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The Arctic is hot. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has resulted in suspended cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council; Finnish and future Swedish membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) means that seven of the eight members of the Arctic Council will also be NATO member states; and a deepening of Chinese–Russian ties over the Arctic has increased security tensions in the region. At the same time, the Arctic is warming four times faster than the global average and is predicted to be ice-free at its summer minimum at least once before 2050 under all climate change scenarios. New resources and fish stocks, shorter shipping routes and unclaimed territory are becoming available as the ice melts. In addition, the Arctic holds 13–30 per cent of the world’s unexploited oil and gas. There are also large deposits of nickel, zinc and rare earth elements in the Arctic that are key to renewable energy and the green transition.  These changes in the Arctic are affecting the development aims of actors such as the European Union (EU). Recent changes in Kiruna, a Swedish mining town located approximately 200 kilometres north of the Arctic Circle, provides evidence of these aims. When Sweden assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in January 2023, it held its first Swedish meeting there. Two key announcements relating to Kiruna were made at that time: confirmation of the largest deposit of rare earth elements in Europe, namely the Per Geijer deposit; and the inauguration of Spaceport Esrange, which will commence launches of small satellites in 2024. These developments are important for the EU and Sweden but, if not properly planned for, they could spill over into local social and environmental conflict and have long-term consequences. The case of the Arctic sheds light on the importance of balancing the trade-offs inherent in economic and development ambitions. This SIPRI Policy Brief first explores the EU’s growing interest in the Arctic and its efforts to reduce negative spillovers. It then takes Kiruna as an example of where interests linked to mining and space-related activities could lead to local controversy. The policy brief concludes with starting points for how to ensure more mutually beneficial outcomes moving forward.  THE EU’S GROWING INTEREST IN THE ARCTIC  The Arctic is becoming of strategic importance to the EU, including for its climate, energy, and space-related possibilities. The EU’s 2021 Arctic Policy promotes cooperation and sustainable development in the region, including through green and blue energy projects and the supply of critical materials that are key to implementing the European Green Deal (EGD), a package of policy initiatives aimed at achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The EU’s 2023 proposal for a Critical Raw Materials Act underpins the need for EU self-sufficiency, strengthened capacities for extraction and refining of raw materials, and diversified supply chains. Europe is currently almost entirely dependent on imports of critical materials, 70 per cent of which are sourced from Russia and China, but it has been set on reducing this dependency, especially given shortages in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and the energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.  The Arctic is also important for expanding EU space capabilities. The EU’s 2023 Space Strategy for Security and Defence outlines the significance of its space assets and the need to defend them, especially given the augmented militarization of space and the increased use of dual-use space assets by Russia, China, the United States, and India. Space technologies can also promote Earth observation to support climate change and scientific monitoring. Polar orbiting satellites launched from the Arctic, for example, are uniquely placed for Earth observation. Since the Earth rotates while a satellite orbits, a satellite in polar orbit passes over both poles and travels directly overhead every point on Earth. Addressing the social and environmental implications  Although the Arctic can provide raw materials and expand space capabilities, the resulting social and environmental impacts can also be significant. Moreover, the economic benefits are not always equitably shared, and any new jobs created are not always compatible with local competences. The extraction of resources can also result in competing land and resource claims with Indigenous communities. A study of 53 socio-environmental conflicts related to the economic extraction of natural resources in the Arctic found that Indigenous people were involved in 64 per cent of them. For the Sami, the EU’s only Indigenous group, these challenges add to those already faced by climate change, which is reducing the availability of lichen used as a winter food source for their reindeer and grazing lands more generally. In Sweden, conflicts with the Sami are often related to mining and renewable energy projects. Nine of the 12 metal mines in Sweden are located on Sami lands. Sweden is dependent on hydropower for around 45 per cent of its electricity generation, and 80 per cent of this also takes place on these lands. Wind power generation through projects like the Markbygden Wind Farm, the largest worldwide with expected completion in 2025, has also reduced access to reindeer herding routes. Sweden is a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) but has not ratified the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which upholds rights to self-determination and control over land and resources.  The EU recognizes the need to address these local impacts. Its ‘Fit for 55’ package, which reduces net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030 and supports implementation of the EGD, emphasizes a socially just and fair energy transition and protecting the Arctic from pollution. The EU’s 2021 Joint Communication on the Arctic reaffirms its responsibility to protect and minimize its environmental footprint there. The 2023 Kiruna Declaration notes the vulnerability of remote areas such as the Arctic to energy transitions and the importance of sustainable place-based development. In June 2023, the EU recognized that external interests in the Arctic are ‘increasing with multifaceted social, environmental, and economic con sequences. The EU also upholds Indigenous rights. The EU supported the adoption of UNDRIP in 2007, which also grants the right to free, prior, and informed consent, enabling Indigenous peoples to give or withhold their consent to projects. Article 3 of the Treaty of the EU protects European cultural heritage, which Sami reindeer husbandry is a part of. However, the EU does not have an internal Indigenous people’s policy, which could help to ensure that the negative impacts of conflicts linked to projects supporting the EGD in Europe are addressed internally within the EU’s framework and to uphold these rights. THE CASE OF KIRUNA   Kiruna is the northernmost city in Sweden, located in Swedish Lapland, around 200 km north of the Arctic Circle, with a population of around 23 000 people (see figure 1). It was built in 1900 to facilitate iron ore extrac tion from the mountain of Kirunavaara (meaning ‘Kiruna mine’), which is the largest and purest underground deposit in the world and the source of approximately 90 per cent of Europe’s iron ore. Kiruna is also home to the Sami and Tornedalian Indigenous peoples, who populated the lands long before the town was constructed. It has the highest concentration of Sami population in Sweden, with eight different Sami villages (known as ‘samebyar’) and around 2 500 people, constituting approximately 10 per cent of Kiruna’s population. In Kiruna, the two current issues of mining and space ambitions shed light on the importance of paying attention to the local impacts of development and economic ambitions.   Mining projects and stakeholder consultations  Mining in Kiruna points to the value of early stakeholder consultation.  Strict environmental and social standards, as well as skills-based and financial requirements, mean that it could be 15 years before the Per Geijer deposit of rare earth elements can be extracted. The state-owned Swedish mining company that discovered the deposit, Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara Aktiebolag (LKAB), has highlighted its importance for the EGD and the proposed Critical Raw Materials Act. If not properly planned, however, mining the deposit could have negative local impacts and lead to project delays and contestation later.  Kiruna has a history of Sami resistance against mining. The Kiruna mine is located within nationally recognized Sami reindeer herding grounds and inside the EU’s Natura 2000 protected areas network. It has cut off Sami reindeer routes and access to lakes previously used for fishing. To counter the increased risk of subsidence and accommodate additional layers of iron ore extraction by LKAB, in 2004 it was decided that Kiruna would relocate 3 km to the east. This relocation is expected to be completed in 2035. The Sami claim they were not properly consulted prior to projects for relocation being accepted and were denied compensation for the time spent in these consultations. The Swedish government has responded that the Sami villages of Gabna and Laevas did participate in research on how reindeer routes would be impacted by the relocation, and thus it had fulfilled its obligations under UNDRIP. Mining the Per Geijer deposit also faces pushback. A 2023 statement by the Saami Council criticizes the decision to mine the deposit for its anticipated impact on reindeer herding in Gabna and Laevas, arguing that: ‘The Saami lands are being disproportionately affected... [and] used to justify and greenwash the unsustainable consumption habits of the Western world.’ It accuses LKAB of not informing the Gabna village in advance of the public announcement. LKAB has countered the claim, saying it had already announced the presence of abundant rare earth elements in Kiruna and was in dialogue with the Sami villages to avoid or compensate for the impacts on local lands and reindeer husbandry. In return, LKAB hopes it will be able to move forward with its environmental permit application and eventually extract the deposit.  Space ambitions and precautionary approaches   Space ambitions in Kiruna demonstrate the importance of proceeding with caution and more information. The Esrange Space Center expects to launch its first satellites early in 2024 from its new spaceport. Esrange has previously only launched rockets and balloons but will now be able to support Earth observation to measure and mitigate the impacts of climate change, enhance maritime activities and search and rescue operations, and improve the tracking of military troops. However, its history also illustrates the need to understand stakeholder perspectives and value systems.  Esrange was established in Kiruna in 1966 because of its suitability for testing and launching rockets, easy transport access and proximity to the Kiruna Geophysical Observatory, and the vast and largely unpopulated area. For the population of Kiruna, Esrange provided the potential to develop local infrastructure and alternative employment to the mining and forestry sectors. A scientific and technical working group was tasked by the European Preparatory Commission for Space Research with approving the location and construction. It found that although Esrange would impact seasonal Sami reindeer herding routes, this would only occur for four months of the year. It identified no security or safety issues. However, the working group underestimated the significance of seasonal land use for reindeer herders. Safety zones, shelters and warning zones were set up for the protection of reindeer and herders, and compensation was paid for the disruption, but new administrative zones divided the land and herders lost their traditional, year-round access. What occurred in Esrange reflects a similar trend in space expansions in remote regions that are far from urban centres but inhabited by people whose heritage and livelihoods are attached to the land. In Hawaii, a plan by the Canadian Astronomical Society to build a Thirty Metre Telescope (TMT) at the peak of Mauna Kea resulted in pushback from the native Kanaka Maoli people, who regard the mountain as sacred and belonging to the gods. In 2014, supporters of the TMT accused protestors of being anti-science. The Indigenous communities responded that they were not against science as such, but rather protecting the cultural heritage of the mountain and their lands, which cannot be understood through conventional science alone. In 2022 an 11-member, state-appointed board, which includes representatives from astronomical observatories and native Hawaiian communities, was established to prepare to take stewardship of the mountain in 2028.  The social and environmental impacts of Arctic space infrastructures remain largely underexplored. Some experts fear that the expansion of launch sites or spaceports could harm habitats and have noise- and light related implications for wildlife, while failed launches would spread toxic materials and debris, and could cause wildfires. Although smaller satellites and reusable launch systems are more reliable and accessible, they could have a greater risk of failure and the scattering of debris and fuel. In 2018, European satellites for environmental monitoring launched by rockets in Russia raised concerns among Inuit people in Canada that the resulting debris could spread toxic fuel and impact wildlife as launchers fell back into Arctic waters, especially given the lack of prior studies conducted on these impacts. In Kiruna, the chair of the Sami village of Talma, who is also a reindeer herder, succeeding in blocking some of the expansion plans for Esrange in 2019 because of the expected impacts on his reindeer and herding routes; and now ‘his sights are set’ on tackling the predicted noise pollution.  STARTING POINTS FOR THE WAY FORWARD  The case of Kiruna demonstrates the importance of human-centred approaches that tap into different sources of knowledge. Mining in Kiruna highlights the need to ensure that stakeholders affected by the outcomes of projects are treated with respect and included throughout the entire process. This can help to distribute economic benefits more equitably and avoid the misreading of concerns. It can also facilitate exchanges between mining industries, environmentalists and communities, and lead to quicker, more inclusive, and fairer consent processes for projects. Space ambitions in Kiruna stress the importance of precautionary approaches that draw from different knowledge and value forms.   Human-centred approaches can help to intertwine development and economic aims with human security. The Saami Council’s 2019 Sámi Arctic Strategy encourages human-centred economic development that is respectful of the environment, co-designed and co-produced using Western and Indigenous knowledge, and rights-based. The strategy emphasizes the importance of human security, which for the Sami includes self determination, participation in decision making, control over their land and resources, and maintenance of their language and culture. Furthermore, human-centred approaches can encourage the co production of knowledge to inform more precautionary decisions. Indigen ous peoples have time-tested understanding of their Arctic environments and living sustainably, and their input can help to prevent unsustainable and conflictual projects. Their ecological knowledge can complement Western methods of environmental protection by introducing approaches that move beyond pure science and rationality. The 2017 EU Arctic Stakeholder Forum report recognized the importance of development based on local Arctic and Indigenous knowledge as a scientific basis. The Saami Council is also trying to bridge this knowledge gap and received funding in 2019 from the EU’s Interreg Nord programme to achieve this aim. In 2022 it organized the first EU–Sámi Week, with a thematic focus on ‘Art and Land’, and workshops to create greater awareness of Sami culture and climate justice through dance, art, music, and food. These initiatives can help to bring stakeholders together and support human-centred approaches to economic and development ambitions in the Arctic.

There will be only one winner in the war that has broken out between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas. And it is neither Israel nor Hamas.  In an operation coined “the Al-Aqsa Storm,” Hamas, whose formal name is the Islamic Resistance Movement, fired thousands of rockets into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters infiltrated Israel by land, sea and air. Hundreds of Israelis have been killed, more than 2,000 injured, and many taken hostage. In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared war on Hamas and launched airstrikes in Gaza. In the first day of reprisals, close to 400 Palestinians were killed, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry. In the weeks ahead, the Israeli military will surely retaliate and kill hundreds more Palestinian militants and civilians. As an analyst of Middle East politics and security, I believe that thousands on both sides will suffer. But when the smoke settles, only one country’s interests will have been served: Iran’s. Already, some analysts are suggesting that Tehran’s fingerprints can be seen on the surprise attack on Israel. At the very least, Iran’s leaders have reacted to the assault with encouragement and support. The decisive factor shaping Iran’s foreign policy was the 1979 overthrow of the U.S.-friendly, repressive Shah of Iran and the transfer of state power into the hands of a Shiite Muslim revolutionary regime. That regime was defined by stark anti-American imperialism and anti-Israeli Zionism. The revolution, its leaders claimed, was not just against the corrupt Iranian monarchy; it was intended to confront oppression and injustice everywhere, and especially those governments backed by the United States – chief among them, Israel. For Iran’s leaders, Israel and the United States represented immorality, injustice and the greatest threat to Muslim society and Iranian security. The enduring hostility felt toward Israel is in no small part due to its close ties with the shah and Israel’s role in his sustained oppression of the Iranian people. Together with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Israel’s intelligence service, the Mossad, helped organize the shah’s secret police and intelligence service, the SAVAK. This organization relied on increasingly harsh tactics to put down dissenters during the shah’s last two decades in power, including mass imprisonment, torture, disappearances, forced exile and killing thousands of Iranians.  Israel under attack in shock Hamas operation  Support for Palestinian liberation was a central theme of Iran’s revolutionary message. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon – in retaliation for Lebanon-based Palestinian attacks against Israel – provided Iran an opportunity to live up to its anti-Zionist rhetoric by challenging Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and checking U.S. influence in the region.  Subsidizing conflict  To that end, Iran sent its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – a branch of Iran’s military, usually known as the “Revolutionary Guard” – to Lebanon to organize and support Lebanese and Palestinian militants. In Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, Revolutionary Guardsmen instructed Shiite resistance fighters in religion, revolutionary ideology and guerrilla tactics, and provided weapons, funds, training and encouragement. Iran’s leadership transformed these early trainees from a ragtag band of fighters into Lebanon’s most powerful political and military force today, and Iran’s greatest foreign policy success, Hezbollah. Since the early 1980s, Iran has maintained support for anti-Israeli militant groups and operations. The Islamic Republic has publicly pledged millions of dollars of annual support to groups and provides advanced military training for thousands of Palestinian fighters at Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah bases in Iran and Lebanon. Iran runs a sophisticated smuggling network to funnel weapons into Gaza, which has long been cut off from the outside world by an Israeli blockade. Via the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah, Iran has encouraged and enabled Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas violence, and these Palestinian fighters now represent a crucial element in what foreign affairs analysts call Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and the United States, which constitutes Iran’s chief purpose.  But Iran cannot risk confronting either state directly.  Iranian weapons, funds and training enable surges in Palestinian militant violence against Israel when frustrations boil over, including during the Palestinian uprisings known as the first and second intifadas. Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and death tolls have escalated steadily since 2020. Palestinians are outraged by increased evictions and destruction of property, and how Israel allows Israeli nationalists and settlers to violate a long-standing agreement preventing Jewish prayer at the Al-Aqsa Mosque – a site holy to both Muslims and Jews. In fact, a recent incursion by settlers into Al-Aqsa was specifically cited by Hamas as a justification for the Oct. 7 attack.  Attacking normalization  That is not to say that Iran ordered Hamas’ attack on Israel, nor that Iran controls Palestinian militants – they are not Iranian puppets. Nevertheless, Iran’s leaders welcomed the attacks, the timing of which serendipitously works in Iran’s favor and plays into the Islamic republic’s regional battle for influence. “What took place today is in line with the continuation of victories for the anti-Zionist resistance in different fields, including Syria, Lebanon and occupied lands,” according to Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani. The week before the Hamas attack, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman denied reports that Saudi Arabia had paused its recent efforts to normalize relations with Israel, which includes a formal declaration of Israel’s right to exist and increased diplomatic engagement. “Every day we get closer,” he said, an assessment praised and echoed by Netanyahu. Israeli-Saudi normalization would represent the pinnacle of achievement thus far in U.S. diplomatic efforts, including the Abraham Accords, signed by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco in 2020. The accords aimed to normalize and build peaceful relations between Israel and Arab countries across the Middle East and in Africa. Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei lambasted Arab states for signing the Abraham Accords, accusing them of “treason against the global Islamic community.” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah praised Saturday’s violence against Israel and echoed Khamenei’s sentiments, warning that the attacks sent a message, “especially to those seeking normalization with this enemy.” Israel’s expected heavy-handed response is likely to complicate Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Israel in the near term, furthering Iran’s aims. Netanyahu said that Israel’s retaliatory operation seeks three objectives: to eliminate the threat of infiltrators and restore peace to attacked Israeli communities, to simultaneously “exact an immense price from the enemy” in Gaza, and to reinforce “other fronts so that nobody should mistakenly join this war.” This last objective is a subtle but clear warning to Hezbollah and Iran to stay out of the fight. Israeli troops have already mobilized to secure its borders, and airstrikes have hit Gaza. In all likelihood, Palestinian attackers will be killed or arrested in a matter of days. Israeli troops and air forces will target known or suspected rocket launch, manufacturing, storage and transportation sites, along with the homes of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members. But in the process, hundreds of civilians will likely also lose their lives. I believe that Iran expects and welcomes all of this.  How Iran wins  There are at least three possible outcomes to the war, and they all play in Iran’s favor. First, Israel’s heavy-handed response may turn off Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to U.S.-backed Israeli normalization efforts. Second, if Israel deems it necessary to push further into Gaza to eradicate the threat, this could provoke another Palestinian uprising in East Jerusalem or the West Bank, leading to a more widespread Israeli response and greater instability. Lastly, Israel could achieve its first two objectives with the minimal amount of force necessary, foregoing usual heavy-handed tactics and reducing chances of escalation. But this is unlikely. And even if this occurred, the underlying causes that led to this latest outbreak of violence, and the enabling role Iran plays in that process, have not been addressed. And when the next round of Israeli-Palestinian violence occurs – and it will – I believe Iran’s leaders will again congratulate themselves for a job well done.

Guatemala’s politics has recently been shaken by the victory of anti-corruption crusader Bernardo Arévalo de León, which has brought fresh air of hope in a country ridden by high levels of poverty, corruption and criminal violence. The result fits with the wave of anti-incumbent victories in Latin America: it is the 16th country in the region where an opposition candidate has been elected president in the past five years, out of 17 elections. But like or even more than in other countries, the electoral results are being contested by an astounded political and economic establishment unwilling to give its power away. Vicious attempts by judicial authorities to prevent Arévalo and his party’s congressmembers from taking office have raised domestic and international concerns that Guatemala may also join the growing list of Latin American countries experiencing setbacks in their democratic standards. The Organization of American States (OAS), a virtually moribund regional body that has proven unable to solve political crises and has at times even exacerbated them, has come back to the fore as the political forum where to coordinate a regional response. Will the Guatemalan case revive the fortunes of the OAS and will international accompaniment be enough to safeguard democracy in the country?  An impunity-prone status quo Guatemala is the biggest country in Central America and with the largest economy. It is also, however, among the most unequal, with around half of the population below the poverty line and suffering from high rates of malnutrition, especially among indigenous people, which account for 40 per cent of its population. It also hosted one of the most successful anti-corruption experiments in Latin America – the United Nations-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, 2007–2019) – which contributed to dismantling over 70 criminal networks encrusted in the country’s institutions involved in violence, drug trafficking and extortion activities. The zenith of this sweeping anti-corruption crusade was reached in 2015, when then-President Otto Pérez Molina eventually heeded the calls to resign by thousands of Guatemalans who protested in front of the presidential palace for months, after a CICIG-led investigation found him and his vice president involved in a large-scale corruption scheme involving the state customs.  The lull, however, did not last long. Pérez Molina’s successor, Jimmy Morales, a former comedian, turned his back on the CICIG after the latter started investigating his brother and his son, and eventually shut it down in 2019. Since then, the country has experienced serious setbacks in its democratic institutions, as a coalition of political, economic and military elites (commonly dubbed as the Pact of Corrupts) scorched by CICIG-led investigations strived to re-establish an environment of impunity through the co-optation of the judiciary. The Attorney General Consuelo Porras, appointed by Morales and confirmed by his successor, the incumbent Alejandro Giammattei, turned out to be the most strenuous defender of these interests. Her office buried investigations into the president’s alleged acceptance of bribes by Russian contractors, and instead persecuted prosecutors, judges and journalists who had championed anti-corruption efforts, leading more than 30 of them to flee the country and jailing others on abuses of power charges. The boomerang effect of a tilted electoral game In the run-up to the 2023 election, growing popular disenchantment with the political class morphed into an anti-system sentiment. Authorities reacted by excluding from the race a number of well-polling candidates for alleged irregularities in their or their parties’ enrolment.  However, this strategy boomeranged, and channelled the protest vote to the only remaining candidate that was perceived as external to the system: Bernardo Arévalo de León, running on an anti-corruption ticket for a tiny party called Semilla. Arévalo, who was polling below 3 per cent before the first electoral round, not only made it to the second round, but then obliterated the other run-off contender, former first-lady Sandra Torres from the UNE party, in a landslide victory on 20 August with an over 20 points lead. Arévalo’s party also obtained 23 seats in the upcoming legislature, more than three times its 2019 performance. Overall, the Guatemalan election results align with a regional trend of anti-incumbent victories in recent years, although in this case the winner is a progressive champion of democracy, instead of an anti-system populist, as had happened in El Salvador, Costa Rica and elsewhere in the region. The legal fightback against change Semilla’s unexpected result prompted the reaction of those same forces that had tried to channel the vote toward less dangerous candidates and that now put up a number of legal challenges to undermine the credibility of the election and disqualify the president-elect’s party. This strategy pivots around accusations of wrongdoings in the creation of Semilla that would erase its status as a legitimate party, and claims of fraud. Right after the first round, the Attorney General’s office opened investigations into alleged irregularities (fake signatures) upon Semilla’s creation, aiming to strip it of its legal status; this was coupled with accusations of abuse of power directed to Supreme Electoral Tribunal’s magistrates that certified the results. As a result, while Arévalo has been confirmed as president-elect, the Congress has already proceeded to strip the Semilla deputies elected in the 2019 elections – including Arévalo himself – of their seats.  In parallel, nine parties obtained by the Supreme Court, allegedly close to the incumbent executive, a ruling in favour of a recount of the votes of the first round, questioning the findings of national and international observation missions, which did not report any broad irregularities. The recount ended with the officialisation of the results in mid-July, eventually assigning a few more votes to Semilla than originally reported. Yet, after the second round, Torres refused to concede and denounced a supposed fraud, despite the unequivocal margin separating her from Arévalo.  Recently, the Attorney General’s office prosecutors even stormed the facilities where ballot boxes where stored, opening 160 of them, a move that electoral authorities considered illegal. After the prosecutors’ raid, Arévalo has eventually decided to halt the transition until the Attorney General resigns and ceases the political persecution.  Domestic and international outcry  The legal attempts to dismiss the will of change of Guatemalan voters have sparked a wave of public outcry in the country. It has also not gone unnoticed in the international arena. The electoral observation missions of the OAS and the European Union repeatedly expressed their rejection of any attempt to defy the electorate’s choice. The OAS Permanent Council discussed the situation in Guatemala and mandated the Secretary General to monitor the situation closely during the transition. The latter warned that the suspension of Semilla is a violation of the due process that Guatemala, being part of the Inter-American system, is mandated to respect. Strong public messaging also came from the US: government representatives, from President Biden to a bipartisan group of Congress members, have reiterated both privately and publicly their concerns and called on Guatemalan judicial authorities to stop undermining the country’s democracy.  These domestic and international pressures may have contributed, together with the blatant arbitrariness of the judicial measures taken so far, to creating some fissures in the establishment. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, an accomplice in the run-up to the election with the disqualification of candidates, has now turned into a strenuous defender of the election results and proceeded to officialise them despite the legal challenges and Torres’s party’s refusal to concede. At the political level, two ministers (Economy and Energy and Mining) resigned from their posts, while a few politicians from across the spectrum decried the obstructionism against Semilla. Most notably, a few private sector chambers and even the country’s largest business confederation, known as CACIF, issued public statements in defence of the integrity of the vote and calling on institutions to let the electoral process come to completion.  Against this backdrop, President Giammattei is believed to be playing a double game. In public, he has opened the door to Arévalo for an orderly transition, inviting OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro to oversee the process. At the same time, however, he has remained silent on the apparent political persecution of Semilla by the judiciary and legislature. The need to keep Guatemala in the spotlight Notwithstanding, the remnants of the current political establishment appear to be eager to defy the public outcry within and without the country. The fate of Consuelo Porras, in particular, seems intrinsically linked to the preservation of the status quo by reducing as much as possible Arévalo’s margin of action.  While Arévalo’s victory seems hard to overturn at this stage, this cannot be ruled out completely until all claims of fraud are dismissed and the transition to the new administration is completed in January 2024. This would be a dismal scenario, which would likely lead Guatemala into the abyss of a full-blown coup d’état, with unpredictable consequences in terms of social turmoil and international isolation. At the same time, however, the legal cases against Semilla are likely to advance, unless they are denounced as political persecution by the widest array of sectors in the country. The suspension of the party would affect Arévalo’s ability to set the legislative agenda, already quite limited from the start, having Semilla won only 23 out of the 160 seats. Constant engagement of regional governments and statements from political and economic sectors should help prevent this. The task is particularly delicate for the OAS, whose legitimacy has been tainted by its inability to craft a coordinated, principle-based response to some of the political and electoral crises that have affected the region in recent years, particularly Nicaragua, Venezuela and Bolivia. Critics have accused the body of approaching crises with an ideological bias: it has occasionally dismissed complaints of undemocratic moves in such countries as Brazil, El Salvador and Honduras when they were under conservative rule, while advancing allegations of fraud without solid evidence, which in turn fuelled tensions in Bolivia in 2019. Guatemala offers an opportunity for the OAS to wash away the perception of being politically biased and reposition itself as the most suitable regional forum to handle the crises arising from violations of the principles enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.  To do so, however, concrete results are needed. Regional governments will have to agree on the reputational and diplomatic costs that the actors trying to overturn the election may encounter, and be prepared to enforce them. These may include scaling down cooperation with judicial authorities and, if Arévalo were eventually prevented from taking office, the activation of the democratic clause of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which may lead to the suspension of Guatemala from the OAS. Additionally, they should coordinate closely with the EU and other partners to maintain Guatemala in the spotlight and engage regularly with Guatemalan authorities to convey their commitment to the cause for democracy in the country. Intermittently monitoring the situation or simply paying lip service may not only keep judicial actions unscathed, thus setting a dangerous precedent in Guatemala’s hardly-fought democracy, but also embolden corrupt actors across the Western Hemisphere to follow Porras’s footsteps.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin have met at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, a spaceport in eastern Russia. Since Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the two states have grown significantly closer – and could now agree on arms supplies for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.   Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's strongman Kim Jong Un held four hours of consultations. According to state media, the two leaders agreed on several cooperation projects and assured each other of solidarity. Most explosively, Russia plans to assist North Korea with its satellite program. Such support would almost certainly violate UN sanctions. Fittingly, the meeting took place at the Vostochny spaceport. Putin and Kim immediately went on a tour of inspection. Kim has "great interest in rocket technology and a focus on progress in space," Putin said. "I plan to acquaint him with the latest technologies during our tour of the base."  The U.S. even assumes that an even hotter topic was on the agenda: ammunition deliveries to Russia for the war of aggression against Ukraine.  According to John Kirby, spokesman for the U.S. Security Council, Russia wants to order missiles and artillery shells from North Korea. Analysts believe it is realistic that North Korea will indeed supply arms. The composition of Kim's delegation also points to talks on arms deliveries. The head of state is being accompanied to Russia by high-ranking military officials, including Defense Minister Kang Sun Nam and Jo Chun Ryong, the head of the Munitions Industry Agency.  It is the first foreign visit of Kim Jong Un in four years. The North Korean leader came to Vostochny in his luxury armored train. The meeting with Putin is another sign of rapprochement between the two states. North Korea is interesting to Russia not only as a possible munitions supplier. The Asian country is also one of the few states that diplomatically support Russia's invasion. With only six other states, North Korea voted against a resolution for Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine at the recent UN General Assembly. Even Iran, which supports Russia with drones, abstained from the vote.  The North Koreans, on the other hand, are securing the support of a veto power in the UN Security Council by cooperating more closely with Russia. At the same time, they reduce their one-sided dependence on China, which is actually their most important partner. Moreover, closer cooperation could improve the desolate economic situation. In particular, the supply of food has deteriorated massively since the beginning of the Corona pandemic.  The U.S. assumes that North Korea could probably pay for arms deliveries with food, among other things. In addition, North Korea will ask for raw materials and defense know-how in return. In addition to weapons, North Korea would also be able to send workers to Russia. Russia also has a labour shortage due to conscription because of the war. North Koreans could fill this gap – and bring foreign currency into the North Korean treasury.  As early as last November, the U.S. had accused North Korea of supplying the Russian mercenary force Wagner with weapons. In January, Security Advisor John Kirby showed satellite images of a freight train allegedly delivering missiles to Russia.  However, this was not conclusive evidence of North Korean arms shipments to Russia.  In the summer, the Financial Times published a report about North Korean weapons in Ukraine – but they were in the hands of the Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry suggested in the report that the weapons had been captured by Russia. At present, however, there is nothing to suggest that North Korean weapons are being used on a large scale in Ukraine – the USA also admits this.  Both states have denied reports of arms deliveries. Russia in particular could lose credibility if it actually obtains weapons. The UN Security Council has banned North Korea from exporting weapons with Russia's consent. If Russia were to actually import weapons now, it would undermine its own sanctions.  However, there are many indications that Russia no longer feels bound by the rules in the Security Council anyway and is pushing ahead with an arms deal.  In July, Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu had already travelled to North Korea. Kim gave him a tour of a weapons display there featuring the latest North Korean military technology, including combat drones. At a military parade, Shoigu also inspected ballistic missiles actually banned by the UN Security Council.  Also taking part in the tour was Deputy Defense Minister Aleksei Krivoruchko, who is responsible for Russia's ammunition and weapons procurement.  According to analysts, Russia is primarily interested in artillery ammunition: North Korea has shells compatible with Russian guns in 152mm and 122mm calibres.   Short-range missiles could also be on the Russians' shopping list. The North Korean KN-23, for example, is a further development of the Russian Iskander missile. Accordingly, Russian soldiers are likely to be familiar with the handling of the weapon. According to military experts, the KN-23 has a range of almost 700 kilometres. The KN-23 was also on display at the weapons exhibition Shoigu visited in North Korea.  The United States is threatening North Korea that it will have to pay a "heavy price" if it actually supplies weapons. However, the U.S. has little opportunity to put North Korea under further pressure. However, bilateral sanctions, as well as sanctions imposed by Western allies, can hardly be increased. Russia, and presumably China as well, are preventing global sanctions in the UN Security Council - and seem unlikely to implement current sanctions.  However, the Americans can act against companies that support secret trade between North Korea and Russia. For example, in mid-August, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on three Slovak companies. They allegedly tried to organize secret arms deals between Russia and North Korea.

Ukraine was the major topic discussed at the NATO summit in Vilnius, the Alliance capital closest to Kyiv. President Zelensky’s call for a clear timetable for his country’s membership dominated the political debate. Less attention was given to the topic with the biggest impact on the Allies: the radically changed requirements for NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. The Vilnius summit has blessed the new defense plans, for which the member states “commit the necessary forces, capabilities and resources”. What does this imply for the NATO countries? This article analyzes the consequences of the new NATO requirements, broken down into four themes: budgets, force structure and capability requirements, readiness, and military presence on the Eastern Flank.   In 2014, at its Wales summit, NATO Allies committed to spending 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense no later than 2024. The forecast is that 19 of the 29 European NATO Allies will have realized the 2% target in 2024. As Iceland has no armed forces, the total number can be lowered to 28. It implies that approximately one third of the European Allies do not live up to the Wales commitment ten years on. Even worse, some Allies have already announced that they will not realize the target even by 2030. The Vilnius language – the 2% GDP target is “a minimum” from now on – stands in stark contrast to these facts. BUDGETS - MONEY SPENT ON DEFENSE The input issue – money spent on defense – continues to present a divided NATO, composed of three categories of Allies: First, the underspenders that will not spend 2% GDP on defense in 2024 and in the years immediately following. The list includes smaller countries such as Croatia, Slovenia and Luxembourg. However, on the minus 2% list one can also find – from North to South – Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Denmark has set the aim of reaching the 2% target by 2030 and Belgium even later, by 2035. Second, the correct spenders: Allies that have taken measures to achieve the 2% target in 2024, thus fulfilling the Wales target. However, they will face the challenge of living up to a minimum of 2% after 2024. This applies to Germany, the Netherlands and others, who have not made firm commitments to live up to the Vilnius “minimum” target of 2% GDP. The third category is the overspenders, comprising Allies spending more than 2% now or in the future. This group includes the countries close to Russia – the Baltic states and Poland – but also major Allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The champion is no longer the US (3.49%) as Poland will spend 3.9% GDP on defense in 2023.  Due to the mix of underspenders, correct spenders and overspenders, the overall European average will rise to almost 2.05% in 2024, but it is clear that the burden within Europe is not equally divided among all Allies. This sends the wrong signal to Russia and it undermines the European aim to become self-reliant for its security and defense. Furthermore, there is the issue of ensuring sustained investment over the long term. For restructuring the armed forces and realizing defense equipment procurement plans, more time is needed than the duration of an average government Atlantisch perspectief 21 term (4-5 years). A change of government after elections may lead to redrafting the defense budget and defense plans, in particular when economic circumstances are deteriorating as was the case in 2010 and in the years that followed. For defense investment, predictability and continuity are required. The solution is to agree on a long-term national defense investment fund for a period of up to at least 10 years. Naturally, parliaments would have a final say in the annual approval of the budget within the overall financial framework of a long-term defense investment fund. From the perspective of adapting and modernizing the armed forces of the NATO Allies, such a long-term financial commitment – connected to the defense plans and acquisition programs – should be connected to the political debate on the 2% minimum spending target. Such sustained and guaranteed financial input is absolutely required to achieve the output, based on the NATO requirements. FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS Although NATO’s three core tasks of deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security remain in place, the Vilnius summit communiqué puts the first task “at the heart of the Alliance.” Based on SACEUR’s requirements, “the planning for our collective defense will be fully coherent with the planning for our forces, posture management, capabilities, and command and control.” The Allies will have to “deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defense, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer competitors.” Region-specific plans will be developed for three areas: Northern Europe (from the Arctic to the Gulf of Finland); Central Europe (from the Baltic states to the Alps) and Southern Europe (from the Black Sea to the whole of the Mediterranean). In terms of command & control (C2), Northern Europe will be covered by the Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Norfolk (Virginia, US), Central Europe by the JFC in Brunssum (the Netherlands), and Southern Europe by the JFC in Naples (Italy).  For the NATO countries bordering Russia, this might not entail a great deal of change. The Baltic states and Poland have consistently campaigned for strengthening the Alliance’s force posture for collective defense with an emphasis on high-end warfighting capacities. Their own defense planning and force structures have already been tailor-made for that purpose, and investment is mainly channeled towards modernizing heavy land forces. However, for Allies in Western Europe NATO’s new force structure and capability requirements may lead to amending their defense planning, including taking into account regional plans. For example, the UK-NL Landing Force that has been training for years in Northern Norway, might also be deployed to Finland or Sweden. The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), led by the UK, could become an earmarked early-entry force for the Northern Flank. In that case, it might require a more fixed composition of the JEF. In Central Europe, even more emphasis will be placed on strengthening land forces for high-intensity warfighting. Germany and Poland are two key European force providers. Other Allies – such as the Netherlands – will have to deliver dedicated contributions. From now on, NATO plans will ask for brigades, divisions, and army corps instead of the tailor-made task forces that were deployed to Afghanistan and elsewhere. Combined arms will be required instead of infantry-heavy forces for crisis management. More robustness and more firepower, less highly mobile and lightly armed troops are the new characteristics.  Jointness and networked operations in all domains (sea, land, air, cyber, and space) are 21st century necessities, requiring high-technology capacities in the digital area and in space, in particular to ensure redundant communications for information-steered, networked operations. The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capacities need to be enhanced and modernized, encompassing all layers of air defense – the importance of which has been shown in the war in Ukraine. Long-range firing delivered by rocket artillery, cruise missiles and other systems will become the norm of the ‘need to have’ for armed forces. This capability also requires a better and more robust C2 architecture and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare (EW) systems, and other sensors for target acquisition. The Vilnius communiqué refers to continuing “to invest more in advanced and interoperable capabilities across all domains, placing particular emphasis on combat capable, predominantly heavy, high-end forces and capabilities.” This sounds like an evolution, but for many Allies it implies a revolution in defense planning and investment or, in the words of the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, “unparalleled integration of NATO and national military planning”. READINESS The new NATO Force Model (NFM) was already agreed upon at the Madrid summit in July 2022. According to the NFM, Allies “are delivering a larger pool of dedicated combat-capable forces, including forces at high readiness, improving our military responsiveness, and harnessing regional expertise and geographic proximity.” In the past, the Alliance had the NATO Response Force (NRF) at high readiness (at 5-30-day notice-to-move (NTM)) with the first elements of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at very short NTM (within 48 hours). The 40,000-military-strong NRF will be replaced by the Allied Reaction Force (ARF), that can provide a quickly deployable NATO response option to threats or crises wherever they occur. Completely new are the tier 1-3 high readiness forces: over 100,000 in tier 1 with a NTM of up to 10 days; around 200,000 in tier 2 (NTM 10-30 days) and at least 500,000 in tier 3 (30-180 days NTM). With these new readiness requirements the number of forces that Allies will have at readiness levels up to 30 days has increased by almost a factor of 10. For the NRF, NATO Allies were making available, on rotation, companies, battalions, battle groups and comparable air and naval units. In the NFM, brigades and divisions, full squadrons and naval task groups will have to be ready to deploy within short timeframes depending on the allocation to tier 1 to 3. This will pose enormous challenges to Allies, not only in terms of personnel but equally in operationally ready-to-deploy equipment, enablers (such as transport capacities), and all necessary logistical support. Ammunition stocks will have to be built up to higher NATO norms. Military mobility requirements – all legal arrangements, infrastructure adjustments, transport means, available staging areas and so forth – need to be fulfilled. Naturally, all of this cannot be arranged overnight. It will take at least five to ten years to transform and modernize the Allied forces to fulfil these far-reaching military requirements. The NFM may look simple on paper, but it is the most challenging NATO demand since the end of the Cold War. PRESENCE ON THE EASTERN FLANK Decisions to reinforce NATO’s military enhanced Forward Presence were already taken at the Madrid summit with the following two most important elements: (i) the deployment of battlegroups in four additional Allied countries (Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria), and (ii) scaling up the NATO battle groups to brigade-size formations where and when required. At the time, the UK, Canada and Germany announced that their battle groups in respectively Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be scaled up to brigades. The additional troops were not to be stationed permanently in the three Baltic states. Brigade headquarters would be established and the equipment for these brigades would be prepositioned in those countries. The model envisaged that troops would be transferred from their home bases in times of crisis or for exercises. Two weeks before the Vilnius summit, the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that his country would station a ‘robust brigade’ with 4,000 troops in Lithuania. Without openly saying so, Pistorius presented a change to the concept announced by Germany the year before. Not only will the brigade headquarters and the equipment be permanently present in Lithuania, the military personnel of a combat brigade are to be located forward as well. On the eve of the Vilnius summit, the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that his country’s military presence in Latvia would be increased to around 2,200 troops.  The Baltic states have pressed strongly for the permanent presence of brigade-sized NATO forces on their soil. NATO itself has met its need by replacing the concept of ‘deterrence by punishment’ by ‘deterrence by denial’ – meaning that every inch of NATO territory has to be defended. The Baltic states have argued that the existing multinational battle groups – suitable for acting as a ‘trip wire’ in case of a Russian attack, but not being able to defend their territory until reinforcements arrive – are no longer suitable for that purpose. Lacking strategic depth, ‘deterrence by denial’ requires the permanent presence of combat-ready NATO forces, at least of brigade size along with the national army units of the three Baltic states.  The same requirement would logically apply to the other five countries that house NATO battle groups. Infrastructure to house the troops and preposition the equipment of the NATO combat brigades will have to be built, which will take time and money. Training areas might have to be expanded. Transferring from ‘trip wire’ battle groups to combat brigades also raises the question of what to do with the smaller contributions – often of company size – from other NATO countries. For example, so far the Dutch contribution to the battle group in Lithuania has consisted of rotating companies – often of different compositions (air mobile, light infantry, mechanized). When Germany transforms its battle group to a combat brigade, Berlin might call on the Netherlands army to contribute a mechanized battalion or combat support (such as artillery). In that case, the issue of prepositioning equipment and permanently stationing troops in Lithuania also becomes a defense-planning topic for the Netherlands with financial and other consequences. THE WAY AHEAD NATO summits come and go. Next year, Heads of State and Government will meet in Washington, D.C. for the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. In November 2024, American citizens will elect a new president. The years of strong commitment by the US to supporting Ukraine and NATO may turn into years of retreat, should a Republican president enter the White House. European Allies will be even more pressed to step up their defense efforts than in the current situation. But even should the Democrats win the presidential election, the European NATO countries will face serious challenges in implementing the decisions of the Vilnius summit. In view of the primary focus of the US on the Pacific/East Asia, the pressure on Europe to become more self-reliant is here to stay. Defense budget growth has to be sustained over the long term. Investment in combat-ready forces and logistics including larger ammunition stocks needs to be stepped up, which also requires industrial production to be ramped up. More military personnel will have to be on stand-by readiness, and a larger number of troops have to be deployed to the Eastern Flank. Equipment needs to be prepositioned in the area. NATO’s regional plans will direct national defense planning, investment, training and exercises. They will also channel multinational cooperation, clustering countries located on the Northern, Central-Eastern and Southern European Flanks with those Allies earmarking their forces for the collective defense task in those respective regions.  The consequences of NATO’s Vilnius summit have yet to sink in within national political circles. The Alliance’s military authorities and diplomats have delivered an ambitious agenda for “modernising NATO for a new era of collective defence”. All presidents and prime ministers of the Allied countries have committed themselves to implementing the Vilnius decisions. History shows that words are not always followed by deeds, such as in the case of achieving the NATO 2% target. The Russian aggression against Ukraine – violating the principles and norms of the international order – should be more than a wake-up call. Europe now needs to stay awake and invest in its defense to fulfil NATO’s requirements as well as to become more self-reliant for its own security.

Vladimir Putin met with Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhang Guoqing. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Zhang Guoqing, friends, I am very pleased to see you and to welcome you to Russia, to Vladivostok. China has traditionally participated in this forum for many years now. I had the pleasure of welcoming the President of the People's Republic of China to it. He participated in person, spoke here, and then took part in the forum in the videoconference format. I would like to take this opportunity to ask you to convey my best wishes to the President of the People's Republic of China, with whom I have friendly work-related and personal relations. This certainly helps promote bilateral relations and ties between our countries. We know you well as a very business-like person. You headed a major company and now engage in matter of industry. As far as I know, you have already had the chance to meet with your counterparts, deputy prime ministers [Yury] Trutnev and [Denis] Manturov. The latter is in charge of the industrial block in the Government. I would like to note that thanks primarily to the efforts of our governments and business circles, Russia-China relations in this area – the area of economic cooperation – have reached a very high level. Of course, this is a derivative of what has been achieved in the political sphere, but nevertheless the results are more than good, they are excellent, and every year our trade grows by almost one third. This year, too, over the first seven months of it, the trade is up by about the same amount, I think, 24 percent – to as much as 120 billion. The goal President Xi Jinping and I have set – to reach the US$200 billion mark in trade – can be achieved very soon, already this year. I am confident that our relations will keep the current pace. We are glad to welcome you, and I would like to thank you for your decision to come and take part in the Eastern Economic Forum. Welcome. Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhang Guoqing (retranslated): Thank you, Mr President, for the opportunity to meet with you. First of all, I would like to pass on to you sincere regards and best wishes from President Xi Jinping. We also wish to offer heartfelt congratulations on the successful organisation of the 8th Eastern Economic Forum. Under the strategic direction of President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin, China and Russia have deepened their overarching partnership and strategic cooperation in this new era. Our relations have maintained a consistently high dynamic. As you rightly noted, our countries have provided resolute mutual support in matters concerning our key interests. We are deepening political cooperation and trust and multiplying our mutual interests, bringing our nations closer. Our multi-dimensional practical cooperation is moving forward progressively, and the range of our bilateral cooperation is constantly expanding. Mr President, you noted the volume of our trade for the first seven months of this year, but in the first eight months of this year, the bilateral turnover reached US$155.1 billion, which is 32 percent higher year-on-year. We have every reason to believe that the goal set at the highest level, to reach US$200 billion in bilateral trade, will be achieved earlier than the end of the year. Last March, President Xi Jinping made a successful state visit to Russia, during which a new large-scale plan for developing China-Russia relations was outlined and new guidelines were set. Currently, the Chinese nation, under the true leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, centred around comrade Xi Jinping, is promoting the comprehensive Chinese modernisation focused on high-quality development. We are ready to share development opportunities and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with our Russian colleagues. Vladimir Putin: We highly value and appreciate the fact that, as you mentioned, the President of China made his first foreign visit after his re-election to Russia. This indicates that the relations between Russia and China have reached an unprecedented and historic level in the past few years. As you said, we will continue working together.

Madam Minister,  Distinguished ministers, Madam Secretary General, President of the Parliamentary Assembly, Commissioner, Ladies and gentlemen, A very warm welcome to Riga! I am very pleased to open this conference, a signature event during Latvia’s Presidency in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The conference is a direct continuation of the Reykjavik Summit that took place in May of this year. The focus of today’s conference is the existential issue Europe is facing now. Namely, justice for Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s aggression and full-scale military invasion. Before briefly addressing the central themes of the conference, I want to recall that the Council of Europe was the first international organisation to decide on the discontinuation of Russia’s membership. This principled position of our organization once again confirmed our commitment to democratic values and the international rule of law. It also affirmed that our organisation is ready to assume a leading role in actively defending these values. Today’s conference confirms that our commitment has not wavered. We seek justice for Ukraine. We stand with Ukraine as long as it takes. Ladies and gentlemen, During today’s conference, you will address themes that represent pillars on which justice is built – accountability, resilience, and hope. First, accountability. Russia has brutally violated international law. It must therefore face full accountability. By “full accountability” I mean both, responsibility of Russia as a state, and the individual liability of those Russian officials who launched the war of aggression against Ukraine. Those who committed war crimes and other most serious crimes of international concern. Russia must also bear full responsibility for the damage, loss, or injury caused to Ukraine and its people. I commend the Council of Europe for creating the Register of Damages. This is an important step towards a future international compensation mechanism. The Register of Damages will ensure proper registration and documentation of the devastation Russia has brought to Ukraine. I call on all countries that have not yet done so to join the Register and demonstrate our solidarity with and support to Ukraine. During our Presidency in the Council of Europe, Latvia is determined to advance the operational launch of the Register. I welcome the intention of the Ministers to adopt today a Declaration containing principles that will guide the functioning of the Register or Riga Principles. I particularly welcome the emphasis on victim-centred approach. We must make sure that victims, in particular the most vulnerable, such as women and children, remain the focus of our efforts. Second, resilience. The justice system of Ukraine is currently bearing a heavy burden. It continues to ensure justice and the rule of law, including through the investigation of crimes committed by Russia. By continuing to uphold fair trial standards, Ukraine clearly demonstrates its values and the strength of its democracy. I encourage member states of the Council of Europe to provide support to the Action Plan on Resilience, Recovery, and Rebuilding of Ukraine. Latvia has already provided its financial contribution. Finally, hope. We all have heard and seen heartbreaking reports about Ukrainian children being forcibly and illegally deported to Belarus and Russia. We must do our utmost to ensure the return of these children, to ensure that they are reunited with their families. We must restore hope. Ladies and gentlemen, In Reykjavik, we committed to strengthening the role of the Council of Europe. We also reiterated our common resolve to unite around our values and standards. I am confident that today’s conference will be an important contribution to our work for the benefit of all Europeans, including future generations. Thank you!

Vladimir Putin: Friends, esteemed veterans, September 8, 1943, marks a landmark date in the history of our country. Eighty years ago today, the legendary unconquered Donbass – Russia’s centuries-old stronghold, a land of hard workers and warriors, a rich and generous land – was liberated and cleansed from Nazi occupiers. Its resources held enormous value for the enemy. Seizing them was one of the goals behind Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and the Nazis did everything to keep the Donbass steppe to themselves and to force the people to work for the war machine of the Third Reich. However, they ran into fierce resistance in the occupied territories, the intensity of which did not wane for nearly 700 days. During that time, while the cruel and cynical beast ruled over Donbass, hundreds of thousands of partisans, underground fighters, civilians, and children were subjected to torture and execution, and unassailable enemy fortifications grew on the key fronts. The banks of the Seversky Donets River were dotted with bunkers and dugouts, and many kilometres of minefields. Breaking through that defence line appeared impossible, but the Red Army soldiers accomplished this task, performed feats beyond human capabilities, and travelled a heroic and sacrificial path, thus solidifying the triumph of Soviet troops at the Kursk Bulge. The arduous and selfless assault of Saur Mogila is a special chapter. The Nazis turned this ancient burial mound into an impregnable citadel, but there was no force in the world that could stop our soldiers. This strategic height changed hands several times and surrendered to the Soviet soldier, who stood to the death for the truth, justice, freedom, and the future of our Motherland. I am confident that nine years ago, on these frontlines that are sacred for us, Donbass militia members, descendants of the Great Patriotic War soldiers followed their example. It multiplied their courage and fortitude in yet another confrontation with Nazism, gave the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the victors the strength to defend their land, culture, language, and heritage. The Saur Mogila Memorial, which was destroyed during the 2014 hostilities, has now been fully restored. Alongside the images of Soviet soldiers, the feats of their valiant and glorious descendants – the new heroes of Donbass – have been rightfully immortalised. That is what Russia is: a nation united by its history, unbreakable through its spiritual traditions, and loyal to the legacy and memory of its ancestors. I warmly congratulate the people of the Donetsk People's Republic and all Russian citizens on the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Donbass from Nazi invaders.

Dear Charles.  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Bled Strategic Forum and welcome to Slovenia.  This month, on the 3rd of August, Slovenia was hit by the most devastating floods in the country’s history. Within just a matter of hours, 10,000 people lost their homes. Families lost everything.  We were able to secure relief from the EU. We received offers of aid from our neighbouring countries within the region. Even NATO responded. Everyone understood the severity of the disaster and sent their best engineering teams, along with heavy equipment, some of whom are still here helping our people rebuild their communities. I would also like to express my gratitude to all of you, all of those who have already helped, either physically or financially, and to others who will perhaps contribute in the coming hours. It is by showing solidarity, by working hand in hand with our friends, neighbours, and allies, that we truly make the world a better place. This is a message that we should not forget under any circumstances, not just when we are facing dire times, because you never know when the situation will become too difficult for you.  And as Peter Grk, Secretary General of the Bled Strategic Forum said, in Europe, sometimes or even most of the time, we live under the impression that extreme events do not happen here. They happen far away, far abroad. Well, not anymore. The extreme weather that we are currently facing is, of course, a localized phenomenon. But the conditions that caused this weather are indeed worldwide. Climate change is not something that any of us can escape. It is here. It is happening. We can see its impact growing every year, though its specific effects are unpredictable. The only predictable thing about climate change is that it is not going to get any better by itself. This is a message that we must never forget.  Still, we need to put in place mechanisms to adapt to the catastrophes like the one that hit Slovenia three weeks ago, because they will happen again. And we can only address such a demanding project at the international level. No nation, especially not individual small nations, can face it alone. Even the biggest nations cannot face it alone. This is one of the most important messages that we will bring to the table during our membership in the UN Security Council. We want to place the climate agenda at the top of our priorities. And one reason why I think we may be successful in this endeavour, not because of the catastrophe that we faced three weeks ago, is that, as a very small country with little international clout makes us a very honest broker. I can tell you right now that we are brave enough to undertake this rule. We want to be an honest broker. We want to be sincere, perhaps addressing issues that bigger nations are somehow neglecting due to their own national agendas.  The second of our primary goals is figuring out how to bring peace to Ukraine. It is practically impossible at this time, perhaps, but we will invest all of our knowledge, all of our time in this one particular goal, whether we are ultimately successful or not. No one can tell. But will we try? Yes, we will, because this is the single most important topic on the table of the United Nations. And that's the only place where this war can end: at the table of the United Nations. And we will do everything we can to bring it forth.  Finally, I'm really glad to have all of you here, my dear colleagues from the Western Balkans. I'm glad that you all made it here safely. Nobody is missing. Just this in itself is a huge success. But it doesn't stop here, because the message that I want to impart, and I'm pretty sure that Charles [Michel] will do so even more decisively, but the message that I want to share is that the momentum is changing due to Russia’s aggression on Ukraine. The stance of European Union Member States regarding the enlargement of European Union took on a totally new perspective. Things are changing rapidly. In the next 12 months I'm pretty sure that the enlargement process will not just gain attraction but an entirely new perspective. And I urge all of you not to be left behind. I urge all of you to continue pressing on with the reforms, but also to be aware of what's going on regarding the changes within the European Union itself. We all know that we will have to reform our processes within the European Union. And as I said, these reforms will either happen within the next 12 months or they may not happen for a very long time. This is an occasion that shall not be overlooked. Slovenia will remain a strong supporter of your membership. Slovenia will continue to do all those things that are necessary within the European Council and also in dialogue with the European Commission to make it possible for you to become members of our European family, to put you where you belong. That is the last message that I wanted to impart: you all belong with us.  And as I said, none of these challenges that I addressed are going to be easy to meet. None. We will have to work hard. It will cost a lot of money, especially for flood relief and the reconstruction. It will take a lot of time, but we need to find both the courage and the wisdom. And we will do so, in order to show that yes, we can, we can build a better world. A world based on solidarity.  Thank you.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic / Dear KyriakosDear Ministers, Dear Governor, Dear Mayor of ThessalonikiDear Mr. Dzikas, Dear Greek friends It is, indeed, a privilege to address you in the context of the Thessaloniki International Fair. I thank the organizers of the HELEXPO and I thank the Greek Prime Minister for his kind invitation. Let me start by saying that during the last days and weeks we have witnessed the worst possible consequences of the climate crisis. We have seen scenes of destruction that we could not imagine we would see in our lifetime. Some of these tragic events happened here in Greece - our closest neighbor and most friendly country, just a few kilometers from our common border. Allow me to express my deepest condolences for the victims of the recent floods in your country and our full solidarity with the friendly Greek people. Tonight I want to send a message loud and clear: Greece is not alone. You have many partners and friends and we will spare no effort to help you mitigate the consequences. Bulgaria and the whole Europea Union stands with you.  We also have victims from the floods in Bulgaria. Both countries face similar problems, such as floods and fires. Helping each other and working together is a must. As an example, this year we have twice deployed Bulgarian firefighting teams to help you overcome devastating fires. Climate change is a global challenge, which demands a common answer. We need to work more closely together to share information and technologies, to integrate our weather forecast systems and our early warning systems to better prevent disasters in the future. I can assure you we are ready for such a mutually beneficial cooperation. Ladies and Gentlemen,Bulgaria is the honoured country at this year’s Thessaloniki International Fair. This is great honour for us, but above all, this is an acknowledgement of the exemplary level, which the relations between Bulgaria and Greece have reached. This is also an acknowledgement of the important role, which my country plays in the region. The presence at such an important international forum provides a broad range of opportunities to enhance further our already excellent economic ties. Bulgaria is represented in several related sectors such as IT, hi-tech, energy, infrastructure, construction, education, tourism and the food industry. Bulgarian companies with a strong international presence participate, including EnduroSat, a significant player in the satellite industry and space technology, and Telerik Academy, providing accessible and innovative digital technology training. Among the participants is Sofia Techpark which provides a platform for global, regional and national companies to develop innovative technologies and to exchange know-how. The Bulgarian Investment Agency, which supports the creation of projects leading to new jobs, exports and transfer of know-how, is also here. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, whose experts conduct scientific research, training and activities of international importance, is present as well. Dear Prime Minister,This is the right occasion to acknowledge the fact that your leadership has transformed Greece into an attractive destination for international investments. Let me assure you that this is valid also for the investments from Bulgaria. At present, they are mainly focused in the energy, infrastructure and tourism sectors. I hope that in the near future we will witness Bulgarian investments in new fields, such us communications and information technologies. The IGB project for the gas interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria, in operation since October 2022, in which Bulgaria participates with a 50% stake, is a clear example of a strategic, long-term investment with a broad regional scope. The same applies to the project for a floating LNG terminal near Alexandroupolis in which Bulgaria participates with 20%. We are jointly working on a project for an oil pipeline connecting Alexandroupolis and Burgas where we have the biggest refinery in the Balkans. Bulgaria has a particular interest in the plans for the future development and management of the Greek ports of Kavala and Alexandroupolis. Bulgarian businesses are also showing strong interest in using these two commercial ports, especially in the context of the blocked trade routes in the Black Sea due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.  All this implies the establishment of a much better, let me call it by its proper name, a modern connecting infrastructure between our two countries, relevant for two members of the European Union and bringing new opportunities for our economic cooperation in the next decades. These new realities are best embodied by the Sea2Sea initiative, which aims at connecting Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube river with the Greek ports in the north Aegean Sea through a modern transport, energy and communication infrastructure. In practical terms, it would be an alternative route to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Undoubtedly, Greece and Bulgaria have the potential to create together an energy and transport hub in Southeast Europe, the importance of which would be not only of regional, but of pan-European scale. Dear friends,I am scientist by profession. As such, I cannot offer a magic formula how to transform the Balkans into a prosperous and modern European region. But I strongly believe in three factors which might do the “miracle”: 1. The consolidating and transformational role of the European Union; 2. The regional connectivity 3. The good-neighborly relations.  Good-neighbourliness is an indispensable guiding principle for the regional transformation. What we have to ensure is that words turn into deeds by all countries in the region.  I am proud to say and I hope that my dear colleague Kyriakos Mitsotakis would agree with me that our two countries, Bulgaria and Greece, are leading by example. An example for the whole region.  The history of relations between Bulgarians and Greeks is very, very old. I can think of no other two nations in Europe who have a longer history of relations. We have been neighbours for centuries. We have shared a turbulent past, marked by ups and downs, wars and peace, opposing blocks and alliances. It is not a miracle that after more than a thousand years of controversies, today Bulgaria and Greece enjoy such exemplary good-neighbourly relations. The truth is that it has taken decades of joint efforts of wise Bulgarian and Greek politicians, incl. Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was born here in Northern Greece. It has taken a lot of good will and dedication from diplomats and ordinary people to overcome the shadows of the past and to build mutual respect, trust and confidence.  The Greek-Bulgarian relations have flourished because they have a solid ground –our common values and our strong belief in a democratic international system, based on the principles and norms of international law.   We are proud with our strategic partnership which plays a crucial role for the stability of the whole region of South-East Europe.  Our nations share common hopes and concerns.  We are allies and friends. We are good neighbours who respect and trust each other. Such relations have an enormous potential for the future generations of Greeks and Bulgarians and they deserve our dedication. Dear Greek friends, A thought by the famous Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard comes to my mind: You can understand life only looking backwards, but you can live your life only looking forward.    We cannot change history, but we can definitely shape our common future. Through leadership, strategic vision, more connectivity and mutually beneficial cooperation.  I believe we can do it together. Bulgaria and Greece.Hand in hand, leading by example. Thank you!