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While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts. This analysis was first published in the Global Observatory, 30 August 2023. When Jim O’Neill coined the BRIC acronym in 2001, the point he was trying to convey was that the global economic system needed to incorporate the world’s largest emerging economies. His advice fell on deaf ears and in 2009, Brazil, China, India and Russia decided to take matters into their own hands and formed the BRIC grouping. South Africa joined the group in 2010 to form the BRICS. This July, the group held its 15th summit in South Africa, where they decided to add six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. More are likely to join in the future, including countries like Indonesia and Nigeria.  What these countries have in common is a frustration, if not a grievance, about being side-lined to the periphery of the world economy. Together, the BRICS represent approximately 40% of the world’s population. The combined size of their economies are approaching approximately 30% of the world’s GDP, which puts them roughly on par with combined size of the economies of the G7 countries, depending on whether size is measured in GDP or PPP.  More importantly, in the next few decades, the combined size of the BRICS economies will surpass that of the G7. Despite this growing parity, all the members of the BRICS, with the exception of Russia, self-identifies as being part of the Global South, i.e., they feel excluded from a global system dominated by the Global North. Their stated aim is to work towards a future system of global governance where they will have equal political and economic say in global institutions, and where no one state will dominate others. In pursuit of this aim, BRICS countries have established their own development bank, set up their own contingency reserve arrangement, are developing their own payment system, and have started to trade with each other in their own currencies.  The BRICS want to free their economies from the dollar-based international financial system. They feel exposed to United States interest rates that can have a negative effect on their economies, for no domestic reasons. The dollar-based financial system also provides the US with significant advantages in the global economy, which the BRICS see as unfair. They also feel a dollar-based financial system gives the US hegemonic influence in global affairs, through for example, exerting US jurisdiction on all dollar-based trade or investments that flow through US banks or financial institutions.  While the BRICS countries have these clear shared macro-economic interests, many of the members also have competing interests in other domains. China and India are geopolitical rivals in South Asia. Egypt and Ethiopia are at loggerheads over the Nile. Brazil, India, South Africa and the newly-added Argentina are democracies, while other countries in the group are governed by a diverse set of autocratic regimes, which could set up an irreconcilable clash of values on some issues. Many of the members of the BRICS also have close ties to the United States and Europe, including Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in a televised statement to the nation on the eve of hosting the BRICS summit in South Africa, explained that South Africa remains non-aligned, and he announced that in 2023 the country will also host a major United States-Africa trade meeting and an EU-South Africa summit. South Africa will also host the G20 in 2025, the first in Africa. For many countries, membership of the BRICS does thus not necessarily imply aligning themselves with one global alliance versus another, but rather cooperation in a group around a series of shared interests.  Where does this place the BRICS on the Russian war in Ukraine? The BRICS summit in Johannesburg steered clear of taking a position on the war, other than welcoming mediation aimed at resolving it through dialogue and diplomacy. Some BRICS members like Iran are clearly supporting Russia, while most others have stopped short of either supporting or condemning Russia. For many such as Egypt, the war has adversely affected their economy. Two of the BRICS members, Egypt and South Africa, are part of an African initiative to seek a mediated end to the conflict, which is perhaps the first African initiative to mediate an international conflict. Overall, however, the BRICS have their eyes on the medium- to long-term transformation of the global macro-economic and financial system, and countries like China are probably frustrated that the Russian war in Ukraine has drawn attention away from this larger objective.  Are the BRICS and the West headed for a new cold war? The shift in the center of gravity of the global economy to the East is an unstoppable fact driven by demographics and economic factors like the cost of production. At the same time, Europe and the United States will remain major economic players. In tandem with these changes in the global economy, it is clear that the global political order will become more multipolar, with China, Europe, India, and the United States representing some of the major centers of influence.  In an August 27 article, Jim O’Neil argues that the influence of the BRICS will be determined by their effectiveness, not their size. An expanding BRICS will most likely succeed in helping its members to break free from a dollar-based international financial system, but that will take several decades of incremental change before it reaches a tipping point. Whether that is a good or bad thing depends on the degree to which your economy is tied to the United States. Many of the BRICS countries, including China, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa all have economies whose prosperity are closely tied to the Unites States. They will thus have an interest in a slow, stable freeing up of the international financial system, and this should give everyone that is prudent time to adapt.  The same logic also applies to changes in global governance architecture. Apart from Russia, all the other BRICS countries have an interest in making sure that changes in the global order are managed at a slow steady pace that does not generate instability. All the BRICS countries, apart from Russia, are also strong supporters of multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center. Many Western countries and BRICS members may thus have more shared interests than the doomsday headlines suggest. While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts.

Surveys show that the elite’s opinion toward China diverges with those of citizens in Singapore and Indonesia. Elites tend to weigh long-term geopolitical strategies and have more access to information, but increased citizen engagement will enhance foreign policy.  Societies are often divided on policy matters — and foreign policy is no exception. American politics have long been divided between the Democrats, who are cautious of U.S. militarisation, and the Republicans, who traditionally tend to support US global military presence. The U.K.’s Brexit referendum saw opinion sharply divided along generational lines, with young people generally preferring to remain in the European Union and the older generation voting to leave. Are similar divisions manifest in Southeast Asia?  Think tanks and research organisations have conducted various surveys to understand how major powers influence the region. Notable ones include the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia Survey, Blackbox’s ASEAN Turns 50, the Foreign Policy Community Indonesia’s ASEAN-China Survey, and the Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitudes Survey. Comparisons of these surveys must be mindful of their different objectives, sampling methods, and timing of sample collection. Still, they provide empirical data to explore whether Southeast Asian elites and laypersons have divergent opinions over foreign policies. This article considers how the rise of China is viewed by society in Singapore, the region’s commercial and financial hub, and Indonesia, ASEAN’s largest country and current chair.  The findings of several polls are quite revealing. The most recent iteration of ISEAS’ annual survey, targeted at the regional elites and policymakers familiar with international affairs, concluded that the region’s trust in China to provide leadership remains low, including respondents in Singapore. However, in contrast, the survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2021 showed that ordinary Singaporean citizens have favourable views of China (Chart 1). This poll, repeated in 2022 on 19 countries (mostly OECD members), found that Singapore was one of three countries that viewed China and President Xi Jinping in favourable terms.   A dissonance can also be observed when comparing surveys in Indonesia – but in this case, the elites’ disposition toward China has grown warmer while the citizens’ mood has chilled over time. The ISEAS surveys concluded that Indonesian elites have become more positive about China in the past three years. Meanwhile, the polls conducted by the Lowy Institute found that ordinary Indonesian citizens tend to be more cautious of China’s influence in their country compared to ten years ago (Chart 2).   What explains these divisions between the region’s elites and laypersons? First, elites and policymakers often project national interests and pursue long-term geopolitical strategies, while some ordinary citizens may prioritise immediate concerns such as economic and social issues. The relationship between Singapore and China is strong, as both sides are indispensable trade and economic partners. Understandably, Chinese economic influence can be felt on the ground. In addition, the social ties between Singapore and China are strong. The majority of Singapore citizens are ethnic Chinese who may still maintain some degree of socio-cultural connection with China.   Second, elites and laypersons have varying degrees of access to information, exposure to disinformation, and interests. Those in foreign policy establishments usually have greater access to information and in-depth analysis, affording them more wide-ranging perspectives on specific issues. Meanwhile, the general public primarily depends on media coverage or word of mouth, which may limit their perspective and sometimes expose them to biased narratives.  In the case of Indonesia’s elites, who tend to be more optimistic over China’s role, their attitudes might be influenced by more nuanced views, for instance, that China’s economic resources are valuable for Indonesia’s economic development and good rapport with China is key to settling the territorial disputes in the Natuna Islands. On the other hand, Indonesia’s laypersons are more wary of China, possibly due to growing concerns over Chinese investments, Chinese natural resource extraction industries, and the influx of Chinese workers taking away local jobs.  While this division might be polarising, the discrepancy can also bring about greater checks and balances between governments’ and citizens’ interests. The cases of Singapore and Indonesia should be a reminder that Southeast Asia is a diverse region at the heart of major power contestations. Taking into consideration different interest groups will help policymakers understand wide-ranging foreign policy preferences so as to better strike strategic balance and neutrality for the region.  Countries in the region must not ignore their citizens’ views when crafting their foreign policies or evaluating whether certain foreign policies resonate well with the public. Several countries have attempted to create platforms for citizens to voice their concerns on foreign policy. The Foreign Policy Community Indonesia (FPCI), developed by the prominent former diplomat Dino Patti Djalal, was established to promote non-government views on international relations and to embrace the Indonesian spirit of civic engagement. The club has chapters in local universities, allowing students to express and channel their thoughts on geopolitical issues. Some Southeast Asian countries also have a network of foreign correspondent clubs, most notably the Foreign Correspondent Club of Thailand (FCCT) founded in the 1950s to be a platform for local and international journalists to discuss international affairs.  The practice of foreign policy is becoming more complex and multifaceted due to increased political tensions between major powers, with greater considerations placed on the nexuses between economics, security, diplomacy, social development, and climate change. Sovereign border lines have become blurred due to greater people-to-people connectivity between countries. The rise of citizen engagement in foreign policy may be a positive development for the region as it would help to moderate foreign policy in the event that governments operate in their own echo chambers.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine imposed a sudden energy shock on Europe 18 months ago. Faced with the prospect of much less Russian gas, there were fears that Europe’s energy infrastructure would not cope with winter 2022-23, causing economies to crumble.   Yet a mild winter and the EU’s gradual rollout of a plan to reduce its energy consumption and buy more from alternative suppliers saw it emerge shaken but not beaten on the other side.  Germany, Italy and other gas-reliant nations pivoted from Russian dependency without major electricity shortages. Since then, there has been more good news. Energy prices have fallen steadily in 2023, while Europe’s gas storage levels hit 90% capacity three months ahead of the November target and could even hit 100% in September.    According to politicians like the German energy minister, Robert Habeck, the worst of the energy crisis is over.  Yet, as we shall see, it’s a little early to be so confident.  New vulnerabilities  The share of EU piped gas imports from Russia fell from 39% to just 17% between early 2022 and early 2023. To cope with this shift, the EU has become much more reliant on shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) than before.  LNG’s total share of EU gas imports rose from 19% in 2021 to around 39% in 2022, amid a rapid upgrade to infrastructure that aims to have grown LNG capacity by one-third between 2021 and 2024. (Indeed, 13% of LNG imports into the EU actually still come from Russia, whose shipments have also significantly increased since the invasion).  This LNG increase has made European countries vulnerable to volatility in that market – particularly as 70% of these imports are bought at short notice rather than using the long-term oil indexed contracts that prevail in Asia.  For example, we’ve seen Europe’s benchmark gas price ticking upwards in recent weeks due to concerns over strikes at Australian LNG plants. This shows that supplies remain tight and that there are many potential disruptions in our highly interconnected world market.  To synchronise demand for LNG, the European Commission has introduced initiatives like the EU Energy Platform, an IT platform that makes it easier for supplier companies in member states to jointly buy the fuel. However, it is uncertain what level of supplies can be channelled through this instrument as it remains untested. Additionally, the industry fears this kind of state intervention could backfire and undermine the functioning of the market.  As for pipeline gas, Norway has overtaken Russia to become Europe’s leading supplier, providing 46% of the requirement in early 2023 (compared to 38% a year earlier). This extra load has strained Norway’s gas infrastructure. In May and June, delayed maintenance work caused sluggish flows that drove up prices, again showing how tight the European market is at present. Extended maintenance work in Norway leading to more obstructions in future looks distinctly possible.  Meanwhile, the EU is still expected to have to buy around 22 bcm (billion cubic metres) from Russia this year. That’s the equivalent of around 11% of all the pipeline gas used by the bloc in 2022. A large proportion is coming through Ukraine, and with the current Russia-Ukraine transit agreement unlikely to be renewed after it expires in 2024, this supply route is in jeopardy.  As part of the pivot away from Russia, the EU managed to reduce gas consumption by 13% in 2022, according to the International Energy Agency (against a target of 15%). In the months ahead, war-weary EU states may not do so well on this front.  It will not help that prices have fallen, nor that some states didn’t pull their weight last winter. Only 14 out of 27 EU members introduced mandatory energy reduction policies, while eastern states like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria did little to reduce consumption. Should there be a physical shortage of gas in continental Europe this winter, this might undermine calls for solidarity.  What comes next  The harsh reality is that for at least another two or three winters, Europe will have to hope for mild weather across the northern hemisphere without major interruptions to global LNG supply if it is to avoid significant gas price spikes.  Even as things stand, European gas prices remain around 50% above their pre-invasion long-run average, which is hurting both households and businesses. This is particularly important for Germany, the EU’s industrial powerhouse, with its energy-intensive automotive and chemical industries. There are growing concerns that continued high energy prices could promote de-industralisaton as energy-intensive industries move elsewhere.  The good news is that pressure on gas should at least subside from the mid-2020s. Significant new supplies of LNG will come online in the US and Qatar and the market will re-balance. European gas demand should also get significantly lower – down 40% by 2030, according to the energy reduction plan.  There is even talk of a supply glut by the end of the decade, depending on renewable energy deployment accelerating in Europe, and a new generation of nuclear power stations coming on stream. This would significantly reduce Europe’s need to import gas for good, but will only happen if the bloc coordinates effectively.  We saw what can be achieved in the months after the invasion when France supplied gas to Germany to help reduce its dependence on Russia, then Germany later supplied more electricity to French cities to help with outages caused by nuclear reactor maintenance.  The challenge is to take the same approach to decarbonisation. While France tries to gather support for nuclear modernisation both at home and elsewhere in Europe, it is facing opposition from the likes of the German-led “Friends of Renewals” group, which advocates building out only renewable energy. Divisions like these may prove a serious obstacle in achieving a more rapid energy transformation away from fossil fuels.  So while Europe has managed to pivot away from Russia’s pipeline gas, it will remain exposed to the volatility of global gas markets unless it reduces its gas demand significantly in the coming years.

Now with 11 members, BRICS’ decision-making by consensus will be that much more difficultOnce upon a time, the BRICS were nothing but a slogan devised by Goldman Sachs’ economists to describe four emerging market economies to which South Africa was later added. But more than a decade later, the grouping, now with an investment bank—New Development Bank—of its own is besieged by dozens of countries of the Global South for membership.The Johannesburg summit of BRICS has drawn unusual interest around the world. There was a time when it barely merited a mention in the western press, but now it has been the subject of major stories, in which some saw BRICS as brittle whiel others thought it was  seeking to challenge the G7 and the western world through a process of enlargement. While the BRICS puts itself forward as a unified face of the emerging economic powers, the reality is that within the organisation—which  is neither a trade nor military bloc—there is considerable jostling between two Asian powers who are developing a global imprint—India and China.BRICS expansion announced in JohannesburgOne of the issues where this jostling played out in was the BRICS expansion process. Reportedly, 40 countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, though some 22 nations had formally expressed interest in joining the bloc. With the latest expansion, Iran, Egypt, Argentina, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and UAE have been offered membership effective 1 January 2024. That there was a bit of lobbying is evident from the fact that  last week, President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran spoke on the phone with Prime Minister Modi. According to the official spokesman, they talked about “regional and bilateral matters” as well as issues like the expansion of BRICS. The two leaders later met in Johannesburg as well.There was some doubt at the beginning of the summit as to whether expansion would actually be announced. This was because of the intense negotiations over the names of the proposed members.Earlier this month, an Indian official spokesman had clarified that India believed that BRICS expansion should take place through “full consultation and consensus” among members of the bloc. In his speech at the summit, the Prime Minister made it clear that “India fully supports the expansion of the BRICS membership. And welcomes moving forward with consensus in this.” On Thursday, too, there were reports that there were “eleventh hour negotiations” over the potential new members. Reuters claimed that an agreement had meant to be adopted on Wednesday, but it was delayed by India’s introduction of new criteria for membership. On Tuesday President Lula of Brazil had made it clear that his country was did not want to be any kind of “a counterpoint to G7, G20 or the United States. We just want to organise ourselves.”In an organisation that acts through consensus, getting in is difficult, but global politics is about give and take and a certain degree of persuasion and arm twisting does go on. So does the notion of giving a push to countries who you see eye to eye with and blocking countries that you don’t. Sometimes the negotiation involves two powerful players splitting the difference and negotiating the entry of countries in such a way that a balance of sorts is maintained. This is the way India became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation dominated by China. India’s case was pushed by Russia to balance China, and Beijing finally agreed to have India, if Pakistan, its “iron” friend, could become a member at the same time.Another element in such organisations is that countries seek membership not just to further their interests but to block the ambitions of others. In this way, China sought and became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) arrangement and once in there, it has used its vote to block efforts by the United States (US) to shape APEC into an Asia Pacific Economic Community in the manner of the European Economic Community that finally gave rise to the European Union.India has been reportedly joined by Brazil in resisting the haste and suggesting that new members may first be given the status of observers. The Indian position has been that while it was all for expansion, there was need to develop and standardise mechanisms to consider the applications and move on them.As of now, BRICS is more of a symbol than a unified and purposive entity. True, it has members like China and India who wield substantial power in their respective regions, but the entity itself hardly functions as an economic bloc of any kind. It does have the New Development Bank headquartered in Shanghai, which, in 2021, sharply stepped up its disbursements to US$7.6 billion, with its total disbursements being of the order of US$32 billion for infrastructure and sustainable development in four continents . The initial subscribed capital of the bank is equally distributed among the BRICS members.China’s role in and vision for BRICSBeijing, no doubt views BRICS as a means of offsetting US global power. In a page 2 commentary in the People’s Daily by someone with the nom de plume  “Huanyu Ping,” said that currently the world governance system was “at a historical turning point”. The growth of the emerging market and developing countries has enhanced their influence. But the western-dominated global order was a “stumbling block to world economic development and social progress.” The multilateralist BRICS was therefore providing a model for decisions to be made on the basis of equality and consensus, as testified by the share-holding of the New Development Bank. They also actively promoted reform of the global governance system and upheld the validity of multilateral and multipolar solutions.There should be no doubt about the weightage China has within BRICS. It has a GDP more than twice the size of the other members combined. Its economy may have slowed down but it is still growing, with IMF predicting a 5.2 per cent growth as against 5.9 for India. The others are growing at less than 1 per cent.  It has played a significant role in getting together two of the new incoming members, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 2022, China was the largest trading partner of South Africa, India and Brazil.There should be little doubt that China sees Africa as a battleground in the global struggle against the US. In a meeting with President Cyril Ramaphosa on Tuesday, President Xi spoke of the urgent need for China to promote cooperation with Africa because of “changes and chaos” in the world, an indirect allusion to the US. He took up the theme in the Business Forum meeting that he did not attend, but where his speech was read out: “Right now, changes in the world, in our times, and in history are unfolding in ways like never before, bringing human society to a critical juncture.”China may swear by multilateralism, but it is not really comfortable with it. What it is seeking to do is to shape institutions like BRICS in its own image for countering its principal rival, the United States of America. In this, it is unlikely to get Indian support, so what it is trying to do is to pack its membership with countries where it has already made significant investments through its Belt & Road Initiative. Such countries would be inclined to follow its global agenda, which is now manifesting itself as the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and the Global Civilisation Initiative.The Chinese aim, according to James Kynge in the Financial Times is two-fold. The first is to ensure that large parts of the world remain open to Chinese investment and trade in an environment where western attitudes are increasingly hardening. And the second is to have a bloc of votes in multilateral forums like the United Nations (UN) to project Chinese influence.In the turbulent world, China’s path is not an easy one. Its economy is slowing down and its global security calculations have been roiled by the Russian adventure in Ukraine. Further, in promoting the Global South it runs up against India which has its own ambitions, as well as the backing of the west. Even while promoting the UN and its institutions, China is not interested in any serious reform there because that could result in a bigger role for its adversaries like Japan and India.Done increases with the expansion of its membership. Now, with 11 members, things will be that much more difficult. The BRICS countries have economies and geopolitical profiles that are hugely divergent, and which makes consensus-based decision-making hugely difficult.

War and conflict in Sudan have forced more than 4.5 million people to flee. Many of those fleeing from the war are themselves refugees, who originally came to Sudan to escape crises in their home countries. Eritreans are among the largest and longest living groups of refugees in Sudan. Many cannot return home, leaving them in a limbo.  Sudan as a transit hub and a new home The majority of migration studies in the Greater Horn of Africa point to Sudan as the main crossing point for migrants from the region. Migrants from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia that are crossing the Sudanese border remain in Sudan for a while and then migrate to Europe, Gulf countries, and Israel. Khartoum is considered as the main transit hub for migrants from the Horn, including Sudanese migrants hoping to make their way to Europe. Thousands of the Eritreans, however, have not only seen Sudan as a transit but as a new home. There are an estimated 134,000 Eritrean refugees and asylum-seekers in Sudan. Some of them arrived as early as the 1960s and have since remained. Most of them live in the camps in Eastern Sudan bordering their country of origin, around 100,000 in Kassala state and 14,000 in Gedaref state, while some of them live in towns, among them around 10,000 in Khartoum state. No longer a safe haven Before the war erupted in Khartoum, many Eritreans had sought permanent refuge in the city, or using it as a pit stop on the journey onward through Libya with hopes of reaching European countries, risking their lives crossing rivers, deserts, and finally the Mediterranean Sea. These young Eritreans, both men and women, had escaped from forced conscription into the Eritrean army. They ran away from an extremely repressive state described as Africa’s equivalent to North Korea, or sought alternatives from a future without economic prospects. Many of them worked in Khartoum’s hospitality or informal business sectors, and have been victims of harassment and arbitrary detention by Sudanese security, aiming at cracking down on irregular migration. When the war broke out, they were among the civilians caught in the crossfire between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with an immediate need for protection and humanitarian assistance. Returning to Eritrea could seem like one of the most obvious ways out of the dire situation. But for many Eritreans, returning to their country of origin is not an option. Going back home would imply no protection from severe human rights violations by the Eritrean regime,  such as arbitrarily detentions, forced disappearances, secret prisons, and collective punishment of relatives of those who ran away from military service. Eritreans interviewed by Adam Babekir in Gedaref all state that they would not go back. A 28-year-old Eritrean woman, who was born in Sudan, expressed: Due to this war in Khartoum, some of my friends fled to other Sudanese towns like Kassala or Wad Medani, and those who have enough money to South Sudan. Most of the refugees are not willing to return to Eritrea because I have heard from a friend of mine from Eritrea that the situation is very bad there. So I will stay here till peace is restored in Khartoum. This is my hope and dream. Precarity in Eastern Sudan According to the Commission of Refugees (COR)’ local office in Gedaref town more than 4000 refugees (Ethiopian and Eritrean) arrived there after fleeing the fighting in Khartoum. Some Eritrean refugees have temporarily settled in the Um Gulja closed camp at Amna Aregawi Church while others are staying in Gedaref town benefiting from their relatives’ network. The refugee camps in Sudan are run by the COR and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) collectively. COR is facing capacity constraints due to the evacuation of UN staff and other humanitarian actors from Khartoum and elsewhere. The evacuation of some UN staff, and NGO employees in addition to the influx of refugees into other states resulted in a heavier work oad and resulted in capacity constraints for COR, and the UNHCR has proposed to relocate the refugees to other camps in Kassala and Gedaref states. The majority of Eritrean refugees who has arrived in the Um Gulja camp are women and children who need essential services such as food, water, sanitation and protection. But there is no service provider or referral pathway for them even though they are in dire need of physical support. The Um Gulia closed camp in Gedaref is infamous for lacking provision of basic services. However, the only alternative camp for Eritrean refugees is El Shagarab camp, Kassala State, Eastern Sudan. A 25 -year-old Eritrean women who was born in Khartoum said: Conditions are very bad here in Gedaref. No one helps us to get medicine, food, and cover basic needs. Even my sister's husband, who lives in Germany, has difficulties sending money to us due to closed cash transfer agencies. To me, returning to Eritrea is an impossible option, so I am thinking about travelling to Egypt. Yet, the vast majority of of the Eritrean refugees are reluctant to be relocated from their current location to the Shagarab camp. The Shagarab camp is remotely located, far away from any nearby town. Therefore this option severely limits the freedom of movement for the refugees. The camp also lacks many facilities that are available to the refugees in Gedaref. Many of the refugees are also hopeful that the UN will work for a third country resettlement solution, eventually enabling them to go to Europe or Canada, and have appealed to the UNHCR to act accordingly. A 27 -year-old Eritrean women born in Khartoum confirmed that ‘COR and UNHCR have proposed for us to stay in refugee camps in Kassala state, but we have requested the UNHCR to take us to a third country, as there is no future for us in Sudan.’ She added that if she suffers more than this, and if the war in Sudan does not come to an end she is considering travelling to Europe via Libya. Her preferred destination is Europe, as she expects Western communities to respect women and their rights: ‘We are very strong women with promising potential in our countries, but our societies do not empower women.’ An immediate need for protection The protection of civilians, including both citizens and refugees, can only materialize through the cessation of hostilities, an opening of safe passage to humanitarian aid, and engagement in  comprehensive dialogue between all parties. For this to happen, international bodies such as the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the UN and the TROIKA countries consisting of Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States must continue to exert pressure, and provide technical help if negotiations materialize. Locally, in Eastern Sudan, COR must work with the UNHCR and all relevant stakeholders to provide safe passage out of conflict areas such as Khartoum to other parts of Sudan and must provide effective services to the Eritrean refugees who wish to stay in the country.

With US-China rivalry and concerns over the long-term viability of the BRI growing, the third Belt and Road Forum will have much to manoeuvre should it take place this year  In July this year, total investments under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) crossed a significant landmark of US$1 trillion. The release of BRI data for the first half of 2023 was accompanied by reports that the third BRI forum is being planned to be held in China at the end of 2023. With the stature of being the highest-level gathering of participating countries, the forum is meant to showcase a collaborative approach towards implementation of the BRI, in addition to highlighting progress made and changes planned in its overall direction. The next forum will be the first in the post-pandemic period, after a gap of nearly four-and-a-half years. The road travelled The BRI rapidly gained momentum after its launch in 2013 (initially launched under the title One Belt One Road, which was changed to BRI in 2015 to stress collaboration and inclusivity). There was a sharp increase in the number of projects announced, total investments committed and executed, and the number of countries joining as partners (with the current number at over 150). The geographical scope of BRI also expanded significantly, transforming it from a regional to a near-global initiative, in both of its components—the continental Silk Road Economic Belt, and the maritime Silk Road. China stressed that BRI was a new model for partnership, trade and integration that was free from hegemonic pressures and conditions. In the second half of its decade-old existence, China started to highlight that the principles of multilateralism, environment and sustainability were embedded in the BRI. The importance of BRI for China has been such that it was included in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) constitution in 2017 and in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan issued in 2021. Before the world was struck by the COVID-19 pandemic, the BRI appeared to be moving at a rapid pace, although numerous problems associated with it had already become evident. Headwinds for BRI  The BRI faced criticism for its underlying objectives of gaining strategic influence through developmental footprint, leveraging assistance for basing and access rights, aggressively linking different regions with Sino-centric value chains, inadequate attention to local needs, lack of transparency, disregard for sovereignty, adverse environmental impact, corruption, and lack of sound financial oversight. In some cases, like the port project in Sri Lanka and the rail project in Kenya, the utilisation and revenues turned out to be well below the initial estimates. The term ‘debt diplomacy’ became popular in reference to the BRI after cases of high debt risk in some partner countries, including Pakistan, Laos, Sri Lanka, Zambia, and Mongolia, became increasingly evident. In some cases, China provided additional lending, while in others, it offered currency swap lines for debt restructuring. Notwithstanding, negative perceptions about the BRI expanded slowly, with some partner countries becoming less enthusiastic about these projects, resulting in a changed stance. New connectivity and infrastructure projects launched by the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the G7, Japan, Australia, India, and others took time to gain cohesion and substance, and have started to take concrete shape post-pandemic. Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (G7), the Global Gateway (EU), the Quality Infrastructure Investment Programme (Japan), and other such initiatives now offer alternatives to the BRI with different structures and processes. These and many linked initiatives have added to the challenges for the BRI, though their ability to rival the BRI in scale is yet to be established. The recent slowing down of the Chinese economy presents another key challenge to the BRI. In the face of high unemployment, a sticky consumer demand, lower trade and growth data, and concerns about the financial health of some big companies, China is being forced to look inwards.  This is also important from the point of view of the stated Chinese strategy of ‘dual circulation’, which links the domestic economy with external trade and investment. In the initial phase, China funded overseas projects under BRI through its policy banks, the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China, and specialised investment funds having the participation of public and private financing institutions. It adopted a new model of leveraging its foreign exchange reserves (currently at about US$3.2 trillion) to capitalise its state banks and sovereign funds. It subsequently diversified into other financing channels that include equity investment funds, sovereign development funds, private equity (PE) funds, and joint (with local investors) investment funds. As of October 2020, more than 70 percent of commitments undertaken by the Silk Road Fund were in the form of equity, with a medium- to long-term investment horizon akin to a PE firm. The capacity of many of these channels is linked with sustained economic growth and the overall health of the financial and banking sector. With very high levels of debt—some estimates suggest that the overall debt of China has crossed 300 percent of GDP—and new reports of bad loans, the BRI investments are likely to see increased scrutiny and lower risk appetite.  The BRI Forum The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) was started by China as a platform for collaboration and networking that would periodically review the broad direction of the BRI, finalise its action agenda, and announce new frameworks and agreements. The first BRF was held in May 2017, and was attended by 29 heads of state, delegates from 30 countries, and representatives from 70 international organisations. The focus was to showcase cooperation and consultation. The Chinese President announced that China would allocate more resources and financial support, and several new agreements and projects were unveiled. The UN Secretary-General, addressing the first forum, praised the BRI as “rooted in a shared vision for global development” and linked it with the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030. By all accounts, the first BRF was highly successful. The second BRF was held in April 2019 and attended by 37 heads of state, a higher number than the first BRF. However, the geopolitical environment had changed significantly, with the US having labelled China as a “revisionist power” and the EU having labelled it as a “systemic rival”. The trade and tariff friction between the US and China had started to evolve, and criticism of BRI projects—including on aspects related to financial terms, debt, local participation, and adverse environmental impacts—had started to grow. Accordingly, the second BRF emphasised consultative mechanisms, high quality and environmental standards, clean and green projects, and improved financial management. A debt sustainability framework, zero tolerance for corruption, and several documents outlining some key principles and deliverables were released. In addition to keeping up the momentum, the focus was also on image makeovers in response to various criticisms. China conveyed that the BRI was adaptive, and the broader assessments in different countries concluded that the BRI was here to stay for a long time. The Third BRI Forum amid a critical phase  The geopolitical and geo-economic shifts between the first two BRFs pale in comparison to those between the second and the anticipated third BRF. With the downward spiral in US-China ties and the unfolding strategic competition, the deterioration in the security environment, the precarious global trade and economic situation, the emergence of new partnerships and alliances, the focus on resilience related to technology and supply chains, and the new emphasis on ‘trust’, the third BRF faces a formidable challenge to reposition the BRI. The BRI itself has been facing some major headwinds, which have been exacerbated by China’s domestic economic problems. As 60 percent of China’s loans are in countries facing debt distress, there may be increased demands for waivers or restructuring at the forum. Given the new environment and re-evaluation by some partner countries, the participation—both in level and numbers—in the third BRF will be keenly watched. This will be a key input for China to schedule and conduct the event and to emphasise that the BRI continues to retain its appeal and enjoys widespread support, despite numerous challenges. For China, the BRI is too important to be allowed to move lower in its national priority. Some trimming of the number of projects and amount of investment is likely, and China may take up smaller projects overseas with enhanced scrutiny and oversight. China must, however, showcase the BRI as a success story whose continuation is in the interest of the entire global community. The third BRF will thus go ahead only if China is confident of a successful event and is able to put forward a plan and narrative that displays its resolve and ability to deal with some major headwinds at a very crucial juncture.

Dear President Zelenskyy, dear Ukrainian friends, Two years ago I represented the EU at the first international summit of the Crimea Platform. And I stated clearly that Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be fully restored. And this applied to Crimea and this applied to the region of Donetsk and Luhansk. And I stand by that today. Since Russia invaded your country, you have suffered nearly 550 days of death and destruction, and Crimea is being used as a strategic springboard to launch its brutal attacks. And last September, just like they did in Crimea, Russia tried to illegally annex Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and this is again a cynical attempt to grab more land, to steal the identity of Ukrainian citizens, to abduct your children and to drive people from their homeland, like they are doing to the Tatars. I pay tribute to Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatar people, who travelled to Saudi Arabia with you, President Zelenskyy, in search of peace. Russia is perfecting the toolbox of terror and persecution that they applied in Crimea over nine long years, and they are now committing atrocities in cities and villages in the whole of Ukraine, many amounting to war crimes. The EU will continue to call for full accountability for these crimes, including for the crime of aggression, and will not recognise any illegal attempt to change the status of Ukraine’s territories, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, because respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries is a basic principle of the UN Charter and that’s why we support you, President Zelenskyy, and your peace formula based on these very principles. In Ukraine you are fighting for your freedom, you are fighting for your future and for your homeland, and in the EU we know you are also fighting for our common values. And that’s why we have imposed massive sanctions against Russia and that’s why we are supporting you with weapons and ammunition, and we will strengthen this support. We are also helping to meet your humanitarian needs, and we are determined to back your country with strong financial support. We stand with you in your fight for freedom, and we will stand with you as you rebuild your country. Our total support for Ukraine amounts to more than €76 billion. And we are preparing a multiannual financing plan of roughly €50 billion. Russia also continues to weaponise food, including by blockading and attacking your seaports. And this cruel Russian tactic hits the most vulnerable around the globe hardest. In the EU we continue to support the efforts of the United Nations and Turkey to get the Black Sea Grain Initiative back up running. And we are also strengthening our Solidarity Lanes through the EU to help get Ukrainian agricultural products to global markets. Ladies and gentlemen, this war is also a fight for your future, for your dream of a bright, democratic and more prosperous future within the EU. Last year Ukraine received EU candidate status. So your European Union future is no longer a question of if, it is a question of when. And later this year, the European Council will discuss the possibility of opening accession negotiations. And I am confident that the Ukrainian people and the leaders will rise to this historic moment. You can count on my personal support, you can count on the EU. We will stand by your side for as long as it takes. Slava Ukraini!

Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end at some point, but when it will end as well as what the policy preferences of his successors might be are uncertain. It would be in the interests of the United States and Europe to signal on what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Russian leadership. Vladimir Putin has been the ruler of Russia since the turn of the century. He may remain in power through 2036, as the 2020 revision of the Russian constitution allows him to, or perhaps even longer. Then again, he may be ousted suddenly and surprisingly any day now, as the recent Wagner mutiny and the apparent lack of effective opposition to it within the Russian security services and public suggest is possible. Maybe he will decide not to run for re-election in 2024, though this does not seem likely. Sooner or later, though, Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end. What is not at all certain, of course, is who will replace him and what sort of foreign policy the new leader will pursue. It would appear, though, that there are only a few possibilities. One is that Putin will be succeeded by someone just like him who will continue Moscow’s hostile policies toward Ukraine and the West in general. Another is that Putin will be replaced by someone within his circle that decides Moscow needs to cut its losses in Ukraine and rebuild good relations with the West both to revive Russia’s economy and to hedge against an increasingly powerful China. While this might seem unlikely, Russian and Soviet history are replete with examples of new autocratic leaders dramatically reversing key aspects of their predecessor’s policies. Yet another post-Putin possibility is an authoritarian leader who wants to cut Moscow’s losses in Ukraine but who sees the survival of both autocratic rule and even Russia’s territorial integrity as best served through increasing reliance on Chinese support and guidance. It is also possible that Putin’s rule will end as a result of the rise of democratic forces which want Russia to become part of the West and cooperate or join the EU or even NATO. For this scenario to occur, there would have to be a dramatic change of heart within the Russian security services about what is in Russia’s and their own interests. While this seems highly unlikely, there have been examples in other where military-backed autocratic rule gave way to democracy. Finally, whether Putin’s successor is autocratic or democratic, he or (much less likely) she may simply be weak as a result of having to deal with a compounding internal crisis resulting from Putin’s policies, including popular discontent over Russian casualties in Ukraine, economic decline, and secessionism in non-Russian or even Russian regions of the Russian Federation. What Can Europe and the United States Do? Russia’s post-Putin leadership and its policy preferences, whatever they may be, will have an enormous impact on Europe and the United States as well as other countries and regions of the world. But while obviously they hope to see Putin succeeded by a new leader who will end the war, withdraw from Ukraine, and improve Moscow’s ties with the West, Europe and the United States will have very little ability, if any, to affect the post-Putin transition — especially if the person who succeeds  him comes from within his inner circle. Putin has sought to rally Russian public support for his war in Ukraine through claiming that the West wants to bring about the breakup of Russia. Whether Putin himself actually believes this, there appears to be no possibility of changing his mind about the West being his implacable enemy. The United States and Europe, though, would do well to signal to whoever might succeed Putin that this is not the case. Specifically, Washington and Brussels should make clear how they would like to relate to post-Putin Russia. Such messaging should include the following points: Just as the United States and Europe support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, they also support the territorial integrity of Russia. The West has no interest in seeing the breakup of Russia. The United States and Europe will lift their economic sanctions on Russia (including those on Moscow’s exports of oil and gas) in response to Russian withdrawals from Ukrainian territory. The more occupied territory that Russia returns to Ukraine, the more Western economic sanctions against Russia will be lifted. While Europe and the United States would like to see Russia become a Western-style democracy, they acknowledge that whether it does so or not is an internal matter which Russians alone will determine. The United States and Europe are prepared to have normal relations with any type of Russian government — democratic or autocratic — which is willing to behave non-threateningly toward the West, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. While they respect the Russian government’s desire to continue cooperating closely with China, Western governments want Moscow to know that the United States, NATO, and the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (US, Japan, India, Australia) are willing to discuss common security concerns about China (which many Russians besides Putin have had) if and when the new Russian leadership wishes to discuss them. The articulation of these messages by the United States, Europe, and, regarding the last point, Quad governments, will not magically lead the Russian people, much less Putin’s inner circle, to oust Putin and embrace the West. Indeed, it is possible that a Putin loyalist successor will spurn them. But if the United States and Europe do not signal under what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Putin leadership, then Washington and Brussels may reduce the chances that a post-Putin leadership will be willing to cooperate with the West.

The steps taken by the parties following Russia’s suspension of the New START, signed in Prague in 2010, as well as statements made by key officials, make it possible to offer a cautious forecast of the medium-term future of arms control between the two leading nuclear superpowers. February freeze In late February, the consistent degradation of relations between Moscow and Washington has also affected strategic nuclear arms limitation: during his address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin voiced his decision to suspend the New START, which was promptly implemented with a respective law taking effect on February 28. Ironically, almost exactly two years earlier, the prolongation of the treaty was formalized (even a little quicker). It was not possible to reach agreement on prolonging the treaty with the Trump administration, so after Joe Biden’s arrival to the White House, the expiration of the New START was a couple of weeks away. As a result of the decision made, the validity of the Treaty was extended until February 5, 2026. However, despite such an optimistic start to the dialogue with the new administration, active work on the future of post-START strategic arms control never got underway. The reason was both the rather significant time specified in the treaty (that would expire during the next presidential tenures in the United States and Russia) and the long list of accumulated problems in the field of ensuring strategic stability. Russia was increasingly concerned about further limitations on strategic nuclear weapons, pointing to the nuclear missile capabilities of the America’s NATO allies—the United Kingdom and France, as well as to the growing countervailing capabilities (aimed at defeating the nuclear triad and control centers) of long-range precision non-nuclear weapons. Hand in hand with the latter was the expansion of NATO and the spread of its military infrastructure even closer to Russia’s borders. Another serious concern was an uncontrolled development of global ballistic missile defense (BMD), even if in the distant future. In the event of further reductions in Russia’s strategic forces, these factors could seriously undermine its confidence in the ability to launch a guaranteed retaliatory strike with a force sufficient to ensure reliable deterrence. On the other hand, the U.S. was reluctant to see further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons without them being linked to other issues. First and foremost, Washington is concerned about the radical growth of China’s nuclear capabilities—under the Trump presidency, Beijing’s inclusion in strategic arms control was, for some time, a mandatory condition for as much as extending the New START. Under the Biden administration, this issue was still in the initial stages, implying a softer touch, though it has never completely left the agenda and would probably rise to its full scale, should substantive negotiations commence. For two years by now, the U.S. top brass has been talking about the need “to deter two virtually equal adversaries simultaneously and independently”, as the most difficult and previously unprecedented challenge. Besides, Washington is concerned about Russia’s much larger and more advanced arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. In the inception of a long journey possibly leading to a new agreement or a set of agreements, a format for a comprehensive bilateral dialogue on strategic stability was announced in June 2021. However, only two face-to-face meetings were eventually held within its framework, which was clearly not enough. Once the Ukrainian crisis broke out, the U.S. announced the suspension of this format. A simple coincidence also played a negative role in the fate of the treaty as inspections thereunder were suspended in the early 2020s through a coordinated decision due to the pandemic. They would probably have been reinstated if the situation were normal in 2022. The parties were already negotiating extra security measures until a sharp deterioration of bilateral relations affected this purely technical dialogue (which it was in the beginning). A separate problem was the Western sanctions against Russia that included a ban on commercial and government aircraft flights from Russia in the airspace of the Western nations. Although Washington later stated that it would have allowed an aircraft with inspectors on board to fly in, it seems that it could not guarantee operational approvals from its junior allies, which meant that the suddenness of inspections would have been compromised. In the very least, there is no talk of equality among the parties to the treaty. The comments made by the U.S. side that Russians could use commercial flights with connections in third countries cannot be seen as anything other than boorish. Consultations on finding a way out continued, when in August 2022 the U.S. side decided to cut the Gordian knot by notifying the Russian side of an urgent inspection as if everything had been resolved. Russia immediately responded to this “attempted assault” by suspending inspections. An opportunity to resolve the differences could arise during the meetings within a special format, the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), which was to be held in Cairo, Egypt, in late November or early December, but Moscow refused to participate at the last moment. As a result, the New START was deprived of the main elements of compliance verification and the mechanism of conflict resolution. Amid this situation, the denunciatory voices of American lawmakers and hawks from other spheres were getting ever louder about Russia’s violation of the New START. After these steps had been taken, declaring a withdrawal from the treaty would seem a logical step to secure and legitimize the de-facto state of things. But the Russian authorities chose not to burn all boats and—instead of withdrawing from the treaty—suspended it, demonstrating readiness to resume participation. However, it must be admitted that the conditions put forward for resumption, namely “the repudiation of hostile policies towards Russia by the United States and its allies”, are rather vague while it is hard to imagine that their fulfilment can seriously be expected in the foreseeable future. The most important difference between the suspension of the New START and a complete withdrawal from the treaty was the cessation of “information exchange” within its framework while maintaining quantitative indicators of deployed carriers and warheads of strategic nuclear forces (SNF). (Not only do the parties exchange general quantitative indicators but they also regularly report on changes in the status of components in their nuclear forces.) Moscow has repeatedly emphasized this at all levels, from the initial presidential statement to statements on the part of lawmakers. The same is expected from Washington—in fact, even the first detailed official commentary on the suspension contained a call on the United States to “refrain from steps that could prevent the resumption of the New START Treaty.” The U.S. took a negative view of the Russian initiative, accusing Russia of violating the treaty and calling for a return to compliance. Yet, those accusations would have been released anyway. That said, administration officials tried to keep a calmer tone. In the following months, the United States announced that it would stop providing Russia with relevant information on the status of its strategic nuclear forces (SNF), but it did not formalize the suspension of the treaty, which drew ironic rebukes from Moscow. This may be due to Moscow’s reluctance to both break the New START and “legitimize” the format of “suspension” as the United States always claimed that Russia had no right to take such actions because they were not directly stipulated in the treaty. Recent statements of American speakers—in particular, the speech of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan that drew a lot of attention in the field and among Russian politicians—make us think that Washington, as of today and in the short term, has resigned itself to the current state of affairs. It appears that the Biden administration will not formally withdraw from the treaty and will be fighting any attempts on the part of lawmakers to force it to do so. Washington, like Moscow, has repeatedly emphasized that it does not plan to exceed the stipulated ceiling of deployed strategic nuclear forces, proposing to think about agreements for the post-START period, separating strategic arms control from the broader scope of problematic issues in relations. Fashion for the 1980s Although some Russian speakers have criticized Sullivan’s references to the times of the Cold War, when the two countries were engaged in arms control despite their confrontation, we see in fact a situation that closely resembles the fate of the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2). The agreement, which has no legal basis for political reasons, continues to be implemented as mutually beneficial from a practical point of view. In the absence of an inspection regime, the parties have no other option but to do business on trust: It is particularly ironic since mutual trust has been at a very low ebb. A similar situation could be observed in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite some détente in the Cold War throughout the 1970s, direct on-site inspections were unthinkable. Concluding the 1972 Provisional USSR-U.S. Agreement on Certain Measures to Limit Strategic Offensive Arms (better known as SALT-1, although it would be more pertinent to include the ABM Treaty in that acronym), the parties undertook a five-year cessation of the quantitative build-up of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To monitor compliance, it was proposed to use “national technical means of verification,” a mild euphemism for satellite reconnaissance. To clarify that this involved nothing more, it was stated that means of control should only be used “in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law”: Only 10 years had passed since the failed flight of F. Powers, so aerial espionage was a very real threat. On the other hand, the countries pledged not to interfere with each other’s satellite reconnaissance, including measures of structural and facility camouflage. It is noteworthy that these articles had been migrating from one agreement to the other until the New START, where they are quoted verbatim (except for the clarification that ICBM camouflaging was permitted on a limited scale). It was emphasized in the very name and text of SALT-1 that the treaty was temporary, pending the conclusion of a more profound agreement. In June 1979, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) was signed, and that one already stipulated specific numerical caps and even an onset of a cautious process of arms reduction. However, U.S. lawmakers—partly because of the domestic struggle with the Carter administration, partly because of their hawkish views and distrust of the USSR—began to oppose the entry of this treaty into force quite vibrantly. One of the most important reasons for criticism was the lack of effective verification tools, which was more important than before, since not just the carriers were limited, but partly also their combat load. In October, a big stir caused by an “unexpected discovery” of a Soviet brigade in Cuba played out, while Soviet troops were marched into Afghanistan on December 25. Under those circumstances, in the year of presidential election, it was political suicide to continue insisting on the ratification of SALT-2, and Jimmy Carter told the Senate a week later that he no longer thought it necessary because of the altered environment. However, neither this, nor the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House a year later, who being one of the most convinced anti-Soviet American presidents opposed the treaty during his campaign, prevented its de-facto observance, even if not de-jure. SALT-2 was to remain in force until late 1985, when it was to be replaced by a more substantive treaty. The initial total number of carriers was limited to 2,400, and to 2,250 by early 1981. The USSR, which declared 2,504 carriers at the time of signing, had to reduce a small part of that fleet in two stages, which it did not do, given the U.S. refusal to ratify the treaty. Even so, the Soviet Union did not exceed the initial quantitative cap, while actively replacing obsolete systems with new, more advanced ones. The U.S. was initially within the limits (declaring 2,284 carriers at the time of the conclusion) and exited them at the end of November 1986 in the process of rearming the B-52 family of bombers with new cruise missiles. Thus, absurd as it may seem, the treaty, while not finalized, was quite successful. Yes, there were mutual reproaches within its framework such as when the USSR openly played the hypocrite by presenting the mobile ICBM RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 «Sickle») system as a simple upgrade of the old RT-2P (SS-13 «Savage») missile, and the U.S. began “research” towards a global missile defense system. Yet, these actions were a lame excuse for an aggressive demarche by the opposite side in the form of initiating a large-scale, dangerous conflict through an attempt to create a preponderant quantitative build-up of strategic nuclear forces. In all candor, U.S. military argued that Topol was violating the letter of SALT-2, while strengthening strategic stability because that system was optimized for dealing a retaliatory strike. However, such “business on trust” had limited potential, especially in the midst of a chronically negative attitude of U.S. lawmakers towards this approach to strategic relations with the USSR, as congressmen were looking for an excuse to publicly bash the “naïve” executives, who were outsmarted once again. As in the case of SALT-2, the agreements that the U.S. presses for sometimes fall victim to political games. Under the Reagan administration, the U.S. began pushing for detailed on-site inspections that should accompany the agreements on strategic arms control and reduction. The motto of the U.S. side was “trust but verify” as the American president asked his advisors to collect Soviet jokes and traditional Russian sayings for him to make an impression during the negotiations. He liked the phrase “Doveryai no proveryai” (“trust but verify”) so much that he kept reiterating it time and again so that Mr. Gorbachev seemed to be sick of hearing it. Time wheel Since then, U.S. interest in the inspection of strategic arms reduction agreements has not diminished. The collapse of the USSR and subsequent events could not help but play a role in this as one can still find the opinion that only a watchful oversight from overseas saved the Soviet nuclear legacy from being “dragged apart”. In the professional community, there even remains the maxim that “the U.S. wants inspections to be included in the START, while Russia needs caps.” It seems that the U.S., for the near future, is losing the part of the treaty that it values so much, which is surely fraught with its complete cancellation on its own initiative. At least, the “hawkish” part of the political leadership is already calling for this move—thus, in May, a bill under the telling title “No START Treaty Act” was entered in the Senate: It requires that the country officially withdraw from the New START no later than one year after the document’s approval. The given bill is interesting in its own right as a likely vision of arms control by Washington hawks, but it is worth being considered only if it gets further traction in Congress. What about the caps and why are they important for Russia, as the simplified formula from above suggested? Although there is no objective of maintaining strict quantitative parity with the U.S. in all parameters of the SNF, a significant superiority of the opponent in the number of SNFs would threaten the deterrence by maintaining the capabilities for dealing a retaliatory strike with the desired power, especially given U.S. allies possessing nuclear potential as well as a significant arsenal of non-nuclear cruise missiles. In the future, that may be accompanied by non-nuclear medium-range ballistic / hypersonic missiles. In this situation, limiting the upper ceiling (cap) of the Strategic Nuclear Defense Forces allowed more funds to be allocated for conventional weapons—obviously, this issue has only become more pressing for Russia over the past year. The START caps have not been fully used. According to the latest data, as of 1 September 2022, Russia had 540 deployed carriers out of 700 permitted under the Treaty. It is possible to commission 10 more Borey-type submarine missile carriers in one go, in compliance with within the agreed limits. Certainly, there is the issue of warheads, where Russian SNF is close to the permitted upper limits, but they could be distributed more evenly in the formation of the triad, increasing overall stability. In any case, this parameter is likely to decrease in the near future with the withdrawal of the heavy R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18 Mod 6 «Satan») ICBMs. In the conditions of preserved military nuclear complex, warheads are a lot less costly than carriers. It is not surprising that Russia currently has no need to announce plans to launch a quantitative strategic nuclear missile arms race, so that military expenditures could easily be reallocated to meet other urgent needs. The U.S. is also incapable of any significant build-up of arsenals in the medium term: In reality, they can only begin the process of refitting Minuteman III ground-based ICBMs from one warhead to three warheads, increasing the load of Ohio-class submarines from 20 to 24 Trident II missiles and refitting them with more warheads. Yet, the former would take a long time and would be visible, while this would probably be possible on only a fraction of the fleet. In response, Russia would also upgrade its missiles, so the benefit would be minimum. The option of increasing the strike power of the submarine component in the nuclear triad seems alluring for the United States, but the availability of “backup” warheads is then in question. Given the collapse of the U.S. military nuclear complex and plans to resume the serial production of thermonuclear charges in the early 2030s at best, it is unlikely that U.S. warehouses are bursting with serviceable warheads. In this situation, the scenario when both parties will generally continue to adhere to the provisions of the New START for as long as it is effective and maybe even longer, despite regular mutual reproaches, looks quite plausible, as in the case of SALT-2. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov, speaking at the PIR Center, commented negatively on Sullivan’s proposals and noted that it might be worthwhile not to try create a complex treaty in strategic arms control including an inspection regime but rather to embark upon the path of “parallel unilateral self-restrictions.” After all, the largest initiative in history to reduce nuclear arsenals was just that. We are not talking about a series of STARTs—this rather refers to the elimination of huge arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, whereby, by foreign estimates, the U.S. would get rid of all but a relatively small number of B61 bombs, whereas Russia would reduce them by some 90 per cent relative to the late Soviet Union levels (while still maintaining a significant advantage over anyone else in the end). In the late 2020s, however, the much-delayed radical upgrading of the U.S. nuclear triad should start bearing fruit, whereas Washington will be a lot more concerned over Beijing’s burgeoning arsenal. Today, it is difficult to predict which way to maintain strategic stability can be found in the new architecture of relations between the nuclear powers, which is much more complex than the U.S.-Soviet system. Perhaps, the future lies in the dialogue between the five major nuclear powers, which continues even at this challenging time, with the presidency just passed on to Russia.

Executive summary The EU’s unprecedented support to Ukraine has included temporary trade-liberalisation measures and the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, which have strengthened the country’s export capacities and the resilience of Ukraine’s wartime economy. In reaction to Russia’s blockade of the Black Sea, the EU set up EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes as an alternative way for goods to leave Ukraine by rail, road, and inland waterways. These measures have helped Ukraine maintain a slight increase in its total merchandise exports to the EU compared to the pre-invasion level. In contrast, Ukraine’s exports to other markets declined substantially. As a result, many Ukrainian producers and exporters were able to maintain their operations during wartime, receive critically needed export revenues, and deepen their integration into EU supply chains.  However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. Their unilateral import bans on a wide range of Ukrainian agri-food products in April 2023 violated EU Single Market legislation. As a result, Ukrainian export flows were immediately disrupted, given that Ukraine’s access to global markets remains limited. While a compromise of the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary tradeliberalisation measures for Ukraine for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure its smooth operation.  To prevent further crises and disruptions of transit flows, the EU should further increase investments in the transport and storage capacity of Solidarity Lanes and connectivity between EU neighbouring countries and Ukraine, enhance transparency and regular monitoring, data exchange, and coordination of transit flows, and conduct regular trilateral consultations between the European Commission, Eastern European countries, and Ukraine to avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lane disruptions. Amid Russia’s new escalation and withdrawal from the Black Sea Initiative on 17 July, the international community should use all possible leverage to pressure Russia, double down on safeguarding Ukraine’s maritime export routes, and provide Ukraine with more defence capacity to protect its critical infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Danube. In addition, further trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market should be a priority on the EU-Ukraine agenda as soon as possible, in line with Ukraine’s accession path. Ukraine’s wartime trade losses and the need for further support The economic burden of Russia’s war on Ukraine is enormous and only continues to increase. Ukraine’s economy contracted by about a third, while exports dropped by 35.1%, meaning that Ukraine received $24 billion less in foreign currency revenue in 2022 compared to 2021 (see Figure 1). The iron and steel industry was hit the hardest, leading to the largest reduction in export supplies - 67.5% or $9.4 billion, in 2022 vs 2021. Significant cuts were also witnessed in ore exports (-56.7% or $4 billion), chemicals (-54.3% or $1.5 billion), machinery, and electronic equipment (-29% or $1.5 billion).  At the same time, the reliance of Ukraine’s economy on agricultural and food exports increased during wartime - agricultural and food products generated more than half of all critically needed export revenues (53% in 2022 vs 40% in 2021). Yet, total agricultural and food exports declined by 15.5% or $4.3 billion in 2022.  Ukraine’s ability to trade has been significantly hampered by Russia’s blockade of key Black Sea ports, disrupting the country’s main export route for grain, vegetable oils, metals, and iron ore. For example, before the full-scale invasion, about 90% of grain and oilseeds were exported from Black Sea ports. In addition, export capacities were hit by the destruction of production facilities and critical infrastructure (especially transport and energy), particularly in the South and East of Ukraine. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, at least 426 large and medium-sized enterprises and thousands of small enterprises have been damaged or destroyed. Disruption of internal and external supply chains, shortages of critical imports, and surging production and logistics costs have become a big challenge for Ukrainian producers, undermining their profitability and competitiveness in global markets. In agriculture, significant losses were caused by Russia’s occupation of vast swathes of territory, mining, and physical damage to agricultural land, storage facilities, livestock, and agricultural machinery.  Many Ukrainian farmers have been driven to the edge of bankruptcy due to a sharp decline in export and domestic revenues and increased production and logistics costs (export costs for Ukrainian grain rose from $30-$40 per tonne pre-war to $140-$150 upon the invasion). The devastating destruction of the Kakhovka dam in Southern Ukraine on 6 June 2023 (leaving at least 500,000 hectares of farmland without access to irrigation water) has further undermined production and export potential. The Black Sea Grain Initiative and the importance of seaport routes Securing and unblocking Ukraine’s agricultural exports is vital for global food security. Ukraine is a major world exporter of maize, wheat, barley, rapeseed, and sunflower oil, supplying over 45 million tonnes of grain to the global market each year. Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian seaports is a major threat to global food security, especially for regions heavily reliant on shipments from Ukraine - North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. It placed huge pressure on food prices in global markets, which reached a record high after the invasion. The UN-Türkiye backed Black Sea Grain Initiative has allowed Ukraine to resume and significantly increase the volumes of its seaport agricultural exports to global markets since August 2022. However, only three Ukrainian Black Sea ports in Odesa were unblocked, and only for grain and oilseeds. Russia constantly threatened and sabotaged the implementation and prolongation of this deal, causing long queues of ships and making seaport shipments more expensive and complicated. Furthermore, export capacity under the deal was limited and unstable (2.9 million tonnes in January, 3.9 million tonnes in March, and 1.3 million tonnes in May 2023) due to Russia delaying the inspection of vessels in the Bosphorus and their registration for participation in the grain agreement. As a result, the workload of Ukrainian ports declined to 30-35% as of April 2023, and Ukrainian farmers were left with large stocks of grain, thereby facing uncertainty about export activities, and suffering significant losses.  According to the UN, almost 33 million tonnes of agricultural produce were exported through the Black Sea Grain corridor, about 50% of all exported grain and oilseeds since its application in August 2022. The agreements helped stabilise global food markets and reduce volatility, with global food prices gradually falling as of March 2022.  The major export destinations of Ukrainian grain through seaports included China, Spain, Türkiye, Italy, the Netherlands, Egypt, and Bangladesh (57% of all shipments under the agreement went to developing countries vs. 43% to developed countries). China was the largest buyer of Ukrainian grain, importing almost a third of all shipments under the grain agreement (mainly maize). By purchasing Ukrainian grain, China was diversifying its food supplies and enhancing its food security. At the same time, Turkish companies, for example, benefitted from re-exporting Ukrainian grain (both processed and unprocessed) to global markets. The grain deal was extended several times (last time– until 18 July). However, on each occasion, Russia usually intensified its pressure on Ukraine before negotiations for its further extension – by threatening to terminate the agreement unilaterally, blocking the work of the grain corridor, and demanding the removal of some Western sanctions. In May-July 2023, the capacity and effectiveness of the grain agreement declined as Russia significantly limited the registration of ships at Ukrainian ports required “to overcome obstacles to Russian grain and fertiliser exports” (see Figure 2). As a result, Ukraine has been reducing its reliance on the sea corridor over the last few months and shifting to alternative routes. However, the seaport corridor is important for Ukraine for its proximity, developed transport and storage infrastructure, and lower logistics costs.  The grain agreement has never been as important to Russia as it is to Ukraine, but rather a tool for pressuring Kyiv and the West. In an attempt to save the grain agreement, the UN suggested some compromises, including the connection of a subsidiary of the state agricultural bank to SWIFT. However, Russia refused, demanding that all of its demands be met, and withdrew from the agreement on 17 July. The subsequent attacks on Ukraine’s Odesa and Danube port infrastructure were clearly aimed at further hampering Ukraine’s export capacity and access to global markets, depriving Kyiv of a major source of foreign currency revenues (Ukraine received about $13 billion for its grain and oilseeds in 2022 in total), as well as increasing the reliance of developing countries on Russian food supplies. The suspension of the grain agreement also increases pressure on global grain prices (according to the IMF, they could rise by 10-15%), as well as make developing countries more reliant on Russian food supplies, thereby deepening their food insecurity. Alternative export routes for Ukraine via EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes Initiated in May 2022, the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provide alternative routes for Ukraine’s exports via Eastern European countries using land transport (trains and trucks) and Danube River ports to ship goods to global markets and EU member states (through seaports in Romania, Poland, and other EU countries). According to the European Commission, the Solidarity Lanes allowed Ukrainian exporters to partly compensate for the loss of sea routes and to unblock about 40 million tonnes as of the end of July 2023, which is more than 50% of Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports since the start of the invasion. In addition, the Solidarity Lanes have been the only option for Ukraine’s non-agricultural exports (metals, iron ore, chemicals) and the only option for Ukraine to import all the goods. The Solidarity Lanes have also helped export over 35 million tonnes of nonagricultural products from Ukraine. The capacity of Solidarity Lanes exceeded 3.5 million tonnes of grain and oilseeds in March 2023 (see Figure 2).  The Danube River, with the ports of Izmail, Reni, and others, has become the vital export route for Ukrainian grain and other products (it shipped about 30% of Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports after the invasion, about 40% in June 2023). Its capacity has been expanded to 2-2.2 million tonnes of grain per month, with volumes increasing. To alleviate obstacles to trade and increase the cargo flow via the Danube, Ukraine has been increasing the depth of the canals leading from the Danube ports to the Black Sea and creating infrastructure for grain storage and export. In particular, Ukraine has increased the depth of its Southwestern Bystre Canal on the Danube River from 3.9 to 6.5 metres and 7 metres in some parts of the canal. Rail and road export routes have handled about 1 million and 600-700,000 tonnes of produce per month, respectively. However, import restrictions against Ukrainian grain by five Eastern European countries reduced the flow of shipments in this direction during the last few months (to about 600,000 tonnes by rail and 200,000 tonnes by road).  Rail and road routes have also faced logistical bottlenecks, such as incompatible rail gauge widths between Ukraine and the EU, the limited transport and storage capacity of Eastern European countries, including shortages of appropriate trains and trucks, slow clearance procedures, and long waiting times at border crossing points. Logistics bottlenecks limit export volumes and raise the logistics costs of alternative routes, which have been considerably higher compared to seaport routes. There have also been organisational and coordination problems in implementing the Solidarity Lanes initiative. Ukraine, the European Commission, and EU member states have been implementing several infrastructure projects to alleviate existing logistical constraints, increase the capacity of the Solidarity Lanes and improve cross-border connections between Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU. The European Commission has mobilised one billion euros to fund the infrastructure developments of the Solidarity Lanes over 2022-2023, such as increasing the number of border crossing points for trucks, road improvements, rehabilitation of railway infrastructure and multimodal logistics in Romania and Moldova to Ukraine’s borders, etc. Additional funding opportunities have become available for Ukraine after its integration into the Connecting Europe Facility programme in June 2023, enabling Ukraine to apply for EU funding for projects in the transport, energy and digital realms.  The Solidarity Lanes have helped diversify and reduce Ukraine’s dependency on a single export route. Amid continued obstruction of seaports by Russia and the suspension of the grain deal, Ukraine needs to reorient its agri-food exports further, placing a larger burden on alternative routes via the Solidarity Lanes and risking new tensions with EU neighbours. Ukraine plans to export the major part of its expected grain and oilseed exports (up to 40 - 42 million tonnes from the expected 48 million tonnes of exports) across the three routes of Solidarity Lanes during the next season. Therefore, it is essential to ensure the smooth running and further expansion of the capacity of alternative export routes – deepening river canals, extending the rail network, and building transhipment terminals. The use of new routes and EU seaports, as offered by Croatia, the Baltic states, and Greece, can also help expand the capacity of transit routes. However, they imply longer distances and higher logistics costs, and require significant investments in rail, road, and storage infrastructure. EU trade-liberalisation measures for Ukraine during wartime EU-Ukraine trade relations were already significantly liberalised under the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Agreement (DCFTA), which has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016. As of the beginning of 2022, most tariffs for industrial and agricultural products had already been abolished under the DCFTA. However, the EU still applied tariff measures to certain Ukrainian exports, the most restrictive of which were tariff rate quotas (TRQs).  TRQs allow for duty-free import of a product’s specified volume, while beyond-TRQ supplies are dutiable and subject to EU tariff rates for third countries. Ukrainian agri-food producers complained about the low and outdated volumes of the EU TRQs under the DCFTA that did not reflect the current level of Ukraine’s production and export capabilities and the level of EUUkraine trade relations.  Ukraine was utilising 31-32 out of 36 EU TRQs under the DCFTA during recent years, from which the following TRQs were usually fully exhausted: honey, processed tomatoes, apple and grape juices, processed cereal grains, sugar, starch, processed starch, eggs, corn, corn flour and pellets, poultry meat, etc. For many of them, Ukraine’s supplies usually exceeded TRQ volumes (e.g. total supplies of honey from Ukraine to the EU usually exceeded the volume of the relevant TRQ by 8-10 times). However, out-of-quota import tariff rates and TRQ administration costs still had a restrictive impact on Ukrainian exports. As Ukraine’s major trading partner (accounting for about 40% of Ukraine’s trade before the invasion), the EU has been supporting the resilience of Ukraine’s wartime economy by restoring Ukraine’s ability to trade and generate export revenues.  The EU has introduced temporary trade-liberalisation measures such as the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) since 4 June 2022 for one year (ATM Regulation 2022/870) including the complete removal of:   ●  The remaining import duties on industrial products; ●  All tariff rate quotas on agricultural and food products; ●  Entry prices on fruit and vegetables; ●  All trade defence measures (anti-dumping duties and safeguards mostly applied to steel products).   The EU also implemented other steps to facilitate transportation and border control for Ukraine’s exports. It has temporarily liberalised the transport of freight by road between the EU and Ukraine in relation to bilateral 8 operations and transit by abolishing the need for permits (the agreement was recently extended for one year - until 30 June 2024). Besides, in October 2022, Ukraine joined the Common Transit Convention which simplified customs transit procedures between the EU and Ukraine. EU-Ukraine trade dynamics after Russia’s invasion  After a significant decline in the first months of Russia’s invasion, Ukrainian exports to the EU even slightly exceeded pre-invasion levels by the end of 2022, while exports to other trade partners substantially declined. Consequently, the role of the EU as Ukraine’s main trading partner increased to 63% in 2022 from about 40% in 2021 (of $44.2 billion in Ukraine’s total exports of goods in 2022, about $28 billion were destined for the EU market).  The driving factor behind export recovery was the fast growth of agri-food exports to the EU - by more than $5.2 billion or by almost 70% year on year in value terms (including cereals – by 141.7%; vegetable oils – by 29.4%; oilseeds - by 96.5%). This helped to compensate for the significant drop in iron and steel exports (by 48.7%), iron ore (by 21.0%), and machinery equipment (by 10.0%) to the EU.  Increased agri-food exports to the EU in 2022 can be explained by several factors, including Ukrainian exporters reorienting to closer markets because of logistics problems and high freight and insurance costs, better access to the EU market due to EU trade liberalisation measures and new export routes, greater demand for imported grain in the EU as a result of a drought affecting many regions of Europe in 2022, as well as higher prices for many agricultural products in the EU due to Russia’s invasion.  Among all temporary trade-liberalisation measures, the suspension of TRQs has been the most impactful - in facilitating Ukraine’s exports to the EU. Namely, exports of sugars, apple juice, poultry meat, eggs, milk powder, starches, processed cereal grains, and cereals, earlier subject to TRQs, saw the greatest growth (see Table 1). The suspension of the over-quota import duties gave these Ukrainian products a competitive advantage in the EU market when compared to products from other third countries, as well as lower TRQ administrative costs for Ukrainian exporters due to the simplification of export procedures. In contrast, despite trade liberalisation, there was a drop in exports of some products such as honey and processed tomatoes. However, this can be explained by other factors (e.g. loss of production capacities due to the war). Unilateral measures of neighbouring EU countries against Ukraine’s imports Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria - the five neighbouring Eastern European countries (EEC) in the frontline of the Solidarity Lanes - became the major markets for the export of Ukrainian goods in the EU. Their joint share in Ukraine’s exports of goods to the EU increased from 32% in 2021 to 56% in 2022. Ukraine’s exports of goods to these countries increased by 54% y/y in 2022 - to $15.7 billion, with agri-food products accounting for the significant increase.  Agri-food exports to five neighbouring countries increased by 5.2 times to a record $7.2 billion in 2022, of which $2.4 billion were generated by grains and $1.9 billion by oilseeds. Five Eastern European countries, which are also large agricultural producers, accepted about 35% of four major agri-food exports from Ukraine to the EU in 2022 vs 1% in 2021 (See Figure 3). Both transit flows and sales of agri-food products to these countries have substantially increased after Russia’a invasion. Due to logistical problems related to the Solidarity Lanes (insufficient storage and transport infrastructure and high logistics costs), substantial transit flows of grain and oilseeds to EU ports and third markets were disrupted, and much of Ukraine’s produce was sold in local markets. According to EU statistics, the physical volumes of Ukrainian wheat, maize, rapeseed and sunflower seed imports doubled in 2022 – 19.3 million tonnes in 2022 vs 9.5 million tonnes in 2021. From this, about 8 million tonnes were sold to the five Eastern European countries in 2022 vs only 176,000 tonnes in 2021.  Transit disruptions and large quantities of Ukrainian crops exhausted storage and transport capacities raised logistics costs for local farmers and put downward pressure on purchase prices of local agri-food products. Additionally, world agricultural commodity prices declined from their early-2022 peaks due to better harvests in major grain-producing countries, improved crop conditions in the EU, and the implementation of the Black Sea grain agreement. Amid these developments, local farmers in these countries responded with protests demanding that they are protected from duty-free Ukraine’s imports. These tensions also caused delays in the adoption of the new regulation on the continuation of duty-free trade with Ukraine. The Eastern European countries blamed Brussels for insufficient help to support them. The EUR 56 million in subsidies allocated by the European Commission to the affected farmers in response to their protests in early April 2023 failed to satisfy them and their national governments. They called for additional EU funding to speed up the development of transit infrastructure, as well as the introduction of automatic compensation for farmers, the possibility for the rapid introduction of trade defence measures and the re-introduction of tariffs and tariff-rate quotas on imports from Ukraine, and the purchase of grain in the EU market for humanitarian purposes.  The lack of adequate coordination and cooperation between the Eastern European countries, the European Commission, and Ukraine related to the operation of the Solidarity Lanes led to a crisis, with EEC adopting controversial unilateral restrictions. On 15 April, Poland’s government unilaterally introduced a ban on imports and transit of Ukrainian agri-food products until 30 June (the transit ban was abolished on 21 April). Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria followed with import bans on certain Ukrainian products (without a transit ban), while Romania also considered taking similar steps.  As a result, Ukrainian exports were significantly restricted, becoming stuck at the Western borders for about two weeks, creating uncertainty and losses for Ukrainian exporters. Import restrictions in the EU neighbouring countries, as well as Russia’s increased pressure and sabotage of the Black Sea grain agreement, were the main factors of the decline in Ukraine’s exports of goods in April and May 2023 ($3 billion and $3.1 billion respectively) compared to March 2023 ($3.8 billion).  These national decisions raised a lot of criticism from Ukraine and the European Commission. A primary concern was their non-compliance with EU legislation, and international and bilateral commitments. Unilateral actions by member states are not allowed under EU law, given that trade policy is an exclusive EU competence. The safeguard clause of с 2022/870 on temporary trade liberalisation measures for Ukraine entitles the Commission to monitor and take necessary steps. The unilateral blocking of imports by one or several member states also undermines the principles of the EU Single Market, which provide for the freedom of movement of goods within common customs territory.  In addition, these decisions are not in line with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules or the provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on freedom of transit and the use of import bans. Additionally, the bans were applied immediately and adopted without proper bilateral consultations with the Ukrainian side.  Another important aspect - the EEC’s decisions were not supported by solid analysis of the import dynamics of specific products and their impact on the EU market. The scope of the bans application was too wide, and the criteria for the inclusion of certain Ukrainian products into the list of banned products was unclear in many cases. For instance, the Polish list was the longest and included a wide range of agri-food products - grains, sugar, meat, fruits, vegetables, oilseeds, processed fruit and vegetable products, wines, milk and dairy products, eggs, honey and others. These products demonstrated different import dynamics after Russia’s invasion, influenced by different factors, each requiring separate detailed analysis.  While many of these products got duty-free access to the EU market following the start of Russia’s invasion under ATM Regulation 2022/870, not all witnessed a significant increase in imports to the EU in 2022 vs 2021 and 2020 (see Table 1). For example, import volumes of Ukraine’s honey and processed tomatoes to the EU even declined in 2022 (in the case of Poland, imports of honey from Ukraine dropped from 16.9 thousand tonnes in 2021 to 10.6 thousand tonnes in 2022). At the same time, some of the banned Ukrainian products, such as oilseeds, frozen fruits, and sunflower oil, were not subject to any TRQs or tariff measures in the EU before the invasion.  Moreover, although the imports of some products subject to TRQs before Russia’s invasion (e.g. milk powder, sugars, starches, poultry meat) considerably grew in 2022 as compared to the previous years, the increased volumes still did not constitute a significant part of the EU extraimports or the EU intra-trade (see Table 1). For instance, EU imports of milk powder from Ukraine (under TRQ 09.4601) grew more than five times in 2022 – from 2 000 to 11 300 tonnes. However, Ukraine’s share in the EU extra-imports of these products was about 9% in 2022, and in the EU intra-imports - less than 1%. Considerable part of these products was imported to Poland (about 45%). However Ukraine’s share in Poland’s total imports of these products was only about 3%.  In a broader context, Ukrainian agri-food imports helped ease the inflationary pressure on the EU food market amid lower grain production in the EU last year. The EEC countries expanded agri-food exports by re-exporting Ukrainian products to other EU countries and worldwide, as well as producing and selling abroad agri-food products processed from Ukrainian crops (such as sunflower oil, processed cereals, flour, meat and dairy products, etc.). For instance, Poland’s agri-food exports reached a record level of EUR 47.6 billion in 2022, and its positive agri-food trade balance amounted to EUR 15.5 billion, or 23% higher than in 2021.  The positions of national governments were also influenced by challenging domestic political contexts, especially considering the upcoming parliamentary elections in Poland and Slovakia in 2023. The Polish government’s narrative was primarily focused on local farmers, whose votes are crucial for the ruling party.46 Farm lobbies tried to use this opportunity to restrict access to their markets for a range of Ukrainian agri-food products disproportionately. It is important to recognise local farmers’ reservations about a significant increase in imports of some agricultural products from Ukraine and their rights to raise these concerns. Still, unilateral responses of these countries are seen as quite unconstructive and undermining the unity and cooperation of EU members. The immediate bans against Ukrainian products were not in line with the solidarity efforts undertaken by Poland and other EU neighbouring countries for Ukraine. This situation also exposed possible challenges the future of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations and their support for greater EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market. A compromise solution between the Commission and the five EU countries By adopting unilateral measures, the EEC put pressure on the Commission to agree on an urgent compromise: introduce exceptional and temporary preventive measures under Article 4(9) of the ATM Regulation 2022/870, namely a ban on imports of four Ukrainian products (wheat, maize, rapeseed and sunflower seeds, revealing the strongest effect on local markets) to five counties between 2 May - 5 June 2023, while the EEC countries agreed to abolish all their unilateral restrictions on all Ukrainian products. At the request of five EEC countries, these safeguards were prolonged until 15 September 2023. In addition, a further EUR 100 million will be allocated to support and alleviate the pressure on affected local farmers of grains and oilseeds in these countries. This decision allowed for more targeted restrictions compared to the earlier unilateral measures and ensured the free and unlimited transit of all Ukrainian products within the EU territory and their import to all EU countries except those bordering Ukraine. It has also allowed for the adoption of the new Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation (ATM Regulation 2023/1077) on the continuation of temporary trade liberalisation for Ukraine for a further year (until 6 June 2024).  Furthermore, the text of the ATM Regulation 2023/1077 has been amended to change the safeguard clause for the expedited reintroduction of the customs duties otherwise applicable under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (namely tariff-rate quotas and the entry-price system) on Ukrainian imports in case they adversely affect the EU market. In particular, member states have to provide sufficient prima facie evidence of the adverse effects of Ukrainian imports on the EU market to request the European Commission to initiate such an assessment, which must be concluded within three months of its launch. These amendments shorten the timelines of the safeguard procedure and better explain the requirements for launching an assessment, which should prevent unjustified claims for import restrictions from member states. The safeguard clause implies clear procedural rules with a prior evidence-based assessment before the adoption of any restriction.  In addition, the new regulation permits the Commission to implement immediate preventive measures under exceptional circumstances, as was the case with the ban on four Ukrainian products under the previous ATM Regulation 2022/870. The ATM Regulation does not define criteria for taking immediate preventive measures, nor the time limits for their possible application. However, since these measures are taken to address a situation requiring immediate action, they should be of an exceptional and temporary nature. The reached agreement and applied measures provided a short-term solution for a crisis. However, it still undermines the integrity of the EU Single Market and creates a precedent for further violations of EU law by allowing member states to bargain with the Commission to achieve additional support measures, thus weakening the enforcement of Single Market rules across EU countries. While the EU’s decisions signal its ongoing trade support for Ukraine, there are risks of prolongation or the introduction of new import restrictions in the EU. Poland and Hungary are again threatening to close their borders unless Brussels extends temporary restrictions against Ukrainian grain and oilseeds until at least the end of 2023 and ensure that none of the products remains in these countries. In addition, the Eastern European countries may request the Commission to impose preventive measures for other sensitive agri-food products from Ukraine such as poultry meat, sugar, eggs, honey, fruits, etc, under the current ATM Regulation. These risks create additional pressure and uncertainty for Ukrainian agri-food producers. Conclusions and recommendations During the first year of Russia’s war on Ukraine, EU trade liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes. They allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market, facilitating the gradual recovery of Ukraine’s exports after the first deep shock of the war.  The European Commission, EU member states, and the Ukrainian government should further intensify their dialogue and efforts to find a solution to the current trade dispute about import bans on Ukrainian grain and oilseeds, facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. This has become critically important, especially after Russia’s withdrawal from the grain agreement and attacks on Ukraine’s port and export infrastructure.  At the same time, the crisis in the Eastern European countries also highlighted the existing logistics and connectivity bottlenecks between Ukraine and the EU. Their rapid resolution should be a priority of the EU, along with international financial support for Ukraine.  In addition, the precedent created by the application of unilateral measures in violation of the EU law revealed significant challenges with the enforcement of EU law by EU member states. This does not bode well for Ukraine’s future enlargement negotiations.  To address current challenges and prevent a repetition of this year’s crisis, the following next steps should be taken:  ● Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU Ensuring smooth operation and increasing the capacity of the Solidarity Lanes is critically vital for the transit of Ukraine’s agricultural and non-agricultural exports to both the global markets and EU member states during wartime. This must include urgently increasing investment in EU-Ukraine road, rail, and river connections, deepening of river canals, increasing the available transport material, enhancing EU-Ukraine border infrastructure, building transhipment terminals, increasing grain and food storage facilities in the Eastern European countries, as well as further optimising customs operations and better coordinating transit across these countries. Although alternative routes cannot fully replace the Ukrainian seaports occupied by Russia, they have helped diversify Ukraine’s export routes, lowered Kyiv’s dependence on the grain agreement and seaport routes, and reduced Russia’s leverage on shipping Ukraine’s exports. After Russia’s withdrawal from the grain agreement, the significance of the Solidarity Lanes is increasingly critical for Ukraine’s trade.  Expanding Solidarity Lanes, extending European Transport Corridors (TEN-T) to the territory of Ukraine, and developing the Ukrainian part of the TEN-T network, improving connectivity and interoperability of transport systems in Ukraine and the EU is also important in view of Ukraine’s post-war recovery and further economic integration into the EU Single Market, and the involvement of Ukraine in European value chains. This will also enhance the performance and resilience of EU food supply chains and will work to the advantage of Ukraine, the EU and global food security.  ● Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridorsThe importance of the Black Sea grain agreement and seaport exports for Ukraine and the world cannot be overestimated. Ukraine cannot reach the same export levels without functioning seaports, so any possibility and mechanisms to ensure free navigation in the Black Sea should be explored.  Ukraine needs greater support from the EU and international community in maintaining shipments through Black Sea ports, resurrecting the grain agreement and opening new sea corridors, purchasing Ukrainian grain in cooperation with the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) and transporting it to developing countries.  Major stakeholders, including the largest buyers of Ukrainian agri-food produce (China, Türkiye, the countries of the Middle East, as well as many African nations), should use their leverage and increase pressure on Moscow to resurrect the deal and safeguard seaport corridors. As Russia seeks to strengthen its position in Africa, strengthening dialogue with African countries is even more crucial in terms of their possible influence on Russia’s position about the blockade of Black Sea navigation and Ukraine’s access to global food markets by sea. Many African nations expressed disappointment about Russia pulling out of the deal at the Russia-Africa Summit. ● Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states, and UkraineEU member states should avoid a violation of EU law and unity and should engage in “sincere cooperation as a cornerstone of the EU legal order”. Unilateral drastic actions do not facilitate unity and coordination between the Commission, member states, and Ukraine and undermine potential solutions.  The European Commission should ensure the consistent enforcement of EU law and prevent a possible repetition of cases using the same political tactics with unilateral measures that violate EU law. To avoid a repetition of crisis situations, efforts from all sides should be intensified to improve the operation of Solidarity Lanes, including data exchanges, notifications of trade volumes and policy changes, monitoring and supervision of transit flows, customs operations, and trading practices in Ukraine and the EU countries. In this respect, the recently established Joint Coordination Platform led by Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis should foster regular consultations and coordination between the Commission, Eastern European countries, and Ukraine to address the concerns of all sides. Strategic partners Ukraine and EU neighbouring countries should demonstrate willingness to coordinate stances and support each other in important areas. ● Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes disruptions The EU and its member states should avoid the application of sudden bans or other restrictions on Ukrainian imports or transit from Ukraine. Such actions are the most harmful for exporters, causing losses and uncertainty. This is particularly the case during wartime when Ukrainian producers are already suffer from production and logistics shocks.  The European Commission should ensure that all decisions are made after proper consultations with the Ukrainian side and be taken on evidence-based assessments of the impact of Ukrainian products in the EU market.  In June, the Commission extended immediate preventive measures in the form of import bans on four Ukrainian grain and oilseeds until 15 September. As immediate preventive measures are exceptional and temporary, they should be replaced by welljustified policy decisions and procedures. Considering the serious challenges faced by Ukraine and its EU neighbours due to Russian aggression, a compromise solution should be found between Ukraine and these countries. It can imply, for example, lifting import bans against Ukrainian products and, at the same time, taking commitments by Ukraine not to exceed the agreed amount of export volumes to EU neighbouring countries (based on the assessment of the market situation, storage capacities and harvest forecasts). At the same time, non-neighbouring EU members should also be prepared to absorb greater volumes of reoriented Ukraine’s agri-food flows.  To increase the transparency of this process as much as possible, the Commission should implement a comprehensive monitoring and analysis of transit flows, the state of storage and transport capacities, and prices based on evidence from all sides and stakeholders.  ● Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks Russia’s attacks on the Black Sea and Danube port infrastructure and possible interruptions of this traffic may significantly undermine Ukraine’s export potential, and international grain supplies and global food security. Ukraine urgently needs more defence capacity to protect its critical infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Danube from Russia’s attacks.  ● Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market  EU member states must continue to demonstrate consistent, robust solidarity with Ukraine, which has been reinforced following Ukraine receiving candidate country status. Their solidarity and support is also critically important for Ukraine’s trade and integration into the EU Single Market.  EU-Ukraine trade volumes and Ukraine’s integration into the EU supply chains are expected to increase further as Ukraine advances on its EU path. Thus, further trade liberalisation and gradual integration into the EU internal market is an inevitable part of this process. Even before the war and the temporary ATMs, further trade liberalisation was on the agenda of EUUkraine relations. In 2021, the EU and Ukraine started negotiations to further liberalise and increase duty-free bilateral trade from both sides, including revising the DCFTA TRQs (as of now, these negotiations are paused).  The possibility for further trade liberalisation is envisaged in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (Article 29). It is expected that after the termination of ATMs, Ukraine will initiate an overhaul of these negotiations to have EU-Ukraine trade more liberalised on a permanent basis - up to Ukraine’s accession to the EU. In this regard, Ukraine is interested in ensuring access to the EU Single Market for its processed agrifood products, increasing food processing capacities and integrating into EU food processing value chains.