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At a time of intense polarisation in Pakistani society, the army cannot remain unaffected by intense divisions among Pakistanis. The images of enraged mobs attacking a Corps Commander’s residence and General Headquarters (GHQs) immediately after the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan illustrate the challenge facing Pakistan’s mighty army. Speculation of divisions among the army’s officer corps notwithstanding, there is no doubt that the chain of command and discipline within the army will endure. But at a time of intense polarisation in Pakistani society, the army cannot remain unaffected by intense divisions among Pakistanis. Imran Khan enjoys massive popularity in military families, which have spent the last three decades hating the country’s traditional politicians. Serving and retired military officers and their children have had a privileged life since the days of General Zia ul Haq and most of them buy into the overly simplistic view that Pakistan’s only problem is politicians who are “crooks” or “traitors”. Since, in their view, Imran Khan is neither, and he also reflects nationalist ‘jazba’; he is the only civilian leader acceptable to them. In my book ‘Reimagining Pakistan’, I have explained the concept of ‘jazba’, which means ‘passion, spirit, and strong feeling or emotion’, a uniquely Pakistani blend of religion, patriotism, and antagonism towards India, the United States, and anyone else who might interfere with the greatness for which Pakistan is destined. For those who believe, ‘jazba’ is the guarantor of Pakistan’s success in all fields, from the sport of cricket to the economy and warfare. The believers in ‘jazba’ often do not analyse, they only emote. For them, Pakistan’s problems are not the result of bad policies. They are attributable to “the lack of sincerity and jazba” of someone or the other. Imran Khan’s engineered political rise was largely based on the ‘jazba’ narrative. In fact, his hardcore followers speak of ‘jazba junoon’, or the spirit of madness, in loving him as Pakistan’s saviour. The army nurtured the ‘jazba’ narrative that propelled Imran Khan into power and is now finding it difficult to get men and women who live in or have grown up in cantonments to change their worldview just because senior generals have realised its limitations. Pakistan’s generals have always been divided between pragmatists, who realise the complexities of the world, and those who are ideological to the point of ignoring everything else. The latter are often drawn to conspiracy theories, which Imran Khan also loves spreading. Former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa had thought that he could use Imran Khan’s charisma and celebrity status to create a political force that would keep traditional politicians in check and enable him to drive from the back seat while maintaining the trapping of democracy. That did not work out. When Bajwa tried to make pragmatic adjustments in Pakistan’s relations with the West and India, Imran Khan stuck to the ideological paradigm. Moreover, Pakistan’s economy did not do better under Khan, who failed to fulfil his key promise of repatriating wealth allegedly ‘stolen’ from Pakistan by traditional politicians and stashed abroad. Imran Khan also interfered with Bajwa’s personal ambitions and that led to Bajwa’s decision not to help his mentee beat the Vote of No Confidence brought against Khan last year by the traditional politicians. Imran Khan has, over the years, become a master narrative builder, which is easy to do when you deliberately ignore every fact and have cult-like followers who accept everything you say. Khan blamed his ouster on a conspiracy by the United States and virtually called upon the army to restore him to office or hold immediate elections, which he hopes to win. The army’s refusal to do so has led to stepping up of rhetoric against the army’s senior commanders. It is wrong to portray Khan’s supporters as having turned against the army or even against military intervention in politics. His party, Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), has in its ranks the son of late military dictator General Zia ul Haq, the grandson of Pakistan’s first coup maker Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and all major civilian collaborators of General Pervez Musharraf. None of them have publicly said anything to suggest there was anything wrong with Pakistan’s past military interventions. By speaking out against the current army leadership, these people are simply trying to get the army to put its weight behind Khan again, where they feel it rightly belongs as long as Pakistan is a democracy. If, at some point, Pakistan’s democratic system breaks down again, and direct military ruler returns (which is difficult under current circumstances), many of Khan’s supporters will go back to supporting the army against ‘corrupt’ politicians (minus Khan, of course.) Imran Khan’s strategy seems to be to use his popularity with military families to force a change in the high command’s decisions. Several years ago, Khan had remarked in a dinner conversation overseas, which was recorded on video, that Pakistan’s generals feared the mob. In recent months, he has been testing out his theory by gradually unleashing the mob against the army. But if, as a Chinese government statement recently described it, the Pakistan army is the “defender of Pakistan’s national security and stability”, its leaders cannot afford to be swayed by either the mob or the ideological spirit of military family members and retired officers. Given its size and command structure, the Pakistan army is not an institution that can easily be fractured or divided. But ideologues have flourished in its ranks before and might exist even now. The late Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, for example, often bragged that he put his Islamic faith and his own resolve to protect Pakistan from external and internal enemies above his loyalty to the chain of command or to Pakistan’s Constitution. But Gul’s bragging came largely after retirement. Even now, the most outspoken advocates of Imran Khan’s cause are retired officers, not serving ones. Pakistan’s army chief has to take into account the sentiment of his officers and troops but, at the end of the day, the decisions of the army High Command prevail. We are currently seeing a massive effort by Imran Khan and his supporters to sway the High Command. Of course, attacking military installations will probably dent that effort significantly.

Abstract The Russian invasion of Ukraine has inflicted a significant blow to the EU’s defence strategy, jeopardising its ability to contribute adequately to the transatlantic security architecture and slowing the development of a continental strategic autonomy. In view of this, Germany and Italy should strengthen bilateral defence cooperation, particularly regarding industrial and procurement policies. As Berlin and Rome are two pillars of Europe’s industrial defence basis, closer bilateral cooperation would facilitate EU defence consolidation and enhance Europe’s military credibility. The future Italian-German Action Plan, the specifics of which are still unknown, is an excellent opportunity to establish a joint defence strategy centred on sectors of mutual interest. 1. European defence after 24 February 2022  As we are writing, a full-scale war is unfolding in Europe, with a nuclear power as the aggressor. War crimes against civilians are being committed on a massive scale and – as of June 2023 – more than eight million refugees have crossed the borders to seek shelter in the EU. As put by the European Court of Human Rights, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine arguably represents the greatest challenge to human rights since World War II (WWII). The war has deteriorated the global security and macroeconomic environment, while inflation, food emergency and the worsening climate crisis are negatively reinforcing each other. The war deeply affected the European security architecture. In the years prior to the war, the Ursula von der Leyen-led European Commission had already been advocating for the Union to take significant steps to strengthen the EU’s position as a geopolitical player worldwide, establishing a series of tools – such as the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the Strategic Compass – to boost EU defence capabilities. The Russian invasion of Ukraine compelled the EU revise its plans, as it was clear that the bloc was far from prepared to face a crisis of such geopolitical magnitude right across its borders. Policies and tools designed well in advance to cope with hard security challenges would have certainly improved the efficacy of the European response. The absence of such supranational structures of political-military coordination opened the doors to centrifugal tendencies, only partially contained by the urgency to address the calamitous emergency of the conflict. Ostensibly, the inadequacy of the EU as a security provider is one of the key factors pushing some member states – and especially those on the Eastern borders – to rely even more on NATO as a guardian of stability.  The request to join NATO by the Finnish and Swedish governments in the face of the Ukrainian war might be interpreted as a negative signal for the credibility of the EU as a defensive alliance, weakening any perspective of Europe to develop an autonomous defence policy. And while the news may be welcomed by those who see NATO as the primary security provider for the continent, it is less enticing for the EU member states who are not part of the Atlantic Alliance. Contrary to the purpose of the two organisations to “play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles” on security issues, this cannot occur if European countries are unable to stand on their own two feet militarily and independently contribute to transatlantic security and burden-sharing.  Current EU defence arrangements are currently insufficient to strengthen a European pillar in NATO, let alone leaving the door open for true strategic autonomy. The practical objectives set out by the Strategic Compass (i.e., the creation of a rapid deployable force of 5,000 units) are obviously unfit to face major conventional military challenges stemming from Russia, but also from a potential conflict over Taiwan or in the Middle East and North Africa region (the latter of which features far less prominently in the latest NATO Strategic Concept). Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that in the near future the Compass will play a significant role in reshaping the organisation of CSDP missions of crisis management and capacity-building.  The war may also undermine the EU efforts to strengthen the European defence market, whose integration has long been welcomed also by the US. In this regard, the priority is arguably the development of the European Defence Fund. At the outset, this instrument had a dual purpose: promote the research and development of modern military systems required by the member states and nurture the intraEuropean supply chains. In other words, the EDF was devised to increase the competitiveness of EU defence companies while strengthening the European Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The initial success of the EDF calls, which resulted in the funding of dozens of multinational initiatives, indicates at least some desire on the part of European companies and governments to invest in the project and embrace this political priority. However, already today the EDF budget of just eight billion euro over seven years is a far cry from the investment needed to reduce the fragmentation of a sector wherein the major EU players represent only a portion of the overall internal market. For decades, the EU defence industry has faced stiff competition from the United States, the United Kingdom, and even South Korea, to the point where many non-EDTIB companies now have profound roots in the procurement traditions of member states. As a consequence, the EU industry lags behind international competitors in key sectors such as disruptive technology, as the European Defence Agency (EDA) acknowledged last year. Aware of this situation, the EU Commission in 2022 launched the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), an instrument that should convey common procurement projects by providing the member states willing to cooperate with both financial incentives and a common procurement platform. However, this platform could even involve associated countries and thus bring into the EDTIB complementary contractors from the UK, Norway, Switzerland, or the US. The effect of this newly established strategy on the EDTIB has yet to be determined and will depend heavily on its implementation; the impact of both the EDF and EDIRPA will be limited if allocations go toward further fragmentation of military stockpiles and will spur additional duplication of capabilities across domains. The creation of a new European main battle tank (also called as the Main Ground Combat System – MGCS) is an example of the limited role that EU procurement might play in the near future. The MGCS has a history dating back to 2015, when it was evident that the EU tank fleet needed an upgrade to keep up with global competition and the EDA was tasked with the responsibility to coordinate the Member States’ investments in R&D. The effort to expedite the delivery of a new model was further accelerated in response to the Ukraine conflict. Yet, in 2022, the only tank project nearing maturity was the new “Panther”, which was the result of a unilateral German initiative led by Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. Considering that Italy and France chose to upgrade their legacy tanks and that the only quasi-European programme, the Franco-German MGCS, is hobbling back, the most likely outcome will be the widespread acquisition of nationally developed systems (including the Korean K2) instead of a common European design. Indeed, the never-ending debate over the development of the MGCS is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to concerns about the EDTIB’s future. Inevitably, the shipment of defence systems to Kyiv will deplete the EU member states’ strategic readiness. To fill the void, the EU nations will most likely initiate a new phase of national procurement to replenish existing stocks. If the procurement of these systems (primarily tanks, artillery, armoured vehicles, missile defence systems, man portable equipment and various kinds of ammunition) prioritises off-theshelf solutions, even if this is in accordance with EDIRPA guidelines, the European Defence Agency’s effort to achieve European interoperability that can embrace NATO standards will be jeopardised. 2. The Italian-German contribution to European defence cooperation  Italy and Germany seem to be on the verge of signing off on an “Italian-German Action Plan” for expanding bilateral cooperation, which is anticipated to encompass a variety of topics ranging from industrial issues to foreign policy. Among the sectors of envisaged cooperation, defence is one of the most prominent. Indeed, the two nations are pillars of the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base and home to renowned prime contractors such as Leonardo, Rheinmetall, ThyssenKrupp AG, and Fincantieri. The investments of these two nations in acquisition, research, and development represent a significant portion of total European military expenditures. This privileged position in the EU landscape makes even more significant the commitment of Rome and Berlin to increase their military spending as a reaction to the Russian aggression. Meeting in Versailles in March 2022, all the EU member states vowed to establish new capabilities and prepare strategic enablers to operate jointly whenever necessary. Nevertheless, the scale and time of this commitment differs between the two countries. Italy should in theory reach the NATO target of spending 2 per cent of its GDP in defence by 2028. The pace of such an increase is very much uncertain, and Italy’s defence budget remains deeply unbalanced, with substantial expenditures focused on personnel costs and few resources directed to exercise and maintenance. Instead, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Germany has responded to the Zeitenwende (“historical turning point”) of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by setting up a one-off fund of 100 billion euro, the Sondervermögen (“special fund”), and a commitment to bring the Bundeswehr’s regular budget in line with the 2 per cent threshold for years. Yet, doubts exist on whether the fund will suffice given inflationary pressures and Berlin’s yawning gap in defence capabilities. It is estimated that Germany will likely need to spend some 300 billion euro worth to put the Bundeswehr in a position to once again be a credible military tool. Differences also exist in the strategic priorities of the two countries. Growing Italian defence investments over the last decade have focused mainly on improving the armed forces’ ability to project power into the “wider Mediterranean”, establishing for instance the carrier strike group Cavour and an amphibious landing group. Germany, on the other hand, is emphasising a return to territorial defence: it recently (re-) instated structures such as a territorial headquarter (Territorialen Führungskommando) for domestic operations and logistical support to allied operations in Europe, putting the Eastern flank front and centre in its strategic outlook.  The disparities in the two countries’ budgetary provisions are thus both qualitative and quantitative, as Italy’s stagnating defence expenditures are allocated differently than Germany’s growing defence budget. This must be balanced against differences in public opinion. Despite Russia’s aggression and the country’s international obligations, the majority of Italians oppose any increase in military spending. In contrast, the German electorate is experiencing change of heart, as it has abandoned long-standing scepticism defence matters and is now massively supporting the government’s stance on strengthening the national military capacity.  The was in Ukraine is offering the opportunity to the two nations to improve their complementarities in several sectors, starting with major investments to plug the holes in basic defence capabilities caused by underspending in ground-based air defence, an improved focus on dual-use technologies, and a promotion of a more integrated procurement process that prioritises ammunition and the development of strategic enablers such as cyber and space capabilities.  A comprehensive political-industrial-military approach would provide Berlin and Rome with a common ground for enhancing their strategic response to the unfolding crisis in Ukraine. Italy and Germany should focus on filling voids in the respective armed forces; more investments in dual technologies such as space capabilities and cyberwarfare, as well as other traditional domains, would also be essential.  The two countries should also commit to joint procurement as the only way to preserve and boost Europe’s Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) in the aftermath of an unprecedented spike in demand for defence goods. The stir provoked in France and Italy by the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, which appears to favour US- and Israeli-made ground-based missile defence systems at the expense of their European counterparts, is revealing: when there is an emergency, there are a few possible trading partners today that could be associated in procurement without compromising medium- to long-term development plans. Therefore, strengthened cooperation in the field of procurement would allow for more transparent communications with international partners, promoting the excellence of the two national industries without fuelling protectionist impulses which would waste resources (or efficiency) on short-sighted projects.  A holistic spending approach, seeking complementarity and rewarding the excellence of small and medium-sized businesses, would be advantageous to the majority of industrial sectors, given the number of prospective investment domains. Italy and Germany are home to a large number of small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) in the defence industry, and these firms frequently hold the keys to the two nations’ competitive advantage in sectors such as sensor technology and electronic and cyber warfare. Both nations have a vested interest in influencing European programs, such as the EDF, to more effectively stimulate innovation within their respective defence ecosystems.  Similarly, the two countries should create synergies within initiatives funded through the EDF. Italy and Germany are already working together in the European medium-altitude, long endurance, remotely piloted aircraft system (MALE RPAS) programme, which is a PESCO project co-financed through EDF and managed by OCCAR that has the objective to empower Europe with a modern and competitive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system. Interestingly, both countries share similar sensitivities when it comes to the employment of armed drones, despite the fact that Italy decided to arm its drones without the decadeslong parliamentary and public debate that marked Germany’s decision to equip its own Heron TP drones with weapons. Moreover, both Rome and Berlin are extremely cautious when it comes to automation, and military interlocutors in both countries stress the importance of keeping a human in the loop.  Space is another area of potential cooperation. The protection of Italian assets (defence from kinetic attacks as well as cyber threats) feature prominently in Rome’s 2019 National Space Security Strategy. Cooperation with Berlin could boost complementarities in sectors with a strong electronics component. The two nations are jointly working on strategic enablers trough the Defence of Space Assets (DoSA), a PESCO initiative whose goal is providing training for space military operations, space resilience and access to space and in-space operation. Both of these projects – obviously started before the breakout of the Ukrainian war – are evidently connected with the upcoming defence challenges that Europe, and thus the two countries, will be facing in a next future. Cooperation is also feasible in the field of electronics, which entails crossdomain capabilities with dual-use benefits for the civilian sector. In this regard, Leonardo’s acquisition of Germany’s Hensoldt is encouraging, as it could facilitate the establishment of economies of scale in the field and pave the way for new collaborations in other industries. Notably, reciprocal support could be conceivable in the areas of avionics, manned-unmanned teaming and combat cloud technologies. Given Germany’s decision to purchase F-35 multirole jets to replace its aging Tornado fleet, Berlin could greatly benefit from Rome’s special relationship with the US and British aerospace industries, as well as its experience in the F-35 programme via the Cameri production facility. A further area in which cooperation should be reinforced is underwater technologies. In this field, Italian and German companies are already collaborating, and the realisation of the U212 NFS submarine is a good instance of the brilliant results that can be achieved together. Cooperation between Fincantieri and ThyssenKrupp could be furthered also considering the expanding interest in the underwater environment and research in underwater unmanned vehicles (UUVs). Italy’s long-standing necessity to protect its critical seabed infrastructure in the Mediterranean basin makes it an appealing partner to Germany, which is especially alarmed over potential repeats of the Nord Stream sabotage. The establishment of the German-led NATO Critical Undersea Infrastructure Protection Cell may offer some further chances of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this regard.  Germany and Italy should also do more together on land systems, notably tanks and mechanised vehicles. Germany has a strong European lead in this realm, while Italy has some positive experiences with the Centauro and a non-negligible niche of turret making. The challenge will be to facilitate Italian participation in the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) project, managed by the FrancoGerman consortium KNDS. From a German perspective, MGCS is supposed to eventually foster a Europe-wide consolidation of land systems technologies and production. An Italian contribution, joining the consortium and transforming it in a true European initiative, would be especially timely given the urgent need for Italy to modernise its armoured fleet, but also to raise Europe’s overall production capacities and match the mounting continental demand for tanks. Furthermore, Italy is currently examining options to create a new hub for land systems, in order to rationalise the current industrial supply chain and procure a successor to the Dardo infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). The offer by Rheinmetall to produce its new Lynx IFV in partnership with Italian companies within the national borders should be carefully considered in order to foster much-needed economies of scale in this domain. Another enticing area of bilateral cooperation for Berlin could be a partnership designed to support its decision to make the Bundeswehr greener. Germany has already demonstrated a developing awareness of the environmental impact of its military activities. This correlation is recognised by both NATO and the EU, and it is believed to be particularly significant in three fields (listed in decreasing importance): static pollution produced by military barracks and other defence buildings; pollution generated by the systems themselves and military mobility; and the dispersion of ammunitions or other wastes, particularly to sea. Italy, for its part, has already devised a strategy to address the dilemma between defence and the ecological transition. The lion’s share of this strategy consists of a plan to control the energy supply of all military installations on Italian territory, renovate vital defence-related infrastructures, and increase the military’s mobility’s sustainability. Research into alternative energy sources for the military, such as solar panels, may reduce the reliance of forward operational bases on petroleum runs, which are particularly susceptible to guerrilla attacks when deployed in contested territories. Conclusions and outlook The so-called Zeitenwende is proving to be all but easy to live up to for Germany, while Italy still has to prove it perceives any urgency when it comes to a change of pace in defence spending. In this situation, cooperation between the two states can help to alleviate the burden imposed by the radical changes both countries will need to implement in their defence policies. Both countries’ defence budgets are currently being increased, but while this was necessary after a long period of underfunding of the respective armed forces, it also comes with some risks. The primary danger is that both Berlin and Rome will use the concept of European strategic autonomy to appease national industrial champions rather than actually implementing plans to strengthen EU defence initiatives. Despite some positive signals, it is uncertain how much of Germany’s 100 billion euro special fund will be invested in multinational strategic armament projects. Similar risks are present in Italy, which badly needs to replenish its stocks after the latest shipments to Ukraine.  The authentic European commitment of the two nations should inevitably result in joint efforts, beginning with technological and industrial advancement. Italy and Germany have declared their willingness to increase their defence expenditures to 2 per cent of GDP, as agreed upon at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. This old threshold, which after 24 February 2022 has become a starting point rather than a ceiling for many within the Alliance, will not necessarily enhance the EU’s defence profile. In contrast, national increases in the defence expenditures that are not coordinated may paradoxically be detrimental to the strategic autonomy of the EU. As a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the imperative need of many EU countries to purchase or upgrade weapons has a negative impact on the European industrial base. In the future, countries with a proclivity to cooperate, such as Germany and Italy, should maximise the potential of strategic, industrial and cultural synergies in the defence sector. This cooperation should begin as a bilateral effort within the framework of the forthcoming Italian-German Action Plan and, whenever feasible, translate into bilateral initiatives in the defence industry. Initiating pragmatic projects and generating industrial and political realities is the most effective method to advance European integration. This is something that can be accomplished more easily by beginning with a bilateral perspective while remaining open to the eventual participation of other EU nations.

The humanitarian and ecological challenges caused by the breaching of the Nova Kakhovka dam present massive challenges for Ukraine, as it launches its long-awaited offensive. Mounting operations to assist and evacuate civilians from affected areas will deplete manpower and resources when the conflict is at a critical juncture. This is to Russia’s advantage. While Ukraine has already deployed an emergency response, there is little indication that Russia has either the capacity or inclination to assist in the humanitarian effort. Thousands are expected to have to leave their homes as waters flood dozens of villages. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has already called on the international community to offer immediate aid. Kyiv and Moscow have both accused each other of bombing people being evacuated. The circumstances surrounding the destruction of the dam on the Dnipro River remain difficult to determine. But the incident is being discussed as a possible war crime and an act of terror, with Russia indicated as the likely perpetrator. While it will be some time before all the details are clear, the event is certainly going to influence events on the battlefield. An attack of this nature can form part of a military strategy. After all, the destruction of Irpin dam in February 2022 played an important role in checking Russian advances earlier in the conflict. In this case, however, the relatively modest military benefit in no way justifies the massive and far-reaching destruction unleashed by the floodwaters. The rising water levels caused by the damage will, of course, have some implications for the campaign. Downstream any crossing of the river will become difficult for the foreseeable future, with the surging waters damaging any remaining infrastructure. The flooded ground may struggle to bear the weight of tanks and artillery as well, limiting the potential routes south for an attacking force. The scale of the disaster introduces many human factors to the battlefield, with displaced civilians further complicating any operations in the region. The result is that a significant portion of the frontline is now difficult to access, leaving Russia with less space to actively defend. While these are significant considerations and will complicate the nature of the battlefield from the Ukrainian perspective, the fundamental balance of power in the region remains unchanged. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their adaptability from the outset in this conflict, and this will serve them well in the next phases. Having taken the time to integrate the training and equipment received from western partners, the forces compromising the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be able to effectively adapt to events of this nature. Current operations show that Ukrainian land forces are effectively probing for Russian weaknesses  in the south and east. These smaller advances – so called shaping operations – which provide intelligence and fix Russian forces in place, are taking place across a wide front. Ukrainian leadership remain quiet on specifics, but when its more heavily equipped brigades do move forward, they will benefit from these earlier efforts to shape the battlefield in their favour. Russian troops overstretched The Nova Kakhovka dam’s breach will do nothing to improve the status of Russian forces. While in the short term, there is now perhaps less frontline to defend, their troops are still overstretched. The fractured Russian leadership will struggle to effectively respond to any setbacks, and the equipment and human resources they currently have available remain of poor quality. If Nova Kakhovka was an attempt to replicate earlier events, in which Ukraine submerged the Irpin floodplain to interfere with the Russian advance to Kyiv, then it has not been successful. If it was the eve of a Russian offensive, an event of this nature might have been disastrous for them, with their rigid command structures and traumatised land forces incapable of adapting on the fly. This is not Russia’s moment, however. For the Ukrainian side, this is a setback that can be overcome. As well as growing disparities in training and equipment, the incident highlights the profound difference in the mindset and ability to adapt between the respective sides. Unfortunately, we may see more attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure as the offensive presses on. The Russian state clearly prefers to break what it cannot control. While attacks on civilian infrastructure may have little impact on how the conflict plays out, the Russian strategy is now about inflicting pain on the Ukrainian side by any available means. This could indicate that Moscow no longer views these areas as future Russian assets that can be assimilated relatively intact, but instead as areas it can devastate to harm the interests of the rightful owner.

President Petro seeks rapprochement with Venezuela Colombia and Venezuela were once part of the same state, have shared a history since their creation, have the same colours on their flags and share a 2,219 km border. What happens on one side of the border affects the other. However, relations between the two sister nations have not always been friendly and have experienced some very critical moments. The inauguration of Gustavo Petro as Colombian president in August 2022 marked a turning point for the prospects of bilateral relations, especially politically, but also economically and socially.The story of a complicated relationshipDespite the traditionally close political, social and economic ties, bilateral relations have been fraught with tension in recent decades. For example, the armed conflict in Colombia led to considerable emigration of Colombians to Venezuela for many years from the second half of the 20th century. The inauguration of Hugo Chávez as President of Venezuela in the late 1990s marked another turning point in relations between the two countries. For more than a decade, bilateral relations were marked by profound differences between Chavez's leftist government and Colombia's conservative government. The panorama deteriorated further when Nicolás Maduro took office in 2013, following the death of Hugo Chávez. Relations between the two countries suffered from the complex humanitarian emergency in Venezuela and the start of mass migration to Colombia triggered by the "Operation to Liberate the People". This operation forced about 22,000 people, mostly Colombians, to leave Venezuela in 2015. According to unofficial data, this number could be as high as 32,000. Ten years later, according to the R4V Coordination Platform for Migration from Venezuela, more than 7 million people have left Venezuela, of which about 2.5 million have resettled in Colombia. While relations were already going through a phase of erosion after the last presidential summit between Juan Manuel Santos and Nicolás Maduro in 2016 and the border closures pushed by Maduro, the discourse against the Venezuelan regime intensified when Iván Duque took office as Colombian president. Bilateral relations were de facto severed in 2019 after Colombia recognised Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president and attempted to force the Maduro regime to allow humanitarian aid into the country with a concert at the border. In February 2019, Maduro decided to sever diplomatic and consular relations with Colombia and gave all Colombian diplomatic personnel 24 hours to leave Venezuela. The common border has been closed three times in the last seven years. The longest period, during the Duque government, was from March 2020 to October 2021 (570 days). This was the longest border closure in the history of both countries. While foreign policy towards Venezuela was at an impasse due to broken relations as well as the recognition of oppositionist Juan Guaidóas a legitimate president, former President Duque focused on measures to protect and integrate Venezuelan migrants at home. The most important of these is the "Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants" (ETPV), a complementary procedure to the international protection system for refugees that allows Venezuelan migrants to move from temporary protection status to normal migration status within a period of 10 years. Today, around 1.5 million migrants already have the Temporary Protection Permit (PPT) and thus a secure, 10-year legal residence status. The Duque government's innovative and generous migration policy has been recognised worldwide. Restarting relations under President PetroSince the Petro government took office on 7 August 2022, circumstances have changed. For the first time in many years, the presidents of both countries are supposedly on the same side of the political spectrum. Already during the election campaign, Gustavo Petro had announced the resumption and normalisation of relations with Venezuela in case of his election victory. In the meantime, Petro has already paid several visits to Venezuela, as have the First Lady, Verónica Alcocer, the Foreign Minister, Álvaro Leyva, and the Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Germán Umaña. In his seven months in office, Petro has already travelled to Venezuela four times to meet with President Maduro. Critics, however, criticise the lack of institutionalisation and intransparency of these meetings. So far, no bilateral thematic agenda has been revealed to flesh out the political declarations of intent to normalise relations. There is a lack of transparency and information and there are no joint statements on the content of the meetings. In recent months, ambassadors Armando Benedetti (Colombia) and Félix Plasencia, who was later replaced by Carlos Martínez (Venezuela), were appointed. On 26 September 2022, the border reopened at the Simón Bolívar Bridge. Subsequently, the Atanasio Girardot Bridge was inaugurated and the "Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments" and the "Recast of the Partial Scope Agreement No. 28", which had governed trade relations between the two countries since 2011, were signed. President Petro places the expansion of trade relations at the centre of his Venezuela policy. German Umaña, current trade minister and former director of the Colombian-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, is considered an expert on Venezuela. According to the Táchira Chamber of Commerce, trade with Colombia reached USD 600 million in 2022, twice as much as in the previous year, but much less than expected by the authorities.  Trade relations are (still) a long way from earlier times, when Venezuela was Colombia's second-largest trading partner. Another important issue in the normalisation of relations is the restoration of consular relations. So far, however, progress on this issue has been slow. The opening of the first Venezuelan consulate in the Colombian border town of Cúcuta was announced only a few days ago. Moreover, the facilities are not yet fully functional. Expectations for the normalisation of relations are high, especially in the border region. In addition to a functioning consular operation in both countries, the regulation of public transport and the re-establishment of air connections as well as a stronger reactivation of trade are needed. It remains to be seen how long it will take for trust to be restored with Venezuelan partners and for economic and social relations to return to the level of earlier times. Parallel to the rebuilding of bilateral relations, a change in the discourse on the migration of Venezuelans to Colombia can be observed in the Colombian government. This important issue does not seem to be on the bilateral agenda - notwithstanding projections that the numbers of migrants to Colombia will continue to increase, reaching almost three million people by 2023, according to R4V projections. At the national level, President Petro seems to want to shift the focus on the migration issue, seeking to extend the legalisation of immigrants under the ETPV to other nationalities and dismantling part of the institutional framework. The most drastic decision in this regard was the abolition of the Office for the Care and Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants. The office, created in 2018, was previously considered a key instrument for effective implementation of migration and integration policies, as well as for coordination between local and regional governments and the national government. When President Petro took office, the migration issue was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; however, many processes and responsibilities remain unclear, as experts criticise. Critics suspect that the Maduro regime may be pushing to exclude the uncomfortable migration issue from the political and public discussion in order to make progress on other issues in return. Despite the symbolically important resumption of relations and progress in some aspects, major challenges remain in political, economic, migration and security terms. Representatives of civil society and the private sector are calling for a concrete bilateral working agenda as well as more transparency and participation beyond the symbolic politics visible so far.Energy transition and "complete peace"Gustavo Petro came to government with the promise of profound change. The revival of relations with Venezuela is part of this domestic and foreign policy paradigm shift because it is central to the planned energy transition and the "complete peace" propagated by Petro. Thus, gas imports from Venezuela are to support Colombia's exit from coal and oil production. And in the negotiations with the ELN guerrillas, the regime of Nicolás Maduro sits at the table as a guarantor state. The proposal to rely on gas imports from Venezuela in the future has met with criticism from the opposition and experts, as it would put Colombia's currently self-sufficient energy supply at risk and place it in a relationship of dependency with Venezuela.  Although Colombia has proven gas reserves for eight years and sufficient capacity not to depend on other countries for its desired energy transition, the government is considering the possibility of not signing any more contracts for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas. Instead, gas imports from Venezuela are to fill the expected energy gap. The debate is taking place in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which is not only driving up international energy prices, but also highlights the risks of making one's sovereignty dependent on other countries for energy supplies. According to the Colombian Natural Gas Association (Naturgas), importing gas would increase the price for Colombian households by about five times. President Petro, on the other hand, publicly stated that Colombia was already importing gas from other countries. While gas prices were rising, private actors were enriching themselves, the president said. Experts question whether Venezuela will really be able to supply gas in the quantities needed, given the state of its current infrastructure.  Whether the early phase-out of fossil energy production and the massive expansion of renewable energies propagated by President Petro in the election campaign will really be supported by gas imports from Venezuela is currently still an open question. Beyond the government's political rhetoric, there are increasing signs that state revenues from oil and gas production will be necessary in the medium term to finance a sustainable energy transition. Besides the energy transition, Venezuela is also an important actor for the Colombian peace process. The Petro government's decision to make Venezuela the guarantor of the negotiation process with the National Liberation Army (ELN) was therefore not unexpected. As a binational guerrilla active on both sides of the border, negotiations with the ELN are hardly realistic without Venezuela's participation. According to information from InSight Crime, the ELN has a permanent presence in eight states of the neighbouring country; at least five members of the central command have their permanent residence in Venezuela. Nevertheless, critics accused the president of unnecessarily legitimising Nicolás Maduro's regime internationally through this mediating role. Security experts consider it paradoxical to appoint Nicolás Maduro as guarantor of the process, as there is evidence of cooperation between Venezuelan security forces and the ELN. It is therefore uncertain which interests the Maduro regime represents in accompanying the negotiations.President Petro in the mediating roleWhereas under its predecessor governments, Colombia was recognised internationally as an actor that clearly criticised the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro, the humanitarian crisis of the Venezuelan people and the resulting refugee migration flows to other countries, the discourse has now changed. Petro sees himself more in the role of mediator to alleviate Venezuela's isolation and to support dialogue on democratic elections in the neighbouring country. The issue of Venezuela played an important role during his state visit to the US. In talks with the US government, he advocated an easing of sanctions against Venezuela if Maduro was willing to make concessions in return. In his speech to the Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States (OAS), he proposed rewriting the democratic charter to put Venezuela and even Cuba back on the path to democracy. Another example of Colombia's new mediating role was the International Conference on Venezuela in Bogotá on 25 April, to which the Petro government invited representatives from more than 20 countries. The initiative was endorsed by the Maduro regime, the United States and part of the Venezuelan opposition. According to Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva, the aim of the conference was to unblock negotiations between Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition in Mexico in order to hold democratic elections in Venezuela and, in turn, to persuade the international community to end economic sanctions. Attention was drawn to the expulsion of Juan Guaidó, who entered the country illegally and was immediately put on a scheduled flight to Miami by the Petro government. The conference did not lead to concrete results; even a joint final declaration was missing. Afterwards, participants described the conclusions of the Colombian government as one-sided. Whether the Petro government's continued rapprochement with Venezuela can also convince the international community to ease sanctions will largely depend on the progress of negotiations on democratic elections between Maduro and the opposition.ConclusionDespite some important steps such as the opening of the border and the resumption of diplomatic relations, it is still too early to make a conclusive assessment of the prospects for Colombian-Venezuelan relations. Political rhetoric and symbolic politics are contrasted by a bilateral thematic agenda that is still barely discernible. The ultimately unsuccessful political approach of the previous Duque government, which was characterised by non-recognition and the goal of replacing Maduro's regime, has given way under President Petro to an open attitude that is willing to engage in dialogue. Critics accuse President Petro of not taking sufficient account of the authoritarian character of the Venezuelan government in the course of the rapprochement and of strengthening the Maduro regime in its self-chosen role as international mediator and advocate for the easing of sanctions. While the tone and interpersonal relationship between political leaders on both sides of the borders has visibly eased, structural challenges and clashes of interests - migration to Colombia, the role of the ELN, economic interests, security and drug trafficking - remain and require complex and institutional approaches. While the Maduro regime can play for time in negotiations with the opposition to secure its own hold on power, President Petro has only one term in office to implement his ambitious domestic and foreign policy agenda. Venezuela is an important player and possible partner in this, especially with regard to the peace process and the desired energy transition. President Petro still has more than three years left in his term to prove that his détente course towards Venezuela is the better policy approach to strengthen democracy, security and development in the region.

“The world is not just Europe and America,” Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson declared on April 10, 2023, implicitly echoing the views championed for years by the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic regarding the ostensible rise of China and Russia. Indeed, the moment when Iran shifted from a traditional balancing relationship between East and West to decisively embrace Russia and China occurred on May 8, 2018, when the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The U.S.’s decision to abandon the nuclear deal deeply disillusioned the Iranian leadership about any possibility of a rapprochement with Washington. Tehran had initially agreed to sign the JCPOA with the Obama administration based on the expectations that its promises to substantially reduce its nuclear program would be recompensed by the lifting of a substantial portion of U.S. economic sanctions.  Consistent with its long-held objective of maintaining distance from Washington, Tehran was pleased that the JCPOA, as agreed, had permitted it to avoid normalizing relations with its adversary while still reaping the economic benefits by being able to resume oil exports and welcome foreign investment. Yet following the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Iran concluded that Washington’s policy toward Tehran is unreliable and the American political class could not be swayed. The Iranian leadership was further disillusioned by the Europeans’ limited ability or willingness to preserve the 2015 agreement. Moreover, the convergence of additional domestic factors — such as pressure from hardliners to bolster the country’s defensive and offensive military capabilities, the weakening state of the economy, and looming challenges to the continuity of the political system — led to intensive debates about the direction of Iran’s foreign policy. Though the foreign and defense policy bureaucracy made the decision to reorient Iranian relations more fully toward China and Russia as early as 2019, it had to wait until the Hassan Rouhani government completed its term in August 2021 before taking any concrete steps in this direction. A clear indication of that decision can be traced to the constant stalling tactics used by the Rouhani delegation during the talks with the U.S. and the broader international community on potentially reviving the JCPOA. The pivot to the East took on a more noticeable character following the inauguration of President Ebrahim Raisi on Aug. 5, 2021. The Raisi presidency led to higher levels of policy compatibility in the totality of the Iranian political system, but even more importantly, it resulted in the executive branch rank and file being staffed with devotees, loyal administrators, and 1970s-era revolutionaries. This was a necessary move following the Rouhani presidency, during which somewhat liberal administrators permeated the bureaucracy. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s legislative and judicial branches have consistently demonstrated their loyalty to the status quo. However, following each change of president, the executive branch has had the opportunity to fill some 11,000 administrative positions throughout the country with like-minded individuals. Now, with the inauguration of the more conservative Raisi government, all three branches are committed to maintaining the current inertia and coherence of the Islamic Republic. Iran is now pursuing a two-tiered foreign policy: a vigorous and determined shift toward Russia and China on the one hand, while, on the other hand, making incremental concessions on its nuclear program to give the impression that another deal can be struck to replace the JCPOA. The former approach is being implemented with almost zero fanfare and the latter with extensive publicity. Iran has been steadfast in its Eastward turn even though this shift does not enjoy the support of the general public or the professional and educated classes in particular. As such, all debate and discussions regarding the country’s foreign policy orientation have been restricted to tightly knit circles within the top ruling elite. Still, it is possible to deduce three broad reasons for Iran’s growing alliance with China and Russia: 1. A refusal to capitulate to or make vast concessions to the United States;2. The valuing of security concerns as more important than economic development needs; and3. The desire to see continuity of the political system.Avoiding capitulating to the United StatesIran has a long-standing policy of avoiding normalization with the United States. Throughout the post-revolutionary period, Tehran has deliberately avoided any moves toward rapprochement except in the face of imminent danger or a potential U.S. military operation against the Islamic Republic. The underlying calculus maintains that normalization with Washington would lead to profound consequences for the current Iranian political system, from disrupting its internal politics to overwhelming its economy and reshaping its culture. First of all, there is a deep-seated fear in Tehran that once American companies, educational institutions, and civil society organizations become active in the country, the Iranian leadership would gradually lose much of its grip on power. Anti-American sentiment also provides the revolutionary class with a common identity and keeps more internationally minded, moderate, or pragmatic groups out of positions of authority. Even following the JCPOA agreement and prior to the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, the dominant perception in the Iranian capital was one of despair since most of the economic sanctions on the country remained intact. The ambiguous future of sanctions, combined with the possibility of spill-over effects on regional issues, created an atmosphere of uncertainty within the corridors of power in Iran. Another factor that dampens hopes for change in U.S.-Iranian relations is Washington’s long list of demands not only with regard to Iran’s foreign policy and nuclear program but also about the nature of its political system and internal conduct. A final facet standing in the way of improved bilateral relations — and closely related to the first — is the Iranian revolutionary class’s belief that rapprochement with the United States would inevitably result in undesired substantial changes in the political system. Any long-lasting improvement in the relationship would require not just policy change but also a redesign of state structures. In line with this thinking, concessions on the nuclear program would be inadequate; Iran would ultimately need to fully capitulate to the U.S., reviving bitter memories of the 1953 American-British coup d’état. The Farsi word for submission, tasleem, was, thus, widely used in the revolutionary state media and television to characterize Washington’s ostensible expectations from Tehran in the realization of the JCPOA. With its vast stake in the political and economic spheres of the state, Iran’s revolutionary class was not prepared to abandon power or open the political floodgates by making structural concessions to the U.S. and facilitating a possible takeover of the country by liberal presidential candidates. The disillusionment in the aftermath of the JCPOA agreement fostered a Raisi-type conservative presidency, an essential prerequisite to the consolidation and continuity of the revolutionary Iranian polity.Precedence of security concerns over economic developmentAt no point in its history has the Islamic Republic prioritized domestic economic development. Continued reliance on energy exports has furnished the state and its elites with a stream of income to maintain this system. Iran’s activist foreign policy antagonizes a large number of neighboring and external countries, yet the leadership considers it essential to protecting the state. For many decades, Iran’s national security doctrine has articulated a hedging strategy of relying on Shi’a and/or anti-Western enclaves in the Middle East to expand its territorial influence vis-à-vis major Arab countries, Israel, and the United States. Turkey is perhaps the only major country in the region with which Iran has been able to manage a stable relationship over the long term. In recent years, Tehran has additionally militarily aligned itself with a major outside power — Russia. Furthermore, Iran’s drone and missile capabilities as well as its geopolitical influence in much of the region have served as a dependable deterrence strategy. Such a conceptualization of national security, threat perceptions, and statecraft have left little room to pursue economic development in a globalized economy. This sharply contrasts with regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, which have deliberately been concentrating their energies on economic diversification, high-tech industries, renewable energy, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The economic rise of China and Russia’s military and political capabilities have provided a wide range of opportunities for numerous developing countries, including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and Mexico, to diversify their foreign and economic policies. However, while drawing on the support they can obtain from Beijing and Moscow, most still strive to maintain a balance between the West and the East. These countries benefit from European and American financial and technological sectors and earn sizeable profits by selling in their markets. But since national economic development is not a priority for the Iranian leadership, and it devotes a large proportion of its energies toward domestic and national security, even a complete political and economic pivot away from the West will not jeopardize Iranian state-owned industries nor affect the already-sidelined private sector and dwindling consumer markets. Indeed, Western companies and banks have also removed Iran as a potential market due to U.S. and European sanctions. Ultimately, Iran’s pivot toward the East will reduce its economy to selling fossil fuels to China and a few other Asian-Pacific countries in exchange for commodity imports. And it is unlikely that these consumers will turn around and invest in Iranian industries due to the sanctions restrictions currently in place. The only conceivable investment opportunities would perhaps be in the form of barter, wherein Iran might export petroleum in exchange for infrastructure development with no financial transactions involved. Furthermore, the timing of the Iranian leadership’s decision to reduce the country’s political and economic reliance on the West in general and Europe in particular was critical: Namely, that strategic choice was made ahead of the looming leadership transition at the top to avoid possible dissenting views when Iran’s third supreme leader takes over. Closer relations with Russia and China promise to not only de-risk Iran’s foreign economic relations but also help maintain an optimum level of progress on the nuclear program as a strategic component of the national security doctrine.Continuity of the political systemIran’s anti-Americanism is considered a highly treasured geostrategic asset in Moscow. In a sense, Iran is Russia’s southern Belarus. From a historical perspective, all permutations of the Russian state over the last two centuries, from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation today, have pursued a similar policy of trying to keep Iran out of the Western orbit. But the Russian-Iranian military partnership that developed in Syria and solidified over Ukraine — specifically covering military hardware, cyber software, and digital surveillance tools that Iran has no hopes procuring through cooperation with the West — has also furthered Tehran’s leverage vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. Iran is expected to receive 24 Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia in addition to S-400 air-defense systems. And the relationship is developing in both directions. Tehran has also supplied Moscow with low-cost drones and weapons systems. Additionally, the two countries are cooperating in the energy sector, with Russia reportedly having delivered 30,000 tons of diesel fuel to Iran in February and March 2023; yet given Russia’s technological limitations in the energy sector, it is not clear whether these projects will eventually and efficiently materialize. Though relations with Russia have undoubtedly expanded in the military domain since the invasion of Ukraine, one can also deduct other Iranian motives to further solidify relations with Moscow. There are at least two crucial reasons behind Iran’s desire to tighten its cooperation with Russia and move from a transactional to a strategic bilateral relationship. First is Tehran’s need to secure intelligence on Israeli and American operations against Iran. And second is the desire to draw on Moscow’s potential political and intelligence assistance during the transition period to the third supreme leader of Iran. Such expectations can be met with or without Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin since they fulfill fundamental Russian interests vis-à-vis Iran and the West. Iran has reached a point where it can no longer depend on increasing internal control and expanding regional deterrence to maintain a status quo conducive to preserving the political system. Israel’s traditional “periphery doctrine,” of reaching out to non-Arab countries to build security partnerships, has now expanded to the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions. Moreover, most Arab neighbors of Iran today maintain normal or at least not overtly antagonistic diplomatic relations with Israel, which has improved American leverage with regard to Tehran as a result. Facing limited foreign policy options, including diminishing hopes of reaching a modus vivendi with the United States through reviving the JCPOA and a lasting divergence in relations between Russia and the West, Tehran has had to succumb to Moscow. This was not only to procure new military hardware but also to secure its position in a shifting regional matrix, deter potential future threats to its internal security, and safeguard the continuity of the political system. In this evolving context, as long as Russian interests remain opposed to those of the West, Moscow will likely do whatever is necessary to protect the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike Russia’s more strategic and long-term calculus vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic, China confines itself to mostly political and commercial relations with Iran and appears to cautiously act in parallel to the U.S. in the Middle East rather than in opposition to it. Beijing has immense short-term and long-term commercial and technological interests in maintaining peace and cooperation with Israel as well as with major Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Moreover, petroleum imports from Iran can easily be substituted in a global glut. That said, Beijing’s mediation role between Iran and Saudi Arabia highlights that for China, good relations with the Islamic Republic provide useful political leverage when navigating the region as well as in its global rivalry with the United States.Challenges aheadThis article attempted to explain Iran’s calculations behind politically and economically pivoting toward Russia and China, founded upon the assumption that the deep state in Iran is prioritizing continuity and issues of succession in the political system. Almost all matters of state are overshadowed by these medium- to long-term concerns — a set of priorities that Iranian leaders have, in fact, held for centuries. The question facing the government today, however, is how the revolutionary domestic apparatus can strive to survive the myriad sources of domestic and foreign challenges, including the Islamic Republic’s stand-off against the Western world. In contrast to the United States and Europe, Russia and China are not concerned with Iran’s internal political system, constitutional structures, or governmental machinery. Of its three main adversaries, namely, the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, Iran recently concluded that a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is a possibility, having made a complete U-turn on this in March 2023, with the help of Chinese mediation. Iran had learned the hard way to compromise with the Saudis, given the latter’s instrumental political and financial role among Iranian minorities inside the country as well as Iranian opposition groups in Europe and the U.S. In order to mitigate this influence, Tehran apparently decided to make concessions on Yemen in return for reduced Saudi support for the Iranian opposition. Of all the points of leverage at Iran’s disposal in the Middle East, Yemen appears to be the least valued, especially compared to Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Evidently, the Iranian leadership’s incremental moves toward China and Russia stem from an unwillingness to redefine the underpinnings of the country’s national security doctrine. Not only does Iran’s current foreign policy orientation not run in opposition to Beijing’s or Moscow’s overall international outlook, but in many ways, its anti-Western predisposition in a critical region of the world serves the two powers in their difficult relationships with the United States. By aligning with Russia and China in the security and commercial spheres, Iran feels it has acquired an insurance policy against any potential negative resolutions emanating from the United Nations Security Council. And even more consequentially, with an eye toward the potentially turbulent looming period of leadership transition and succession, Tehran may feel comfortable with relying on Moscow and Beijing for security, political, intelligence, and financial support. But a major challenge confronts the political system: Will the Iranian public, professional and intellectual groups, and the country’s slim private sector — all deeply accustomed to Western ideas, systems, and customs — be willing to embrace and adapt themselves to this Eastward shift that was formulated by Iran’s political and security elites? Perhaps the social and political atmospherics that emerge as the Islamic Republic’s third supreme leadership seeks to consolidate its power will reveal the durability of this unbalanced geopolitical reorientation.

Egypt faces an economic crisis that risks fuelling unrest. The International Monetary Fund demands reforms in return for loans, while the authorities seek to broaden their base through a much-criticised national dialogue. Foreign partners should cautiously support this balancing act to enhance the country’s stability.  Egypt is in the midst of a profound economic crisis that threatens to disrupt its domestic, economic and foreign policies – deepening public disenchantment and potentially fuelling social unrest. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated this predicament: its effects on the global economy have exposed Egypt’s longstanding dependence on fuel and food imports, which have become too expensive for the country to afford, as well as short-term foreign financing, which has also become more costly. The resulting imbalance has led to the currency’s devaluation and an inflation spike that is hitting the middle and working classes especially hard. Egypt has gone through economic troughs before, but today’s woes are different, and both the government and its creditors are responding in kind. Instead of providing an unconditional bailout, the country’s Gulf partners are working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – which has already loaned the government $3 billion – to press Cairo to undertake structural reforms. These include slowing down government-run infrastructure projects and reducing military-owned companies’ holdings. Both moves, while important for the country’s long-term economic health, will cause considerable pain for many of President Abdelfattah al-Sisi’s supporters. If the hurt is too great and too widespread, it could bring with it the possibility of political instability.  The authorities are clearly worried. Their decision to launch a national dialogue with civil society and opposition forces reflects a desire to broaden their base of support as the economic situation goes from bad to worse – although activists worry the government is now rethinking the initiative.  Against this backdrop, the role for bilateral partners and multilateral institutions will be to press Cairo for overdue reforms, both economic and political, while keeping an eye on the social impact of structural adjustments and calibrating their requests to avoid fuelling instability in what remains an influential and strategically important state. Economic Vulnerabilities ExposedAfter holding up better than many experts expected during the COVID-19 pandemic, Egypt’s economy has suffered a body blow as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine.  The crisis built up over the course of 2022 and snowballed at the start of 2023. The exchange rate began falling on 4 January, reaching a low of 32 Egyptian pounds to the U.S. dollar on 11 January before stabilising at around 30. (Up until March 2022, the pound was trading at around fifteen to the dollar.) This major downward adjustment in the exchange rate is the third in the past year, and foreign investors expect further declines. The devaluation has caused a spike in inflation, which reached 31.9 per cent in February year on year, up from 25.8 per cent in January. Food prices rose by 61.8 per cent year on year, with poultry, pasta, dairy and red meat prices increasing faster than others. These developments have had a significant impact on the population, with many middle- and working-class Egyptians reportedly holding down several jobs to make ends meet, and changing their diets to replace animal proteins with cheaper options. The crisis has a history that stretches back years. Since President Sisi took power in 2013, the government has pursued an economic model focused on government-run infrastructure projects funded by debt financing, both foreign and domestic, and led by military-owned companies. These firms came to dominate many sectors, while crony capitalists associated with President Husni Mubarak – who ruled for 30 years before being ousted amid Egypt’s 2011 popular uprising – lost clout and private businesses were crowded out. This arrangement reflected Sisi’s statist world view, secured for him the army’s political loyalty and supported a modest economic expansion. It failed, however, to reduce unemployment, while exacerbating poverty and external imbalances.  When COVID-19 hit in 2020, domestic observers and international investors were concerned that it would expose Egypt’s vulnerabilities. But while tourism virtually disappeared, and business activity stagnated, the country was able to weather the pandemic’s impact. Attracted by high returns, foreign investors flocked to Egypt’s treasury bills, and remittances from Egyptians abroad also went up. These inflows helped Cairo temporarily finance its current account and budget deficits and supported local incomes.  Instead, it was the Ukraine war that accelerated a major economic crisis. Russia’s February 2022 invasion drove up commodity prices and thus Egypt’s already sizeable import bill, showing just how heavily the country relies on purchases of fuel and cereals from abroad. The country’s foreign reserves dwindled. The government’s attempts to curb imports failed, and soon investors began to doubt its ability to defend the managed exchange rate, leading to a portfolio outflow of around $20 billion between January and September 2022. Foreign reserves dropped even further, reaching little more than three months of imports in July 2022 (down from 6.8 months one year earlier).  Given exchange rate devaluations and rising debt servicing costs, Cairo will now struggle to pay its debts. With investors pulling out and a structural current account deficit, the authorities had to let the exchange rate decline. In turn, the Central Bank hiked interest rates to contain the resulting inflation and limit capital outflows. The higher rates and lower currency value mean that debt servicing is set to explode. The 2023-2024 budget anticipates that repayments will absorb 56 per cent of total government spending. This debt burden, according to a regional investment professional, is the main reason why Egypt watchers are sounding the alarm. A Delicate Balancing ActAs the economic outlook deteriorated over the course of 2022, Cairo sought assistance from the IMF. At first, Egypt requested a $12 billion loan, but it was unable to come to terms with the Fund. Instead, in December 2022 the IMF approved and Egypt accepted a less ambitious $3 billion package over 46 months. It spelled out a list of unusually detailed measures Cairo would have to take in order to qualify, identifying a “permanent shift to a flexible exchange rate” as the top priority.  In effect, the Fund was requiring Egypt to devalue its currency – a difficult demand of Cairo, given its political sensitivity. According to an international official, the Egyptian government saw a strong pound as a sign of national prestige and a way of managing external debt levels, inflation and the cost of key imports, including building materials, for military-owned firms. But the IMF correctly saw that artificially high currency value was crippling the export sector, widening the external account deficit and boosting demand for dollars on the black market. These issues in turn exacerbated the shortage of foreign reserves, as Egyptians anticipated that the government would lower the pound’s value sooner or later. While the devaluation has temporarily alleviated hard currency liquidity problems as Egyptian officials have moved toward full flotation of the pound, there are signs that they continue to manage its value against the IMF’s wishes. The other reforms negotiated with the IMF could also prove tricky. Fiscal austerity measures and the phasing-out of fuel price subsidies risk stirring frustration among the middle and working classes. The IMF’s request that Cairo slow down infrastructure projects, in order to reduce pressure on external accounts and inflation, is a challenge to one of President Sisi’s core policies and sources of domestic support. In January, the president reiterated the importance of these projects for economic development, but international financial officials are serious about this point: they have indicated that they are ready to make public statements if Egypt fails to comply. As Cairo remains under scrutiny from investors and rating agencies, any public criticism from the IMF could deepen market scepticism about its commitment to reform and prove costly for Egypt’s finances.  Still, the creditor-driven policy change that is arguably the most controversial for Sisi and his core constituencies concerns divestiture from state- and military-owned companies. This measure requires the authorities to set clear criteria for government intervention in the economy, increase transparency around public procurement processes, privatise non-strategic firms, and end tax exemptions and other advantages for these enterprises. The goal is to reduce the government and military footprint in the economy and bring in much-needed foreign investment. To pre-empt resistance within the state and security apparatus, the IMF secured the president’s official endorsement of the measure.  Even so, it may not work. The military’s opposition to these reforms and the difficulties associated with such privatisations risk derailing the IMF deal and, with it, the broader effort to restore confidence in the Egyptian government’s stewardship of the economy. Some observers argue that the president’s endorsement, along with the uncharacteristic detail of the loan document negotiated with Cairo, as well as international alignment behind the deal (discussed below), will make it hard for Egypt to shirk its commitments. But in January, despite the IMF agreement, the president signed a decree allocating more land to the armed forces for commercial purposes – perhaps a signal of more defiance to come. The IMF did not react officially to this measure, although it could choose to do so in the forthcoming review.  Some observers also doubt the feasibility of privatising army-run and army-linked ventures because of the military’s privileged place in Egyptian state and society. Among other things, due diligence on these companies, ie, the standard examination of a company’s legal and financial records by prospective buyers, is nearly impossible given the lack of full transparency about their economic health.  While there is broad international backing for these reforms, they entail a degree of risk for the Egyptian government. The slowdown in infrastructure projects and the state divestment policy could risk upsetting the president’s relationship with his core constituencies – especially the military – which benefited greatly from the arrangements that the reforms are intended to replace. In addition, fiscal austerity measures, subsidy reform and further devaluations – measures the IMF also insists upon – are likely to erode incomes throughout society. As the effects of these measures ripple through the economy, there is some danger that military and public disenchantment could become volatile and destabilising.  International Alignment behind the IMF DealEgypt’s international partners are generally supportive of the IMF reform program, but some have expressed concern to Crisis Group about the potential for the more stringent measures to cause political instability and related phenomena, especially an increase in irregular migration. Publicly, Western officials fully back the IMF scheme, saying there is no alternative, but they may not all be on exactly the same page. In private conversations with Crisis Group, U.S. diplomats voiced worry that European governments may be pressuring the Fund to water down its demands because of the instability risk. An Egyptian observer noted to Crisis Group that, unlike for the U.S., “Egypt is really too big to fail from Europe’s perspective”.  Gulf countries are the other major variable in this equation, given their huge treasuries and previous support for Egypt. Following the popular protests and military coup that deposed Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi, in July 2013, Egypt’s Gulf backers, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait, quickly pledged $12 billion to help stabilise the country. The aid consisted of long-term deposits with the Central Bank and direct grants, much of which came in the form of transfers of oil products. Since 2013, however, relations between Cairo and Gulf capitals – including Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – have been tense and marked by mutual disappointment.  The Gulf countries are vexed by Egypt’s poor economic performance and resistance to financial reform, as well as by its regional policy, which has at times run counter to their priorities. Egypt, the most populous Middle Eastern country and one accustomed to a leadership role in Arab affairs, bristles at what it sees as the Gulf monarchies’ heavy-handed attempts to dictate its policymaking. It is keen to hew to an independent line. While Egypt found common cause with its Gulf patrons when they feuded with Qatar from 2017 to 2021, it also conspicuously refused to deploy its forces in support of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen and declined to get behind the Gulf effort to topple Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Egypt has also avoided entangling itself in the Gulf’s strategic competition with Iran. Even where Egypt has worked in partnership with the Gulf, as it did with the UAE in Libya, the cooperation has produced friction. Egypt and the UAE have found themselves in effect aligned with opposing camps in the current fighting in Sudan, with Cairo supporting the Sudanese army, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Abu Dhabi siding with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, under the command of Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo. Nonetheless, Egypt now needs Gulf financing to plug its external deficit. The IMF anticipates that its $3 billion loan will be complemented by an additional $14 billion from a variety of international and regional partners. In particular, the IMF program is predicated on Gulf countries contributing $10 billion over the next five years, on top of their pledge to roll over $28 billion in deposits with Egypt’s central bank. According to a regional bank official speaking with Crisis Group, the IMF agreement will only afford durable relief if it is coupled with Gulf support.  But the Gulf countries have become more demanding creditors. In addition to the frustrations enumerated above, they are confronting the demands of their own ambitious national development plans, which means diminished appetite to bail out Cairo. While Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar deposited $13 billion in Egypt’s central bank to help Cairo absorb the immediate economic shocks following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, over the past months the Gulf has reassessed its approach. As a Gulf official told Crisis Group, “We aren’t prepared to help those who are unwilling to help themselves. And even if we were willing, Egypt’s needs are massive. None of us really has that kind of firepower any longer”. Thus, unlike in previous crises, Gulf states now demand public assets in return for their financial backing. This new policy has led to Gulf sovereign wealth funds buying minority stakes in Egyptian firms that they could sell at a profit at a later stage. It has also created frictions with Cairo over these assets’ value as the Gulf puts a premium on return on investment, as opposed to thinking primarily about how best to support Egypt. According to several sources, in November 2022 Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund suspended its plans to buy out United Bank. Egypt insisted on setting the asset price in dollars, rather than in pounds, but the Saudis refused, hoping that further devaluations could reduce its dollar price.  These tensions have spilled over into relations between Cairo and its Gulf backers. Between January and February, two prominent Saudi Arabian commentators, Turki al-Hamad and Khalid al-Dakhil, wrote pieces criticising Egypt’s inefficient economy and the army’s interference in business, among other things. In response, Egyptian journalist Abdel Razek Tawfiq published an aggressive article in the pro-Sisi Cairo24 and al-Gomhuria outlets decrying what he called the kingdom’s arrogance. Later, President Sisi sought to calm tempers, calling on Egyptians to remember everything their “brothers” have given them. Cairo24 and al-Gomhuria took down Tawfiq’s incendiary article, replacing it with a more conciliatory editorial. While the spat reflected exasperation on both sides, some observers also think Riyadh is irritated by Cairo’s delays in handing over the Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir, which it agreed to cede to Saudi Arabia, in the teeth of significant public and security-sector opposition, in 2016. With doubts remaining about the Gulf partners’ willingness to fill gaps in Egypt’s finances, investment bankers suggest that Egypt look for alternative funding avenues. One idea is to securitise future Suez Canal revenues, ie, package these expected earnings into bonds that could be sold to foreign investors. The canal has excellent credit standing and highly predictable revenue flows, making this unorthodox approach compelling to many. But the idea raises concerns about public perceptions and national security, highlighting the lack of clear options in Cairo. The National Dialogue InitiativeThe deteriorating economic picture also contributed to the president’s surprising decision to initiate a national dialogue with civil society and opposition forces. In April 2022, Sisi called for such a dialogue, with no political group to be excluded, though he later specified that the Muslim Brotherhood would not be allowed to take part.  Egyptian opposition figures saw the move as an attempt to expand the government’s social base before the anticipated economic turbulence and improve its international image as it prepared to seek foreign economic assistance. It suggested a shift from the authorities’ previous approach of closing avenues of political contestation. As Egyptian journalists and Western diplomats pointed out in conversations with Crisis Group, Sisi and the security sector believe that former President Mubarak made the 2011 uprising possible by tolerating the activities of opposition parties, independent media and civil society groups even to the limited extent he did.  Against this backdrop, the Egyptian opposition cautiously welcomed the initiative and tried to set preconditions for its participation. The Civil Democratic Movement, which brings together a collection of secular opposition parties and activists, laid out conditions for its participation in the dialogue. It said the participants must include an equal number of pro- and anti-government figures. It later asked the authorities to release more political detainees as a show of good-will. Another group launched a petition to demand the release of all political prisoners, a halt to media censorship and an end to the use of anti-terror laws for political purposes. An activist with the political opposition told Crisis Group that negotiations have continued over the last two months about when and how to start the dialogue. The activist emphasised, however, that “participation is the only card we have to play, so we have to try to make sure that our few conditions, such as on political prisoners, are met before agreeing to join”. The government’s response to the opposition’s demands has so far been disappointing. Although it has freed some political prisoners, many others remain behind bars. Repression of political and civil society activists and independent journalists goes on, moreover, despite the opposition’s appeals. “We have made clear in our meetings with senior intelligence leaders that there has to be a political decision to stop these arrests or else we will just be stuck in this ongoing cycle”, explained the above-referenced opposition figure.  The dialogue started in May, more than a year after Sisi announced it, but Egyptian activists are sceptical about its chances of success. One close observer noted, “From the inside we almost always don’t see any hope”. This person said the initiative includes credible mediators representing intelligence services, but any momentum is now gone. “It’s a scandal really. It’s been a year now, but they don’t care. It’s clear there has been some sort of setback or shift. Our interactions suggest that they aren’t interested in this initiative moving forward, that they now see this as a potentially dangerous course”. What’s Next?The Egyptian authorities face domestic and international challenges that may require at least a partial restructuring of the country’s longstanding arrangements. In a private conversation with Crisis Group, an Egyptian observer pointed to Lebanon’s debt default and ensuing political crisis as a signpost for the future: “I think people need to reimagine their mental models as to where Egypt is headed, and Lebanon is useful in this respect. The long-term impact of the devaluations is still being underestimated and will take some time to filter through the system. Without trust between the people and their government there really is no natural backstop. Egypt probably won’t get that far, but it’s still useful to go through the exercise”.  While Egypt is very different from Lebanon, the chances that the crisis will force the authorities to review years-old policies are considerable. Indeed, it is already happening. Confronted with severe economic worries, IMF scrutiny and tensions with the Gulf, Cairo has had to make painful concessions, as it did in the sharp devaluation, although it remains unclear whether it will fully abide by its commitments. Whether its international partners will stay lined up behind the IMF is likely to be an important factor.  Against this backdrop, Egypt’s international partners should continue to press for the structural reforms that remain the key priority in creating long-term resilience. Reducing the military’s economic footprint should be a top priority: enterprises currently staffed by soldiers who do not need jobs could become job creators for civilians who do. Likewise, the U.S. and its European allies should consider linking at least some of their future support to progress on the lacklustre national dialogue initiative. While thoroughgoing political liberalisation remains a near-term impossibility, targeted criminal justice and electoral reforms are within reach; a meaningful dialogue could lend them momentum.  At the same time, Egypt’s international partners should approach the situation with some caution, mindful of short-term instability risks stemming from fiscal austerity. In particular, subsidy reform and inflation could contribute to social unrest. They should therefore be prepared to show flexibility, for example regarding spending cuts, which could have devastating effects on the population, and the exchange rate.  In sum, while the Egyptian authorities continue to walk a political and economic tightrope in the coming period, foreign governments and international financial institutions should be prepared to do the same – offering careful and calibrated support to strengthen the country’s long-term resilience and minimising short-term instability risks.

The Russian financial sector has taken a double hit from sanctions – both in infrastructure (affecting financial transactions) and in technology (affecting the hardware and software). Infrastructural sanctions imposed by Western countries in reponse to the war on Ukraine (de-SWIFTing, overcompliance, and breaking of correspondent relationships) affected their operational activity. Moreover, the Russian government banned the use of foreign software and equipment imports, which has been a drag on business development. The financial sector was able to withstand the first shock. However, the most recent restrictions on access to advanced technologies, especially from the US and the EU, will lead to import substitution based on technologies of yesterday.  - Since the war began, every second Russian company has lost tech support and access to cutting-edge technology. - Import substitution leaves tech companies scrambling for what they can get, not what they actually want or need, and stunts business development. - The financial sector is shifting from creating innovations to ensuring technological security and supporting current operations. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a coalition of Western countries led by the European Union and the United States imposed a large array of sanctions. Since then, the Russian financial sector has taken a double hit, namely sanctions on the infrastructure, affecting financial transactions, and on the technology, like software and hardware, it needs to operate. Infrastructure sanctions restrict banks’ ability to make payments (disconnection from the SWIFT global payments system and overcompliance). Technology sanctions create hindrances to technical upgrades and innovation. Before the war in Ukraine, the Russian financial sector was a world leader: it was third in financial technology penetration, in the top 10 in digital banking development, and fourth in the transition to cashless payments during the pandemic. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions in 2022, it has lost this competitive position.   The sanctions against Russia’s financial sector have largely isolated Russia from access to the global financial system. Inside Russia, however, only a small fraction of Russians have felt these restrictions. Russian payment infrastructure was and remains resilient primarily due to the financial messaging system (SPFS), the Russian equivalent of SWIFT, which was developed in 2014 and through which banks are required to exchange data within Russia. In 2022, traffic in the system increased by 22 percent. There are currently 469 participants, including 115 non-Russian banks from 14 countries. Among the foreign countries, banks in Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Switzerland are connected to the system. Due to the risk of new sanctions, Russia’s central bank does not disclose detailed statistics. Direct messaging channels allow for direct international transactions with those banks connected to the SPFS, including those bypassing SWIFT. Minimizing the damage of sanctions that target Russia’s financial sector infrastructure is considerably more difficult. Former partners, even in friendly jurisdictions like some post-Soviet countries, have been slow to help Russia with system-level transactions. It will take considerable time to build new payment infrastructure channels, as the technological constraints are much more difficult. The lack of access to modern technology keeps banks’ IT systems in their current state and impedes fintech development and innovation. Pain and Risk About 85 percent of software used in the Russian financial sector is produced abroad. For hardware, the situation is even worse. Only large-scale assembly takes place in Russia. For this reason, the departure of companies that ensure the viability of the financial sector has been particularly painful for the financial sector - companies like Oracle, SAP, Cisco, IBM, Intel, AMD, Diebold Nixdorf and NCR (ATMs). Every second Russian company was left without technical support after the war began. For Russian banks, it was impossible to quickly switch to domestic solutions, as the right quality and scale were simply not available on the market. Virtually all operations of a modern financial institution, from client services to internal operations, are heavily dependent on the smooth operation of software and equipment. This makes the financial system particularly vulnerable on the technological side. Banks and non-financial institutions may face operational risks due to the lack of servers and software. This could make systems more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, raise the risk of technical failures due to a shortage of equipment and maintenance specialists, and require failing equipment to be replaced with either used Western-made products or Chinese analogues. The Bank of Russia, which supervises the financial sector, pointed out these risks for the first time almost a year after the invasion. Import Substitution Software The withdrawal of foreign companies has left the Russian financial sector with a huge gap in software and services. Also, in October 2022, the government banned Russian banks from using foreign software, a rule that applies even if there are no domestic equivalents. This has forced critical information infrastructure facilities to urgently seek domestic solutions. The combination of these two factors has given a boost to software development in Russia. Thus, according to Ilya Sivtsev, CEO of Astra (developer of operating systems and PostgreSQL database management system (DBMS) based on open source code), the company’s revenue in 2022 doubled to over RUB 6.5 billion (USD 65 million) and the share of its revenues from the financial sector increased from 4 to 22 percent. Astra’s outlook for 2023 is for double-digit growth.  Astra’s figures generally reflect the situation in the Russian IT market in 2022: there was rapid growth due to the departure of foreign competitors. As Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, who oversees the industry, reported, IT firms in 2022 grew revenues by 35 percent and earned RUB 2.38 trillion (USD 27 billion). Despite the reduced presence of foreign companies, turnover in the Russian IT market has grown. Switching to Russian software instead of foreign software may not be the most significant challenge, but it is an expense that businesses could have invested in furthering business growth. With all the advantages of the Russian DBMS, migration from the US-made Oracle software may lead to performance degradation of 30-50 percent. This is a serious limitation for the financial sector, whose mission-critical core system (processing, the core of an automated banking system) requires high-speed interaction with databases. The banking applications must also be transferred to the new DBMS. In addition, information security risks that could jeopardize the stability of the financial system have increased. The massive migration to new IT solutions reduces the cybersecurity of the entire system. The growth of the Russian software market is limited by two factors: the Russian government’s permission for companies to use unlicensed foreign software and the country’s own borders. Before the war, Russian IT companies were rather active on the markets of neighboring countries, providing various services (e.g. 1, 2, 3 )–from the integration of IT systems and products to the provision of services to companies and private customers. Russian solutions were often cheaper and technical support in Russian was an important advantage in the regional Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) market. And while Russian companies were also looking to expand abroad before the war, they will now have to compete there with Western companies that have left the Russian market and whose technological development is not restricted by sanctions. The relationship between customers and integrators running programs to implement products from different vendors has also changed. The customers say, “I want it like SAP, but faster and better,” while the integrators say, “My offer is limited, so take what I have or you will run out too.” In other words, customers have to accept a downgrade in software and hardware capacity for certain technologies. Import Substitution and Hardware Because it was not profitable, the equipment needed for  assembly in Russia is not produced in the country. Until 2022, only large-scale assembly from imported components was carried out in Russia. And the financial sector is not the only one waiting for servers, storage systems, controllers and components – industry, the public sector and retailers are also in line. In their search for equipment, Russian companies have turned to parallel imports, obtaining what they need from countries that have not imposed sanctions. They have also acquiesced to lower requirements for equipment quality and delivery deadlines. However, there are no systemic solutions or supply lines yet. Right at the beginning of the conflict, the US applied the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) mechanism to Russia. The FDPR prohibits exports to sanctioned countries of equipment that US companies were involved in developing or manufacturing – thus it affects companies outside the US in so-called third countries. This mechanism is primarily aimed at keeping the defense industry from importing technology. However, civilian products that can be classified as “dual-use” (military and civilian) are also largely subject to the restrictions – including the kinds of equipment needed by the financial sector. That has made systematic and large-scale purchases much more difficult. Third countries are willing to restrict technology exports to Russia, and the US is constantly updating its sanctions lists to include intermediaries. Nevertheless, loopholes in sanctions frameworks and delays in sanctions decisions allow Russia more room to adjust, finding new partners in Asia or new ways to bring hardware to Russia. Chinese partners, for example, support Russian companies not only with equipment but also with chips. Shipments of microchips and other semiconductors from China to Russia  are 2.5 times higher than than pre-war level; China now accounts for more than 50 percent of semiconductor imports to Russia. By the end of 2022, China supplied 40 percent of Russia’s imports and purchased 30 percent of its exports, and the RMB had become the only (albeit less convenient due to its incomplete convertibility) alternative to the euro and dollar for Russia’s international payments. In 2022, trade turnover between the two countries reached an astronomical USD190 billion, and it is quite likely that within these imports are sanctioned goods that Russia desperately needs. Reports that China is helping Russia circumvent sanctions, especially in the technology sector, are mounting. The Russian IT sector’s focus on Chinese suppliers and their products – from servers and data center equipment to bulk purchases of consumer electronics – reflects Moscow’s growing and asymmetrical dependence on Beijing. For second- and third-tier Chinese companies, this opens up opportunities to enter the Russian market. For example, Sber, Russia’s largest bank, is testing its own custom-made laptops. Sber’s partner, the Chinese company Shanghai IP3 Information Technology, is a contract manufacturer that takes orders for electronic devices and commissions them from Chinese production facilities. Whereas before the war Russian companies were free to choose their equipment and electronics suppliers, taking advantage of the wide supply on the market to obtain favorable prices, the choice has now narrowed to Chinese manufacturers. The lack of alternatives also forces them to accept less attractive terms. Innovation Inhibited The sanctions bottleneck in both hardware and software is shifting the focus of IT specialists in the Russian financial sector from creating innovations to ensuring technological security and supporting current operations. The most prominent example is the introduction of payment stickers for Russians who can no longer make contactless payments with their smartphones. A payment sticker has an embedded near-field communications (NFC) chip that exchanges data with a payment device. In other words, it is a bank card chip stuck onto an iPhone, as iPhone owners are considered to be the highest-paying target group, and banks have a vested interest in maintaining the usual number and volume of card transactions. Android smartphone owners will still have the option of making contactless payments via a MirPay wallet linked to their domestic payment system card. Frank RG, the Russian financial information publication, estimates that 12 of Russia’s 25 largest banks already offer stickers to their customers. Tinkoff, the leader in innovative banking, plans to issue over 1 million stickers by July 2023. At state-owned Sberbank, over 100 000 people applied for stickers within three hours of their offering. Issuing stickers is more expensive for the bank than standard payment card issuance, bankers acknowledge. Russian financial institutions have become so similar to IT companies that they are almost indistinguishable. Sberbank alone employs 38,000 IT specialists, Sberbank President Herman Gref reported to Vladimir Putin in March 2023. Besides the purely financial challenges, such as ensuring the sustainability of the payment infrastructure, the financial sector needs to work with the IT industry on providing non-sanctioned hardware and software, finding indigenous solutions to replace Western ones, and localizing instead of scaling up. An important but not decisive obstacle to innovation is the mass exodus of IT professionals. Competition for the remaining specialists is fierce and will only increase. The government is making gigantic efforts to keep the remaining skilled workers in the country. The slowness in changing the taxation of departing Russians seems partly related to the fear that most foreign IT professionals who continue to work in Russia will no longer do so. Prospects for the Financial Sector The Russian financial sector’s resilience to sanctions on its financial infrastructure has been limited to Russian territory. The sanctions have largely isolated Russia from the international financial infrastructure. Russia’s demand to allow banks to use SWIFT (e.g. under the Grains Agreement) is a clear indication of this. Technological restrictions and the withdrawal of Western companies from the Russian market may seem less painful at first glance, but this is not the case. Their impact is longer-term: declining quality of hardware and software, forced investment at IT, cybersecurity, and operational risks. And while infrastructural constraints have had only a temporary impact on the ability of the financial sector to operate smoothly, technological constraints have significantly limited its potential for growth and development. The Russian financial sector’s dependence on foreign, especially Western, software and hardware manufacturers is high. This poses a significant risk to Russia’s financial stability, especially if Western countries tighten sanctions against the Russian IT sector.

The war in Ukraine accelerated a global energy crisis just as the world was beginning to recover from the Covid-19 pandemic. Venezuela has the largest crude oil and the eighth largest gas reserves in the world and can therefore offer an alternative for Europe to replace its fossil fuels imports from Russia. The problem is, of course, that EU–Venezuela relations have been in a sorry state since the EU denounced President Nicolás Maduro’s re-election in 2018 as neither free nor fair. Since then, the EU has adopted targeted sanctions against the Venezuelan government, thus adding to the maximum economic pressure that former US President Donald Trump imposed on Caracas in an attempt to fatally weaken Maduro. This approach has yielded no result in that respect, and the war in Ukraine, and its energy security implications for the EU, creates the occasion for a revision of EU and US strategies. The hope is that a “more carrots, less sticks” approach could convince Maduro to engage in meaningful dialogue with the opposition. The EU must seize this opportunity of rapprochement and readiness and push forward the recommendations put forth in its electoral observation mission’s report of 2021, reconcile internal disputes to focus on the big picture, give momentum to dialogue efforts, consolidate support among regional allies and rekindle its efforts towards humanitarian relief.A failed pressure strategyVenezuela used to be among the most prosperous countries in Latin America, but is now home to one of the largest external displacement crises in the world next to Syria and Ukraine, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. When he came into power in 2013, President Maduro inherited from his predecessor Hugo Chávez a country in economic turmoil, high in debt and on an increasingly authoritarian track. The slump in oil prices in 2014 added fuel to the fire, prompting a wave of unrest to which Maduro responded with repression. He then tried to replace the democratically elected National Assembly, which had an opposition majority, with a loyalist Constituent Assembly in 2017. But it was after the 2018 presidential election, when Maduro secured a second term in what are widely considered rigged elections, that Venezuela descended into a full-blown political crisis. Juan Guaidó, speaker of the National Assembly, used a constitutional clause to declare himself interim president until new elections could be held, backed by more than 60 countries worldwide. In the following years, various negotiations attempts between Maduro and the opposition failed to solve the country’s political dispute, prompting fatigue in the opposition ranks while eventually consolidating Maduro’s authoritarian grip. As the political crisis unfolded, the EU and the United States responded with sanctions against the Maduro regime, although with different goals. The Trump administration pursued regime change through a maximum pressure strategy. Instead, the EU combined targeted restrictive measures with humanitarian aid and support for dialogue and mediation efforts. EU efforts have been hampered by: internal divergences, especially on the recognition of Guaidó as interim president; multipolar competition and the perceived excessive proximity with the United States; and regional fragmentation and polarisation. Sanctions have failed to produce substantial change as Russia and China, and to some degree Iran and Turkey, have continued trade (including in oil) and strengthened economic ties with the Maduro regimeHow has the EU mitigated constraining factors on its policy?There have been two issues over which the EU struggled, even failed, to reach consensus. The first was the recognition of Guaidó as interim president. While most member states eventually did so, Italy and Cyprus dragged their feet, until the issue became irrelevant in early 2021 when the term of the National Assembly of which Guaidó was speaker expired. EU divergences stemmed from the political composition of member state governments and their view of the EU’s role in the world. Left-leaning governments in the EU tended to frame the recognition of Guaidó as a US-led, “interventionist” initiative, while right-leaning governments advocated a confrontational approach to Maduro, including through the recognition of Guaidó. It was a missed opportunity to show EU unity and put the spotlight on the EU’s difficulty to reach agreement over its foreign policy. Second, internal disagreements within EU institutions and member states revolved around the opportunity to send an electoral observation mission to local and regional elections in November 2021, out of fear that this could whitewash the Maduro regime. The mission eventually garnered enough support to be deployed and was later largely perceived as a success by EU member states. The EU electoral observation mission (EOM) produced a report with recommendations that have become the benchmark for the conditions for a free and fair election in the agenda of the Mexico-based talks between the government and the opposition. The region’s fragmented and polarised approach to the Venezuelan crisis has been another factor hampering EU efforts. Trump’s push for regime change, embraced by most Latin American countries led by right-wing governments in 2019–20 (crystallised by the creation of the so-called Lima Group) exacerbated geopolitical tensions in the region. The EU-backed creation of the International Contact Group (ICG) in 2019, which aimed to promote dialogue but did not bear fruit because it coincided with the recognition of Guaidó and the EU's rapprochement with the Lima Group. Regional polarisation was epitomised by the appointment of a Guaidó representative in the Organization of American States, despite Maduro’s decision to withdraw from the pan-American body, and the prolonged stalemate in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (CELAC). The EU was dragged into a polarisation spiral where its policies were associated with those of the Trump administration, even though they had different objectives. Besides, Trump’s policy of maximum pressure as an instrument for democratisation proven ineffective in a context of geopolitical competition with China and Russia. Their support for the Maduro regime allowed it to survive, even though at the cost of the country’s descent into economic disaster. Russia in particular also invested political capital by participating in the Mexico talks as the government’s accompanying country.A changed scenario, a new strategy?President Biden’s election and Latin America’s shift towards the left created openings for a more constructive international engagement with Venezuela, which have further widened after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, providing the EU with a new set of foreign policy options. The EU and the US, together with Canada and the United Kingdom, have signalled a willingness to agree to conditional sanctions relief. The Biden administration has permitted American oil company Chevron to resume limited oil operations in Venezuela in exchange for an agreement by Maduro and the opposition to continue dialogue after a year of stalemate. The talks have made no progress other than an agreement to turn up to 3 billion US dollars of frozen government fund into aid to be distributed by the UN and the International Red Cross to alleviate the domestic humanitarian predicament. Although a more concessions-based foreign policy towards Venezuela may not lead to the regime change some have hoped for, it could still make Maduro willing to allow for fairly free and democratic elections in 2024, when his second term comes to an end. However, it is clear that the humanitarian crisis will not be over shortly, and the implementation of the 2022 agreement between government and opposition is proceeding slowly. Increased EU humanitarian aid could help promote goodwill in Venezuela and in the region, and thus is not solely to be considered an altruistic gift, but an important part of the EU’s foreign policy arsenal. Finally, Venezuela and the broader region of Latin America and the Caribbean is not only important due to its natural resources, but an important political partner for the EU in its bid to defend a rule-based global order. This has become ever more evident since the war on Ukraine, which has seen some Latin American countries refusing to pick sides. Over the last few years the political landscape in Latin America changed with the election of leftist presidents in almost all countries in the region, with interest in seeking a negotiated response to the crisis in Venezuela. The International Conference on Venezuela convened by Colombian President Gustavo Petro in Bogotá in April 2023 is an illustration of the region’s renewed engagement on the issue. The upcoming EU–CELAC summit in July, the first in eight years, is an opportunity to engage with regional partners to foster political cooperation on global and regional issues, including Venezuela. The EU’s pragmatic rapprochement with Venezuela offers the prospect for some progress in the negotiations between government and opposition, but it should not be perceived as a relegation of EU’s commitment to democratic norms. The EU should not waste the opportunity to step up its diplomatic engagement with the region and coordination with the US and like-minded countries to ensure that Maduro concedes a real level playing field for the 2024 elections while at the same time pursuing its strategic goal of diversifying energy supplies. This article is brief published under JOINT, a project which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 959143.

Ethiopian women’s migration is influenced by an array of interconnected factors including environmental degradation, poverty, limited social protection, political unrest, and vulnerability to gender-based violence. These factors all potentially increase vulnerability to human trafficking. Focusing only on the risks faced during irregular travel to and work arrangements in the Arab Gulf states and Lebanon may overlook the risks involved in staying put. Key Findings Climate change is not directly causing migration but acts as an amplifier of already existing drivers. Legal and humanitarian categories such as human trafficking often fail to accurately reflect the complex interplay of factors shaping women’s migration trajectories. Women’s mobility is often grounded in systemic gender inequality occurring at the level of the family, the community and the state. Future analysis must take women’s life situation before, during and after migration into account. Throughout history, demographic, economic, political, religious, and environmental developments have resulted in Ethiopian mobility, mainly within the country or neighbouring region, but also further afield. Although Ethiopia’s current migration rate is only about half of the sub-Saharan average of 2%, the combined effects of poverty, population growth, conflict, and climate change have led to a recent growth in international migration. Women make up half of these flows. Proximity to the Middle East has facilitated women’s migration for domestic work while simultaneously raised concern over human trafficking violations. International Human Rights and anti-trafficking organisations predict that the negative effects of climate change will increase the vulnerability to trafficking in persons, forced labour, sexual exploitation, and debt bondage. This policy brief draws on research carried out under the auspices of the collaborative ‘Governing Climate Migration’ (GCM) research programme to further explore how climate change, migration and human trafficking may interlink. It questions routine applications of the human trafficking label to irregular Ethiopian migrant domestic workers and suggests replacing it with a migration-trafficking continuum approach that takes life before, during and after migration into account.Climate change and migrationWhile no conclusive evidence regarding the influence of climate change on the magnitude, direction and gender composition of Ethiopian migration can be found, findings indicate that local employment opportunities primarily facilitate men’s seasonal and/or temporary internal migration in response to climate change impacts. A critical lack of local pathways for women makes migration to the Middle East a reasonable adaptive and capability-enhancing strategy. The newly established industrial parks seem to have little effect on halting migration, primarily due to low wages.Numbers and ways of travelEthiopia is one of the main suppliers of domestic workers to the Gulf and Middle East. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, some 30,000 women left Ethiopia for the Middle East every year. This number has risen steadily over the years, not least through bilateral agreements made between the Ethiopian government and individual states. Recent estimates vary. Around 750,000 Ethiopian workers were believed to reside in Saudi Arabia in 2022, and another 200,000 in Lebanon. Other countries in the region have also attracted Ethiopian domestic workers. In response to domestic pressure to protect migrant workers and international pressure to halt irregular migration, the Ethiopian government imposed a ban on domestic workers moving overseas in 2013, which it subsequently revoked and replaced with the Overseas Employment Proclamations amid attempts to regulate recruitment and employment agencies in 2018. An unintended consequence of the ban was a rise in irregular travel arrangements, both during and after the implementation of the ban. At present, more than half of Ethiopian domestic workers abroad have irregular status. Travels organized by recruitment and employment agencies tend to be by air and are therefore considered less risky than over land and sea. When regulated by bilateral agreements, they supposedly include legal protections. When traveling over land, human smugglers may be involved, but migrant women tend to rely on family networks and trusted community brokers. Findings indicate a wide range in travel assistance arrangements and costs, the latter ranging from 10,000 ETB (approximately 185 USD) in Amhara regional state to 60-70,000 ETB in Oromia regional state. Respondents evoked cases of deceit, confinement and extra pay along the route. Many nevertheless referred to the assistance obtained as a necessary protective measure when traveling irregularly. Working conditions abroad Jordan, Lebanon, and all Arab Gulf States (except Iraq and since 2018 Qatar) regulate migrant residency and employment through a sponsorship system known as kafala. The system connects foreign workers with specific employers and outlines their relationship. A local citizen must sponsor any foreign worker for their residency and work visa to be valid. Sponsors are supposed to cover the travel and living expenses of their workers, as well as health insurance. A lack of regulation and protection of migrant workers’ rights, as well as restrictions on changing employers, have historically made domestic workers vulnerable to exploitation. The system is currently under revision in several states. Gruelling working conditions and incidents of abuse abound. Hardship is more pronounced among recent arrivers due to language difficulties and limited knowledge of the content of the work and ways of carrying it out. But women also find ways of altering their working conditions, either by changing employers or by moving from employment as live-in domestic workers to working by the hour, the latter arrangement involving a considerable rise in earnings.Human traffickingEthiopia has for years been identified as a country with a burgeoning human trafficking problem in the form of forced adult and child labour and sex, organ harvesting, and domestic servitude. Multiple layers of structural disadvantages rooted in gender inequalities in the family and society are making women and girls more vulnerable to human trafficking. Human Trafficking Human trafficking refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by use of threat, force or other forms of coercion. To qualify as human trafficking, three elements must be present: The act of transferring, transporting, or recruiting a person, by Using the means of threat, coercion, force, deception or abduction to control the person, With the purpose of forced labour, sexual exploitation and slavery.  The US Government office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons has placed Ethiopia on the Tier Two Watch List continuously over the past 20 years, indicating that the Government of Ethiopia – despite progress - does not fully meet the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking within and from the country. The 2022 report criticizes Ethiopian government officials for continuing to conflate human trafficking and migrant smuggling, for insufficient efforts directed at protecting migrant workers abroad, and for inadequate protection services for potential victims of trafficking being returned. GCM findings confirm a widespread conflation of irregular migration with human smuggling and trafficking among public authorities. The politization of the human trafficking label has led national authorities to adopt anti-trafficking legislation without necessarily providing state resources for its implementation. Local job creation and vocational training offices, as well as offices dedicated to promoting the welfare of women, children and youth, often rely on NGO funding for rehabilitation of returned/deported migrants. Donor interests in combating human smuggling and trafficking – rather than local migration-related needs – often determine the funds available. A note of caution Knowledge of human trafficking tends to be based on victim accounts gathered by NGOs and international organisations. The accounts have shown that human trafficking is indeed a serious problem that must be ended. However, empirical studies based on victim accounts, or scoping studies identifying risk factors potentially leading to human trafficking, risk generalizing the idea that all women who travel irregularly fall prey to human traffickers and experience abuse. They also risk turning attention away from national socio-cultural, political and structural factors constituting important risks in women’s lives. First Criminal Complaint In 2022, an Ethiopian woman was the first domestic worker in Lebanon to file a criminal complaint against her employer for illegal confinement, torture, verbal and physical abuse and intimidation over a period of eight years. Beyond economic drivers The structural forces underlying Ethiopian women’s irregular mobility may be better understood as embedded in broader demographic, political and economic transitions occurring across the country.  Migration often occurs at a particular moment in a woman’s life course, for instance when transitioning from adolescence into adulthood. Young girls may be ‘sent off’ by their parents with the aim of supporting those who stay behind; but migration may also be a means to escape an early forced marriage.  Thus, women’s mobility can be part of a household strategy or be influenced by a wish to escape parental or societal control. Ethiopia´s Child Brides Ethiopia is home to 15 million child brides, 6 million of whom are below the age of 15. 40% of young women are married before their 18th birthday. Ethiopian women face disproportionate levels of violence when navigating multiple concurrent transition processes. In some rural areas violence against women and children is prevalent. Up to a third of Ethiopian women are reportedly subjected to intimate partner violence. Living in rural areas, being divorced and being poor are among the main predicters. Consequently, women’s migration can be a way to escape gender-based and intimate partner violence, or a way for poor and/or single mothers to support their children. Conclusion Ethiopian women’s migration is conditioned by a range of interlinked factors, including environmental degradation, poverty, recurrent famine, poor governance, limited social protection provision, political unrest, and vulnerability to domestic violence. Rather than predetermining their mobility as human trafficking, a continuum understanding based on the idea that the point at which tolerable conditions end and human trafficking begins is set where threat, force and coercion are present in recruitment, transfer and labour conditions. At one end of the continuum are women who have been thoroughly deceived about travel and working conditions, are confined to the domestic workplace by the kafala system, fall into debt bondage, and are physically or sexually abused. At the other end are women who operate with some knowledge and agency, and who are not necessarily deceived or mistreated by brokers and employers. Irregular Ethiopian women migrants often move back and forth along the continuum during their migration trajectory. To put their vulnerability into perspective, we need to take their lives before, during and after migration into consideration.

An ongoing power struggle for the position of ambassador at the Afghan embassy in New Delhi underlines India’s diplomatic quandary about the nature of its engagement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has not issued any public statement regarding the dispute between representatives of the previous Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan over who should occupy the post, but reports suggest India has conveyed to both sides that they need to settle their internal issue on their own. However, the fact that the visa of Qadir Shah, the person appointed by the Afghan Taliban as chargé d’affaires in New Delhi, has reportedly expired further complicates the power struggle. If the Indian government decides to extend Shah’s visa, it would interpreted as India’s willingness to accept a Taliban-appointed diplomat in the Afghan embassy in New Delhi. Following its seizure of power in August 2021 after overthrowing the U.S.-backed Ashraf Ghani government, the Taliban regime has been seeking international diplomatic recognition along with Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations. The Taliban regime has so far taken control of more than a dozen missions abroad, but India is yet to have a Taliban-appointed ambassador. In March, the Taliban regime’s spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, revealed that “efforts are underway to take charge of other diplomatic missions abroad. [...] Diplomats of the former government are continuing their activities in coordination with the [Taliban] Foreign Ministry.” Afghan embassies in Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and some other Arab and African countries are now working under Taliban-appointed diplomats. India’s involvement in Afghanistan The security, economic, and humanitarian vacuum left by the withdrawal of American troops has significant implications for India’s interests in Afghanistan. India has always required and worked for a relatively stable Afghanistan free from threats by terrorist groups. Without formally recognizing the Taliban regime, in its many recent official statements India has made clear that it recognizes the reality on the ground. While India has also underscored the need for the Taliban regime to reform its governance in terms of gender and ethnic inclusivity, such normative considerations are unlikely to influence the substance of the India-Taliban relationship insofar as they do not essentially affect regional stability. India has no history of military intervention or political interference in Afghanistan and New Delhi has focused on forging people-to-people connections and projecting soft power. That is why, despite setbacks due to the hasty exit of U.S. forces, India continues to maintain goodwill among ordinary Afghans and perhaps even a section of the Taliban leadership (such as Abbas Stanikzai, the Taliban’s deputy foreign minister, who is believed to have a soft spot for India). Next to the U.S., India was Afghanistan’s principal regional source of development assistance since the Taliban’s ouster in 2001. In fact, India’s engagement with Afghanistan offers a compelling example of the use of soft power. Beyond its geostrategic motives, New Delhi was determined to bolster Kabul to ensure that a radical Islamist regime beholden to Pakistan’s security establishment did not gain a foothold in the region. That India and the Taliban-led Afghanistan have gradually drawn together to the extent that they have is an example of pragmatism in foreign policy making at its best. For India, it makes sense to try to give some reason, in the form of diplomatic exchanges and developmental assistance, for the Taliban not to permit the export of terrorism from Afghan soil. For the Taliban, notwithstanding their ideological rigidity domestically, the dire need for development assistance means maintaining silence on India’s policies on the Kashmir Valley, which is predominantly Muslim.  The Taliban have sought India’s assistance in rebuilding their country. For a regime that has been diplomatically and financially isolated, its normal relationship with India also holds much pragmatic appeal, given New Delhi’s growing geopolitical influence and longstanding interest in accessing Central Asian markets via Afghanistan. New Delhi expands its presence and engagement In June last year, New Delhi decided to deploy a “technical team” at the Indian embassy in Kabul to re-establish its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan for the first time since the Taliban takeover. And soon after, when India delivered a consignment of medical supplies to Afghanistan as part of its humanitarian assistance, India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, characterized India as “a true first responder” in Afghanistan. India’s move to expand its diplomatic presence is also driven by a desire to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts. In order to avert a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, India supplied 40,000 metric tons (MT) of wheat overland via Pakistan in February 2022 and an additional 20,000 MT via Iran’s Chabahar port in March 2023 to be distributed through the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP), along with 45 tons of medical assistance in October 2022, including essential life-saving medicines, anti-TB medicines, 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines, winter clothing, and tons of disaster relief material, among other supplies. In addition, India’s union budget for 2023-24 also made a special provision for a $25 million development aid package for Afghanistan, which has been welcomed by the Taliban. The Taliban have reportedly requested that India finish about 20 incomplete infrastructure development projects across the country. In April, during the signing of a memorandum of understanding with India for the dispatch of an additional 10,000 MT of wheat, the WFP assured India that it has the necessary infrastructure on the ground to quickly deliver the wheat to the most needy sections of the Afghan population. Recently, the MEA, under the aegis of the India Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC), invited Afghan government officials to attend a four-day virtual course on Indian legislation and business climate. In principle, India’s outreach to the Taliban is also conducive to achieving its counterterrorism objectives. However, there is a risk of over-expectation on the part of New Delhi that the Taliban would crack down on anti-India terrorists, as well as indications that the Taliban regime continues to maintain its deep links with Pakistan’s security establishment. It has been suggested by National Defense University Professor Hassan Abbas in his recently published book, The Return of the Taliban, that the Taliban regime consulted the Pakistani military before allowing India to reestablish its diplomatic presence in Kabul in June 2022. The Taliban’s ideological constraints India-Taliban relations could be hampered by the Taliban’s internal ideological positions, which the group has clung to rigidly even at the expense of its efforts to secure international recognition. The Taliban regime banned girls from educational institutions and prevented women from working in most fields of employment, including at non-governmental organizations. Women have also been ordered to cover themselves in public and are barred from many entertainment and sports venues. External pressure, including the imposition of sanctions, has not done much to convince the rigid hardliners within the Taliban regime to change their direction on human rights, gender equality, or ethnic representation in governance. This suggests that there are limits to what India can achieve through its interactions with the Taliban. The risks for India are heightened because some Pakistan-based terrorist groups would likely criticize the Taliban regime for seeking closer ties with India. Moreover, were Kabul’s cooperation with New Delhi to pose a threat to the Taliban’s own internal ideological legitimacy, this would also serve as a check on efforts to normalize relations. Regional dynamics and prospects for cooperation The Taliban regime is enthusiastically courting other regional powers as well, such as China, Russia, and Iran, each of which has its own regional interests. For instance, in contrast to India’s passive role and limited footprint in Afghanistan, China has been expanding its diplomatic and economic presence in the country. Recently, China discussed with the Taliban regime how to bring Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to boost investment in the crisis-hit country, while also pressing Kabul to deliver on its regional and international commitments to counter terror. In January of this year, Beijing signed a 25-year contract to extract oil from the Afghan Amu Darya Basin and is also negotiating other lucrative commercial deals with the Taliban regime. Central Asia has often been seen as a test case for Indian leadership. It is in Afghanistan that India has taken a notably more proactive approach to driving regional cooperation through connectivity initiatives. India has also used the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) platform for this purpose. With inclusion of Iran this year, membership in the Eurasian political, economic, and security organization now includes all of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors with the exception of Turkmenistan. Early this month in Goa, India, the foreign ministers of SCO countries called for the establishment of a representative government in Afghanistan as well as the protection of women’s rights. Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar remarked, “Our immediate priorities include providing humanitarian assistance, ensuring a truly inclusive and representative government, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and preserving the rights of women, children, and minorities.” While the SCO might appear a viable platform for regional cooperation, there are certain limits to its effectiveness in dealing with Afghanistan due to the divergent political and security interests of some SCO members, particularly India and Pakistan. Moreover, given Russia’s reduced international stature and Beijing’s growing leverage over Moscow due to its brutal war against Ukraine, the SCO is now a China-led organization. China is a key participant in many important regional forums where Afghanistan remains a core security concern. Since India has a very uneasy relationship with China and supports U.S.-led geopolitical initiatives, primarily the Quadrilateral Security Initiative or Quad (comprising India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia), to counter China, there are practical constraints to what India can achieve through the SCO.   While the Taliban have not yet shown the traits required for recognition as a legitimate political organization responsible for governing Afghanistan, the non-recognition of their regime should not worsen the suffering of the Afghan people. India has a clear interest in a stable and well-governed Afghanistan, not least to prevent spillover into Kashmir. For now, India’s policy toward Afghanistan remains focused on building pragmatic, if not cooperative, relations with the Taliban. India is engaging the regime on its own terms and continues to highlight its commitment to Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities and women. India is equally careful that its interactions should not be viewed as a diplomatic embrace of the Taliban or its acceptance of their repugnant governance model.