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Europe stands at a precipice. Following the US military operation in Venezuela, President Donald Trump and his close advisers have reiterated that Greenland – currently an autonomous territory of Denmark – will be next. “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security, and Denmark is not going to be able to do it,” Trump told reporters this week. “Let’s talk about Greenland in 20 days.” The threat is not mere hyperbole. Trump has appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry, who publicly supports US annexation, as special envoy to Greenland. And Katie Miller, wife of top Trump adviser Stephen Miller, recently posted an image of Greenland in US flag colours with the caption “SOON”. These are not random provocations but coordinated pressure tactics against a sovereign territory. Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen responded by saying “That’s enough now. No more pressure. No more insinuations. No more fantasies of annexation.” Danish leaders have warned a US attack on Greenland would signal “the end of NATO” and of post-second world war security. Threats against NATO members (such as Denmark) could also embolden Russia even more and lead to more uncertainty for Europe. So why are European leaders not more forcefully calling out Trump’s threats against Greenland – as well as his government’s shocking intervention in Venezuela? And what’s at stake? Europe’s weak response NATO’s Article 5 commits members to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. If the US were to attack Greenland, Denmark would expect NATO’s collective defence mechanisms to activate against the US. European leaders have been forced to confront a reality they hoped to avoid: the US, NATO’s founding member, may become the alliance’s gravest threat. But so far, the response across the continent to both the Greenland threats and the US’ actions in Venezuela has been feeble and confused. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer admitted he wanted to speak to President Trump before he condemned the attacks, epitomizing Europe’s subordination. A letter signed by the Danish prime minister and the leaders of France, Germany, Spain, the UK, Italy, and Poland, has affirmed only Greenland and Denmark should determine Greenland’s future. The European Union has pledged to defend members’ territorial integrity. But they didn’t articulate any solid counter-threat to Trump’s comments about Greenland. They could, for instance, have reiterated their long-term partnership, the potential collapse of the biggest alliance in human history, or the costs in losing cooperation (both economic and security) with Europe that directly benefits the US. And such vague declarations about Greenland ring hollow when the same governments hesitate to condemn US violations of international law in Venezuela. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the “legal classification of the US intervention [in Venezuela] is complex” and that Germany needed time to consider this. Such equivocation on the most basic, foundational concept of international law not only signals incredible weakness. It also undermines Europe’s credibility when invoking the “rules-based order” against Russia and its actions in Ukraine, making it near impossible to mobilise Global South support, sustain sanctions coalitions, or claim principled restraint. When European leaders respond so cautiously to the Venezuela operation – stressing respect for international law while avoiding direct criticism of Washington – their principles are exposed as highly selective. Russia benefits Russia understands this dynamic perfectly. Moscow has already characterised US actions as “armed aggression” while pointing to Western hypocrisy. Moscow benefits from this in fundamental ways. First, Western hypocrisy validates Russia’s narrative that international law is merely a tool the powerful use against the weak. The vacillation on condemning US action in Venezuela or threats against fellow NATO members contradicts the European narrative against Putin’s war. Second, NATO’s potential collapse or paralysis would hand Moscow a strategic victory that Russian military power alone has been unable to secure. If the United States annexes Greenland, Denmark would face an existential choice: accept the violation and remain in a compromised NATO or leave an alliance that no longer protects its members. All other members would face the same choice. The NATO alliance cannot function if its members no longer share fundamental values about sovereignty and law. Trump has forced Europe to confront whether it will defend these principles universally or accept a world where might makes right. Appeasement all over again? This moment recalls Europe’s crisis of the Munich agreement. In 1938, Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty to appease Nazi Germany, excluding Prague from negotiations over its future while negotiating away its territory. Only later would the democratic powers discover that appeasing aggression – however politically convenient at the time – would only invite yet more aggression. Today, Europe faces a parallel dilemma: how to respond when its most powerful ally directly threatens an EU and NATO member state. Europe is edging toward another Munich agreement moment, with concessions dressed up as stability and peace a euphemism for appeasement. The events in the coming weeks will largely determine the very future of Europe. The continent faces a choice between political expediency or rules-based international order built on the prohibition of aggressive war, respect for sovereignty, and collective security. Will its leaders be prepared to confront their own hypocrisy or timidly accept the erosion of the rules they claim to defend?

On January 3, 2026, in a surgical operation in the early hours of the morning, just days after the New Year celebrations, the Delta Force special unit successfully carried out a raid capturing Nicolás Maduro, who had held power uninterruptedly for 13 years. The first images showed him aboard the USS Iwo Jima, being taken to the courts in New York to finally face trial — a scene that, along with the operation itself, will provide Hollywood with material for years to come. We are left to wait and see how long the sentence will take. Beyond the immediate event, the message and worldview it conveys for the rest of the world are far broader and more significant. What happened can be read in multiple ways, beyond the basic explanations of oil, resources, or the threat to the United States. Reality is much more complex, full of twists and intersections that enrich the events. We have an opportunity to see beyond the obvious, to reflect on things even the protagonists themselves may not fully understand. This event invites us, like few others, to reflect on one of the central axes of humanity: power. How is it understood now? How is it interpreted? Is power something one possesses, demonstrates, or enacts? Or perhaps all of the above? We can debate not only these questions but also the legality of Maduro’s overthrow, yet it is also true: what else could have been done? This is where the issue of power comes into play — not only through the act of detention itself, but through the operation designed to remove it. However, underlying this is a fragile topic: the institutions themselves, their weaknesses, and whether they will ever fulfill their function, if they even have one. Both Venezuela and the United States have become central actors in international anarchy, yet the latter, in exercising its power, raises the question of why, while the former is left with the uncertainty of what. Beyond them, one must ask: what happens with the rest? How is the global geopolitical board now positioned? How does this influence other actors, and how does it affect us? Each aspect could merit an in-depth analysis, but the aim of this piece is to open these questions for discussion. To go beyond what happened, to invite thought and debate, and not to let ourselves be swayed by media narratives that seek to extinguish the most human thing we have: our voice. The Trump Corollary: Power and the New Paradigm. U.S. Decisions, “The Why.” Since the end of the First World War, and with greater emphasis after the Second, the United States consolidated its global image not only as a great power but as a defender of democratic ideals. During the Cold War, it dispersed its forces to contain the Soviet Union while always ensuring what once again resonates strongly today: the American hemisphere. Years after that bipolar confrontation, the world shows new arrangements. There is no longer direct rivalry with a single power, but the unipolar dominance of the United States seems to have given way. Are we facing a multipolar reality? Do actors have true autonomy in the continuum of political decisions? It is difficult to answer definitively, but the fact is that the capture of Maduro completely changes these perceptions. It is no secret that Venezuela was a historic target sought after by Donald Trump. Ever since he was first president, he tried through various means to remove Maduro; however, now he has succeeded with a shrewdness and forcefulness he lacked in his prior four years. From this arises the first questions for analysis: Why now? Why Venezuela? The speed of the operation is surprising. It is not just the audacity of the command, but the authority with which it was carried out: without calls for interrogation, freely using the instruments of power at Trump’s disposal. The interpretation centered on oil is the most obvious: the president himself does not hide that between 30 and 50 million barrels will be transported to the U.S. But the background is more complex. Facing weak economic foundations in his administration, volatility with the Federal Reserve, and the spectacular failure of his tariff policy against China, Trump needed a show of authority. In his early days in charge, Donald Trump began threatening various countries with tariff increases until April 2, 2025, the so called “Day of Liberation,” on which he announced dozens of taxes. Whether to negotiate or actually implement them, this proved to be a spectacular failure, far from what Trump believed. Not only did he have to renegotiate most of them without securing concessions or beneficial agreements for the United States — with some simply maintaining the status quo — but his main “rival,” China, ended the year in a stronger position. This made two things clear: commercially, China is at least very difficult to match, and Trump lost authority. This authority — or, more precisely, negotiation power and credibility — was lost on the ground and under the rules of agreements and dynamics we believed would prevail from the American side. What Trump did in Venezuela not only enhances his figure and empowers him, but also shows that his comments on social media (the new form of political communication) are serious. He left both allies and enemies in uncertainty: those who believed in his decline because of tariff issues and those who counted on them, because in order to exercise power, he can go beyond what was thought to be “fantastical” or “crazy.” The warnings to Colombia and its president, Gustavo Petro — who, knowing his position of weakness, has already communicated with the White House — as well as to Mexico — where a ground operation against cartels has already been announced and whose president, Sheinbaum, according to Trump, is worried — or Cuba make this evident. But even more striking is his obsession with Greenland: without directly attacking NATO, he frames it as a matter of hemispheric security. All of this is part of the new dynamic imposed by Trump; the one people fear is him and his persona, positioning himself as the figure that even Russia or China watches closely, understanding that, beyond commerce, they have little real influence in the hemisphere. Trump’s ambition for power blossomed at the beginning of this year, and we do not know if it will end. Ignoring Africa, keeping the Middle East and Europe in view, and knowing that beyond Japan or South Korea there is little he can do, he elevates the American continent. In fact, he speaks of a new Monroe Doctrine, rebranded as the “Donroe,” making clear the question of power: how he exercises it and how he now uses it to construct his own narrative. The “why” behind this desire will likely remain unknown; beyond the good of the United States, we are entering a new reality of leaders who place themselves above all else, like Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China: figures who shape the board to their liking. Perhaps the reason is more human than we think, perhaps the most human fear: death. From being a successful businessman to becoming president, in his latest term he seeks to leave a mark in history and thus ensure that he does not “die” in a spiritual sense. Or perhaps it is a unilateral decision made at random; the truth only he will know. It cannot be ignored that this is his last term, and in addition to criticism, he is already experiencing electoral setbacks, as in New York, where Zohran Mamdani of the Democratic Party won as mayor, representing a clear challenge to his use of power. Even political scientist Andrés Malamud argued that the Republican base rejects foreign interventions, so Trump must justify to them that this action will bring a concrete economic benefit. The internal dynamics seemingly unfolding within the party between J.D. Vance and Marco Rubio — the architect of the operation — also invite reflection on how this move is being positioned. Rubio emerges as a prominent figure, enhancing his stature, drawing a parallel to Kissinger during the Cold War. In his analysis of classical realism, Rubio acts similarly in a different world: seeking to centralize instruments to build that sphere of influence and diversify the tools that become the American directives for countries in the Americas. Completely leaving aside institutions or democratic legality — a topic I will address later — Donald Trump demonstrates how, under the new dynamics and the new multipolar order, the old artifice of power must still be maintained. As if following Machiavelli, this move makes one thing clear: what he does is, and will remain, Power. The Venezuelan “What,” the Drift of the Apeiron: What Remains for the Rest of the Hemisphere? That Maduro was a dictator who perpetuated himself in power through fraudulent actions is a fact. Each person will decide whether he was a good ruler for his people or not; despite cases of corruption or political censorship, making a definitive judgment about his governance inevitably leads to confrontation between those who supported his ideology and those who opposed it. Here, what happened left a vacuum in the Chavista apparatus of the ousted leader. Despite the low standard of living endured by Venezuelans, the reality is that Maduro’s certainty — negative as it was from that perspective — was exactly that: certainty. Delcy Rodríguez, who assumes the presidential role, is a strong figure within Chavismo who has held very important positions within the apparatus and was supposed to constitute a solid axis to confront Donald Trump. Contrary to expectations, she now responds to the U.S. as a partner in the so-called stabilization process, or phase one. An equation that becomes mutually beneficial for both the United States and Rodríguez. For his part, Trump cannot be challenged for directly imposing or controlling Venezuela through any of his men; while it is clear that Caracas now aligns with American interests, aside from Maduro’s removal, the names remain the same: the change occurs in the responsibilities and alignment. Rodríguez herself seeks the same as Trump, but from a subordinate position: power. Here, this new arrangement — or the image projected to the world — is demonstrated once again: that in order to ensure one’s continuity, one is capable of anything, including changing historical positions within a party or reinterpreting theories of betrayal. It is also clear that, in the case of the Venezuelan leader, there are no options, as she is already threatened by Trump with worse consequences. Yet it is evident that the entire apparatus that answered to Maduro complies and collaborates without resistance, at least in practice, to maintain their positions. This image reinforces the idea that there are no values or ideals to uphold — only power to wield. For the people, the worst part remains. From Maduro’s perspective, those who suffered under his rule, while confident that he will face some form of punishment, know that he will not be held accountable for the crimes committed in his own country — or at least not judged for them — but rather for what he did against the United States. This leaves, at least symbolically, a form of penalty — not in legal terms — for the Venezuelan people. The internal situation is also unclear: the apparatus has already begun releasing political prisoners, but it is uncertain how this process will continue. The United States has not issued clear directives for the population, only specifying the concessions that must be made to the nation and how the U.S. will now deal with it and with countries it considers hostile. It remains to be seen whether there will be elections, or whether Edmundo González Urrutia or María Corina Machado will respond to those who declare them winners, despite Trump’s dismissal of them. The return of a clear system is far off, and under the decision and judgment of the United States, the question remains: Does the U.S. truly care about Venezuela and its people, in human and institutional terms? Or do they only respond to material interests, regardless of the power figures involved? There is also an unfinished path in terms of the hemisphere. The Donroe Doctrine no longer guarantees the complete freedom and autonomy of countries within the system; they remain at the mercy of their subservience to the United States, or at least to what the U.S. deems necessary. Events like those in Argentina, where Trump himself claimed that Milei’s legislative victory was thanks to him, or Nasry Asfura in Honduras during the presidential elections, demonstrate that, despite minor gestures, the President of the United States is beginning to pull the strings across the Americas. This shift — or turn — toward the right in the Americas is perhaps less a change in mindset than a product of dependency and the condition of being tied to the United States. Countries like Brazil are the main exception: through their links with other multipolar actors (China, Russia, India, as part of BRICS), they secure at least some autonomy and maneuverability in this process of change. Even with unresolved issues like Cuba or the dictatorship in Nicaragua, there remain theoretical aspects of the Donroe Doctrine to clarify: Who does it apply to? Under what cases? What distinguishes it from its predecessor? What can be said with certainty is that the doctrine fluctuates and evolves according to Trump’s decisions, which may be designed to prepare for a confrontation with other global actors, justifying why the Americas do not ally with China and remain aligned with the United States, creating unity under a single mandate and exercising that power. What remains to be seen are the consequences of Trump’s Greenland issue, which sooner or later will become his next international victory. Tensions with Denmark are already difficult to manage, and Europe is unlikely to oppose U.S. decisions. Trump has stated that he will not dismantle NATO by any means, but considers the lack of control over the island a national security risk. With little economic or resource potential, the issue is more symbolic, as previously discussed: the Donroe Doctrine, national security, and Trump’s ambitions, in addition to the strictly geopolitical concerns and the strategic position it would provide in a confrontation with China or Russia. As the latter is the goal closest to the top of the president’s agenda, time will reveal how events unfold. What is certain is that every aspect, which could be analyzed from a particular lens, is conditioned by Trump — by his logic, perspective, and desires — demonstrating the exercise of his power. The International Conception: From the Periphery to the Power From an international perspective, and positioned on the periphery, what best aligns with the world ahead is what Argentine political scientist Carlos Escudé described with his concept of peripheral realism. The parallels with this theory are clear: we see states that set the rules — in this case, the United States for our hemisphere, but also China within its sphere; states that follow the rules, such as countries that align due to Trump’s influence and end up gravitating toward Washington; and rebellious states, like Venezuela, which paid the price. Faced with the new logics introduced by the U.S. president, Escudé provides a theoretical framework to understand the behavior of countries. He shows how we can, even without full freedom (if Latin America ever truly had it), use our autonomy and take advantage of what a great power can offer. Avoiding confrontations and maintaining “close relations” allows us, even under the oversight of being in their hemisphere, to make progress. Accepting our role as a peripheral actor serves as a starting point to build more domestically than internationally, understanding that we lack sufficient autonomy to set new rules of the game. American scholar John Mearsheimer also offers insight into Trump’s stance, which, together with Escudé’s perspective, clarifies the reasoning behind these events in the system’s anarchy. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism makes it clear that Trump’s proposals on national security and hemispheric defense align with the idea that states only seek security, and the only way to achieve it is by having more power than others. This frames Trump’s logic within the dynamics of a multipolar world. The goal pursued by the United States is the same as Mearsheimer describes: to be the regional hegemon. Uncertainty about what other actors can do represents a threat; therefore, security through power is fundamental, and this power is unlimited: the more, the better. These theories, framed within a realist perspective, define the current international system and will likely describe events to come while the Trump administration is in charge and exercising hard power. Soft power actions, while important in various areas, are set aside, as they cannot match what is gained through the use of hard power. While these situations could be analyzed through other lenses, this analysis is centered on the axis of power. How Trump is handling it creates a scenario that, far from idealism, forces us to operate within realist frameworks. This moves us away from idealized global perspectives and confirms that the system, anarchic as always, functions through power relations — and it is precisely these that the President of the United States is targeting. The Meaning of Institutions and the Anticipatory Future Finally, without going into detail — since the topic itself would warrant a full analysis —the role of institutions, both international and democratic, deserves at least a mention. Not only because they form the foundations of what we know as society, but also to reflect on their functionality and effectiveness: are they truly necessary? Should they be modified? On the international side, it is clear that they seem outdated. UN meetings often function merely as spaces for presentations or speeches that lack real results. From its flawed composition to its limited capacity for action, one would not expect years to pass before resolving situations like the recent case in Venezuela. The United States has withdrawn from 66 UN bodies; other countries that do not participate raise the same question: what is the UN really for? Does it need restructuring? How? One might accuse Trump of violating international law regarding the legality of his action, but what can really be said? He addressed a problem in his own way, defending his nation against offenses related to drug trafficking. Which organization could realistically sanction the United States for this move when the UN itself cannot provide solutions to even larger problems? The legality of the act is debatable, but no resolution could realistically be reached; once again, we are left to consider how decisions might be made without producing confrontations in the legal realm, which, rightly or wrongly, operate within the territory of power. Other bodies, such as MERCOSUR — which recently approved its agreement with the European Union after 25 years — demonstrate that essential or basic issues can take decades to resolve. The fragility of NATO regarding Greenland further shows that even in defense organizations, rules are unclear; naturally, interests collide, which has even contributed to conflicts like that between Russia and Ukraine. What remains for these institutions in terms of power and organization if their own interpreters override them? Democracy is also called into question: how can Trump transgress the institutional legal procedures of his country to achieve his goals? Various world leaders celebrate such violations — like Emmanuel Macron, President of France — while supporting Paul Biya’s regime in Cameroon. So, what is truly being defended? What constitutes a dictatorship? What represents a breach of democracy? Rather than speaking strictly of democracy, we could refer to the concept of polyarchy, introduced by American political scientist Robert Dahl. However, even with democracy as an ideal, its meaning loses moral or practical weight when we see that major actions must occur outside institutional channels, and support shifts depending on each actor’s geopolitical convenience. Discussing democracy and international organizations invites broader analyses and alternative proposals, which must go beyond the specific case of Venezuela. But it is worth mentioning them, because they form part of the daily workings of power; although power can override them, these institutions are supposed to act as brakes, yet they lack solid foundations and rely on tools that are themselves imperfect. On the international level, we are left to rethink the role of institutions: do they genuinely act as participants in the system, or are they merely observers with minimal influence? The unfolding of events will show how they develop under the new logics of a multipolar world and how the geopolitical board is configured. Are we witnessing a new paradigm? Should this be understood as an isolated case, or merely as the result of Trump’s actions? Surely Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin also have their national security ambitions. Outcomes like the conflict in Russia and Ukraine, Middle East tensions, and the fragile or developing institutions in Africa are the key areas to monitor this year. What happened in Venezuela demonstrates that international affairs affect us closely; we are not far removed from these events and must attempt to understand them. The new dynamics of power present different scenarios, which we may never fully know, but one thing is clear: despite everything, history and decisions are ultimately grounded in a single reality —power.

I. Introduction Relations between Japan and China entered a state of crisis on November 7th, 2025, after Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan potentially constituted an “existential crisis” under the Legislation for Peace and Security, allowing Japan to take military action in collective self-defense [1]. Following Takaichi’s remarks, the Chinese general consul in Osaka, Xue Jian, made threatening comments against Takaichi on X, triggering a diplomatic row between the two countries. Both sides protested the other’s remarks. In response to questions from the members of Japanese parliament, Takaichi refused to withdraw her remarks, claiming that they were consistent with the Japanese government’s existing position on the issue. Japan requested that China take “appropriate measures” against Xue. China refused the Japanese request and instead demanded Takaichi retract her statements. Then the Chinese government issued numerous retaliatory measures against Japan, including restricting travel and cultural exchanges, issuing a travel advisory, and cutting off seafood imports from the country. Moreover, On November 15th, the China Maritime Safety Administration announced that the People’s Liberation Army would conduct live-fire exercises in the central Yellow Sea from November 17th to 19th, and that navigation in this area would be prohibited during this period. The notice drew criticism from Taiwan, which accused China of saber-rattling in Japan for political gain [2]. On November 16th, the China Coast Guard announced that a formation of its ships carried out a patrol within the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, a territory disputed between Japan, China, and Taiwan. On December 2nd, Chinese and Japanese coastguard vessels engaged in a standoff over the islands. China said that it had implemented “necessary control measures” and driven a Japanese fishing boat away from the islands. On the other hand, Japan stated that it had intercepted and driven away two Chinese coastguard vessels, which approached the Japanese fishing boat. [3] From December 6th to 7th, Chinese Liaoning aircraft carrier transited through the Miyako Strait between the islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and began takeoff and landing drills with Shenyang J-15 jets; aircraft took off from and landed on the aircraft carrier roughly 100 times in two days. [4] On December 7th, Japanese defense minister Shinjirō Koizumi accused China of two incidents on December 6th in which Shenyang J-15 jets from the Liaoning aircraft carrier at locking their fire-control radar at Japanese F-15 jets near the Miyako Strait. The Japanese government strongly protested to China. Takaichi also called the incident “extremely disappointing.” Japanese vice foreign minister Takehiro Funakoshi summoned Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao over the incident. [5] In response, the PLA Navy spokesperson Wang Xuemeng accused Japan of a “slander and smear campaign,” saying that the Liaoning was carrying “routine carrier-based fighter jet flight training. [6]” In addition, he said that Japan Self-Defense Forces' aircraft had repeatedly approached and disrupted its fighter jet training. Japanese officials later said that their Chinese counterparts didn’t answer the hot line during the incident. Japanese defense minister Koizumi also said that while notified, Japan “did not receive sufficient information” regarding the military exercises, while Kihara said Japanese jets were far away from the Chinese jets while training. [7] The US criticized the radar targeting of Japanese aircraft and strengthened the US alliance with Japan. A US State Department spokesperson also said that “China’s actions do not contribute to regional peace and stability.” [8] The Liaoning aircraft carrier group traveled northeast from their position east of Kikai Island following the incident. A Chinese naval Type 054 frigate also sailed through the Miyako Strait on December 8th, while another traveled through the Osumi Strait. On December 9th, two Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers, four Chinese Shenyang J-16 fighter jets, and two Chinese Xi’an H-6 bombers flew through the Miyako Strait into the Pacific Ocean as part of joint military drills. On December 10th, two US B-52 bombers flew together with three Japanese F-15 jets and three F-35 jets. The Japanese defense ministry said that the US and Japan “reaffirmed their strong resolve to prevent any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force.” [9] With this recent tension between China and Japan in the background, this paper explores the impacts of the China-Japan conflict on the global economy. This paper first explains major conflicts between China and Japan in the past and then examines the effects of the China-Japan conflict on the global economy. II. Past Conflicts between China and Japan The First Sino-Japanese War The First Sino-Japanese War (July 25th, 1894 – April 17th, 1895) was a conflict between the Qing dynasty of China and the Empire of Japan primarily for influence over Korea. [10] After more than six months of unbroken successes by Japanese naval and land forces and the loss of the ports of Lüshunkou (Port Arthur) and Weihaiwei, the Qing government sued for peace in February 1895 and signed the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan two months later, thereby ending the war. In the late 19th century, Korea remained one of the Qing tributary states, while Japan viewed Korea as a target of imperial expansion. In June 1894, the Qing government, at the request of the Korean emperor Gojong, sent 2,800 troops to aid in suppressing the Donghak Peasant Revolution. The Japanese government considered this a violation of the 1885 Convention of Tientsin and sent an expeditionary force of 8,000 troops to Korea. The Japanese force landed in Incheon. The Japanese army moved to Seoul, seized the Korean emperor, and set up a pro-Japanese government on July 23rd, 1894 in the occupation of Gyeongbokgung. The Qing government decided to withdraw its troops, but rejected recognition of the pro-Japanese government, which had granted the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Qing’s Huai Army from Korea. However, approximately 3,000 Qing troops remained in Korea, and could be supplied only by sea; on July 25th, the Japanese Navy won the Battle of Pungdo over the Qing navy and sank the Qing’s steamer Kowshing, which was carrying 1,200 Qing reinforcements. Japan declared war against the Qing on August 1st. Following the Battle of Pyongyang on September 15th, Qing troops retreated to Manchuria, allowing the Japanese army to take over Korea. Two days later, the Qing’s Beiyang Fleet suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of the Yalu River, with its surviving ships retreating to Port Arthur. In October 1894, the Japanese army invaded Manchuria, and captured Port Arthur on November 21st. Then Japan captured Weihaiwei on the Shandong Peninsula on February 12th, 1895. This gave the Japanese army control over the approaches to Beijing, and the Qing court began to negotiate with Japan in early March. The war concluded with the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17th, which required the Qing government to pay a massive indemnity and to cede the island of Taiwan to Japan. Japan gained a predominant position in the Korean peninsula. The war demonstrated the failure of the Qing dynasty’s attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats to its sovereignty, especially when compared with Japan’s successful Meiji Restoration. For the first time, regional hegemony in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; the prestige of the Qing dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow. [11] Inside China, the defeat was a catalyst for a series of political upheavals led by Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei, culminating in the 1911 Revolution and ultimate end of the Qing dynasty in China. The Second Sino-Japanese War The Second Sino-Japanese War was fought between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China and between 1937 and 1945, after a period of war localized to Manchuria that started in 1931. [12] It was the largest war in Asia in the 20th century. [13] On September 18th, 1931, the Japanese staged the Mukden incident, a false flag event fabricated to justify their invasion of Manchuria and establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. This is sometimes marked as the beginning of the war between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. From 1931 to 1937, China and Japan engaged in skirmishes, including Shanghai, as well as in Northern China. The military forces of Nationalist and Chinese Communist Party, led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong respectively, had fought each other in the Chinese Civil War since 1927. In late 1933, Chiang Kai-shek encircled the Chinese Communists in an attempt to finally destroy them, forcing the Communists into the Long March. The Communists lost almost 90% of their men. Although a Japanese invasion became imminent, Chiang still refused to form a united front with the Communists before he was placed under house arrest by his subordinates who forced him to form the Second United Front in late 1936 in order to resist the Japanese invasion together. [14] The full-scale war started on July 7th, 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge incident near Beijing, which prompted a full-scale Japanese invasion of the rest of China. The Japanese army captured the capital of Nanjing in 1937 and perpetrated the Nanjing Massacre. After failing to stop the Japanese capture of Wuhan (China’s de facto capital at that time) in 1938, the Nationalist government relocated to Chongqing in the Chinese interior. After the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Soviet aid bolstered the National Revolutionary Army and Air Force. By 1939, after Chinese victories at Changsha and with Japan’s lines of communications stretched deep into the interior, the war reached a stalemate. The Japanese forces could not defeat the Communist forces in Shaanxi, who waged a campaign of sabotage and guerrilla warfare. In November 1939, Nationalist forces carried out a large-scale winter offensive, and in August 1940, Communist forces launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive in central China. In April 1941, Soviet aid was halted with the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact. [15] In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and declared war on the US. The US increased its aid to China under the Lend-Lease Act, becoming its main financial and military supporter. With Burma cut off, the US Air Forces airlifted material over the Himalayas. In 1944, Japan launched Operation Ichi-Go, the invasion of Henan and Changsha. In 1945, the Chinese Expeditionary Force resumed its advance in Burma and completed the Ledo Road linking India to China. China launched large counter-offensives in South China, repulsed a failed Japanese invasion of West Hunan, and recaptured Japanese occupied regions of Guangxi. [16] Japan surrendered on September 2nd, 1945, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US, Soviet declaration of war against Japan and subsequent invasions of Manchukuo and Korea. The war resulted in the deaths of approximately 20 million Chinese. China was recognized as one of the Big Four Allied powers in World War II and one of the “Four Policemen,” which formed the foundation of the UN. [17] It regained all lost territories and became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946, ending with a communist victory and the Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The government of the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan. Senkaku Islands Dispute September 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision The Senkaku boat collision incident occurred on the morning of September 7th, 2010, when a Chinese trawler (Minjinyu 5179) collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands. The Senkaku Islands are a group of five uninhabited islands and three islets located in the East China Sea, which are under the administrative control of Japan, but also claimed by China and Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands have both economic and military value. There are rich fishing grounds in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding the Senkaku islands, as well as significant oil and gas deposits. The islands are also of great geostrategic value, facilitating control over the East China Sea. [18] The Senkaku Islands are claimed by Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). [19] In 2008 a sports fishing boat from Taiwan, Lien Ho, was rammed and sunk by Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships which led to an official apology and monetary compensation of NT$10 million paid by Japan. Multiple events involving Japanese Coast Guard and fishing boats from nearby Chinese provinces and Taiwan have occurred since 1972. From 2005 to the 2010 incident, however, bilateral relations between Japan and China had been positive.  [20] According to the Japanese Coast Guard, the patrol boat Mizuki of the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters encountered Minjinyu 5179 at around 10:15 (JST) on September 7th, 2010. Mizuki ordered Minjinyu 5179 to stop for inspection since Minjinyu 5179 was traveling 12 km (7.5 mi) north-west of the Senkaku Islands, which is outside the agreed area for Chinese fishing, and within disputed Japanese territorial waters. Minjinyu 5179 refused to follow the order and attempted to flee from the scene. During the chase and interception, Minjinyu 5179 collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessels. On September 8th, 2010, Japanese Coast Guard boarded the Chinese trawler and arrested its captain for obstruction of performance of public duty and illegal fishing. [21] The trawler, the captain, and 14 crew members were transported to Ishigaki Island of Japan for detention. A Japanese investigator told the press that he smelled alcohol on the arrested captain but apparently no alcohol test results were ever released. The collision and Japan’s subsequent detention of the captain, Zhan Qixiong resulted in a major diplomatic dispute between Japan and China. When China’s repeated demands for the release of the captain were refused and his detention extended for ten more days, the Chinese government canceled official meetings of the ministerial level and above. [22] In response to the arrest, the Chinese government made a series of diplomatic protests, demanding the immediate release of the trawler and all its crew. China summoned Uichiro Niwa, the Japanese ambassador to China in Beijing, six times, each time with an official of higher diplomatic rank, on one occasion after midnight. Moreover, China initiated a series of escalatory measures, including rhetorical threats, encouraging popular protests across China, the arrest of four Japanese citizens in China for allegedly photographing military targets and the implementation of an unofficial embargo on Rare Earth Elements (REE). These measures were implemented with various degrees of ambiguity and designed to exploit a number of Japanese vulnerabilities – including the Japanese government’s weakened domestic position and the Japanese economy’s high dependency on Chinese REE exports. [23] In the short-term, China attempted to force Japan to release the detained trawler captain immediately. In the long-term, however, China tried to demonstrate its ability to use a strong economic instrument which could be used as deterrent, and as coercive measure. The detained Chinese crew members were released without charge and were allowed to return home. In China, the overall event is perceived as a diplomatic victory, while the Japanese government’s “weak-kneed” handling of the issue was criticized in Japan, in particular by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. [24] One hundred Japanese conservative lawmakers signed a letter criticizing the release of the Chinese captain, and Japanese citizens took to the street to protest both China’s behavior and the “weakness” of the Japanese government. Video footage proving the deliberate nature of the boat ramming was only shown to Japanese lawmakers in a closed screening, but not released to the wider public, likely out of fear of further diplomatic clashes with China. The footage was eventually leaked online and led to increased criticism of the Japanese government for keeping details of the incident from the public. The crisis was resolved by the end of November 2010 when diplomatic dialogue between Japan and China was fully restored, and a significant de-escalation of measures took place. September 2012 Japanese Government’s Island Purchase The Senkaku Islands dispute in September 2012 was a major flare-up between Japan and China, triggered by Japan‘s purchase (from private owners) and nationalization of three of the uninhabited islands, which China claims as its territory. In April 2012, the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, a right-wing nationalist, announced a plan for his municipal government to purchase three of the islands (Uotsuri, Minamikojima, and Kitakojima) from their private owner and build on them in order to assert Japanese sovereignty. In August 2012, Chinese activists from Hong Kong briefly landed on the islands, triggering a visit by Japanese activists in response. In September 2012, the Japanese government completed the purchase of the three islands from a private Japanese owner. This action triggered massive anti-Japanese protests across China, disruptions to Japanese businesses, boycotts of Japanese products, and increased patrols by Chinese vessels near the islands, thereby escalating tensions between China and Japan over sovereignty. This action also impacted trade between the two countries and tested the US-Japan security alliance. Consequences of the conflict were as follows: First, the dispute intensified nationalist feelings in both China and Japan, with demonstrations occurring in more than 100 Chinese cities, coinciding with the anniversary of the Mukden Incident. The Japanese embassy in Beijing was attacked. Major Japanese companies temporarily shut their factories and offices in China. Two more Japanese activists landed briefly on the islands. Secondly, Chinese Boycotts and business disruptions hit Japanese companies like Panasonic, Honda, and Canon, with significant drops in Japanese car sales and exports to China. Third, in response to Japan’s purchase of the three islands, China sent patrol boats to the area, challenging Japan’s administration and marking a new, more confrontational status quo. Later six Chinese ships sailed into the waters around the islands, staying for a short period of time to assert China’s territorial claim. Chinese maritime surveillance vessels made 12 forays into the waters close to the Islands after Japan bought the three islands in September 2012. Japan increased the number of coastguard vessels patrolling the island from three to thirty. Moreover, in December 2012, a Chinese maritime surveillance plane flied over the islands for the first time. Japan responded by scrambling eight F-15 fighter jets. The incident demonstrated that the dangers of an armed clash existed not only at sea, but also in the air. The dispute wasn’t resolved; instead, it marked a significant escalation, with Japan solidifying its de facto administrative control and China increasing its assertive presence. Fourth, since 2012, China has maintained a daily presence with its coast guard vessels near the islands, thereby creating the situations of confrontation with the Japanese navy. III. The Economic Effects of Conflicts between China and Japan 1. Evolution of China-Japan Conflict It is hard to predict what effects China-Japan conflicts will have on global economy, as well as the economy of both countries. Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies at University of Cambridge carried out research on this issue in June 2014 after Japanese government purchased three of the uninhabited Senkaku islands and then the conflict between China and Japan took place in September 2012. Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies categorizes China-Japan Conflict as a magnitude 3 conflict. Table 1: Magnitude scale of conflict (source: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies) Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies provided three scenario for the China-Japan Conflict (S1, S2, and X1). Standard Scenario S1 consists of 9 months of conflict before stalemate occurs and intervention enables peace to be concluded. Scenario Variant S2 is similar to the standard scenario, but the conflict period lasts for 2 years, with trade disruption continuing for a further 3 years. An important aspect of the macroeconomic consequences is the duration of the disruption to international trade. Phase 4 in the scenario is prolonged, with double the economic losses and around 250,000 people dead. Scenario Variant X1 (Extreme 1) is the most severe variant considered in the impact analysis. Conventional weapons are still preferred but the conflict lasts more than 5 years, thereby causing over 3 times the losses and nearly 500,000 deaths. Such a variant plunges the whole world into a three-year recession after 90% of export trade is lost. According to Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, the China-Japan Conflict evolves through Phase 1 through 7. Phase 1: escalating tensions Diplomatic posturing, Naval maneuvers, and large-scale war-games have defined recent tensions between Japan and China. Amid military modernization, increased Chinese nationalism, the legacy of conflict (Sino-Japanese wars) and an extreme thirst for natural resources, Japan and China have continued to clash over the Senkaku Islands. As Japan imports 90% of its energy, it is eager to maintain an open and free flow of maritime trade, but despite bilateral trade reaching US$ 345 billion, China has pursued a more assertive position, fueled by nationalism and a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment. [25] Since Japan’s nationalization of three of the disputed Senkaku islands in 2012, China has increased the frequency and scale of incursions. For example, Chinese aircraft have entered the disputed airspace, and Chinese frigates have engaged Japanese destroyers. Tensions have reached their highest level since the end of World War II in 1945. In a show of self-determination, Japan’s Diet (parliament) passed new laws that repealed limitations of the Constitution on use of military force to settle international disputes. There is a growing concern that the situation in the East China Sea will soon escalate beyond the disputes in the South China Sea, where the Chinese navy attacked commercial Vietnamese vessels over proximity to the Spratly Islands. [26] A Japanese fishing vessel is fired upon after straying into Chinese waters. Although the crew of the damaged boat are returned safely, angry diplomatic exchanges begin from the highest levels of both Japanese and Chinese governments. Japan acknowledges the error of the fishing boat and promises immediate action to prevent further incidents. [27] Although tight-lipped at first, details emerge that the Japanese government deployed naval engineers to install radar equipment on the disputed Senkaku islands to ‘help ships and boats navigate the area safely.’ The Chinese government and state-run media react angrily to the news, stating that the objective of ‘preventing marine accidents’ is a ‘thinly veiled attempt to disguise a notorious, unlawful and dangerous attempt to claim Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku islands.’ Phase 2: provocation and posturing Stocks tied to Japanese businesses suffer heavy losses on Chinese stock markets as tensions between Japan and China increased amid uncertainty over the Chinese response. Although expected to call for a UN Security Council meeting, the Chinese government bypass diplomatic protocols and issue a public condemnation and ultimatum, demanding that Japan remove immediately the radar and personnel within 72 hours. Failure to do so, the statement from the Chinese government continues, is considered “an unacceptable act of aggression against Chinese sovereignty.” Despite international calls for calm action and volatility in global stock markets, Japan refuses to remove the radar equipment, reiterating their “honest and responsible intent to protect all in the East China Sea.” After 24 hours, China orders an immediate cessation of all trade import agreements with Japan. China also issues a travel advisory, warning all Chinese citizens to leave Japan immediately. The US and several EU countries urge calm. The Dow Jones and FTSE100 are among many global markets that suffer heavy losses on fear of war and the implications for long-term economic growth. The world waits anxiously for the deadline. Rumors of negotiations excite the press and prop up the markets but the sudden and conspicuously coordinated departure of all non-essential personnel from the Chinese embassies and consulates in Japan creates widespread pessimism. Many international operations decide to withdraw executives from their offices in key cities in the region. Phase 3: military incidents Seventy-two hours after the ultimatum, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Lanzhou-class destroyer launches a C-602 cruise missile against the radar installation on the disputed islands. The missile destroys the radar along with a naval transportation unit, killing 18 members of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The Western countries condemn the Chinese missile attack with UK, US, and France calling an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council. Japanese citizens are outraged. The Japanese government publicly promises retaliation against China. The US government urges restraint on Japan and warns that any proactive Japanese actions to provoke China could compromise US ability to support them in future actions. Stock markets plunge as fear of war sets in, with commodity prices, in particular oil, increasing significantly. The following evening two Japanese Mitsubishi F2 fighter planes from Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka, armed with ASM-2 anti-ship missiles, destroy the Chinese ship responsible for the missile attack on Senkaku Islands. China state news agencies report 37 Chinese sailors killed in the attack, with the destroyer afloat in open water but damaged beyond repair. Protestors in China take to the streets, criticizing Japan’s attacks. Japanese citizens are jubilant, with nationalistic media coverage. The wider international community condemns the retaliation act. China instigates a full blockade of Japanese vessels traveling through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, while promising safe passage for all non-Japan bound ships; China closes its airspace to airplanes coming to or from Japan. Japan reacts similarly, restricting movement of Chinese ships and airplanes. To prevent any attempt on the part of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force to access the islands, Chinese PLAN enacts a familiar mine warfare strategy to block access. The ‘Elfreida’, a commercial US$200m Ultra Large Container Vessel traveling from Busan in South Korea to Singapore, is lost at sea along with nearly 15,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) of cargo. Although the cause is not confirmed, speculation mounts that the ship struck a Chinese mine that had drifted into open water. Japan is quick to label it as another Chinese act of recklessness, while China blames a Japanese submarine attack for the disaster. Amid the high level of tension, another civilian disaster occurs as a commercial aircraft carrying 400 passengers disappears. A 747-400 heading from Beijing to Sydney disappears from the radar over the East China Sea. Accident investigators cannot determine whether it was destroyed in an act of war. Aside from the human cost, insurance claims are expected of up to a billion dollars. The US, Australia, and India create a total blockade of the East China Sea. Ships traveling from Japan are forced to travel south of the Philippines, thereby increasing journey times by over 30%. South Korea’s trade routes with Asia and Europe are also severely affected, however, as it is summer, trade with Europe suffer less, as they can use Arctic-shipping lanes and actually reduce shipping times by almost one week. China’s imports and exports are hit hardest. Their cross-Pacific journeys are rendered almost impossible, severely hampering trade and diplomatic relations with the US. [28] Chinese citizens take to the streets in protest. Although protests are generally anti-Western, they focus on anti-Japanese protests. Japanese businesses are ransacked and burned, and Japanese commercially branded products destroyed on the street. A Japanese factory in Shanghai is stormed by an angry mob, killing Japanese managers. Dozens more Japanese workers are taken hostage by Chinese protestors. Phase 4: all-out conflict Japan’s Special Forces mount a clandestine operation to rescue the Shanghai hostages, bringing commandoes ashore and into the factory compound in central Shanghai, undetected by Chinese defense forces. The clandestine operation successfully extracts the Japanese hostages, and the Japanese Special Forces escape before the Chinese army react, but several Chinese protestors are killed. China responds with a subtle but devastating act. A cyber attack shuts down Japan’s Futtsu Power station, near Tokyo, the second largest gas power station in the world and key provider of energy to the Keihin and Keiyo Industrial Zones (the largest industrial region in Japan). The attack cripples Japan’s industrial sector and denies power to military bases in the region. Power shortages restrict industries to three-day weeks as Japan starves for energy. At the same time, Washington D.C. suffers a mysterious but temporary power outage. Despite China denying responsibility for computerized hacking of the US power grid, military commentators interpret it as ‘virtual shot across the bow’, to warn the US away from military intervention in the China-Japan conflict. Trading is suspended on global stock markets as fear of a world war triggers sharp falls. Panic strikes Japan as people begin to evacuate the major cities in Japan. Many foreign nationals have already left but those who remain struggle to find ways to exit Japan. A full diplomatic effort is launched to remove citizens from both China and Japan. Foreign governments provide a constant stream of flights to India, Singapore and Australia as fear of escalation spreads. After a short period of relative calm, Japan carries out a pre-dawn air strike against mainland China. Ship-launched cruise missiles and aircraft-launched air-to-ground missiles target the military bases and radar stations around Shanghai, Beijing, and the Hong Kong - Guanghzou region. It is the start of a major period of offensive action by Japanese military forces, which continues for nearly three months of nightly bombing. As the anti-aircraft defenses around the cities in China are degraded, air raids are launched targeting the major industrial and commercial centers, in a concerted action of strategic bombing to reduce the economic power of China and change the strategic balance of military power and global influence in the region after the conflict. Assembly plants, office buildings, factories, ports, trucking and rail facilities are destroyed in concerted waves, night after night. Chinese air defense is fierce, and Japanese aircraft suffer heavy losses. Despite the night timing of the attacks, and air raid warnings, tens of thousands of Chinese workers are reported killed in the first few weeks. The death toll mounts over the coming months. China’s retaliation is swift; carrying out similar airstrikes against industrial and commercial sites in Japan’s Sendai region, and commencing an intensive bombing campaign of Japan’s power plants, liquid petroleum gas plants and shipping terminals. Japan’s already restricted energy supply is further damaged, and China’s strategy is now to cripple Japan’s economic infrastructure and to place pressure on the Japanese government to back down. China launches waves of missile attacks against industrial sites in the Tokyo-Yokohama region. In addition to tens of thousands of casualties, Japan’s industrial capacity suffers severe damage. Phase 5: stalemate The hostilities between Japan and China provokes global condemnation and the international community suffers economically from the fallout of the war, but for some period of time nobody can prevent the conflict from continuing. China’s membership of the UN Security Council is suspended. The UN Security Council calls for an immediate ceasefire and de-militarization of the area, but is unable to get agreement to mandate trading sanctions against the belligerent nations. Shipping of gas and oil supplies to both Japan and China are severely curtailed and energy reserves in both countries are reported running low, but critically so in Japan. The US declares that it is not prepared to let the Japanese citizens run out of fuel, and soon will provide Japan with the gas and oil supplies it needs. Japan agrees to suspend military attacks against China. A US shipping convoy of oil tankers heads for Japan, and the US demands that China withdraws its naval blockade around Japan to let it pass. Aircraft carriers and supporting ships from the US Pacific fleet move into tactical positions around the South China Sea. The implication is clear. The US can not allow Japan to lose the conflict and now prepare to intervene militarily if necessary. Russia protests against the US action and hints that it will make its gas and oil available to China in reciprocation, but after diplomatic pressure Russia finally aligns with the international consensus to end the China-Japan conflict. The rest of the ‘democratic security diamond’- i.e. Australia and India, as well as the UK, France, Germany, and regional actors, Vietnam and the Philippines – shows public solidarity around the initiative to end the war. For weeks the US navy and Chinese navy face off at sea, circling and withdrawing, but no shots are fired. There are no further attacks on the Japanese mainland and there is a period of stalemate between the two countries. Phase 6: negotiated peace The US, along with Russia as a partner, calls for an immediate ceasefire, the removal of the weapons on the disputed islands, and the opportunity for both China and Japan to address the UN on the issue of each country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Chinese premier and the Japanese prime minister finally meet at peace talks in Singapore. After three days of negotiations, a peace treaty is signed, thereby guaranteeing the free flow of trade through the South and East China Sea and gestures towards the reconstruction of each other’s infrastructure. Global markets respond positively. Phase 7: aftermath China agrees to the conditions that any further attack would void all agreements, and that Pacific and South China Sea shipping lanes will be opened as soon as possible so that trade with the US and Canada can begin again. Japan also agrees to the ceasefire and to the US and Russia’s role in negotiating trade relations with China and restoring most of the US$ 345 billion agreement. The free flow of shipping routes returns within 3 months, causing an increase in global stock markets as some normality returned. It requires a large presence and deployment of US Naval forces, at significant cost to their economy. Commodity prices began to drop within hours of the agreement. Ownership of the Senkaku islands remains disputed, but after 9 months of conflict, 100,000 deaths, and billions of dollars in losses, neither side has the political will, energy supplies, the public support, or the money to continue the conflict. 2. Examination of the Effects of China-Japan Conflict on Global Economy To model the effects of a China-Japan conflict, Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies at University of Cambridge selected a number of key indicators. Shocks were chosen based on historical precedents that would be expected to occur during a China-Japan conflict. While the conflict may last for only a few months, most of the shocks applied in the model persist and generally last for a period of one year before returning to baseline over the next several years. Several of the variables were shocked for a longer period to represent the ongoing macroeconomic effects created by conflict. The effects of conflict. on some variables were very long lasting and have very high macroeconomic inertia in the system, thereby taking several years to return to pre-disaster levels. Such an example is the effect of conflict on global trade. The modeling by Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies was carried out in 2014, but the Cambridge Centre is interested in generic results for whenever a conflict might break out in future years. Variable descriptions The three independent scenarios (S1, S2, and X1) have been modeled using the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model. Following are the variables in the model to which the shocks were applied. Table 2 provides an overview of the input (parameter) variables applied. Table 2: Input (parameter) variables in macroeconomic modeling   Inward foreign direct investment is investment in business and capital. China has significant inflows of foreign direct investment and is therefore much more affected by a conflict shock to this variable than Japan. A 40% reduction of inward foreign direct investment represents a loss of approximately US$ 100 billion per year to the Chinese economy at its peak in year 2. In Japan, this represents a loss of about US$ 2.1 billion per year at its peak in year 2. Government consumption increases during the conflict to pay for military, ammunition and additional resources required for conflict. China spent 2% (US$ 166 billion) of GDP on defense in 2014, while Japan spent 1% (US$ 59.3 billion) of GDP on defense. In each of the three scenarios, government spending increased 7% in the first year and then returned to baseline levels by the end of the second year. This represents an increase in government spending of US$ 86 billion per year for China and US$ 70 billion per year for Japan. Exports and imports account for a significant share of GDP for both Japan and China. In China, exports account for 26% of GDP and in Japan, exports account for 18%. One of the largest economic effects that will occur as a result of this conflict will result from exports and imports being prevented to entering the East China Sea. Exports and imports are both shocked simultaneously and equally in each scenario. The peak of the shock to exports and imports occurs at the outbreak of conflict but takes a further six years to recover to pre-conflict levels. Capital destruction is defined as capital that can no longer be used as a productive resource and is an expected but unfortunate consequence of conflict. A declining capital base therefore has very serious consequences for economic growth and output. The level of capital destruction increases in each of the three scenarios from 2% of the capital stock in S1, 5% in S2 and 10% in X1. Share (stock) prices capture the market valuation of firms within an economy and incorporate the assets into a firm’s books and the expected value of future revenue and profit. Share prices therefore capture the level of confidence that the market has in the future profitability of a firm. Any firm that operates in a country that is in conflict will face increasing risks to its normal business operation and long-term strategic objectives. Increased uncertainty about future growth will have significant downward pressure on the market valuation of firms that operate in these areas. Share prices have been shocked 2% in S1, 5% in S2 and 10% in S3 compared to the baseline. Share prices are also expected to decline in other parts of the world as future global expectations are amended downward. These effects are modeled directly on neighboring Asian countries and the US stock market. In all three scenarios, however, share prices return to baseline by the end of second year after the conflict began. Capital flight occurs when assets and money rapidly move out of a country or region. Capital flight is most likely to occur when investment and business outlooks are uncertain, and investments are placed at risk. In Japan, capital flight is modeled as a devaluation of its exchange rate benchmarked against the US dollar. A 10% devaluation of the Japanese currency takes place in S1, 15% in S2 and 50% in X1. Modeling capital flight from China is more problematic. China has strict controls on capital, and the Yuan does not float on international currency markets. As a result, the exchange rate in China is fixed at present levels across all scenarios. Capital flight from China is therefore indirectly captured through a decline in investment funded by loans. This is represented by a shock of 40% in S1, 60% in S2 and 80% in X1 with recovery back to baseline projections taking six years. World oil prices typically rise during conflict due to increased demand for energy and heightened uncertainty around supply. This is modeled as a 20% increase in S1, 30% increase in S2 and 50% increase X1. The rise in oil prices lasts for 12 months during the conflict and then is allowed to return to base during the second year. Impact of China-Japan conflict on exports and imports A shock on exports and imports to Japan and China represents one of the most significant effects that will affect global economic output. Figures 1 and 2 show the international exports from Japan and China which are halted by the conflict. The biggest recipient of exports from Japan and China, apart from each other, is the US. Figure 1: China exports by value and type to different countries Figure 2: Japan exports by value and type to different countries. As a result of the conflict, total exports in China for the year 2 drop by 80% in the X1 scenario or approximately US$ 1.5 trillion. And for Japan exports decline by US$ 726 billion. Behind Japan and China, exports from the US are the most adversely affected international market dropping in traded value by over US$ 450 billion in the X1 scenario. Globally, the aggregate value of total exports declines by over US$ 6 trillion. A similar picture can be described for imports. Imports to the US reach a minimum in year 2 with a drop of US$ 165 billion, while the value of aggregate global imports drops by almost $4 trillion across all markets and sectors. Impact of China-Japan conflict on energy prices Brent crude spot price spikes at US$ 120 per barrel in scenario X1 and roughly US$ 110pb in each of the other two scenarios. This occurs despite downward pressure on global aggregate demand due to a decline in aggregate output, a substantial shock to global trade and a significant drop in market confidence. The biggest impact on global oil prices occurs 12 months after the conflict began with a steep decline in oil prices as the world recovers from the shock of conflict. There is then a period of two years of persistent decline in oil prices until the end of year 3. Global oil prices does not fully recover to pre-conflict levels by the end of the model period in year 7. Impact of China-Japan conflict on commodity prices A similar pattern will occur in the price of most other natural resources and commodities. Prices of raw commodities will initially rise as Japan and China increase demand for raw materials and resources in preparation for conflict. Coal, iron ore, natural gas and other rare earth metals will all spike in price as the threat of conflict looms. Once a long and protracted conflict between Japan and China looks unlikely and the international community is successful in getting the peace treaty signed, the price of natural resources will then decline rapidly as aggregate demand drops. By this point, the signs of a global recession are imminent. Aggregate demand is down, and trade between Japan and China has ceased. And market confidence will be at an all-time low. China, which was once the world’s largest exporter, struggles to attract foreign direct investment and cannot find sufficient buyers for its manufactured goods. This leads to lower demand for raw materials, which in turn leads to persistently low prices for raw commodities and resources for the next several years. Impact of China-Japan conflict on employment A drop in global aggregate demand leads to a rapid increase in unemployment caused primarily by a drop in exports and a loss in the value of share price. In both Japan and China, there is a rapid increase in unemployment as the economy adjusts in the post-conflict period between year 2 and year 7. Unemployment in Japan skyrockets after the end of the conflict and reaches a peak at 14% in year 5, 10% higher than baseline. In China, the effects of unemployment are much more acute, reaching a peak unemployment rate of 9% during the first year, 5% above baseline. Similarly, unemployment in the rest of the world is also adversely affected. Unemployment in the US reached 9.4% in year 3, 2 years after the conflict has started, 3.8% above baseline projections. Impact of China-Japan conflict on inflation Historically, one of the most devastating macroeconomic consequences in post-conflict periods is high and runaway inflation. Figure 3 shows the effects of the conflict on inflation in different countries in the scenario S1. Figure 3: Impact of the conflict on inflation in different countries, in scenario S1 In the conflict scenario, both Japan and China experience inflationary pressure and a rise in consumer prices precipitated by a combination of import inflation and cost-push inflation. Cost push inflation occurs because important resources and goods are diverted away from the real economy and used for the war effort. Manufacturing plants that once made goods for general consumption are now used to produce weapons required for conflict – this drives up the price of normal goods in the economy as there are limited supplies of alternatives. Import inflation will occur because the import of goods from international markets are blocked from coming through the South and East China Seas, with a limited supply of local substitutes, prices for these goods will also rise. In China, prices are down in line with a drop in aggregate demand, a direct result of a reduction in foreign direct investment. In the most extreme scenario X1, there is a short period of deflation in the Chinese economy, peaking at -1.5%, which is followed by increasing inflationary pressure after the conflict ends. Inflation reaches a peak at 9.6% in year 4 in the S1 scenario before declining to pre-conflict levels by year 7. In Japan, where FDI is quite small, inflationary pressure accompanies the start of the conflict. Scenario S1 peaks at 5% inflation in year 2 before going into deflation in year 6. In scenario X1, inflation reaches 20% in year 2 before plunging to negative levels (deflation) from year 5 onwards. The global economy experiences a similar pattern of inflation. During the conflict, inflation increases and reaches peaks in scenarios S2 and X1 before starting a long decline. Average global consumer prices then go down for 4 to 5 years before returning to positive growth rates from year 6. Impact of China-Japan conflict on government balance and reserves The scenario results in a significant decrease (compared to baseline) in foreign reserves for both Japan and China. In the X1 scenario, Japan and China will decrease their foreign reserve holdings by US$ 2.2 trillion and US$ 430 billion respectively when compared to baseline by year 7. In a similar way, gross government debt as a percentage of GDP will also increase. In China, the debt to GDP ratio approaches 45% in scenario X1 and a little over 30% in scenario S1 by year 7. In Japan, the debt to GDP ratio increases from 212% in year 0 to around 277% in year 7. Impact of China-Japan conflict on interest rates Interest rates are often used exogenously as a policy instrument to affect economic activity. Lowering interest rates gives the economy a boost and encourages borrowing, while raising interest rates has the effect of slowing down an economy that is overheating. In the scenario, interest rates are allowed to adjust endogenously (not through policy intervention) to reflect economic pressures that occur in the economy. For example, interest rates adjust to inflationary expectations and demand. When inflation is expected to go up in the future, borrowers need to compensate lenders for the expected drop in the value of money. Figure 4: Short-term interest rate impacts from the conflict, scenarios S1 and X1. Inflation in both Japan and China increases over the scenario period, contributing to a rise in the interest rates in both nations. Interest rates also increase because of increased risk. During and after the conflict both Japan and China experience increased exposure to risk, which places upward pressure on interest rates. Exchange rates represent the relative value of a nation’s currency and are closely correlated with a nation’s interest rates. In the scenario, Japanese exchange rates are free to adjust on currency markets, reflecting relative value of the Japanese Yen, while China controls its currency on international markets, depressing the value of the Yuan to favor its own exports. This different policy approaches to currency will result in different impacts on interest rates in both countries. In China, where exchange rates are fixed during the modeling period, short-term interest rates experience the highest increase in scenario S1, reaching a peak at a little over 12%. Because the Yuan is fixed and not allowed to devalue, the major forces acting on interest rates are dominated by inflation and the money supply. In Japan, where exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate on international markets, high interest rates are caused by an increase on the risk premium of US denominated debt and the lagged effects of the exchange rates affecting investment and consumption. In Japan, therefore, the highest interest rates will occur in scenario X1. Figure 5: Long-term interest rate impacts from the conflict, scenarios S1 and X1. As Figures 4 and 5 show, short-term interest rates increase over the medium term before steadily declining. In China, a small decline in short-term interest rates for a period of 18 to 24 months after the conflict began is caused by the drop in foreign direct investment and increase in capital flight. Short-term interest rates then start to rise above baseline projections two to three years after the conflict started due to rising inflation and an increase on the risk premium of US denominated debt. By contrast, Japan experiences an immediate increase in short- term interest rates caused by rising inflation and increased risk premiums. Interest rates in the rest of the world are represented by the US in Figure 5. Historically, UK and US interest rates behave very similarly. Short-term interest rates are shown to decrease and plateau at a little over 0% for four years after the conflict before rising again. In a similar way, long-term interest rates drop to a low of 0.5% and 1.5% in the UK and US respectively in year 6 before rising once again. Impact of China-Japan conflict on productivity and growth In all scenarios, both Japan and China go into recession in the first year of the conflict, year 1. In China, the recession lasts approximately 12 months, with negative growth reaching a peak at -10% in scenario X1 (see Figure 6). Figure 6: Result of the conflict on China GDP In Japan, the recession is much more protracted, lasting five years in scenario X1 (see Figure 7). Figure 7: Result of the conflict on Japan GDP Globally, the recession lasts 1.5 years in scenario S2 and 2 years in scenario X1 with negative growth peaking at -2%. The conflict is shown to have a significant effect in terms of lost output (see Figure 8). Figure 8: Result of the conflict on Global GDP Table 3 shows the cost of the conflict compared to baseline over a five-year period between the start of year 1 and the end of year 5 for different regional economies. It is notable that the global economic consequences of the conflict are almost as significant in the US and the EU as they are in Japan and China. Table 3: Lost output over 5 years from China-Japan Conflict scenario, ‘GDP@Risk’, US$ Trillions.   IV. Conclusion This paper examined the effects of China-Japan conflict on global economy through three scenarios. The conflict had negative effects on all aspects of global economy, including exports & imports and GDP. As the China-Japan conflict prolongs, the negative economic impacts of the conflict became bigger. Therefore, the negative economic impacts were largest in the scenario of X1. References [1] See Wikipedia, 2025 China-Japan diplomatic crisis. [2] Su, Yung-yao; Chin, Jonathan (16 November 2025). "Taipei slams Beijing for Yellow Sea live-fire drill". Taipei Times. [3] Wei, Alcott (2 December 2025). "Chinese and Japanese coastguard ships confront each other near disputed islands". South China Morning Post. [4] Kobara, Junnosuke (9 December 2025). "Japan says China didn't answer hotline during radar incident". Nikkei Asia. [5] Wang, Orange (8 December 2025). "Mid-air military stand-off triggers duelling protests in China-Japan row latest". South China Morning Post. [6] Hernández, Javier C. (7 December 2025). "Japan Says China Aimed Military Radar at Its Fighter Jets". The New York Times. [7] Murakami, Sakura; Gale, Alastair (10 December 2025). "Japan and China Remain at Odds Over Radar Use as US Weighs In". Bloomberg News. [8] Psaledakis, Daphne; Geddie, John (10 December 2025). "US backs Japan in dispute with China over radar incident". Reuters. [9] Kaneko, Kaori; Kelly, Tim (11 December 2025). "US bombers join Japanese jets in show of force after China-Russia drills, Tokyo says". Reuters. [10] Kim, Samuel S. (2006). The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. Cambridge University Press. p. 2. [11] The Defeat That Changed China's History -- Beijing Review". [12] China's War with Japan". Faculty of History, University of Oxford. Retrieved 13 July 2024. [13] Bix, Herbert P. (1992). "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility". Journal of Japanese Studies. 18 (2): 295–363. [14] Hotta, E. (25 December 2007). Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931–1945. Palgrave Macmillan. [15] See Wikipedia, the Second Sino-Japanese War [16] See Wikipedia, the Second Sino-Japanese War [17] Frank, Richard (2020). Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War: July 1937-May 1942. W. W. Norton & Company. [18] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [19] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [20] Unryu Suganuma (2000). Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations. University of Hawaii Press. [21] "High-seas collisions trigger Japan-China spat". Agence France-Presse. 7 September 2010. [22] Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. [23] Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press [24] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [25] Storey, Ian. “Japan’s Growing Angst ov er the South China Sea ”, ISEA’S Perspective, In stitute of Southeast Asian Stu ies, Singapore. [26] Kyodo News International; March 3, 2014; ‘Japan eyes revising current laws to enable collective self-defense’. [27] Senkaku air intrusion prompts radar upgrade”, December 15, 20102, Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/15/national/senkaku-air-intrusionprompts- radar-upgrade/#.Ugz9oxapBYI [28] Lim Jae-Un, Korea gains permanent observer s tatus on Arctic Council, May 21 2013, http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=108026 [29] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (http://webjapan.org/factsheet/en/pdf/02RegionsofJap.p df)

The Israel-Hamas War has calmed down. The events that preceded it – including the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel and the taking of Israeli and other hostages – and that resulted from it will be remembered for decades to come, especially the dead and wounded, the trauma and pain, the destruction of dreams and property. If there is any lesson to be learnt, it is that better ways must be found to resolve conflict. There is deep concern now that the West Bank is increasingly reaching a critical point. The weak governing structure of the Palestinian Authority, the contraction of the Palestinian economy, settler violence, and much more are causing serious distress and instability. What is preventing conditions from spiraling out of control are Israel’s strict security measures and Palestinian fear that the West Bank will turn into Gaza, even though both regions are different. Years of diplomatic inertia have been counterproductive. The status quo is untenable. Much is at stake and indecision is costly for all concerned. Why continued conflict? Israelis and Palestinians have become victims of their own exclusive national narratives and are speaking past each other. Many on each side are unable to go beyond their zero-sum mentality. They selectively highlight the rightness of their own cause, accuse the other side of bad intentions or misconduct, and fail to realize how their own rhetoric and acts cause aggravating conditions. While the obstacles in the way of progress to peace are numerous and real – power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, one state reality with Israel dominant over the Palestinians, hardening of attitudes in Israel and Palestine, relative weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps, Israeli settler radicalization, Palestinian anti-normalization stance, terrorism – these must not delay or prevent the search for opportunities and positive outcomes. In this regard, simple facts present themselves. First, Israelis and Palestinians are neighbors forever. Their present and future are intertwined whether they choose this reality or not. Second, the longer Israelis and Palestinians wait to negotiate, the more complicated the issues become and the less room there will be for an agreeable peaceful solution. Third, the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians – borders, the separation wall, security, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, water – are well-known, thoroughly debated, and resolvable. The challenge is to initiate negotiations and negotiate in good faith. Fourth, Israelis and Palestinians have proved to be both incapable and unwilling to restart negotiations on their own. The United States thus must go beyond managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to taking the lead to resolve it. It is indispensable for the promotion and sustenance of peace negotiations, as was recently shown in the diplomatic intervention to stop the Israel-Hamas War. Fifth, the inclusion of regional and international actors becomes key as peace requires assurances, follow-up, and support to take root and grow. As Gershon Baskin argues, “Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and confidence require external mechanisms to verify implementation of the agreements, to ensure compliance, and to offer external dispute resolution” (Baskin, 2025). The prerequisites for peacemaking (e.g., context and timing, leadership and political will, societal strength and resilience, process, and content and creativity) are known (Kurtzer, 2020). US diplomacy must be credible, intentional, sustained, and transformative. This comprises not only making peace a priority, but also acting accordingly. The situation on the ground must change. A realistic plan and process of peacemaking must be prioritized. Israelis and Palestinians must be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The vital policies of Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords (especially United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) and others that mediated (that is, United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey) or attended the Gaza “peace conference” in October 2025 should impel them to motivate Palestinians to make hard decisions to end conflict and reach a peaceful settlement. Israel needs to reciprocate. Circumventing the Palestinian issue or wishing it away will not advance Israel’s strategic goals, especially in the long run. Initiating unilateral moves and thinking of the Palestinian issue as a security matter only without addressing its political and territorial dimensions will not enhance Israel’s defense. If anything, they will continue to rile the Palestinians, particularly the youth among them. The two-state solution, the official United States policy since 2002, has become increasingly less viable. This is at a time when 157 out of 193 Member States of the United Nations have already recognized the State of Palestine. On July 28-30, 2025, a High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution was held at the United Nations. The conference, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, committed “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but [also] to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution” (United Nations, 2025a). Follow-up work took place on September 22, and the commitment was made to continue the implementation of the conference’s outcomes. The US’s plan (Trump, 2025) to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and to reconstruct it for the benefit of its inhabitants is a good start, and the plan’s “Phase 2” was even endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025 (United Nations, 2025b). However, resolving all aspects of the Gaza issue will take years. Meantime, it is essential for the US to take a leading role in endorsing again the two-state solution, as it is in the best national interest of Israel, Palestine, and the US. Moreover, the US can facilitate the solution by urging Israel and the Palestinians to seriously consider the idea of confederation, which adjusts or introduces important modifications to the two-state solution. While there have been more than a dozen confederation models over the years – with some specific only to Israel and Palestine and others that encompass Jordan as well – a main goal of confederation, according to the proponents of the Holy Land Confederation (me included), is not to totally separate the Palestinians from the Israelis living in the Holy Land, i.e., “divorce,” but to empower them to “cohabitate” in the two respective sovereign states (Holy Land Confederation, 2025). This cohabitation would allow for greater cooperation and movement between them. “If properly implemented, confederation would enable Palestinians to advance their search for freedom, independence, and statehood without being anti-Israel, and it would enable Israelis to have their security and wellbeing without being anti-Palestinian” (Beilin and Sarsar, 2022). The Gaza crisis must be solved. However, the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian relations must be broken as well. If past negotiations are any indication, there is middle ground between the positions of Israel and Palestine. The US possesses the vital capabilities to move both parties to take the necessary political risks by compromising and engaging in unavoidable tradeoffs on the path to peace. References - Baskin, Gershon. (2025) “Monitoring agreements and verifying implementation.” October 18, https://gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/monitoring-agreements-and-verifying. - Beilin, Yossi and Sarsar, Saliba. (2022) “Israeli-Palestinian confederation is a way forward for peace.” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696830. - Holy Land Confederation. (2025) “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution.” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_hlc. - Kurtzer, Daniel C. (2020) “The Ingredients of Palestinian-Israeli Peacemaking.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring): 5-16. - Trump, Donald J. [@RapidResponse47]. (2025, September 29). “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” X. https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494. - United Nations. (2025a) “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” July 28-30, https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025/. - United Nations. (2025b) United Nations Security Council, November 17, https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

Background (Venezuelan Presidential Crisis [2019–2023] and the 2024 Presidential Elections) Between 2019 and 2023, Venezuela experienced a political crisis centered on the legitimacy of the country’s presidency, stemming from “irregular” elections that declared Nicolás Maduro the winner. As a result, the Fourth Legislature of the Venezuelan National Assembly — controlled by the opposition — declared Maduro a usurper of the presidency and appointed Juan Guaidó as interim president under Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution (León, 2019). Subsequently, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice declared the National Assembly unconstitutional (BBC News Mundo, 2019), as well as Guaidó’s appointment, thereby triggering a political crisis that would persist until 2023. During this period, Maduro and Guaidó governed in parallel. Guaidó’s government was recognized by the United States, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and several European countries and international organizations, while Maduro’s government was recognized by Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, and South Africa, among others. Countries such as Mexico, New Zealand, India, and Indonesia remained neutral. Figure 1: Countries recognizing Guaidó’s presidential legitimacy as of February 8, 2019, during the peak year of international recognition for Guaidó. Black: Venezuela; Grey: Neutral; White: No official position; Dark green: Recognizes Guaidó; Bright green: Supports the opposition National Assembly; Red: Recognizes Maduro. By Jose001aef23 – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=76054258 Figure 2: Recognition of Venezuela’s president in 2023. Black: Venezuela; Red: Recognition of Maduro; Dark blue: Recognition of Guaidó; Light blue: Support for the Fourth National Assembly; Grey: Explicitly neutral. By ZiaLater – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=75890028 The crisis lasted for nearly four years and was marked by economic sanctions, social unrest, widespread public dissatisfaction, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a dialogue between opposition parties and the Maduro government that ultimately culminated in the signing of the Barbados Agreement. In the end, Guaidó’s interim government — despite enjoying broader international backing — failed to achieve its initially stated objectives, and the National Assembly formally dissolved it in January 2023. The Barbados Agreement (International Crisis Group, 2023) — signed in 2023 between the Venezuelan government and the opposition with the aim of guaranteeing electoral safeguards and political rights, as well as protecting national interests — paved the way for presidential elections held on July 28, 2024. However, both the outcome of the elections and the way they were conducted gave rise to allegations of irregularities and electoral fraud (Infobae, 2024; Singer, 2024; Gómez Forero, 2024; Diario Las Américas, 2024). According to the National Electoral Council (CNE), Maduro won the election with 51.95%, while Edmundo González received 43.18%. By contrast, the opposition platform Comando Con Venezuela (CCV) released results claiming González won with 67.05%, compared to 30.49% for Maduro. It is important to note that González ran as the opposition candidate after María Corina Machado, an opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was barred from participating in the election. Figure 3: Comparison of the 2024 presidential election results according to the CNE and the CCV. Source: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_presidenciales_de_Venezuela_de_2024#cite_note-:19-27 As of now, Maduro remains in power in Venezuela. González, meanwhile, is exiled in Spain and has been recognized as the winner or president-elect by Argentina, Costa Rica, Italy, Ecuador, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Israel, among others. Relations with the United States (Suspension of Relations and Current Situation) Diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela have steadily deteriorated since Hugo Chávez — who governed Venezuela with an anti-imperialist and socialist discourse — was president. From Chávez’s tenure through the 2019 presidential crisis, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Venezuela, and bilateral relations experienced periodic fluctuations. However, beginning in 2019, relations worsened significantly, culminating in a formal rupture initiated by Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro severed diplomatic ties with the United States after Donald Trump, during his first term, recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president (CNBC, 2019). Although the National Assembly later dissolved the interim government, the United States did not recognize Maduro. At present, relations between the two countries are critical. With Trump’s return to the White House, the already minimal level of interaction has shifted toward threats, warnings, and displays of power, including a military deployment described by Trump as “the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America” (Maher & Liptak, 2025). This escalation has been justified — or framed — by the Trump administration as part of an effort to protect U.S. citizens from drug flows originating in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. As part of its broader campaign against drug trafficking, Trump has also designated certain organized crime groups as terrorist organizations (The White House, 2025). Among these newly designated groups — relevant to this analysis—are the Tren de Aragua gang (Knickmeyer, 2025) and the Cartel of the Suns (Cártel de los Soles) (Wells & Blasey, 2025; InSight Crime, 2025). Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have accused Nicolás Maduro of being the leader of the Cartel of the Suns (Savage, 2025). The U.S. Department of State has even offered a reward of up to $50 million for information leading to Maduro’s arrest (U.S. Department of State, 2025). Maduro, for his part, has denied all such accusations and alleged ties. Tensions in the Caribbean The threats and actions carried out in recent months between the United States and Venezuela have culminated in an unprecedented U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean Sea. The United States has mobilized up to 15,000 troops in the region, in addition to reinforcements and personnel stationed in Puerto Rico. The arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford alongside the USS Iwo Jima, as well as warships, destroyers, submarines, fighter jets, bombers, helicopters, drones, and other military assets, has further reinforced the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea (Ellis, U.S. Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team, 2025). Alongside this military buildup, the United States launched Operation Southern Spear, aimed at deterring Venezuela and targeting alleged drug-trafficking speedboats in international waters. From the start of these attacks in early September through December 16, 2025, 25 attacks had been recorded, resulting in at least 95 deaths (Muñoz Morillo, 2025). The U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean has been supported by Trinidad and Tobago. The United States and Trinidad and Tobago have conducted joint training exercises and military drills in the region over recent months (Infobae, 2025), and Trinidad and Tobago has also agreed to allow U.S. military aircraft to transit through its airports (Rios, 2025). Venezuela responded by suspending a joint gas agreement and declaring Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, persona non grata (DW News, 2025). For its part, Venezuela has mobilized approximately 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militia members in large-scale exercises and has deployed 5,000 Igla missiles (Sliwinski, 2025). The Venezuelan government has also urged preparations for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and social destabilization to render the country ungovernable (Reuters, 2025) — a strategy that may be viewed as the most effective response given the asymmetry between the two sides. Maduro further warned that Venezuela would not become the “Gaza of South America”, while proclaiming a message of “peace, life, and love — no to hatred, no to war” (Swissinfo.ch, 2025). Maduro has likewise turned to international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as regional bodies including CELAC and ALBA, to denounce the escalation of tensions in the region. He has even called for Colombian military support in light of the critical situation in the Caribbean (El Colombiano, 2025). However, recent polarization in Latin America has been reflected in the responses. Lula (Brazil) and Petro (Colombia) have applied the strongest pressure regarding regional destabilization, while Mexico, maintaining an ambiguous neutrality, has taken a more cautious stance, emphasizing sovereignty and self-determination. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago have aligned with the U.S. position (Rivas Molina, Galarraga Gortázar, Marcial Pérez, & Esteban Lewin, 2025). Finally, outside the region, Russia (OIR-MPPCI Cojedes, 2025) — one of the main suppliers of arms and military equipment to the Bolivarian National Armed Forces — along with Iran (Sputnik, 2025) and China (Revista Economía, 2025), all allies of Venezuela, have expressed various forms of support for the South American country, though their rhetoric has focused primarily on concerns over what the U.S. military deployment and harassment could trigger in the region. War Speculation and the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine All of the above brings together the necessary elements to consider the possibility of an invasion or a declaration of war by the United States against Venezuela, and such possibilities clearly exist. However, there are key factors that, for now, would prevent the outbreak of a new war. Regardless of the logistical difficulties involved in a large-scale invasion, the United States lacks a clear casus belli to declare war. Moreover, U.S. domestic politics — particularly the opposition — are not fully convinced that an invasion would be the best course of action. Nonetheless, Trump has shaped and carried out a series of political maneuvers, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and more recently a total oil blockade (BBC News, 2025), aimed at paving the way for a potential invasion or declaration of war, though so far without success. It is important to note that most of these actions — whether justified or not — such as the designation of cartels as terrorist groups, extrajudicial attacks in international waters against alleged drug-trafficking vessels, the military deployment in the Caribbean, and the seizure of a sanctioned oil tanker (BBC News, 2025), primarily generate heightened expectations of an impending war. In addition, on December 2, 2025, the U.S. government published its National Security Strategy (The White House, 2025). Without delving into details and for the purposes of this article, the strategy seeks to maintain the United States as a global power — while acknowledging the rise of China — and to consolidate U.S. dominance over the “Western Hemisphere” by controlling the American continent, establishing a supremacy-based relationship with aligned European countries, and ensuring that neither the European Union nor any other bloc emerges as an alternative center of power (González Posso, 2025). Rare Earths, Oil, and a Possible Regime Change in Venezuela? At this point, the reasons behind the escalation of tensions between Venezuela and the United States may not appear entirely clear, although they are hardly surprising and can be understood considering the divergent worldviews held by both countries. This sequence of events — fraudulent elections, military deployments, sanctions, and economic blockades — has gradually breathed new life into a pre-existing rupture that had previously remained stagnant. However, as is often the case, there is always a broader underlying context that tends to be overlooked. Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, estimated at around 300 billion barrels, representing approximately 18% of global reserves. It also possesses substantial natural gas reserves and deposits of more than 40 types of minerals and precious stones, including iron, bauxite (aluminum), coal, gold, coltan, diamonds, nickel, zinc, and rare earth elements, among others (Blanco, Rey S., Romero, Rosendo, & Berroterán). No less significant, Venezuela ranks seventh among the world’s 17 megadiverse countries, hosting roughly 9% of global flora and fauna (Álvarez Bernard, 2022). In addition, Venezuela holds the tenth-largest freshwater reserves globally — approximately 1,233 km³ — and contains an extensive network of rivers and lakes, which are essential for agricultural and livestock activities, supported by fertile soils, as well as for electricity generation and hydroelectric power (Montoya, n.d.). Given Venezuela’s natural resource potential, it is unsurprising that the United States has sought to “recover all the oil, land, and other assets that they previously stole from us,” as Trump wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social (Trump, 2025). Trump’s remark refers to the nationalization of oil projects carried out by Hugo Chávez in 2007, which affected major U.S. oil companies ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil (Al Jazeera Staff, 2025). As for a possible regime change in Venezuela, all remains speculative. Maduro continues to hold onto power, or at least presents an image of firmness before the cameras. At the same time, speculation about a potential war or invasion places him in a precarious position, fueling rumors and theories about resignation or exile. What is clear, however, is that U.S. pressure on the Venezuelan government is real. Although Maduro and Trump held a phone call in late November in search of a diplomatic off-ramp, the demands of both sides prevented any agreement. Prior to that call, in September, Maduro sent a letter to Trump seeking to “preserve peace through dialogue” (TRT Español, 2025). One month later, according to The New York Times, Maduro reportedly offered the United States significant participation in Venezuela’s oil fields, while remaining in power — a proposal that displeased U.S. officials and led to the suspension of talks at that time (Haberman & Kurmanaev, 2025). Discussion The situation between Venezuela and the United States is highly significant from a geopolitical perspective. On one hand, the United States appears to be poised and waiting for the green light to launch a potential large-scale invasion. On the other, Maduro, through his characteristic anti-imperialist discourse, is attempting to navigate and prolong the survival of his regime. This is no minor issue. Maduro’s continued hold on power has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency, its numerous irregularities, and even electoral fraud. Nevertheless, the recent escalation of tensions with the United States has worked to his advantage, reinforcing his anti-imperialist rhetoric and strengthening his Bolivarian nationalist narrative. Unfortunately, these recent developments are more likely to further suffocate the Venezuelan population than to consolidate Maduro’s position. Regardless of the underlying causes, Venezuelans have endured years of hardship, and toying with the prospect of war is far from sensible — a reality Maduro himself has implicitly acknowledged by attempting to de-escalate tensions by any available means. However, whether driven by ambition, ideology, or sheer will to power, the simplest exit — stepping down from office — does not appear to be, nor is it likely to become, part of his plans. Thus, while Maduro projects strength domestically and repeatedly calls for peace and rejects war at public rallies, he is experiencing a level of strain whose sustainability remains uncertain. The external pressure exerted by the United States — both diplomatic and in the form of a total economic blockade — is likely, sooner or later, to yield results for Washington. It is important to recall that Venezuela has survived in recent years largely due to oil revenues. With a total blockade focused on that asset, Venezuela’s economic situation would deteriorate further, with potentially severe social and political consequences. In short, the near-term outlook is far from optimistic. As for the United States, it appears ironic and contradictory that Trump — a figure who has boasted of having “ended” seven wars and portrayed himself as a staunch advocate of peace — is now demonstrating the opposite in the Caribbean by deploying the largest naval force seen in the region in years. One could argue that a war has not yet begun and may never materialize, but the very nature of these actions and their consequences cast doubt on his credibility, not to mention the attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels in international waters. It is understandable that the deployment of the U.S. naval forces in the region may be intended as an “extreme” form of diplomatic pressure. However, this does not justify — in terms of international relations, even if it might within the framework of U.S. foreign policy — the interference in and violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. Even more concerning is that the very rhetoric so often condemned by Maduro has long been one of the primary tools used by the United States to maintain its influence and intervention in the region since the last century. Nevertheless, the erosion of this approach in the medium and long term could prove costly for the United States. At this stage, as can be observed, drug trafficking and the economic and social crisis have been relegated to the background; they function merely as pretexts. What is truly at stake are national — or personal — interests, influence, and power in a world where the more one possesses, the better. This dynamic is clearly illustrated by the recent support Venezuela has received from Russia and China, which has been largely rhetorical rather than material (Paredes, 2025), in contrast to earlier instances when their backing was direct and tangible. The current situation, although complex, could have been avoided, as its underlying causes have been developing for several years. However, it would be irresponsible to take sides. One cannot defend an “illegitimate government,” nor align with a state that has consistently undermined the sovereignty of others in pursuit of its national interests — an approach that is even explicitly embedded in its national security strategy. International condemnation should be directed at both parties, and while diplomacy should prevail, this case is ironically contradictory, as both actors have operated outside international norms. Against this backdrop, multiple questions arise: What will ultimately happen? Will Maduro step down and negotiate a “democratic” transition? Will the United States invade Venezuela and succeed in overthrowing the Maduro regime? How long will the economic blockade and attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels continue? What role will Venezuelan society play, and will the opposition be able to capitalize on this moment? What role will other countries in the region truly assume? Many questions remain unanswered, and the coming weeks are likely to bring significant developments. References Al Jazeera Staff. (17 de December de 2025). Trump aide Stephen Miller suggests Venezuelan oil belongs to US. Obtenido de Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/17/trump-aide-stephen-miller-suggests-venezuelan-oil-belongs-to-us Álvarez Bernard, D. (21 de Enero de 2022). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Ecología Verde: https://ecologiaverde.elperiodico.com/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela-3609.html BBC News. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Fuerzas de EE.UU. interceptan y confiscan un buque petrolero sancionado frente a las costas de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c14vp73mk16o BBC News. (17 de Diciembre de 2025). Trump ordena el bloqueo "total y completo" de todos los petroleros sancionados que entren y salgan de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cx2p45d0g2xo BBC News Mundo. (21 de Enero de 2019). El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela declara "inconstitucional" a la Asamblea Nacional y anula el nombramiento de Juan Guaidó como su presidente. Obtenido de BBC News Mundo: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46952641 Blanco, Á., Rey S., S., Romero, D. E., Rosendo, M., & Berroterán, Z. (s.f.). Influencia de la distribución de los recursos naturales en el desarrollo regional de Venezuela. Universidad Central de Venezuela. Facultad de Humanidades y Educación. Escuela de Geografía., 118. CNBC. (24 de January de 2019). Maduro says Venezuela is breaking relations with US, gives American diplomats 72 hours to leave country. Obtenido de CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/venezuela-president-maduro-breaks-relations-with-us-gives-american-diplomats-72-hours-to-leave-country.html Diario Las Américas. (10 de Agosto de 2024). ONG señala que el CNE omitió tres auditorías post electorales en Venezuela. Obtenido de Diario Las Américas: https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/ong-senala-que-el-cne-omitio-tres-auditorias-post-electorales-venezuela-n5361569 El Colombiano. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). Régimen de Maduro lanza llamado desesperado a Colombia en busca de apoyo militar ante tensión con EE. UU. Obtenido de El Colombiano: https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/maduro-pide-ayuda-militar-colombia-tension-ee-uu-EN31879278 Ellis, E., US Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team. (26 de November de 2025). We've tracked the US military build-up in the Caribbean. Here's what it could do. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://stories.theconversation.com/tracking-the-us-military-in-the-caribbean/ Gómez Forero, C. (30 de Julio de 2024). ¿Por qué ver estos decimales ayudaría a hablar de un fraude en Venezuela? Obtenido de El Espectador: https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/elecciones-venezuela-2024/por-que-ver-estos-decimales-nos-ayudaria-a-hablar-de-un-fraude-en-venezuela/?outputType=amp González Posso, C. (7 de Diciembre de 2025). Corolario Trump a la doctrina Monroe: I take west – O la paz por la fuerza –. Obtenido de Indepaz: https://indepaz.org.co/corolario-trump-a-la-doctrina-monroe-i-take-west-o-la-paz-por-la-fuerza/ Haberman, M., & Kurmanaev, A. (2025 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y Maduro hablaron por teléfono la semana pasada. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/28/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-maduro-llamada-venezuela.html Infobae. (30 de Julio de 2024). El burdo cálculo matemático en la información oficial que aumenta las sospechas sobre la manipulación de la elección en Venezuela. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/30/el-burdo-calculo-matematico-en-la-informacion-oficial-que-aumenta-las-sospechas-sobre-la-manipulacion-de-la-eleccion-en-venezuela/ Infobae. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago aprobó el uso de sus aeropuertos por aviones militares de Estados Unidos para combatir el narcotráfico. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2025/12/15/trinidad-y-tobago-aprobo-el-uso-de-sus-aeropuertos-por-aviones-militares-de-estados-unidos-para-combatir-el-narcotrafico/ InSight Crime. (22 de September de 2025). Cartel of the Suns. Obtenido de InSight Crime: https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile/ International Crisis Group. (20 de Octubre de 2023). Pacto en Barbados: la ruta sinuosa de Venezuela hacia comicios competitivos. Obtenido de International Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/es/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/barbados-deal-sets-venezuela-rocky-path-competitive-polls Knickmeyer, E. (19 de February de 2025). PBS News. Obtenido de Trump administration designates 8 Latin American cartels as ‘foreign terrorist organizations’: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-designates-8-latin-american-cartels-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations León, I. (11 de Enero de 2019). Efecto Cocuyo. Obtenido de Prensa de la AN rectifica comunicado que proclama a Juan Guaidó Presidente de la República: https://web.archive.org/web/20190702155934/http://efectococuyo.com/principales/prensa-de-la-an-rectifica-comunicado-que-proclama-a-juan-guaido-presidente-de-la-republica/ Maher, K., & Liptak, K. (17 de December de 2025). Trump orders ‘total and complete blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers coming to and leaving Venezuela. Obtenido de CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/16/politics/blockade-venezuela-sanctioned-oil-tankers#:~:text=%E2%80%9CVenezuela%20is%20completely%20surrounded%20by,%2C%E2%80%9D%20Trump%20said%20Tuesday%20night. Montoya, J. D. (s.f.). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Desarrollo Sustentable: https://www.desarrollosustentable.co/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela/#:~:text=Biodiversidad:%20recursos%20animales%20y%20plantas%20de%20Venezuela,-Aves%20de%20Venezuela&text=Venezuela%20es%20un%20pa%C3%ADs%20con,el%20ave%20nacional%20del%20pa%C3%ADs. Muñoz Morillo, M. (16 de Diciembre de 2025). Un nuevo ataque de EE.UU. contra 3 narcolanchas deja 8 muertos en el Pacífico. Obtenido de Euro News: https://es.euronews.com/2025/12/16/un-nuevo-ataque-de-eeuu-contra-3-narcolanchas-deja-8-muertos-en-el-pacifico Noticias DW. (25 de Noviembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago anuncia ejercicios militares con EE. UU. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/trinidad-y-tobago-anuncia-nuevos-ejercicios-militares-con-estados-unidos/a-74755359 OIR-MPPCI COJEDES. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Rusia considera “especialmente preocupante” tensión en el Caribe. Obtenido de Ciudad Cojedes: https://ciudadcojedes.com/rusia-considera-especialmente-preocupante-tension-en-el-caribe/ Paredes, N. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Por qué China y Rusia parecen haber abandonado a Nicolás Maduro en plena escalada con EE.UU. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cj97rxlw8zro República Bolivariana de Venezuela. (30 de Diciembre de 1999). Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Obtenido de https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/constitucion_venezuela.pdf Reuters. (12 de November de 2025). Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. Obtenido de Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ Revista Economía. (5 de Noviembre de 2025). China defiende su alianza con Venezuela y critica la presión militar de EE.UU. en el Caribe. Obtenido de Revista Economía: https://www.revistaeconomia.com/china-defiende-su-alianza-con-venezuela-y-critica-la-presion-militar-de-ee-uu-en-el-caribe/ Rios, M. (15 de Diciembrre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago permitirá el tránsito de aviones militares de EE.UU. por sus aeropuertos; Venezuela toma medidas. Obtenido de CNN Latinoamérica: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/12/15/latinoamerica/trinidad-y-tobago-transito-de-aviones-militares-eeuu-trax Rivas Molina, F., Galarraga Gortázar, N., Marcial Pérez, D., & Estaban Lewin, J. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). América Latina toma partido ante la amenaza de Estados Unidos a Venezuela. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2025-11-30/america-latina-toma-partido-ante-la-amenaza-de-estados-unidos-a-venezuela.html Savage, C. (18 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y compañía dicen que Maduro lidera un ‘cártel’. Esto es lo que significa. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/18/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-cartel-soles-maduro.html Singer, F. (14 de Agosto de 2024). La ONU concluye que las elecciones en Venezuela no cumplieron las medidas “de integridad y transparencia”. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2024-08-14/la-onu-concluye-que-las-elecciones-en-venezuela-no-cumplieron-las-medidas-de-integridad-y-transparencia.html Sliwinski, K. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). El aumento de tensiones en el Caribe: EE.UU. y Venezuela en medio de un complejo regional de seguridad. Obtenido de World & New World Journal: https://worldandnewworld.com/es/eeuu-venezuela-crisis-caribe/ Sputnik. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Irán expresa su apoyo a Venezuela ante las "provocaciones hostiles" de EEUU. Obtenido de Sputnik: https://noticiaslatam.lat/20251217/mapa-como-avanza-la-operacion-especial-de-rusia-en-ucrania-1126329635.html Swissinfo.ch. (15 de Noviembre de 2025). Maduro dice que Venezuela no será la Gaza de Suramérica en plena tensión con EE.UU. Obtenido de Swissinfo.ch: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/maduro-dice-que-venezuela-no-ser%C3%A1-la-gaza-de-suram%C3%A9rica-en-plena-tensi%C3%B3n-con-ee.uu./90337213 The White House. (20 de January de 2025). Designating Cartels And Other Organizations As Foreign Terrorist Organizations And Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/ The White House. (November de 2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf TRT Español. (22 de Septiembre de 2025). Carta de Maduro a Trump invita a "preservar paz con diálogo" y rechaza "fake news" de narcotráfico. Obtenido de TRT Español: https://www.trtespanol.com/article/cdae6966f705 Trump, D. (17 de December de 2025). @realDonaldTrump. Obtenido de Truth Social: https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115731908387416458 US Department of State. (7 de August de 2025). Nicolás Maduro Moros. Narcotics Rewards Program: Wanted. Obtenido de US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros Wells, I., & Blasey, L. (17 de November de 2025). US to designate Venezuela's Cartel de los Soles as terrorists. Obtenido de BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxr3w2464eo

A historic turning point in Sahelian sovereignty, as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger bolstered their regional security through a unified military force and in the same week held its second AES summit. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has taken a decisive step toward regional self-defense after officially launching a joint military force aimed at combating Islamist insurgency and terrorism across the Sahel. The force was inaugurated on December 20, 2025, during a ceremony held at an air base in Bamako, Mali’s capital. The ceremony was presided over by Mali’s Transitional President, Head of State, Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, and outgoing President of the AES, Army General Assimi Goïta. The event was the formal handover of the Unified Force of the AES banner, marking the operationalization of a long-declared commitment by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to jointly secure their territories’ sovereignty. The newly established force, known as the FU AES, brings together approximately 5,000 troops drawn from the three member states. It is designed to integrate air power, intelligence sharing, and coordinated ground operations to confront armed groups that have destabilized large parts of the Sahel for over a decade. Addressing the gathering, Malian General Aliou Boï Diarra delivered a deeply symbolic and emotional speech, underscoring the historical and moral significance of the banner. He described the banner as far more than a ceremonial object. “The standard that you are presenting to the unified AES force represents a memory, a will, an irreversible commitment. It profoundly affirms a certainty now deeply engraved in the hearts of our beloved peoples. This is indeed a truly historic and momentous act,” General Diarra said. Diarra declared that the banner embodied sacrifice and struggle rather than decoration: “This sacred standard is not merely a decorative symbol. It is the profound and enduring result of precious blood bravely shed, immense courage valiantly embraced, and fundamental truth profoundly rediscovered.” Paying tribute to the fallen, he added: “To our cherished martyrs, to all innocent civilians, and to the brave soldiers who have fallen in battle, I humbly pay a solemn and heartfelt tribute beneath the eternal snow. They did not die in vain.” Mali’s leader, General Goïta, in his own address, described the launch as a historic turning point for the Sahel. He began by saluting the defense leadership and troops of the region. “On this significant occasion, I would like to extend my sincere congratulations and profoundly salute the exceptional courage, unwavering professionalism, steadfast commitment, and resolute determination of the ministers of defense, the chiefs of general staff, and especially all the brave defense and security forces of the AES area for the remarkable achievements they have made in their relentless fight against armed terrorist groups,” he said. The AES president recalled that since the Niamey Mutual Initiative (NMI) declaration of July 6, 2024, joint military operations have already been underway, noting that they resulted in the neutralization of several terrorist leaders and the destruction of multiple insurgent sanctuaries. According to Goïta, “All these positive results were achieved thanks to meticulous planning, timely and effective intelligence sharing, and above all the comprehensive pooling of our collective efforts and resources.” He further announced key institutional steps consolidating the unified force, including the appointment of a new commander, the establishment of a central command post in the strategic city of Niamey, and the assignment of specialized battalions fully dedicated to AES operations. He stressed that the task ahead would require adaptability to the evolving tactics of armed groups. “It is now critically important for the new commander not only to anticipate the increasingly complex operating methods of terrorist groups, but above all to resolutely continue this crucial fight to secure the entire Sahel region and ensure lasting peace and stability.” General Goïta added that the conflict confronting the Sahel is multidimensional, “This war is not only military. It is also political, economic, and informational.” He identified what he described as three major threats facing Sahelian states: armed terrorist violence, economic terrorism, and media terrorism. In response, he noted that the confederation has adopted a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond battlefield operations. “We have taken measures to counter these threats not only by establishing this unified force, but also by creating AES Television, AES Radio, and AES print media,” he said, framing these platforms as tools to counter disinformation and psychological warfare. The military launch follows a series of symbolic and political moves that underline the bloc’s growing autonomy. Earlier in the year, the AES unveiled a new flag, representing the confederation’s shared identity and its intention to redefine political, economic, and security cooperation outside the shadow of French imperialism and Western neoliberal frameworks. Leaders of the bloc have repeatedly criticized past military partnerships with France and other Western powers, arguing that foreign interventions failed to bring peace while undermining national sovereignty. The AES summit Mali hosted a summit of the Alliance of Sahel States in the same week, which concluded on Tuesday, December 23. During the summit, Burkina Faso’s leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, was appointed as the new head of the Alliance of Sahel States. Following the meeting, the Alliance announced that the summit would be followed by a large-scale military operation. Earlier this year, the three countries also introduced a joint AES passport, a major step toward deeper integration. This move came after Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an organization they now openly describe as hostile. The launch of the unified force also takes place amid rising regional tensions. Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, both influential ECOWAS members, have been criticized by AES leaders and their supporters for what they see as counter revolutionary postures. In official and popular discourse within the Sahel, these countries are increasingly portrayed as attempting to contain or reverse the radical political shifts unfolding in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey. What is clear is that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are charting a new path, one that is redefining power, alliances, and resistance in the heart of West Africa.

Amidst US bombs and lies about Venezuelan drug trafficking as a pretext for regime change, the subordinated position of Caribbean states’ economies plays a role in U.S. aggression. It is no exaggeration to say that for over half a millennium, the Caribbean has been a stage for imperial incursions. In the past two months, the US has increased its military presence in the Caribbean Sea, including carrying out an airstrike campaign, while claiming that these operations are necessary to protect US citizens from illicit drug trafficking allegedly occurring off the coast of Venezuela. As of November 15th, the US military has launched eleven deadly air strikes on small boats in Caribbean waters and eleven on South America’s Pacific Coast, killing over eighty people. In these operations, the US Navy also raided a tuna fishing boat, detaining the fisherfolk on board for several hours before releasing them.[1] To date, the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it publicly executed are trafficking drugs. These extrajudicial killings have struck fear into the hearts of millions of ordinary people across the region, especially the fisherfolk who depend upon traversing the sea for their livelihoods. Meanwhile, Caribbean countries have either blatantly come out in support of the imperial violence at their doorsteps or been hesitant to respond. When these attacks began, Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) as well as Guyana expressed enthusiastic support for US militaristic incursions and extrajudicial murders.[2] As tensions escalated, the Guyanese government attempted to backpedal from its original position. However, the T&T Prime Minister, Kamla Persad Bissessar, has maintained a pro-US stance. PM Persad Bissessar is on record saying, “I have no sympathy for traffickers, the US military should kill them all violently.”[3] This position by the T&T government was reiterated even after the US murdered two of its citizens, Chad Joseph and Rishi Samaroo, in these airstrike campaigns. T&T allowed the US warship, USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, to dock in the country’s capital between October 26-30 and for US military agents to “address shared threats like transnational crime and build resilience through training, humanitarian missions, and security efforts” on T&T soil.[4] The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) - the intergovernmental regional organization - has dragged its feet to take a position, waiting a whole month on October 18, to release a presser wherein it reaffirmed the region as a “zone of peace,” with Trinidad and Tobago excepting itself from this stance. The foot dragging is sinister when it is known for a fact that the US propaganda of conducting “anti-narcotics” operations is/are a ruse. These hostile US military aggressions in the Caribbean Sea and on South America’s Pacific Coast are part of a broader US imperial geopolitical strategy aimed at toppling the government of Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro. The aim, as Trump has publicly intimated,[5] is to get the Venezuelan government to grant the US more beneficial access to Venezuela’s resources. One might ask: Why are governments, like Trinidad and Tobago, enabling US imperial terror in the region? And why have CARICOM governments not taken an unequivocal anti-imperialist position? The answer lies in the subordinated position of these states’ economies within the global economy. Caribbean states are historically structured to be neoliberal, pro-imperial, and anti-democratic – while political elites are beholden to enacting external interests. Moreover, internal political dynamics – in terms of racial and class struggles – are also a factor, influencing the timing and intensity of these Caribbean governments’ responses to present US imperial terror. Debunking the Myth of the Venezuela Narco State The first order of business is dispelling the myth that Venezuela is a ‘narco-state.’ US officials have framed the current operations — boat strikes, deployments of destroyers and aircraft — as counter-narcotics efforts designed to stem the flow of illicit drugs from Venezuela to the US. However, the Caribbean route is not among the primary conduits for major volumes of cocaine and methamphetamines into the US. Most trafficking flows of narcotics to the US are overland, through Central America and via Pacific routes.[6] It is no surprise therefore that the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it has extrajudicially murdered in the Caribbean Sea or on South America’s coast are engaged in drug trafficking. Additionally, the scale and nature of force being used are far beyond what traditional interdiction operations require – with the Trump administration claiming that interdiction has not worked, hence deadly air strikes are necessary. In addition to the lack of evidence of a Venezuelan route being key to drug trafficking into the US, there is also no credible proof linking the Maduro government to organized drug trafficking, despite the Trump regime’s claims, which are parroted uncritically by many Caribbean media and politicians. Within the US’s own intelligence establishment, one report explicitly states: “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA [Tren de Agua] and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”[7] The report goes on to say: “Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services view TDA as a security threat and operate against it in ways that make it highly unlikely the two sides would cooperate in a strategic or consistent way.” These facts stand out, especially given the evidentiary long and sordid history of the US’s leading role in drug trafficking in the Americas, and the US as the #1 supplier of weapons to those involved in the global drug trade in the region. The US government’s real motive is to destabilize and topple the Maduro government in Venezuela, in favor of a regime that undermines Venezuela’s sovereignty. Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney and many others remind us that capitalist imperialism depends upon neocolonial puppet governments occupied by a predatory elite who facilitate accumulation by extractivism, dispossession, and exploitation. Positioned to usurp Maduro in Venezuela by imposition and not elections, is 2025 Nobel “Peace” Prize winner, María Corina Machado. Machado is a key US ally, Trump admirer, supporter of Israel and its bombing of Gaza, and an overall admirer of repressive regimes in Latin America – including El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Brazil’s former president, Jair Bolsonaro. Machado has been begging for foreign military intervention in Venezuela to remove the Maduro government while professing that her administration, if granted power through non-electoral means, intends to open up Venezuela’s doors to foreign exploiters. If the current iteration of US imperial antagonism in the region leads to regime change in Venezuela, the US is poised to have control over the resources in the southern Caribbean – namely Guyana and T&T – as well as on the South American Coast: again, namely Guyana and then Venezuela. This will give the US direct control over shipping routes in the region, as it prepares for a wider economic confrontation with China. Hence, these alleged “anti-narcotics” operations which have taken the lives of over eighty Caribbean and South American people, are just a smokescreen for deeper US geopolitical interests. Dependency and the Character of the State Caribbean states are disregarding the lives of the Venezuelan, Latin American, and their own Caribbean populations using external security narratives, largely because there is a true dictatorship of foreign capital in the region. As US Vice-President JD Vance let slip, places like the Caribbean countries were always intended to remain extractive workstations, not autonomous, functioning nations.…at all.[8] T&T, for example, has long been dependent on oil and gas extraction for the bulk of its national income. However, the country has been experiencing a decline in natural gas and crude oil production over the past decade and the country’s liquefaction complex and petrochemical plants producing ammonia, methanol, and other key exports – which depend upon gas input – have been suffering.[9] Combined with the collapse in energy prices in 2014, this situation has produced a decline in foreign exchange inflows and government revenues.[10] With the demand for US dollars far outstripping the supply, T&T is facing one of the most severe foreign exchange crises in the Caribbean, causing uproar across the working, middle, and upper classes of society alike.[11] As such, the T&T government is desperate for the resuscitation of its flailing oil and gas sector. The T&T government spent decades developing a “Dragon” gas deal, where Shell would lead operations that funnel gas located in Venezuelan waters to T&T, where it can be exported as LNG. This deal, considered by the T&T state to be the lifeline that would save the local economy from collapse, has become a weapon in Washington, DC’s arsenal against Venezuela. In the midst of the extra-judicial killings in the region, the US has revoked licenses approving the deal and re-approved them under new terms meant to ensure the involvement and profits of US companies. The continued structural dependency of T&T on foreign capital and imperial markets renders its misleaders susceptible to these coercive measures to ensure that Caribbean states align with US capitalist imperialist policies. Economic coercion is an important part of the context for Kamla Persad Bissessar’s support for imperialism, but her position cannot be traced to this alone. Persad Bissessar and the educated elite and comprador class she represents come out of some of the “best” primary, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions locally and internationally. Are these elites supposed to provide independent, critical thinkers who would decolonize “post” colonial societies? Are they only unwitting agents of imperialism or are they willing participants? From the time of many states' flag independence, foreign interventions have secured for the local Caribbean elites’ (or comprador classes) party longevity and/or political dominance, and/or visas and dual citizenships, and/or the ability to accumulate wealth for themselves by exploiting the people and land within their countries. As Frantz Fanon’s “Wretched of the Earth” and Walter Rodney’s “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” detailed, these elites lack the sort of creativity and vitality to independently develop into an industrial bourgeoisie. They therefore turn to propping up foreign entities and dependent economic relations. Consequently, Caribbean state-making and the establishment of territorial statuses in the context of US and European imperialist capitalism has reproduced institutions that are unresponsive to Caribbean people. Whether through hopes of securing or acquiring foreign investment, or due to rank economic blackmail that threatens foreign investments elites through sanctions and other restrictions – many Caribbean states choose to serve US and Western imperialism as an almost “practical” strategy of economic “stability”. However, such imperial service only guarantees continued underdevelopment and economic beggary. Herein, T&T’s misleadership is positioning the country as a beggar to the US and reinforcing US sanctions on Venezuela, which makes it hard for Venezuela to sell its own oil and gas to states that need it, including T&T. Worse still, the US does not want China to remedy this situation between Venezuela and Trinidad. So not only are some Caribbean leaders and party supporters encouraging naked US imperialism cloaked in the deceptive language and rhetoric of “anti-drug trafficking” and “protecting the region,” they are also upholding a condition of dependency of the region on the US, advancing US attempts to subvert Chinese influence in the region, and in the process supporting direct attacks on states in the region’s right to self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover, local internal racial and class dynamics are also shaping the timing and intensity of Caribbean governments responses to US aggression in the region. In the post-WWII construction of party politics in T&T, middle-class parties carried forward the colonial divisions between the predominantly African and Indian segments of the population that multiracial worker movements had fought so hard to overcome. Kamla Persad Bissessar, as leader of the party popularly known as the one representing “Indian interests,” is advancing and exploiting this racial wedge to garner support for her pro-imperial policies. This party has actively engaged in criminalizing poor African communities as well as Venezuelan migrants, while downplaying the fact that the many poor and marginalized Indians are similarly caught in the net of US imperialism. Persad Bissessar and her party affiliates’ own ideas of “purity” mixed with class notions of entitlement merge with the supremacist foundations of US local and foreign politics. It’s bad enough that a Prime Minister — a lawyer — supports extra-judicial murders in violation of International Law, but how does one align with a political ideology that produced people like Senator James Reed, who, circa 1919, openly dismissed dealing with “a nigger from Liberia, a nigger from Honduras, a nigger from India…each (having) votes equal to that of the great United States.” Before one argues that this was long ago, consider what right-wing political commentator Ann Coulter told Vivek Ramaswamy why she’d never vote for him regardless of how his views match hers. We acknowledge that political leaders, seeking re-election, opt for the path of least resistance which in this case means not offending the mighty United States. But this cannot just be naïveté. It is in this context that Kamla Persad Bissessar has broken with even the basic understanding of what CARICOM is, and is astonishingly peddling the idea that each island seeking its own interest is somehow more progressive than banding together as one bloc! In other words, she and those who support her stance have embraced regional colonial divide-and-conquer tactics. The US has always stood in opposition to a unified body in the region. As then US diplomat Charles Whittaker put it: “A strongly federated West Indies might be detrimental to American interests.” As such, they undermined the West Indian Federation in the 1950s and sabotaged the New International Economic Order throughout the 1970s. The Caribbean misleaders proclaiming disunity as strength subscribe to political ideologies that interlock with a particular brand of politics in the West that has been openly Euro-nationalist and imperialist. Hence, at a time when many resource-rich countries are forming partnerships and alternative trading and security blocs, the political misleaders in the Caribbean calling for further fragmentation should warrant deeper investigation. Media, Political Misleadership, and How the State Weaponizes “Security” It is important to clarify that crime does exist in the Caribbean region, just as it exists elsewhere throughout the world. The size of Caribbean countries are also important to note, because though it is true that the amount of drugs flowing through the Caribbean are low relative to the global drug trade, the little that does pass through is indeed wreaking havoc, given the geographical and population sizes of these countries. The increase in guns and violent crime associated with the global drug trade in places like T&T has become a critical factor affecting everyday life for ordinary people there. This context has enabled the T&T government to justify and legitimate US military aggression in the name of “fighting” the drug trade in the region. Thus, most people cheering on the US military are simply desperate for a sense of safety. However, it is precisely this need for safety that is being weaponized — to increase unsafe conditions as new US-produced military weaponry and technologies become even more commonplace in the region. There is a direct and indirect connection between (geo)political and economic decisions made by successive generations of ruling elites in the Caribbean, and North American narratives of crime, which have – going back to the 19th century in some countries – allowed (and made space for) imperial aggression in the region. Over a number of decades, the United States has taken advantage of crises caused by rising violent crime to pursue its own security interests – even though rises in violent crime in the region is directly linked to US imported and manufactured weapons, and US consumer demands for items that the US state deems “illegal.” To establish and maintain US dominance — and the accompanying cheap labor[12] from the surplus populations which exist in a region notorious for high levels of unemployment and underemployment — the US has deployed constant applications of violence, packaged as maintaining “law and order” in the drive to “progress” and “catch up” with the West. It’s no coincidence that modern policing began in the Caribbean as militarized slave patrols in St Lucia.[13] Then, like now, the purpose is the same: protect wealth from the workers who created it. However, the real effectiveness lay in conditioning the exploited to adopt the values of the elites. To date, Western elite definitions of progress and development for the wider working people in the Caribbean region dominate, even as the dependent status of Caribbean economies make this impossible for the majority of the people in the region. Thus, US reliance on expanding its military apparatus for economic growth is justified through the construction of permanent threats that the US supposedly has to “defend” itself against. Another such narrative, like the need to “promote democracy” in Venezuela, is also within this vein of western imperialist propaganda. The US and western imperialists maintain that Venezuela is not a democracy, despite the presence of robust, active citizen’s assemblies and communes, as well as elections that occur under the presence of election observers – including from the US. Nonetheless, the western imperialist narrative maintains that Venezuela is not democratic and thus their people can be bombed for some purported “greater good.” Meanwhile, these same imperialist narratives call genocidal Israel a democracy deserving of “protection” and “defense,” as it exterminates Palestinians and decimates Palestinian land. This propaganda – not analysis based on any facts – readily frames western imperialism as “defensive,” “pro-security,” and “pro-safety” and those not in line with it as “aggressive” and “undemocratic.”[14] In lockstep with imperialists, local political figures too have long used or encouraged the use of dehumanizing language when discussing criminalized people and communities. When the T&T Prime Minister, Police Commissioner, and other influential authority figures refer to human beings as “carcasses,”[15] “pests,” “fleas” or “cockroaches,” the message sent is that these are not citizens or members of society and therefore, not worthy of certain basic courtesies and legal obligations, including the right to life. When this sort of thinking is widespread, issues of social justice fall by the wayside. Instead, heavy, often murderous attacks on real or alleged drug runners who come from poor, precarious, vulnerable communities become justified while the power brokers, bankers and their institutions[16] that launder money do not get so much as a paper weight dropped on them. Likewise, the local and international media is playing a significant role in the unfolding crisis. Save for a few columnists, the local media has been disgraceful, little more than sycophantic stenographers for egregious narratives coming from Washington. Initially, the local media conducted little to no critical research into the many available sources discrediting[17] false allegations connecting the Maduro administration to drug cartels. They parroted language that criminalized the victims of the attacks without presenting any evidence proving that they were guilty of violating any laws. They were silent on the voluminous literature connecting the CIA and the US military to colonial land and resource grabs that violate international and local laws.[18] They also proliferated the myth that Nicolas Maduro “lost” or “rigged” elections in Venezuela, contrary to information provided by election observers. The lack of critical and independent journalism is a clear dereliction of duty, supporting imperialist narratives and providing cover for extrajudicial murder. Conclusion The neoliberal era shortly after many states’ independence extended the life of bourgeois colonial thought in the Caribbean, interpreting the human “firstly, [as] a figure that is homo economics, and, secondly, a figure that can only operate within the field of white supremacy and capitalism.”[19] In this environment, Caribbean resistance weakened, having to establish itself alongside the intensification of neoliberal processes – foremost amongst them being state repression and militarist aggression supported by the US hegemon – so that Caribbean peoples could be definitively integrated into a Western capitalist system as “bottom labor-exporting economies,” whose labor commodification was masked by discourses on ‘growth’ and ‘development.'[20] It is in analyzing the characteristics of Caribbean states and governance within them – including how they interpret “development” – that helps us to answer why so many states elect to do imperial service: Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) states are fundamentally anti-democratic with no real regard for Caribbean life within them. The T&T government’s deliberate facilitation of US imperial aggression in the region mirrors the position of several African states. The post-genocide Tutsi-dominated regime of Paul Kagame in Rwanda, leveraging its image as a victim of colonialism and genocide, justifies domestic repression of Hutus and expansionist military ventures in neighboring states, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo in close alliance with the United States, France, and Israel. In exchange for U.S. and western military, financial, and political backing, Rwanda facilitates imperial access to Congo’s mineral wealth — coltan, gold, and tin — channeling profits both to Western capital and Rwandan elites. Thus, Rwanda functions as a pro-U.S. imperial proxy, advancing the global system of resource extraction and accumulation on behalf of Western powers. In addition, Rwanda along with a growing list of African states, including Ghana, Eswatini, and South Sudan have accepted the terms of bilateral agreements with the US government to receive people who have been criminalized and deported under the Trump regime’s attack on communities racialized as non-white in the US.[21] By enlisting themselves to be locations for the outsourcing of US racist incarceration policies, they are enabling the geographical expansion of the US military industrial prison complex to more and more corners of the world. These Caribbean and African misleaders will go down in history as active enablers and facilitators of the very imperial greed, oppression, and exploitation that the masses have been resisting since the days of direct colonial domination. Only invigorated mass resistance that takes power away from Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) elites engaged in imperial service can rectify these conditions. Global Africans in the Caribbean and around the world must claim power and reclaim movement histories that fought back against capitalist imperialism. Originally published in Pambazuka News and republished in Black Agenda Report References [1] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/venezuela-says-u-s-warship-raided-a-… [2] https://www.caribbeanlife.com/trinidad-guyana-us-moves-venezuela/ [3] https://newsday.co.tt/2025/09/03/kamla-says-kill-all-traffickers-as-tru… [4] https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/26/world/us-warship-docks-trinidad-venezeul… [5] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/17/trump-maduro-venezuela [6] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2025.ht… [7] https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U1bd-D1PIZg&pp=ygUZIGogZCB2YW5jZSBnbG9i… [9] https://www.finance.gov.tt/2020/03/16/effect-of-the-oil-price-collapse-… [10] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14271.pdf; https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/06/04/Trinidad-and-T…. [11] Chamber of Industry and Commerce 2025; University of the West Indies Campus News 2024. [12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAJgGFtF44A [13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kavkiH9YHag&pp=ygUaanVsaWFuIGdvIHBvbGlj… [14] See, for example, the Trilateral Commission’s “The Crisis of Democracy” in which influential thinkers who shaped US policy complained that decolonising countries were exercising too much democracy, which needed to be contained, leading to the proliferation of NGOs all over the peripheralized world. [15] https://trinidadexpress.com/news/local/kamla-state-resources-won-t-be-wasted/article_5d0c61fd-d633-4dd3-8e3e-6995a454c774.html [16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcpZPGOksp0 [17] https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025NationalDrugThreatA…; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [18] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/455652.Dark_Alliance; https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/1628-whiteout?srsltid=AfmBOor…; https://www.betterworldbooks.com/product/detail/the-politics-of-heroin-…; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxbW0CCuT7E [19] Bogues, Anthony. 2023. “Sylvia Wynter: Constructing Radical Caribbean Thought.” BIM: Arts for the 21st Century 11(1): 33–41, p.37. [20] Henry, Paget. 2000. “Caribbean Marxism: After the Neoliberal and Linguistic Turns.” In Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy, Africana Thought, New York: Routledge, 221-46, p.228. [21] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/more-african-nations-are-receiving-t…

1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/artificial-intelligence.html

In the 21st century, the maritime security environment in Northeast Asia is changing more rapidly than ever, with information superiority and covert operational capabilities at sea emerging as core components of national security. At the heart of this shift lies the submarine force, which possesses both strategic deterrence and surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities. As China, Japan, and North Korea advance their submarine technology, South Korea finds itself in a situation demanding independent maritime strategic assets to counter these developments. The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) submarine force, which initially relied on foreign technology, has now grown into a submarine technology powerhouse capable of indigenous design and construction. The introduction of the KSS-III Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine, in particular, has equipped South Korea with SLBM operational capability and advanced AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion) and electric propulsion technology, establishing a strategic-level submarine force.  This technological advancement not only strengthens national defense but also elevates the international status of the Korean defense industry, leading to enhanced export competitiveness. Concurrently, amidst the military expansion of surrounding countries, the need for nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)—which offer far greater strategic survivability and sustained operational capability—is being raised in South Korea. Despite the high cost, the SSN is a strategic asset that provides overwhelming stealth, range, and operational endurance in the long run.  This article will comprehensively examine the importance and technical characteristics of submarines, followed by an analysis of South Korea's submarine force development, its international standing, and comparisons with neighboring countries. Furthermore, it will explore the implications of the nuclear submarine acquisition debate for South Korea's future security strategy. 1. The Importance of Submarines  The submarine is an extremely important weapon system in the defense industry from strategic, technological, and economic perspectives.  1) Strategic Deterrence and Control: Submarines act as a strategic deterrent to covertly check the enemy's maritime activities and protect a nation's sea lines of communication and security. The strategic deterrence of a submarine is based on its 'stealth' and 'lethality'.  - Stealth (Psychological Pressure): A submarine can move and be deployed secretly underwater without being exposed to the enemy, placing psychological pressure on the enemy's maritime operations and strategic weapon deployment during peacetime. Because it is extremely difficult for an attacking enemy to predict or neutralize the submarine's location, the enemy always harbors the fear of a potential strike. - Lethality (Retaliatory Capability): If the enemy attempts an actual invasion or provocation, the submarine can conduct a sudden and precise strike with high-power weapons like torpedoes or missiles. Specifically, a Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN), equipped with strategic weapons like the SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile), provides a 'second-strike capability' to retaliate against the opponent's core targets at any time. - Maximizing Deterrence: The mere existence of strategic submarines maximizes the 'psychological deterrent effect', making the enemy's political and military leaders hesitate to initiate an attack. Due to the nature of submarines being covertly deployed anywhere in the ocean, the enemy is constantly exposed to threats, making it difficult to attempt military provocations recklessly. In essence, the core principle of strategic deterrence is the creation of a 'deterrence effect through uncertainty', combining the submarine's covert and unpredictable operational methods, its powerful striking capabilities, and the psychological fear it instills.  2) Enhancing National Defense and Economic Effects: The development of advanced submarines is central to a nation's naval power. It enhances defense self-reliance by securing indigenous design and construction technologies and promises enormous economic benefits through overseas exports. - Asymmetric Warfare Power: With its stealth and lethality, the submarine wields the most potent deterrent force and asymmetric warfare effect among all maritime forces. When surface fleet power is relatively insufficient, an advanced submarine can effectively check large enemy vessels or aircraft carriers and deny access to maritime domains. - Advanced Mission Capabilities: Advanced submarines are deployed for various missions, including long-duration submerged operations, strategic surprise, and special warfare support, utilizing cutting-edge technologies like next-generation guided missiles and sophisticated sonar/navigation systems that make detection and tracking difficult. - Increased Defense Industry Competitiveness: When advanced submarines are developed and operated with indigenous technology, it not only boosts the nation's defense industry capacity and technological self-reliance but also significantly increases related industry development and economic effects. In short, the advanced submarine is the qualitative and strategic linchpin of national naval power, encompassing defense, offense, intelligence deterrence, and the securing of cutting-edge technology. 3) Driving Advancement in Overall Defense Technology: The development of highly sophisticated weapon systems (e.g., SLBMs, advanced sonar, low-noise technology, etc.) also promotes the advancement of overall cutting-edge defense technologies. - SLBM Development: Developing SLBMs is not just missile technology; it complexly requires materials engineering to withstand the extreme pressure of the underwater launch environment, precise guidance systems, and miniaturized propulsion technology. The technology secured during this process naturally transfers to other fields, such as space launch vehicles and precision strike weapons. - Advanced Sonar Technology: The process of increasing the precision of underwater acoustic detection advances capabilities in signal processing, AI-based pattern recognition, and big data analysis. Such technology can also be utilized in civilian sectors, including marine resource exploration, underwater communication, and seismic detection systems. - Low-Noise Technology Development: The ripple effect of low-noise technology development is even greater. Vibration reduction in propulsion systems, special hull coatings, and hydrodynamic optimal design enhance the competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Propeller noise reduction technology, in particular, contributes to improving the fuel efficiency of commercial vessels and protecting the marine ecosystem. Furthermore, the process of developing these advanced technologies fosters high-level research personnel, strengthens industry-academia-research cooperation networks, and promotes the domestic production of materials, components, and equipment. Consequently, the single weapon system of a submarine has the effect of elevating the nation's overall scientific and technological capabilities to the next level. 4) High Competitiveness and International Credibility: The limited number of nations capable of manufacturing submarines ensures high competitiveness and international credibility in the global defense market. Currently, only about 12 countries are capable of independently designing and building submarines: the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, India, Japan, and South Korea. This technical rarity offers several strategic advantages. - Favorable Negotiation Power: Due to the high barrier to entry, a limited supplier market is formed, securing favorable negotiation power during exports. - Proof of Overall Defense Technology: Submarine construction capability serves as proof of comprehensive defense technology, raising the credibility of other weapon systems. South Korea, in particular, has demonstrated strengths in technology transfer and localization by successfully achieving domestic production after introducing German technology. This establishes South Korea as an attractive partner for middle-power countries that desire advanced submarines but find self-development difficult. The interest shown by nations like Indonesia and the Philippines in South Korean submarines is within this context. - Sustainable Economic Effects and Strategic Ties: Submarine projects lead to long-term follow-up businesses, including maintenance, upgrades, and crew training, ensuring sustained economic effects and strengthening strategic ties between nations. As such, the submarine is considered a core capability of the defense industry in terms of national security, industrial competitiveness, technological innovation, and economic benefits. 2. Technical Characteristics of Submarines The technical characteristics of submarines can be broadly divided into three key domains: stealth and survivability, propulsion and power systems, and weapons and combat systems. 2.1. Stealth & Survivability This is the technology area most directly tied to the fundamental purpose of submarines. In underwater environments, radar (radio-wave detection) cannot be used, so detection relies on sonar (sound-wave detection). While radar can detect surface targets from up to 500 km, sonar detection of a quiet, stealthy submarine is typically limited to around 30 km. - Acoustic Quieting Technology is essential for avoiding enemy sonar detection. Submarine noise reduction involves suppressing mechanical noise (machinery vibration), flow noise, structural vibration, and propeller noise through an integrated set of technologies. This is not just a matter of equipment but a comprehensive quieting process that spans the entire lifecycle of a submarine—from design and manufacturing to operation and maintenance. - Non-Acoustic Stealth Technology minimizes physical signatures other than sound—such as magnetic fields, heat/infrared emissions, radar/optical reflections, and surface disturbances—to prevent detection by non-acoustic sensors. Figure 1. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) sonar system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.2. Propulsion & Power System This system is key to determining a submarine's range and submerged operational endurance. It is broadly divided into conventional (non-nuclear) and nuclear propulsion. 1) Conventional Submarines (Diesel-Electric) - Diesel-Electric System: This is the traditional method where a diesel engine powers a generator to charge batteries, and an electric motor provides propulsion. It is favored for its cost-effectiveness and quietness, making it the standard for small and medium-sized submarines. However, because the diesel engine requires oxygen from the atmosphere, the submarine must periodically surface or use a snorkel, which severely limits continuous submerged endurance (to a maximum of about 3 days). Submarines equipped with the latest Lithium-ion batteries can extend this submerged time up to 7 days. - Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP): An innovative technology that produces power underwater without relying on an external oxygen supply. The main types include the Fuel Cell (PEMFC), Stirling Engine, and Closed-Cycle Diesel. AIP is used in conjunction with the diesel-electric system and significantly extends submerged endurance, often up to 3 weeks. Because it is cheaper than nuclear power while offering high strategic value, many nations have adopted it. - Hybrid Propulsion System (Cutting-Edge Technology): The integrated operation of three systems—the diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion), and Lithium-ion batteries—allows for continuous submerged operation for up to 4 weeks. South Korea's Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III) utilizes the integrated operation of these three systems: a diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP, and Lithium-ion batteries. Excluding nuclear power, the current cutting-edge technology is considered to be the Fuel Cell AIP + Lithium-ion battery hybrid system. Each propulsion system is selected based on operational range, mission sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and technological sophistication. South Korea is actively pursuing the development of next-generation submarines that combine both AIP and Lithium-ion battery technologies. However, the maximum continuous submerged endurance (up to 4 weeks) is only achievable when operating at low speeds (5–10 knots, or approx. 9–18 km/h). When operating at maximum speed (around 20 knots, or approx. 37 km/h), the battery consumption is extremely high, causing the submerged time to sharply decrease: - Older Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for only 1–2 hours. - Li-ion/AIP Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for 3–6 hours. After high-speed maneuvering, the submarine requires snorkeling for recharging, which significantly increases the risk of detection by the enemy. Figure 2. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) lithium battery system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 3. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) fuel cell AIP system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2) Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSN/SSBN) Nuclear-powered submarines use nuclear fission reactors to generate steam, which drives turbines and provides virtually unlimited propulsion. Because they do not require refueling for months, their submerged endurance and operational range are effectively unlimited, enabling them to operate anywhere in the world. Only a small group of states—including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and India—possess such submarines. Nuclear propulsion is used in both strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN: nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN: fast attack submarines powered by nuclear reactors). However, nuclear submarines are extremely expensive to build and operate, require large hull sizes (especially SSBNs), and demand sophisticated reactor noise-management technologies. Compared to conventional submarines, nuclear submarines can operate at much higher sustained speeds for long periods. Their average top speed is typically 25–30 knots (46–55 km/h), while specialized Soviet/Russian designs such as the Alfa-class have demonstrated speeds exceeding 40 knots in trials. This makes nuclear submarines more than twice as fast as most conventional submarines, with the added advantage of being able to maintain high speeds for extended durations without limitations. 2.3. Weaponry & Combat Systems This category encompasses the submarine’s offensive capabilities and intelligence-gathering functions. Submarine weapons and combat platforms can be divided into four major types: 2.3.1. Launch Weapons Launch weapons are categorized as follows: - Torpedoes: Underwater weapons fired from a submarine’s horizontal launch tubes, used to attack underwater targets such as other submarines, surface ships, and mines. - Missiles: This includes anti-ship missiles (ASM) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) designed to strike surface or land targets. Some missiles are launched through Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). - Nuclear Weapons: The primary example is the SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile), equipped with a nuclear warhead. These form the core of a nation’s strategic nuclear deterrence capability. Table 1. Types of Launch Weapons Table 2. Ballistic/Guided Missiles Table 3. Submarine-Launched Weapon Systems Figure 4. Weapon systems of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III): Torpedoes/Mines (Horizontal Launch) and Missiles (Vertical Launch) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 5. Vertical Launch System of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.2. Underwater Drones / Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV/AUV) Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are unmanned underwater platforms deployed from submarines. They can perform missions such as intelligence collection, reconnaissance, mine detection, and even underwater attacks. In the latest technology trends, AUVs serve as important auxiliary assets for submarines, used for tasks such as detecting specific targets, locating and neutralizing naval mines, and tracking enemy submarines. Figure 6. Combat Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.3. Electronic Warfare Systems A submarine’s electronic warfare (EW) systems defend against enemy detection through electronic surveillance countermeasures. By transmitting deceptive or disruptive signals, these systems help conceal the submarine’s presence and significantly enhance survivability. Capabilities such as electronic deception, electronic jamming, and counter sonar/radar measures enable the submarine to evade enemy tracking and maintain strategic advantage. In addition, electronic attack (EA) capabilities can inflict direct damage on enemy military assets by disrupting or degrading their electronic systems. 2.3.4. Naval Mines Naval mines are explosive devices used by submarines to block enemy sea routes or hinder the approach of surface vessels. Submarines can deploy underwater mines or launch them from dedicated systems, allowing them to disrupt maritime traffic and defend against the movement of hostile fleets through area denial tactics. 3. Economic Impact of Submarine Strategy Submarine capabilities are not only crucial for military security but also represent a high-value industry that generates substantial direct and indirect economic effects for the nation. 3.1. Direct Industrial Impact (Manufacturing and Employment) Submarine construction is a highly technology-intensive, large-scale project, creating significant economic effects for the shipbuilding and defense industries: • Development of high-value shipbuilding: Submarines require extremely high precision and complex construction within much tighter spaces than commercial ships. The construction process itself represents the pinnacle of shipbuilding technology, directly enhancing the competitiveness and qualitative growth of the shipbuilding industry. • Job creation: Building a single submarine involves thousands of workers over several years, from design and component production to final assembly and sea trials, creating a large number of highly skilled technical jobs. • Activation of component and partner industries: Submarines consist of numerous precision components (sonar systems, propulsion units, special alloys, batteries, etc.), which stimulates supply chains largely composed of small and medium-sized defense companies and elevates technological capabilities across the sector. 3.2. Indirect Economic Impact (Security and Exports) The existence of a submarine fleet generates invisible economic benefits and opportunities: • Reduction of national security costs: Submarines are one of the most effective tools of asymmetric deterrence — a military strategy where a country at a disadvantage in conventional forces or numbers neutralizes an adversary’s attack intentions and deters war through unique and unpredictable means. Maintaining submarine capabilities helps prevent potential economic damages in crises (trade disruptions, destruction of industrial facilities) and raises the cost of potential aggression, effectively reducing national security expenditures. • Protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs): As a highly trade-dependent nation, Korea relies critically on maritime routes. Submarines deter hostile naval forces threatening these routes during crises and protect major trade arteries, ensuring the continuity of economic activity. • Opportunities for defense exports (K-Defense): o Demonstrating Korea’s ability to independently design, build, and operate submarines (Dosan Ahn Changho-class / Jangbogo-III KSS-III) establishes technological credibility in global markets. o This capability generates high-value defense export opportunities, not only for the submarines themselves but also for related components, maintenance, and training systems (Korea has already exported submarines to Southeast Asia). In conclusion, submarine capabilities serve as a form of national security insurance while fostering domestic advanced technology industries and opening export markets, providing significant economic value as a future growth engine. 4. History of South Korea’s Submarine Forces Although the history of the Republic of Korea Navy’s submarines is relatively short, it has made significant leaps in both independent technological development and force enhancement. The following outlines the chronological development and progress of Korea’s submarine forces. Figure 7. Timeline of Submarine Acquisition and Operations of the Republic of Korea. Note: SSM: Submersible Ship Midget (small submarine), KSS: Korea Submarine System (the systematic development plan for the ROK Navy’s submarine force) 4.1. Early Stage (1975–1990): Direct Acquisition of Cosmos-class and Foundation of Submarine Forces Starting in 1975, the ROK Navy acquired seven small Italian-made Cosmos-class submarines (70-ton class) for intelligence missions and special operations, laying the foundation for Korea’s underwater capabilities. These submarines were primarily used for special operations, such as special forces infiltration, mine-laying, and intelligence gathering, rather than as conventional warships. Crew members of the Cosmos-class submarines later became key personnel in the development of the Dolphin-class indigenous submarines in the early 1980s. 4.2. Formative Stage (1983–1991): The Dolphin-class Small Submarine Era In the beginning in 1977, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) started developing a submarine modeled after Italy’s Cosmos-class. Construction took place at Tacoma Korea’s Masan Shipyard, and a total of three submarines were commissioned starting in 1983. This marked Korea’s first domestically built submarines, and the experience gained became the foundation for developing South Korea’s own underwater weapons. Based on operational results from the first submarine delivered in 1984, the second and third units were designed and built, being commissioned in 1990 and 1991, with reinforced pressure hulls and improved armament: SSM-051 1985 commissioned, 2003 decommissioned, SSM-052 1990 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned, SSM-053 1991 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned. The experience with the Dolphin-class played a critical role in advancing domestic submarine construction technology, serving as the stepping stone for the introduction and deployment of medium- to large-sized submarines. Table 4. Specifications of the Dolphin-class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) 4.3. Development Stage (1992–2006): Introduction and Localization of the Jangbogo-class (Jangbogo-I) In 1987, the ROK Navy signed a contract with the German company HDW for three Type 209 submarines (license for design acquisition), officially launching the Jangbogo-class (KSS-I) 1,200-ton program. Among these, one submarine was delivered as a complete unit from Germany in 1992, while the other two were assembled and constructed at Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering’s Okpo shipyard using imported German parts, delivered in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Subsequently, six additional submarines were built, bringing the total to nine in service by 2001. This program was not merely an import project; the core goal was to transfer German technology and secure domestic assembly and construction capabilities. It laid the foundation for Korea’s submarine technology independence and advanced development. Leveraging the experience gained from constructing the Jangbogo-class, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) signed a contract in 2011 to build three 1,400-ton submarines for Indonesia. Known as the DSME1400, these submarines are named the Nagapasa-class in the Indonesian Navy, marking Korea’s advancement in export capabilities. Table 5. Specifications of the Jangbogo-class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki). Note: A batch refers to a group of submarines of the same model built in series, with incremental performance improvements applied in each production run. Table 6. Development Stages of the Jangbogo-Class Submarine 4.4. Leap Period (2007–2020): Son Won-il Class (Jangbogo-II) and AIP Technology In 2000, the Republic of Korea Navy signed a contract with Germany’s HDW to acquire three Type-214 submarines under a design-license arrangement, launching a full-scale 1,800-ton Son Won-il–class program with Hyundai Heavy Industries. The first submarine, Son Won-il, was delivered in 2007, and an additional six submarines were subsequently built by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). The key feature of the Son Won-il class is its AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system, which uses fuel cells to allow submerged operations for 2–3 weeks without surfacing. Construction was divided between Hanwha Ocean (formerly DSME) and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. The vessels are named Son Won-il, Jeong Ji, An Jung-geun, Kim Dae-geon, Hong Beom-do, Yu Gwan-sun, Yun Bong-gil, Ahn Chang-ho, and Baekdusan. Table 7. Specifications of the Son Won-il Class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) Table 8. Development Stages of the Son Won-il-Class Submarine   Over time, the armament and electronic systems have progressively advanced. Below is a simplified cross-sectional diagram of the HDW Type 214, which was used as a reference for the construction of the Son Won-il class submarines. The diagram helps to easily understand the complex internal structure by showing the main components. Here, the Fuel Cell Plant represents the AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) technology. Figure 8. Simplified cross-section of the Type 214 Submarine (Source: TKMS) Figure 9. Cross-section of the Son Won-il-class Submarine (Source: Defense Mirror) 4.5. Independent Period (2021–Present): Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class (Jangbogo-III) Indigenous Design Achievements of Complete Domestic Design In December 2012, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) signed a contract with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) for the construction of two Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class submarines. The contract amount for the two submarines was approximately 1.675 trillion KRW (1.14 billion USD). The project was based on the construction experience of the Jangbogo-class and Son Won-il-class submarines, as well as the technology transferred from HDW and the experience in developing the DSME-1400 submarine (Nagapasa-class submarine) based on the Type 209 design. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho (launched in August 2021) is the first submarine fully designed, built, and equipped with its own weapon systems by South Korea. It has a displacement of 3,000 tons, making it a large submarine. It is the first in the world to be equipped with lithium-ion batteries, enabling long-term submerged operations without the need for an AIP system. Strategic Weapon Deployment Capability The most notable feature of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class is the vertical launch system (VLS) with 6 launchers (Batch-II will have 10 launchers), which allows the operation of the Hyunmoo-4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This capability is considered the most powerful strategic strike capability among non-nuclear nations. Currently, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho, Kim Jong-seo, and Yun Bong-gil have been commissioned, with a total of 9 submarines planned: 3 from Batch-I, 3 from Batch-II, and 3 from Batch-III. Table 9. Specifications of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki)   The following is information on the improvement projects for Batch 2 and Batch 3. Table 10. Development Stages of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine   Over time, the missile payload and electronic systems continue to evolve. Below is a cross-sectional diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarine, including a comparison of its size with the North Korean Romeo-class and the German Type 214 submarines. It also includes the proposed diagram by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) for the BrahMos missile-equipped version, which was part of their bid for the Indian next-generation submarine construction project. Figure 10. Cross-sectional Diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class Submarine (Source: Naval News) 4.6. Comparison of 3 Generations of ROK Submarines Table 11. Development Stages of South Korean Submarines 5. Exports and International Status The history of South Korean submarines follows a trajectory of introduction, indigenization, technological accumulation, advancement, and international expansion. In 2011, South Korea became the first Asian country to export submarines by selling three Jangbogo-class derivative Nagapasa-class submarines to Indonesia for 1.1 billion USD. Currently, South Korea owns 18 submarines, making it the 8th largest submarine-owning country in the world. When it comes to conventional (diesel-electric) submarines, South Korea is regarded as one of the top global powers, along with Germany and Japan. Current Submarine Power Rankings 1. United States (68 nuclear submarines) - Overwhelming leader 2. Russia (45 nuclear submarines + 20+ diesel submarines) 3. China (12 nuclear submarines + 50+ diesel submarines) 4. United Kingdom (11 nuclear submarines) - Entirely nuclear-powered submarines 5. France (10 nuclear submarines + diesel) 6. India (2 nuclear submarines + 15 diesel submarines) 7. Japan (22 diesel submarines) 8. South Korea (18 diesel submarines) 9. Germany (6 diesel submarines, export power) 10. Sweden (5 diesel submarines, technological powerhouse) Detailed Classification by Country A. Nuclear Submarine Exclusives B. Nuclear + Conventional Submarine C. Conventional Submarine   The following are the rankings of the leading countries in conventional submarine exports: 1. Germany - 100 years of tradition, top exporter 2. Japan - Highest technological capabilities 3. South Korea - Only country with VLS/SLBM capability 4. Sweden - Specializes in stealth technology 5. France - Combines nuclear and diesel capabilities The following compares the key features of export submarines from each country. Table 12. South Korean KSS-III Competitor Submarines Export Competitiveness Evaluation Top Exporting Countries 1. Germany - Type 209/214 series, more than 100 units exported 2. France - Scorpène, 16+ units (additional orders in progress) 3. South Korea - 3 units exported, actively competing in various tenders Latest Trends • Lithium-ion Batteries: South Korea (Jang Yeong-sil class), Japan (Taigei class), France (Scorpène Evolved) • VLS (Vertical Launch System): South Korea (SLBM), Sweden (Cruise Missiles) • Stealth Technology: Germany (Diamond hull), Sweden (Ghost), Japan (Low noise) Hanwha Ocean, the builder of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class KSS-III submarines, and the South Korean government are actively engaging with the following countries for submarine exports: • Canada: The Canadian Navy's Submarine Replacement Program (CSCP) is a major project worth up to 40 billion USD (with an acquisition cost of about 14 billion USD and operation and maintenance costs of around 27 billion USD). Canada plans to introduce 12 new submarines. The KSS-III, at 4,000 tons, is considered a strong candidate due to its suitability for Canada’s operational environment (including the Arctic). South Korean defense companies are offering technical cooperation and local construction options in an effort to secure the deal. • Poland: Poland is pursuing the Orka project to modernize its navy, aiming to acquire 3 new submarines project worth about 14 billion USD. The KSS-III is consistently mentioned as one of the main contenders by the Polish government. • Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries: The Philippines is focused on strengthening its naval power to counter China. Other Southeast Asian nations are also looking to enhance maritime security through submarine acquisitions. South Korea, having previously exported submarines (e.g., the Nagapasa-class to Indonesia), is actively pursuing KSS-III sales in the region. 6. Comparison of the Latest Submarine Capabilities of Countries Surrounding South Korea This section examines the key features of the latest submarine technologies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan. Table 13. Comparison of the latest submarines of South Korea and neighboring countries Overall Assessment • Military Ranking: Evaluated as top-tier in Asia in the order of China > Japan > South Korea > North Korea. • Advanced Technology: Japan, South Korea, and China are rapidly advancing in technological innovation, while North Korea focuses on strategic threat capabilities. • Operational Capability: Japan and South Korea excel in maritime route defense and blockade capabilities, whereas China’s strength lies in ocean-going and strategic power projection. Asian military experts particularly regard South Korea’s KSS-III, Japan’s Soryu-class/Taigei-class, and China’s latest submarines as the pinnacle of their respective national defense technologies. North Korea, while still relatively underdeveloped, raises the threat level through the public display of its strategic nuclear-powered capabilities. 7. Future Prospects: Development of Nuclear-Powered Submarines South Korea is considering the development of next-generation submarines over 4,000 tons in the 2030s, with nuclear-powered submarines being a key option under discussion. In the past, in 2003, the basic design for a 4,000-ton reactor was completed, but at that time, cooperation with the United States was essential due to restrictions such as the Korea–U.S. nuclear agreement (“123 Agreement”). Recently, with the revitalization of Korea–U.S. shipbuilding cooperation through Hanwha Ocean and Philly shipyards, the possibility of acquiring nuclear submarine technology has increased. In particular, following the official U.S. approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction at the 2025 APEC Summit, technical, fuel, and policy cooperation with the U.S. is expected to move forward in earnest for South Korea’s project. 1. Scope of Future Cooperation • The U.S. has agreed to share key technologies for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines. • Cooperation will also include securing nuclear fuel for propulsion (highly enriched uranium or HALEU – high-assay low-enriched uranium) and the design and fabrication of small reactors for submarine use. • Both countries have agreed to expand mutual investment and technical collaboration in shipbuilding, marine plants, and submarine construction industries. 2. Technology Transfer and Conditions • South Korea has requested U.S. approval and supply for submarine propulsion nuclear fuel, and the U.S. is reported to have approved the use of nuclear fuel for South Korea’s submarine construction. • However, based on currently available information, this does not automatically include the full transfer of submarine reactor design or propulsion systems; the scope and method of technology transfer (joint development vs. full transfer) are still under discussion. • If South Korea transitions to third-country technology transfer or domestic development under U.S. cooperation, there could be restrictions linked to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 123 Agreement. 3. Potential Timeline • According to the fact sheet released at the APEC Summit, this cooperation is linked to investment in the shipbuilding industry, and South Korea is reported to have pledged around US$150 billion to U.S. shipbuilding. • South Korean government reports indicate the goal is to secure four or more medium-sized (approximately 5,000-ton or larger) nuclear-powered submarines by the mid-2030s. • However, specific milestones such as design completion, project start, construction, and delivery dates have not been officially finalized, and Korean officials have stated that detailed schedules are still under coordination. 8. Comparison of Nuclear Submarines and Conventional Submarines & the Importance of Nuclear Submarines Nuclear submarines can be broadly divided into two types based on their primary missions: 1) Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN: Ship Submersible Ballistic missile Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Equipped with ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carrying nuclear warheads, SSBNs patrol covertly for extended periods to maintain nuclear deterrence. This means deterring adversaries from using nuclear or major conventional attacks by maintaining the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, thereby preventing war. • Characteristics: Large in size, prioritizes extreme stealth and long-range operational capability. 2) Torpedo-Attack Nuclear Submarine (SSN: Ship Submersible Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Engage enemy submarines (Sub Hunter) or surface ships (Ship Killer), conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), support special operations forces, or carry out land-attack missions using cruise missiles. • Characteristics: Smaller and faster than SSBNs, emphasizes agility and maneuverability. Summary: • SSBN: Strategic missions with nuclear missiles. • SSN: Tactical attack missions with torpedoes and cruise missiles. 8.1. Nuclear-Powered Submarines vs. Conventional (Diesel-Electric) Submarines – Propulsion Comparison The most fundamental difference is in the power source: • Nuclear propulsion: Uses a reactor; heat from nuclear fission boils water to produce steam, which drives turbines to generate propulsion and electricity. • Diesel-electric submarines: Operate differently on the surface/snorkeling versus submerged. o Surface / Snorkeling: Diesel engines are run to propel the submarine or charge the batteries. The submarine must surface or use a snorkel to intake air and expel exhaust gases, reducing stealth. o Submerged: Diesel engines are turned off; the submarine runs solely on large charged batteries powering electric motors. This allows for very quiet, stealthy operation, but operational endurance is limited. Once the batteries are depleted, the submarine must surface to run diesel engines and recharge. Table 14. Comparison of Nuclear Submarine and Conventional Submarine Specifications Key Points • A nuclear-powered submarine is similar to an aircraft carrier: it provides long-range, high-endurance capability and serves as a powerful tool for global power projection. It is designed to dominate the open ocean. • A conventional submarine is comparable to a coastal patrol craft or a hunter-killer submarine: a stealthy and cost-effective weapon optimized for controlling regional waters and coastlines. Its greatest advantage is extremely low noise during battery-powered operation, making it a deadly threat in shallow waters—like “a hole in the water.” • Choosing a submarine type is not about absolute superiority, but about selecting the model best suited to a country’s strategic goals, budgetary limits, and geographic operational environment. 8.2. Maintenance Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Which force should a nation prioritize: Nuclear submarines, the backbone of strategic deterrence thanks to their unlimited underwater endurance, or conventional submarines, which offer excellent cost-effectiveness and are easier to field in larger numbers? One of the core factors in this decision is operational cost-efficiency. Beyond construction cost, the long-term burden of decades of maintenance, training, reactor refueling, and life-cycle logistics must be considered. The comparison below outlines these sustainment requirements. Table 15. Maintenance Comparison: Nuclear vs. Conventional Submarines 8.3. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Let us compare two submarines of similar class size as examples: • Dosan Ahn Changho–class (KSS-III, South Korea) — conventional (diesel-electric + AIP) • Virginia-class (SSN, United States) — nuclear-powered Between these two types, the Total Lifetime Cost is 3 to 4 times higher for the nuclear-powered submarine. Below, we analyze the causes of this massive cost difference using concrete figures. Table 16. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison: Nuclear Submarine vs. Conventional Submarine 8.4. Importance of Nuclear-Powered Submarines for the Republic of Korea Navy Despite the enormous cost gap shown earlier, the South Korean government has strong reasons for wanting to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. These reasons are rooted in national security, strategic autonomy, and enhanced maritime defense capability. Key strategic motivations include: 1) Responding to North Korea’s SLBM Threat North Korea: Developing the Sinpo-class SSBN (armed with SLBMs). If a North Korean SLBM submarine hides in the deep waters of the East Sea, it becomes impossible to track with conventional submarines. Only nuclear-powered submarines can conduct continuous 24-hour tracking due to their unlimited underwater endurance 2) Monitoring Chinese Submarine Activity: China has ~12 nuclear submarines + ~50 diesel-electric submarines and is increasing activity in the East China Sea and Western Pacific. To monitor Chinese submarines operating in the open ocean, nuclear-powered submarines are essential 3) Strengthening Strategic Deterrence: Current South Korean SLBM range: ~500 km, requiring operations near the Korean Peninsula. A nuclear submarine can launch from anywhere in the Pacific, drastically expanding deterrence. Provides a “survivable second-strike capability”—a retaliatory force that cannot be located or neutralized 4) National Prestige: Nations that operate nuclear submarines are considered major military powers. Only six countries currently possess them. Strengthens technological sovereignty and diplomatic leverage South Korea’s desire to operate nuclear-powered submarines is driven by strategic and security needs that far outweigh cost considerations. For over 30 years, South Korea has pursued nuclear submarine capabilities as part of a long-term defense strategy, aiming to achieve: enhanced nuclear deterrence, increased strategic autonomy, breakthroughs in defense technology, effective countermeasures against the expanding submarine forces of North Korea and China. Nuclear-powered submarines are seen as essential platforms capable of long-duration, high-speed, and highly covert operations—capabilities that are crucial in Korea’s security environment. Figure 11. Conceptual Cross-Section of the Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarine (KSS-N) Conclusion The Republic of Korea began with the small Dolgorae-class submarines in 1983, and in 42 years has risen to become the world’s 8th-largest submarine operator and one of the “Big Three” diesel-electric submarine powers (Germany, Japan, Korea). The Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (KSS-III), in particular, is the world’s only diesel-electric submarine equipped with 10 VLS cells for SLBMs, and with its combination of AIP and lithium-ion batteries, it possesses some of the strongest underwater endurance and operational capability in the world. It has proven its real-world combat performance by eluding detection from a U.S. aircraft carrier during the RIMPAC exercises, and has demonstrated strong export competitiveness—Korea has already secured a 1.1 billion USD contract with Indonesia, and is competing for additional tenders in Canada, Poland, and the Philippines. Despite the overwhelming cost burden of nuclear-powered submarines, they remain essential for South Korea to counter North Korea’s SLBM-equipped SSBNs, and China’s expanding submarine fleet. Only nuclear-powered submarines can perform unlimited submerged operations and maintain high-speed, long-duration tracking of North Korean SSBNs 24/7. They also allow South Korea to exercise strategic deterrence across the entire Pacific, not just near the Korean Peninsula. While challenges remain—such as restrictions from the U.S.–Korea 123 Nuclear Agreement and various technological barriers—ongoing Korea–U.S. naval cooperation through Hanwha Ocean’s Philadelphia Shipyard significantly increases the likelihood of acquiring nuclear-submarine technology. Securing 4 to 6 nuclear-powered submarines would mark a transformational leap for the ROK Navy and a historic turning point in Korea’s rise as a true maritime power. South Korea’s submarine industry is not just a weapons program—it is an advanced technology sector and a driver of economic growth. It represents a core capability for self-reliant defense and national security. Based on its world-class diesel-electric submarine expertise, if Korea succeeds in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines as well, it will firmly establish itself as one of the world’s top five submarine powers. As history teaches that “those who command the seas command the future”, the continued advancement of South Korea’s submarine capabilities will serve as the foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.

With its fragmented production process, European defence procurement is inefficient and uncompetitive in comparison to the United States. A new approach, prioritising cross-country collaborations, could improve things, but would not be without its own challenges. Introduced in March 2024, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) forms the centrepiece of European Defence Industrial Policy. The strategy aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through greater inter-state collaboration. It includes some ambitious targets, all of which are designed to allocate more resources to the EDTIB. For example, by 2030 the goal is for 50% of defence procurement budgets and at least 40% of defence equipment procurement to come through collaboration. There is also a designated €1.5 billion budget for European defence industry ‘readiness’. The background to all of this is British and European rearmament (readiness), largely in response to the increasing threat of Russia (following its acquisition of Crimea and its illegal military operations in Ukraine). European defence spending increased from €343 billion in 2024 to €381 billion in 2025. Figure 1 shows 2024 defence spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by European country. Taking 2% as a target, Italy, Spain and Portugal are below the threshold. Poland – which shares a border with war-torn Ukraine – spent more than double the target last year, at 4.15%. At the same time, last year Russia spent an estimated 7.05% of its GDP on ‘defence’. Figure 1: European defence spending as a share of GDP, 2024. Source: NATO & SIPRI. Note: NATO members have agreed a new benchmark for defence spending, targeting 5% of GDP by 2035. How do inefficiencies in the European defence market affect spending? Inefficiencies within the European defence market shape spending patterns. For example, there are cases of duplication of defence R&D, fragmented national defence markets, ‘off-the-shelf’ procurement from non-EU suppliers, and a general failure to exploit economies of scale and learning. Compared with the US market, for instance, Europe is neither efficient nor competitive. This inefficiency is reflected in Europe producing three different types of combat aircraft: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and the Swedish Gripen. Each type supplies national and export markets: 782 Typhoons, 710 Rafales, and 369 Gripen aircraft had been ordered or delivered as of October 2025. So, if each European nation had agreed to buy one type of combat aircraft, total output would have been around 1,800 units. Common procurement would also have reduced production costs by an estimated 10-20%. In contrast, the American F-35 combat aircraft has a total planned output of 3,556 units – almost twice the total for Europe. What about sixth-generation aircraft? The sixth-generation fighter aircraft market already looks highly competitive. By 2027, Europe plans to build the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS), with France, Germany and Spain all taking part in the project. At the same time, the UK is developing the Tempest combat aircraft jointly with Italy and Japan, with the first flight also due in 2027. Meanwhile, across the pond, in March 2025, the United States announced that Boeing would be developing the F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. It is designed to replace the F-22 aircraft, with the first flight planned in 2028. There have already been 185 orders. For public policy purposes, there are questions as to whether Europe can afford to fund two similar combat aircraft projects. In one sense, the answer must be that Europe and the UK can afford to pay the price of having two separate independent developments. Even so, there are other policy options (with differing costs). On the one hand, European countries could collaborate further and undertake the project with great cost-sharing. On the other hand, they could simply buy American aircraft. Further collaboration is economically and politically attractive. Economically, more nations joining a project would lead to greater sharing regarding R&D and the pooling of production orders. But this assumes all else remains unchanged – which is unlikely. Further collaboration is costly, as each partner nation demands its share of high technology on the project – namely, a share of the advances in airframe, engine and avionics (aviation-specific electronics), and duplicate flight test centres. Similarly, partners will each demand a share of the production work, leading to duplicate final assembly lines and adding to total costs (although these could still be less than a national-level initiative would cost). At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, more collaborative partnerships could lead to cost sharing and cost savings. This is likely to mean lower prices for each partner nation compared with an independent, single-nation solution. But problems can also come from further collaboration. The number of partner nations will rise from three to six, increasing transaction costs. More difficult will be the process of selecting the ‘winning project’ and the inevitable ‘national champion’ – namely, a choice between BAE Systems in the UK and Dassault of France. In an ideal world, sharing design work between two world-class firms should produce an outstanding design. But in reality, the outcome is likely to be a compromise, with equal sharing of development work on the aircraft, which might not be an efficient solution. Even so, some inefficiencies are the price of further collaboration. An alternative solution would be for European governments to buy American units. The options here are to buy off-the-shelf, either completely or with some form of ‘offset’ (a type of compensation arrangement made between a supplier and the purchasing government) offering varying amounts of work to the importing nation. Again, these options involve different benefits and costs. For example, direct imports involve foreign currency payments while an offset provides some jobs and the retention of domestic industrial capability for the importing nation. Another possibility is a negotiation similar to the F-35, where the UK was a ‘level 1 partner’ with a 15% share of the programme. A similar deal might be negotiated for the purchase of the US F-47, with the UK enjoying similar benefits. Where next in an ideal world for European defence? European defence industrial policy must address the choice of the next-generation combat aircraft. A simple solution would be to continue with the FCAS and UK-led Tempest projects as separate independent ventures. But the new EDIS framework, with its commitment to European solutions, suggests a better option would be to seek a new collaboration between the FCAS and Tempest. These seem like similar aircraft, and creating a new collaboration involving six partner nations could be beneficial. Such a collaboration would offer cost savings in both R&D and production. Fixed R&D costs would be shared between six nations rather than three, and production orders would be considerably increased (possibly even doubled). This could allow for further economies of scale and learning, and at least a 10% unit cost savings (PwC, 2021; Mueller, 2025). Indeed, production numbers for the FCAS have been estimated at 200-300 units and a merger with the Tempest could double this to 400-600 units (Mueller, 2025). There would, however, still be transaction costs associated with the six-part collaboration. This is not a unique problem. For example, the Airbus Atlas military transport aircraft is a seven-nation collaboration, and the Eurofighter Typhoon involves four partner countries. Conclusion A possible merger between the FCAS and Tempest programmes might be a way forward for both projects. It would create a large military-industrial-political complex whose true economic benefits and costs would still need to be assessed. It would also be a centrepiece of the new European defence industrial policy, and might attract new export customers from the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. A more ambitious target is the formation of a European Army, Navy and Air Force. But this would require a single European decision-making mechanism replacing the current arrangement of individual European Member States. It would allow common procurement policies and large-scale purchasing for land, sea and air weapons. This is certainly a long run dream but could be one worth pursuing. Removing the inefficiencies in European defence markets described above by creating a single European market for defence equipment could create substantial gains, both economically and in terms of security.