when he cut his state visit to Denmark short, following the Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024, which was in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. President Meli then convened a crisis committee alongside the Israeli ambassador to Argentina and his security minister, who began criticizing the positions of other Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Chile, describing them as “Islamic hotbeds” and accusing them of hosting Hezbollah elements. He also criticized the defense agreement Iran concluded with Bolivia in July 2023. c. Milei, a university economics professor, bases his economic ideology on far-right principles and anti-leftist Peronism in Argentina, making him the most eager to strengthen the relationship with the US and, consequently, with Israel. d. It is noted that trade relations between Israel and Argentina are escalating significantly. Israeli exports to Argentina increased annually by 15.2% from 2017 to the end of 2022, reaching $156 million in 2022. Similarly, Argentine exports to Israel increased annually by 25.2%, reaching $200 million in 2022. Third: Trends in Public Opinion in CELAC Countries Quantitative studies on access to information and data from various sources show that Latin American countries lead the world in relying on social media for obtaining and sharing information. This trend has influenced Israel’s public image in the region.[15] Public opinion polls in Latin America reveal that approval of the way US President Joe Biden’s is dealing with the GS war is modest. A survey of six major Latin American countries showed the following results:[16]   The approval rate with Biden’s GS war policy in six countries is notably low, at around 26%. In contrast, the same survey indicates that the disapproval in these countries is more than double the approval rate, reaching approximately 57%. Meanwhile, the people of CELAC countries expressed their solidarity with Palestine after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This solidarity was evident in demonstrations involving former presidents, civil society organizations, popular sectors, football associations, artists and universities, particularly in Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina, etc. Conclusion The “instability” in political orientations towards international issues is a key feature of Latin American countries’ policies, largely due to the frequent shifts in political regimes and the consequent changes. In analyzing the positions of Latin American countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict, four factors seem to be the most significant in shaping this relationship:[17] 1. The political shifts between leftist and rightist regimes, whether due to coups or presidential elections, often characterize these countries as “unstable.” This is particularly evident in major countries within this group, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia. This instability is reflected in their stances on the Arab-Israeli conflict: leftist regimes typically support Palestine, while rightist ones back Israel. 2. The positions of these countries on Israel are notably influenced by US policies. Some countries align with the US stance to avoid potential pressure, a pattern observable since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. 3. A growing trend among Catholic Christians toward Anglicanism, which shares a closer religious alignment with the Israeli position. 4. Israeli presence in the technological sector of the Latin American economy is significant. In major Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, more than 450 Israeli companies are active in this industry. The data we have discussed highlight the need for resistance forces to recognize the significance of this region in the following ways: 1. Despite a noticeable division among Latin American countries in their responses to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath, the balance of support leans considerably toward the resistance. This is due to the increasing leftist inclination in the region, particularly in its major countries. Demonstrations in support of Palestine have occurred in Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Peru and Chile. 2. Cutting ties with Israel, recalling ambassadors, or participating in cases against it in the ICJ and the ICC by Latin American countries is perhaps the most significant in terms of political impact. This development requires follow-up, including providing these countries with relevant information and support to reinforce this trend. 3. Despite their Anglican background, public opinion trends in these countries reveal a strong sympathy for Palestinian suffering, which is more than twice as significant as the sympathy for Israel. This is evident from the approval rates toward President Biden’s pro-Israel policies. These findings suggest the need for engaging with leftist forces in the region based on shared libertarian values. 4. Comparing the trade between Latin American and Israel, which was $6 billion in 2022, to the trade with Arab countries, the trade volume with the Gulf countries alone is more than three times greater than that with Israel. However, the political influence of these trade relations with the Arab world remains relatively modest.[18] 5. Arab and Palestinian diplomacy should focus on four Latin American countries-Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia—due to their significant political, economic and demographic influence in the international arena. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals. [2] CELAC/ Zone of Peace: “A key step to countering the globalization of militarism” – UN Expert, site of The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3/2/2014, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2014/02/celac-zone-peace-key-step-countering-globalization-militarism-un-expert [3] World Economic Outlook Database: October 2023, site of International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October/weo-report?c=311,213,314,313,316,339,218,223,228,233,238,321,243,248,253,328,258,336,2; GDP, PPP (current international $) – Latin America & Caribbean, site of World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=ZJ; and List of Latin American and Caribbean countries by GDP (PPP), site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_American_and_Caribbean_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)#cite_note-1 [4] Latin America’s left-wing experiment is a warning to the world, site of The Economist newspaper, 18/5/2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/05/18/latin-americas-left-wing-experiment-is-a-warning-to-the-world [5] For a historical overview of Israel’s relations with Latin America, see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Academic Paper: Israeli Relations with Latin America, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/4/2021, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2021/04/05/academic-paper-israeli-relations-with-latin-america/ [6] Estimates vary, but the number of signatories is likely to be 27, see CELAC member states divided over Israel-Gaza war stance, site of SEARCHLIGHT, 5/3/2024, https://www.searchlight.vc/front-page/2024/03/05/celac-member-states-divided-israel-gaza-war-stance; and Brazil, 23 other Celac countries call for immediate ceasefire in Gaza, site of Agencia Brasil, 4/3/2024, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2024-03/brazil-23-other-celac-countries-call-immediate-ceasefire-gaza [7] CELAC summit fails to take unanimous position on Gaza, site of iWitness News, 2/3/2024, https://www.iwnsvg.com/2024/03/02/celac-summit-fails-to-take-unanimous-position-on-gaza [8] Latin American peace, anti-imperialism, and Gaza at the heart of CELAC, site of Al Mayadeen English, 1/3/2024, https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/latin-american-peace–anti-imperialism–and-gaza-at-the-hear; Oliver Stuenkel, The Israel-Hamas War Is Inflaming Polarization in Latin America, site of Americas Quarterly (AQ), 16/11/2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-israel-hamas-war-is-inflaming-polarization-in-latin-america; Ecuador VP says she will go to Israel amid spat with president, Reuters News Agency, 28/11/2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ecuador-vp-says-she-will-go-israel-amid-spat-with-president-2023-11-28; and At CELAC, Lula extols the potential of Latin Americans and Caribbeans as an integrated bloc, site of Planalto, 5/3/2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/03/at-celac-lula-extols-the-potential-of-latin-americans-and-caribbeans-as-an-integrated-bloc [9] For detailed information on the positions of CELAC countries, either individually or as a bloc, please refer to the following references, see Rogelio Núñez Castellano and Carlos Malamud, Latin America and the Gaza crisis, site of The Elcano Royal Institute, 24/11/2023, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-and-the-gaza-crisis; Enrique Reina (@EnriqueReinaHN), site of X (Twitter), 3/11/2023, 10:01, https://x.com/EnriqueReinaHN/status/1720531624289575107; Brazil’s president withdraws his country’s ambassador to Israel after criticizing the war in Gaza, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-israel-ambassador-withdrawn-af9d295d989a86c4fcd8ca4531350f42; Colombia breaks diplomatic ties with Israel but its military relies on key Israeli-built equipment, AP, 3/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/colombia-israel-diplomatic-ties-military-equipment-0c04009ccfc6110e20ee358403509500; President Milei’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension in Argentina and beyond, AP, 3/6/2024, https://apnews.com/article/milei-judaism-hezbollah-israel-hamas-war-netanyahu-d8831369a6bc8a96205d4080d2b2045b; Argentina demands that Bolivia explain its new defense agreement with Iran, AP, 25/7/2023, https://apnews.com/article/argentina-bolivia-iran-defense-mou-2cb8c5917fdb6d3e01af4c67af969797; Israel/ Argentina, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg; Latin America divided and nuanced on Israel-Hamas conflict, site of Buenos Aires Times, 1/11/2023, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/latin-america-divided-and-nuanced-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict.phtml; Marta Tawil Kuri, Perspectives from the Global South: Latin America’s Fragmented Approach to Palestine, site of Arab reform initiative (ARI), 15/12/2023, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/perspectives-from-the-global-south-latin-americas-fragmented-approach-to-palestine; IntelBrief: Leaders in Latin America Speak Loudly on Gaza, site of The Soufan Center (TSC), 1/3/2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-1; Honduran president in Israel for opening of Jerusalem embassy, site of i24NEWS, 24/6/2021, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/1624517565-honduran-president-in-israel-for-opening-of-jerusalem-embassy; Angeline Montoya, In Honduras, the mixed track record of President Xiomara Castro, site of Le Monde, 10/2/2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/10/in-honduras-the-mixed-track-record-of-president-xiomara-castro_6015218_4.html; Latin America countries hold rallies in support of Palestine, site of Anadolu Agency (AA), 4/3/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/latin-america-countries-hold-rallies-in-support-of-palestine/3154305; Latin America: Demonstrations expressing support for Palestinians scheduled in several regional cities Oct. 20-22, site of Crisis24, 20/10/2023, https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/10/latin-america-demonstrations-expressing-support-for-palestinians-scheduled-in-several-regional-cities-oct-20-22; Gaza solidarity sweeps across Latin America, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 23/10/2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231023-gaza-solidarity-sweeps-across-latin-america; Alejandro Santos Cid, University Gaza solidarity protests extend to Mexico: ‘We are urgently calling for an end to genocide’, site of EL PAÍS, 4/5/2024, https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-05-04/university-gaza-solidarity-protests-extend-to-mexico-we-are-urgently-calling-for-an-end-to-genocide.html; site of PRIMICIAS, 7/10/2023, https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/ecuador-condena-ataque-hamas-israel (in Spanish) [10] See Lithium, severing ties with Israel, or rapprochement with Russia? What is the secret to the failed Bolivian coup?, site of RT, 28/6/2024, https://arabic.rt.com/world/1578053- الليثيوم-غزة-أم-موسكو-أيهم-كلمة-السر-في-الانقلاب-البوليفي-الفاشل/; and Türkiye and Bolivia: Experiences of Resisting Coups in a Changing World, site of Turk Press, 29/6//2024, https://www.turkpress.co/node/102003 [11] Patricia Garip, What Does Latin America Think About the Israel-Hamas War?, site of Foreign Policy, 29/1/2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/29/israel-hamas-gaza-war-latin-america-chile-argentina-colombia-mexico-genocide/ [12] Lazar Berman, Israel livid as Brazil’s Lula says Israel like ‘Hitler,’ committing genocide in Gaza, site of Times of Israel, 18/2/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-livid-as-brazils-lula-says-israel-like-hitler-committing-genocide-in-gaza/ [13] Argentina shifts historic position on Palestine as UN member state, Buenos Aires Times, 10/5/2024, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-shifts-historic-position-on-palestine-asun-member-state.phtml [14] AP and TOI STAFF, Argentinian president’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension, Times of Israel, 3/6/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/argentinian-presidents-surprising-devotion-to-judaism-and-israel-provokes-tension/; Argentina/ Israel, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/arg/partner/isr; and Israel/ Argentina, OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg [15] 4 Trends Among Latin American Internet Users That Will Impact the Market in 2022, site of Americas Market Intelligence (AMI), 9/1/2022, https://americasmi.com/insights/trends-latin-american-internet-users-marketing/#:~:text=In%20Latin%20America%2C%2083%25%20to,websites%2C%20broken%20down%20by%20country; and Annie Pforzheimer, Latin American Views on the Gaza War Are in Flux, site of The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune journal, November 2023, https://jstribune.com/pforzheimer-latin-american-views-on-the-gaza-war-are-in-flux [16] Survey conducted in Spring 2024, see Majorities disapprove of the way Biden is dealing with the Israel-Hamas war, site of Pew Research Center, 10/6/2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/11/how-well-is-biden-handling-international-issues/gap_2024-06-11_us-image-2024_5_06 [17]Gian Luca Gardini (ed.), External Powers in Latin America: Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism and South-South Cooperation (Routledge, 2021), pp. 153-163; and Political stability – Country rankings, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/Latin-Am [18]Chase Harrison, Explainer: Latin America’s Relationship with Israel and Palestine, site of Americas Society (AS), Council of the Americas (COA), 16/11/2023, https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-latin-americas-relationship-israel-and-palestine; and “Cultivating Ties: Deepening trade and investment between Latin America and the GCC,” site of Economist Impact, The Economist Group, 2022, https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/economist_impact__dcci_latam_report_10th_march_2022_english_web.pdf

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The next president of the US will face various challenges that divide the nation, including a nuclear defense policy. The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy. Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal. The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those threats, along with China’s growing military might, US Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China. Thanks to those events and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people. And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China. The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation  The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5th, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.) At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21st, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities. Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow. Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable. The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it. In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.) Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5th, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them. The Three-Way Arms Race  Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable. Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states. Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike. Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China. As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program. The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China. “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal. Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation. The Need for Citizen Advocacy  For many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale. And one thing should be made clear: adding more weapons to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.” A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”