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The BRICS meeting in Rio on July 6th and 7th gives a snapshot of the great power competition between China and the United States in different regions around the world, including Latin America. China has become the largest trading partner for many countries in Latin America, investing heavily in infrastructure and forging political alliances that further its strategic objectives. For its part, the Trump Administration of the United States issued the statement that those participating countries will face increased tariffs. The statement was the continuation of exercise and assertion of its authority for the past and present century. The positioning of various BRICS members and participating countries is particularly telling of what the great power competition means in the region and also globally. Brazil’s Lula hosted the meeting aiming to showcase its foreign policy leadership, not necessarily antagonizing the West. Russia is still going through the war in Ukraine, and Putin attended only online. India’s Modi was present as well as Ramaphosa from South Africa. No show of Xi Jinping was notable, although Premier Li Qiang was attending. Besides the BRICS core, other countries also showed promotion of their interests. Iran, for one, joined the group in 2024 and sent a ministerial level delegation to rebuke recent strikes on Iran. As the United States appears to be pulling back from its traditional leadership role in the world, China is seizing the opportunity to expand its influence and reshape global dynamics. Through a combination of state-driven development policies and active international engagement, Beijing has positioned itself as a major player in the Global South, extending its reach beyond Asia to regions such as Africa and Latin America. China’s increasing presence in the region has been mainly driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a surge in trade volumes, marking a major shift in the region’s economic landscape. Many experts point to China’s use of “infrastructure diplomacy”—financing ambitious, strategic infrastructure projects across the region—as a key factor in this rise. The numbers tell a compelling story. Trade data from the World Bank (Figure 1) shows that in the past ten years, China has overtaken the United States as the leading trading partner for much of the region, upending a dynamic that had held steady since the early 2000s. Beyond trade, China’s influence deepens through the 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that have joined the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese loans have poured in, funding major energy, infrastructure, and development projects that have reshaped local economies. China’s push isn’t just economic—it’s political too. Beijing has taken steps to strengthen cultural ties, increase academic exchanges and boost tourism in Latin America, including waiving visa requirements for travelers from some countries. This multi-faceted approach highlights China’s pragmatic mix of economic self-interest and strategic diplomacy as it works to secure resources, expand markets, and bolster its global standing. On the other hand, the United States has long been a strategic ally and key trading partner for Latin America. Agencies like USAID have funneled millions of dollars into economic and military initiatives across the region. With the recent changes in the aid policy, immigration policy, and tariff policy, Washington’s recalibration of its foreign policy are transforming the geopolitical balance in Latin America and the Caribbean. As both powers deploy their strategies — from deepening economic ties to defending national interests — the decisions of Latin American states remain critical in shaping their alignments with global powers. The ultimate outcome is still up in the air, but one thing is clear: power in the region is actively being renegotiated. The diverging approaches from China and the US have set the stage for a broader reconfiguration of power in Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet, it’s essential to recognize that each country’s internal decisions and policies also play a critical role in shaping this shifting landscape. Colombia provides a case in point. Historically, it has maintained close diplomatic ties with the United States while keeping China at arm’s length. Unlike countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, Colombia has received relatively little Chinese infrastructure investment. However, with the election of president Gustavo Petro—the first left-wing president in the country’s history—Colombia has taken decisive steps to strengthen its relationship with China, presenting new challenges for the United States to maintain its strategic foothold in the country. We observe – both on political and economic dimensions – that the changes in China’s strategy, coupled with Colombia’s domestic policies, have reduced the country’s dependence on the US while increasing its desire to integrate with China. Politically, Colombia and the United States have long enjoyed a strong diplomatic relationship, as reflected in their shared memberships in international organizations, high-level dialogues, and multiple bilateral agreements. However, diplomatic tensions have emerged in recent years. Disputes between the two leaders, the change of course of USAID, and a significant drop in new bilateral agreements over the past four years have contributed to a shift in this traditionally stable partnership. Against this backdrop, diplomatic ties between China and Colombia have strengthened. In 2023 alone, both countries signed 12 cooperation agreements in trade, technology, and economic development, upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership, and Colombia’s entry into the Belt and Road Initiative during recent China – CELAC Forum in May. Colombia also joined the BRICS New Development Bank a few weeks after that Forum. Economically, the US has traditionally been Colombia’s largest trading partner, backed by a free trade agreement and significant investment. Yet, in recent years, the share of US trade has steadily declined, while China’s footprint has grown (see figure 1). Although there’s no formal trade agreement, ties have strengthened during the current administration, including the opening of a Buenaventura-Shanghai trade route in 2025. Additionally, China’s “infrastructural diplomacy” has significantly grown: over 100 Chinese companies now operate in Colombia, and major infrastructure projects like Bogotá’s Metro Line 1 and the Regiotram are underway, along with investments in mobility, technology, and health. Latin America, and Colombia in particular, finds itself at the center of a geopolitical tug-of-war with China’s calculated investments and the US’s shifting policies. While Beijing leverages trade, infrastructure, and cultural diplomacy to expand its influence, Washington’s recalibration of its foreign policy leaves room for new alliances and opportunities. Our analysis shows that power reconfiguration is not merely a product of external rivalry. It is driven by the choices each Latin American nation makes. As Colombia’s case demonstrates, the region’s destiny hinges not just on global superpowers, but on its own internal political decisions and developments. The coming years will test how Latin America navigates these shifting currents. Disclaimer This article was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York (G-PS-24-62004, Small State Statecraft and Realignment). The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. Figure 1: China vs. US Import and Export TrendsDrawn by the authors using data from the World Bank.  

On March 4, the U.S. Department of Justice charged ten Chinese nationals with carrying out massive hacks against government agencies, media outlets, and dissidents in the United States and around the world. They allegedly acted on behalf of the Chinese company i-Soon, under contract from the Beijing government. Two officials from China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were also indicted, identified as the ones “directing the attacks.” According to documents held by the U.S. justice system, China’s domestic intelligence services (MPS) and foreign intelligence (Ministry of State Security, MSS) relied on a vast network of private companies and domestic contractors to hack and steal information, thereby masking the Chinese government’s direct involvement. In some cases, the MPS and MSS paid private hackers to target specific victims. In many others, the attacks were speculative: hackers identified vulnerable computers, breached them, and extracted information that was later sold — either directly or indirectly — to the Chinese government. The Growth of Chinese Cyberespionage and Its Main Areas of Operation This is not an isolated case. Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) hacking program has expanded rapidly. In 2023, then-FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that it was larger than that of all other world powers combined. This increase in power and sophistication has led to success in three key areas: political interference, sabotage of critical infrastructure, and large-scale intellectual property theft. Beijing integrates computer networks, electronic warfare, economic, diplomatic, legal, military, intelligence, psychological, and military deception resources, along with security operations, to weaken states, make them economically dependent on China, and more receptive to a “new authoritarian world order with Chinese characteristics.” For this reason, unlike traditional interpretations, Chinese state-sponsored hacking should be understood within a broader context — where control over technology, strategic infrastructure, and global supply chains is part of “trans-military” and “non-military” warfare operations, as described by two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) colonels in the 1999 book “Unrestricted Warfare”. This approach is known as liminal warfare — an escalating conflict in which the spectrum of competition and confrontation with the West is so wide that the battlefield is, quite literally, everywhere. Cyberespionage as a Tool of Electronic Warfare In electronic warfare, hacking is used for sabotage during times of crisis or conflict. These actions are led by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. In 2023, it was discovered that a hacker group linked to the PLA, known as “Volt Typhoon”, had infiltrated a wide range of critical infrastructure in the U.S. for years, including ports, factories, and water treatment plants — both on the mainland and in strategic locations like Guam. “Volt Typhoon is a military operation with political and potentially military strategic purposes,” explained Ciaran Martin, former director of the UK’s cybersecurity agency. Led by the PLA’s cyber unit, the operation involved installing readiness capabilities — “digital traps,” as some call them — within critical U.S. infrastructure. In addition to a sustained attack in 2023 on a power company in Massachusetts, which aimed to extract sensitive data about its operational technology (OT) infrastructure, “Volt Typhoon” gained notoriety for multiple attacks on telecommunications systems in the U.S. and other critical infrastructures globally. One of its subunits, “Voltzite”, targeted the Littleton Electric and Water Departments, prompting the FBI and cybersecurity firm Dragos to respond jointly and publish a detailed report on the attack and its mitigation. Intellectual Property Theft Through Cyberespionage The most damaging channel for intellectual property theft is cyberespionage. These intrusions allow Chinese companies — sometimes with direct support from the Communist Party or the state — to access information on operations, projects, and technology from foreign firms. China has used state-backed and coordinated cyberespionage campaigns to steal information from companies in strategic sectors such as oil, energy, steel, and aviation. These actions serve both to acquire science and technology and to gather intelligence useful for future attacks on military, government, or technical systems. In the United States, there have been numerous precedents: • In 2014, five PLA hackers were indicted for economic espionage.• In 2017, three hackers linked to the Chinese firm Boyusec were charged with stealing confidential business information.• In 2018, two Chinese nationals were indicted for intellectual property theft.• In 2020, two hackers connected to the MSS were charged with targeting COVID-19 research. Among these, the 2018 indictment stands out as part of a broader U.S. effort to raise awareness about Chinese cyberespionage. On that occasion, Chinese hackers carried out a campaign known as “Cloud Hopper”, which involved a supply chain attack on service providers like Hewlett Packard and IBM. The defendants worked for Huaying Haitai and collaborated with the Tianjin State Security Bureau of the MSS. In 2017, the U.S. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated that such crimes cost the U.S. economy up to $600 billion annually — a figure comparable to the Pentagon’s defense budget and greater than the combined profits of the 50 largest companies in the Fortune 500. Beyond the United States: The Global Impact of Chinese Cyberespionage In June 2024, Dutch military intelligence (MIVD) warned that Chinese cyberespionage was broader than previously believed, affecting Western governments and defense companies. A 2023 cyberattack on the Dutch Ministry of Defense reportedly affected at least 20,000 people within a few months. In 2018, the Czech Republic’s National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NUKIB) issued a warning about risks linked to China. Since then, the country has strengthened its capabilities and controls against Beijing and has worked on mechanisms to counter foreign information manipulation. According to U.S. prosecutors, dozens of European parliamentarians have been targeted by Chinese attacks. In March 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted hackers linked to the MSS for attacking “all EU members” of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a coalition critical of Beijing. In 2021, the hackers sent over a thousand emails to around 400 accounts linked to IPAC, attempting to spy on their internet activity and devices. In addition, ASML, the Dutch leader in semiconductor lithography, suffers “thousands of security incidents per year,” including several successful infiltration attempts by Chinese actors. Research centers like Imec (Belgium) are also frequent targets. Belgium has expelled Chinese researchers suspected of espionage. The European Union has reinforced security and identified advanced semiconductors as one of four critical technologies requiring risk assessments and enhanced protection. Notably, APT41 is one of the most active and sophisticated Chinese cyberespionage groups, based in the PRC and linked to the MSS. According to Google’s Threat Intelligence Group, APT41 combines state espionage with ransomware attacks — malicious programs that encrypt files and demand financial ransom to restore them — making attribution more difficult. Unlike other PLA-aligned groups whose operations are region-specific, APT41 acts globally, attacking strategic sectors in the U.S., Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It also carries out financially motivated operations, particularly in the gaming industry. Mandiant, a global cybersecurity leader, highlights APT41’s technical capabilities: it frequently exploits zero-day and n-day vulnerabilities and uses techniques like phishing, social engineering, and SQL injections. Since 2020, APT41 has conducted large-scale campaigns against over 75 companies in more than 20 countries. It is responsible for compromising supply chains, such as in the “ShadowHammer” campaign targeting ASUS, which affected over 50,000 systems in 2018. APT41 is also linked to the use of “MESSAGETAP” malware in telecommunications networks. The Role of Chinese Universities in Cyberespionage Chinese universities also collaborate with the PLA and MSS in state-sponsored cyberespionage operations. Shanghai Jiao Tong University works directly with the Chinese military on such operations. Zhejiang University and the Harbin Institute of Technology are key centers for recruiting hackers. Xidian University offers students hands-on experience at provincial MSS offices and previously maintained ties with the Third Department of the PLA’s General Staff before its reorganization in 2015 into the Network Systems Department. One of its graduate programs is co-directed with the Guangdong Office of the Chinese Information Technology Security Evaluation Center (ITSEC), an MSS-run office that leads an active team of contractor hackers. Southeast University also maintains links with security services and co-manages the “Purple Mountain Lab” with the PLA’s Strategic Support Force. There, researchers collaborate on “critical strategic requirements,” operating systems, and interdisciplinary cybersecurity studies. The university also receives funding from the PLA and MSS to develop China’s cyber capabilities. The Cybersecurity undergraduate program at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) is taught at a PLA information engineering base. Within this program, SJTU claims to work on “network and information systems testing and evaluation, security testing for connected smart networks, APT attack and defense testing, and key technologies for cyber ranges.” Universities associated with the MSS for talent recruitment include the University of Science and Technology of China, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Xi’an Jiao Tong University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Nanjing University, and the Harbin Institute of Technology. In addition, some cybersecurity firms — such as Beijing TopSec — collaborate with the PLA in hacking campaigns, operator training, and developing future hackers. This article was originally published by Agenda Digitale and later by Expediente Abierto, who granted us permission for its translation and republication.

ABSTRACT  This paper examines de-dollarization as a geopolitical industrial policy within the BRICS framework and its implications for Cuba, Venezuela, and Argentina. De-dollarization, a process aimed at reducing reliance on the US dollar, has gained momentum among BRICS nations as a response to economic sanctions, monetary sovereignty concerns, and external financial shocks, particularly following the 2008 global financial crisis. For Cuba and Venezuela, de-dollarization is necessary due to US sanctions, pushing them toward alternative  financial  mechanisms  through  BRICS  partnerships. Cuba’s  possible  de-dollarization  follows  increased ties with Russia, China, and Iran. Regarding Venezuela, despite its partial dollarization, Caracas seeks  to  strengthen  non-dollar  transactions  through  oil  trade. In  contrast,  under  President  Javier  Milei,  Argentina  has  rejected  BRICS  and  continues  to  debate  dollarization,  reflecting  the  country’s  historical  and economic ties to the US dollar. The study highlights that de-dollarization is a State-led, multilateral process influenced by external economic conditions and geopolitical alignments. While Cuba and Venezuela actively integrate with BRICS to reduce dollar dependence, Argentina’s approach remains uncertain, shaped by ideological and financial considerations. Keywords: De-dollarization, BRICS, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina INTRODUCTION De-dollarization is almost a synonym of BRICS. The reduction  of  US  dollar  dominance  and  the  consequential dependence on it represent critical stakes for BRICS countries. Nonetheless, there are nuances and differences amongst BRICS members on monetary policies. Since the first summits (2009–2010), BRICS  asserted  the  Global  South’s  need  to  prioritize  trade  in  domestic  currency  and  refrain  from  US  dollar  pegging. For  initial  members  like  China  and  Russia,  as  well  as  newly  associated  countries  such  as  Iran  and  Cuba,  Western  sanctions  are  the  main  driver  for  de-dollarization. Instead,  for  Brazil,  India, and the majority of most recent BRICS partners  (primarily  from  Africa  and  Southeast  Asia),  de-dollarization  means  enhancing  their  monetary sovereignty,  fostering  domestic  currencies’  value,  and  avoiding  depending  on  US  institutions:  Treasury and Federal Reserve. De-dollarization pertains to  monetary  and  public  policies. Therefore,  it  is  a  state-led process. For this reason, it might be considered an industrial policy. It is necessary to outline that this article adopts the term geopolitical industrial  policy  for  a  State-led  economic  strategy  that,  unlike  inward-oriented  monetary  or  financial  policies, is deeply intertwined with the outward-looking dimension of foreign policy. Hence,  this  work  examines  de-dollarization  as  a  geopolitical  industrial  policy  within  the  BRICS  framework  and  its  implications  for  Cuba,  Venezuela,  and  Argentina. De-dollarization,  a  process  aimed  at  reducing  reliance  on  the  US  dollar,  has  gained momentum  among  BRICS  nations  as  a  response  to economic sanctions, monetary sovereignty concerns,  and  external  financial  shocks,  particularly  following the 2008 global financial crisis. For Cuba and  Venezuela,  de-dollarization  is  necessary  due  to  US  sanctions,  pushing  them  toward  alternative  financial  mechanisms  through  BRICS  partnerships. Cuba’s  possible  de-dollarization  follows  increased  ties  with  Russia,  China,  and  Iran. Regarding  Venezuela, despite its partial dollarization, Caracas seeks to  strengthen  non-dollar  transactions  through  oil  trade. In  contrast,  under  President  Javier  Milei,  Argentina has rejected BRICS and continues to debate dollarization, reflecting the country’s historical and economic ties to the US dollar. The study highlights that de-dollarization is a State-led, multilateral process  influenced  by  external  economic  conditions  and geopolitical alignments. While Cuba and Venezuela actively integrate with BRICS to reduce dollar dependence,  Argentina’s  approach  remains  uncertain,  shaped  by  ideological  and  financial  considerations. It is undebatable that there are differences between usual industrial policies and de-dollarization. Indus-trial policies look inward, are fashioned upon domes-tic  matters,  and  contradict, court,  multilateral  efforts. De-dollarization  is  a  geopolitical  industrial  policy that looks outward, focusing on the role of a given country in the world economy. Without multilateralism, a State pursuing de-dollarization would quickly become a pariah. As a geopolitical industrial policy,  de-dollarization  owes  its  rationale  to  external  shocks. It  is  safe  to  define  de-dollarization  as  exogenously  motivated. The  2008  global  financial  crisis (GFC) represented the critical external shock for  BRICS  members  to  escalate  their  de-dollarization objectives: “[E]specially  since  the  2008  global  financial  crisis,  central banks of many countries have been trying to diversify their portfolios to shift away from the US dollar through liquidating holdings of US Treasuries and increasing other assets including the euro, yen, renminbi and gold.” (Li, 2023, p. 9).  The 21st century wrought incentives to de-dollarization that finally sparked because of the GFC. However,  the  mainstream  doubts  surrounding  de-dollarization involve its feasibility. There are no tools to objectively  measure  the  status  of  de-dollarization  or its future outcomes. Notwithstanding limitations, de-dollarization  is  increasingly  attracting  Global  South economies. Specifically looking at Latin America,  this  work  outlines  how  de-dollarization  becomes  an  obligation  for  sanctioned  countries:  Cuba  and  Venezuela. The  two  ALBA  governments  mingled  with  BRICS  for  a  long  time,1  with  Havana  joining the forum in association and Venezuela almost on the same route, stopped by the Brazilian veto in the  Kazan  summit. Cuban  and  Venezuelan  de-dollarization finds in BRICS a multilateral opportunity.  The third country examined is Argentina since the government  of  Javier  Milei  refused  to  enter  BRICS  and  continuously  flirted  with  dollarizing  the  economy. From President Menem’s pegging to the US dollar (uno a uno) to the 2001 Corralito, Argentina’s recent economic history inevitably rests on currency issues (IMF, 2003). Unlike Venezuela, and on the contrary of Cuba (which is not part of the IMF), Argentina’s economic policies intertwine with Bretton Woods  institutions. That  might  be  the  reason  why  neoliberal Argentinian economists found in dollarization  a  solution  for  Buenos  Aires  (Cachanosky  et  al., 2023).  1. Force Majeure De-Dollarization for Cuba and Venezuela  Since  1999,  when  Fidel  Castro  and  Hugo  Chávez  coincided, de-dollarization meant an industrial foreign policy to antagonize US hegemony. In Cuba, de-dollarization  is  a  more  difficult  process  than  usual  assumptions  and  certainly  more  challenging  than  in  Venezuela. 2004  marked  the  year  when  the  US  dollar  was  officially  prohibited  on  the Caribbean Island, to reverse the dual currency  system  implemented  since  the  Special  Period  (Herrera  &  Nakatani,  2004). The  extra-territoriality  of  US  sanctions,  affecting  in  their  secondary effect  Cuba’s  trade,  led  Havana  to  a  de-dollarization fashioned upon the path that Deligöz (2024) identified  for  China  and  Russia. Besides  realpolitik  and  geopolitical  strategies,  Cuba’s  association  with  BRICS,  occurred  in  October  2024,  is  the  la-test  effort  to  de-dollarize. Venezuela’s  economic  crises and COVID-19 pushed Cuba into continuous indebtedness to survive, with US dollars reallowed but  still  at  limited  provision  due  to  Washington’s  restrictions  (Luis,  2020). To  give  account  of  its  urgencies,  in  a  few  months,  Havana  moved  from  apparent dollarization to initiatives for de-dollarization, thanks to BRICS. Over the summer, Primer Minister Manuel Marrero enabled USD payments in the  tourist  sector  (Gámez  Torres,  2024)  to  tackle  the balance of payments deficit with liquidity. For  a  country  obliged  to  rapidly  change  industrial  policies,  the  BRICS  opportunity  could  not  be  mis-sed. Cuba’s  reliance  on  Russia,  China,  and  Iran  may  materialize   a   complete   de-dollarization   that   can   favor  BRICS  projects  and  escape  US  sanctions. Of  course, the evident permanence of the bloqueo, regardless  of  who  runs  the  White  House,  is  the  main  driver for Cuba’s de-dollarization. A similar but quite nuanced situation applies to Venezuela as well. From the Bolivarian era inaugurated by President Chávez, de-dollarization  entangled  foreign  policy  objectives  even before US sanctions. The Sucre digital currency was  created  by  the  governments  of  Venezuela  and  Ecuador  as  the  main  ALBA  initiative  to  de-dollarize  commercial  transactions  among  Bolivarian  nations  (Benzi et al., 2016). ALBA-promoted Sucre was analogous to BRICS’ favoring of blockchains and digital currencies, limiting the USD to a reference value for the  bloc’s  transactions  (Mayer,  2024). US  sanctions  on Venezuela’s oil production, sparked under the first Trump Administration, meant a significant remotion of USD-denominated transactions for Caracas. Considering  ALBA’s  slow  progress  and  the  infeasibility  of fully adopting the Sucre, President Maduro had to look at BRICS for solutions. Despite  not  having  diplomatic  relations  with  Washington,  Venezuela  is  still  an  IMF  member. Ladasic points  out  that  “[a]s  Venezuela  joined  the  pack  of  countries  trading  oil  outside  of  USD  and  has  instead priced it in Chinese yuan, BRICS together with Venezuela  already  have  16%  needed  for  IMF  veto  power to use in a crisis” (2017, p. 100). The rentier characterization of the Venezuelan economy and its dependency  on  oil  exports  make  de-dollarization  a necessity. As per Cuba, unilateral policies are not enough. Venezuela’s  outcry  merged  with  inflation,  the  devaluation  of  the  bolívar,  and  a  paralysis  of  the  Venezuelan  Central  Bank  (BCV)  that  put  total  dollarization on the industrial-public policies’ table (Briceño  et  al.,  2019). Although  the  country  is  still  under  a  sort  of  de  facto  dollarization,  Venezuela’s  economic  resurrection  should  occur  together  with  a  de-dollarization  strategy. Failure  to  enter  BRICS  in the Kazan summit provides a temporary brake to Venezuela’s  de-dollarization,  but  the  prolific  trade  with China, Russia, Iran, and Türkiye will, in all cases, align Venezuela with BRICS policies. 3. Argentina: De-Dollarizing a Passion Economists  were  surely  interested  in  Javier  Milei’s  dollarization  claims. Less  than  a  year  into  his  government,  dollarization  seems  impossible  to  the  libertarian  president. Milei’s  negative  to  BRICS  demonstrates  that  de-dollarization  is  currently  not  considerable  for  Casa  Rosada. Nevertheless,  it  is  relevant to outline that Argentinian academia questioned  the  role  of  the  USD  and  studied  economic  policies  involving  de-dollarization. Corso  and  Sangiácomo (2023), in affiliation with the Central Bank of  Argentina  (BCRA),  argued  that  de-dollarization  might  help  in  relieving  the  extreme  inflation  saw  under  Alberto  Fernández’s  ruling. Other  authors  implied  that  the  Kirchners’  limitations  on  USD  access would lead to a gradual de-dollarization of the economy,  but  with  constraints  particularly  from  a  USD dominated housing market across Latin America  (Luzzi,  2013). If  under  the  Kirchners,  and  with  support of South American left-leaning geopolitics, de-dollarization  could  really  offer  a  pathway  for  the Argentine economy, with Milei that is barely an option. The  Argentine  relation  with  the  USD  does not hold a clear ideological cleavage. Argentinians’ passion for the dollar, as stressed by Bercovich and Rebossio (2013), embraced diverse political figures such as Perón, Aníbal Fernández (a prominent Kirchnerist politician), and Martínez de Hoz. The peso’s continuous  instability  legitimized  the  widespread  informal adoption of the USD, with first insight fore-seeable in the currency devaluation subsequent to the Great Depression (Díaz Alejandro, 1970). There is also a nationalistic meaning behind the peso, whose  national  heroes  imprinted,  from  Belgrano  to  Evita (Moreno Barreneche, 2023), portray a sentimental attachment to the banknotes that Argentinians do not want to erase. In sum, Argentina’s de-dollarization is as difficult as dollarization. Milei’s obsession for US hegemony inserts de-dollarization in a faraway scenario. Moreover,  Donald  Trump’s  victory,  who  promised  high tariffs to countries that unpeg from the USD (Butts,  2024),  constitutes  a  natural  barrier  to  de-dollarization. Its political viability might depend on an eventual Peronist succession to Milei. Argentina’s financial closeness  to  China,  and  a  possible  resume  of  BRICS  talks,  could  indicate  de-dollarization  as  a  future  last  resort. In this sense, de-dollarization within the BRICS framework might help Argentina in solving structural issues: Chronic external debt and dependency on Bretton Woods institutions. CONCLUSIONS De-dollarization is State-led and can be considered a  geopolitical  industrial  policy. Cuba,  Venezuela,  and  Argentina  show  that  de-dollarization  depends  on  geopolitical  calculus  and  economic  considerations. The incentives may be different, ranging from US sanctions to devaluation of the national currency. However,  unlike  dollarization,  de-dollarization  cannot  be  pursued  unilaterally. The  rise  of  BRICS  motivates  Global  South  countries  to  de-dollarize  under its guarantees. For Cuba and Venezuela, the association  with  BRICS  and  the  interdependence  with other sanctioned economies like Russia, China, and Iran, make de-dollarization an opportunity. Argentina’s  relation  with  the  USD  follows  its  turbulent  economic  history. Simultaneously,  there  is  passion  for  dollars and nationalism toward the peso banknotes. In this  context,  even  Milei  showed  that  dollarization  is  in  no way easier that de-dollarization. The currency issues affecting Argentina might not be resolved by neither of the two policies, but a future BRICS collaboration could bring de-dollarization again into the political debate. NOTES1  ALBA  references  the  Alianza  Bolivariana  para  los  Pueblos  de  Nuestra  América,  a  regional  organization  founded  by  Cuba  and  Venezuela,  including Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and several Caribbean islands. 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Over time, the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States has gone through multiple stages and transitions, reflecting both moments of collaboration and episodes of deep antagonism. At certain points, both countries have succeeded in consolidating frameworks of cooperation in specific areas, such as the peaceful resolution of the El Chamizal territorial dispute in 1967 or the promotion of academic exchange through the Fulbright-García Robles Scholarship Program. However, this interaction has also been marked by significant conflicts, most notably the war of 1846–1848. This confrontation, whose outcome was unfavorable for Mexico, culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, through which the country was forced to cede more than half of its territory. This episode left a deep imprint on Mexico's collective memory. The shared history thus reveals a complex and constantly evolving dynamic. The geographical proximity between Mexico and the United States, with a land border exceeding 3,000 kilometers, requires both governments to adjust their priorities to respond to shared challenges in areas such as security, trade, investment, migration, and other strategic issues. This border condition generates a constant bilateral dynamic, in which national priorities must be harmonized with bilateral and regional interests. From a theoretical perspective inspired by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Dr. Rafael Velázquez Flores argues that this relationship is configured as an asymmetric and multifaceted interdependence. Within this framework, Mexico seeks to expand its decision-making capacity in an environment characterized by structural power imbalances. For his part, Dr. Jorge Schiavon contends that the bilateral agenda operates within a logic of complex interdependence, in which the dense network of institutions and the multiple economic, social, and political ties restrict the ability of either country to act unilaterally. One of the most evident manifestations of the interdependence that characterizes the North American region was the signing of NAFTA in 1992, which came into effect two years later and was transformed into the USMCA in 2018 following a deep renegotiation process. This economic integration mechanism, though less ambitious than the European Union’s model, has strengthened trade and production ties in the region, generating reciprocal benefits. On one hand, U.S. companies have consolidated preferential access to inputs from Mexico, which has boosted key sectors such as automotive, electronics, and agribusiness. Through stricter rules of origin, the agreement has encouraged greater domestic production of components within the United States, protecting industries in strategic states such as Michigan, Texas, and Ohio. In this context, Mexico became the United States’ main trading partner in 2023, with imports valued at $475 billion, surpassing both China and Canada. On the other hand, Mexico regards the United States as its main trading partner, which as of April 2025 accounted for over 80% of its exports and more than 40% of its total imports. The preferential access established by the USMCA has enabled the Mexican economy to position itself as a strategic supplier of goods and services to the U.S. economy, with particular significance in sectors such as automotive, electronics, manufacturing, and agribusiness. The stricter provisions on rules of origin in the automotive sector have encouraged deeper regional integration, leading plants located in Mexico to expand their role in component production and assembly processes. Although the automotive sector captures a large share of the benefits, other industries have also experienced significant growth. As a result, Mexico has become the United States’ main agricultural supplier and has strengthened its presence in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and capital goods, including machinery, electrical equipment, and computing devices.     As shown in Table 1, the United States and Canada occupy the top two positions as destinations for Mexican exports. Based on data from April 2025, the U.S. market imported nearly $45 billion worth of goods from Mexico. Regarding Mexican imports during the same period, the United States ranked first as Mexico’s main trading partner, exceeding $21 billion, with China in second place at just over $10 billion. In this context, it is worth noting that, as shown in Table 2, Canada ranked 10th as a source of Mexican imports. This scenario highlights that the economic integration between Mexico and the United States goes beyond the exchange of goods: both countries have built an integrated and highly specialized production network that generates millions of jobs while fostering growth in the North American region.     On the issue of migration, Mexico and the United States maintain a deep interdependence that permeates the bilateral agenda not only in socioeconomic matters but also in security-related issues. In 2023, approximately 10.6 million Mexican-born immigrants were legally residing in the United States, representing 23% of the total foreign-born immigrant population. At the same time, according to the Pew Research Center, around 4 million Mexicans were living without legal status — down from a peak of 6.9 million in 2007. Thus, the Mexican presence in the U.S. continues to have a dual impact: it contributes labor and demographic stability to the American economy while also generating a steady flow of remittances and transnational ties that support regional development in Mexico and strengthen binational relations. In fact, the Bank of Mexico estimated that remittances sent from the United States to Mexico exceeded $62 billion in 2024 — far surpassing Mexican exports of petroleum products, which amounted to approximately $30 billion that same year. In the current scenario of complex interdependence between Mexico and the United States, the re-election of Donald Trump has introduced a climate of tension that has weakened traditional channels of bilateral dialogue and cooperation. The Republican administration has replaced structured diplomacy with a rhetoric characterized by threats, misperceptions, and a widespread atmosphere of uncertainty. Although President Trump’s confrontational strategy is not limited to Mexico — as it stems from the narrative that the international community has excessively and asymmetrically taken advantage of its relationship with Washington — his administration has intensified the portrayal of Mexico as a key factor behind various domestic grievances in the United States. Irregular migration, drug trafficking, and the trade imbalance have become recurring issues through which the White House channels internal demands, reinforcing a narrative of confrontation. This dynamic undermines the institutional mechanisms of bilateral understanding and places at risk the progress made in economic cooperation, security, and cross-border governance. Since the beginning of his second term, President Trump has implemented a series of unilateral actions that intensify his restrictive immigration agenda. On the very day of his inauguration, he declared a national emergency at the southern border and signed multiple executive orders that eliminated access to asylum, suspended the refugee resettlement program, and reinstated the “Remain in Mexico” policy. He also delegated border control functions to the Department of Defense and authorized the deployment of the military and National Guard to perform tasks traditionally carried out by civilian agencies. Through the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, he ordered expedited deportations, including those targeting unaccompanied minors. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has carried out mass raids, even in sanctuary cities, schools, and hospitals. This institutional offensive has intensified the criminalization of undocumented individuals, while the use of military forces in urban areas has undermined legal certainty and created an atmosphere of insecurity that fractures social cohesion and amplifies collective fear. In the commercial sphere, President Donald Trump has promoted executive orders imposing tariffs on Mexican exports of steel, aluminum, and automobiles, justifying such measures with arguments related to the trade deficit, irregular migration flows, and efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking. Although his administration has temporarily suspended some duties on products covered by the USMCA, these unilateral decisions have heightened uncertainty in the bilateral relationship by contradicting commitments made under the agreement. Constant threats to expand tariffs to goods not included in the treaty, along with the use of extraordinary powers to impose trade restrictions, have eroded the climate of trust between the productive sectors of both countries. In response, the Mexican government has pursued diplomatic actions and dialogue mechanisms aimed at ensuring the proper implementation of the USMCA and establishing safeguards to reduce the risks posed by protectionist measures that affect the stability and predictability of regional trade. In the current context, President Trump has disregarded the strategic importance of the United States’ historic allies and trade partners by adopting measures that have eroded trust not only with Mexico but also with other key partners such as Canada and the European Union. This situation has confronted the Mexican government with a complex challenge: preserving the stability of its most important economic relationship while also maintaining a strong consular protection policy. To this end, Mexico operates one of the world’s largest consular networks, with 53 consulates distributed throughout U.S. territory. The work of the Mexican Foreign Service is essential in this scenario, as it strengthens diplomatic dialogue and underscores to Washington that Mexico shares democratic and economic values with the United States. Recognizing mutual interdependence is vital: the prosperity and stability of both countries are intertwined, and a strong bilateral relationship is a key component of sustained economic growth in North America as a whole. Although it is uncertain what future decisions President Trump may make, the Mexican government must prioritize dialogue and political coordination as underlying strategies of its foreign policy, avoiding any confrontational maneuvers, as these only undermine the bilateral relationship. President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration faces the critical task of accurately identifying the priorities of the U.S. government to act proactively with clarity and consistency. Mexico cannot allow its foreign policy to be reduced to merely reacting to unilateral initiatives marked by aggressive rhetoric and uncertainty. In this context, the Mexican Foreign Service must firmly exercise its well-established negotiating capacity to consolidate Mexico’s position as a reliable neighbor and a key actor in the regional economic structure. The bilateral relationship must clearly convey that the prosperity of the United States is closely linked to Mexico’s stability and growth — an interest grounded in a shared logic of structural interdependence.

Abstract Buffeted by the headwinds of US unilateralism, Europeans and Canadians are bound together in a community of fate. As the US departs the field, Europe and Canada need to cooperate more. To avoid being abandoned, they need to avail themselves of Atlanticist power for mutual benefit. Rather than merely protecting a liberal–democratic zone of peace across the Western hemisphere, Europe and Canada need to project the power of the transatlantic security community to deter Russia from using war to precipitate a multipolar world order in which it becomes a global player. This article draws on the metaphor of transatlantic relations as a triangle: with the US, Europe and Canada at its angles. Canada is in an existentially precarious position: a more autonomous Europe would make Canada even more dependent on the American hegemon, which would heighten Canada’s risk of being absorbed by the US. Although that outcome is not in Europe’s interest, Europe and Canada have been disengaging for decades. Reversing this trajectory would come at a significant military cost but would be a political gain that would be difficult to measure, resulting in cooperation on energy security, critical minerals, defence and defence in depth. Yet, to achieve this strategic counterbalance, Europe and Canada need to protect abiding security and political interests: to keep the US in Europe and to keep the Russians out. KeywordsCanada, Europe, EU, Euro-Atlantic community, US, NATO, Energy security, Defence, Defence in depth, Transatlantic relations, Structural realism Introduction ‘Europe and Canada are trusted friends and partners. Today this relationship is more critical than ever. I look forward to working with you to defend democracy, free and fair trade, and our shared values’ (von der Leyen 2025). The words of the president of the European Commission, on the swearing in of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, identify Europe’s common priorities with the ‘most European of non-European countries’. The words reinforce a reinvigorated Schicksalsgemeinschaft, a German term that denotes a community with a common fate. After decades of distraction by ‘Asia-Pacific’ imaginaries, Europe and Canada are rediscovering the inevitability of their common fate, in the Euro-Atlantic community. Traditionally, the North Atlantic triangle has comprised an Atlanticist Anglosphere: the UK, the US and Canada. This article instead draws on an age-old metaphor coined by celebrated Canadian historian John Bartlet Brebner (1966): a North Atlantic triangle that reflects transatlantic strategic and political cultures. The angles of this triangle consist of the US, Canada and Europe writ large, as manifest in but not limited to the EU. Europe and Canada share a common strategic fate that makes them interdependent. Both stand to benefit from cultivating their relationship, while both stand to lose should Canada become even more dependent on the US. Canada’s strategic amnesia is manifest in its having forgotten the lesson of leveraging Europe to hedge against the uncertainties of US unilateralism. This is reminiscent of what Brebner called the ‘bookkeeper’s puzzle’: how can Canada best manage relations with both the UK and the US so as (a) to be able to invoke the assistance of the former against the latter’s political (and perhaps military) pressure, while at same time (b) ensuring that the British desire for an Anglo-American rapprochement does not result in any ‘sacrifice’ of Canadian interests? Historically, Canada had managed relations with the easternmost angle of the triangle, the UK, to assure its assistance against political (and possibly existential military) pressure from the US. At the same time, in the interests of its sovereignty, Canada wanted to ensure that any rapprochement with the UK would not end up sacrificing Canadian interests. An offshoot of the bookkeeper’s puzzle applies to attempts by Canada to involve its allies from NATO in an expanded triangle to counterbalance the US politically and economically (Haglund 2025). The bookkeeper’s puzzle thus reflects a real fear of abandonment: in Canada of being abandoned by Europe, and in Europe of being abandoned by the US. The key to the puzzle is for Canada and Europe to retrench and harness their interdependence. But that is easier said than done, due in part to free trade with the US, which has reinforced the shift of Canada’s organisational focus from east–west to north–south. The new North Atlantic triangle Since the founding of NATO in 1949, European countries and Canada have come to depend disproportionately on the world’s largest defence and intelligence complex for their security and have had the world’s largest economy as their primary trading partner. The US shored up its Atlantic and Pacific rims by design: a favourable trading relationship with the US allowed Europe to prosper, while the US guaranteed and underwrote Europe’s security against the Soviet threat. With the end of the Cold War, however, European allies opted to reduce their defence posture significantly. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War, the US has invested US$500 billion per year more than Europe in defence (at today’s prices)—which comes to almost US$20 trillion more than Europe over 35 years. This explains why Europe depends on US capability—especially in cyber, space and intelligence. The US feels that this came at its expense: 64% of European defence is still underwritten by the US (NATO 2025), up from 52% over the past decade, nothingstanding NATO members’ 2014 Wales summit pledge to spend more on defence. Why are 340 million Americans defending 450 million Europeans? Moreover, the US perceives those allies as benefiting from asymmetric trade relations, which the Trump administration considers to be to the detriment of the US. That is, European allies have failed to heed the first purpose of NATO which, in the infamous words of its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, is ‘to keep the Americans in Europe’ (Rodman 1995). To keep ‘the Russians out’ of Europe is the second purpose Lord Ismay sets out for NATO (Rodman 1995). In line with Article 5 of NATO’s founding charter (North Atlantic Treaty 1949, art. 5), allies rely on the US as the guarantor to deter Russia from its ambition of becoming a global player in a multipolar world order, which Russia is prepared to bring about by force. France and the UK notwithstanding, only the US has the nuclear triad and second-strike capability to ensure credible extended nuclear deterrence. However, two world wars and the Cold War have shown that Europe needs Canada for defence in depth. The usual connotation of this military strategy is to contain a bad actor that has breached a layer of defence by providing a second layer of defence. In this case, it refers to Canadian territory as being a safe and like-minded industrial hinterland for resources and an industrial base for Europe to rely on in times of war, as it did during the world wars. During these, Canada provided surge capacity and defence in depth from day one, long before the US ultimately joined in. In both cases, Canada’s reliable contribution changed the outcome of the war: the Second World War might have turned out quite differently had Canada not helped the UK hold down the island fort. Along with prevailing historical, ethno-cultural, political and economic ties, Canada and Europe share geostrategic interests: in the Arctic with the Nordic countries, and in the Atlantic rim with the UK, France, Spain and Portugal. Although Canada is disproportionately exposed to the consequences of US unilateralism, for Canada, leveraging European power to counterbalance the US is controversial (Haglund 1999). Canada’s changing demographics and trade relationships have oriented Canada away from Europe as the obvious ally and partner in safeguarding Canadian sovereignty. Conversely, Europe has an interest in using its power to assure Canada’s independence so as to limit the latter’s potential overexposure to the hegemonic impulses of the American empire: given the size of Canada’s economy and population, US leverage over Canadian natural, economic and human resources would increase America’s structural leverage, over Europe and the world, by about 10% over today’s American power. Such a situation would ensure its unrivalled status as the premier global superpower, which China alone could not match. In theory then, Canadian sovereignty depends on counterbalancing the US using European power. In practice, since the Second World War, both Canada and Europe have been drafting behind the US, deepening their economic and military reliance on the US, and shifting their strategic gaze away from a Euro-Atlantic community that they have taken for granted. Fixated on the US, both parties have seemingly suffered from amnesia about their bilateral transatlantic geostrategic interdependency. As US geostrategic interests increasingly diverge from those of the EU and Canada, and the US becomes more consumed with domestic (electoral) priorities and structural shifts in geopolitical gravity towards the Indo-Pacific, the relationship between Canada and Europe stands at a cross-roads. To counterbalance the power politics of an emboldened US, Russia and China, Europe and Canada need one another to preserve and uphold the liberal–democratic rules-based international order. This is especially true since the US’s pivot in geopolitical orientation, priorities and resource allocation towards the Indo-Pacific to disrupt an expansionist China that is intent on upending the prevailing international order. The US response to China has been to secure control over critical resources and geostrategic approaches that could render it vulnerable, while ensuring that it remains the world’s largest economy. On the one hand, eyeing natural resources and critical minerals in its proximate vicinity, notably Canada and Greenland, puts the US on a confrontational course with Europe and European interests. On the other, the US is ‘rebalancing’ away from Europe, the European neighbourhood and the Euro-Atlantic community as its priorities, and resources, shift to the Indo-Pacific. As a result, the US is expecting Europe to take on (far) greater responsibility for securing its own political interests and military backyard. In response, some European leaders, notably France, have continued to advocate for greater ‘strategic autonomy’ for Europe—an approach that drew the ire of the first Trump administration and is likely to aggravate Euro-Atlantic tensions—while others, notably Germany, have favoured chequebook diplomacy. This term describes the use of economic aid and investment as a means of attraction as part of soft-power projection (Leuprecht and Hamilton 2020). As the least powerful of the G7, Canada has neither luxury. Without European allies by its side, Canada runs an extreme risk of being left out in the geostrategic cold, with deleterious consequences for both Canada and the EU (Nossal 2023). Within the Euro-Atlantic community, the EU and Canada have not just suffered from mutual benign neglect. In the post–Cold War era, and especially with the advent of the Global War on Terror, Europe’s value to Canada has been declining steadily. Canada’s primary strategic relationship is naturally with the US, with which it shares a continent: co-located with the world’s largest economy, which a free trade agreement has made it ever more dependent on, Canada’s economy and security have become overly reliant on the US. The EU and the vast majority of its member states are also highly—arguably overly—dependent on the security and economic umbrella of the US. The supposed ‘peace dividend’ after the Cold War made NATO members even more dependent on the US. With so great an emphasis on their strategic relationships with the US, the perpendicular Canada–EU edge of the new North Atlantic triangle has never received much attention. What was a sin of omission, is now a sin of commission, by both parties. Friends, without benefits Reorienting Canada–Europe relations—as desirable as it may be—is a tall order. However intellectually appealing and geopolitically necessary, there are many obstacles. First, political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have neither prioritised bilateral Euro–Canadian relations, nor really taken note of them, whether out of disinterest or because there was no pressing need: to date, 10 EU member countries still have not ratified the Canada–Europe Trade Agreement. In both the Old and the New World, long-term thinking in politics and society is a popular topic of discussion in the salons of the capital cities, but rarely reaches the offices of decision-makers and their advisers. In the end, the untapped potential for more vital, productive and politically successful relations between Canada and Europe is inversely proportional to the actual political will and capital that elites are willing to expend, especially relative to their interest in the US. Second, realignments in international relations require not only a strategic basis but also complementary apparatuses that are willing and able to action new strategic direction. This does not bode well for either Canada or the EU. The Canadian foreign service suffers from a vast backlog of reforms in terms of its structures, vision and mission, which is indicative of a broad decline in the efficiency, effectiveness and objectivity of the Canadian civil service (Savoie 2024) and the steady erosion of the ability of Canada’s federal government to manage civil society. Former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Senate Reform resulted in the worst of both worlds: it further aggravated the struggle between Ottawa and the provinces over power and resources, and failed to generate greater capacity and interest in foreign and security policy in Canada’s upper chamber. The senators he appointed were preoccupied with domestic policy, and ideologically disinclined towards provincial rights. Recent foreign policy has resulted in six Canadian foreign ministers over the course of a decade; poor preparation and engagement by ministers who tout Canada’s ‘convening power’ but have little actual legitimacy to convene, let alone deliver; and two failed candidacies for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The foreign services of the EU and its member states, too, seem more preoccupied with themselves—notably with identity politics—than with playing a measurable, active role in shaping bilateral and multilateral external relations. In both the EU and Canada, the visibility and political effectiveness of foreign affairs instruments underperform: spending is unstructured and not optimised for strategic effect. Yet, both sides share a dogmatically defiant adherence to the legacy of a liberal rules-based international order. Indications of upheaval in the transatlantic relationship date back at least to President Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia. Realists posit the international system as anarchic, with states competing against one another and striving for survival. That world of power and interest-driven politics stands in increasingly stark contrast to Europe’s and Canada’s liberal institutionalist and values-driven approaches to the world. Third, for a realignment of the Canadian–European relationship at the political level, the impetus must not only originate from their respective civil societies, but also be accepted and actively legitimated in societies whose demographic composition is undergoing rapid change. Yet, legitimation deficits loom large. The EU’s view of the North American subcontinent remains wedded to the bilateral relationship with the US. At the same time, due to the slow implementation of the Canada–EU Trade Agreement, the potential for economic cooperation with EU institutions and member states remains largely unrealised, despite the fact that it has long been far easier for Canada and European allies to work together than for either to work with the US. For example, the extremely low international mobility rate of Canadian students, which is in the single digits, and the relatively few EU students who study in Canada, foreshadow a lack of future bilateral networks for emerging young leaders to tap into (European Commission 2020). Overly rigid certification standards in Canada for European university degrees impede broader student exchanges, labour mobility and more extensive knowledge transfer. Nevertheless, academic networks, that is, joint projects by non-governmental organisations from the EU dedicated to political cooperation with and in Canada, such as that fostered by the local EU delegation in Ottawa, portend positive developments: for example, the Jean Monnet Chairs and a centre that parlays European interest in Canadian universities, and the Europe Canada Network (EUCAnet) which facilitates transatlantic knowledge sharing among experts. Similarly, in the private sector, Canadian chief executives are in short supply in the EU, and potential candidates more often than not prefer to stay in their home country, the US or the Anglosphere, rather than invest in a transatlantic management career and the associated bilateral networks. The fourth obstacle is a direct result of the meagre transatlantic civil society: the prevailing images Canada and Europe have of one another one the one hand, and the failure to ‘bridge’ the transatlantic imaginary on the other. On the one side is Canada, the cosmopolitan, tolerant and fun subcontinent with bears, lakes, mountains and maple syrup, which—post-colonial realities notwithstanding—is considered by most Europeans to be the better North America and which, with its playful lightness, often manages to escape the critical gaze, and not only that of Europeans. On the other side is ‘Fortress’ Europe, with its sprawling bureaucracy, and myriad unmanageable regulations and trade barriers, which seemingly only feigns openness. Perception could not be further from reality. Foreign policy is driven by national interest, yet despite a trajectory of convergence among Euro–Canadian interests, especially of late, for the EU and European countries, Canada remains a low priority: Canada ranks about sixtieth in terms of priority across European states, well behind all the EU member states, and behind many other large and mid-sized powers around the world. Fifth, despite the intent to build closer ties, fundamentally different economic gravitational pulls on both sides persist: owing to bilateral free-trade agreements and globalisation, over the past 30 years, Canada has gradually become more dependent on the US, while the integrative benefits of the EU’s common market have reduced incentives for member states to invest in bilateral relations with Canada. Sobering foreign trade figures for the EU and European states with Canada hold little prospect of change in the foreseeable future: Canada barely cracks the top 10 of European export markets, whereas the EU is actually Canada’s second most important trading partner—but at barely a tenth of Canada’s trade with the US. Finally, if bilateral EU–Canada cooperation is to deepen, parliaments on both sides need to be more proactive and deliberate in transforming the relationship: while political executives, the European Commission and Canada’s government of the day set the agenda, it is the legislatures that legitimate and sustain it. The European Parliament maintains a permanent liaison office in Washington, DC as well as a European Public Law Organization in London and in every member state, but not in Ottawa. The Canada–Europe Parliamentary Association needs to fashion new formats to invigorate and promote relevant political projects among the Canadian, European and national parliaments, perhaps modelled on the robust array of activities undertaken by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Strategic friends, with benefits Its position in the new North Atlantic triangle makes Canada an attractive partner for Europe. Rich in natural resources and critical minerals, Canada has the potential to rank among the world’s most prosperous countries. Canada’s three largest export industries are oil, natural gas and agriculture, along with vast resources in potash (for fertiliser) and uranium (nuclear power). Were Canada to build more pipeline capacity to export hydrocarbons, it would have the potential to make Europe (much) more energy and critical-minerals secure, more competitive and prosperous by contributing to lower European energy prices, and less reliant on the US, the Middle East and Russia, especially for liquified natural gas. Canada has the third-largest oil reserves in the world, produces some of the cleanest natural gas and ranks among the world’s top five exporters of agri-food. Yet, Canada’s pipeline infrastructure is overly reliant on the US, which means Canada has to sell the bulk of its oil to the US at a 25% discount on world market prices. Bringing down European energy prices is the most important contribution Canada could be making in standing with Ukraine: Canada’s failure to export hydrocarbons to Europe keeps European energy prices high, which effectively amounts to Canada subsidising Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Europe procures negligible amounts of Canadian oil via US facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, and Canada exports no liquified natural gas to Europe at all, despite Europe now procuring 120 billion cubic metres a year, about half of which comes from the US. Besides an abundance of natural resources and critical minerals, as well as cheap, clean electricity, Canada is also rich in human resources and other intangible assets: it has a concentration of data centres and artificial intelligence infrastructure, it is home to some of the best public universities in the world, it has a more diverse and younger demography than any European ally, and its immigration strategy has historically favoured high skillsets and education. As a result, Canada has long had the most tertiary-qualified workforce among OECD countries (OCED 2022). Although Canada shares common interests, institutions (such as the North American Aerospace Defence Command, NORAD), a continental identity and ideas with the US, as a Westminster parliamentary democracy, its values and political culture are closer to those of Europe than those of the US (Hataley and Leuprecht 2019). Moreover, as the only country that is a member of both the British Commonwealth and La Francophonie, Canada shares key cultural–linguistic attributes with both the UK and France: within the G7, Canada thus offers a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxon world. Europe also remains Canada’s second most important strategic partner, after the US. Owing to its experiences in the two world wars, Canada has a vested interest in Europe’s territorial integrity, political stability, economic prosperity and social harmony, with its like-minded European allies helping Canada to offset US unilateralist propensities. To that effect, NATO is a vital multilateral organisation for Canada; arguably, it is the most important, giving Canada a voice alongside 30 European allies and the US. Although it would be a mistake to equate counterbalancing the US with participation in NATO, Canada has a vested interest in sustaining and preserving NATO for the purpose of bandwagoning with European members to do just that (Jockel and Sokolsky 2021). For this reason, the Canadian Armed Forces has long been postured as an expeditionary organisation, with its primary orientation towards Europe. Via NATO’s external borders, Canada’s boundary with Russia stretches from its border with Alaska via a (disputed) Arctic maritime flank close to 1,000 km in length, to a 1,215 km land boundary in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe. Canada has thus sustained military commitments along much of the Russian flank. The pattern of Canada’s military deployments also shows that the country has vested interests in the Balkans, Europe’s southern flank, in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. However, in recent decades, Canada has let its military atrophy to the point where it struggles to meet basic commitments—to NATO, to NORAD and to defending its own northern interests—let alone make new ones. Yet, the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific has created an opportunity for Canada to support US and European interests by backfilling some US capacity across Europe’s central, eastern and southern flanks, thus shoring up NATO, which is of benefit and interest to all member states. Were the EU to become a more independent defence actor, this would pose a serious risk to Canadian sovereignty and Canada’s standing in the world. In theory, Europe has the industrial base and financial capacity to provide for its own defence, security and survival. This, however, comes at a cost, for which European allies have thus far proven unable to muster the political will, although the European Commission’s $800 billion ReArm Europe plan holds promise that political will may be changing. The lack of will is cause for concern in the US, since Europe’s NATO allies have been sourcing about 60% of their arms from the US market. When France tried to take the initiative to achieve greater strategic autonomy for Europe during the first Trump presidency, Trump’s then NATO ambassador promptly dispatched an aggressive cease-and-desist letter (Leuprecht and Hamilton 2020). Although the US has resisted getting entangled in alliances since its first president, George Washington, NATO offers the US important levers. Nowhere in the world does the US invest proportionately less in defence for a higher rate of return. Canada and Europe are better positioned to add value to US military, political and strategic interests, than to try to go it alone individually. As Keohane (1988) famously observed, for the US, NATO is a very efficient and effective collective decision-making mechanism, gathering 30 European countries plus Canada—including some of the world’s top spenders on defence—the UK, Germany and France. Combined, the non-US NATO members spend about US$600 billion on defence (as compared to the US$877 billion by the US). The importance of NATO as an information-sharing and coordination mechanism has grown substantially since the formulation of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which brought key partners in the Indo-Pacific into the fold, including Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. Together, these allies and partners spent roughly US$1.7 trillion of a total global defence expenditure of about US$2.44 trillion in 2023. Of course, aggregate expenditures are an inchoate measure of military capability and commitment. While the US can necessarily exert greater pressure on any one country bilaterally, the benefits of NATO decision-making and coordination far outweigh the transaction costs for the US to do so bilaterally across three dozen countries. The reason the US spends as much as it does on its military is to preserve its freedom of action. Ultimately, being able to act unilaterally means never having to rely on others. Nonetheless, even though dispensable, allies are convenient to have as they also bring soft power, money and moral legitimacy. Greater European strategic autonomy is of little interest to the US, outside the NATO framework. The US does, however, have an interest in greater complementarity, capability and effectiveness within the organisation: it wants allies to do more together, on their own, provided they deconflict with the US. As the only other non-European NATO member country, Canada necessarily shares the transatlantic orientation of the US. Canada’s defence relations with Europe thus offer the US a mechanism to fall back on should the EU strive for greater strategic autonomy without coordinating with NATO and, therefore, with US interests. The lesson that the US drew from the Second World War was that, as a superpower, it has global interests. To this end, US unilateralism took on the trappings of a more multilateral approach to global affairs. The US collaborated with European partners and Canada to build the foundations of the post-war security, trade and monetary infrastructure: NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Bretton Woods Accord (which laid the foundations for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). This strategic collaboration brought North America and (Western) Europe historically unprecedented security, prosperity and stability. Over time, however, both the European members of NATO and Canada have forgotten that, multilateral trappings aside, the arrangement was born primarily out of US interest. In the aftermath of the two world wars, the US learned that territorial integrity, political stability, collective prosperity and social harmony in and of Europe were in the best interests of its aspirations as a global superpower. The claim to superpower status depended on a degree of control over Europe. Russia has long understood this; the US came to this realisation in the twentieth century; and for a China with global ambitions, this is a relatively recent realisation. For the US, NATO and extended nuclear deterrence are the means to this end; which is why Russia is intent on upending NATO, as both Russia and China aspire to be global players in a multipolar world, rather than regional players under a Pax Americana. Although Canada does not have nuclear arms, its position in North America necessarily means it has a role in assuring extended nuclear deterrence. Russia’s strategic approaches to North America, by way of the Arctic, pass through Canadian airspace. Canada’s gradual commitment to and spending on Arctic security and defence, including NORAD, therefore, are not just about homeland defence, but are also an investment in NATO by means of continental defence writ large (Leuprecht et al. 2018). North American continental defence assures uncompromised latitude for sovereign decision-making in Washington as well as Ottawa. An adversary that can threaten North America with intercontinental ballistic missiles or hypersonic missiles, for instance, could effectively curtail sovereign decision-making that reflects the best interests and legitimate democratic will of Americans or Canadians. That is, an adversary could overtly threaten Ottawa or Washington with an attack if confronted with a political choice that runs counter to its interests. This matters all the more since North American continental security is the bedrock of credible extended nuclear deterrence. An adversary that is able to call the nuclear triad, and especially the second-strike capability, into question would effectively undermine the US security umbrella that spans the Atlantic and Pacific rims. The states that currently rely on US extended deterrence would thus have an incentive to resort to nuclear proliferation to ensure their own survival. Since nuclear proliferation runs counter to European and Canadian interests in regional and global stability, this is one more reason for them to be more strategic about coordinating their contribution to the triangle. Ostensibly, the US does not need Canada to provide North American continental defence: the US has the capacity, capabilities and resources to go it alone. However, cutting Canada out of North American strategic defence would significantly reduce NATO’s leverage over collective defence. Europe and European allies would be left to deal with the US alone; Canada’s currency on the continent and across the Atlantic would be greatly diminished. The coincidence of NATO’s pivot to North American Arctic defence and Obama’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific is no accident. Certainly, there is an operational requirement to coordinate with NORAD on an integrated all-domain layered Arctic defence along NATO’s entire frontier with Russia. But this change also highlighted that NATO is, first and foremost, a political—not a military—alliance. Obama’s pivot necessarily meant less US attention paid to, input and interest in NATO; thus, it was in NATO’s best interest to show the flag in America’s backyard. NATO has not one but three pillars: Europe, North America and the transatlantic area. How we imagine the third matters for how the US imagines NATO’s role in the Atlantic: either, as popularised by Walter Lippman (1917), as an ‘ocean highway’ that by geography, culture and necessity connects two continental ‘communities’; or, in a triumph of politics over geography, as theorised by Alan Henrikson (1980), as a ‘lake’ and ‘inland sea’ that unifies rather than divides. Within the North Atlantic triangle, Canada can bridge the divide of a vast ocean, making it into a much more manageable inland sea. Canada’s geographic continental co-location with the US gives Europe limited, but strategically indispensable, leverage beyond Washington through which to influence the second and third pillars of NATO, using defence and diplomacy to counter US unilateralist proclivities. Conclusion For Canada to become even more (over)dependent on the US than it already is runs fundamentally counter to European interests. The EU has a vested interest in Canada maintaining sovereign control over its resources, political decision-making and defence. Conversely, the prospect of greater European strategic autonomy in defence outside of the NATO framework poses a potentially existential risk to Canada, rendering it more dependent on the US, and thus reducing its value to allies and partners and, by extension, its standing in the world. If this were to happen, Canada would face much higher transaction costs more akin to those of its partners in the Indo-Pacific, having to invest a lot more in foreign policy and defence for greatly diminished returns. Canadian sovereignty is a Trump card that the US is now playing to maximise its power and range of unilateral action in a world where its hegemony is under threat. Europe and Canada used to be discretionary friends. Now is the time to realise mutual benefits for strategic effect. Canada can support Europe’s interests in energy security, critical minerals, defence and defence in depth. In return, the EU can bolster Canadian political and economic sovereignty. Partnering with the EU is also the most efficient and effective way for Canada to gain greater independence from the US in defence and defence-industrial capacity. Greater, more autonomous military-industrial capacity would enable both Canada and the EU to build sustainable capabilities and commit to collective defence. Such a strategy would have a dual signalling purpose: of military deterrence to Russia, and of political and economic deterrence to the US. Canada and the EU should not just protect but actually promote their military, political and economic interests. Failing to be strategic about collective transatlantic security and the Euro-Atlantic community within the new North American triangle increases the risk that Canada and Europe will be abandoned by the US. Lord Ismay had a premonition should Europe and Canada fail to shape their future: Russia in Europe, America out, under German leadership. ORCID iDChristian Leuprecht https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9498-4749ReferencesBrebner J. B. (1966). North Atlantic triangle: The interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.European Commission. (2020). 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Abstract The so-called Anglophone Caribbean has historically been an area of strategic importance for Cuban foreign policy. With more than half a century of history, Cuba-CARICOM ties constitute a successful example due to their comprehensiveness, strength, dynamism, and concrete results in terms of political coordination and cooperation. However, in a complex and changing international context, various elements constitute threats to the effective execution of Cuban foreign policy toward the subregion, mostly linked to structural difficulties facing Caribbean states and their integration into the international economy, as well as the effects of the blockade and the policy of economic suffocation implemented by the United States against Cuba, which has intensified with Trump's arrival as president. Likewise, there are opportunities that can be seized to preserve the privileged historical relationship that Cuba maintains with this subregional bloc. Introduction The Caribbean has historically been a region of strategic importance for Cuba's foreign policy, primarily because it constitutes its natural environment and setting, to which it belongs not only for geographical reasons but also due to historical and cultural ties. Cuba's connections with the so-called non-Hispanic Caribbean even predate the consolidation of the Cuban nation, considering the constant influence of intra-Caribbean migratory flows during the colonial era. This intensified with the massive arrival of laborers — mainly Haitians and Jamaicans — to the largest of the Antilles during the early decades of the 20th century, a migration flow that continued until the 1950s. Cuba shares with Caribbean nations a historical legacy linked to the tragic scourge of slavery, associated with the plantation economy. This involved, on one hand, the forced migration of a large African population, and on the other, a series of similar characteristics in terms of socio-economic structures — although the differences among the various European colonial powers present in the region should not be overlooked. After the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Cuba's ties with the non-Hispanic Caribbean went through various phases, particularly since 1972, when four newly independent Caribbean nations (Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago) collectively decided to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba. This decision ignored the OAS agreements of July 1964, which had mandated the political, diplomatic, and economic severance of relations between the governments of the continent and the Island. It was during the 1990s and into the 21st century that the most solid foundations were laid for articulating a coherent, harmonious, and coordinated projection that acknowledges the real importance of the Caribbean subregion for the objectives of Cuban foreign policy. The results achieved thus far in terms of coordination, political dialogue, and cooperation have led several authors to describe Cuba's policy toward the Caribbean as one of the most dynamic and effective aspects of the Island’s foreign outreach in recent years. The aim of this paper is to provide an updated analysis of the Cuban government’s external projection toward the Caribbean, focusing on the threats and opportunities that, in the foreseeable future, may impact the country’s interactions with this subregion under the leadership of President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez. It is important to clarify that, from a methodological standpoint, this paper focuses primarily on the group of countries that make up the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), most of which are island nations, although three are located on the mainland (Belize, Guyana, and Suriname). As noted by scholar Milagros Martínez Reinosa in her work “Cuba’s Relations with the Caribbean,” this is a “group of nations with marked differences, determined by their respective geographic and population characteristics, by the colonial powers that divided up this part of the world, and by the unique socio-economic development of each. This group, in which the so-called English-speaking insular Caribbean predominates, includes (…) different economic systems and forms of political organization, with varying levels of development, economic potential, and geographic size” (Martínez, 2011, p. 203). Development Historical Analysis of Cuba’s Foreign Projection Toward the Caribbean It is well known that, in the historical period following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, significant progress was made in the Caribbean’s decolonization processes. Gradually, and with particular characteristics in each case, several countries achieved independence: Jamaica (1962), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Guyana (1966), Barbados (1966), The Bahamas (1973), Grenada (1974), and Suriname (1975). Later, others followed: Dominica (1978), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1979), Saint Lucia (1979), Belize (1981), Antigua and Barbuda (1981), and Saint Kitts and Nevis (1983). At the same time, the first steps were taken toward economic integration in the subregion, marked notably by the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973. This treaty established the Caribbean Community and set the goal of creating the Caribbean Common Market, both known by the acronym CARICOM. These agreements aimed to advance economic cooperation and integration, as well as to establish a degree of coordination in foreign policy among the governments of the member states. All of this laid the groundwork for building a subregional institutional framework, giving these small states greater negotiating power and the ability to act jointly, both within international organizations and within the Inter-American System itself. One of the most representative examples of the emerging political coordination among these countries was the previously mentioned establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba by the governments of Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago in December 1972. This event marked the beginning of a new era in the foreign policy of the revolutionary Cuba, enabling cooperation and mutual support with the newly independent Caribbean states. However, in 1983, the U.S. invasion of Grenada — which was supported not only by the OAS but also by members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), along with Barbados and Jamaica — somewhat deteriorated Cuba’s relations with the subregion. Beginning in the early 1990s, a new, more dynamic and productive period began in Cuba’s relations with the Caribbean. In 1993, the Cuba-CARICOM Joint Commission was established, and throughout the decade, Cuba gradually intensified its engagement with CARICOM member states — particularly following the creation, in 1994, of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). This organization included all Caribbean island states, along with Central America, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. The ACS provided a particularly favorable space for Cuba’s foreign policy outreach in the region, as it was outside the sphere of influence of the United States and offered conditions that allowed the Cuban government to assume a leadership role and promote a regional dynamic focused on cooperation. Cuba’s strategic projection toward the Caribbean reached a high point with the holding — at the initiative of the Cuban government — of the First CARICOM-Cuba Summit, held in Havana in December 2002, marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. At this historic meeting, attended by all CARICOM heads of government, common goals and guidelines were set to shape relations between Cuba and the subregional bloc. During the summit, a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed —previously negotiated two years earlier during the Joint Commission meeting in Santiago de Cuba. The agreement aimed to promote trade in goods and services, establish financial arrangements to facilitate commerce, encourage market access, foster the creation of joint ventures, protect investments, and promote information exchange. This agreement was later updated in 2006 to reflect new economic and commercial realities. From that point on, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs began implementing the so-called Comprehensive Caribbean Plan (PIC, in Spanish), which integrated all actions directed toward the region with the explicit goal of contributing to the fundamental objectives of Cuba’s foreign policy (Martínez, 2011, p. 217). In the years immediately following, ties were rapidly strengthened at the highest levels, both bilaterally and with CARICOM. Some have described as an “avalanche” the large number of official visits to Cuba by Caribbean heads of government between 2002 and 2005 (the year of the Second CARICOM-Cuba Summit), reflecting the success of Cuba’s political-diplomatic outreach in the region and the high priority the Caribbean had acquired in its foreign policy agenda. This period also saw a sustained increase in Cuban cooperation in areas such as health, education, sports, culture, and more. At the Third Summit, held in 2008, cooperation was reaffirmed as the central and leading element in Cuba’s intergovernmental relations with the Caribbean, with expanded and deepened assistance across a wide range of fields —many of them supported by the Bolivarian Government of Venezuela. At the same time, the emergence of political coordination and cooperation initiatives such as ALBA-TCP and Petrocaribe — and the subsequent inclusion of some CARICOM countries in the former — multiplied opportunities for interaction, political alignment, and regional coordination. Similarly, both sides have maintained close coordination in various international forums, including the UN General Assembly, UNCTAD, WIPO, UNIDO, FAO, WTO, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G-77+China, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). This international collaboration has been strengthened by the clear political will and the ability of both parties to resolve differences constructively. CARICOM’s solidarity with Cuba has been particularly notable in its unanimous stance against the U.S. embargo. To date, eight CARICOM-Cuba Summits have been held, the most recent one taking place in Barbados, attended by Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez. On that occasion, he also made an official visit to Barbados and toured two other countries —Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada. According to recent figures, there are currently more than 850 Caribbean scholarship students in Cuba, with over 6,000 having graduated. Additionally, more than 2,000 Cuban professionals are currently providing services in CARICOM countries. Cuba’s Foreign Projection Toward the Caribbean in the Current Context: Threats and Opportunities For Cuba, maintaining strong relations with CARICOM remains a priority. From a political standpoint, it is strategically important to preserve a close and positive relationship with the countries that make up this subregional organization, as they often achieve high levels of consensus on key international issues. As a relatively large bloc in terms of membership, this often translates into an equal number of votes in international organizations. This is particularly relevant considering the transformations the international system has undergone in the 21st century — marked by the gradual decline of U.S. global leadership, the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world, the shift of economic and commercial dynamism toward the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing influence of new information technologies, among other factors. These changes pose significant challenges to the Cuban government’s foreign outreach and have also influenced the implementation of U.S. foreign policy in the region, on one hand, on curbing the progress of resistance movements to its model of regional domination, and on the other, on trying to counter the growing influence of extra-regional powers in the hemisphere. Currently, all independent Caribbean states maintain diplomatic missions in Havana, and Cuba does the same in each of those countries. This makes Cuba a key and prominent actor in the region and highlights the importance CARICOM member states place on their relationship with Cuba. Within the Caribbean Community there is a strong consensus on condemning the U.S. embargo and recognizing Cuba’s cooperation efforts — reflected in joint declarations across both global and regional multilateral organizations. However, economic relations between Cuba and CARICOM have significantly lagged the levels achieved in the political and cooperation spheres. Despite the existence of a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement that includes broad tariff preferences (ALADI, 2011), trade volumes remain very low and are highly concentrated in a few countries —such as Trinidad and Tobago ($57.9 million), Jamaica ($3.2 million), Guyana ($507,000), and Suriname ($84,000). Altogether, total trade amounts to approximately $61 million (National Office of Statistics and Information—ONEI, 2024, pp. 233–236). The underdevelopment of economic ties is not primarily due to a lack of willingness on either side to implement coordinated actions but rather stems from more complex causes related to the economic structures of Caribbean islands and how they are integrated into the global economy. It is also important to consider that both Cuba and most CARICOM members are classified as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), a condition that presents shared development challenges. Factors such as limited economic and geographic size, high levels of openness and dependence on the international economy, low diversification, transportation and connectivity issues, and high exposure to the effects of climate change and extreme weather events, among others, represent significant obstacles to the development of multifaceted ties between Cuba and the Caribbean — particularly in the area of economic and trade relations (Laguardia, 2022, p. 179). Threats The arrival of the Republican administration led by Donald Trump to the U.S. government undoubtedly represents a threat to Cuba’s relations with the Caribbean and, more broadly, to its foreign projection toward the region. The appointment of controversial figures closely linked to the anti-Cuban far-right in the U.S. — such as Marco Rubio and Mauricio Claver-Carone as Secretary of State and Head of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs at the State Department, respectively — forecasts an extremely difficult scenario for Cuba. This will greatly hinder the long-sought development of economic and trade ties with CARICOM, due to the tightening of the blockade, the potential implementation of additional unilateral measures, and Cuba’s reinstatement on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. It is undeniable that the blockade — significantly reinforced in recent years and expanded in its extraterritorial reach — currently stands as one of the major obstacles to elevating Cuba-CARICOM economic relations to the same level as their political ties. This remains a clear objective within Cuba’s foreign policy approach to the region. Broadly speaking, the blockade and the aggressive U.S. policy prevent Cuba from operating under normal conditions in the international market by limiting access to credit and financing, disrupting financial operations, reducing export revenues, and creating an intimidating environment for potential foreign investors. All these factors have worsened the Island’s economic crisis and intensified issues such as declining export capacity and foreign currency shortages, directly impacting Cuba’s trade with the rest of the world, including the Caribbean. These challenges are compounded by logistical limitations that hinder intra-Caribbean trade. Furthermore, the lack of mutual understanding of institutional and bureaucratic systems remains a significant barrier to expanding economic ties (Marín, Martínez, & Laguardia, 2024). Nonetheless, even under current complex conditions, there are still possibilities and spaces to develop broader and deeper economic relations, based on the principle of identifying areas of complementarity and leveraging mutual strengths and opportunities. In this regard, the internationally recognized scientific achievements of Cuba’s biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, along with a wide catalog of high-quality, advanced technology products, offer a valuable opportunity to increase exports to the region while also strengthening the healthcare systems of CARICOM countries. Additionally, other biotech products developed by Cuban companies and institutions —applicable in agriculture and livestock — could contribute to CARICOM’s efforts to achieve greater levels of food sovereignty. Likewise, the emerging private sector of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Cuba has gained increasing importance in the national economy, particularly in foreign trade, and shows strong potential to help boost commercial exchange and business between Cuba and the Caribbean nations. On the other hand, another threat to Cuba’s foreign projection toward the region —particularly regarding the development of its economic relations — comes from the financial limitations caused by the inclusion of several Caribbean states on blacklists of tax havens, as well as their classification as middle-income countries. This classification prevents them from applying for development aid and other preferential financing. All of this adds to the challenges Cuba already faces because of the U.S. blockade. Another significant threat is the intensification of the effects of climate change, particularly the increasing occurrence of extreme weather events. These phenomena damage ecosystems and biodiversity, destroy agriculture, reduce tourism revenues, contribute to food insecurity, damage infrastructure, and create a constant need for budgetary spending and public debt, among other harmful impacts. Also, we also consider as a threat, — particularly over the past decade — the decline of Venezuela’s economic capacity to meet the energy demands of CARICOM countries and to support other cooperation projects in the Caribbean, especially under initiatives such as ALBA-TCP and Petrocaribe, in which Cuba played an important role. Additionally, there is the ongoing conflict over the Essequibo region, where there is strong consensus among CARICOM countries in support of Guyana’s position. This places Cuba in a complex position regarding how to approach the issue — an issue also used by the United States to exert pressure on Venezuela. Compounding this is the campaign promoted by the U.S. and its regional allies against the government of President Nicolás Maduro in the context of the Venezuelan elections and his inauguration, which has triggered a wide-ranging political, diplomatic, and propaganda offensive. While some Caribbean states have aligned with U.S. positions, it is worth noting that the majority have remained outside of this campaign. For CARICOM member states, the United States remains the primary “provider” of security. The need for cooperation and coordination in security matters with the U.S. is undeniable, especially given shared challenges such as cross-border criminal flows, the Caribbean’s status as the U.S. “third border,” economic dependency, and the need for aid and financing among CARICOM countries. This power asymmetry means that the U.S. uses security as a tool of pressure, which represents a constant threat to Cuba’s relations with the bloc — particularly under the new U.S. administration, which has prioritized migration and drug trafficking and embraces Monroe Doctrine-style views regarding inter-American relations. Another threat we identify is the weakening of regional mechanisms such as the ACS. Despite Cuba’s consistent efforts, the ACS has largely failed to meet its founding objectives since its establishment in 1994: to create a common economic space, preserve the Caribbean Sea, and promote the sustainable development of its member states – although there have been some positive experiences in cooperation on climate change mitigation and disaster risk prevention. Opportunities One key opportunity lies in the development of close coordination and the building of broad consensus on issues of shared interest and broader relevance on the multilateral agenda. This applies both within United Nations bodies and forums, as well as in platforms like the G77+China and the NAM. These spaces have demonstrated mutual support for various common demands and proposals, including: reparations for slavery; the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change; the reform of financing eligibility criteria; the Bridgetown Initiative as a proposal for reforming the global financial architecture; the lifting of the U.S. blockade on Cuba; recognition of Cuba’s international cooperation — particularly in the health sector; and the removal of Cuba from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, among others. Another ongoing opportunity for Cuba’s foreign policy projection lies in its respectful and diplomatic engagement, which has allowed Cuba to act as a political and diplomatic bridge between the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America. This role facilitates relationships that remain limited due to differing political and communicational frameworks, as well as stark economic asymmetries. This bridging role has been particularly evident in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), where Cuba’s efforts supported the inclusion of a permanent CARICOM representative in the organization's leadership troika and ensured the incorporation of Caribbean concerns in CELAC’s joint declarations and statements. Another external opportunity is the growing interest of global powers and extra-regional actors in the Caribbean, most notably the People’s Republic of China. China has vast potential in economic and trade relations with the region, especially considering that CARICOM countries offer several attributes attractive to Chinese investors. China’s high demand for Caribbean products has driven its interest not only in production but also in developing transport infrastructure across the region to secure supply chains and reduce costs. In this context, the membership of Cuba and several Caribbean nations in the Belt and Road Initiative presents both an advantage and an opportunity. Cuba maintains a strong, strategic, high-level political and diplomatic relationship with China and can be considered as China’s principal ally in the region. This places Cuba in a unique position to play an important role in expanding China’s political engagement with CARICOM, particularly given that five CARICOM countries — Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, and Haiti — still maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In other words, Cuba could further leverage its privileged relationships with both parties to continue fostering political rapprochement, help expand economic and trade links with the subregion, and participate in various development projects with Chinese capital through a triangular cooperation. In this framework, Cuba can contribute with its expertise, knowledge, and highly qualified human capital in fields where many Caribbean nations lack capacity. At the same time, Cuba’s admission as an associate member of the BRICS represents an opportunity that opens promising prospects for cooperation, investment, and access to financing — within a framework that promotes a multipolar vision of the world, composed of several of the largest and most dynamic economies on the planet. In addition to its strategic geographic location as the “Key to the Gulf,” which facilitates access to major markets in Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba can contribute to BRICS with an influential and privileged political relationship with Caribbean countries, built over 50 years. This could help foster a strategic partnership between BRICS and the Caribbean. Likewise, Cuba’s historical cooperation ties and its high-level political and diplomatic dialogue with the African bloc — as well as with other countries of the so-called Global South — also represent an opportunity, as they can help bridge the Caribbean with these extra-regional actors, enabling coordination on common positions in multilateral arenas and fostering economic ties. In the case of Africa, CARICOM has aimed in recent years to strengthen relations with the continent, starting with the first summit between both blocs held virtually in 2021. This goal is clearly reflected in the signing of a Partnership Agreement by 12 of the 15 CARICOM member states with the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), which has approved over $1.5 billion in investments for the Caribbean (Afreximbank, 2024). Moreover, cooperation between Cuba and CARICOM still offers a wide range of untapped opportunities, aligned with the specific needs and advantages of each party. As previously mentioned, Cuba has a highly skilled human workforce that can benefit the region. In this regard, triangular cooperation becomes a key mechanism for accessing funding from governmental and multilateral sources. The growing interest in the Caribbean by various powers — both Western and non-Western — also represents an opportunity to attract resources for key areas such as climate change mitigation, energy transition, and digitalization, where Cuba can participate with its trained professionals and developed capabilities (Marín, Martínez, & Laguardia, 2024, p. 10). Conclusions Cuba–CARICOM relations, with more than half a century of history, stand as a successful example of strategic comprehensiveness, coherence, and tangible achievements in political and cooperation matters. However, they still face the challenge of producing similar results in the economic and trade sphere, where progress has been limited. The main obstacles to achieving this goal are linked to the structural conditions and constraints of Caribbean economies and their integration into the global economy, as well as to the effects of the U.S. blockade and the economic strangulation policies implemented against Cuba. The worsening of Cuba’s economic crisis — driven by the tightening of the blockade, the imposition of new sanctions, and its continued inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list under a likely more aggressive policy by the new U.S. administration — poses a threat to the achievement of Cuba’s goals in the Caribbean. At the same time, the positive outlook generated by Cuba’s admission as an associate member of the BRICS presents an opportunity to develop a possible strategic alliance between the bloc and the Caribbean — supported by the privileged, trusting, and cooperative relationship that Cuba has built with Caribbean countries over more than 50 years. Cooperation has been the cornerstone of Cuba’s relations with the Caribbean, and despite challenges, it has remained intentional and prioritized. However, more efforts should be made to leverage other areas in which Cuba possesses expertise and highly qualified human capital. The potential of triangular cooperation, along with the growing interest of key international actors in the Caribbean, could represent a valuable opportunity for Cuba to maintain and expand its cooperation efforts in the region. References Cabrera Agudo, M. (2011). Las políticas de seguridad de CARICOM en torno al crimen trasnacional organizado: incidencia de los intereses estadounidenses de seguridad nacional (2001-2011). Buenos Aires: CLACSO.Cabrera Agudo, M. (2013). La concertación política en el marco de CARICOM: focos de ruptura y espacios para la construcción de consensos. Cuadernos del Caribe, 16(1), 67-79.Caribbean Community Secretariat. (2022). Annual Report of the Secretary-General 2022. Guyana.CARICOM Secretariat. (2014). Strategic Plan for the Caribbean Community 2015–2019: Repositioning CARICOM. Turkeyen, Guyana.Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (2020). U.S. Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean. Caribbean 2020: A Multi-Year Strategy To Increase the Security, Prosperity, and Well-Being of the People of the United States and the Caribbean. Recuperado de: https://www.state.gov/u-s-strategy-for-engagement-in-the-caribbean/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (5 de julio de 2023). Secretary Blinken’s Remarks at the CARICOM Plenary. Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-caricom-plenary/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (febrero de 2025). Integrated Country Strategies (países miembros de CARICOM). Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/office-of-foreign-assistance/integrated-country-strategies/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (16 de noviembre de 2023). Cooperación entre EE. UU. y el Caribe para detener el tráfico de armas de fuego. Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/translations/spanish/cooperacion-entre-ee-uu-y-el-caribe-para-detener-el-trafico-de-armas-de-fuego/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (1 de marzo de 2024). Compromiso entre Estados Unidos y el Caribe (traducción al español). Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/translations/spanish/compromiso-entre-estados-unidos-y-el-caribe/Díaz Vázquez, J. (2017). Las relaciones económicas de China con los países del Caribe. En J. Laguardia Martínez (Ed.), Cuba en sus relaciones con el resto del Caribe. Continuidades y rupturas tras el restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos (pp. 243-256). Buenos Aires: CLACSO.García Lorenzo, T. (2005). La economía y la integración de la comunidad del Caribe: Encuentros y desencuentros (Tesis doctoral). Universidad de La Habana.Girvan, N. (2012). El Caribe, dependencia, integración y soberanía. Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente.Girvan, N. (2017). El pensamiento de la Dependencia en el Caribe Anglófono. En F. Valdés García (Ed.), Antología del pensamiento crítico caribeño contemporáneo (pp. 459-499). Buenos Aires: CLACSO.Griffith, I. (1997). El narcotráfico como una cuestión de seguridad en el Caribe. En P. Milet (Ed.), Paz y Seguridad en las Américas. Chile: FLACSO.Griffith, I. (2002). Security, Sovereignty, and Public Order in the Caribbean. Security and Defense Studies Review, 1-18.Laguardia Martínez, J. (2022). La IX Cumbre de las Américas y su impacto en el Caribe. VII Conferencia de Estudios Estratégicos.Laguardia, J., Marín, C., & Martínez, M. (2024). 50 años de relaciones Cuba – CARICOM: avances, retos y posibilidades. Cuadernos del pensamiento crítico latinoamericano, CLACSO.Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI). (2024). Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2023. Edición 2024. La Habana.Regueiro, L., & Marín, C. (2023). Consensos y disensos en la Política Exterior de CARICOM. Caribes, (9), 8-32.Romero, A. (2016). Los desafíos de la reconfiguración regional. Anuario de Integración, 65-85.Sanders, R. (2022). US-Caribbean Relations in Biden Administration. Florida: Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center, FIU.Suárez Salazar, L. (2019). Cuba y Estados Unidos en el Caribe insular y continental: misiones en conflicto. En N. López Castellanos (Ed.), Geopolítica e integración en el Gran Caribe. Alcances y desafíos (pp. 167-187). México: UNAM.Suárez Salazar, L. (2021). Presentación y Prefacio del libro: Revolución Cubana. Algunas miradas críticas y descolonizadas. Revista Política Internacional, 160-168.Suárez Salazar, L., & García Lorenzo, T. (2008). Las relaciones interamericanas: continuidades y cambios. CLACSO.

Abstract This paper examines whether the European Union (EU) can supplant the United States (US) as a benign hegemon in the contemporary international system. It discusses the concept of a benign hegemon, traditionally associated with the US, characterized by military and economic dominance exercised with liberal values, multilateralism, and the promotion of global security and prosperity.  The analysis highlights the limitations of US hegemony, including military overextension, economic challenges, and a decline in soft power, particularly in regions such as the Middle East. Conversely, the EU's global ambitions are examined, with a focus on its peace efforts, trade agreements, development aid, and multilateral engagement. However, the EU's internal divisions, lack of unified foreign and defense policy, and historical perceptions of coercion limit its ability to act as a benign hegemon. The analysis concludes with a proposition that the EU's unique nature and current constraints suggest it cannot fully assume the US's role, raising questions about the viability of benign hegemony in today's context. Key Words: SAFE, EU, US, Benign Hegemon, Geopolitics Introduction In the recent two pieces, we looked at Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and its potential consequences regarding the role and nature of the EU as a military power {link}, and Ukraine's integration into European defence cooperation, highlighting its unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. {link}, This article will examine the transatlantic relations and specifically address the question of whether the EU could replace the US as a benign hegemon. According to popular sources, a "benign hegemon" refers to a dominant power that exercises its influence in a manner that is generally considered beneficial. This notion is contemporary and is almost always used referring to the United States (US). Accordingly, the US has used its influence to provide global security and stability without being overly aggressive or coercive. The concept is rooted in hegemonic stability theory, which posits that a single dominant state is necessary to maintain the stability of the international system.[i] Scholars define a benign hegemon as one that provides the necessary power to uphold the international order. This involves advancing its interests while promoting global security and prosperity through multilateral treaties and international organizations, safeguarding national sovereignty via alliance networks and the UN Security Council, and fostering unrestricted market capitalism through trade deals and bodies such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund.[ii] Moreover, a benign hegemon is typically defined as a hegemonic power that, in addition to possessing overwhelming military and economic power, utilises its influence to promote more liberal principles within the international system. This includes pursuing liberal international values such as economic development, liberal and democratic political structures, and fostering a community of civilised states that resort to war only as a last resort and never against each other. The United States, as the hegemonic power after the Cold War, is often described as benign because its influence is broadly progressive, aiming to create a liberal world order based on free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unencumbered by the state. While the US maintains traditional geopolitical objectives, it also attempts to refashion the operational ground rules of the international system itself, promoting free trade, human rights, democratisation, and a global cultural infrastructure based on US technological companies. This combination of overwhelming power and a liberal agenda is what characterises a benign hegemon.[iii] Furthermore, experts often cite the US's "liberal grand strategy" as constructing a relatively benign and highly institutionalised multilateral system based on open markets, free trade, and the provision of public goods, such as collective security and an open international trading regime.[iv] This system is viewed as enabling other countries to prosper economically in a secure environment, with examples such as the rebuilding and subsequent success of Japan and Germany. However, the concept of benign hegemon is contested, with some arguing that the US lacks the resources to be a genuine global hegemon, as noted by John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye, who suggest it cannot achieve all security, political, and economic goals alone. This argument highlights the complexity of assessing whether the US's actions are truly benign, especially given its military and financial reach.[v] Historical Context The US's role as a potential benign hegemon has been prominent since the end of World War II, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when it occupied a hegemonic position within world politics Historical instances include its leadership in establishing the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and security alliances like NATO, which aimed to stabilise the global economy and provide collective defense. The US also played a key role in democratising post-war Europe and Japan, furthering its image as a stabilising force. On the positive side, the US led through consent, with high global approval ratings and multilateral actions, such as Bush Sr.'s Gulf War coalition and Obama's Libya UN action, which are claimed to be foundational to the liberal order since World War II. On the negative side, actions like the Iraq War, drone attacks, and government overthrows in Latin America and the Middle East are cited as evidence of coercion and imperialism, undermining the benign label. Scholars focusing on the Middle East note that despite its hegemonic role, the region has experienced significant violence and instability, with US interventions such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 Libya seen as sources of disorder rather than stability. This challenges the notion of benign hegemony, suggesting unipolarity (power dominance without ideological consensus) better explains US actions in the region.[vi] US hegemony and its limitations The concept of American hegemony has been a cornerstone of international relations since the end of World War II. However, in recent decades, the limitations of American hegemony have become increasingly apparent across military, economic, and cultural domains. Given the recent developments in the Middle East (war in Gaza and incursions between Israel and Iran), it seems logical to examine the limitations of US hegemony in the context of the region. Several factors contribute to the decline in American influence in the Middle East. Firstly, the failure of political reconstruction efforts in Iraq after the US-led invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein shifted America's position in the region from advantageous to disadvantaged and exposed the limits of American hegemony. Secondly, war-weariness within the United States affects the ability to sustain prolonged involvement and influence in the region. Thirdly, there is a relative neglect of the Arab-Israeli peace process, which undermines American credibility and effectiveness in the region. Fourthly, the impact of US regional policies on the influence of Iran, which has grown stronger partly as an unintended consequence of the Iraq war. Next, the emergence of a new regional power struggle between an Iranian-led bloc of mainly Shia actors and a Sunni bloc led by Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The rise of Islamist militias and political groups like Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, which were advantaged by early elections promoted by the US before adequate security and political institutions were in place. Next, the Bush administration's distancing from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process contributed to the rise of Hamas and further undermined moderate Palestinian leadership. Lastly, the diminished fear of American power by adversaries such as Iran, which refused negotiations and disregarded weak UN sanctions, and the uncertainty of America's Arab allies about the reliability of the US as a partner.[vii] Generally speaking, one of the most significant limitations of American military dominance is the issue of overextension. The US has maintained a global military presence, with bases and troops stationed across the world. However, this overextension has led to military fatigue and resource depletion. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, have strained the US military, leading to a decline in its ability to project power effectively.[viii] The rise of other military powers, particularly China, has also challenged the United States' military dominance. China's rapid military modernisation, including advancements in technology and naval capabilities, has narrowed the gap between the two superpowers. This has raised concerns about the US's ability to maintain its military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. [ix] Maintaining military dominance is costly, and the economic burden of sustaining a global military presence has taken a toll on the US economy. The high defence budget has led to trade imbalances and deindustrialisation, weakening the economic foundations of American hegemony.[x] The US economy has faced significant challenges, including deindustrialisation, financialisation, and rising competition from China. The shift of manufacturing activities to countries with lower labour costs has weakened the US industrial base, while the rise of China as a global economic powerhouse has challenged American economic influence.[xi] Globalisation has created a more interconnected world economy, reducing the US's ability to dictate economic policies unilaterally. The rise of emerging economies, particularly in Asia, has shifted the balance of economic power, making it difficult for the US to maintain its hegemony in global trade and finance.[xii] The dominance of the US dollar in the global financial system is facing challenges. The rise of alternative currencies and the increasing use of cryptocurrencies have threatened the dollar's hegemony. Additionally, countries like Russia and China are reducing their dependence on the dollar, further eroding its global dominance.[xiii] American cultural influence, once a cornerstone of its global hegemony, is facing resistance. The rise of non-Western cultural formations, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, has challenged the dominance of American media, entertainment, and values. This has led to a decline in the global appeal of American culture.[xiv] The US's soft power, which was once a key component of its hegemony, has declined in recent years. The country's unilateral policies, military interventions, and domestic challenges, such as racial tensions and economic inequality, have eroded its moral authority and global influence.[xv] What is the EU hoping to achieve as a global player? A thorough analysis of available up-to-date documents issued by the EU itself suggests several key areas of interest to the organisation as a key global player. First and foremost, the EU is committed to fostering peace, preventing conflicts, and strengthening international security. It supports a rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core, advocating for multilateralism and the rule of international law.[xvi] The EU has actively engaged in conflict resolution, such as promoting a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and supporting ceasefires in regions like Gaza.[xvii] It also invests significantly in the defence of Ukraine to counter Russian aggression, viewing this as critical to maintaining European and global stability.[xviii] As the world's largest trading power, the EU seeks to use its economic strength to boost prosperity, enhance its trading power, and foster mutually beneficial partnerships. The EU's economic influence is a key pillar of its global power strategy, as evidenced by recent agreements. In April 2025, the EU-Central Asia summit agreed on a strategic partnership aimed at strengthening economic ties between the EU and Central Asia.[xix] A month later (May 2025), the EU and Singapore signed a landmark Digital Trade Agreement, enhancing the EU's digital trade capabilities.[xx] Overall, the EU has over 40 trade agreements with 70 countries. These agreements fall into three distinct categories: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and Association Agreements (AAs). The EU also enters into non-preferential trade agreements, as part of broader deals such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs).[xxi] The EU provides significant development aid, which, when including the UK, is two-thirds greater than that of the US and is mainly supplied as grants rather than loans. According to the EU, this highlights its commitment to promoting human rights and sustainable development. The EU has built a dominant position in global development. It accounts for half of all aid worldwide, but the plethora of different programmes disguises its profile in this regard. [xxii] The EU aims to establish strong, well-managed partnerships with countries and regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood, particularly with middle powers (e.g., Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia) and pivotal regions (e.g., Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia). This is crucial for maintaining its influence in a multipolar world.[xxiii] In that respect, the EU is committed to reforming multilateral institutions, such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, to ensure more equitable representation and effectiveness. It also aims to play a leading role in shaping the future of global forums, such as the G-20. Initiatives such as the "Golden Gateway" (€300 billion by 2027, launched in late 2021) and "Team Europe" for post-COVID investments are part of the EU's strategy to counterbalance China's Belt and Road Initiative and engage more effectively with developing countries.[xxiv] The EU focuses on addressing global challenges, including climate action, migration, and economic development. It wants to ensure that its climate policies, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, do not hinder the development of Southern countries and offers compensation through initiatives like the Global Gateway and climate funds.[xxv] In 2021, the EU was the top partner for 80 countries and provided 43% of global official development assistance, underscoring its commitment.[xxvi] Migration reform is another priority, with the EU aiming to facilitate legal immigration pathways, including work visas, circular migration, and resettlement schemes, to address irregular entries and support global development.[xxvii] In this respect, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum in May 2024. According to the EU, "the asylum and migration pact will ensure a fairer and stronger migration system that makes a concrete difference on the ground. These new rules will enhance the effectiveness of the European asylum system and foster greater solidarity among member states. The European Union will also continue its close cooperation with third countries to tackle the root causes of irregular migration".[xxviii]   The EU aspires to be a more assertive player in global security, potentially reevaluating its role in NATO and taking on greater responsibility as a security guarantor, particularly in regions such as Africa. It recognises the need for a foreign policy that is both humble (acknowledging the need to do more to have an impact) and ambitious (aiming for strong partnerships to promote its interests and objectives). The EU faces challenges from disinformation campaigns by Russia and China, as well as historical resentment from centuries of European dominance. To address this, Brussels is scaling up its diplomatic engagement and communication efforts, including task forces for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and communication hubs like the one in Beirut (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives, citing EEAS Disinformation Speech). The EU aims to repair its image and rebuild trust abroad by positioning itself as a force for reform and a reliable partner for developing nations.[xxix] The EU finds itself squeezed between the United States and China, with its interests increasingly aligned with those of the US, yet also needing to assert its independence. The US's "pivot to Asia" has given the EU more freedom on specific international issues, but it also underscores the need for the EU to strengthen its global role.[xxx] The EU must also clarify its position vis-à-vis the Global South, ensuring that its policies are perceived as supportive and beneficial to developing nations, particularly in areas such as trade, climate, and security. Can the EU ever become a benign power? The answer to this question turns out to be negative, at least as long as we adhere to the criteria used so far. Below, the reader will find a list of reasons supporting the above-proposed statement. First, the EU is still not a unified entity, especially regarding its foreign, security, and, even more so, defence policy. It remains a collection of 27 semi-independent states, some, such as Germany, being more independent than others, notably the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Ultimately, the EU's ability to achieve its declared foreign and security objectives depends on the political dynamics and appetite for further integration among member states. For example, the latest proposed 18th package of Russian sanctions was blocked by Hungary and Slovakia, and Brussels has limited options for action, at least for now.[xxxi] The EU's vast asymmetry in power with its neighbors can lead to perceptions of dominance and coercion, even if the EU does not intend to be seen that way.[xxxii] One does not have to look far, but consider the latest (since 2015) waves of immigration. In northern Africa, as well as in some parts of the Middle East, South Asia, and South America, the EU member states are predominantly seen as former colonial powers. There appears to be a shared sense of entitlement towards the EU and its member states regarding its imperial past, which was often anything but benign. Importantly, this does not refer to central and Eastern European members of the EU.[xxxiii] While the EU remains an economic (albeit comparatively declining) and normative power (at least this is what it likes to self-identify), it lacks the military capacity to project its influence in the same way that traditional hegemons have. It is also doubtful that even if the SAFE instrument is fully realized in the next couple of years, the EU member states will have the industrial and human capacity to match the great powers, such as the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, or, most of all, China.  A quick juxtaposition of current defense spending, population numbers, population growth forecasts, and economic output forecasts tells us all we need to know in this regard. The answer is bitter for the EU; it is likely to matter less and less. On top of that, let's look at the notion of “benign”. What does it even mean? Perhaps the term is entirely false; maybe even the US does not now fulfill the “benign” requirements, at least not in the way it has been defined (as in the introduction). Perhaps, there has never really been a “benign hegemon,” and the EU should not even try to fill these shoes. As usual, there are more questions than answers. Whatever the EU becomes via SAFE, it will probably stand for, not the first time, as new and an “undefiable animal” – sui generis (of its kind) as the EU academics usually posit. The concept of the EU as a benign hegemon is complex and contested. While the EU does promote its values and norms through various means, the extent to which its influence is truly benign is debatable. The EU's internal divisions and its neighbors' perceptions of its power dynamics play a crucial role in shaping the reality of its regional role. Can the EU become a benign power in the future? The author of this analysis is rather negative. Especially, if the EU does not address the challenges as explored here: https://worldandnewworld.com/safe-europe-military-power-3/ and https://worldandnewworld.com/ukraine-european-defence-cooperation/   [1] Although not official, some discussions suggest animals like the Golden Eagle as potential symbols due to its historical significance in Europe, including its use in the Roman Empire and modern Germany.[i]   See more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory[ii]Keay, L. (2023). Surviving the End of US Hegemony. The International Spectator. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/c05/surviving-end-us-hegemony[iii]  Catley, B. (1997). Hegemonic America: The benign superpower? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 18(4), 377-399. ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798354[iv]   Catley, B. (1997). Hegemonic America: The Benign Superpower? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 18(4), 377–399. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798354[v]Mearsheimer, J. J. (2016). 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In Latin America, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are not alone in their support for Russia and its invasion of Ukraine. In many cases, support has been disguised as an interest in peace or a neutral stance towards the conflict, as seen in the cases of Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil. While we find manifold diplomatic approaches toward Russia and Ukraine in Latin America, the underlying motivations can be understood in terms of support or rejection. While a majority of nations reject the invasion, considering it a threat to territorial sovereignty and self-determination, others have been reluctant to place any blame on Russia. More broadly, there has been less of an ideological bloc and more of an anti-imperialist or anti-colonial sentiment, with a few exceptions, such as Gabrie Boric from Chile who has publicly repudiated Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. His opposition is a departure from other Latin American leftist leaders like Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Gustavo Francisco Petro who have been more critical of Volodymyr Zelensky than Vladimir Putin. However, we can still identify three distinctive approaches to the crisis: 1) geopolitical, 2) economic, and 3) historical. The region has a keen interest in keeping its doors open to Russia. BRICS members like Brazil have managed to maintain their alleged neutrality in the pursuit of peace—even as President Lula has explicitly supported  Putin—while simultaneously protecting their economic interests. Others like Colombia and Mexico have shielded their unwillingness to condemn Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in an apparent push for peace. On the economic front, attitudes towards Russia are more tenuous given that Russia’s capability for foreign direct investment has been significantly reduced by the brunt of the war, along with the impact of the economic sanctions that followed their aggression. To be sure, Russia’s investments in the region have been winding down for some time, with a decreasing profile in areas such as energy, oil, and gas, as well as software and IT. However, the economic ties are more significant in the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—where they are joined more by their subjection to economic sanctions, and therefore the necessity to evade the consequences of economic isolation. There are specific areas key to this alliance: Russian fertilisers, along with oil and diesel, are critical to bypassing Western sanctions. Meanwhile, historical ties are more consequential than is commonly understood. Misinterpretations of Russia’s Soviet past by leftist-governed Latin American countries and longstanding social and cultural commonalities partially explain the continued support from diverse leaders such as Lula and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. These ties, rooted in shared anti-colonial sentiments and cultivated over decades, and regardless of ideological shifts, illustrate Russia’s multifaceted regional influence. This context underscores the fact that Russia’s regional impact transcends ideological lines, with both left and right-wing governments either explicitly supporting Russia or criticising Ukraine’s NATO aspirations to justify Russia’s aggression. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has prominent leaders of the Latin American left aligning with the new administration, resulting in significant consequences for the region. The new US administration’s criticism of Kyiv resonates with positions held by Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Despite ideological differences, their alignment emerges from a mix of political affinities, geopolitical strategies, and historical connections. Putin’s explicit defiance of Donald Trump’s negotiation efforts raises questions about Latin America’s influence over the conflict, largely due to its initial reluctance to adopt a decisive stance against Putin. The lonely voice condemning Putin’s war of attrition continues to be Chilean President Gabriel Boric, in stark contrast to Lula DaSilva and Gustavo Petro, who remain in Putin’s corner, making it unlikely they can be viewed as honest brokers in a peace initiative. Trump’s policies have prompted Brazil and Colombia to voice limited concerns about US plans for Ukraine, although still refraining from outright condemnation of Russia. This stance appears less a genuine support for Ukraine and more an opposition to US involvement in peace processes, even blaming Ukraine as partially responsible. Meanwhile, ideology alone has proven insufficient to prompt unified condemnation of Russia or widespread support for Ukraine in Latin America. Previous efforts by the Biden administration to secure regional military assistance for Ukraine were met with firm rejection and reluctance. This distancing, interpreted as tacit support for Russia, contributes to concerns about increasing authoritarian tendencies in the region, reflecting a diminished commitment to emerging democracies in crisis. Effectively abandoned by the international community, Ukraine faces negotiations with nations seeking its valuable earth minerals in exchange for protection, essentially framing it within a debt relief context. The absence of significant Latin American critique of this neocolonial approach underscores a troubling shift where sovereignty and self-determination appear increasingly disposable, contingent upon geopolitical interests and contexts. Maria I. Puerta Riera is a Visiting Professor of Political Science at Valencia College in Orlando, FL., where she teaches U.S. Government and International Politics. She holds a PhD. in Social Sciences, with her research focusing on the crises of democracies in Latin America. She has a special interest in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, and is currently working on the effects of the illiberal regimes of China and Russia and their use of sharp power in the region. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Abstract We examine the roles of Gold and Bitcoin as a hedge, a safe haven, and a diversifier against the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the Ukraine War. Using a rolling window estimation of the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-based regression, we present a novel approach to examine the time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier properties of Gold and Bitcoin for equities portfolios. This article uses daily returns of Gold, Bitcoin, S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. Our results show that Gold is a better safe haven than the two, while Bitcoin exhibits weak properties as safe haven. Bitcoin can, however, be used as a diversifier and hedge. This study offers policy suggestions to investors to diversify their holdings during uncertain times. Introduction Financial markets and the diversity of financial products have risen in both volume and value, creating financial risk and establishing the demand for a safe haven for investors. The global financial markets have faced several blows in recent years. From the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to the outbreak of the pandemic and uncertainty regarding economic policy measures of governments and central banks, the financial markets including equity markets around the world were faced with severe meltdowns. This similar behavior was observed in other markets including equity and commodity markets, resulting in overall uncertainty. In this scenario, the investors normally flock toward the safe-haven assets to protect their investment. In normal situations, investors seek to diversify or hedge their assets to protect their portfolios. However, the financial markets are negatively impacted when there are global uncertainties. Diversification and hedging methods fail to safeguard investors’ portfolios during instability because almost all sectors and assets are negatively affected (Hasan et al., 2021). As a result, investors typically look for safe-haven investments to safeguard their portfolios under extreme conditions (Ceylan, 2022). Baur and Lucey (2010) provide the following definitions of hedge, diversifier, and safe haven: Hedge: An asset that, on average, has no correlation or a negative correlation with another asset or portfolio. On average, a strict hedge has a (strictly) negative correlation with another asset or portfolio.Diversifier: An asset that, on average, has a positive correlation (but not perfect correlation) with another asset or portfolio. Safe haven: This is the asset that in times of market stress or volatility becomes uncorrelated or negatively associated with other assets or a portfolio. As was previously indicated, the significant market turbulence caused by a sharp decline in consumer spending, coupled with insufficient hedging opportunities, was a common feature of all markets during these times (Yousaf et al., 2022). Nakamoto (2008) suggested a remedy by introducing Bitcoin, a “digital currency,” as an alternative to traditional fiduciary currencies (Paule-Vianez et al., 2020). Bitcoin often described as “Digital Gold” has shown greater resilience during periods of crises and has highlighted the potential safe haven and hedging property against uncertainties (Mokni, 2021). According to Dyhrberg (2016), the GFC has eased the emergence of Bitcoin thereby strengthening its popularity. Bouri et al. (2017) in their study indicate that Bitcoin has been viewed as a shelter from global uncertainties caused by conventional banking and economic systems. Recent research has found that Bitcoin is a weak safe haven, particularly in periods of market uncertainty like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis (Conlon & McGee, 2020; Nagy & Benedek, 2021; Shahzad et al., 2019; Syuhada et al., 2022). In contrast to these findings, a study by Yan et al. (2022) indicates that it can function as a strong safe haven in favorable economic times and with low-risk aversion. Ustaoglu (2022) also supports the strong safe-haven characteristic of Bitcoin against most emerging stock market indices during the COVID-19 period. Umar et al. (2023) assert that Bitcoin and Gold are not reliable safe-havens. Singh et al. (2024) in their study reveal that Bitcoin is an effective hedge for investments in Nifty-50, Sensex, GBP–INR, and JPY–INR, at the same time a good diversifier for Gold. The study suggests that investors can incorporate Bitcoin in their portfolios as a good hedge against market volatility in equities and commodities markets. During the COVID-19 epidemic, Barbu et al. (2022) investigated if Ethereum and Bitcoin could serve as a short-term safe haven or diversifier against stock indices and bonds. The outcomes are consistent with the research conducted by Snene Manzli et al. (2024). Both act as hybrid roles for stock market returns, diversifiers for sustainable stock market indices, and safe havens for bond markets. Notably, Bhuiyan et al. (2023) found that Bitcoin provides relatively better diversification opportunities than Gold during times of crisis. To reduce risks, Bitcoin has demonstrated a strong potential to operate as a buffer against global uncertainty and may be a useful hedging tool in addition to Gold and similar assets (Baur & Lucey, 2010; Bouri et al., 2017; Capie et al., 2005; Dyhrberg, 2015). According to Huang et al. (2021), its independence from monetary policies and minimal association with conventional financial assets allow it to have a safe-haven quality. Bitcoins have a substantial speed advantage over other assets since they are traded at high and constant frequencies with no days when trading is closed (Selmi et al., 2018). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the average monthly volatility of Bitcoin is higher than that of Gold or a group of international currencies expressed in US dollars; nevertheless, the lowest monthly volatility of Bitcoin is lower than the maximum monthly volatility of Gold and other foreign currencies (Dwyer, 2015). Leverage effects are also evident in Bitcoin returns, which show lower volatilities in high return periods and higher volatilities in low return times (Bouri et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). According to recent research, Bitcoins can be used to hedge S&P 500 stocks, which increases the likelihood that institutional and retail investors will build secure portfolios (Okorie, 2020). Bitcoin demonstrates strong hedging capabilities and can complement Gold in minimizing specific market risks (Baur & Lucey, 2010). Its high-frequency and continuous trading further enrich the range of available hedging tools (Dyhrberg, 2016). Moreover, Bitcoin spot and futures markets exhibit similarities to traditional financial markets. In the post-COVID-19 period, Zhang et al. (2021) found that Bitcoin futures outperform Gold futures.Gold, silver, palladium, and platinum were among the most common precious metals utilized as safe-haven investments. Gold is one such asset that is used extensively (Salisu et al., 2021). Their study tested the safe-haven property of Gold against the downside risk of portfolios during the pandemic. Empirical results have also shown that Gold functions as a safe haven for only 15 trading days, meaning that holding Gold for longer than this period would result in losses to investors. This explains why investors buy Gold on days of negative returns and sell it when market prospects turn positive and volatility decreases (Baur & Lucey, 2010). In their study, Kumar et al. (2023) tried to analyse the trends in volume throughout futures contracts and investigate the connection between open interest, volume, and price for bullion and base metal futures in India. Liu et al. (2016) in their study found that there is no negative association between Gold and the US stock market during times of extremely low or high volatility. Because of this, it is not a strong safe haven for the US stock market (Hood & Malik, 2013). Post-COVID-19, studies have provided mixed evidence on the safe-haven properties of Gold (Bouri et al., 2020; Cheema et al., 2022; Ji et al., 2020). According to Kumar and Padakandla (2022), Gold continuously demonstrates safe-haven qualities for all markets, except the NSE, both in the short and long term. During the COVID-19 episode, Gold’s effectiveness as a hedge and safe-haven instrument has been impacted (Akhtaruzzaman et al., 2021). Al-Nassar (2024) conducted a study on the hedge effectiveness of Gold and found that it is a strong hedge in the long run. Bhattacharjee et al. (2023) in their paper examined the symmetrical and asymmetrical linkage between Gold price levels and the Indian stock market returns by employing linear autoregressive distributed lag and nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag models. The results exhibit that the Indian stock market returns and Gold prices are cointegrated. According to the most recent study by Kaczmarek et al. (2022), Gold has no potential as a safe haven, despite some studies on the COVID-19 pandemic showing contradictory results. The co-movements of Bitcoin and the Chinese stock market have also normalized as a result of this epidemic (Belhassine & Karamti, 2021). Widjaja and Havidz (2023) verified that Gold was a safe haven asset during the COVID-19 pandemic, confirming the Gold’s safe-haven characteristic. As previously pointed out, investors value safe-haven investments in times of risk. Investors panic at these times when asset prices fall and move from less liquid (risky) securities to more liquid (safe) ones, such as cash, Gold, and government bonds. An asset must be bought and sold rapidly, at a known price, and for a reasonably modest cost to be considered truly safe (Smales, 2019). Therefore, we need to properly re-examine the safe-haven qualities of Gold and Bitcoin due to the mixed evidences regarding their safe-haven qualities and the impact of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine on financial markets. This work contributes to and deviates from the body of existing literature in the following ways. We propose a novel approach in this work to evaluate an asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier characteristics. This research examines the safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities of Gold and Bitcoin against the equity indices; S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50. Through the use of rolling window estimation, we extend the methodology of Ratner and Chiu (2013) by estimating the aforementioned properties of the assets. Comparing rolling window estimation to other conventional techniques, the former will provide a more accurate representation of an asset’s time-varying feature. This study explores the conventional asset Gold’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. We use Bitcoin, an unconventional safe-haven asset, for comparison. Data and Methodology We use the daily returns of three major equity indices; S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. The equity indices were selected to represent three large and diverse markets namely the United States, France, and India in terms of geography and economic development. We assess safe-haven assets using the daily returns of Gold and Bitcoin over the same time. Equity data was collected from Yahoo Finance, Bitcoin data from coinmarketcap.com, and Gold data from the World Gold Council website. Engle (2002) developed the DCC (Dynamic Conditional Correlation)-GARCH model, which is frequently used to assess contagion amid pandemic uncertainty or crises. Time-varying variations in the conditional correlation of asset pairings can be captured using the DCC-GARCH model. Through employing this model, we can analyse the dynamic behavior of volatility spillovers. Engle’s (2002) DCC-GARCH model contains two phases; 1. Univariate GARCH model estimation2. Estimation of time-varying conditional correlation. For its explanation, mathematical characteristics, and theoretical development, see here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578] Results and Discussion The outcomes of the parameters under the DCC-GARCH model for each of the asset pairs selected for the investigation are shown in Table 1.   First, we look at the dynamical conditional correlation coefficient, ρ.The rho value is negative and insignificant for NSE 50/Gold, NSE 50 /BTC, S&P500/Gold, and S&P500/BTC indicating a negative and insignificant correlation between these asset pairs, showing Gold and Bitcoin as potential hedges and safe havens. The fact that ρ is negative and significant for CAC 40/Gold suggests that Gold can be a safe haven against CAC 40 swings. The asset pair CAC/BTC, on the other hand, has possible diversifier behavior with ρ being positive but statistically insignificant. Next, we examine the behavior of the DCC-GARCH parameters; α and β. We find that αDCC is statistically insignificant for all the asset pairs, while βDCC is statistically significant for all asset pairs. βDCC quantifies the persistence feature of the correlation and the extent of the impact of volatility spillover in a particular market’s volatility dynamics. A higher βDCC value implies that a major part of the volatility dynamics can be explained by the respective market’s own past volatility. For instance, the NSE 50/Gold’s βDCC value of 0.971 shows that there is a high degree of volatility spillover between these two assets, with about 97% of market volatility being explained by the assets’ own historical values and the remainder coming from spillover. Thus, we see that the volatility spillover is highly persistent (~0.8) for all the asset pairs except NSE 50/BTC. The results above show that the nature of the dynamic correlation between the stock markets, Bitcoin and Gold is largely negative, pointing toward the possibility of Gold and Bitcoin being hedge/safe haven. However, a detailed analysis is needed to confirm the same by employing rolling window analysis, and we present the results in the forthcoming section. We present the rolling window results for S&P500 first. We present the regression results for Gold in Figure 1 and Bitcoin in Figure 2   Figure 1. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Gold.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. In Figure 1, we examine the behavior of β0 (intercept term), β1, β2, and β3 (partial correlation coefficients). The intercept term β0 will give an idea about whether the asset is behaving as a diversifier or hedge. Here, the intercept term shows significance most of the time. However, during 2018, the intercept was negative and significant, showing that it could serve as a hedge during geopolitical tensions and volatilities in the global stock market. However, during the early stages of COVID-19, we show that the intercept is negative and showing statistical significance, suggesting that Gold could serve as a hedge during the initial shocks of the pandemic. These findings are contrary to the results in the study by Tarchella et al. (2024) where they found hold as a good diversifier. Later, we find the intercept to be positive and significant, indicating that Gold could act as a potential diversifier. But during the Russia-Ukraine War, Gold exhibited hedge ability again. Looking into the behavior of β1, which is the partial correlation coefficient for the tenth percentile of return distribution shows negative and insignificant during 2018. Later, it was again negative and significant during the initial phases of COVID-19, and then negative in the aftermath, indicating that Gold could act as a weak safe haven during the COVID-19 pandemic. Gold could serve as a strong safe haven for the SP500 against volatility in the markets brought on by the war in Ukraine, as we see the coefficient to be negative and large during this time. From β2 and β3, the partial correlation coefficients of the fifth and first percentile, respectively, show that Gold possesses weak safe haven properties during COVID-19 and strong safe haven behavior during the Ukraine crisis. Next, we examine the characteristics of Bitcoin as a hedge/diversifier/safe haven against the S&P500 returns. We present the results in Figure 2.   Figure 2. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Bitcoin.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. Like in the previous case, we begin by analysing the behavior of the intercept coefficient, which is β0. As mentioned earlier the intercept term will give a clear picture of the asset’s hedging and diversifier property. In the period 2018–2019, the intercept term is positive but insignificant. This could be due to the large volatility in Bitcoin price movements during the period. It continues to be minimal (but positive) and insignificant during 2019–2020, indicating toward weak diversification possibility. Post-COVID-19 period, the coefficient shows the significance and positive value, displaying the diversification potential. We see that the coefficient remains positive throughout the analysis, confirming Bitcoin’s potential as a diversifier. Looking into the behavior of β1 (the partial correlation coefficient at tenth percentile), it is positive but insignificant during 2018. The coefficient is having negative sign and showing statistical significance in 2019, suggesting that Bitcoin could be a good safe haven in that year. This year was characterized by a long list of corporate scandals, uncertainties around Brexit, and tensions in global trade. We can observe that throughout the COVID-19 period, the coefficient is showing negative sign and negligible during the March 2020 market meltdown, suggesting inadequate safe-haven qualities. However, Bitcoin will regain its safe-haven property in the coming periods, as the coefficient is negative and significant in the coming months. The coefficient is negative and shows statistical significance during the Ukrainian crisis, suggesting strong safe-haven property. Only during the Ukrainian crisis could Bitcoin serve as a safe haven, according to the behavior of β2, which displays the partial correlation coefficient at the fifth percentile. Bitcoin was a weak safe haven during COVID-19 and the Ukrainian crisis, according to β3, the partial correlation coefficient for the first percentile (coefficient negative and insignificant). According to the overall findings, Gold is a stronger safe haven against the S&P 500’s swings. This result is consistent with the previous studies of Triki and Maatoug (2021), Shakil et al. (2018), Będowska-Sójka and Kliber (2021), Drake (2022), and Ghazali et al. (2020), etc. The same analysis was conducted for the CAC 40 and the NSE 50; the full analysis can be found here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578]. However, it is important to highlight the respective results: In general, we may say that Gold has weak safe-haven properties considering CAC40. We can conclude that Bitcoin’s safe-haven qualities for CAC40 are weak. We can say that Gold showed weak safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis and good safe-haven characteristics for the NSE50 during COVID-19. We may say that Bitcoin exhibits weak safe haven, but strong hedging abilities to NSE50. Concluding Remarks In this study, we suggested a new method to evaluate an asset’s time-varying hedge, diversifier, and safe-haven characteristics. We propose a rolling window estimation of the DCC-based regression of Ratner and Chiu (2013). Based on this, we estimate the conventional asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying properties during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. For comparison purposes, we include Bitcoin, a nonconventional safe-haven asset. We evaluate Gold and Bitcoin’s safe haven, hedging, and diversifier properties to the S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 variations. We use a rolling window of length 60 to estimate the regression. From the results, we find that Gold can be considered as a better safe haven against the fluctuations of the S&P 500. In the case of CAC 40, Gold and Bitcoin have weak safe-haven properties. While Bitcoin demonstrated strong safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis, Gold exhibited strong safe-haven characteristics during COVID-19 for the NSE 50. Overall, the findings indicate that Gold is the better safe haven. This outcome is consistent with earlier research (Będowska-Sójka & Kliber, 2021; Drake, 2022; Ghazali et al., 2020; Shakil et al., 2018; Triki & Maatoug, 2021). When it comes to Bitcoin, its safe-haven feature is weak. Bitcoin, however, works well as a diversifier and hedge. Therefore, from a policy perspective, investing in safe-haven instruments is crucial to lower the risks associated with asset ownership. Policymakers aiming to enhance the stability of financial portfolios might encourage institutional investors and other market players to incorporate Gold into their asset allocations. Gold’s strong safe-haven qualities, proven across various market conditions, make it a reliable choice. Gold’s performance during crises like COVID-19 highlights its potential to mitigate systemic risks effectively. Further, Bitcoin could also play a complementary role as a hedge and diversifier, especially during periods of significant volatility such as the Ukraine crisis. While Bitcoin’s safe-haven characteristics are relatively weaker, its inclusion in a diversified portfolio offers notable value and hence it should not be overlooked. Further, policymakers may consider how crucial it is to monitor dynamic correlations and periodically rebalance portfolios to account for shifts in the safe haven and hedging characteristics of certain assets. Such measures could help reduce the risks of over-reliance on a single asset type and create more resilient portfolios that can better withstand global economic shocks. For future research, studies can be conducted on the estimation of the rolling window with different widths. This is important to understand how the safe-haven property changes across different holding periods. Further, more equity markets would be included to account for the differences in market capitalization and index constituents. This study can be extended by testing these properties for multi-asset portfolios as well. We intend to take up this study in these directions in the future. Data Availability StatementNot applicable.Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ReferencesAkhtaruzzaman M., Boubaker S., Lucey B. M., & Sensoy A. (2021). Is gold a hedge or a safe-haven asset in the COVID-19 crisis? Economic Modelling, 102, 105588. Crossref. Web of Science.Al-Nassar N. S. (2024). Can gold hedge against inflation in the UAE? A nonlinear ARDL analysis in the presence of structural breaks. PSU Research Review, 8(1), 151–166. Crossref.Barbu T. C., Boitan I. A., & Cepoi C. O. (2022). Are cryptocurrencies safe havens during the COVID-19 pandemic? A threshold regression perspective with pandemic-related benchmarks. Economics and Business Review, 8(2), 29–49. 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Abstract European states currently lack a clear joint strategy on China and a coordinated approach to US–China competition. This article offers a novel perspective on the challenges for European approaches to this issue due to an omnipresent transatlantic component and the risk of an alliance dilemma. Illustratively focusing on France, Germany and the UK, it demonstrates that Europeans are facing a transatlantic alliance dilemma with the risks of abandonment and entrapment. It argues that Europe needs to strike a balance between its dependence on Washington, especially with regard to European security, while fearing entrapment by the US approach towards Beijing as it aims to maintain economic ties with China. The article concludes that the ramifications of this dilemma can be mitigated through a distinctly European approach to China, strengthening European coordination on China and bolstering European strategic autonomy. As a conceptual piece rather than a full empirical analysis, this article therefore unpacks the strategic challenge and lays the groundwork for further empirical works on the topic. Introduction Strategic competition between the US and China plays out in many realms of international affairs, ranging from global trade to security in the Indo-Pacific. European states are directly affected by this dynamic as they maintain critical ties with both sides. Albeit allies of the US through NATO, Europeans have been reluctant to align with the US on its approach to the Indo-Pacific and China, which is currently characterised by the quest to win the strategic competition with Beijing in all areas of international affairs (see Leoni 2023). Furthermore, Europe maintains close economic ties with Beijing, and imports from China to the EU have most recently increased (Lovely and Yan 2024). European governments certainly do not pursue an approach of maintaining equidistance between the US and China: not only do they regularly emphasise their strategic proximity to Washington, but more recent events, such as the willingness of European allies to publicly adopt the wording of the communiqué from NATO’s Washington summit (NATO 2024) describing China as an ‘enabler of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine’, clearly demonstrate that the tone is changing in European capitals (Politi 2023). However, Europeans still tend to emphasise China’s role in global affairs and the importance of including it in multilateral cooperation formats. With the re-election of Donald Trump as US president, European policy on China and its approach to US–China competition will increasingly be a focus of the US administration. While the exact approach of the new US government still remains to be defined, there are good reasons to anticipate a more hawkish China policy from Washington, through which the US might seek not only to further compete with China, but to actually win this competition (see Pottinger and Gallagher 2023). When designing their approaches towards China—which, among the key European states, only Germany has done so far, with the publication of its China strategy in 2023—Europeans always face a transatlantic elephant in the room. US–China competition, a structuring feature of international relations shaping the global order today through the increasing emergence of geopolitical blocs (see Leoni and Tzinieris 2024), and China’s rising global influence in almost all areas of international affairs—ranging from climate to economics, the rules-based order and security—are forcing European states to reflect on their approach vis-à-vis Beijing (for a full discussion, see Oertel 2023; García-Herrero and Vasselier 2024). As NATO members, European states also need to adapt their strategy in light of the partnership with the US as their key ally. This article argues that European approaches towards China, as shown in the examples of France, Germany and the UK, have a distinctly transatlantic component. It illustrates how these three European states find themselves in an alliance dilemma with the US, and how the risks associated with alliances also define European approaches to China and US–China competition more broadly. As the US administration regularly refers to China as a ‘challenge’ (US Department of Defense 2022), this article alludes to this formulation through the coining of the term ‘transatlantic China challenge’ to describe the strategic challenges Europeans are facing with regard to defining their approach vis-à-vis China and US–China competition more broadly. It offers a conceptual understanding of the strategic challenges for Europe in this context and thereby constitutes a basis for a more thorough empirical analysis. The alliance dilemma and European strategy in US–China competition Originating in realist international relations theory, the alliance dilemma generally describes a situation in which states face risks resulting from joining an alliance. As demonstrated by Snyder (1984), smaller allies especially face a parallel risk of abandonment and entrapment by a hegemon, that is, the dominating power, after joining an alliance. Abandonment, in these circumstances, implies that the hegemon has no further interest in defending or supporting the smaller allies, whereas entrapment refers to a situation in which a state is ‘dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that [it] does not share, or shares only partially’ (see Snyder 1984, 466–8). In the context of alliances, a small state is ‘the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own’ (Wivel et al. 2014, 9), and hence has more limited space for action than the great powers (Wivel and Thorhallsson 2018, 267). This definition arguably applies to Europe in its partnership with the US, as demonstrated by the excessive military and economic dominance of the US as compared to the European states (see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute n.d.; International Monetary Fund 2025). The re-election of Trump as US president now presents the risk of an increased alliance dilemma for Europeans. On the one hand, Trump has announced several times that he does not value the alliance commitments within NATO and potentially would not defend European allies (Sullivan 2024), threatening Europe with abandonment. This scenario is being taken seriously in European capitals, and reflections on how ‘defending Europe with less America’ (Grand 2024) could shape up have gained traction, especially in 2024. Similarly, defence initiatives within the EU to enhance the European contribution to the continent’s security have leapt forward in recent years (see Scazzieri 2025). On the other hand, even the Biden administration had pushed Europe to align with the US approach on China (see Lynch et al. 2023). However, France and Germany in particular, as the big EU member states, have been hesitant to do so, as reflected in France’s opposition to the opening of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo (McCurry 2023) and Germany’s vote against tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, fearing reprisals from Beijing (Demarais 2024). Trump’s foreign policy might be strongly characterised by issue linkage, which means that policies in one area will be linked to those in another area. Through this strategy, the new US administration might force Europeans into alignment and thereby entrap them, making them accept policies they are not eager to support (see Barkin and Kratz 2025). The exact policies of the Trump administration vis-à-vis European allies remain to be seen, but it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which abandonment and entrapment could emerge or increase, namely when the threat of abandonment is used to entrap allies and force them to support certain policy decisions. The alliance dilemma could play out for Europeans specifically when designing their approaches towards China (see Barkin and Kratz 2025) and formulating their response to US–China competition more generally. As noted above, among the big European states, only Germany has formally adopted a strategy on China, in 2023 (The Federal Government of Germany 2023). However, China and the response to US–China competition takes a prominent place in France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and its strategy review (Government of France 2021; Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale 2022), and the UK systematically included the dimension of strategic competition in its Integrated Review and its refresh (Government of the United Kingdom 2021, 2023) and has announced an ‘audit’ of its China policy under the new government (Taylor 2024). While these strategies emphasise their individual approaches towards China and the risks stemming from US–China competition, the US has increasingly pressured Europe to align with its approach (Lynch et al. 2023) and can be expected to continue this pressure (Barkin and Kratz 2025). Through the potential issue linkage of security (openly questioned by President Trump) and China policy, Europe therefore finds itself in a new form of alliance security dilemma. European approaches to US–China competition: strategic hedging How can Europe respond to the alliance dilemma of the risks of abandonment and entrapment when it comes to its approaches to China? Reviewing the theoretical literature on the alliance dilemma, one can imagine different strategies. According to Snyder, members of alliances can choose between strategies that strengthen or weaken their commitment to the alliance. To demonstrate commitment, actions could include reassurances for the ally or demonstrations of loyalty, whereas actions to weaken the commitment to the alliance could consist of restraining the ally (mostly to reduce the risk of entrapment in a conflict), increasing bargaining power over the ally or preserving options for realignment outside the existing alliance (for a full discussion, see Snyder 1984, 466–9). Alternative strategies include hiding from cooperation, that is, ‘seeking to maximize autonomy by opting out of specific aspects of the cooperation or by setting up “bastions” in the cooperation’, or bandwagoning, through which states pursue strategies of adaptation ‘to the more powerful actors in the cooperation’ (Pedersen 2023, 442). At the moment, it seems that France, Germany and the UK ‘drive on sight’ rather than approaching the question holistically. The following analysis aims to unpack how the three European states see US–China competition, the risk of the alliance dilemma and how these reflections have played out so far in their strategies. The strategies of France, Germany and the UK on China demonstrate that their approaches are influenced by a distinctly transatlantic component and reflect the transatlantic alliance dilemma. This is visible in their (1) high awareness of the risks stemming from great power competition, (2) approaches to managing the risk of short-term abandonment, and (3) hedging to mitigate the medium- and long-term risks of abandonment and entrapment. The empirical evidence for this analysis was gathered through a qualitative analysis of European strategic documents, statements and policy decisions taken mostly during the period of the Biden administration. However, in light of the risk of a scaling-up of the alliance dilemma under the Trump administration, sources and evidence accessible by the end of January 2025 were included to illustrate the European approaches. In addition to publicly available documents and the sources mentioned above, this paper draws on conversations with policymakers and experts under the Chatham House rule. Mitigating risks from US–China competition: multilateralism instead of alignment That France, Germany and the UK are close allies with the US is clearly visible in their respective strategies on China, not least because of references they make to the importance of the alliance and their descriptions of their own positions between the two great powers. Overall, France, Germany and the UK share the perception of US–China competition and the emergence of blocs as potentially harmful to their interests. As a consequence, all three call for an inclusive multilateral order instead of falling into a logic of blocs, as the increasing competition is seen as a risk for Europe (Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale 2022, 9–15; The Federal Government of Germany 2020, 24–6; Government of the United Kingdom 2023, 22–6). The response of all three European powers to the emergence of blocs is multilateralism: instead of clearly aligning with the US, the French, German and British strategies call for building broader multilateral coalitions, which should, eventually, also include China (The Federal Government of Germany 2020, 23–6; Government of the United Kingdom 2023). The tone in Paris, Berlin and London towards Beijing has clearly changed over recent years; accordingly, the European capitals were also willing to support strong wording on China in the 2024 NATO summit declaration, which describes China as a ‘critical enabler’ of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine (NATO 2024). Albeit also recognised as a critical partner for key issues such as climate policy and trade, European states openly describe China as a ‘systemic rival’ and occasionally call out China’s behaviour, as they did, for example, in the case of a note verbale on the South China Sea (UN 2020). Nevertheless, Europe has not (yet) given in to US pressure to align with Washington’s more confrontational approach towards China (Etienne 2024). Even if European states and Washington have moved closer to each other, especially on economic security (Meyers and Reinsch 2023), the European positions on US–China competition demonstrate that Europeans are not willing to fully endorse or follow Washington’s approach—not least because European imports from China have increased in recent years (Lovely and Yan 2024). Managing the risk of short-term abandonment Since Trump’s election, the risk of abandonment by the US has been seen as increasingly high in Paris, Berlin and London.1 This is not least because Trump has openly questioned his willingness to adhere to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the case of an armed attack on Europeans (Sullivan 2024). Europeans are especially concerned about issue linkage in this context, meaning that demands in a policy area other than security could be used as a condition. Concretely, Trump could use the threat of abandonment as leverage to compel Europe to align with the US on China policy.2 Barkin and Kratz (2025) suggest that Europe adopt a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, whereby Europe could start with an offer to the US: buying more liquified natural gas, defence goods and agricultural products from the US could mitigate the risk of abandonment. However, there is awareness among European states that coercion from the US to align on US–China policy, especially when linked to the threat of abandonment, might best be mitigated through enhancing European military capabilities—which would still leave the continent exposed to these threats, though to a lesser extent.3 Addressing the risk of medium- and long-term abandonment and entrapment: transatlantic hedging However, the risk of at least partial abandonment is not a new challenge for European strategy, and had already infused earlier strategic thinking. The shift of US strategic priorities away from Europe and to the Indo-Pacific has already been demonstrated in the allocation of resources to the different theatres. Moreover, European states have increasingly become aware that US forces will be withdrawn from their territories in the future and have concluded that they will have to step up their own commitment to European security (see Grand 2024). In parallel, there is an awareness in European capitals that showing more interest in the Indo-Pacific and giving more importance to policy on China is also a way for Europeans to demonstrate an understanding of their ally’s strategic priorities.4 Accordingly, the approaches of France, Germany and the UK to China and the Indo-Pacific also have to be understood as a commitment to the priorities of the US in order to keep this ally engaged in the European theatre and mitigate the risk of abandonment; however, European states abstain from fully aligning with the US approach, as their capabilities and strategic goals are perceived as diverging from those of the US. In this way, Europe aims to avoid entrapment over the medium term through slightly distancing itself from US policy. While all three European states also call for de-risking from China and diversification of their supply chains, maintaining strong economic ties with Beijing is a key component of their respective approaches—which contrasts with the US calls for decoupling. Furthermore, these states have never formally endorsed the US policy on China (Etienne 2024). Nevertheless, enhancing European capabilities would not only send a signal to Washington, but also qualify as hedging, understood as an ‘insurance policy’ to avoid a deterioration in US–Europe relations if the US opted for abandonment, or even as part of a move towards emancipation to reduce strategic dependencies on Washington (see Fiott 2018, 4–6). Conclusion: a transatlantic China challenge Designing their approaches to China and to US–China competition more broadly constitutes a complex strategic dilemma for European states. Paris, Berlin and London do not fully align with Washington’s approach, and it remains to be seen whether they will be willing to do so under the second Trump administration. To manage the risk of abandonment and entrapment, European states pursue different individual approaches to strategic hedging: their strategies on China and US–China competition are designed in a way that allows them to mitigate the risk of abandonment which might stem from significant transatlantic divergence, and to avoid automatic entrapment through their slight distancing from the US approach. From a theoretical perspective, this article has demonstrated that the alliance dilemma, along with the parallel fear of abandonment and entrapment by the US, is a major factor accounting for Europe’s limited strategies on China and its hedging behaviour. This article offers a conceptual analysis of the structural forces explaining European strategies, but other strategic cultures and relationships with the US could offer important complementary insights. To further analyse how individual European states design their strategies vis-à-vis China in light of the alliance dilemma and potential domestic constraints and specificities, neoclassical realism could offer an interesting analytical concept. This approach posits that structural forces set the parameters for foreign policy and treats domestic factors, including strategic culture, as intervening variables (see Rose 1998). Accordingly, it appears well suited for foreign policy analysis, and has indeed gained popularity in the field in recent years (see, for example, Martill and Sus 2024; Meibauer et al. 2021; Weber 2024). Empirically, this article constitutes a conceptual starting point rather than an exhaustive analysis of the strategy-making processes of European states with regard to China and US–China competition and makes a more comprehensive assessment desirable. The findings of this article have broader implications for policymaking. First, they demonstrate the necessity for Europe to determine its place in the increasing US–China competition. European coordination on the respective approaches vis-à-vis the US—especially in light of potential coercion to align—and China is of paramount importance to ensure that foreign policy strategies are mutually reinforcing and not undermining European objectives. Second, the article demonstrates that Europe currently responds to the ‘transatlantic China challenge’ through transatlantic hedging: while this strategy seems to be promising in the short term, it is questionable to what extent the strategy is sustainable and could help European states to navigate the parallel challenges of abandonment and entrapment. Unless Europe decides to fully align with the US—and it is questionable whether this decision would be in its interest—European states would be well advised to develop a sustainable long-term approach to China. A transatlantic dialogue on China, in which Europe and the US openly discuss synergies and divergences, could help prevent misunderstandings and decrease the risk of coercion or issue linkage due to a misreading of European approaches in Washington. Third, as the risks of (at least partial) abandonment and entrapment are systemic challenges due to the current composition of the transatlantic alliance, a logical step for European states to decrease their dependence on the US as the hegemon in the alliance would be to significantly strengthen European capabilities. Stronger military capabilities could help mitigate the ramifications of abandonment, and the aforementioned distinctly European strategy could allow Europe to avoid strategic entrapment in relation to China imposed by Washington. As Europe remains the junior partner in the transatlantic alliance, the parallel risks of abandonment and entrapment, as well as issue linkage, are highly likely to influence its approaches towards China in the long term, but there are certainly ways to render this ‘transatlantic China challenge’ less challenging. ORCID iDGesine Weber https://orcid.org/0009-0008-2643-0400Footnotes1. 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