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Defense & Security
A hand with a drawn USA flag holds a ball with a drawn Venezuela flag, a sign of influence, pressure or conservation and protection. Horizontal frame

Venezuela at a critical juncture (Part I): tensions between the US and Venezuela and the shadow of war

by World & New World Journal

Background (Venezuelan Presidential Crisis [2019–2023] and the 2024 Presidential Elections) Between 2019 and 2023, Venezuela experienced a political crisis centered on the legitimacy of the country’s presidency, stemming from “irregular” elections that declared Nicolás Maduro the winner. As a result, the Fourth Legislature of the Venezuelan National Assembly — controlled by the opposition — declared Maduro a usurper of the presidency and appointed Juan Guaidó as interim president under Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution (León, 2019). Subsequently, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice declared the National Assembly unconstitutional (BBC News Mundo, 2019), as well as Guaidó’s appointment, thereby triggering a political crisis that would persist until 2023. During this period, Maduro and Guaidó governed in parallel. Guaidó’s government was recognized by the United States, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and several European countries and international organizations, while Maduro’s government was recognized by Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, and South Africa, among others. Countries such as Mexico, New Zealand, India, and Indonesia remained neutral. Figure 1: Countries recognizing Guaidó’s presidential legitimacy as of February 8, 2019, during the peak year of international recognition for Guaidó. Black: Venezuela; Grey: Neutral; White: No official position; Dark green: Recognizes Guaidó; Bright green: Supports the opposition National Assembly; Red: Recognizes Maduro. By Jose001aef23 – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=76054258 Figure 2: Recognition of Venezuela’s president in 2023. Black: Venezuela; Red: Recognition of Maduro; Dark blue: Recognition of Guaidó; Light blue: Support for the Fourth National Assembly; Grey: Explicitly neutral. By ZiaLater – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=75890028 The crisis lasted for nearly four years and was marked by economic sanctions, social unrest, widespread public dissatisfaction, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a dialogue between opposition parties and the Maduro government that ultimately culminated in the signing of the Barbados Agreement. In the end, Guaidó’s interim government — despite enjoying broader international backing — failed to achieve its initially stated objectives, and the National Assembly formally dissolved it in January 2023. The Barbados Agreement (International Crisis Group, 2023) — signed in 2023 between the Venezuelan government and the opposition with the aim of guaranteeing electoral safeguards and political rights, as well as protecting national interests — paved the way for presidential elections held on July 28, 2024. However, both the outcome of the elections and the way they were conducted gave rise to allegations of irregularities and electoral fraud (Infobae, 2024; Singer, 2024; Gómez Forero, 2024; Diario Las Américas, 2024). According to the National Electoral Council (CNE), Maduro won the election with 51.95%, while Edmundo González received 43.18%. By contrast, the opposition platform Comando Con Venezuela (CCV) released results claiming González won with 67.05%, compared to 30.49% for Maduro. It is important to note that González ran as the opposition candidate after María Corina Machado, an opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was barred from participating in the election. Figure 3: Comparison of the 2024 presidential election results according to the CNE and the CCV. Source: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_presidenciales_de_Venezuela_de_2024#cite_note-:19-27 As of now, Maduro remains in power in Venezuela. González, meanwhile, is exiled in Spain and has been recognized as the winner or president-elect by Argentina, Costa Rica, Italy, Ecuador, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Israel, among others. Relations with the United States (Suspension of Relations and Current Situation) Diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela have steadily deteriorated since Hugo Chávez — who governed Venezuela with an anti-imperialist and socialist discourse — was president. From Chávez’s tenure through the 2019 presidential crisis, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Venezuela, and bilateral relations experienced periodic fluctuations. However, beginning in 2019, relations worsened significantly, culminating in a formal rupture initiated by Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro severed diplomatic ties with the United States after Donald Trump, during his first term, recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president (CNBC, 2019). Although the National Assembly later dissolved the interim government, the United States did not recognize Maduro. At present, relations between the two countries are critical. With Trump’s return to the White House, the already minimal level of interaction has shifted toward threats, warnings, and displays of power, including a military deployment described by Trump as “the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America” (Maher & Liptak, 2025). This escalation has been justified — or framed — by the Trump administration as part of an effort to protect U.S. citizens from drug flows originating in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. As part of its broader campaign against drug trafficking, Trump has also designated certain organized crime groups as terrorist organizations (The White House, 2025). Among these newly designated groups — relevant to this analysis—are the Tren de Aragua gang (Knickmeyer, 2025) and the Cartel of the Suns (Cártel de los Soles) (Wells & Blasey, 2025; InSight Crime, 2025). Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have accused Nicolás Maduro of being the leader of the Cartel of the Suns (Savage, 2025). The U.S. Department of State has even offered a reward of up to $50 million for information leading to Maduro’s arrest (U.S. Department of State, 2025). Maduro, for his part, has denied all such accusations and alleged ties. Tensions in the Caribbean The threats and actions carried out in recent months between the United States and Venezuela have culminated in an unprecedented U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean Sea. The United States has mobilized up to 15,000 troops in the region, in addition to reinforcements and personnel stationed in Puerto Rico. The arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford alongside the USS Iwo Jima, as well as warships, destroyers, submarines, fighter jets, bombers, helicopters, drones, and other military assets, has further reinforced the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea (Ellis, U.S. Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team, 2025). Alongside this military buildup, the United States launched Operation Southern Spear, aimed at deterring Venezuela and targeting alleged drug-trafficking speedboats in international waters. From the start of these attacks in early September through December 16, 2025, 25 attacks had been recorded, resulting in at least 95 deaths (Muñoz Morillo, 2025). The U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean has been supported by Trinidad and Tobago. The United States and Trinidad and Tobago have conducted joint training exercises and military drills in the region over recent months (Infobae, 2025), and Trinidad and Tobago has also agreed to allow U.S. military aircraft to transit through its airports (Rios, 2025). Venezuela responded by suspending a joint gas agreement and declaring Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, persona non grata (DW News, 2025). For its part, Venezuela has mobilized approximately 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militia members in large-scale exercises and has deployed 5,000 Igla missiles (Sliwinski, 2025). The Venezuelan government has also urged preparations for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and social destabilization to render the country ungovernable (Reuters, 2025) — a strategy that may be viewed as the most effective response given the asymmetry between the two sides. Maduro further warned that Venezuela would not become the “Gaza of South America”, while proclaiming a message of “peace, life, and love — no to hatred, no to war” (Swissinfo.ch, 2025). Maduro has likewise turned to international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as regional bodies including CELAC and ALBA, to denounce the escalation of tensions in the region. He has even called for Colombian military support in light of the critical situation in the Caribbean (El Colombiano, 2025). However, recent polarization in Latin America has been reflected in the responses. Lula (Brazil) and Petro (Colombia) have applied the strongest pressure regarding regional destabilization, while Mexico, maintaining an ambiguous neutrality, has taken a more cautious stance, emphasizing sovereignty and self-determination. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago have aligned with the U.S. position (Rivas Molina, Galarraga Gortázar, Marcial Pérez, & Esteban Lewin, 2025). Finally, outside the region, Russia (OIR-MPPCI Cojedes, 2025) — one of the main suppliers of arms and military equipment to the Bolivarian National Armed Forces — along with Iran (Sputnik, 2025) and China (Revista Economía, 2025), all allies of Venezuela, have expressed various forms of support for the South American country, though their rhetoric has focused primarily on concerns over what the U.S. military deployment and harassment could trigger in the region. War Speculation and the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine All of the above brings together the necessary elements to consider the possibility of an invasion or a declaration of war by the United States against Venezuela, and such possibilities clearly exist. However, there are key factors that, for now, would prevent the outbreak of a new war. Regardless of the logistical difficulties involved in a large-scale invasion, the United States lacks a clear casus belli to declare war. Moreover, U.S. domestic politics — particularly the opposition — are not fully convinced that an invasion would be the best course of action. Nonetheless, Trump has shaped and carried out a series of political maneuvers, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and more recently a total oil blockade (BBC News, 2025), aimed at paving the way for a potential invasion or declaration of war, though so far without success. It is important to note that most of these actions — whether justified or not — such as the designation of cartels as terrorist groups, extrajudicial attacks in international waters against alleged drug-trafficking vessels, the military deployment in the Caribbean, and the seizure of a sanctioned oil tanker (BBC News, 2025), primarily generate heightened expectations of an impending war. In addition, on December 2, 2025, the U.S. government published its National Security Strategy (The White House, 2025). Without delving into details and for the purposes of this article, the strategy seeks to maintain the United States as a global power — while acknowledging the rise of China — and to consolidate U.S. dominance over the “Western Hemisphere” by controlling the American continent, establishing a supremacy-based relationship with aligned European countries, and ensuring that neither the European Union nor any other bloc emerges as an alternative center of power (González Posso, 2025). Rare Earths, Oil, and a Possible Regime Change in Venezuela? At this point, the reasons behind the escalation of tensions between Venezuela and the United States may not appear entirely clear, although they are hardly surprising and can be understood considering the divergent worldviews held by both countries. This sequence of events — fraudulent elections, military deployments, sanctions, and economic blockades — has gradually breathed new life into a pre-existing rupture that had previously remained stagnant. However, as is often the case, there is always a broader underlying context that tends to be overlooked. Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, estimated at around 300 billion barrels, representing approximately 18% of global reserves. It also possesses substantial natural gas reserves and deposits of more than 40 types of minerals and precious stones, including iron, bauxite (aluminum), coal, gold, coltan, diamonds, nickel, zinc, and rare earth elements, among others (Blanco, Rey S., Romero, Rosendo, & Berroterán). No less significant, Venezuela ranks seventh among the world’s 17 megadiverse countries, hosting roughly 9% of global flora and fauna (Álvarez Bernard, 2022). In addition, Venezuela holds the tenth-largest freshwater reserves globally — approximately 1,233 km³ — and contains an extensive network of rivers and lakes, which are essential for agricultural and livestock activities, supported by fertile soils, as well as for electricity generation and hydroelectric power (Montoya, n.d.). Given Venezuela’s natural resource potential, it is unsurprising that the United States has sought to “recover all the oil, land, and other assets that they previously stole from us,” as Trump wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social (Trump, 2025). Trump’s remark refers to the nationalization of oil projects carried out by Hugo Chávez in 2007, which affected major U.S. oil companies ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil (Al Jazeera Staff, 2025). As for a possible regime change in Venezuela, all remains speculative. Maduro continues to hold onto power, or at least presents an image of firmness before the cameras. At the same time, speculation about a potential war or invasion places him in a precarious position, fueling rumors and theories about resignation or exile. What is clear, however, is that U.S. pressure on the Venezuelan government is real. Although Maduro and Trump held a phone call in late November in search of a diplomatic off-ramp, the demands of both sides prevented any agreement. Prior to that call, in September, Maduro sent a letter to Trump seeking to “preserve peace through dialogue” (TRT Español, 2025). One month later, according to The New York Times, Maduro reportedly offered the United States significant participation in Venezuela’s oil fields, while remaining in power — a proposal that displeased U.S. officials and led to the suspension of talks at that time (Haberman & Kurmanaev, 2025). Discussion The situation between Venezuela and the United States is highly significant from a geopolitical perspective. On one hand, the United States appears to be poised and waiting for the green light to launch a potential large-scale invasion. On the other, Maduro, through his characteristic anti-imperialist discourse, is attempting to navigate and prolong the survival of his regime. This is no minor issue. Maduro’s continued hold on power has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency, its numerous irregularities, and even electoral fraud. Nevertheless, the recent escalation of tensions with the United States has worked to his advantage, reinforcing his anti-imperialist rhetoric and strengthening his Bolivarian nationalist narrative. Unfortunately, these recent developments are more likely to further suffocate the Venezuelan population than to consolidate Maduro’s position. Regardless of the underlying causes, Venezuelans have endured years of hardship, and toying with the prospect of war is far from sensible — a reality Maduro himself has implicitly acknowledged by attempting to de-escalate tensions by any available means. However, whether driven by ambition, ideology, or sheer will to power, the simplest exit — stepping down from office — does not appear to be, nor is it likely to become, part of his plans. Thus, while Maduro projects strength domestically and repeatedly calls for peace and rejects war at public rallies, he is experiencing a level of strain whose sustainability remains uncertain. The external pressure exerted by the United States — both diplomatic and in the form of a total economic blockade — is likely, sooner or later, to yield results for Washington. It is important to recall that Venezuela has survived in recent years largely due to oil revenues. With a total blockade focused on that asset, Venezuela’s economic situation would deteriorate further, with potentially severe social and political consequences. In short, the near-term outlook is far from optimistic. As for the United States, it appears ironic and contradictory that Trump — a figure who has boasted of having “ended” seven wars and portrayed himself as a staunch advocate of peace — is now demonstrating the opposite in the Caribbean by deploying the largest naval force seen in the region in years. One could argue that a war has not yet begun and may never materialize, but the very nature of these actions and their consequences cast doubt on his credibility, not to mention the attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels in international waters. It is understandable that the deployment of the U.S. naval forces in the region may be intended as an “extreme” form of diplomatic pressure. However, this does not justify — in terms of international relations, even if it might within the framework of U.S. foreign policy — the interference in and violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. Even more concerning is that the very rhetoric so often condemned by Maduro has long been one of the primary tools used by the United States to maintain its influence and intervention in the region since the last century. Nevertheless, the erosion of this approach in the medium and long term could prove costly for the United States. At this stage, as can be observed, drug trafficking and the economic and social crisis have been relegated to the background; they function merely as pretexts. What is truly at stake are national — or personal — interests, influence, and power in a world where the more one possesses, the better. This dynamic is clearly illustrated by the recent support Venezuela has received from Russia and China, which has been largely rhetorical rather than material (Paredes, 2025), in contrast to earlier instances when their backing was direct and tangible. The current situation, although complex, could have been avoided, as its underlying causes have been developing for several years. However, it would be irresponsible to take sides. One cannot defend an “illegitimate government,” nor align with a state that has consistently undermined the sovereignty of others in pursuit of its national interests — an approach that is even explicitly embedded in its national security strategy. International condemnation should be directed at both parties, and while diplomacy should prevail, this case is ironically contradictory, as both actors have operated outside international norms. Against this backdrop, multiple questions arise: What will ultimately happen? Will Maduro step down and negotiate a “democratic” transition? Will the United States invade Venezuela and succeed in overthrowing the Maduro regime? How long will the economic blockade and attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels continue? What role will Venezuelan society play, and will the opposition be able to capitalize on this moment? What role will other countries in the region truly assume? Many questions remain unanswered, and the coming weeks are likely to bring significant developments. References Al Jazeera Staff. (17 de December de 2025). Trump aide Stephen Miller suggests Venezuelan oil belongs to US. Obtenido de Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/17/trump-aide-stephen-miller-suggests-venezuelan-oil-belongs-to-us Álvarez Bernard, D. (21 de Enero de 2022). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Ecología Verde: https://ecologiaverde.elperiodico.com/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela-3609.html BBC News. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Fuerzas de EE.UU. interceptan y confiscan un buque petrolero sancionado frente a las costas de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c14vp73mk16o BBC News. (17 de Diciembre de 2025). Trump ordena el bloqueo "total y completo" de todos los petroleros sancionados que entren y salgan de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cx2p45d0g2xo BBC News Mundo. (21 de Enero de 2019). El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela declara "inconstitucional" a la Asamblea Nacional y anula el nombramiento de Juan Guaidó como su presidente. Obtenido de BBC News Mundo: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46952641 Blanco, Á., Rey S., S., Romero, D. E., Rosendo, M., & Berroterán, Z. (s.f.). Influencia de la distribución de los recursos naturales en el desarrollo regional de Venezuela. Universidad Central de Venezuela. Facultad de Humanidades y Educación. Escuela de Geografía., 118. CNBC. (24 de January de 2019). Maduro says Venezuela is breaking relations with US, gives American diplomats 72 hours to leave country. Obtenido de CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/venezuela-president-maduro-breaks-relations-with-us-gives-american-diplomats-72-hours-to-leave-country.html Diario Las Américas. (10 de Agosto de 2024). ONG señala que el CNE omitió tres auditorías post electorales en Venezuela. Obtenido de Diario Las Américas: https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/ong-senala-que-el-cne-omitio-tres-auditorias-post-electorales-venezuela-n5361569 El Colombiano. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). Régimen de Maduro lanza llamado desesperado a Colombia en busca de apoyo militar ante tensión con EE. UU. Obtenido de El Colombiano: https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/maduro-pide-ayuda-militar-colombia-tension-ee-uu-EN31879278 Ellis, E., US Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team. (26 de November de 2025). We've tracked the US military build-up in the Caribbean. Here's what it could do. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://stories.theconversation.com/tracking-the-us-military-in-the-caribbean/ Gómez Forero, C. (30 de Julio de 2024). ¿Por qué ver estos decimales ayudaría a hablar de un fraude en Venezuela? Obtenido de El Espectador: https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/elecciones-venezuela-2024/por-que-ver-estos-decimales-nos-ayudaria-a-hablar-de-un-fraude-en-venezuela/?outputType=amp González Posso, C. (7 de Diciembre de 2025). Corolario Trump a la doctrina Monroe: I take west – O la paz por la fuerza –. Obtenido de Indepaz: https://indepaz.org.co/corolario-trump-a-la-doctrina-monroe-i-take-west-o-la-paz-por-la-fuerza/ Haberman, M., & Kurmanaev, A. (2025 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y Maduro hablaron por teléfono la semana pasada. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/28/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-maduro-llamada-venezuela.html Infobae. (30 de Julio de 2024). El burdo cálculo matemático en la información oficial que aumenta las sospechas sobre la manipulación de la elección en Venezuela. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/30/el-burdo-calculo-matematico-en-la-informacion-oficial-que-aumenta-las-sospechas-sobre-la-manipulacion-de-la-eleccion-en-venezuela/ Infobae. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago aprobó el uso de sus aeropuertos por aviones militares de Estados Unidos para combatir el narcotráfico. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2025/12/15/trinidad-y-tobago-aprobo-el-uso-de-sus-aeropuertos-por-aviones-militares-de-estados-unidos-para-combatir-el-narcotrafico/ InSight Crime. (22 de September de 2025). Cartel of the Suns. Obtenido de InSight Crime: https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile/ International Crisis Group. (20 de Octubre de 2023). Pacto en Barbados: la ruta sinuosa de Venezuela hacia comicios competitivos. Obtenido de International Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/es/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/barbados-deal-sets-venezuela-rocky-path-competitive-polls Knickmeyer, E. (19 de February de 2025). PBS News. Obtenido de Trump administration designates 8 Latin American cartels as ‘foreign terrorist organizations’: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-designates-8-latin-american-cartels-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations León, I. (11 de Enero de 2019). Efecto Cocuyo. Obtenido de Prensa de la AN rectifica comunicado que proclama a Juan Guaidó Presidente de la República: https://web.archive.org/web/20190702155934/http://efectococuyo.com/principales/prensa-de-la-an-rectifica-comunicado-que-proclama-a-juan-guaido-presidente-de-la-republica/ Maher, K., & Liptak, K. (17 de December de 2025). Trump orders ‘total and complete blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers coming to and leaving Venezuela. Obtenido de CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/16/politics/blockade-venezuela-sanctioned-oil-tankers#:~:text=%E2%80%9CVenezuela%20is%20completely%20surrounded%20by,%2C%E2%80%9D%20Trump%20said%20Tuesday%20night. Montoya, J. D. (s.f.). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Desarrollo Sustentable: https://www.desarrollosustentable.co/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela/#:~:text=Biodiversidad:%20recursos%20animales%20y%20plantas%20de%20Venezuela,-Aves%20de%20Venezuela&text=Venezuela%20es%20un%20pa%C3%ADs%20con,el%20ave%20nacional%20del%20pa%C3%ADs. Muñoz Morillo, M. (16 de Diciembre de 2025). Un nuevo ataque de EE.UU. contra 3 narcolanchas deja 8 muertos en el Pacífico. Obtenido de Euro News: https://es.euronews.com/2025/12/16/un-nuevo-ataque-de-eeuu-contra-3-narcolanchas-deja-8-muertos-en-el-pacifico Noticias DW. (25 de Noviembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago anuncia ejercicios militares con EE. UU. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/trinidad-y-tobago-anuncia-nuevos-ejercicios-militares-con-estados-unidos/a-74755359 OIR-MPPCI COJEDES. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Rusia considera “especialmente preocupante” tensión en el Caribe. Obtenido de Ciudad Cojedes: https://ciudadcojedes.com/rusia-considera-especialmente-preocupante-tension-en-el-caribe/ Paredes, N. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Por qué China y Rusia parecen haber abandonado a Nicolás Maduro en plena escalada con EE.UU. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cj97rxlw8zro República Bolivariana de Venezuela. (30 de Diciembre de 1999). Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Obtenido de https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/constitucion_venezuela.pdf Reuters. (12 de November de 2025). Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. Obtenido de Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ Revista Economía. (5 de Noviembre de 2025). China defiende su alianza con Venezuela y critica la presión militar de EE.UU. en el Caribe. Obtenido de Revista Economía: https://www.revistaeconomia.com/china-defiende-su-alianza-con-venezuela-y-critica-la-presion-militar-de-ee-uu-en-el-caribe/ Rios, M. (15 de Diciembrre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago permitirá el tránsito de aviones militares de EE.UU. por sus aeropuertos; Venezuela toma medidas. Obtenido de CNN Latinoamérica: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/12/15/latinoamerica/trinidad-y-tobago-transito-de-aviones-militares-eeuu-trax Rivas Molina, F., Galarraga Gortázar, N., Marcial Pérez, D., & Estaban Lewin, J. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). América Latina toma partido ante la amenaza de Estados Unidos a Venezuela. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2025-11-30/america-latina-toma-partido-ante-la-amenaza-de-estados-unidos-a-venezuela.html Savage, C. (18 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y compañía dicen que Maduro lidera un ‘cártel’. Esto es lo que significa. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/18/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-cartel-soles-maduro.html Singer, F. (14 de Agosto de 2024). La ONU concluye que las elecciones en Venezuela no cumplieron las medidas “de integridad y transparencia”. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2024-08-14/la-onu-concluye-que-las-elecciones-en-venezuela-no-cumplieron-las-medidas-de-integridad-y-transparencia.html Sliwinski, K. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). El aumento de tensiones en el Caribe: EE.UU. y Venezuela en medio de un complejo regional de seguridad. Obtenido de World & New World Journal: https://worldandnewworld.com/es/eeuu-venezuela-crisis-caribe/ Sputnik. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Irán expresa su apoyo a Venezuela ante las "provocaciones hostiles" de EEUU. Obtenido de Sputnik: https://noticiaslatam.lat/20251217/mapa-como-avanza-la-operacion-especial-de-rusia-en-ucrania-1126329635.html Swissinfo.ch. (15 de Noviembre de 2025). Maduro dice que Venezuela no será la Gaza de Suramérica en plena tensión con EE.UU. Obtenido de Swissinfo.ch: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/maduro-dice-que-venezuela-no-ser%C3%A1-la-gaza-de-suram%C3%A9rica-en-plena-tensi%C3%B3n-con-ee.uu./90337213 The White House. (20 de January de 2025). Designating Cartels And Other Organizations As Foreign Terrorist Organizations And Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/ The White House. (November de 2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf TRT Español. (22 de Septiembre de 2025). Carta de Maduro a Trump invita a "preservar paz con diálogo" y rechaza "fake news" de narcotráfico. Obtenido de TRT Español: https://www.trtespanol.com/article/cdae6966f705 Trump, D. (17 de December de 2025). @realDonaldTrump. Obtenido de Truth Social: https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115731908387416458 US Department of State. (7 de August de 2025). Nicolás Maduro Moros. Narcotics Rewards Program: Wanted. Obtenido de US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros Wells, I., & Blasey, L. (17 de November de 2025). US to designate Venezuela's Cartel de los Soles as terrorists. Obtenido de BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxr3w2464eo

Defense & Security
Paris, France, Europe, August 23 2025, demonstration in support of the African states of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger at Place de la République in Paris.

The Alliance of Sahel States launches a unified military force and strengthens regional security

by Nicholas Mwangi

A historic turning point in Sahelian sovereignty, as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger bolstered their regional security through a unified military force and in the same week held its second AES summit. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has taken a decisive step toward regional self-defense after officially launching a joint military force aimed at combating Islamist insurgency and terrorism across the Sahel. The force was inaugurated on December 20, 2025, during a ceremony held at an air base in Bamako, Mali’s capital. The ceremony was presided over by Mali’s Transitional President, Head of State, Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, and outgoing President of the AES, Army General Assimi Goïta. The event was the formal handover of the Unified Force of the AES banner, marking the operationalization of a long-declared commitment by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to jointly secure their territories’ sovereignty. The newly established force, known as the FU AES, brings together approximately 5,000 troops drawn from the three member states. It is designed to integrate air power, intelligence sharing, and coordinated ground operations to confront armed groups that have destabilized large parts of the Sahel for over a decade. Addressing the gathering, Malian General Aliou Boï Diarra delivered a deeply symbolic and emotional speech, underscoring the historical and moral significance of the banner. He described the banner as far more than a ceremonial object. “The standard that you are presenting to the unified AES force represents a memory, a will, an irreversible commitment. It profoundly affirms a certainty now deeply engraved in the hearts of our beloved peoples. This is indeed a truly historic and momentous act,” General Diarra said. Diarra declared that the banner embodied sacrifice and struggle rather than decoration: “This sacred standard is not merely a decorative symbol. It is the profound and enduring result of precious blood bravely shed, immense courage valiantly embraced, and fundamental truth profoundly rediscovered.” Paying tribute to the fallen, he added: “To our cherished martyrs, to all innocent civilians, and to the brave soldiers who have fallen in battle, I humbly pay a solemn and heartfelt tribute beneath the eternal snow. They did not die in vain.” Mali’s leader, General Goïta, in his own address, described the launch as a historic turning point for the Sahel. He began by saluting the defense leadership and troops of the region. “On this significant occasion, I would like to extend my sincere congratulations and profoundly salute the exceptional courage, unwavering professionalism, steadfast commitment, and resolute determination of the ministers of defense, the chiefs of general staff, and especially all the brave defense and security forces of the AES area for the remarkable achievements they have made in their relentless fight against armed terrorist groups,” he said. The AES president recalled that since the Niamey Mutual Initiative (NMI) declaration of July 6, 2024, joint military operations have already been underway, noting that they resulted in the neutralization of several terrorist leaders and the destruction of multiple insurgent sanctuaries. According to Goïta, “All these positive results were achieved thanks to meticulous planning, timely and effective intelligence sharing, and above all the comprehensive pooling of our collective efforts and resources.” He further announced key institutional steps consolidating the unified force, including the appointment of a new commander, the establishment of a central command post in the strategic city of Niamey, and the assignment of specialized battalions fully dedicated to AES operations. He stressed that the task ahead would require adaptability to the evolving tactics of armed groups. “It is now critically important for the new commander not only to anticipate the increasingly complex operating methods of terrorist groups, but above all to resolutely continue this crucial fight to secure the entire Sahel region and ensure lasting peace and stability.” General Goïta added that the conflict confronting the Sahel is multidimensional, “This war is not only military. It is also political, economic, and informational.” He identified what he described as three major threats facing Sahelian states: armed terrorist violence, economic terrorism, and media terrorism. In response, he noted that the confederation has adopted a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond battlefield operations. “We have taken measures to counter these threats not only by establishing this unified force, but also by creating AES Television, AES Radio, and AES print media,” he said, framing these platforms as tools to counter disinformation and psychological warfare. The military launch follows a series of symbolic and political moves that underline the bloc’s growing autonomy. Earlier in the year, the AES unveiled a new flag, representing the confederation’s shared identity and its intention to redefine political, economic, and security cooperation outside the shadow of French imperialism and Western neoliberal frameworks. Leaders of the bloc have repeatedly criticized past military partnerships with France and other Western powers, arguing that foreign interventions failed to bring peace while undermining national sovereignty. The AES summit Mali hosted a summit of the Alliance of Sahel States in the same week, which concluded on Tuesday, December 23. During the summit, Burkina Faso’s leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, was appointed as the new head of the Alliance of Sahel States. Following the meeting, the Alliance announced that the summit would be followed by a large-scale military operation. Earlier this year, the three countries also introduced a joint AES passport, a major step toward deeper integration. This move came after Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an organization they now openly describe as hostile. The launch of the unified force also takes place amid rising regional tensions. Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, both influential ECOWAS members, have been criticized by AES leaders and their supporters for what they see as counter revolutionary postures. In official and popular discourse within the Sahel, these countries are increasingly portrayed as attempting to contain or reverse the radical political shifts unfolding in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey. What is clear is that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are charting a new path, one that is redefining power, alliances, and resistance in the heart of West Africa.

Defense & Security
U.S. Navy Adm. Alvin Holsey, commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), provides remarks at the TRADEWINDS 25 (TW25) closing ceremony at Teteron Barracks in Teteron Bay, Trinidad and Tobago, May 8, 2025. U.S. Army National Guard photo by Spc. Astia

Imperialism by Invitation: Murder, Mafioso Politics and Caribbean-Venezuelan Futurity

by Zophia Edwards , Corey Gilkes , Tamanisha John

Amidst US bombs and lies about Venezuelan drug trafficking as a pretext for regime change, the subordinated position of Caribbean states’ economies plays a role in U.S. aggression. It is no exaggeration to say that for over half a millennium, the Caribbean has been a stage for imperial incursions. In the past two months, the US has increased its military presence in the Caribbean Sea, including carrying out an airstrike campaign, while claiming that these operations are necessary to protect US citizens from illicit drug trafficking allegedly occurring off the coast of Venezuela. As of November 15th, the US military has launched eleven deadly air strikes on small boats in Caribbean waters and eleven on South America’s Pacific Coast, killing over eighty people. In these operations, the US Navy also raided a tuna fishing boat, detaining the fisherfolk on board for several hours before releasing them.[1] To date, the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it publicly executed are trafficking drugs. These extrajudicial killings have struck fear into the hearts of millions of ordinary people across the region, especially the fisherfolk who depend upon traversing the sea for their livelihoods. Meanwhile, Caribbean countries have either blatantly come out in support of the imperial violence at their doorsteps or been hesitant to respond. When these attacks began, Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) as well as Guyana expressed enthusiastic support for US militaristic incursions and extrajudicial murders.[2] As tensions escalated, the Guyanese government attempted to backpedal from its original position. However, the T&T Prime Minister, Kamla Persad Bissessar, has maintained a pro-US stance. PM Persad Bissessar is on record saying, “I have no sympathy for traffickers, the US military should kill them all violently.”[3] This position by the T&T government was reiterated even after the US murdered two of its citizens, Chad Joseph and Rishi Samaroo, in these airstrike campaigns. T&T allowed the US warship, USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, to dock in the country’s capital between October 26-30 and for US military agents to “address shared threats like transnational crime and build resilience through training, humanitarian missions, and security efforts” on T&T soil.[4] The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) - the intergovernmental regional organization - has dragged its feet to take a position, waiting a whole month on October 18, to release a presser wherein it reaffirmed the region as a “zone of peace,” with Trinidad and Tobago excepting itself from this stance. The foot dragging is sinister when it is known for a fact that the US propaganda of conducting “anti-narcotics” operations is/are a ruse. These hostile US military aggressions in the Caribbean Sea and on South America’s Pacific Coast are part of a broader US imperial geopolitical strategy aimed at toppling the government of Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro. The aim, as Trump has publicly intimated,[5] is to get the Venezuelan government to grant the US more beneficial access to Venezuela’s resources. One might ask: Why are governments, like Trinidad and Tobago, enabling US imperial terror in the region? And why have CARICOM governments not taken an unequivocal anti-imperialist position? The answer lies in the subordinated position of these states’ economies within the global economy. Caribbean states are historically structured to be neoliberal, pro-imperial, and anti-democratic – while political elites are beholden to enacting external interests. Moreover, internal political dynamics – in terms of racial and class struggles – are also a factor, influencing the timing and intensity of these Caribbean governments’ responses to present US imperial terror. Debunking the Myth of the Venezuela Narco State The first order of business is dispelling the myth that Venezuela is a ‘narco-state.’ US officials have framed the current operations — boat strikes, deployments of destroyers and aircraft — as counter-narcotics efforts designed to stem the flow of illicit drugs from Venezuela to the US. However, the Caribbean route is not among the primary conduits for major volumes of cocaine and methamphetamines into the US. Most trafficking flows of narcotics to the US are overland, through Central America and via Pacific routes.[6] It is no surprise therefore that the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it has extrajudicially murdered in the Caribbean Sea or on South America’s coast are engaged in drug trafficking. Additionally, the scale and nature of force being used are far beyond what traditional interdiction operations require – with the Trump administration claiming that interdiction has not worked, hence deadly air strikes are necessary. In addition to the lack of evidence of a Venezuelan route being key to drug trafficking into the US, there is also no credible proof linking the Maduro government to organized drug trafficking, despite the Trump regime’s claims, which are parroted uncritically by many Caribbean media and politicians. Within the US’s own intelligence establishment, one report explicitly states: “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA [Tren de Agua] and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”[7] The report goes on to say: “Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services view TDA as a security threat and operate against it in ways that make it highly unlikely the two sides would cooperate in a strategic or consistent way.” These facts stand out, especially given the evidentiary long and sordid history of the US’s leading role in drug trafficking in the Americas, and the US as the #1 supplier of weapons to those involved in the global drug trade in the region. The US government’s real motive is to destabilize and topple the Maduro government in Venezuela, in favor of a regime that undermines Venezuela’s sovereignty. Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney and many others remind us that capitalist imperialism depends upon neocolonial puppet governments occupied by a predatory elite who facilitate accumulation by extractivism, dispossession, and exploitation. Positioned to usurp Maduro in Venezuela by imposition and not elections, is 2025 Nobel “Peace” Prize winner, María Corina Machado. Machado is a key US ally, Trump admirer, supporter of Israel and its bombing of Gaza, and an overall admirer of repressive regimes in Latin America – including El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Brazil’s former president, Jair Bolsonaro. Machado has been begging for foreign military intervention in Venezuela to remove the Maduro government while professing that her administration, if granted power through non-electoral means, intends to open up Venezuela’s doors to foreign exploiters. If the current iteration of US imperial antagonism in the region leads to regime change in Venezuela, the US is poised to have control over the resources in the southern Caribbean – namely Guyana and T&T – as well as on the South American Coast: again, namely Guyana and then Venezuela. This will give the US direct control over shipping routes in the region, as it prepares for a wider economic confrontation with China. Hence, these alleged “anti-narcotics” operations which have taken the lives of over eighty Caribbean and South American people, are just a smokescreen for deeper US geopolitical interests. Dependency and the Character of the State Caribbean states are disregarding the lives of the Venezuelan, Latin American, and their own Caribbean populations using external security narratives, largely because there is a true dictatorship of foreign capital in the region. As US Vice-President JD Vance let slip, places like the Caribbean countries were always intended to remain extractive workstations, not autonomous, functioning nations.…at all.[8] T&T, for example, has long been dependent on oil and gas extraction for the bulk of its national income. However, the country has been experiencing a decline in natural gas and crude oil production over the past decade and the country’s liquefaction complex and petrochemical plants producing ammonia, methanol, and other key exports – which depend upon gas input – have been suffering.[9] Combined with the collapse in energy prices in 2014, this situation has produced a decline in foreign exchange inflows and government revenues.[10] With the demand for US dollars far outstripping the supply, T&T is facing one of the most severe foreign exchange crises in the Caribbean, causing uproar across the working, middle, and upper classes of society alike.[11] As such, the T&T government is desperate for the resuscitation of its flailing oil and gas sector. The T&T government spent decades developing a “Dragon” gas deal, where Shell would lead operations that funnel gas located in Venezuelan waters to T&T, where it can be exported as LNG. This deal, considered by the T&T state to be the lifeline that would save the local economy from collapse, has become a weapon in Washington, DC’s arsenal against Venezuela. In the midst of the extra-judicial killings in the region, the US has revoked licenses approving the deal and re-approved them under new terms meant to ensure the involvement and profits of US companies. The continued structural dependency of T&T on foreign capital and imperial markets renders its misleaders susceptible to these coercive measures to ensure that Caribbean states align with US capitalist imperialist policies. Economic coercion is an important part of the context for Kamla Persad Bissessar’s support for imperialism, but her position cannot be traced to this alone. Persad Bissessar and the educated elite and comprador class she represents come out of some of the “best” primary, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions locally and internationally. Are these elites supposed to provide independent, critical thinkers who would decolonize “post” colonial societies? Are they only unwitting agents of imperialism or are they willing participants? From the time of many states' flag independence, foreign interventions have secured for the local Caribbean elites’ (or comprador classes) party longevity and/or political dominance, and/or visas and dual citizenships, and/or the ability to accumulate wealth for themselves by exploiting the people and land within their countries. As Frantz Fanon’s “Wretched of the Earth” and Walter Rodney’s “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” detailed, these elites lack the sort of creativity and vitality to independently develop into an industrial bourgeoisie. They therefore turn to propping up foreign entities and dependent economic relations. Consequently, Caribbean state-making and the establishment of territorial statuses in the context of US and European imperialist capitalism has reproduced institutions that are unresponsive to Caribbean people. Whether through hopes of securing or acquiring foreign investment, or due to rank economic blackmail that threatens foreign investments elites through sanctions and other restrictions – many Caribbean states choose to serve US and Western imperialism as an almost “practical” strategy of economic “stability”. However, such imperial service only guarantees continued underdevelopment and economic beggary. Herein, T&T’s misleadership is positioning the country as a beggar to the US and reinforcing US sanctions on Venezuela, which makes it hard for Venezuela to sell its own oil and gas to states that need it, including T&T. Worse still, the US does not want China to remedy this situation between Venezuela and Trinidad. So not only are some Caribbean leaders and party supporters encouraging naked US imperialism cloaked in the deceptive language and rhetoric of “anti-drug trafficking” and “protecting the region,” they are also upholding a condition of dependency of the region on the US, advancing US attempts to subvert Chinese influence in the region, and in the process supporting direct attacks on states in the region’s right to self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover, local internal racial and class dynamics are also shaping the timing and intensity of Caribbean governments responses to US aggression in the region. In the post-WWII construction of party politics in T&T, middle-class parties carried forward the colonial divisions between the predominantly African and Indian segments of the population that multiracial worker movements had fought so hard to overcome. Kamla Persad Bissessar, as leader of the party popularly known as the one representing “Indian interests,” is advancing and exploiting this racial wedge to garner support for her pro-imperial policies. This party has actively engaged in criminalizing poor African communities as well as Venezuelan migrants, while downplaying the fact that the many poor and marginalized Indians are similarly caught in the net of US imperialism. Persad Bissessar and her party affiliates’ own ideas of “purity” mixed with class notions of entitlement merge with the supremacist foundations of US local and foreign politics. It’s bad enough that a Prime Minister — a lawyer — supports extra-judicial murders in violation of International Law, but how does one align with a political ideology that produced people like Senator James Reed, who, circa 1919, openly dismissed dealing with “a nigger from Liberia, a nigger from Honduras, a nigger from India…each (having) votes equal to that of the great United States.” Before one argues that this was long ago, consider what right-wing political commentator Ann Coulter told Vivek Ramaswamy why she’d never vote for him regardless of how his views match hers. We acknowledge that political leaders, seeking re-election, opt for the path of least resistance which in this case means not offending the mighty United States. But this cannot just be naïveté. It is in this context that Kamla Persad Bissessar has broken with even the basic understanding of what CARICOM is, and is astonishingly peddling the idea that each island seeking its own interest is somehow more progressive than banding together as one bloc! In other words, she and those who support her stance have embraced regional colonial divide-and-conquer tactics. The US has always stood in opposition to a unified body in the region. As then US diplomat Charles Whittaker put it: “A strongly federated West Indies might be detrimental to American interests.” As such, they undermined the West Indian Federation in the 1950s and sabotaged the New International Economic Order throughout the 1970s. The Caribbean misleaders proclaiming disunity as strength subscribe to political ideologies that interlock with a particular brand of politics in the West that has been openly Euro-nationalist and imperialist. Hence, at a time when many resource-rich countries are forming partnerships and alternative trading and security blocs, the political misleaders in the Caribbean calling for further fragmentation should warrant deeper investigation. Media, Political Misleadership, and How the State Weaponizes “Security” It is important to clarify that crime does exist in the Caribbean region, just as it exists elsewhere throughout the world. The size of Caribbean countries are also important to note, because though it is true that the amount of drugs flowing through the Caribbean are low relative to the global drug trade, the little that does pass through is indeed wreaking havoc, given the geographical and population sizes of these countries. The increase in guns and violent crime associated with the global drug trade in places like T&T has become a critical factor affecting everyday life for ordinary people there. This context has enabled the T&T government to justify and legitimate US military aggression in the name of “fighting” the drug trade in the region. Thus, most people cheering on the US military are simply desperate for a sense of safety. However, it is precisely this need for safety that is being weaponized — to increase unsafe conditions as new US-produced military weaponry and technologies become even more commonplace in the region. There is a direct and indirect connection between (geo)political and economic decisions made by successive generations of ruling elites in the Caribbean, and North American narratives of crime, which have – going back to the 19th century in some countries – allowed (and made space for) imperial aggression in the region. Over a number of decades, the United States has taken advantage of crises caused by rising violent crime to pursue its own security interests – even though rises in violent crime in the region is directly linked to US imported and manufactured weapons, and US consumer demands for items that the US state deems “illegal.” To establish and maintain US dominance — and the accompanying cheap labor[12] from the surplus populations which exist in a region notorious for high levels of unemployment and underemployment — the US has deployed constant applications of violence, packaged as maintaining “law and order” in the drive to “progress” and “catch up” with the West. It’s no coincidence that modern policing began in the Caribbean as militarized slave patrols in St Lucia.[13] Then, like now, the purpose is the same: protect wealth from the workers who created it. However, the real effectiveness lay in conditioning the exploited to adopt the values of the elites. To date, Western elite definitions of progress and development for the wider working people in the Caribbean region dominate, even as the dependent status of Caribbean economies make this impossible for the majority of the people in the region. Thus, US reliance on expanding its military apparatus for economic growth is justified through the construction of permanent threats that the US supposedly has to “defend” itself against. Another such narrative, like the need to “promote democracy” in Venezuela, is also within this vein of western imperialist propaganda. The US and western imperialists maintain that Venezuela is not a democracy, despite the presence of robust, active citizen’s assemblies and communes, as well as elections that occur under the presence of election observers – including from the US. Nonetheless, the western imperialist narrative maintains that Venezuela is not democratic and thus their people can be bombed for some purported “greater good.” Meanwhile, these same imperialist narratives call genocidal Israel a democracy deserving of “protection” and “defense,” as it exterminates Palestinians and decimates Palestinian land. This propaganda – not analysis based on any facts – readily frames western imperialism as “defensive,” “pro-security,” and “pro-safety” and those not in line with it as “aggressive” and “undemocratic.”[14] In lockstep with imperialists, local political figures too have long used or encouraged the use of dehumanizing language when discussing criminalized people and communities. When the T&T Prime Minister, Police Commissioner, and other influential authority figures refer to human beings as “carcasses,”[15] “pests,” “fleas” or “cockroaches,” the message sent is that these are not citizens or members of society and therefore, not worthy of certain basic courtesies and legal obligations, including the right to life. When this sort of thinking is widespread, issues of social justice fall by the wayside. Instead, heavy, often murderous attacks on real or alleged drug runners who come from poor, precarious, vulnerable communities become justified while the power brokers, bankers and their institutions[16] that launder money do not get so much as a paper weight dropped on them. Likewise, the local and international media is playing a significant role in the unfolding crisis. Save for a few columnists, the local media has been disgraceful, little more than sycophantic stenographers for egregious narratives coming from Washington. Initially, the local media conducted little to no critical research into the many available sources discrediting[17] false allegations connecting the Maduro administration to drug cartels. They parroted language that criminalized the victims of the attacks without presenting any evidence proving that they were guilty of violating any laws. They were silent on the voluminous literature connecting the CIA and the US military to colonial land and resource grabs that violate international and local laws.[18] They also proliferated the myth that Nicolas Maduro “lost” or “rigged” elections in Venezuela, contrary to information provided by election observers. The lack of critical and independent journalism is a clear dereliction of duty, supporting imperialist narratives and providing cover for extrajudicial murder. Conclusion The neoliberal era shortly after many states’ independence extended the life of bourgeois colonial thought in the Caribbean, interpreting the human “firstly, [as] a figure that is homo economics, and, secondly, a figure that can only operate within the field of white supremacy and capitalism.”[19] In this environment, Caribbean resistance weakened, having to establish itself alongside the intensification of neoliberal processes – foremost amongst them being state repression and militarist aggression supported by the US hegemon – so that Caribbean peoples could be definitively integrated into a Western capitalist system as “bottom labor-exporting economies,” whose labor commodification was masked by discourses on ‘growth’ and ‘development.'[20] It is in analyzing the characteristics of Caribbean states and governance within them – including how they interpret “development” – that helps us to answer why so many states elect to do imperial service: Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) states are fundamentally anti-democratic with no real regard for Caribbean life within them. The T&T government’s deliberate facilitation of US imperial aggression in the region mirrors the position of several African states. The post-genocide Tutsi-dominated regime of Paul Kagame in Rwanda, leveraging its image as a victim of colonialism and genocide, justifies domestic repression of Hutus and expansionist military ventures in neighboring states, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo in close alliance with the United States, France, and Israel. In exchange for U.S. and western military, financial, and political backing, Rwanda facilitates imperial access to Congo’s mineral wealth — coltan, gold, and tin — channeling profits both to Western capital and Rwandan elites. Thus, Rwanda functions as a pro-U.S. imperial proxy, advancing the global system of resource extraction and accumulation on behalf of Western powers. In addition, Rwanda along with a growing list of African states, including Ghana, Eswatini, and South Sudan have accepted the terms of bilateral agreements with the US government to receive people who have been criminalized and deported under the Trump regime’s attack on communities racialized as non-white in the US.[21] By enlisting themselves to be locations for the outsourcing of US racist incarceration policies, they are enabling the geographical expansion of the US military industrial prison complex to more and more corners of the world. These Caribbean and African misleaders will go down in history as active enablers and facilitators of the very imperial greed, oppression, and exploitation that the masses have been resisting since the days of direct colonial domination. Only invigorated mass resistance that takes power away from Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) elites engaged in imperial service can rectify these conditions. Global Africans in the Caribbean and around the world must claim power and reclaim movement histories that fought back against capitalist imperialism. Originally published in Pambazuka News and republished in Black Agenda Report References [1] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/venezuela-says-u-s-warship-raided-a-… [2] https://www.caribbeanlife.com/trinidad-guyana-us-moves-venezuela/ [3] https://newsday.co.tt/2025/09/03/kamla-says-kill-all-traffickers-as-tru… [4] https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/26/world/us-warship-docks-trinidad-venezeul… [5] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/17/trump-maduro-venezuela [6] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2025.ht… [7] https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U1bd-D1PIZg&pp=ygUZIGogZCB2YW5jZSBnbG9i… [9] https://www.finance.gov.tt/2020/03/16/effect-of-the-oil-price-collapse-… [10] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14271.pdf; https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/06/04/Trinidad-and-T…. [11] Chamber of Industry and Commerce 2025; University of the West Indies Campus News 2024. [12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAJgGFtF44A [13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kavkiH9YHag&pp=ygUaanVsaWFuIGdvIHBvbGlj… [14] See, for example, the Trilateral Commission’s “The Crisis of Democracy” in which influential thinkers who shaped US policy complained that decolonising countries were exercising too much democracy, which needed to be contained, leading to the proliferation of NGOs all over the peripheralized world. [15] https://trinidadexpress.com/news/local/kamla-state-resources-won-t-be-wasted/article_5d0c61fd-d633-4dd3-8e3e-6995a454c774.html [16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcpZPGOksp0 [17] https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025NationalDrugThreatA…; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [18] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/455652.Dark_Alliance; https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/1628-whiteout?srsltid=AfmBOor…; https://www.betterworldbooks.com/product/detail/the-politics-of-heroin-…; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxbW0CCuT7E [19] Bogues, Anthony. 2023. “Sylvia Wynter: Constructing Radical Caribbean Thought.” BIM: Arts for the 21st Century 11(1): 33–41, p.37. [20] Henry, Paget. 2000. “Caribbean Marxism: After the Neoliberal and Linguistic Turns.” In Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy, Africana Thought, New York: Routledge, 221-46, p.228. [21] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/more-african-nations-are-receiving-t…

Diplomacy
Flag USA and China on Computer Chip . Global chip shortage crisis and China-United States trade war concept.

Leading States in the Race for Artificial Intelligence in the Current International System

by Danna Fernanda Mena Navarro

1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/artificial-intelligence.html

Defense & Security
Dugu beach, Donghae-myeon, Nam-gu, Pohang-si, South Korea - October 1, 2021 : South Korean Navy Jangbogo submarine at Dogu Coast for 2021 Armed Forces Day

Development of South Korea’s Submarines and Future Prospects

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

In the 21st century, the maritime security environment in Northeast Asia is changing more rapidly than ever, with information superiority and covert operational capabilities at sea emerging as core components of national security. At the heart of this shift lies the submarine force, which possesses both strategic deterrence and surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities. As China, Japan, and North Korea advance their submarine technology, South Korea finds itself in a situation demanding independent maritime strategic assets to counter these developments. The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) submarine force, which initially relied on foreign technology, has now grown into a submarine technology powerhouse capable of indigenous design and construction. The introduction of the KSS-III Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine, in particular, has equipped South Korea with SLBM operational capability and advanced AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion) and electric propulsion technology, establishing a strategic-level submarine force.  This technological advancement not only strengthens national defense but also elevates the international status of the Korean defense industry, leading to enhanced export competitiveness. Concurrently, amidst the military expansion of surrounding countries, the need for nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)—which offer far greater strategic survivability and sustained operational capability—is being raised in South Korea. Despite the high cost, the SSN is a strategic asset that provides overwhelming stealth, range, and operational endurance in the long run.  This article will comprehensively examine the importance and technical characteristics of submarines, followed by an analysis of South Korea's submarine force development, its international standing, and comparisons with neighboring countries. Furthermore, it will explore the implications of the nuclear submarine acquisition debate for South Korea's future security strategy. 1. The Importance of Submarines  The submarine is an extremely important weapon system in the defense industry from strategic, technological, and economic perspectives.  1) Strategic Deterrence and Control: Submarines act as a strategic deterrent to covertly check the enemy's maritime activities and protect a nation's sea lines of communication and security. The strategic deterrence of a submarine is based on its 'stealth' and 'lethality'.  - Stealth (Psychological Pressure): A submarine can move and be deployed secretly underwater without being exposed to the enemy, placing psychological pressure on the enemy's maritime operations and strategic weapon deployment during peacetime. Because it is extremely difficult for an attacking enemy to predict or neutralize the submarine's location, the enemy always harbors the fear of a potential strike. - Lethality (Retaliatory Capability): If the enemy attempts an actual invasion or provocation, the submarine can conduct a sudden and precise strike with high-power weapons like torpedoes or missiles. Specifically, a Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN), equipped with strategic weapons like the SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile), provides a 'second-strike capability' to retaliate against the opponent's core targets at any time. - Maximizing Deterrence: The mere existence of strategic submarines maximizes the 'psychological deterrent effect', making the enemy's political and military leaders hesitate to initiate an attack. Due to the nature of submarines being covertly deployed anywhere in the ocean, the enemy is constantly exposed to threats, making it difficult to attempt military provocations recklessly. In essence, the core principle of strategic deterrence is the creation of a 'deterrence effect through uncertainty', combining the submarine's covert and unpredictable operational methods, its powerful striking capabilities, and the psychological fear it instills.  2) Enhancing National Defense and Economic Effects: The development of advanced submarines is central to a nation's naval power. It enhances defense self-reliance by securing indigenous design and construction technologies and promises enormous economic benefits through overseas exports. - Asymmetric Warfare Power: With its stealth and lethality, the submarine wields the most potent deterrent force and asymmetric warfare effect among all maritime forces. When surface fleet power is relatively insufficient, an advanced submarine can effectively check large enemy vessels or aircraft carriers and deny access to maritime domains. - Advanced Mission Capabilities: Advanced submarines are deployed for various missions, including long-duration submerged operations, strategic surprise, and special warfare support, utilizing cutting-edge technologies like next-generation guided missiles and sophisticated sonar/navigation systems that make detection and tracking difficult. - Increased Defense Industry Competitiveness: When advanced submarines are developed and operated with indigenous technology, it not only boosts the nation's defense industry capacity and technological self-reliance but also significantly increases related industry development and economic effects. In short, the advanced submarine is the qualitative and strategic linchpin of national naval power, encompassing defense, offense, intelligence deterrence, and the securing of cutting-edge technology. 3) Driving Advancement in Overall Defense Technology: The development of highly sophisticated weapon systems (e.g., SLBMs, advanced sonar, low-noise technology, etc.) also promotes the advancement of overall cutting-edge defense technologies. - SLBM Development: Developing SLBMs is not just missile technology; it complexly requires materials engineering to withstand the extreme pressure of the underwater launch environment, precise guidance systems, and miniaturized propulsion technology. The technology secured during this process naturally transfers to other fields, such as space launch vehicles and precision strike weapons. - Advanced Sonar Technology: The process of increasing the precision of underwater acoustic detection advances capabilities in signal processing, AI-based pattern recognition, and big data analysis. Such technology can also be utilized in civilian sectors, including marine resource exploration, underwater communication, and seismic detection systems. - Low-Noise Technology Development: The ripple effect of low-noise technology development is even greater. Vibration reduction in propulsion systems, special hull coatings, and hydrodynamic optimal design enhance the competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Propeller noise reduction technology, in particular, contributes to improving the fuel efficiency of commercial vessels and protecting the marine ecosystem. Furthermore, the process of developing these advanced technologies fosters high-level research personnel, strengthens industry-academia-research cooperation networks, and promotes the domestic production of materials, components, and equipment. Consequently, the single weapon system of a submarine has the effect of elevating the nation's overall scientific and technological capabilities to the next level. 4) High Competitiveness and International Credibility: The limited number of nations capable of manufacturing submarines ensures high competitiveness and international credibility in the global defense market. Currently, only about 12 countries are capable of independently designing and building submarines: the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, India, Japan, and South Korea. This technical rarity offers several strategic advantages. - Favorable Negotiation Power: Due to the high barrier to entry, a limited supplier market is formed, securing favorable negotiation power during exports. - Proof of Overall Defense Technology: Submarine construction capability serves as proof of comprehensive defense technology, raising the credibility of other weapon systems. South Korea, in particular, has demonstrated strengths in technology transfer and localization by successfully achieving domestic production after introducing German technology. This establishes South Korea as an attractive partner for middle-power countries that desire advanced submarines but find self-development difficult. The interest shown by nations like Indonesia and the Philippines in South Korean submarines is within this context. - Sustainable Economic Effects and Strategic Ties: Submarine projects lead to long-term follow-up businesses, including maintenance, upgrades, and crew training, ensuring sustained economic effects and strengthening strategic ties between nations. As such, the submarine is considered a core capability of the defense industry in terms of national security, industrial competitiveness, technological innovation, and economic benefits. 2. Technical Characteristics of Submarines The technical characteristics of submarines can be broadly divided into three key domains: stealth and survivability, propulsion and power systems, and weapons and combat systems. 2.1. Stealth & Survivability This is the technology area most directly tied to the fundamental purpose of submarines. In underwater environments, radar (radio-wave detection) cannot be used, so detection relies on sonar (sound-wave detection). While radar can detect surface targets from up to 500 km, sonar detection of a quiet, stealthy submarine is typically limited to around 30 km. - Acoustic Quieting Technology is essential for avoiding enemy sonar detection. Submarine noise reduction involves suppressing mechanical noise (machinery vibration), flow noise, structural vibration, and propeller noise through an integrated set of technologies. This is not just a matter of equipment but a comprehensive quieting process that spans the entire lifecycle of a submarine—from design and manufacturing to operation and maintenance. - Non-Acoustic Stealth Technology minimizes physical signatures other than sound—such as magnetic fields, heat/infrared emissions, radar/optical reflections, and surface disturbances—to prevent detection by non-acoustic sensors. Figure 1. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) sonar system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.2. Propulsion & Power System This system is key to determining a submarine's range and submerged operational endurance. It is broadly divided into conventional (non-nuclear) and nuclear propulsion. 1) Conventional Submarines (Diesel-Electric) - Diesel-Electric System: This is the traditional method where a diesel engine powers a generator to charge batteries, and an electric motor provides propulsion. It is favored for its cost-effectiveness and quietness, making it the standard for small and medium-sized submarines. However, because the diesel engine requires oxygen from the atmosphere, the submarine must periodically surface or use a snorkel, which severely limits continuous submerged endurance (to a maximum of about 3 days). Submarines equipped with the latest Lithium-ion batteries can extend this submerged time up to 7 days. - Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP): An innovative technology that produces power underwater without relying on an external oxygen supply. The main types include the Fuel Cell (PEMFC), Stirling Engine, and Closed-Cycle Diesel. AIP is used in conjunction with the diesel-electric system and significantly extends submerged endurance, often up to 3 weeks. Because it is cheaper than nuclear power while offering high strategic value, many nations have adopted it. - Hybrid Propulsion System (Cutting-Edge Technology): The integrated operation of three systems—the diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion), and Lithium-ion batteries—allows for continuous submerged operation for up to 4 weeks. South Korea's Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III) utilizes the integrated operation of these three systems: a diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP, and Lithium-ion batteries. Excluding nuclear power, the current cutting-edge technology is considered to be the Fuel Cell AIP + Lithium-ion battery hybrid system. Each propulsion system is selected based on operational range, mission sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and technological sophistication. South Korea is actively pursuing the development of next-generation submarines that combine both AIP and Lithium-ion battery technologies. However, the maximum continuous submerged endurance (up to 4 weeks) is only achievable when operating at low speeds (5–10 knots, or approx. 9–18 km/h). When operating at maximum speed (around 20 knots, or approx. 37 km/h), the battery consumption is extremely high, causing the submerged time to sharply decrease: - Older Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for only 1–2 hours. - Li-ion/AIP Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for 3–6 hours. After high-speed maneuvering, the submarine requires snorkeling for recharging, which significantly increases the risk of detection by the enemy. Figure 2. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) lithium battery system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 3. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) fuel cell AIP system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2) Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSN/SSBN) Nuclear-powered submarines use nuclear fission reactors to generate steam, which drives turbines and provides virtually unlimited propulsion. Because they do not require refueling for months, their submerged endurance and operational range are effectively unlimited, enabling them to operate anywhere in the world. Only a small group of states—including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and India—possess such submarines. Nuclear propulsion is used in both strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN: nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN: fast attack submarines powered by nuclear reactors). However, nuclear submarines are extremely expensive to build and operate, require large hull sizes (especially SSBNs), and demand sophisticated reactor noise-management technologies. Compared to conventional submarines, nuclear submarines can operate at much higher sustained speeds for long periods. Their average top speed is typically 25–30 knots (46–55 km/h), while specialized Soviet/Russian designs such as the Alfa-class have demonstrated speeds exceeding 40 knots in trials. This makes nuclear submarines more than twice as fast as most conventional submarines, with the added advantage of being able to maintain high speeds for extended durations without limitations. 2.3. Weaponry & Combat Systems This category encompasses the submarine’s offensive capabilities and intelligence-gathering functions. Submarine weapons and combat platforms can be divided into four major types: 2.3.1. Launch Weapons Launch weapons are categorized as follows: - Torpedoes: Underwater weapons fired from a submarine’s horizontal launch tubes, used to attack underwater targets such as other submarines, surface ships, and mines. - Missiles: This includes anti-ship missiles (ASM) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) designed to strike surface or land targets. Some missiles are launched through Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). - Nuclear Weapons: The primary example is the SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile), equipped with a nuclear warhead. These form the core of a nation’s strategic nuclear deterrence capability. Table 1. Types of Launch Weapons Table 2. Ballistic/Guided Missiles Table 3. Submarine-Launched Weapon Systems Figure 4. Weapon systems of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III): Torpedoes/Mines (Horizontal Launch) and Missiles (Vertical Launch) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 5. Vertical Launch System of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.2. Underwater Drones / Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV/AUV) Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are unmanned underwater platforms deployed from submarines. They can perform missions such as intelligence collection, reconnaissance, mine detection, and even underwater attacks. In the latest technology trends, AUVs serve as important auxiliary assets for submarines, used for tasks such as detecting specific targets, locating and neutralizing naval mines, and tracking enemy submarines. Figure 6. Combat Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.3. Electronic Warfare Systems A submarine’s electronic warfare (EW) systems defend against enemy detection through electronic surveillance countermeasures. By transmitting deceptive or disruptive signals, these systems help conceal the submarine’s presence and significantly enhance survivability. Capabilities such as electronic deception, electronic jamming, and counter sonar/radar measures enable the submarine to evade enemy tracking and maintain strategic advantage. In addition, electronic attack (EA) capabilities can inflict direct damage on enemy military assets by disrupting or degrading their electronic systems. 2.3.4. Naval Mines Naval mines are explosive devices used by submarines to block enemy sea routes or hinder the approach of surface vessels. Submarines can deploy underwater mines or launch them from dedicated systems, allowing them to disrupt maritime traffic and defend against the movement of hostile fleets through area denial tactics. 3. Economic Impact of Submarine Strategy Submarine capabilities are not only crucial for military security but also represent a high-value industry that generates substantial direct and indirect economic effects for the nation. 3.1. Direct Industrial Impact (Manufacturing and Employment) Submarine construction is a highly technology-intensive, large-scale project, creating significant economic effects for the shipbuilding and defense industries: • Development of high-value shipbuilding: Submarines require extremely high precision and complex construction within much tighter spaces than commercial ships. The construction process itself represents the pinnacle of shipbuilding technology, directly enhancing the competitiveness and qualitative growth of the shipbuilding industry. • Job creation: Building a single submarine involves thousands of workers over several years, from design and component production to final assembly and sea trials, creating a large number of highly skilled technical jobs. • Activation of component and partner industries: Submarines consist of numerous precision components (sonar systems, propulsion units, special alloys, batteries, etc.), which stimulates supply chains largely composed of small and medium-sized defense companies and elevates technological capabilities across the sector. 3.2. Indirect Economic Impact (Security and Exports) The existence of a submarine fleet generates invisible economic benefits and opportunities: • Reduction of national security costs: Submarines are one of the most effective tools of asymmetric deterrence — a military strategy where a country at a disadvantage in conventional forces or numbers neutralizes an adversary’s attack intentions and deters war through unique and unpredictable means. Maintaining submarine capabilities helps prevent potential economic damages in crises (trade disruptions, destruction of industrial facilities) and raises the cost of potential aggression, effectively reducing national security expenditures. • Protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs): As a highly trade-dependent nation, Korea relies critically on maritime routes. Submarines deter hostile naval forces threatening these routes during crises and protect major trade arteries, ensuring the continuity of economic activity. • Opportunities for defense exports (K-Defense): o Demonstrating Korea’s ability to independently design, build, and operate submarines (Dosan Ahn Changho-class / Jangbogo-III KSS-III) establishes technological credibility in global markets. o This capability generates high-value defense export opportunities, not only for the submarines themselves but also for related components, maintenance, and training systems (Korea has already exported submarines to Southeast Asia). In conclusion, submarine capabilities serve as a form of national security insurance while fostering domestic advanced technology industries and opening export markets, providing significant economic value as a future growth engine. 4. History of South Korea’s Submarine Forces Although the history of the Republic of Korea Navy’s submarines is relatively short, it has made significant leaps in both independent technological development and force enhancement. The following outlines the chronological development and progress of Korea’s submarine forces. Figure 7. Timeline of Submarine Acquisition and Operations of the Republic of Korea. Note: SSM: Submersible Ship Midget (small submarine), KSS: Korea Submarine System (the systematic development plan for the ROK Navy’s submarine force) 4.1. Early Stage (1975–1990): Direct Acquisition of Cosmos-class and Foundation of Submarine Forces Starting in 1975, the ROK Navy acquired seven small Italian-made Cosmos-class submarines (70-ton class) for intelligence missions and special operations, laying the foundation for Korea’s underwater capabilities. These submarines were primarily used for special operations, such as special forces infiltration, mine-laying, and intelligence gathering, rather than as conventional warships. Crew members of the Cosmos-class submarines later became key personnel in the development of the Dolphin-class indigenous submarines in the early 1980s. 4.2. Formative Stage (1983–1991): The Dolphin-class Small Submarine Era In the beginning in 1977, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) started developing a submarine modeled after Italy’s Cosmos-class. Construction took place at Tacoma Korea’s Masan Shipyard, and a total of three submarines were commissioned starting in 1983. This marked Korea’s first domestically built submarines, and the experience gained became the foundation for developing South Korea’s own underwater weapons. Based on operational results from the first submarine delivered in 1984, the second and third units were designed and built, being commissioned in 1990 and 1991, with reinforced pressure hulls and improved armament: SSM-051 1985 commissioned, 2003 decommissioned, SSM-052 1990 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned, SSM-053 1991 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned. The experience with the Dolphin-class played a critical role in advancing domestic submarine construction technology, serving as the stepping stone for the introduction and deployment of medium- to large-sized submarines. Table 4. Specifications of the Dolphin-class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) 4.3. Development Stage (1992–2006): Introduction and Localization of the Jangbogo-class (Jangbogo-I) In 1987, the ROK Navy signed a contract with the German company HDW for three Type 209 submarines (license for design acquisition), officially launching the Jangbogo-class (KSS-I) 1,200-ton program. Among these, one submarine was delivered as a complete unit from Germany in 1992, while the other two were assembled and constructed at Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering’s Okpo shipyard using imported German parts, delivered in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Subsequently, six additional submarines were built, bringing the total to nine in service by 2001. This program was not merely an import project; the core goal was to transfer German technology and secure domestic assembly and construction capabilities. It laid the foundation for Korea’s submarine technology independence and advanced development. Leveraging the experience gained from constructing the Jangbogo-class, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) signed a contract in 2011 to build three 1,400-ton submarines for Indonesia. Known as the DSME1400, these submarines are named the Nagapasa-class in the Indonesian Navy, marking Korea’s advancement in export capabilities. Table 5. Specifications of the Jangbogo-class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki). Note: A batch refers to a group of submarines of the same model built in series, with incremental performance improvements applied in each production run. Table 6. Development Stages of the Jangbogo-Class Submarine 4.4. Leap Period (2007–2020): Son Won-il Class (Jangbogo-II) and AIP Technology In 2000, the Republic of Korea Navy signed a contract with Germany’s HDW to acquire three Type-214 submarines under a design-license arrangement, launching a full-scale 1,800-ton Son Won-il–class program with Hyundai Heavy Industries. The first submarine, Son Won-il, was delivered in 2007, and an additional six submarines were subsequently built by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). The key feature of the Son Won-il class is its AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system, which uses fuel cells to allow submerged operations for 2–3 weeks without surfacing. Construction was divided between Hanwha Ocean (formerly DSME) and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. The vessels are named Son Won-il, Jeong Ji, An Jung-geun, Kim Dae-geon, Hong Beom-do, Yu Gwan-sun, Yun Bong-gil, Ahn Chang-ho, and Baekdusan. Table 7. Specifications of the Son Won-il Class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) Table 8. Development Stages of the Son Won-il-Class Submarine   Over time, the armament and electronic systems have progressively advanced. Below is a simplified cross-sectional diagram of the HDW Type 214, which was used as a reference for the construction of the Son Won-il class submarines. The diagram helps to easily understand the complex internal structure by showing the main components. Here, the Fuel Cell Plant represents the AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) technology. Figure 8. Simplified cross-section of the Type 214 Submarine (Source: TKMS) Figure 9. Cross-section of the Son Won-il-class Submarine (Source: Defense Mirror) 4.5. Independent Period (2021–Present): Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class (Jangbogo-III) Indigenous Design Achievements of Complete Domestic Design In December 2012, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) signed a contract with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) for the construction of two Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class submarines. The contract amount for the two submarines was approximately 1.675 trillion KRW (1.14 billion USD). The project was based on the construction experience of the Jangbogo-class and Son Won-il-class submarines, as well as the technology transferred from HDW and the experience in developing the DSME-1400 submarine (Nagapasa-class submarine) based on the Type 209 design. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho (launched in August 2021) is the first submarine fully designed, built, and equipped with its own weapon systems by South Korea. It has a displacement of 3,000 tons, making it a large submarine. It is the first in the world to be equipped with lithium-ion batteries, enabling long-term submerged operations without the need for an AIP system. Strategic Weapon Deployment Capability The most notable feature of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class is the vertical launch system (VLS) with 6 launchers (Batch-II will have 10 launchers), which allows the operation of the Hyunmoo-4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This capability is considered the most powerful strategic strike capability among non-nuclear nations. Currently, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho, Kim Jong-seo, and Yun Bong-gil have been commissioned, with a total of 9 submarines planned: 3 from Batch-I, 3 from Batch-II, and 3 from Batch-III. Table 9. Specifications of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki)   The following is information on the improvement projects for Batch 2 and Batch 3. Table 10. Development Stages of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine   Over time, the missile payload and electronic systems continue to evolve. Below is a cross-sectional diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarine, including a comparison of its size with the North Korean Romeo-class and the German Type 214 submarines. It also includes the proposed diagram by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) for the BrahMos missile-equipped version, which was part of their bid for the Indian next-generation submarine construction project. Figure 10. Cross-sectional Diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class Submarine (Source: Naval News) 4.6. Comparison of 3 Generations of ROK Submarines Table 11. Development Stages of South Korean Submarines 5. Exports and International Status The history of South Korean submarines follows a trajectory of introduction, indigenization, technological accumulation, advancement, and international expansion. In 2011, South Korea became the first Asian country to export submarines by selling three Jangbogo-class derivative Nagapasa-class submarines to Indonesia for 1.1 billion USD. Currently, South Korea owns 18 submarines, making it the 8th largest submarine-owning country in the world. When it comes to conventional (diesel-electric) submarines, South Korea is regarded as one of the top global powers, along with Germany and Japan. Current Submarine Power Rankings 1. United States (68 nuclear submarines) - Overwhelming leader 2. Russia (45 nuclear submarines + 20+ diesel submarines) 3. China (12 nuclear submarines + 50+ diesel submarines) 4. United Kingdom (11 nuclear submarines) - Entirely nuclear-powered submarines 5. France (10 nuclear submarines + diesel) 6. India (2 nuclear submarines + 15 diesel submarines) 7. Japan (22 diesel submarines) 8. South Korea (18 diesel submarines) 9. Germany (6 diesel submarines, export power) 10. Sweden (5 diesel submarines, technological powerhouse) Detailed Classification by Country A. Nuclear Submarine Exclusives B. Nuclear + Conventional Submarine C. Conventional Submarine   The following are the rankings of the leading countries in conventional submarine exports: 1. Germany - 100 years of tradition, top exporter 2. Japan - Highest technological capabilities 3. South Korea - Only country with VLS/SLBM capability 4. Sweden - Specializes in stealth technology 5. France - Combines nuclear and diesel capabilities The following compares the key features of export submarines from each country. Table 12. South Korean KSS-III Competitor Submarines Export Competitiveness Evaluation Top Exporting Countries 1. Germany - Type 209/214 series, more than 100 units exported 2. France - Scorpène, 16+ units (additional orders in progress) 3. South Korea - 3 units exported, actively competing in various tenders Latest Trends • Lithium-ion Batteries: South Korea (Jang Yeong-sil class), Japan (Taigei class), France (Scorpène Evolved) • VLS (Vertical Launch System): South Korea (SLBM), Sweden (Cruise Missiles) • Stealth Technology: Germany (Diamond hull), Sweden (Ghost), Japan (Low noise) Hanwha Ocean, the builder of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class KSS-III submarines, and the South Korean government are actively engaging with the following countries for submarine exports: • Canada: The Canadian Navy's Submarine Replacement Program (CSCP) is a major project worth up to 40 billion USD (with an acquisition cost of about 14 billion USD and operation and maintenance costs of around 27 billion USD). Canada plans to introduce 12 new submarines. The KSS-III, at 4,000 tons, is considered a strong candidate due to its suitability for Canada’s operational environment (including the Arctic). South Korean defense companies are offering technical cooperation and local construction options in an effort to secure the deal. • Poland: Poland is pursuing the Orka project to modernize its navy, aiming to acquire 3 new submarines project worth about 14 billion USD. The KSS-III is consistently mentioned as one of the main contenders by the Polish government. • Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries: The Philippines is focused on strengthening its naval power to counter China. Other Southeast Asian nations are also looking to enhance maritime security through submarine acquisitions. South Korea, having previously exported submarines (e.g., the Nagapasa-class to Indonesia), is actively pursuing KSS-III sales in the region. 6. Comparison of the Latest Submarine Capabilities of Countries Surrounding South Korea This section examines the key features of the latest submarine technologies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan. Table 13. Comparison of the latest submarines of South Korea and neighboring countries Overall Assessment • Military Ranking: Evaluated as top-tier in Asia in the order of China > Japan > South Korea > North Korea. • Advanced Technology: Japan, South Korea, and China are rapidly advancing in technological innovation, while North Korea focuses on strategic threat capabilities. • Operational Capability: Japan and South Korea excel in maritime route defense and blockade capabilities, whereas China’s strength lies in ocean-going and strategic power projection. Asian military experts particularly regard South Korea’s KSS-III, Japan’s Soryu-class/Taigei-class, and China’s latest submarines as the pinnacle of their respective national defense technologies. North Korea, while still relatively underdeveloped, raises the threat level through the public display of its strategic nuclear-powered capabilities. 7. Future Prospects: Development of Nuclear-Powered Submarines South Korea is considering the development of next-generation submarines over 4,000 tons in the 2030s, with nuclear-powered submarines being a key option under discussion. In the past, in 2003, the basic design for a 4,000-ton reactor was completed, but at that time, cooperation with the United States was essential due to restrictions such as the Korea–U.S. nuclear agreement (“123 Agreement”). Recently, with the revitalization of Korea–U.S. shipbuilding cooperation through Hanwha Ocean and Philly shipyards, the possibility of acquiring nuclear submarine technology has increased. In particular, following the official U.S. approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction at the 2025 APEC Summit, technical, fuel, and policy cooperation with the U.S. is expected to move forward in earnest for South Korea’s project. 1. Scope of Future Cooperation • The U.S. has agreed to share key technologies for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines. • Cooperation will also include securing nuclear fuel for propulsion (highly enriched uranium or HALEU – high-assay low-enriched uranium) and the design and fabrication of small reactors for submarine use. • Both countries have agreed to expand mutual investment and technical collaboration in shipbuilding, marine plants, and submarine construction industries. 2. Technology Transfer and Conditions • South Korea has requested U.S. approval and supply for submarine propulsion nuclear fuel, and the U.S. is reported to have approved the use of nuclear fuel for South Korea’s submarine construction. • However, based on currently available information, this does not automatically include the full transfer of submarine reactor design or propulsion systems; the scope and method of technology transfer (joint development vs. full transfer) are still under discussion. • If South Korea transitions to third-country technology transfer or domestic development under U.S. cooperation, there could be restrictions linked to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 123 Agreement. 3. Potential Timeline • According to the fact sheet released at the APEC Summit, this cooperation is linked to investment in the shipbuilding industry, and South Korea is reported to have pledged around US$150 billion to U.S. shipbuilding. • South Korean government reports indicate the goal is to secure four or more medium-sized (approximately 5,000-ton or larger) nuclear-powered submarines by the mid-2030s. • However, specific milestones such as design completion, project start, construction, and delivery dates have not been officially finalized, and Korean officials have stated that detailed schedules are still under coordination. 8. Comparison of Nuclear Submarines and Conventional Submarines & the Importance of Nuclear Submarines Nuclear submarines can be broadly divided into two types based on their primary missions: 1) Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN: Ship Submersible Ballistic missile Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Equipped with ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carrying nuclear warheads, SSBNs patrol covertly for extended periods to maintain nuclear deterrence. This means deterring adversaries from using nuclear or major conventional attacks by maintaining the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, thereby preventing war. • Characteristics: Large in size, prioritizes extreme stealth and long-range operational capability. 2) Torpedo-Attack Nuclear Submarine (SSN: Ship Submersible Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Engage enemy submarines (Sub Hunter) or surface ships (Ship Killer), conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), support special operations forces, or carry out land-attack missions using cruise missiles. • Characteristics: Smaller and faster than SSBNs, emphasizes agility and maneuverability. Summary: • SSBN: Strategic missions with nuclear missiles. • SSN: Tactical attack missions with torpedoes and cruise missiles. 8.1. Nuclear-Powered Submarines vs. Conventional (Diesel-Electric) Submarines – Propulsion Comparison The most fundamental difference is in the power source: • Nuclear propulsion: Uses a reactor; heat from nuclear fission boils water to produce steam, which drives turbines to generate propulsion and electricity. • Diesel-electric submarines: Operate differently on the surface/snorkeling versus submerged. o Surface / Snorkeling: Diesel engines are run to propel the submarine or charge the batteries. The submarine must surface or use a snorkel to intake air and expel exhaust gases, reducing stealth. o Submerged: Diesel engines are turned off; the submarine runs solely on large charged batteries powering electric motors. This allows for very quiet, stealthy operation, but operational endurance is limited. Once the batteries are depleted, the submarine must surface to run diesel engines and recharge. Table 14. Comparison of Nuclear Submarine and Conventional Submarine Specifications Key Points • A nuclear-powered submarine is similar to an aircraft carrier: it provides long-range, high-endurance capability and serves as a powerful tool for global power projection. It is designed to dominate the open ocean. • A conventional submarine is comparable to a coastal patrol craft or a hunter-killer submarine: a stealthy and cost-effective weapon optimized for controlling regional waters and coastlines. Its greatest advantage is extremely low noise during battery-powered operation, making it a deadly threat in shallow waters—like “a hole in the water.” • Choosing a submarine type is not about absolute superiority, but about selecting the model best suited to a country’s strategic goals, budgetary limits, and geographic operational environment. 8.2. Maintenance Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Which force should a nation prioritize: Nuclear submarines, the backbone of strategic deterrence thanks to their unlimited underwater endurance, or conventional submarines, which offer excellent cost-effectiveness and are easier to field in larger numbers? One of the core factors in this decision is operational cost-efficiency. Beyond construction cost, the long-term burden of decades of maintenance, training, reactor refueling, and life-cycle logistics must be considered. The comparison below outlines these sustainment requirements. Table 15. Maintenance Comparison: Nuclear vs. Conventional Submarines 8.3. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Let us compare two submarines of similar class size as examples: • Dosan Ahn Changho–class (KSS-III, South Korea) — conventional (diesel-electric + AIP) • Virginia-class (SSN, United States) — nuclear-powered Between these two types, the Total Lifetime Cost is 3 to 4 times higher for the nuclear-powered submarine. Below, we analyze the causes of this massive cost difference using concrete figures. Table 16. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison: Nuclear Submarine vs. Conventional Submarine 8.4. Importance of Nuclear-Powered Submarines for the Republic of Korea Navy Despite the enormous cost gap shown earlier, the South Korean government has strong reasons for wanting to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. These reasons are rooted in national security, strategic autonomy, and enhanced maritime defense capability. Key strategic motivations include: 1) Responding to North Korea’s SLBM Threat North Korea: Developing the Sinpo-class SSBN (armed with SLBMs). If a North Korean SLBM submarine hides in the deep waters of the East Sea, it becomes impossible to track with conventional submarines. Only nuclear-powered submarines can conduct continuous 24-hour tracking due to their unlimited underwater endurance 2) Monitoring Chinese Submarine Activity: China has ~12 nuclear submarines + ~50 diesel-electric submarines and is increasing activity in the East China Sea and Western Pacific. To monitor Chinese submarines operating in the open ocean, nuclear-powered submarines are essential 3) Strengthening Strategic Deterrence: Current South Korean SLBM range: ~500 km, requiring operations near the Korean Peninsula. A nuclear submarine can launch from anywhere in the Pacific, drastically expanding deterrence. Provides a “survivable second-strike capability”—a retaliatory force that cannot be located or neutralized 4) National Prestige: Nations that operate nuclear submarines are considered major military powers. Only six countries currently possess them. Strengthens technological sovereignty and diplomatic leverage South Korea’s desire to operate nuclear-powered submarines is driven by strategic and security needs that far outweigh cost considerations. For over 30 years, South Korea has pursued nuclear submarine capabilities as part of a long-term defense strategy, aiming to achieve: enhanced nuclear deterrence, increased strategic autonomy, breakthroughs in defense technology, effective countermeasures against the expanding submarine forces of North Korea and China. Nuclear-powered submarines are seen as essential platforms capable of long-duration, high-speed, and highly covert operations—capabilities that are crucial in Korea’s security environment. Figure 11. Conceptual Cross-Section of the Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarine (KSS-N) Conclusion The Republic of Korea began with the small Dolgorae-class submarines in 1983, and in 42 years has risen to become the world’s 8th-largest submarine operator and one of the “Big Three” diesel-electric submarine powers (Germany, Japan, Korea). The Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (KSS-III), in particular, is the world’s only diesel-electric submarine equipped with 10 VLS cells for SLBMs, and with its combination of AIP and lithium-ion batteries, it possesses some of the strongest underwater endurance and operational capability in the world. It has proven its real-world combat performance by eluding detection from a U.S. aircraft carrier during the RIMPAC exercises, and has demonstrated strong export competitiveness—Korea has already secured a 1.1 billion USD contract with Indonesia, and is competing for additional tenders in Canada, Poland, and the Philippines. Despite the overwhelming cost burden of nuclear-powered submarines, they remain essential for South Korea to counter North Korea’s SLBM-equipped SSBNs, and China’s expanding submarine fleet. Only nuclear-powered submarines can perform unlimited submerged operations and maintain high-speed, long-duration tracking of North Korean SSBNs 24/7. They also allow South Korea to exercise strategic deterrence across the entire Pacific, not just near the Korean Peninsula. While challenges remain—such as restrictions from the U.S.–Korea 123 Nuclear Agreement and various technological barriers—ongoing Korea–U.S. naval cooperation through Hanwha Ocean’s Philadelphia Shipyard significantly increases the likelihood of acquiring nuclear-submarine technology. Securing 4 to 6 nuclear-powered submarines would mark a transformational leap for the ROK Navy and a historic turning point in Korea’s rise as a true maritime power. South Korea’s submarine industry is not just a weapons program—it is an advanced technology sector and a driver of economic growth. It represents a core capability for self-reliant defense and national security. Based on its world-class diesel-electric submarine expertise, if Korea succeeds in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines as well, it will firmly establish itself as one of the world’s top five submarine powers. As history teaches that “those who command the seas command the future”, the continued advancement of South Korea’s submarine capabilities will serve as the foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.

Defense & Security
MADRID, SPAIN - OCTOBER, 2023: 3 EF-2000 Eurofighter Typhoons (part of a group of 9) flying over Madrid as part of the Spain Day celebration. October 4, 2023, Madrid, Spain

Global defence spending: What is next for European military procurement?

by Keith Hartley

With its fragmented production process, European defence procurement is inefficient and uncompetitive in comparison to the United States. A new approach, prioritising cross-country collaborations, could improve things, but would not be without its own challenges. Introduced in March 2024, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) forms the centrepiece of European Defence Industrial Policy. The strategy aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through greater inter-state collaboration. It includes some ambitious targets, all of which are designed to allocate more resources to the EDTIB. For example, by 2030 the goal is for 50% of defence procurement budgets and at least 40% of defence equipment procurement to come through collaboration. There is also a designated €1.5 billion budget for European defence industry ‘readiness’. The background to all of this is British and European rearmament (readiness), largely in response to the increasing threat of Russia (following its acquisition of Crimea and its illegal military operations in Ukraine). European defence spending increased from €343 billion in 2024 to €381 billion in 2025. Figure 1 shows 2024 defence spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by European country. Taking 2% as a target, Italy, Spain and Portugal are below the threshold. Poland – which shares a border with war-torn Ukraine – spent more than double the target last year, at 4.15%. At the same time, last year Russia spent an estimated 7.05% of its GDP on ‘defence’. Figure 1: European defence spending as a share of GDP, 2024. Source: NATO & SIPRI. Note: NATO members have agreed a new benchmark for defence spending, targeting 5% of GDP by 2035. How do inefficiencies in the European defence market affect spending? Inefficiencies within the European defence market shape spending patterns. For example, there are cases of duplication of defence R&D, fragmented national defence markets, ‘off-the-shelf’ procurement from non-EU suppliers, and a general failure to exploit economies of scale and learning. Compared with the US market, for instance, Europe is neither efficient nor competitive. This inefficiency is reflected in Europe producing three different types of combat aircraft: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and the Swedish Gripen. Each type supplies national and export markets: 782 Typhoons, 710 Rafales, and 369 Gripen aircraft had been ordered or delivered as of October 2025. So, if each European nation had agreed to buy one type of combat aircraft, total output would have been around 1,800 units. Common procurement would also have reduced production costs by an estimated 10-20%. In contrast, the American F-35 combat aircraft has a total planned output of 3,556 units – almost twice the total for Europe. What about sixth-generation aircraft? The sixth-generation fighter aircraft market already looks highly competitive. By 2027, Europe plans to build the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS), with France, Germany and Spain all taking part in the project. At the same time, the UK is developing the Tempest combat aircraft jointly with Italy and Japan, with the first flight also due in 2027. Meanwhile, across the pond, in March 2025, the United States announced that Boeing would be developing the F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. It is designed to replace the F-22 aircraft, with the first flight planned in 2028. There have already been 185 orders. For public policy purposes, there are questions as to whether Europe can afford to fund two similar combat aircraft projects. In one sense, the answer must be that Europe and the UK can afford to pay the price of having two separate independent developments. Even so, there are other policy options (with differing costs). On the one hand, European countries could collaborate further and undertake the project with great cost-sharing. On the other hand, they could simply buy American aircraft. Further collaboration is economically and politically attractive. Economically, more nations joining a project would lead to greater sharing regarding R&D and the pooling of production orders. But this assumes all else remains unchanged – which is unlikely. Further collaboration is costly, as each partner nation demands its share of high technology on the project – namely, a share of the advances in airframe, engine and avionics (aviation-specific electronics), and duplicate flight test centres. Similarly, partners will each demand a share of the production work, leading to duplicate final assembly lines and adding to total costs (although these could still be less than a national-level initiative would cost). At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, more collaborative partnerships could lead to cost sharing and cost savings. This is likely to mean lower prices for each partner nation compared with an independent, single-nation solution. But problems can also come from further collaboration. The number of partner nations will rise from three to six, increasing transaction costs. More difficult will be the process of selecting the ‘winning project’ and the inevitable ‘national champion’ – namely, a choice between BAE Systems in the UK and Dassault of France. In an ideal world, sharing design work between two world-class firms should produce an outstanding design. But in reality, the outcome is likely to be a compromise, with equal sharing of development work on the aircraft, which might not be an efficient solution. Even so, some inefficiencies are the price of further collaboration. An alternative solution would be for European governments to buy American units. The options here are to buy off-the-shelf, either completely or with some form of ‘offset’ (a type of compensation arrangement made between a supplier and the purchasing government) offering varying amounts of work to the importing nation. Again, these options involve different benefits and costs. For example, direct imports involve foreign currency payments while an offset provides some jobs and the retention of domestic industrial capability for the importing nation. Another possibility is a negotiation similar to the F-35, where the UK was a ‘level 1 partner’ with a 15% share of the programme. A similar deal might be negotiated for the purchase of the US F-47, with the UK enjoying similar benefits. Where next in an ideal world for European defence? European defence industrial policy must address the choice of the next-generation combat aircraft. A simple solution would be to continue with the FCAS and UK-led Tempest projects as separate independent ventures. But the new EDIS framework, with its commitment to European solutions, suggests a better option would be to seek a new collaboration between the FCAS and Tempest. These seem like similar aircraft, and creating a new collaboration involving six partner nations could be beneficial. Such a collaboration would offer cost savings in both R&D and production. Fixed R&D costs would be shared between six nations rather than three, and production orders would be considerably increased (possibly even doubled). This could allow for further economies of scale and learning, and at least a 10% unit cost savings (PwC, 2021; Mueller, 2025). Indeed, production numbers for the FCAS have been estimated at 200-300 units and a merger with the Tempest could double this to 400-600 units (Mueller, 2025). There would, however, still be transaction costs associated with the six-part collaboration. This is not a unique problem. For example, the Airbus Atlas military transport aircraft is a seven-nation collaboration, and the Eurofighter Typhoon involves four partner countries. Conclusion A possible merger between the FCAS and Tempest programmes might be a way forward for both projects. It would create a large military-industrial-political complex whose true economic benefits and costs would still need to be assessed. It would also be a centrepiece of the new European defence industrial policy, and might attract new export customers from the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. A more ambitious target is the formation of a European Army, Navy and Air Force. But this would require a single European decision-making mechanism replacing the current arrangement of individual European Member States. It would allow common procurement policies and large-scale purchasing for land, sea and air weapons. This is certainly a long run dream but could be one worth pursuing. Removing the inefficiencies in European defence markets described above by creating a single European market for defence equipment could create substantial gains, both economically and in terms of security.

Energy & Economics
Automated AI industry robot and robotic arms assembly in factory production. Concept of artificial intelligence for industrial revolution and automation manufacturing process NLP

Seven emerging technologies shaping the future of sustainability and innovation

by World & New World Journal

Introduction Technological innovation is accelerating at an unprecedented pace, reshaping how societies generate energy, transport people and goods, produce food, fight disease, and explore space. Across multiple sectors, groundbreaking solutions are emerging in response to global challenges such as climate change, public health threats, energy insecurity, and resource scarcity. This article examines seven transformative technologies — from wireless electric-vehicle charging roads and regenerative ocean farming to graphene applications and disease-eliminating robots — each demonstrating how science and engineering are redefining sustainability, resilience, and human capability in the 21st century. 1. Wireless Electric Vehicles Charging Roads Electric Vehicles (EVs) have become key technology to decarbonise road transport, a sector that accounts for over 15% of global energy-related emissions. The increase of their sales globally exceeded 17 million in 2024, and it is forecasted to surpass the 20 million units by 2025. (IEA, 2025) Source: IEA analysis based on country submissions and data from the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), European Alternative Fuels Observatory (EAFO), EV Volumes and Marklines. Despite this growth, several concerns continue to slow down their widespread adoption. Limited charging infrastructure, battery-related autonomy issues, high purchase costs, slow charging times, and the environmental impact of the battery productions remain major obstacle. The broader EV industry, however, is actively developing new technologies to overcome these challenges. (Automotive Technology, 2025) In this context, one of the most pressing challenges is energy supply – specifically, the need for better batteries and more accessible charging points. To address this bottleneck, a promising new trend has emerged: wireless roads capable of charging EVs while they drive. This technology could fundamentally transform the charging experience and significantly reduce dependence on stationary chargers. The idea is simple, a system that supplies power to EVs while driving, using embedded inductive coils (wireless charging) or conductive rails on the road, in other words a dynamic or in-motion charging on the road. In fact, this technology already exists and there are several examples worth mentioning: - South Korea: introduced in 2013, the first road-powered electric vehicle network, in which electrical cables were buried below the surface and wirelessly transfer energy to the electric vehicles via magnetic resonance. An electrified road has the advantage of eliminating the plug-in infrastructure and vehicles usually require a smaller battery, reducing weight and energy consumption. In 2009, KAIST introduced the OLEV (online electric vehicle), a type of EV that uses wireless dynamic charging through inductive coils embedded in the road. The OLEV public transport buses were later used in the 2013 first electric road in the city of Gumi, which consisted of a network of 24 km, by 2015 the number of OLEV buses increased to 12 (Anthony, 2013) and another bus line was launched in Sejong that same year. (SKinno News, 2021)- Sweden: a 1.6 km road linking Stockholm Arlanda airport to a logistic site outside the capital city was a pilot project achieved in 2016. (The Guardian, 2018), (Carbonaro, 2022) However, the Swedish government didn’t stop there and by 2020 they built a wireless road for heavy trucks and buses in the island city of Visby, and they are planning to expand it to the 13-mile E20 highway – logistic hub between Hallsberg and Örebro – and even have a plan of further 3,000 km of electric roads in Sweden by 2035. (Min, 2023), (Dow, 203)- USA: a quarter mile (400 m) section of road through the Corktown area of Detroit was changed to a wireless electric road. Electreon was the company in charge of the project. (Paris, 2024), (6abc Philadelphia, 2025)- France, Norway and China: Electreon – a leading provider of wireless charging solutions for EVs – has partnered and gained projects for wireless highways in France – a section of the A10 highway (Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure, 2023) –, Norway – evaluation of wireless charging for AtB’s BRT routes in Trøndelag (Foster, Electreon to install the first wireless electric road in Norway, 2023) – and China – not wireless but in an 1.8 km electrified highway in Zhuzhou. (Foster, China demonstrates electrified highway, 2023) While all these examples show a “tendency” to switch into wireless roads, it is important to highlight three points to keep that are decisive and have slowed down the transition: in first place, these wireless roads are being targeted mainly for freight trucks and buses, the second point is the initial cost of the infrastructure is high and third point is the technology that should be added to the EVs. 2. Fire Suppression Using Sound Waves Seth Robertson and Viet Tran, engineering students from George Mason University in Virginia designed a fire extinguisher that uses sound waves to put out flames. Their device emits low-frequency sound waves that disrupt the conditions necessary for a fire to sustain itself, meaning that no foam, powder, chemicals or water are needed to extinguish a fire, just sound. In order to understand how it can be possible to extinguish fire with sound it is necessary to remember that a fire needs heat, fuel and oxygen to survive, if one of these elements does not appears, there is no fire, under this principle, Robertson and Tran’s prototype uses sounds to separate the oxygen from the flame, as a result, the fire extinguish. The interesting part is that the sound must have the right frequency, specifically between 30 to 60 Hz – low frequency sounds. The sound waves will act as pressure waves moving the air molecules back and forth, and in the right frequency, the movement will disrupt the flames’ structure, separating the oxygen molecules and the fire will simply die out with the lack of these molecules. Potential applications include small kitchen fires or small fires, while unfortunately, large-scale structural or wildland fires still remain a challenge, mostly due to the environmental factors, like wind, air density and flame intensity, that can be a hurdle in uncontrolled environments. Moreover, the generation of low-frequency sound waves powerful enough to suppress fires requires a significant amount of energy. Nonetheless, an early prototype consists of an amplifier to generate low-frequency sound and a collimator to focus the sound waves directly on the fire, and as mentioned before, one limitation is that specialized equipment is required to produce the high-pressure sound waves. Still, research has been carried out recently and it is expected that this technology could be a non-destructive and less damaging method for firefighters soon. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPVQMZ4ikvM 3. Regenerative Ocean Farming Regenerative ocean farming is a climate-friendly model of aquaculture where seaweed and/or shellfish are grown in a way that requires no freshwater, feed or fertilizer, as the crops naturally filter nutrients from the water and capture carbon and nitrogen. This farming model can benefit coastal ecosystems and communities by increasing food security, creating jobs, improving water quality, protecting coastlines, supporting ocean justice (Urban Ocean Lab, 2023) and most importantly, mitigating climate change. Ocean farming can rely on a polyculture system – cultivate a mix of shellfish and seaweeds – or just a single species system. While the climate conditions determine the species to grow, it does not affect the system itself. The system follows a vertical layer farming way, in which farms use ropes that extend vertically from the surface to the seabed, in addition to the use of different levels and cages for scallops, oysters or clams, for example, as shown in Figure 2. Other species like kelp, abalone, purple sea urchins or sea cucumbers can also be harvested. Figure 2: Ocean farming diagram. Source: Urban Ocean Lab The big advantage is the maximization of the ocean space, producing more food in a smaller footprint, in addition to the use of the benefits of the species – seaweed and shellfishes – which are both natural filters that help to clean the water and absorb excess nutrients, combating ocean acidification and reducing marine pollution (Hassan, 2024) naturally. Moreover, the versatility of these species allows them to use them in other areas, such as biofuels, soil fertilizers, animal feed or cosmetics and not only for human food. Around the world, there are several projects that have adopted this methodology (Hassan, 2024): 1. GreenWave (USA): increased biodiversity by 50%, reduced nitrogen level in water by 20% and created sustainable job opportunities for locals.2. Ocean’s Halo (Ireland): annual harvest of 500 tons of kelp, creation of 20 jobs in rural areas and carbon footprint reduction by 30%3. Kitasaku Marine (Japan): Nori production increased by 25%, coastal water quality improved by 15% and local support of 50 locals.4. Catalina Sea Ranch (USA): harvested 1 million pounds of mussels annually, increased local biodiversity by 20% and created 10 new jobs.5. Blue Ventures (Madagascar): harvested 146 tonnes of red seaweed, plus they have created a sea cucumber market with a value of $18,000 and 700 farmers have been trained to farm in the ocean. (Blue Ventures Conservation, 2015)6. Havhøst (Ocean Harvest) (Denmark): they are growing seaweed, mussels and the European flat oyster in 30 communities along the Danish coast. In addition, they focus on educational activities to introduce ocean farming to more people. (Waycott, 2022) Overall ocean farming creates a positive environmental impact; it provides a sustainable food source and economic opportunities for the local people and the industry. Of course it faces challenges, but it has become a way to mitigate climate change and protect the ocean. 4. Wave Energy Generators There are two types of waves. Surface waves are generated by a combination of wind passing over the sea’s surface raising up water and gravity pulling it back down. In a technical way, warm air rises and expands, creating areas of low pressure compared to places with cooler air. Air then moves from high-pressure areas to low-pressure areas. This movement of air is wind and when it rushes across the surface of the Earth it creates waves in oceans. (Lumley, 2025) On the other hand, underwater waves are sound waves produced by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions; these waves travel by compressing and expanding the water. (Kadri, 2025) In both cases temperature variations and other factors can affect the nature of the waves. For instance, wave energy or wave power harnesses the ocean’s waves to generate energy by converting a wave’s kinetic energy into electricity. Wave power is a form of renewable and sustainable energy which has potential cost benefits over solar and wind but faces technological challenges limiting its large-scale adoption in electricity generation and water desalination. (Lumley, 2025) The nature of the waves makes wave energy the world’s largest source of energy with a potential of annual global production of 29,500 TWh, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2012). In addition, it works well in tandem with other renewables such as wind. (Ocean Energy Europe, s.f.) In terms of technology itself, wave energy has relied on the next devices: 1. Point absorbers: floating buoys that capture the vertical movement of waves, which then is harnessed through a cable anchored to the seabed. The vertical movement of the waves is subsequently transformed into electricity via converters (alternators, generators or hydraulic systems). These are usually mounted on the seabed in shallower water and are connected to the floating buoys.2. Oscillating water columns (OWCs): a partially submerged, hollow structure connected to an air turbine through a chamber. These devices use the rise and fall of the waves to compress air, the air is forced to move back and forth in the chamber and creates a strong air flow that powers the turbine, generating electricity.3. Overtopping devices: a floating structure made of segments linked together, which lifts up and down with the waves. These devices harness wave energy by allowing waves to flow into a reservoir, which then releases the water through turbines to generate electricity. Design, flow dimensions, turbine efficiency and structural elements influence their efficiency. Source: BKV Energy Despite its huge potential and considering it as a clean energy source with no GHG emissions, the main concern related to wave energy is the marine life affectation – including habitat alteration, noise pollution or collision risks for marine life. On the other hand, high costs, complex design, maintenance and technological constraints also have become a problem, still, the potential of this continuous energy is huge compared to the more limited wind energy, for example. (Lumley, 2025) Despite all that, there are some active projects being developed in different parts of the world, for example: Azura Wave Power (tested in Hawaii), Anaconda WEC (UK’s prototype), CalWave (in California), CETO (tested in Australia and expected to be tested in Spain too), Crestwing (tested in Denmark), HiWave-5 (Swedish-based tested in Portugal), the Wave Energy Program (in India) or the Ocean Grazer WEC (developed in The Netherlands), among many others. (Wikipedia, 2019) 5. SpinLaunch SpinLaunch is a spaceflight technology development company working on mass accelerator technology to move payloads to space. This innovative space company is known for their Meridian Space and their Suborbital Accelerator. The Meridian Space is a low-cost, highly differentiated LEO satellite communications constellation which offers speed, reliability and flexibility (SpinLaunch, 2025). The company has partnered, and investments have been achieved in order to launch 280 satellites (Berger, 2025) as part of their satellite constellation, which will satisfy the needs in any area needed such as maritime, national security, communications, corporate networks, aviation, military, etc. The highlight of these satellites is their mass that is only 70 kg, and its facility to be launched in one or two rockets. On the other hand, SpinLaunch is aiming to build a kinetic launch system that uses centrifugal force instead of traditional rockets and spins a rocket around at speeds up to 4700 mph (7,500 km/h) before sending it upward toward space. At 60 km or so altitude, the rocket would ignite its engines to achieve orbital velocity. To achieve this, they have built a Suborbital Accelerator prototype, in Spaceport America, New Mexico. This prototype is a 33-meter vacuum chamber that can launch payloads from 800 to 5000 mph. Several tests have already been carried out, being the 10th the latest on September 27th, 2025. (Young, 2025) SpinLaunch hopes to have a 100-meter Orbital Lauch system by 2026. The engineering behind these systems is as follows: both systems are circular accelerators, powered by an electric drive that uses a mechanical arm to sling payloads around in circles to reach incredibly high speeds of up to 5,000 mph. They then release the payload through a launch tube and spaceward. (Young, 2025) The company claims that their method is cheaper as it eliminates 70% of the fuel compared to the traditional rocket launch, in addition, the infrastructure is less, and it is more environmentally friendly than the traditional methods. However, the limitations are seen in the payload weight (no more than 400 kg per payload) and their resistance (payloads must be able to withstand up to 10,000 G’s of force during the centrifugal acceleration process) Source: SpinLaunch. 6. Disease-Eliminating Robots “Disease-eliminating robots” encompass a diverse set of robotic and AI-driven systems designed to prevent, monitor, and treat infectious diseases while minimizing human exposure to risk. These technologies operate at multiple scales — from environmental disinfection in hospitals to microscopic interventions inside the human body. Environmental disinfection robots are among the most established applications. Devices such as Xenex and UVD Robots utilize pulsed ultraviolet (UV-C) light to destroy viral and bacterial DNA, effectively sterilizing hospital rooms within minutes (UVD Robots, 2023; Xenex, 2024). Others deploy vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP) to disinfect enclosed environments like train carriages and operating rooms (WHO, 2022). These systems substantially reduce hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) and cross-contamination risks. In medical and clinical settings, robotics contribute to precision and safety. Surgical robots such as Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci and Ion platforms enable minimally invasive operations with reduced infection risk and faster recovery times (Intuitive Surgical, 2024). At the microscopic level, nanorobots are under development for targeted drug delivery, capable of navigating the bloodstream to deliver chemotherapy agents directly to tumor sites, thereby minimizing systemic side effects (Lee et al., 2023). Meanwhile, biofilm-removing microbots are being engineered to eradicate bacterial colonies on medical implants and dental surfaces (Kim et al., 2022). Automated systems are also emerging for precise injections, such as intravitreal therapies for ocular diseases, helping reduce clinician workload and human error (Zhou et al., 2024). Beyond clinical contexts, robots support public health surveillance and disease prevention. Prototypes like MIT’s “Luigi” sewage-sampling robot autonomously collect wastewater data to monitor community-level infections and anticipate outbreaks (MIT News, 2025). In precision agriculture, AI-guided robotic systems detect infected crops early, controlling plant disease spread and protecting global food security (FAO, 2023). Collectively, these robotic systems demonstrate the increasing convergence of automation, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence in safeguarding human and environmental health. By taking on tasks that are dangerous, repetitive, or biologically hazardous, disease-eliminating robots represent a pivotal advancement in the global strategy for infectious disease control and public health resilience. 7. Graphene Graphene is the world’s thinnest material, consisting in a single layer of carbon atoms arranged in a hexagonal honeycomb lattice. Despite its thinnest it is stronger than steel and diamond. In addition, graphene is flexible, transparent, conductive, light, selectively permeable and a 2D material. In summary it is a versatile material with many different applications and that has gained attention since its isolation in 2004 by Russian and Nobel prize scientists Andre Geim and Konstantin Nocoselov. (Larousserie, 2013) The characteristics of graphene make them an important player in the energy, construction, health and electronics sectors. In a deeper analysis, its high conductivity is valuable for battery life, autonomy and energy efficiency. Its lightness is suitable for manufacturing drone batteries, which reduce their weight, and the drone’s weight too. Graphene’s transparency and flexibility could be used in screen devices including cell phones, televisions or vehicles – Samsung already produced a flat screen with graphene electrodes. In addition, its high resistance and excellent heat and electric conductivity make them valuable for the light industry. Other sectors that are beneficial from graphene include the construction and manufacturing sector. For example, adding 1 g of graphene to 5 kg of cement increases the strength of the latter by 35%. Another example refers to Ford Motor Co., that is adding 0.5% of graphene to increase their plastic strength by 20%. (Wyss, 2022) Graphene has become a promising material, and it has been studied and tested to be used as a replacement or equivalent of silicon in microelectronics. It has been used in sports, like tennis rackets made by Head or in electric cars concepts like BASF and Daimler-Benz Smart Forvision. Bluestone Global Tech partnered with mobile phone manufacturers for the first graphene-based touchscreen to be launched in China. (Larousserie, 2013) Paint with graphene for a better thermal regulation in houses; bones, prosthesis, hearing aids or even diagnosis of diseases could also rely on graphene. (Repsol, 2025) Nowadays, its costs are high, but the graphene is going through a moment of intense academic research that surely in some years will end up with even more promising results and applications. Conclusion Together, these seven emerging technologies form a powerful snapshot of the future. Their diversity — spanning transportation, renewable energy, aquaculture, aerospace, robotics, and advanced materials — reflects the multi-sectoral nature of today’s global challenges. Yet they share a common purpose: to create more sustainable, efficient, and resilient systems capable of supporting a rapidly changing world. Wireless charging roads challenge the limits of mobility; ocean farming and wave energy reimagine how we use marine ecosystems; SpinLaunch and graphene redefine what is physically possible; and disease-eliminating robots transform public health. These innovations are still evolving, but they show that the solutions to some of humanity’s most pressing problems already exist — they simply need investment, scaling, and political will. By embracing these technologies and continuing to pursue scientific discovery, societies can accelerate the transition toward a cleaner energy future, safer communities, healthier ecosystems, and a more equitable and technologically advanced world. References 6abc Philadelphia. (2025, Juky 11). Electric vehicle tech: The rise of wireless charging roads. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NzJO67JIUE Abing, H. (n.d.). The Sonic Fire Extinguisher That’s Changing Firefighting. Retrieved from Rareform Audio: https://www.rareformaudio.com/blog/sonic-fire-extinguisher-sound-waves Anthony, S. (2013, August 6). World's first road-powered electric vehicle network switches on in South Korea. Retrieved from ExtremeTech: https://www.extremetech.com/cars/163171-worlds-first-road-powered-electric-vehicle-network-switches-on-in-south-korea Automotive Technology. (2025). What Are the Biggest Challenges Facing Electric Vehicle Adoption Today? Retrieved from Automotive Technology: https://www.automotive-technology.com/articles/what-are-the-biggest-challenges-facing-electric-vehicle-adoption-today BBC Earth. (2023, March 3). Are Underwater Farms the Future of Food? | Our Frozen Planet | BBC Earth. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=93nk2xIRcbk&t=11s Berger, E. (2025, April 4). SpinLaunch—yes, the centrifuge rocket company—is making a hard pivot to satellites. Retrieved from Ars Technica: https://arstechnica.com/space/2025/04/spinlaunch-yes-the-centrifuge-rocket-company-is-making-a-hard-pivot-to-satellites/ Blue Ventures Conservation. (2015). Community-based aquaculture. Pioneering viable alternatives to fishing. Retrieved from Blue Ventures: https://blueventures.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BV-Aquaculture-Factsheet-2015.pdf Carbonaro, G. (2022, June 24). Wireless charging for electric cars is already here - but the technology isn’t for everybody yet. Retrieved from euro news: https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/06/24/wireless-charging-roads-for-electric-cars-ev-technology-is-here-fiat-stellantis Dow, C. (203, May 16). Sweden will build the world's first EV charging road. Retrieved from TopGear: https://www.topgear.com/car-news/electric/sweden-will-build-worlds-first-ev-charging-road Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure. (2023, July 20). Electreon, together with Vinci, wins tender for first wireless electric road in France. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/electreon-together-vinci-wins-tender-first-wireless-electric-road-france Ellen MacArthur Foundation. (2024, March 20). 3D Ocean Farming | Transforming tradition. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PqvHaaL6EQ&t=225s Emergent Team. (n.d.). Using Sound Waves to Put Out Fire: The Story of Two George Mason University Students. Retrieved from Emergent: https://www.emergent.tech/blog/sound-waves-to-put-out-fire FAO. (2023). AI and Robotics in Precision Agriculture: Combating Plant Diseases. Foster, J. (2023, March 29). China demonstrates electrified highway. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/china-demonstrates-electrified-highway Foster, J. (2023, June 28). Electreon to install the first wireless electric road in Norway. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/electreon-install-first-wireless-electric-road-norway George Mason University. (2015, February 6). Pump Up the Bass to Douse a Blaze: Mason Students' Invention Fights Fires. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPVQMZ4ikvM Greenwave. (2025). Regenerative Ocean Farming. Retrieved from Greenwave: https://www.greenwave.org/our-model Hassan, T. (2024, October 15). Vertical Ocean Farming. Retrieved from AgriNext Conference: https://agrinextcon.com/vertical-ocean-farming-sustainable-and-shellfish/ IEA. (2025). Electric Vehicles. Retrieved from IEA: https://www.iea.org/energy-system/transport/electric-vehicles Intuitive Surgical. (2024). da Vinci and Ion Robotic Systems Overview. IPCC. (2012). Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Retrieved from IPCC: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SRREN_Full_Report-1.pdf Kadri, U. (2025, April 7). Wave energy’s huge potential could finally be unlocked by the power of sound – new research. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/wave-energys-huge-potential-could-finally-be-unlocked-by-the-power-of-sound-new-research-253422 Kim, J. et al. (2022). “Microbotic Eradication of Biofilms on Medical Implants.” Nature Biomedical Engineering, 6(11), 1215–1226. Larousserie, D. (2013, November 22). Graphene - the new wonder material. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/nov/26/graphene-molecule-potential-wonder-material Lee, S. et al. (2023). “Nanorobotic Drug Delivery Systems for Cancer Therapy.” Science Advances, 9(4), eabq1234. Lumley, G. (2025, March). What Is Wave Power? Retrieved from BKV Energy: https://bkvenergy.com/learning-center/what-is-wave-energy/ MIT News. (2025). “Luigi: A Robot for Wastewater Epidemiology.” Min, R. (2023, July 06). Sweden is building the world's first permanent electrified road for EVs to charge while driving. Retrieved from euro news: https://www.euronews.com/next/2023/05/09/sweden-is-building-the-worlds-first-permanent-electrified-road-for-evs NOAA. (n.d.). 3D Ocean Farming. Retrieved from NOAA: https://oceantoday.noaa.gov/fullmoon-3doceanfarming/welcome.html Ocean Energy Europe. (n.d.). Wave energy. Retrieved from Ocean Energy Europe: https://www.oceanenergy-europe.eu/ocean-energy/wave-energy/#:~:text=Wave%20energy%20technology Paris, M. (2024, January 31). Wireless charging: The roads where electric vehicles never need to plug in. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240130-wireless-charging-the-roads-where-electric-vehicles-never-need-to-plug-in Porter, A. (2024, June 20). What is Aquaculture? An Overview of Sustainable Ocean Farming. Retrieved from PBS: https://www.pbs.org/articles/a-guide-to-hope-in-the-water-and-aquaculture Repsol. (2025). An innovative and revolutionary material. Retrieved from Repsol: https://www.repsol.com/en/energy-move-forward/innovation/graphene/index.cshtml SKinno News. (2021, July 8). Charging while driving – electrified road for electric vehicles. Retrieved from SKinno News: https://skinnonews.com/global/archives/6253 SpinLaunch. (2025). Pioneering The Next Generation of Satellite Broadband. Retrieved from SpinLaunch: https://www.spinlaunch.com/meridianspace The Guardian. (2018, April 12). World's first electrified road for charging vehicles opens in Sweden. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/apr/12/worlds-first-electrified-road-for-charging-vehicles-opens-in-sweden Urban Ocean Lab. (2023, November). What is Regenerative Ocean Farming? Retrieved from Urban Ocean Lab: https://urbanoceanlab.org/resource/regenerative-ocean-farming-factsheet UVD Robots. (2023). Next-Generation UV-C Disinfection Systems for Hospitals. Waycott, B. (2022, January 10). Regenerative ocean farming is trending, but can it be a successful business model? Retrieved from Global Seafood Alliance: https://www.globalseafood.org/advocate/regenerative-ocean-farming-is-trending-but-can-it-be-a-successful-business-model/ WHO. (2022). Guidelines on Hydrogen Peroxide Disinfection in Healthcare Settings. Wikipedia. (2019, June). List of wave power projects. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wave_power_projects Wyss, K. (2022, November 29). Graphene is a proven supermaterial, but manufacturing the versatile form of carbon at usable scales remains a challenge. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/graphene-is-a-proven-supermaterial-but-manufacturing-the-versatile-form-of-carbon-at-usable-scales-remains-a-challenge-194238 Xenex. (2024). LightStrike Germ-Zapping Robot: Clinical Outcomes and Use Cases. Young, C. (2025, October 18). SpinLaunch just catapulted a NASA payload into the sky for the first time. Retrieved from Interesting Engineering: https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/spinlaunch-catapulted-a-nasa-payload Zhou, Y. et al. (2024). “Automated Injection Robots for Ophthalmic Care.” Frontiers in Medical Robotics, 5(2), 45–57.

Energy & Economics
Brazil and USA relations, chess pawns with national flags - 3D illustration

Brazil’s Seven Strengths that Enable Brazil to challenge the US & US President Trump

by World & New World Journal

 I. Introduction On October 6, 2025, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had a phone call with US President Donald Trump. Two leaders spoke for 30 minutes. During the call, they exchanged phone numbers in order to maintain a direct line of contact, and President Lula reiterated his invitation for Trump to attend the upcoming climate summit in Belem, according to a statement from Lula’s office. At the UN General Assembly in New York on September 23, 2025, two leaders had a brief, unscheduled meeting. President Trump commented that he had “excellent chemistry” with his Brazilian counterpart. Even Trump told reporters that President Lula liked me, I liked him. This Trump’s comment has been interpreted by some analysts as a potential thawing in recent frozen US-Brazil relations. This apparently friendly call and comments from President Trump may signal a turnaround in relations between the two leaders, which have been strained in recent months. Trump and Lula have been at loggerheads since July 2025, when the US leader imposed 50 percent tariffs on Brazilian exports. In announcing those tariffs on Brazil, Trump cited what he described as a “fraudulent” prosecution of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. In addition to sky-high tariffs, Trump tried to further pressure Lula to drop the Bolsonaro case by hitting Brazilian supreme court justices with visa bans and slapping financial sanctions on the judge overseeing the case – Alexandre de Moraes. Ultimately, however, Brazil went ahead with Bolsonaro’s prosecution, and the former president was convicted. Why did President Trump suddenly soften his stance towards Lula now? Trump’s softer tone may have been prompted by hard economic realities in US, according to Pantheon Macroeconomics’ chief economist, Andres Abadia. The US depends heavily on Brazil for its coffee and meat imports, and both have taken a hit amid the tariff war. The result: prices have shot up. Brazil is the largest source of imported coffee for the US – responsible for $1.33billion out of the $7.85billion total coffee imports by the US in 2023, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. But since the 50 percent tariffs kicked in, Cecafe, Brazil’s council of coffee exporters, said that exports to the US fell by 46 percent in August 2025 and had dropped 20 percent more by September 19, 2025. Amid that supply crunch, coffee prices in the US rose 21 percent in August 2025 compared with a year earlier, even as overall food price inflation hovered at about 3 percent, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. “The prospect of higher coffee prices,” Abadia said, “would be definitely bad for President Trump.”[1]  Brazil is also the US’s third-largest source of imported meat behind Australia and Canada, according to the US Department of Agriculture. “As with coffee, higher beef prices would hit President Trump,” Abadia told Al Jazeera. Beef and veal prices rose by almost 14 percent in August 2025 compared with a year earlier, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. According to a new survey published on September 29, 2025, by the New York Times and Siena University, President Trump’s approval ratings have fallen recently, with 58 percent of respondents saying they think the country is headed in the wrong direction. “Inflation is definitely biting in the US,” says Abadia. “And anything that can be done to ease the pain, especially as we approach the holiday season, would be seen as positive.” [2] By contrast, Brazil appears to have weathered Trump’s tariffs better than the US has expected: Its overall exports grew in September 2025, compared with a year earlier, as it expanded its offerings to other markets, including China and Argentina. Lula’s feud with Trump has boosted his popularity, and Washington’s interventions in Brazilian politics have put the country’s conservatives on the back foot. Before next year’s presidential election, Lula is currently polling ahead of his top opponents, although the 79-year-old President has not formally announced his bid.  Abadia believes that there is an opportunity for rapprochement between the two leaders. The most fertile area for compromise may lie in rare earth minerals. Brazil has the world’s third-largest reserves behind China and Vietnam. And for now, they remain largely untapped. “Critical minerals are one area where bilateral interests align,” he said. “The US wants to diversify away from China and play an important role in the Brazilian market.” [3] Trump has shown a clear interest in rare earths, placing them at the heart of his deal with Ukraine, for instance. Brazil, on its part, wants to emerge as an exporter and supplier of these minerals. “Clearly,” noted Abadia, “that would be a positive for cooperation.”  [4] With these episodes in mind, this paper examines why Brazil can challenge US President Trump and force him to soften his position on Brazil. In doing so, this paper explores seven strengths that enables Brazil to challenge the US as well as US President Trump. Brazil’s seven strengths are as follows: 1. niobium; 2. rare earth; 3. agriculture; 4. oil; 5. ethanol; 6. aircraft industry; 7. leader of BRICS. II. Overview of Brazil Brazil, officially the Federative Republic of Brazil, is the largest country in South America. Brazil is also the world’s fifth-largest country by area and the seventh-largest by population, with over 213 million people. The country is a federation composed of 26 states and a Federal District, which hosts the capital, Brasília. Its most populous city is São Paulo, followed by Rio de Janeiro. Brazil has the most Portuguese speakers in the world and is the only country in the Americas where Portuguese is an official language. [5] Brazil is a founding member of UN, the G20, BRICS, G4, Mercosur, Organization of American States, Organization of Ibero-American States, and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. Brazil is also an observer state of the Arab League and a major non-NATO ally of the US.  Brazil is a rising global power. As Figure 1 shows, Brazil is the 8th largest economy in the world in PPP terms and the largest economy in Latin America.    Figure 1: Brazil is the 8th largest economy in the world (source: IMF) Brazil is one of the world giants of mining, agriculture, and manufacturing, and it has a strong and rapidly growing service sector. Brazil is a leading producer of a host of minerals, including iron ore, tin, bauxite (the ore of aluminum), manganese, gold, quartz, and diamonds and other gems, and it exports vast quantities of steel, automobiles, electronics, and consumer goods. Brazil is the world’s primary source of coffee, oranges, and cassava (manioc) and a major producer of sugar, soy, and beef. The city of São Paulo, in particular, has become one of the world’s major industrial and commercial centers.[6] However, Brazil has a lot of domestic problems. Income inequality is very high. As Figure 2 shows, Brazil is one of world’s highest unequal countries along with other Latin American and African countries. The most common tool used to measure different types of inequality is the Gini Coefficient. The Gini Coefficient represents inequality on a scale where 0 equals perfect equality (where everyone has the same wealth, for example). At the other end of the scale, 100 equals a situation of perfect inequality: One person has all the wealth, and no one else has any. Fortunately, income inequality in Brazil, as measured by the Gini index, has dropped. Income inequality in Brazil reached the lowest level in 2024 since the historical series began in 2012, according to Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. Last year, the Gini index dropped to 0.506, a 2.3% decrease from the 0.518 recorded in both 2023 and 2022. [7] Nonetheless, Brazil’s income inequality is still very high.   Figure 2: which countries are most unequal. (source: Statista) Moreover, crime rate in Brazil has been very high. Brazil had the seventh-highest crime rate in the world in 2020. Brazil’s homicide rate was 23.6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2020. Brazil’s most massive problem remains organized crime, as it has expanded in recent years, and violence between rival groups is common. Drug trafficking, corruption, and domestic violence are all pervasive issues in Brazil. [8] Luckily the ranking of Brazil’s crime rate was down in 2024. As Figure 3 & Table 1 show, Brazil became a country with the 15th highest crime rate in the world   Figure 3: Crime rate by country, 2024 (source: World population review) Table 1: Highest crime rate countries in the world, 2024 (source: World population review)   III. Brazil’s Seven Strengths that challenge the US and US President Trump 1. Brazil’s Dominance of Niobium in the world Brazil is one of the world giants of mining. It is a leading producer of a host of minerals, including iron ore, tin, bauxite, manganese, gold, quartz, and diamonds. In particular, Brazil leads the world in reserves and production of niobium as Figure 4 & 5 show.   Figure 4: niobium reserves worldwide by country, 2021 (source: USGS)   Figure 5: production of niobium worldwide by country, 2024 (source: Statista) Brazil holds an overwhelming lead, accounting for 90% of global niobium reserves and approximately 85% of its global production. Canada is the sole major producer, supplying most of the remaining 15%. As Figure 6 shows, in 2023, the Brazilian company Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineracao (CBMM) supplied 76% of global niobium production, followed by the Chinese-owned CMOC, which supplied 11%. The world’s largest deposit is located in Araxa, Brazil and is owned by CBMM. The reserves are enough to supply current world demand for about 500 years, about 460 million tons. Another pyrochlore mine in Brazil is owned and operated by the CMOC and contains 18 million tons, based on a grade of 1.34% niobium oxide. Canadian production is from one mine. Much smaller production, usually as mixed Nb–tantalum (Ta) ores, comes from Australia and sub-Saharan Africa. The US has had negligible niobium production since 1959, and imported about 9.4 kt (thousand tons) of niobium in 2023. [9]    Figure 6: Niobium mine supply, 2000 to 2023. source: SFA (Oxford) Niobium (Nb, formerly known as columbium) is a rare metal that is included on the 2022 US Geological Survey’s Critical Minerals List. This light gray crystalline metal is primarily used in alloys with iron (Fe) as ferro niobium to increase the strength, corrosion resistance, and temperature resistance of steel. It is also found in specialty superconducting magnets such as those found in medical MRI instruments. The extraordinary properties of niobium have rendered it indispensable across a broad spectrum of industrial and technological applications. Its significance became evident in the mid-1930s when niobium was first employed to stabilize stainless steel against corrosion. Later, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, niobium's breakthrough role as a microalloying element (MAE) for steel, typically in the range of 0.05–0.15 wt.%, further solidified its importance. The importance of niobium as an MAE is underscored by its ability to enhance material properties such as high heat and corrosion resistance, increased strength, reduced density, exceptional conductivity, and enhanced biocompatibility. Its presence is essential in the construction of steel structures, including bridges, buildings, pipelines, offshore platforms, and automotive components, where it is predominantly employed as an MAE (∼90 %). [10] Furthermore, niobium plays a central role in the production of superalloys, holding significant importance in aerospace and power generation technologies. Its exceptional conductive properties also find applications in the healthcare industry, such as in MRI machines and in research institutions. Currently, niobium is finding exciting new applications in the transition to low-carbon energy solutions, and it is already a key component in wind turbines. Ongoing research into niobium-based rechargeable batteries holds the potential for further advancements in sustainable energy technologies, and it is being explored for use in solar panels and smart glass that can filter sunlight radiation and control the amount of light and heat entering buildings. [11]  From its applications in defense systems, where its unique properties are irreplaceable, to its pivotal role in green technologies and infrastructure, niobium’s economic and strategic significance is undeniable. Niobium is essential for the advancement of low-carbon and green technologies. Its classification as a critical mineral stems from both its vital applications and the concentrated nature of its supply. One of its most impactful uses is in steelmaking. The addition of just 0.1% niobium to steel produces high-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) variants, allowing for the construction of lighter, more durable structures. This reduces the quantity of material required, as well as contributes to lower carbon emissions. HSLA steels are particularly valuable for building pipelines, wind turbine towers, and hydrogen gas transmission infrastructure. [12] Niobium’s contribution to renewable energy systems is also important. Its excellent strength-to-weight ratio makes it vital for wind turbine frames, while in solar and hydrogen technologies, it boosts the efficiency of solar cells and enhances the longevity of hydrogen fuel cells. In sustainable manufacturing, niobium supports the production of high-performance components via 3D printing, reducing both weight and material waste. [13] The criticality of niobium is largely due to its concentrated supply. Approximately 90% of global niobium production comes from Brazil, with Canada as the only other significant producer. The US has had no domestic production since 1959, and both the US and EU rely wholly on imports. Beyond its scarcity, niobium is difficult to substitute. It is a core material in the defense and aerospace sectors, used in jet engines, missiles, and military systems where few or no viable alternatives exist. Niobium plays a crucial role in advanced materials and high-performance applications, with demand primarily driven by its use in steel, strategic industries, and emerging technologies. Steel alone accounts for 85–90% of global niobium consumption, serving as a microalloying element to enhance strength, toughness, and weldability. As global regulations increasingly push industries towards lighter and stronger materials, average niobium intensities in steel manufacturing are rising.  Currently China is the world’s largest consumer of niobium, with demand propelled by its infrastructure development and car production growth. Steel remains the backbone of niobium usage, with high-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) and structural steels accounting for the majority share through to 2035. Nevertheless, demand from other sectors, such as aerospace and electronics, is steadily increasing. In particular, interest in niobium for use in batteries is growing, although its uptake heavily depends on the successful commercialization of early-stage niobium-based technologies. Despite steel’s continued dominance, emerging applications begin to expand niobium’s demand profile. The CBMM, the world’s leading niobium producer, primarily shaped the supply landscape. The company’s strategy centers on aligning production with demand, allowing it to scale output flexibly in response to market needs. This responsive model, however, could pose challenges for new niobium projects seeking investment, as CBMM’s dominant position reduces incentives for alternative supply. Anticipating a significant rise in demand—particularly from battery markets, which are projected to account for 25% of company revenues by 2030—CBMM has already increased its output of battery-grade niobium. [16] Niobium’s potential in the battery space hinges on its ability to compete with established technologies. Niobium-based anodes offer high-speed charging and long cycle life, often exceeding tens of thousands of cycles. However, their lower energy density than graphite or silicon anodes poses a challenge, especially for electric vehicle applications where energy density is critical. To achieve broader adoption, niobium battery technologies must overcome this performance gap and significantly reduce costs through economies of scale or further technological innovation. In May 2018, President Trump recognized a group of 35 ‘basic’ minerals considered necessary to US national and economic security, which are to be produced nearby. This order follows Trump’s ‘America first’ initiative to reduce US dependence on imported natural resources, with a US Geological Survey (USGS) report reasoning that 20 of the 23 elementary minerals are sourced from China. Niobium is one of these minerals and was recognized as both critical and essential mineral, indicating its significance to the US, even though it’s not an easy mineral to extract and process. [17] Niobium’s qualities make it one of the top 8 strategic raw materials considered indispensable. Niobium has been deemed important to the US’s national welfare in part due to their inherent military and industrial potential. Jeffery A. Green, the president of a bipartisan government-relations firm in Washington DC and a former US Air Force commander, wrote in Defense News that, “with no access to such minerals, including niobium, our precision-guided missiles will not hit their targets, our aircraft and submarines will sit unfinished in depots, and our war-fighters will be left without the equipment they need to complete their missions.”  The scarcity of niobium means that the vast majority is currently imported. The report notes that niobium has not been mined in the US since 1959. Niobium is now imported from Brazil and Canada only. [18] Vacuum-grade niobium’s role in aerospace is not a newfound revelation. Its unparalleled resilience against extreme thermal stresses, withstanding temperatures over 2,400 degrees Celsius, renders it indispensable for critical components in hypersonic vehicles. Beyond its inherent properties, niobium’s crucial role lies in its use for crafting heat-resistant superalloys essential for hypersonic missiles and the broader aerospace sector. Its low density compared to other refractory metals contributes to a high strength-to-weight ratio, which is essential for reducing the weight of aerospace components. This reduction in weight directly impacts fuel efficiency and payload capacity, two critical factors in aerospace design. For example, companies like SpaceX and Hermeus rely on niobium C103 for their spacecrafts, which require extremely high temperatures that surpass that of other superalloys. [19] For decades, niobium has played a pivotal role in the US aerospace industry, with its notable use in the innovative designs of the iconic Gemini and Apollo programs of the 1960s and 70s. However, despite its significance, the US depends entirely on niobium imports, with no substantial domestic mining since 1959. This dependence introduces a severe risk to its supply chain. Of the estimated 8,800 metric tons imported annually in 2022, a significant majority comes from Brazil (66%) and Canada (25%). This heavy reliance on just two primary sources—both neighbors of the US—exposes the US to considerable national security and economic vulnerabilities. The situation becomes even more precarious considering China’s dominant position in the niobium sector and its growing footprint in the hemisphere.  China has recognized the potential of niobium for over a decade. In 2011, a consortium of five Chinese firms acquired a 15 percent stake in CBMM. This engagement intensified in 2016 when China Molybdenum Co. Ltd. (now known as CMOC) secured ownership of the Chapadão and Boa Vista mines, further strengthening China’s position in the niobium market. The importance of niobium was further highlighted in the Brazilian political arena in 2018. Then presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro emphasized niobium’s role in Brazil’s economic independence. Despite Bolsonaro’s campaign rhetoric focusing on safeguarding this critical commodity from foreign control and advocating for its national governance, Chinese influence in the Brazilian niobium sector continued to grow. By 2020, Chinese entities controlled approximately 26 percent of Brazil’s niobium production. This control not only ensures China’s preferential access and influence over pricing dynamics in the niobium supply chain, but also positions it advantageously in a global context.  China managed to maintain and even strengthen its position at the subnational level under President Bolsonaro. CMOC, for example, provided $1.2 million in Covid-19 aid to the city of Catalão, demonstrating China’s strategic engagement beyond mere commercial interests. China’s influence over Brazil’s niobium production conforms to a pattern of growing ownership and sway over the regional mining industry, a trend with substantial environmental, political, and security implications. Such tactics could force nations into making diplomatic compromises, ceding trade advantages, or grappling with economic dilemmas, thereby solidifying China’s geopolitical standing. The US is not immune to this exposure; the US Geological Survey in 2022 identified niobium as the second most critical of 50 minerals, falling behind only gallium in its criticality to US national security and economic growth. [22] Facing such formidable challenges, the US cannot afford to remain a passive observer. Safeguarding its strategic interests and maintaining its global position demands a comprehensive and multifaceted critical mineral strategy, in particular in securing niobium supplies. Incorporating Brazil into the 13-nation Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) could significantly fortify the global niobium supply chain. The MSP represents a concerted multinational endeavor to develop environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards and bolster investments in critical mineral supply chains, an initiative that aligns well with the strategic interests of both Brazil and the broader international community. Brazil’s inclusion would make it the first Latin American country to enter the partnership, signaling its regional leadership and increase in international stature. The integration of Brazil into this partnership is particularly strategic, considering its substantial niobium reserves, in addition to its other critical mineral deposits. This move would add a robust layer of security against potential supply disruptions. [23] President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government, with its strong emphasis on ESG standards, is likely to find the MSP’s principles congruent with its policy priorities. The MSP’s emphasis on elevating global standards in these areas could resonate with Lula’s progressive agenda, potentially making Brazil’s participation both beneficial and attractive. Moreover, Brazil’s inclusion in the MSP would facilitate its adherence to a framework that advocates for the diversification and stabilization of mineral supply chains. This alignment could be important in mitigating China’s dominant influence in the niobium market. By joining the MSP, Brazil would not only assert its role in the global mineral economy but also contribute to a more balanced and less vulnerable critical mineral supply landscape, including niobium. [24] 2. Brazil has the third largest rare earth reserves in the world According to US Geological Survey in 2024, China holds the largest rare earth reserves with 44 million metric tons, followed by Vietnam and Brazil. As Table 2 shows, Brazil holds the third largest rare earth reserves with 21 million metric tons. Other countries with significant reserves include India, Russia, and Australia. [25] However, as Figure 7 shows, Brazil ranked  12th position in the world in the production of rare earth minerals. Table 2: world mine production and reserves of rare earth minerals (source: USGS in 2024)    Figure 7: Global rare earth production by country, 2024 (source: USGS) Surprisingly, Brazilian rare earth exports hit a record high in 2025, according to data from the Brazil National Mining Agency (ANM). Almost the entire volume was shipped to China. Exports of raw rare earth materials—part of a group of minerals deemed strategic for the global energy transition—reached $7.5 million between January 1 and June 30, 2025. That figure is ten times higher than the $705,900 recorded in the same period last year, more than double the $3.6 million exported in all of 2024, and higher than in any other full year since official records started in 1997.  Though the total exports remains small, the surge in exports underscores the growing strategic value of these materials. Rare earth elements are critical in high-tech industries, used in wind turbine components and batteries, particularly for hybrid and electric vehicles. They have also become a flashpoint in US-China trade tensions, which began with President Donald Trump’s tariff war. At one point, China restricted exports of critical minerals to the US in retaliation. With this background, President Trump said in May 2025 that the US needed Greenland “very badly,” renewing his threat to annex the Danish territory. Greenland is a resource-rich island with a plentiful supply of critical minerals, a category that also includes rare earths elements, under its ice sheet. Trump also signed a “rare earth deal” with Ukraine in May 2025. The tussle over rare earths precedes the current Trump administration. China for years has built up near-total control of the materials as part of its wider industrial policy. [27] The International Energy Agency said 61% of mined rare earth production comes from China, and the country controls 92% of the global output in the processing stage. There’s two types of rare earths, categorized by their atomic weights: heavy and light. Heavy rare earths are more scarce, and the United States doesn’t have the capabilities for the tough task of separating rare earths after extraction. “Until the start of the year, whatever heavy rare earths we did mine in California, we still sent to China for separation,” Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told CNN. [28] However, the Trump administration’s announcement of sky-high tariffs on China in April, 2025 derailed this process. “China has shown a willingness to weaponize” America’s reliance on China for rare earths separation, Baskaran said. The US has one operational rare earth mine in California, according to Baskaran. [29] China holds a near-monopoly control over the global processing of rare earths. In 2023, China produced 61% of the world's raw magnet rare earth elements, which are essential in high-tech industries such as electronics, electric vehicles and defense. Its dominance is even more pronounced in refining these materials, making up 92% of the global refined supply. The export controls by China could have a major impact, since the US is heavily reliant on China for rare earths. Between 2020 and 2023, 70% of US imports of rare earth compounds and metals came from the country, according to a US Geological Survey report. [30] The US and Australia have signed a deal intended to boost supplies of rare earths and other critical minerals, as the Trump administration looks for ways to counter China’s dominance of the market. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said the deal would support a pipeline of $8.5bn (A$13bn; £6.3bn) "ready-to-go" projects that would expand his country's mining and processing abilities. It includes $1bn to be invested by the two countries in projects in the US and Australia over the next six months, a framework text says. The US and Australia have been working on these issues since Trump’s first term, but Albanese said the latest agreement would take the partnership to the next level. [31] Under this situation, to counter China’s dominance of rare earths, the Trump administration identified Brazil as a potential strategic partner in rare earth production. Despite holding the world’s third-largest reserves—behind China and Vietnam—Brazil accounts for 0.005% of global output in 2024, according to the USGS, as Figure 7 shows. [32] Accordingly, Brazil's rare earths sector is gaining momentum, with key industry players outlining the country’s potential to become a vital player in the global energy transition. During the Brazil Lithium and Critical Minerals Summit held in Belo Horizonte on June 4-5, 2025, over 300 senior executives and international delegations from China, US, Australia, Canada, the UK, Japan, France, Italy, Portugal, and Argentina discussed Brazil’s abundant resources and the need for strategic partnerships to explore potential reserves and ensure energy security.  [33] 3. Brazil: the world giant of agriculture Brazil is one of the world giants of agriculture. Brazil is the world’s largest producer of sugarcane, soy, coffee, orange,  açaí, guaraná, and Brazilian nut. Brazil is also the second-largest producer of ethanol, and third-largest biodiesel producer. Brazil is also one of the top 5 producers of maize, tobacco, papaya, and pineapple. Brazil is one of the top 10 world producers of avocado, cocoa, cashew, tangerine, guava, mango, rice, tomato, and sorghum. In addition, Brazil is one of the top 15 world producers of grape, melon, apple, peanut, fig, peach, onion, palm oil, and natural rubber.  A. Soybean  According to USDA (United States Department of Agriculture), as Table 3 & 4 shows, Brazil is the world’s largest soybean producing & exporting country in 2024. This is the results of the increase in production of soybean in Brazil as Figure 8 shows. Table 3: World’s Top 10 soybean producing countries, 2024-25 (source: USDA)     Table 4: World’s Top 10 soybean exporting countries, 2023-24 (source: USDA)     Figure 8: Soybean production in Brazil (source: Joana Colussi & Fram Progress) Historically, the US was the world’s largest soybean exporter. In 2013, Brazil surpassed the US in soybean shipments for the first time. Since then, Brazil’s share of the global soybean trade has increased steadily, with Brazilian soybean exports reaching a record 3,744 million bushels in 2023, according to the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Secex). At the same time, American soybean exports were reduced to 1,789 million bushels, half the Brazilian soybean export volume, according to the US Department of Agriculture (see Figure 9). [34]  Figure 9: Total soybean exports by US and Brazil (source: Farmdoc Daily, IL, USA) Over the last 20 years, Brazilian soybean exports jumped fourfold (431%), from 705 million bushels in 2004 to 3,744 million bushels in 2023. This jump occurred mainly in the second decade. Soybeans have become Brazil’s primary agricultural export commodity by volume, accounting for more than 60% of the soybeans grown domestically. The Brazilian soybean crop for the 2022/23 marketing year was 5,680 million bushels, a historic record, according to Brazil’s food supply and statistics agency. [35] Revenues from Brazilian soybean exports totaled a record $53.2 billion in 2023 versus $46.5 billion in the previous year, according to the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Secex). Considering the soybean complex, which also includes soybean oil and soybean meal, the revenue reached $67.3 billion in 2023, representing 40% of the total export revenue for the country. For the first time since the 1997/98 season, Brazil displaced Argentina as the leading global exporter of soybean meal due to severe drought, which cut Argentine soybean yields by half. [36] On the other hand, over the past 20 years, US soybean exports have increased 94% from 922 million bushels in 2004 to 1,789 million bushels in 2023. The US soybean exports have plateaued since 2016, with an average annual volume of 1,993 million bushels. The roughly doubling of exports occurred over the first decade and stagnated in the second decade. Revenues from soybean exports totaled $27.9 billion in 2023 versus $34.4 billion in 2022, according to the USDA. On average over the past five years, the US has exported 49% of total soybean production. The soybean crop for the 2022/23 marketing year reached 4,160 million bushels, slightly lower than the previous year. [37] The dynamics of global soybean trade remain heavily influenced by China, which accounts for approximately 60% of worldwide soybean imports. China predominantly sources its soybean supplies from Brazil and the US. For many years, the US was the top supplier, but in the past 15 years China has depended more on imports from South America, especially from Brazil. From 2019-2023, 73% of Brazil’s exported soybeans have headed to China, versus a 51% average for the US (see Figure 10).   Figure 10: China’s share of US and Brazil soybean exports (source: Farmdoc Daily, IL, USA) Shifting dynamics from China, the top global soybean buyer and consumer, has played a central role in the divergence between the US and Brazil as top global soybean producers.  In 1995, US soybeans accounted for 49% of Chinese soybean imports, with soybeans sourced from Brazil only totaling 2%. The US drought in 2012 kicked off a massive rise in Chinese imports of Brazilian soybeans. As a result, Brazil surpassed US in soybean shipments in 2013 for the first time. By 2024, 71% of China’s soybean imports were sourced from Brazil, with a only 21% sourced from the US. [38] As China purchased more soybeans from Brazil, Brazilian growers expanded acreage to meet export demand as Figure 8 shows. Moreover, the trade war between US and China in 2018 shifted more soybean production to Brazil at the expense of US soybean acreage as China imposed higher tariffs on US soybean. In 2018, Brazil’s soybean accounted for 82% of Chinese soybean imports while US only 18%. In the middle of another trade war between US and China in 2025, China stopped buying US soybeans. Accordingly, this trend of Brazil’s dominance over the US in soybean exports to China is likely to continue even though China resumed to buy US soybeans in accordance with Trump-Xi trade deal reached on October 30, 2025 in South Korea. [39] B. Meats  In the production of animal proteins, Brazil is today one of the largest countries in the world. In 2024, Brazil was the world’s second largest producer of beef and the world’s largest beef exporter as Table 5 and Figure 11 show.  Table 5: Top 10 beef producing countries in the world, 2024-25 (source: USDA)     Figure 11: As of December 2024, top 10 beef exporters in the world (source: AuctionPlus) In 2024, the global beef export market was dominated by five key players, each nation with significant shares of the market. Brazil led the beef market, commanding a substantial 27.8% of global beef exports. Following Brazil, Australia held a notable 14.7% share, positioning itself as a major player in global beef trade. India, another significant contributor, was responsible for 12.7% of the beef exports. The US also played a critical role, contributing 9.1% to the international beef export figures. Argentina rounded out the top five, with 6.6% of the beef market share. These five countries collectively shaped the dynamics of the global beef market, influencing pricing and supply chains. [40] Brazil sets record for beef exports in 2024 worth US$ 12.8 billion. A total of 2.89 million tons were exported, an increase of more than 26% compared to 2023. The volume exported generated US$ 12.8 billion, approximately 22% more than the amount earned in 2023. China maintained its position as the main destination for Brazilian beef, with 1.33 million tons exported, generating revenue of US$ 6 billion. Next came the US, which imported 229 thousand tons, totaling US$ 1.35 billion. Other important markets include United Arab Emirates (132 thousand tons and US$ 604 million), European Union (82.3 thousand tons and US$ 602 million), Chile (110 thousand tons and US$ 533 million) and Hong Kong (116 thousand tons and US$ 388 million). [41] In addition to beef, according to Statista (2025), Brazil was the world’s largest poultry meat  exporter as Figure 12 shows. Moreover, Brazil has been the world’s largest chicken exporter during the period of 2020-25, as Table 6 shows. Chicken meat exports reached 5.294 million tons in 2024, generating $9.928 billion in revenue.   Figure 12: Poultry meat exports worldwide leading countries, 2025| Statista  Table 6: Market share of global chicken meat exports, 2020-2025 (source: WATTPoultry) Over the past 50 years, Brazil has exported nearly 100 million tons of chicken meat to more than 150 nations. Today’s top markets include China, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and European Union—reflecting global recognition of Brazil’s quality standards and food safety. A significant portion of these exports are halal products aimed at Muslim consumers. More than 2 million tons are shipped annually, making Brazil the world’s largest exporter of halal chicken. [42] According to Euromeat News on February 18, 2025, the top 10 biggest exporters of halal meat to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries account for a total trade value of $14.04 billion. Brazil is the largest exporter of halal meat to OIC countries with a trade value worth $5.19 billion, followed by Australia with $2.36 billion and India with $2.28 billion on the second and third spots respectively. The biggest importer of halal-certified food is Saudi Arabia, followed by Malaysia, UAE, Indonesia, and Egypt. Share [43] According to SIAL Daily, an Italian newspaper, countries like Brazil and Australia dominate exports of halal-certified meat, especially to Middle Eastern countries. Brazil is the largest exporter of halal products, particularly meat, supplying significant quantities to many countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. [44] Overall, Brazilian meat & soybean exports have dominated the world. As a result, citizens in the world have problems preparing for meals without Brazilian products. 4. Brazil, one of top 10 producer of oil in the world Brazil is one of top 10 influential oil country in the world. In 2024, Brazil was the world’s 9th largest crude oil producer as Table 7 shows. Brazil was also the world’s 10th largest crude oil exporting country, as Table 8 shows. Brazil company ‘Petrobras’ is the world’s 7th largest oil company, as Figure 13 shows.  Table 7: Top 10 crude Oil Producing Countries in the world, 2024 (source: 2024 Statistical Review of World Energy Data - Energy Institute )     Figure 13: Top 10 oil companies in the world, 2024 (source: Macrotrends)  Table 8: Top 10 crude oil exporting countries in the world, 2025 (source: https://www.seair.co.in/blog/crude-oil-exports-by-country.aspx)   Moreover, as Figure 14 shows, Brazil is one of net oil exporting countries. Figure 14 shows the trade balance in crude petroleum for 2023. Colors represent the difference between each country’s export and import values. Shades of green indicate a trade surplus (exports largest than imports), while shades of red represent a trade deficit (imports largest than exports).   Figure 14: Global trade balance of crude oil, 2023 (source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity: OEC) In 2023, countries with the largest trade surpluses in crude petroleum were Saudi Arabia ($181 billion), Russia ($122 billion), and United Arab Emirates ($96.2 billion).  In 2024, Brazil exported $44.8 billion of crude petroleum, and the main destinations of Brazil’s crude petroleum exports were China ($20 billion), followed by the US ($5.77 billion), Spain ($4.78 billion), and Netherlands ($3.21 billion). In 2024, Brazil imported $8.69 billion of crude petroleum, and the main origins of Brazil’s crude petroleum imports were Saudi Arabia ($1.93 billion), the US ($1.45 billion), Angola ($1.01 billion), and Guyana ($859 million). [45] Brazil exported more crude oil to the world and US than it imported in 2024. Oil trade surplus with the world and US was $36.11 billion and 4.32 billion, respectively. 5. Brazil, the world’s largest producer of sugarcane ethanol Ethanol is a renewable fuel made from various plant materials collectively known as “biomass.” More than 98% of US gasoline contains ethanol to oxygenate the fuel. Typically, gasoline contains E10 (10% ethanol + 90% gasoline), which reduces air pollution. As Table 9 shows, the US was no. 1 producer of fuel ethanol in the world. In 2024, the US produced an estimated 16.2 billion gallons of the biofuel. Brazil was the world’s second-largest ethanol producing country, with an output of 8.8 billion gallons that same year. Table 9: Annual ethanol fuel production by country, 2015-2024   (source: Annual Ethanol Production | Renewable Fuels Association. https:// ethanolrfa.org/markets-and-statistics/annual-ethanol-production) However, the US and Brazil have different ethanol industry. Brazil has sugarcane-based ethanol industry, while the US has corn-based industry. Brazil is the leading producer of sugarcane ethanol, followed by such countries as India, Thailand, and Colombia. While the US produces the most ethanol globally, its production is primarily from corn, not sugarcane.   Brazil has the largest and most successful bio-fuel programs in the world, involving production of ethanol fuel from sugarcane, and it is considered to have the world’s first sustainable biofuels economy. [46]  Brazil’s sugar cane-based industry is more efficient than US corn-based industry. Sugarcane ethanol has an energy balance seven times greater than ethanol produced from corn. Brazilian distillers are able to produce ethanol for 22 cents per liter, compared with the 30 cents per liter for corn-based ethanol. US corn-derived ethanol costs 30% more because the corn starch must first be converted to sugar before being distilled into alcohol. [47]   Although Brazil has sugarcane-based ethanol industry, its corn ethanol industry has also been expanding rapidly, with production reaching 6 billion liters in 2023, representing an 800% surge over the past five years. [48] Brazil is also a significant developer of the second-generation ethanol, from sugarcane waste or “bagasse.” This gives it the advantage of being able to produce significantly more ethanol from the same land and, as technology advances, producers are also able to extract more energy from the bagasse. Second generation ethanol, known as an advanced biofuel, is particularly in demand because it meets growing sustainability related regulatory requirements. This all sounds promising – but it is not to say that the Brazilian ethanol industry is without its challenges. Its great advantages have been the strength of its domestic sugarcane and ethanol production, the availability of a strong internal market and its flexibility. It has also been helped by legislation and regulation. As both the domestic and international ethanol markets change, these advantages continue to prove useful. [49]    Figure 15: US fuel ethanol exports to Brazil (source: Renewable Fuels Association) https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-releases/article/2025/08/rfa-supports-u-s-investigation-of-punitive-brazil-trade-practices The trade volume of fuel ethanol between Brazil and US is low. US exports to Brazil averaged 3,800 barrels per day—or just 2.7% of total US ethanol exports—from January to May, 2024, according to USDA data. As Figure 15 shows, exports to Brazil in 2024 were valued at USD 53 million, down from a peak of USD 761 million in 2018, according to the USTR investigation notice. The US imported just 491 barrels per day from Brazil during the first five months of 2024, equivalent to 81% of total US ethanol imports.  [50] Overall, Brazil shipped about 300 million liters of ethanol to the US in 2024, with the trade flow relying heavily on incentives paid for low-carbon fuels in California. But exports are just a tiny fraction of the size of the domestic market, where so-called flex-fuel cars can run either on 100% ethanol or a mixture of biofuel and gasoline. Historically, most of Brazil’s production has been absorbed by the domestic fuel market where it is sold as either pure ethanol fuel (E100; hydrous ethanol) or blended with gasoline (E27; anhydrous ethanol). Brazil has been a pioneer in using ethanol as motor fuel in what are known as flex fuel engines. [51] 6. Brazil, a major aircraft manufacturer & exporter  The Brazilian aeronautical industry, led by Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.), is an outstanding example of successful national industrial production. The commercial aircraft company, which is among Brazil’s main exporters, is recognized as the only large national company with active international insertion in a high technological intensity sector. This leadership position is the result of a historical trajectory that dates back to the 20th century, from the pioneering achievements of Santos Dumont with the creation of the 14-bis airplane to the continuous efforts over the years to develop a sustainable aeronautical industry in Brazil. The initial incentives for the development of the aeronautical industry in Brazil occurred under the government of Getúlio Vargas, through the national-developmentalist model, when two state-owned companies were created: Fábrica do Galeão and Fábrica de Aviões de Lagoa Santa, with the support from the private sector. During the same period, the Aeronautics Technical Center (CTA) and the Institute of Research and Development (IPD) emerged. The two institutions were considered the foundations for the establishment of a modern aeronautical industry in Brazil. Later, the CTA and the Ministry of Aeronautics argued for the creation of a state-owned company in the aeronautical sector, which led to the foundation of Embraer in 1969.  [52] In a post-World War II context, in which aircraft development became more expensive and complex, Embraer faced two challenges during its early years: the growing technological complexity and the greater concentration of the production structure. To overcome these challenges, Embraer developed a strategy which focused on creating its own technologies and intensifying its international operations through exports, resulting in the expansion of its production capabilities and an active global insertion. From the 2000s onwards, Embraer continued to stand out in the development of high-performance technological aircraft and expanded its operations to executive aircraft and the defense sector, transforming itself into an aerospace conglomerate. According to Flight Global, which publishes the ranking of the 100 largest aerospace companies, Embraer reached 3rd place in the ranking of sales of commercial aircraft, behind Airbus and Boeing in 2022. Embraer has divisions for commercial, executive, military, and agricultural aviation; it also maintains an incubator for aerospace technologies and businesses. While Embraer continues to produce aircrafts for the defense sector, it is best known for the ERJ and E-Jet families of narrow-body short to medium range airliners, and for its line of business jets, including the market-leading Phenom 300. As of May 2024, Embraer has delivered more than 8,000 aircraft, including 1,800 E-Jet planes. [53] On the other hand, concerning aircraft exports, Brazil ranked 7th in 2022, behind France, Germany, Canada, Spain, US, and Ireland. And Brazil ranked 9th in the world in the aircraft/spacecraft exports in 2023. [54] Moreover, as Table 10 shows, according to Aerotime, Embraer is the 7th largest aircraft manufacturer in the world in 2025. [55] Table 10: Top 10 Aircraft Manufacturers in the World, 2025 (source: Aerotime)   7. Brazil, the leader of BRICS BRIC was originally a term coined by British economist Jim O’Neill and later championed by his employer Goldman Sachs in 2001 to designate the group of emerging markets. The first summit in 2009 featured the founding countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, where they adopted the acronym BRIC and formed an informal diplomatic club where their governments could meet annually at formal summits and coordinate multilateral policies. In April 2010, South Africa attended the second BRIC summit as a guest. South Africa joined the organization in September 2010, which was then renamed BRICS, and attended the third summit in 2011 as a full member. Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates attended their first summit as member states in 2024 in Russia. Indonesia officially joined BRICS as a member state in early 2025, becoming the first Southeast Asian member. The acronym BRICS+ (in its expanded form, BRICS Plus) has been informally used to reflect new membership since 2024. [56] As Figure 16 shows, BRICS now consists of 20 countries. The 10 BRICS members are the founding five — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — plus Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The 10 BRICS partners are Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.  Figure 16: BRICS PLUS as of July 2025 (source: Geopolitical Economy) Some in the West consider BRICS the alternative to the G7. Others describe the organization as an incoherent joining of countries around increasing anti-Western and anti-American objectives. BRICS has implemented competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, BRICS PAY, the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication and the BRICS basket reserve currency. [57] BRICS has been growing in size and influence, and this has frightened some Western politicians. Donald Trump is particularly rattled. After he returned to the White House for his second term as US president, Trump threatened very high tariffs on BRICS, and falsely said he had destroyed the organization. Although Trump threatens BRICS, it grows stronger, resisting US dollar. [58] The US government’s fear of BRICS is rooted in the Global South-led organization’s increasing power. As Figure 17 shows, 20 BRICS members and partners already represent more than two-fifths of the global economy: 43.93% of world GDP, when measured at purchasing power parity (PPP). The BRICS 20 also have a combined population of 4.45 billion, meaning that they represent 55.61% of the global population — the majority of the world.   Figure 17: BRICS share of global GDP (source: IMF) One of the key issues discussed at the 2025 BRICS summit in Brazil was de-dollarization — the attempt to create alternatives to the US dollar as the global reserve currency. Brazil’s left-wing President Lula da Silva has long been an advocate of de-dollarization. [58]“The world needs to find a way that our trade relations don’t have to pass through the dollar,” Lula said at the BRICS summit. “Obviously, we have to be responsible about doing that carefully. Our central banks have to discuss it with central banks from other countries,” the Brazilian leader explained, according to Reuters. He added, “That’s something that happens gradually until it’s consolidated.” [60] Lula agreed that de-dollarization is “complicated” and will be a slow, gradual process, but he maintained that it is necessary. At the 2025 BRICS summit, the Brazilian president even reiterated his call for the creation of a new global currency to challenge the US dollar. [61] Lula declared that “BRICS is an indispensable actor in the struggle for a multipolar, less asymmetrical, and more peaceful world.” He lamented that the US-dominated international financial system benefits the rich colonial countries at the expense of the poor, formerly colonized ones. At the BRICS summit on July 6, 2025, the 20 BRICS members and partners signed a lengthy joint statement. The Rio de Janeiro Declaration was 31 pages long and consisted of 126 points, encompassing a wide variety of subjects. The joint declaration made many references to BRICS initiatives to encourage de-dollarization. The declaration called to strengthen the BRICS bank, the New Development Bank, to “support its growing role as a robust and strategic agent of development and modernization in the Global South.” In particular, the document emphasized the need for the New Development Bank to “expand local currency financing.” [62] Dilma Rousseff, the former Brazilian president from Lula’s left-wing Workers’ Party, has been the Chair of the New Development Bank. In her remarks at the BRICS summit, Dilma emphasized that the New Development Bank is promoting financing in local currencies. “Any business or government that borrows in foreign currency becomes subject to decisions made by the Federal Reserve or other central banks in Western developed nations,” she said, warning of exchange-rate risk and currency volatility. As a positive example of an alternative, the BRICS website noted that Dilma “pointed to a project in Brazil funded directly in renminbi, without the need for dollar conversion.” [63] The BRICS declaration similarly urged further development of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), which could serve as an alternative to the US-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF), by providing short-term liquidity to developing countries facing balance-of-payments crises. Another initiative discussed in the declaration was the New Investment Platform (NIP), which seeks to facilitate investments in local currencies, instead of US dollars, Euro, or British pounds. The declaration addressed the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (ICM), which is working on “finding acceptable mechanisms of financing in local currencies.” The joint statement also highlighted the work of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative and BRICS Payment Task Force (BPTF), which it noted identify “the potential for greater interoperability of BRICS payment systems,” as part of “efforts to facilitate fast, low-cost, more accessible, safe, efficient, and transparent cross-border payments among BRICS countries and other nations and which can support greater trade and investment flows.” [64] As a leader of BRICS to push for de-dollarization, Brazil has deepened its bond with China. Growing ties between Brazil and China were a reality well before Donald Trump came into office. But as US president Trump tried to intervene in Brazil’s judiciary and politics and imposed one of the highest tariffs in the world, enthusiasm for collaboration between the two governments seems to be at an all-time high.  “Our ties are at their best moment in history,” China’s President Xi Jinping said in August 2025 after holding an hour-long call with Brazilian President Lula da Silva. “China supports the Brazilian people in defending their national sovereignty and also supports Brazil in safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests,” he added. Xi also told Lula that China “stands ready to work with Brazil to set an example of unity and self-reliance among major countries in the Global South.” [65] China has been a key commercial partner for South America, and the tie with Brazil has for years been the strongest—it’s China’s top trade partner in the region and one of its main foreign investment destinations. In recent years the breadth of the relationship widened, even under former President Jair Bolsonaro, who used anti-China rhetoric and wanted to see Brazil more aligned with the United States. During Lula’s third term, the connection between China and Brazil has strengthened further. 2025 has seen significant developments. In July 2025, Brazil hosted the 17th BRICS summit, and Brazil and China co-announced the construction of a bi-oceanic railway corridor between Brazil and Peru’s Pacific coast. In addition, Chinese car maker BYD rolled out the first electric car built entirely in Brazil, at its new factory in Camaçari, Bahia, its first outside Asia. [66] In the context of the US-China rivalry, Washington is anxious. According to US media, Brazil’s hosting the BRICS summit meeting was a factor in the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs. On the other side of US politics, Senate Democrats recently wrote a letter to Trump  saying “a trade war with Brazil would make life more expensive for Americans, harm both US and Brazilian economies, and drive Brazil closer to China.” [67] China has been Brazil’s top trading partner since 2009, when it overtook the US. As Figure 18 shows, the trade volume between Brazil and China doubled the volume between Brazil and US in 2024. China is the world’s biggest soybean importer, and gets most of its supply from Brazil. In 2024, 28% of Brazil’s exports went to China. In 2023, Brazil was China’s main supplier of soy, beef, cellulose, corn, sugar and poultry.   Figure 18: Brazil’s trade with China vs USA (source: ComexStat & Americas quarterly) The balance of trade between Brazil and China has historically been favorable to Brazil, although China has increased its exports in recent years. And when the US tariffs took effect, China authorized 183 new Brazilian coffee companies to sell to its market, and did the same with other products. A recent new step between Brazil and China is to negotiate for the adoption of mechanisms to track the origin of agricultural products, particularly soy and beef. The goal is to create a system where both countries recognize the same environmental certifications, so that products can be tagged, for example, as “carbon-neutral beef.” There’s also talk of China importing Brazilian ethanol for the production of “sustainable aviation fuels.” [68] Commodities comprise the vast majority of exports, but the trade relationship between Brazil and China is no longer based solely on them. The manufacturing industry represented 23% of Brazil’s exports to China in the first quarter of 2025, an increase of 6 percentage compared to the same period in 2024, according to the Brazil-China Business Council.   The kinds of exchanges have been changing, too, from government to government, to company to company, to company to client. Beyond BYD’s new factory in Camaçari, expected to be fully functional by the end of 2026, green energy and telecommunications services see strong Chinese investment, and Chinese companies operating in fields like delivery apps are expected to be active in Brazil in the coming years. [69] By contrast, as Table 11 shows, US-Brazil trade has been limited compared to China-Brazil trade. Brazilian exports to the US are less than 2% of Brazil’s GDP in 2024, while Brazilian exports to China are more than 4% of Brazil’s GDP. Brazil economy is too large to be bullied by the US. Moreover, Brazil’s strong ties to China guarantees Brazil’s economic independence from the US.  Table 11: Bilateral trade between Brazil and China & US, 2024(source: SECEXMDIC)   IV. Conclusion This paper explained Brazil’s seven strengths that enabled Brazil to challenge the US as well as US President Trump. Brazil has important strategic assets such as niobium and rare earth. Brazil holds the world’s largest niobium reserves, as well as the world’s third largest rare earth reserves. Brazil also has been the world giant of agriculture that has exported the largest amount of soybean and beefs & chicken to the world. In addition, Brazil is the world’s 9th largest crude oil producer and the world’s 10th largest crude oil exporting country. Moreover, Brazil is the world’s largest producer of sugarcane ethanol, as well as the world second largest ethanol producer, leading Bazil to its energy independence. Furthermore, Brazil is a major aircraft manufacturer & exporter. Embraer, a Brazilian company, reached 3rd place in the ranking of sales of commercial aircraft, behind Airbus and Boeing in 2022. Concerning aircraft exports, Brazil ranked 7th in 2022, behind France, Germany, Canada, Spain, United States, and Ireland. And Brazil ranked 9th in the world in the aircraft/spacecraft exports. More importantly, Brazil has been a leader of BRICS that has wielded huge geopolitical influence around the world. On top of that, Brazil has strengthened its ties with China which has been another BRICS leader. Because of these seven strengths, Brazil has not relied on the US for its economy. Rather Brazil has been able to resist US President Trump’s pressure and threats.  Brazil has been different from Mexico which depends on US for its trade and overall economy. Mexico’s total exports in 2024 were valued at US$618.98 billion, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. Mexico’s total exports to the US in 2024 was valued at US$503.26 billion, constituting 81% of Mexico’s total exports and 27.5% of Mexico’s GDP. [70] Brazil’s exports to the US hit a record $40.3 billion in 2024, but it made up 1.9% of Brazil’s GDP in 2024. [71] Thus, Brazil sharply contrasts with Mexico in terms of its economic dependence on the US.  Brazil has also been different from Japan in terms of its security dependence on the US. Japan has heavily depended on the US for its security. As Figure 19 show, as of March 2025, approximately 53,000 US military servicemen have been stationed in Japan. By contrast, as Table 12 shows, there are 58 US soldiers in Brazil as of March 2025. Even 58 US servicemen in Brazil are not stationed there. They are temporarily in Brazil for a moment. Moreover, unlike Japan where there are several military bases in Japan, including major installations like Futenma air station in Okinawa and Yokota air base in Tokyo, there are no US military bases in Brazil. Thus, Brazil has not depended on the US for its security. Accordingly, Brazil sharply contrasts with Japan in terms of its security dependence on US.   Figure 19: US troops overseas (source: https://usafacts.org/articles/where-are-us-military-members-stationed-and-why/) Table 12: Number of US military personnel (source: https://usafacts.org/articles/where-are-us-military-members-stationed-and-why/)  On the other hand, the US has a growing military presence in Australia, primarily through the marine rotational force in Darwin, which involves thousands of US marines rotating annually for training exercises. These rotations, which have happened since 2012, have grown from an initial 200 marines to nearly 2,500 each year. In addition, the US planned to host up to four nuclear-powered submarines at a future base in Australia, beginning as early as 2027. Moreover, Australia has been a member of Quad and AUKUS that are anti-Chinese alliance.  On the economic front, however, Australia exported a total $517.0 billion in merchandise goods in 2024, with $23.8billion of this going to the US. Australian goods exports to US made up 5% of its total goods exports in 2024 and were 0.9% of Australia’s annual GDP. [72]  In 2024, as Figure 20 shows, around 35% of Australia’s merchandise exports by value went to China. China is also Australia’s largest export market for services with a 13.3% share. China is also Australia’s largest import partner with AUD 116 billion in 2024, followed by the US at AUD 93 billion, and Japan at AUD 32 billion. China has been Australia’s largest trading partner since 2009, when it replaced Japan. Thus, Australia is situated in-between Japan (with heavy security dependence on the US) or Mexico (with extreme economic reliance on the US) and Brazil (with economic and security freedom from the US) in terms of its economic and security dependence on US. Australia straddles a middle path between the US and China. Australia depends on China for its economy, while it strengthens its security ties with the US.  Figure 20: Australia’s exports to China, 2024 (source: Australian Bureau of Statistics) In conclusion, Brazil’s seven strengths have made Brazil achieve both economic and security independence from the US. Thus, Brail was able to resist US pressures and threats. Even Brazil has been able to challenge the US. Brazil’s pursuit of de-dollarization and multipolar world order are good examples of such efforts. References[1] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright. 7 Oct 2025. AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/10/7/is-donald-trump-trying-to-dial-back-tensions-with-brazil[2] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright.[3] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright.[4] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright.[5] For more information on Brazil, see Wikipedia.[6] see Wikipedia[7] For more information about income inequality in Brazil, see “Income Inequality Drops Again and Hits Lowest Level on Record in Brazil.” May.8.2025. Folha De S. Paulo.[8] For more information, see https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/crime-rate-by-country[9] For more information, see https://www.mbmg.mtech.edu/pdf-publications/fs23.pdf[10] Moisés Gómez, Jinhui Li, Xianlai Zeng. “Niobium: The unseen element - A comprehensive examination of its evolution, global dynamics, and outlook.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling. Vol. 209 (October 2024), p.1[11] Moisés Gómez, Jinhui Li, Xianlai Zeng., p. 2.[12] For more information, see https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[13] See https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[14] For more information, see https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[15] See https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[16] See https://www.mining-technology.com/news/cbmm-opens-niobium-production-facility/?cf-view[17] For more information, see https://niobiumcanada.com/why-is-niobium-a-critical-mineral-resource-for-the-united-states/[18] https://niobiumcanada.com/why-is-niobium-a-critical-mineral-resource-for-the-united-states/[19] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer. CSIS. March 4, 2024.[20] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[21] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[22] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[23] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[24] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[25] For more information, see USGS website: https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-rare-earths.pdf[26] https://valorinternational.globo.com/business/news/2025/08/05/brazils-rare-earth-exports-hit-record-but-remain-modest.ghtml[27] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf. CNN. June 3, 2025.[28] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf.[29] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf.[30] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf[31] “US and Australia sign rare earths deal to counter China's dominance.” Natalie Sherman. BBC News. October 20, 2025.[32] https://valorinternational.globo.com/business/news/2025/08/05/brazils-rare-earth-exports-hit-record-but-remain-modest.ghtml[33] https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/060625-brazils-rare-earth-projects-seek-partnerships-to-enhance-energy-security [34] For more information, see https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[35] https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[36] https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[37] https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[38] https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/how-does-u-s-soybean-production-compare-to-brazil/[39] https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/how-does-u-s-soybean-production-compare-to-brazil/[40] For more information, see https://pulse.auctionsplus.com.au/aplus-news/insights/whos-got-beef-and-wheres-it-going[41] https://pulse.auctionsplus.com.au/aplus-news/insights/whos-got-beef-and-wheres-it-going[42] https://www.thepoultrysite.com/news/2025/08/brazil-marks-50-years-as-top-global-chicken-exporter[43] “Top 10 exporters shipped halal meat worth $14.04 bn to OIC countries.” EuroMeat News. February 18, 2025.[44] For more information, see https://newsroom.sialparis.com/topics/news/middle-east-food/[45] For more information, see https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/crude-petroleum/reporter/bra[46] D. Budny; P. Sotero (April 2007). "Brazil Institute Special Report: The Global Dynamics of Biofuels" (PDF). Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center. [47] The Economist, March 3–9, 2007 "Fuel for Friendship" p. 44[48] The flourishing ethanol industry in Brazil, Brazilian Farmers.[49] https://www.hfw.com/insights/bioenergy-series-the-evolution-of-the-brazilian-ethanol-industry/ [50] https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-releases/article/2025/08/rfa-supports-u-s-investigation-of-punitive-brazil-trade-practices[51] https://www.czapp.com/analyst-insights/trump-targets-brazil-over-ethanol-tariffs-amid-falling-us-exports/[52] For more information, see "The Remarkable Story of Brazilian Jet Maker Embraer." Bloomberg. July 5, 2024.[53] "Embraer Delivers 1800th E-Jet". Embraer. Archived from the original on 2 May 2024. Retrieved 21 July 2024.[54] https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/aircraft-and-spacecraft-exports-by-country[55] https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/largest-airlines-aircraft-manufacturers[56] "Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?" (PDF). Think Tank, European Parliament. 15 March 2024.[57] For more information, see Wikipedia.[58] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[59] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[60] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[61] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[62] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[63] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[64] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[65] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[66] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[67] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[68] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[69] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[70] https://trading economics.com /mexico/exports-by-country[71] https://www.publicnow.com/view/8D388094BA5934BD1B86E434070AA54216D7E628?1756817187 & SECEXMDIC[72] See Australian Bureau of Statistics; https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/australias-trade-united-states-america

Defense & Security
Missiles in front EU flag. Air defense systems European Union. Cruise missiles in Europe. Concept weapons development in Europe. Stockpiles strategic missiles. Concrete wall in foreground. 3d image

Nuclear Sharing Between the U.S. and the EU. Benefits and Challenges.

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

Abstract This paper examines the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, focusing on its benefits and challenges within the U.S.-EU security framework. Nuclear sharing involves the U.S. deploying B61 nuclear bombs in select European NATO countries, with host nations providing delivery systems and infrastructure while the U.S. retains full control, ensuring compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The arrangement strengthens NATO's deterrence posture, promotes alliance cohesion, and supports non-proliferation by dissuading the development of independent nuclear arsenals. Recent geopolitical tensions, especially Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have intensified calls for expanding sharing to countries like Poland, enhancing deterrence on NATO's eastern flank. Exercises such as Steadfast Noon validate operational readiness and signal resolve. Critics, however, highlight legal and escalation risks, potential NPT violations, and domestic opposition in host countries. Despite these issues, nuclear sharing remains a crucial component of Euro-Atlantic security, adapting to evolving threats while balancing deterrence, alliance unity, and non-proliferation goals.  Key Words: International Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Sharing, Alliances Introduction Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's deterrence strategy, designed to distribute the benefits, responsibilities, and risks of nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. Under these arrangements, the United States deploys a limited number of B61 nuclear gravity bombs at bases in several European NATO member states. At the same time, those host countries provide the necessary infrastructure, security, and dual-capable aircraft (DCAs) to deliver weapons in a crisis. The weapons remain under full U.S. custody and control at all times, in compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A nuclear mission can only be authorised after explicit political approval from NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which includes all NATO members, and the U.S. President (and potentially the UK Prime Minister). This setup ensures collective decision-making and underscores the U.S.'s extended deterrence commitments to its allies, helping prevent nuclear proliferation by giving non-nuclear states a stake in the Alliance's nuclear posture without independent arsenals.[1] The arrangements originated in the Cold War era, with the first U.S. atomic weapons arriving in Europe in 1954. By the 1960s, they were formalised through the NPG to allow non-nuclear allies input on nuclear policy. Today, approximately 100 B61 bombs are forward-deployed in Europe, hosted by five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Seven NATO allies contribute DCA, including F-16s and F-35s, which serve dual roles in conventional operations and as potential nuclear delivery platforms. France and the UK maintain independent nuclear forces that complement the US-led sharing but operate outside the formal NATO structure. While the question references the EU, nuclear sharing is strictly a NATO framework; all host countries are EU members except Turkey, creating significant overlap but no direct EU-level involvement.[2] These arrangements serve multiple purposes: they enhance Alliance cohesion, provide tools for managing escalations in conflicts, and signal resolve to adversaries, such as Russia. Recent geopolitical tensions, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have prompted discussions about expanding sharing to strengthen deterrence on NATO's eastern flank.[3] Poland, a NATO member since 1999, has long advocated for a stronger role in the Alliance's nuclear mission amid heightened Russian threats, particularly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In June 2023, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki first publicly expressed interest in hosting U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO's sharing policy, arguing it would bolster deterrence without violating the NPT. This push intensified in early 2025, driven by concerns over U.S. reliability under the second Trump administration and Russia's aggressive posture.[4]   On March 13, 2025, President Andrzej Duda explicitly urged the U.S. to deploy nuclear warheads on Polish territory, stating in interviews that NATO infrastructure—including nuclear assets — should "shift east" to match the eastward expansion of the Alliance's borders since 1999. He emphasised that such a move would enhance security guarantees and deter future Russian aggression, while also praising France's potential extension of its "atomic umbrella" as a complementary option. Duda's proposal carried domestic political weight, positioning Poland's conservative opposition as pro-U.S. ahead of the May 2025 presidential election, where candidates debated transatlantic ties versus European autonomy.[5] Proponents argue Poland is an ideal candidate: it spends 4.7% of GDP on defence (exceeding NATO's 2% target), has built one of Europe's strongest militaries, and hosts significant U.S. rotational forces. Analysts suggest that deployment could involve adapting Polish F-35s for DCA roles or constructing secure storage facilities. However, logistical and political hurdles remain, including a potential Russian backlash and the need for NPG consensus.[6] As of October 2025, however, no U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed to Poland, and the proposal remains under discussion without a formal U.S. commitment. Instead, Poland has deepened integration through participation in NATO's annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, which began on October 13, 2025, across Belgium, the Netherlands, and the North Sea — testing procedures for credibility and safety. Poland joined as a full participant alongside Finland, Germany, and the U.S., signalling growing involvement in nuclear planning but stopping short of hosting assets. Alternatives like a dedicated U.S. "nuclear umbrella" declaration for Poland have been floated to avoid escalation without physical deployment.[7] What academics say Academic experts agree that Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's defence strategy. This arrangement refers to an agreement according to which the United States deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons on allied territory while maintaining ownership and peacetime custody.[8]This allows selected NATO members to participate in nuclear planning and provide delivery systems, creating a framework that extends American nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. The operational structure of nuclear sharing involves dual-key arrangements in which both U.S. and host-nation authorisation are required for weapon employment. The United States maintains absolute control and custody of its nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe, while Allies provide military support for the DCA mission with conventional forces and capabilities. Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the Alliance's interconnection and remain a key component of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security across the entire Euro-Atlantic area.[9] These arrangements are coordinated through NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, ensuring multilateral consultation on nuclear policy and targeting decisions. Currently, only five European NATO members have signed bilateral nuclear-sharing agreements with the U.S. These are: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, under which the U.S. stores B61 nuclear gravity bombs at their airbases and their dual-capable aircraft can deliver them in a NATO context. These arrangements, dating back to the Cold War and reaffirmed in subsequent treaties, involve approximately 100 U.S. warheads as of 2025.[10] Nuclear sharing serves multiple strategic purposes within the alliance framework. It strengthens extended deterrence by visibly integrating allied forces into NATO's nuclear posture, thereby reassuring front-line states of American commitment.[11] Experts claim that these arrangements helped prevent nuclear proliferation by reducing incentives for European allies to develop independent arsenals during the Cold War.[12] Additionally, nuclear sharing distributes the political and operational burdens of nuclear responsibility across participating members rather than concentrating them solely with the United States. However, nuclear sharing faces significant criticisms. Legal scholars argue that forward-deploying U.S. weapons on non-nuclear states potentially contravenes the Non-Proliferation Treaty's spirit, creating ongoing diplomatic tensions with Russia and other nations.[13] Domestic opposition within host countries and concerns about the escalation of crises further complicate these arrangements.[14] Despite these challenges, nuclear sharing remains integral to NATO's deterrence strategy, particularly as renewed great-power competition has reinforced alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defence in the contemporary security environment. Benefits of Nuclear Sharing Firstly, official sources from NATO and the U.S. government consistently highlight the benefits of their efforts in preserving peace, deterring aggression, fostering unity, and aligning with global non-proliferation norms. The primary official argument for nuclear sharing is its role in bolstering NATO's deterrence posture against evolving threats, particularly from nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept and related documents emphasise that the Alliance's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons, serve to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression". [15] The 2024 Washington Summit Declaration reaffirms this, stating that "nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security" and that NATO's capabilities provide the "supreme guarantee" for all members.[16] By integrating U.S. nuclear assets with European contributions, such as DCA from seven Allies, these arrangements complicate adversaries' planning and enhance crisis management. As noted in NATO's factsheet, "nuclear sharing provides military and political tools for deterrence and can be used to manage escalation in a crisis," with DCA serving as a "visible and valuable instrument for strategic communications" to signal resolve.[17] Accordingly, in a security environment marked by Russia's integration of nuclear forces into its military strategy and threats against Allies, nuclear sharing ensures credible deterrence without provoking conflict. NATO’s former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argued that "the purpose of NATO's nuclear weapons is not to provoke a conflict but to preserve peace, deter aggression and prevent coercion," underscoring that arrangements like those involving Germany are vital for the "security of the whole alliance".[18] The U.S. State Department echoes this rationale, claiming that with NATO "numerically outgunned on the central front," nuclear sharing maintains a "nuclear deterrent posture sufficient to deter the Soviet aggression," a logic that persists against modern threats.[19] Against this backdrop, exercises like Steadfast Noon[1] Further strengthen this by simulating nuclear scenarios, ensuring "the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission".[20] Overall, according to official sources, these mechanisms help preserve stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, and adapt to challenges posed by actors such as China and North Korea. Secondly, nuclear sharing fosters unity and shared responsibility among NATO members, distributing the benefits, risks, and political burdens of deterrence more evenly among them. NATO's publications explicitly state that these arrangements "ensure that the benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared across the Alliance," demonstrating "unity and cohesion amongst all Allies" through joint decision-making in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).[21] This shared approach, as NATO sources claim, reinforces the indivisibility of security, as outlined in NATO's nuclear policy: "Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the interconnection of the Alliance and remain one of the main components of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area".[22] The 2024 Summit Declaration commits to "modernising its nuclear capabilities" and "strengthening its nuclear planning capability," ensuring broader participation to "demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve".[23] By involving European Allies in Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) missions and infrastructure, nuclear sharing is intended to help mitigate disparities in capabilities, promote equitable burden-sharing, and prevent fragmentation within the Alliance. Thirdly, NATO posits that nuclear sharing supports non-proliferation efforts. Contrary to criticisms, official sources argue that nuclear sharing advances non-proliferation by reducing incentives for Allies to pursue independent nuclear programs. NATO's review of the NPT at 50 years notes that these arrangements "have contributed to security in Europe and non-proliferation as Allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella have not felt pressure to develop their own weapons".[24] Codified during the 1960s negotiations, they comply fully with the Treaty, as both the U.S. and the USSR ensured that no prohibitions were placed on such setups.[25] The U.S. State Department details this compromise, which allowed for "wartime nuclear sharing" without requiring peacetime transfer, thereby reassuring allies like West Germany and dissuading proliferation.[26] Post-Cold War reductions — over 90% in NATO's nuclear stockpile — align with NPT Article VI disarmament goals while maintaining deterrence.[27] This balance facilitates peaceful nuclear cooperation under the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, thereby strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.[28] Finally, according to the U.S. State Department, nuclear sharing underscores the U.S. commitment to European security, countering fears of "decoupling" where allies doubt American resolve. The State Department describes it as addressing whether the U.S. would "sacrifice Chicago to save Hamburg," by making nuclear weapons available for Europe's defence.[29] NATO's policy affirms that U.S. strategic forces, supplemented by forward-deployed assets, provide the "supreme guarantee," with Allies contributing to ensure integration across domains.[30] To sum up, official arguments portray nuclear sharing as indispensable for deterrence, cohesion, non-proliferation, and transatlantic solidarity. These arrangements, according to Western policy-makers and experts, have sustained European stability for decades, with ongoing modernisation ensuring their relevance in an unpredictable world. Nuclear Sharing in the Face of an Ongoing War in Ukraine Nuclear sharing has allegedly bolstered NATO's overall deterrence posture, helping to prevent Russian escalation in Ukraine, including potential nuclear use. NATO's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons in Europe, are described as essential to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression" in the face of Russia's nuclear threats and integration of nuclear forces into its strategy.[31] This has indirectly supported Ukraine by signalling to Russia that any significant escalation — such as nuclear strikes or attacks on NATO territory — would invoke a collective response, thereby limiting Russia's options in the conflict. Russia's invasion has been accompanied by nuclear sabre-rattling to deter Western intervention, but nuclear sharing has helped counter this by maintaining credible deterrence without direct NATO involvement in Ukraine.[32] In that sense, the already mentioned exercises like Steadfast Noon simulate nuclear scenarios, reinforcing the "credibility, effectiveness, safety and security" of the deterrent, which has been crucial amid threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. Analysts note that this has made Russian nuclear signalling less credible over time, allowing the West to provide advanced weapons to Ukraine that were initially considered taboo.[33] However, Russia's threats have still delayed and limited the scale of Western aid, such as restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia, due to fears of crossing "red lines".[34] As mentioned before, nuclear sharing agreements have arguably fostered greater unity among NATO allies, enabling sustained military and economic support for Ukraine. By sharing the "benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence," nuclear sharing demonstrates Alliance solidarity and the "indivisibility of security" in the Euro-Atlantic area.[35] This has reassured European allies, particularly those near Russia, allowing them to commit resources to Ukraine without fearing abandonment. For example, Poland's push to join nuclear sharing reflects heightened threat perceptions from the war, aiming to strengthen deterrence and defence in a hostile environment. NATO's support, including intelligence sharing and strategic communications, has, at least in the eyes of Western policy-makers, deterred Russian use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Ukraine.[36] Without reassurance from nuclear sharing of U.S. commitment — countering fears of "decoupling" — it might have been harder for Europe to maintain this level of involvement.[37] From Russia's perspective, nuclear sharing exacerbates tensions, viewing it as part of NATO's eastward expansion that provoked the invasion.[38] Putin has used this to support claims behind "Russia's Special Military Operation" in Ukraine, framing Ukraine's potential NATO integration as a threat that could place U.S. nuclear weapons near Russia's borders, similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse. This rationale has fueled Russian nuclear threats, which aim to limit Western aid and prolong the conflict by raising escalation fears.[39] The war has heightened nuclear risks, with some analysts arguing it presents greater dangers than the Cuban Missile Crisis due to the potential for miscalculation.[40] Russia's deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as a counter to NATO's sharing arrangements has further escalated postures.[41] Recent decisions by the U.S., UK, and France to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles against Russian targets have prompted Putin to warn of a direct NATO-Russia war, indirectly tying into nuclear sharing's role in deterrence dynamics.[42] This has possibly complicated peace efforts, as Russia perceives Western escalation as existential, making negotiations harder. As mentioned earlier, nuclear sharing has arguably helped mitigate proliferation risks during the war. By providing a shared nuclear umbrella, it reduces the incentives for allies like Poland and Germany to pursue independent nuclear programs, thereby supporting the NPT.[43] Possibly then, the invasion has not sparked widespread proliferation, partly because NATO's deterrent reassures members. Interestingly, however, the debates over a "European nuclear deterrent" independent of the U.S. — spurred by uncertainties such as potential shifts in U.S. policy under Trump — could undermine this if not managed effectively.[44] The war has also renewed focus on modernising nuclear sharing, with NATO committing to enhancing capabilities at the 2024 Washington Summit.[45] This has indirectly affected Ukraine by diverting Russian resources and attention, though some argue it prolongs the stalemate without a decisive victory. In summary, nuclear sharing has possibly acted as a stabilising force for NATO, enabling robust support for Ukraine and deterring Russian nuclear escalation. However, it has also contributed to heightened tensions and Russian intransigence, complicating pathways to peace. As the war persists into 2025, proposals to expand sharing (e.g., to Poland) reflect its evolving role in countering ongoing threats. Conclusion The "Steadfast Noon" exercises are arguably a clear signal to any potential adversary, including Russia, that NATO is prepared to defend all its members against any threats, including nuclear ones. Such exercises involve the use of American non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, although no real combat weapons are used during the drills. The exercises serve not only to practice deterrence against possible nuclear attacks but also to prepare for the potential use of nuclear weapons by NATO if necessary. The fact that these exercises involve nuclear deterrence indicates that NATO's defence strategy includes readiness to escalate to a nuclear response if provoked by a nuclear attack. The locations of these nuclear weapons are not publicly disclosed. Still, there is speculation about their presence in countries like Poland, particularly in light of recent secret agreements that allow foreign troops to enter Polish territory. On the other hand, one should also consider potential downsides, especially for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Nuclear sharing for potential allied use in wartime poses significant risks despite its deterrence aims. One major downside is its incompatibility with the NPT, which violates Articles I and II.[2] Enabling the indirect transfer of control to non-nuclear states undermines global non-proliferation efforts and draws criticism from states such as China. This arrangement also heightens proliferation risks, as peacetime training and exercises normalise nuclear readiness, potentially inspiring similar setups in Asia-Pacific regions like Japan and South Korea, escalating regional tensions.[46] Security concerns include increased escalation dangers, where limited nuclear use could spiral into full-scale war, especially amid vulnerabilities at host bases like Incirlik in Türkiye during political instability. Expanding sharing, such as to Poland, fuels arms races with Russia and exposes more European sites to attacks, without adding credible deterrence given NATO's conventional superiority. Politically, it breeds divisiveness within NATO, fostering resentment among allies and diverting resources from conventional forces, while eroding U.S. control and complicating disarmament. Domestically, host nations face public backlash and moral burdens from anti-nuclear norms, straining alliance cohesion. Russia's objections in NPT forums further highlight how sharing provokes international backlash, risking broader conflicts. Notes [1] On Monday (October 13 2025), NATO began its annual nuclear deterrence exercise Steadfast Noon. The exercise is a long-planned, routine training activity and part of NATO’s broader efforts to maintain readiness and ensure transparency around its nuclear posture. It is not linked to any current world events, and no live weapons are used.[2] Article I - Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. See more at: https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html References [1] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (2022, February). NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[2] Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., & Knight-Boyle, M. (2023, November 8). Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-11/nuclear-weapons-sharing-2023/[3] Johns, E. (2025, October 10). Incomplete Upgrades at RAF Lakenheath Raise Questions About Suspected US Nuclear Deployment. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/publication/incomplete-upgrades-lakenheath-questions-nuclear/[4] Johns, E. (n.d.). Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing. IISS. Retrieved October 14, 2025, from https://fas.org/publication/incomplete-upgrades-lakenheath-questions-nuclear/[5] Poland’s president urges U.S. to move nuclear warheads to Polish territory, FT reports. (2025, March 13). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/polands-president-urges-us-move-nuclear-warheads-polish-territory-ft-reports-2025-03-13/[6] Poland’s president vows to spend 4.7% of GDP on defence this year. (2025, February 5). Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/05/polands-president-vows-to-spend-47-of-gdp-on-defence-this-year[7] NATO’s annual nuclear exercise Steadfast Noon begins. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_238367.htm[8] von Hlatky, S., & Lambert-Deslandes, É. (2024). The Ukraine war and nuclear sharing in NATO. International Affairs, 100(2), 467-485. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/100/2/509/7617216?redirectedFrom=fulltext[9] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_50068.htm?selectedLocale=en#:~:text=Nuclear%20consultation,are%20members%20of%20the%20NPG[10] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (2022, February). NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[11] von Hlatky, S., & Lambert-Deslandes, É. (2024). The Ukraine war and nuclear sharing in NATO. International Affairs, 100(2), 467-485. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/100/2/509/7617216?redirectedFrom=fulltext[12] Khalessi, D. (2015). Strategic ambiguity: Nuclear sharing and the secret strategy for drafting articles I and II of the nonproliferation treaty. The Nonproliferation Review, 23(1-2), 81-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1155865 [13] Park, K. C., & Choo, J. (2022). NATO's nuclear sharing strategy and its implications for establishing a new strategy for strengthening extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. International Area Studies Review, 26(1), 51-78. https://doi.org/10.18327/jias.2022.1.26.1.51 [14] Smith, M. A. (2004). To neither use them nor lose them: NATO and nuclear weapons since the cold war. Contemporary Security Policy, 25(3), 485-514. https://doi.org/10.1080/1352326042000330637[15] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[16] Washington Summit Declaration. (2024, July 10). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm[17] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[18] Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom. (2020, May 11). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm[19] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[20] NATO’s annual nuclear exercise Steadfast Noon begins. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_238367.htm[21] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[22] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[23] Washington Summit Declaration. (2024, July 10). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm[24] Durkalec, J. (2018, June 29). The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at fifty: a midlife crisis. NATO. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/06/29/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-crisis/index.html[25] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[26] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[27] See more at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf[28] See more at: https://www.iaea.org/[29] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[30]NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[31] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm [32] Nuclear Stability and Escalation Risks in Europe. (2023, September 1). Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/09/nuclear-stability-and-escalation-risks-in-europe/[33] Ibidem.[34] Kimball, D., & Bugos, S. (2022, February 28). Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-02/FAQ-russia-ukraine[35] NATO’s support for Ukraine. (2025, October 14). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[36] Dickinson, P., Arick, R., & Lander Finch, N. (2025, October 15). How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/how-the-us-and-europe-can-deter-and-respond-to-russias-chemical-biological-and-nuclear-threats/[37] Dalton, T. (2022, April 8). Nuclear Nonproliferation After the Russia-Ukraine War. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/08/nuclear-nonproliferation-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/[38] Magnier, E. J. POST. X. Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://x.com/ejmalrai/status/1796511588465201374[39] Ukraine: how nuclear weapons continue to increase the risks, two years on. (n.d.). ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons). Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://www.icanw.org/ukraine_two_years_how_nuclear_weapons_increase_the_risks[40] Kimballl, D., & Bugos, S. (2022, February 28). Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-02/FAQ-russia-ukraine [41] Kayali, L., Jungholt, T., & Fritz, P. (2024, July 4). Europe Is Quietly Debating a Nuclear Future Without the US. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/04/europe-us-nuclear-weapons-00166070[42] Katchanovski, I. (n.d.). POST. X. Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://x.com/I_Katchanovski/status/1858244090909127000[43] Dalton, T. (2022, April 8). Nuclear Nonproliferation After the Russia-Ukraine War. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/08/nuclear-nonproliferation-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/[44] Samuelki, O. (2025, March 11). Europe going nuclear would be a catastrophic mistake. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/3/11/europe-going-nuclear-would-be-a-catastrophic-mistake[45] NATO’s support for Ukraine. (2025, October 14). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[46] Analysis of the Incompatibility of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (2024). China Arms Control and Disarmament Association China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy. https://www.cinis.com.cn/zhzlghyjzy/yjbg/1446912/2024072914514738359.pdf 

Energy & Economics
Mersin, Turkey-09 12 2024: A cold Coca Cola or pepsi  bottle or metal can with water droplets on it. Coca Cola on black background

The geopolitical impact on global brands: Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the Middle East and Muslim markets

by World & New World Journal

Coca-Cola and Pepsi are among the most recognized and consumed soft drinks in the world, with Coca-Cola leading as the global favorite (World Population Review, 2025). However, in recent years, geopolitics has shaped their presence in certain regions, particularly in the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries. The reason behind this is interesting, these brands are often seen or associated with the United States (Hebblethwaite, 2012), a nation whose fame in these regions has always been questioned and been controversial, and whose policies in the region have long sparked controversy and criticism. Overview of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the US Coca-Cola was born on May 8th, 1886, when Dr. John Pemberton delivered his newly perfected syrup to Jacob’s Pharmacy in downtown Atlanta, USA. After 139 years, what started as medicine evolved into the iconic soft drink that is enjoyed in more than 200 countries and territories every day (The Coca Cola Company, 2025). On the other hand, a few years later, in 1893, Brad’s drink, later rebranded as Pepsi-Cola, was invented in New Bern, North Carolina, USA by Caleb Brandham, as an aid in digestion (History of the Birthplace, 2018). Pepsi’s presence worldwide also covers more than 200 countries and territories and can be said it is Coca-Cola’s closest rival. While these brands have built a reputation, they have a long history, their competition has been fierce to the dominance of their market across the globe. The term “Cola Wars” represents this fierce competition. Cola wars gained global attention and likely reached their peak around the 1970s and 1980s in the US, while nowadays the fight keeps on, those years were key in how their presence around the globe has resulted nowadays. A bit of the context of the Cola Wars; during the beginning of the 20th century Coca-Cola led the market, while Pepsi had a rough time and went bankrupt in 1923. After its restructured, Pepsi maintained but Coca-Cola advertisements, such as those featuring Santa Claus, made it difficult for Pepsi to compete and by the time of WWII, Coca-Cola could be found in 44 countries already. In 1965 Pepsi merged with Frito-Lay-Inc trying to gain better footholds in restaurants and supermarkets. At the time Coca-Cola was expanding its brand into other soft drinks beverages, Pepsi could simply not compete against them. But by the mid-1970s, Pepsi launched its “Pepsi Challenge”, a genius blind test marketing bet in which over 50% of Americans chose Pepsi over Coca-Cola due its sweeter taste, of course Pepsi claimed its first victory over giant Coca-Cola and started its rise. Coca-Cola's response came with celebrity endorsement and the diet coke in the early 80’s. But by the mid 80’s, Pepsi sales skyrocketed due to its collaboration and promotion with Michael Jackson and appearance in several movies like Back to the Future. Coca-Cola had an identity crisis at the time, but after going back to its roots, (Weird History Food, 2022) once again it came back to fight and claimed its important place in the industry. Coca-Cola and Pepsi around the world While the Cola Wars were largely defined within the American market, their global expansion strategies took very different trajectories once they reached international audiences. Coca-Cola made their debut in the international market in the early 20th century, but it was until WWII when it got international recognition. A marketing associated with American optimism and modernity was followed by the company, and during the war, the company produced millions of bottles for US troops abroad, introducing the drink to soldiers and civilians across Europe, Africa and Asia. The strategy transformed Coca-Cola from a domestic beverage into a global cultural symbol. Pepsi, meanwhile, took a more opportunistic route. After financial struggles between the 1920s and 1930s, the brand re-emerged with a more aggressive global approach. Its internationalization came in 1949 with exports to Canada and later expanded to Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines, but it was until the Cold War, when its real global expansion began (FBIF Food & Beverage Innovation, 2014), when it merged with Frito-Lay and diversified its portfolio. By 2024, PepsiCo generated $92 billion net revenue (PepsiCo, 2025) while Coca-Cola grew 3% to stand at $47.1 billion net revenues (The Coca-Cola Company, 2025) that same year and their products and diversifications not only include the classical soft drinks, but also other beverages and foods. Yet despite their shared dominance in over 200 countries, both face different degrees of acceptance depending on local political, cultural and religious attitudes. The role of geopolitics: soft power, sanctions, wars, risks and opportunities As stated already, both brands are known globally, however, it is important to highlight that their presence in different regions of the world has been shaped by other actors more than just commercial advertisements, or even due to their advertisements and commercial strategies. Let me explain in more detail. In the case of Coca-Cola, during WWII and the Cold War, many people outside of the United States associated the product with American culture, Coca-Cola became a symbol of American soft power and globalization, clearly seen in war advertisements featuring soldiers enjoying cokes suggesting the commonly used “bring people and nations together” phrases. (Edelstein, 2013) On the other hand, with a more social-cultural strategy, Pepsi used the American pop-culture as their approach to gain attention worldwide. Michael Jackson, Madonna, Britney Spears, Beyoncé, among others (Kalgutkar, 2024) were iconic in the brand. In addition, Pepsi’s marketing leveraged music, youth, and rebellion, giving a softer and aspirational appeal. However, this cultural and ideological symbolism also made both companies vulnerable to political backlashes and somehow have defined their reputation and presence in some areas of the world. In the 1950’s, France coined the term “coca-colonization” denouncing American influence. During the Cold War, Coca-Cola became a capitalist symbol (in the eyes of outsiders), and it was banned in the Soviet Union, an opportunity Pepsi took advantage of there. Later, when the Berlin Wall fell, Coca-Cola became a representation of freedom. (Hebblethwaite, 2012) However, the most notable geopolitical response came when the Arab League boycotted the brand between 1968-1991 in the 13-nation organization, because it chose to operate in Israel while the Palestinian land was under occupation. Pepsi capitalized on this absence, solidifying its position in the Arab markets. In addition to the Arab League boycott, there are other cases where sanctions imposed by the US to different countries have led to a small or lack of sales of the products, such as Myanmar, North Korea, Cuba or the Soviet Union, back on time. Moreover, occasional protests and bans in countries like Iran, Venezuela or Thailand (Hebblethwaite, 2012) has also affected the brands at certain points of the history and of course have created an image and reputation in the society, with positive, neutral or negative perceptions. Moving towards present day, after the war in Gaza broke out in October 2023, pressure on the brands reappeared on the Middle East; Coca-Cola, who has a factory in the illegal settlement in East Jerusalem in the Atarot Industrial Zone, was accused of complicity and violations of the international law, in addition to being “related” with the Israeli army. These led to the BDS Movement to add it to a boycott list, which led to protests and has also been spread across other Muslim-majority countries. Of course, sales have dropped sharply in different countries in the region like Egypt and Bangladesh. (Boycat Times, 2025) Pepsi, on the other hand, even though it has a major presence in the Middle East market built over the space left by Coca-Cola during the 1968-1991 boycott, has also been affected by the War in Gaza and the boycotts in the region. PepsiCo reported stagnation in beverage growth across Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan, compared with 8-15% growth a year earlier the war started. (Awasthi, 2024) The boycott of these American brands in the Middle East and some Muslim-majority markets has led to important losses in the share market and the sales itself. For instance, Coca-Cola sales reportedly fell by 23% in Bangladesh and dropped by over 10% in Egypt, overall, there is an estimation of 7% regional revenue loss in the MENA region. The losses of the American brands had become an opportunity to the local brands, like Pakistan’s Cola Next and Pakola (shared market increased from 2.5% up to 12% after the boycott (The Economic Times, 2024)), Qatar’s Kinza or Egypt’s V7, which have up to 40% in market share growth and up to 350% growth in exports, canalizing consumer preferences for local alternatives. (The Economic Times, 2024), (Awasthi, 2024), (CBC, 2024), even in the West Bank, the Palestinian Chat Cola has been positioned in the market, with sales of over 40% in 2023 compared to the previous year. (Associated Press, 2025) Coca-Cola and Pepsi boycotts are not the only ones, other companies like McDonald’s or Starbucks have also been affected in the region, due to similar or same reasons. Even more, in Canada, another great example is the “americano” [coffee] being renamed as “canadiano”, (Barista Magazine, 2025) as response to the economic and political tensions developed earlier this year between Canada and the USA. Despite the boycotts, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have a base in the region, and they have seek opportunities to continue, through investments (Coca-Cola invested $22 million in upgrading technology in Pakistan) or new strategies (PepsiCo reintroduced Teem soda in Pakistan with a “Made in Pakistan” printed on the label) (Shahid, DiNapoli, & Saafan, 2024). Overall, both companies are trying to maintain, penetrate and expand their products in the market, they have been using and relying on bottling companies as a strong tool for those purposes, creating alliances with local companies as well as innovating and testing different new products in the region. Conclusion The current boycott of Coca-Cola and Pepsi across the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries is not only a reflection of political anger – it is a window into how geopolitics can directly reshape consumer economies. What once symbolizes Western globalization, and cultural appeal has now become a marker of political identity and economic nationalism. In a society driven by consumerism – where success is often measured by how much one owns – people tend to care less about genuine human values such as love, kindness, respect, empathy and consideration (MET, 2022). Ironically, today that statement seems reversed. For many consumers, boycotting Western brands has become not only a moral choice but also an act of solidarity and empowerment. Beyond economics, the boycott also reflects a psychological and cultural response. For many consumers in the Middle East, choosing what to drink has become a symbolic act of identity, resistance and empathy. Avoiding brands such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi offers a sense of agency and unity Palestine, turning everyday consumption into an expression of political consciousness. Although both companies remain resilient and continue to invest heavily in local markets, their challenges go beyond short-term losses. The rise of local brands such as V7. Kinza and Cola Next highlights a deeper regional shift – where consumers are not merely reacting to politics, but redefining loyalty based on ethics, identity and sovereignty. In the long term, this phenomenon could accelerate the regionalization of the markets, as local producers gain confidence and international corporations are compelled to adapt – by respecting cultural sensitivities, building genuine local partnerships, and ensuring transparency across their supply chains. Ultimately, the story of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the Middle East demonstrates that in today’s interconnected world, soft power is no longer a one-way export. Consumer behavior itself has become a form of diplomacy – capable of rewarding inclusion or punishing complicity.ReferencesAssociated Press. (2025, 03 02). Coca-Cola's appeal to Palestinians fizzles amid war. Retrieved from VOA News: https://www.voanews.com/a/coca-cola-s-appeal-to-palestinians-fizzles-amid-war/7991182.htmlAwasthi, S. (2024, 09 15). Middle East conflict bites Coca-Cola, Pepsi. Retrieved from SBS News: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/podcast-episode/middle-east-conflict-bites-coca-cola-pepsi/z445sv6glBarista Magazine. 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