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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In January 2002, the city of Goma, located in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, lay in ruins. The cause was not the Great African War,[1] which had been ravaging the country for several years. The war’s first rebellion had, in fact, started here in August 1998, when Banyamulenge-Tutsi fighters, led by a former ally of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila and backed by Rwanda (where Paul Kagame has ruled since the 1994 genocide), seized control of much of Congo’s resource-rich northeast. By early 2002, tensions were mounting between Rwanda and the Congolese Banyamulenge, while peace talks, facilitated by South Africa, were finally on the horizon. In January 2002, Goma—a city on Lake Kivu’s northern shore, at the foot of the Virunga Mountains—was still in rebel hands. But it also sat just 14 kilometers away from Nyiragongo, a volcano whose lava, low in silicates, moves fast—up to 100 km/h during an eruption. When Nyiragongo erupted, it took just hours for the lava to reach the city center, displacing over a million people and pushing the region toward yet another humanitarian disaster. The region teetered on the brink of it—yet again. Fast forward to January 2025, Goma once again made global headlines. This time, it was not because of a volcano, though the city’s situation did not look too different at first glance. On January 25–26, the M23 rebel group—born in 2012, partly from the remnants of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) that rebelled in 1998—launched a major offensive in North Kivu. Within days, they captured key locations in and around Goma, including Mount Goma, the airport and the TV station, though the city remained contested. The rebels also seized the nearby towns of Saké and Minova—both crucial for Goma’s supply lines—and started advancing into South Kivu, toward Bukavu, the provincial capital, and Nyabibwe, a key tin-mining site. Clashes led to a fire at Munzenze prison, allowing some 3,000 inmates to escape, adding to the chaos not only in the country’s northeast but also in the capital. On Tuesday, January 28, frustration over international inaction spilled onto the streets of Kinshasa, where mobs targeted embassies, including those of the U.S. and France. Any hope for de-escalation between the DRC and Rwanda now seems all but shattered: borders and embassies are shut, and most openly accuse Kigali of backing M23. Meanwhile, Rwanda remains under the firm grip of Paul Kagame, who was reelected in July 2024 for a fourth term with 99.15% of the vote—an election whose legitimacy, notably, did not raise many eyebrows in the West. Meanwhile, in Goma, early estimates suggest that one in five residents—out of a population of two million—has been forced to flee their homes, even before the conflict reached the current level of intensity. There is no electricity, and shortages of water, food and fuel are worsening, while UN humanitarian efforts appear to be scaling down rather than ramping up. Roots of the conflict The escalation in eastern DRC began long before alarming headlines started appearing in the media. But how far back do we go? Options are open and include: • 2022, when tensions steadily rose as M23 expanded its territorial control in eastern DRC;• 2021, when M23 resurfaced after its military defeat in 2013;• 2012, when M23 first emerged, reached its peak capturing Goma;• The Second Congo War (1998–2003), or even further back to the colonial era, when the ethnic dynamics that now fuel the conflict first took shape to complicate the current events. At this point, one might ask: who are the Banyamulenge and why are they closely linked to Rwanda? The answer lies in the history of the Lake Kivu region, home to multiple ethnic groups. Many of these groups can be classified under the broader linguistic umbrella of Kinyarwanda speakers—meaning they speak different variations of the same language and live not only in Kivu but also in Rwanda. Their core identity lies in ethnic categories such as Hutu, Tutsi or the lesser-known Twa. However, many other ethnic groups in eastern DRC do not see Kinyarwanda as autochthonous (indigenous), which fuels tensions and conflicts, both socially and politically. In response, Kinyarwanda-speaking communities have emphasized their Congolese, rather than Rwandan, identity by adopting local geographic names instead of ethnic labels. That is why we hear terms like Banyabwisha, Banyamasisi and Banyamulenge. Banyamulenge literally means “people from Mulenge,” a highland plateau in what is now South Kivu province. The issue of indigenous status is far from theoretical. On a practical level, perceptions of who is autochthonous and who is not dictate access to land, resources, and political rights and influence. And since power dynamics between ethnic groups in the region are constantly shifting—along with the broader political landscape in the country—so too are identity categories based on autochthony. For instance, the Hutu population in Goma often considers itself more “native” than the Tutsi. One reason for this is that Hutu and Tutsi were arriving in eastern DRC at different points in history: • The earliest waves of migration reached Kivu before the arrival of European colonizers (Germans and Belgians).• The second wave was engineered by colonial authorities, who sought loyal local administrators (such as the Banyamulenge) and a larger labor force for their plantation economy—since Kivu did not have enough workers.• Between 1959 and 1963, Rwanda was shaken by the “Wind of Destruction”—a revolution that overturned Belgian-backed Tutsi rule in Rwanda–Urundi and brought the Hutu to power in an independent republic. Thousands of Tutsis fled, settling in Kivu, where they became known as the “fifty-niners.”• Finally, after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when Hutu extremists turned their weapons against the Tutsi, the “defeated” Hutu (Banyarwanda) fled to eastern Congo, adding yet another layer of instability to the region. Over time, Congolese authorities treated different “waves of migrants from Rwanda” differently, adjusting their policies to fit the political expediency. They repeatedly changed citizenship laws, granting or stripping Kinyarwanda speakers of political rights. For example, a new law established 1885 as the official “cut-off date” for autochthony, effectively denying voting rights to most of the Banyamulenge—a decision that was enforced during the 1982 and 1987 elections. Unsurprisingly, this political and social exclusion created (and continues to create) fertile ground for mobilization and conflict under various pretexts. In the 1990s, for instance, many Congolese Tutsi, whose ambiguous citizenship status left them disconnected from Congo, joined Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took control of northern Rwanda and later ended the genocide by capturing Kigali. A few years later, the Banyamulenge threw their support behind Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), which helped Rwanda’s new government partially “resolve the issue” of Hutu refugees who had fled to Congo. After fleeing Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, many Hutu militants eventually rebranded themselves into the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The presence of both Hutu and Tutsi armed groups in eastern Congo effectively transplanted Rwanda’s ethnic conflict across the border. And both the Congolese and Rwandan governments found ways to manipulate this struggle to serve their own interests. This historical context is important to highlight the complex and often contradictory dynamics among the seemingly related ethnic groups living around Lake Kivu. The various ethnic communities in the area are fractured by competing interests, historical grievances and shifting alliances, with numerous armed factions operating on the ground. While Kinshasa and Kigali may view them as proxies, they fall short of full control over these groups, whose actions are often dictated by immediate gains and local rather than regional political interests. The Volcanic Republic On the other side of the border, in Rwanda, the notion of autochthony carries a different significance. Many Rwandans believe that a split of the Banyarwanda (“people from Rwanda” as opposed to Kinyarwanda, “people speaking Rwandese”) between two countries was a colonial construct, imposed by European powers, suggesting that borders in the region are quite artificial. A more extreme version of this narrative argues that Rwanda was historically much larger: “From a vast country that covered swathes of eastern Congo, southern Uganda and north-western Tanganyika, Rwanda became the tiny hill of Central Africa,” a perspective echoed by Rwanda’s formal President Pasteur Bizimungu in 1996. But this is more myth than reality as this claim oversimplifies history and ignores ethnic distinctions. More importantly, it fails to acknowledge that eastern Congo was never under a sustained Rwandan rule—neither before nor after colonization. Still, the idea of a “Greater Rwanda” breeds and fuels certain revanchist sentiments in some corners of Rwanda’s leadership. That is why many Congolese believe Rwanda is trying to carve out a “Volcanic Republic” (République des Volcans) in Kivu—a proxy state that would give it direct access to the region’s vast natural resources. Rebel leaders themselves reinforce these fears. For instance, Laurent Nkunda, leader of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)—a faction that split from the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) that rebelled in 1998 and maintains strong ties to Rwanda through Banyamulenge–Tutsi networks—argued: “If there had been no colonization, and thus the creation of totally new and artificial territorial entities in Africa, today’s Congo would never have existed for sure; but Bwisha would certainly be here as a transvolcanic province of ancient Rwanda.” Ultimately, this has for a long time contributed to both inter- and intra-ethnic tensions in the region, with shifting political, territorial or even personal allegiances of the groups. Who are the M23? To answer this question, we must once again trace the evolution of rebel groups in eastern DRC. During the First Congo War (1996–1997), Tutsi rebels, under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila[2] and with open support from Rwanda and Uganda, succeeded in toppling Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled since 1965 with support from the West. As the Cold War ended, Mobutu had outlived his usefulness by the 1990s, allowing Laurent-Désiré Kabila to take power. The problem was that many in Congo viewed Kabila as a Rwandan pawn. When he tried to shake off Kigali’s influence, the Second Congo War erupted (see above). Rwanda (and partly Uganda) responded by backing a new rebel group—the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)—which included Tutsi fighters. But when the war stalled, in part due to SADC’s military intervention led by South Africa, the RCD splintered. Its most powerful faction—RCD-Goma—held onto North and South Kivu, although Rwanda’s military remained the true power behind the scenes. In 2002, the Sun City Accords allowed Joseph, Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s son, to stay in power while granting RCD-Goma and the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), operating in northern Congo, formal status as legitimate political actors. As part of the deal, Rwandan and Ugandan troops withdrew from the DRC. By 2006, Joseph Kabila sought to consolidate his rule, but his 2007 election victory triggered clashes in Kinshasa with the MLC and a fresh Tutsi-led uprising in the east. This time, it was the Tutsi-dominated National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a faction that grew out of RCD-Goma. Neither Congolese troops nor UN peacekeepers could stop the CNDP’s advance. The rebels seized control of key mines and supply routes, though they ultimately failed to capture Goma—largely due to their lack of legitimacy and support locally. However, after a peace agreement reached between Kinshasa and the CNDP on March 23, 2009, the Congress formally transformed into a political party, while Joseph Kabila remained in power. In 2011, the CNDP suffered a crushing defeat in parliamentary elections, while Kabila retained the presidency, even as virtually all support for him in the east collapsed. Trying to preempt another rebellion, he decided to redeploy former CNDP fighters, who had by then been “integrated” into the Congolese army, away from the east. At the same time, he moved to arrest their leader, Bosco Ntaganda[3], who had been wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2006. This strategy backfired, triggering a new rebellion and the birth of M23, named after the peace deal of 2009, which they claimed Kinshasa had violated. M23 started out small (around 300 fighters in April 2012) compared to its predecessor, the CNDP, it quickly followed in its footsteps and even captured Goma in November 2012. However, this was a step too far for the international community, which quickly mobilized efforts to crush M23 militarily. By 2013, the group had suffered an irreversible defeat—or so it seemed at the time. Paradoxically, however, it was not military pressure alone that led to M23’s downfall. After years of continuous conflict, the rebel leaders—who had transitioned from the RCD to the CNDP and then to M23—had lost much of their political credibility. While they claimed to defend the interests of Congolese Tutsis and protect them from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—a Hutu militia hostile to Tutsis and Kigali—in reality, their real struggle was internal as they competed for power among themselves (M23 changed leadership just one month into the rebellion) and became ever more dependent on Rwanda’s direct military support, which further eroded their local legitimacy and claims to autochthony. Their rhetoric was highly populist, filled with calls for a nationwide revolution, but it failed to address the real concerns of Congolese Tutsis. Military control never translated into political support. By 2013, they were isolated and crushed. The remnants of M23 retreated over the border into Rwanda. With M23 collapsing, its factions splintered into local militias, losing any ideological pretence but continuing to operate along ethnic and materialist lines. The presence of a growing number of armed factions in eastern Congo as well as their constant fracturing is one of the reasons why the conflict has such a complex mosaic to it. Adding to the complexity are the Wazalendo (“patriots” in Swahili)—quasi-governmental militias, some of whom originated from the old Mai-Mai militias that once fought the CNDP. While they may oppose M23, they are far from a unified front. Instead, they operate independently, often pursuing economic interests not too dissimilar from those of M23 and expanding their political clout at the local level. Some of their leaders, too, have been hit with international sanctions. Rather than trying to rein the Wazalendo in, the government in Kinshasa has tolerated their presence, effectively militarizing governance in the country’s east—preferring to co-opt their influence rather than risk another line of conflict. When Goma fell in 2012, it forced the DRC government into something it is now desperate to avoid: direct negotiations with M23. The Kampala Dialogue dragged on for about a year, but it was hardly a real political process. By the time an agreement was reached—where M23 renounced rebellion and agreed to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate—the group had already been militarily defeated and was no longer a real negotiating force, nor was it a pollical actor. The retreat of M23’s remnants into Rwanda only reinforced Kinshasa’s stance: there was no point in talking to a fractured and disorganized rebel group with no clear political vision. If any real negotiations were needed, they had to be with Rwanda, not M23. The group’s main goal had always been controlling the resources and getting the rent—for its leaders, this was about profits, not politics. Even for ordinary M23 fighters, ideology often took a backseat to personal loyalty toward commanders they had known since the CNDP days or before. Volcanoes and minerals In May 2021, Nyiragongo erupted again. While this was just a coincidence, by November 2021, M23 had risen “from the ashes.” Crossing over from Rwanda, they returned to North Kivu, just as they had in 2012, and began their operations in Rutshuru—a town 30 kilometers from Rwanda, home to both Tutsis and Hutus (many of whom had settled there after the Rwandan genocide). Controlling Rutshuru is rather lucrative, as the region holds one of the world’s largest deposits of pyrochlore (a niobium oxide essential for electronics, aerospace, defense and other industries) as well as several gold mines. Without diving into the complex web of connections, it is worth noting that niobium/tantalum became Rwanda’s fifth-largest export in 2022—making it the ninth-largest exporter globally (accounting for 3.35% of global exports and surpassing the DRC’s less than 2%). Thanks to volcanic activity, the provinces on Lake Kivu are especially rich in highly sought-after minerals. North Kivu alone holds deposits of tantalum, cassiterite, cobalt, tungsten, gold, diamonds, tourmalines and pyrochlore. The problem, however, is that mining here is anything but transparent. Most extraction is artisanal, lacking proper environmental, safety or any oversight. The world’s growing demand for critical minerals is only making things worse in eastern DRC. The country relies on mining for 35–40% of its government revenue, and the mining sector is a key pillar of economic growth. However, agreements with Kinshasa do not always guarantee real access to resources. Even within a single province, competing power structures—provincial politicians, the Congolese military, local armed groups, and rebels proxy-linked to the neighbour country—can all contest control over mining sites. Rather than declining, illicit mineral exports—regardless of how they flow—have only increased in recent years, as global demand for these minerals surges and more competition kicks in. Eastern DRC has an estimated 2,500 mining sites—each one sustaining local armed groups and ensuring that the cycle of conflict remains unbroken. Since 2021, the EU and the U.S. have taken a much more proactive stance on critical minerals as new policies were introduced, partnerships with countries like the DRC and Rwanda have been strengthened, and steps have been taken to secure supply chains for critical raw materials while also developing a joint procurement platform. Around the same time, M23 made its comeback. While no direct causal link can be established, it can be suggested that close ties between the West and Rwanda have at the very least given Kigali the confidence to act without major international backlash. It is also probable that Rwanda indirectly controls eastern DRC’s resources through M23, since the group’s successes heavily depend on Rwandan military and logistical support. If these assumptions are correct, Western powers may well see Rwanda as a more reliable and predictable partner—one that could secure their resource interests in the region, something Kinshasa has failed to do for years due to its geographical and political detachment from the conflict zone. However, the situation is more complex than it seems. As M23 expands the territory under its control, it is not just gaining land—it is also increasing its ability to tax local populations. In late 2023, estimates suggested that M23 was collecting around $69,500 per month through various forms of taxation. This steady cash flow, combined with subsistence farming and local trade, actually sustains M23’s daily operations far more than mineral resources do. Extracting value from minerals is a slow, complex and difficult-to-control process, making it a less immediate source of funding for the rebels. So, while minerals are undeniably a catalyst for conflict and something that attracts both regional and global players, they are not the main factor keeping M23 alive. It would be a mistake to view it as the sole driving force behind instability. Even if access to resource extraction were cut off, M23 would still find ways to profit from controlling eastern DRC—which means the conflict in eastern DRC will persist regardless of changes in the resource trade. Why is the conflict exploding now? After its resurgence, M23 has been playing a long game, slowly building momentum for a decisive push. Until the right conditions were in place, they pushed forward assertively but carefully—avoiding an escalation that could bring the same level of international scrutiny as in 2012–2013, when it led to their defeat. In May 2022, M23 tested the waters near Goma but was repelled by the Congolese army and UN peacekeepers. A month later, in June, they triggered a “small-scale” humanitarian crisis at Uganda’s border by seizing the town of Bunagana, forcing thousands to flee—including Congolese soldiers. This move allowed them to control trade routes between Uganda and the DRC, giving them a stronger foothold. By February 2023, they had captured Mushaki and Rubaya, securing control over mines that produce nearly half of the DRC’s coltan output. And the more territory they controlled, the stronger their ranks grew. Meanwhile, there were several failed attempts at diplomacy. In April 2022, the Congolese government agreed to direct talks with several rebel groups in Nairobi, but nothing came of them. In July 2022, Angola attempted to broker a ceasefire, but violations by both sides rendered it ineffective. March 2023 saw new peace agreements, but these quickly collapsed, too. By December 2023, negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda had failed, further escalating tensions in Kivu. At the same time, public frustration with the perceived inaction of UN peacekeepers reached a boiling point. In August 2022, protests erupted in Goma and surrounding areas, targeting MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission deployed since 1999, by far the most costly in UN history. That same month, the East African Community (EAC) deployed a regional task force, but it was stationed in South Kivu rather than North Kivu, where the crisis was most acute. Their presence often led to M23 not being fully removed, but simply repositioning and sometimes coexisting with peacekeepers, as seen in Bunagana. Many locals viewed troops from Burundi and Kenya as little different from the “occupiers” from M23. In the end, the Congolese government demanded the withdrawal of the EAC contingent by December 2023. That same month, after repeated appeals from DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to withdraw MONUSCO from South Kivu and scale down its activities in other provinces. By the end of 2024, the mission was set to be fully dismantled. For M23, this was the perfect storm. The failures of international peacekeeping efforts, along with the stagnation and futility of negotiations—regardless of the mediators or external pressures on Rwanda and the DRC—ultimately played into M23’s hands. Though internal divisions persisted within the group, they understood that their window of opportunity was approaching. The arrival of SADC peacekeepers—who replaced the EAC forces—did little to change things. South Africa, the largest contributor, has been unwilling to fully commit. Public opinion largely views the casualties among South African troops as unjustifiable, while the country’s military is perceivably lacking the necessary preparedness for operations of such complexity, as is the case for eastern Congo. Throughout 2024, M23 laid all the groundwork to make their rapid advance on Goma possible in January 2025. In February 2024, they seized Shasha, a critical choke point controlling access to Goma’s supply routes. Around the same time, they came close to capturing Saké, which they fully took over in 2025—though sporadic shelling never ceased. By May 2024, half of Masisi Territory was under their control. Looking at the maps tracking M23’s territorial expansion compared to their 2012 peak when they first took Goma, it becomes painfully clear: their march toward Goma was never a question of ‘if’—only ‘when.’ Source: IPIS It appears that M23—and quite so Rwanda—have learned critical lessons from their 2013 defeat. Back then, as previously noted, the movement lacked both a political leader and a clear agenda, aside from an empty call for revolution across the DRC. Now, however, a major political figure has entered the scene: Corneille Nangaa has arrived in Goma, now under M23’s control. Formerly the head of the DRC’s National Electoral Commission, he was the one who validated Félix Tshisekedi’s contested victory in the 2018 elections. However, by 2023, tensions with Tshisekedi escalated, leading Nangaa to break ranks and align himself with M23. For the movement, he represents their first national-level political figure, unaffiliated with the Tutsi. Moreover, Nangaa has his own vision for the conflict: “In Congo, we have a non-state. Where all the armed groups have sprung up, it's because there’s no state. We want to recreate the state.” This suggests that the endgame for the current iteration of the conflict could be about securing political power in Kinshasa. This, in turn, echoes the dynamics of the First Congo War. Meanwhile, international mediators continue to flounder. Turkey has been dismissed, Angola’s peace talks have gone nowhere, South Africa has suffered reputational damage that led to tensions with Rwanda, and France’s shuttle diplomacy has achieved little. The EAC and SADC emergency summits continue, but this all with little coordination or tangible impact—each actor is seemingly pursuing their own interests, hoping for a chance of breakthrough. In stark contrast, M23 has moved with confidence and clarity, seeking solid control over eastern DRC and now willing to install an ally (at least) in Kinshasa.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It was to be expected, and we were poorly prepared for it, Donald Trump’s phone call to Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly ended 75 years of transatlantic relations. We, the French, had long warned that our security interests with the United States were not always aligned and that these differences could lead to serious disputes. There was the Suez Canal in 1956, there was Iraq in 2003, and there was, in a more moderate sense, Macron’s brain-dead stance on a dispute arising from Turkey’s actions in Syria in 2019. From now on, there will be February 12, 2025. But today, the situation is more serious because it is the security of Europe itself that is at stake, the very security that forms the heart of the existence of the Atlantic alliance. One can understand that the war in Ukraine is unwinnable and that a solution must be found to stop this war. One can understand that Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a red line for Russia. One can also understand that the United States wants Europeans to take a more significant share of the burden of their defence. However, the problem is that the United States made Ukraine’s NATO membership a goal of the Atlantic alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, against the advice of France and Germany at the time, thus worsening a relationship with Russia that was already deteriorating. The problem also is that Trump wants to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia without inviting the European Union and other European countries to the negotiating table, while Europe’s security is at stake. The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe’s conventional security, as US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to give security guarantees to Ukraine and completely discredit themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have shown that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe’s security.Or they provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the cost of a financial burden that will affect the European Union’s competitiveness in the long term.In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. This solution, however, seems outdated given the new context. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), it is better for Europeans to fully take on Europe’s security. This would mean taking control of NATO: Europeans must quickly discuss this option and communicate their decision to Secretary General Mark Rutte. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Germany’s presumptive new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, faces challenges both at home and overseas following his conservative alliance’s election victory on Feb. 23, 2025. A strong showing from the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) – which Merz, in line with other mainstream German parties, refuses to countenance as a coalition party as part of an unofficial “firewall” against extremism – will make forming a functioning government tricky. But in the moments after the election results, it was the future of the European Union and its relationship with America that was his immediate focus: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” To understand why that is such a concern for Germany now and what “real independence” from Washington means, The Conversation U.S. turned to Garret Martin, an expert on U.S.-Europe relations at American University, for answers. What prompted Merz’s ‘real independence’ line? Presumably it was a response to a series of recent announcements and actions by the Trump administration that have shocked the German political establishment. This includes the sudden revelation that the U.S. would negotiate directly with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, but seemingly without the Europeans or Ukrainians involved. That development went down like a lead balloon in Berlin, especially considering Germany’s significant financial support of Kyiv since 2022. Moreover, the German establishment has also frowned at a series of recent declarations by members of the Trump administration. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he harshly criticized Europe for allegedly undermining freedom of expression, provoked clear pushback from German leaders. Trump, for his part, hardly endeared himself to his German allies when he denounced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator.” And, of course, Elon Musk’s interference in the German elections – as well as his open support for the far-right Alternative for Germany – provoked a fierce response from Merz. The then-candidate promised that Musk would need to be prepared for legal consequences for his meddling. How would this ‘real independence’ be achieved? Defining what “real independence” means and being able to implement such a drastic change in transatlantic relations will be a tall order. If by “real independence” Merz means that Germany would no longer rely on the U.S. for its security, then that would require several major steps. Merz would first need to convince his likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, that this is the right goal. After all, German governments are bound by very detailed coalition agreements. Second, Merz would need to significantly increase German defense spending. As it stands, Germany’s annual defense budget is slightly over US$90 billion, or 2% of its GDP. But a recent study by the economic think tank Bruegel suggests Berlin would need to increase its budget by $145 billion annually to defend Europe without the assistance of the U.S. But to achieve this, Merz will likely need to increase defense spending by such a level that it will contravene the country’s “debt brake.” This 2009 constitutional rule essentially caps the annual deficit that the government can take on. But overturning this mechanism would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the German Parliament. Merz’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union party won 28.6% of the vote – and even with the support of the country’s main center-left party, the Social Democrats, Merz will fall short of the parliamentary votes needed. Finally, “real independence” would also require convincing other European Union partners to join him down that path. Assuming that the Trump administration continues its current trajectory and further undermines NATO, the EU would have to step in to become a more prominent security actor for the continent. It might also require, as Merz hinted, that the United Kingdom and France be ready to share their nuclear weapons, since the U.S. may not be trusted anymore to defend NATO countries. All of these steps would cover “real independence” only in the security sphere and not touch other crucial policy areas, such as trade and energy. And that would be an equally tall order given the level of economic ties binding Germany to the U.S., as well as the looming threat of tariffs. What does this mean for German-US relations? Merz’s “real independence” statement would have been noteworthy coming from any German chancellor. But it is even more striking when one considers the fact that Merz is a committed transatlanticist who deeply admires the U.S. and counts Ronald Reagan as one of his role models. At 69, Merz came of age during the final years of the Cold War, when the U.S. played a key role in enabling German reunification. He worked for years for Atlantik-Brücke, a lobbying group pushing for closer transatlantic ties. And he has, by his own account, traveled more than 100 times to the U.S. Independence will not likely mean a complete divorce between the U.S. and Germany – the ties binding the two countries, whether economic, cultural or political, run too deep. However, we can expect that Berlin will not hesitate to take a more combative approach toward Washington when necessary, so to protect German and European interests. As Merz pointed out, it is clear that the Trump administration does “not care much about the fate of Europe.” What does this signal for Merz’s view of Germany’s position in the EU? Merz’s win will certainly lead to important shifts in Germany’s position in the EU, and could be a major boost for a union in need of leadership. His predecessor, Olaf Scholz, was hampered by a weak economy, divisions within his coalition and indecisive leadership in Europe. Moreover, poor relations with French President Emmanuel Macron also stalled the Franco-German partnership, normally a key engine of leadership in the EU. Merz certainly plans to take a very distinct approach toward the EU than his predecessor. His calls for “real independence” will certainly be very welcome in France, which has long called for Europe to be more responsible for its own security. As such, it opens up the possibility of far closer ties between Paris and Berlin than we saw in recent years. Moreover, Merz, with his more hawkish position toward Russia, could be counted on to provide greater support for Ukraine.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The commitment to free trade is based on the competitive advantage that nations gain from possessing certain material and human resources that are scarce in other countries. The exchange of goods under the umbrella of free trade results in a global benefit, as it fosters economic growth, improves the quality of goods, and diversifies supply. The free trade doctrine, which has governed international trade in recent decades, is opposed by protectionism, which seeks to favor domestic producers over foreign competition. Above All, Protectionism Trump's campaign to win votes from the U.S. automotive and agricultural sectors was based on extreme protectionism – which we could call the ‘Trump Doctrine’ – centered on the promise of raising tariffs on products from competing countries. The increase in tariffs to boost domestic production in non-competitive sectors clashes with the rules of the World Trade Organization and the already established trade relations with exporting countries. On the other hand, those who silently suffer from Trump's protectionist measures are American consumers, who will have to pay higher prices for imported products that are currently cheaper. The need to reorganize international trade flows had already been raised due to the existence of ecological, social, or economic dumping. In response to violations of competition rules and the presence of discriminatory situations, agricultural groups have demanded mirror clauses to ensure that imported products comply with the same regulations as domestic ones. However, all these proposals have been made within a negotiating framework and not in a disruptive and unilateral manner, as the Trump Doctrine does. Tariff Increases Specifically, the U.S. has formalized a 25% tariff on steel and aluminum from other countries, set to take effect on March 4. This impacts the Spanish industrial sector, which exports aluminum worth 500 million to the U.S. market. There are still no details on which Spanish agri-food products (such as wine, olive oil, meat, and dairy) may be affected and to what extent by the Trump Doctrine. Latin American countries are also at risk: in 2021, 86% of their agri-food exports were destined for three regions — the U.S. (23%), the EU (18%), and China (13%). The EU and Latin American countries belonging to Mercosur have the advantage of having signed an agreement in December 2024, which will allow them to strengthen their trade relations and potentially offset losses in the U.S. market. In response to these tariff attacks, countries have reacted by attempting to reach agreements among the affected nations. The European Union and Canada have met to design a joint strategy against the Trump Doctrine, and China is also considering reorganizing its trade flows, which could provide some relief for its exports. However, the damage caused by tariffs is global and does not only affect exporting countries. In the United States, there will be negative impacts on consumers and businesses in the form of higher prices and even shortages or the disappearance of some imported products. United States-Europe Trade Relations There is no free trade agreement between Europe and the United States, although an attempt was made, without success, to establish the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). However, progress has been made in harmonizing food safety regulations, quality standards, and data privacy rules. Nevertheless, Trump accuses Europe of "treating the United States very badly" and has warned that they must balance the "$350 billion" trade deficit. In Europe, the most exposed sectors to the threat of U.S. protectionism are aerospace, automotive, and agri-food. The countries at the highest risk include Germany (automotive), France (aerospace), the Netherlands (petrochemical), Italy (pharmaceutical), Ireland (technology), and Spain (agri-food), as they have the most open economies to foreign trade. On the other hand, the United States exports high-tech products, machinery, chemicals, and agricultural goods (corn, soy, meat) to Europe. In the digital sector, major U.S. companies (Amazon, Google, Apple, Meta) are well-positioned in the Old Continent, often engaging in market dominance abuses that the EU has attempted to curb through fines and legislative changes. Spanish exports to the United States focus on automobiles, machinery, and pharmaceutical and agri-food products (wine, olive oil, meat, dairy, and horticultural products). U.S. imports into the Spanish market primarily consist of machinery, electronic products, pharmaceuticals, financial services, and agricultural goods. The U.S. has invested in Spain in the automotive, technology, energy, distribution, and finance sectors. In turn, Spain has a presence in the North American market in the distribution sector (Inditex, Mango), renewable energy (Iberdrola, Acciona, Naturgy), communications, and infrastructure (Ferrovial, ACS, Sacyr). The Technological Battle A fierce competition is emerging in the development of space travel, military technology, and integrated artificial intelligence. In the geopolitical landscape, development cooperation, armed conflicts, climate change, and environmental sustainability are key issues to consider. We have just witnessed how restrictions on the supply of microprocessors stimulated China's creativity in the tech sector. China welcomed the new year with DeepSeek, its own AI model — with similar capabilities to ChatGPT but significantly lower costs — which has shaken the U.S. tech industry and triggered a stock market upheaval. Meanwhile, the EU is now trying to shake off its role as a mere spectator in the development of these new technologies and has just announced a €200 billion investment in the development of European AI. It is important to remember that Europe has been a pioneer in AI legislation, with the Artificial Intelligence Act approved by its Parliament at the end of 2023.  Outlook and Solutions The impact of trade wars depends, on one hand, on the measures imposed (tariff, fiscal, or regulatory) and the volume of existing trade flows. However, the characteristics of the regions, economic sectors, and affected social groups also play a crucial role. In the final countdown, before the implementation of the new tariffs, the United States reached a preliminary agreement with Mexico and Canada, granting a one-month pause before enforcing the announced tariffs. In the case of China, its response to the U.S. threat was to announce similar tariff increases on American products. Among European countries, there are different strategic approaches to the Trump Doctrine. The positions of the Paris-Berlin axis — ready to respond to U.S. tariff threats — and the Rome-Budapest axis are opposed. It remains to be seen whether Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who attended Trump's inauguration on January 20, will act as a mediator between the EU and the U.S. or if she will focus solely on securing a favorable position for Italy. Volatility, Uncertainty, Fluctuations A trade war affects foreign investments and creates volatility in financial markets due to the uncertainty it generates. Additionally, it reduces trade exchanges (imports-exports) and causes fluctuations in currency markets. The dilemma of “restructuring or rejection” posed by the Trump Doctrine involves the option of readjusting the existing order or entering into direct competition. For now, tensions remain high, and The Wall Street Journal, one of the major U.S. media outlets, describes the trade war as “absurd,” “unnecessary,” and “stupid.” The reality is that an atmosphere of international insecurity has been created regarding future investments, and stock markets have suffered losses. Meanwhile, the threatened countries insist they will enforce countermeasures, to which Trump responds by threatening to raise tariffs even further.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Conflict hotspots and democratic instability are the major challenges facing a continent that now everyone in the world wants to partner with. In these, which will be the first articles of the year, we aim to reflect on 2025, a key year to consolidate Africa's growing importance in global geopolitics, a trend that has been evident in the last two years. A key point: we are just days away from the inauguration of an unleashed Donald Trump* in international relations. It will be crucial to observe how he handles his ties with Africa and how African countries react in a world marked by populism, far-right politics, and the decline of multilateral organizations. This weakens global consensus and reduces the prominence of Human Rights in increasingly polarized international debates, marked by disinformation and noise. Today, I will address the main challenges and threats facing the continent, from a more security-oriented perspective, including the main active and potential conflicts. Next week, I will take a more positive approach, focusing on the opportunities, even in this uncertain global scenario. Sudan: The worst humanitarian catastrophe in the least mediated war Sudan is facing the worst humanitarian catastrophe today, with over 150,000 deaths, millions of displaced people and refugees since the civil war began in April 2023. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has left 24 million people facing food insecurity and triggered a cholera outbreak, accounting for 10% of the global humanitarian needs despite representing less than 1% of the world's population. In 2025, the outlook remains bleak. The supply of weapons and fuel by Russia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates fuels the conflict, while the lack of political will between the SAF and RSF blocks any progress toward peace. Without a drastic change in international intervention, Sudan will remain trapped in a cycle of war, hunger, and global neglect. The conflict in Sudan is so complex that it is impossible to clearly define who the aggressors and the victims are, unlike in Ukraine or Palestine. In a world of simplification and misinformation, these complexities are overlooked, which explains why Sudan receives so little attention. Sahel In 2025, Sahel faces growing political instability and jihadist violence. Coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have led to the formation of the Sahel Alliance (AES), an anti-Western military bloc seeking to consolidate its authority. However, it must gain legitimacy both with citizens and international institutions while managing crises in governance, development, and security. In this context, the region's stability and regional influence will depend on its relationship with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (it is expected that in the coming days or weeks, the definitive rupture and exit** of the three countries from this West African economic bloc will be official), the African Union (which is also undergoing elections and renewal of its leaders) and foreign powers. Russia's growing presence, especially through the previously known Wagner Group (now Africa Corps), further complicates the dynamics in the Sahel. Moscow has filled the void left by France's withdrawal and the diminished influence of the EU, offering military support to the juntas in exchange for expanding its geopolitical influence (while also taking large amounts of gold to finance its invasion of Ukraine). However, the activities of Russian soldiers have been linked to human rights abuses, which could exacerbate social tensions and the delegitimization of military governments. It is a complicated moment, with a context of reinforcing the anti-Western narrative in the region (Senegal and Ivory Coast have already joined the call for the French to withdraw their troops from the military bases they still maintain in those countries) while consolidating the military juntas' dependence on external actors, rather than strengthening their state capabilities. The rise of jihadist organizations and the resulting violence remain the biggest security challenge for the region. Factors such as poverty, corruption, and state weakness perpetuate the influence of these groups, which have shown a remarkable ability to adapt and fund themselves through the exploitation of local resources and illicit activities. The withdrawal of international forces has left a security vacuum that not only facilitates the expansion of their territorial and social control but also increases their recruitment capacity, as they become the only option for some young people to find a way to support themselves. We thus have a prolonged Sahel crisis ahead, with all the implications it holds for the migration scenario along the so-called Atlantic Route, now primarily driven by young Malians fleeing the instability caused by jihadism and government breakdown. At the same time, we must remain attentive to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, whose control should be a concern for us. Other conflicts We must not forget that there are other points on the African continent that we must remain constantly alert to. Here, telegraphically, we highlight the main ones: Somalia The humanitarian crisis in Somalia remains one of the most complex in the world, exacerbated by internal conflicts, clan violence, and recurring climate disasters. In 2024, more than 4.5 million people in 20 districts were affected by insecurity and clashes, including over seventy clashes between clans since June, which caused the displacement of nearly 395,000 people. Additionally, military operations against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab and protection incidents related to displacement, which exceeded 11,000 between January and October 2024, are worsening the situation. Climate change has increased the country's vulnerability, with devastating events such as the 2020-2023 drought and the 2023 Deyr floods, which caused damages estimated at $176.1 million in 16 districts. The combination of conflicts and climate crises continues to undermine the country's recovery and development efforts. Democratic Republic of the Congo The DRC faces a critical stage in 2025, marked by the intensification of armed conflicts and severe food insecurity. Tensions in North Kivu, due to the advance of the M23/AFC group, and the increased military presence in provinces such as Maniema and Mai-Ndombe, threaten to cause massive displacement of people. Additionally, the concerning projections from United Nations agencies (FAO and WFP) on acute food insecurity foresee a significant deterioration for the most vulnerable populations in the country. Ethiopia Following the war between the central Ethiopian government and the northern Tigray region, Ethiopia has not yet closed the chapter on active conflicts, as it remains embroiled in a violent internal conflict, this time led by militia groups from the Amhara and Oromia regions. There are also concerns about the return of political hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  —-*Article was written before Trump’s inauguration, which was on January 20, 2025**Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso formally exited ECOWAS on January 29, 2025.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском After weeks of speculation over his future, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced his intention to resign on Jan. 6, 2025. His departure will bring an end to a decade of power for the progressive politician and once-darling of the liberal left. It follows infighting in his own party and a slump in Trudeau’s popularity to the point where he trails the leading opposition candidate by over 20 percentage points. But it can’t escape notice that the resignation comes just weeks ahead of a Trump administration – and after a barrage of personal slights and threats of punishing tariffs directed at Canada by the incoming Republican president. The Conversation turned to Patrick James, an expert on Canadian-U.S. relations and Dean’s Professor Emeritus at USC Dornsife, to explain why Trudeau chose now to bow out – and what role Trump played in his departure. Why did Trudeau resign? The first thing to note is that Trudeau’s resignation is no real surprise to anyone following Canadian politics – the only real surprise is the timing. At its heart, this is a personal political decision; the reality is Trudeau’s party was doomed in the next election – which is due to take place before the end of October 2025. Barring any wild changes between now and the vote, the chances of Trudeau’s Liberal Party winning are as dead as a doornail. The opposition Conservative Party, also known as the Tories, are up in the polls by some 24 points. The Tory leader, Pierre Poilievre, has done a reasonably good job at moderating his image from that of a hard right-winger – narrowing any chance Trudeau had of capturing enough of the center he needed. My best guess is that, faced with this imminent defeat, Trudeau believes getting out now will insulate him and make it more likely that he can return to front-line Canadian politics further down the line, after a period of time in the wilderness. Is such a return likely? While in the U.S. figuratively dead presidents rarely come back to life – with Grover Cleveland and Trump the only ones to return after a reelection loss – in Canada, there is a bit more of a tradition of political resurrection. This stretches back to the country’s first prime minister, John A. MacDonald, who resigned in 1873 amid scandal only to be reelected five years later. William Mackenzie King served three nonconsecutive terms as prime minister in the first half of the 20th century. And Trudeau’s father, Pierre Trudeau, came back after losing the 1979 election to serve a fourth and final term in 1980. But I feel with Justin Trudeau it is different. At this moment in time, his parliamentary career looks beyond rehabilitation. He is deeply unpopular and has enraged many of his loyal lieutenants – with the resignation of longtime ally and Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland in December adding to the pressure on Trudeau to resign. And while inflation – a scourge of left, right and center incumbents the world over – no doubt played a role in Trudeau’s declining popularity, other factors are at play, too. Canadians generally feel that given the cards he was dealt, Trudeau still played a bad hand. Under Trudeau, immigration to Canada increased massively – and many blame this for a housing affordability crisis. More generally, it seems like Trudeau, despite being the relatively young political age of 53, is out of step with politics at this precise moment in time. Trudeau, much like his father before him, is very much associated with identity politics, focusing on the perceived needs of certain groups over others. And while the merits of identity politics can be argued, what is certainly true is that it isn’t particularly popular anywhere in the world right now. Indeed, right-of-center populists such as Trump have been able to make great political capital in painting opponents as identity politicians. How did Trump’s election win affect Trudeau’s prospects? Former Deputy Prime Minister Freeland resigned in part over discontent with the way Trudeau had responded to Trump’s proposed tariffs on Canadian goods. And that discontent with the way Trudeau was dealing with the incoming Trump administration extends to a lot of Canadians, regardless of their political stripes. The Canadian economy isn’t in good shape, and a 25% tariff – as envisioned by Trump – would be disastrous. Canadians are looking for someone who can negotiate with Trump from a position of strength, and that doesn’t appear to be Trudeau. In fact, faced with being trolled and humiliated by Trump – for instance, being referred to as a “governor” rather the leader of a nation – Trudeau has faced criticism for his weak response. He symbolizes a growing sense in Canada that the country is seen by policymakers in Washington as weak. While Trudeau reportedly laughed off a suggestion at Mar-a-Lago that Canada become the “51st state,” back home the remark was seen as a test – would Trudeau stand up for Canada or not? In this sense, Trump’s election provided a challenge to Trudeau but also an opportunity to stand up to Washington – something that would have won him favor among anti-American Canadian nationalists. Instead, he is perceived to have cowered before Trump, further damaging his reputation at home. What will Trudeau’s legacy be in regard to US-Canada relations? I believe he got caught up in a dynamic that has seen a growing perception in the U.S. – as espoused by the incoming president – that Canada is freeloading militarily off its southern neighbor. President Joe Biden is more aligned politically with Trudeau, but, certainly under Trump’s first term, the Canadian prime minister was seen by Washington as one of the NATO leaders not paying a fair share for the military alliance. Partly as a result, Canada under Trudeau has dropped down the list of trusted allies – especially among Republicans. If you asked Americans to name Washington’s most trusted ally, the United Kingdom or Israel would likely beat out Canada. Trump’s statements since being reelected suggest that he sees Canada as less an ally and as more of an irrelevance. Comments regarding the buying of Greenland point at Trump’s desire to run roughshod over the desire of other nations in order to be more active in the Arctic – something that should have raised alarms in Canada. So, in short, you can characterize Trudeau’s relationship with the U.S. as OK under Biden, bad under Trump’s first administration and – potentially – irrelevant under Trump II. What happens next in Canadian politics? I see one of two things happening. The most likely scenario is that the Conservatives will win an election that could take place any time between March and October. Current polling suggests they are on course of winning over 50% of the vote. If that happens, we can expect a Canadian government much more aligned with that of the incoming U.S. administration – with a more centralist foreign policy and border reforms that will tighten immigration controls. And the timing may provide an opportunity for Trudeau’s successor to start afresh with Trump and forge a relationship that is either stronger or, alternatively, to reassert a degree of Canadian resistance to Trump. The second scenario is what I call “the French oddity.” Just like in France’s last election in which the two main anti-right parties entered a noncompetition deal to thwart the far-right National Rally, we could see the Liberal Party and the socialist New Democratic Party try something similar in an attempt to blunt Tory gains. But that is a long shot and still won’t increase the chances of Trudeau returning. As for the Liberal Party post-Trudeau, it is difficult to see who will want to lead it into a near-certain election defeat. But I believe the most likely outcome will be the party will try to tack to a more centralist, economically conservative agenda. It would truly mark the end of the Trudeau era.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Western missteps in Africa are creating an opening for Russia to deepen its influence. Recent protests against International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed austerity measures have rocked several African states. Kenya, a long-time partner of the United States and a key contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti, experienced violent clashes between government security forces and anti-austerity protestors over tax hikes in a controversial finance bill. Simultaneously, many protesters saw Kenyan engagement in Haiti as footing the bill for American security interests while ordinary Kenyans struggled to make ends meet. Soon after, similar protests against IMF measures spread to Nigeria. Analysts and locals are concerned that spreading protests may threaten stability across Africa. Citizens of other countries continue to voice their displeasure with the political and economic status quo through protest (in Mozambique) and at the ballot box (in Botswana). IMF loans come with significant stipulations, including reforms to financial systems and governance. Critics of these conditions frequently malign the IMF as a violator of sovereignty. Changes to economic and governing models, combined with high debts and economic stress, increase the costs of everyday products and diminish purchasing power across the continent. To many ordinary citizens, the West is benefiting from the fruit of African resources while hindering Africans’ access to the global economy. Publics in these countries demand alternatives to IMF funding, protesting governments to oppose IMF-imposed austerity. Youth, an increasingly important demographic, are especially active. Many of these young people are college-educated but fail to secure adequately paid employment in skilled industries. The informal economy is growing but increasingly separated from formal and international economies. IMF austerity measures are driving the continent to economic crisis and protest that may have lasting effects anathema to US foreign policy and the liberal international order. Some already see China as a viable alternative, although public opinion of Chinese influence is mixed. Elsewhere, faded Cold War memories make Russia a relatively unknown economic and political alternative. So, while recent Western actions in Africa have put long term relationships at risk, Russia is slowly increasing its influence on the continent. In fact, the Kremlin has already taken action and is engaged in the politics surrounding the various debt crises in African nations. African countries owe debts to multiple international actors, including Russia. However, Moscow has forgiven debts owed by many of these countries, coupling debt relief with additional economic benefits, including an influx of grains and energy resources. It has also deepened defense cooperation with several African countries. This cooperation often includes contracts for weapons sales and the deployment of irregular military units, including the Wagner Group. Diplomatic actions such as the above have led some protestors to see Russia as a viable alternative to IMF funding and partnerships with the US and Europe. In a visual representation of this phenomenon, protestors have been seen waving Russian flags at mass gatherings across Africa. Russia appears to receive the greatest support in the Sahel, where governments have failed to curb political instability and deliver on economic development promises. Publics in the region were already angry with the continued postcolonial military presence of France, and Russia took advantage. Mass publics are not the only actors seeking alternatives, ruling elites also see Russia as an attractive partner. Russian defense cooperation and the presence of irregular forces bolster these regimes in the face of increasing civilian protests over poor governance or human rights. Still, Russia has not yet made the gains it could. The war in Ukraine is hurting Africans and contributing to economic stress as global grain prices have skyrocketed. Some perceive Russia as exacerbating the problems of failed governance through its use of Wagner Group formations to back corrupt officials, protect corporate interests, and bolster unpopular governments. Russian interest in the region is also less significant than in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or the Arctic, where Russia has more proximate strategic, economic, and political goals. Rather than rushing in, Russia’s economic presence in Africa is slowly advancing Moscow’s goals on the international stage. When Russia sought to undermine financial, technological, and energy sanctions from the West as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, it turned to Africa to find new consumers for food products, energy, and arms. Already, in the wake of the invasion, only half of the continent voted to condemn Russia. Such voting patterns at the UN indicate greater support for Russia in Africa than in other regions around the world, even if distrust of Russia remains high in some parts of the continent. Forecasted crises could increase Russian influence on the continent as well. Shocks generated by the African debt crisis could become a proximate cause for geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts. Rapid demographic changes and disastrous climate events (e.g., droughts and floods) exacerbate existing economic and migratory challenges. Since the tentacles of Russian economic and security influence, as well as misinformation, are already present in Africa, such future crises could pull multiple African states further into Russian orbit, and away from Western countries and institutions. Further alignment of African states with Russia would have several drawbacks. Russia would discourage democratization and use security assistance to bolster dictators across the continent. Environmentally sustainable development is also likely to be hampered. Russia may increase the extraction of natural resources in environmentally damaging ways. Additionally, Russian energy exports will be oil and gas, eroding the already significant investment and progress in green energy development many African political economies have made. As Western missteps create openings for Russia to gain a foothold in Africa, they also set the stage for other global powers to capitalize on the vacuum. Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa also contributed to debt burdens, but unlike Western approaches tied to IMF austerity measures, China is recalibrating its strategy. By shifting to smaller projects with lower debt exposure and promoting green energy development overseas, China positions itself as a more appealing partner. This strategy not only bolsters China’s domestic solar and EV industries but also enhances its soft power by responding to local economic needs. Moreover, as Western policy blunders alienate African publics and governments, both Russia’s and China’s influence may grow. Russia’s gains in the region could indirectly strengthen China’s position by fostering broader skepticism of Western-led systems, aligning African leaders more closely with Beijing’s geopolitical goals, including its stance on Taiwan. Africa is a burgeoning continent. One in four humans will be African by 2050. If the US and Europe pass on opportunities to engage with a continent of emerging green development powers and an increasingly educated demographic bulge, Western policies will undermine their own power and influence in the international order. Russia’s quiet increase in trade and security assistance offers an established alternative. Meaning ultimately, both Russia and China, may play the long game, gaining incremental support from a region of one billion people at a time. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.