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A wave of violence, neoliberalism and drug trafficking Ecuador has been grappling with a profound crisis marked by heightened insecurity, exacerbated by the implementation of neoliberal policies and widespread impoverishment over the past few years. The looming threat of a quasi-permanent state of conflict, at least until the upcoming elections, coupled with a concerning trend towards creeping authoritarianism, while not yet institutionalized, casts a shadow over the current state of affairs. “By associating the presentation of meat to a dog with a bell sound for a certain number of times, eventually the bell sound alone will determine salivation in the dog.” - Pavlov's experiment There is much neuropolitics in the unraveling of the most recent events in Ecuador, with the worsening internal crisis and the draconian responses decided by President Daniel Noboa. There is the neuropolitics of terror, there is neuropolitics in the performance anxiety of a newly elected president who is confronted with a situation, already clear from the outset, that threatens to undermine his eventual future election. And there is much psychopolitics in a country that cannot shake off its visceral hatred of the years of the "Revolucion Ciudadana" on the one hand or its unconditional love for its father Rafael Correa on the other. And who inevitably falls back "like Pavlov's dog," into electoral choices that favor the country's economic elites in the belief that they are choosing the lesser evil. And there is a country exhausted by impoverishment, marginalization, viral weakening of the state apparatuses. And on the other side, again, overseas, there is a kind of Pavlovian reflex that a civil war, or a coup, is going on in Ecuador today. A hell on Earth, in short. A Pavlovian reflex that seems to hide a sort of latent "Orientalism" that still permeates the reading of events on this continent on the other side of the ocean. It will therefore be necessary to use the classic Occam's razor, to try to debunk the facts, news, and interpretations and get to the grain of things. The grain of things is so called. Ecuador has been experiencing for some years now an overt situation of increasing insecurity brought about by the penetration of as many as 22 drug trafficking gangs (Colombian, or affiliated with the Mexican cartels of Jalisco - Nueva Generación and Sinaloa, assisted by Albanian gangs present on the country's coast, which also suggests connections with the Calabrian "ndrangheta") mostly in the coastal regions. The homicide rate is among the highest in Latin America. Regions such as Esmeraldas - with an overwhelming majority of Afro population, which has always been marginalized and impoverished, or Guayas, in one way or another, are fertile or strategically relevant terrain for cocaine routes. The former due to the great availability of cheap "labor," "gatilleros" they call them, notably suburban boys left to their own devices, victims of a historical fate that marginalizes them, who for a fistful of dollars receive a gun and simply pull the trigger. Or they go to extort bribes, "vaccinations," from traders or families. The latter for the important port of Guayaquil, territory to be controlled to export drugs to the United States and Europe, often inside banana containers, as happened in a recent large seizure at the port of Gioia Tauro, Calabria, Italy. The penetration of narcos gangs into Ecuador undergoes a paradoxical acceleration with the peace process in Colombia when border areas "controlled" by the FARC are abandoned and left prey to new paramilitary formations or the coca-producing gangs. Ecuador thus finds itself between two producing regions such as Colombia and Peru, with porous borders, small and large ports from which to ship cargoes, a social fabric torn apart by years and years of neoliberal policies, an economy centered almost exclusively on an extractivist model that leaves large swaths of the population impoverished (and which is, after all, the "good" face of that of the narco-economies), a society ridden with enormous inequalities, first and foremost in urban areas, informal labor markets, and rampant corruption in state apparatuses. A dollarized economy that also makes money laundering easier, and further backed up by widespread illegal gold mining. What better combination for the narco-traffickers to make it the place for processing and shipping their goods? There is a strong correlation between the application of the IMF's neoliberal "shock doctrine," and its social, political and economic consequences, and the spread of organized crime. A correlation that calls for a indepth analysis of the root causes causes of what can be considered a "polycrisis" that runs through the small Andean country, certainly not used to situations such as that experienced in the past in Colombia or currently in Mexico. A polycrisis that is evident by analyzing in filigree the events of the last six months. Let us rewind the tape to August of last year. Riots have been igniting in prisons for some time. Gang clashes, often aided by the connivance of prison authorities (how else would one explain the presence of weapons and explosives used in the riots?) rage with unprecedented brutality. The prison problem stems from widespread pan-penalism in state apparatuses and an essentially punitive and deeply patriarchal view of retribution, and one that has disproportionately increased the type of crimes for which people go to jail (even for driving without a license). And by the construction in 2014 of three maximum security prisons in which narcos are locked up, creating the conditions for their transformation into command centers and theaters of internal wars among them. The presidential election campaign, convened prematurely following then-President Lasso's decision to dissolve parliament recurring to the mechanism of "muerte cruzada" and go to the polls to avoid impeachment proceedings for corruption, is actually dominated by the issue of security. Close to the opening of the polls, there comes the knockout blow that will determine the election outcome. First the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, a champion of the fight against corruption, killed in Quito at a campaign event, few weeks after Augustin Intriago, the mayor of Manta, another port city, a territory in the hands of gangs like others on the coast. In the days that followed, the hitherto minor figure of the coastal candidate, an expression of local and national oligarchies - the same ones that had supported Lasso at the time - emerged in the polls. A young man unknown to most, a sort of electora underdog, Daniel Noboa, son of "Alvarito" great tycoon of the banana industry, a permanent candidate for president, and grandson of Isabel a Guayaquil’s wealthiest real estate entrepreneur. In the runoff Noboa wins against the Revolucion Ciudadana candidate, Luisa Gonzales, and immediately makes of security his priority. He faces a very complex scenario. A Congress in which on paper it does not enjoy a majority (although it will later vote by a majority for the first economic measures and the state of internal armed conflict also by virtue of a pact with important sectors of the oppositions), the overwhelming majority of territories controlled by opposition parties (Revolucion Ciudadana and Pachakutik, the reference party of the powerful CONAIE, Confederation of Indigenous Organizations of Ecuador). In the background is the important victory in the national referendum against oil extraction in the Yasuni, which foreshadows the existence of a social and ecological movement far stronger than electoral numbers. In short, Noboa appears from the outset to be a kind of lame duck who will experience a situation, to return to the neuropolitics mentioned above, of a real post-electoral stress disorder, squeezed between the urgency of giving strong and impactful signals to counter organized crime and that of responding in the short time of his term (new elections are due for mid 2025), to the interests of the lobbies to which he refers. Tertium non datur, even if that tertium is represented by the overwhelming majority of the country, already affected by the pandemic. And it is precisely there, in that "tertium," "from below," Uruguayan sociologist Raul Zibechi would say, that decision makers should start to reconstruct a plausible hypothesis of a country capable of another future. It is that tertium to which the country's resources should be devoted, young people and adolescents left alone and in the grip of criminal gangs, with fathers and mothers migrating out of desperation, crossing the Isthmus of Darien on foot to try to get to the United States. So even before he takes office, Noboa finds himself making some pre-government reshuffles, launches a security plan, "Phoenix," then decides to get the inconvenient vice president, a great Vox sympathizer, out of the way by sending her to Israel with the assignment of "special envoy" for peace. And he gets to work. A few weeks go by and the "Metastasis" scandal explodes, proof of how far the narcos have managed to penetrate the judicial sector, squeezed between corruption and death threats. In the meantime, the president begins to set his economic agenda by presenting laws aimed mainly at flexibilizing the labor market, creating free-trade, tax-free zones that coincide with the large estates and plantations of the agribusiness tycoons, announcing the removal of fuel subsidies, the main detonant of last year's indigenous uprising, brutally suppressed by the Lasso government. A "ley economica" that would create great resistance in the country, and which responds, along with the others, to the need to secure support from the International Monetary Fund. In parallel, funds to local authorities are reduced, the security department under his direct command is even closed. A tax "amnesty" for the highest incomes is announced. Cases of corruption in the security apparatus follow one another. Noboa prepares a package of legislative proposals and amendments to the Constitution that would allow the police and army to have a free hand and enjoy total immunity, which in fact is already the case thanks to the decrees issued by Lasso, who several times resorted, in vain, to the state of emergency. Nothing new then. He then attempts the popular plebiscite card a few months before the new election deadline. To the first 11 referendum questions announced, it then adds others, even including issues that only partly have to do with the issue of security. These include the opening of casinos, or measures to ease foreign direct investments. Proposals that a leading constitutionalist and former member of the Constitutional Court, Ramiro Avila Santamaria, defined as unconstitutional or unfounded. The decision is now up to the Court. Then comes the sensational news of the escape from prison in Guayaquil of one of the leaders of the Choneros gang, alias "Fito," allegedly occurring as early as Christmas, and of another leader of the "Lobos" apparently implicated in the murder of Villavicencio. A severe blow to the government's credibility to which Noboa responds with yet another declaration of a state of emergency, resulting in a curfew from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m., a decision to have the army assist the police in public order operations, and the restriction of the right of assembly and the inviolability of the home. The narcos' response is immediate: new riots in prisons, attacks on some police stations, and the "raid" - the details of which have yet to be fully clarified - of a commando breaking into a live broadcast of a Guayaquil television station. A blow to the heart of his main electorate. Fact of the matter is that within a handful of hours of the blitz a new decree is issued in which the President - for the first time in the country's history - declares a state of internal armed conflict, that would be fought by the army, and recognizing the 22 gangs as "belligerent" parties. The crisis thus shifts from being a matter of public order to one of actual war, governed by international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva convention. Upon the announcement of the measure, the country goes into panic. Classes are suspended and will remain in online modality for several days, the evacuation of public buildings is ordered, and contingents of soldiers are dispatched to guard sensitive targets. The president locks himself up in the Carondelet Palace with senior state officials to decide what to do. After a few hours, military big brass in full uniform appear in front of the cameras, explaining the situation to the country and giving the line. A coup? There goes the first Pavlovian reflex. And yet no, Decree 111 declaring a state of "internal armed conflict" is overwhelmingly approved by Congress, even by the leftist opposition parties that had from the outset given declaration in favor of national unity. Indeed the main concern is that of not appearing as those who throw up their hands in the face of organized crime, a tasty opportunity for opposing parties in the upcoming 2025 presidential and parliamentary elections. A civil war? Not even, since we are not faced with organizations structured in paramilitary form, nor are we faced with an armed conflict on a national scale, but rather with public order operations "with boots on the ground" in well-defined territories. The declaration of war is in fact a media coup for effect to create the conditions for a "national unity" and "war", in which a clear distribution of tasks is emerging. On the one hand, the military, which from now on takes command of public order operations, with the police at their service (something that creates quite many frictions) and which can thus reaffirm their role and their credibility before the people. It must be said that the presence of the military in the streets is - at least in the capital Quito - very sporadic, the effect appears to be mostly symbolic. On the contrary the situation is pretty different in prisons where the military can now intervene freely to suppress riots and free that hundred hostages still in the hands of the rioters. Or when launching raids or searches in the "hot" outskirts of crime-ridden cities. However, even in the symbolic also lurks the risk of a pervasive "securitization" of public space, resulting in the inhibition of every possible form of dissent or social conflict. Noboa was quick to declare that even those who do not take action against gangs, (by extension one could also interpret those who oppose his policies) could be considered "the enemy." And then, in that public space now controlled by the military, there is a clear risk that the real victims of repression will end up being those marginal and marginalized classes, guilty only of being such, or of having dark skin. The precedent of "false positives" in Colombia comes to mind, where the military, in order to demonstrate the success of their operations, displayed to the public corpses of poor people in guerrilla uniforms. The military thus takes over – de facto - the public space determining by default the direction in which the country will go. In parallel, the private space is taken care of by the president with new decree-laws presented invoking the need to raise funds for internal warfare, from raising VAT to 15 percent, to the liberalization of the energy sector, the rejection of the result of the public consultation on Yasuni in order to continue drilling to generate funds to support the “war”, to policies aimed at attracting foreign capital. In the background are two agreements on cooperation in the military and security sector with the United States signed months ago by Lasso providing for the albeit temporary presence of the military on the national territory. They are in a hurry in Washington, with the specter of Trumpian “America First” isolationism looming. No surprise that the Ecuadorean Constitutional Court ruled that no approval by Congress is required. Then the free trade agreement with China, so far stalled by Congress, is due to go into effect soon. What about what exists and lives between public and private space? Movements? Civil society organizations? Theirs are the only expressions of criticism and dissent. CONAIE declares solidarity with the victims of the conflict, urges communities to organize indigenous guards to protect their territories (so far almost untouched by narco violence) and warns the government not to use the pretext of war to impose anti-popular measures. Its Amazonian organizations have recently taken to the streets to protest the construction of one of the two “Bukele-model” megaprisons in the Pastaza province. Environmental and indigenous movements are now denouncing Noboas’ decision against the ITT Yasuni’s decision. On the other hand, human rights organizations point the finger at the inappropriateness of the use of the military instrument, and the possible serious effects on human rights. The risks to the millions of Ecuadorians and Ecuadoreans working in informal economies or on temporary contracts are also stressed, as well as how the state of exception may increase cases of intra-family and gender-based violence. The rest is still a work in progress. The risk of a sort of permanent state of war that will characterize the country and the public debate at least until the next elections is just around the corner together with a creeping authoritarianism, certainly not at the institutional level, but surely in the state of affairs. Although the decrees of emergency and state of internal armed conflict have a duration of two months, it is highly unlikely that in that time the state will be able to declare victory. Since when you declare a war you must also be clear about when you are going to win it. Which at the moment is very vague and indefinite. Will it be when all Colombian or Venezuelan criminals are deported? Which is very difficult since the Constitution recognizes the human right to free mobility. Or when will they all be put in jail? Or when they will all be "shot down"? (numbers range from 30 to 50 thousand gang members), according to the term used by the mainstream press. This article was published originally in the Transnational Institute under the Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 licence

However a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is achieved, neither punishing Benjamin Netanyahu nor patronising a non-elected Palestinian administrative entity will produce tenable post-war governments. The only viable path will be one that is paved with political legitimacy. Two months after Hamas’ attack on Israel, UN Secretary General Antonio Gutterres invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter to formally bring the gravity of the war in Gaza to the attention of the Security Council. Gutteres judged that the war was “fast deteriorating into a catastrophe with potentially irreversible implications for Palestinians as a whole and for peace and security in the region.” While such concerns are thus being expressed at the highest international level, it remains an open question how Israel and Gaza are to be governed once a permanent ceasefire is eventually achieved. Unresolved and volatile conditions in local, regional, and international political environments indicate that a variety of factors will need to be considered in any credible post-war proposal. Locally ‒ in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza ‒ it is difficult to identify anything resulting from the November 2023 truce that was beneficial to the Netanyahu government. By allowing negotiations with Hamas to proceed (via Qatari mediators), in order to free a limited number of captives, Netanyahu was being drawn away from his initial position of outright refusal to “surrender to terrorists,” and drawn into a pragmatism of dividing members of hostage families from one another. Predictably, Netanyahu faced renewed public anger from the families of those still in captivity once the truce broke down. On the Palestinian side, and unpromising for both the Netanyahu government and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) in terms of their ability to manage future conflict in the West Bank, the release of 240 Palestinian teenage and women prisoners (some jailed for attempted murder) prompted scenes of public jubilation. This provided authentic propaganda for Hamas during the truce, spreading in real time on Telegram channels. One Palestinian former detainee announced she was proud of Mohommed Deif and Yahya Sinwar for not having forgotten her. Her gratitude to Hamas’ leaders in Gaza was an expression of popular resistance that is not likely to evaporate when the women and children return to their homes. Even less encouraging for the prospects of effective security cooperation between the PA and Israel in the West Bank, the release of these women and minors indicated simultaneously that Israel was unable to keep them incarcerated and that the PA had been able neither to prevent their incarceration previously, nor to free them now. Since 1994 the PA’s Western-endorsed security cooperation with Israel has proceeded alongside Israel’s “administrative detention” of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank, detained without trial or charge. The liberation of these 240 women and minors can only be attributed to the negotiation with Hamas into which Israel has been drawn. One poll conducted during the week of prisoner exchanges showcased a dramatic increase in Palestinian support for Hamas. These street-level displays, of course, do not indicate that Hamas is on the way to mobilising political imagination throughout the West Bank. Nor is it capable of forcing itself back into the sphere of government from which it was removed after winning the 2006 elections. But it would be difficult to describe the truce and the prisoner exchanges as having damaged Hamas’ popular legitimacy. Regionally, Israel’s siege on Gaza has elicited strong responses that have demonstrated increasing antagonism on and around Israel’s borders. To the north, Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called Netanyahu “the butcher of Gaza.” To the south, Yemeni Houthis have staged brazen attacks on Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea. In each case, Iran’s presence has been felt. Turkiye’s cultivation of diplomatic common ground with Tehran over Gaza has proved troublesome, while the Houthis have relied considerably on Iran for military aid. But glib condemnation of these regional alliances will be of little use when it comes to developing viable post-war political and governmental arrangements. Simply pointing the finger at Iran will not provide Israel with new geostrategic techniques for avoiding a multi-front war. Nor will it provide the United States with new geostrategic ideas for controlling the international disorder emanating from Gaza. At the international level, the strained position of the United States has become more pronounced, and the United Nations more vocal. As fighting resumed following the truce, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Israel’s war cabinet that it may not be able to count on many more months of international support for its siege on Gaza. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin meanwhile has suggested that Israel risked “strategic defeat” if it could not combine its war aims with the protection of civilians. The US-Israel relationship may be “ironclad” now as earlier, but the US government’s highest foreign policy and defence officials also seem to be acknowledging that Israel’s sovereignty has been challenged as never before. While Israel is naturally focussed on military objectives and geostrategic conditions, Blinken and Austin were making it clear that the lives of civilians in Gaza lives must also be taken into account. By 6 December, international pressure had come to fully bear on Israel’s prosecution of its war aims. While the UN Security Council’s permanent ceasefire resolution was vetoed by Washington, it was clear that what E.H. Carr called the “political community of nations” was keen to make its wishes heard. Ideally these wishes will lead to a cessation of hostilities, comparable to that achieved by Resolution 1701 in 2006, at the close of the second Lebanon war. However, a month later the wishes of the international community had not become a reality; no binding UN Security Council resolution had brought a ceasefire into effect. As the war proceeds into 2024, sceptics might be forgiven for observing that, today, declarations of international governance still have something about them of the “embryonic character” that Carr warned of in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 84 years ago. By whatever means a permanent ceasefire is achieved, all parties will eventually need to face the long-term question: “How are Israel and Gaza to be governed after the war?” In order to be credible, post-war proposals will need to put aside the attractions of punishment and patronage, and will need to come to terms with enduring fundamentals of political legitimacy. Punishing Benjamin Netanyahu by calling for his resignation may seem legitimate to the families whose loved ones have been killed or are still in captivity. Certainly, there are enough former Israeli statesmen and security chiefs who consider Netanyahu a disgrace or a liability. But having Netanyahu gone will not produce a new coalition government ˗ led by Benny Gantz or anyone else ˗ that can magically restore psychological security in the lives of Israelis and political stability in the State of Israel. Punishment will not induce rehabilitation. International patronage of an unelected Palestinian administrative body may be the best way to prevent inclusion of Hamas in a post-war government. Such a consideration may also ensure that the Palestinian Authority is “revitalised.” But this would be a repeat of 2007, when principles agreed among outsiders overturned Hamas’ election victory. At worst, a Palestinian government managed under international patronage would be a reversion to the post-Oslo dialectic that Anne Le More described in 2008 as “political guilt, wasted money.” Any credible proposal for democratic post-war government in Israel and Gaza will need to start from the political fundamentals as summed up by Olivier Roy: “there can be no democracy without political legitimacy.” The future will need to be governed by people and parties arising within local political life, and who are voted for by the local population, and who are held accountable by the political will of Israelis and Palestinians themselves.

The fighting continues between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas militants in and around Gaza. The death tolls continue to rise, but where do the weapons keep coming from? The Israeli government estimates that Hamas’ surprise attack on Oct. 7, 2023, killed 1,200 people in Israel. Since then, both sides have fired missiles and rockets, mortars and other weapons at each other. Israeli missiles and bombs have killed over 25,000 people in Gaza, according to the United Nations. Hamas has launched over 13,000 rockets and mortar rounds into Israel and killed 189 Israel Defense Forces soldiers. As a scholar of the global defense industry and international weapons trade, I see that both Israel and Hamas make some of their own weapons and get the rest from suppliers in other nations. Israel’s weapons supply Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been acutely aware that it is surrounded by hostile countries with many more inhabitants. Its defense strategy has emphasized self-sufficiency and advanced technology. This philosophy has been reinforced and refined by the nation’s experience in prior wars in 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973, as well as prior conflicts in Gaza and the West Bank. And its defense spending matches this priority. In 2022, Israel spent 4.5% of its gross domestic product on defense, a share that was the lowest in decades but more per person – US$2,623 – than any other country except Qatar. For a small country, Israel has a highly regarded defense industry, which can ramp up production on short notice in case of increased fighting. Three Israeli companies rank among the world’s top 100 arms producers: Elbit Systems manufactures ammunition and artillery; Israel Aerospace Industries produces unmanned aerial vehicles; and Rafael makes air defense systems. Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries collaborated to develop the highly regarded Iron Dome missile defense system. The U.S. provided development aid, and about half of Iron Dome’s components are made in America. Led by those firms, Israel has gone from being a net weapons importer to the world’s 10th-largest arms exporter. Much of its success in the weapons industry is a result of entrepreneurship and innovation within the overall economy, as well as civilian-military linkages. Since most Israelis are required to serve in the military, they develop decision-making and leadership skills at a young age. They also tend to be given tasks with high levels of responsibility. All of this contributes to the country’s startup and entrepreneurial culture. Israel also imports weapons from other countries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s arms transfers database, 68% of Israel’s weapons imports from 2013 to 2022 came from the U.S. Another 28% came from Germany. Imports are funded in part by $3.3 billion of military aid provided annually by the U.S., along with $500 million for missile defense cooperation. Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the U.S. has provided more than 5,000 MK-84 munitions, a type of 2,000-pound bomb. As of late December 2023, the U.S. had sent artillery shells, armored vehicles and basic combat tools to Israel, delivered in 230 cargo planes and 20 ships. U.S. military aid to Israel also includes stockpiled weapons. For years, the Pentagon has stored weapons in Israel, presumably for use by the U.S. military. But the U.S. has allowed Israel to draw down some of these supplies during the Gaza conflict. In fact, the U.S. has directed some of these stored armaments to be sent to Ukraine, which allows those warehouses in Israel to be restocked with more advanced equipment. Less sophisticated bombs and bullets shipped to Ukraine will free up space, to be filled with precision-guided munitions from the U.S. Hamas’ weapons supply In response to Israeli blockades, Hamas has constructed an elaborate and extensive tunnel complex under Gaza and across the Egyptian border. Hamas gets most of its weapons from Iran. The weapons are transported though Egypt and smuggled into Gaza through the tunnels. But Hamas’ weapons also include AK-47 assault rifles from China and Russia, and rocket-propelled grenades manufactured in North Korea and Bulgaria. In the murky global arms trade, it can be difficult to determine who is selling weapons to whom. A weapon manufactured in one country could end up in the hands of Hamas by way of one or more intermediary countries. Like nonmilitary goods, copycat armaments also are part of the weapons business. Hamas fighters are using a variety of Soviet-era weapon designs that have been copied and manufactured by China and Iran. Hamas even manufactures some arms in Gaza. Local factories, some of which are within the underground tunnels, produce mortars, rockets, rifles and bullets. Some countries, such as Russia, give Hamas permission to imitate their products. Iran trains Gaza-based engineers on design and production techniques. Ironically, when the Israeli military destroys buildings and equipment in Gaza, material from the ruins is recycled by Hamas factories into weapons. As the war progresses, Israel will likely be in a position to restock its depleted weapons, so long as Washington continues to provide political and military support. But with Israel now occupying much of Gaza, it will be far more difficult for Hamas to reload.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah was caught off guard by Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on 7/10/2023, followed by a widespread Israeli aggression on Gaza Strip (GS) and continuous incursions into various areas of the West Bank (WB). The PA has been confused, hesitant, helpless and weak in responding to the evolving confrontations and in taking practical measures against these aggressions. This situation raises questions about the factors influencing the PA’s position. First: Determinants and Influential Factors: The most important factors influencing the PA decisions and positions regarding the Israeli aggression on GS and incursions into WB can be summarized as follows: 1. The PA is concerned about its existence and role in light of threats from the right-wing Israeli government to undermine the PA, limit its role and accuse it of financing terrorism. The lack of condemnation of Hamas’ attack on October 7 has further complicated the situation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated the readiness of the Israeli army to confront the PA security forces, describing the Oslo Accords that established it as a “fateful mistake.” 2. There is a contrast in opinions within the PA regarding how to deal with the aggression on GS: one advocating neutrality, caution and waiting for the outcome of the confrontation between Hamas and the occupation forces, and the other emphasizing the necessity of taking practical actions to preserve the PA’s image and avoid condemnation for complicity and abandonment. News indicate that Mahmud ‘Abbas, Hussein al-Sheikh and Majed Faraj adopt the first, which has reflected clearly in the PA’s decisions and current position. 3. The security obligations imposed by the Oslo Accords, requiring the PA to coordinate security with Israel, maintain security conditions and prevent resistance activities. Unlike previous cases where the PA hinted at freezing security coordination with the occupation, it is noteworthy that no such position was made concerning the current aggression. 4. The US has called the PA to engage with its visions and arrangements in order to manage GS after the current confrontation with Hamas. The PA has responded to these demands, expressing its readiness to manage GS, after the end of confrontations, within a political framework that includes WB and GS. 5. The political rivalry with Hamas and the desire to weaken it as a strong political opponent. Some PA prominent influential figures believe that the current confrontation between Hamas and Israel presents a crucial opportunity to settle the competition with their political rival and regain control over GS. 6. The positions of influential Arab parties that seek to end Hamas’ rule of GS, weaken it and enhance the PA’s role in WB and GS. They also want to stop the increase of resistance activities in WB, which threaten the PA’s influence. 7. The PA’s fear of economic repercussions if it adopts positions that provoke the Israeli side. Israel has decided to withhold about $156 million from the monthly clearance funds, claiming that this amount includes salaries, allowances for employees and expenses for GS. There are indications that the Israeli security cabinet is considering the possibility of releasing the withheld clearance funds to the PA and allowing workers from WB to work inside the occupied Palestinian territories under new security conditions. 8. The decline of the PA’s popularity among Palestinians due to its weak position concerning the war on GS and its inability to resist the widespread incursions in WB. Numerous angry protests in WB cities have called for the resignation of the PA’s president. A recent opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Political and Survey Research in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung revealed a significant decline in the PA’s popularity. About 58% of respondents called for its dissolution, while 72% supported Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, and 64% opposed the PA’s participation in meetings with the United States, with the involvement of Arab countries, in order to discuss the future of GS after the war stops Second: The PA’s Position on the Aggression: Through monitoring the PA’s actions and positions during the 70 days of Israeli aggression on GS and the continuous invasions of WB cities, its stance can be summarized in the following points: 1. The PA had limited reaction, only declaring its rejection and condemnation of the Israeli aggression without undertaking effective and influential action to counter it. It relinquished its role in protecting the Palestinian people, or at least acknowledged its implicit inability to do so. 2. The PA participated in the meetings of joint Arab and Muslim action institutions and became a member of the committees derived from these meetings to follow-up their decisions. 3. The PA prevented its security forces from confronting the ongoing Israeli attacks in WB. It continued pursuing resistance groups and conducting arrests among Palestinian activists. 4. The PA worked to restrain popular activities in WB that support the resistance and oppose the Israeli aggression on GS. It limited the spaces for popular movement and prevented interaction with the Israeli forces. 5. The Palestinian mission at the United Nations (UN), along with some Palestinian ambassadors, have effectively clarified the Palestinian position, countered the Israeli narrative and worked to issue from the UN General Assembly resolutions to cease fire. They also confronted US proposals condemning the resistance. 6. The PA avoided calling for any joint national meetings to strengthen the internal front against the Israeli aggression. It emphasized that the PA and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are the sole representatives of the Palestinian people, excluding any other party. Conclusion In general, the PA’s position aligned with the official Arab stance, dominated by a negative view of the Palestinian military resistance and reformist Islamic movements. This aligns with its desire for the PA to replace Hamas in managing GS. Despite presenting itself as the representative of the Palestinian people, expressing their suffering and aspirations, its practical behavior on the ground in WB, especially through maintaining security coordination with Israel, suppressing popular movements and preventing any escalation of Intifadah, civil disobedience and armed resistance, established for a “comfortable” environment for Israel. It practically sidelined over three million Palestinians in WB from engaging in resisting activities, except under exceptional circumstances. It seems that the PA leadership prefers a policy of waiting, anticipating what will result from the Israeli aggression on GS, with some of its leaders considering the defeat of the resistance and the dominance of the occupation a matter of time. Consequently, the PA is the candidate to take over the administration of GS, but it refuses to overtly acknowledge this, so as not to appear that it is coming riding Israeli tanks. For this would lead to further deterioration of its already declining popularity and loss of credibility. It prefers having transitional phase before assuming responsibility, within a national consensus if possible and a broader vision for genuine progress in the peace process. Therefore, it is unlikely, in the coming days, that a substantial change in the PA’s position on the Israeli aggression on GS will occur, given the continued influence of the mentioned factors and while it is waiting for battle outcomes to become clear.

Drone technology has been used extensively in twenty-first-century armed conflict, but the Russia-Ukraine war is driving innovations in autonomous warfare not seen on other battlefields. From drones that fit in the palm of the hand to drones weighing more than 1,000 pounds (454 kilograms), Ukraine has built and acquired a diverse fleet of remotely piloted aircraft to complicate and frustrate Russia’s advances. The constantly evolving scope of this technology and its ever-growing use signal not only the potential for drones to level the playing field in the Russia-Ukraine war, but also their ability to influence how future conflicts are waged. Why is the war in Ukraine a hotbed for drones? As the war enters its third calendar year, neither side is close to achieving air superiority. Most military analysts expected that Russia, with its superior air power, would quickly seize control of contested airspace early in the conflict. But surprisingly, Ukraine’s defenses, later bolstered by Western systems, were able to repel and deter Russian aircraft from making near-border and cross-border strikes. The inability of either side to break through the other’s integrated air defenses has forced them to increase the agility of their fielded forces and rely more heavily on standoff weapons, including long-range artillery, missiles, and drones. These conditions have led to the development of new drone technologies that could help Ukraine level the playing field in the air battle and possibly turn the tide of the war in its favor. What technologies are in use? Ukraine’s drone deployment has evolved with the changing battlefield. During earlier stages of the war—when Russia’s air defense and electronic-warfare capabilities were less pronounced—Ukraine relied on larger drones such as the Turkish TB2 Bayraktar to great effect. The TB2’s ability to carry multiple air-to-ground munitions and loiter for long periods allowed Ukrainian forces to penetrate Russian air defenses and strike heavy targets. However, as time progressed and Russia took greater control of the skies, it was able to detect and shoot down these larger models more easily. The TB2 may maintain some relevance—its sensor suite and considerable range still enable Ukrainian operators to collect intelligence—but Ukraine has nonetheless shifted to using smaller drone technology to adapt to Russian advances. The more abundant, smaller drones are proving to be serious game changers in that they have given Ukraine better battlespace awareness and more capability to hit targets. The Ukrainians have tapped into commercial technology—the same recreational products available to civilians—to get cheap, off-the-shelf drones onto the battlefield quickly. Many of these “hobbyist” drones have been acquired through grassroots crowdfunding efforts, or “dronations.” At just one thousand dollars per unit, the small drones can be rapidly amassed and repurposed by operators for a specific effect. For example, the popular first-person view (FPV) drones commonly used for racing or filmmaking are retrofitted with makeshift explosives and flown to strike fixed targets at relatively low cost. These drones can carry out single-use strikes with high precision while remaining less susceptible to Russian air defense systems. Additionally, the Ukrainians have repurposed significant aspects of their domestic economy to support the new drone supply chain, increasing their drone-making capabilities through public-private partnerships. One year ago, Ukraine had seven domestic drone manufacturers and it now has at least eighty. As for Russian drone technology, Moscow deploys indigenous models, such as the Orion, Eleron-3, Orlan-10, and Lancet, but Western sanctions on crucial Russian supply chains have prevented Moscow from excelling in drone production. Instead, Russia has turned to Iran for a steady supply. The Russians now boast an extensive fleet of Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that can carry 100 pounds (45.4 kilograms) of explosives over a range of 1,200 miles (1931 kilometers). How are drones shaping the war? This conflict has demonstrated the battlefield advantages of drones, which have become smaller, more lethal, easier to operate, and available to almost anyone. They compress the so-called kill chain, shortening the time from when a target is detected to when it is destroyed, and they can bolster a military’s ability to reconnoiter the forward edge of the battlefield. Drones with longer endurance profiles can effectively conduct hours of reconnaissance, enabling other, more advanced drones to carry out precision strikes deep inside enemy territory. Other models enable individual soldiers to monitor adversary movement without risking lives or giving up the soldier’s position. Drones can also play an important international humanitarian role, for instance, by conducting battle and collateral damage assessments or exposing war crimes. U.S. drone manufacturer Skydio recently donated nine drones that—with their high-resolution cameras—will be used to help Ukraine document potential Russian war crimes. Through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), images captured will be used to aid the Office of the Prosecutor General in documenting many instances of human rights abuses. What are the defenses against drones? Drones are susceptible to air defenses. Larger drones with a distinct radar cross-section are easy, slow-moving targets for air defense interceptors and anti-drone guns; both Ukraine and Russia have downed thousands of drones with their interceptors and artillery. However, the continual use of these systems by both Ukraine and Russia can be prohibitively costly, as a single drone could cost thousands or even millions of dollars to intercept. An emerging challenge of counter-drone defense is the need to develop and employ a system that is cheaper than its target. Crucially, smaller drones that can swarm toward a target are more difficult to shoot down. as they can overwhelm air defense systems. A key countermeasure has been to utilize electronic warfare in the form of jammers, spoofers, and high-energy lasers that prevent drones from reaching their target. Jammers—used by both Russia and Ukraine—send out powerful electromagnetic signals that can cause a target drone to fall to the ground, veer off course, or turn around and attack its operator. As the war progresses, both sides are continually investing in and adapting electronic warfare tactics to counter the innovations of their adversary. How will the drone war evolve? The Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that innovations in drone technology can change the balance of power in the air defense domain especially. While Russia seeks to build pockets of air superiority and bolster its drone production and anti-drone defenses, Ukraine continues to develop both more and less sophisticated solutions. In a recently uncovered partnership project with Iran, Russia finished constructing a drone factory in Tatarstan, 500 miles (805 kilometers) east of Moscow, where it could produce an estimated six thousand Shahed-136 prototypes (renamed the Geran-2 by Moscow) by mid-2025. This expanded drone production could be enough to counter Russia’s shortage of drones on the front lines and turn the tide of the conflict in its favor. However, Ukraine’s ability to acquire and crowdsource commercial drone technology, tactically modify drones in the field based on real-time feedback, and alter tactics to defeat anti-drone systems have proved to be crucial to its war effort. Even while overmatched force-wise, Ukraine has shown how savvy technological adaptation can change twenty-first century warfare and could tip the balance of power in favor of the force that is more innovative. Editor’s Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author.

Israel has emerged as one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists, according to a newly released census compiled by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists. Each year, the committee releases a snapshot of the number of journalists behind bars as of December 1 2023 was the second highest on record with 320 in detention around the world. In a small way, that is encouraging news. The figure is down from a high of 363 the previous year. But a troublingly large number remain locked up, undermining press freedom and often, human rights. China takes out unenviable top spot At the top of the list sits China with 44 in detention, followed by Myanmar (43), Belarus (28), Russia (22), and Vietnam (19). Israel and Iran share sixth place with 17 each. While the dip in numbers is positive, the statistics expose a few troubling trends. As well as a straight count, the Committee to Protect Journalists examines the charges the journalists are facing. The advocacy group found that globally, almost two-thirds are behind bars on what they broadly describe as “anti-state charges” – things such as espionage, terrorism, false news and so on. In other words, governments have come to regard journalism as some sort of existential threat that has to be dealt with using national security legislation. In some cases, that may be justified. It is impossible to independently assess the legitimacy of each case, but it does point to the way governments increasingly regard information and the media as a part of the battlefield. That places journalists in the dangerous position of sometimes being unwitting combatants in often brutally violent struggles. China’s top spot is hardly surprising. It has been there – or close to it – for some years. Censorship makes it extremely difficult to make an accurate assessment of the numbers behind bars, but since the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in 2021, journalists from Hong Kong have, for the first time, found themselves locked up. And almost half of China’s total are Uyghurs from Xinjiang, where Beijing has been accused of human rights abuses in its ongoing repression of the region’s mostly Muslim ethnic minorities. The rest of the top four are also familiar, but the two biggest movements are unexpected. Iran had been the 2022 gold medallist with 62 journalists imprisoned. In the latest census, it dropped to sixth place with just 17. And Israel, which previously had only one behind bars, has climbed to share that place. That is positive news for Iranian journalists, but awkward for Israel, which repeatedly argues it is the only democracy in the Middle East and the only one that respects media freedom. It also routinely points to Iran for its long-running assault on critics of the regime. The journalists Israel had detained were all from the occupied West Bank, all Palestinian, and all arrested after Hamas’s horrific attacks from Gaza on October 7. But we know very little about why they were detained. The journalists’ relatives told the committee that most are under what Israel describes as “administrative detention”. 17 arrests in Israel in less than 2 months The benign term “administrative detention” in fact means the journalists have been incarcerated indefinitely, without trial or charge. It is possible that they were somehow planning attacks or involved with extremism (Israel uses administrative detention to stop people they accuse of planning to commit a future offence) but the evidence used to justify the detention is not disclosed. We don’t even know why they were arrested. Israel’s place near the top of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ list exposes a difficult paradox. Media freedom is an intrinsic part of a free democracy. A vibrant, awkward and sometimes snarly media is a proven way to keep public debate alive and the political system healthy. It is often uncomfortable, but you can’t have a strong democratic system without journalists freely and vigorously fulfilling their watchdog role. In fact, a good way to tell if a democracy is sliding is the extent of a government’s crackdown on the media. This is not to suggest equivalence between Israel and Iran. Israel remains a democracy, and Israeli media is often savagely critical of its government in ways that would be unthinkable in Tehran. But if Israel wants to restore confidence in its commitment to democratic norms, at the very least it will need to be transparent about the reasons for arresting 17 journalists in less than two months, and the evidence against them. And if there is no evidence they pose a genuine threat to Israeli security, they must be released immediately.

Only days after Cambodia’s recently elected national assembly endorsed Hun Manet as the country’s new prime minister, the young leader revealed his vision for the next 25 years of economic growth and prosperity. Cambodia is aspiring to become a high-income country by 2050. To make this happen, Manet released his Pentagonal Strategy, centring on the five objectives of sustained economic growth, more and better employment, human capital development, diversification of the economy and increased competitiveness. For those who have been advocating sweeping reforms to Cambodia’s economy, the new strategic objectives comprise all the right catchwords. But it remains uncertain whether the ambitious new strategy will help Cambodia reach its targets. Despite GDP forecasts for 2023 not living up to expectations, the Cambodian government forecasts 6.6 per cent GDP growth in 2024. The Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund downgraded their 2023 economic growth projections to 5.3 per cent, down from 5.8 per cent in April 2023, while the World Bank projects 5.4 per cent growth, down from 5.5 per cent in May 2023. The minor adjustments were made in response to global geopolitical tensions and a worldwide economic slowdown, as well as the country’s structural issues, which include limited productivity and competitiveness, a lack of economic diversification and dependence on a small number of external markets. The government’s optimistic growth projection for 2024 is based on the anticipated revival of key sectors including garment manufacturing. Cambodia’s garment sector showed continuing decline throughout 2023 but is expected to surge by around 8 per cent in 2024. For Manet’s pentagonal ambitions to become a reality, Cambodia must diversify its product range, upgrade its production capacity and productivity and process resources at home instead of exporting them. The garment sector is not conducive to such transformations. The sector is already on life support — a tax break is in place for garment factories until the end of 2025 — but a continued reliance on garment manufacturing also exacerbates Cambodia’s economic vulnerability. Primarily a cut, make and trim industry employing low-skilled labour, garment manufacturing relies on the import of raw materials sourced from other Asian countries, predominantly China. It exports to the major economies where Cambodian products enjoy increasingly precarious preferential treatment under the European Union’s Everything But Arms scheme. To move Cambodia beyond being a cheap labour hub, the Pentagonal Strategy outlines a comprehensive makeover of three sectors identified as the engines of future economic growth — agriculture, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and tourism. With nearly 70 per cent of Cambodian households depending directly on agriculture, an overhaul of this sector is long overdue. The new strategic objectives bolster agribusiness to better serve Cambodia’s export markets. The turn to ‘smart farming’ advances local processing of Cambodian crops and high-value products instead of high-volume cash crops. Loans have also been made available for agribusiness and are being directed to ‘economic poles’ spread across the country. The transformation of over 500,000 MSMEs in Cambodia is a core agenda under the new strategic plan. MSMEs closely entwined with agribusiness and digitisation will have access to a new loan scheme established in partnership with the private sector and Wing Bank. Efforts will also be made to integrate the informal sector into the formal economy under the National Strategy for Informal Development 2023–2028, encouraging informal businesses to register and receive benefits such as penalty waivers, tax incentives and skills training. Tourism, heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, is forecasted to bolster GDP as international arrivals, particularly from China, begin to surge. Foreign tourists are returning to Cambodia, with 4.4 million arriving in the first 10 months of 2023. But the rising numbers have not generated the desired income, as most of the arrivals are low-spending visitors from neighbouring countries. Crowds from China are not as anticipated despite major efforts including the new Siem Reap airport operating direct flights to and from a variety of Chinese destinations, the reintroduction of Chinese package tours and the launch of the China Ready program. Efforts to diversify the tourism sector are ongoing, with India and Indonesia identified as likely markets for outbound tourism. The Ministry of Tourism is also implementing a new tourism strategy and action plan with a focus on cultural heritage, coastal and eco-tourism. As the new government pushes economic reforms with vigour, old habits die hard. International attention was recently drawn to a new investigation by Amnesty International into the 2022 evictions of 10,000 families making a living on the premises of the Angkor Archaeological Park. The Angkor Archaeological Park, Cambodia’s biggest tourist attraction and a UNESCO World Heritage site, is pivotal to the new tourism action plan. While the Cambodian government claims these families were squatters causing overdevelopment at the complex, the report revealed that the evicted families were relocated to a remote site lacking infrastructure, jeopardising their livelihoods. Similarly, the voluntary registration of informal businesses under the new development strategy was temporarily suspended due to pushback from small business owners concerned about the regulatory burden imposed by the measure. The economic reforms outlined in the Pentagonal Strategy are long overdue and will have beneficial impacts on Cambodia’s socioeconomic development. But as Cambodia’s new leadership pursues growth, it should consider that even well-intentioned interventions can have detrimental bearings on people’s livelihoods and may be reminiscent of past injustices suffered at the hands of authorities. This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2023 in review and the year ahead.

Since at least a decade, migration has remained a hot-button issue in European politics, providing fodder for parties on the right of the ideological spectrum. With a steady increase in its migrant population from 8.5 percent in 2010 to over 10 percent in 2022, the situation is no different in France where the issue has long presided over French politics. Just after the European Union (EU) reached an agreement on Migration and Asylum in December, the French Parliament passed a law to reform its approach to immigration while combating illegal immigration. After the outright rejection of President Emmanuel Macron’s previous more lenient version of the immigration bill that was painstakingly drafted for 18 months, the version that eventually passed through Parliament was significantly toughened to appeal to the far-right. Even while granting temporary residence permits for work sectors plagued with labour shortages, the bill introduces tough controls. These include stricter conditions for immigrants to bring over family members, annual quotas for immigration, preferential access to state subsidies and welfare benefits to French citizens in a country traditionally known for its generous and inclusive welfare system, additional visa fees for foreign students, stripping crime-accused dual nationals off their French citizenship, diluting the right to automatic citizenship for those born in France, and installing an easier process to expel undocumented migrants. “The kiss of death” Unlike France’s controversial pension overhaul that was non-democratically imposed in March 2023 by bypassing Parliament and invoking special constitutional powers, the immigration bill was voted on in the lower house. The toughened legislation received 349 votes in favour and 186 against, where many in Macron’s own Renaissance Party and his centrist coalition either abstained or opposed the bill. On the other hand, all 88 members of the far-right voted in favour of the bill, lending their strong endorsement and backing. Many in the French media labelled this move as far-right Opposition leader Marine Le Pen’s “kiss of death” after the initial impression that her party the National Rally would either abstain or vote against the bill. Even though Macron managed to democratically pass legislation that was central to his second mandate, the optics of the compromise could not have been poorer. The results of a poll demonstrate that while 70 percent of the French population including 87 percent, of Macron’s own supporters support the new bill, 73 percent assumed that the bill was inspired by Le Pen’s ideas, leading to the outcome being touted as a massive “ideological victory” for Macron’s contenders on the far-right. Le Pen’s surprise coup and the strict measures that the bill contains also enraged Macron’s coalition members on the left, accusing him of caving into pressure from the far-right and risking the French Republic’s fundamental values. Moreover, the bill, through its incorporation of the beliefs of the far-right, has alienated supporters who voted for Macron as an alternative to the far-right, and are now accusing him of becoming their “stepping stone” rather than repelling their ideas. While France’s health minister Aurélien Rousseau resigned from his post, the Greens’ Yannick Jabot referred to the bill as the arrival of Trumpism in France. Furthermore, the process has exposed the governance difficulties associated with Macron’s weak mandate from the 2022 election, which led to a loss in parliamentary majority. The whole affair has prompted a government reshuffle and the resignation of French Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne with the hope of focusing on fresh priorities, ahead of EU elections scheduled for June where eurosceptic parties are leading the charge. Mainstreaming the far-right In their endeavour to assuage voter concerns amidst hardened public opinion on immigration, parties across the board have found themselves in a bind to tackle the issue of migration, which the far-right has successfully fed upon. Thus, the centre’s co-opting of the talking points of the far-right is a phenomenon being observed throughout European politics, whereby the mainstream is mainstreaming and legitimising the politics of the far-right. For Macron too, this is not the first time that he’s accommodated or imitated far-right rhetoric for political survival as evident in his increasingly hardline rhetoric on Islam in 2023. In September last year, Macron’s then-Education Minister Gabriel Attal, who has recently been appointed as France’s new Prime Minister, announced a ban on wearing the Muslim abaya in schools in the interests of secularism. The ball is now in the hands of France’s constitutional court to examine whether the law complies with the constitution or requires amendments. In addition, the caveat that while European countries, including France, crack down on immigration, they are simultaneously facing declining populations and need migrant labour, is inescapable. As France moves to the right on immigration, Macron may have managed to democratically pass a law on the most contentious issue in French politics. But his own image, as a defender of liberal democracy and a centrist alternative to the far-right, remains in tatters.

Comrade Choe Son-hui, I am very glad to welcome you and all your delegation members to Moscow in the first days of 2024. I would like to once again congratulate you and our Korean friends on the holidays we have celebrated recently and wish you all the best and every success in the new year. The timing of this meeting provides us with a perfect opportunity to conduct a preliminary review of our efforts to carry out the agreements resulting from the summit between President of Russia Vladimir Putin and Chairman of State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Kim Jong-un at the Vostochny Space Launch Centre in September 2023. We are proactively working on these matters. I have warm memories of my visit to Pyongyang in October 2023 and the hospitality you extended to our delegation. The 10th meeting of the Russian-Korean Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in November 2023 was another important event. There were also other bilateral exchanges at the agency, ministry, and regional levels. We appreciate the fact that DPRK’s Minister of Physical Culture and Sport, Kim Il-guk, took part in the Russia – A Sports Nation international forum in Perm in October 2023, while DPRK’s Minister of Culture Sung Jong-gyu proactively contributed to the 9th St Petersburg International Cultural Forum in November 2023. The visit by a delegation from the Primorye Territory to Pyongyang, led by Governor Oleg Kozhemyako, in December 2023 was also very useful. These contacts mark the beginning of an intensive and demanding, but also fruitful and rewarding, work to expand our relations across the board. We are preparing several other important events, including on cultural and humanitarian matters. I can mention the upcoming performance by Mariinsky Theatre’s Primorye branch in Pyongyang, as well as the participation of Russian performing groups in the annual April Spring festival. Today, we will have a detailed discussion on topical bilateral matters, including ways to further enhance our practical cooperation. As for the international agenda, we are looking forward to continuing our trust-based dialogue on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general. Russia reaffirms its principled position on the need to find comprehensive and fair solutions to the existing problems. We have always advocated for talks without preconditions as a path to achieving lasting peace and stability across Northeast Asia. Russia has independently submitted proposals to this effect, as well as together with the PRC, to the UN Security Council. These proposals are currently on the negotiating table. We must recognise that the policy pursued by the United States and its regional satellites to create security threats for the DPRK does nothing to promote any positive advancements. We will continue to call for the rejection of any steps that lead to escalation and heightening tensions. We are working together within a broader geography on security matters in the Asia-Pacific region, where we must uphold universal mechanisms rooted in ASEAN proposals and which have been effectively operating for many decades. However, attempts by the United States and its allies to create closed, bloc-based formats and to expand NATO infrastructure to this region undermine these mechanisms and erode their effectiveness. We have been working closely and very successfully with Pyongyang within the United Nations and at other multilateral organisations. Russia has always supported the DPRK within the UN and appreciates the fact that you have treated Russia in the same manner, including on matters related to the ongoing special military operation in Ukraine. We have a packed agenda, and I am certain that today’s talks will enable us to advance towards delivering on the agreements between our leaders resulting from the September 2023 summit.

Ecuador was until relatively recently seen as one of the safest countries in Latin America. That reputation has surely now been destroyed. On Jan. 9, 2024, images of hooded gunmen storming a TV studio were broadcast around the world. It was one of a number of violent incidents that took place that day, including prison riots, widespread hostage-taking, the kidnapping of several police officers and a series of car explosions. I have been tracking how gang crime has affected states in Latin America for 38 years. When I started, few would have projected that Ecuador would descend into the crisis it finds itself today. But the story of Ecuador reflects a wider story of how countries across Latin America have struggled with organized crime and transnational drug gangs and how they have responded. Ecuador now looks set to follow the recent path of El Salvador under President Nayib Bukele’s leadership in trying to crack the gang problem through the use of military and the suspension of democratic norms. In the aftermath of the Jan. 9 violence, Ecuadorean President Daniel Noboa named 22 gangs as terrorist organizations – a designation that makes them legitimate military targets. He has also imposed a 60-day state of emergency, during which Ecuadorians will be subject to curfews while armed forces try to restore order in the streets and the country’s gang-controlled prisons. Ecuador: Victim of geography To understand why Ecuador has become the epicenter of gang violence, you need to understand both the geography and history of Latin America’s drug trade. Ecuador, a nation of 18 million people, is situated between Colombia in the north and Peru in the east and south. Colombia and Peru are the two top producers of cocaine in the world. Further, Ecuador has a near-1,400 mile (2,237-kilometer) coastline through which drugs from the continent can be taken to markets in Europe and the United States. But it wasn’t until the U.S.-led “war on drugs” put the squeeze on cartels in other countries that Ecuador became the preserve of narco gangs. Plan Colombia In the 1980s and 1990s, Colombia was the center of the international illegal drug trade. This is hardly surprising, given that it was the top producer of coca leaves. But beginning in 2000, a joint initiative between Colombian authorities and the U.S., known as Plan Colombia, pumped billions of dollars into an effort to clamp down on the Colombian cocaine trade. While it may have been successful in supressing drug cartels in Colombia itself, it has had a balloon effect elsewhere in the region: Squeeze in one place, the bulge appears elsewhere. In this case, it was Mexico’s cartels that “bulged” first. Over the past decade, there has been a massive growth in Mexican cartels, led by the Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco Nueva Generación, or Jalisco New Generation. In fact, a study last year found that Mexican cartels were in effect the country’s fifth-largest employer. These cartels came to dominate the illegal drug trade in Latin America, not just for cocaine, but also the trafficking of heroin and more lately fentanyl. Aligning themselves with Clan Del Golfo – a Colombian paramilitary organization formed from the remnants of the gangs dismantled under joint Colombian-U.S. operations – the cartels helped traffic drugs through Ecuador and out of South America. They were joined by European gangs, notably from Albania, who began to show up in Ecuador. The impact locally of these outside gangs has been disastrous for Ecuador. Prior immunity European and Mexican organizations ran local operatives as enforcers and transporters. And these are the people who have become the backbone of Ecuador’s gang problem today. Ecuadorian gangs such as Los Choneros developed as a de facto subsidiary of the Sinaloa and other cartels. The escape from jail of Los Choneros’ leader, Jose Adolfo Macias, on Jan. 7, 2024, set off the latest explosion of violence. But Ecuador’s descent into violence and chaos has also been aided by the very fact that for so long it was immune from the worst of the gang violence of the region. For many years, Ecuador had one of the lowest homicide rates in Latin America – an indicator of low gang activity. As a result, it hadn’t developed a robust police and military response to gangs. Ecuador, in comparison to Colombia, El Salvador and other countries, was seen as a “soft touch” to organized crime bosses. This became ever more the case in 2009 when former President Rafael Correa closed down the U.S. air base in Manta, from where American AWAC surveillance planes had been monitoring and trying to disrupt drug trafficking. Militarizing the response Explaining how Ecuador became the epicenter of drug gang violence is one thing. Trying to find a way out for the country now is another. Across Latin America, countries have employed different models to counter organized crime, with varying degrees of success. Colombia, with extensive U.S. assistance, transformed its military and police and went to war with the cartels. The strategy somewhat successfully dismantled organized crime groups in the country, even if it failed to halt drug trafficking itself or lower the high levels of violence in Colombia. Mexican authorities have tried a different approach and have been reluctant to confront the country’s drug cartels head-on. Instead, Mexico has employed a more hands-off approach, allowing drug gangs to essentially govern their states – the state of Sinaloa is run largely by the cartel that shares its name. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has touted this “hugs not bullets” approach, but under it the power of the cartels has only grown. And then there is the Salvadoran model. For many years, El Salvador suffered from organized crime, with the Maras gang behind much of the country’s violence. Then in 2019 the electorate voted in Nayib Bukele on a law-and-order platform. Since then, he has militarized the country, adopted draconian security measures and jailed some 72,000 alleged gang members, often without due process. As a result, El Salvador is now perceived as one of the safest places in Latin America. This has been achieved at the expense of human rights, critics say. But, nonetheless, Bukele’s methods have enormous popular appeal. Path of El Salvador With an unprecedented wave of violence in Ecuador, it looks like President Noboa is looking to take his country down the same path as El Salvador. He has ordered the Ecuadorian military to “neutralize” the criminal gangs that operate in the country. Whether the approach will work is another matter; Ecuador is in a weaker position than El Salvador. Whereas many of the gangs were imported into El Salvador – many members of Maras had been deported from the U.S. – in Ecuador, they are homegrown and have become more sophisticated. Further, Noboa – despite taking office in December – has only 15 months of his presidency left before a general election takes place in May 2025. Yet, the adoption of Bukele’s methods might be seen as an election winner. Like in El Salvador, the majority of Ecuador’s citizens appear ready for an iron fist approach to counter the gangs – even at the expense of some civil liberties. If you speak to the average Ecuadorian, many would no doubt tell you that talk of human rights violations is bogus at a time when they live under the fear of being murdered simply by leaving their homes. As one man told The Associated Press in the aftermath of Jan. 9’s violence, the government needs to employ “a firmer hand, to have no mercy, no tolerance or (respect for) the human rights of criminals.”