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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract Religious extremism and radicalization have dominated the discourse on the causes of terrorism. However, little is written of other drivers of terrorism, such as economic and social deprivations, which could prompt religious groups to resort to terrorism. Scholars have sufficiently analyzed the imports of radical ideological and religious views on the emergence of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. By contrast, the Seleka and anti-Balaka terrorists of the Central African Republic introduces a new perspective to the explanation of terrorism. This essay uses the analytical framework of abnormality and State fragility to discuss the rise of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The essay argues that the historical precedent of State failure and weak institutions provides a catalyst that propels the use of terrorism by religious groups, the state and organized groups to demand political and economic dividends as well as a tool for power contestations and regime change. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and building nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. They include the transformation of the subsistence farming culture to a masses-driven cash crop economy for exportation, which will manage state fragility and promote civil-military counter-terrorism culture at the grassroots. IMPACT STATEMENT Terrorism is one of the greatest threats to human security and the survival of the state in the 21st century. Since the 9/11 bombings, scholars and policymakers have committed significant resources to unpack the causes and course of terrorism. In this paper, we look away from the prevailing drivers of terrorism such as religious radicalisation and offer another lens through which policymakers and framers of counter-terrorism operations can view the use of terrorism by religious groups, individuals, and non-state actors within a state. The paper argued that where a state is unable to fulfil its social contract with the citizens, such a state permits its citizens to use terrorism as a tool to derive the benefit which the state failed to provide. The paper draws instances from the trajectories of the Balaka and Anti-Seleka terrorist groups operating in the Central Africa Republic. Introduction Terrorism has become a fundamental problem for individuals, groups and the state to manage in different parts of the globe. The growing nature of terrorism has made terrorists strong actors in national politics and international relations. The contemporary world records the increasing influence of terrorists. This has become true in the relations between Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran and other countries of the Middle East. Ironically, the multiplier effect is manifested in protest and politics across American universities and transportation of goods across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Studies on terrorism have linked the increasing use of terror by organized groups and States to ethnic, ideological, political, and religious factors (Schmid, Citation1998; Shultz, Citation1978). Essentially, the discourse on religiously motivated terrorism, although controversial and problematic, is prevalent particularly following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaida, and Boko- Haram (Jackson, Citation2012, p. 1). Elu and Price (Citation2014) linked terrorism in Africa to deprivation. Cilliers (Citation2001) argued that the root causes of terrorism and conflict in Africa include climate change, competition over resources, marginalization of the majority and global militarism. Nevertheless, critical terrorism studies have shown that more than the religiously and ideologically motivated use of terror by organized groups; the state also uses terrorism to drive its political objectives, especially against opposition groups (Lacqueur, Citation2001; Jackson et al., 2015). This study contributes to scholarship on how State failure and weak political institutions provide a catalyst that crystallizes the use of terrorism by religious and organized groups in demanding political dividends and power contestation. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. While Okereke et al. (Citation2016) study is in line with the position of this study, particular focus is on the unique nature of terrorism in CAR. It is this nature of state fragility that has weakened the ability of the state in CAR to provide other necessary societal conditions, resources, social amenities and developments that are needed to curb or eliminate terrorism. For instance, the inability of the state to provide and fund sustainable, functional education has created a society where people can easily be brainwashed to join terror sects. Again, the fragile nature of the CAR state has also undermined its ability to generate sustainable employment and a vibrant economy where a greater per cent of the citizenry could engage in small and medium-scale enterprises or engage in meaningful economic activities that would deny them the idleness that pushes them to terror activities. The place of ethnic, identity and ideological factors in driving terrorism cannot be neglected in CAR. This is because it is the fusion of state fragility and the advanced nature of ethnicity that drove the country into full-fledged terrorism as against mere ethnic crisis, thereby creating the absurdity that ethnic tension has become a driver of terrorism. The connection between economics, education and terrorism is deeply connected. In short, when the three factors are weak in a particular environment like CAR, and they become inflamed with religious fundamentalism, terrorism will be ignited in a very deadly form. The same factor played an active role in the mobilization of men and women who joined the Boko Haram terror sect in Nigeria (Ani kelechi et al., Citation2018). This is because the etymology of the word Boko Haram emanates from the traditional Hausa idea in the colonial era, which conceptualized and projected Western education (Boko) as a sin (Haram). Thus, the uneducated masses in North Eastern Nigeria did not desire further schooling to join a sect that was fighting for a hitherto historic ideology (Kukah, Citation2009). The position of Kukah (Citation2009) was also captured by Zenn et al. (Citation2013), who also linked local grievances to ideology (that was dominant in CAR) and internal politics of Nigeria in developing the study on terrorism. It should be noted that the concept of terrorism has evolved, and the precise meaning has remained contentious and exacerbated (Adibe, Citation2020; Ramsay, Citation2015). Puccetti (Citation2021) has argued that failing states create conditions for fostering terrorism. However, he has maintained that not all failing states experience the emergence of terrorism. Gaibulloev et al. (Citation2024) studied how terrorist groups survive in failed states. They maintain that in a state that is failing, terrorist groups easily survive. However, these studies did not particularly focus their analysis on the Central African Republic. The structural weakness and failure of the state have remained the major drivers of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The central objective of the study is to evaluate the place of state fragility and abnormality in the development of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The key research question is, to what extent is terrorism in the Central African Republic a function of state fragility and abnormality? The situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) represents a new dimension to the motivation for terrorism among organized groups. The CAR is one of Africa’s most economically viable states, but it repeatedly scores at the bottom of global development indices (World Bank, 2020: Boas, Citation2014). Economic and political development in the country remains, at best, a paradox because the poverty rate, inequality, and underdevelopment in the country, do not correlate with the country’s rich natural and human resources. With large-scale unemployment, poverty, terrorism, insurgency, maritime piracy, trafficking, increased insecurity, and delayed economic and political reform and integration, the CAR presents an example of an abnormal and fragile state in Africa. The absence of a standing state security apparatus means that the state does not have a monopoly on national force and security. As a result of weak political institutions, contestation to State power and regime change is a function of a ‘group’s ability to exert a higher degree of terror (Crescent, 2018, p. 8). It is this failed political, economic and security environment that triggers the proliferation of terrorism in the CAR. The study was developed using secondary data sourced from journals and books. The analysis of earlier scholars was sourced thematically and used to enrich the content of the study. This paper is significant because it breaks away from the simplistic explanation of terrorism in CAR as a mere religious and ideological phenomenon. It interrogates how an impoverished population can possess the capability for terrorism and contributes to the argument of state-sponsored terrorism. The paper argues that the insufficiencies of State institutions, a poor economy, and a security apparatus in disarray permit the use of terrorism by an impoverished population to demand political accountability and change. The argument of the paper is structured in two parts. The first part provides an overview of the CAR, clarifies and critiques the concepts of terrorism, state fragility, and abnormality, and the second part analyses the linkages between terrorism and state fragility and abnormality in CAR and concludes. Conceptual clarification terrorism versus state fragility and abnormality terrorism There is no precise definition of the concept of terrorism. The varying use of the concept by scholars, policymakers, and observers to create the desired political effect, the attempt to determine what fits and does not fit as terrorism, and efforts to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence make the concept difficult to define (Shimid, 1998, Weinberg et al., Citation2004). As a ‘contested ‘concept’, terrorism has been variously defined. Lacqueur (Citation1999) has argued that there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution in the character of terrorism. The new terrorist represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the familiar traditional terrorist groups (Hoffman, Citation1999). Terrorism covers the manipulation of fear to attain defined goals. Traditionally, terrorists target the killing of great political figures to ignite massive reactions like the killing of Archduke Ferdinand. However, during colonial rule in Africa, the imperial administrators were increasingly accusing Africans who challenged their exploitative rule as terrorists. This was the case with Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and the Zikist movement in Nigeria, among other nationalist movements that employed radical ideologies towards decolonization. However, the reality is that terrorism and terrorists change in form, scope and dynamics. They are more organised, strategic, and focused on unleashing harm and threats to individuals, groups, and states. While several scholars present terrorists as men and women who are irrational in their decisions, the reality is that terrorists are radicalized to rationally manipulate fear and violence to achieve certain goals that are set out by the protagonists of the terror onslaught (Ani & Uwizeyimana, Citation2021). The complexity in conceptualizing terrorism in CAR and many parts of Africa like Nigeria made Ramsay (Citation2015) to argue that terrorism should not be defined. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. Notwithstanding, Alex Schmid gave a popular definition of the concept. According to him, Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the primary targets (Schmid, 1988, p. 28). Furthermore, the above definition captured the orthodox perspective of terrorism as an act of State and non-state actors. Nonetheless, the definition follows the traditional explanation that terrorism is ideologically, religiously, and politically motivated. It undermined how weak political and economic institutions in a State could permit the use of terrorism to demand social and economic development and reforms by groups (Ani & Osisioma, Citation2014). Such uses of terrorism often have a clear target selection. In such situations, the persistent use of terrorism is aided by weak political and economic structures and intended to coerce the government to improve the economic and social life of the people (Ani & Chukwu, Citation2014; Anikelechi et al., Citation2018). In turn, the government uses terrorism in the absence of strong state security institutions for counterterrorism operations (Ani & Uzodike, Citation2015). Similarly, the absence of a strong political and state security institution permits the sponsorship of terrorism by external actors for their economic interests (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). Evidence of this type of terrorism is found in the Central African Republic, where religious groups form a coalition and use terrorism to demand economic and political dividends from the government. The next section of the essay will conceptualize State fragility and abnormality as a driver of terrorism in Central Africa. The weakness of the state, therefore, creates a sustainable environment for terrorism to strive. When the state is weak, and the machinery of the state cannot effectively deliver on its expected targets of providing the needs of the masses and guaranteeing the security of lives and properties, it naturally creates a lacuna that manifests in what is generally referred to as the ungoverned spaces. This is a collection of areas that are not under active state control, experience partial state control, or have a relatively weak presence of the rule of law (Bernard & Daful, Citation2021; Gov.UK, n.d.). It is this causal relationship between the nature of the state in the Central African Republic and the rise of terrorism that worsened the conditions for the security of lives and properties in the country. These ungoverned spaces are further occupied directly and indirectly by terror actors. Moreover, from these ungoverned space, they begin to launch their influence into other parts of the country and beyond. Downey (Citation2021) maintained that the United States’ war on terror did not deter ungoverned spaces in Africa. State fragility and abnormality As with terrorism, the concept of state fragility is complex and lacks a precise definition. Although a novel concept in development policy, the concept has been variously defined. The United Kingdom Department for International Development uses the term to describe the failure or lack of will and capacity by a State to perform its core functions and responsibilities to the citizens (DFID, 2005). According to the World Bank, fragile States are low-income countries scoring below 3.2 and below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. It applies to states that have higher tendencies to fail in their economic, security, and political obligations to their citizens (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 1). As a result, there is a prevailing atmosphere of poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, insecurity, weak institutional frameworks, lack of territorial control, and a high propensity to conflict and civil war (OECD, Citation2012, Citation2014). A state is described as fragile when there is an increase in poverty and economic decline, with State institutions incapable of handling civilian grievances arising from inequality in the distribution of wealth, representation, and access to public institutions (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 7). It should be noted that these main characteristics of state fragility are widespread in Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and CAR. These states share widespread poverty as a visible status of the economy among their citizens. Again, the nature of their insecurity is widespread within the sovereign state. Unfortunately, the managers of these states focus on advancing their exploitation of state resources, thereby creating opportunities for Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to advertise their quest for followership using social media and, in some cases, declaring dominance over some specified ungoverned spaces within the country (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). The difference among these sects is that Al Shabab survives on sea piracy in the Gulf of Guinea more than any other source of economy when compared to the terrorists in CAR (Anyika et al., Citation2022). Again, while Boko Haram and Al Shabab make use of social media to advertise and advance their network, economy, training and resources with international jihadi fighters and terrorist groups, terrorism in CAR is relatively domesticated (Anikelechi et al., Citation2018) In the Central African Republic, the income level of the masses remains low due to a weak national economy. There is a lack of bubbling production units and companies that could enhance mass production for commercial purposes and export earnings in general. The prevailing atmosphere of poverty and widespread unemployment and underemployment ensures that the society is prone to the negative influence of foreign terror sponsors as well as exposes the masses to the culture of exploitation by those who use their minimal resources to attract the frustrated poor and unemployed into the world of terrorism. The nature of the national geography also gives an advantage towards the expansion of insecurity and terror attacks within the country. Similarly, the concept of State abnormality is novel; the word is used in this paper to describe a State with full prospects and potential in terms of human and natural resources for development and economic growth but lacking in the human initiative and capacity to drive necessary developments and growth. In other words, the natural and economic resources in an abnormal State do not match the level of progress in all ramifications. An abnormal state is, therefore, a State riddled with developmental paradoxes. It is worth noting that all fragile and abnormal states are prone to and riddled with conflicts and threats of violence (Eugene, Citation2020). Moreover, scholars do not agree on the exact indices or parameters for measuring State fragility and abnormality. There is controversy over how the concept is operationalized and who sets the parameters for measuring fragility and abnormality (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 2). However, Besley and Persson argue that in a fragile and abnormal State, there is the pathology of State ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and raising revenues or political violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict or even both pathologies are present at the same time (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Similarly, the World Bank uses the CPIA ratings based on Economic Management, Structural Policies, Social Inclusion and Equity Policies, and Public Sector Management and Institutions to measure fragile States. Moreover, the Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity observed three major features of fragile States – authority, service, and legitimacy failures (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Nonetheless, an overview of the working definitions of different organizations and agencies proposed above reveals three basic variables in measuring fragile and abnormal States. This paper has classified these three variables as legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps based on the core functions of the state. For this paper, the fragile state and abnormality of the state will be measured based on the existence of some legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps in the Central African Republic. Discussion on Terrorism in CAR: The State Fragility and Abnormality Linkages Geographically, the Central African Republic is located at the centre of the African continent. The country’s current borders were established by the French during the scramble and partition of Africa in the late 19th century. Because of its central location, the CAR shares boundaries with multiple countries within the Central African region of the African continent; these countries include Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan. The country covers an area of 622,984 sq. km with a population of about 4.7 million (BBC Africa, 2018). The country is made up of over 80 ethnic nationalities of varying sizes in both land areas of concentration and number and with distinct languages (Alusala, 2017, p. 11). Economically, the Central African Republic is endowed with natural resources, including uranium, oil, gold, diamonds, and timber, as well as a huge potential for hydroelectric power. However, these resources have not been properly harnessed, and the little activity that exists does not generate much income for the state as it is dominated by foreign powers that align with some privileged politicians to exploit them for their selfish interests (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 4). The country came under colonial domination in 1899 and attained political independence from France on 12 July 1960 (Alusala, 2017, p. 13). Statistics show that since 2013, the country has witnessed over 29 terrorist activities by both state and non-state actors resulting in over 1764 deaths and about 851 injured (World Data, Citation2020). The legitimacy gap is a key feature of fragile and abnormal States. Legitimacy gaps describe the institutional instability undermining public decision-making processes’ predictability, transparency, and accountability (Andersen & Engberg-Pedersen, Citation2008). Legitimacy gaps exist in a state where the electoral process that produces political leaders is compromised, tele-guided, or subverted, leading to the emergence of unpopular leaders who execute elitist policies. In such a system, the pervasive inconsistency in the process of regime change permits the use of force, violence, or threats in the acquisition and consolidation of State power. As a consequence, compliance with the state is achieved by force, violence, or threat of it (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 9). The use of violence guarantees that the state maintains an advantage over other armed groups and legitimizes its grip on power (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). The use of terrorism by organized groups and the state in CAR is linked to the fact that there is no clear electoral approach to acquiring State power. At independence in 1960, the government of David Dacko institutionalized the one-party system to maintain its grip on power and whittle down opposition groups. This gave rise to pockets of political crises and protests, which were met with autocracy, kidnapping, and torture of protesters by State security agents (Le Vine, Citation1968, p. 12). Similarly, the second President, Jean-Bidal Bokasso, dissolved the parliament in 1976 and declared himself Emperor for the life of the CAR. His regime was characterized by torture, assassination, and oppression of political opponents, including the murder of over 100 demonstrating school children. Furthermore, when General Andre Kolingba seized power in 1981, he used State machinery to suppress and detain oppositions groups that supported a democratic system in the country. This use of force, violence, and intimidation by leaders to attain or sustain political power created the legitimacy gap that triggered terrorism by the Seleka and Anti-Balaka coalitions in the CAR. Consequently, legitimacy gaps in the country precipitated external/State sponsors of terrorism in CAR. For instance, the French government provided arms and support for the regime of Jean-Bidal Bokasso, who was willing to cut off economic and political relations with China and subsequently for the Anti-Balaka groups against the Selekas in 2013 following the overthrow of the Balaka-led government. Similarly, neighbouring countries like Chad and Sudan continue to support rebel leaders who agree to protect their economic interests (Congressional Research Group, Citation2024). For instance, in 2003, Chadian President Idriss Déby provided support for the Anti-Balaka leader Francoise Bozize, who overthrew Ange-Felix Pattasse. However, in 2013, Deby switched his support for the Seleka leader Michel Djotodia to replace Bozize. Consequently, in 2014, Derby used his militia to stand down the government of Djotodia and airlifted the entire CAR government to N’Djamena, where Catherine Samba-Panza was elected as the President of the transitional government (Lombard, Citation2014). The externalization of legitimacy in the CAR was effectively perfected during the colonial era. There was no unified system of political administration in CAR under the French colonial administration. The French leased the territory to private companies to run for their profit (Marima, Citation2014). In the absence of a unifying force for all peoples within the colony, colonial resistance was coordinated along ethnic lines, leading to the emergence of a multifarious coalition of ethnic groups who struck deals with concessionary companies to replace the French colonial officials (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). By leasing out different parts of the country to private companies to administer, the colonialists had given room for the privatization of state force, interference by foreign powers, and the proliferation of different armed groups with different ideologies of independence. The system has continued since independence and has created what Knoope and Buchanan-Clarke described as: A system whereby CAR politicians are often more concerned with the personal relationships they hold with these outside sources of power than with fulfilling their social contract with CAR citizens. This has resulted in a weak state that has little legitimacy to govern beyond the capital. (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Notwithstanding the introduction of a multi-party system in 1993, successive leaders of the country have failed to sustain the system as a legitimate means of political transition. Rather, it was characterized by meeting the personal ambition of the leaders, intent on staying in power, destroying the opposition, and ensuring their political interests (Siradag, Citation2016, p. 5). Consequently, a well-functioning state must possess the capacity to deliver certain public goods that improve the lives of its citizens as well as provide infrastructure that stimulates economic growth and development (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Fragile and abnormal states are remarkable for their lack of capacity to stimulate economic growth and development and a high dependence on foreign aid (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Capacity gaps in the Central African Republic can be seen from the inability of the government to provide basic amenities for its citizens. Since the country gained independence in 1960, successive governments have failed to establish state institutions that provide social, economic, and political dividends to the people (Sıradag, 2017, p. 1, International Crisis Group, Citation2017). Over half of the country’s 4.6 million people depend on UN humanitarian aid, the highest recipient of UN aid destinations globally (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). The public sector in CAR since independence is characterized by deplorable working conditions, absence of educational opportunities for children, large-scale corruption, mismanagement of public finances, irregular payment of salaries, a lack of sanitation, absence of educational opportunities for children, and permanent insecurity (Boas Citation2014. This situation not only questions the capacity of successive CAR governments but also increases the disillusionment towards government officials. Amidst economic resources, the country ranks as one of the least developed and poorest in the world. Per capita, the national income is a meagre $774, and about 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (Trading Economics, Citation2018). A report by Conciliation Resources showed that the country’s debt tripled to 1.8 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2011. The study further revealed various anomalies in the execution of projects, ranging from corruption and embezzlement of project money to compromised accounting procedures and a lack of vigilance. The CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2016, economic growth in the country slowed from 5 percent to 4.4 percent (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, only 10 of the 460 industries that operated in the country in the 1970s are functional. The only university in the country with a capacity of 1000 students has more than 20,000 students (Paul-Crescent et al. Citation2018, p. 8). These negative functional indicators suggest that the country is not just fragile but also abnormal because it lacks the initiative and capacity to harness its resources. Moreover, the use of terrorism by the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka groups is not aligned with religious identity but with the government’s inability to bridge the socio-economic inequalities in the country (Conflict Scan, Citation2017, p. 3). Successive governments in the country perpetrated inequality in the distribution of infrastructure between the Muslims who dominated the northern region and the Christians who dominated the southern region. Economic marginalization and neglect suffered in these regions provided a background for the use of terrorism by the northerners under the Seleka coalition to demand a fair share of the national resources and control of State power. For instance, the provinces of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto suffered marginalization and neglect as successive governments failed to establish schools, hospitals, roads, and general infrastructure. This led to the emergence of rebel groups who began to launch an attack on government facilities, taking hostages and seeking to take over power to protect their interests (International Crisis Reports, 2017). Furthermore, the replacement of the National Armed Forces with private security created security gaps in the CAR, which permitted the continued use of terrorism by both the State and organized groups (Global Security, Citation2020). When President Bozize came to power in 2003, he established a presidential guard made up of Chadian mercenaries to protect his government. Subsequently, successive governments have continued to maintain private securities at the expense of the national armed forces. The absence of a national security agency for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens means that the state is not the only legitimate monopoly of force. By maintaining private security, the state can carry out successful acts of terrorism against opposition groups. The anti-Balaka group was one of the groups mobilized by the Bozize government in 2003 to provide security for rural communities (CAR Briefing, Citation2014). However, following the rise of the Seleka coalition, he reactivated them in 2013 to protect his administration and help keep him in power till the general elections scheduled for 2016 (Kah, Citation2014, p. 9). Anti-balaka terrorism resulted in the ethnic cleansing of members of the Seleka coalition and created massive refugee crises and internal displacement (Amnesty International, Citation2014). This privatization of State security paved the way for foreign intervention and the upsurge of militia armed groups who perpetrate violence to secure State power, unleash vendetta as well as protect their members. The composition of these groups is constantly changing but is often made up of self-defence militia, highway robbers, and former members of the security and defence force. Between 2002 and 2017, 14 armed groups were identified (International Crises Group, 2017). Similarly, France, Chad, and Cameroon, among other foreign powers, have at one time or another, armed one group or another to protect their geo-strategic and economic interests in the CAR (Boas Citation2014),). In 2013, following serial bombings and killings which resulted in the death of over 2000 civilians, the Seleka, backed by Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, under Michel Djotodia usurped State power from the Christian-led government (International Crisis Group, Citation2017, p. 7). In a retaliatory move, the Anti Balaka began its reign of terror to counter the Seleka coalition. The Anti-balaka group did not start as a religious group but emerged out of the need to provide security to the population; they were motivated by their thirst for revenge (Kah, Citation2014, p. 36). The absence of government security forces in the peripheral and geostrategic areas of the country including Bocaranga, Ndassima, Yassine paved the way for rebel groups to control the rich mineral resources of the region while using revenue generated from the resources to finance their operations (African Union, Citation2018; Lombard, Citation2014). Added to failed security architecture is the question of State dispensation of justice and equity and asses to the State justice system. The State justice system has been subverted and hijacked by some members of the state who maneuver and manipulate the system to serve their selfish interests and intimidate opposition groups (Kah, Citation2014, p. 37, Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Basic institutions such as the Office of the Prosecutor, the tribunals, the gendarmerie, the Police, and the prison services are not operational in most parts of the country (Amnesty International, Citation2014). Conversely, it is imperative to appreciate the religious undertone of insurgency in the CAR. Since the escalation of the conflict in 2013, religion has been used as an instrument to radicalize members of both the Seleka and Anti-Balaka groups. The dynamics of terrorism have drawn the lines between Muslims and Christians in the country. Up till 2013, when the Seleka coalition (dominated by the Muslims) overthrew the government, the country was under a Christian leadership that paid little attention to the development of the Muslim-dominated Northern region of the country. Only two Muslims have been in parliament since the independence of the country (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). This painted a picture of political exclusion and economic marginalization by the Christians. These grievances were easily mobilized by the Seleka leader Djotodia during the coup of 2013. The rise of the Anti-Balaka groups and the consequent bombings of Muslim centers such as Mosques and schools have added to the narrative of religious terrorism (Union Africane, Citation2018). The presence of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko-Haram, the Islamic State, and Al-shabaab increases the risk of infiltration and violent Jihad by the Seleka groups (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). Moreover, although the parties involved in the use of terrorism are drawn along religious lines, they do not claim to establish a state along religious line. Their use of terrorism is motivated by the weak political institutions and economic inequalities which are core features of fragile States (Besley & Persson Citation2011). In its manifesto, the Muslim Seleka coalition had three mandates: to topple the Bozize regime, take control of the state, and seize the natural resources (International Crisis Group, Citation2017). The anti-Balaka, on the other hand, is determined to maintain its grip on power by attacking Muslim civilians and bombing Muslim villages. These two main rebel groups have splintered into several movements over time. Some sources put the number of armed groups currently operating in the country at about twenty (Union Africane, Citation2018). The legitimacy crises in the country and the inability to set a blueprint for political transition and regime change have laid a culture of violence as the fastest way to gain State power, and CAR politicians have consistently used such armed groups to get to power or when in power, to fight bandits and other small criminal groups in remote parts of the country (Paul Crescent et al., 2018, p. 11). Conclusion The sovereign states within the African continent face different forms of nation-building challenges. This ranges from poverty to conflicts and other multiple forms of insecurity. Unfortunately, when the insecurity level within a country grows so that the state cannot fulfil its obligation of ensuring the protection of lives and properties, the state could be considered fragile. Unfortunately, the state does not become fragile in a day or year; rather, state fragility emerges from multiple weaknesses of the state, which strives when abnormal or dysfunctional behaviours are allowed to grow over time by the institutions of the state. Studies on terrorism have shown that economic and weak political institutions within a state make it possible for terror groups to emerge. These terror groups further degenerate the state of security within the polity. This study draws from existing literature to investigate the emergence of terrorism in the CAR. The study reveals that the state’s failure directly manifests in the state’s character and the state’s inability to perform its fundamental roles. The CAR state is very weak due to the inability of the state to transform or refine its mineral resources and use the products to produce good governance. The character of the state was weak in the provision of employment, basic education and eradication of mass poverty within the country, thereby allowing the masses to be dependent on religious and ethnic cleavages as an opium that determined their social relations. Consequently, this affiliation and addiction to religious inclinations soon divided the CAR state and found expression in religious fanaticism and fundamentalism. The paper argued that the use of terrorism by religious groups and the state in the CAR is a direct consequence of the failure to utilize State resources for the betterment of the people and not from the desire to establish a State based on religious ideologies. This is because the primary role of the state is to provide good governance, which is meant to transform the lives of the citizenry. The various religious armed groups are reacting to a long history of negligence, deprivation, isolation, and frustration arising from the government’s inability to mobilize State resources for equitable national development and self-actualization for the citizens. In this context of a broken social contract, the country fits itself into the fragile and abnormal State theory. Worthy of note in the use of terrorism in CAR is the sponsorships by foreign countries, which further buttresses the claim of State fragility. By and large, by situating the CAR within the purview of fragility and abnormality, this paper has opened up underlying historical and developmental issues that are critical in understanding and addressing terrorism in the country. Why terrorism in CAR has not attracted sufficient attention from international actors and their role in escalating terrorism in the CAR country merits further research and study. In conclusion, there is a need for leadership transformation in the CAR State. The leaders of the state must focus on the development of national resources to provide social amenities and meet the basic needs of the masses. They must build a circular state where national identity and patriotism are central to national transformation through intergroup cohesion and resource (human and material) development. It is then that the conditions of sustainable peacebuilding and societal transformations would be created in CAR. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Kenya’s government faces the challenge of meeting its debt obligations, while avoiding further unrest. President William Ruto must find ways to raise money, manage the economic recovery from Covid-19 and respond to the threat of climate change. William Ruto was elected as Kenya’s fifth president in September 2022. He had previously served ten years as deputy president and came into office with broad international support. In May 2024, Ruto embarked on the first state visit to the United States by an African leader in 16 years. That same month, his government proposed a raft of taxes designed to reduce Kenya’s budget shortfall – the fiscal deficit is projected to be 4.3% of GDP in 2024/25. The measures were encouraged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had loaned Kenya $2.3 billion to meet the financial obligations resulting from Covid-19 and existing debt-servicing costs. The taxes were drafted into a bill comprising mostly VAT measures, which would place a disproportionate burden on poorer Kenyans. As a result, thousands of citizens, led by the younger generation, took to the streets in protest. This culminated in them storming the parliament buildings on 25 June, with around 50 protesters being killed. The next day, the president declined to sign the bill. Two weeks later, he dismissed his entire cabinet. What are the roots of Kenya’s debt crisis? In the last 15 years, Kenya’s debt has risen significantly. Government debt totalled a manageable 39% of GDP in 2010; by March 2023, it stood at 68% of GDP. This rise in debt is the result of a surge in borrowing between 2013 and 2022, under Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration. Following strong growth rates in the early 2000s, Kenyatta took out large loans to pay for infrastructure projects. Many of these did not result in enough economic growth to cover their costs. One often-cited example of this excessive borrowing is the $5.3 billion loan from China to pay for the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project linking the port city of Mombasa and the capital, Nairobi. Many of these infrastructure projects were victims of corruption, which siphoned money away from large loans. In particular, significant allegations of embezzlement have been levelled over the allocation of the Eurobonds (large international loans) secured by the Kenyan government in 2014 and 2018. The government lost at least 567.4 billion Kenyan shillings ($4.4 billion) to corruption between 2013 and 2018 alone, according to estimates from consulting firm Odipo Dev. Over the last ten years, Kenya has consistently ranked between 120th and 140th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s corruption perception index. During this period, the Kenyan shilling has also lost 31% of its value against the US dollar. This has helped Kenyan exporters, particularly those that export to the United States (9.8% of exports). The dollars that Kenya receives from exporting have been vital to its debt repayment, especially because the country imports more than it exports. Its trade deficit sat at around $18 billion, according to 2022 figures. The shilling’s drop in value poses a significant problem for the treasury. Kenya’s $80 billion debt pile is mostly denominated in dollars, and the depreciation of the shilling has made these repayments significantly harder. Figure 1: Kenyan shilling ten-year exchange rate with the US dollar Source: xe.com The Kenyan government is not solely at fault for the accumulation of debt. IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva called Kenya an ‘innocent bystander’ to external shocks after visiting in May 2023. She was referring primarily to the pandemic, which had caused dramatic short-term rises in unemployment and food security, and to the drought and inflation that followed. Where there is a country in debt distress, such as Kenya, there is often an irresponsible lender as well as the borrower. Campaign group Debt Justice points out that Kenya’s credit dried up after the pandemic, when developing countries were generally seen as riskier lending options. As a result, it had to turn to World Bank and IMF loans, and eventually bonds with double-digit interest rates. In the words of the African Forum on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), Kenya’s debt was the result of ‘a combination of irresponsible lending by developing partners… and an unsatiable appetite to borrow by the government of Kenya.’ In May 2020, the World Bank upgraded Kenya’s risk of debt distress from moderate to high. The pandemic depressed Kenyan exports and economic growth, and the government’s strong fiscal response magnified the existing budget deficit. At this point, both the World Bank and the IMF still viewed Kenya’s debt as fundamentally sustainable. What role has China played in Kenya’s debt burden? Since the Kenyatta administration started borrowing vast sums of money from China in 2013, the Asian giant has been accused of indulging in ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. Many Kenyans fear that the collateral for China’s $5.3 billion loan for the SGR is the strategic Mombasa port. Specifically, if Kenya is forced to default, it has been argued that China will seize the port. Similar accusations have dogged Chinese projects in Uganda and Zambia. In the last financial year, Kenya has repaid China $1.18 billion, a third of which comprised interest payments. Nonetheless, China’s role in Kenya’s debt crisis has probably been overstated. Kenya owes China approximately $6 billion, out of a total of $70 billion of debt. The World Bank and the IMF have judged the $2 billion Eurobond to be the more decisive factor in Kenya’s default risk. While Kenyatta’s government did borrow excessively from China, those loans at least resulted in completed infrastructure projects. The challenges that Kenya faces with Chinese loan repayments are mostly representative of its wider debt struggles. Chinese loans are dollar-denominated, and repaid at 3% above the benchmark global interest rate. What happened in 2024? In 2024, Kenya faced a looming June deadline to repay a $2 billion Eurobond issued in 2014. The IMF stepped in with a $941 million loan in January, bringing the organisation’s total exposure to Kenya to $4.4 billion. To cover the rest of its shortfall, Kenya issued an international bond of $1.5 billion, with an interest rate of 10.4%. The second loan was met with relief by international markets, which no longer feared an immediate Kenyan debt default. Many observers see this level of interest payment as a stark warning of financial ill health. Indeed, six of the 15 countries to issue bonds at 9.5% or higher interest rates since 2008 have eventually defaulted, according to Morgan Stanley analysts. In return for the low-interest loan from the IMF, Ruto’s government agreed to raise taxes. It introduced a finance bill in May 2024, outlining plans to raise 346 billion Kenyan shillings ($2.68 billion). It was these proposals that triggered the country’s mass protests. In the end, the president refused to sign the bill into law after these protests, which had culminated in the storming of Kenya’s parliament on 25 June. At least 50 demonstrators were killed in the violence, bringing worldwide attention to Kenya’s political and economic struggles. Who is protesting and why does it matter? Debt repayment is a controversial topic in many developing countries. Since the so-called ‘third world debt crisis’ in the 1980s, many have been mired in debt. The IMF provided emergency loans to affected countries throughout the 1980s. But these loans were conditional on austerity measures being implemented, privatisation programmes introduced and the countries’ economies opened to foreign capital. As a result, the IMF is frequently accused of seeking to influence the economic strategy of poor countries. Many Kenyan protesters took this line, decrying the IMF programme for tax rises and spending cuts in order to finance Kenya’s debt to the West as colonial. Many debt specialists around the world have sympathised with this view. Binaifer Nowrojee, president of the Open Society Foundations, noted that Kenyans make up just some of the three billion people living ‘in countries that are spending more on servicing their debt than public spending on education or health’. The Ruto government faces the challenge of overcoming the debt crisis and convincing the population to accept measures needed to do so. The protesters are predominantly urban, young and poor – the Kenyans who feel squeezed in the current economy. One study indicates that youth unemployment could be as high as 67%. For example, to buy a motorbike – often critical for employment – young people are forced to turn to microloans, which often leave them in inescapable debt. Kenya’s biggest cities have been at the heart of the anti-tax protests since the movement escalated on 18 June – 57 of the 215 protests took place in just seven cities. Many of the protesters left rural areas in search of economic opportunity and better government services but were left disappointed with the opportunities available. The demonstrators generally see themselves as existing outside civil society. One study finds that the wave of African protests since 2010 have typically been led by ‘political society’ (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). These are the most impoverished urban workers, who have little interaction with the state and tend to accomplish their aims through direct demonstration rather than the electoral system. Where does Kenya go from here? The IMF’s communications director has apologised to Kenyans, but maintains that an austerity programme is critical for the country’s economic health. So long as Ruto’s government seeks to avoid a default, the IMF is likely to insist on its measures being passed. Ruto responded to the 25 June events by branding the demonstrations as ‘treasonous’. He later moderated his position, dismissing almost his entire cabinet on 11 July. The new cabinet includes four members of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by political opponent Raila Odinga. Demonstrations continue against the government, albeit to a lesser extent than in June. In order to address these, Ruto will have to accept that the ‘political society’ behind the protests is not allied to the ODM. Thus far, protesters have not shown themselves to be wedded to a party political or ethnic identity. Their demands – to bring down inequality, introduce measures against corruption and end police brutality – will require political will. Ignoring the protests, on the other hand, risks another crisis. Now that indirect tax rises are too politically toxic, the government must find other ways to increase its revenue. The obvious pivot is to raise direct taxes, particularly income tax and corporation tax. Kenya has a GDP per capita of $1,949, ranking 17 out of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The treasury has historically struggled to convert this into revenue. A recent study finds that Kenya’s tax revenue is equivalent to just 16.5%, down from a high of 17.5% in 2017 (OECD, 2023; KRA, 2024). This puts Kenya below the African average in both tax and non-tax revenue, and far below the Western average of 30-40%. Increasing direct tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa is easier said than done. Prior to independence, colonial governments built tax bases that relied on controlling the movement of goods in and out of the territory (Cooper, 2002). Modern African states – many of which are poor and sparsely populated – have also relied on indirect taxes (Herbst, 2000). The IMF’s encouragement of Kenya to move away from indirect taxes on trade (that is, tariffs) towards taxing consumer expenditure (VAT) has damaged the government’s ability to collect taxation on a natural source. In common with some other African countries, state infrastructure is generally more effective at taxing trade since it is more regulated and accessible to the public authorities than domestic consumer spending. A short-term return to tariffs on foreign goods would be risky. It would be likely to result in higher consumer prices and increased costs of production for Kenyan companies. In the longer term, the government may need to expand formal employment and seek to bring in higher-wage jobs in order to expand the tax base (Cheeseman and Griffiths, 2005). For the time being, Kenya has averted a default. IMF loan interest rates are minimal, and the country won’t have to start repayments on its $1.5 billion bond until 2029. There are also some positive indicators. Kenya’s tax revenue in 2023/24 was $18.8 billion, an 11.1% increase on the previous year (at $16.4 billion). Economic growth rates are stable, at around 5.5% year-on-year. Nonetheless, Kenya is still spending 60% of its revenue on debt servicing, half of which goes to interest repayments alone. The situation is close to unsustainable and, without changes, the country could be facing a negotiated default in the coming years. What about inflation? Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) has a mixed record of managing inflation. The country has seen inflation averaging 6.5% over the last decade. The impact of Covid-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought further rises, but this has been contained at 7.7%, broadly in line with the sub-Saharan average of 7.1%. Figure 2: Inflation in Kenya, 2014-24 Source: World Bank The rise in the value of the shilling in 2024 may begin to translate into a further reduction in inflation, but this is is unlikely to be sustainable. Kenya’s foreign exchange reserves have seen significant volatility, as the country has repaid and subsequently issued large bonds. The CBK’s reserves total around $7 billion – enough to cover less than four months’ worth of imports. If these reserves fall further, then foreign investors may withdraw from Kenya, depreciating the shilling and inducing higher inflation. What about climate change in Kenya? Kenya has suffered repeated droughts over the last decade, with that of 2021-22 being particularly severe. In late 2022, 4.3 million people faced severe food insecurity, as a result of the country’s worst drought for 40 years. Approximately 2.6 million livestock deaths were attributed to the drought. Food prices jumped temporarily by 60-90%. In a country where agriculture comprises 33% of production and exports are predominantly horticultural, food insecurity is widespread. Climate change poses a major challenge to Kenya and its neighbours. Kenyan farmers are vulnerable to increasingly variable rainfall – 98% of agriculture in the country does not use irrigation. The economic damage from droughts – which interrupt work, school and medical appointments and thus have knock-on effects on health and education – is costing Kenya 2-2.8% of GDP every year. By 2050, the crop yields of staples such as maize, rice, coffee and tea are likely to drop by 40-45%. By 2055, food prices are expected to be between 75-90% higher in relative value (World Bank, 2022). Kenya’s ability to develop climate resilience, through effective land and water management, will be vital for its economic health in the next few years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While the IPCC warns that we should reach the emissions peak this year, greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere will grow by 0.8%, according to the annual report from the Global Carbon Project presented this Wednesday at COP29. A cold shower in the middle of the Climate Summit, or rather, a scorching one. The independent organization Global Carbon Project (GCP), specialized in quantifying greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel combustion, has released its latest research. The 2024 edition of the Global Carbon Budget projects, with just over a month and a half left in the year, total annual emissions from fossil fuels to reach 37.4 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). This represents a 0.8% increase compared to 2023 — with a possible error range from a 0.3% decrease to a 1.9% increase — marking a new unprecedented record at the worst possible moment. In the crucial year in which, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), humanity should reach its emissions peak if it wants any chance of avoiding a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C, not only has a new historical high been reached, but there is also "no signal" that the world has reached the peak of emissions from fossil industries, warn the team behind the research presented this Wednesday. As Professor Pierre Friedlingstein from the University of Exeter’s Global Systems Institute, who coordinated the study, laments, "we still don’t see any signs that fossil fuel burning has peaked." The figures are actually more concerning, as the emissions from the "changes in land use" —which include deforestation caused by humans and their agroindustry — will add 4.2 billion tons of CO2 (GtCO2). This means that we will emit 41.6 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere, one billion more than last year, a period that was already a record. More coal, more oil, and more gas amid the acceleration of the climate crisis Despite significant progress in decarbonization, emissions from the three main fossil fuels will increase in 2024. The GCP’s projection is that coal emissions will rise by 0.2%, with coal responsible for 41% of emissions from fossil fuels; oil emissions will increase by 0.9%, with oil burning accounting for 32% of emissions; and gas emissions will grow by 2.4%, contributing 21% of total fossil fuel emissions. On the other hand, emissions from the cement industry, which account for 4% of global emissions, will decrease by 2.8% in 2024, mainly due to a reduction in the EU, although they will increase in China, the United States, and India, according to the research. By economic poles, while the EU — responsible for 7% of global emissions — will reduce its emissions by 3.8% this year, the United States, accounting for 13% of the total annual emissions, will only reduce them by 0.6%. China, the leading polluting power, with 32% of global annual emissions, is projected to increase its emissions by 0.2%, although the projected range suggests it could end the year with a slight decrease. Another emission hub, India, which produces 8% of greenhouse gases, will increase its emissions by 4.6% in 2024. In the rest of the world, where 38% of global emissions are produced, the forecast is an increase of 1.1%. The GCP highlights the growing importance of aviation and maritime transport in the emissions inventory: their emissions are expected to increase by 7.8%, although they remain below their 2019 level. An unprecedented concentration of gases in human history The report, conducted by researchers from over 80 institutions worldwide, including the universities of Exeter and East Anglia (UK), Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich (Germany), and the CICERO Center for International Climate Research (Norway), provides an overview of emissions over the past decade. While they mention a certain stagnation in the past decade regarding the total greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere, the reality is that emissions continue to rise, and the previous decade (2004-2013) saw strong emission growth, with an annual increase of around 2%. Such figures mean that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere continues to rise. Just two weeks ago, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) warned of a new record for greenhouse gas concentrations last year: an annual average of 420 parts per million (ppm) for CO2. In addition, surface concentrations of 1,935 parts per billion (ppb) of methane (CH4) and 336.9 ppb of nitrous oxide (N2O) were recorded. These represent increases of 151%, 265%, and 125%, respectively, compared to pre-industrial levels. "During 2023, CO2 emissions caused by massive wildfires and a possible reduction in carbon absorption by forests, combined with persistently high CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels for human and industrial activities, drove the observed increase in concentrations," stated the WMO Annual Bulletin on Greenhouse Gases. Never in human history has the atmosphere been so laden with these gases, which have been released at an unprecedented speed: in twenty years, CO2 concentrations have increased by 11.4%. It is expected that atmospheric CO2 levels will reach 422.5 parts per million in 2024, 2.8 ppm higher than in 2023 and 52% above pre-industrial levels. Half-full glass However, at GCP, there is room for hope amid all the discouraging figures. "Despite another increase in global emissions this year, the latest data shows evidence of widespread climate action, with the growing penetration of renewable energy and electric vehicles displacing fossil fuels, and the decrease in deforestation emissions in recent decades, now confirmed for the first time," says Corinne Le Quéré, Research Professor at the Royal Society in the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia. In the same vein, Dr. Glen Peters from the CICERO Center in Oslo points out that "there are many signs of positive progress at the country level, and a sense that a peak in global fossil CO2 emissions is imminent." A total of 22 countries, accounting for a combined 23% of global fossil CO2 emissions, have reduced their emissions in the 2014-2023 decade. Furthermore, countries within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in the group of wealthier nations, increased their emission reduction rates in the last decade compared to the previous one, from 0.9% to 1.4%. In the non-OECD group (excluding China), emissions growth decreased from 4.9% in the 2004-2013 decade to 1.8% in 2014-2023. However, Peters warns that "the global peak remains elusive" and emphasizes that "climate action is a collective issue, and while gradual emission reductions are occurring in some countries, increases continue in others." Another positive note is that, globally, emissions from the change in land use have decreased by 20% in the last decade, although they are expected to increase in 2024 under this category. While permanent CO2 removal through reforestation and afforestation (new forests) is offsetting emissions, it is only compensating for about half of the emissions from permanent deforestation. The GCP also issues a direct message to proponents of techno-optimism: "Current levels of technology-based carbon dioxide removal (excluding nature-based methods such as reforestation) account for only about one-millionth of the CO2 emitted by fossil fuels," they emphasize.This article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The BRICS group emerged at the beginning of the current century as one of the important economies in the international system based on the hegemony of Western powers led by the United States of America. With the emergence of this group, political and economic writings have diversified, trying to explain the extent of this group's ability to compete globally facing the Western powers to rise to the top of the hegemony pyramid on the one hand, and the role of this group and its political and strategic influence in confronting economic, political and security challenges on the other hand. With the holding of the sixteenth presidential summit of the group in the Russian city of Kazan during the period 22 - 24 October 2024 under the slogan "Strengthening multilateralism for development, security and fair worlds" and with the participation of the group’s members and a number of other countries and representatives of international and UN organizations, many theories of international relations have tried to provide explanations for the emergence and rise of this group, including the Power Transition Theory. From this perspective, this study comes to investigate the BRICS group by relying on the interpretation of the Power Transition Theory as one of the most important theories of international relations that can contribute to developing interpretations of this group. KeywordsBRICS, International Relations Theories, Power Transition Theory, Kazan Summit Introduction Since the establishment of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in September 2006, and its first summit meeting in 2009, and with the accession of South Africa in 2011 to become an entity that includes the fastest growing economies in the world, and its name became the "BRICS Group", the group has appeared on the horizon as a diplomatic and financial alliance that is increasingly important for development in many countries, and it has also appeared as an attempt to escape Western control at the economic level. Despite the differences between the BRICS countries in terms of geographical affiliation, economic disparity and their levels of production, and ethnic, religious and linguistic disparity, they have succeeded in finding a formula for agreement among themselves and finding global geostrategic influence. In this context, it is easy to notice the serious and ambitious endeavor of the countries of this group to formulate a new international system within the framework of the important radical changes that the world is witnessing. The countries currently under the group's banner: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, present themselves as an alternative to the existing international financial and political entities. The countries of the group are trying to present themselves as representatives of the countries of the South and as "the alternative model to G7". From this perspective, the BRICS group has received great attention from a wide sector of researchers and scholars in various science fields despite the recent history of this group. Accordingly, this study attempts, by relying on the statements and assumptions of the Power Transition Theory, to determine the nature of this group. Can BRICS achieve success in shaping a new global order? The problem of the study This study believes that understanding of the BRICS group does not only require applied analysis, but also requires theoretical understanding, as theoretical thinking helps to avoid the limitations of purely empirical interpretation of the nature, mechanisms & perspectives of the BRICS countries' development. Accordingly, this study focuses on interpreting the theory of power transition for the rise of the BRICS group, and its position in the international system facing the Western powers led by the United States. How does this theory view this group through its propositions and assumptions, by answering the following questions: Are the BRICS countries just another institution for international cooperation that fits the structure of the existing international system, or is it a radically different way of international relations that could seriously change current global politics? What are the motives of the BRICS countries? Can the BRICS group become an alternative to the hegemony of Western powers that has been formalized in the current system of international institutions and systems? Will this institution provide fundamentally new conditions that may lead to the development of international cooperation in contrast to the power policies pursued by the United States and its allies? Can the BRICS countries be considered as a new mechanism for global governance, or are they nothing more than a temporary/short-lived international governmental arrangement? Accordingly, through the previous questions, this study examines a main question that revolves around how to interpret the Power Transition Theory for the BRICS group. First, Power Transition Theory Despite the many writings that have addressed the future of global hegemony in light of the remarkable rise of the role of the BRICS group, these writings have not paid much attention to placing the issue of the impact of the power transition process on the future of that hegemony within its theoretical framework, which is a framework that may shed useful light on the nature of the challenges imposed on the Great Power as it exercises its hegemony. Here, the study discusses this theory and its ability to explain the rise of the BRICS countries and its potential to bring about changes in the current international system. This is done by addressing the concept of power transition, its indicators, and its application to the BRICS group. (1) The concept of power transition Organski proposed the Power Transition Theory in an attempt to analyze global politics by presenting a hierarchical system of powers or states in light of the proportions of power resources and the possibility of war. Thus, he describes a hierarchical system through which all states are known according to the relative power distribution. The distribution of power varies between units, so at the top comes the group of Dominant Nations in which power is concentrated, and thus they are at the top of the pyramid, and thus they control the largest proportion of resources in it, but they are not considered the dominant power, because they cannot control the behavior of other powerful actors on their own, but they maintain their position as a dominant power by ensuring the preponderance of power in their favor in the face of the potential competing power, as well as their ability to manage global politics according to the rules that help ensure the profit of their allies [1].   This, and in the next tranche of the pyramid of power, come those countries called "Great Powers", which are the major countries that are not as powerful as to dominate global politics, but they have the capabilities that make them a potential competitor to the dominant power. This group of great powers is generally satisfied to remain in its position as long as there is an alliance with it and with the dominant or hegemonic power. However, in many cases, a number of these great power countries are not satisfied to remain in the same tranche following the hegemonic power, and therefore seek and try to make a change in its current international status (Kai, J. (2017)). Accordingly, the concept of a great and not satisfied power - according to Organiski's description - is the group of countries that have grown to their maximum power after the current international system has been completely entrenched, and they have not - therefore - had a share or a portion in establishing this current international system, the benefits of which have already been distributed. In addition, the dominant power and its supporters are generally unwilling to grant newcomer countries more than a small fraction of the advantages they derive from the status quo, and thus these newcomers seek to establish a new position for themselves on the international stage, these countries are noted to be growing rapidly in power and are expected to continue to grow, which gives them reason to believe that they can compete with - and sometimes surpass - the dominant nation in terms of power. Also, one of the characteristics of this category of great powers is that they do not accept the marginalization of the international stage, especially if their pursuit of hegemony and dominance will contribute to granting them greater benefits and privileges [2]. In this, and at the third and lowest stage of the pyramid of international power comes this group of countries called "middle powers", which are considered relatively strong countries in specific geographical regions, but they do not have the ability to challenge the dominant nation or the structure of the international system as a whole. At the base of the pyramid of power comes this group of states called "small powers" and colonies. Accordingly, the concept of "Power Transition" refers to "the loss of a hegemonic country’s leadership position in the international system to another newcomer whose power is rapidly growing." Thus, this newcomer seeks to reach a position of hegemony. In order for a power transition to occur, the rising country must possess power components that are greater than those of the dominant country, or at least equal to them, and thus the rising country must work to narrow the gap between its national capabilities and the capabilities of the hegemonic country. (2) Applying the Power Transition Theory to the BRICS groupThe power transition theory (PTT) is considered the most popular theoretical approach to studying the BRICS group among Western scholars. PTT is based on a number of assumptions, including: that changes in the balance of power in world politics occur systematically, and that disputes and wars are usually the result of the increasing influence of countries competing with the hegemonic powers. In this regard, all countries are divided into two groups: those that support the status quo, and "revisionists", which are the group of emerging countries that are dissatisfied with the status quo. Powerful and influential countries, such as the United States, enjoy the advantages of the existing world order and fall into the status quo category, while countries that are dissatisfied with their status and role in the international relations system are considered revisionists. According to PTT, the latter favor radical changes in the current international order. In this sense, Russia and China are the main candidates for revisionist powers, while PTT supporters view Brazil, India and South Africa as countries with “moderate” revisionist ambitions (mostly regional in nature, although Brazil and India have some global aspirations such as their intention to become permanent members of the UN Security Council). In the following, the study examines the application of traditional and non-traditional indicators of the power transition theory to the BRICS group. A- Indicators of military power transition for Russia and ChinaAs for Russia, it has succeeded in modernizing its military force and doubling its military spending through huge oil revenues, which has placed the Russian army in the second place globally among the 138 most powerful armies in the world after the United States army [3]. Moreover, Russia’s military spending is expected to increase in light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, and in March 2021, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute issued a report on arms exports for 2020, in which it confirmed the growth of the American, French and German arms exports against a decline in Russian-Chinese arms exports, but the report expects the arms boom for 2020, especially in the wake of the billions of dollars in military aid provided by Europe to Kiev. The Russian Ukrainian war highlighted the inevitability of increasing military spending, which is directly proportional to the growth of the arms market. As for China, its defense budget has been revealed, especially in light of the escalation of external threats to suppress and contain it, as it will increase by 7.2% during 2023 in order to support and develop its military capabilities, bringing total military spending to $225 billion, according to the draft budget report issued by the annual meeting of the National People's Congress of China, making this increase the fastest in China's history since 2019 in light of the escalation of tensions with the United States of America. B - Indicators of the transition of the economic power of Russia and ChinaThe economic development that Russia witnessed during the Putin era represented a pivotal point for political decision independence, which was clearly evident in the Russian national security strategy, and in Russia's approach in dealing with the challenges it faced on the international stage. Russia's domestic production in 2020 amounted to about $1.67 trillion, ranking second among the world's strongest economies (4), and it also ranks third in oil production with an estimated 12.1% of global production, in addition to being the second largest producer of natural gas with 17%. Despite the economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia following its war with Ukraine, the Russian economy remains able to bounce back and remains one of the major powers on the international stage. As for the Chinese economy, it recorded higher-than-expected growth in the first quarter of 2023, reaching 4.5% year-on-year, supported by policymakers’ moves to boost growth after lifting strict anti-Covid-19 restrictions in January 2023. Retail sales in the first two months of the year jumped 3.5% compared to 2022, a turnaround from the 1.8% year-on-year decline recorded in January 2023. This consumption will lead the economic recovery at a time when weak global demand is weighing on China’s exports. Infrastructure investment also increased by 9% year-on-year in early 2023, driven by government spending aimed at supporting the economy (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2023). According to PTT, today’s Russia is a typical revisionist country that creates many problems for the United States and its allies. Especially the threats it poses to countries friendly to the United States, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden. The problem is also exacerbated because of Russia’s cooperation with “rogue countries,” such as Syria, Iran and North Korea. While revisionist powers – Russia and China – are seen as a source of destabilization of the international system and their activities are automatically associated with negative consequences, the behavior of hegemonic or dominant countries (status quo) is considered positive because they perform protective functions within the above system. C- Indicators of power transition for Brazil, India, and South AfricaAs for explaining the “moderate” revisionist policies of Brazil, India, and South Africa as middle powers, it is primarily through their ambitions to play the role of “regional hegemony” in South America, South Asia, and Africa, respectively. However, unlike Brazil and South Africa, which do not have “hot” conflicts with their neighbors and mainly use their soft power arsenal to achieve hegemonic positions in their areas of influence, India faces more serious security challenges, including territorial disputes with China and Pakistan – and sometimes – military confrontation with the latter. It should be noted that the policies of individual BRICS countries are assessed differently. A number of PTT advocates see BRICS as a tool that allows some of its members to secure their status as great powers and balance the West at the regional and global levels. However, another group of PTT adherents see the international position of the BRICS countries differently: while Brazil and China are seen as rising powers, Russia and South Africa are seen as declining powers due to their economic problems. However, in response to the challenges posed by China and Russia, a group of push-and-talk advocates have proposed various types of containment policies, yet not all PTT theorists see the BRICS countries as revisionist powers. Some even see Putin’s policy in Ukraine as a status quo strategy aimed at securing Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space and counterbalancing NATO’s eastward expansion [5]. These analysts believe that the same (status quo) motivations drive Beijing and Moscow’s behavior at the global level. For example, Beijing and Moscow are quite skeptical about reforming the United Nations, preferring to preserve its structure and powers. As for the rest of the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, South Africa), on the contrary, they express their interest in reforming the UN in the hope that their status in the Security Council in particular and in the UN system in general will be raised. The advocates group of BRICS countries’ behaviour of PTT theorists who interpret the status quo believe that many of the problems with the BRICS countries stem from the fact that they have not been equally integrated into the international security system that emerged in the post-Cold War era. That is, Western countries led by the United States and Europe have crossed some of the “red lines” set by Russia in the post-Soviet space. For example, the armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 was a clear manifestation of this Western policy 1. The Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 with a crisis and is still ongoing, is another example. When the Kiev authorities that came to power after the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime publicly declared their intention to join the European Union and NATO, Moscow reintegrated Crimea into Russia and supported pro-Russian rebels in Donbass (southeastern part of Ukraine). From the point of view of this group, Russia's policy is determined not only by its geopolitical interests but also by its geographic & economic interests, in particular, there is a constant competition between two integration projects - Russian and EU - in the post-Soviet space: the Eurasian Economic Union led by Moscow and the Eastern Partnership program led by the EU [6]. Supporters of this point of view believe that it is better to cooperate than to confront Russia. The same approach has been proposed in relation to other BRICS countries including, for example, the Chinese "Belt and Road" initiative or the "New Silk Road" initiative.  D- Soft power in BRICS countries’ policies as an unconventional indicator in the concept of power transitionWithin the framework of the principles and assumptions of the liberal perspective that help understand international relations, dating back to John Stuart Mill, Giuseppe Mazzini, Woodrow Wilson and John Maynard Keynes, as well as to the perceptions of Immanuel Kant in the 18th century, neoliberal IR theorists believe that the BRICS group can be better explained through the concept of soft power, and they emphasize that in contrast to the Cold War era, when many countries preferred to rely on hard (military) power, soft power tools have become more effective nowadays. Neoliberals note that the soft power strategy is attractive to the BRICS countries for a number of reasons: First, it can help them overcome their negative image in the international stage, an image that resulted from their systematic involvement in a series of international conflicts (Russia versus Georgia and Ukraine; China versus its neighbors in the South China Sea; India versus Pakistan, South Africa versus Angola and Namibia). Second, the soft power arsenal can also be useful in diversifying the BRICS countries’ methods of geopolitical and geoeconomic expansion and making these methods more effective. It is worth noting some specific details in the BRICS countries’ interpretation of the concept of soft power. First, the BRICS countries interpret soft power differently from its initial meaning given by Joseph Nye, who defined soft power as the power of attraction. In fact, however, the soft power policies of the BRICS countries (especially Russia and China) are often dominated by pragmatic interests rather than being attractive to other countries. For this reason, these soft power strategies do not always consider the preferences of international partners. In Nye’s view, this is often unacceptable to the BRICS partners and may provoke a hostile reaction to their soft power initiatives [7]. Moreover, several studies have found that the BRICS countries’ reading of the concept of soft power is much broader than Nye’s. While Nye believes that a country’s soft power depends primarily on three resources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies that should be attractive to foreign partners, BRICS theorists believe in the need to include the problem of soft power in everything that cannot be attributed to the security (military) agenda. That is, for BRICS countries, the concept of soft power is synonymous with the concept of soft (non-military) security, which includes not only diplomatic, social, and cultural components - according to Nye - but also other elements, such as economic and/or financial power. In contrast, this belief is unacceptable to Nye, who believed that economic and financial tools can be tools of coercion and push rather than attraction. Moreover, for BRICS theorists, soft power is a comprehensive concept that covers other closely related concepts: public diplomacy, peoples’ diplomacy, the humanitarian dimension of politics, and NGO diplomacy. Among the soft power tools, economic and financial tools, cultural cooperation, ethnic diaspora, educational and religious institutions are the preferred methods of the BRICS countries. In this context, the BRICS countries have created special bodies to implement soft power: the Chinese Confucius Institutes, the Russian Rossotrudnichestvo (agency for cooperation with citizens abroad), the “Russian World”, the Gorchakov and Andrei Pervozvani foundations, among others. It is worth noting here that in the BRICS countries, the governments of the countries play a major role in controlling and directing soft power policy, which makes it less flexible and effective.  In general, it can be said that the BRICS countries use soft power in their own way, trying to avoid imitating the Western experience and going beyond Nye’s interpretation - which can be described as narrow - of the concept of soft power. Policymakers and experts/academia in these countries have not yet developed a clear terminology regarding soft power and this negatively affects both the theoretical understanding of this political tool and its effectiveness. At the same time, the BRICS countries have enormous soft power potential that can enhance their international positions if used properly. This is what the BRICS countries have demonstrated in the successful use of their soft power arsenal through: China’s economic, financial and cultural expansion in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. Beijing’s “Belt and Road” initiative; the rather successful Russian integration projects in the post-Soviet space (the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization). From the perspective of what was mentioned before, it can be argued that, although there are several advantages put forward by the power transition theory, it has many shortcomings. This theory was most applicable in the Cold War period, when two superpowers were interested in preserving the status quo due to the risk of mutual destruction in the event of a nuclear war. The current system of international relations, including its structure, is still in its formative stage, and in this context, the PTT can explain little about the behavior of the BRICS countries. Moreover, the PTT does not take into account the existence of a third type of countries - reformers who do not fully agree with the current system of international relations but prefer not to radically change the “rules of the game”. Instead, they try to adapt these rules to the dynamic changes in the world system in order to make them more fair and comfortable for all members of the international community. Often, these countries do not act as revisionists but it prefers the status quo by demanding that the "rules of the game" and international legal standards be observed. For example, the BRICS countries strongly oppose any attempts to revise the UN Charter regarding the use of military force and the principles of inviolability of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states (in contrast to the Western doctrine of “humanitarian intervention”). It is clear from the above that if PTT supporters want this theory to better fit current realities and retain its explanatory power, they need to revise the classification of states they use and supplement it with a new (“reformist”) type of authority. Second: The Kazan Summit and its dynamics and interactionsDuring the period 22-24 October 2024, the Russian city of Kazan hosted the sixteen Presidential Summit under the slogan "Strengthening Multilateralism for Fair Global Development and Security", with the participation of members of the bloc and several other countries and representatives of international and UN organizations. This summit witnessed several dynamics and events, which can be summarized in the following elements: 1. Continuing requests to join the group: The group represented about 36.7% of the global economy in 2024, which is more than the share of the G7 countries, which amounted to 30% in 2023. In this context, many countries expressed their desire to join, most notably Turkey, which submitted an official request to join in September 2024, while countries such as Azerbaijan and Belarus also applied to join the group.  2. Wide participation by heads of state: 38 countries participated in the BRICS summit held in the Russian city of Kazan, and most of the participation was at the level of leaders and heads of state; The participations came mainly from the heads of the bloc’s member states, namely His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, in addition to the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Antonio Guterres, and the participation of some the head of the heads of states that showed interest in the bloc, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and, Vietnamese Minister Pham Minh Chinh. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia participated with a high-level delegation headed by Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, as an invited country to join the group, and not as a full member as is the case for countries that have recently joined at the beginning of 2024. 3. Focus on international issues: The main focus of that summit's agenda was focused on the governance of the global system and its institutions, especially financial institutions that have begun to harm developing countries and tend to achieve the interests of Western powers alone; and the severe damage caused by Western sanctions to the economy and their conflict with the values of globalization, in addition to addressing raging international and regional issues such as the war in Ukraine and the Middle East. Views were also exchanged on cooperation between the BRICS countries on the international stage, including with regard to resolving ongoing regional conflicts. The agenda included discussing the conclusions of the previous summit in Johannesburg, especially deepening financial cooperation within the group, and discussing expanding the scope of the group and including new members in light of more than 30 countries expressing the desire to join. 4. Holding several meetings on the sidelines of the summit: Several meetings were held on the sidelines of the summit between the participants, perhaps the most prominent of which was a direct meeting between the Chinese president and his Indian counterpart for the first time. This came shortly after the two countries reached an agreement on conducting patrols on the disputed border in the Himalayas, after four years of military confrontation that led to an escalation of tensions between the two countries. As the host president, Putin also held bilateral meetings with all participating member states, as well as heads of invited states such as: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, and Bolivian President Luis Arce. 5. Moscow presented cooperative proposals: These included the creation of an online information exchange mechanism to resolve disputes related to e-commerce; with the aim of creating a proactive framework before litigation; an initiative to establish a BRICS Investment Arbitration Center; and the development of an agreement to settle investment disputes, it also proposed the establishment of a BRICS grain exchange, which would help discover fair and predictable prices for products and raw materials; to ensure food security and protect national markets from harmful external interference, speculation, and attempts to create artificial food shortages. That summit concluded with several outcomes and results, and the Kazan Declaration was formulated as the final statement of the summit. The most prominent of these outcomes were: 1. Financial and monetary cooperation: by moving forward towards establishing an independent infrastructure to regulate the settlement of cross-border payments and financial transactions (BRICS Clear), with the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (ICM) focusing on facilitating and expanding innovative financial practices and methods for projects and programs, including finding acceptable mechanisms for financing in local currencies. With the study of establishing a unified transportation platform to ensure multi-modal logistics services between the countries of the association, and welcoming the establishment of a new investment platform that uses the infrastructure of the New Development Bank. 2. Reforming the governance of the global system: by endorsing the call launched by the G20 during Brazil’s presidency of the group regarding reforming global governance, while endorsing dialogues and partnerships that enhance cooperation with the African continent, such as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum Summit, the India-Africa Forum Summit, and the Russia-Africa Summit, while working to build on the outcomes of the second Johannesburg Declaration of 2023, and supporting the call for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council; with the aim of making it more democratic, representative, effective and efficient, and increasing the representation of developing countries in the membership of the Council so that it can respond appropriately to prevailing global challenges, and support the legitimate aspirations of emerging and developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America.  3. Stance regarding Palestinian events: The bloc stressed the urgent importance of launching a comprehensive political process to address the entire Middle East problem, stop the violence, provide vital assistance to those affected, and work to establish a two-state solution and correct the historical injustice that the Palestinian people suffered from, and which is the only guarantee for establishing peace in the Middle East, while supporting Palestine's accession to the bloc as a member state.  4. Strengthening nuclear security: The bloc countries call for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and for the Middle East region to be free of nuclear weapons, while stressing the need for all parties to renew the Iranian nuclear agreement. Support for the initiative to establish a center for research and vaccines development was also announced, as well as continuing to develop the integrated early warning system for the BRICS group to prevent the risks of diseases and epidemics. 5. Regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war: The bloc members stressed the importance of resorting to a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian crisis and resorting to dialogue. The summit, its dynamics and its outcomes carry many implications and may have some repercussions, which can be explained as follows: 1. Russian flexibility and vitality: The success of Russian diplomacy and the Kremlin in hosting this summit at this time and mobilizing broad international participation, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations, represents a challenge to Western efforts to represent Putin as an isolated leader under Western sanctions and threatened with arrest, under the ruling of the International Criminal Court; as Russia has proven the flexibility and vitality of its regional and international partnerships as a system that enjoys international acceptance and trust. 2. The balance of Turkish foreign policy: Perhaps Turkish participation has provoked many reactions; given that it has the largest army in the ranks of NATO, which is hostile to Russia, this comes as an extension of its balanced approach in its foreign policy in order to diversify alliances while maintaining relations with the West, and it also reflects Turkish discontent with European policy regarding Ankara's membership in the European Union, and Turkey's joining the BRICS group would achieve strategic gains for the group; this will give it a balanced character instead of viewing the group as anti-Western, and this will achieve gains for Turkey, which will benefit from the flexibility of its relationship with both the East and the West. 3. Establishing a unified currency: The symbolism that Putin used during the summit regarding a unified currency for the bloc was not accepted by some of the bloc’s members themselves, who fear identifying with the Russian-Chinese orientation at the expense of their interests and their relationship with the West, most notably India and Brazil. There is a degree of exaggeration in imagining the possibility of eliminating the dollar’s position in the global system and moving towards removing it from the global economy. 4. Resolving the balance of power: We cannot ignore what is reflected in the interest of the countries of the South in participating in the activities of the BRICS summit, as well as the emerging international powers, and what it represents in terms of a trend among those countries to express their desire to change the balance of power in the global system based on Western hegemony, and to express dissatisfaction with the prevailing system, which reflects the interest in the efforts of China and Russia to direct the international community against the Western system due to its double standards, especially after the fragility of the international community organizations entrusted with implementing the rules of international law regarding the war in the Middle East became clear, in addition to their exposure of the flaws in the rules of international trade, and the frameworks of economic sanctions that harm the economies of the countries of the South in favor of the West.  In estimation, the importance of the development represented by the BRICS group and what it reflects in terms of a rapid transformation in the global system cannot be overlooked, within the framework of what it includes in terms of economy, markets, natural and industrial resources, and a huge human mass, but exaggerating the impact of the group's movements deviates from reality, especially considering that the group carries within it many contradictions that prevent the group from moving effectively, and in light of the divergence of the interests and goals of its members themselves, which can be inferred from the nature of the outcomes of the presidential summit, which are limited to announcements and visions regarding general cooperative projects without the existence of timetables and realistic implementation plans for many of them; the effectiveness of the group remains questionable. Third: Economic cooperation between the BRICS countriesData indicate that the ratio of the BRICS countries' GDP to the global GDP is witnessing a continuous increase during the period (2000-2023) to the point that it surpassed the G7 countries for the first time in 2020, as the BRICS share reached 31.02% for the G7 countries.   It is notable that the GDP rate of BRICS countries has witnessed declines during the mentioned period (2000-2024), and this decline can be explained by a number of reasons, including: the global financial crisis of 2009, the economic conditions experienced by a number of BRICS countries such as: Brazil 2015, represented by a high budget deficit and high inflation rates, Russia 2014, the decline in South Africa's GDP due to the collapse of raw material prices, and the decline in the GDP growth rate of the group's countries due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the global economy. As for the trade exchange volume, it witnessed a growth of 95.2% during the period from 2010-2022, recording about $10.52 trillion in 2022 compared to $5.39 trillion in 2010 [9]. On the side of foreign direct investment flows, according to UNCTAD data, we find that foreign direct investment flows to the BRICS group more than quadrupled during the period from 2001 to 2021, recording about $355 billion in 2021 compared to about $84 billion in 2001. In addition, the share of these flows in total global flows reached about 22% in 2021, compared to about 11% in 2001 [10]. UNCTAD data also indicate an increase in foreign direct investment among the group’s countries to reach about $167 billion in 2020, compared to about $27 billion in 2010, and China played a pivotal role in this increase by being the largest investor and recipient of investments within the BRICS group. On the other hand, Brazil and India witnessed strong growth among the group’s countries, while Russian growth declined and South Africa's foreign direct investment balance declined [11]. ConclusionThere are many theories of international relations that have tried to explain the emergence and development of the BRICS group, one of these theories is the power transition theory. The power transition theory has several analytical advantages that explain the rise of the BRICS group, but one of its biggest shortcomings is its greater applicability to the conditions of the Cold War era, where the status quo was maintained and there was fear of a nuclear war. However, the current international system is completely different, as it is in a new birth phase that hinders the power transition theory in explaining the behavior of the BRICS countries. This necessitates the interest of researchers and academics in several theories of international relations that explain the BRICS group, such as the peaceful coexistence theory, the state theory, and the global regionalism theory. In addition, supporters of the power transition theory should review the classification of countries they use to classify countries, and they should establish another type, which is reformist countries, as stated in the study. The concept of soft power as defined by Joseph Nye is completely different from that used by the BRICS group, as the group adheres to a pragmatic and practical approach to using soft power directed at promoting and protecting national interests rather than considering the preferences of international partners. The BRICS member states apply different methods in their pursuit of status - from mobility and competition strategies - to different types of policies. The BRICS group is one of the most important global economic groups that is characterized by a large number of advantages that qualify it to play a vital role in bringing about changes in the global economy due to the diversity of its member economies: Among these advantages are: - The growing economic weight of the group as a result of its association with the economies of emerging countries, which contributes to improving its ranking within the economies of the G20 countries. - The vital role played by the group in global food security through the occupation of Russia, Brazil, and India as the largest producers and exporters of wheat, soybeans, and rice - respectively - - It has adopted several important initiatives to promote and encourage investment within the group, especially with the increasing concern about the conditions of the global economy and the challenges associated with tensions on the international stage. - The BRICS countries are interested in establishing alternative development financial mechanisms to those of the West, such as: the New Development Bank (NDB), and the establishment of a Contingency Reserve Fund (CRA). - Establishing the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2025, which defines the path for the group’s development and sets the framework for cooperation between its members in accordance with current economic trends and conditions. References 1. تعتبر الحرب الروسية الجورجية التي اندلعت في أغسطس 2008 أحد الأدلة على بدء سعي روسيا للسيطرة واستعادة نفوذها السابق سواء إقليميا أو عالمياً، حيث أن تلك الحرب مثلت لموسكو فرصة كبيرة لتحقيق نصالحها عبر استعادة نفوذها في جورجيا من جهة، وإيصال رسالة للغرب وللدول السوفيتية السابقة التي تحاول الخروج من دائرة النفوذ السوفيتي بأنها قادرة على حماية مصالحها ونفوذها ولا يمكن الاستهانة بقوتها وقدرتها العسكرية والتعامل معها كدولة كبرى لها دور فاعل ومؤثر.لمزيد من التفاصيل حول الحرب الروسية- الجورجية 2008، أنظر: عودة،جهاد (2017)، الحرب الروسية- الجورجية: استعادة النفوذ الروسي في جورجيا، المجلة العلمية للبحوث والدراسات التجارية، المجلد ،31 العدد .1  [1] Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. [2] A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Pp. xii, 292. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1980 [3] Stockholm international Peace2020 ، [4] Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020 [5] Samuel Charap & Keith Darden, Russia and Ukraine, Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 56, 2014, Issue 2. [6] Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas, Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 41, 2015. [7] Joseph S.Nye, JR, The Limits of Chinese Soft Power, The World’s Opinion Page, Jul 10, 2015. [8] http://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/#:~:text=By%202023%2C%20the%20difference%20had,held%20by%20the%20G7%20countries[9] World Development Indicators Database. [10] UNCTAD. 2023. BRICS Investment Report [11] UNCTAD. 2023. BRICS Investment Report

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском If there is a central theme to this year, it is the world getting accustomed to the lack of predetermined scenarios. Discussions focusing on the international order are fading; the former order no longer functions, and there is no knowledge of what the new one, if it ever materializes, will look like. When the authors of an annual Valdai report suggested1 several years ago that order, as we know it, was unlikely to ever emerge, their hypothesis drew restrained comments at best. How can we do without order?  However, the habit of living in a structured international system was formed recently by historical standards. Unregulated international relations have marked political history. These relations took shape in the process of interaction between the countries and quickly changed. What we now habitually call a multipolar or a polycentric world is reminiscent, in its form, of a return to an environment last seen before the Great War that broke out in the early 20th century. However, such parallels are misleading because international relations today are structured in a whole different manner.  First, despite stark differences, the world remains an integral and interconnected place. Conflicts do not sever ties but warp them, quite badly at times.  Second, compared to the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, or even 1945 when the most robust so far known global order was established, the number of significant players influencing international processes has increased by order of magnitude. That includes more than just major countries.  Previous approaches to establishing the global balance through peaceful or military means are no longer effective, and the countries have yet to see innovative tools make their way to their arsenals. We will be compelled to make do with what we have and accommodate this toolset to deal with the changed circumstances. This will require everyone to re-interpret the ongoing developments and to forgo the stereotypes that defined our perspectives in the previous era. In last year’s report,2 we suggested that the impossibility of structuring international relations around a hierarchy-based approach would be a hallmark of the coming era. The ensuing events showed that things have indeed taken this course.   Avert an all-out cold war.  In 1945, when the international order that we view to this day as exemplary was emerging, writer and essayist George Orwell made a disappointing conclusion in his essay You and the Atomic Bomb3 to the effect that the formidable military capabilities of the countries with massive nuclear arsenals made perpetual cold war unavoidable. This goes beyond confrontation between them and includes − an even more consequential factor − their confrontation with other countries that do not possess weapons of mass destruction. In the hierarchy of international priorities, the relations between the great nuclear powers will always top other kinds of relations, and their conflict will prevent a system of cooperation, global or regional, from ever being created and will only allow creating a system of competition instead. All initiatives put forth by these powers bear the imprint of their relations with those who match them in destructive capabilities. Thus, international politics appeared to him doomed to a perpetual state of not a war, but “peace that is no peace.”  So far, the fate of global stability has indeed been falling prey to differences among the most powerful countries, such as the United States, Russia, and China. But does this provide enough ground to believe we should “bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of?”4 Especially so since, even amidst intense confrontation, the world is not splitting into rivalling blocs as it did in the past century. The bloc system experience, like that of the Western community, is not replicated despite its perceived success. This suggests that binding alliances marked by ideology and stern discipline are an exception than the rule. There is no indication that other countries are seeking to form alliances like the West in terms of like-mindedness.  New rules emerge from shifts in the balance of power and, if we take the modern-day world, the fact that small groups of countries are no longer able to tell the rest of the international community what to do. The drive for independence relying on mutual respect that we see in most countries around the world has become the structural foundation underlying an emerging regional and international order. Today’s situation is ironic. On the one hand, a profound shift is unfolding on the international stage. It is greater in size and depth than the previous one that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand, these changes are not revolutionary by nature. They are not leading to collapse and evanescence, but rather to transformation of the erstwhile rules and norms. Truth be told, no one is really interested in seeing a radical scenario play out. The current and anticipated international escalation looks less like a premeditated strategy and more like an outcome of hare-brained actions or a lack of alternative ideas. The key point is that there is no going back, and what lies ahead will look nothing like recapitulation of the past.  There is a demand for stabilizing mechanisms that would not only expand existing capabilities of the countries, but also function as safeguards against the woefully tragic scenarios, such as those playing out around Ukraine and in the Middle East. The search for such mechanisms will be most widespread in Eurasia, which is the world’s largest continent in terms of its territory and population. This is where the most favorable prerequisites for that have developed. Eurasia’s connection to the rest of the world is so deep that Eurasian processes will have a decisive impact on the other parts of the planet and on approaches to addressing crucial security and sustainability issues, such as food, energy, and the environment. Development of each means security for everyone From the particular to the general  Building a Eurasian system of security cooperation, both as an ideal and a practical project, runs into numerous obstacles. Yet it is possible within this vast expanse, if the goals of each nation’s development can be prioritized over the factors that drive conflict and competition. In Greater Eurasia, conflicts impact only peripheral areas and do not go deep inside the territory, which means that preserving stability through leveraging new forms of security coordination appears quite achievable.  Global events of the past three years clearly show that individual countries’ push to pursue diverse paths of development and to avoid confinement within specific blocs is stronger than the inertia of division along ideological or even strategic lines. Even at the peak of the ideological and military rivalry in the latter half of the 20th century, many “third world” countries chose not to align with either side of the binary universe, even though the two opposing blocs formed the core of international politics. This reluctance has become even more natural now that rivalries have lost their structured character, and the ideology-driven attempts to divide the world into democracies and autocracies are artificial to the point where they fail to hold up to the international real-world test.  With varying degrees of confidence and assertiveness, most countries are upholding their right to their unique place in global affairs, aiming to determine their own paths to achieve their development and security goals. Modern history provides examples of cooperative initiatives aimed at shared prosperity, of which ASEAN is the best known one. Such cooperation is grounded in ruling out diktat in political matters and expanding practical interactions to address each country’s unique needs. These principles offer a starting point for reflections on what regional security might look like in the modern world. Collectively, regional security systems form a foundation of universal security.  Eurasia’s security is inseparable from global security, which makes it particularly special.  First, the security of Russia and China directly depends on their respective relations with the United States. This is a crucial element of international politics that defines its content. Accordingly, the strategic ambitions of the United States have a direct impact on Eurasian security. Furthermore, the western edge of Eurasia − Europe − remains part of the collective West and pursues its group interests.  Europe’s future is a crucial factor which will affect international politics in the decades to come. Even though the era of Europe as the global center is ending, it remains an attractive partner for achieving development goals in other regions due to its economic power and technological capacities. The 2022−2024 events reinforced transatlantic ties and diminished Europe’s agency in international affairs, as the latter continued to follow unwaveringly in the wake of US politics. However, given the pace and scale of global changes, this situation may not last forever. The key Eurasian powers are operating on the premise that the positioning of Europe can shift in the coming years in the wake of the international system transformations, potentially drawing some European countries into embracing broader Eurasian projects. Second, the security of a group of Eurasian countries also makes up part of the collective security. Many of these countries find key financial, technological, and cultural resources for their development outside of Eurasia. They also play important roles in international politics and have influence on numerous developments around the world. Their global importance and involvement in the highest level “great game” ensure that they have a stake in maintaining peace in Eurasia. This helps explain the relative stability within Eurasia’s borders and supports the efforts to establish common security platforms in Eurasia. Notably, not a single major military conflict involving Eurasian countries has ever broken out after WWII (the western edge is an exception due to the European “zero-sum game” approach that has dominated that part of the world for centuries).  The historical paths and itineraries across Eurasia and around it, which predate the Age of Discovery and European colonization, are being revitalized as the global political and economic system continues to diversify. Ironically, the punitive economic measures imposed by the United States and its allies on Russia help develop alternative global trade networks, promote economic flexibility and the search for alternative solutions.  Third, Eurasia objectively covers a sizable portion of habitable land and is home to multiple civilizations and dozens of countries that accommodate 70 percent of the world’s population. It is no coincidence that this region intrigued classical geopolitical theorists who saw Eurasia’s Heartland as the center of global processes.  Eurasian security is inseparable from global security, and its specific principles, mechanisms for country-to-country cooperation, and institutional forms can hardly be defined specifically for just one region. Eurasia is complex in terms of country-to-country relations, but holds vast potential, given its quest for a sustainable interrelations system and absence of obsolete institutions. It has the potential to develop alternatives to the principles and institutional forms of European security,5 which cannot be universal due to Europe’s unique cultural and historical background. The Helsinki framework, which created the Conference and then the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was Europe’s most significant achievement in establishing security for all. However, the OSCE was unable to adapt to the new balance of power following the 1946–1990 Cold War, which spawned ongoing major military and political crisis in Europe.  From the general to the particular  Eurasia is a region that may give birth to a new concept of international security. This potential is supported by, on the one hand, its inseparability from global security and development issues and, on the other hand, by the countries’ interest in a stable environment that is free from existential threats. Eurasia’s position in the global economy does not require nations to unite solely to reap the benefits of unification, as is the case with the Western countries. However, the creation of well-defined geopolitical and civilizational barriers is unlikely in Eurasia. The continent’s vastly different experiences in new international trends may eventually provide a foundation for global transformation.  Factors that underlie Eurasian security are the following:  Recognition of the continent’s spatial integrity and the impossibility of drawing dividing lines there.  Acknowledgment of shared interests and collective leadership.  Political equality of all countries of the region, regardless of their size or potential. There are no revolutionary or revisionist countries in Eurasia that feel compelled to export their political systems (exporting socio-political models as the Soviet Union or the United States did) to survive. Radical ideas come not from the countries, but from transborder extremist groups. Containing and eliminating them is a common objective.  The Eurasian regional security system aims to address issues separately from global security concerns which are, according to Orwell, dominated by relations between major nuclear powers, and to enhance the region’s resilience to external challenges, which implies resilience of each country. Defence against external threats and preventing internal conflict from getting worse are achieved through multilateral cooperation rather than rigid bloc discipline. A practical objective at hand is to identify external threats that will not force Eurasian countries into picking sides in an Orwellian Cold War with the involvement of nuclear powers.  A shared understanding that independent countries form the basis of order helps articulate the core principle of mutual renunciation of any moves that may violate the region’s integrity and equality of the countries in that region. The core value lies in unconditional respect for each other’s socio-political systems and firm rejection of the efforts to change them. This approach may seem self-evident and is in stark contrast with the practices used in the 1990s–2010s when forceful transformation of sovereign countries with active external involvement up to military intervention was cast as a standard approach by Western political leaders.  Sovereign equality enables justice, a concept that, while subjective, is central to international politics. Future international order will center on ensuring just relations, even if past institutions, which were designed to smooth power imbalances, get dismantled. The more the future rules can guarantee fairness, the more effective they will be at preventing armed conflicts. The collective goal is to uphold justice regarding the core interests and values of all Eurasian nations. Not like in Europe  It is unrealistic to expect that the next stage will somehow replicate the circumstances which were typical of Europe in the past centuries or decades. Speaking of future regional security, it is essential to break free from traditional patterns of perception and all-too-familiar solutions. Unlike Europe where the interests of Russia and the West overlap, Eurasia lacks a common fundamental challenge that could be resolved by establishing a Helsinki-like model of collective regional security. In this case, there will be no opposing great powers or blocs, whose balance will prioritize interests. In Eurasia, there are no second-grade countries or second-grade interests, because even the largest countries are incapable of imposing their own rules on any other country.  As we have seen, the balance of power underlying the European system cannot be considered a solution simply because major Eurasian countries do not compete in issues that are critical to their survival. In other words, the balance of power and influence between Russia, China, and India − even if tensions arise occasionally − does not affect their chances of survival or their chances to achieve their development goals. The differences implicating major Eurasian powers do exist, but they manifest on a global level of international politics. They are not of paramount importance in Eurasia, which is critically important when it comes to cooperation. Power and its emotions  Even though Eurasia’s make-up is unique, and it is an integral part of the international system, it is not detached from the international context and historical patterns. After a period of high regulation and reliance on institutions (this order of things was established in 1945), international relations have reverted to the “original settings.” Power remains a key category, and the use (or the threat of use) of power is back in demand. Moreover, the emotions and personal qualities of leaders, combined with national strategic cultures, now shape interactions among major powers even more than the established order, norms, and rules that date back to the era of the bipolar face-off, which persisted throughout the transitional period.  Fear and anger are two emotions that matter in international affairs. In addition to existing circumstances, they are identified in each case by a nation’s historical experience. Fear, ranging from apprehension to anxiety and dread, is one primary driver behind the countries’ behaviour.6 Anger, spanning from irritation and resentment to rage, also drives international relations and manifests itself in acts of retribution and violence that include terrorism. Fear and anger often drive not only political leaders, but entire societies as well. These emotions impact the way security is arranged and understood.  Occasionally, countries are observing the evolution of international processes from a position of force and the position of force-derived emotions, such as tranquility and firmness. The sense of power is a vital driving force in relations among leading military powers. The basic emotions such as fear and anger, as well as tranquility rooted in the sense of one’s own superior strength once again, as in previous historical eras, determine the choice between two key strategies: annihilation and positional strategy.7  The annihilation strategy invariably relies on significant superiority in assets and military force, initiative-taking moves, and swift overpowering of an opponent. By contrast, the positional strategy concedes the initiative and allows the advancing party to act. It relies on the importance of concentrating and gradually building the resources up. Anyone employing this strategy avoids decisive battles for as long as they can and engages only when they believe they cannot lose. Typically, time favors those who employ positional strategy.  Traditionally, most Eurasian countries prioritize the positional strategy. Classical Eurasian military thought is captured, for example, in the Chinese treatise The Art of War, which outlines the principles of positional strategy: “Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans, the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces, the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the fi eld.”8 In Russia, patience and willingness to endure lengthy confrontations have always been part of the military and political tradition, which manifested itself, for example, in the tactic of medieval Moscow princes or the generals of the 1812 Patriotic War.  These speculations are related to the ongoing international developments. Amid profound shifts in the balance of power, the United States, striving to maintain its hegemony, increasingly chooses offensive and provocative policies. This policy is not rooted in quiet confidence in its own strength but stems from anger and frustration at being challenged by its antagonists and resentment aimed at the internal opposition that underestimates the scale of this challenge. In addition to anger, there is fear and anxiety that the unfolding trends could lead to a scenario that is unfamiliar and unsettling for the United States where the balance of power will shift towards East.  The clash of emotions is a hallmark of the post-institutional world. 9 A different conference  Eurasia lacks conditions where any power can become dominant. This does not mean, however, that rivalry is out of the question here. Each power pursues its own interests, and balances of power will form over time and with difficulty. However, Eurasia’s advantage lies in the fact that − with few exceptions − there are no long-standing or deeply rooted conflicts between the countries overfilled with fear or anger. Major Eurasian powers do not have an objective need to be at feud with each other to achieve their vital goals. Vast and rich expanses of land can accommodate diverse cultures, civilizations, and foreign policy priorities. This is why Eurasia can reach a balance relying on a patient positional strategy rooted in quiet confidence, firmness, and mutual interest.  The Eurasian collective security system cannot rely on the principles of a military alliance with clear-cut obligations. Bloc discipline or a rigid institutional structure are ruled out as well. As mentioned above, the model established in Europe in the 1970s as part of the pan-European process cannot be used, either. However, the concept of a “conference on security and cooperation,” which emerged back in the day, fits the Eurasian space well as a mechanism for ongoing multilateral consultations involving interaction on all issues. The key difference from Europe is that the CSCE/ OSCE was originally created to defi ne spheres of influence in Europe and later morphed into a tool to maintain Atlantic monopoly. Neither is a viable option in Eurasia. An equal distribution of responsibility for stability and security among Eurasian powers is based on forgoing any nation’s dominance.  The principles of polycentricity, first outlined in the 1997 Russia China Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order,10 include non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for mutual interests, equality, and a commitment to a collective approach to addressing security issues, such as demilitarization of shared borders or provision of security guarantees to small and medium-sized buffer countries located between major powers. These principles are now taking on a multilateral dimension. The Eurasian security cannot rely on a closed architecture. It is embodied not in a single international organization, but rather in a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements and diverse associations that collectively cover all (not just military and political) aspects of collective security. Downsizing the presence of external forces, which leverage fears and anger of small and medium-sized countries to stir up tensions in Eurasia, and mitigating chances for their intervention is an important goal. The security system will focus on resolving all major conflicts with the involvement of regional actors.  The mutual nuclear deterrence between major powers makes achieving absolute political goals an unviable proposition. Now is the time for relative victories; achieving an absolute victory is out of the question. All major conflicts that we observe in Eurasia, such as between Russia and the West, the United States and China, India and Pakistan, and Iran and Israel, to name a few, are rooted in positional confrontations, where a strategy of annihilation is fraught with high risks and is largely unproductive. The architecture of Eurasian security in its military and political and force-based aspect will rely precisely on the sense of quiet confidence in one’s strength and the general drift of international relations. Security and advantages  Modern-day international security is a complex construct that transcends the military and political framework. Just like competition embraces all spheres of activity, including culture and the economy, so too does security with its compound nature. Common sense suggests that economic cooperation creates a foundation for confrontation-free political relations. However, things tend to be more complicated in the real world.  The Russia-EU economic relations were remarkably strong. Even in 2022, trade amounted to $258.6 billion.11 The EU was Russia’s key trading partner and the primary market for its energy. Deeper integration, such as allowing Russian companies to own EU pipeline asset shares, or shares in individual companies, such as Opel, was held back for political reasons long before Ukraine crisis broke out in 2014.12 High trade volumes did nothing to prevent degradation, and the political dialogue collapsed. Russia-Ukraine relations were likewise marked by elevated levels of mutual dependency even after 2014. In 2021, trade amounted to $12.2 billion, which did not alleviate, but rather exacerbated political differences. A peaceful matter about exclusivity of economic relations with Europe dating back to the early 2010s led to an onset of a deep crisis that ended in an armed conflict. The highest level of economic interdependence between China and the United States (with trade hitting $690 billion in 2023)13 goes hand in hand with an escalation of political competition and Washington’s attempts to throw a wrench in China’s technological growth, including by way of imposing restrictive measures.14 Conversely, complex political relations between China and India are unfolding amid trade numbers in excess of $100 billion.15  Examples of the non-linear relationship between the economy and international politics, particularly in matters of security, abound. Economic benefits may create enabling conditions for political cooperation but cannot shield countries against confrontation when it comes to fundamental security issues. Politicization and ways to fight it.  The modern-day world economy is highly globalized in terms of finance and trade. Globalization has significantly brought down costs, streamlined supply chains, and integrated multiple economies into technological and value-added chains, thus promoting their growth and modernization. The US dollar has become a convenient tool for making international payments and creating reserves, while technological platforms have brought countries together into a single economic organism. However, the “vital organs” of the global networks in the form of financial, technological, and communication hubs have remained under the jurisdiction of Western, primarily US, state bodies. The United States is losing credibility, because it takes advantage of economic interdependency networks for political gains, yet there are no full-fledged alternative solutions in sight.16 With the US dollar dominating the international scene, disconnecting individual companies or individuals from payments in dollars can result in heavy economic damage. According to SWIFT, the US dollar accounts for 48.03 percent of transactions handled by this international payments network, while the share of euro has plummeted to 23.2 percent.17 Blocking financial sanctions feature prominently in the US toolset, and are widely used by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries as well. Russia has become a primary target for such measures, although individuals from Iran, North Korea, China, and even US allies and partners like Türkiye or the UAE are also on the receiving end of these sanctions, albeit to a lesser extent. Trade and technological ties have become hot-button political issues as well. Sanctions on Russia include sweeping bans on exports and imports. US legislation imposes export control compliance on countries that use US-made technologies, manufacturing equipment, and software. Import restrictions cover Russian petroleum, refined products, gold, diamonds, steel, and other products. Export controls regarding China, especially in electronics and telecommunications, are tightening. Chinese electronic services are banned in the United States and some companies face contract restrictions in Western countries. Iran is under a total exports and imports ban, with even stricter bans imposed on North Korea. Even EU companies are forced to comply with the US export controls to avoid secondary sanctions.  Transport and digital infrastructure are affected as well. Tools include setting price thresholds for transporting Russian oil, sanctions for sizable transactions with Iran’s oil sector, and restrictions on the use of maritime space and airspace, ports, airports, gateways, and other infrastructure facilities. Sanctioned individuals are cut off from access to what are now customary services, such as email, audio, and video file aggregators, not to mention more applied online solutions in the sphere of engineering and other technical areas.  The targeted countries do provide a response. Russia and China have incorporated instruments to block financial sanctions into their legislation. Russia has imposed a ban on exports of manufacturing equipment and has implemented extraordinary measures against economic agents from unfriendly countries. China is implementing a “dual circulation” system in strategic economic areas and investing in developing its own technology. Iran and even more so North Korea have long lived under partial or near-total autarky. The US allies are pondering diversification of financial assets. Back to market  The above developments have become quite widespread and continue to expand. They transfer the cutthroat zero-sum-game-like military and political competition to the economy. It cancels market principles that are based on mutual advantages. With the economic ties and interdependence networks weaponized, severing such ties or at least diversifying them appears a sensible response. Even if such steps are deficient from a market perspective, they are inevitable as a means of mitigating security risks.  Diversifying financial settlements implies using currencies other than the US dollar. National currencies partially address this issue. Using the renminbi in trade with China is a rational choice given the availability of a vast Chinese market. However, difficulties with investing rupees arise when it comes to Russia-India trade. Even more challenges arise from trade with less developed or more specialized economic systems. Strategically, a more universal mechanism is needed that could be used by several major economies, a BRICS mechanism.  The quest for ways to diversify payments is ongoing but expecting to see a “BRICS currency” emerge any time soon is premature for technical reasons, among other considerations. A better path is not to introduce an alternative reserve “anti-dollar,” but to create diverse bilateral or multilateral settlement arrangements that can bypass the US financial service monopoly. Russia is at the forefront of these efforts given its economy size and the number of sanctions imposed on it.  The same applies to creating innovative technological chains and domestic production capacities, as well as looking for alternative suppliers of manufactured goods and technologies. More recently, we had the chance to witness critical vulnerabilities when it comes to using products that include Western-made components. The domestically made substitutes can be less effective and more expensive but are unparalleled in terms of security. Amid bans and restrictions, such alternatives provide a solution, as does searching for replacements in other markets. Today, we see new chains pop up in places where they could hardly be expected to exist just a few years ago, especially when it comes to Russia-China relations. The US stick policy has defeated its purpose when economic agents around the globe became more ingenious and improved their economic flexibility. The infrastructure constraints have spurred the emergence or scaling of various phenomena, including “shadow” tanker fleets, alternative insurance systems, exchanges, communication, and online communication services.  Large transport projects in Eurasia are back on the agenda. Progress can be clearly seen in the North-South corridor. Moving such initiatives forward and creating a single system across the Eurasian region is a challenge, since Eurasian countries vary among themselves and maintain different relations with the United States and the Western countries. Significant economic disparities are also a factor to be reckoned with. More likely, such a system might incorporate a multitude of decentralized bilateral and multilateral formats and include financial tools for transactions between individual countries, as well as settlement systems for international associations such as BRICS, technological projects in niche areas, and targeted infrastructure solutions. However, the number of such innovations will inevitably give rise to qualitative changes.  The Eurasian economy will inevitably move away from the nets of West-centric interdependence which are being used as weapons. There is no need to forget them, but there is a need for backup tools as safeguards against arbitrary politicization. Eurasian economic security can be a flexible and decentralized set of mechanisms to reduce “dependence on interdependence.” While this may seem strange now, Eurasia could indeed become a flagship in global processes for returning to a much more market-based system of economic ties. Trust without coercion  Peaceful and productive relations between countries, whether bilateral or multilateral, can only be built on trust, which holds equally true for the prospects of development and matters of security.  What underlies trust in international relations? The Western answer to this question emphasizes cultural and ideological homogeneity, with the North Atlantic Alliance as a product of this approach. Modern Western countries display a strict bloc (self-)discipline about key international issues, which can be seen in their voting as one at the UN General Assembly and the G20, as well as their unified policies. Those who break the ranks, if any, are quickly put back in their place. On the face of it, this approach presents a competitive advantage in a multipolar world, which is further proof of internal strength. However, it lacks flexibility and is marked by ideology-driven dogmatism, which is an irritant for the non-Western world.  The World Majority countries18 (a term used in Russia to refer to non-Western Global South and Global East countries) do not have to follow bloc discipline. In the face of acute geopolitical conflicts that seek to split the modern world, this can be perceived as weakness, which fact is occasionally exploited by our Western counterparts, for example, on the G20 platform. However, this phenomenon should be approached differently: as a striving of various countries to achieve ultimate flexibility, which will allow them not to limit their options and to attract every development resource within their reach.  An important question arises in this regard, though: how can relationships be built within a diversified community torn by numerous contradictions? The tradition of independent cooperation among non-Western countries spans decades, and is rooted in the 1955 Bandung Conference, where the countries then categorized as part of the Third World or the Non-Aligned Movement proclaimed shared goals and objectives. The declaration affirmed a commitment to the common cause of resisting Western colonialism and imperialism, recognized the equality of all participants regardless of differences between them, and promoted shared interests in the name of development. Later, ASEAN adopted a similar set of principles, which has now made its way to BRICS and the SCO platforms.  Similar processes are observed in Africa as well. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was based on shared values and objectives facing African countries, such as opposing colonialism and neo-colonialism. Statements by the OAU founding figures come to mind. Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, had the following to say: “Only with unity can we be sure that Africa really governs Africa.”19 In his opening remarks at the 1963 summit in Addis Ababa, where the OAU was founded, Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie I also emphasized the importance of unity and setting aside individual differences to achieve solidarity: “Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about means we discuss alternative paths to the same objectives; we engage in debates about techniques and tactics. But when semantics are stripped away, there is little argument among us. We are determined to create a union of Africans.”20 This keynote address also highlighted the direct link between Africa and Asia: “We stand united with our Asian friends and brothers. Africa shares with Asia a common background of colonialism, of exploitation, of discrimination, of oppression. At Bandung, African and Asian states dedicated themselves to the liberation of their two continents from foreign domination and affirmed the right of all nations to develop in their own way, free of any external interference. The Bandung Declaration and the principles enunciated at that Conference remain today valid for us all.”21.     Much has changed since the Bandung and Addis Ababa conferences, and the world has changed out of recognition as well. Yet, the principles and goals declared there have not only remained relevant, but are now getting a second wind, especially because they imply mutual trust. As we sum up the experiences of Asian and African countries, we can pinpoint several principles that have been tested and approved by political practices in the non-Western world.  First: Recognizing a common goal, which unites different countries, and advancing towards it is an undeniable priority of their policies.  Second: Recognizing that differences should not hold back progress towards common goals.  Third: Acknowledging the fact that differences will not vanish. Each country has its unique specifics and a path to follow. Trust implies tolerance for differences and trade-offs to make sure differences do not lead to conflict.  Fourth: Flexible institutional and procedural mechanisms. The combination of trust and acknowledgment of differences takes rigid institutional frameworks and restrictions off the list of priorities. Coexistence and intertwining of different structures with various formats of membership and commitments thus becomes the practical outcome. Fifth: Gradual internal consolidation fostering the necessary conditions.  Sixth: Strengthening trust-based solidarity among the World Majority countries.  Seventh: Commitment to seeking local solutions to regional problems and addressing global issues as a sum of regional approaches to ensure that individual countries’ right to development is not hostage to new global constraints.  This path is longer and more complex than conventional bloc discipline, but, in an increasingly diverse world, it may be the only viable path, as fewer countries out there are willing to align in a single column. Is agreeing on the world order principles possible?  The post-World War II era brought forth new, never used approaches to structuring the international political and economic system. The achievements of the then created institutions are undeniable, yet no product is everlasting. The ongoing profound transformation of the global landscape calls for an effort to deeply rethink the accumulated experience rather than discard it. The events of the second quarter of the 21st century will not draw a line under the previous world structure but will pave the way to enhance and to adapt it to new realities. After all, the ideals that guided the architects of the post-war world remain in force and align with the global trends.  An open world space that ensures the rights to peaceful development, prosperity, and self-realization for all nations and countries is a shared goal in today’s world. In fact, we are now much closer to this goal than we were eighty years ago when the post-war order was being discussed. Back then, much of the world was still under colonial rule, and major powers were entrenched in systemic ideological confrontation. Today, neither of these conditions exists, though remnants of the past are still there. Addressing these remnants should be part of the efforts to create a renewed world architecture.  The emergence of new global organizations is highly unlikely. However, at the level of large regions, unilateral efforts will be insufficient, and the push for more stable forms of cooperation is likely to prevail. Currently, new constructs of that kind − the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Organization of Turkic States, and the Belt and Road Initiative − are being tested in Eurasia. All these initiatives, as well as any existing or future ones, are experimental in nature. Time will tell how effective and functional they really are. In the future, universal regional platforms might be able to encompass different cooperation institutions in specific areas whose objectives will not conflict with one another.  In the middle of the 20th century, the world was built from the top down, from the peak of the hierarchical pyramid down to its base. The new system will not be that consistent, but it will be far more democratic. It is being built from the bottom up and relies on self-organization and cooperation between countries within individual regions, where they must jointly address pressing, practical issues. If humanity avoids making the mistakes that will set it back as was the case in the past, then practical interaction at the regional level will give rise to a new system that will capture the planet’s complexity and diversity and be able to transform these qualities from obstacles on the way to development into a foundation for growth. References 1: Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, Ivan Timofeev. Living in a Crumbling World. Valdai Club Annual Report. October 15, 2018. URL: https://valdaiclub. com/a/reports/living-in-a-crumbling-world/  2: Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, Ivan Timofeev. Maturity Certificate, or the Order That Never Was. Valdai Club Annual Report. October 2, 2023. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/maturity-certifi cate-or-the-order-that-never-was/ 3: Orwell G. You and the Atomic Bomb // Tribune, October 19, 1945.  4: William Shakespeare, Hamlet. 5: For four hundred years, the latter has served as a global security system: the Westphalian rules of the game, the balance of power, and Metternich’s rule, which holds that international security is achieved when one country considers the security concerns of another country as its own. 6: Pace M., Bilgic A. Studying Emotions in Security and Diplomacy: Where We Are Now and Challenges Ahead // Political Psychology. 2019. Vol. 40. No. 6. Pp. 1407–1417. Lebow R.N. Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations // International Affairs. 2006. Vol. 82. No. 3. Pp. 431–448. 7: Стратегия в трудах военных классиков. Edited and commented by A. Svechin. Moscow, 1924; Carr A., Walsh B. The Fabian Strategy: How to Trade Space for Time // Comparative Strategy. 2022. Vol. 41. No. 1. Pp. 78–96.  8: From the treatise The Art of War commonly attributed to the legendary military commander and strategist Sun Tzu (6th-5th century BC).  9: Dominique Moisi. The Clash of Emotions. January 31, 2007. URL: https://www.ifri.org/en/external-articles/ clash-emotions 10: Russia-China Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order. URL: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902155?ysclid=m27d9a94wj720511004 11: Товарооборот между Россией и ЕС оказался максимальным за восемь лет. March 7, 2023. URL: https://www. rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/6406ceed9a7947b3912b3c98?ysclid=m0l0zgm3hl844648897  12: Беликов Д., Егикян С. Magna и Сбербанк прокатили мимо Opel. November 5, 2009. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1268884?ysclid=m0l145995v673478546 13: Козлов А. Объем торговли США и Китая обновил исторический рекорд. February 10, 2023. URL: https:// www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2023/02/10/962429-obem-torgovli-ssha-i-kitaya-obnovil-rekord  14: Тимофеев И.Н. Политика санкций США против Китая: сравнительный анализ //Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2023.Т.67, №11. p. 70–79.  15: СМИ: Китай стал главным торговым партнером Индии в 2023–2024 финансовом году May 13, 2024. URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/20778213  16: See more about the phenomenon of weaponising interdependence in: Farrell H. and Newman A. Weaponized Interdependence. What Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion // International Security. 2019. Vol. 44, No 1. P. 42–79. 17: Доля доллара в расчетах через систему SWIFT достигла рекордного уровня в 48%. September 28, 2023.URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6239234?ysclid=m0l1mzg1fu656162416 18: The World Majority and Its Interests. Valdai Club report, ed. by Timofei Bordachev. October 10, 24, URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/the-world-majority-and-its-interests/   19: Quotable Quotes of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere / collected from speeches and writings by Christopher C. Liundi. Dar es Salaam: Mkukina Nyota Publishers. 2022. P. 68. 20: Important Utterances of H.I.M. Emperor Haile Selassie I. 1963-1972. Addis Ababa: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information. 1972. P. 352.  21: Ibid. P. 361–362.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The outcome of the G20 leaders' summit held in Rio de Janeiro undoubtedly marks a series of victories for Brazilian foreign policy and also for the international community if we understand what is considered a success in terms of global governance. Firstly, the G20 summit declaration is a major achievement for Brazilian diplomacy, as it brings together twenty countries around agendas that not all of them support (such as human rights). Reaching this consensus required a year of intense negotiations to reach the final result. Brazil obtained support on the main themes it proposed: hunger and poverty, always off the radar of rich countries; sustainability; the bioeconomy , reaching the first multilateral treaty on the subject. Another consensus was the taxation of the super-rich , an issue that touches on the issues of inequality between countries and tax havens. Reaching the support of the G20 members around these proposals represented the reconstruction of the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy, which had been mocked during the Bolsonaro government, and crowned Brazil's return as a relevant country in the international community after years of self-inflicted isolation. Two other points that went unnoticed by some analyses is that the G20 summit allowed dialogue with Venezuela to return to normal, avoiding enormous damage to the Brazilian government and preserving good relations with the tumultuous neighboring country. And what can we say about the turbulent presence of the newest representative of the Latin American extreme right, Argentine President Javier Milei, who until the last moment tried to undo the consensus reached and was skillfully circumvented by Brazilian diplomacy? Returning to the proposals made by the presidency and supported by the other members of the group, are they “more of the same”, “undefined”, that do not change at the international level, as some analysts and part of the press said yesterday? Understanding the nature of international forums such as the G20 may answer this question. Outlined in 1999 and formalized in 2008, the G20 was created to bring together finance ministers and central bank governors from the twenty largest economies on the planet to discuss the financial crises of those periods. The crises of the 1990s, in particular, brought a new factor: it was the first time that economic problems in developing countries affected the central economies. It was therefore necessary to expand the discussions beyond the restricted Group of Seven (G7), a group of rich countries created in 1975, and to bring emerging economies to the negotiating table. Over the years, the G20 began to discuss other topics besides finance, and today sustainability is at the center of the work. The G20 emerged as an informal group with a flexible structure, dependent on a rotating presidency among its members to organize summits and working groups. In addition, it does not have a constitutive treaty and does not have the capacity to impose standards. When reading this brief description, most people wonder why a forum of this kind should exist if it “serves no purpose.” But informality and flexibility are a demand of the member countries that voluntarily chose to participate. These are the characteristics that allow ministers and other representatives of countries with divergent interests, such as the United States and Russia, to discuss issues that affect humanity, such as the eradication of hunger or climate change, for almost a year. The concrete actions that we so desperately need will depend on the efforts of each country and the corresponding pressure from their civil societies. The commitments exist, and now it is necessary to demand their implementation. Imagining a world without any kind of coordination is difficult because we have lived under the weak governance of the United Nations (UN) since the end of the Second World War, which, by the way, will be 80 years old in 2025. The memories of an international system under constant threat of global wars and in which common problems were not even discussed are a pale memory and, perhaps for this reason, so many people disdain the advances of international forums such as the G20. There are political forces today that oppose these alliances and the minimum level of global governance that we have managed to achieve, as Milei’s criticisms in his speech at the leaders’ meeting made clear. In line with the thinking of other far-right politicians, the Argentine president called global governance a “corset” that suffocates countries that think differently. It is contradictory that international regimes are criticized for restricting the freedom of States while at the same time being accused of being weak and ineffective, which demonstrates empty criticisms that serve only to encourage their supporters against imaginary enemies. Leaders like Donald Trump and Miley defend the “every man for himself” rule in international relations. This idea is gaining more and more followers among the people, a situation that makes declarations like the one by the G20, which defends basic principles of human rights and sustainability, an important manifesto for those who still defend an international order based on rules and cooperation. The Brazilian presidency has achieved important achievements for our foreign policy and also for the international order that it seeks to preserve.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In Rio de Janeiro, world leaders are gathering for a historic summit. The G20, the symbol of global governance, is at a crossroads. The planet is waiting. The climate, economic and geopolitical challenges are urgent.Since yesterday, at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, under the strategic engagement of Russia, Foreign MinisterSergey Lavrov, guided by the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, has been playing a key role in discussions on combating inequality, hunger and poverty, as well as reforming global institutions. Together with the BRICS Alliance, innovative initiatives are being put forward to strengthen economic cooperation and global stability, including sustainable development projects and strategic trade agreements. This Summit is proving to be a crucial platform for addressing pressing global challenges such as security and climate change, while potentially influencing global governance and international relations in the years to come.Geopolitical context of the summit, the madness of the Biden administrationAs the G20 group meets in Rio de Janeiro to reconcile the positions of the balance of power in the global chessboard, the recent antithetical decisions of the United States, held on the very eve of the summit and supported by France and Great Britain, are once again dispersing the positions to be reconciled. The Western minority, accustomed to living off the labor of the planetary majority, is lamentably trying to redefine the dynamics of the international community in its favor, by authorizing deep strikes on Russian territory. This approach, adopted by the Biden administration, reflects both madness and a vision of resistance in the face of the potential defeat of Ukraine and NATO allies against Russia, while seeking a reaction that could exacerbate global tensions. This audacious geopolitical calculation, perceived as a last-ditch attempt to consolidate Ukrainian positions before a potential change in American leadership, marks a turning point towards a dangerous escalation of hostilities. It can also be compared to a very big step taken towards the start of the Third World War.The 2024 G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro is therefore taking place in a complex geopolitical context, marked by key global issues. International conflicts, exacerbated in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, and tensions over the role of the United States, France, Great Britain and the collective West are at the heart of discussions on global security. While António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) urges the G20 to adopt actions aligned with the UN Charter – although Western ambitions of domination are being challenged by the rise of the BRICS Alliance – the Western minority continues to pour oil on the embers precisely to satisfy its ambitions of eternal domination.The climate crisis, meanwhile, is forcing more ambitious policies, as the G20, responsible for 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions, must revise its commitment to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Also, growing economic inequality and the need for reforms to a perceived unfair international financial system underscore the urgency of changing the global financial architecture. Despite the political challenges, the summit embodies a push towards stronger multipolarism, with key players such as Sergei Lavrov, Xi Jinping, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, etc., advocating for international cooperation. The political transition in the United States, with the imminent departure of Joe Biden and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, adds uncertainty, potentially impacting global cooperation and sustainability efforts. This nineteenth summit of the Group of Twenty powers (G20) is crucial to encouraging collective action in the face of complex challenges related to security, climate, the economy and international cooperation.Russia’s engagement in the world chessboardRussia’s participation in this Rio de Janeiro Summit is of major strategic importance. Led by Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and mandated by the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian delegation demonstrates the country’s strong commitment to global discussions. Russia aims to take a leading position in addressing global challenges such as combating inequality, hunger and poverty, and reforming international institutions. Mr. Sergey Lavrov’s interventions at the plenary sessions are essential, while his bilateral talks with other world leaders could lead to decisive agreements, strengthening international relations. Capitalizing on its long history of global engagement, Russia is ideally placed to influence these crucial debates for the future of the planet.Positive initiatives of the BRICS Alliance in global dynamicsThe BRICS, originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and expanded over time to BRICS+ – represent an undeniable emerging force in global economic cooperation, as demonstrated by their landmark initiatives at the Rio Summit yesterday. By establishing the New Development Bank, these nations are demonstrating their commitment to financing joint infrastructure projects, strengthening their synergy and displaying a clear desire for de-dollarization. The significant progress made in social security also demonstrates their determination to improve social protection on a large scale. Looking ahead, the BRICS countries are committed to driving reform of international financial institutions, placing their economic weight at the heart of global decisions, while working towards sustainable development and the fight against climate change. Speeches by representatives such as Mr. Sergei Lavrov at the summit captured attention, underscoring the BRICS’ determination to impact global governance and promote a more equitable and sustainable economic future.The impact of the summit on global governanceAs mentioned above, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, represents a crucial opportunity to transform global governance and have a lasting impact on the future of the planet and international relations. Since yesterday, this strategic meeting has been addressing major issues such as the reform of international institutions, requested in particular by the member countries of the BRICS Alliance, the proactive fight against climate change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and international security requiring enhanced cooperation in the face of current geopolitical tensions. Through decisive decisions, the summit could establish a new multipolar world order and decide on the choice between cooperation and global confrontation. The challenge lies in reconciling national and global interests, strengthening trust between international partners, and finding innovative solutions to address the complex challenges of our era. The G20 Summit in Rio thus offers a unique platform for leaders to demonstrate their leadership and vision, thereby shaping a multipolar and sustainable future for future generations.It can be said that the 2024 edition of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro marks a turning point where world leaders are called upon to choose: cooperation or confrontation, progress or stagnation. The future of the planet is now in their hands. Today’s decisions, contained in the Summit Declaration, will shape the world of tomorrow. History will judge.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On July 6, 2024, the military leaders of Mali (Assimi Goïta), Niger (Abdourahamane Tchiani) and Burkina Faso (Ibrahim Traoré) signed a treaty establishing the Confederation of Sahel States, or, more precisely, the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States—retaining the acronym AES (Alliance des États du Sahel in French). The document was signed in Niamey, Niger, during the summit of the Alliance of Sahel States, a military pact formed by the same countries on September 17, 2023. The Confederation’s founding signaled the determination of the governments of the three Sahel nations, which came to power via a series of military coups in 2020–2023, to chart a joint course of political and economic development. The AES was announced after Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrew in January 2024 from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—a regional bloc that urged the trio’s leaders to restore civilian rule in their countries. At the opening of the Niamey summit, Niger’s military leader said, inter alia, that his “people have irrevocably turned their back on ECOWAS” and that the new alliance would be a community immune to the “stranglehold of foreign powers.” At the same time, the three leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and objectives of the UN and the African Union. They asserted that by forming the Confederation, the three countries would strengthen their sovereignty and more effectively counter terrorism and external Western influence. The charter of the AES stipulates that “any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more Contracting Parties shall be considered as an aggression against the other Parties and shall give rise to a duty of assistance and relief by all the Parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force.” From Alliance to Confederation The first step towards political and economic integration of the three countries was the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States on September 17, 2023, which grouped a total of over 72 million people and is primarily aimed at building a trilateral architecture of collective defense. The decision to set up the Alliance was taken after negotiations in Ouagadougou in early September 2023 between representatives of the three nations and a delegation from the Russian Defense Ministry, headed by Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In other words, Russia played its role in founding the AES, thereby assuming certain obligations to support the Alliance’s counterterrorism efforts. The prospect of deeper integration of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso was first raised in late 2023, and in early July 2024, after Yevkurov’s next visit to the Sahel (Mali and Niger), the Confederation of Sahel States was established. The inaugural summit, in addition to security and military cooperation, addressed further trilateral cooperation in the socio-economic sphere. This suggests that the AES’s scope of activity will likely include the construction of new industrial facilities and the expansion of ties in areas such as energy, finance, healthcare, education, agriculture and natural resource management, as well as mining, transport, combating cybercrime, ICT development, sports and employment. The AES leaders decided to establish an investment bank and a stabilization fund, which, however, will only function if they can secure sufficient funding. Furthermore, the countries agreed to pool their resources to build large-scale transport and communications infrastructure, facilitate trade and the free movement of goods and people, and invest in various sectors of the economy. One example that demonstrates the feasibility of these plans is Niger’s agreement to sell 150 million liters of diesel to Mali at almost half the going rate, supporting a nation plagued by enduring electricity shortages. The three leaders also reaffirmed the decision taken after the meeting of the Alliance’s foreign ministers on May 17, 2024, to coordinate diplomatic actions and formulate common approaches to relations with external partners, although combating terrorism seems likely to remain the Confederation’s main priority. The trio has on many occasions pointed to the key reasons behind their collective actions: the failure of the AU and ECOWAS to provide adequate support in the fight against jihadists; “illegal sanctions” that harm the people of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger; and ECOWAS’s unwillingness and/or inability to break free from Western influence. In other words, this integration is driven not only by the desire for collective security, but also by the pushback to the former colonial ruler, France (with which the trio has severed all defense ties), and, more broadly, the collective West, which has clearly underestimated the Sahel’s frustration with years of ineffective military intervention [1]. As a result, French military contingents and most U.S. troops have withdrawn from the three nations, with Russian forces taking their place. So the Confederation’s main stated goal is to support one another in combating terrorism (the Sahel accounts for 43% of the world’s terrorism-related deaths). The Niamey summit saw calls to put an end to this scourge. The leader of Burkina Faso, in particular, addressed the forum participants with the following words: “In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who fought and won for us this land that we call Mali, Burkina and Niger. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who helped the whole world rid itself of Nazism and many other scourges. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors that were deported from Africa to Europe, America, Asia … and who helped to build those countries as slaves. In our veins runs the blood of worthy men, robust men, men who stood tall…” Yet this raises the question: will the armies of these three nations, which previously struggled to tackle the “Islamist evil,” grow much stronger if they come together? After all, the conflict in Mali involved military personnel from many African nations, not to mention Europeans, yet the problem of terrorism persisted. In some areas of all three countries, Islamists are “successfully” replacing public authorities and drawing recruits from the local population, and these processes have not stopped after the Alliance was established, nor after the Confederation was formed. Attacks on various facilities and civilians continue—in the first half of 2024, the number of victims of Islamist violence in the three countries exceeded 300, a significant increase compared to the same period in 2023. The AES has taken pride in routing the insurgents from the Malian town of Kidal in November 2023, but it is still unclear how lasting the trio’s victory in this direction has been. Or is all hope now pinned on Russia? The security landscape in the Sahel varies from country to country but remains very complex throughout the region. This is partly because the armed conflicts in the three nations have different origins and are not purely “Islamist.” In fact, disputes between herders and farmers, which all past governments of the trio tried and failed to resolve, pose a major and perhaps even greater threat to stability than the confrontation with the Tuareg. Meanwhile, this matter has not even been taken up by the military, possibly because it stems from socio-economic issues, and solving such problems is far more difficult than political or military ones. In response to instability, the regimes are tightening the screws and becoming more repressive, with opposition figures being arrested. Although references to Western experts may seem out of place in the context of today’s global upheavals, history has shown that increased repressiveness is a common feature of all illegitimate regimes, and governments that came to power through military coups are illegitimate by definition. If the military leaders fail to achieve significant breakthroughs soon in ensuring security, reconciling herders with farmers (whose conflict, exacerbated by Islamists, is only aggravated amid climate change in the Sahel), providing basic services to citizens and more, public discontent will grow and likely lead to more military coups, throwing the future of the Confederation into question. While the trio’s leaders currently enjoy at least the appearance of public support, if they do not hold elections in the next few years, there will be someone in their inner circle tempted to take their place. Especially since the military withdrew their countries from ECOWAS without consulting the public, which now fears the potential introduction of a visa regime between the trio and other West African nations. As of now, the Confederation has yet to prove itself as a solid union to the point where one can predict either positive or negative outcomes for its future. True, various joint projects are being set up—so far only on paper—ranging from food security and water resource management to energy, transport and ICT development, but these plans are financially fragile, and their implementation remains a distant goal. The three nations still use the CFA franc, with France controlling most of their foreign currency assets. The AES’s activities are apparently supposed to be funded through “membership fees,” but this has always been a major stumbling block. For ECOWAS, for example, the timely payment of dues has been intractable throughout the 50 years of its existence. For landlocked Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the smooth functioning of logistics corridors for receiving goods from other continents is critical. This brings into focus the need to form a customs union and restore “working” relations with neighboring states—Benin and Côte d’Ivoire—which have recently soured, particularly due to plans to establish U.S. military bases in these countries. The Sahel is rich in natural resources—uranium, gold, iron ore, lithium, tin, copper, zinc, manganese, limestone, phosphates, marble, salt, gypsum and oil—but will the trio manage to extract them on their own (though jointly) in commercial quantities to gain economic sovereignty, not just political one? Or all hopes are again pinned on Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and other non-Western nations? And if so, is “sovereignty” the right word here? Of course, “dependence” on Russia, for example, would differ from neocolonialism by ensuring “fairness” and “equality between partners,” as evidenced by recent contacts between Moscow and the trio. The factor of ECOWAS The original mission of ECOWAS, established in 1975, was to achieve economic integration of the countries in West Africa, which involved establishing free trade zones, facilitating the free movement of labor, goods and capital across national borders, introducing a common currency—the eco—as well as improving and expanding regional infrastructure such as highways, railroads, seaports, airports, gas and oil pipelines, and more. There were also plans for joint energy projects and the development of shared communication, banking and customs systems, among others. In 1990, a trade liberalization scheme was formally adopted, which entailed gradual elimination of customs duties, and, indeed, by 2001, duties on raw materials and semi-finished products had been abolished, a common customs nomenclature was compiled, and free movement of labor was achieved. However, even at that time, more effective regional integration was hindered by the participation of certain West African nations in other groupings. In 1994, the French-speaking countries of the region (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) along with Portuguese-speaking Guinea-Bissau, founded the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), where a duty-free trade regime has been in place since 1996, excluding only agricultural products and aviation equipment. The members of this union—now except for the Sahel trio—have consistently resisted deeper economic integration within ECOWAS, largely because of their alignment in all spheres of life with France, which continues to provide them with substantial financial and political-military support as the former colonial power. Moreover, the nations dominating WAEMU—Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal—are reluctant to see Nigeria as a regional leader. But these are subjective reasons for the slowdown in integration. Meanwhile, there are also several objective reasons why virtually no economic project within ECOWAS has been brought to fruition. ECOWAS was founded as an economic community and operated in an environment where most countries in the region had extremely low levels of economic development, the export commodity structure was monocultural and largely uniform, and the member states’ leaders had noticeable political disagreements. These and other divisive factors meant that integration processes were often more symbolic than practical and that the impact of free trade zones was weak. Civil wars and political conflicts—which erupted in individual countries time and again but had a negative effect both on the security of the region as a whole and on integration processes—made it inevitable that ECOWAS would gradually shift its focus from economic issues to political-military ones, especially since one of the Community’s founding documents, the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression, stated that economic integration could only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and mutual understanding among member states. ECOWAS has an extensive sanctions toolkit, which is used against its member states in the event of their “disobedience.” The regional bloc imposed extremely tough sanctions on Mali and Niger in the early 2020s. In Niger, for example, the prices of rice and sorghum rose by over 16%, wheat and maize by 12%, millet by 6.4% and meat by 5.2% after the sanctions were imposed. Moreover, a $400 million deal to export crude oil from Niger to China via a pipeline linking the Agadem field to Benin’s port was delayed and put at risk. Even after ECOWAS lifted its sanctions, Benin chose not to reopen its land border (apparently under the influence of Paris), which further strained relations between the two nations. In all fairness, it should be noted that ECOWAS generally opts for diplomatic means to resolve various disputes, including those resulting from military coups, so the imposition of sanctions against some of the continent’s poorest countries and their expulsion from the organization were extraordinary precedents. While it may be tempting to see such actions as evidence of the Community’s “noble” intentions to uphold a principled stance on illegal changes of power, there was clearly some external influence in the cases of Mali and later Niger (Burkina Faso was not sanctioned). France relies on uranium supplies, with Niger accounting for 20% of total imports, so the Elysee’s desire to “teach the Sahel states a lesson” is quite “understandable.” Especially since Nigerien authorities in the summer of 2024 revoked the licenses of France’s Orano and Canada’s GoviEx to exploit uranium deposits. The 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provided for the imposition of sanctions, including suspension of loans, discontinuation of aid program funding and more, if member states fail to comply with their commitments. However, in January 2022, after Bamako announced its decision to extend the transition period by five years, citing internal political instability, ECOWAS not only suspended Mali’s membership in the organization, but also imposed diplomatic, economic and trade sanctions against this country. These included freezing Mali’s assets in the central banks of the Community’s member states, closing land and air borders and imposing an export ban on all goods (with the exception of materials for the control of COVID-19, oil products and electricity), which dealt a heavy blow to the economy of this landlocked nation that imports 70% of its food and depends on humanitarian aid supplies. Some of the sanctions were lifted only in July 2022, a month after the Goïta government agreed to a 24-month transition period. Niger, which saw a military coup on July 30, 2023 that ousted civilian President Mohamed Bazoum, faced sanctions in February 2024. As part of these restrictions, land and air borders between Niger and other ECOWAS member states were closed, accounts of Niger’s state-owned enterprises in the ECOWAS Central Bank were frozen and financial assistance was suspended. Immediately after the developments in July, ECOWAS issued an ultimatum, giving the coup leaders a one-week deadline to reinstate deposed President Bazoum and threatening to use force. However, military intervention never materialized, although the ECOWAS Standby Force was activated for potential deployment in Niger. The very fact that ECOWAS could issue such a threat to one of its members undoubtedly alarmed the leaders of the three nations (and others), who are closely connected in various ways. As a result, their trust in the bloc was shattered, which led them to take further action—quit the association and form new alliances. They also believed that ECOWAS not only failed to help them in combating Islamic extremism, but instead weakened their positions by imposing sanctions. Indeed, ECOWAS, which in the 1990s and 2010s sought to diversify its economic ties and political contacts with the outside world, has in recent years adopted a pro-Western stance on many international issues, which is not surprising since the direction of any organization is largely shaped by the views of its leaders and sponsors. Regardless of who holds the rotating one-year ECOWAS chairmanship, Nigeria has always played first fiddle in the bloc and will continue to do so for a long time, as it shoulders nearly half of the Community’s expenses, including most of the funding for its peacekeeping operations. As the saying goes, “he who pays the piper calls the tune.” Nigeria’s current president, Bola Tinubu, who also chairs ECOWAS, spent nearly a decade studying, working and living in the United States. From the moment he came to power in 2023, he has been determined to cultivate ties with the West, primarily with the U.S. and the UK, but also with France. The position of Nigeria and ECOWAS toward the trio is a vivid testimony to the enduring significance of the “role of the individual in history”: a country that had maintained friendly relations with Russia for decades is now gradually distancing itself from it and shifting its foreign policy orientation. For better or worse, after the coup in Niger and a harsher response from ECOWAS compared to the events in Mali and Burkina Faso, relations between the trio and the Community broke down, with Bamako and Ouagadougou expressing their readiness to leave the organization. As a result, on January 28, 2024, despite the Community’s decision to lift sanctions against Niamey, the governments of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS, driving the process of regional disintegration further. Shortly before that, the Sahel trio had one after another pulled out of the G5 Sahel—Mali in the spring of 2022, Burkina Faso and Niger in November 2023—leading to its collapse (the G5S had also included Mauritania and Chad). After the Confederation was founded, ECOWAS signaled its willingness to negotiate the possible return of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to the Community, especially since it had not received any formal notice of their departure, even though the proper procedure requires member states wishing to leave the bloc to provide one year's notice. The three countries made their announcement in January 2024, which should have given the ECOWAS a chance to try to convince them to reconsider their decision until January 2025, but the trio ignored the procedural rules and refused to continue fulfilling their obligations to ECOWAS. It seems that ECOWAS leaders have not yet come to understand that the trio is fighting not only for survival in the face of the Islamist threat, but also for an overhaul of trade and economic patterns, which subject underdeveloped nations to severe exploitation by developed powers. The Republic of the Niger, for example, is unhappy that despite being the world’s fourth largest producer of uranium and lighting up a third of France, 80% of its population has no electricity. So Niger has had to seek help from Nigeria, which, incidentally, cut off electricity supply after the July 2023 coup. In response to the establishment of the Confederation, the head of one of the Community’s bodies, the ECOWAS Commission, Omar Alieu Touray, said the three countries risked “diplomatic and political isolation,” the loss of millions of euros in investments and the possible introduction of visa requirements for their citizens wishing to travel to ECOWAS member states. Touray also warned that in addition to the numerous threats to peace and security along with economic challenges, there was also a risk of disintegration of the region, as ECOWAS on the one hand and the AES on the other become increasingly entangled in the conflict between non-African powers. As France and the U.S. are strengthening military ties with some ECOWAS countries (notably Côte d’Ivoire), the three AES members have established military relations with Russia after expelling Western troops. But is the rift between the AES and ECOWAS truly so noticeable? For example, on July 18, 2024, a delegation from the ECOWAS Water Resources Management Centre visited Burkina Faso to mark the 49th anniversary of the Water Museum’s founding. Since many countries in the region, including key players like Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, stand to lose economically from strained relations with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which are important trade partners, it seems that efforts to bring these “prodigal children” back into the Community’s fold will continue until they result in either a positive or negative outcome. There have been speculations about the possible withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from WAEMU, which also imposed sanctions against these nations. However, since the trio has not yet developed the banking and financial infrastructure necessary for an independent system and cannot quickly ditch the CFA franc, which is used by WAEMU member states, their stance toward this currency union remains neutral. The founding of the Confederation raises questions—not least about the future of regional cooperation in West Africa. As Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have decided to chart their own course, ECOWAS’s role and policies are likely to change, although it is still unclear in what direction. There is also concern among the African public that the AES may attract into “their ranks” other countries grappling with similar issues and disillusioned with the regional bloc. For example, the idea of closing French military bases in Senegal has already been floated. Developing relations with Russia and other non-Western nations Russia has become a new strategic ally for the Sahel nations in their fight against Islamists, who are active across the three countries. Supported by the Russian military, Mali’s army has managed, as noted above, to retake the northeastern town of Kidal from insurgents in November 2023. Since April 2024, a mechanism for coordination between the militaries has been in the works, and operations are underway to divide the territory under Islamist control, which stretches from eastern Mali through northern Burkina Faso to Niger. Trade and economic cooperation are also expanding: since September 2023, several Russian private and state-owned companies have signed agreements with the AES countries in areas such as mining, industrial construction and others. While Russia focuses primarily on food security (Moscow shipped 50,000 tonnes of free grain to the Sahel in 2023) and developing the digital economy, China and Turkey are making inroads into energy production and mining precious and rare-earth metals. Moreover, Niger’s agreement to bring the extraction of these resources under the Confederation’s control reflects the trio’s willingness for deeper cooperation with Beijing and Ankara.***Without a doubt, the decision of the three nations to exit ECOWAS and form the Confederation demonstrates their readiness to strengthen their sovereignty, yet they did so amid resentment over sanctions and euphoria from their own assertiveness and growing ties with Russia. These steps cannot but deserve respect, especially against the backdrop of the turbulent geopolitical situation around the world and widespread, and largely valid, discussions that major European powers, including France, are losing their autonomy in foreign policy issues. Announcing the establishment of an integration project is one thing; strengthening it and making use of the benefits of cooperation is quite another. A telling example is ECOWAS, which has not become a truly effective economic or political community in the fifty years of its existence and now is even starting to fall apart. The problem for the AES is that “strengthening sovereignty” in its member states will take place in the context of weak economies, further strained by wars and conflicts, and lingering reliance on various forms of external aid, a habit that will take time to break. At the same time, dismantling the long-standing patterns of cooperation with the West, particularly with the former colonizer, cannot be done overnight. French enterprises and specialists—engineers, doctors, teachers, oil workers and others—are still working in the three countries; many families are linked to France through relatives living and children studying and working there; political, business and creative elites own real estate in France. In other words, it is too early to speak of a complete break with the former colonial ruler, although, of course, the three regimes see the Confederation as an opportunity to distance themselves from the legacy of French colonialism and the Françafrique policy. Ibrahim Traoré, for example, spoke very strongly against France’s presence in Africa at the Niamey summit. But speeches alone cannot bring about real change. In the context of its “return” to Africa, Russia appears determined—quite justifiably so—to support the AES in many, if not all, of its endeavors, but their outcomes will largely depend on the consistency and persistence of the military leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in defending their current ideals. It seems that relations between the members of the Confederation of Sahel States and Russia will deepen, especially since the AES sent a letter to the UN Security Council President in August 2024 condemning Ukraine (which could not but be welcomed by Moscow) for supporting terrorism in the Sahel and demanded that the Security Council prevent Kiev’s subversive actions in Africa. This primarily refers to the Islamist attack on a convoy of Russian and Malian soldiers in northern Mali, in which Ukrainian militants were confirmed to have participated by Ukraine itself. As a result, Bamako and Niamey broke off diplomatic relations with Kiev, and on August 7, 2024, Mali and Niger petitioned the Security Council to investigate Ukraine’s support for rebel groups in the Sahel. As the leaders of the three nations affirmed in their joint statement at the Niamey summit, they “have taken full responsibility before history.” However, only time will tell what the results of these actions—the withdrawal from ECOWAS and the creation of the AES—will be. In any case, the process of polarization in Africa between pro-Western nations and alliances on the one hand, and those trying to escape neocolonial dependence on the other, has already started and seems to have become irreversible. 1. Filippov V.R. African Policy of French President E. Macron: Chronicle of Actions and Evolution of Ideas. M.: IAS RAS, 2023.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.